

FRANCE

COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS

Lester Mallory	1931-1934 1934-1939 1944-1946	Foreign Agricultural Service, Marseille Consular Officer, Paris Political Officer, Paris
Douglas MacArthur, II	1937 1937-1942 1951-1953	Vice Consul, Naples Vice Consul, Paris Consul, Paris
Thomas W. Wilson	1937-1938 1949-1952	Journalist, <u>Paris Herald</u> Information Officer, Marshall Plan
William C. Trimble	1939-1940	Consular Officer, Paris
Ella DeSchaub	1939-1940	Personal Assistant to Ambassador & Mrs. Biddle, Angers and Paris
Constance Ray Harvey	1941-1942	Vice Consul, Lyon
James Cowles Hart Bonbright	1942-1949	France Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Paul F. DuVivier	1942 1958-1961 1961-1962 1962-1965	Consular Officer, Marseille Deputy Commercial Attaché, Paris Commercial Relations, Bordeaux Principal Officer, Nice/Monaco
Robert C. Haney	1943-1945 1945-1949 1951-1959	XVIII Airborne, US Army Journalist, <u>Paris Herald</u> Press Officer, Paris
Ridgway B. Knight	1944-1950	Special Assistant to the Ambassador, Paris
Richard Funkhouser	1945-1947 1965-1968	Petroleum Attaché, Paris Political Counselor, Paris
Harold Kaplan	1945-1950 1952-1957	Information Officer, USIS, Paris Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Jacques Reinstein	1946-1947	Foreign Ministers' Peace Conference, Paris

Peter J. Skoufis	1947-1950	Veteran Affairs Officer, Paris
Frederick W. Flott	1947-1952	Consular/Political Officer, Paris
John Berg	1947-1998	Locally Hired Employee, Paris
Robert G. Cleveland	1948-1952	Economic Officer, Paris
Arthur A. Hartman	1948-1953	Economic Officer, Paris
Edgar J. Beigel	1948-1970	French Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
A. Lincoln Gordon	1949-1950	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Jack B. Kubisch	1949-1950	Junior Assistant to the Ambassador, Paris
Melbourne L. Spector	1949-1951	Deputy Personnel Officer for European Region, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Paris
Elizabeth A. Burton	1949-1952 1952-1954	Statistician - Marshall Plan, Paris Statistician – NATO, Paris
Virginia Hamill Biddle	1949-1954	Passport Clerk, Paris
John Gunther Dean	1950-1951	Economic Analyst, ECA, Paris
William J. Cunningham	1950	Clerk – Typist, Paris
John C. Leary	1950-1953	Vice Consul, Cherbourg
Laurent E. Morin	1950-1952 1952-1954	Economic Officer, Le Havre Economic/Commercial Officer, Paris
Leonard L. Bacon	1950-1954	Consul, Strasbourg
James McCargar	1950-1954	Political Officer, Paris
Jacob J. Kaplan	1950-1959	Board of European Payments Union, Paris
William A. Crawford	1950-1954	First Secretary, Paris

James M. Wilson	1951-1952 1953-1954	Air Force Representative, Paris USRO, Paris
Albert E. Hemsing	1951-1958	Marshall Plan Film Division, Paris
James G. Lowenstein	1952	Administrative Officer, ECA/Mutual Cooperation Administration, Paris
Stanley D. Schiff	1952-1954	Consular Officer, Strasbourg
John W. McDonald	1952-1954	Staff Secretary, Office of the Special Representative in Europe, Paris
Frederick H. Sacksteder	1952-1955	Senior Vice Consul, Lyon
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1952-1955	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Paris
Joseph F. Donelan, Jr.	1952-1955	Consular Officer, Paris
Richard T. Davies	1953-1955	NATO Staff, Paris
John A. Linehan, Jr.	1952-1956	Visa Officer, Paris
William J. Galloway	1952-1956	Special Assistant, NATO, Paris
Rudolph Aggrey	1953-1954 1954-1960	Information Officer, USIS, Strasbourg/Lille Youth Activities Officer, USIS, Paris
Carl F. Norden	1953-1956	Economic Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Economic Officer, Paris
Jean Mary Wilkowski	1953-1956	Assistant Commercial Attaché, Paris
Elden B. Erickson	1954-1956	Industry Reporting Officer, Paris
C. Douglas Dillon	1953-1957	Ambassador, France
Edwin McCammon Martin	1953-1957 1968	Marshall Plan, Paris Director of Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris
Ralph E. Lindstrom	1954-1957	Economic Financial Officer, Paris

Robert H. Miller	1954-1957	U.S. Delegation to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Elizabeth A. Burton	1954-1958	Coordinating Committee (COCOM), Paris
Lucius D. Battle	1955-1956	Deputy Executive Director, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Alan Fisher	1955-1957	Motion Picture Officer, USIS, Paris
James F. Leonard	1955-1957	Consular Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Albert Stoffel	1955-1957	Economic Officer, Paris
Manuel Abrams	1955-1958	USRO Director of Economic Division, Paris
L. Dean Brown	1955-1958	Internal Affairs, Paris
Herman J. Cohen	1955-1958	Consular Officer, Paris
Bertha Potts	1955-1959	Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon
Philip H. Valdes	1955-1959	Political Officer, Paris
Edmund Murphy	1956-1958	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon
William D. Morgan	1956-1958	Staff Aide, USRO, Paris
John W. Tuthill	1956-1959	Minister of Economic Affairs, Paris
Daniel L. Horowitz	1956-1960	Labor Attaché, Paris
Alan W. Lukens	1956-1960	International Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
	1961-1963	Political Officer, Paris
W. Garth Thorburn	1956-1961	Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Paris
Henry E. Mattox	1957-1958	Vice Consul, Paris
Thomas R. Donahue	1957-1960	Program Officer, Free Europe

		Committee, Paris
Thompson R. Buchanan	1957-1960	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
David A. Korn	1957-1960	Political Officer, Paris
John A. McKesson, III	1957-1960	Political Officer, Paris
L. Michael Rives	1957-1961	Ambassador's Aide, Paris
George L. West	1957-1959	Political Counselor, Paris
Lewis Hoffacker	1958-1960	Political-Military Officer, Paris
Thomas W. Fina	1958-1960	Economic Officer, United States Regional Office, Paris
Robert E. Barbour	1958-1961	Political Officer, Paris
Dorothy A. Eardley	1958-1963	Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Paris
Cecil B. Lyon	1958-1964	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Robert Bauer	1959-1961	Media Officer, USIS, Paris
Harriet Curry	1959-1961	Secretary, OECD, Paris
Jacques J. Reinstein	1959-1963	Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, Paris
Robert Anderson	1959-1961	Political/Economic Officer, Bordeaux and Paris
	1962-1968	Political Counselor, Paris
Gilbert H. Sheinbaum	1959-1962	Economic Officer, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1959-1962	Treasury Office, Paris
Richard B. Finn	1959-1963	Political Officer, Paris
Robert J. Ryan, Sr.	1959-1964	Counselor for Administration, Paris
Ralph S. Smith	1959	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon
	1960-1964	Assistant Press Attaché/Special Assistant to

		Ambassador for Public Affairs, USIS, Paris
Woodward Romine	1959-1965	Political Officer/Ambassador's Aide, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1959-1965	Rregional Public Affairs Officer, USIA, Marseille
Thomas D. Bowie	1960-1962	Labor Attaché, Paris
Wingate Lloyd	1960-1962	Economic Officer, Marseille
Frederick Z. Brown	1960-1962	Consular Officer, Nice
John Howard Burns	1960-1965	Political Aide, France
Jay P. Moffat	1960-1965	Aide to Ambassador, Paris
G. Richard Monsen	1960-1966	Information Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Wells Stabler	1960-1965	Political Officer, Paris
Donald R. Norland	1961-1963	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Robert L. Funseth	1961-1964	Consular Officer, Bordeaux
William V.P. Newlin	1961-1964	Special Assistant to the Economic Minister, Paris
Anthony Geber	1961-1967	Development Assistance Advisor, OECD, Paris
Richard J. Dols	1962-1963	Consular Officer, Bordeaux
Thomas F. Conlon	1962-1963	Consul, Le Havre
Norbert L. Anschutz	1962-1964	Political Counselor, Paris
Margaret J. Barnhart	1962-1964	Consular Officer, Paris
Stephen H. Rogers	1962-1964	Economic Officer, Paris
Peter K. Murphy	1962-1965	Consular Officer, Paris
James D. Phillips	1963-1965	Rotation Officer, Paris

Howard Imbrey	1963-1966	CIA, Worldwide Information Services, Paris
Stephen Paterson Belcher	1963-1966	Cultural Affairs Director, Dragon Student Center, USIS, Paris
Denise Abbey	1963-1967	Cultural Officer, USIS, Paris
Michael H. Newlin	1963-1967	Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Operations, Paris
Alan G. James	1963-1968	Political Advisor, European Command, Paris
Robert H. Maybury	1963-1968	UNESCO, Paris
Perry J. Stieglitz	1963-1967 1968-1970	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Marseille
John L. Loughran	1964-1966	Deputy to Political Advisor, NATO, Paris
Dorothy M. Sampas	1964-1966	Spouse of Foreign Service Officer, NATO, Paris
Cornelius D. Scully, III	1964-1966	Consular Officer, Nice
Idar D. Rimestad	1964-1967	Counselor for Administration, Paris
Jack R. Perry	1964-1969	Political Officer, NATO, Paris
William A. Crawford	1965-1967	Special Assistant for International Affairs, Paris
John E. Hall	1965-1967	Consular Office, Bordeaux
Stephen T. Johnson	1965-1967	Staff Assistant, USRO, Paris
Cecil S. Richardson	1965-1968	Consular Officer, Paris
Harlan Cleveland	1965-1969	US Ambassador to NATO, Paris
John Gunther Dean	1965-1969	Political Officer, Paris

Mary Chiavarini	1965-1968	Consul, Paris
Donald A. Kruse	1965-1968 1968-1970	Political Military Advisor, NATO, Paris Assistant to NATO Security General, Paris
William A. Weingarten	1965-1968	Economic/Political Officer, Paris
Harvey E. Gutman	1966-1967	AID Attaché, Paris
Richard W. Bogosian	1966-1968	Consular Officer, Paris
Denis Lamb	1966-1969	Administrative Officer, Paris
Woodward Romine	1966-1969	Desk Officer for France, Washington, DC
Lester E. Edmond	1966-1970	Counselor, US Mission to OECD, Paris
Christian A. Chapman	1966-1967	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs and Information, NATO, Paris
Serban Vallimarescu	1966-1969	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Perry W. Linder	1967-1968	General Services Officer, Paris
Frederick G. Mason	1967-1969	Deputy Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Robert B. Oakley	1967-1969	Political Officer, Paris
John H. Adams	1967-1969	Consular Officer, Marseille
George M. Barbis	1967-1969	Principal Officer, Bordeaux
James Dobbins	1967-1969	Consular Officer/Staff Assistant, Paris
Edward C. McBride	1967-1970	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Michael B. Smith	1967-1969 1969-1970	Economic Officer, Strasbourg Principal Officer, Lyon
Max W. Kraus	1967-1972	Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Carl F. Salans	1968-1969	Delegate, Vietnam Negotiations, Paris

Robert O. Blake	1968-1970	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Thomas F. Conlon	1968-1970	Consul General, Nice
Robert H. Miller	1968-1971	Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam), Paris
Maynard W. Glitman	1968-1973	Political Officer, Paris
James Mocerì	1969	Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Frances Cook	1969-19970	USIS, Staff Assistant to Ambassador Shriver's wife, Paris
David T. Jones	1969-1971	Rotation Officer, Paris
Teresa Chin Jones	1969-1971	Instutite Pasteur: Post Doctorate, Paris
Charles L. Daris	1969-1971	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Stephen J. Ledogar	1969-1972	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Joseph A. Greenwald	1969-1972	U.S. Representative, OECD, Paris
Andrew Steigman	1969-1972	Political Officer, Paris
Charles Lahiguera	1969-1973	Political Officer, UNESCO
John H. Trattner	1969	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Strasbourg, France
	1969-1970	Regional Information Officer, USIS, Paris
	1970-1974	Press Attaché, USIS, Paris
Burnett Anderson	1969-1977	Director, USIS, Paris
James D. Rosenthal	1970-1972	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1970-1972	Economic Officer, Paris
Carl C. Cundiff	1970-1973	Economic Officer, OECD, Paris
Patrick F. Morris	1970-1973	Deputy Director, OECD, Paris
Henry A. Holmes	1970-1974	Political Counselor, Paris
Stephen Bosworth	1971-1973	Economic Officer, Paris

Jack B. Kubisch	1971-1973	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
James Dobbins	1971-1973	Consular Officer, Strasbourg
Ronald D. Flack	1971-1974	Trade Promotion Office, Paris
James D. Phillips	1971-1975	Political Officer, Paris
Peter J. Skoufis	1971-1975	Administrative Counselor, Paris
Peter K. Murphy	1971-1975 1975-1977	Consular Officer, Paris Principal Officer, Nice
Anthony Quainton	1972-1973	Political Officer, Paris
Donald M. Anderson	1972-1973	Political Officer, Paris
Marshall P. Adair	1972-1974	Rotation Officer, Paris
John O. Grimes	1972-1974	Counselor for Labor Affairs, Paris
Richard Sackett Thompson	1972-1974	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
William H. Marsh	1972-1974	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Stephen H. Rogers	1972-1975	Counselor, OECD, Paris
John N. Irwin, II	1973-1974	Ambassador, France
Robert M. Beecroft	1973-1975	Staff Aide to Ambassador Irwin, Paris
Marie Therese Huhtala	1973-1975	Consular Officer, Paris
Galen L. Stone	1973-1975	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
William Veale	1973-1975	Vice Consul, Strasbourg
Gordon S. Brown	1973-1976	Economic Officer, Paris
Mark S. Pratt	1973-1978	Member, US Delegation to International Conference on Vietnam, Paris
Joan M. Plaisted	1973-1980	Commercial Officer, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1974	Consul General, Marseille

Elizabeth Raspolic	1974-1976	Vice Consul, Lyon
John Hurd Willett	1974 1975-1977	Consul, Bordeaux Political Officer, Paris
Herman J. Cohen	1974-1977	Political Counselor, Paris
Woodward Romine	1974-1977	Consul General, Strasbourg
George Q. Lumsden	1974-1979	Economic Officer, Paris
Samuel R. Gammon, II	1975-1978	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
David M. Adamson	1975-1976 1976-1977	Deputy Principal Officer, Strasbourg Executive Secretary, Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), Paris
Victor D. Comras	1975-1978	Deputy Delegate to COCOM, Paris
George Jaeger	1975-1978	Political Officer/Deputy Counselor, Paris
Raymond Malley	1975-1978	Minister Counselor and U.S. Representative to OECD, Paris
Roy Stacey	1975-1978	Program Officer, USAID, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1975-1979	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
James Dobbins	1976-1978	Officer in Charge of French Affairs, European Bureau, Washington, DC
John H. Kelly	1976-1980	Political/Military Officer, Paris
Jon G. Edensword	1977-1979	Consul, Nice
Warren Zimmerman	1977-1980	Political Counselor, Paris
Joseph Cheevers	1977-1981	Consular Officer, Paris
Arthur A. Hartman	1977-1981	Ambassador, France
Samuel S. Rea	1978-1980	USAID Liaison Officer, Paris

Gregory T. Frost	1978-1981	Vice Consul, Lyon
William D. Morgan	1978-1981	Consul General, Paris
Robert B. Duncan	1978-1982	Economic Counselor, Paris
Paul K. Stahnke	1978-1982	Counselor of Mission, OECD, Paris
Christian A. Chapman	1978-1982	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Richard Fenton Ross	1979-1984	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Anne O. Cary	1980-1983	Trade Policy Officer, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1980-1984	Economic Minister, Paris
Lynne Lambert	1981-1985	Investment Advisor, OECD
Philip C. Brown	1981-1986	Assistant Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Aurelius Fernandez	1982-1986	Economic Officer, OECD, Paris
Terrance Catherman	1983-1985	USIS Director, Paris
William V.P. Newlin	1983-1986	Consul General, Paris
Richard Fenton Ross	1984-1988	Public Affairs Advisor, UNESCO, Paris
Glenn Slocum	1984-1988	Club du Sahel Officer, OECD, Paris
Timothy Deal	1985-1988	Deputy Representative to OECD, Paris
Kenton W. Keith	1985-1988	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
William P. Pope	1985-1988	Political Officer, Paris
David M. Winn	1985-1989	Political Officer, Paris
Victor D. Comras	1985-1989	Consul General, Strasbourg
W. Robert Warne	1986-1988	Economic Counselor, Paris
Denis Lamb	1987-1990	Ambassador to OECD, Paris

Mark C. Lissfelt	1987-1991	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
John Hurd Willett	1987-1991 1991-1992	Deputy Political Counselor, Paris Consul General, Strasbourg
Ints M. Silins	1989-1990	Consul General Strasbourg
Miles S. Pendlton, Jr.	1989-1993	Political Counselor, Paris
Walter J.P. Curley	1989-1993	Ambassador, France
Franklin E. Huffman	1990-1993	Director of Programs, USIS, Paris
Ronald D. Flack	1990-1995	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls, Paris
George Kenney	1991-1992	Visa Officer, Marseille
Luke Kay	1992	State Department Intern, Paris
Shirley Elizabeth Barnes	1992-1995	Consul General Strasbourg
William A. Weingarten	1992-1996	Minister from Economic Affairs, OECD, Paris
Joyce E. Leader	1997-1999	Consul General, Marseilles
Larry Colbert	1997-2001	Consul General, Paris
Lisa Piascik	2011-2014	Consul General, Paris

LESTER MALLORY
Foreign Agricultural Service
Marseille (1931-1934)

Consular Officer
Paris (1934-1939)

Political Officer
Paris (1944-1946)

Ambassador Lester Mallory entered the Foreign Agricultural Service in 1931 and became a Foreign Service officer in 1939. His career included assignments in France, Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina, and ambassadorships to Jordan and

Guatemala in 1959. Ambassador Mallory was interviewed by Hank Zivetz in 1988.

MALLORY: And it came to my attention, through the head of the outfit, that the Department of Agriculture, in Washington, was recruiting people for the Foreign Agricultural Service, which was then a small, specialized, rather elite group. So I applied.

I claimed a knowledge of French, because they wanted somebody to go to Marseille. I'd had high school French, and I'd had a couple of years of college French, but my French wasn't very good; anyway, it worked. I got a job, with the stupendous salary of \$2,600 a year, to become the Assistant Agricultural Commissioner in Marseille, France, for the Foreign Agricultural Service.

We had a regional operation, which covered Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Northern Africa, and in some respects we reached out elsewhere. So it was tremendously good training. That lasted until 1934, when we had the bust-up in Washington.

Roosevelt devalued the gold dollar, and some of us were pulled back to Washington. I spent about a year and a half with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Then in 1934, I went back to Paris, where we had moved the offices at that time because the French wanted to collect income taxes on people who weren't actually in the consular service – in Marseille. So I spent five years in Paris.

Then Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, thought there was much too much emphasis being put onto Europe, and nothing on Latin America.

Q: You were in Paris on the eve of the war. Could you give us some impressions of what was happening at the embassy; what was the reaction to the events that were leading up to the Second World War?

MALLORY: We were stationed in the embassy, but we had no information on policy. We attended the weekly staff meetings, with the ambassador. And we were not aware – embassy wise – of what was going on. Of course, we heard Hitler's speeches on the radio. (I can be confidential about this, I suppose.) I remember one day Ambassador [Bullitt] said, "Look, the French are now finally waking up. They need an air force (inaudible), and they want planes. If you people have something that you want to get out of the French government, now is the time to strike."

Well, Pierre Cot was the minister of aviation at that time, and they'd resisted all this business, but it was by then pretty late. That was the only concrete thing that I remember.

Q: What year was that?

MALLORY: That would be about 1938. But we weren't privy to these things, and it wasn't until much later – after I got here – that I read Bill Bullitt's biography, by his brother; which covered his correspondence to Roosevelt, in which much of this stuff came to light. It's beautifully done; it's very, very interesting, particularly those things which get into some of the nitty gritty, and

the internal politics, which aren't very pleasant.

When Joe Kennedy was ambassador to London, and he had been told by Bullitt that the Gray Code had been jeopardized; but Kennedy wouldn't do anything about it. The Germans had our stuff for quite a long time, right from our cables. Bullitt told Roosevelt about this, but I don't know what happened. But Kennedy, as far as the information on the war (inaudible), was just strictly bad news. I don't know that his sons – Jack and Joe at that time – were old enough to appreciate any of this or not, because they were quite junior. But it wasn't a good time, by and large, and our appointments weren't good.

Bullitt was a very dynamic, forthcoming guy, and he operated a lone-wolf sort of operation.

Q: *What do you mean by lone-wolf?*

MALLORY: He didn't bring a lot of people into his confidence, as far as I know, and a lot of his stuff was done very directly. Many of his things – as you'll see in that book, if you ever get a chance to look at it – were “for the eyes of the President.” And when he had something that he wanted to get off his chest, he stayed up until 2:00 in the morning and got on the telephone; and this happened quite frequently. He called Roosevelt directly.

As I say, in my position, as number two in the agricultural office, we were not aware of what was going on, except what we saw in the newspapers. I was aware of a group of younger Frenchmen, who were quite concerned with relations with Germany; and they were preparing a sort of – not a coup – but a situation where they were going to support the Germans. They didn't come out much in the open, but I do know that at least one or two of them had had their houses searched by the French secret police. Apparently the police were getting on to this. I knew it, in part, from friends of mine in the Associated Press and United Press, who had been friends of mine for years there; and they were getting on to this.

Also, I heard of it because I was a member of a sort of social club, with not much importance, and a lot of these people were in it. And they were people of maybe 35, 40 years old.

Q: *This was a French social club?*

MALLORY: Yes, a French thing. I don't know why I was in it, just by chance I guess. I think they had to run for cover when things broke, but I have no recollection because I left there in June of '39.

Q: *So you left before the war broke out?*

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: *Was there a sense, in Paris, that things were coming to the edge – that the war was imminent?*

MALLORY: Not really. I wasn't privy to enough of the French thinking. But again, I say my

close association with the correspondents should have been enough to know what was going on; and I didn't get much of that feeling at all.

Q: I see. Now, interestingly, you came back to Paris after the war. How soon after the war were you back in Paris?

MALLORY: I arrived in Paris during the Battle of the Bulge. As I mentioned, Henry Wallace thought that Latin America ought to have some attention. So they decided the first agricultural attaché should be in Mexico. I came back from Paris in June, of '39. (Somebody in Washington was pretty clever about this, because they were beginning to close down our operation.) I spent five years in Mexico, getting things started, trying to build up a background of information, which we didn't have at all.

Q: A background of information on what?

MALLORY: On agriculture – the food production, needs, and so on. Then the war broke out, and I became terribly involved in the whole business about rubber, and medicinal plants, and strategic things of that nature. But then, in late '44, I heard from Washington, and they asked if I would go back to Paris? I said I would go back for a year, if they would bring me back to Washington afterwards, because I wanted to get married.

The business in Paris was to reestablish the office. The embassy was just opening with a few people. But the important thing was food supplies. The American army needed munitions; the French wanted food stuffs. How much food stuff did they need?

Well, by great good luck when I got back to Paris, after five years, down in the basement I found my complete files! So I had the basis of operations. It wasn't much extra effort to sit down and make a judgment on food production; what was available. Because the French were under rationing at that time, they were screaming, but actually there was plenty of food if it had been distributed. They couldn't get it from the farmer to the town. So the rationing went on, particularly for bread stuffs.

Anyway, I was able to pull things together, and submit some reports to Washington pretty promptly – relatively speaking. It took a little while to catch up. That was my primary job when I got back, to see what the food situation was. I worked on that pretty intensively, and I had a young man with me who was good. We spent a lot of evenings over in the embassy; there wasn't anything else to do around there.

Q: Was this an American or Frenchman?

MALLORY: American.

Q: Who were you dealing with on the French side?

MALLORY: Primarily their Ministry of Agriculture.

Q: And was there the beginnings of the division of the Gaullists, or the communists?

MALLORY: No, not at that time. The people we were dealing with were a few of the older holdover bureaucrats; but primarily, people that had come out of the resistance, and had worked in it and knew it. And we cooperated right across the board with them.

Q: And when the war ended, did things change? Did the relationship between the French and the Americans change after VE Day?

MALLORY: No, it just went on as far as we were concerned.

Q: And you felt it was a cooperative arrangement?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Because, as you know, with de Gaulle and so forth the tensions began to arise.

MALLORY: That was later.

Q: Later, okay; that's what I wanted to know.

MALLORY: Yes, I think that was later. As a matter-of-fact, when the war was over, and things broke up, we had tremendous demands for certain things. For example, French agriculture – as far as grains were concerned – was still based on the combine; and the combine needed binder twine. They didn't have binder twine, and we didn't have a lot of stuff to give them because we were using it all up for cordage for the Navy. Well, I had a whole commission of Frenchmen go to Washington for binder twine. This was just after the war was over, you see, and the approach of harvest. So we had things like that come up.

Q: Was there a great deal of hunger in France, at that time?

MALLORY: No. Hunger – not really; a lot of people got thinner, but I wouldn't call it hunger.

Q: Now, you stayed in Paris until when?

MALLORY: Until the end of 1945 – beginning of 1946.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Vice Consul
Naples (1937)

Vice Consul
Paris (1937-1942)

**Consul
Paris (1951-1953)**

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II came from a distinguished military family and spent his childhood in various cities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1935. His career included positions in Canada, Italy, and France, and ambassadorships to Japan, Belgium, and Austria. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

Q: When the war started in September of '39, what were you doing? What became your role?

MACARTHUR: I did some liaison work with the French foreign ministry, which had asked us to be the “protecting power” of French interests in Berlin. Woody Wallner, was in Paris on a vacation from Spain and we held him over to work on French interests in Germany. He had come into the Service at the same time I came in and spoke excellent French. He was then in Barcelona, I think, or Valencia. He’s dead now. As for the Embassy, we kept in close touch with the French on their perceptions of what the Germans were going to do. But the whole emphasis of the reporting was not any longer on the domestic political side, but on the international side and the relationships with Italy, which did not come into the war until June of 1940, when France had fallen, the relationships with neutral Belgium, Holland and the like. The emphasis shifted, with everybody in France but the communists rallying behind the government in time of war, from domestic political reporting, to the relationships with France of countries in Europe that were not yet involved in the war, and their positions and the French attitudes toward them, and the like.

Q: We had a really remarkable crew in Paris at the time in the embassy. Bullitt was the ambassador, Robert Murphy as the . . .

MACARTHUR: They had very able men. Bob Murphy was there, but Ed Wilson was there the year before him, and Edwin Wilson was extremely able. Bob took his place. But we did have a very able crew. Maynard Barnes.

Q: Freeman Matthews.

MACARTHUR: Doc Matthews, who was one of the best. I’ll have more to say about him.

Q: Did you feel that there had been a deliberate strengthening of the embassy at the time? Or was this happenstance?

MACARTHUR: This was pure happenstance. Bob Murphy was consul general. Bullitt liked him, he was a very able man, he had never had a diplomatic appointment before. He’d been in the consular branch in Germany, and he headed a consulate general there. But he knew a lot of people and had political savvy. When Edwin Wilson, who was what we now call the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) was transferred to become a minister in Latin America – Bullitt selected Bob Murphy to replace him as councilor of the embassy. Doc Matthews; Hugh Fullerton had been there for two or three years; Bob Murphy had been there for two or three years. Doc

Matthews came in late '38, I think. It just so happened that there were some extremely capable people there.

Q: Tyler Thompson is another one.

MACARTHUR: Tyler was there. Bill Trimble. We had a good team.

Q: Looking back on it and putting yourself in the position you were then, was there a feeling within the embassy staff that France really was – maybe it's the wrong term, but rotten to the core, as they say, or at least there was something wrong with the spirit of France at the time?

MACARTHUR: I think it was more a question of something wrong with the spirit of France. Bullitt had become an absolute Francophile, and he could not see the weaknesses that France had. I'm speaking primarily of military weakness. We had a very able military attaché, Colonel Horace Fuller, and Horace Fuller told Bullitt that the French Army was a very disorganized, incoherent outfit, in effect. Bullitt wouldn't believe him. When war broke out, we thought Paris might be bombed by the Luftwaffe, so I took a little cottage outside of Paris at a village called Gambais beyond Versailles, for my wife and child, so that if there were bombing, they would be out of the way. To take this house, you had to have a notaire for the contract. The notary in France is like a court officer and other things. This little notaire had been mobilized to a unit in Versailles. He took the train in every morning, came back in the evening, went on with his notarial work. And this was characteristic. When they mobilized, it was a farce. Some of the units that were mobilized were no more capable, were no more battle-worthy or capable of action than children. You know, enlisted men went home for the weekend, they went home at night. There was no training. They'd do a little close-order drill or something during the day, but there was no real training, and there was no readying of the reserves that had been called up and mobilized. It was business as usual. It was the so-called phoney war – drole de guerre.

Bullitt lived with the conviction that the French had, with the Maginot line, and one of the greatest standing armies in the world and that there was no question of a German breakthrough. The French were like ourselves; we slept the same way. Let me cite a the most typical example, I served in the Army for a while under Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, who later was the famous General Patton, who was absolutely rabid in the early 1930s about armor. He was a cavalry man. He wanted the cavalry of the future armored, and he was 100% right. There was an American gentleman named Mr. Christie. Mr. Christie developed a tank that had the piece (the gun) in the turret, and the machine guns down below, you could lie behind the crest of a ridge, with just the gun protruding over it, and destroy your enemy. As for others, the French produced a tank that they claimed was the best tank in the world called the B-1-bis. The B-1-bis had the piece, the gun mounted down low between the tracks, and it had to get up on the ridge and silhouette itself to fire. It was a sitting duck. We on the other hand produced the General Grant tank that had a gun in the lefthand corner of the tank, so that if it were immobilized and lost a track or anything happened, the gun had only a 30 degree traverse and was also virtually helpless. Whereas the Germans and the Russians both bought the Christie rights and produced the Christie type of tank with the gun in the turret with a 360 degree traverse.

But again, this is not the first time this sort of thing has happened. There was a gentleman named

Browning, who early in this century came up with a machine gun that our Army ordnance people said was no good. So Browning went to Belgium and founded what is now Fabrique National, one of the great arms producers of the world, which, incidentally, also produces Browning shotguns, the Browning revolver, the Browning automatic, the Browning machine gun, we had a chance for them all, but we just turned them down cold, and they went someplace else.

Q: Did you get any direction from the ambassador? One almost hesitates to say the Secretary of State, because one has the feeling that the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was pretty much bypassed.

MACARTHUR: He was bypassed.

Q: But did you get any direction both from the embassy and from Washington about what your role was when the war started?

MACARTHUR: I can't recall any specific instruction, but the ambassador certainly made it clear that our role was to do everything we could to build up support for the Allies – that is, the French and the British, who were fighting. I don't recall any specific role. To follow developments with France's relations with the neutral countries, because most countries of Europe were neutral, BENELUX, Scandinavia, Italy, Switzerland, Eastern European countries: this to be abreast of their views and report them in. But I don't recall any indoctrination of any specific kind. I do recall that Bullitt had staff meetings once a week, and in these meetings he would lay out assignments to various officers, saying, "You find out about this or that". But those were details.

Q: Was the pace, I assume, much more hectic? Were you pretty much on a seven-day week?

MACARTHUR: No. We weren't on a seven-day week. The ambassador was sometimes, but not often, in the office on Saturday or a Sunday. But on weekends he operated out of his residence. Telegrams went out and came in, and if he (Ambassador) had something to do, somebody he wanted to see, or some minister he was going to call on during the weekend period, he would do so and then dictate his telegram to Carmel Offie. Carmel Offie was absolutely incredible. He could take shorthand, he could type, he had a memory like this recorder. He was a fantastic person. So Bullitt operated that way. We had duty officers, of course, at the embassy on weekends in all the various sections but except for one at the chancery, the others were just on call.

Q: Were you contacting mostly other embassy people? You say you weren't working with the political parties then.

MACARTHUR: We did maintain close contact with political leaders to have their views on the war and we worked with the foreign office much more closely, also with people in the economic side of the French Government. The economic and financial side was extremely important. We developed excellent relations with Couve de Murville and Gaston Palewski, both inspecteurs d'finance, France's elite, and with some of the other people who later became very prominent in the de Gaulle era. Herve Alphand, who later was ambassador here for some time, and Foreign Office Secretary General Rochat. Financing a war is a big business – trade, economics, the

problems of submarine warfare. But we were not in the war. We had sympathies. The President, the American people, they had great sympathy with the French and the British, but we were not in the war. We of course saw people of other embassies to find out their views.

Q: Can you give any reflections on the consular side of the attempts of refugees who fled Germany to try to get out of the country at that time?

MACARTHUR: Certainly, but the big exodus did not come at that time (1939). The big exodus started in May 1940, when the Germans broke through at Sedan. Before that, there were a few people that said, "We'd better get out. War has broken out, and you can't tell what's going to happen." But it was quite manageable. What became unmanageable was when you had about 10 million people on the roads, and you had tens of thousands of Jewish refugees from the low countries and France that were streaming over, trying to get out either through Bordeaux or out over the Pyrenees through Spain and Portugal. The Spanish were not very easy about letting them through, and the Portuguese were not anxious to be inundated by a tremendous group of refugees in Portugal.

Q: This was in May?

MACARTHUR: No, this was later. May was when they started. When the Germans broke through and the refugees started by the end of May, the roads of France, down from the north, if you tried to go north, you couldn't get anywhere. The cars were coming down three abreast on a three-lane highway, where that's all there was. Wagons, people coming through Paris, these big farm wagons, with the dogs tied underneath, trotting along, or walking along, or dragging along, the kids in the wagons, the guy walking, leading the horses, automobiles crammed with kids in the things, and all the rest of it – that came only in May of 1940. You see, until then it was the phoney war, the drole de guerre, where there was a bit of shooting here, a bit of shooting there, a guy might be killed here, a guy might be killed there. But suddenly, when the Germans hit through the Ardennes, which the French had thought defended itself, to use their phrase, and struck through the Sedan, and then drove first to the sea . . .

The Germans broke through at Sedan, and they turned first, quite properly, to the sea, to encircle the British and liquidate that before they knew that there was nothing between them and Paris. Paris didn't fall until the 12th or 15th of June. But on May 20, we were told, "There is absolutely nothing between the German Army and France that can put up even the slightest kind of a defense." The Germans turned to the sea to roll up the British, liquidate them, and then take over the rest of France.

It was in this period, when they broke through at Sedan, that the refugees started streaming down from the BENELUX countries and northern France, and absolutely clogged the roads. I can tell you that as late as June, when I went to join the French Government at Tours, the roads were impossible. I left at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to get a little bit ahead of the business, and by the time of 6:30 or 7:00, it was four abreast. The stukas would come down and bomb the column to create confusion, so the French units couldn't use the road, and get low-flying aircraft to do a bit of strafing and the like. But that was the bad period, from the 20th of May until the armistice.

Q: Were you prepared for this? How did the embassy react?

MACARTHUR: I don't think anybody was prepared for the extent to which the whole damn thing collapsed – literally – in a matter of several days. Call it a week. Actually, on May 10th, I'd been having the duty, weekends, and we were prepared, in case we had to evacuate Paris, each embassy had a place across the Loire, a chateau or something like that, that the owner had made available if the bombings and so forth were such that you wanted to pull back some of your people and have them located in areas that didn't have military targets or objectives. I drove down one afternoon, would spend the night, and the next day drive back and the next night. It was one a two-and-a-half hour drive. It was still business as usual.

I got a call, the morning of the 10th, from Carmel Offie, saying, "The Germans have broken through at Paris. Get the hell back right away, quick." We took off. By the time we got past the airfield at Tours, as we were approaching the airfield at Tours, the sirens went off, and we were within about a mile of it, on one of those typical French tree-lined country roads. All of a sudden, these planes swept over, and we pulled the car under a tree, and jumped into a ditch. They started bombing and strafing the airfield. We got back to Paris all right, and there it was. But the lack of preparedness, you can see. From September 1st until May 20th, there had been this war, where both sides appeared to be stalemated along a fixed line, where no breakthrough, and certainly the Allies, the British and the French, weren't trying to break through; the Germans weren't trying to break through. They seemed to be satisfied that they didn't have the strength. They would suffer too many casualties if they committed themselves into a World War I type of operation, and so there they were.

You recall the drole de guerre, the phoney war. Business went on as usual in Paris, in the life of the French people, and in the life of France. It was business as usual.

Q: What happened to you, then, when the breakthrough came?

MACARTHUR: I came back immediately. Plans were made for evacuating, because it was quite clear that this was it. Plans were made for evacuating wives and family at once. Bullitt did that, very wisely. They were given a choice. The hope was expressed they would return to the United States, but they were also given a choice, if they wanted to, to go to Spain or Portugal. My wife and I decided that staying in Portugal would be the best bet, rather than go back across the Atlantic. So while some of them left on ships that were going out still from Le Havre and particularly from Bordeaux, my wife and daughter were shipped off to Lisbon.

The news got worse every day, and finally, by the beginning of June, it was quite clear that it was just a question of time. Mr. Bullitt asked me to go down. Bullitt decided that he did not – the French Government had to retreat before the advancing Germans, which was quite clear that they had to do – he did not wish to accompany the government, because the government might go on to – although he didn't put it this way, to North Africa, to continue the fight there, and he had strong ambitions to be either Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy, and he didn't want to be immobilized in North Africa or someplace at that time.

So Mr. Bullitt elected to stay in Paris with Bob Murphy and the majority of the staff. He then

decided that there would be a small group, a liaison group, that would have to accompany the French Government, and he selected to head that group from the embassy Doc Matthews, then myself and Woody Wallner, who had been reassigned from Spain to Paris, because we needed him for this liaison work with the French on protection of French interests in Germany. The three of us would go, but Bullitt also decided – and talked the President into saying that Tony Biddle would be ambassador-at-large, sort of. They didn't use that term; I've forgotten. He would be an American ambassador near the French Government. Tony Biddle, when Poland fell in September of '34, had retreated through Poland to Eastern Europe, and then when the Polish Government, in exile, was set up in Angers, France, Tony Biddle was there with the Polish Government in exile. So Bullitt communicated with Tony Biddle, and then he sent me in June down to see Tony Biddle and explain the whole deal, and get back to Paris.

I went down, saw Tony Biddle, then detoured by Bordeaux. Our airplanes had no cannons in those days; they had just machine guns. It was quite clear that what was happening between the Luftwaffe and the British RAF that if you didn't have cannons, you might just as well not get up into the air. So we had gotten the plans of the Hispana-Suiza cannon, 20-millimeter cannon, from Switzerland, and they were to be bundled aboard the America, which was the last ship that was obviously going to leave Bordeaux, an American ship, and this captain was a reserve naval officer. The plans were turned over to him. I did not bring the plans down. Our military attaché, brought them down. I had detoured to Bordeaux to see about the last ship out, and that everything had gone well, and to get a reading, then go back to Paris.

I got back to Paris after a very bad day, when the roads were still congested. I was going the wrong way, and the roads were very, very congested. I had had only about four hours' sleep, because there was no place to sleep. The hotels in Bordeaux, the Royal George, and all the hotels were filled with French parliamentarians and politicians and refugees. I started out at 4:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q: Were you driving a car?

MACARTHUR: Yes, I was driving a car. It was the only way to go. Fighting the four lines of people coming down, we were dive-bombed twice and strafed a couple of times. I got back to Paris at about 6:00 or 7:00 that night, and I was told that the French Government decided to move, and that Doc Matthews and Woody had already left with Raymond Bastianello, a code clerk, and Clarence Palmer, a very capable crew of Foreign Service clerks, who had been with us for many years, of senior intellect quality. I was told to rejoin them. So I left at 7:00 o'clock, with the clothes on my back, going on side roads which I knew well out to Gambais, where I had this house, bypassing Versailles and the main roads that were still clogged and congested, on these little secondary roads, picked up a suitcase, filled a suit in it and some shirts and pajamas and a toothbrush, and left at 3:00 o'clock in the morning for Tours, where the government was.

I got there in the morning, about 11:00 o'clock. Normally it would have taken me two hours. I reported to Tony Biddle, who was there, and Doc and Woody. At this time, the French were working on a message for President Roosevelt, which they had let us know they were working on. Paul Reynaud had replaced Daladier as prime minister. So I went with Tony Biddle, who didn't speak much French, spent the night with him at the Chateau Azay le Rideau, and we left at

4:00 o'clock in the morning, because they were afraid Tours would be bombed, and the French Government was about 100 kilometers up in the Loire at the chateau. We got there at 6:00, Biddle and myself, and Reynaud was in a dressing gown, had this vinyl text. He had the final appeal of the French to the American Government, to President Roosevelt, which was basically a propaganda ploy, to exonerate himself more than anything else, because there was nothing we could do.

Q: Yes. I was going to ask what could they hope that we could do?

MACARTHUR: There was nothing we could do, and it was one of those final appeals. You can say, "Well, you know, I appealed, but our friends didn't help us or wouldn't help us," or whatever it might be.

So we talked about ten minutes, and then Roland de Marjorie, the father of the present French ambassador today, I think, a very capable French diplomat, and I sat down and went over and worked out the English translation of this final appeal from Reynaud to Roosevelt, which was in French. We got an agreement on the English text, that it conveyed all the nuances and the other things. Then I went back to join Doc. Tony Biddle said that he was going to push on toward Bordeaux, because they told us they were moving on from Tours to Bordeaux. So Tony Biddle went directly down to Bordeaux, picked up his wife and went on to Bordeaux, and I went back and met with Doc and joined him where he was located, and then dictated the telegram of this final meeting with Paul Reynaud, the French prime minister, and the text of message. We sent that off. By the time we finished with the PTT, the telegram place, because we had no communications other than the local communications within the community, we left about 7:00 o'clock that night for Bordeaux.

We got down eventually to Bordeaux early in the morning and moved into the house there. The government had arrived. Doc covered the prime minister's office, and Woody and I covered other people that we knew in the foreign ministry with the government there, and some of the ministers, like Georges Mandel, who was later assassinated by the Germans. He was Jewish. We got messages out about what was happening, because this was in the midst of the power business, where Laval and Petain were working to replace Paul Reynaud. This went on until Laval and Petain replaced Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, and in the meantime, the Germans bombed us. To hasten the decision-making process of the French Government with this change, the Germans bombed Bordeaux. We'd hear a bomb drop, and all of a sudden you'd see the columns of debris and smoke coming right towards you. The nearest one hit about 200 meters from us. We took refuge, needless to say, under the desks in the office.

Then the Petain-Reynaud government came in, said they would sign the armistice. The armistice was signed, and it was announced that the government was established in Vichy, and we proceeded from Bordeaux, in our cars, to Vichy.

Q: During this time of change of government, if that's the right term for it, in Bordeaux, your role – really, there was nothing constructive that the United States could do at this point.

MACARTHUR: Absolutely nothing. We were 3,000 miles away, we had no forces mobilized,

we had nothing that we could do. There was nothing that we could do. Our voice was absolutely zero. With Laval, you must remember Laval staked everything on a German victory. In fact, you may remember that in '41, after the staff of the Vichy Government had been all set up and established, he made that basic statement, "Je souhaite la victoire allemande" – "I want a German victory." And Laval saw France as Germany's first satellite. With the evil conviction they have of their superiority, Laval was convinced that the French intelligence and everything else would fix everything up if Germany won the war. They would be the first of the satellites, and he had a very special condition by collaborating with the Germans.

Q: So at that point, you moved to Vichy.

MACARTHUR: Yes. We moved, actually, to a little place called La Bourboule, because we had no place to stay in Vichy. Then we got Florence Gould's villa, Villa (Inaudible), in Vichy, as an office. We moved to Vichy. First, Bullitt came out while we were quartered at La Bourboule, which was about 45, 50 minutes away.

Bullitt came out and decided that he wanted to go back to the United States, so without waiting for the President, he took off for Portugal, where he could clipper home. The Germans held him for about three weeks in Paris before they let him go. Bob Murphy stayed in Paris temporarily for about another five days to leave Maynard Barnes in charge there and Tyler Thompson. We still had an establishment there, and we were not at war with Germany. Then Bob came down and took over the Vichy operation from Doc Matthews. Bullitt, when he left, he had three cars. He had a Cadillac. In those days, the government didn't furnish ambassadors with automobiles or chauffeurs. The ambassador furnished himself with automobiles and chauffeurs, and so did everybody else, if they had one. He had a Buick, and he wanted this Buick also, so he asked me if I would drive the Buick down, not to be his chauffeur, but to take the French Minister of Air, Guy la Chambre, across the Spanish frontier into Portugal, because Guy la Chambre, who had been in the Deladier Government and then staunchly anti-German, they were afraid that the Germans would go after him and liquidate him. So Guy la Chambre had been given a false American passport by Bob at the ambassador's written instruction, and his wife, (Inaudible) Madou, had been a famous singer and stage actress. So in a convoy with the ambassador, I drove the ambassador's Buick with the former minister of the air and his wife down. We drove from La Bourboule to Barcelona, and we left at about 7:00 or 8:00 in the morning, and we got to Barcelona about 4:00 in the morning. My companions in the car, the minister of air and his wife, were extremely nervous at the border, but that went all right.

Then we drove across the next day to Madrid, and then we drove the next day from Madrid to Lisbon. They communicated with the President, who was now happy with the departure.

Q: That was sort of the end of Bullitt.

MACARTHUR: That was the end of Bullitt. The President wanted him to stay on with the French Government. He wanted him to not pick up and leave, but to stay, because they were convinced that some kind of a French entity would be set up.

Then I stayed in Lisbon for a month or so, because they had nobody there, and there was an

influx of thousands of refugees, many of them Jewish, poor bastards. I say “poor bastards,” because there was no sympathy from the Portuguese authorities under Salazar, and they put them in camps. I used to go up and get these people out of camps and process them.

Then I went back to Vichy, and I was in Vichy until the end.

Q: I was just thinking, it's probably a good time to cut off now. Then we'll continue this at a later date.

MACARTHUR: We can take on the Vichy part, which leads right into the war, because it was the Resistance thing that led me going to Normandy, which led to the other thing.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, on our last session of January 29, 1987, we finished our interview at the time that you had been repatriated to the United States from detention. You were in the Black Forest, was it?

MACARTHUR: We were on the edge of the Black Forest in Baden-Baden. There were three camps in that area, one with British soldiers taken by the Germans in North Africa; another was a mixed bag of various people that had been collected here and there, some of them irresponsible people, or what the Nazis considered irresponsible people from some of the Eastern European countries they had overrun; and I forget what the nature of the third camp was. We were interned in a hotel. Our treatment there was correct, and we had only one extremely painful and disagreeable business when the Gestapo came down and went to work on Thomas Cassidy, our assistant naval attaché in Vichy, their brutal interrogation, and it's no fun to hear someone being interrogated, when the moaning stops, and you know they've passed out. Cassidy was being interrogated probably because he was a contact point with some of our French Resistance people. Actually he worked for Colonel Donovan's OSS organization, and obviously some French contact who had been taken by the Gestapo and tortured had given his name. So the Gestapo came down, and if it had not been for the intervention of a fine young Swiss diplomat who periodically visited us, his name is Kiya Bordier (phonetic), who was later an ambassador, Cassidy might have ended extremely badly, except rather than just being painfully abused for a couple of days.

Q: You were repatriated after we landed in . . .

MACARTHUR: No, we were taken by the Germans after the Allied landings in North Africa at the beginning of November 1942. The Germans burst into our embassy, although we had so-called diplomatic immunity. They burst into our embassy with tommy guns and started removing us, when the dean of the diplomatic corps of Vichy, Mr. Stukey, heard what was happening and went to Laval, and said that this would create a major scandal for the Petain/Laval Government if it wasn't stopped immediately. So Laval called the Germans off and said we would be interned and exchanged with the members of the French diplomatic Vichy mission in Washington, headed by Ambassador Henrier.

Well, they interned us, shipped us down to Lourdes, the shrine city in southern France, of Bernadette fame, but we had been there a very short time when Laval gave the Germans the

green light, and a group of SS and German soldiers arrived and bundled us into a train and took us off to Germany to hold as hostages.

We remained in Germany from that time – that's the end of '42 – until March of '44, when, finally, an agreement was negotiated for the exchange of our group plus a few very badly wounded Americans against some Germans that had been taken by us in North Africa during the North African campaign, including Ribbentrop's niece and her husband and some other Germans that we had picked up in this country or in transit between Latin America, where they had been active, and this country.

When the agreement was finally reached in '44 – the end of February, it was reached, I think, if I recall correctly – part of that agreement was that we would be repatriated to Lisbon, and the neutral Swedish vessel Gripsholm – was it Swedish? Yes. It would carry over those exchangees that the Germans wanted from the United States and the others that had been in North Africa, would be brought together in Lisbon, and we would be exchanged there. So we left Germany on a sealed train that went through France, to the French border. There we were held overnight to await the final arrangements with the Spaniards for transit across Spain, and we were put in a sealed train, but no longer with the German guards, and dispatched from Confront, which is just below Biarritz on the French-Spanish border. Maybe it wasn't Confront. It was the border point just below Pau to Lisbon.

In Lisbon, after a couple of days processing, we were placed in the Gripsholm and returned to the United States.

Q: Obviously, you had a lot of catching up to do with your family at that time, but sort of moving beyond that, how did the State Department treat you when you came back?

MACARTHUR: Oh, they treated us very well. I think all of us that came back, the war was going on, and we had missed a good part of it. We were anxious to get back to work. I took – I think it was two and a half weeks' leave with my wife. We went down to visit her family in Kentucky, and then I came back and went to work on the so-called French desk, because they had no one there that had been in France during the period of the occupation from '40 to the end of '42 who knew personally some of the Resistance personalities and other people and had some feeling. I was put on the French desk, because they wanted, at the time of the liberation, to ship me back to Paris to head up the embassy political section in Paris when it would be liberated. I'm speaking about the spring, because then the Allied landings in Normandy had not occurred. So this was a preparatory visit.

Well, in the course of the debriefings I had, including those of the OSS, when the OSS discovered that I had worked personally with people like Dr. Mazze, who was the leading Resistance leader in Brittany, and Laniel, from Normandy, and some of the other people, they proposed that I join with them and be parachuted into France at the appropriate time, about three weeks before our landings, which I did not know, and they didn't reveal, if they knew when those would be. I said that was agreeable to me if it was agreeable to the State Department.

The Department felt that a better use of me could be made by having me go into Normandy after

we landed, and then at the liberation of Paris, presume a place in the embassy political section, because obviously when France was liberated, there were going to be all sorts of new political leaders who would emerge from the French Resistance, as French Resistance leaders and heroes, and have somebody that would work personally with a number of them, and had the credentials of not only having worked with them, but having also been deported to Germany and gone through that experience, too, which many Frenchmen had gone and never returned from. They felt that this whole combination of background would make me a useful person in the Paris Embassy.

Q: Sounds like they were using more finesse in their personnel policies, at least from my experiences, than normal.

MACARTHUR: The personnel policy – it wasn't personnel policy at all; it was Doc Matthews.

Q: Ah!

MACARTHUR: Later Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews, who had been in charge of the embassy in Vichy from 1940, really, until Admiral Leahy came, when he went to London. He knew intimately the inside picture of a France that was being occupied, but that would emerge, and he was the deputy director, I think, of the whole European department of the State Department under Jimmy Dunn, who also was extremely interested and sympathetic to the idea. So they simply said, "This is the way it's going to be."

In those days, during the war at that time, when it was a question of personnel in critical spots or spots that might become critical, I don't think the so-called administrative and personnel people of the department had much to do with the assignments, because the people that knew the qualities and experience and background were in some of the active policy-formulating departments of the department, the geographic bureaus, and they knew the capabilities, personalities, experience, and so forth.

Of course, in this plan, the Defense Department's approval had to be concerned for me to go back into Normandy after the landings; that would be before France was liberated. That represented no problem at all. We had a political advisor in General Eisenhower's headquarters in London, before the landings, and then when the time came for the landings and to send somebody into Normandy, he was a very senior diplomatic personality, former ambassador. And they decided that they wanted, in the rigors of a campaign in Normandy, where you never knew quite what was going to happen, they wanted two people, a younger officer to be the so-called POLAD, political advisor, who really was an advisor on international affairs, to work with General Eisenhower's staff, of course, and also particularly with the G-5 people, who had to do with the relationships with the military, the headquarters, the military, and the liberated civilian authorities in the areas as we gradually liberated them.

So I went into Normandy, went to London first for a couple of days' briefing. I was no hero in terms of landing in Normandy; the landings had been accomplished, the headquarters had been set up in Normandy, and I flew over in an old C-47 with some officers, and was in Normandy a relatively short time until it was clear that when General Patton broke out and started the big

swing up in the encirclement, it was clear that the Germans were going to have to pull back or risk having very, very substantial numbers of their forces trapped.

I went to Bedell Smith, who was General Eisenhower's chief of staff, and said, "I'd like to go in with the T force into Paris for practical reasons connected with the fact that obviously, when Paris was liberated, the National Council of Resistance members, we would know who they were, and I'd like to establish contact with them immediately."

And Bedell laughed at me and said, "Doug, if you went in with the T force and you were shot, everybody in America would say we were putting civilians in front of our military guys to protect them. But you can go in the next day."

So Paris was liberated on the 25th, and I arrived the morning – we left very early – the morning of the 26th, with two general officers.

Q: This is 26 August 1944.

MACARTHUR: August. Yes. With two general officers. We drove up a road that I knew very well, up through Dreux and Houdan and La Queue-les-Yvelines, Trappes, Versailles, and as we headed in, these two general officers had never been in France before the landings, and I was feeling emotionally very charged up, because I had left Paris around the tenth of June 1940, with the Germans pursuing us. I was one of the three people that went to the French Government, the three American diplomats that went with the French Government as it retreated. And to be entering Paris and to see it for the first time, it was a beautiful day, not a cloud in the sky, the sun was warm, I suggested, as we drove in from Versailles, that we go through the Parc de St.-Cloud, which is a bluff above the Seine, just above the bridge of St.-Cloud, where you can look out and see all of Paris. They thought that was an excellent idea, so we went in with our escort and came to that marvelous sort of platform above the river, a cobblestone platform above the river, and there looked out, and before us was the Seine and the Bois de Boulogne, and the Eiffel Tower, and the dome of Les Invalides, the two towers of Notre Dame, and way off on the left was the glistening spire and dome of Sacre Coeur. I must say I was so emotionally moved that tears started streaming down my face to see this beautiful city totally intact.

So we drove in, and after I got set up in the general officers' hotel that had been taken over for the night, I went down to the embassy, where we found a very faithful French woman who had been in the embassy before, who had been kept on by the Swiss. I went into the embassy, and it was intact, except in several places where the fighting had occurred. Bullets had come through the windows, and one had pierced a portrait of a former ambassador. But there was firing still going on, and there were Germans holed up still in the foreign ministry, right across the Seine from La Place de Concorde, and in other places. You could hear the rat-a-tat-tat of machine gun fire as the forces cleaned them up, our American boys and the French boys in the LeClerc division, which General Eisenhower gave the honor of entering Paris first – quite properly.

Mixed up with all this was the confusion of all these Resistance fellows running around with their armbands, brassards, of different things, saying, "FIFI" or "FTP." Frontier Terre Partisan was the communist one: FIFI was the Free French Forces of the Interior, with (inaudible) guns

firing guns into the air in joy. [Laughter] And the people of Paris just absolutely delirious. So it was emotional – still is, when I think of it – highly emotional.

Q: Did you have any instructions? There was this sort of uneasy relationship with General de Gaulle during this entire period. Did you have any instructions how to treat the various Resistance groups, especially those associated with General de Gaulle?

MACARTHUR: No, because by the time we landed, virtually all the Resistance groups, except the communist resistance group, Frontier Terre Partisan, were associated and had pledged allegiance to the Free French of General de Gaulle. There were people that had ambitions to be head of France and one thing or that kind, but there was no problem in dealing with the French Resistance. There was no problem with de Gaulle's people or from the French Resistance people with whom we knew. This was the thing that you had to play by ear. We had no instructions from the department that I recall, other than to establish and maintain contact with all our contacts across the broad spectrum of French political life, including the communists, because we were still allies of the Russians at that time. So that we did, and with the de Gaulle people, there was no problem at all. Some of them were people that immediately were surrounding him, that we had known before, like Gaston Palewski, who became his director of cabinet and sort of eminence, who screened everybody that went in and out, and Couve de Murville, both of whom I had known as inspecteur des finances before the war. There really was no problem at all insofar as the Quai d'Orsay was concerned.

Some of the people that I had worked with in Vichy, including Jean Chauvel, a marvelous man, had escaped and gotten over to London, and he came back and was set up as the secretary general of the French foreign office. So I had access through Jean, whom I knew intimately and whose wife was a great friend of ours, of my wife's. There were really no problems at all.

There was one problem, though, because de Gaulle moved in, but the CNR, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, kept its organization intact, kept its leadership, which included people like Bideau, who was later foreign minister and prime minister, Laniel, who was prime minister, and other people. They kept their organization intact and used to have regular meetings, where they felt that they were the people that had gone through the occupation, they knew what the French people wanted and needed, they felt much more than people that had been living in exile in London knew about the requirements of the situation.

So in that autumn, that is, in the early days, end of August, September, right up into October, I think, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, the highest Resistance body, they had grabbed a building that belonged to the Earl of Gloucester, a very nice building on the Left Bank, a big palatial residence. The Earl of Gloucester's son being then Lord Forbes, Arthur Forbes, an air commodore in the RAF, they commandeered that building and held regular meetings there, and they used to hold these meetings in the evening. Then I had arrangements with Laniel and a couple of them that I would go over about 10:30 and 11:00, when the meetings broke up. They would brief me on exactly the position they had taken at the meeting, with respect to what they would say to the government, because they did not consider themselves a government; they considered themselves the most knowledgeable advisory body that the de Gaulle people could have. I used to go back to the embassy and write out a telegram in longhand, so that Washington

would know. After Mr. Caffery arrived there, with his full approval, I used to go out at 11:30 or 12:00 and let him look at the telegram, and then we'd send it, because that way it would be on the desk of the people here in Washington the next morning at 9:00 o'clock, whereas if we'd waited til the next morning, with the time difference, they wouldn't have gotten it until the following evening or the day after.

Q: Just to backtrack a little, when you arrived, you actually set up the embassy?

MACARTHUR: No. I arrived. I was the only person there. I was the first person into the embassy.

Q: You and the cleaning lady.

MACARTHUR: And the cleaning lady. Well, she was more than that; she was sort of a custodian.

The whole plan had been laid out that the people from North Africa – because we had a mission in North Africa, where General de Gaulle had moved following the successful landings there – Algiers. We had a mission headed by Selden Chapin. He had the rank, I think, of minister counselor. They were to come up that diplomatic representation, NEAR. They called it NEAR – the Free French Government in exile, the so-called Free French Government. They would come up and take over the embassy.

Q: NEAR? You said NEAR.

MACARTHUR: NEAR. You didn't accredit them, too. It was NEAR. Because the whole question – that was one of the thorny questions of the legitimacy of de Gaulle. As long as the de Gaulle government, the Free French, as they called it, was in exile, we had a diplomatic mission. NEAR, I think, was the euphemism they used, rather than accredited to, which would mean that you recognized it as the government before the people of France themselves had had an opportunity to express themselves as to what they wanted in free elections.

Q: I understand.

MACARTHUR: So they were to come up and assume the thing. Well, there was still shooting going on for three or four days after the 25th of August, and they finally, if I recall correctly, arrived up in the first week of September. Then Selden Chapin became chargé d'affaires of the embassy, and he brought up people that had been with him down there. It was a small group – Jerry Drew, there were about five or six officers. I was sort of set up as the political section, because I had had the good fortune to know so many of these people that suddenly had become very prominent.

Q: I want to go back to one thing, though, that you mentioned: your relationships with the various Resistance groups and so forth and de Gaulle people.

MACARTHUR: Our instructions were to keep in touch across the board so that we would be

able to assess the situation, including the communist role of the French Communist Party, which, you may recall, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement was signed in August of 1939, which precipitated World War II, because it gave Hitler's Germany a secure rear in Eastern Europe against Russian business, the French Communist Party denounced France and Britain's imperialistic war against Nazi Germany, was declared illegal by the Deladier Government, and it went underground. It just laid doggo and did absolutely nothing during the period of German occupation of the first year – that is, from June 1940 until June 1941. Of course, it was the only group that had in existence a secret cellular organization along classical communist lines, an underground, and it laid doggo until June 25-26, 1941, when Hitler's Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Then suddenly, this organization appeared as the leading resistance group, because it had its secret underground organization all in place, it had weapons, it had means of communication, it had people scattered – not scattered, but people in virtually every urban community, and it was prepared to go. And go it did. It started a campaign of sabotage and assassinations of Germans, sabotage of railway lines and things of that kind the Germans used, one thing and another.

But then as the liberation of France came, it became also clear – during this period, when I was there, after, that is, almost a year and a half between '41 and '42 . . .

Q: This was when you were in Vichy.

MACARTHUR: When I was in Vichy, yes. The FTP, the Frontier Terre Partisan, the communist people, I was in touch with some of them, but all they wanted was weapons from us. They didn't want to cooperate with anybody else or anything else; all they wanted was delivery of weapons. There were some arms drops to them made by the British, because it was in everybody's interest to have them creating problems for the Germans.

But at a time when the original, authentic Resistance was just getting really organized, because when France fell, there was no organization, there was another, it was just a few individuals or people or people with some leadership qualities here and there who said, "What can we do to help Britain? What can we do to make it tough on the Germans?" But there was no organization, nothing at all, and these little groups sprang up in different places. Then some of them came together, and then formed their larger réseaux, and then they had cross-relationships. But the Frontier Terre Partisan, the communist group, wouldn't play with any of those groups; they kept to themselves, and they manifested a tendency for complete authority. So that was the situation that existed when France was liberated.

Then we got disquieting reports as the Germans withdrew from Normandy and Brittany, in some areas where the FTP, the Frontier Terre Partisan, where they were strong, they took out some of the minor Resistance leaders who were known to be anti-communist, and shot them as collaborationists. These reports were disquieting.

So when I arrived in Paris, liberated Paris, at the end of August, in late August, one of the first persons I made contact with was Marcel Cachan, the head of the French Communist Party, who I had met when I worked in the embassy before the war, because I worked for a while with Lawrence Higgins. The embassy was divided into sections; one had the left, and one had the

more conservative elements, and another man had primary responsibility for the political thinking of industrial leaders and the like. I worked with him, and I'd met Cachan, had been in his apartment, and Madame Cachan, I think, had been born in Boston, although, I think, of French parents. She spoke accented English. So two days after I arrived in Paris, there were Frontier Terre people all over the place, and I saw a lieutenant of Frontier Terre, and I had prepared a little message to Cachan, saying, "Dear Mr. Cachan, mon cher Monsieur Cachan, I don't know if you . . ." It was in French, of course. ". . . if you remember me or not, but I'm So-and-so, and we met [and so forth]. I'd be happy to see you." I gave it to this lieutenant of Frontier Terre Partisan, who was there and seemed to be in charge of some people that were massed around the Place de la Concorde, some FTP people.

The next morning, I was in the embassy. This was before the people of North Africa had arrived. I was in the embassy, and the next morning a FTP guy – they had a guard. We put a guard at the embassy. He said, "There's something to see you."

I went down, and he said, "Be standing out on the corner of the Place de la Concorde, right at the corner of your embassy, sharply at 12:00 o'clock, and a car will pick you up and take you to see Monsieur Cachan."

So I went out and stood on the corner, and sure enough, promptly at 12:00 o'clock, a car drove up, a little Citroen, with three people in it – a driver and two tommy gunners with tommy guns, one in the back and one in front. When I came up, they put me in front, and the two guys with the tommy guns got in back, and we drove out to the so-called red belt of Paris, and we stopped in front of one of those mass small apartment dwellings that had been built for the French workers, and got out. The two tommy gunners escorted me up to the door, and inside the door there was another man with a tommy gun. He checked me again for weapons. Then they took me to an apartment on the first floor, knocked on the door. It was opened by another guy with a tommy gun. I went in and there embraced my friend Mr. Cachan, who I had not seen. Mr. Cachan then described to me what had happened to him during the war, how he had grown a beard. He showed me a picture. He had a flowing white beard, much more whiskers than Santa Claus. I understand how he was able, with false identities, not to be recognized, because nobody would have recognized him. We had an excellent lunch, aided by a bottle of wine, with his wife, who was very much a part of his political communist life. It was a very interesting conversation.

Then after I'd been with him about two and a half hours, we wound up. I had questioned him about what their plans were for the future, one thing and another, and what the role of the party would be. We had a long back-and-forth about the history of the party in France and what it should be and what its role should be. He made it clear that the French communists were loyal to France, but that it was time for a new era, the people who had been responsible for the war and all the ills of the war should no longer have any role to play, and that the French Communist Party should be the vanguard of a peaceful revolution.

Q: Did the question come up, what would the role of the United States be in the future of France at all?

MACARTHUR: No. They knew that we were deeply engaged and committed. They knew from

statements that the government had made that we would do everything we could to alleviate the suffering that was bound to exist in a liberated France that had been deprived of things for so long. But I don't recall any particular probing on his part about our activities or policies, because what everybody wanted in every party, regardless of their own political views, was American aid and assistance to get France back on its feet. So the problem never came up. But I did do a long report which I sent. I used to send these to Doc Matthews in numbered letters, rather than at that particular time, in those first days, we could send telegrams through military channels to the State Department, and we could send things through a form of pouch, which is what I did, because we had no diplomatic pouch. But the military had facilities to get back to the Pentagon, and they shifted the stuff over. So in that first period until we got set up with Selden Chapin and his people and had a code room and our own facilities, and had a diplomatic courier tied in with the one in London, and so forth, I used the military facilities.

Q: You said that Jefferson Caffery came rather soon after.

MACARTHUR: Yes. Jefferson Caffery came in September, the latter part of September. He was obviously Doc Mathew's candidate for the job. Matthews had worked with him as a DCM in Latin America. Caffery had had experience. He had served in France after World War I as an embassy secretary. He spoke some French. But Caffery was not a very articulate man. He was very bright and perceptive, but he was not very articulate; he had sort of a stammer or a stutter. But he was bright and ran an excellent embassy, I must say. He knew how to manage his human resources and get the most out of them very well indeed. He, not having been associated with any of the politicians of pre-war France, that the de Gaullists blamed for France's debacle that had occurred to France, he was, in one respect, as pure as snow insofar as they were concerned. He didn't have any close ties to the old guard that had gone out with the war, but some of whom were trying to make a comeback. He got along extremely well with – I say "extremely well" – he got along well with General de Gaulle. I remember that General de Gaulle had a small dinner not too long after Caffery arrived, at which I think there were ten people – General and Mrs. De Gaulle, George Bideau and Suzy Bideau as foreign minister and his wife – she was a former career diplomat – Ambassador Caffery and his wife, myself and my wife.

Q: Your wife had joined you by this time.

MACARTHUR: She had joined me by this time. This was the end of October, beginning of November. And two of his staff, Colonel Guy, I think, and Palewski. But it was a very intimate dinner. The general was very kind to me because I had helped some of his people who had been parachuted in during the Vichy days. The embassy's relationship with not only de Gaulle, but with these disparate Resistance leaders, who were part of the French system because they were all elected to the Parliament in landslides in the first elections and the like, was really very, very good. There were no problems. The problems, of course, arose for France as the communists made it increasingly clear that they planned, eventually, to run the country.

Q: I was looking through the foreign relations series, and I noted that by January of 1945, Ambassador Caffery was saying that the French were very sensitive about some things, that they felt that the United States was treating German prisoners too well, much better than German POWs would be treated by Germans in Germany, and that the United States wasn't giving

enough supplies, and that we weren't clearing out the Germans who were still in the channel fortresses, such as St. Lazare, Brest, and all, and that the Americans were treating the French like children, and also the Americans didn't believe the stories about what the Gestapo had done in France. I mean, it was obviously a time of sensitivity.

MACARTHUR: There were these news reports that we got of ill treatment of German prisoners of war. I was not personally involved in any investigations or anything, because, if I recall correctly, these prisoners were largely being held in northern France or Germany...

Q: Mr. Ambassador, in a tape that we did before, for technical reasons, we didn't really cover your mission as a young officer to General Weygand very well. I wonder if we could go over that once again. Could you explain how that took place?

MACARTHUR: Certainly. You will recall that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which brought us into the war. And shortly after that attack in December, Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to the United States to meet with the President, because that act of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor brought us into World War II. They discussed strategy and tactics and all sorts of things, the role of the United States, which is all a matter of history. But they also discussed in some detail the question of a second landing, or a landing, rather, in France. They reached the conclusion that the best way to eventually liberate France was to first go in and move in and take over North Africa, which would provide a springboard for either a second front, a dual attack on German-occupied France, or a springboard up through Italy and the like.

The problem that they faced was that in French North Africa there were elements that were not terribly pro-de Gaulle. They wanted to find a French leader that was respected, who could rally the French military, which had some strength in North Africa, to the Allied cause, as well as the general population. And they came to the conclusion that General Weygand was the person. General Weygand had been in France in French North Africa, and he was known to bitterly oppose any effort by the Germans to take over North Africa, to occupy French North Africa. In fact, he was finally removed from his position of commander of the French forces in North Africa by the Vichy Government at German request.

I might add a personal thought, that the rather difficult personal relationships and feelings that President Roosevelt had for de Gaulle probably played an important part in seeking someone other than de Gaulle to head up the French effort in North Africa.

Q: Do you think President Roosevelt was also looking to the future beyond, to develop a new leader other than de Gaulle to deal with France?

MACARTHUR: Well, he did not personally like General de Gaulle. I mean, that is a matter of record. And I think, basically, he was looking for somebody that the French could rally to other than de Gaulle. I should add, parenthetically, jumping ahead a bit, that at a later date, President Roosevelt also tried to set General Giraud up as an alternative, if you will, to General de Gaulle.

But to go back to the Weygand mission, when this was decided, Doc Matthews, H. Freeman

Matthews, who was consular of the embassy in London, and who had been our chargé d'affaires in Vichy, France, and the Vichy Government until he was assigned to London, after Admiral Leahy had arrived and taken over, and who knew, Doc Matthews knew intimately the atmospherics inside the so-called unoccupied zone of France, he was called to Washington to participate in some of these meetings. And then it was decided by Roosevelt and Churchill that an effort should be made to enlist General Weygand on a contingency basis, that if it was necessary to go into French North Africa, we hoped that he would head up the movement in support of Allied landings.

Doc Matthews then flew to Portugal on his way back to England, and there he contacted Butch Leverich, who was a second secretary, as I recall it.

Q: Butch Leverich?

MACARTHUR: Henry Leverich, I think his name was. He was known as Butch, as his nickname. Doc Matthews got Leverich, and had Leverich memorize, in great detail, the instructions which would be sent to the embassy in Vichy, with respect to contacting General Weygand. The instructions were extremely detailed. And I remember that a message came in – I can't remember if it was from the department or from Doc Matthews – to our embassy in Vichy, saying that Leverich would arrive from Portugal with some extremely important instructions for Admiral Leahy, our ambassador, and myself.

We awaited Leverich's arrival in Vichy with great interest, because we didn't have a clue what this was all about, and when he arrived, he gave us, in great detail, the full message. And what the full message involved was A) a completely innocuous but very nice letter from President Roosevelt to General Weygand, a short, friendly letter. This letter was to serve as the credentials to establish the bona fide of the oral message which would accompany the delivery of this written message. Doc Matthews had suggested that because, obviously, it was impossible for Admiral Leahy, the ambassador, to go anywhere without being followed, and because the admiral did not speak French, that I should be the emissary that carried out this mission, as I was the only officer that had been continuously in France since the fall, since 1940, when the Vichy Government had set up, and knew a great many people, and knew my way around, and had friends in various Resistance organizations and groups. Admiral Leahy concurred in that decision, and I was assigned to carry out the mission.

The first problem was to find out where General Weygand lived. We did not dare go and start asking our French Resistance friends where General Weygand might be found in France, in unoccupied France. We knew he was someplace there after he had been relieved by the Vichy Government of his duties in North Africa. Because we feared that some loose-talking Resistance fellow might say, "Well, I wonder why the American Embassy in Vichy is asking where Weygand is. What's up?" And news could spread swiftly. Secondly, if we asked a Resistance member, who was quite reliable, or we thought was quite reliable, and the Gestapo should pick him up and torture him, and it came out, the mission could be blown also. So all we had heard about General Weygand was that he was living someplace in the south of France, in Provence, someplace near the French Riviera.

So we then developed a cover story, and the cover story was that since I had been in Vichy since the beginning of the Vichy regime, virtually, I was tired, needed a rest, wanted to get away with my wife and daughter from the very ingrown and strange atmosphere of Vichy, which had a collaborationist government, and wanted ten days' rest someplace. And with this cover story, my wife, my daughter, the daughter's nurse, took off in my little Ford car for the south of France, and we proceeded to Cannes, which we had known before the war. And we stayed at a hotel that was open. It was in January by this time. It was cold, damp. There was occasional sleet. But the good life was still going on, and a casino which was open every night for gambling, collaborationists, and people of that sort with money to spend, and so my wife and I decided that the best way – or the only way, really – to try to find out where Weygand lived, without giving away the show, was to go to the casino and have a few drinks of champagne and gamble a bit, strike up acquaintances with some of these people that were there, and then individually, she or I, depending on what personal group we were with, would say something like, "Isn't it a pity that there isn't a single famous well known Frenchman left on the Cote d'Azur, when before the war it was filled with well known personalities like the Windsors and international personalities like the Ali Khan and all sorts of French wealthy people of various classes and the like?"

So for about four nights, we ruined our alimentary canals by going to the casino each night, gambling, having a few drinks, picking up people here and there, chatting with them, and we tried this gambit on them. And nobody came up with anything. They all said, "Yes, it's very sad that there are no longer any French people here." And we got very discouraged.

By this time, I believe it was a Sunday, it was a very rainy day, the casino wasn't open, and we drove over to Juan les Pins for luncheon, which is a small, little Riviera village just before the peninsula that sticks out to the east of Cannes, that houses the Hotel de Pacques and some of the famous properties. We found a delightful little bistro, a French restaurant, and there we ran into two couples who were having drinks before luncheon, attractive young Frenchmen and women, and we started chatting with them. They were interested in the fact that we were Americans but spoke French, and they were also interested that we came from Vichy. So we had a few more glasses of wine and had lunch together, and then my wife tried the gambit about, "Isn't it a pity there are no longer French people?"

And one of these girls who lived in Grasse, about 15 kilometers up in the hills above Cannes, said, "Well, there's one famous Frenchman that is still there, and is still down here, and that's General Weygand, who lives at the Hotel So and So, about a kilometer or two from Grasse."

So with this golden nugget of information, we returned to our hotel and ordered a bottle of champagne, and then got ready for the next day. The next day, I asked carefully about the parfumerie, a factory in Grasse that I asked the concierge of the hotel, said that I wanted to go up to Grasse and visit the famous parfumerie, where they made these marvelous French perfumes. So he gave me instructions, and my wife and daughter and nurse, we all took off and drove up that day, just before lunch, and visited the parfumerie, and found out where the hotel was. Then we had lunch. Bought a bit of perfume at the parfumerie, and then we had lunch.

After lunch, we drove to about a half a kilometer from the hotel, which was on a rather deserted road, and my wife and daughter and the nurse got out under the trees, and I walked to the hotel. I

arrived, and I had written out a little card to General Weygand, which said, in effect, “Dear General Weygand, I am the nephew of General MacArthur and served with the French Army, and who knew and respected you. I served in the French Army in World War II under General Giraud, and knew and respected you greatly, and I’d like to pay my respects.” And I had this all ready in an envelope, addressed to General Weygand. I went into the hotel and asked if the letter, without identifying myself, could be delivered to the Weygand apartment, and I would await a reply.

I got word down to please come up to the apartment. I went up, and there was Madame Weygand, who said the general was out for a walk, but would I not come in and have some tea with her. So I went in and had tea, and we chatted inconsequentially about one thing or another, and then the general returned. I then gave him the rather very nice but innocuous letter from President Roosevelt, and said that the letter which I presented him, which he read and asked me if I would thank the President for his good wishes, I said, “The letter is simply to establish my bona fide. I have a very important and personal message for you from President Roosevelt.”

I then started off by saying, which was part of the instructions which I had, which Leverich had memorized and brought from Lisbon, that there had recently been three new international developments of great significance. The first were the serious German military reverses in Russia, which raised questions about a final German victory; the second were the recent British successes, which made it impossible for Hitler to seize the Suez Canal and have control over North Africa and the Middle East; and the third was the entry of the United States into the war as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the entry into the war on the side of the British and the Allies, with this tremendous economic and industrial and military potential, which would greatly increase the strength of the Allies and their ability to successfully prosecute the war against Nazi Germany.

I said that while these developments, in the judgment of our government, meant clearly that Germany could not win the war, they led the American Government, at the same time, to attach particular importance to French North Africa, because what happened in North Africa, French North Africa, could affect the length of the war, the number of people of occupied countries that might die as a result of it, and it could also play an important role, ultimately, in the liberation of metropolitan France.

Knowing, as the President of our government did, of the French sensibilities about being replaced in the French colonies, which the German propaganda had been spreading assiduously throughout France from the moment that France fell, to divide them from the British, saying that the British and later the Americans wanted to take over all French colonies after the war. Knowing this, my instructions included saying to General Weygand that the President wanted him to know that the United States intends to see to it that the integrity of France and her empire is respected after the war, and that the French possessions in North Africa would remain in French hands. The United States had no desire to replace France, nor to see the British or supporters of de Gaulle take over that area, knowing that Weygand, parenthetically, did not appreciate General de Gaulle too much.

I then went on with General Weygand to say that in the light of what was obviously a German

objective, which was to seize French North Africa, the President wanted Weygand to know that if there were any indications that the Germans were or might move against North Africa, the United States would be obliged to take protective action to keep French North Africa from falling into German hands. These steps would necessarily include an attack on German forces, should they move into North Africa. In other words, if there was any indication of a change in the status quo of North Africa, we would be obliged to act. And insofar as what changes in the status quo might entail, I listed several, which were: 1) the replacement by the government of Marshal Petain by government until total German domination; that is, simply a completely puppet government; the utilization of the French fleet against America or its Allies; the ceding of African bases by the Vichy Government to the Germans. We knew the Germans had been asking for bases in French North Africa. A military threat against North Africa, such as preparations for a German attack through Spain or from any other direction; and finally, if there were signs of German infiltration into North Africa, which was clearly an indication of a prelude to an attempt to take it over.

I said that the President greatly regretted that General Weygand was no longer in French North Africa to cope with the German endeavors to take over that vital area, and the principal objective of my call was the President's desire to know whether in the event of any of the eventualities leading to a major threat against North Africa, which I had listed, occurred, whether General Weygand would be willing to play a role of leadership in French North Africa. The President, I said, believed that no one was as well-equipped and as knowledgeable and as respected as he was to fulfill that role, and that such a mission could greatly speed the liberation of metropolitan France from the Nazi occupation.

General Weygand replied to me that, in effect, he no longer had any role to play, civil or military. He was retired, he was out of action, and he did not feel that he could play any role in the events of the scenario that I had described.

I then said to him that I had been asked specifically by the President to say that if he could not accept the role which the President had in mind, in the event the Germans attempted to take over North Africa, that he would keep entirely secret and to himself the proposal which I had made to him and outlined to him; it was to go no further. And General Weygand replied that he could not, in honor, do so. He was honor-bound to inform Marshal Petain, and he would inform Marshal Petain.

I said that Marshal Petain lived in the Hotel de Pacques in Vichy, which was riddled with collaborationists, and that if he did so, word would probably get back to the Germans very swiftly. And he looked at me and said, "I have ways of doing this so that the Marshal alone will know, and I know the Marshal will not break the confidence that I impose, and that the knowledge of this will go no further."

So that was the end of a mission which ended in failure. But there is, however, an epilogue. I went back to Vichy, and we reported cryptically, as we'd been instructed to do, the message that the initiative had not succeeded. Admiral Leahy sent a telegram which was for the President's eyes only, through a special communication channel which, I think, has been later released. But there is an epilogue. About a month later, after my return to Vichy, the admiral called on Marshal

Petain, and I went along, as usual, as the interpreter. And the admiral went in and shook hands with the Marshal and said, "I've brought along, as usual, Mr. MacArthur, to interpret for me."

And the Marshal looked at me with a quizzical smile and said, "Monsieur MacArthur, I believe you've been doing a bit of traveling lately." And he smiled again. In fact, he said, "I think you've been visiting with your family in the south of France." And the Marshal never let anyone know, Laval or any of the others, know about this initiative, which indeed he did keep entirely to himself.

Q: Let's start all over again on this part about Yalta.

MACARTHUR: After the Yalta Conference, the date and place had been agreed to by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, but before the conference was actually held, President Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins to Europe to meet and consult with various European leaders and with General Eisenhower. He came to Paris, and General Eisenhower put him up at the Brown House, which was a special guesthouse that General Eisenhower had as Supreme Allied Commander. And a little dinner was arranged at Brown House, with General Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, his executive chief of staff, Winston Churchill flew over from London, Duff Cooper, the British ambassador to Paris was there. I've forgotten who Churchill brought with him. Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador, was there. And I accompanied Ambassador Caffery to this very small, intimate dinner. Harry Hopkins was the star of the occasion. He was the one who was the occasion for the dinner. I recall, without going into all the details of the discussions and the back-and-forths, the fact that the French had felt very, very insulted – or de Gaulle had felt very insulted – about not being included. I remember that Churchill, I believe it was, who asked Harry Hopkins the following question. He said, "Does the President really believe that as a result of our cooperation with Russia, with the Soviet Union, during the war, that after the war Stalin will change in any way his ambitions and the declared intention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to see its system triumph throughout the world? Does he really believe there's a good chance or there is a chance of that?"

To which Harry Hopkins replied, "The boss," he said, "feels that after all we've done for the Russians, lend-lease support, cooperation, that there's a good chance, a 50-50 chance that he can turn Stalin into a good Democrat."

I was shocked by this answer, because it was quite clear at that time that the Soviet Union, through the French Communist Party, was doing everything it could to be disruptive inside France and create a situation from which it might – that is, the French Communist Party – might ultimately emerge as the primary influence of any French Government. But there it was.

I should add that we had had, all through that early partial liberation period of France, that is, partial in the sense that the greater part of France had been liberated, sign after sign that the French Communist Party's true intent and certainly there was at that time no Communist Party in the world more totally subservient to Moscow than the French Communist Party. They supported the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that brought on the war. Then when the Soviet Union was attacked by Hitler, they turned right around, and in the early liberation period, as some of the towns were liberated, the communists, who were perhaps in that area, who, when they happened to be most

powerful, would on a number of occasions take out other Resistance leaders who were known for their anti-communist feeling, but were staunch French Resistance leaders, they were taken out and shot as collaborationists, they also looted banks. When the Germans withdrew, the FTP, the French Communist Resistance organization, would move right in on a bank and loot it, and we had one very serious incident where a convoy of six FTP trucks was challenged by an American sentry group on a road in France. And instead of stopping, they pulled out their guns and started shooting at our guards. We shot back and killed some of them and captured some of them, and the five trucks were loaded with the French currency that they had looted from a small city that had been liberated several days earlier, and the FTP had seized the money in the banks before our forces arrived and took over the town.

So there were all these indications that the French Communist Party was really trying to bring about a situation where eventually it would be the government of France.

Q: In your role in the political section of the embassy, were you able to report this, even in a wartime situation, where the communists are Allies?

MACARTHUR: Yes. We not only reported it, but I still was acting as the liaison with the SHAPE staff. And the military, of course, our military reported it back once through military channels. We reported it through our channels, because we got it through our military. There were people that told us about this incident. But one must remember that after four years of German occupation, when France was liberated, there was a mess in the sense that there were all kinds of splinter groups, splinter Resistance groups of various kinds while de Gaulle had an overall umbrella over the Resistance. There were individual groups, some of leaders who had centrist or center right aspirations; other non-communist leaders of the socialist-left persuasion, and the political situation was extremely fragmented. There was also a situation at that time where, after the liberation, although de Gaulle moved in and established his government, the National Resistance Council, which was the top Resistance body that brought together the Resistance leaders of many groups into the National Resistance Council, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, all groups – except the communists, who refused to participate with other groups, kept to themselves – they held meetings. The National Resistance Council held meetings several times a week on policies that the government had decided. And in those meetings, there were frequently very substantial disagreements within the National Council of Resistance on what should be done in that early post-liberation period.

Because of my friendship with several members of the National Council of the Resistance, including Joseph Laniel, the big Resistance leader from Normandy, and Ito, whom I knew, and Tsetjin, I used to go over at 10:30 at night and wait until the meeting broke up, and then I would get from one or two different sources an account of what they had been up to or what they had been discussing.

Q: Go ahead.

MACARTHUR: So later, when we had a rather chaotic domestic political situation, where the Fourth Republic was finally formed, but in the Fourth Republic, if a prime minister lasted a couple of months, it was almost a miracle, it was, in part, a result of this terrific fragmentation of

political views, and the resistance of some people to de Gaulle's government – that is, the initial government that was set up there before the elections were held eventually that brought the constitution in the Fourth Republic, which in itself, because of the instability, some of which I've mentioned, was later replaced by the Fifth Republic.

Q: Running the political section at that time, what was your role? Did you report on this? Were there instructions of how to make them move?

MACARTHUR: I don't recall any instructions. Our role was to encourage, to the extent possible, stability in the French political system, but if you know the French as I know them, it's very difficult for a foreigner to offer suggestions to a Frenchman about what he might or might not be doing, without creating a very, very considerable backlash. And our basic effort was concentrated certainly on reporting. I think, because of my background, I was one that had the very large number of contacts with different people in the French military, as well as the French Resistance people who turned out to be future political leaders of one kind or another. But we had a special section that dealt with the communist-left, under Norris Chipman, which reported and followed very closely what the communists were doing, and that section of the embassy reported, at the specific request of the department, that felt certain that we had been infiltrated by Soviet moles, and they were proven right, as the Alger Hiss trial later proved, and Harry Dexter White's suicide.

Q: He was in the Treasury.

MACARTHUR: He was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and worked for the Soviet Union, and committed suicide when it all started unraveling. We had a special office in the State Department, to which Norris Chipman's numbered reports went, and then went directly to Doc Matthews and Jimmy Dunn. Jimmy Dunn was the head of the European bureau, and Doc was his deputy. We did not dare trust at that time reporting on communist activity through ordinary channels, for fear that it would be back to Moscow within 36 hours.

Q: How were you informed of this particular problem?

MACARTHUR: Well, we were informed of it through people like Ray Murphy, who headed the special little office in the department that dealt with this problem. I mean, it was no secret what the Russians were up to then, and that's why many of us were so disappointed at the Roosevelt performance at Yalta. The first thing that you know when you deal with the Russians is that if you get an agreement, you have to nail down every single clause in airtight fashion; otherwise, if you just sign some general agreement that you agree in mother love, that you agree with mother love and be kind to animals and that sort of thing, the Soviets will run with that 1,000 miles before you can even see them. Certainly that's what happened at Yalta, when they agreed to free elections. I remember later when we challenged Molotov about that at the Berlin Conference, he said, "But the elections are free."

We said, "Yes, elections are free, but you have to be a member of the Communist Party and you can only vote for the member that the Party sets up a single candidate set up by the Party."

Molotov replied, “Yes, but anybody can vote, or they can vote ‘no’ if they want to, or they can vote for that man or oppose him.” And the performance at Yalta was one for which, at that time, when we had the monopoly of the weapon, and we had a great deal of cards to play, one of which we didn’t do ourselves a great amount of good.

Q: Was this perceived at the time, basically throughout the officers?

MACARTHUR: Well, it was certainly perceived by those of us in the European bureau, and I think there was no mystification, I think, in the minds of people who had responsibility for Soviet affairs in the Foreign Service. Certainly Norris Chipman had served in Moscow, and that was why he was picked to come to Paris, because he knew there were no scales on his eyes about what the Soviet leadership was really up to in terms of the rest of Europe. And while Chip Bohlen was perhaps never as vocal on the subject of what they were up to as Norris Chipman, I’ve talked to Chip, I knew him well, many, many times, and there was certainly not a shadow of a doubt about his understanding of what they were up to. Actually, how we knew that they knew that Hiss and Harry Dexter White were working and passing information to the Soviets, I don’t know. I don’t know what the details are.

Q: But you knew that in the atmosphere . . .

MACARTHUR: But we knew that both of them were passing things on to the Soviet Union, and we knew that in that atmosphere and with what the Soviets were trying to do through the use of the French Communist Party, if it got back to them, it would make the job that much easier for them, if they knew what we knew about what they were trying to do. So we also had some brilliant people who had left the Party. You must remember that when the French Communist Party was formed, it was a split-away from the Socialist Party, after the Socialist Congress of Tours, in 1917 – I think it was 1917; it could have been a little later – the communist wing, there was no French Communist Party then, the ultra Marxist left of the wing splintered away and formed the French Communist Party. And among those people were a number of people who were idealists. One in particular, whose real name I’ve forgotten now, he had a pseudonym, was a member, until the 1930s, was a member of the Politburo of the Party, and he and another member of the Politburo split away, when finally they understood, during the great Stalin purges, that this was not a great social experiment that was designed to lift the well-being of man and make life a better place for all people, in democratic political surroundings; that it was a simple, total power autocracy with expansionist desire. And indeed, these people, who were close to people in the Communist Party, although they’d split from it, were a very, very valuable source of information to Norris Chipman and to myself, when Norris was away. There were a number of them, and they knew exactly what was up. They knew the leadership of the Communist Party intimately; they knew all about them. They knew they had their feelers into the Party, and so they kept us very, very well informed at that time.

Q: Turning away from dealing with the Communist Party, but dealing with the French Government towards the end of the war, you wore two hats. You were both working with Eisenhower’s headquarters and with the embassy. Were there any particular problems?

MACARTHUR: Yes. After I left, after the liberation of Paris, there on General Eisenhower’s

staff in Normandy, then I was assigned to the – they had a SHAPE liaison group, and I was assigned to that. Then when I was reassigned to the embassy, my official membership in the SHAPE liaison group was severed, but the informal relationship of working with them continued on. So I continued to work with them and be sort of a channel, if you will, middle-level channel, of information that they wanted passed on to the ambassador in the embassy.

And in the military sphere, we ran into one very serious problem just before the end of the war. I think it was in April. As Germany was beginning to collapse and the eastern front was giving way, and we were advancing on the continent, our intelligence had information that the Germans might try to regroup in an Austrian redoubt in the Alps, and if that happened successfully, it could represent a very difficult target because of the terrain, and we could lose a hell of a lot of Allied lives. So a drive was put on. General Eisenhower mounted a drive which was to kick off and strike – I guess it was across the Rhine and in toward the heartland of the so-called Austrian redoubt, and cut off any connection.

In the Allied forces, of course, the French Army was included in the Allied forces under the overall command of General Eisenhower. The advance led by a French general, was triggered to kick off – I think this was in April of '44, at 5:00 in the morning or something like that. There had been heavy preparation before artillery barrages and things of that kind, and then to the consternation of our forces, of our commander of the Army group of which the French Army was a part, the French Army, instead of advancing in the direction of the line of battle, as indicated in the plans, marched right across the front – I think it was the French Ninth Army or one of the armies – to grab Stuttgart and Hume. In other words, it advanced at a 90-degree angle, directly across the front of the advancing Americans. We either had the choice of shooting our way through the French or holding up the advance. We held up the advance for 36 hours, and this created a real crisis. The answer was that General de Gaulle had given the orders to the French commander, and he so informed our Army group commander to take these places, and this is part of his move to move into this part of Germany, so that France would have a zone of occupation or a larger zone of occupation than it might otherwise have had. This did nothing, of course, to make our government any happier about General de Gaulle. I think President Truman had taken over by that time. President Roosevelt had died.

Q: Yes, I think that final push into Bavaria had taken place after, probably in late March, early April.

MACARTHUR: I think it was early April. And of course, President Truman, one of our great Presidents, it didn't do much to give him much confidence in General de Gaulle, to have a partner in a war, with a world war going on, who, when the plan has been accepted, or you understand has been accepted, and everybody has their orders to march, suddenly disrupts the whole plan because of his own political objectives.

I had one other interesting experience at that time. As we moved forward in April and started liberating these concentration camps, I alerted the T forces every time we passed through the SHAPE liaison group of the . . .

Q: The T forces?

MACARTHUR: The task forces. The T force is the force that goes in first. It's the attack force, the initial point force, that goes into the area of combat, the objective that you're trying to take. I gave to all CORE and Army headquarters a list of people who had worked with us in the Resistance that I knew personally or whom I knew of because their group had worked with us, who were missing. Because during the period '44-'44, there had been a terrible blood-letting of the French Resistance. A lot of the reseaux, the Resistance groups, had been broken, and a great many people disappeared.

From Dachau, I got word that one of the finest contacts that had done a great deal for us in the Vichy days, with two other people that I had worked with, were alive in Bergen-Belsen, had been picked up alive. They all had tuberculosis and were very ill, but they survived. And then I got word from Gaston Palewski, General de Gaulle's director of cabinet, and his sort of *imminence grise*, that they would like me to go forward when Dachau was liberated, to see if I could find any of the listed Resistance leaders that they would give me still alive, and if so, if I could evacuate them back at once to Paris. So I went forward to General Sandy Patch's headquarters in a little L5, I guess it was called, a little two-passenger liaison open biplane, and got there the day before the liberation, the night before they were going to move in the next morning, and then went forward and stayed with the medical groups behind the T force, until the T force went in and the shooting stopped.

I went into the camp, and the Germans in these PW camps, Dachau then had 32,500 people still in it, they divided them up into national groups, a French group, an Italian group, this group, and Dutch, and they quartered them together, and they had one man who, in French, is known as the chef de fil, the head man, and the Germans would only deal with one man in that national contingent. So I went forward, and it was the most ghastly spectacle I've ever seen in my life. As we advanced toward the camp when the shooting stopped, there was a train on the side with about 50 boxcars, a terrible smell coming from it, but there was a trail of bodies from one of the cars. They'd obviously broken open the doors, and there was a trail of skeletons. I couldn't call them bodies; there was nothing but bones and skin. It went about 100 feet and then stopped, where they simply collapsed and died. The rest were just dead bodies in these boxcars. They'd been moved from another camp, and they had never been let out of the boxcars.

I got into the camp, and there was a mound of bodies outside of what was the crematorium, a mound of bodies 12 feet high, perhaps 150, 200 feet long, something over virtually 8,000, 10,000 bodies. There were people dying. As I came in, a man was sitting against the front, just a skeleton with skin, looked up at me, and he whispered something. I leaned over to listen, and I understood him to say, "Cigarette, cigarette." I pulled out a cigarette and lit it and put it in his mouth, and he gave me a beautiful smile, and then he just fell over dead.

But in any event, I finally found the chef de fil of the French, and to my amazement, he was number three or four on de Gaulle's list. I said to him that I had a plane, and I could take 26 people back, would he designate 26 people, Resistance people, from this list that General de Gaulle had given me to fly back to Paris. And of course, he would be one of them. He looked at me with great pain in his eyes, and he said, "I am the leader of the French group. There are 3,200 Frenchmen here still alive." He said, "They're dying like flies." He said, "I will leave Dachau

when the last Frenchman has been repatriated or died, because some of them are never going to make it back.” And he did. He stayed three and a half weeks.

Q: With the French dealing with the problems of peace, I believe there were peace negotiations going on during the time you were there.

MACARTHUR: There were indeed, and the embassy was involved to a certain extent. Jimmy Byrnes, our Secretary of State, former Senator Byrnes, came over with a delegation from Washington, but the people in the embassy were drafted to serve on various subcommittees, working groups, you might call them, international, of the peace council group. I served on a subcommittee of a group that was deliberating the French-Italian border. You remember that after France fell, Italians, who had been neutral until Paris and France fell, stabbed the . . .

Q: The hand that held the dagger in the back.

MACARTHUR: (Laughs) Yes. They stabbed the French in the back, and the French were determined to have a hunk of that Italian territory as a bit of payment for that. I got my first real experience with negotiating with the Soviets. They, of course, were part of the peace . . .

Q: This was about what period are we talking about?

MACARTHUR: We’re talking about ‘46, ‘47. It’s after the war is over and the peace machinery has been set up and so forth. I’ll never forget. The Soviets, if they disagreed with – there was general agreement on the Allied side, the British, French, and American side, but the Soviets, when they disagreed, would go on and on and on and on. I discovered later, when I was responsible as coordinator for some of our negotiations in the post-war period with the Soviets, that it’s a standing tactic. You wear the guy down. You go on, and you go on, and 8:00 comes, and 9:00 comes, and 10:00 comes, and 11:00 comes, and 12:00 comes. I remember once they simply want to wear you down. Once we were there until 5:00 in the morning, and we just sat it out, and eventually, when they saw they weren’t going to get what they were after, they folded up, not then, but the next day, when they saw that we were not going to finally in fatigue or whatever it might be, just sort of say, “Oh, well, what the hell. Let’s give an inch here or there,” or something like that. But one of the tactics, there are two basic tactics. One is to wear the opposite negotiator that’s on the other side down, but the basic tactic is to get language that is so vague and general that it is subject to almost any interpretation that they want to give it, and that is why any negotiation with the Soviets – any negotiation – it’s got to be spelled out to the last word and every “t” crossed and every “I” dotted, or else you’re going to find yourself that you’ve got absolutely nothing, and they’re proceeding ahead and saying, “Well, the agreement says this and this, and that’s what we’re doing within the terms of the agreement.”

Q: How did the negotiations you were involved in work out, between the French and the Italians?

MACARTHUR: I don’t even remember, it was such a small, inconsequential part of the business as a whole. I think there was a section of a small piece of territory, if I recall correctly, but it was not terribly important.

The most serious problem we had with France then, at that time, involved the so-called European Defense Community. Basic to American policy after World War II, with respect to western Europe, had been the question at the very center of our policy, was the problem of Germany. How could you weave Germany into a western European fabric, economically, politically, militarily, so that the German strings would only be part of the strings that composed that fabric? And if at some future time undependable leadership emerged in Germany, it would become extremely difficult for the Germans to unravel their threads of this European fabric and go their own way, floating between east and west or signing up with the wrong side. And, of course, in pursuit of that policy, we ran immediately into the centuries-old animosity between France and Germany and the bitterness that still existed in that early post-war period on the part of the French, because of the German victory and occupation of France, and the suffering they had gone through, and the rest of it. It was quite obvious to us that without Germany in some form of European fabric, the defense of Europe would be extremely difficult. To try to defend Europe on the Rhine would be logistically, and in other ways, against the kind of forces the Soviet Union had, with no cushion, nothing, would be extremely difficult and highly problematic.

So the problem came up of how could you integrate Germany into a European fabric. Economically, we thought by encouraging European economic integration, which developed into the EEC, and militarily, there had to be some way, because we certainly, with all that we were doing, did not have the resources to put men in the other countries of Europe recovering from the devastation of war, didn't have the resources, we certainly needed a German military contribution at some appropriate stage. And as I recall it, a Frenchman first came up with the idea of the European Defense Community.

Q: It was a French proposal.

MACARTHUR: A French proposal which would integrate at low level, about company or battalion . . .

Q: A brigade level.

MACARTHUR: Well, it was below brigade. I think it was regimental level, units of different countries. I was told later by a Frenchman that it was put up because they thought it was so absurd that it would never fly. But to their surprise and chagrin, the British and ourselves both said, "All right, if this is what it takes to weave Germany into the fabric to do it," the French then walked smartly away from the proposal, and the French prime minister at that time refused to go along. This created very considerable stresses and strains on our relationship with the French, but the damage was repaired fairly swiftly at a later date.

Q: Did we feel that this was going to be a workable system, or was it something that we went along with more for European cooperation than military?

MACARTHUR: Our position was that we would do nothing, we would accept nothing that couldn't be made to operate militarily with a degree of effectiveness. The thought was that in extremis, our military said this could be made to work. It was not a preferred solution. In fact, it

was just above the borderline of unworkability, but they could make it work, and it would bring the Germans in with all the advantages, and overall, the advantages of bringing them in militarily outweighed the absurdity of the proposal, of trying to integrate forces at that low regimental level.

Q: There must have been quite a few conflicts between you and the State Department and the Defense Department.

MACARTHUR: There are always conflicts between the State Department and the Defense Department because of their perception that their responsibility is military, for military security, whereas the State Department has to take into account infinitely broader considerations. It may be fine militarily, but if your friend and ally, on whom you depend, isn't going to agree to it, it's no good at all. And some of the things that the Defense Department has put forward has been things that manifestly would be unacceptable to friends and allies; they just wouldn't agree to it. And if they wouldn't agree to it, they're a non-starter. So diplomacy, I think, is the art of the possible. You have to do what you can with what you've got to work with, always trying to bring the other people along to your persuasion, but that is not an easy task, and it takes time. You know, we're always going to have a difference between a purely military point of view that disregards all the political, social, psychological, and other aspects of a problem. From a purely military point of view, it may look, you know, super. But when you have to take in the other things, and when you are in the position that we're in, where we do not have the resources to assure our own security by ourselves without friends and allies, then you come into a much broader problem of what can you do to achieve this goal, when you can't do it by this narrow military position, because it's unacceptable. What can you do to move it in that direction?

And our position is compounded, of course, by the fact that we have no constituency. The Foreign Service, the State Department, has no constituency whatsoever. The military have the families of millions of people. I'm talking about politics now. We've got no political constituency; we've got no constituency in the news world. There's nothing the news world likes better than to talk about striped pants diplomats and cookie pushers and the like.

THOMAS W. WILSON
Journalist, Paris Herald
Paris (1937-1939)

Information Officer, the Marshall Plan
Paris (1949-1952)

Thomas W. Wilson was born in Baltimore in 1912. After Graduating from Princeton University, he worked as a reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun and later the Paris Herald. He served on the National Defense Advisory Commission, the War Production Board and the Economic Warfare Agency in World War II. After the War, he worked as an Information Officer for the Marshall Plan, and would later serve as a Political Advisor to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson was

interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 30 1996.

Q: You say you left the Evening Sun and you went where then?

WILSON: The Paris Herald.

Q: First I'd like to get the dates. When did you go to the Paris Herald?

WILSON: In 1937.

Q: In 1937. And you were with the Paris Herald from when to when?

WILSON: 1937-1938. Then I was hired by the INS, the International News Service in Paris in their bureau. So I was in Paris for two and a half or three years.

Q: How did you get this Paris Herald job. This must have been like going to heaven in a way wasn't it?

WILSON: It was unbelievable. I had been on a story that had a lot to do with a guy, I guess he was the public affairs vice president of the American Express Company in Baltimore. We got to be fairly friendly. He asked me what I wanted to do next, and I told him I wanted to leave Baltimore. I was thinking of a classmate of mine working on a newspaper in Texas and I was thinking of writing him to see if he would like to swap jobs. Texas sounded like a more lively place than Baltimore did. He said he was public relations director of the American Express company in Paris for several years and got to be fairly good friends with Hills, who was publisher of the Paris paper. He happened to know there was a vacancy there. They have had several Baltimore Sun people, and they have always turned out very well. Would you like me to write him and see if he would like to hear from you? I said, "Yes I would." Sometime later I was down at a murder story near Stillville, Maryland and I got a call from my office saying we've got a telegram from Larry Hills offering you a job. "Keep it. I'll be right there." In any event that's what I did. It was just as lucky and as silly as that.

Q: May I add for the record that the Paris Herald in those days and for many years on was the pre-eminent American newspaper in Europe. It was a top job. It was associated with the New York Herald which was a close rival to the New York Times in those days.

WILSON: The Paris Herald was the European edition of the New York Herald. There also was a Paris Tribune which was a European edition of the Chicago Tribune. The Chicago Tribune folded and the Herald bought some part of it, so the old Paris Herald became the Paris Herald-Tribune. Then somewhere along the line the New York Herald bought the... Was there a New York Tribune? I'm not sure. Yes! There was the New York Herald Tribune. So these two things worked together. Anyhow it was the Paris Herald Tribune which was the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune. That's what it was when I went there.

Q: I might say that the New York Herald Tribune had some of the top writers in many fields. I particularly think of the sports writers, but others were extremely... I mean it was a classy paper.

Could you tell me about, I mean here you are a boy from Baltimore and you are in the big city of lights. What was your impression of Paris in the late 1930's?

WILSON: I roomed with Jim Lardner who was one of Ring Lardner's four sons.

Q: Ring Lardner being a pre-eminent writer and columnist of that era.

WILSON: Yes. Jim Lardner and Walter Kerr. There were two Walter Kerrs. This was the one who was head of the Paris Bureau and then head of the European Bureau and head of the Washington Bureau. Not the theater Walter Kerr. The three of us lived together. It was a night job. We went to work at 6:00 to 8:00 for the so called day side of the paper, and then went out to dinner for an hour and a half or two hours and then came back because of the time difference, the US. News was just beginning to come in around 10:00 there so then we worked until 2:00 maybe a little less than that because you could be out at a nightclub if you want at 2:00 and things were still going on in Paris nightclubs. Then you sleep eight hours and get up and have the whole day free. It doesn't work that way now, but it was a great time.

Q: What did the job consist of?

WILSON: It was mainly re-writing. You'd get little one or two sentence or paragraph items from New York. For the follow story, you kept the story in the files and you expanded a one or two sentence lead in to a new lead on an old story.

Q: I can speak as a retired Foreign Service Officer, I was Consul General in Naples, I read it every day. Then it was the Paris Times Herald. It was an amalgamate but essentially it is the same paper. This is where you got your news and it served beautifully.

WILSON: It was very good. I don't know why the New York Times tried to put out a European edition after WW II; it didn't work. It was just a shrunk down New York Times. This was a paper by itself.

Q: Yes it really is unique. It was very influential. How about the French? Were you getting involved with the French while you were there or were they a difficult people to crack?

WILSON: No. I'm afraid that Americans are not much better than other people when they live in other countries. They tend to hang around with their own. The staff of the Paris Herald Tribune at that time was roughly divided into two groups. One were leftovers from WWI and the other were people who had been there a year or less. I fell in with some expatriate American news people who had been there long enough to have had a lot of French friends and French relations. Actually I got married over there.

Q: What about the great political waves going on in France. As Americans were you observing the rise of the United Front and the almost fascist right in French politics. I mean this was all getting very close to WWII. Or were you all sort of focused on what was happening back home?

WILSON: I think when I left the sit down strikes were on in Detroit, but so was the Spanish

Civil War, and that's what I sort of grew up on politically. As a matter of fact, I had notions that I could volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln brigade, part of the International Brigade. As a matter of fact, Jim Lardner did and was killed. We were absolutely obsessed with the rise of fascism and the Spanish Civil War and the nonsense in Italy.

Q: You are talking about Mussolini and his thing and the rise of Hitler.

WILSON: Yes the rise of Hitler. That's what we talked about. That was the overwhelming political interest at that time.

Q: What was your impression of the French body politic? Did you have a feeling that this was a country that was going to sort of be the bastion of democracy?

WILSON: France was? I'm really getting into very fuzzy memory. I think Leon Blum was still in when I got there in 1937. But the failure indeed refusal of the French and British before you get to the Americans to do anything for the Spanish was our dominant scandal of the times as far as I was concerned. And certainly some of the people I spent time, I didn't go to the Deux Magots. I went to the Dome. I walked home after the paper and there was always somebody sitting there in the Dome I and you would sit around there and have a few beers and pretty soon the sun's coming up. There goes the day.

Q: You left there when? No you had sat a certain point moved over to the International News Service.

WILSON: Do you remember when the Duke of Windsor was coming to the United States for a trip and there was a big story in the American press. The Duke of Windsor was a great pal of a Frenchman who was supposed to be the originator of a system of industrial production that increases the speed...

Q: We can fill this in later but I know what you mean. It was a time management system.

WILSON: That's right and some Baltimore labor leader made a particularly nasty speech about the Duke of Windsor coming over. Because of his friendship with this dirty guy who was speeding up production on the industrial line, and he canceled his trip. That is to say the Duke of Windsor canceled his trip because of this lack of welcome. It so happened that the INS guy, poor fellow, had been around the Crillon Hotel all day waiting to find out whether the Duke was going to the United States tomorrow or not. And unfortunately the bar was on the same floor and he got drunk up in the course of the day. I wrote the story in the office. He canceled his trip at 11:00 at night which as I say was a big story in the U.S. I wrote the story for the Paris Herald. Unfortunately the INS guy had gotten crocked and missed the story entirely. As a result, the head of the INS Bureau fired him and hired me. So I was with the INS for several years.

Q: What type of work were you doing for the INS?

WILSON: The INS was strictly office writing. Lots of mailboard stuff. Background stories and feature stories. Otherwise just compiling news. We had a very able French journalist who

covered Parliament for us. Otherwise we just read the news.

Q: You say Parliament, you mean Chamber of Deputies.

WILSON: Chamber of Deputies, yes.

Q: You were in Paris until when?

WILSON: '49 until '51 or '52.

Q: Could you talk a bit about Averell Harriman. I mean he was a major figure in American diplomacy for many years. During the time you dealt with him in Paris, what was your impression and how did he operate?

WILSON: Well I did know Harriman very well and worked with him several times. I don't know anybody who worked with him, if they could work with him, who didn't love him. He was a man who was absolutely totally committed to what he was doing. He worked like a dog. He expected you to also, but he didn't expect you to do anything he didn't do himself. He was really a wonderfully effective person. Everybody felt they had to respect him. I'm not talking about the non-Americans with which we had to deal. I think quite apart from the fact that sure he was a very welcome man – he was an ambassador, and he was running in this case the Marshall Plan. He was running a program that the Europeans were absolutely dependent on. But I think he was, now that we begin to talk about it, very persuasive in private. He was never a very good speaker. If you are talking about diplomacy, I'm talking about private diplomacy. He always knew what he was talking about. I think he was probably more responsible than any other individual in forcing the Europeans to take the Marshall Plan in a way that I think became ultimately its most important impact. That is to say, I don't know if he's responsible for this but we, the United States Government, refused to deal with the French and the Italians and the rest of them, nation by nation, which they all wanted. They thought they could get more from us I guess. He insisted that it be a European plan, that they put together their requirements subject to our review and approval, but that they do it themselves; but that they not do what all of them tried to start doing which was to face their terrible economic problems on a national basis. All of them wanted to deal with their problems by cutting imports and exports. They wanted to nationalize their currencies, and in any event, I think he had more to do with it than anybody else, insisting on a daily, practical day to day basis that this was a European recovery program. They had to present their combined requirements. We would allocate against it. They would then have to re-divide it among themselves. They could not do it by nationalist priorities

Q: Germany at this time of course was not in it. I mean was Germany in it too?

WILSON: Yes, from the beginning.

Q: Your job again was making sure the European public was aware. Looking at it sort of country by country, we've already looked at England, what about France? Did you find any difficulty getting the message out to the French?

WILSON: Well the Marshall Plan information program in Europe, I believe, probably engaged

in the most open, active, large scale propaganda warfare that we've ever had. The Russians were out to ruin the Marshall Plan. You remember they refused to...

Q Yes they made Czechoslovakia withdraw from the Marshall Plan aid and all that.

WILSON: The first ships arrived in Europe in Le Harve with Marshall Plan goods. The dock workers refused to unload them. They had to be unloaded by the French Army. The mine workers not only went on strike but they flooded the coal mines in France and Belgium. Some of the European governments, as I said before, had Communists in them as part of their coalition cabinets. This being a quite understandable reward for having conducted active anti fascist, anti German activity during the occupation. The only people who really fought were the Communists in some of those countries, and they were sometimes taken in to those cabinets and had people in the governments. While they weren't at the top nonetheless, you're in a – I'm thinking of France in the early days – country that is short of paper for example. It turns out there's a Communist in control of paper allocations, and you can believe me the Communist press gets plenty of paper, while the anti-communist press doesn't. The same sort of thing could be said about film stocks and that sort of thing. What's more they had money. They could afford publishing when some other people couldn't. If you've ever walked down a street where the walls only on one side are covered with posters, and they are all the same posters and they are all the same source, they carry a sense of power.

Q: Oh yes I've seen it. The workers with the sickle and hammer. You really feel like they are the movement of the future.

WILSON: Exactly! The Communists had a monopoly on the walls of Paris. So this was a real fight. So we did everything. We put the story in every media. We ran traveling exhibits in trucks and in trains and on barges down the canals of Europe. We had access to the non communist press completely. We could get our stuff in the British newsreels but the newsreels ran, I can't think of the neighborhood of Paris, it was almost completely communist. It didn't run in those theaters because if it did they'd get bricks through the screen. I remember every now and then getting a call from a French mayor from some town saying the local communists tried to bust up your exhibit this afternoon. We've got them arrested. Do you want to charge them? We never did; that's not the point. I remember we published a paper for French unionists. It used to get thrown off the train sometimes as the train went over the river somewhere. So it was a good fight.

Q: How did you find the French bureaucracy at that time? Was it difficult to, I mean the ones with whom you would have contact. Were the ones who were not Communist sympathetic to the Communists or not?

WILSON: No. They were trying to get France back on its feet, back in business so they could tell us they didn't like us. They were very active allies.

Q: By this time it was quite clear to everyone who was involved that the Soviet Union was the enemy and these were their surrogate warriors in a way. Was there any doubt in anyone's mind what the battle was about?

WILSON: No. Well of course there was. There were always left wing French intellectuals to worry about, but they were also hard to deal with. In due course even the French got into it. They didn't like us. We gave all of these things to the program in France, but they didn't have much choice, and they put up with it when it was easy to do so. We would rather have their name on it than ours anyhow. You know sometimes we'd want to do some things they just didn't know how to do. That was embarrassing. The French were also curious about things. This was probably about half way through the Marshall Plan and emphasis was starting to shift, I think Paul Hoffman had a thing about productivity; that was the key to manufacturing and industrial success. I remember we sent a group of journalists over once to the U.S. to visit some high productivity plants in the U.S. They came back and all wrote the same set of columns. I'm sure this is not true, they all had the same title, at least a number had the same title, "Quest que c'est la productivitee?" They were intrigued. They hadn't thought of productivity. It was a strange idea to them. So it had a kind of intellectual level to it.

Q: Did you find there was any sort of approach you could make to the left wing intellectuals or did you almost write them off as somebody you couldn't make any impression on? I'm not talking about the hard line Communists; I mean the...

WILSON: Well, some of our most active help came from the Socialists. They knew the Communists. They knew you couldn't work with them. By this time there was an anti communist free trade union.

Q: Yes. There were two trade unions. One was dominated by the Communists and the other was not. I forget the name. We had a representative, I don't know if you knew him, Irving Brown. Did you work with Irving Brown at all?

WILSON: Yes. I don't think I did personally but I remember the French had something called the Quai Liberte. They were anti Communist. This is when I thought about the walls. And they did some wonderful things. There would be these huge Communist posters up. They would invent a little piece to go across it to paste over it. I remember the French, no doubt with some encouragement from us, were about to extend their military service from 12 months to 18 months. Of course the Communists took a battle against this. They had posters all over the place "Down with the 18 months." The Quai Liberte people made a little banner kind of thing that would go across these things and it said, "We want 36 months like they have in Russia." This killed it. They just couldn't get anywhere with it. Who was the famous head of the French Communist Party for many years?

Q: Maurice Thorez?

WILSON: Thorez. Of course. Thorez became very ill, or apparently very ill. The Russians sent a special plane to Cairo to pick him up and take him to a hospital presumably on the theory that he couldn't get competent treatment in France. You also know how any time any communist would get put in jail they would slap the posters all over the place "Liberee whatever the guy's name was." So as soon as the Russians took Thorez to Russia, they plastered France with things saying "Liberee Thorez." So they had some real competition. The French were active too.

Q: *You finished up in 1953?*

WILSON: '52.

Q: *'52. How did you feel about it when you left? Sort of you had done your bit and as far as you were concerned people in France and all pretty well knew what we were doing?*

WILSON: Yes. I'd like to think a job well done. I thought like most of us, there would be a United states of Europe within a decade. That was 40 years ago and they haven't made it yet. I'm not sure they are ever going to make it. Yes, thoroughly convinced that it had been a very wise policy and a very effective program, and it was on the right course.

Now I think the Marshall Plan was actually kind of deceptive for many Americans. Because when we went over there the continent was a mess, and we fixed it in a few years. It didn't really occur to us we didn't do it. All we really did was provide the one thing that was missing from their point of view. The industrial revolution had started there. They knew how to build factories and bridges, things like that. They had just been bombed out, and they needed steel etc. etc. which you could only get from one place in the world, and it took dollars to buy it. We provided them with the dollars, that's all. That they didn't have and couldn't get anywhere else. They made the recovery plans. We provided them with the money to buy the stuff they needed, and so it worked perfectly. But it gave some of us I'm afraid, the notion that we know how to fix a country if they're in trouble. I think a good deal of our foreign aid program probably was driven by that myth. That's not quite the same thing as going to a country that has no experience and in some cases effectively no government that knows how to work. I think we had that illusion that we knew how to do things and in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the same thing doesn't apply. But I think we also failed to understand the significance of forcing them to decide what it was they wanted and what they needed. I think when it came around to running the, what did they call that in the Kennedy administration?

Q: *The Alliance for Progress.*

WILSON: The Alliance for Progress, we stuck to a country to country basis. I think it was because our people probably liked to do it that way. We were used to running those countries.

WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE
Consular Officer
Paris (1939-1940)

Ambassador William C. Trimble was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He entered the Foreign Service in 1931. His career included assignments in Seville, Buenos Aires, Estonia, Paris, Mexico City, London, the Hague, Rio de Janeiro, and Bonn, and an ambassadorship to Cambodia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Well, now, then you were really thrown into a hot spot. Could you tell where you went and what you were doing?

TRIMBLE: Because of my work in graduate school, the courses there in economics and finance, I was transferred to Paris.

Q: This was in 1939.

TRIMBLE: We arrived four weeks before war broke out.

Q: As I say, it's a vintage 1939.

TRIMBLE: Yes, it was. My wife and I went over leaving the children. We were hoping to get an apartment somewhere in Paris. Of course, they never got there. I was meant to be working on financial matters, but then when I got there, there was such a rush of people – immigrants, refugees, the German Jewish refugees wanting to get into the United States – that I was put on the visa desk, as also were several other officers. And we did that until war was declared.

Q: Could I ask you a question? Because this is really a very crucial part of American policy in this period. What was our attitude? I mean, you know, there you were on the visa desk, and you had people trying to get out, particularly the Jews. And, of course, we know now what was waiting for those that didn't get out and that was the gas ovens for many.

TRIMBLE: We didn't know that.

Q: We didn't know it then.

TRIMBLE: No.

Q: And it's been claimed that the State Department was indifferent and all. What was your feeling? And what were your instructions at that time in dealing with that situation?

TRIMBLE: Well, we knew about Kristallnacht and having served in Europe. –

Q: Kristallnacht being – would you explain what it was?

TRIMBLE: Kristallnacht was when Hitler's Brownshirts attacked and burnt synagogues and broke the windows of Jewish stores in Germany. And that was the beginning, really, of the persecution of the Jews and the Jewish population in Germany. Many of them had gotten out mainly to France, but most of them remained in Germany.

Our job was do everything we could to help them get out. Immigration law was bent. Regulations were bent. For example, there used to be a provision of the law that said that skilled agriculturists had a preference. Jewish groups in this country formed a school in Paris where in three months refugees studied agriculture. Well, that school was a subterfuge and we knew it.

But we overlooked that.

There was also an institution called the New School For Scientific Research in New York, and people would come to join it. I gave so many visas to so-called “professors” that I’m sure the number of people on the staff of the New School For Research was far greater than the number of students. Yes, we leaned over backwards. Indeed I was criticized several times, by the Immigration Service for being overly lenient. And the rest of us were doing it, too. We were doing everything we could to get the refugees out.

Q: I come from a basic consular background, and often you get people at the top who get very consistent on the regulations within an embassy, but down below the vice consuls who are dealing with the problem, see what the problem is and do everything they can to help.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: How about in the Embassy? Were you getting any sort of pressure from above, say, “What are you doing?” Or even from Washington?

TRIMBLE: Well, the Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, William Bullitt, was very much in favor with what we were doing. Actually, he had Jewish blood, but that had nothing to do with it. But he believed strongly in what we were trying to do. He gave us all the support he could. Washington wouldn’t tell us directly. But, yes, it was unwritten that you do all you can.

Q: You had that feeling?

TRIMBLE: And we twisted regulations. We really twisted regulations, and we got an awful lot of people out. And I’m sure it was done in other posts, too. Then war was declared.

Q: This was September 1, 1939.

TRIMBLE: Yes. By that time, we knew that war was coming. There was no question about that. People would come down from the Embassy in Berlin who told us about it, and we realized that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement meant the Russians would not help the Allies. Yes, we knew that war was imminent.

And so the visa work practically ended for there were no more ships to carry refugees, except for those who got to go through Portugal and for a few to Holland. I then worked on trying to get the American tourists out. And that was quite a job. There were thousands of American tourists. Practically no ships! How are we going to get them out? The Department arranged to have River Line boats sent over.

Q: Fall river-line boats? These were coastal cruisers.

TRIMBLE: Yes, but they put some planking on the side to make them a little bit more seaworthy. After all, it wasn’t a bad season of the year for the passage to the U.S. A couple of American liners were still running, the Washington and Manhattan.

Q: What was this?

TRIMBLE: The U.S. Line ships, the Washington and Manhattan.

Q: Oh, yes.

TRIMBLE: But then the French issued a regulation that you had to have special visas to get out of the country, and the French red tape can be something. So I was put in charge of that work, getting people out, American tourists out. I was assisted by a young naval officer who had been over studying naval architecture in France, and a young Marine officer who had been attending some military school. We worked out a system to get them out – special trains, group exit, etc. And we did get them out, except for a few who refused to leave. But that's another matter. It was quite a job, and ships were awfully crowded.

Then came the "Sitzkreig" period.

Q: This was the so-called "phoney" war, the sitzkreig, the sitting war.

TRIMBLE: This was the winter of 1939-40 and the time of the Soviet attack on Finland. Next the Germans invaded Norway, followed by Denmark, Holland and Belgium and the war really heated up again. During that winter we had, under Washington's instructions, worked very hard to get all resident Americans, to leave, requiring that their passports be validated to remain in France. Unless they had a very good reason, they had to go home. The reasons some gave to remain in France were really absurd. But we did get most American residents out. Unfortunately a few refused to leave.

Then came the invasion of France. In preparation for that period – we knew it might happen – the Embassy had been divided into two sections. In anticipation that Paris might be bombed or gassed and so forth, most of the Embassy personnel would move to southern France, and only a small staff remain in Paris. Actually things moved so fast that the two became three, one followed the French government to Bordeaux, one went to a place in southern France, and a nucleus remained in Paris. Since I knew some German – my wife spoke it quite well, but nevertheless was evacuated – I stayed on in Paris along with Bob Murphy and Ambassador Bullitt and not more than six or seven others. So I saw the Germans arrive, which was really pretty awesome.

Q: But to go back a little, did you see Ambassador Bullitt operating prior to the sort of collapse, the breakthrough and all, but before that?

TRIMBLE: I'd worked with Ambassador Bullitt. Some people criticize him. I know he had enemies. But he was very able, particularly for that job. He spoke French fluently, and he was a great speaker. I remember when we were doing visa work, he would come down almost every day and see how we were doing, hurrying us to get –

Q: I might say this is quite interesting. I speak as a consular officer. It's usually a cold day in

hell when an ambassador gets close to a visa line, even in a case of emergency.

TRIMBLE: Oh, he did. He was very good at that. However he and Sumner Welles did not get along well together. That was one of the difficulties we had. Welles was Under Secretary when he was there and a great friend of President Roosevelt. I never knew all the inside details. That wasn't my business. But I thought he was a very good ambassador.

Q: Looking at this as things developed, what was the Embassy doing during, say, this period outside of the visa issue, during the sitzkreig? I mean, were we going out?

TRIMBLE: We had to get Americans out.

Q: So really we were concerned with day-to-day immediate operations, not looking at the greater picture or something. You were just busy.

TRIMBLE: I was not in the political side of it, you know. I was assigned to the Embassy for financial and economic work. And trying to get Americans out, that was my big job after the immigration stopped, and then doing economic financial reporting as well. Reporting on political matters was done by others. Except I do know when the Germans finally arrived, just before they arrived, we had to burn all the archives. In those days in the Foreign Service reports or dispatches were always bound in books. Well, to take those damn bindings off, and put them in the furnace was quite an operation. But we did it and burned all the codes. The process left the Place de la Concorde covered with ashes.

Q: Well, how did we feel? I mean, after all, we were not at war at the time. How did you all feel?

TRIMBLE: We were probably going to war. I certainly did and I remember telling Mr. Bullitt that having been in the ROTC at college and given a 2nd Lieutenant's commission in the Reserve, I felt I should rejoin my unit in Maryland.

This was in 1940, early 1940. He said, "I think you're more useful to your country as a consul in Paris than you would be a second lieutenant, field artillery, horse-drawn reserve division in Maryland," which was quite true. But we all felt that way. We knew it was going to happen.

Q: In the Foreign Service the feeling was, "It's coming!"

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. There's no question about it. At least, it certainly was in Paris and I should think elsewhere, too. Yes, we knew we would enter the war. But we didn't know when. Isolation was so strong. After all Senator Borah, who was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, said there won't be a war and if there was one, we must stay out. But we in the field knew that the war was coming, and also believed that we would get in it sooner or later.

Q: Well, now, then we come to the point, if you would describe, please, how you felt and what you saw when the Germans came in and how the Embassy reacted at that point.

TRIMBLE: Only a skeleton staff was left. Beforehand, we had seen the poor refugees from Holland, particularly Belgium, passing through. It was a pathetic sight. These poor people pushing baby carriages, dogs running around, and then, of course, French refugees from the north. There's nothing we could do for them. The Norwegians, I will say, had it organized – although Norway had already been occupied. The Norwegians in Paris organized soup kitchens, and that helped. However, the French government was not prepared for it.

And so then after the Germans came, or just before the Germans came, the Embassy took over interests, foreign interests, of England, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, one or two other countries, which meant that I was given that job in addition to the financial matters. We put up signs in German, English and French, "This building, is under the protection of the United States of America." We put them on every apartment, every house where staff members of those diplomatic missions had lived.

I also arranged to have all the furniture and belongings of U.K. staff members moved to the British Embassy. We had truckloads, horse-drawn vehicles, bring the stuff in. When Goering wanted to take over the British Embassy as his headquarters, it was full of furniture. The British said when they went back after Paris was liberated, the floors were falling in. [Laughter] It was one of those funny situations.

Let's see, what was I talking about – oh, yes – getting the Americans out and the Germans came in, and they tried to – Mr. Bullitt felt strongly that an American ambassador or an American minister always remained in Paris at the time of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and –

Q: Particularly during the commune and all that. The famous thing during the siege of Paris.

TRIMBLE: Yes, during the War of 1870 and aftermath.

Q: The Ambassador stayed on.

TRIMBLE: The American Ambassador must stay there, which he did. He was later recalled when the French government was established in Vichy and Bob Murphy was temporarily in charge. So we got nearly all of the Americans out and we helped the British and other foreigners to do so.

Just before the Germans arrived, I remember, Italy entered the war and kicked all the English out of Italy, civilians, officials, etc. and they all came in trains to France. This was just in early June – Paris fell on June 14, 1940, and this was about a week before. Those poor English people didn't know what to do. They couldn't speak French, and the British Embassy had gone, the Consulate had gone and we must look after them. Just before leaving, the Consul informed me that arrangements had been made for special trains to take them from Paris to Brest and thence by boat to England. Most managed to find their way to the Consulate where I instructed them to go to the Gare de l'Ouest. There I found thousands of people milling around the station including several hundreds of English. One was standing on top a pissoir holding an umbrella shouting "Britishers here!" [Laughter]

And then when I went inside to see the Stationmaster, he said, “All trains are stopped. The Germans are Stuka-bombing all the trains.”

Q: Stuka being a type of dive-bomber.

TRIMBLE: Yes. So it was pretty awful, these poor people. But they finally got out somehow or other.

Q: Were you there when the Germans came to our Embassy?

TRIMBLE: Absolutely.

Q: This was a rather tricky period. We didn't quite know what was going to happen.

TRIMBLE: Well, the 13th of June, I think it was, Paris was declared an open city. The French government was gone. The Germans were outside, hadn't come in. They were waiting to come in the next day. They were shaving and getting their uniforms pressed to make a great impression, which they did, on the population.

Mr. Bullitt thought there would be rioting in the streets, so he made all of us – his small staff – spend the night in the Embassy. My room, where I had a cot, faced on the *Plâce de la Concorde*. It was a beautiful night. I remember the stars and moon shining, and we all were upset, of course. I looked about 4:00 in the morning, 5:00 maybe, because the sun was coming up, and you could see German helmets behind the *bec-de-gas*, the street lights, in the *Plâce* and then more poured in, hundreds and hundreds filling the entire square.

We had heard the German soldiers were in pretty poor shape physically because of malnutrition after the First World War. They weren't. They were well-fed and husky, tough-looking and able. No question about it. And they poured in all that day. And then afterward came the reserve groups, the German reserves, and they were rather older men who composed a military garrison. But they were also able and almost as well disciplined. We also saw many of the fifth column people who had been paid by the Germans.

Q: These are the French.

TRIMBLE: French. And, of course, many of them were Communists, because Germany and Russia had reached an agreement in 1939, and the Communist Party in France had helped the Nazis. There's no question about that. It was pretty awful.

Q: In the first place, were you around when the first meeting between somebody official from the German side and –

TRIMBLE: Yes. Mr. Bullitt left shortly thereafter on instructions from Washington. He was told to get out. Bob Murphy was left in charge, and he spoke German quite well – he was Ambassador Murphy afterwards. He met with the Germans, and they wanted to take over the

British Embassy. We stopped them. I remember seeing one German soldier putting up a telephone line on the – tying it on to the gates of our Embassy running over to the hotel next door where they had their headquarters. We stopped that, of course, but we had to deal with the Germans.

I had to – that's another long story. I had to deal with one German who was an officer in the German Army intelligence service, who had been a Rhodes Scholar after WWI. He spoke excellent English but claimed to hate the British because of his experience there. However, he was in charge of dealing with all the British still in Paris and all the Americans, a nasty little type, but he had lots of guts. On returning to Paris in 1949, I found out that he'd been a British agent the whole time! His mother had been part Jewish. He was actually very anti-Nazi, secretly working the whole time for the British until finally caught and shot. In my mind he was a nasty person but tough and very able. We saw all sorts of strange things like that.

But then France had surrendered. The government at Bordeaux had been forced to agree to a demarcation between north and south. Germans occupied all the northern part of France and the coastal area on the Southwest. The capital was moved to Vichy with Marshal Petain as Head of State. There, as you know, we had a small Embassy.

Q: At Vichy, yes?

TRIMBLE: Yes, Vichy. I remained in Paris until September, 1940 and then transferred to the Embassy at Vichy.

Q: Well, during this period of time from June 14th until September what were you doing in our sort of "rump" Embassy in Paris?

TRIMBLE: I was trying to do whatever I could on financial reporting, which was my job. The Germans were flooding the country with their occupation Marks with bad effects on the economy – a recourse to barter, black marketing, etc. As the codes had been destroyed, we had to rely on couriers to get reports out. Once in a while one would come down from Germany, and he'd carry the pouch back to Berlin and from there forward it on. But it was hard communicating with Washington, very difficult. So much of my work was helping such Americans that still remained to get out some how or other, and protection of foreign interests, seeing that the Germans did not steal – which they did – things.

Oh, there's one more story which I'd forgotten. Well, four days before the Germans arrived, the French Minister of Finance, urgently called concerning the French gold reserves. They had been shipped to Casablanca, and the Government wanted them carried by an American ship, the USS Pittsburgh, to the United States.

Q: The American naval cruiser.

TRIMBLE: Well, so Bob Murphy, and I together with an American secretary went to the Ministry to draw up the transfer document in both French and English. As you know, in French, where we put a period, \$1,000.75, they put a comma instead of that. And when we put a comma,

\$10,000, they'd put a period, and more trouble over that. [Laughter]

Q: Oh, yes. Because we're talking about millions and millions of dollars worth of gold there, and you have to get it just right.

TRIMBLE: And it was really something. All this back and forth, "How are we going to reconcile this in a legal document?" But we finally did, and the gold arrived in the U.S.

Q: Robert Murphy, of course, was one of the great figures in American diplomacy in this period, and you were working with him. How did you see him operating, and what sort of a person was he to work with?

TRIMBLE: He had great charm, very Irish charm, very able, people liked him, a very smooth operator, and intelligent. He was very – I wouldn't say he was an intellectual type. I don't think he was as bright as Mr. Bullitt, but he had more stability than Mr. Bullitt who was emotional, and Bob Murphy wasn't. He was a very, very able officer.

There's one nice story about Bob Murphy. He had been consul in Munich before the war, just the time when Hitler was coming on the scene. And one of his great friends was the Papal Nuncio. Do you know this story?

Q: No, I don't know the story, but I know the Papal Nuncio because he later became Pius XII.

TRIMBLE: That's right. One day when they were meeting together Bob said, "I'm worried about this man, Hitler, and what he may do" to which the Nuncio replied, "it's nothing, just one of those passing things." When many years later, Bob asked his old friend, "How about that?" to which the Pope responded, "Well then I didn't have papal infallibility." [Laughter]

Q: Well, then how did Murphy deal with the Germans?

TRIMBLE: He spoke German well. Yes, and he stood up for our rights, everything, and they respected him. At that period, yes, he was very good with them. Later he was assigned to Vichy and then to Washington, but returned on a short visit in the Spring of 1941. By then Admiral Leahy had been appointed Ambassador there, an excellent choice.

Q: There was North Africa.

TRIMBLE: That came afterwards.

Q: Yes.

How did he deal with the Germans? I mean, what was the relationship with the Germans?

TRIMBLE: Bob Murphy?

Q: Yes.

TRIMBLE: At what time?

Q: After they came in. Was it sort of a very standoffish situation?

TRIMBLE: No, because Bob was not that type of person. He stood up for our rights and made sure the Germans respected our rights as neutral. But he wasn't antagonistic. He said, in a sense, "You can't do this!" He'd tell them very firmly what our situation was, and they had to acknowledge, and they did, by and large. But then he was moved shortly afterwards down to Vichy. And so just a small group of us remained, a skeleton force.

Q: And what did you do then? I mean, again, I'm interested in this relationship with the Germans.

TRIMBLE: Since I had to handle the British interests and Americans living there, I had to deal with this one German, as I told you.

Q: The nasty type.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: Who was a secret agent.

TRIMBLE: A fellow whose name –

Q: You can fill it in later, because you'll get a transcript.

TRIMBLE: I can't remember his name. I have it in notes somewhere. [Rostin] I had to deal with him when the Germans would try to arrest the Americans for alleged spying or some other charge. And that took a lot of time. Then also seeing that they respected buildings under our protection, homes of people, and did not interfere with the movements of household effects to the British Embassy, and so on. So it was a standoffish type of thing, but I had to deal with him, because we were neutral, and he was responsible for matters concerning American civilians and British civilians. And, as I said, tough as hell.

Also I was doing what financial reporting I could, what was happening to the French finances as we saw it in Paris and with the Germans flooding the market with their occupation marks.

Q: Wasn't this a peculiar thing, because this was an Embassy sitting where an ambassador and all had moved, the French government had left there. You must have felt that you were dealing on borrowed time.

TRIMBLE: We were, in a sense, but we kept on. Actually, the Embassy remained on until Pearl Harbor. We kept it on an even smaller staff but then it was interned, of course.

Q: Well, you were transferred down to Vichy.

TRIMBLE: To Vichy.

Q: What were you doing down in Vichy and what was the situation there?

TRIMBLE: Doc Matthews, H. Freeman Matthews, was the Chargé. Bob Murphy had already left for Washington and Mr. Bullitt had resigned. It was a very small Embassy. We had a military attaché and a naval attaché in Paris, and, let's see, three 3rd Secretaries – Douglas MacArthur, Woodruff Wallner and me, and a couple of American clerks. We had cable communications and a code room and thus sent and received messages in code with Washington.

Doug and Wallner worked with Doc Matthews on political matters. Mine were largely financial and economic. I dealt with representatives of the Bank of France and Ministry of Finance and was able to work out an arrangement to help the British civilians living in southern France. The French owed the British quite a bit of money from the period where they were fighting together before the fall of France. So to pay that off an arrangement was worked out that the French would give me so much, transfer to me so much – or rather to the Embassy – a sum of money, hundreds of thousands of francs, of which, in turn, went through the Consulate General in Marseille and Lyon Consulate to provide a small monthly stipend to each English subject.

And then we tried to work – I worked very hard with Ted Achilles, who was then the third secretary in London, through cable, to have a ship come over from England which would take back to France a number of the French soldiers who had been evacuated from Dunkerque, and wanted to come home – France was then out of the war – and return with British who were stuck in France. We had to get permission, of course, clearance for the ship from the Germans, the Italians, the British and so forth.

We finally worked the thing out. It was called Djenne. But then the British didn't want to leave. I remember once I got so angry when one of them said: "Well, can we have – we always play bridge together – our friends in the next cabin?" Another said: "I don't want to go back to England. It's cold, and I'm used to living in Italy and so I must have a warm climate. If you get me down to South Africa it would be different."

Q: Wasn't P.G. Wodehouse one of those then?

TRIMBLE: If he was one, I don't remember him. It was the darnedest. Anyway, the French came back, but very few British went home.

Again on the subject of foreign interests protection, a number of British soldiers had been hidden in northern France after Dunkerque and in French peasant homes. The French underground was very, very good. It smuggled many out across the demarcation line, which was the line between where the French Vichy government controlled and the Germans occupied zone, and some came to the Embassy for help. As they were not civilians, all I could do was give them enough francs to reach an internment camp the French had set up for British soldiers who had managed to escape to unoccupied France and where under the terms of the Armistice Agreement to be held until the end of the war. The site chosen happened to be on the coast near Marseille, and it also

happened that the guarding was relaxed on nights when a British submarine would anchor offshore. [Laughter] So it was quite a transient camp.

Most of the people in the French government – not most, I won't say most, but the ones I was working with, were pro-British or rather very anti-German, I'll put it that way. What they would do in the daytime was something different at night. And there was some fascinating stories.

I remember one time we received a note from the Papal Nuncio in Vichy that he had been called on for assistance by a young Canadian student seminarian and since we had Canadian interests under our protection, would we handle the matter. So I arranged to receive him. He was dressed in a soutane, one of those flat hats worn by French priests, black shoes with buckles on the top and having a tonsure. And he was obviously Canadian which I could tell from his accent which was French-Canadian, not French. He said that he had been in Paris and studying at a seminary when the war broke out and then after the Germans came they said, "You get out. You're non-combatant. We don't want to feed you here. Go south." So he came to Vichy, and went to the Papal Nuncio who told him to see us. Under questioning, however, I found he was actually a Canadian Army officer who had been hidden by a French family in northern France. He later had gotten to Paris where the French equivalent of our Army's G2 had provided him with priest's clothing to get into the unoccupied zone. He had also fooled the Nuncio. The French can be very clever.

Q: I think Canada should be spelled out, that here we were, we were neutral, but we were doing everything we could. I mean, there was no doubt in our minds of not trying to help the British at that point.

TRIMBLE: We were anti-German, but after all this country was still neutral. The President knew that we would probably get into war, but the Congress didn't want us to get entangled. We had gotten into the First World War and we mustn't do so again was a strong neutrality feeling in this country. So we were –

Q: But within the Embassy in Vichy, I mean, you knew what we were supposed to do and you were doing it.

TRIMBLE: We did a lot of things we shouldn't have done.

Q: But this is almost instinctive then?

TRIMBLE: Surreptitiously, yes. Instinctively, I suppose. Yet we felt that the people in the Department knew, what we were doing and the President also knew. But we had to do it very carefully.

Then I had another kind of job. The Red Cross was sending over some shiploads of wheat flour to be given free to French school children because of malnutrition. It was pretty bad. The Red Cross representative sent to arrange the details was a nice fellow, but he couldn't speak French, so I worked with him. And the French ministry with whom we dealt said: "How were we going to fit this free wheat flour for children alone into our bread rationing system? Maybe you

shouldn't send it at all." You know, the bureaucratic attitude, "You can't do this! It's against the regulations." Well, we got it all worked out. But it was quite a lot of work.

At times I would go to see the former governor of the Bank of France, Jacques Rueff, who was Jewish or half Jewish, I think, and while retired or forced out of the Bank was living in southern France under the protection of Marshal Petain for his wife had been Mme. Petain's goddaughter. We would discuss financial matters, and I would tell him about news not reported in the controlled press. A very good man as were many in the Foreign Ministry, younger officers, I knew and in the Finance and Agriculture Ministries. Very anti-Hitler, very patriotic and some pro-British.

Q: Well, at that time, de Gaulle was not much of a figure, was he?

TRIMBLE: He was broadcasting, but he hadn't been, no. There was the feeling in France at the time of *pouriture*, meaning rottenness, that that had caused France's defeat. It had been rotten in the Popular Front Governments of the 1930s and further weakened by pacifism and Communist infiltration. But the military, by and large, were very French – not pro-English but anti-German.

Q: I suppose the French Navy was, of course, always anti-British.

TRIMBLE: Yes. And Admiral Darlan was very anti. He was jealous. That's traditional of the French Navy.

Speaking of that inspires an interesting story. The French before the Second World War had developed naval architecture to a very high degree. The British had many ships, but the French hadn't, and so were able to concentrate on a few. The Jean- Bart was one of them.

Q: Yes. As a battleship, the Richelieu.

TRIMBLE: Yes, the Richelieu and Jean-Bart.

Q: Dunkerque.

TRIMBLE: And they were very advanced in naval architecture. As I mentioned earlier, one of the young officers who helped me in 1939 had been a student of the subject in Paris. Well, in early 1941 the French Navy Ministry in Paris gave to our naval attaché, Hillencotter, who became afterwards head of the CIA –

Q: Hillencotter, Roscoe Hillencotter.

TRIMBLE: Gave him 10 or 15 large bags of blueprints for the Jean-Bart which, of course, was completely against the armistice terms.

Q: Oh, yes. Yes.

TRIMBLE: We were able to get them down – I never knew exactly how – from Paris to Vichy:

It was all very secret. There Doc Matthews said: “Bill, I want you to take the pouch – it’s a rather large pouch – over to Switzerland. And I can’t tell you what’s in it, but there are 15 or 20 bags.”

I was naturally suspicious but asked no questions only replying: “Yes, sir.”

So I took the train from Vichy to Lyon where you had to transfer to another one. Fortunately, there were porters to carry all this stuff to the second train where it filled my compartment. I was scared that something awful might happen, for the train passed through the German occupied zone. Regulations required that the window curtains be pulled down, lights turned off, and there I was in the compartment sitting on top of these bags for what seemed hours. Finally I raised a shade a little and seeing the lights of Switzerland thought, “Thank God!” I delivered the bags to the Consulate in Geneva where a regular courier would take them from there to Washington. But if the Germans had known, that train would have been stopped, and I would have disappeared. It was a scary thing.

Q: Oh! Well, you left there before our invasion of North Africa.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: We ended the whole Vichy period for us because then the Germans came in and took over all of France.

TRIMBLE: After Pearl Harbor.

Q: When did you leave? Well, even with Pearl Harbor, they didn’t come into Vichy. They didn’t come into Vichy until we landed in November of 1942.

TRIMBLE: That’s right. You’re quite right. Doc Matthews had left then, and the Vichy staff had been cut even further down. My wife had been evacuated in June, 1940. All the wives had to leave for the United States. I hadn’t seen my children in two years. I hadn’t had any home leave for three or four. So I asked to have home leave, and it was approved by the Department. This, I think, was June 1941 – maybe May or June, I don’t remember which month.

As Doc Matthews’ wife, who had joined him in Vichy, had to go back and see her children who were in school in this country, the Department said, “Both of you can go back together.” So we drove south – I spoke Spanish as well as French – in my car and got enough gasoline to get to the Spanish border and then on to Madrid, and finally to Lisbon where we both took the PanAm clipper back. So I got home.

Q: This is when?

TRIMBLE: June 1940.

Q: Well, now, before we go to that, we were mentioning at lunch – you mentioned there was an episode going way back about Eleanor Roosevelt.

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes.

Q: I wonder if we can put that in now?

TRIMBLE: Yes. In 1940, the Spanish Civil War was just over. A number of Spanish refugees who had fled to France were put in camps, internment camps, in Southern France – Gurs, Septfonds, Argeles and one or two others. At this time, as you recall, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement had been signed.

Q: This was about August of '39.

TRIMBLE: No, this was around March – well, they signed in August, 1939. This was January or February of 1940, before the French pulled out and France fell. The Russians were backing the Germans, and the Communist Party was very strong in Paris, still strong in France then, although the Russian influence was weakening. And they put out rumors about harsh treatment the French were giving to the Spanish refugees in these camps. Now, Mrs. Roosevelt had a very big, great heart, and thought about the refugees and so forth, was quite upset about it.

So she had the State Department instruct Mr. Bullitt that he send out somebody to inspect the camps to see whether the allegation was true or not. Since I spoke both Spanish and French, I was assigned to make this trip. And Nancy and I – our children were not here, still hadn't joined us and actually never did – went down and saw each of the camps. And I could talk freely to the refugees. Only in one camp did the French have people watching me, listening to me. I found that they were, by and large, well treated depending on the commandant, some were very good. The food was just as good as the French had at that time. I saw the meals, saw what they had. And at one camp I remember seeing the French soldiers, guards, and the Spanish having a snowball fight together, laughing and playing together. I wrote back and reported on each camp. I said one camp was bad. And that's where the military guards were Senegalese.

Q: These were French colonial troops in Senegal.

TRIMBLE: Yes. They were pretty nasty. And the commandant wasn't much good. But in the rest of them, the French were doing a very good job and this when there was war. They were helping these people. They really were doing the best they could. And so I wrote the report, and it went back to Mrs. Roosevelt, because she was worried about the propaganda against the French as affecting our policy towards the Allies.

Q: Well, this, of course, was coming particularly from the left wing.

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes, very much.

ELLA DeSCHAUB
Personal Assistant to the Biddles
Angers and Paris, France (1939-1940)

Ella DeSchaub describes her life as personal assistant to Ambassador and Mrs. Anthony Biddle in Poland, France and Norway. She describes vividly wartime life in those countries with Ambassador and Mrs. Biddle. A biographical sketch is included as addendum. The interview was conducted in 1991 by Randolph W. Baxter

Q: Was your loyalty ever questioned by any of the Poles, because you were Swiss?

DeSCHAUB: No, no -- I must say, on the contrary, I stayed very friendly with people -- the ones we saw later on found houses for me, in Angers [France, where the Embassy relocated after reaching Paris]. That was my main duty. I was sent to this place, Angers -- I'd never been there before, but I knew where it was -- and Mrs. Biddle said, "You go find us a nice house." By that time, we had been in France for quite a few weeks or months, maybe, and everybody had found a house, already. So I had to -- what do you call it, when a country is allowed to take it --

Q: Lease an estate -- or requisition it?

DeSCHAUB: Requisition. They had a requisition for them in a chateau which I have pictures of because I had become friendly with the proprietor and his wife, two elderly people. They were there all alone in that big chateau -- a chateau-fort really -- which had a moat around it, and they had those old caves [for wine storage] just like at Fontainebleau. They were very nice people, and I would see him go out to the gate, and clean, and go about their other things. The Biddles had part of the castle, [but] not entirely [all of it] -- they didn't have the library, which was quite big, and the chapel, and then there were those poor proprietors had one wing. But they seemed quite resigned to it, because, you know, it was war[time]. I went to see them quite often to see if everything was in order.

But it was too primitive for Mrs. Biddle. They had very little heat -they had those big faillances - heat, what do you call it? -- faillances des poiles --

Q: Grates?

DeSCHAUB: Grates. They all had the doorway heated with the grates, and you had to throw in coal -- all along the couloir [hallway], and they had these long couloirs. Every morning, probably at seven or before, the man came and put in the coal in all the [grates] all along. So it wasn't warm, but it was better than outside. That still existed in all those castles. They had towers -- it was a chateau-fort, really -- an old, old castle. The little -- restroom, or whatever you call it - was in one of those, and there, of course, there was no heat at all! That was also something the Biddles didn't quite understand. I suppose he did, but Mrs. Biddle didn't.

Q: The toilet room didn't have any heat at all?

DeSCHAUB: Oh, no! It was that round place, you know, and it was freezing cold! That was one of the dark sides of life in a chateau. But the proprietors were very nice and accepted everything we said or did. Of course, we kind of turned the whole place upside down. Mrs. Biddle said she

wouldn't stay there because it was quite a distance from the town, so Mr. Biddle had to go out very early. He couldn't come for lunch, and he'd be out quite late -- and she didn't like that. So finally, they told me, "Find us a house -- in town." By now, everything was taken -- it was true, there was hardly any room! They had 40,000 more inhabitants by that time during that time, with the Americans and foreign people. We had the French Ambassador to Poland was there -- it was such stupid, stupid thing to have a French Ambassador in France, because he came with a whole court -- he had to stay! I had to find a house, first for the Turks -- why I forgot -- and then [for] Mrs. Biddle with her request, "Something in town." I said, "Mrs. Biddle, I don't know Angers, number one. [When] I came here, it was my first visit to this city. I don't know a soul." "Oh," she said, "you'll meet people." [laughs] So I went first to the bishop and asked him for help, if he would know [of anyplace]. He was very pleasant, but he didn't know. Then I went to the prefecture [police station], to the Prefect [Police Chief], and he was much better. He understood. I said, "You must give me some leads, someplace I [can] go and see." It was very difficult, but he was good. He was very good; he gave me some addresses of people who might have a house - - nearby -- not in the city.

I set out, until at last, there was a Madame de Pimodan [phonetically: pee-moh-DAH-N], who had a little castle outside [Angers], and she had a house in town like practically all the wealthy people had. I went to her and said, "Oh, please!" But she said, "I have to have a place in town." I said, "Oh, but you can't refuse, because Mrs. Biddle can't stay in that castle. You know which one. It's cold, and impractical." She said [demonstrating a despairing sigh] "Will you let me have my room?" [laughs] It [turned out to be] a big house with three stories, and I said, "Of course, certainly, we'll do all we can to make you --" and she said, "But you must come and see my little castle outside." I said, "All right, I'll come and see the little castle. We went -- we had a car, of course, so it wasn't difficult -- and we arrived the day they were killing the pig! You know how they scream -- but she talked to the people, and they seemed very friendly. She called them all by their first name, all of them. We looked at the place, and it was all right for Angers people. But the first thing I saw, there was a mouse in the -- baignoir, what do you call it?

Q: Bathroom? [meaning "salle de baigne" or room with the bathtub; different in French from the "w.c." or room with the toilet]

DeSCHAU: Bathroom, that's it, yes. A big mouse -- she didn't pay any attention. I said, "No, I don't think that's for us." Anyway, we came back, and we settled for the town house with the room for her. She could leave all her things in that room, and we locked it -- she was satisfied.

In that house -- Mr., or Mrs. Biddle's son [who] was in the Red Cross -- he and his sister, both, gave several ambulances to the Poles [wounded Free Polish soldiers]. While we were there, the war [May 1940 German invasion of France] was on -- and those poor Poles had such miserable equipment, and were at the end of their lives. Three or four men came one night, Poles, uniformed, tattered, looking like death! And they sat there in the hall, and I said to Ted, "Who are they?" He said, "That's all they have left of their regiment." It was ghastly.

Q: This was in Angers?

DeSCHAU: In Angers, yes.

Q: The house you stayed at in Warsaw, was that more luxurious than the one in Angers?

DeSCHAUB: By then, we were out of Poland. We had to get out, after they bombed it! They bombed that castle that was [unintelligible] to the Biddles in town, and they bombed it thoroughly, and it was -- I always find [the word] in French -- the Military Attaché of the Germans, who had been there for several dinners, directed the bombing. It was completely flat. [It had been] a beautiful place [with] a beautiful library.

Q: Right. How did you get to Paris earlier? Did you have a mission that you had to go with?

DeSCHAUB: I had to do something for Mrs. Biddle or the children - I don't remember. Anyway, she told me, "Stay - don't come - don't come." I would have gone to Warsaw to be with them, but they said no. So I stayed there, and there they arrived. It was marvelous to see them again. You don't know, in a war, what happens. They had a hard time. Probably Genie told you, they were reported wherever they stopped for the night. Any little village -- a few hours later, they were bombarded. They were reported -- they [the Germans] knew all the numbers of their cars -- they knew everything -- German or Russian, I don't know which ones. It was a very bad time.

Q: Then, did you leave with the Biddles back to the United States, fleeing through Spain and Portugal?

DeSCHAUB: Yes, yes. But that was when Genie went -- it was Mr. Biddle's idea -- Genie was sent with him to England; that's when she went to England. "Oh," Mrs. Biddle said, "You can't go, you can't go." I said, "Why?" She said no, because Peggy was expecting her first baby. "I wouldn't have any news, maybe, and it's better that you stay with her -- she'll be very lost, you know, without her family." And so [cut off]

Q: That was in Washington, you stayed?

DeSCHAUB: No. She stayed -- Mrs. Biddle bought a little place for her, very nice -- in Maryland. That's where she was, though she had the baby in Washington, of course. That was her first one.

Q: Mrs. Biddle had gone on with her husband?

DeSCHAUB: Yes, yes, she had gone to London. But all the time we had communications. I was never lost -- if she wanted this or if she wanted that. Genie told you, of course, London was a terrible place at the time. They didn't get good food -- they didn't get this, they didn't get that -- so I had to send all that, as much as I could. Cocoanut, and [unintelligible] was very, very big. And writing -- it was all right [that] it was censored -- we knew that we shouldn't say anything political. Genie probably didn't tell you: by chance, I once had sent little tubes of onion, or some type of condiment. So I sent one of those [unintelligible] that was all. And the cook at the Ritz was so enchanted to hear about me [that] he said, "Could you have some more sent? 'Cause I

have a client, he would just [be] in heaven if he could have some of it.” They didn’t have any of it! So I sent some of them [unintelligible] -- and he took them and gave them to the client. It’s strange what takes value at some time, when nothing else counts.

But in France, it wasn’t bad. It was cold -- it was very cold in winter. It was exceptionally cold because, I remember that one night, I was coming home -- I had had a little supper, I don’t know where -- and [when] I came home, I had to hold on to the side of the houses because it was so slippery [since] it was all ice!

Q: This was in Angers?

DeSCHAUB: No, Paris. By then, I was in Paris. Mrs. Biddle had this house there, still, and guardians, and one dog. [laughs] I was there all alone for quite a while, in that big house on the second floor. But they were very nice, the guardians, both of them -- a husband and a wife. She would often just cook a little soup or something for me. It was not pleasant to go out and walk dark streets, you know! There were no lights! Not so long ago, I heard that they lived somewhere in the south of France, that couple who lived in that house and were the guardians of Mrs. Biddle’s house. They were still alive, I was surprised to hear.

Q: And then you met the Biddles in Paris?

DeSCHAUB: Yes. I had this friend who later she came to Oslo with us, and she was the one who knew the Biddles, she and her sister. She wrote to me -- and I found, the other day in my old papers, the telegram she sent. She’d said, “You could come and stay with the Biddles for a school year, because the children are coming.” Mrs. Biddle was divorced, and she had already obtained the permission to have the children. They were coming, and were by then already twelve, seven and nine -- something like that -- a difficult age, and they were taken away from their father and from their life here [in the U.S.]. She knew it would be difficult, and she was not particularly fond of children. She said, “They are arriving, and would you be willing to stay for a school year? We’ll be half in the States, and half in Paris. You should meet them and see, if you like.”

That’s how it started. I spoke to a very dear aunt I had, who said, “Oh, you must accept -- for a school year, what’s that?” I said, “I don’t think I should go.” Finally, she said, “Do it for a school year,” so I did. I met them and the way it started, I might tell you, it’s so strange and ridiculous. They had rented a house in Paris -- with a garden; it was very nice -- and they said, “Come for tea.” So I came for tea, not knowing what to expect! They both were there, and they said, “Oh, let’s go walk in the garden and walk around and then we’ll have tea.” So that’s what I did, and we talked about this, and that -- and not a word about anything!

[At this point the tape ran out; remainder of DeSchaub’s story taken from Baxter’s notes: The Biddles didn’t mention employment to DeSchaub, who left rather disappointed and thinking she didn’t have the position. DeSchaub later heard from some friends, however, that the Biddles thought she was wonderful and were expecting her to start taking care of the children right away.

DeSchaub never did figure out why the Biddles hadn't mentioned the job during her "interview" but she nonetheless accepted the job, which she would end up holding for a quarter century!]

CONSTANCE RAY HARVEY
Vice Consul
Lyon (1941-1942)

Constance Ray Harvey was born in New York in 1904. She received a bachelor's degree from Smith College and a master's degree from Columbia University. Ms. Harvey entered the Foreign Service in 1930. Her career was comprised of mostly consular work in Milan, Basel, Bern, and Lyon. Ms. Harvey received the Medal of Freedom in 1947. She was interviewed by Dr. Milton Colvin in 1988.

HARVEY: There was another period (when I was already interned in Germany in '43) which I don't know much about except by hearing that Switzerland was almost invaded a second time. They had expected that the Germans would try to send troops across to Italy by rail. That didn't happen either. I think I understand why, because in about July or August '42, when I was still in France at that time, I happened to be traveling on the train from Lyon to Berne, and asked a Swiss officer who was riding in the compartment with me what would happen if the army decided to take to the réduit, as they called it, the fortified area in the mountains, if anybody, German or French, should cross the line. I said to him, "You mean to abandon the cities?"

"Oh, yes," he said.

And I said, "Your wife and children in the hands of the enemy?"

And he said, "Of course." So that, of course, was a typical Swiss attitude, and it was why Switzerland was not invaded. It would not be worth that much today.

Well, they didn't get us until the landings in North Africa took place on the seventh of November, a Sunday. We had had a slight indication that we had to be ready to burn documents and possibly to leave perhaps a day before, so I had spent all of the Saturday of the sixth of November and the Sunday morning of the seventh of November, burning everything in the consulate that I could lay my hands on that had the names of anybody who had come in there. How they ever reopened that office afterward, I don't know, but I was determined that no French people or anybody else who had had any contact with the Americans could be traced from the records in that office.

I remember that I went home to get my coffee which I'd left, when the message came over the radio early on the Sunday morning, which made me rush back to the office immediately: "The Americans are landing. No news from Vichy." And we wondered where they were landing. Where? We had no idea! Of course, it was taking place, but we didn't know where! We thought it was undoubtedly the coast of France. I certainly got over there to the office to start my burning as fast as I could.

I remember I had a rather wild Haitian diplomat spend part of the morning with me. He had been up in Paris until the last moment, because Haiti wasn't in the war, but he described to me how his place in the country had flown a Haitian flag, and how the Germans had come in and lowered the flag. He immediately packed up and went right straight to headquarters in the Palais de Versailles, this very insignificant diplomat, I should say, and stamped his foot, and he said, "I'm an independent neutral nation, and this cannot take place. You are occupying my property, and you've pulled down the Haitian flag." They sent somebody out immediately to put it up again, and they only sent a colonel. He said, "Not so! It was pulled down by a general; a general should put it up!" (Laughter) I cannot remember his name, but he was well known in various circles, and he spent that morning with me as we got ready. We knew that we were going to be in serious trouble.

I might tell you what happened on Monday morning. My Belgian clerk that I have told you about, who helped me so much with the Belgian passports and so forth, he had been already arrested and was in Montluc prison, in the hospital part of the prison, because he was ill. He'd been there for about ten days. I got news on Monday that he had disappeared from the prison, and finally, we discovered what had happened. He'd been put on a train to go to the south of France, to an assembly point, where they were getting people ready to send them to concentration camps. I said to my chief, "I'm going to the prefet de police immediately." We couldn't stand this man. I can't remember his name, but we didn't like him a bit. "I'm going to see him."

He said, "It won't do any good."

I said, "I'm going to go anyway." I must say, I was absolutely beside myself. I stayed in that man's office over an hour, an hour and a half, and I wouldn't leave. I think I kicked and screamed and cried, and I said, "Never, never will I go to a diplomatic internment," which we knew we were headed for on Wednesday, "and let this man go to a concentration camp. I went to school in France, France has been my second country for all these years. I will spend the rest of my life fighting against France if this occurs."

Finally, he said, "I'll telephone." And we got him off the train just ten minutes before the train left, and he was put back in an ambulance and rushed back to the hospital. His wife and I trailed after the ambulance, and we got in and sat down on his bed, where he had crawled back, and ate up all his dinner, and laughed and laughed and laughed. We could hardly believe what was going on.

Then after we were interned, everything in that part of France changed. I mean, the day it was occupied. People who had been very reluctant to do very much started to do things they'd never had the courage to do before, really.

Q: That was America coming into the war, a catalyst for that.

HARVEY: It was also the occupation that did it. You see, now they'd lost everything, and now they weren't afraid in the same way. It's the same kind of psychological thing.

So the nuns who were running the hospital in the prison got Jack – that was the day or the day after we left; I think the very day we left – dressed up in some kind of nun's garments, whisked him across to the Archbishop's palace across the road, where he was hidden, I don't know, for not very long, but then friends came and finally smuggled him out of France, also with his wife, I think separately, into Switzerland, where he spent the rest of the war and mostly working for Allen Dulles. So that was the beginning of occupation for me.

Q: Then you were interned? You were picked up and sent to Lourdes?

HARVEY: Yes. We were put on the train. We were taken and put on a train on the very day that the German Army passed through Lyon on the way to the Mediterranean. I really didn't see any of that, because I was being taken in the police car to the train, to leave Lyon. What happened was that we got there and, of course, there were all kinds of people, official guards and everything, to see us off. There were only three of us, the consul general and I and our non-career vice consul, a very elderly gentleman who had just recently joined us. When the time for the train to start came, none of our luggage had arrived. We were allowed a couple of suitcases, and I said, "I will not go into internment without my suitcases. I'll never see them again. I'm going to get off this train."

So they both got off with me, because they hadn't got theirs either, and the train just left without us. And there we were, completely unchaperoned. All the officials had gone away, and all the people who had come to say goodbye to us, of course, had gone away, too. One very crazy man who was the president of the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce, a Monsieur Jacquel, whom I knew, because so many Alsations on the Chamber of Commerce were 76enefited, as they said (that means they had come to Lyon from occupied Alsace), was there with a great bouquet of flowers for me. I said, "Get Mr. Jacquel and his flowers off this platform and don't let him come near me." It was the craziest thing I had ever heard of, to have these people coming to say goodbye to me.

Q: I think it's a marvelous touch.

HARVEY: It was, really. It was an amazing thing. In any case, the train was gone, there we were, nobody there. I said, "I think we'd better inform the authorities that we're still here. Otherwise, they'll make some trouble."

So we telephoned to the 76enefited76, and they said, "Well, your luggage is on the way. Just take the next train which goes down toward Marseille, and there you can get the train that's coming from Marseille, pick it up and go on the night coach to Lourdes. That will be all right."

We had had nothing to eat, and there was nothing to eat in the restaurant, there were no taxis, nothing running, of course. By this time, the German Army had gone through with their tanks and everything else. So we decided, "Well, we've just got to walk back and see if we can't find some black restaurant somewhere that will give us some food, because it's going to be a great many hours before we see food again."

So we started up the road, along up the Rhone, and we came to a restaurant that we knew about, where you always had to have a reservation at least two days in advance to be given any food. We stuck our heads in, and they said, “No, no, no. No, there’s no food. No place, no place to sit down, no food.”

So I went and put my head behind a curtain or something and said, “Do you really want to have the consul general of the United States and his two officers who are on their way to be interned, do you want to turn them away without feeding us at all?”

And they said, “Come in, come in.” They hid us behind a curtain, and we had a champagne lunch, a perfectly marvelous lunch, and two and three people that we knew for some reason – I don’t know how they found out where we were – came and joined us and stayed with us. Then we turned around and walked back to the station, where we were going to get on the train.

On the way back, just going along back – it was a long walk – we passed two Polish secret service men whom we knew. Of course, we didn’t recognize them, we didn’t say anything or do anything at all, and they looked as if they’d seen ghosts. Well, they sort of had. (Laughter) Then we got on our train and left for internment in Lourdes, with our luggage.

Q: Pick up a little bit, Constance, on the interment in Lourdes and then what happened when you were brought into Germany.

HARVEY: I think we were there about two months and a half. We were interned on the 11th of November, and we left about the tenth or 12th of January, something like that. In any case, we didn’t know about our future; we just thought that we were going to be exchanged and sent out through the Pyrenees to Spain, you see, across to Lisbon. That was what we all expected. We were put in three different hotels.

Lourdes, at that time, didn’t have many visitors in cold weather, and mostly the hotels weren’t open, but they provided us. We had a member of the French Foreign Service, a very young man, a very young officer, staying in one of our hotels. We were guarded, so to speak, in a very gentle sort of fashion. We could go out and go shopping and get various things if we were taken out by somebody. Whoever took us out would just stand in the middle of the square, and we could go in all directions and do our errands, then come join him again and go back to the hotel.

We also had the opportunity occasionally of going and having a meal, a dinner, in one of the three hotels where some of our friends were, instead of always eating in our own hotel. This is important, really. It was in January then when I was with this Frenchman whose name was Pierre Dupuis, sort of like Joe Jones, you see. He had been in the United States and had taught in Smith College for about two years, and he’d married an American girl, but he was a very young widower and he was stationed in the Foreign Service at the government in Vichy. He had been assigned to go with us, wherever we would be, Mr. Dupuis would be with us as a member of the neutral government of Vichy. If you ever really have physical contact with somebody who is scared to death, you never forget it. Because we’d been talking at dinner, at the hotel, with Dupuis at the table, about the possibility of maybe the Germans might come and get us, because we were not being exchanged as we had expected, you see. We sat there for two and a half

months. It was kind of spooky.

As we went back home, in theory, Mr. Dupuis took my arm to try to keep me from stumbling in the dark, but he was shaking like an aspen leaf. I practically had to hold up the little man. We got back to the hotel. Then a couple of days later, we were interned by the German Army. I will tell you later what happened to Monsieur Dupuis. That was during internment.

To go back to Lourdes itself, I had a visitor who came. I can't remember exactly when it was, but I think it was sometime perhaps just before Christmas or after Christmas. A woman from one of the Resistance groups was sent to me by a friend of mine, and she came with a carte d'identité with my picture on it and everything, to help me escape. I thought, "Well, this would be very fascinating." But unfortunately, just the night before – yes, this is well before Christmas – "Kippy" Tuck had got everybody together and he said, "Now, no matter what happens, none of you must try to escape. It would be very dangerous for the rest of us. This is very, very important that we stick together. We have old people and children with us, and we can't just put people in jeopardy by somebody trying to do some funny business."

So I had to say to this young woman, "No, I'm sorry. This is impossible. I will not come with you."

She said, "I can arrange everything for you and see that you get railroad tickets and everything."

I said, "No." So I didn't.

And when I got back to Washington, I went in to see Jack Earhardt, talked a little about my experiences, and he said, "Constance, we thought if anybody would escape, you would. Why didn't you escape?" And I was as mad as could be! I thought, "Well!" But I think I probably could have made it into Switzerland. In any case, I didn't. So my life was different because of that.

Q: Yes, but let's pick up on the Frenchman you mentioned who was so terrified.

HARVEY: He went with us, too. He was one of the people who went with us into internment, as a representative of the neutral government of Vichy. We had a Swiss diplomat with us, who was a representative of our protecting power. Then when we got there, we also had a German diplomat who was delighted to be in Baden-Baden looking after us, instead of being bombed in Berlin. (Laughter) He was with us the whole time, and I think his wife was with him, too. We were 150 people altogether, which was quite a collection. But they wanted to get, for us, you see, the German Military Commission in North Africa which had been captured during the landings. They would have been of great assistance if they could have gotten them even some months later, and that's why, for 13 months, the governments haggled about this. But our government never gave them up. That group spent the rest of the war in Texas, and we were finally exchanged in February of '44 for German diplomats held at White Sulphur Springs.

I think that one story which I may have told you off the cuff explains it pretty well. I was very pro-English, pro-British, although I personally never lived or was stationed in England, and I

remember saying to one of my close French friends one day, who had been in the Army himself, had been captured and escaped in the very first days of the war, “Why doesn’t France pull itself together and continue to join up with England, to help save England? Why doesn’t France get back into the war?”

And he looked at me and said, “Oh, you don’t know what it was to see men running.” And I felt deeply, deeply ashamed of myself when I realized what the defeat and humiliation had meant to that country. Of course, in a sense, that also explains the power of De Gaulle later.

Q: It just was a wrenching experience for the nation, with this great military history, to essentially be defeated and be humiliated in the process.

HARVEY: Yes, and so rapidly. In World War I, it was a terrible, murderous war, but in a sense, at that time, the country wasn’t overrun, you see, practically overnight, in 1940, in such a short time, a complete collapse. This was really very, very shocking to the French. They weren’t really prepared for that sort of thing at all psychologically. I think a great many of them just had to have a “father figure” to hang onto psychologically, and the general was there.

Q: Was there to some degree an anti-British feeling because Britain had not been defeated, and somehow or other, the British were still in the war when France was out of the war? In other words, was there sort of a mixed feeling of admiration for the British for keeping up, and at the same time a dislike for the British because the French had capitulated and the British had not? Was there a sort of schizophrenia there for the French? Because there was, I know, a strong anti-British feeling among many of the French. Is that the traditional anti-British feeling, going back to the Middle Ages, or is that the French feeling that somehow or other, British should have quit, too?

HARVEY: I think, above all, latently there’s a great deal of anti-British feeling still in France, probably even today. This is something that goes way, way back, and you can find it in England, too, definitely, even before Napoleon. That was reactivated by various things, as you say. The British bombing at Mers el Kébir, of course, had been a shock to them, especially to the French Navy. Of course, of all people, it was the French Navy who hated the British more than anybody else.

You see, we Americans were not frequented by the people who were anti-Anglo-Saxon, so to speak. I mean, we knew that they existed and we knew we had to be careful about this, that, and the other, but there were people who were really our friends. I happened to have some very good friends in Lyon, because I went with one letter of introduction to a prominent family when I arrived there, which was very helpful. They were very pro-British. But you had to know who in a family was pro-Vichy, and who was against it. You couldn’t trust anyone just because he was related to or had a certain position or was the brother or son of somebody. You had to know each individual well, and you had to be very careful what you said. You couldn’t let any cats out of bags just by chatting too much.

Q: Were the French astonished that the British could stay in the war? Did they sort of expect the capitulation of Great Britain shortly after the capitulation of France?

HARVEY: Again, the people I knew kept up their hope that the British were going to hang in there, and they did admire them, even some people that didn't like them that much. That doesn't mean that they necessarily liked De Gaulle. That was quite a different story. Of course, anyone who had anything to do with the Navy was not likely to like the British in any case, but I don't think I ran across many naval people there in the middle of the country.

I had one French friend, this family I knew well, very well indeed. He did business with the Germans right up to the last moment. All the time I was there, he was going up to Paris and further north on business with the Germans. I knew perfectly well he was betting on the British winning the war, but he wasn't giving up his business because of that. They, of course, wanted very much for the Americans to come.

I've never told you about down in the country. I had a house in the country because I couldn't have an apartment or anything in the city; I just had a room in a hotel. But I had a house in the country in the department of the Ain, and there I had people down for weekends to this country house. To get food, you had to go scrounging. I would go around to one place where they sold butter right from where they made it black market, of course, naturally. The man who ran this, the fruitier, as they called the man who does butter and cheese in the country, he would call me aside. He'd say, "Mademoiselle, come, come. Let's have a little drink in the room above the shop. I want to talk to you."

So I would go up with him to this little room above the shop, and he'd put his great hands and arms on the table, lean forward earnestly, and say, "When? When? What should we do in the meantime? When are the Americans coming? Are we supposed to work now?" This was just one of the common people. But there were lots of people who were looking for their real savior, you see, for the Americans.

Q: The United States was the real savior?

HARVEY: Well, there was always a feeling of friendliness, in general, for the Americans, still. You see, the Americans were not just Anglo-Saxons to them; they were the people with whom they'd been involved in our revolution and then we'd taken on theirs and so forth. They remembered that, and they remembered us as friends.

People were divided about the Vichy Government. We couldn't help but see both kinds in a way, but people made little waves. They didn't dare talk too openly, you see, because they never knew when the Gestapo would arrive and scoop you up. We had Gestapo coming into the office constantly. We were very careful not to find out too closely who came into that office. We didn't ask too many questions. We found it better not to know always. Some of them, we knew pretty well were members of the Gestapo, which was quartered right across the street from my hotel, in the hotel where my consul general was lodged.

For instance, people got around things in funny ways. There was nothing to be bought in the shops. It was practically impossible to buy any objects. I had a maid whom I would send to buy anything she could find, and one day she came back with a teapot. She said, "It was the only

thing I could buy anywhere.”

I said, “That’s great.” I’m still using it.

But for instance, in a picture shop where they did beautiful picture framing and sold pictures, they had nothing left to offer because no merchandise was created during all this period. But in one window they had a great big picture of Petain, and in another was a great big picture of Laval. Under the picture of Petain was “Epuisé.” And under the picture of Laval was a sign “Vendu.”

Q: *That says everything.*

HARVEY: Other funny things would happen. One day, a horse came down the main street of Lyon, the Rue de la République, right where our office was, and everybody stopped and clapped. (Laughter) Nobody had seen a horse in they didn’t know how long!

One had to be very careful with whom one spoke, because they might be on one side or the other and go and tell what you said. So before you got into politics of any kind, you had to know the person really well with whom you were speaking. The French are apt to chatter a bit too much. I was traveling on a train from Vichy back to Lyon once, and happened to sit next to one of the rather famous French generals, General De La Laurencie, and he started to talk to me, you see, because he was very anti-Petain. I was terrified with what he was talking about. I thought he was doing the most imprudent thing I’d ever known. People could pick up what he was saying. So we were very careful, you see.

Q: *Now we come to one of the questions that fascinates me, and I know of interest to others. That’s what you can tell us about your meeting with, and your knowledge about General Giraud and also under what circumstances you met him and what role he was at that time assuming, or just anything that you want to say about that. And if you want to bring in anybody else, that’s fine, too. We’ll call this a Giraud chapter.*

HARVEY: Before I talk to you about Giraud, whom I got to know probably in late July of ‘42, I want to back up a bit and tell you a little bit more about the work I’d been doing regularly for our attaché in Bern, General Legge. I told you about one or two things that I did for him, but I went personally to Switzerland every once in a while, carrying documents to him and reports which we had from the occupied zone and from other places and, of course, from Belgium and so forth.

Once, for instance, I arrived and we met in a field outside of Geneva. I presented him with some documents which I knew what they were, and which had been brought down to me by one of the agents that we had working in the north, who brought information to us. They were the maps of all the emplacements of the anti-aircraft equipment of Germans all in and around Paris. He turned sort of white and said, “Oh, for goodness sake, you just brought this in by hand?”

I said, “Oh, yes, no problem.” And the way I did it: I had a Ford car, and when you crossed the frontier, there was always a member of the Gestapo right at the frontier with a French officer, watching as you went back and forth. I knew all about that. Fortunately, that Ford car had a

glove compartment for which there was a separate key, not the key to the rest of the car, the ignition, which is more usual. So when I went in, I very often just locked up papers inside the glove compartment and turned the key down inside my bosom. When I went into the place to check out with the French officer and the Gestapo to go into Switzerland, I left my car open, with the keys just hanging from the ignition. Everybody trusted everybody else, of course, and there wasn't any problem about it. Sometimes people had hidden things in the machinery under the hood, and they sometimes looked under the hood. I thought that was something to avoid. So if a package weren't too bulky, it could get into that glove compartment and often did.

I remember the general said, "I shall remember that, Constance." So later, when he gave me the Medal of Freedom, I guess he remembered.

However, this was just part of the story. So to go back to your more specific question. Toward the end of the summer of 1942, Giraud had arrived in France and having escaped from a German prison east of Dresden. We didn't know much more than that, I had a good friend, Leon de Rosen, a Frenchman working with the American Red Cross, helping distribute milk and other supplies, various things, mostly for children. He got Red Cross parcels and other things to people in the occupied zone. He moved around a good deal, and he was a very patriotic Frenchman. One day he said to me, "Constance, you know Giraud is here in this area, and I've told him about you and he wants to meet you. He's very anxious to have a way of communicating safely with the Americans, and he doesn't see any way in which he can do that." You will remember he was at Vichy, but he left Vichy, I think, for good in May or thereabouts, and never went back. "He is here and staying at the Chateau de Fromente outside of town, and I could take you up there if you would like to meet him."

I said, "Oh, yes, sure, I'd love to. That would be very interesting." As usual, I didn't say anything to anybody. I just went with Leon.

He said, "I will stay outside in the car. You are to go in. Just go in, open the door, go in. Don't stop to ring the bell. Just walk in."

I went in. It was, to me, a memory I shan't forget. It was a beautiful entryway, black and white marble floor, a staircase, and there was no one there but this very tall general, a very elegant-looking gentleman. Apparently there was no one else in the whole building. I think the servants had all been sent away. Then we met and talked, and he said that he was very anxious to try to get in touch with Americans, but didn't see how he could. He couldn't go back to Vichy, wasn't about to go back to Vichy. There had been attempts to assassinate him and rumors of assassination, and he had to be very careful.

I said, "Well, I have a way of doing that."

He said, "My young friend thought maybe you might be able to help me."

I said, "Yes. A good friend of mine is the military attaché in Bern, and I see him, and I could easily take a message if you want to send one. I would be very happy to do it."

So we talked for a little while, and I told him I had gone to school in France, and then he said, "Let's get De Rosen in, and we'll talk together." So De Rosen came in, we strolled in the garden, and had a nice chat about things, and I departed.

I went back once more some weeks later. I guess I got another request to go. I went alone that time, and I didn't take my American car. I had, by that time, also acquired a little old dirty Peugeot for such occasions and thought that was better. So I drove up the hill outside of town to the Château, and went in and saw him once more there.

Then I saw him a third time, a few weeks later, by appointment. He sent word that he wanted to see me. I was to go to a very humble part of Lyon, the working-class quarter, and just go in the door and up to the apartment on the second floor. He told me just where to go, so I did. When I arrived, I found a room with nothing in it but a couple of chairs and a table and an enormous bouquet of carnations on the table. Carnations from a French gentleman for a lady visitor, you see, just to make it look attractive. So we talked again, and both times he gave me papers to take to Legge. One of the times, I don't remember which time, but probably during that third visit, he gave me the papers which were his proposals for the landing in the south of France. He had mapped out exactly how he wanted to have it done and how he would personally take command. I took those papers to Legge. That was the last time I saw Giraud.

One of Giraud's adjutants was Colonel de Limarès. I went to see de Linarès a couple of times, and he always gave me documents to take to Legge. Sometimes I think I had messages from Legge to hand in the other direction.

Then toward the end of October 1942, Giraud left the area and went to join his family near Aix-en-Provence, and I didn't see him again until after the war, when he came to see me in Zurich.

Q: Why don't we just jump that for a moment? How was that meeting after the war, when he came to see you in Switzerland?

HARVEY: Oh, that was fascinating. When he came back to Switzerland, I think it was in '48, my last year at Zurich. Here he is back, seeing friends in Zurich. [Looking at photographs] These are some of them, the people he saw when he was brought through Switzerland, when he escaped from Königstein fortress on the Elbe, which was really quite an episode. It was way off beyond Dresden in what is now East Germany. He spoke German very well, and he got himself across the border out of Germany and first into a part of Switzerland.

Q: He climbed out on a rope or something, didn't he? And here he is, this extremely tall man.

HARVEY: Yes, very tall for a Frenchman. He shaved his moustache off when he escaped. Here he is with his moustache, but this is when he came to see me. He came to my office to see me.

Q: Tell us a little bit about that meeting, when he came to see you. Was it to thank you?

HARVEY: Yes, yes, and to talk to me about lots of things. In any case, that was the last time. He said, "Do come and see me in Paris sometime," but I never did get to that. I was very shortly

afterwards transferred to Athens.

I had a letter from him not very long before he died. He died thinking he'd been poisoned. I heard this afterward. But he didn't; he died of internal cancer.

When in 1942 he joined the troops in North Africa, he took one son with him, leaving his wife, a daughter, and another son, I guess, behind. They were taken to Germany. His daughter died in Germany in a concentration camp.

Q: Going back to Eisenhower's memoirs, where he meets Giraud and Giraud says that he is prepared to take charge of the Allied forces, and Eisenhower has to explain to him, no, that's his job. Obviously, that came as a shock to him, in that here he was, in a sense, the ranking general, and he was not going to command that. Did that come up in later discussions, that he was essentially pushed aside? I'm quoting the book, Diplomat Among Warriors, and it's dangerous to quote without the book, but as I remember, basically in that book, they said, "You can command the French forces."

HARVEY: Yes. After the assassination of Darlan, he sort of took charge, in a sense, in Africa. He claimed, I think, to me, and he certainly claimed in his second book, of which I do not have a copy, that he had sent a message to President Roosevelt, and something had come back or something was written about it, "Okay. Roosevelt." I was queried on this by the military historian, but I had never known the answer to that. I think he certainly wanted, before he actually got to Africa, and expected that he would be in charge, in command of any force landing on French soil, because he was the ranking French general. Weygand was too old to do anything, that Giraud would be in charge. But whether he ever got any real acceptance of that, I very much doubt. I knew what Eisenhower did. I knew that, but I didn't go over this with him. I certainly didn't talk it out with him. I have no idea whether there was this document. I don't know. They've never found out. It may be in some archives; I have no idea.

Q: He may very well have gotten a letter from Roosevelt which could be read in several different ways, Roosevelt keeping his hands open to De Gaulle or Giraud.

HARVEY: Yes. I don't think he thought so much about De Gaulle, but the command was to be Eisenhower, obviously. I think that knowing, at least at a distance, a little about Roosevelt, I think his being equivocal was quite possible. And knowing Giraud, I think Giraud interpreted it the way he ardently desired it to be. But that is only, of course, what I deduce.

Then there is one other mystery about the whole thing. After I met Giraud the first time – this is in his first book, Mes Evasions, his daughter got a message that somebody should go and talk to somebody at Vichy. A young woman went up and talked to somebody else, and came back and said that, "There is somebody in the American Embassy who wants to talk with some representative of Giraud, wants to get in touch with him." Giraud sent one of his officers, General Baurès. I didn't know about that. Giraud never told me about it. Whom Baurès saw in the forest outside of Vichy, no one seems to know. No one. I never knew, never heard about it until after the war. They apparently have talked to Admiral Leahy, to Doug MacArthur II. In a sense, you would have thought it would have been the military attaché in Vichy, who was Bob

Schow, with whom I was interned for 13 months. But as I never spoke about these matters to anyone when I was interned, or at any other time, I have no idea about that. I don't know who it could possibly have been. I don't know who it was. I don't know who would know, because nobody seems to be living except possibly Schow. I don't know if somebody could find out if Schow is still living and ask him.

Q: Somebody in the State Department could probably track that.

Let me ask you this indelicate question, and you answer it as you wish. In any meetings with Giraud, including the post-war meeting, did he ever express any opinion about General De Gaulle?

HARVEY: I don't remember any kind of comment about de Gaulle. He expressed He said to me often an idea which was virtually the title of his second book, Un Seul But: La Victoire. Translated, "My Only Objective: Victory." I think it expresses him and his attitude very strongly. He was a soldier, and he wasn't interested in, nor had a real concept of the political future of France. Of course, that is the difference between him and De Gaulle, the real difference.

Q: I'm glad that you said that, because you had told me that once, and I thought that was very important, that essentially De Gaulle had the concept.

HARVEY: Oh, yes, and he had it all worked out in his mind what he was going to do with France. There's no doubt about it.

Q: And Giraud was the soldier who would bring about the victory and then retire.

HARVEY: Oh, yes. I don't think he had any real political ambition in that sense whatsoever. I don't think it occurred to him. I think he thought that he had the right and station to be the general, you see. When I saw him after the war, I don't think that he ever mentioned De Gaulle to me. I don't remember that. Nothing striking.

Q: In Bob Paxton's book on the French Army, a very interesting book, how the French – Juin, for instance, as an example – were first with Vichy, then against Vichy. There was no unity in terms of the French Army, in terms of supporting, until after the North African landing. Am I right on that?

HARVEY: Supporting De Gaulle?

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: He wasn't that popular, as I gathered it, when I was there, with the leading officers in the French Army. This is something that I was interested in myself. I think our government understood this, and that's one reason they were perhaps interested a bit in Giraud, because they were not entirely against him, you see. He made a trip to the United States, you know, before De Gaulle did. I don't know which year it was, but during the war while I was still in captivity, I guess. It was in '43 sometime when he made a trip to the United States. He was received, of

course, by Roosevelt. I think that they felt that many French officers in France would follow Giraud rather than De Gaulle, and I think that that was possible. The ones who wanted to follow De Gaulle had already gone to London.

Q: They'd gone to England, yes.

HARVEY: They'd gone to England, and also there was a certain jealousy among the people who hadn't gone, I think. It wasn't quite the same thing. Masses of people and the younger people were perhaps attracted to De Gaulle. Of course, there were people who were De Gaullists. One of them was the young daughter of the subsequent ambassador to Washington, whom I knew well. She was only 17 years old at that time, Violaine Hoppenot, a very, very brave girl. She was working for the Belgian underground. Afterwards, she went back to Paris, I don't know just when, but after we were interned.

Q: You mentioned one thing I'd like to come back to in a moment. Giraud was one of the very senior officers, a five-star general in the French Army. So was Weygand.

HARVEY: So was Weygand.

Q: Was there any liaison between Giraud and Weygand?

HARVEY: Giraud would go down to talk with Weygand. He did that, I think, a few times. I didn't know much about this, but I gathered that was the case. But Weygand always said, "I'm too old." He was old at that time. "I'm too old to really play any part." I think that was part of the story. Of course, there were a number of people who felt that Petain was secretly in favor of what was going on, but nobody knew that.

Q: Does anybody really know that to this day? It's sort of a mystery point, isn't it? It was not brought up when Petain went on trial. There was some sort of attempt, as I remember it, to bring this up, and nothing came of it. It made Petain, in that sense, a mystery man, didn't it?

HARVEY: I think the trouble really with Petain was that he was really too old. I think I've said in various places. It was generally known while I was in Lyon that one of the tricks was to get him to sign papers late in the afternoon when he was vague, that they didn't give him important documents in the morning when he was more alert. This became a sort of practice. He was surrounded by a bunch of people who . . .

Q: Psychopaths?

HARVEY: Oh, no. People who were really playing the German game. Quite a few of them. After all, the country was divided. One forgets this, that there were people who were afraid of communism, and there were the extreme right who existed in France, and a good many of them were really virtually pro-German and thought that, after all, they could work things out with Germany.

Q: There was that wonderful book and movie that was made some years ago, which brought this

out, when we heard that young aristocrat talking about how he was educated to hate the Jews. "The Sorrow and the Pity" is the movie. That came out very strongly that there was that element.

HARVEY: Oh, yes. There was always the group which was the far right. They were, as always, interested in their positions. They were sure the Germans were going to win, and they didn't want to be on the losing side. I think it's as simple as that.

Then there were these other people, like my industrial friend, who would talk with and do business with the Germans, who told me once, while I was still there, that he had been in a conference in Alsace. This was sometime in '42, before I was interned. He said, "One of those Germans said, 'We know what's going on with the Jews. Even if we lose the war, we should have gained the annihilation of the Jews.'" And this chap came back and told me, and various other people.

Another thing I just couldn't believe my ears: in about August of '42, a woman from the Swiss Red Cross came to my office and said that their group, the Red Cross, sometimes got permission to go in to see the really sick people in some of the German concentration camps, as well as the prisoner of war camps. She said, "We have learned that they're actually taking their victims and making soap of Jews." We talked it over. Of course, it was literally true, it really was. I remember this woman. Actually, the Swiss Red Cross got out quite a number of elderly people into Switzerland just a little bit toward the end of the war. One of them had been my dressmaker, the most important dress maker outside of Paris. I had known her for years, and I didn't know, of course, that she'd been captured. She was almost 60, and she went through an awful business, being in a camp. They brought her out, dying of tuberculosis. She finally recovered, and I saw her before she went to the hospital. I saw her in St. Gallen, and she told me about some other people, what had gone on in the camps. I knew what had happened. I had eight people I knew who went to concentration camps. Two of them that went were clerks at the consulate in Lyon.

Q: Did they come back?

HARVEY: The woman died in Ravensbrück, and the man was finally liberated by our troops at Buchenwald. He came back, and I had long talks with him afterward, but he didn't live very long. He died young. But he told me about what it was like to be sent there.

Also, I must say just a few words about one of our Canadian friends, a young man, Frank Pickersgill. He stayed in my house out in the country for a number of weeks, quite a while in 1942. He had been studying for the Canadian Diplomatic in Paris, had overstayed his time and been picked up by the invaders and taken to the prison at St. Denis. There's a big prison there just north of Paris. He and another Canadian boy were there for a year and a half, and they escaped. Frank, you couldn't have told he wasn't a Frenchman; he spoke absolutely flawless French. My French friends couldn't believe he wasn't French. He didn't have a drop of French blood. He'd been brought up, I think, in Manitoba, and he had learned French from a French governess. He didn't have French blood, but he sure knew how to talk French, and he knew Frenchmen all over the country, all over France.

He stayed at my place quite a while because he had escaped, and we picked him up and said he

was not to try to go out on one of those “lines” that people had rigged up for people to go out, that we’d get him out with a passport. We were pretty sure we could, with a proper passport and a permit, because he was deaf in one ear and therefore a non-combatant. Very unfortunately, he’d had a gun go off near his ear. So after a number of weeks, we did get him off to go through Spain to Portugal, and on to England. He showed up again in England. After intelligence and communications training, he was parachuted back into France by the English, with a number of other people. I’ve heard that about 20 were parachuted at the same time. That was probably sometime in ‘43, after I was interned. They were all picked up almost immediately, and put in prison again in Paris. He almost liberated the whole bunch of them, but he fell and broke his leg, and that didn’t help any, so they got him again. They finally took him to Buchenwald, the concentration camp, where he was hanged as a spy. The man who was our consular clerk, and who also had been in that camp, told me later, “When he walked in, he was just the same old chap we had known before in Lyon. He was just as cheerful as anything, and he acted in a perfectly normal way.” That was our last news of him. He was a brave guy.

Q: About the possibility of Spain entering into World War II on the side of Germany and Italy. You mentioned that you had an interesting story to tell in relation to that.

HARVEY: It concerns an American who was very well known to our service, but not in our service, Royal Tyler, who lived in Geneva and had a chateau in Burgundy, and went back and forth occasionally between the two residences. I got to know him. He had lived a life in his youth in constant connections with Spain. He had done his undergraduate studies and, I think, some graduate studies, entirely at the University of Salamanca, and he knew all of the Spanish nobility and everybody of consequence in Spain, and had gone back and forth and seen a lot of them over the years. He told me, when this was discussed occasionally, when I was in Lyon, that he just knew that Franco and the Spaniards would never, never join the war with Hitler, that they were going to stay out of it, they weren’t going to do it, and there was no use thinking that they would.

A great deal of our policy was based on the belief Spain would join the Axis, especially efforts to get people as fast as they could through France and into Switzerland before something like that happened. Of course, that is one thing that the Department did soon after Pearl Harbor. They kept sending people into Bern, so that they’d have as many people at listening posts as possible before the frontiers all closed.

I myself was sent up with two other people from our office in Lyon, just before Christmas of ‘41. Finally, after demonstrations on my part, I was sent back in January of ‘42, to Lyon, where the staff of Americans had been considerably reduced.

Q: When you were sent back there, Constance, in the meantime, Pearl Harbor had happened.

HARVEY: That’s right.

Q: So when you arrived back there, we were no longer a neutral nation, but we were an enemy of the Axis powers. How long did it take before they got hold of you and took you to Germany for internment?

HARVEY: It was a good many months that we were still there. Of course, our French friends and the people that really were our friends were delighted that America was in the war. They'd been waiting for this moment as their real hope of salvation. During the summer of '42, that was a very interesting period. Some information together about the result of British bombings. There were no American bombings yet, you see. It was all British. And Dupuis was taking this out, and the girl was sending the messages in some way or other. That is what has happened to Dupuis. We went through the rest of our internment without him.

Then there is a sequel to this grizzly story. I don't know, perhaps six or eight months after the war had ended, our embassy was back and working in Paris, and in walked Monsieur Dupuis! He had been this timid little man. I didn't see him. I wasn't there, of course; I was then stationed in Switzerland. But I talked with the people I'd been interned with, several of them that were in the Paris embassy, and they said, "Constance, he is a changed man. You can't imagine how he has changed. You remember what a Mr. Milktoast he was, scared of his shadow and everything, so timid? Well, he's calm and collected."

He was taken to the Alexander Platz prison in Berlin under sentence of execution, put in solitary confinement, and he was there until Berlin was liberated. They probably forgot about him. He even survived the bombing. Instead of breaking him, he had become a man. It was absolutely unbelievable!

Q: A transformation of character.

HARVEY: A transformation. He had faced up to it, whatever it was, and he lived through it. He really had a different personality.

Then later on, quite a few years later, when I was stationed in the embassy in Bonn, and I knew the people in the French Embassy well, one of the top people there said to me, "We told him, when he got back, we'd give him any position he wanted. We would send him back to Washington." He'd been in Washington and knew America well. "We'd make him cultural attaché, and he said, 'Oh, I don't think I could do that.' We said, 'Nonsense, of course you can do that. We'll send somebody to teach you just how to do it. Anything you want, anything we can do for you, we will do.'" So he did. He went to Washington, where he was cultural attaché, and then he married another American girl. Some friends fixed up a cocktail party for him to come to see me with just one or two other people, but at the last moment, he called and said he had something else, he couldn't come. I think he just didn't feel he could see somebody from those days. He didn't live very long. He was really the greatest man I've known, because he was scared to death, but he went ahead with it. When Tom asked him to help, he helped.

Q: That's true bravery. That's right.

HARVEY: That's true bravery.

Q: It's the scared man that did the right thing.

HARVEY: Who really did the right thing, and it transformed him. The fact that he had done that,

you see, made him a different person.

Q: *Constance, picking back up on this, you were then exchanged.*

HARVEY: I must tell you just one or two things.

Q: *Yes, please.*

HARVEY: About my life there. Everything was more or less all right, and we were taken on these walks and so forth. Then when we knew we were going to be exchanged, we knew ahead of time, things began to get kind of – I don't know, go in every direction. People who had been quite fond of each other began to quarrel, one thing and another, and people were emotionally upset. Then one day, it was snowy weather and people had gone out for their walk with the Gestapo, about eight men had gone out. I don't think there were any women in the group. Sometimes these Gestapo took us up to a little wine place, a weinstube, up in the hills, and we had a drink of some kind of odd wine or something or other with them, and then they brought you back. It was all quite friendly.

The group came back, and one of the Americans was missing. Oh, my! Well, the Gestapo were not very much worried. The German diplomat wasn't that worried, but the person who absolutely couldn't stand it was the U.P. correspondent, because the man that was missing was the A.P. correspondent! He said, "That so and so, if he isn't back in half an hour, I'm making a break for the frontier. That's where he's gone. He's on his way to Switzerland."

Q: *With all the news!*

HARVEY: With all the news! (Laughter) We tried to calm him down. Poor McHenry finally did appear. I think he had perhaps stopped behind a tree or something and lost the rest of them, followed the lights in town and was glad to get back into the hotel again, you see. About the correspondents, when they got to the frontier of Spain, there was a terrific rush for the telephones. All the lions and lambs who had been lying down together were clawing each other at the telephones once again.

Then we were taken to Lisbon, and we were there about three days or so in the Lisbon Triangle. We were put on the Gripsholm and came back to the United States.

JAMES COWLES HART BONBRIGHT
France Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1942-1949)

Ambassador James Cowles Hart Bonbright was born in 1903. He entered the Foreign Service in 1928. His career included positions in China, Yugoslavia, and France. Ambassador Bonbright was interviewed by Peter Jessup on February 26, 1986.

Q: I'd just keep it rolling chrono-wise. Reber was in Fort de France, and you were "French-desking it."

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Of course, the big problem at that time with the French and a long time after was our relations with de Gaulle and his Free French. We got off on a very bad start. This was before my time; I think it was around Christmas of '41. Without consulting us, General de Gaulle ordered an admiral, who was loyal to him, to take the two French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, two ratty little places off the coast of Newfoundland, of no importance except they'd been a thorn in our sides all through the Prohibition era, a haven for jolly boating. This infuriated FDR and Mr. Hull, on reflection a little bit more than it should have, but it did, and caused Mr. Hull, I think, to refer to the takeover as "by a group of so-called Free French." That, really, we never recovered from.

Q: That slur.

BONBRIGHT: I'm not sure that it was meant with quite the sense that it sounds. The name "Free French" hadn't been in use all that long. I think he was using it more as a descriptive, and not in the sense as "so-called but not really Free." But who knows?

Q: Yes.

BONBRIGHT: He may not have. But this upset things. We were upset fundamentally, I think, because we still had maintained relations with the French Government in unoccupied France, in Vichy, and we didn't want that upset. Of course, it was a very unpopular policy at home. All the papers practically were all for de Gaulle, and people like Walter Lippmann went around basting the President and the Department for keeping on this connection. But we thought it was important to have people still in unoccupied France and keep an eye on Petain and try to keep him from going overboard, and also as a sign that those French were loyal and hopeful, and at no time did it ever allow it to appear that we approved or loved them, the Vichy government.

Q: Keeping channels open.

BONBRIGHT: Keeping channels open, I think very valid. Of course, that blew up when we invaded North Africa. The Vichy crowd broke diplomatic relations with us. The French fleet, too, had all scuttled, which we would have preferred to get it intact, as indeed we should have; I mean, before the fall of France. That fleet should have been ordered to sail the hell out of there. It wasn't. But it was better sunk than in the hands of the Germans.

Q: Didn't the British bombard?

BONBRIGHT: They had hit them at one time, yes.

Q: In North Africa.

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: Was Ambassador Murphy operating out of the Department or secretly for FDR? I mean, with his maneuverings around Europe.

BONBRIGHT: He did go through the Department. I'm not too clear about the details of the preparations for the landing. There was a special group that was formed with military and State Department people to do that. So that was separated from the normal work of the French desk. I was aware of a lot of it, the work of the vice consuls that we had in North Africa had helped make preparations for the landing, but not in detail. Murphy had carried a good deal of clout when he reported in those days. Of course, the big fight was over Admiral Darlan, whom we sort of recognized as the controller. It became enormously unpopular in our press, but it was designed to save American lives and cut down the military opposition to our landing, and which I think was pretty successful.

Q: Casualties were minimal.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Then he, of course, was assassinated shortly thereafter. Of course, the Gaullists all wanted to move right in on that, but we had brought out this General Giraud in France, who had been a prisoner of war in Germany, I think, a fine man with a good military reputation. He was dating a civilian, Ruth. Actually, I don't know who picked him. It turned out to be a pretty poor choice. He had no political savvy, he had no stomach for the end-fighting. In fact, finally he just threw in the sponge. He wasn't a viable opponent for de Gaulle; he wouldn't have lasted one round with him and didn't. Of course, we were all criticized then for not being more forthcoming with de Gaulle, for whom there was great sympathy. Everybody appreciated what he'd done. His stand at the independence and to keep on fighting and so on were all very noble and appreciated everywhere. But after things like the St. Pierre and Miquelon episode, they refused to commit themselves to having this man going to France as the French Government without the French people having a chance to express their opinions of what they wanted after the war, because while there were all sorts of rumors coming out, de Gaulle claimed that he had enormous support. It was hard to judge.

Q: You couldn't take a poll.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, you couldn't take a poll. So basically, I think our Vichy policy and our holding off on running 100% out for de Gaulle was sound. What wrecked it was the public relations job. Even when we did something for de Gaulle – and we did many things – we seemed to do it reluctantly.

Q: Or it was painted reluctantly.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Or under pressure, or it really didn't mean anything, anyway. Some of us in the lower ranks of the Department were bothered by this, and we tried to push the vine further up, but if you're going to do something, for God's sake, let's do it gracefully and try to see if we can't get a little credit for it. But that didn't work with the President and Mr. Hull.

Q: Wasn't there a factor also in there that General de Gaulle was not an unbending back-

slapping type; he was a very arch-imperious person?

BONBRIGHT: Indeed he was. First, the British, you see, agreed with us privately. That was the difference. They agreed privately. In fact, Churchill used to say that, “The cross of Lorraine (which was de Gaulle’s logo, so to speak) is the heaviest cross that I have to bear.” But he didn’t say it out loud, publicly. Everyone had heard it, I suppose de Gaulle himself, but it wasn’t the public sphere. So the British got away with much more just by that attitude than we did.

Fundamentally, too, the French group that was allowed to set up business in London, they were just too damned unreliable. There was a sieve. We all found, the British, too, by bitter experience, that you couldn’t pass on anything of a confidential nature to the French in London that didn’t go back to Vichy and eventually to the Germans. Any military planning was out; you just couldn’t do it. That’s really, I think, why de Gaulle was not drawn into any of the planning for the invasion. I don’t think he even knew about it until maybe the boats were already on the way. Anyway, it was last minute. They were taking no chances, and they had to, no question about it. I’ve often wondered, and many people have, if things might have been better after the war if we had treated de Gaulle differently. Surely, I think, in our own interests we could have done some things a little bit differently, but I honestly don’t think it would have made any difference. I think he was a great man, no question about it, but he wasn’t on the same wavelength with us. I mean, he got plenty of support from us once he was accepted by the French. We did all sorts of things for him, like letting French troops lead the way into Paris at the time of liberation, when they had had nothing to do with liberating whatsoever.

Q: They let General LeClerc or somebody move in with the division.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Of course, the French in the town, the underground, was not without its importance in the liberation and turnover. Then at other times de Gaulle would go right against direct orders and move his troops sometimes right in front of where we were going, things of that sort, just for political reasons. When NATO came along, he supported it all right, but then he wouldn’t let his troops serve under the NATO command. Always the grandeur of France. I think this attitude, particularly during the war, was important in helping to maintain French morale after the disaster, and up to the point of getting them back on their feet after the liberation. But I think he overdid it; I think maybe he got the French to feel that they were stronger than they really were. Anyway, we had trouble with him always to the day he died.

Q: Was his French in writing and oratory superb?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, yes.

Q: An American general in English couldn’t match his eloquence?

BONBRIGHT: I don’t think so. He was very, very intelligent. He was something, great contradictions. Of course, he had that enormous height up above most people.

Q: Would you say one of his great accomplishments was fighting all those right-wing generals and everything and getting Algeria to be independent? I mean, realizing the handwriting on the

wall.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think so. He's the only one who could do it. I don't think anybody else would have got away with it. I don't know. That's a pretty messy place still, I think. I look back with some nostalgia to the days of the French and British empires, I confess. They were galling at times, and a servant of British crown colony in the old days could be personally very humiliating, they were so patronizing and arrogant, but it was a far, far better world when they were top dogs. They ran pretty tight ships.

Q: Africa, with all its multiple little countries, was pretty much a disaster area as far as not being able to manage things themselves economically.

BONBRIGHT: No. Perhaps they can work themselves out.

Some time in 1943, I think it was, we gave a form of recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation, the de Gaullist group. It agreed to certain powers that we would deal with them, but it was, of course, short of their ultimate goal, which always was that they wanted to be recognized as the future government of France; nothing else was good enough. But when this recognition took place, it was carefully worded, and we thought it was doing them a pretty big favor. Mr. Hull had a press conference after the announcement of this recognition. I give this as an example of Mr. Hull's ability to obfuscate a question.

"Mr. Secretary, when the Allies reconquer France, will the administration of the recaptured territory be turned over to the French Committee or the Allied military government?"

Mr. Hull: "You mean metropolitan France?"

"Yes, sir."

Mr. Hull: "If you will read these terms of recognition, you will find where those phases will be taken up and dealt with as each comes up or as they come to them, or if they should do so earlier, they may do that."

I don't often sympathize with gentlemen of the press; I think they're spoiled brats, a lot of them. But I did feel pity for the man who was covering this press conference and how to write about that announcement.

Q: There must have been similar obfuscation.

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: About some of the others in the Department that helped with the problems or didn't help.

BONBRIGHT: My real boss through all this period was H. Freeman Matthews, known as "Doc," who was head of the European office. He himself had been in Vichy, I think, and had been a French hand for some time. He also worked in South America. He was a wonderful man.

Q: He still lives in Washington, doesn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I believe so. He sits in a chair all day long and doesn't recognize anybody. But then he had a mind like a steel trap and a tenacity that a bulldog would admire. If he once got his teeth into an opponent, he never, never let go. I owe a great deal to him. He really got me started by arranging for me to go as number two in Paris at the end of my time in the Department. I remember the day he called me in and put this before me. I was greatly flattered. I was only a Class 3 officer at the time, pretty far down still. Of course, the end of the war saw an explosion in the number of people. Everybody who was already in was apt to go up pretty fast because they needed bodies in all directions. I had not particularly looked forward to being in any really big embassies, and I told this to Doc that I'd like to think about it. I could feel his cold eye on me as I left the room.

The next morning he called me in again and looked at me coldly, and said, "With regard to what you said to me yesterday, if you don't want to go to Paris, if you prefer a small post, I'm sure I can arrange to have you sent to Bulgaria."

At which I said, "Doc, I'd be pleased and honored to go to Paris." So he laughed, and we talked about it often afterwards. He was a great friend and a pillar of strength in that department, I always thought.

Another that I worked with not too long was Woody Wallner. He had been in Vichy, too, and Doug MacArthur, the general's nephew, was also a Vichy veteran, both very good officers. I always held it in Doug's favor that he leaned over backwards to ignore the relationship with his famous uncle. He wanted to do it on his own, and he did.

Q: He wasn't like Warren Delano Robbins, waving "Delano"?

BONBRIGHT: No, no, not in the least, which was pretty good. His wife was the daughter of the veep, Senator Alben Barkley, and that didn't do him any harm either. But the thing that really rocketed him up was that after being in the Paris Embassy for a while, he was sent to SHAPE as political advisor to General Eisenhower, who got to depend on him greatly. When he came home after this tour with Eisenhower, when he first became President, Doug was slated to go to Saigon as consul or something, and Eisenhower refused to let him go, and kept him in the State Department as counselor, which is an old slot of many years standing and has no exact place in the hierarchy, but it had always been influential. You could make anything out of it that you could. So he served in that.

Q: It isn't correct to say that as there are so-called Kremlinologists in the Department who devote much of their lives to the Soviet problem, there was not a similar corps of French specialists, were there? They kept shifting around?

BONBRIGHT: No, but there were several of them who did different tours of duty in that area. Wallner, I thought, of all the officers I ran into, knew more about France than any of them. He had the ultimate fate of being number two to Mr. Kennedy's brother-in-law Shriver, who didn't

like to have people around who knew more than he did and made life pretty miserable for Woody. So I think Woody pretty much retired after that; he never got another mission, which he richly deserved.

Q: But there wasn't a "Mr. France" as Hickerson was "Mr. Canada"?

BONBRIGHT: No. We regarded Matthews as our guiding light. Of course, Murphy in a way had his own entourage. Basically he was, to me, an Irish Catholic politician.

Q: An operator?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. He got his start under Bullitt in Paris. He was a consul general in Paris at the outbreak of the war. He hadn't had anything to do with the political side before that. He knew how to cut the butter. He was very highly regarded and had a good reputation, but I wouldn't put him in the same room as Bob Matthews.

I'll talk a little about that later when I come back to my last assignment with the Department. Perhaps I can comment about the Russian boss.

Q: So you had a laugh with Freeman Matthews and accepted that assignment.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Before going to the embassy, I was assigned to the Peace Conference, which took place in Paris in the spring of 1946. I went over first for that. Mr. James Byrnes was Secretary of State at that time and head of the delegation. Those of us from the Department, career people, were scattered around in different jobs, but Matthews was the guy who pulled our strings. We all lived in the Hotel Meurice, which was comfortable but not gaudy. The food was not up to our standards at that time right after the war, as you can imagine.

My particular assignment was on a couple of the peace treaties with the Balkans, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. My boss was General Bedell Smith, who I had never met before, a very impressive officer and strong-willed, and had, unfortunately, one of the worst tempers I ever saw.

Q: That was purportedly induced by ulcers from which he suffered during his life.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, he did. He did have bad ulcers. I'll describe my run-in with him later back at the Department. Here everything went all right. Everybody helped with the difficult job of negotiations. I fought a little bit with the general. He thought he could win points with these ardent communists by small gestures. He used to hand out fountain pens, things of that sort. I remember when the Czechs sent him back a case of Czech beer; he thought he had it made with these fellows. I found that I. I guess he got over it when he went as ambassador to Moscow at that time and felt that you could maneuver these things on a personal basis, which you couldn't, nobody could.

At the end of the conference, then I moved over to the embassy. My boss there was Jefferson Caffery, who had a long and distinguished career mostly in South America, Cuba, Brazil. He was

a very strange man. He worked with only a handful of people. Although I was his number two and I got on all right with him, I was never his favorite. His favorites were Douglas MacArthur, who he had worked with him, and in his whole outer office he had a man named Elim O'Shaughnessy, a Foreign Service officer.

To digress a little bit, Elim's history is amusing. He was the son of a Foreign Service officer, educated abroad, and he had acquired very British mannerisms and accent, wore his pocket handkerchief in his sleeve, like Mr. Roosevelt, smoked a long cigarette. He gave the impression of being a real striped pants-lah-de-dah, which the press would love. Actually, he had a very tough mind and a good one. He took exams for the Foreign Service and two or three times he passed the written, and every time they turned him down on the orals.

Q: Too effete or what?

BONBRIGHT: Finally, he went to somebody on the board and said, "What's the matter?" He was told very frankly that his manners and everything were too European and too un-American, and there wasn't room in the Service for all of this. This fellow suggested to him that he take the orals once more, but that before doing so, he go out in the Middle West somewhere and spend six months in any old job, sort of rubbing elbows with the great American people. So he went out to St. Louis, actually, where he got a job in a gas station, and he worked there for almost the required six months, I think, and never a peep of complaint from him. Finally, an officer from the Department who was going out west to give some exams out there stopped off. He had been instructed to stop off and see O'Shaughnessy.

Q: Was he on a leave without pay or a sabbatical, or what?

BONBRIGHT: No, he wasn't even in the Service then.

Q: Oh, I see. He hadn't been accepted yet.

BONBRIGHT: No, he hadn't been accepted. So this fellow stopped off to have a look and see if O'Shaughnessy had really tried to do as had been suggested to him. When he got back to the Department after this trip, they said to this fellow, "Now how about O'Shaughnessy? Has he changed?"

He said, "I'm sorry to have to report that O'Shaughnessy hasn't changed in the slightest, but everybody else who worked in that gas station was walking around smoking cigarettes out of a long amber cigarette holder."

Q: That's a wonderful story.

BONBRIGHT: A nice fellow. They took him, of course, and never regretted it. He was very good.

Q: Mr. Caffery also had been in Egypt, hadn't he, in Cairo?

BONBRIGHT: He went there afterwards.

Q: He could be described as an eccentric, couldn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Very much so. He was a bachelor for most of his life and married just before he came to Paris. She was a nice woman, his wife, but on the mousy side. He treated her without any consideration whatsoever. I think she had money and that helped. He was a stickler for protocol. I have seen him walk into somebody else's dining room and go up to where he thought he should have sat and see that his name card was somebody else's, take it up and tear it apart and throw it on the floor. Talk about arrogant.

He had a large supply of these little tiny pads on his desk, and he'd write these messages all day to different people. I once got a letter from a congressman or something, he had sent for me to draft a reply, and five minutes later I got a second follow-up: "Mr. Bonbright, how about that letter?" Well, hell, I hadn't had it for five minutes. I finally went in and said, "I'll do my best for you, but I really can't do it this fast." He started laughing. He'd write you three or four at a time and then just feed them into the "out" basket and his secretary would get these.

I remember he was a devout Catholic and used to go to church every morning and read all the papers at home. He got to the office at about 10:00 o'clock, and then he'd stay all through the day. He never ate lunch. He'd go home and run in his garden. But one day he came up to the office at 10:00 with Elim O'Shaughnessy, and he didn't say anything to Elim. A few minutes later after Elim got to his office, he found a note from the ambassador, saying, "Mr. O'Shaughnessy, don't you think that you are exaggerating when you get to the office as late as I do?" He wasn't a man who was greatly loved, I mean, like old Herrick, they said, who couldn't speak a word of French but who was greatly loved there. He was all business.

Q: What did the diplomatic corps think of him? Did they get along with him?

BONBRIGHT: His relations with the British were poor, I think. The British were much more sociable. Duff Cooper was there at the time and Caffery didn't care for him much. O'Shaughnessy and some of the boys used to see a lot of the British but they didn't talk about it in front of Caffery. They had to be a little careful. On important matters, his instincts were good, nothing frivolous about his approach. A strange, strange man.

Q: You've mentioned a number of people who had certain odd quirks and so forth, as all of us do, but time and again you have found career Foreign Service people, when you get right down to it, they really were extremely intelligent and able. Do you attribute that to picking the best of the best in the selection process or to training within the Department and just the learning process as you go from post to post?

BONBRIGHT: I think it was that.

Q: And serving under other good people.

BONBRIGHT: Good men pick good people, as a rule. I think that's how the better officers got

ahead. God knows the Foreign Service had lots of people that are not what you would call top-notch. Others have certain qualities that are good, some that are not so good. But it's how the machinery works in contacts. When you're in a job with a bunch of people under you, you instinctively seek the ones who you think can deliver and see that those people move up. One result of that is, I'd say, a lot of people who didn't serve in the Department were at a disadvantage because they never served under the people who were in positions of influence. A lot of them didn't want to be in the Department, but I think they suffered on that account.

Q: I thought of all places, somewhat like the Army, a general will get maybe a couple of people he asks for, but the rest will just come out of the computer or what existed before, and in the Department, an ambassador might get the DCM he wants but the others are just assigned there.

BONBRIGHT: Absolutely. That happens a lot, particularly in the smaller posts. By chance, for instance, I had what I consider a good staff in Lisbon, and what I consider a good staff in Stockholm. I had nothing to do with picking any of them.

Q: I see. That makes it difficult.

BONBRIGHT: Except my counselor in Stockholm, Liv Merchant was in the top slot in those days, I got a letter from him saying that I could have my choice of three men, and he suggested strongly that I choose this fellow. Well, if I had really known any of them well and thought one was really much better than the other, I wouldn't have hesitated to, though contrary to his recommendation, but I didn't. In fact, the one he named was the one that I knew most about and would have picked anyway. Otherwise, I had nothing to do with that.

Q: There's no such thing as surrounding yourself with the eight people you know best?

BONBRIGHT: Everybody tries. They try, and they're lucky if they can get one or two good ones.

I'd like to quote here from a letter which my friend Woody Wallner sent me as I was taking off for Paris.

"Dear Jamie,

This is to say Bon Voyage and to add a word on a threadbare subject, one worn thin by self-appointed Panegyrist from Transylvania, Rosario, and Nebraska. Paris is Paris, has a life and being of its own and a beauty that quite apart from what can be captured on a photographic plate, grows out of that almost autonomous life and being. It doesn't seep in all at once, but it seeps and stays quite independently of the quantity or quality, success or failure of the things one does while living in Paris."

Q: That's very nice.

BONBRIGHT: I always kept that. It was very true. I liked it.

Q: Very nice. You were about to say something more about Elim O'Shaughnessy?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, there was one other rather nice story about him, I think. When he was through with the present assignment in Paris, he was assigned back to the State Department, and he shipped all of his belongings home ahead of him. What was unusual was that among these belongings that he shipped were 20 cases of champagne, a drink of which he was very, very fond. The high figure, however, caught the notice of the customs officials in Washington, who eventually asked him to come in and either explain or be charged rather heavy duties. He then came up with the explanation that under the present Paris law, a worker entering the United States is allowed to bring in, free of duty, the tools of his trade. This so enchanted the customs people that they let him have all the champagne and charged him nothing, but they did give him a warning not to try it again.

He and a Lieutenant Commander John Williams worked in Mr. Caffery's outer office. Williams was his sort of social secretary, and O'Shaughnessy did more substantive jobs for him, as a rule.

I have before me, however, a copy of a memorandum which was addressed to Mr. O'Shaughnessy and Lieutenant Commander Williams, April 1947, which reads as follows:

"As I was accompanied on my Alsace trip by only one secretary, one aide de camp, two Marines, and two chauffeurs, it will be necessary on the next trip to take someone along, especially to see that my luggage does not get lost."

Q: Incredible! And that was in dead seriousness.

BONBRIGHT: He was joking, but he usually had a barb in it.

Another of the best officers was Doug MacArthur. I think I might have spoken about him. I think I did.

Q: Being married to Alben Barkley's daughter.

BONBRIGHT: That's correct.

The other principal officers that I thought well of were Norris Chipman, who was a Russian hand and had an encyclopedic memory about members of Communist Parties in France and elsewhere. He and Richard Eldridge, the labor attaché were very helpful in combating communists who were in control of the labor unions pretty much at that time.

Q: Is Norris Chipman the officer who many years later went back and was fired on by some terrorists in recent years?

BONBRIGHT: No, I don't think so. Norris died not too long after this time.

One officer who, frankly, I didn't care for was Graham Martin, who was the chief administrative officer, very able, ambitious, as slippery as a cold basket of eels. He was intimately acquainted

with all the laws and regulations which administrative officers are left to play with, and he was able to turn them to his own use and the use of anyone who was working for him particularly. He was always trying to ingratiate himself with the ambassadors and also getting his own position in the embassy raised. This was pretty well stopped by Caffery, but I'm sorry to say that when David Bruce took over, as much as I admired him and his father, he let down the bars and helped Martin, gave him almost anything that he wanted. This boost eventually started him up the ladder to being ambassador to Italy, I think, at first.

Q: And also he had the rank of ambassador at Geneva to the European office of the United Nations. He didn't lack self-confidence, did he?

BONBRIGHT: No. I thought he was a particularly bad choice for Italy. The Italians liked sophistication, and Martin had no social graces at all. I thought he was a miserable appointment just on those grounds alone. I don't know enough about his handling of things in Saigon to know that he was just the victim of the inevitable. I can't say whether he was good or bad out there, but he certainly was there when the curtain came down.

Q: I understand that he's an embittered retired person in Virginia or North Carolina now. He hasn't written a book, I don't think.

BONBRIGHT: After the war, our government had purchased a number of houses with so-called counterpart funds. One of these was set aside for the deputy chief of mission, a nice house near the Champs de Mars. But I had already rented a nice house which suited me perfectly; it had belonged to the Count Charles de Noailles on Rue Nitot, just off the Place des Etats Unis, not far from the Etoile. It was a charming place, and I preferred it to any of the government housing properties I saw. I was glad that I stayed there. My only objection to it came later, in accordance with the habit of the French of continually changing the names of the streets, and after a while they changed Nitot, which was simple and easy, to Rue de l'Admiral D'Estaing, which I had trouble pronouncing and trouble spelling.

Q: As in Giscard d'Estaing?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. It was the admiral who fought in our revolution in support of the French troops.

Q: What is the origin of that switching names? When somebody sort of becomes obscure? Who was Nitot – a person?

BONBRIGHT: I don't know. I don't remember. I don't know that I ever knew. They like to pay the compliment to somebody who has just done something for them, and then after he's been dead long enough, if they want to honor somebody else, they ditch him. I mean, one of the bigger streets there in Paris was named for Roosevelt – I forget what the name had been before, but it must have been a fairly prominent name because it was one of the big avenues.

Q: That would cause havoc here, wouldn't it?

BONBRIGHT: Absolutely! Perfectly terrible.

Q: You would not be living at 4200 Massachusetts Avenue, but Avenue Cordell Hull or something.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, quite possibly.

The foreign minister at the time when I first got there was Robert Schuman, an Alsatian, a tall, homely man, but a man of great character and strength. He was really a good one. He and Jean Monnet were more or less the fathers, from the French side, of the coal and steel community, which led to the other steps pointing toward greater European integration. We were all sorry when he stepped down.

He was succeeded, I think, by Georges Bidault, who for all of my time there was in and out of the government as either prime minister or foreign minister. He was an unattractive man and he had gotten his reputation for having done great things during the Resistance. But I confess I never saw any evidence of either moral or physical courage. Maybe he did, but you can't prove it by me. Actually, it was a very hard time, because everybody, whether they were collaborators or whether they were loyal, or whether they were working actively for the Resistance or just sitting out the days of the occupation, everybody was trying to get on the bandwagon after the liberation. It's understandable, but there were really no records to go by, and you had to rely on word of mouth and reports from different people, which weren't always unbiased.

I know I inherited from Doc Matthews a loathing for one particular Frenchman named Rene de Chambrun. His father, General de Chambrun, was a fine old gentleman, and everybody liked him. He had a fine career in life. He was a direct descendent of Lafayette, and Rene, his son, tried to get into the United States on the basis that at the time of the revolution, the state of Maryland had voted Maryland citizenship for the direct descendants of Lafayette. Of course, the state of Maryland is not the United States of America. But on the other side, Rene "the rat," as we called him, had married one of the daughters of Pierre Laval, the arch-collaborator, who was prime minister under Petain. The bad thing that he did was fairly well documented. In fact, I think they tried him, and I think they hanged him.

Doc Matthews had this fellow blocked, and he couldn't get a visa. They tried again when I was in the position to carry on the blockade, which I was happy to do. I think eventually he did get in.

Q: Permanently or temporarily?

BONBRIGHT: I don't know how long he lasted, to tell you the truth. I think they finally gave him a visa. The Chambruns had connections to the White House, and he pulled out all the stops on this side of the water as well as France.

Q: Were those connections to Truman?

BONBRIGHT: No, to FDR. He was the worst of the cases. Of course, some of them were pretty good people.

I forgot to mention one of the advantages of my location in our house was that it was just about two miles from the embassy, which allowed me to keep on with the practice which I had started in Washington, walking to work, which was healthy and very pleasant. I enjoyed it always.

Q: In Brussels, you used a bicycle. That was a longer ride?

BONBRIGHT: That was longer; that was 13 kilometers.

Again, not to do anything official, but in Paris I was able to indulge for the first time my growing love for French wines. I had become briefly acquainted with some of them when I was in Brussels. The Belgians always imported the very best French wines. In Paris, I got to know, I think through Ridgway Knight, a man named Raymond Beaudois, who was head of the Academie de Vins de France, who had a marvelous palate and was in the business. He was a wine merchant, a very nice man. I got to know him well. He took some of us in the embassy under his wing just to choose good wines and buy cases for us, and we'd distribute it around. I was always very grateful to him for this and never got a bad steer.

I was also sensible enough while I was in Paris that every case of wine that I bought – and in my position there, I had to buy quite a few – I would remove four bottles and put them aside, so that by the time I left Paris about four years later, I had the foundations of a very nice little cellar, which the original inhabitants of that cellar have long since been consumed. I kept filling up their places and still have quite a number of lovely French wines.

Q: How does it work with wine if you have a particular brand of burgundy which has been known to be superb for years? That doesn't mean it will always be superb?

BONBRIGHT: No, no.

Q: Do you buy only the year that you previously tasted and know is so good? Or do you take a risk?

BONBRIGHT: Of course, there is always some risk. The experts will have a pretty good starting idea of what a wine is going to do within the first year or two, and that's the time when you can buy them the cheapest, is before they have a great reputation. It doesn't always work out, but actually, as I recall it, I don't think I ever paid more than \$7 a bottle for even the finest. I have some Chateau Petrus 1961 in my cellar today that sells for \$300 or \$400 a bottle; it's just fantastic. I can assure you that I didn't pay anything like that when I got it. I'm a fool not to sell them.

Q: What about wines like Chateau Petrus? Are they at their best served with a certain dish, or sipped separately instead of a cocktail? How do you most enjoy good wine?

BONBRIGHT: Good red wines, I think, should be drunk pretty much with food. The old business of having red wine with meat, I think is a pretty good rule of thumb, and white wine with fish, although a good white burgundy, I think, will go with just about anything. Myself, my

tastes have shifted pretty much and Letitia's, too. We drink very little red wine anymore. We drink mostly white. As I say, you don't have to worry too much if it's a good vintage and if it goes well with many things.

Q: People who booze a lot and drink rather heavily, their taste buds are not as sensitive as people who refrain?

BONBRIGHT: I suppose so. My palate isn't good enough. I'm not an expert. I was never in the class with Ridgway Knight, although I wasn't bad. There used to be certain rules – I don't know if they still follow. The French were adamant against the drinking of whiskey, Scotch, cocktails before dinner, if you're going to have wine. They would tolerate a dry martini or vodka, something of that sort. I think that's fair enough, although people have whiskey and then go ahead and enjoy their wine, too. But that's not the French way I was taught.

Q: These people who endorse wines – Alexis Lichine and Frank Schoonmaker and Peter Sichel and so forth – is that strictly commercial, or do they really like what they're recommending?

BONBRIGHT: Probably a combination of both. Schoonmaker, I think, was rather well regarded – he wasn't that from the French. But my friend Beaudois couldn't stand Alexis Lichine, couldn't stand him. In Beaudois's view, Lichine did the unpardonable thing: he owned a vineyard of his own that he bought there, and he would unmercifully advertise his own wares. A wine fellow is supposed to be unbiased and let only his taste buds tell him what was good and what wasn't, and he should act accordingly. So Beaudois and his friends thought Lichine was just commercial, I think, in an unacceptable way.

I haven't talked much about the substantive matters, and I don't think I want to get into that too much. Of course, this was a time of some very important developments – the Marshall Plan, and then we had all sorts of problems in connection with Indochina starting up, colonial problems, generally.

Q: Did you visit any of the French colonies?

BONBRIGHT: No. I had a trip laid out once with Mr. Bruce to go down to Morocco, but something came up and we never went. I just never left France while I was there.

The colonial problem was a terrible sore point, and one which I personally felt was not well played by us. FDR was obsessed with it; he was determined that the French would never get anything. He felt about the same, but not quite as strongly, I guess, in regard to the British empire, that great stabilizing force of the last century.

Q: That they would have to give up India?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. I think that movement was inevitable, but what bothered me about it was that I didn't think we should give it a push. As far as I could see, it never created any gratitude on the part of the recipients for support. Take a look at Africa today: many places that we helped gain their independence, they all hate us. So we got the worst of both worlds. The new people

didn't appreciate it. We earned the distrust and intense annoyance, to put it mildly, of our allies, who still had some colonial possessions. It was all too fast. Practically none of them were ready for it. We had no chance to break them in gently. The best chance, of course, was the British effort, which to some extent prepared the way.

Q: *Were you in Paris during Dien Bien Phu?*

BONBRIGHT: I don't remember if I was there or whether I was back in the Department. I forget the date of it. I think it was in the Fifties, wasn't it?

Q: *Early Fifties.*

BONBRIGHT: I was back in Washington then. When I left Paris, things were still and not hotted up. The French were still coping, with difficulty.

Q: *I remember then that they asked President Eisenhower for air support from the carriers in the Pacific, and Admiral Radford, who was in charge, recommended it, but the White House turned it down.*

BONBRIGHT: That came later, but I remember I attended a meeting with Radford. Mr. Dulles was Secretary then. Top military people were at Dulles's house one Sunday afternoon, and I took notes and wrote the minutes of the meeting. This thing was debated. As I remember it, none of us wanted to do it.

Q: *Because of the impracticality of it, or because of lack of sympathy with the French?*

BONBRIGHT: We didn't want the possible involvement, plus lack of sympathy with the French, too. Of course, we took over from them and tried to do the same job that they failed to do, and equally failed.

Q: *You stayed in France. Caffery left and Bruce replaced him.*

BONBRIGHT: I stayed there until '49 sometime, I think.

Q: *He went off to Egypt?*

BONBRIGHT: He went off to Egypt. He was offered a choice of Egypt or Czechoslovakia. He felt – and I think he was right – that they were trying to get him to retire. In fact, he had been interested in things Egyptian for a long time and was enchanted with it, so he accepted with alacrity. I think that was his last post.

Q: *He could have a somewhat similar lifestyle there but not in Prague.*

BONBRIGHT: Oh, no. He would have retired if faced with just that one. If they wanted to get rid of him, they made the wrong move.

Q: Bruce and his wife made a good couple, didn't they?

BONBRIGHT: Oh, yes, superb. Of course, he'd been in France for a year or more. He was head of the French ECA mission, which in turn was under the Southeast group, led by Averell Harriman.

By that time, I confess, the place was overrun with Americans. I think we had 300 or 400 people in the embassy proper and God knows how many in the ECA. At one time, I think there were five Americans with a personal rank of ambassador. It was just hopeless, you know. Part of my time, I didn't see many French people; I was too busy being in this tangled web of scratching Americans. That part I didn't like.

Actually, I could have – and perhaps I should have, but I didn't – leave in the fall of '49 after Caffery did. It was decided that up to then the top officer in any of our missions was the counselor who, as in my case and many others, was given the personal rank of minister. He was also called the minister counselor. They decided that they wanted a full-time minister as number two in London and Paris and so on. There was a scramble for these choice positions, and Paris was allotted Chip Bohlen, an old friend of mine. I'd known him for years. He had a brilliant Russian career, had been to Yalta, been close to FDR and his interpreter. This, of course, meant that he would be technically between me and the ambassador, and I would no longer be deputy chief of mission. Normally in those circumstances, the fellow that was squeezed, like I was there, would be transferred, lest he lose face or something. But I never felt that way about it. As it turned out, I went on just about as I had before, never had any problems of being cut off of David Bruce. There were so many international, multinational problems floating around which was the kind of thing that Bohlen found he was good at, and he concentrated more on that sort of thing. So I just said I'd move if they wanted me to, but otherwise I was quite happy to stay on, and I did for another eight months, I guess.

One amusing little thing I'd forgotten. In 1948, the time of the election, John Foster Dulles was in Paris in connection with some international meeting. The Philippine ambassador to Paris got the bright idea of having a dinner for Dulles two days after the election, just at the time that Truman was going to get beaten and that Dulles would be Secretary of State very soon. So we all had to laugh when the day after the election, here is the Filipino stuck with his guest of honor with egg on his face. I rather thought – although I didn't know him well at the time – that Dulles would tell him, "Let's forget it," but he didn't. They had the dinner, and Dulles went to it. I'm told – I wasn't there – that he joked about it and took it all in very good form. I don't think back of him as having too light a touch. I thought he did very well.

Q: Who came in then?

BONBRIGHT: Truman was reelected. He beat Dewey.

Q: Dewey was elected in the papers for a few hours.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. That happened once before, you know. Remember Charles Evans Hughes was announced in the paper as the winner over Wilson. I forget whether it was the first or second

term.

Q: And that proved to be false.

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: So then Truman brought in Dean Acheson, didn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Marshall was in there somewhere, at the time of the Marshall thing. Marshall came in. In November of '44, Hull retired. Then came Byrnes, who went to the peace conference, and then came General Marshall. He wasn't there too long, I don't think, more than a year. Then Acheson, who, in my opinion, was the best Secretary of State that I ever worked with. Of course, before him I'd been too junior to see or have too close a contact with such an exalted person. But I've known them. He served in the Department for different stints; he'd been an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. He had several jobs. I got to know him and his wife. We were friends, and I was a great admirer of his.

Q: Was he a good choice for Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations?

BONBRIGHT: I would have thought it would be the reverse. He was haughty, you know, and they thought that he was talking down to congressmen, who weren't as bright as he was.

Q: And he dressed so much better than they did.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. It was a funny thing, but he worked hard at it. He was a charming man. I think when he tried, he could overcome a lot of this feeling about it. He was great.

Q: He worked well with Truman, didn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Perfect.

Q: Completely opposite types.

BONBRIGHT: Absolutely. Couldn't have been more different. He never tried to upstage Truman. Always Truman was the boss, and he was his servant, if you would. He never, never tried to push, as so many secretaries have, to get the limelight for themselves at the expense of their boss. Truman, of course, saw this very clearly. Of course, he'd had no foreign experience at all, and he knew a good thing when he saw it. He got his money's worth from Dean Acheson.

I have a couple more things about Acheson. Acheson was not an admirer of the United Nations. Of course, Stettinius had been Secretary of State at the time of the San Francisco Conference and the United Nations was born.

This is from a personal letter which Acheson wrote me in October 1960, right after the meeting in New York at which Khrushchev had taken off his shoes and pounded the desk and raised

perfect hell:

“The performance in New York was incredible. Nothing could have more perfectly vindicated the judgment of those of us who strongly objected to the United Nations being in New York. It was the three masterminds of Ed Stettinius, Nelson Rockefeller, and Warren Austin that put it there. Can you imagine how much more amusing history would be had Attila the Hun been able to appear with immunity in Rome and tell off the ruling Caesar, or if Napoleon could have taken (inaudible) across the channel and told the younger Pitt and the prince regent and perhaps the Iron Duke himself how he was going to bury them?

“I saw Harold MacMillan last Saturday afternoon, who told me that even his experience in Moscow had not prepared him for the violent effrontery of Khrushchev’s performance at the United Nations. I did not say it to him, but I believed that Mr. K could not have picked a more useful man to insult than the honorable Harold himself. It really shook him out of the pipe dream which he has found so useful for political purposes in England. I did observe to him that when the United States, the British Commonwealth and NATO found themselves fortunate to be saved by a Swede, the world had come to a pretty pass.”

Q: Meaning Hammarskjold or Trygve Lie?

BONBRIGHT: Hammarskjold.

Q: That’s a pungent letter.

BONBRIGHT: One other little tidbit that was passed on to me by my friend William Tyler, who later became the Assistant Secretary for Europe and later ambassador to the Hague, a charming man and a superb officer. He was in Bonn when he wrote this letter, written April 1961.

“I must relate the following to you. Last Sunday I was with Mr. Acheson, who came here to see the chancellor. He told me that while things in Washington were, on the whole, going well, there were issues on which he disagreed violently with the administration’s policies, e.g., Angola. ‘The other day,’ he said, ‘I was in a car with Dean Rusk and that funny little man Waldron, or whatever his name is.’

“‘Waldron,’ I asked, ‘who is he?’

“‘He works in the U.N. liaison office,’ said D.A.

“‘Oh, do you mean Wallner?’

“‘Yes, that’s it. Wallner.’

“‘Anyway, when I objected to our vote on the inscription of Angola, he said, ‘Well, you see, that is what we call higher realism.’

“And I said to him, ‘Look here, if you don’t want me to throw up into the Secretary of State’s

lap, don't talk like that again in my presence.”

Poor Woody, my old friend. Wallner, who had been a great officer on the French thing, he'd gone to work for the U.N. division for a while, and that's where he picked up this “higher realism.”

I can probably work this one in, but while I'm at it, I might as well put it in. This is another letter from Acheson dated June 23, 1958. This had to do with George Kennan:

“While I was in England, I stayed with Wally Barbour, and one day going into his office at the embassy, I met George Kennan coming out. We had a well-behaved, indeed, affectionate reunion, and then went off in an empty office to talk for half an hour. I thought George looked badly. He said he was still suffering from sinus trouble, which he had had all winter. I think he had found his year at Oxford somewhat disappointing and certainly very uncomfortable. He was in one of his melancholy moods, and he appeared to regard all the troubles of the world as punishments for sin. He was going on to give some lectures in Warsaw and expected to go back to Princeton in the autumn, although he was not yet sure he would persevere in the third volume of his trilogy or devote himself to lecturing and writing on current affairs. I devoutly hope that he will take the former course.” Wonderful man!

BONBRIGHT: I might go back to Paris for a few minutes and finish up there. Sometime in 1949 – I forget exactly when – George W. Perkins was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. He was then attached to the ECA France mission and was head of the industry section. He was a very fine man, and everybody seemed pleased at the appointment. Like some of the rest of the embassy staff, we had met him but didn't know too much about him. Before he left for Washington, I gave a small lunch for him at my house, to which I invited several of the embassy people like Bohlen and Wallner, Ridgway Knight, and Tyler. We had an interesting time, but after lunch, we were sitting around having coffee, and George asked us to speak about what each of us thought were the most important issues of the day. As I recall it, we all spoke either about relations with the Soviet Union or the French recovery, some European thing. At the end, we asked George what he thought, and, to my surprise, he replied without hesitation, “The world population explosion.” That's the kind of man he was; he was thinking beyond the small, immediate problems. Looking at the world today, I think his remark is as true now as it was then, even more so. This was 35 years ago.

PAUL F. DUVIVIER
Consular Officer
Marseille (1942)

Deputy Commercial Attaché
Paris (1958-1961)

**Commercial Relations
Bordeaux (1961-1962)**

**Principal Officer
Nice/Monaco (1962-1965)**

Paul Du Vivier entered the Foreign Service in 1940. His career included posts in Accra, Ottawa, Stockholm, Berlin, Edinburgh, and Frankfurt, as well as the French cities of in Marseille, Paris, Bordeaux, and Nice. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

DUVIVIER: But afterwards, of course, we heard quite a bit about it. And because I performed satisfactorily there, after a year's probation I was brought back to a very intellectual man called G. Howland Shaw who was Chief of Personnel. He sort of sized me up and said, "You seem to know French very well," and I said, "Yes," and he said, "The Consul General in Marseille has just come home and he needs a replacement for George McMurtrie Godley," whom I'd known in college, and "Would you like to go to Marseille?" and I said, "Fine," knowing nothing about it. So I had thirty days leave and met my wife, incidentally, and then I went off on the China clipper, or the equivalent, Pan-American clipper, that took a day and a half of continuous flight from Laguardia airport.

Q: *You went to the Azores.*

DUVIVIER: From Laguardia to Bermuda for refueling to the Azores for breakfast and then to Lisbon. And once again, with practically no briefing in the Department.

Q: *This was when?*

DUVIVIER: This was August 1942.

Q: *So by that time Germany had occupied up to the Vichy Line...*

DUVIVIER: Correct. They had done so two years earlier.

Q: *We're talking about a truncated France under Marshal Petain.*

DUVIVIER: Yes, yes.

Q: *Marseille was within that district.*

DUVIVIER: Exactly. And on the plane were seventeen members of the American Red Cross who became close friends, and they were doing food relief work in France. The Quakers had about a dozen men there too, and they were giving out milk and chocolate and so on to underfed French children, and incidentally helping some Jewish refugees to slip out with fake passports and US visas through Lisbon and get to this country. So there was a great deal going on there, but once again, before going to my post, I didn't get any shots, I wasn't told what to buy or what

to say, I had access to very low classified dispatches as they were then called, and I made a few handshakes...James Bonbright, who was the French desk officer, said, "Do what you're told and we'll watch what you come up with." And when I got there, I found in Marseille that I was in a maelstrom of activity. That was a large consulate of 12 Americans and 25 French "locals." We'd taken over the office of the British consulate general, which was slightly more protected from eavesdropping than our own facing the Prefecture in the main square.

Q: I'd like to just stop for one minute. How did you get there? I mean, we were at war with Germany by this time, and how did you get through over to Marseille, because you'd have to go through German-occupied territory.

DUVIVIER: No. From Lisbon, where I spent six days, I went by train with two Foreign Service stenographers to Madrid where a friend met me. And after a day there by train we proceeded to Barcelona where we spent another two nights, and then we went by train into unoccupied France at Cerbere to Narbonne, and, strangely enough, when I got there, a train station master was curious about me, since I had a huge suitcase – seventy-two pounds – full of clothes, cigarettes, and coffee beans. He was fascinated about what I was doing, and of course I wasn't going to talk, and he said, "What are the movies like in America?" And we spent about twenty minutes on the windy platform talking about Betty Grable and Charles Boyer and Mickey Mouse and all of these heroes we love. Then a French couple came up and said, "Where's the next train to so-and-so?" The chef de gare hated to be interrupted, and said, "Let me see your tickets," and so he took the tickets like that and he said, "These tickets are no good," and he tore them in half like that and he says, "Go to booth window number 3 and get a new set of tickets. You ought to know better than to interrupt when I'm having a serious conversation." And then he went back to talk about what were our best planes, and when are we coming over, and what are we going to do and all that. And then I, after a night trip in a private compartment, landed at Marseille at daybreak and was met by a consular clerk. I stayed with an American consul general in his very comfortable home for about five days until I moved into the big hotel on the main city street.

Q: What was the staffing of the consulate like?

DUVIVIER: The staffing was an FSO-2, Jay Webb Benton – a bachelor who traveled with his mother, a Romanian maid, and a couple of dachshunds; an FSO-4 consul, Bill Peck, who had been in the Marine Corps for about fifteen years, and he had a Russian-born wife; and then, in rank, myself; and then came three auxiliary vice-consuls, Betts, Crook, and Bradford. The auxiliary vice-consuls did the bulk of the consular work. There was no visa work or commercial invoices to speak of. There was a fair amount of passports, and there was a tremendous amount of intelligence-gathering. Because of my French nose and name, I was whisked into doing underground work with various groups. One of the Maquis clubs was called Comete, "shooting star," and another was Colbert, and I got to know them very well because one of their members was married to a...

Q: Maquis being the...

DUVIVIER: Underground network of anti-German resistance fighters.

Q: *M-a-q-u-i-s.*

DUVIVIER: And they, for instance, were monitoring the German radio signals that were flooding the place. There were a lot of Gestapo agents undercover throughout the area. Patriotic Frenchmen were listening to the BBC nightly radio broadcasts and picking up the London Times airmail edition dropped on the hillsides and distributing it. They were also passing on information to our embassy in Vichy. I didn't know what the OSS was. I never heard of it until the end of the war, but I was called upon to collect detailed information for it on the repair or non-repair of four large French warships, including the Strasbourg, and 12 other crippled cruisers and destroyers who had escaped the Royal Navy at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria. (July 3, 1940)

Q: *Jean Bart? Was that there?*

DUVIVIER: Jean Bart was unfinished and lay at Casablanca.

Q: *Maybe it was in Dakar.*

DUVIVIER: No, the Richelieu also unfinished was at Dakar. But Toulon had also the Algerie and Colbert were two heavy cruisers. The Toulon shipyards were deliberately dragging their feet on repairing them so that they wouldn't be of service to the Nazis when they came or determined to scuttle them, as indeed they did.

Q: *These were in Toulon.*

DUVIVIER: They were in Toulon, and I had three bright young Franco-American men who were clerks at the consulate and who went to the naval base every week to feed this information back to me and then I would feed it up to the assistant naval attaché at Vichy who was called Lt. Commander Thomas B. Cassidy. And he was OSS, but I learned that only later.

Q: *Well now, Bill Donovan starting this OSS, had flooded French North Africa, with so-called vice-consuls who were running all over the place, and I understand were actually OSS people.*

DUVIVIER: Yes, under Bob Murphy.

Q: *How about your auxiliaries? Were they, I mean, this was not part of their organization?*

DUVIVIER: Not at all. We were under orders from "Kippy" Tuck, the Charge d'Affaires in charge of our Embassy in Vichy.

Q: *But you were doing their work.*

DUVIVIER: I was doing their work, and we were not told who they were. One day a Frenchman came in and he was referred to me, a great big tall man, he must have been six feet four or five, and he used a cover name which I didn't know, and it turned out that he was the brother of Henri Giraud, the escaped four-star French general. He was negotiating to get his brother out of France over to Gibraltar where he was to meet Eisenhower and eventually to set up a Free French

government in North Africa.

Q: He was taken out by a British submarine commanded by an American naval officer.

DUVIVIER: I think it was an American submarine.

Q: Well, I have the story on another tape of the interview with Admiral...he had been a consul to China.

DUVIVIER: Jerauld Wright, now a retired admiral in town.

Q: But he was a captain at the time. They didn't have an American submarine. Giraud wouldn't go on an English one, so he appeared on the bridge of the submarine in full American uniform and said it was his submarine. It was a British submarine.

DUVIVIER: Is that right? It's interesting. Well, I negotiated that meeting but I didn't go to the meeting place which was near Cassis...I've forgotten the little peninsula, but I got the various people – they were called passeurs, which meant the people passing prisoners or escapees from one man to the other, and it was very successful. I never met the general, but I dealt with the brother, and we were under the impression that Giraud would be the future head of France. In fact, De Gaulle was largely discredited in France as a traitor at that time and quite ignored. This is hard for Americans to appreciate.

Q: Allow me, were you able to talk to a lot of the French, and were they saying this at the time?

DUVIVIER: Yes, yes. De Gaulle was a renegade in their eyes. He had run out of his country. He'd gotten on board the airplane of General Spears, the British military attaché in Paris, and he'd fled to London and they didn't listen to his broadcasts, and he was a has-been. It was interesting to see that the French lacked a leader. There was a lot of fighting between the Communist cells of the Maquis and the conservative cells of the Maquis, and they were bickering for territory, and this went on 'til the day of the Liberation, and I was with the conservative cells and one of my good friends, Leon Baneal, was the editor of the main newspaper there called Le Petit Provençal, and he wrote a very touching editorial which I've kept entitled "Goodbye Mickey Mouse," and for that he was questioned and tortured and incarcerated during the Occupation. Then eventually he was released, and at the Liberation he came out with a new editorial in the same newspaper, entitled "Good Morning, Mickey." Now we can talk and laugh and we can be free again, and those funny green leaves...green leaves were a synonym for German soldiers because of their green uniforms...now the green leaves are gone and we can just be ourselves again. It was perfectly charming, and I went back to see him twenty years later at the end of his life, and he was a delightful man. And there were some very warm, human people like that. We ate extremely well on the black market in exchange for coffee beans or cigarettes or just plain spam (from our Red Cross friends).

Q: First, you were reporting on...there were no German troops per se...

DUVIVIER: No.

Q: But you were reporting on the status of the French fleet...

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: ...because this was a major component, these were very modern battleships.

DUVIVIER: Exactly. France after Britain had the greatest navy in Europe.

Q: It could have changed the whole balance.

DUVIVIER: It might have, yes, it might have intercepted the American landings in North Africa had they come under German control. And then when Eisenhower landed in North Africa, we knew what was coming imminently, and at the moment it happened, I was coming back from Aix-en-Provence and I hitchhiked a ride back to Marseille at midnight and immediately the other consuls were there and we began burning all our archives and for two days we destroyed everything including a few blank passports and passports of friends of mine so that when we were ordered to go into internment at Lourdes five days later to join Doug MacArthur and Constance Harvey and Woody Wallner – all people that you may have heard about.

Q: I've interviewed Douglas MacArthur and somebody else has interviewed Constance Harvey.

DUVIVIER: Well we got to know them extremely well as you can imagine during internment, but they were working at other posts. My main job turned out to be contact with the French Underground and keeping their hopes alive and telling them not to give up hope. I never gave them any money, but I gave them hope and laughter.

Q: How did the French Underground view you? By that time we were at war with Germany.

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: But things weren't going terribly well, I mean, we were just building up in Europe, and we were doing rather poorly in the Far East in 1942.

DUVIVIER: Correct.

Q: Did you find they felt that we had the potential, or were they feeling that they were almost discounting us, the United States?

DUVIVIER: On the contrary, they knew that we were coming, they knew that we would “sweep out” the Germans, they had utter contempt for the Germans and their patriotism was extraordinary, the daring things they did. One contact Prosinos, who came to see me under the cover name, “Berini,” was caught by a crossfire of radio monitoring cars of the Germans and he was tortured, and apparently died without revealing his contacts. His wife had been in Paris, the secretary of my father, and his daughter in 1965 gave me the gold watch of my late brother. And there were other cases of people who were persecuted and showed extreme courage. But there

was an enthusiasm. I never felt afraid, I never worried about where I would get my food, and I felt a certain exhilaration at being able to do something for my country.

Q: Although you weren't dealing with them directly, what about refugees? I mean, obviously the Jewish refugees, but other people who were caught there in this area. We knew that the Germans would probably come in at some point. What were we doing?

DUVIVIER: They usually were picked up and herded by the Quaker movement from outlying areas, whether it was Lyon or the Pyrenees or Nice and so on and shepherded to our visa section, and either we would give them a visa or we would give them a false American passport. We did some of that in 1941 in order to get them over into Spain where they were picked up by contacts. I had very little contact with the Jews or the Quakers. I probably wrote the first report on a shipment of so-called labor volunteers to Germany, and I think that only one-third of that trainload of 600 people were Jews. This was in October 1942. Later on it changed, but the Jews we knew were then harassed not persecuted. The overblown role given to the Holocaust by people like Herman Wouk, whom I know personally. I helped him in his last book: War and Remembrance. In that book he used my notes, impressions, in order to rewrite his plot because he didn't realize that there were no commercial planes going into Germany or France. He rewrote it to conform more or less to the truth.

To recap, the people I met were journalists, students, professors, a few businessmen. There was a very nice couple, called Goudchoux. He was a marine insurance broker, and his wife was a great cook. They would talk freely, usually in their home rather than in the consulate because the consulate was being surveyed constantly and we knew it. One morning I went to the office on foot from the hotel, and I found a strange group of seventeen English types conspicuous by their short blond hair and gray turtleneck sweaters. They turned out to be downed pilots of the RAF who had escaped. The problem was, how do we get these people to Spain? And with two hours of phone calling, my colleagues and I got them out of our consulate and disguised them, told them to stop talking English and try to smoke Gauloises instead of Craven A's, and they eventually were slipped out by cars or trucks across France to Pau. There was a very interesting ex-honorary British consul called the Marquis de Guidelmina there. He was binational – and he had a wonderful scheme whereby he would disguise these people as drivers and stokers on locomotives and on the night train over to Pamplona these people were all smuggled out in a few days. So there were twice as many stokers on their way south as there were on the way north, and it worked like a dream, and these young kids – typical college boy types – went back to Britain and presumably manned planes again and continued their fighting. But it was that sort of an experience. Courage and fun!

Q: But you know, there's another side to this, and that is, a lot of French were not that unhappy with Petain particularly from the conservative, from the right wing. Did you run across many of these?

DUVIVIER: No.

Q: You must have, didn't you?

DUVIVIER: No. They avoided me and vice-versa.

Q: I would have thought that they would have, you know, been fairly prominent in the Vichy government.

DUVIVIER: Mostly they must have been at Vichy. I went to Vichy three times as a courier or something, on the overnight train, once sharing space with 2 young wives, but the people we dealt with were quite sophisticated. Some of them were wives or widows of prominent ship owners, maritime brokers, or oil people, or merchants and bankers, and those people were crippled economically, and they knew that we were coming, and they knew that it was only a matter of time, and they gave us their wholehearted attention. To one of them I gave eleven pounds of honey because he had two small kids, and a wrapped-up landscape painting which is upstairs in our living room, and I said, "Jackie" – that was his code name – "Would you please keep this painting for me, and one day I'll come back and claim it. Good luck," and he said, "Good luck," and then two years later, I went down to Accra, Ghana, Gold Coast then, and the Air France manager one day said, "Paul, I'm going to Marseille. Do you have any messages?" I said, "Yes. Look up "Jackie" and try to recover my painting," and he came back two months later with this landscape all wrapped up in a newspaper faded but still charming. It was a warm, personal relationship in almost every case.

Q: So in Marseille you really weren't up against the extreme right wing...

DUVIVIER: No.

Q: ...the French fascists.

DUVIVIER: No. There were some, but I never saw them. I traveled on a train once with a Prefect of Nice from Marseille to Nice, and we talked about the war to some extent, and from the start, I knew his opinion and he knew mine, and I remember we deliberated on whether after World War II, America would have compulsory military service, and he said no and I said yes, and we skimmed around the subject of the invasion, knowing where we stood.

Q: You were saying that after the landings in North Africa, that was in November...

DUVIVIER: No, a month before November 8, 1942. The Prefect knew it was coming.

Q: You knew that your mission was over, that the Germans would be coming in.

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: And you say you burned, you really had a couple of days to take care of things.

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: The French weren't anticipating you, the French authorities, or were they just going to...

DUVIVIER: The French knew we were going to do it, and they didn't interfere, and we had a good system – wish they used it now – of never keeping our files. Every two months one of these auxiliary vice-consuls would go by car to Geneva and take with him the office copies of anything we had written – telegrams or dispatches – and so we worked from memory as to what we reported instead of referring to telegram number so-and-so, “As reported previously,” and then we'd take on from there, and a lot of time was saved that way. The last time Bradford was held up at the border, he broke the border gate with his Buick, crashed into Switzerland, and got away with it, and he delivered the goods and stayed in Switzerland until the end of the war.

Q: Well now, how did the internment process work in your case? What happened to you?

DUVIVIER: We went by train...

Q: Were you just ordered there...

DUVIVIER: We were ordered.

Q: ...or did the Germans come and...

DUVIVIER: No, we never saw the Germans until we'd been in internment for ten weeks. We were ordered to meet on a Sunday afternoon, at the Marseille suburban station. We boarded a train which already had the consulate staff in Nice on board, which consisted of six people, and we went overnight in a sealed train to Lourdes. There we got off the train and went to one of four hotels where we were allowed the privilege of moving around the town and countryside freely without escort at first. Then, little by little, they insisted on having a French police inspector on our bicycle rides as escort. Later on we were confined to the hotel except for specific things like playing soccer or going to church or shopping walks.

Q: This was all run by the French?

DUVIVIER: It was run by the French national police (Surete).

Q: Was France, I mean Vichy France, at war with us at that time, had they declared...

DUVIVIER: We had broken diplomatic relations, but we were not at war, and it remained that way. There was a dramatic scene told to me later by Kippy (S. Pinckney) Tuck, the Chargé d'affaires in Vichy, that when he went as instructed by Sumner Welles to call on Marshal Petain and explain that we had landed in French North Africa, Marshal Petain, very alert, said, “I know.” Kippy added as a result, we can no longer have diplomatic relations, and Marshal Petain said, “I know.” And then Marshal Petain got up...he was 86 at the time...and turned over to the window and looked out the window of his office at the Hotel du Parc and began whistling to himself, “It's a long way to Tipperary.” He whistled that World War One tune soulfully to himself, and then he came back and he said, “I consider the interview closed.” They did not shake hands, and Kippy Tuck withdrew. Kippy believed it was a signal he believed in our victory. Thereafter it was handled not by Admiral Darlan in power at that time – but by various civil servants in the foreign office. But Kippy, whom I knew very well, said that that signal

showed Petain was secretly hoping for an Anglo-American victory and he was delighted that the break in relations would be a prelude to the liberation of France. He was a very patriotic man, and I think quite misunderstood at home and over here. My father felt the same way and wrote about it at the time.

Q: Well now, how did the internment go? Did you go up to the Black Forest later with the Germans?

DUVIVIER: Yes, two months later.

Q: Because I know Douglas MacArthur mentioned this. The whole group went up.

DUVIVIER: The whole group went up, and there's a very good report which you should look up if you don't have it, written by Woody Wallner and published in The Foreign Service Journal, issues of May, June and August, 1944.

To my knowledge this is the official report. It is detailed and it's correct and I can only add my recollections. But at Lourdes we did next to nothing except walk and keep healthy. Ate well on the black market, even oysters and lamb chops. There was an abundance of cognac available at a high price from a bar called St. Lawrence O'Toole. The bootlegger there would drink a toast to the image of the sacred heart of Jesus which was a peculiar thing to have in a bar. Then we'd start chatting and bargaining over what we would have to pay for a supply of liquor. But we were cut off as far as newspapers and people were concerned. One or two people slipped in and invited me to walk over the Pyrenees into Spain. Others from Paris or Vichy...and brought messages. I had two chances to escape on foot, one with a very good friend from Marseille, but he never spoke to me again because he thought I was chicken not to go with him. He escaped safely, and I think in retrospect, I made a mistake, but I felt that I was ordered to stay because there had been a telegram earlier signed Sumner Welles saying Walter Orabaugh will be dispatched from Nice to Monaco to open a consular post and "DuVivier will remain at Marseille." I felt that was like a direct order, and I thought it was a dirty trick, but I never met Mr. Welles. (Laughter) And so I stayed at my job and did not escape. I think if I had, I would have been picked up by the embassy in Madrid and put to work, and I wouldn't have been dismissed from the Foreign Service, which is what I feared at the time.

After about six weeks there, the Germans came in abruptly, four days after New Year's 1943, took charge of the inmates at the four hotels. We were then confined to our bedrooms, and they used the large stock of sleeping cars at Lourdes...all the Wagon-Lits in France were stored there. They put us in one sealed train directly from Lourdes to Baden-Baden circling around Paris by La Grand Ceinture belt line. We proceeded via Nancy on to Strasbourg to Baden-Baden. There we were much better heated and much worse fed than in Lourdes. We were kept under the custody of eight German police. Four or five were clearly Gestapo in civilian clothes. The others were state and foreign office police – Statspolizei. Our official "host" was a career foreign service embassy counselor from the Wilhelm-Strasse, Dr. Schlehman. He, his wife and pretty secretary were very correct. He made sure that everybody knew their place and didn't fraternize. We could not go outside the hotel and the hotel grounds without one or two guards. But, aside from shopping and churches, which was a good escape to get out of the confinement, we partook

of a great many hikes and walks. There were the fast walkers, the medium walkers, the slow walkers. I walked up to about twelve miles a day with the eight “fast walkers,” taking picnics but no photographs. Tyler Thompson was a great walker, and Dr. Harold Stuart and Gilbert White, later Gil Stewart a famous geographer at Aspen, and myself, a few others of that kind, were just indefatigable as far as walking through the Black Forest. And we sometimes would look down over the Siegfried Line on the German-French frontier, or we would go into a little inn. And one time at the inn, this was, I think, at the very end of 1943, we went in from the snow to eat our sandwiches, and the innkeeper was delighted to see us, and said, “Would you like to buy a little white wine?” and we said, “Ja Wohl.” We had some marks, I think, or cigarettes for currency, and then after a while he said, “My daughter sings very well,” and so the daughter came out and she began singing “Lorelei” and a few German Lieder, and then somebody produced an accordion and we all got pretty drunk, especially the Gestapo guard. Then they began playing war songs, Lily Marlene. After awhile they played something Ah-na-na na na (humming to “Roll out the Barrels”).

Q: *It's “Roll out the Barrels.”*

DUVIVIER: I said, “I think I’ve heard that.” The innkeeper said, “Oh, yes, it’s a very famous German song.” And I said, “It must be very well-known,” and he said, “Oh, yes. It’s called ‘Marshal Rommel’s Victory March.’” (Laughter) So they’d simply taken it over, you know, and rechristened it. And then at the end, I think it was the same session, Henry J. Taylor, the Associate Press correspondent in Vichy, disappeared in the woods – I think he was really three sheets to the wind – and it was rather pathetic to see the poor Gestapo – the two Gestapo calling out, “Herr Heinrich, Herr Heinrich, 119enefi du den? Bitte, kommen sie mal zuruck.” And we never did find Henry-Henry, but he somehow managed to stagger back to the hotel alone. He knew enough to know that he would be starved to death if he stayed out overnight in the snow. So there were some interesting episodes of that kind, but really, on the whole, we were very disciplined, we wasted a lot of time giving each other courses...I gave a course on geopolitics which I knew nothing about, but we gave each other exams and diplomas. We also put on dramatic shows, and I read three daily German newspapers because my German was fluent. Furthermore, we would listen very carefully to a monitored radio set in the big lounge (guarded night and day) to the Oberkommandor der Wehrmacht Communique at 2 p.m. followed by the news interpretation by Dr. Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. We took notes and lists. The second broadcast was elaborate, fanciful and totally misleading. Afterwards with Attachés Bob Scow, the army colonel, and Abel Sabelot, the navy captain, and Kippy Tuck and sometimes Tyler, Doug, Woody and myself, if I could get in the caucus, we would discuss the news. Since we had excellent German maps we’d bought locally – I still have one or two – we would find that when they wanted to announce the evacuation of a big city they justified it as a shortening of their lines of communications. Or else it was to reinforce their lines ready for the spring offensive. And actually the little hamlet or mentioned village was about five or ten miles west of the big city on the Russian front (like Orel or Smolensk) which they would only mention days later. But we kept tabs, I kept my map marked up properly by crayons behind my coat closet and it was never disturbed. I brought it home and then I checked the dates with people in the Pentagon and found we were within four or five days of the actual changes in the Russian front. The same was true with the Pacific theater about which we had little knowledge.

Q: *Well, how did you get out, how did it work, getting out of there?*

DUVIVIER: Getting out of Baden-Baden?

Q: *When were you repatriated?*

DUVIVIER: All 145 of us were released on Saturday February 19, 1944 after 478 days. I'm trying to write my memoirs...

We were told to have breakfast at 3:30 a.m. at the hotel, so we did, and then the women and children were taken – there were about fifteen children – by bus to the railroad station two miles across town. I walked, with or without my suitcase, I can't remember, it weighed sixty pounds. We left at daybreak on the train, and it took about six hours to go from Baden-Baden to Paris via Strasbourg. And there was a tussle with the police because some relatives of our group – French relatives – tried to break the police cordon on the outskirts of Paris. One young boy did greet his grandmother before the police drew him back on board. But with pistols and truncheons they made sure that there was no contact. And then from the beltway of Paris, it took us forever (eleven hours) to go to Bordeaux and then to Biarritz where we spent four days waiting. The trip across France took us twenty-four hours, almost exactly, and it was very cold. Years later, in Ottawa, I learned from an assistant air attaché that he had been ordered not to bomb a certain train leaving at daybreak on a certain day, and he watched this little train zigzagging across all the byways of France because eighty percent of the bridges were blown up. And he said it would have been a perfect target. He said, "I really had my X right there on the bomb release and I just hated not to pull the lever." Thank God he didn't. So we made it, and we got to Biarritz where we spent four days because of a hitch in the exchange schedule. Finally when the Germans heard that their own people had landed safely in Lisbon from the SS Gripsholm, we were allowed to go over the frontier into Spain, again at daybreak. Somebody waved the Gestapo goodbye. I didn't want to see them again.

In retrospect my two greatest personal hardships were the lack of a date for sixteen months and the paucity of mail. For the first six months none of us received or were able to send out a letter. After that mail came once a month, heavily censored by three governments and only after taking six weeks in transit. It is a miracle my girl in Baltimore waited so long for my return. All the 14 packages of food she sent me were confiscated.

Three hours into Spain somebody staggered down the railway cars, they were not sleepers, and came back after an hour to say, "We've had deviled eggs," and we said, "Oh, go away," like this, and they said, "No, we've really had eggs." We'd had two eggs in two years. We were craving for anything like cream and butter. So we all went tearing down to the dining car, and we ate this delicious stuff – eggs Benedict or something, and we got sick as dogs because it took us a long time to get our stomach back to normal. I was fifteen pounds underweight and weighed 130 or so when I went in, so I was skinny. When we got to Lisbon, we got a chance to spend ten days or so getting readjusted and picking up on news and exchanging mail and the embassy, legation, excuse me, in Lisbon under Henry Norweb, and people like Bill Boswell and Merritt Cootes were there to help us, treated us very nicely. By the time we got on shipboard we were practically back to normal.

Q: *You went to Paris, from 1958 to 1961...*

DUVIVIER: Correct.

Q: *...as Deputy Commercial Attaché, is that right?*

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: *How was France at this time? It must have been a considerable change from when you'd been there before.*

DUVIVIER: It was an enormous change, since 1942. But there was a great deal of work again to promote French exports to America, and we were pushing the old standard trade opportunity forms and the world trade directory reports as well as US investment opportunities in France. That was my principal responsibility. Gradually the emphasis changed from helping France to helping US business interests. Today we only do the latter as best we can overseas.

Q: *I started to say, it must have been about that time when all of a sudden you began to say, "Hey, wait a minute."*

DUVIVIER: Exactly and we did. It was a fascinating seven years in one country. One big project in 1960 was the month's trip by a large Commerce Department trade mission to find outlets outside of Paris. It was led by Bradley Nash, who had been an Assistant Secretary of Commerce. I planned for months an elaborate tour in four to ten different provincial cities throughout north and western France. We interviewed 200 people and they came with concrete proposals. Thanks to our work, they planted a factory of Goodyear tire at Amiens, and a food processing plant in Brittany. When we drove south to Bourges and went all the way out to Brest for boat building and sailing. There we were trying to get them to buy our equipment, our nautical equipment and adopt our standards after centuries of ignoring us. It was an exhausting trip. But I was accompanied by a French male clerk – an older man, of fifty plus, and he was the official interpreter while I was the public relations man. We stayed in run down hotels but were wined and dined extensively by corporate presidents and chambers of commerce.

Q: *Well tell me, I mean, here you were at a critical place at a critical time, because there really was a change. I mean, we'd said, "OK, Europe, you've recovered. Now we've got our own commercial interests to be concerned about."*

DUVIVIER: Yes.

Q: *Did you find resistance on the part of the French government which has always seemed to resent outside interference? I suppose they were delighted at our helping them find markets, but when we came in, how about this? Was this a problem?*

DUVIVIER: It was a big problem in Paris but not much in the provinces. The equivalent of the National Association of Manufacturers and all mayors were very helpful at the beginning. Then

after two years, they wrote and published a series of articles stressing US trade barriers to French exports. We got them to vent their draft articles with us before they were published, but they were quite bitter on our agricultural and FDA regulations as well as tariff classifications which you know are very rigid over here, the Buy America Act and definitions of Camembert cheese, etc.

Q: *Food...*

DUVIVIER: Pharmaceuticals.

Q: *...drug screening. You have to pass certain tests and all that sort of thing.*

DUVIVIER: Oh yes, and selling wines in France called Champagne, Chablis or Burgundy...they were bitter about our success in making good wines. Many sarcastic remarks were made, and it was uphill. There was a big US pavilion at the Paris Trade Fair, where we spent a lot of money on a pavilion, with a motto I came up featuring Jules Verne's story of a Submarine to say that oceans drew countries closer. His novel, Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea, was elaborated into the idea that we didn't have any land barriers between us and therefore there was no obstacle between America and France. It created a bit of surprise in Washington but the French love whimsy so they played along and it flew, and was very well attended and featured in the press.

Q: *Well now, the trade side, the economic side, are absolutely vital, yet the Foreign Service often isn't very, I mean, I'm speaking about the ruling group, are usually political reporters. They're more interested in what's happening.*

DUVIVIER: That's true.

Q: *How about, we had a political ambassador, a non-career ambassador, Amory Houghton most of the time you were there.*

DUVIVIER: Yes. There's his picture on my bookcase.

Q: *How did he feel about the commercial side? Did he bring any different perspective, or was he caught up in the politics?*

DUVIVIER: He was caught up in the politics, so he sort of had open hands on the economic. He entertained the bankers and the countesses, but he was fascinated by the turmoil within the French foreign office. Being the past chairman of Corning Glass he neglected the descendants of Lafayette and Rochambeau to support our economic goals. He was extraordinary in having us on the inner circle of his staff night and day – and weekends.

Q: *What was his background? Where was his money from?*

DUVIVIER: His grandfather founded the Corning Glassworks in upstate New York.

Q: *Say no more.*

DUVIVIER: And he still ran it, and his father had been the German minister to the Kaiser around 1910. So he, out of duty I think, wanted to do what his daddy had done, and he came, although he had had cancer of the throat and had a vocal cord removed, but you couldn't really see any scar, and he spoke with a very funny voice, as you can imagine, but he struggled to learn French, and as a French foreign office man told me afterwards, he said, "Mr. Houghton was a hard man to know, but he always came to us beautifully prepared." And he was so meticulous and thorough with his briefs that he really came right to the point. The French respected his courage and his effort to be as good as our best ambassadors. Jimmy Gavin, who was a charming man and succeeded him, was picked out because, being a general, Kennedy thought that general to general he'd get along with de Gaulle.

Q: *He was the first general officer to jump into France...*

DUVIVIER: Exactly. But I must say that he was the only ambassador that I knew to whom General de Gaulle spoke in English. De Gaulle spoke much better English than he is given credit for, and man to man they spoke in English and got along, but other than that, General Gavin was a workaholic who didn't know anything really about the fundamental problems, about the disintegration of Algeria, about our commercial trade efforts, about the investment resistance, and the growing OECD, the Common Market.

Q: *I have had other interviews with people who served at the embassy, which was a huge embassy at the time, who said, these were people mainly who were involved in the political reform, but saying that the embassy was sort of divided up into Gaullists and anti-Gaullists. Out of personal feelings from the various officers and everybody marched to the same drum, but if their leader who happened to be on one side or the other was gone, they would immediately pick up their particular standard. Did you find this to be the case?*

DUVIVIER: Two-headed?

Q: *Two-headed as far as de Gaulle who was a person...*

DUVIVIER: There was no leader of the anti-Gaullist faction. Cecil Lyon, the DCM, was overwhelmingly Gaullist, I think to an embarrassing extent, and his political reporting which I seldom read, although I could have if I had wanted to, reflected an intimate collaboration with the Quai d'Orsay, but I dealt with the manufacturing people, the Chambers of Commerce – I was very close to them – and they were very outspoken, especially after a few good wines at my table. At one dinner party I remember, in our funny little house we had in Auteuil on the edge of the city – a Victorian house, but it was a house – I had a pro-Gaullist couple and an anti-Gaullist couple and I didn't realize it when I invited them. We barely got through the dinner, and after the dessert had been served, the pro-Gaullist, I think it was, said, "Oh, I'm terribly sorry, but my wife isn't feeling well," and he begged off, he skipped the coffee and brandy and disappeared like that. It really was a total fiasco. There was a lot of feeling, usually over the future of Algeria.

Q: *Those of you who were involved in commerce – did you feel that de Gaulle represented a*

problem to you, I mean, as far as pushing commerce because of his...I don't know about the economic side, but it would appear that he was a very strong nationalist, and did this spill over into commercial relations?

DUVIVIER: To some extent on the investment projects, but not very much. I stayed out of political discussions. We had much better experts in that field, but there were things, like oil exports from Algeria, which ran across the political mainstream. Since I was experienced in petroleum reporting, one of my jobs in Paris was to report not only on the few little oil fields in metropolitan France, like the gas field at Lacq which were discovered when I was there and which I visited, but also the oil fields in Algeria where I spent five days with a French Board of Trade mission. They gave me room number 1 at one hotel, which was very flattering. These Parisians were desperately trying to accelerate the industrialization of Algeria. There was a large plan called the Plan de Constantine which was intended to set up steel mills and shipyards around Constantine in eastern Algeria in order to make Algeria a commercial and industrial force even while the civil war was going on. Our trip to Algeria was dangerous, because they were shooting in the streets. I remember a few bombs went off near the Hotel St. Georges while I was sleeping. But it was an exciting time, and the French had done an astonishing job of building up oil drilling camps, roads and refineries with little or no American advice. Where they got their advice, I don't know, Jacques Soustelle was proud of avoiding the riggers and the equipment from Texas and Oklahoma. They were building a gas pipeline which was finished from the desert to Oran which exported a lot of methane gas that was shipped as far as Boston. They also had another from the Edjelah in Tunisia to the Libyan frontier for export to Italy, Greece and Egypt as well as to Marseille. It was really a shame that all of this stack of cards collapsed so abruptly with independence right after I left Paris when I was in Bordeaux. Now Bordeaux...and maybe we, can we switch to that now?

Q: Yes we can. Just one question...You were there at the time when the Kennedy administration came in. How did the...this was quite a change from the Eisenhower one, a young man and all...How did the French commercial industrial people feel about Kennedy at the beginning?

DUVIVIER: I'd left Paris when that happened.

Q: We won't talk about that then.

DUVIVIER: We'll talk about that when we get down to Nice.

Q: Okay, well then you were then in Bordeaux?

DUVIVIER: In Bordeaux for only about a year. The man in charge was Aubrey Lippincott, whom I frankly disliked because he didn't trust me, and I think he did everything he could to have me transferred or worse, but I survived and he was retired. I was his number two, and then there were two or three vice-consuls under him doing a lot of immigration visa work. The Basque shepherds are in great demand in Montana.

Q: Oh, yes. And also to Nevada because Senator McCarran was pushing Basque shepherds.

DUVIVIER: Yes, Basque shepherds, well they're the best apparently. I didn't get into that but there was a lot of other activities. My job in Bordeaux was, again, commerce and trade promotion, both ways, and I got to know very well not only the wine merchants including a namesake but also the shipping brokers.

Q: You were there from '61 to '62.

DUVIVIER: A little over a year, and during that time I used my wine pedigree very well because my grandfather had been a wine merchant on Park Avenue in New York at the turn of the century, and he dealt exclusively with Barton et Guestier, so I looked up their office, and their descendants made a big fuss, and they couldn't have been more generous and helpful in entertaining our visiting delegations such as the Coast Guard ship Eagle. Now you may think, what was the American interest in Bordeaux? Other than the historic interest – it was one of the five original consulates of the Foreign Service opened in 1790. It also has a long tradition of slave trade, which we don't talk about anymore, and of airplane manufacturing. And I've looked up in the National Archives some of the old invoices of 1790-94 which are very interesting. And so I was busy there doing a variety of things, running the office for half the time. Mr. Lippincott was on home leave and then he was on vacation, and I didn't mind that a bit.

Q: I'd just like to ask something. What happens, I mean in a small post, there you are, and you and the principal officer, you're number two, don't get along. I mean, is the best thing to do did you find was to try to get away, I mean both to separate...

DUVIVIER: Well, yes. I knew that I could never persuade him that I wasn't trying to undermine his authority, but I had a lot of trump cards. I had a French name and a French fluency and surely a more attractive wife, and so it was very hard for him to refer things to me if he could do them himself, and I think that he would have done anything to get me out, but Perry Culley, a very nice inspector came for two weeks and took drastic steps for my promotion and rapid transfer. I had almost lost hope.

Q: He inspected me, too.

DUVIVIER: Well, you know.

Q: Yes, I know.

DUVIVIER: And then after he'd been there for about four or five days, he took me aside like that and says, "This has got to change." And he got in touch with Herb Fales, the counselor for consular affairs in Paris, and they rewrote my efficiency report between them, and he said, "I'll have you transferred." And it's because of his intervention as an inspector that I went overnight to Nice.

Q: This is, for somebody who's not familiar with the Service, the inspectors, particularly in those days, much less now, played a role in sorting out these things when there were real conflicts that the Embassy cannot understand.

DUVIVIER: Who does it now? Does anybody do it?

Q: *Well, I don't think it's done that well now. It almost ends up in the laps of lawyers.*

DUVIVIER: Oh yeah, yeah, understood.

Q: *This is one of the things about you might say the old boy network did sort of smooth things over without turning it into a big deal, but now it's much more difficult because if you're moved to another post, then you might be taking it away from somebody else or something like that.*

DUVIVIER: That's right.

Q: *Well, then you went to Nice and Monaco from '62 to '65.*

DUVIVIER: Yes, yes.

Q: *That sounds like a dream assignment. Was it or wasn't it? Sometimes these things are not quite as good as they seem.*

DUVIVIER: Well, it was because we were successful, but we worked like dogs, leading a double life. It was a two-man post, which meant that every other weekend you had to stay at home and be near the telephone. You had to be up much of the nights because a great deal of entertaining was done which you could never pay back, this is embarrassing, as you know, after a few weeks. And then, I had this little girl who had to be at the nuns' day school at eight o'clock every morning, and I usually had to be sure that she got there at eight o'clock before I went and opened the consulate. Sometimes I strung up the flag myself before the chauffeur or the seven locals had arrived. But we loved it because, once again, I had the advantage of having been brought up as a little boy in France, and I had photographs to show the olive mill my father had bought in 1923 and restored, and I could speak some of the local patois, (dialect). They responded to that. When I returned to Nice with my daughter about ten years ago, they gave me that handsome bronze medal on the shelf, "for conspicuous services to Franco-American relations."

Q: *Oh yes, I see.*

DUVIVIER: We cannot accept decorations, but this is as far as they could go. Last but not least, I really was fascinated by the Princess of Monaco.

Q: *Grace Kelly.*

DUVIVIER: Grace Kelly. And this is the passport picture of her, in April 1956, when she traveled by sea to marry the Prince in Monaco. The other is a picture of myself with her when Winston Churchill upstairs had a cold and couldn't come down, so I had her all to myself. It's very difficult to dance with a woman like that because she's so perfect that you sort of don't dare squeeze or lead. And I felt like a dumb fool. But I've seen her in every mood by day or by night, even at three o'clock in the morning when she still wore her emerald jewels in her hair and decided that a swim at the palace was the thing to do. From any angle her classic features

perfectly symmetrical made her possibly the most beautiful woman when we knew her at her peak, in the early sixties. The one advantage of Grace in Hollywood was that the left side of her face was exactly like the right side, and therefore Hitchcock and Darryl Zanuck could photograph her from either side, and it always came out perfectly in the first “take.”

Q: *Well now, what was our interest in Monaco at the time?*

DUVIVIER: Our interest was that Prince Rainier like his grandfather had married a prominent Philadelphia woman, and there were strong cultural ties since the 1880's when the casino of Monte Carlo started. Rainier is a sovereign prince with the right of life or death over his subjects. He had, just before I arrived, hired away from our embassy in Paris, a bright vice-consul called Martin Dale to benefit foreign investment opportunities in the Principality.

Q: *I know Marty Dale very well. We came into...*

DUVIVIER: Do you?!

Q: *...the Foreign Service together.*

DUVIVIER: Well, he worked with me in Paris.

Q: *He was in my class.*

DUVIVIER: Really! How interesting! Well, Martin Dale was lured away, and was set up as investment counselor in the Palace. I have a copy of his brochure. Maybe you do. “Come to tax-free Monaco and you'll have all the benefits.” And then his wife Joan looked so much like the Princess that sometimes they'd be sitting in the royal box at the opera and you'd wonder which was which. It was incredible. Thanks to Marty Dale, who gave me a lot of information, and others, I was able to report in detail on the trade embargo that de Gaulle placed on Monaco six months after I got there. Nothing manufactured in Monaco or Monte Carlo, was allowed to go into France, such as motor boats, electronics, textiles and sports' goods. There were customs guards at the border and a few soldiers in order to enforce the embargo. On my first call on the Prince he said, “What can you do for us?” And I said, “Well Your Highness, I don't know. I'm only a reporter.” And then later one of the artists painted a picture of the frontier in reverse showing Monaco charging duty on goods coming from France, and after awhile the French relented. But one day in 1963 when Ambassador Chip Bohlen was playing golf with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville the Frenchman remarked: “We each have our flights in fancy; in America you have Disneyland, in France we have Monaco.”

Monaco has a great postage stamp industry; they make more revenue from stamps than they do from the five casinos, strangely enough. The interest also came from the fact that Princess Grace, being an American, expected her consul in Nice to get a catalog from Sears Roebuck or GE and to be on hand when she received distinguished American admirals or other visitors usually at a moment's notice. One morning at ten I was summoned to the Palace and had to borrow a clean suit from the day cleaners to look my best. The Prince never noticed...

Q: Well now, in Nice and Monaco, as chief of consular section, did you have many protection problems there, and how were they dealt with if you did?

DUVIVIER: We had a unique system which I inherited, and it's never been written up. I think it was called the American Association of the Cote d'Azur. The honorary president was the American consul. The work was done by the Protective Services clerk, who had been a British major in World War II, and quite an extraordinary "operator," who knew everybody and collected butterflies, as well as being a very amusing man besides. The finances were managed by the manager of the American Express office. Every year for some twenty years they had passed the hat to the two thousand American residents, collected a large amount of money, carefully invested in French bonds, I can't remember. And from that they would make loans to a great many people who fell destitute, were incapacitated at the end of their lives – one man died at the age of a hundred after we had supported him for about a year. A pretty and pregnant young girl who wanted to be out of sight of her parents until it was safely over. Through the Rotary Club, which I joined for the first time, I was able sometimes to get free hotel lodging for some of these people, or find them clothes when they had been swimming and it cost the government not a penny. I think the State Department was unaware of it except when the F.S. Inspectors came in 1965, and we...

Q: This was true at a number of posts abroad. I'm sure they have something of this nature in Athens, too. It's a very useful thing because it takes care of the problem at the site without having to refer it back to Washington.

DUVIVIER: Exactly.

Q: What about, how were the police there? You must have had US sailors or people coming off either yachts or cruise ships and getting into trouble.

DUVIVIER: Yes, quite a bit. Well, we had the Sixth Fleet, and that's why I have Admiral David McDonald at the top and three aircraft carriers on which I've slept, all on the wall. I'd say a third of my time at Nice was spent with Navy problems. I would brief the incoming Navy captains and make official calls with them. I gave at least one big cocktail party for each successive vice-admiral who came to take command of the Sixth Fleet. I would sometimes induce local mayors and VIP's to go on board for a cruise on shipboard around the Riviera. There was a British-American hospital on the board of which I was and we would accept from the Navy hospital beds, supplies, and you name it. And there was a great deal of intimate relationships. I had three vice admirals in the three years there.

Maybe the strangest case of all was the unfortunate Rear Admiral Lee. After a three day visit off the beach at Cannes his aircraft carrier discharged by mistake 45,000 tons of diesel oil (instead of steam) as he was sailing away. The prefect, mayor and population was outraged and ordered the Sixth Fleet navy to come back. For days the sailors worked night and day to remove the muck from the Croisette Beach. One night all the hookers and sailors' girl friends sat on the beach to give the boys coffee and sing song encouragement. When the carrier finally departed a tall blond told the press, "I've never worked so hard in all my life, and without pay." Naturally fraternization resumed when the Navy was authorized to resume visits to Cannes two years later.

Q: Well, then, what was the impact of the Algerian crisis? Was there any on your operations?

DUVIVIER: Yes, in many ways. More in Bordeaux than in Nice. In Bordeaux the counter-Gaullist revolution was started by General Salan. I had met some of his political friends in Paris before in connection with oil exploration. Salan, Soustelle and the Mayor of Nice were right-wing, felt that de Gaulle was selling out to the local population, which indeed he was. A French cousin in Oran was forced out of his job as a judge and lost all his property when he had to flee to Nice for his life in 1963. There were 3,000,000 other Frenchmen who also had to flee. Their parents had been born in Algeria so they had a right to be permanently guaranteed a livelihood. In Bordeaux, where there was a lot of bombing of banks and warehouses and like incidents all the time, you couldn't mention plastique, which was sometimes mistaken for mastique, the French word for putty. There was some people killed, and the French commanding general there, another distant cousin, resigned from the French Armed Forces as a three-star general rather than continue for de Gaulle at his three hour retreat ceremony, everybody cried but admired him because he wouldn't serve with de Gaulle. He was denied his pension and his seven children were unable to attend government schools in France. Yes, there was a tremendous emotional impact there. We were really torn because Chaban-Delmas, the mayor of Bordeaux, was the right-hand man of de Gaulle since the liberation of Paris in 1944, and he later became Prime Minister of France. When he invited de Gaulle to come and give speeches twice in the year we served there I had the chance to meet de Gaulle. His great big clammy hand had no squeeze to it, it was like a giant Teddy bear, and he said, "Bonjour, monsieur, le consul general des Etats Unis," and I moved on. There was no sign of recognition, or friendship. I never felt any sympathy for him but I was curious to meet him. I think all my sympathies were on the opposite side. In Nice, the son of the mayor (the present mayor) published a weekly anti-Gaullist gazette. He was very active in sheltering and harboring people from Algeria who were destitute. In my view de Gaulle was very undemocratic and did a lot of permanent harm to France. It was hard for me to find contacts who openly admired de Gaulle unless they were Americans! But then Napoleon did a lot of harm to France and he wasn't very broad-minded either.

Q: Were we under strict instructions to stay out of this thing, I'm talking about the American staff.

DUVIVIER: No, I never got any briefing on it, but you could feel it, and being out of the political section, I felt that it wasn't really something to discuss. I think the direction came straight to the ambassador. What he did with it, I don't know. I have heard French people referred to Chip Bohlen as the "Wailing Wall" because he never betrayed their anti-Gaullist views.

Q: But I mean, nobody was going out and saying, OK, just don't talk about this.

DUVIVIER: No, no. It was just understood that it was better simply to avoid the whole subject.

Q: Well then, we move on to Scotland in July of 1965.

DUVIVIER: Yes, but before that I'd like to relate two very touching stories.

The murder of John F. Kennedy shocked deeply everyone living along the Riviera partly because he had sojourned there many times with his parents and was considered the world leader of a new era of peace and prosperity. The consulate overnight had to find guest books and photographs for the lines of mourners, some of whom brought flowers and food offerings. My own bilingual secretary who had served Joseph Kennedy senior for ten years was so upset she required a week's leave at home.

Eleven memorial services demanded my formal presence in one week, ranging from the cathedrals at Nice and Monaco to the replica of Moscow's St. Basil's church and a synagogue to which I wore my hat!

Several months later Jean Pessione, an elderly stone mason, came from Vence to ask my assistance in dedicating a monument he had created single-handed atop the sheer cliff of the mountain of 2205 feet dominating Vence. It consisted of a marble slab, a framed photograph, two flags and a six foot olive tree (symbol of peace) which he watered with a bucket of water he took himself to the top of the "Baou des Blancs" once a week.

The date of Saturday, June 15, 1965 was set and I mobilized my cohorts for support in the American Legion Post No. 1, the Rotary Club, and the American Church. At high noon on a sparkling day in many cars, the press, the mayor and two chartered busses parked half-way up the mountain and banners flying almost two hundred strong, we trudged along the goat path, past a prehistoric Vence cave, to the iron cross at the top. As our daughter and dachshund wistfully watched, a number of self-appointed orators extolled the glorious "martyr of peace" and Lancelot of Camelot in two languages. The mayor of Vence and a retired senator gave us a civic reception with champagne afterwards in the town hall at, with more speeches.

The second story about JFK occurred barely three months before when the State Department transmitted a request from the family for a "sealed tape recording" of the true feelings of Princess Grace for the deceased president. The ideal choice for this confidential interview was Paul Gallico the author of The Snow Goose and Flowers for Mrs. Harris. We had the Gallicos meet Rainier and Grace at our house for lunch and the interview, taped at the Palace, was transmitted to Washington by diplomatic pouch. The contents at Boston's Kennedy Memorial Library will be revealed to the Public and possibly to my wife and my children, only in the year 2014 – if she should miraculously live that long. Probably the attraction was once very strong but unlike Marilyn Monroe she didn't succumb!

ROBERT C. HANEY
XVIII Airborne, US Army
(1943-1945)

Journalist, Paris Herald
(1945-1949)

Press Officer

Paris (1951-1955)

Robert Haney was born in Iowa in 1921. After attending from the University of Iowa in 1943, he fought in World War II in the U.S. Army. After the end of the War, he worked in France with the Paris Herald. He later graduated from the University of Iowa with a Bachelor's in French. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1951, his career has included positions in Paris, Washington, Belgrade, Mali, Saigon and Warsaw. Mr. Haney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 21, 2001.

Q: Did you go to France?

HANEY: Yes, eventually. We waited about three or four weeks at Broadway for an assignment to a unit. We had left Camp Ritchie as a team, headed by a captain whose name was Zing, an Alsatian name. Captain Zing had been a trumpet player in a jazz band. A lieutenant was second in command. We had a staff sergeant. I was a master sergeant. We had two corporals. There were six of us on the team altogether. One day, the captain got orders, in a sealed envelope for reasons that escape me. He was told to take the two jeeps assigned to us and all of our equipment and get on the road. When we had proceeded several kilometers, the captain took a look in the envelope, and we followed the instructions it contained. We ended up at a place called Ogbourne St. George. I was dismayed to see that at the gate of the military headquarters in that small town there was a soldier on guard wearing airborne insignia. We had been assigned to an airborne unit, the XVIII Airborne Corps, Major General Matthew B. Ridgway commanding. His headquarters didn't have any need for a French-speaking team right then, so I was assigned as the ranking noncom in the military intelligence (G-2) section. I worked directly for the G-2, Colonel Whitfield Jack, a former West Pointer who had resigned his commission and gone to law school. When the war came along he went back into service. He was from Shreveport, Louisiana, and a former associate of Huey Long. Colonel Jack was my boss throughout the war.

Q: What were you doing?

HANEY: Once we got into combat, in the Battle of the Bulge, I was in charge of nightly production of the G-2 report compiled from G-2 reports from headquarters of the three American divisions under corps command. Those were the 17th Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. Intelligence officers on our staff wrote the Corps G-2 report, which we had to produce by early morning. It was typed on stencils and mimeographed. Often, there would also be map overlays on clear acetate. Colonel Jack would occasionally send an officer out with a jeep and driver to round up as much acetate as he could find at division headquarters. Thanks to Colonel Jack's zeal, the G-2 section lugged heavy chests of acetate through France, Belgium, Holland and Germany. At the height of the Battle of the Bulge, we were putting out a 31-page G-2 report with six overlays, if you can imagine that. My job was to produce the report, see to it that everything was proofread, that it was run off and assembled properly, and ready for the colonel in the morning. Colonel Jack would arrive at our field headquarters around 7:00 a.m. His first words were always, "What's the 131enef in the repoht this moanin', Sahjint?"

Q: How did the Battle of the Bulge hit you?

HANEY: As I've mentioned, I was with the XVIII Airborne Corps. We had the 82nd, 101st, and 17th American airborne divisions under our command.

Q: What happened? The 101st and 82nd are well known, and they had both taken part in the Market Garden campaign in the Netherlands.

HANEY: Oh, yes – “A Bridge too Far.”

Q: Were you involved in that?

HANEY: Yes, at an early stage and only peripherally. It was Monty's [Field Marshal Montgomery's] show. The XVIII Airborne Corps was still in England. Three airborne divisions were to be deployed – the British 1st and the American 82nd and 101st divisions. The Americans weren't too happy about that because they had fought in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and then in the Normandy landings. They were hoping to get a little bit of a rest. But they were told, “It's just for three days. The British forces will finish it off.” Of course, you know what happened.

Then we moved to France. Our first headquarters was at Reims in what had been a boys' school. It was a big quadrangle with a courtyard in the middle. On the second story looking out on the courtyard was a balcony. I was responsible for nighttime security in the map room on that floor. I used to sleep there on a cot at night, my loaded carbine on the floor beside the cot, and a bottle of Mumm champagne hung out the exterior window on a stout cord. A late fall chill accompanied the sunset, and we didn't have other means of cooling that most famous product of Champagne Province, of which Reims was a principal city.

The school was quite comfortable because it had its own dormitory, dining room and kitchen – and squat toilets. In all, the best quarters I had seen since I was inducted. But one day, as I was coming out of the map room onto the balcony, I bumped into an officer, which in itself was not unusual. But this officer was a general. It was General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff. I asked myself, “What the hell is he doing here?” A couple of weeks later, I looked out in the courtyard, and down there were a couple of six-by-six Army trucks. They were loaded with toilet bowls. I knew that we were not long for those comfortable digs. The school became SHAEF headquarters. That is where the German capitulation was signed on May 7, 1945.

I have not been back to Reims, but I can't help wondering whether that fateful event took place in the map room where I had slept. News correspondents writing at the time about SHAEF headquarters and VE Day frequently called the boys' school “the little red schoolhouse.” It wasn't little, and the brick walls were not markedly red. But the description made good copy.

SHAEF displaced the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters to Epernay, on the Marne River south of Reims. The 101st and 82nd airborne divisions were pulled out of Market Garden in the Netherlands after weeks, not days, as they had been promised. They were moved to the area around Reims, expecting some well-earned downtime. The 17th Airborne, which had been assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps, was a brand new airborne division with no combat

experience. In December 1944 it was still training in England. General Ridgway had flown to England to observe the training exercises.

XVIII Corps headquarters got word in Epernay on the 16th of December 1944 that the Germans had attacked Belgium and Luxembourg. Soon thereafter, we learned that XVIII Corps was being sent to the front, if the higher echelons could figure out where that was. I was detailed to go with the advance headquarters group, traveling without winter gear in one staff car, one jeep and one six-by-six truck. Thus for me began the Battle of the Bulge.

From Epernay we headed northeast into Belgium, the only American convoy moving in that direction. Most U.S. units had cleared out earlier. At about midday we arrived in Bastogne, where American VIII Corps headquarters was supposed to be. It had already pulled up stakes and left; only a quartermaster baking company remained in town, and they were packing their ovens. So we continued on toward Houffalize, about 25 km. to the north, where we were to meet General Ridgway, who was flying over from England to resume command of the corps. When we got within a few kilometers of Houffalize the staff car received a radio message saying, "Don't go into Houffalize, the Germans have taken it. Meet Ridgway in Bastogne." We hastily turned around and headed back, hoping not to run into German troops. Fortunately, we didn't, because they were advancing on east-west roads, and we were traveling south. We didn't dally at the intersections.

When we got back to Bastogne it was turning dark, and a heavy mist covered the hills like a shroud. We took turns walking around our vehicles, which we had put in a large shed open at both ends. There were no other American troops in Bastogne that night. It was very eerie. We could hear the clank of German armor muffled in the mist. And we could see the blurred halos from German signal flares. At about 4:30 a.m., in came General Ridgway in a jeep. He had flown over to an airfield nearby. At first light, we headed west on the only road left open in and out of Bastogne. As we pulled out of town, we met the 101st Airborne troops walking in on both sides of the road to be surrounded. We went up north to Werbomont, with the 82nd Airborne division. We remained committed throughout the Battle of the Bulge, went into Germany and through Aachen, and then returned to our headquarters in Epernay.

Q: Were you more or less doing staff support work by this time rather than language work?

HANEY: I was doing some interpreting when we were in Belgium. But my main job was seeing to it that that damned G-2 report was ready for distribution by 7:00 a.m. I was the equivalent of the production editor on a daily paper.

Q: What was your impression of the Battle of the Bulge? Were things pretty chaotic?

HANEY: They were chaotic at the beginning. When we had made our way in the staff car, jeep and truck up to meet the general, the few American vehicles we passed were going in the other direction. The Belgians were glad to see us heading toward the front and brought out fresh eggs to give us when we stopped to check our bearings. I hadn't seen a fresh egg in more than a year. We didn't have any company at Bastogne until the 101st started to trek in.

The Germans pushed very hard. They were launching hundreds of the V-1 “flying bombs” propelled by a ram-jet engine. They had used them earlier in England. Their target was the port of Antwerp. One of our first field headquarters in Belgium was in a chateau fairly high on a hill. The V-1s were launched from the Eifel, a plateau region in West Germany northeast of Luxembourg. So many of the “flying bombs” failed off the launchpad that the German civilians called them the “*Eifel-Schreck*” (“Eifel terror”). We used to get 40 or 50 V-1s overhead every day on their way to Liège and Antwerp. They flew so low you could easily see them. When they came over, you hoped you would keep hearing the flatulent sound of the ram jet when the V-1 had passed. If the sound stopped, you knew that it was coming down. The V-1s were designed to power-dive onto the target, but that never worked. They came down when they ran out of fuel.

Q: What happened after the Battle of the Bulge?

HANEY: We returned to Epernay and began preparing to participate in a Montgomery “set piece” (as airborne General Gavin called it). It was to be a major assault across the Rhine in late March 1945. On the night of March 23-24, British troops of the 30 Corps crossed to the right bank within minutes of entering the river near the small town of Rees. At 10:00 a.m. on March 24, paratroopers and gliders of the British 6th Airborne and the American 17th Airborne began landing across the Rhine near Wesel, Germany, in an assault that lasted two-and-a-half hours.

For a week before the drop, I had been in Xanten, a small town in the Netherlands across the Rhine from Wesel, as part of the advance headquarters of XVIII Airborne Corps. From the ground near the left bank of the Rhine, we watched the seemingly endless train of troop carriers and C-47s towing gliders pass low overhead. I later learned that we were in good company: Somewhere nearby, Prime Minister Churchill and General Eisenhower also observed that awesome spectacle. Then our headquarters personnel waddled across the Rhine in a “Duck,” an amphibious vehicle that could carry a jeep and a trailer as well as troops. Not very spectacular, but less scary than a glider (for which I was qualified after declining to practice something you have to do perfect the first time – bail out of a C-47 with a parachute).

A few days after the Rhine crossing, we were flown back to corps base headquarters in Epernay. Then we were committed to the Rhineland campaign. Patton was moving at such a pace it was hard to keep up with him. Our forces encircled and took thousands of German prisoners. A typical sign placed by advancing troops on the side of a road would be, “Mines Cleared to Shoulders Only.” Patton’s troops planted signs that read, “Krauts Cleared to Shoulders Only.”

Q: How did you get your connection to the wire service?

HANEY: In Paris the newspaper business was in upheaval because the postwar French had purged anybody suspected of dealings with the enemy during the occupation. New publications seemed to spring up like weeds. When I got to Paris as a new employee of the French wire service there were 35 to 40 daily newspapers in the city, few of them run by an experienced professional.

On my way from Biarritz to Namur, I had stopped briefly in Paris, as I mentioned. I found my way to the Paris bureau of the London *Sunday Times*, where I met the bureau chief. He didn’t

have a job for me, but he told me, “There’s a new wire service in town called the Agence Européenne de Presse. I think they want to start an English section.” So I went down to the AEP offices near the Opéra and talked my way in to see one of the editors. He had been a schoolteacher and apparently didn’t know much about newspaper work. I told him, “Look, I’m here only on leave. I’m going to be discharged shortly.” He said, “Fine. As soon as you come back, you have a job.”

My job was to take AEP’s French copy and translate and adapt it for transmission in English. AEP was a favored agency because it was socialist. It was in their offices that I met Léon Blum, the great man of French socialism. The president of France, Vincent Auriol, was a socialist. AEP was then in the position now occupied by the Agence France-Presse (AFP). My most interesting assignment at AEP was helping to cover the peace conference with the German satellite powers, held at the Luxembourg Palace in the summer of 1946. Jimmy Byrnes, the U.S. secretary of state, was our chief delegate.

The socialists in France began to run into difficulties that summer, and the ripple effect was felt at AEP. I was told I could stay on, but I would have to shift to reporting in French. It was much more of a chore, because French is not my native language. So I went to the European edition of the New York *Herald Tribune*, and they hired me.

Q: What job did you have with them?

HANEY: I started out doing cable rewrite. Most of the Paris *Herald* copy that we received from our correspondents came in a form called “cablese.” You leave out all the articles, shorten things and run words together to lower the word count, which was the basis of cost. It was akin to reconstituting mashed potatoes from the dried and powdered Army rations still available on the Paris black market. Somebody had to take the cablese and reconstitute it into proper English.

After cable rewrite, I did reporting. And I did translating. An elegant Frenchman who followed the races would come back from Longchamp and write his racing report in longhand. I would translate that for our sports page. I also translated speeches by de Gaulle. That is not so easy. It’s said that French is “the diplomatic language” because it is so precise. My experience has been that it’s a diplomatic language because it’s so fuzzy. Just try to pin down in English what de Gaulle meant exactly when he used grand language, accompanied by equally grand gestures.

Q: Wasn’t it, “Algerians, I understand you,” which was a famous saying that everybody interpreted different ways?

HANEY: Yes. After cable rewrite, translating racing news and deciphering de Gaulle, I became a full-time reporter. Four of us and the two-man Paris bureau of the New York edition did the reporting. Some of the stories by the local staff would be picked up by the bureau for use in New York. The local newsman from New York who was the chief reporter for the European edition was David Perlman (in later years science editor at *The San Francisco Chronicle*). When he went back home to the New York edition, I took his place. If I wanted to make a good impression, I could always tell outsiders that I was “city editor” of the European edition, although there were only four of us doing the reporting. I stayed with the Paris *Herald* for three years. It was an

interesting time.

Q: What was your impression of the Fourth Republic, how it worked?

HANEY: Structured Gallic chaos. Because of the war – so much damage, so much loss, so much dislocation, so much ambivalence about how to be French in a France occupied by a foreign power – the national psychological landscape was not the kind of territory that favors obvious, easy answers. Charges of treating with the enemy during the occupation were being made recklessly. Most industries had been disrupted. The newspaper business didn't know where it was going, because so many of the people running it, from top to bottom, were inexperienced. The winter of 1946-'47 was very bad, very cold. In Paris, the outdoor, street-side urinals ("Vespasiennes," named for the emperor who established them in Rome) froze up and coated parts of the street with ice. The garbage wasn't picked up; it piled up frozen on the streets.

There was a shortage of food. The extreme cold had killed the winter wheat, and that French staple – the baguette – was in extremely short supply or even not available. That's about as close as you can get to a state of emergency in France without calling out the troops. French, British and American representatives met in England to seek a remedy. The Americans were generous. We offered to provide what the British interpreter called "corn," which in British English means any kind of bread grain. The Americans who heard "corn" thought of Iowa. When the American contribution arrived by the shipload, it was maize – "corn" as in "Iowa."

As a result, during most of 1947, the French had to eat bread made from corn, which has no gluten. Without gluten, it will rise from the yeast in the dough, but there's nothing elastic (gluten) to hold the bubbles. The French insisted that if it was bread it had to be a baguette. France's "yellow bread" was baked into baguettes about as long and hard as a gendarme's billy club and not much thicker. It caused great furor (and much indigestion) that year. To write a feature about it for the Paris *Herald*, I visited a laboratory of the National Center for Scientific Research that was testing the "yellow bread" on rats. Some rats were getting regular bread made from wheat. A second cage was served wheat baguettes with a little bit of corn. The third cage got only "yellow bread" – no wheat. According to the scientist in charge of the experiments, a rat in the third cage stuck his nose out between the top and side of the cage, let go with his feet, and was hanged. The scientist said it was an accident.

Yellow bread aside, American assistance was enormously valuable to the French during that period. Regional headquarters for aid to Europe was located in our embassy in Paris.

Q: Did you have any dealings with the embassy while you were in Paris?

HANEY: Yes. The embassy was, of course, the source of the official American view on stories relating to the United States. I went there more regularly also because, with my discharge papers, I could still use the commissary and the PX. Food and American cigarettes were hard to come by, and I was living on the French economy.

And often, when I was down near the Place de la Concorde, I would stop by the embassy to brush up my Russian. One of the elevator operators was a Russian who had fled the revolution

and immigrated to France. I'd ride in the elevator with him, we would stop between floors and chat in Russian until people began buzzing insistently for the elevator.

Some years later I was assigned to the embassy as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer, my first post.

Q: Did you run into Art Buchwald?

HANEY: You might say that Art ran into me. As the "city editor" of the Paris *Herald*, it was my job on behalf of the editor, Geoff Parsons, Jr., to say "No" to the hopeful young Americans who sought to emulate Hemingway and Elliot Paul, who went to Paris after the First World War and ended up as famous writers. Art Buchwald had served in the Marines in the Pacific. He was a Brooklyn lad. After his discharge, he got on a ship and sailed for France. In Paris, he came straight to the *Herald Tribune*. That was almost always the first place where a newly arrived wannabe would show up. I was the first American connected with the paper that Art met, because I was the designated naysayer.

I used to get two or three young job-seekers a month, and I tried not to discourage them, even though we might not have any opening at the time. After listening to their pitch, I would tell them, "Look, I don't know anybody who has come here and spent several months methodically checking all the possibilities – AP, UP, INS, the *Chicago Tribune* bureau, the *New York Times* bureau, and so on – who has not found some kind of an entry job."

So I told Art, "I think that if you stick with it and make the rounds, something will turn up. That's what happened to me. But there's nothing at the *Trib* right now."

But Art kept coming back. I would say, "I'm sorry, nothing new today, Art. Have you tried some of the other places?" No, he hadn't. He carried a letter from *Variety* magazine, which he showed me. The gist of it was, "If this young man ever writes anything that is of interest to us, we might print it." Not the sort of thing you could take to the bank. It was clear to me that he didn't have any meaningful backing from *Variety*, because I knew the Frenchman who was the magazine's stringer in Paris.

Art was so persistent that I thought, "This guy deserves to get the 'No' from Geoff Parsons himself." I went to Geoff and said, "Another young man has been coming around looking for a job. I don't think he knows how to write. But he is so persistent and so nice, I really think that you should tell him 'No' yourself." Geoff didn't like that. But I insisted, so Geoff made the appointment to see Art.

The day after Art's interview with Geoff, I turned up in the city room at 2:00 p.m., the usual check-in time for editorial staff on a morning newspaper. To my surprise, there was Art Buchwald busily occupied at the long table by the switchboard at one end of the city room. He was bent over the table with a ruler and "chopping copy" – tearing off the separate "takes" of wire service copy and sorting them by story. Puzzled, I asked, "What are you doing here, Art?" He replied, "Well, I had a nice talk with Geoff Parsons yesterday, and he told me I could start today."

Geoff was congenitally incapable of saying “No.” Getting him to make up his mind was like trying to nail Jell-O to a wall. He had hired Art and started him off chopping copy. Geoff was interested in getting a regular column started, but he didn’t have the time himself. In my view, he was too busy on the social circuit. Art thus became our only English-speaking copy boy (the rest of the staff at that level were all French). In addition to those duties, Geoff then asked Art to try writing a column on Parisian restaurants. That meant free meals, which I think he needed. Art would write a piece about the restaurant that had just fed him, the copy desk would clean it up, and the copy would go down the tube to the composing room for the next day’s edition.

Little by little, Art’s writing got better, more interesting, proving all of us except Geoff Parsons wrong. I think to this day Art has no analytical notion of what he’s doing. He just instinctively knows what will go. When I went back to Paris in 1951 to begin my job at the embassy, Art was still at the Paris *Herald*. By then, he was a well-established columnist, and his pieces were appearing in the New York edition as well as in Paris.

Q: And he’s still going.

HANEY: Yes.

Q: Was there the equivalent of a USIS or an OWI in Paris?

HANEY: When I got to the Paris embassy in 1951, the information and cultural function was carried out by the United States Information Service (USIS). The Office of War Information (OWI) had been phased out. The United States Information Agency (USIA, no longer extant, alas!) was not created until 1953, after John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State. I think Dulles wanted to unload USIA because the most visible part of it in the United States was the Voice of America (VOA). That was the McCarthy era, and VOA, seeking foreign language skills, had hired many employees who were emigrants from Europe. The VOA was a soft target.

Q: But while you were working for The Herald Tribune, how did the American embassy handle its press relations?

HANEY: Through the press attaché.

Q: He was a Foreign Service officer?

HANEY: Initially, yes. Then it was a New England newspaperman who, I think, got the job because his congressman pulled strings in Washington. He was a Foreign Service Reserve Officer (as I was at the beginning). Within a year or two, Ben Bradlee arrived to occupy the position of assistant press attaché, eventually press attaché.

Q: We’re moving up toward the time when you were making an application to get into the State Department, aren’t we?

HANEY: Not quite. In 1949, I had been with the Paris *Herald* for three years and in Europe for

five, counting my time in the Army and with the French wire service. At that point I was feeling restless at *The Herald Tribune*. I had been sent on assignments to Belgium once and to Switzerland twice to do the interviews and collect the material to support advertising supplements relating to those two countries. Coordinating my coverage with the advertising department, I wrote every story in an eight-page supplement, followed the copy down to the composing room, adjusted the makeup as needed for space, watched the typesetters lock the page into the form, and finally checked the proofs on the stone. From the flat form holding the type the impression was made on a flexible material the French called “*flan*” (“custard”), which was then rolled into a cylinder for the rotary presses. The flan was also sent to New York, where *The Herald Tribune* would use the same copy already set in type for a New York supplement on Belgium or Switzerland.

For all my extra work on a supplement, I would get a byline on the front-page lead. I told Geoff Parsons and Eric Hawkins, the managing editor, that I thought I should get some additional compensation for my editorial work on advertising supplements. My appeal fell on deaf ears. I got tired of what had become an annual supplement drill and thought, “Maybe I’ll go back home and finish my college degree before I get too old.”

So I left the Paris *Herald* in the summer of 1949 with an option to return if I wished. I traveled to New York from Le Havre on the old Queen Elizabeth with Maggie Higgins, a foreign correspondent for the New York edition. She was heading from her post in Berlin to Asia to cover the Korean War.

You went back to Paris again. You were there from ‘51 to when?

HANEY: Late ‘55.

Q: When you came into the Foreign Service in ‘51, was there any training? Or did they just figure you knew what to do?

HANEY: The Foreign Service Institute had a course that ran for a few weeks. We had general exposure to what faces someone abroad serving the U.S. in the Foreign Service. There was also language training. They didn’t give me any because I knew French already.

Q: When you arrived in Paris in 1951, who was our ambassador?

HANEY: David K. E. Bruce.

Q: Did you have much to do with the main part of the embassy, or were you off in a separate area?

HANEY: We were in a very distinguished area. If you walk down the Rue du Faubourg St.-Honoré, which goes past one side of the embassy, you come to what is now the ambassador’s residence, at number 41. That’s where the U.S. Information Service (USIS) was located at the time. The vast garden behind number 41 extends to the Champs-Élysées.

Q: What was the French government like? This was the Fourth Republic. How were relations with the United States?

HANEY: Relations were good, although I think that Mr. Dulles, who was then our Secretary of State, overestimated the eagerness of the French to get together with the other European powers that had been allies to form the European Defense Community, a precursor to NATO. Georges Bidault, who had been premier and was president briefly and then premier again, had given the impression to Mr. Dulles and his aides that the Assemblée Nationale was going to agree to join its European allies in approving the new European body – no problem. It dragged on and on in the Assemblée Nationale for about four years. It was finally accepted, but the French weren't very happy about it. And their eventual connection with NATO was a tenuous one.

Q: What part of the action did you have in the Press Office?

HANEY: We really had two functions with respect to the press. One was the press attache's office in the embassy on the mezzanine floor. That was the office that managed the spokesman role, answered queries to the embassy, and accompanied the ambassador at press conferences. Then USIS had a press section. It was aimed at a French audience. It received material that was prepared in Washington and sent out by wireless file overnight. That file was translated and packaged as a press report, which was circulated to newspapers or to anybody interested in the U.S. view of things. The press office at USIS was also called on to do things like speechwriting. The USIS audience was exclusively French. The press attaché was at the elbow of the ambassador and other embassy officers who would occasionally have contact with the press. Ben Bradlee became the assistant press attaché, then press attaché while I was stationed at the embassy.

Q: He later won fame with The Washington Post as its editor.

HANEY: And in the Watergate movie, too.

Q: How receptive did you find the French press to what we were putting out?

HANEY: I would say that they were about as receptive as our press is to press releases from embassies here in Washington. In Paris, if it was big news, the announcement would come from Washington, or the ambassador would announce it through the press attaché's office. The USIS wireless file would, of course, carry the gist of big news, but scoops were not our preoccupation. The USIS supporting role was to carry on one part of a dialogue with the French public.

Q: Did we have any contact with the communist press?

HANEY: We read it carefully, but we didn't have any association with it. We certainly did not try to use it as an outlet.

Q: I imagine you had your old colleagues who were still in place. What about the socialist press? How receptive were they? Were they beginning to distance themselves from the U.S. more and more?

HANEY: I don't recall that that was the case. Of course, I had a rather unusual position, because I had worked in the French press earlier. As a reporter for the Agence Européenne de Presse, I had covered the peace conference with the former German satellite powers. We had an AEP team at the Luxembourg Palace. Molotov headed the Soviet delegation at that conference. Our Secretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes, was head of the U.S. delegation. At his elbow was Chip Bohlen.

I knew the French press well. My boss at AEP was a Russian Jew who had emigrated to France and had been editor of *Le Populaire*, organ of the French Socialist Party. He was in charge of AEP operations at the Luxembourg Palace. As I have recounted earlier, many press people in the immediate postwar period had little knowledge of the profession. But there was one AEP old-timer who was an accomplished newspaper man. He was trying to get me to join the CGT, the Confédération Générale du Travail, the big French trade union.

Q: Was this communist?

HANEY: No, not at that time. But communists had infiltrated it to the point that many Americans thought of it as a commie outfit. I am grateful that I did not follow up on my French colleague's suggestion. I joined the newspaper Guild later when I went to *The Herald Tribune*. I ordinarily support labor unions, and I had no reason not to be in favor of the CGT. But if I had been obliged to put that down on my record when I applied to become a Foreign Service officer, I probably wouldn't be sitting here now.

Q: Did you run across McCarthyism, either you or people around you? This was the height of McCarthyism.

HANEY: Cohn and Schein came to visit when I was stationed in Paris.

Q: Infamous.

HANEY: I was present at one of the sessions down the street at the Rue du Faubourg St.-Honoré. The cultural attaché, a distinguished American professor, was to be interrogated by that pair working for Senator McCarthy. Cohn took over the cultural attaché's desk. Schein sat next to him. While Cohn fired questions, Schein was going through the professor's desk, opening the drawers and looking to see what was in them. It was a most disgraceful performance. So I could say that we were painfully aware of McCarthyism. Some of our colleagues in USIA were fingered by Cohn and lost their jobs on the basis of alleged guilt by association.

Q: Were there people who were saying, "Maybe you'd better not say this or do that or have contact with so and so," because of McCarthyism? Did you feel it was an inhibiting time?

HANEY: I really didn't feel inhibited. We would not ask ourselves, "What would McCarthy say about this?" We would just do what we thought was the best thing given our mission.

Q: What about the Indochinese war? This was the time of Dien Bien Phu. How was that playing

from your perspective?

HANEY: As you know, the American government did consider giving the French aid – not just financial aid, but supplies and perhaps more, I don't know. That possibility was rejected. But living in Paris, you could not help following rather closely what was happening at Dien Bien Phu. Later, I knew a French liaison officer who worked with one of the embassy missions. He had been with French forces at Dien Bien Phu, and I had several interesting talks with him about his experience. We followed it closely. But I was not aware that there was ever a real possibility that the United States might intervene.

Q: Dien Bien Phu fell in early 1954. I was an enlisted man in the Air Force getting ready to get out of the military. All of a sudden, the rumor went around that we might all be kept in, which was not pleasing to us at all.

HANEY: You probably knew more about the possibility than we did.

Q: I was just in the barracks. But it was of concern. Did Algeria play much of a role in your contacts with the French?

HANEY: At that point, Algeria was still considered by the French to be part of the Métropole, like a province, a part of European France. Of course, as time went on and the colonies became more restive, voices were heard in France advocating independence, and strong voices opposed it.

In 1952, the U.N. General Assembly met in Paris, in one of the wings of the Palais de Chaillot. Dean Acheson was Secretary of State at the time. I was detached from the embassy to join the U.S. delegation for the duration of the GA meeting because they needed a French speaker familiar with the French press. I worked for Porter McKeever, head of the U.S. delegation's public information section.

I remember that when the subject came up of independence for the French colonies in North Africa – Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria – the U.N. decided that "We won't discuss that in Paris because that would be offensive to our hosts." But in his opening speech to the political committee, Acheson made a reference to the desires of the French colonies, in Africa particularly, for independence. I can remember what he said, because I was sitting in the U.S. delegation offices working with the staffer who transcribed speeches. He would pass his transcription to me, and I would clean it up as necessary. Acheson had said, "If you're standing on a railroad track and you see an express train coming toward you, get off the track." He was talking about the drive for independence among the colonies. I thought that was an apt description of what was happening. The next day, the wireless file that was compiled in Washington daily by USIA and sent out worldwide gave a lot of space to Acheson's speech. The "express train" reference had been removed, however, apparently because somebody felt it would be offensive to the French.

Subsequently, when the General Assembly returned to the United States for a rump session in New York, the ministers for foreign affairs of the French colonies in North Africa applied for

visas at our embassy in Paris. They held French diplomatic passports, and they wished to be present when the GA discussed the colonial question, which had been kept off the agenda in Paris. Our embassy denied them visas. I never did find out why.

Q: There was something that became known in the State Department as the “Battle of North Africa” or the “Battle of Africa,” between the European bureaus – i.e., France and all—and officers who were dealing with the Near East and Africa. The European side was thinking in terms of “We don’t want to get the French riled up because we want them to join NATO. So, let’s just forget about this.” People who dealt with the Near East and Africa were saying, “This express train is coming along. We’re going to catch it.” This was a battle that was really being waged in Washington.

HANEY: That’s what I sensed.

Q: What was your impression of French politics at this time? There were so many changes in government. Did you feel that this was the sign of a very weak state, or did you see this as something that really wasn’t as bad as it looked from the outside?

HANEY: It was a matter of concern to most Frenchmen because they certainly didn’t have a stable government for some years following the Second World War. Bidault, the prime minister, got caught between pressure from the United States to sign on to the European Defense Community and the feeling on the part of most Frenchmen that they didn’t want to give away any part of their sovereignty, that they didn’t want their military power, for example, subjected to scrutiny or orders from any other part of Europe. If they got into EDC and NATO, they feared that a French military unit might fall under the command of, who knows? A German unit.

Q: With your connections with France, how did you find the social life and the professional melded together? How receptive did you find the French?

HANEY: I had no problem whatsoever. My own view was that very often we in USIA who had immediate contact with the French press on a working basis and more contact with ordinary people, not just other diplomats, sometimes had a better sense of what was in the works than an embassy political officer who might pick up much of what he learned at diplomatic cocktail parties.

Q: It gets quite incestuous within the diplomatic community.

HANEY: Yes. We saw that particularly later in India where, because of the language problem among other things, the embassy political section was not really on top of what was happening. My wife, Mary, was doing work with Indian women, which gave her valuable insight into the minds, if not the hearts, of the Indians.

Q: Let’s stick to France. What was your wife doing at that time?

HANEY: In Paris she was taking care of our first child.

Q: That kept her hands full.

HANEY: Yes. We had met in Paris when she was a staff member of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, which met there in 1952.

Q: Did you find that there was much difference between what was happening in Paris and elsewhere in France? Was the real political life concentrated in Paris?

HANEY: Political life on an international scale was of course concentrated in Paris. But French internal politics had plenty to do with the provinces. The agricultural sector, for example, was very important to any French politician. But with respect to the international scene, Paris had its view much as Washington inside the Beltway has its view of what's going on, not just in the country but in the world.

Q: What about radio and television? Was television much of a factor in those days?

HANEY: Television was just beginning. I became the radio and television officer when the radio officer who had been clinging to the job for six years was finally told he was being transferred to Africa. I think he quit. After a stint as a press officer, then temporary duty with our U.N. delegation at the Palais de Chaillot in 1952, and finally a year as an assistant in the office of the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), I was shifted to the radio officer slot. Television was added to my responsibilities when French TV finally took off.

Q: Was the activity different with radio and television? Was it an important factor in molding French opinion? How did we get to it?

HANEY: Yes, I think radio – and then TV – was important because in many parts of France, radio was how you got your news. The Voice of America (VOA) had a half hour every night on the French Chaîne Nationale network, a slot that had been used by the OWI until the VOA came along. I inherited that half hour. The first 15 minutes I filled with American music – performers that were American, American works, American opera. I even tossed in some Kurt Weill, for example his “Down in the Valley,” from the folksong expanded into a musical. I spent every Wednesday afternoon in a small Radiodiffusion Française (RDF) studio in the rue Vernet, near the Étoile, recording in French on large platters a week's worth of comments on the music. Day by day at the appointed hour throughout the following week, the French technicians in the studio alternated my comments with the works I had chosen on commercial records, and the whole recorded segment was broadcast on the Chaîne Nationale. In short, I was a disk jockey (except that I never had to lift or plant a tone arm).

The second segment of my half hour was 15 minutes of news and commentary broadcast shortwave from VOA and picked up by RDF for relay by medium wave in France. The signal was crackly and sometimes weak – it reminded me of listening to the BBC in Europe on shortwave during the war. I would introduce the Stateside segment with, “*Ici, New York!*” Because that galvanizing introduction had been recorded the week before, I could head home from my downtown office every evening and listen to myself and my New York colleagues on the Chaîne Nationale before dinner.

Probably more significant in terms of reaching a French audience with a radio program serving our policy objectives was the work I did with Radio Luxembourg, a commercial station with its main studios in Paris. The French radio was nationalized, an instrument of whatever government was in power. Radio Luxembourg had no such ties, was independent, and could broadcast what it thought would appeal most to listeners. Polls showed consistently that Radio Luxembourg's listenership in France was greater and its programs more favorably regarded than any of the RDF channels. Luxembourg broadcast by long wave and could be heard on ordinary radios throughout France. Its evening news came on in prime time, 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., as I recall.

Radio Luxembourg didn't have the staff to cover much of Europe. I employed a stringer who had earlier worked as an RDF correspondent. So I suggested to Radio Luxembourg that I furnish them coverage, using my stringer, of events in Vienna, London, Rome. My man could send his report and any useful sound effects (for example, crowd noises) by wire to the large and well-equipped Marshall Plan studio on the Boulevard Haussman, not far from l'Étoile. As a courtesy to the embassy (and the VOA), I was allowed to use a modern (1954) recording studio and the services of a top-notch engineer. He recorded on tape (I said we were up-to-date) at 30 inches per second. That speed allowed him to remove a hiccup or a syllable, no one the wiser.

Luxembourg accepted my offer. I would propose stories to be covered, and, with their agreement, I would send my stringer to report the story, furnish the sound elements, and we would put it in Luxembourg's hands as a tape ready to go in time for their evening newscast. Although Radio Luxembourg didn't say so, the listener was left to believe that my stringer was one of Luxembourg's correspondents.

American radio was so wedded to authenticity that if you covered a fatal leap from the Empire State Building, you would have to have someone on the sidewalk with a mike to catch the sickening sound of the impact. Not so in France. With imagination, the requisite recorded sound elements, a brief narrative and a good engineer you could put together a coherent story that would nicely fill a two-minute spot.

This is the way it worked for coverage of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna: My stringer was dispatched to Vienna with detailed instructions. On the day of the signing he recorded the sound of bands and crowd noises and the beginning of the principal speech in German. A separate recorded chunk provided his translation in French of salient elements of the speech. When we had received all these recorded bits in the studio, I worked with the engineer to meld the separate parts into a coherent and smoothly flowing two-minute spot. My engineer then copied the finished product on a fresh tape as a seamless package. And at 6:00 p.m., a "*cycliste*" from Radio Luxembourg came to the studio to pick up the edited tape. Then I went home to listen to it on Radio Luxembourg evening news, which identified my stringer by name but not by affiliation.

Q: They wouldn't identify you as . . .

HANEY: Oh, no. The tape I provided was broadcast as part of a Radio Luxembourg newscast. I once figured out that I was spending about \$3,000 a year in transportation and expenses for my

stringer, plus his hourly compensation for time spent on assignment. And we were getting about \$65,000 worth of airtime. Our spots were carried in prime time, and Luxembourg was a commercial station.

Q: Of course, at that time, Radio Luxembourg was the authoritative and most popular station around.

HANEY: Right. Independent polls showed that Radio Luxembourg was way ahead of any French station.

Q: How did the Soviet Union play? Did you get involved in showing the depths of depravity in the Soviet Union, the “Evil Empire” and all that, or was that not part of your business?

HANEY: We usually didn’t get into that. It would have taken up manpower and time that could be used more effectively for positive and more interesting subjects for a French audience. The whole business of the Cold War – who’s the good guy, and who’s the bad guy – was a theme with variations played *ad nauseam* by the French Communist Party.

When the U.N. General Assembly met in Paris in 1952, Eleanor Roosevelt was a member of the U.S. delegation. Warren Austin was the head of the delegation. When Austin had to return to the States early, Eleanor Roosevelt replaced him. During the GA meeting, she was doing a weekly program on the French radio in French. The temporary RDF studio installed in the Palais de Chaillot was a cubicle half a story up in one of the high-ceilinged halls. You had to climb up to it on rickety wooden stairs. I remember ushering Mrs. Roosevelt up there every week for her ten-minute program.

Throughout the GA meeting we were besieged by French communist delegations coming from as far away as Marseilles to protest the alleged American use of germ warfare in Korea. These groups would arrive on the steps of the Palais de Chaillot seeking an audience. One of my jobs was to receive these guys, try to identify the leader, and agree to take one or two representatives of the group to see Mrs. Roosevelt. I don’t believe she changed any minds, but she might have opened some.

Q: I might add that this germ warfare accusation was as far as anyone knows pure propaganda put out by the communist side.

HANEY: Yes.

Q: You left there before de Gaulle came in?

HANEY: De Gaulle was president from ‘44 to ‘46 under the provisional government. I began work at the Paris *Herald* while he was still in the Élysée Palace. Then he was president again in ‘59 and ‘69. I was transferred from the Paris embassy back to Washington for a home assignment toward the end of ‘55. But de Gaulle remained very much a part of the French political scene even out of office.

Q: Did you have any contact with de Gaulle at that time? Did he sort of appear and make pronouncements and then go back home?

HANEY: Yes, you would see him on French TV, in newsreels and in the press. He appealed to a part of the French psyche that had not quite lost its grip on the glory that was France in Napoleonic times. It would be interesting to check the texts of his public speeches to see just how often he would invoke “*la gloire française*.” When he spoke those words, you’d swear you could hear trumpets in the background.

De Gaulle’s speeches did strike a cord in the French people. France was in pretty bad shape at the end of the war. I had lived there as a civilian on the French economy until 1949, so I knew first-hand what a struggle it was. In 1952, France was fighting to maintain its colonial power in Vietnam. Its African colonies were restive. “*La gloire française*” rang a bit hollow, even when intoned by de Gaulle.

During the ‘52 GA meetings, the offices of the U.S. delegation were in the Astoria Hotel, on the Champs-Élysées not far from the Étoile. Our windows looked out on that grand boulevard. While we occupied those offices, General de Lattre de Tassigny died. He had commanded the French 1st Army in World War II and was subsequently named high commissioner and military commander in French Indochina. In Paris, “*la gloire française*” shone once more, briefly, to mark his passing. De Lattre was posthumously given the rank of “Maréchal.” And from an upper floor of the Astoria we watched the elaborate funeral cortege make its stately way from the Étoile down the Champs-Élysées to the Place de la Concorde. For one day, the pomp matched the circumstance. “*La gloire française*” had made a brief apparition, then faded quickly into memory again.

Q: During the time you were there both as a plain citizen and as a member of the diplomatic corps, what were you noticing about the division within France of those who collaborated and those who didn’t? Was there almost a tacit “Let’s not talk about that?”

HANEY: In the immediate wake of the war, as cities and towns were liberated, rough street justice was sometimes meted out to known collaborators. This punishment was more psychological than physical – nobody that I know of was taken out and shot. Frenchmen believed to have been cozy with “*les Boches*” were subjected to insult and innuendo rather than injury. Prostitutes who had associated with the occupiers were rounded up, their heads shaved bald, and herded down the street.

There was not a clear-cut line between Frenchmen who collaborated for personal benefit and those who simply tried to get along with the Germans because times were tough. I think you’re right about the inclination “not to talk about that.” There has never been a clear definition in the public mind of “collaboration.”

I’ve mentioned the chaotic state of the French press in the immediate wake of the war. When all the professionals who – rightly or wrongly – had been accused of “collaboration” were flushed out, the technical, political and intellectual task of publishing a daily paper often fell to neophytes. The press perhaps suffered more postwar upheaval than other sectors because it had

left a “paper trail.” Many French men and women saw the disarray of the press as a great opportunity and promptly joined the fray. As I have pointed out, in Paris this led to a large turnover in the press corps and the publication of something like 40 dailies in the first years after the war.

I sense that now, a half-century and several generations later, the French are more disposed to look more searchingly, more realistically at how they reacted to the occupation. The film, “*Le Chagrin et la Pitié*” (“The Sorrow and the Pity”) is an example of the more clear-eyed view that the current generation is beginning to cast on the trying years of German occupation.

Q: When you were moving with your contacts, did people say, “Oh, yes, So and So, he or she was very much dealing with the Nazis?”

HANEY: I never saw or heard of anybody fingered as a collaborator except prostitutes who were marched down the street.

Q: You left the Paris embassy in 1955. Where to?

HANEY: I returned to Washington on a home assignment. I became chief of the Soviet and Satellites Branch of USIA Intelligence and Research.

RIDGWAY B. KNIGHT
Special Assistant to the Ambassador
Paris (1944-1950)

Ambassador Ridgway B. Knight was born in Paris of American parents. He became a Foreign Service officer in 1946 under the Manpower Act. His career included positions in France and Pakistan, and ambassadorships to Syria, Belgium, and Portugal. Ambassador Knight was interviewed by Kirstin Hamblin in 1993.

KNIGHT: You asked me how I came into the Foreign Service, that wasn't the reason. Actually, after the North African landings I went into the Army, and after landing in Italy at Salerno, seeing duty on the Anzio beachhead and working as liaison officer between General Clark commanding the Fifth Army, and General Juin commanding the French Expeditionary Corps, I was, as a favor, assigned to an outfit which was to land in southern France on August 15, 1944. Strange as it may seem, that is how I came into the Foreign Service! As we made our way up through southern France, politically interested as I was, I wrote a memorandum on political conditions as I observed them. By a miracle of efficiency, which I'm sure has not been often repeated, my memo was amongst the papers given to Ambassador Caffery when he took his plane in October of 1944 to join his post in Paris. My paper happened to be the only paper written on conditions south of the Loire, and he said, “I want that Major on my staff.” And that is how I came into the Foreign Service.

Q: *And so you were then?*

KNIGHT: Then I became a special assistant to the Ambassador, and also of his successor Ambassador David Bruce until I went back to Washington in January of '50. Finally, in 1946, I was integrated into the Foreign Service as a Class 4 officer under the Manpower Act.

Q: *And what specifically did you do as special assistant to both of these ambassadors?*

KNIGHT: I had two titles, I was special assistant to the Ambassador, and I was a full-fledged member of the Political Section. I was responsible for dealing with several of the French political parties, and I reported on the French colonies.

Q: *What sort of involvement did you have in post World War II negotiations?*

KNIGHT: I was one of the two American Commissioners handling the rectification of the Franco-Italian border. The other one was Freddie Reinhardt.

RICHARD FUNKHOUSER

**Petroleum Attaché
Paris (1945-1947)**

**Political Counselor
Paris (1965-1968)**

Richard Funkhouser was born and raised in Trenton, New Jersey. He graduated from Princeton University with a Degree in the Liberal Arts. He began working for Standard Oil but eventually moved on to Foreign Service in 1945. During his active duty he has served in Paris, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Moscow, Gabon, Vietnam, and Scotland. This interview was conducted on February 2, 1988 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

FUNKHOUSER: I went down there and, believe it or not, a classmate of mine, Findley Burns, whom you undoubtedly know, was the young Personnel Officer. He said, "You're an oil expert, aren't you?"

I said, "No."

He said, "You worked for an oil company, didn't you?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "You're an oil expert to the State Department."

I said, "Okay."

He said, "We and the British are both trying to get the oil industry back on its feet. Not only the industry, but get oil moving to all the destroyed countries of Western Europe."

Q: We're talking about what, 1945?

FUNKHOUSER: We're talking about 1945 in September. And Findley told me that both the Americans and the British Foreign Service were trying to get a few people to go to key oil industry centers such as Paris with responsibilities for Western Europe and French North Africa, London and the empire as it was, Cairo and all of the Middle East, and Tokyo for the Pacific area. What we were assigned to do was to be contact with government officials who worked on oil problems and energy (they didn't have departments of energy then), Foreign Office people who were trying to handle political problems in oil-producing countries, and/or Treasury reps. We were having great problems with what was called then and became the "dollar-sterling oil problem," wherein the British would produce oil from the Middle East and sell it for sterling to countries that had built up great pound debts during World War II. The British would sell them "sterling oil" which they could get at a much cheaper price than with American dollars. No one had dollars, everyone had sterling. And so these were problems which had to be worked out in Western Europe.

Let's take, for example, tank cars. The Germans stole the French tank cars, then the Russians stole the German tank cars. And what a Petroleum Attache had to do was try to get the tank cars back from wherever they were. Many were destroyed, but tank cars are pretty tough, too.

And pipelines; we had a lot of pipelines in Europe such as were laid down during the war from Marseille up the Rhone Valley. The problem was to dispose of those pipelines. They weren't meant to last very long: they were above the ground and the one from Marseille had so many holes in it from French peasants trying to get gasoline for their tractors that they weren't worth a great deal. But there were problems of negotiation which even as a junior Foreign Service officer Class Six I handled. I became the focal point in the embassy for trying to get the flow of oil moving. This was my first job. I had the title of Acting Regional Petroleum Attache until I took the exams and became a Third Secretary. A secondary but significant responsibility for me was to allocate and distribute to the Americans in France coupons issued by the French government for rationed gasoline. I sometimes wondered why we as a naive, young couple seemed to be so popular and so often invited by businessmen to the best black market restaurants?!

In retrospect, I am also struck by how lucky I was to learn my first diplomatic ropes from such outstanding officers as Douglas MacArthur and Livingston Merchant. Coming from three years in the oil fields and two years piloting a plane over the Hump, I was unable to draft reports or speak in meetings effectively. Doug redrafted my diplomatic notes; Livy was a model chairman of staff meetings where he could brilliantly summarize disparate views so as to make each participant believe his contribution was included. No one in my career could match him. This was undoubtedly why our Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, who strangely enough was embarrassingly inarticulate in large meetings, sent Livy to Washington to sell the \$500 million aid package for France which preceded and probably inspired the Marshall Plan.

Q: During your time there you were there during a time when DeGaulle was really reasserting what he would say was the rightful role of France in the world, and also were you there during the May of 1968, too?

FUNKHOUSER: I was, yes, during the student riots.

Q: During the riots. So in a way he got his come-uppance. But as a Political Counselor, how did you deal with these really sort of cataclysmic effects in our policy within France and with France itself?

FUNKHOUSER: Well, the worst crisis, of course, was the student uprising. This was May 1968. And my role, for which Dean Rusk sent me a special congratulatory telegram, was basically to organize all of the resources in the Embassy to report on a daily basis, immediate telegrams, what was going on. Jack Perry would go down and talk to the Communist party leaders and go mingle with the crowds. John Dean would cover the Asians, and Oakley others; they were all out and around town. My job was to go to the Quai d'Orsay and get their information. I got the Economic/Commercial Section to report what was happening to the franc and USIA to cover the media.

We didn't really work, unfortunately, with the CIA. They did their own reporting. We gave them all of our stuff, but I rarely saw any of theirs. They had some very fine contacts.

The military we worked with, but not too closely. And Dick Walters had excellent sources. The crisis came to a head when DeGaulle disappeared. Sarge Shriver was Ambassador then. Perhaps unfortunately he was a new boy. I'd been there three years, and it was pretty hard to go from Bohlen, who knew everything about the French to Shriver. But Shriver depended more on the staff, and after all, it was a crisis.

We, I think, reported it, all of the developments as well as we could, extremely fast. That was my role. Unfortunately, the Quai d'Orsay diplomats, when Charles DeGaulle disappeared, weren't very useful. The Military Attaché, Dick Walters, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the Agency, Locke Campbell, who were both very good, had the best information. And to prove that, Sarge Shriver called a rare meeting of all the heads. "Where is DeGaulle?"

Woody Wallner, who took Bob McBride's place, had inside information from Andre Fontaine, the Le Monde correspondent, and some of the best sources in town.

Q: He had been there during the war.

FUNKHOUSER: Yes. He knew everything. He knew with whom everyone was sleeping, male or female. But he and Shriver never got along. Woody was sort of a caricature of a Europeanized Foreign Service Officer... long cigarette holder, and sort of a sophisticated Elim O'Shaughnessy, laid back, perfect French, totally un-American in Shriver's way. Shriver even put a trampoline in the Residence garden and everybody coming to cocktail parties would jump on the trampoline,

most unsophisticated. They reacted very badly to each other. Unfortunately, Woody got the wrong advice from his best contacts saying that DeGaulle was going to either quit or be thrown out. And Shriver, in a very important incident in my diplomatic career, called all of the heads of section together and said, "Where is the General? We have to get into print on that. Katzenbach and others, including Ball, are calling for it. Where is he?"

Walters said, "He's in Germany talking to the top Generals, finding out if they will support him if it comes to civil strife." Walters didn't know whether the military would support him, but he assumed that they would. And that was absolutely correct as later history showed. When the General moved secretly, he moved very well.

Locke Campbell's Central Intelligence Agency deputy at the meeting was more ambivalent than Walters, but took the position that the General would stay in office. Woody, my boss, took the position that the General was out. "Whether he will fight or whether he doesn't fight, he's out." I took the position that my Quai d'Orsay contacts and the Political Section's contacts did not know where he had disappeared to.

At the end of the meeting Shriver said to Woody Wallner, "Write it up." And Woody, unbeknownst to anyone, sent in a telegram which unfortunately said exactly what he thought, rather than what Dick Walters and the Agency thought. No one really knew how it would come out. After all, he had quit back in 1946 when he became disgusted with the political scene. His expression for the student revolt was "chier au lit:" "I will take student and popular opposition, but I won't take chier au lit," literally "shit in the bed." It's an old barracks term. I didn't know what it meant, I had to look it up. He could have, in Woody Wallner's view and others, followed precedent and resigned. But he didn't, and came back. And this was a very interesting exercise in foreign policy. But [neither] Shriver nor anyone else in our Embassy saw Woody's telegram. And that caused a great embarrassment in Washington, because Katzenbach immediately had a press conference and said welcome to Charles DeGaulle's successor. It wasn't quite that dramatic, but this was a very interesting exercise in "country team" action.

The DeGaulle incident exposed a curious example of errors in diplomacy made and compounded by both political appointees and career diplomats at home and abroad. Serious Error #1 was for political-appointee Shriver to demand a categorical message to Washington to show the Embassy knew without question what DeGaulle was up to! Error #2 was the equally positive and equally erroneous information provided to the Ambassador by a most experienced career diplomat in the face of conflicting, interagency intelligence. Error #3 was the impulsive decision of political-appointee Under Secretary Katzenbach to announce prematurely and erroneously to the world that the USG welcomed the new head of state Pompidou, and, Error #4, without his career diplomatic staff in State checking the facts directly with all intelligence sources, including the CIA and Pentagon in Washington with their "back-channel" reports. The irony of the incident was that DeGaulle must have been immensely delighted to have fooled and embarrassed the U.S. once again!

Under Bohlen I don't think that could have ever happened. Bohlen would have known or would not have given a categorical answer. He would have talked to the General, and he wouldn't have sent out such a telegram unless he had confidence in it. Shriver, being new, wanted a simple

conclusion. He was running for Vice President at the time and was only in Paris on a sabbatical. I'm overstating the problem. Ten years later I had occasion to ask Fontaine where he got the inaccurate information that DeGaulle was resigning. His answer, "Pompidou himself!" Whether the Prime Minister wished to prime the pump for his succession of DeGaulle or whether he too had been duped by the General hopefully will be resolved by historians.

HAROLD KAPLAN
Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1945-1950)

Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1952-1957)

Harold Kaplan was born in 1918 and raised in New Jersey. His career included positions in France, Germany, Vietnam, and Brussels (NATO). He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

KAPLAN: I found myself part of a little team that was being readied to accompany the landing in North Africa, which was our first big military action, as you recall. On that team was the man I mentioned, Bill Tyler, and Mike Bessey. There were a number of very seasoned old journalists who had worked a great deal in Europe, like Joe Ravoto.

Q: *Oh, yes. I remember him.*

KAPLAN: He was head of the UPI, I believe, for quite a while. And there was Gene Speck. There was a fellow named Clark. It was quite a good group. Above all, for me, because he sort of took me under his wing, there was an old Parisian journalist who had arrived well before World War I and had been the correspondent of the old *New York World* for years and years. [Laughter] His name was Bill Byrd. He lived through the '20s in Paris and knew all that period of the "lost generation," knew [Ernest] Hemingway and all those people and so forth, and was for me, of course, an object of great veneration. I thought he was the old man of the mountain, and he was very nice to me and helped me a great deal.

I was the youngest and stupidest, I should think, of that crowd, because they were all very knowledgeable about Europe, but I did have a gift for the language, which was appreciated. The odd thing is, there were members of that group who had worked in Europe for years and hardly could speak a word of French, you see. [Laughter]

Q: *Not uncommon for Americans.*

KAPLAN: Not uncommon for Americans. I remember there was a fellow named Jules France – I forget which outfit he was – also a newspaper type, whose French was extremely rudimentary, and so was Gene Speck's. So they had me.

We were on this huge convoy going to North Africa. We didn't know where we were going at first. There were 120 ships in that convoy holed up on this thing, sailing off to the war. We would have daily language seminars. That was the one place where I could sponsor. They got the young professor. Because Bill Byrd, who, God knows, knew the French language perfectly – his hobby was sort of language and grammar, and he was a walking dictionary. Nobody knew the language better than he, but he still spoke with an accent, an extraordinary American accent, you see, whereas my professors back in Chicago had worked very hard to smooth out mine, so I was able to help in that way.

Anyway, we landed in North Africa, and in the fullness of time, landed near Oran and spread out. I was sent to Algiers; most of us were. Algiers was where we set up the headquarters. I had a period working in the OWI of real practical work in the midst of war.

We had destroyed our own transmitter accidentally, because we put it at the bottom of a cruiser. Off the coast of Oran, there was a little sporadic bit of fighting at the beginning, and I think it fired one salvo and destroyed the whole transmitter. [Laughter] So we needed to use the French facilities, which were capable of reaching France and beyond, well into Europe, and since I was quite fluent in the language very quickly – even though it was rather, as I say, classical French I had begun with, I picked it up very quickly – and they made me a liaison officer with the outfit they called Radio France, which had the transmitter that we needed to do our broadcasting. We set up the first Voice of America broadcast from Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers.

Q: Did you run into any difficulty with the French? Because, of course, the Vichy French were in North Africa at that time. Did you have any trouble getting the transmitters?

KAPLAN: Yes, we had a lot of trouble. We had great, daily troubles, even once they had officially come over to our side, even before [Charles] De Gaulle arrived. De Gaulle was always very sticky to deal with, but even before he arrived. He didn't arrive until August, and I'm talking about the period – we landed in November, you recall – and there's the period before August of the next year in which we were dealing with the Vichy French essentially, but who had come over to our side. Our arrival had triggered the end of the Free Zone in France, the occupation of the entire country, which was now our target in our broadcasts, so that the Vichy officers, those who had family and all the rest back there, most of them swung over very suddenly to our side. But they remained very independent and frequently politically very opposed to a lot of our points of view, so we had a constant problem. So we had a constant problem with them.

When the problems got the least bit sticky, they had to go well above my head. I was a very junior officer. I was in my twenties, just out of school. So when we got into trouble, it was people like Bill Tyler and C.D. Jackson and our British counter- parts, because we formed a thing that was called the Psychological Warfare Branch, of which the OWI was the American component, the OWI and a few other American elements, and the British supplied another component.

The head of the British effort was a man named Richard Crossman, a very brilliant, sarcastic, funny, interesting man who later became a backbencher in the Labor government and then

finally very much a front-bencher and even a member of the Cabinet. You must remember Dick Crossman.

Q: I remember the name, yes.

KAPLAN: He and C.D. Jackson were the two civilian heads, and we had military heads, as well, because we were integrated into the Allied Force Headquarters at the Hotel St. George under Eisenhower at the very beginning.

Q: To the States?

KAPLAN: To the States, just at the time when they moved into Sicily, so I missed that. We had the most extraordinary improvised sort of war effort. The American way of making war was always very plethoric. We just piled everything into big warehouses and then when we had to move, we moved, and everything was left there.

So I came back, the very junior officer that I was, and found that all the important people had left and I was in charge. I had this extraordinary period of being in charge of a vast operation, the inventory of which was not in my hands. I didn't even know! There was a senatorial investigation group that came on the scene after the departure of all my colleagues, who sat me down. They had set up a consulate there, a civilian consulate. They sat me down for a full day and put me through the worst day of my life, I think, saying, "Well, Mr. Kaplan, will you tell us about your warehouse at Blida?" I'd never heard of it. "Well, it's in this warehouse." They said, "You mean you are in charge here, and you don't even know how many transmitters you have?" They kept, in short, asking questions which, on the record, must show me to be the worst idiot that has ever served the American Government, because I had no answers to all their questions. [Laughter] And somewhere that's preserved. God knows I hope it's turned to dust by now.

Q: I'm surprised it didn't become congressional report. Maybe it did.

KAPLAN: Oh, it did! It did. A senator from Maryland, the father of another senator.

Q: I know who you mean. Tydings, I think.

KAPLAN: Yes, the senior Tydings. He was the head of that, and he gave his name to the group. And they just made mincemeat, not only of us. They didn't blame the OWI more than the whole establishment which had left the North African countryside from Casablanca to Tunis – that is to say, an area as great as from Paris to Moscow – strewn with warehouses, inventories, material, so forth and so on, and hardly turned its back to look and see what was there. I've never forgotten that experience. It was a real shocker for me because I felt terrible about it. The highest ranking naval type was a young Captain Morris – I remember his name – from New York, very top drawer, I think of the family of Governor Morris, who went through something of the same thing. He was the highest ranking, and we had all these port installations and all the rest. Really, he didn't have the answers either, and everybody felt very bad about this. [Laughter] So I was kept on quite long.

Q: You were still broadcasting to France?

KAPLAN: Yes. We still had a broadcasting thing going, but it was tapering off a great deal and we were turning things over more and more to the French, De Gaulle, by that time having come and taken over. They had a provisional government established there.

Q: You were personally voicing some of these broadcasts?

KAPLAN: Yes. I actually wrote them, spoke them, got up at four o'clock in the morning sometimes to put them on the air. I sometimes wondered, because although my French by that time was quite good, I sometimes wondered what horrors I perpetrated against the French language. [Laughter] Because there was, by that time, very little way of controlling, you know. But anyway, it was an interesting experience and a very good learning experience for me. I learned a great deal and got very fascinated by the whole thing.

Then in the fullness of time, I was sent to Paris, intending, as a matter of fact, to join what was no longer the Psychological Warfare Branch, but the Psychological Warfare Division, I think it was.

Q: In other words, you remained in North Africa then until after the Normandy invasion?

KAPLAN: Yes. I didn't get sent to Paris until the winter of '45, the invasion having taken place in '44 and Paris falling in August. Of course, I was dying to go up there and chafing at the bit and bombarding everybody with requests, and being stiff-armed by everybody. They decided to create a permanent structure in North Africa, and they sent a Colonel Sedley Peck and various other people to organize that, but they needed somebody to make the transition, so they said, "Just wait a little while, and you'll join your old colleagues in a little while." The "little while" got longer and longer and longer.

This was all fulsomely documented in my complaining letters to my wife, which went up in flames for the most part in that little accident I told you about that happened in 1972 in Creteil. [Incident was described off the record, and never got on tape.] No, I guess I haven't told you about it on tape, anyway.

Q: It isn't on tape. We'll get to it later.

KAPLAN: Anyway, I lost all those papers. But as I say, I bombarded Washington and anybody who would listen to me, and my poor wife, of course, had to listen to me, with complaints about being held over there when all the action was in Italy and General Patch was beginning to move up from the south.

I had a lot of French colleagues, because this one function I had for years with Radio France remained all through my work there, doing the broadcasting and so forth, but I was left, also, to do the diplomatic liaison with them. Bill Tyler and Mike Bessey and C.D. Jackson, of course, and all the top people had gone off to London or somewhere else, you see, and I was left to do that, too. So I got to be very friendly with a lot of the French.

When we invaded in the south and they moved the Seventh Army up the Rhône, a lot of my French types that I was liaising with, went. That was a final humiliation, you see.

Q: *They all went off to Italy.*

KAPLAN: They had been back and forth to Italy, but then they went up, and they would still use Algiers as a base for some of them. I remember one very good friend named Pistor, who worked for the France Combatante, it was called, the Fighting French, but he was a correspondent, basically. He was one of the unfortunate very few casualties that they took. When they landed on the beach near Marseille, some sniper got him. He was standing in a jeep and he got killed.

There was practically no German rear-guard action there when we landed in the south. They moved back with very little. There were a few places on the way up where they had some very sharp little engagements, but fundamentally the Germans were under orders to make an orderly retreat. They were probably the best army in the entire world. In that whole war, I don't think there was anything like the German Army, and they did their retreat very well.

The movement up the Rhône, once it started, just about took the last of my French, vis-à-vis, and then I really felt bad about being left. At last, they sent me up to Paris. That was very early, I think somewhere about March 1, in Paris, landing in Marseille. Marseille was another disaster, I must say, from the point of view of my papers. I seem to have some sort of fate that has pursued me and will ensure that the world will not be burdened by memoirs of this period, because I had a footlocker full of papers which was lost in Marseille. I also had a draft – this is significant – of a Ph.D. thesis that I had brought from Paris in the early days and I'd done nothing with, but nevertheless was sort of laid out and agreed with Professor Vigneron, who was going to be my thesis person. Because the assumption was always that the war would be over, and I'd go back to Chicago. I think in some unconscious way I got the idea that God was telling me something when He did away with the draft of my Ph.D. thesis, because I never went back to Chicago, as you know.

I got to Paris, and then did not move forward into Germany for another reason, because I got scarlet fever, and they kept me there for a month in isolation, along with a lot of other guys. There was a little mini-epidemic. I can't remember whether at that point it was scarlet fever or hepatitis. One or the other, because I remember having them both at the American Hospital at different times. But I think this first one was scarlet fever.

Meanwhile, some of my old colleagues, including Bill Tyler, who was our greatest French expert, and Mike Bessey, who was also very, very learned and had much pre-war experience in France and so forth, were organizing, with Cass Canfield, the publisher of *Harper's*, and a few other distinguished gents, what would later turn out to be the USIS France. The term "USIA" did not yet exist.

Q: *No, it didn't. USIS existed long before USIA existed.*

KAPLAN: Exactly. We called it the USIS then, although the home office was still the OWI until

about '47, wasn't it?

Q: *Yes, about that time. Then things died for about a year, and then they came back with the Smith-Mundt Act.*

KAPLAN: That's right. So they were organizing USIS in the embassy. The embassy was being put together in a way that was probably unique in the sense that in the years to come, you would never do the kind of recruitment that occurred then. The embassy people were desperate for help. So a young American who was being shipped back to the States and decided he would like to stay in Europe for a while, or almost anybody who was literate and had the proper background, had a chance to get at least a temporary job at the embassy. I'm not talking really about the proper diplomatic work and the people in the Foreign Service, but all the ancillary services that we were putting together, such as our cultural and information services. They just couldn't get people over from the States fast enough, so people were hired right there on the spot.

Q: *Probably didn't have enough of them with French, either.*

KAPLAN: That's right. This was later, of course, maybe a year or two later, I worked in the press office when the war had come to an end. I was helping out there and doing all sorts of odd jobs there, and a young Marine, who had been demobilized, came over and came to see me. His name was Art Buchwald, and he said, "How about a job?" [Laughter] Art Buchwald was out of the Marines, adventurous, and wanted to stay in Europe for a while.

It just happened that at that particular point, when Congress did away with the OWI there was a short period where they just threw everything out. This coincided more or less with that period, if I recall correctly. I'm probably mixing the dates up. But in any event, I asked around. There was nothing for Art there. He seemed to be very amusing and prepossessing, a good guy, you know, and I said, "Well, God, here's a man we could surely use." I said, "Why don't you go over and see Jeff Parsons?" who was running a resuscitated *New York Herald Tribune*.

Q: *Was that the same Jeff Parsons who stayed on in the diplomatic service, or is this a different Jeff Parsons? I had a Jeff Parsons who was my DCM in Japan in about '53 to '56. I'm not sure it's the same Jeff Parsons.*

KAPLAN: No, I don't think it could be. It might have been. About what age would he have been?

Q: *He would have been in his late forties or early fifties at that time.*

KAPLAN: Well, my Jeff Parsons would have been a little younger then, and he was a side of the Parsons family that had owned the *Herald Tribune*.

Q: *I don't think it's the same one.*

KAPLAN: After he left, he was the man who set the *Herald Tribune* going again and ran it for a good many years. Then he joined a big aircraft company.

Q: *Northrop?*

KAPLAN: Northrop it was. But he was in charge of the *Herald Tribune* when I sent Art Buchwald over there, and he was in the same situation the embassy was in. They needed anybody who could push a pencil, you know, and spell a word correctly. He said, "You're going to cover the restaurants," because Art was a pudgy fellow and looked like a man who liked food, and he did a marvelous job.

Q: *He started his column over there, as a matter of fact, during that time.*

KAPLAN: That's right. He started his column covering restaurants. You know, there were other examples of people who were temporarily taken on and put in the Foreign Service Reserve, but very shortly, Washington clamped down on that and said, "No. We're in the process of working out an orderly system."

Everybody was beginning to realize, or had already realized, in Washington, that the Foreign Service establishment could not even remotely resemble the pre-war affair, that we now had taken over responsibility for the reconstruction of all of Europe, we had Japan on our hands, we had the whole world on our hands, and nothing from the former great powers but ruins and needs and very few resources. So it was dawning on people at home that we would have to have services that we had never had before, and one of the them was our kind of thing.

It took a while, some backing and filling. I remember when they abolished the OWI and replaced it with nothing at first, leaving the embassy high and dry, and gutting USIS. My wife said, "Well, now it's time to do what you intended doing all your life. Go back and become a professor of literature at the University of Chicago."

Q: *Before you discuss that, you said you didn't want to bore me with the UNESCO experience, but that it was a very frustrating one. I can understand it, because I had some exposure to UNESCO a number of years later. In what sense was it frustrating? What were you trying to do for UNESCO, and in UNESCO, that you felt you were being frustrated in attempting to accomplish?*

KAPLAN: The Cold War crept into UNESCO very early on. It was impossible, really, to project a program for the organization without every single national representative of one of the member states having a say about it. Consequently, any kind of movement in UNESCO, it was impossible to say anything without having eighteen censors on your back. That was one thing.

Another thing was that the program itself was already being tilted in a way that I found absolutely indigestible towards some of the – we were still an organization of basically Western orientation during the period I'm talking about. The real influx of the former colonial countries and, consequently, the Third World and "non-aligned" element that came in, and by supporting the Soviet communist thrust in there, made the place politically unbreathable, hadn't quite happened yet. So my frustration was not comparable to what happened in the '50s.

Q: *When it became quite a leftist organization.*

KAPLAN: When it really became leftist. It was, rather, just being stuck and unable to say anything or do anything without everybody looking over your shoulder. I found that the substantive achievements of the organization, which I was intended to tell the world about, were also stymied in that way.

The frustration of having thirty-six bosses, of having to cope, if you wish, with the diplomatic sensibilities of everybody every time you said anything about what UNESCO did or wanted to do, was perhaps secondary to the general feeling that the organization itself was going deeper and deeper into a mire of bureaucracy and inaction because the various bureaucracies of the member states absorbed the overwhelming majority of the organization's funds in endless palaver and meetings and discussions and so forth.

We were constantly *talking* about increasing the availability of mass communications. We were constantly *talking* about doing something to increase literacy and so forth. We had a worldwide literacy campaign. We were *talking* about programs of scientific exchange and so forth. But the real work was always done outside of UNESCO, and it was very hard to identify any areas where significant and useful exchanges in the fields of education or science or culture were taking place because UNESCO existed.

These were all channels that were knitting together from before the war, in any event, where people had an intrinsic interest in exchanging materials and working together and so forth, and it was very difficult to see how the organization, even when it satisfied all the diplomatic problems and were sure not to raise the hackles of anybody on the east or west side, even when it was being very careful and feathered back from that point of view, managed to do anything really substantive.

Later on, I can't say. Now, I'm rather exaggerating the picture in a sense that special funds within the UNESCO purview, if not actually part of the UNESCO budget, were finally raised in order to do substantive things, so that some, at least, pump-priming money was provided to save the great temples of Dendur, for example, in Egypt, or to do one or another of the great things that we wanted to do. But in almost every case, the best we could point to and say, "Well, we held a meeting which got people started" – you must remember that our budget in the first years was really a very tiny budget. As I recall, the first budget of UNESCO was something on the order of \$7 million. We were talking about things that really cost immensely more money than that, even if you think of dollars in the terms of the 1945, '46, '47 range, which, of course, you'd have to multiply that by at least ten to get to what that dollar represented. But even so, the funds were manifestly insufficient to do much in a substantive way. This was frustrating, too.

My last big job in UNESCO was going to Beirut, spending several months there to organize an annual conference, which was, I believe, the third. After the one in Paris, they went to Mexico City. The practice at UNESCO was to hold one general conference out of two at the headquarters in Paris, and the other one would be held in one of the member states. There was an interest in holding them in member states that were not European, so we went to Mexico City and then we went to Beirut.

I had a great deal to do with the organization of the one in Beirut, and that was interesting simply from a logistical point of view. I'm not an administrative type and I'm not very good at these sort of things, but I had to learn a lot about it, and I discovered that there was a great deal of substance in administrative work, if you wish.

Q: *There is.*

KAPLAN: Yes. So it was interesting. That was an interesting job, and I came back with a sort of glow about that and I thought, "Well, at least I've done something useful in UNESCO."

It was at that point that embassy people came after me and said, "Look, that's all very well, your UNESCO thing, but we need" – they were setting up a huge organization branch, which I didn't realize. Governor [Averell] Harriman came over to oversee this from a European-wide basis. But on the French side, they put somebody in charge. I think the first one was General Parkman, wasn't he? Or was that Barry Bingman? I can't remember.

Q: *I don't remember, because I was in the Far East and not in the European picture at all.*

KAPLAN: Whoever did the first French mission had a person in charge of their public information, which was a very important part of the Marshall Plan, for obvious reasons, because we were doing an enormous effort in Europe, against what was the beginning of a great deal of Cold War propaganda. The Russians were throwing out all the stops, and we were being vilified and denounced everywhere.

It seems, in retrospect, it's going to be very difficult to explain to our children that we had a problem when we were in the process of giving the Europeans the wherewithal to start their economies up, and we were making these enormous sacrifices and having this extremely forward-looking economic policy, and yet we had to argue with the Europeans and explain it.

Q: *To persuade them to take it.*

KAPLAN: You know, it seems, on the face of it, a very difficult thing to understand. But if you put yourself back in that era, if you look at 1952, for example, about the time I'm talking, all of Paris, the walls were covered with these great whitewash slogans, "Ridgeway, la peste!" *La peste* was the bubonic plague. The Korean War had come and the Berlin blockade had happened, and there was a terrible shudder of apprehension throughout all Europe. The communists had broken with their erstwhile partners that had come back to restore the [French] Republic after the liberation and were engaged in an all-out war against the Republic, and we were in it up to our ears.

So, hastily, the United States Government reacted to all this by undoing what they had done in the suppression of the OWI, building a new organization, trying to put things together again. My entry back into all that was through the Marshall Plan, because General Parkman (I think it was Parkman), our first director, and Barry Bingman fought hard upon him, hired as the chief information person in the French mission Helen Kirkpatrick, who had been one of the younger

correspondents, with Bill Stoneman as the boss, of the – which 162enefited162 paper? I’ve forgotten now. Stoneman’s paper was the *Chicago* –

Q: *The Chicago Tribune?*

KAPLAN: No.

Q: *The Chicago Daily News?*

KAPLAN: For goodness sake, to think I’ve forgotten which paper he represented! Anyway, Stoneman had on his staff this young, tall, intelligent, energetic woman named Helen Kirkpatrick, and she left the paper in order to join the government then as the information officer of the first head of the French mission, and she built a staff. She’s the one who came to me and said, “You’ve got to come back to the government.”

So I went back and entered as an FSR, and I can’t recall whether I was then relayed straight back to the OWI or stayed with the –

Q: *It would have been by that time, probably, a State Department FSR. What later became USIA was still in the State Department at that time.*

KAPLAN: Yes. I’ve sort of forgotten that side of things. In any event, my work was there on the ground. In France all through those years, they maintained something called the USIS, whatever there was at home, and I did not, of course, as a member of the Marshall Plan, belong to the USIS, but I was, of course, working very closely with them.

Q: *Was either Bill Cody or Lee Brady in Paris at that time, do you recall? They were over there very early in USIS.*

KAPLAN: Yes. I’m just trying to remember which came when and so forth. Cody is the one who took me back into the embassy, so that must have been around ‘53 or ‘54 – ‘53, maybe ‘52.

Q: *It might have been even a little earlier than that.*

KAPLAN: Maybe you’re right. Yes, it would have been earlier.

Q: *He went back over to France, I think in late ‘51 or early ‘52, right around Christmas time. Of course, he might have been there a year before he took you back in.*

KAPLAN: Yes. Had Brady been there a brief time before him?

Q: *Brady, I think, had had some experience in France before.*

KAPLAN: Yes, he had some experience. It seems to me he was working under Tyler for a while as the cultural officer, then left. Then he had a very brief period, I think, in charge.

Q: *Yes, I think he did.*

KAPLAN: Then Cody replaced him. I joined the USIS, properly speaking, left the Marshall Plan thing, with Cody.

Q: *Let's go back to your Marshall Plan experience. What was your position in the Marshall Plan program? How long were you in it, and what were you trying to get across? I think you've given us some advance information, an idea about that before.*

KAPLAN: I was Helen Kirkpatrick's general deputy in the Marshall Plan, and we had an organization that helped the substantive people, mainly economists, in their work with the interministerial commission that the French set up in order to whack up the sums of money that were allotted to France by the overall European setup.

The structure, you will recall, generally involved a European setup, which was the OECD, that whacked out the large sums for France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and so forth. Then within each country, there was a country plan worked out by the inter-ministerial committee. There was a great deal of haggling about that, about how to do it. Our young economists had studied the French economy and had their idea of what was needed, the priorities and so forth and so on, but generally they worked in relative harmony about allocating the French needs to fill the so-called dollar gap, which were clear enough and there was not a great deal of argument about that.

There came to be a good deal more argument about the so-called counterpart funds, because the system involved giving the French the dollars to import what they needed to prime the pump of their industry and get things started. Those dollars were then transformed by selling them to private industry – you know, raw materials, machines, whatever – they were paid for in francs. The francs were put in escrow, and that was called the counterpart fund.

Q: *The U.S. controlled the counterpart, more or less.*

KAPLAN: The U.S. controlled it with the help of the interministerial committee. In fact, you could say we had a veto power on the use of the counterpart. I think it's probably a bit too much to say we just controlled them, because the French had a commissariat, which sat over on the Rue Martigny, under Monnet in those first years, which was called the Commissariat Du Plan, and which really had the initiative in deciding where those counterpart funds were going to go. Our people would horn in and look over their plan and say, "No, you shouldn't do this, you ought not do this." I was on the information side and not deeply involved in all this, except they used everybody for everything in that we were a small group and we all sat in a country team. It was interesting to me because I wasn't just being an information and press guy; I was involved in some of the substantive discussions. The impression I've come away with is that it was a cooperative effort, where the French were the instigators and initiators and we were the control group.

Now, in those counterpart funds, of course, there was a percentage put aside for information work, which gave us a very generous budget, you might say. My feeling now, in retrospect, is that we had more money than we needed, that we did a lot of things we wouldn't have done

otherwise that were extremely expensive, simply because we had so much money.

Q: Did you have any contact with Al Hemsing and Larry Hall and maybe Mickey Boerner and Ned Nordness at that time?

KAPLAN: Well, we did from time to time, but they were in other countries and I was on the French mission.

Q: Yes. I think they were on the European level and you were in the French mission.

KAPLAN: I was in the French mission. On the European level, they would come and look over our shoulders from time to time. I would attend meetings. I once went to Germany for one, I remember, where we'd compare notes. But the European level worked quite separately. They were the source for us. In addition to the funds we got out of our counterpart fund, they were the source of a great deal. That's another reason why I thought we had more money than we needed, frankly.

There was an extremely dynamic exhibits program, for example. Herndon was a very brilliant fellow in this field, and he created these very razzle-dazzle big exhibits that he paraded all over Europe.

Meanwhile, Mickey Boerner was with the High Commission, along with Shep Stone and people like that in Germany. Hemsing, I think, worked out of the European office. We knew all these people, but we were sort of maniacally intent on the French, who were a terrific psychological challenge, you might say, and they absorbed all my waking moments. I used to talk to myself and I'd be arguing with the French all the time, because they were so ornery. They were so difficult.

Q: So what's new? [Laughter]

KAPLAN: That's right. [Laughter] After all, we were in a country that was giving 25 percent of the popular vote in every election to the communists. And along with the communists, there were all these fellow travelers and so forth, so we sometimes felt there was *nobody* on our side. Because on the right, you had the Gaullists, who were often anti- American. So the French were a very absorbing problem, and I spent a lot of time thinking and worrying about them.

When I say that the Marshall Plan gave us more funds than we needed, I think of some of the programs that we did, probably we would never have undertaken if there weren't any counterpart funds and Congress never would have funded. I, for example, edited for a couple of years a magazine that was distributed almost up to a million copies free.

Q: Do you think it was generally used and read?

KAPLAN: It was loved! The French just loved it. It was an illustrated magazine. It was the first contact that the French had with something like what we call photojournalism. After that, they had their commercial things. They began to create them along. As a matter of fact, when we put

Rapport, it was called, to bed, a lot of people came around and wanted to buy it. They thought it was tremendously valuable, and I had mountains of mail every day to prove to me that it was read. But it was a very expensive thing to produce, and we gave it to people. All they had to pay was the postage stamp. We insisted that they write to us and ask for it, but that's all.

Periodically we would have these discussions with the administrative people about some way of charging for this magazine, and for one reason or another, the idea was always turned down. So we spent an incredible amount of money on this thing, because it was in four colors and lavishly illustrated. It was a photo magazine, essentially, and it cost a lot of money.

Q: Were you using just general themes in it, or were you actually, in subtle or unsubtle terms, trying to counter some of the communist type of left-wingism that was getting into France at that time?

KAPLAN: Yes. I couldn't state it better than you just have what we were doing on the magazine. We were doing general themes, but general themes meant things of hope and optimism for the rebirth of French industry, telling the French that they could come back, because we had analyzed the situation there and decided that a great deal of the communist appeal was an appeal to despair.

People said, "This system won't work anymore. We can't really ever build a modern industry. We can't ever do it this way. It has to be done in some other way." They had this bizarre idea that it could be done by government planning and socialism, in short. We know how bizarre it is now, but in those days, it didn't seem so bizarre to a lot of people. There's an old tradition in France of socialist thinking.

Then we had the direct business of dealing with the communists. Lies that were being told, that we dealt with very gently in the magazine. As I say, the two themes that you've just defined were basically what we were trying to do in the magazine.

Q: Would you say that this was your chief vehicle of getting those ideas across, or did you have a widespread press utilization and also cultural activities that promoted the same themes?

KAPLAN: In the Marshall Plan mission, this was our biggest single project, but we also had a fairly extensive exhibits program.

Q: You just mentioned that a while ago.

KAPLAN: Largely exhibits created by Herndon. He was very good at this. He was very lavish. He, too, was dealing with counterpart funds from all over Europe, and so he would make these really knock-out exhibits that we would take from Lyon to Marseille, to Nice and so forth, and would require big hauls. The effect of them was something I had some reservations about, but they certainly attracted crowds. We got a lot of visitation. We had a lecture program. We had a normal press program, in the sense of press releases. Our principals were encouraged and helped to give press conferences or interviews, because newsmen would come over. That was, of course, of great use, particularly at home. But the newsmen would come over and say, "How are

we doing over here? How's the French economy doing?" and so forth and so on. We helped in that respect, too.

We also tried to get into the French press. We did all the things that you, as a professional, can imagine. For example, the counterpart funds' investment program would open a new hydroelectric station down near Foix and, say, in the mountain region near the Spanish border. So that was done with hundreds of millions of francs that came out of our fund. It was Marshall Plan funds. Counterpart funds were always ticketed as Marshall Plan funds. We made a great point of that, putting the American stamp on all the stuff that went out. So when the hydroelectric station, which would provide a whole area with electricity which the French desperately needed down there, was opened up, we would parade our chief of mission down there. We'd do the things that public relations organizations always do. Helen Kirkpatrick or I would make a speech, and the local prefect would make a speech, and everybody would say nice things about the Marshall Plan. You do the things that obviously you do when you're trying.

You've got a big substantive program which is rebuilding the country. It is relatively easy to say, "Look, fellows, this is what we are doing, and we're not asking you to get down on your knees and thank the great American people, but we want you to know that we're doing these things."

Q: You have gone into this to some extent before, but the reason I'm going to ask the question is that, of course, as we went on in the years after the Marshall Plan and later through the Cold War era, we were often accused of being far too anticommunist to the point of being almost paranoid about it.

Although you've already said some things about the extent to which you faced an extremely serious problem in France at this time, I think perhaps more almost than you did in any European country that did not actually go under the communist domination. Did you think that you were getting across your message fairly well, and did you get a lot of counter propaganda from the Soviet side, the communist side, trying to combat what you were doing?

KAPLAN: Well, you know, France had a communist party that emerged from the war as the biggest single party in the country. In the election statistics, I think at the high water mark, they pushed close to 27 percent. That was in one election. But generally, you could find them in a range between 20 percent and 25 percent for the first post-war years.

That in itself is very considerable when you think that behind that vote, there is a corps of activists who have created an entire communist infrastructure. They've got sports clubs and they've got theater groups and they've got insurance to bury the elderly, the old people, with. There was a whole communist culture in France. It was deeply engraved, and the communists did an enormous job at organizing that.

When you think, after all, they've been through the war forced to act clandestinely, they'd been smashed several times as an apparatus and so forth and so on, and, that before the war, the biggest single party on the left was not the communists, but the socialists, to emerge from the war that way and build this kind of organization required an incredible effort on the communists'

part.

It also required – this is something I cannot prove to this day; I don't know if anybody can; I'm sure somebody in the CIA could – an enormous amount of money, which they got from the East. [From the USSR] I'm sure they got it. I know they got it. I could see the effects of it and so forth, but it was very difficult to persuade, even the French who were on our side, that the Soviet Union was actually the source.

They said, "Well, Moscow gold." That's nonsense. You don't need that in any way to explain, because you've got such a large following of the communists here, anyway. But I am absolutely sure that the Russians poured millions and millions of dollars.

Q: I'm sure they did.

KAPLAN: I had good friends on the extreme right, you might say, who were considered on the extreme right, like Barry Souverin, ex-Russian, author of the first big biography of Stalin, who had been a member of the first communist international. I knew people of that kind who really could cite it chapter and verse. They said, "I know that So-and-so is Moscow's current treasury man." And, of course, in our embassy, we had very knowledgeable people who followed this very closely. I remember there was a fellow named Chapman. I think he was a Foreign Service officer, but I think he worked with the CIA.

So we knew that we had an opposition that was extremely well implanted in the country, practically without limit to its financial resources, because the Russians considered the French thing very important, had every conceivable sort of advantage over us because they had all these French agents, you see. So this was a tremendous battle for us, and we thought about it night and day and how best to counter it. We countered it, you know, in terms of substance, of argument and so forth. We wanted to counter it organizationally, too. It's on the second score that I think we didn't do so well.

We would establish libraries, but they had to be libraries of our type. We were not propagandists of the communist nature. In short, "to thine own self be true" was also something that applied to us. You couldn't set up widely propagandistic things that were somehow not representative of the sort of people we were.

Q: You were inhibited by the truth.

KAPLAN: That's right. So we had these reading rooms and we had these rather genteel things. We had lectures and we'd bring over cultural people. It was a way of keeping above water the heads of all the French who were not poisoned by the other side. That was the best we could do, you might say, in that respect.

There were also people doing sharp political work, but they had to do that clandestinely. So the CIA, I'm sure, had programs of one kind. Of course, at a certain moment, the CIA had, I think, the idea of genius for France, anyway, an idea of genius which was the Cultural Freedom Congress. But, obviously, we in the official services stayed very far away from all that, because

the CIA was doing this clandestinely for a while.

I think those things were extraordinarily effective in France. It's very hard to measure, but simply the provision of rallying grounds to which people who were resistant to the communist thing were immensely important.

Q: Had to have some material base on which to argue their point.

KAPLAN: Exactly. Somewhere to go, somewhere to print their prose, some publishing houses that were not infested by communists and so forth. Just to provide that was very, very important. So you might say the Cold War thing, through the middle '50s, well into the '60s, was really the essence of our work there.

Meanwhile, a lot of people were doing cultural programs of a much more genteel nature and so forth. I think that that was extremely important. But it's the long-term stuff that, as I say, keeps people's heads above water, gives them the feeling that the country is going to survive, and that reason is going to prevail, but does not address the immediate problem. The immediate problem our noses were rubbed in it frequently by these damn congressional people who would come over, look at the statistics, and say, "Well, if we keep you here a few years more, maybe the communists will get to 30 percent, 35 percent." You know, they'd be constantly needling us, as if the work we were doing were to be judged by the immediate electoral statistics. I remember Senator Allen Ellender from Louisiana, and there were others, who would come over and rub our noses in all this and say, "Well, you guys are . . ." and so forth and so on. Sometimes someone would say, "Senator, I'd like you to get a notion of what it would be if we weren't here." But in the end, those people did support us year in and year out. They did continue to vote our funds, so you have to say that even though they were frequently nasty to us when they came to see us, in the end they supported us.

Q: Well, Ellender did his best not to support us, but he had enough counterparts in the Senate committees so that he didn't get away with it.

KAPLAN: I didn't realize that.

Q: He was bitterly against us. I want to go off the record here and tell you more about my experience with him. He just fought USIA tooth and nail. In every hearing, he took it upon himself to say, "You know, I don't believe in your program. I think it's just a bunch of poppycock and you don't accomplish a thing. Don't try to tell me that you're doing any kind of work over there that has any effect on the European population. They have their media. They're doing everything that's necessary. You guys aren't responsible for anything."

KAPLAN: Oh, really? It was as bad as that? I always thought he just said those things to us.

Q: He said it for the record in press conferences and everywhere else. He was a bitter man.

KAPLAN: Well, anyway, we worked our way in God's vineyard, and I think did a lot of extremely useful work. It's very difficult to measure now, but if we had not been there, I feel that

there are elements in the French cultural, political, sociological situation that might have fought their way through, anyway, somehow survived, but would have been, it seems to me, much weaker and much slower to make their points. I think of single individuals who have emerged as the most influential in the French intellectual situation after the [Jean-Paul] Sartrean period, after the period of fellow traveling, of people of that kind – Raymond Aron.

Now, Raymond was a genius and a great man. I've got a shelf full of his books. He would have done his work anyway, but we did a great deal to facilitate his work and made it easier for him and for the second layer of people around him who attended his seminars and then wanted to go off to the United States to follow a particular point at Harvard or at this or that other university. If our cultural people hadn't made that possible for them, everything would have been more difficult and much more slow to take its course.

And I feel that we carried the torch until we got the great reinforcement from the East when the Russian dissidents began getting out and confirming what we had been saying, that their confirmation of information was the thing that finally really turned the French around so that the French became as anti-communist, or more, so, than we are.

Q: *And their Communist Party virtually died.*

KAPLAN: Virtually died, yes. It was the [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyns and the Plyusches and the people of that kind who came out. But we laid the basis for their confirmation in the early years by supporting such things as David Rousset's commission against the concentration camp. Now, I think the CIA did most of that. They provided funds. The trial that was held with Kravchenko [phonetic], I think there were a certain number of stepping stones over the years. If you were in France all those years, you realize that there were great moments when French awareness of what we were really dealing with in the East was ratcheted up a bit. And I think of those moments in terms of the trial that Rousset had to sustain against *Les Lettres Francaises*, the Kravchenko trial.

Then the arrival in France of the first of the dissidents who were vilified and so forth, but in each case we would try to help these people and give them platforms. Now, in the case of Kravchenko and David Rousset's effort on the concentration camps – you may have forgotten that, but that was a very big show trial in France. Rousset was an author of books about his experience in the German concentration camps. He was very famous in France, a friend and neighbor of mine. He was an ex-communist. He began saying, "The same experience we've been through still exists in the Soviet Union. There are concentration camps there, and this is intolerable." He had created a tremendous effect with his study of the concentration camps in Germany, and he created an international commission which was headquartered in Brussels, I believe, with a great many, very distinguished French people. It was called the International Commission Against the Concentration Camp.

At a given point, he published a statement of a woman who had come out of the extreme north of the Soviet Union. She somehow had been able to work her way out of there. He was denounced as a liar and a thief and a crook by a communist literary journal called *Les Lettres Francaises*. This led to a big public trial. Now, that trial was *the* page- one headline in France for weeks and

weeks and weeks. It was a tremendous thing. And Rousset was able to parade a succession of absolutely authentic witnesses that nobody could possibly deny, to show the existence of what years later Solzhenitsyn called the gulag. But that time, they didn't use that term and they didn't know what it was, and even for an ordinary French communist voter who had these extraordinary illusions about Russia, who thought it was the land of milk and honey, for him it was an unbelievable idea that you could have something like Dachau and Buchenwald and Auschwitz in this great land of the workers' and peasants' paradise. And Rousset was able to prove that over and over again in the most gruesome testimony you got from these people.

Well, I mentioned the CIA, who financed the Congress for Cultural Freedom, published a magazine, did all these wonderful things that I think were very useful. I also believe the CIA must have helped. I don't know how it happened.

Q: They probably did.

KAPLAN: Because this commission, his international commission, had enormous expenses. They had to find these people and bring them to France. The CIA was enormously effective in stuff of this sort, and it's been vilified in our country so much that it's time somebody really stood up and said, "They did a tremendous job in the Cold War in Europe." There's no question about it.

Q: The CIA has gotten a very bad name for its black activities, and, of course, they have bumbled terribly in a number of these cases. I'm very glad, therefore, that you have put on tape what you think their effectiveness was in the information and cultural field, which was more in the white areas, even though they were doing them clandestinely.

KAPLAN: The other thing that you have already said, on which I simply want to put a period, is that it was almost impossible in the years that it was going on, to prove that the long-range cultural and informational activities you were performing were laying a groundwork, a climate of receptivity, for what ultimately the French came to believe. I agree with you, and I think you have made the point marvelously well, that France might have turned in a completely different direction or been much longer coming back to normality had it not been for those long-range practices and programmings which we could not prove at the time were worth anything. You were trying to tell the congressmen visiting you what your specific effects as of yesterday and today are, whereas, the long-term effects were a decade down the line.

Of course. There were all these people who came back from their American experience, disciples of Raymond Aron, for example, who, when they went to Bordeaux or went to Lyon, went to one of the universities. They began to turn out students of their own and created in the country an atmosphere which, when the great revelations came and the country swung politically, meant that there was a reception of it. There were people who said, "Of course, we know about this," and so were able to come out and assert themselves.

That is why when the communists began to go in France, when they began to decline, it was catastrophic, because the terrain had been very thoroughly prepared. Once you remove the fear element, which played a considerable role, by the way, in the early years, in some cases it wasn't

just conviction on the part of all the people who fought, they really frightened people, and they said, "These are people who are going to win."

Q: *"If they win, we're in the doghouse."*

KAPLAN: That's right, so we better be careful. And there was a great deal of that in the early years. I think when history looks back at that whole period, the whole so-called Cold War period, it will be recognized that this fear existed until the time when the Russians finally threw in the towel and said, "Look, we can't run this anymore. We can't even feed our people anymore, and we can't keep up this pretense anymore," we held the fort during that period. It was terribly important that we did. You might say, in retrospect, "We made too much of it. They [the Communists] never had a chance. They never had the economy of a world program. They couldn't have done it anyway even if we had just sat back." But the fact is that during the Stalin period and immediately after, if you look at what they did in the way of taxing themselves and bleeding themselves to build a military installation, and what they did in terms of their propaganda work outside, the amount of money they spent, you have to believe that there was a very important party, perhaps the dominant party amongst them, that said, "We can't do this thing at home. We can't create the kind of society we've promised. The world revolution is the only answer for us. We've got to break through. If we won Europe, with the resources of the Germans and all the rest –"

Q: *"Then we could do it."*

KAPLAN: "Then we can do it." So they had to be contained. According to the original analysis of containment, they had to be contained and shown that they couldn't do it, until finally they said, "No, it's impossible. We can't go on taking a quarter of our GNP and putting it in these missiles that are never going to be used when we can't even feed our own people or produce a bar of soap for our miners." And they finally gave up.

Q: *If they had converted France and Germany and the Western world generally to their view –*

KAPLAN: Just imagine!

Q: *-- you would have had stolen resources which would have disguised the impossibility and impudence for probably another quarter of a century.*

KAPLAN: Exactly. We would have really been pushed back into Fortress America, and it's hard to imagine what you would have had. It's an extraordinary thing. I feel that we played our little part in that. Obviously, the military forces that we set up in NATO, finally, and the economic bulwark that we created were the first things that really saved Europe, but along with that had to go the kind of cultural and informational effort that we were making. And we did it. I just don't see how anybody can quarrel with that anymore.

Q: *Well, there are still people who will quarrel with it, but nevertheless, I agree with you. At what point in this effort did you move back from the Marshall Plan into the regular embassy operations, and how long did you stay in the embassy thereafter in France?*

KAPLAN: I'm afraid the dates are rather hazy, and as I've said, I've lost all my papers and I'd have to go back and do some research. But it seems to me that I was back with Bill Cody in the embassy by about '52, '53, and I even seem to recall going somewhere, I think it was Bad Godesberg, and taking the Foreign Service exams.

Q: *They were giving it then, so it probably was about that time.*

KAPLAN: There will be a record of that somewhere at home, because I entered the Foreign Service, in short. I left the Marshall Plan setup and became a FSIO. That must have been about '52, '53. I worked with Bill, who was a very effective, dictatorial, difficult PAO. He was a difficult guy to work with if I ever saw one, but he really left his imprint on that operation. I stayed with Bill until about '57, when I was transferred home for a tour of duty.

JACQUES REINSTEIN
Foreign Ministers' Peace Conference
Paris (1946)

Jacques Reinstein was born in 1911 in Savannah, Georgia. He attended the University of Basel, Switzerland, the Alliance Francaise, Paris, Georgetown University, and American University. He then joined the Department of State in 1936 as an Economic Analyst and Assistant to the Secretary of State. After a long career in the Department of State, he was sent to France as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs. He was interviewed by Willis Armstrong in 1989.

REINSTEIN: We went to Paris and we started to get further into the substance of some of the issues, particularly the reparation issue. Reparation became a major stumbling block. And the foreign ministers went home and we sat around there trying to get things started. At this point, we put in complete drafts of treaties. And what this did was make us have to deal with all the technical problems, copyrights, the return of property that had been sequestered, the liquid property. We sat in my office in Number 5 Grosvenor Square.

As I said, you had a meeting of foreign ministers in the spring without results, wheel-spinning, really, in between with the deputies and the committees. Because of the fact that we had submitted the text of agreements, we didn't have the text to discuss. While many issues didn't get solved, we began to put the pieces together, in a way, in committee structure. And so we got a fair amount of technical work done but we didn't get at the major stumbling blocks.

The foreign ministers came back to Paris the second time in June and July. Byrnes said, "Look, let's sit here until we solve two questions: the Soviet claims for reparations from Italy and the opening date of the peace conference. And we just sit until we settle those." And we did settle both points. I was the representative from the Italian reparations committee, which the second deputy foreign minister was my Soviet opposite number. Hervé Alphand was the French representative, and a U.K. Treasury official, Sir David Laly. And I tried out several things in the

way of gimmicks to sort of give them some kind of satisfaction so they could say they had gotten something that they wouldn't buy.

We came up with another solution which was to have the Soviets deliver raw materials to the Italians who would then custom manufacture them for Soviet use, which seemed to us would enable us to respond to Congressional criticism that we were financing the Italian reparations. We putting money in and the Soviets taking things out. This really worked out between me and Byrnes and we were sitting there and were negotiating language right there at the table.

And he finally handed me a text which he had written down to try and express this idea. The language was subject to negotiation and, of course, the language barrier. And he finally handed me this piece of paper and said, "Jacques, what do you think of this?" I looked at it very carefully and didn't think there was anything fishy about it. I handed it back to him and said, "Mr. Secretary, I think we can buy that." And he turned to Molotov and said, "The United States agrees."

So we settled that and we settled the date of the peace conference. And then the next day the Soviets were busily obstructing that. Molotov had, apparently, gotten his lines crossed with Moscow and had gone further than they thought he should have or something, and so they hung everything up on procedural grounds for about three days until they sorted things out among themselves. And then we went on to the peace conference.

Now in that time period we had, for the second time, a discussion of Germany. By that time things were really a mess in Germany. We were not getting anywhere in setting up a governmental administration of the kind we expected, a government of technicians who would operate under Allied direction. We couldn't get anything of that kind and we weren't getting any cooperation from the Allied Control Council. And the discussions with the Soviets indicated quite clearly that they weren't going to cooperate. I don't recall the exact date in July, but it's all in the records.

Those records were very carefully put together. I kept all of my files and I had an excellent secretary in Washington who later put them in first rate order. They were all transferred to the Archives in quite good shape.

Two things happened at that stage. I don't know how much discussion there had been about this. Like I say, we never had any delegation meetings. But it was at that point that Byrnes said, "Well, if we can't get everybody to cooperate, we'll cooperate with anybody else who will cooperate with us." This was read by the British as an invitation to get together and did result in their offering to do this and the negotiation of the Bizone Infusion Agreement, which was worked on in Washington and in Germany over the coming months, and finally concluded in December.

Q: December of 1946?

REINSTEIN: December of 1946. Substantive decisions being worked between Washington and New York.

Q: When did the French zone get to be part of it?

REINSTEIN: The French zone came in bit by bit. As I say, they kind of waffled. They had communists in the government and they were trying to play a position of being intermediaries between the U.S., and the U.K., and the Soviets. Although as we proceeded with the technical drafting, we increasingly found the French sliding over to our direction, particularly when we got the Marshall Plan stage. They had to come along. Although, you know, in the Marshall Plan we had bilateral agreements between the three military governors and the United States. The U.S. one was signed by General Clay on the German side, and Bob Murphy, his political advisor, for the U.S. side.

Q: Perfectly reasonable.

REINSTEIN: Until the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949 there were still, technically, some separate organizations. For instance, we had a joint export-import agency in my zone. The French had an organization to perform the same functions in their zone. In fact, though, we had a working arrangement. As I say, it was the Marshall Plan that really crystallized it. They had to cooperate at that point. Otherwise, they wouldn't have gotten any help in their zone.

Q: Or themselves, or not as much.

REINSTEIN: Well, just what we would have done in that case, I'm not quite sure. That problem, I don't think, arose.

Well, going back to 1946. We went through the peace conference with a repetition of all the same things. You know, we settled a few things, but a repetition of all the same record-playing. You just had a larger cast of characters in the peace conference. It dragged on to the point that it was up against the starting date for the first United Nations General Assembly, so they asked the General Assembly to postpone its meeting. We still didn't get anywhere and, finally, they decided this was really getting to be a scandal. It was holding up the creation of a world organization. So they just gave instructions to committees to wind up their work by a certain time and we just sat night and day until we went through all the process of getting out committee reports with disagreements, and then going up to general conference and holding the same positions in the general conference without a final solution.

You asked a question at some point about when did we get the Italian Treaty. We finally got it, and the others, in December. I think Mr. Byrnes finally told Molotov that he was tired of discussion. So at that point, they decided to come along and we got instructions, "Wind the thing up." So then we went into the hectic final negotiations. They tried tricks on us.

Q: Was there any other treaty agreed to at that time?

REINSTEIN: Yes, all the treaties.

Q: All except Germany's?

REINSTEIN: No. Germany, Austria, and Japan. I think this is very important, the concept which Byrnes and, I think Ben Cole, had, whether Foster Dulles at one stage. Foster was at the London conference in 1945. But in 1946 it was Tom Connally and Vandenberg who were the advisors. We had bipartisan advice. In September there was a big uproar when Wallace made a speech which was widely construed as beginning a willingness to deal with the Soviets. [Transcribers note: This paragraph was very difficult to make out due to low volume on the tape, but I tried to catch part of it.]

Q: He was still Secretary of Commerce, wasn't he?

REINSTEIN: I'm trying to remember. He was Vice President at one time.

Q: He was Vice President under Roosevelt in his third term. Then when Harry Truman became President, he was in one term. But Harry Truman became President in 1944.

REINSTEIN: There were no vice presidents in this particular time period.

Q: Not in 1944, no.

REINSTEIN: 1946.

Q: 1946, he was Secretary of Commerce because I used to have meetings with him and I remember.

REINSTEIN: He made this speech.

Q: I remember his speech.

REINSTEIN: Byrnes, Connally and Vandenberg decided to get on the phone and tell Truman that he had to disavow this, so Harry Truman fired Wallace. But they threatened to come home. And at that point, I was sitting as a U.S. representative with Vandenberg as my political advisor in this meeting. And he left that meeting to go back to the Maurice Hotel. I guess that's where they made the telephone call from, where our delegation was housed. Anyhow, they went and had it out with Truman on the telephone because they felt they had been completely undercut by the revelation in Paris. And so we had that thing going on.

As I say, we finally got to New York where we met at the Waldorf Astoria. The American delegation lived there.

Q: Your next venue was New York so you wouldn't interfere with the functioning of the U.N.?

REINSTEIN: It was New York so we could deal with both of these things at the same time. And in the case of the Soviets, they had to use the same personnel. They had a hell of time running back and forth between Lake Success and the Waldorf Astoria. They finally caved in to Byrnes

pressure and the treaties were all agreed to and the final drafting and tidying up had to be done. I was left with the team in New York to do that.

PETER J. SKOUFIS
Veteran Affairs Officer
Paris (1947-1950)

Peter J. Skoufis was born and raised in Bangor, Maine. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included assignments in France, Italy, South Africa, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (England). Mr. Skoufis was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1992.

SKOUFIS: One day, a flier came across my desk which announced that the VA was going to open offices in Paris, London, Rome, Mexico City, Manila and elsewhere to service the many ex-Gis who had decided to reside abroad. The VA was looking for candidates to fill these new offices. I was getting pretty tired by this time of waiting for the law school to admit me; I rationalized that I had spent the war years on one island after another, including 13 months in Honolulu at Hickam Field; the rest of the time I was on Guam, Okinawa, Saipan, etc. I debated the opportunity to go to Paris. You had to be able to speak French. That happened to be fine with me because if you come from Maine, you speak French as a second language. It wasn't exactly Parisian French; it was Canadian French. I had also had French in college; that had been my foreign language at the University of Maine, which was the customary thing to do. So I decided to throw my hat in for Paris although with some trepidation because I realized that I was not a fluent French speaker. Harry McKee, who was then heading a unit very near me, decided to apply for a job in London.

Both of us were called by some people in the central office who were staffing these foreign posts. Both of us were accepted and slated to be sent to Europe. I had never been in Europe; my ideas of Paris came from travelogues, fantasies and ex-Gis who had served in Europe and were now working for the VA. While sitting in Okinawa with little to do, I had expressed an interest in military governments which were being established all over the world. I thought that if I had been accepted, I might have served in Europe, which would have exposed me to a part of the world I had not seen.

We were then instructed to report to the State Department for indoctrination and to become a member of the United States Foreign Service. An agreement had been reached between the VA and the State Department which was known as the "Bradley-Byrnes" agreement (Omar Bradley having been the head of the VA and Jimmy Byrnes the Secretary of State). That agreement stipulated that the VA would supply the technical personnel and the Foreign Service would supply the administrative support necessary to establish and maintain these new veterans' offices. The team would consist of a senior VA officer, who would then become the Veterans' Attaché. These teams would take care not only of screening the applications for educational grants, but also administer the claims programs – insurance, death, pensions, etc – which were necessary to support the widows of dead veterans. Many of these women were foreigners and

many had children who were also eligible for certain benefits.

My senior officer, Mr. Share, had been a claims officer in the VA after World War I (he was a World War I veteran). I headed a group, consisting of four people and I also was the Registration person who determined eligibility under the school programs. We had two counselors to help veterans select programs and we had a budget and fiscal officer. The latter was there because the State Department was not able to handle the greatly increased workload of payments for substance or tuition and books. The Embassies and consulates were just collecting the filled out forms and sending them back to Washington to the International Affairs office of the VA. State didn't have either enough people or sufficiently trained people to handle the workload.

In my case, my Foreign Service appointment was to the Foreign Service Staff (FSS) Corps. My boss, Mr. Share, was given an Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) appointment. All the VA field office directors got FSR appointments. The staff members were given FSS appointments. My payment for accumulated annual leave – six or seven days – was given to me by the VA and then I was separated from the Civil Service. I was sworn into the Foreign Service. I had been earning \$4,500 per annum at the VA; that was probably the salary of a GS-11 at the time. The FSS-8 level, which I was given provided roughly the same pay, but in fact my earnings almost doubled because in addition to salary, the Foreign Service give allowances to its employees. Those allowances were primarily to pay for rent in Paris and maybe for a cost-of-living differential. So that when I went to Paris, my gross income was \$9,000. I thought I had made a great career change. Going to Paris with that kind of income seemed to be the most that the world could offer me. I took the Paris job and left for France soon thereafter. I actually entered the Foreign Service in March, 1947.

Paris was a great experience. I went to France by ship – a converted troop ship. On the same ship, was a VA team that was going to open the Geneva office – John Hays, Randy Dickens and Frank Harris. The Paris office had already opened several months earlier. Share, his secretary and others were already in place. We sailed at the end of April. Hays had been in the Army's military government – G-5 – and had been in France and Paris from right after the invasion. He was coming from the Richmond, VA office as did his whole team. He had with him a convertible Cadillac which was unloaded at Le Havre. He was going to drive to Geneva through Paris and asked me if I wanted to go along. That was a trip! Every town we went to brought back some memories to John of his war campaigns. He would visit a French family here and one there; he would see mayors with whom he had worked. Everywhere we went he was greeted like a long lost friend who was returning home. We got our fill of Calvados. It took us three days to get from Le Havre to Paris.

When I got to Paris, Share wanted to know where the hell I had been. He said that the Embassy had been looking for me. So I went there and found that it was the Budget and Fiscal section who was looking for me because I was on their payroll. That section was run by Larry Daimond; Joe Dagenhart was the Finance Officer – he was the one who signed the checks. The Veterans Program was actually a part of the Consular Section because it had been determined that our functions were more akin to that of the Consular section than any other embassy office. So we reported to the chief Consular officer. Physically, we had separate offices in the Hotel D'Iena off the Champs-Élysées. We shared space with the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission,

which was an Army operation aimed at getting rid of all of the Army's surplus equipment in Europe. Paris was the headquarters. We ate in the Embassy cafeteria. The Embassy assigned us an old Chrysler for transportation purposes which we used to go to the Embassy for lunch. There were no other restaurants in Paris at the time – food rationing was still in effect.

I also remember a long May weekend. My birthday was May 7 and on this particular year, it fell on a French holiday which made it a long weekend. During the next week there was another holiday – the day the Allied troops liberated Paris in 1945. The following week, we had another holiday. So it seemed to me that for the first few weeks I was in Paris, we only worked four day weeks. I just couldn't get over that. I thought it was a great deal. That of course was sheer coincidence, but I won't forget that introduction to French work habits. We had a lot of work to do because we found that the French schools – primarily the University of Paris – had not been paid at all even though it had accepted ex-Gis as students. They had sent bills to the Embassy for tuition and books and wanted reimbursement. There were about 2,000 American students who had taken their discharges abroad and were attending universities in France. Then there were another approximately 1,500 claims, mostly coming from French dependents of soldiers who had been killed in the war. We also had to work on claims by World War I veterans whose benefits had been interrupted by the war and who wished to be reinstated. So the office's workload was heavy.

My primary function was to get the veterans on a payroll so that their benefits would begin to flow. Some because they had not been paid were already beginning to become involved in illegal activities so that they could make enough to live on. The black market was rampant in Paris and in Europe in general, especially in currency dealings and cigarettes. The ex-Gis were getting packages from home, or were buying goods from friends who had commissary and the PX privileges – there were still in existence – and selling the goods on the black market. There were still all sorts of small military units all around Paris cleaning up after the war. There was very unsavory business being conducted at the time. Both the VA and the State Department were anxious to get some money to these veterans so that they would not need to survive from illegal operations.

We finally got straightened out and money began to flow to the veterans. We worked out a system which permitted the checks to be written in Paris rather than in Washington. Our finance man, Bob Griggs, who had worked in the VA's Buffalo office, set up a system with Joe Dagenhart which permitted Joe to issue monthly checks to a list of people that Bob would provide with the amounts of their entitlement. I certified that list which was time consuming because I had to check to make sure that all of the people on the list were eligible.

At the end of the month, the check would be ready for the veterans or other beneficiaries. The big problem was how to get these checks to the recipients. The veterans were living in rooming and boarding houses all over Paris and were constantly moving. So we decided that they would have to come to our offices to pick up the checks. That meant that on the first of the month there would be long line of people waiting for his or her check. It was useful to us because it also meant that we knew that the intended recipient was still alive and that the checks were getting to the right person. We asked the recipients to certify at the time he or she picked up the check that they were in fact still going to school and benefited eligible for their benefits. That satisfied

the GAO requirements. The system was somewhat cumbersome, but it worked well. After about six months in Paris, we moved from the Hotel D'Iena to the Embassy and were co-located with the Consular Section. The Embassy had vacated the space by moving out the regional courier office. So the grantees came to the Embassy on the first day of every month. Of course, the Consular section was well known to many of the ex-Gis because that is where they had to go whenever they lost or had stolen their passports. That happened frequently. The Consular officer was Agnes Schneider who was a real legend in the Foreign Service; she was in charge of the Passport section. The ex-Gis had quickly learned that their passports were valuable commodities; that increased the issuances of new passports considerably. I found veterans to be pretty good guys, but many acquired unsavory reputations in the Consular section.

A lot of the veterans were artists who were going to art schools in Paris. Because of their temperament they were difficult to deal with; some were nearly impossible. A lot studied French; others just stayed there because Paris was just a nice place to be after the war. They all needed the \$50 per month subsistence allowance. There were a number of future distinguished people among the beneficiaries – people like Art Buchwald, who had been a Marine who stayed to study French at the Alliance Frances because he enjoyed the place and he had a chance to write. I would say that 60-70% were serious students; the others were there for the thrill of being in Paris.

For most of our substantive work, we dealt directly with the VA in Washington. We started to send material through the State Department, but then found out that headquarters was not receiving our mail. There was no special office in the Department that was concerned with our operations so that much of our mail seemed to disappear. There was a woman in the Department that was supposed to act as the liaison with the VA, but she became overwhelmed by the workload. So we began to send most of our reports – fiscal, etc – directly to the VA. We were spending its appropriations and it had to have these reports to maintain accountability. So we worked closely with the VA on the technical aspects of our work.

I got to Paris in 1947 and stayed for four years. As we gained experience, we developed a *modus operandi* with State Department – the Paris Embassy and the VA Office. The system worked very well; the Embassy became much more responsive to our problems in terms of space and administrative support in general. One indication of that was the fact that we were permitted to move into the Embassy. After my first year in Paris, the Embassy improved greatly in the administrative area with the arrival of Graham Martin as the chief administrative officer. He brought with him a team of administrative people who greatly improved the Embassy's operations and made it much more responsive to its clients' need including our own. We got space and people when we needed them. We were quite happy with Martin, Eddie Crouch, Seaborn Foster, Harvey Bufallo, Jack Herford – a whole succession of administrative types who were complete professionals. The administrative support became first rate and our relationships with the Embassy became very good. Although we were, as were all Staff Corps personnel, responsible for finding our own housing, but we were given lots of help.

Ambassador Bruce became Ambassador. He used to walk around the Embassy from time to time just to see how things went. He was not an infrequent visitor to our offices. He would say that he was a veteran and would ask about his insurance program. We would brief him on how it

operated and that if he wanted to keep up his insurance, he had to pay premiums. Then he would ask about the programs for which he was eligible. He took an interest in us and made us feel a part of the Embassy. It really gave our morale a boost. That was also true of the Consul General, who was Joe Gray. We were all included in the Embassy-wide parties, like 4th of July. We really felt part of the Embassy and of the Consular Section especially. There weren't many men officers in the Consular Section, so were very welcomed. The women officers used to call on us if they ever encountered a male problem, e.g. some obstreperous American young man who was getting out of line. We were sitting close by and would come to the rescue of the woman consular officer. In general, the Embassy was very forthcoming, both work-wise and socially.

However, one problem developed. As I mentioned earlier, we had all entered the Foreign Service in the Staff Corps except for the head man, who was an FSR. We became part of the Department's promotion system; the Inspectors reviewed our work; we were subject to the performance evaluation system – we were full fledged members of the Foreign Service for personnel administration purposes. But no one performing VA work was getting promotions. As I was an FSS-8 as was Harry McKee in London; Columbo in Rome was at the same grade and none of us were getting promoted. The staff corps was being reviewed yearly and yearly some were being promoted, but none of us. So after three years, I went in to talk to the administrative people. I was delegated by my boss to talk to the Embassy on behalf of all of us doing veterans' work. I was told that the VA people didn't really work for the State Department; we were working, in their eyes, for the VA. We were viewed as temporary employees of the Foreign Service who were in the Foreign Service for administrative convenience, but whose career was in the VA. I pointed out that we had been separated from the VA and that we were no longer a part of the Civil Service. We believed that we were full fledged members of the State Department. I finally convinced the Embassy that we were indeed members of the Foreign Service.

The Embassy referred the matter back to Washington. And there we found the same problem; our names had not been considered by the promotion panels because we were not considered part of the Foreign Service. We were viewed essentially as temporary adjuncts. We became very discouraged because we had really fallen into a crack. I was the Consular Section's duty officer when North Korea invaded the South – I thought we were back in the Civil War (although the Department did not consider us as full fledged members of the Foreign Service, the we were fully integrated in the Consular Section and took our turns as duty officers) I got a call in French from a representative of the *Press Francais* wanting to know what the Embassy's views were and what we were doing about this development. I told him that I would call back and ran upstairs to the Ambassador's office. There were several people there following developments. As time passed, we realized that the U.S. would join the conflict. All of us in the VA saw a repeat of previous experiences – another GI bill, another cycle of support.

I went to see Graham Martin and told him that I didn't want to stay in the VA operation. I wanted out and was prepared to return to the U.S. He asked whether I would be interested in working for the Embassy. I told him that I had been in Paris for four years and that I thought it was time to move on. I had been recently married and I thought it was time to get back home. Then I got a cable from the VA informing me that Tom Quinnen in Rome was about to retire and that I had been assigned to replace him. I thought that that job sounded interesting; I wanted to

get back to Italy and I would be in charge of the office. Tom had been an FSR and an Attaché – diplomatic passport and status. The VA promised that I would given the same rank and privileges that Tom had had.

So at the end of 1950, Helen and I embarked for Rome; we were anxious to do a tour there.

FREDERICK W. FLOTT
Consular/Political Officer
Paris (1947-1952)

Frederick W. Flott was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1921. He entered the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included assignments in France, Iran, Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Mr. Flott was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

FLOTT: I went into the Foreign Service the day after I got my MA. After a few months in training, I was assigned to Paris, where I stayed for five and a half years. The reason behind this happy first assignment was that since I had been with the French Army during the war and had had some exposure to the French Resistance, the State Department personnel people felt I could be helpful to the Labor Attaché because of all my possible access to Communist trade-union types. Actually, these people would have gladly cut my throat, but if Personnel decided that was a good reason to send me to Paris, I certainly didn't argue with them.

Q: *Did you work at all with Irving Brown?*

FLOTT: Oh yes, I knew Irving Brown. He had other people working more directly with him, but I certainly tried to be helpful to him in any way I could.

Q: *He was a major figure in the post World War American/French labor relations.*

FLOTT: Yes.

Q: *You were there from '47 – '52 in Paris. What was your impression of the political situation at that time?*

FLOTT: The French, of course, were very divided, as they had indeed been during the war. They were perhaps in some danger of going Communist. I wouldn't say they were on the very brink, but it was, in some respects, touch and go. If we had not carried out the Marshall Plan as we did, there certainly would have been considerable disorder, probably some fighting, and the whole recovery of Europe would have been much delayed. But I wouldn't go quite so far as to say that they were all that close to the brink of going Communist. There were a lot of conservative forces at work in France that would probably have pulled them back from the brink in good time. But it was worrisome. In a nutshell, the Marshall Plan did a wonderful job. In the Embassy in Paris, I had a ringside seat on that and knew the people who were running it – David Bruce, Averell

Harriman, Henry Tasca, Paul Porter, and all those good people.

Q: What was your impression of David Bruce as the Ambassador? How did he run things?

FLOTT: First rate. First rate in every way. Personally, substantively. He had run the OSS Mission in London during the War and was, of course, a hands-on solver of problems – inclined that way. Whenever there was a rumor of some hidden Nazi, like Martin Bormann, for example – rumors that he was in Spain or France. David Bruce pursued the matter with more direct involvement than you would expect from an Ambassador to a large country. And he very much encouraged his boys who were looking after these things. He was also a very gracious gentleman. I served later under him in Germany as well, and he was just first rate. As was Averell Harriman.

Q: Averell Harriman was a different type wasn't he? How did you find him? He was running the aid...the Marshall Plan?

FLOTT: What was it called? The Economic Cooperation...Administration, I think. It went through various names. Averell Harriman was perhaps more directly connected to the political administration in Washington. But Bruce was also a very distinguished Democrat and had good ties in Washington, too.

Q: Can you give an idea, a feel for how we viewed the French government at that time. I mean it was the beginning of these series of governments that kept changing, wasn't it?

FLOTT: Yes, they changed a lot. They had some good people in it who were individually bright. Their collective efforts were often subject to divisions determined by French politics and French social structure and other factors. But looking back on it and taking into account where they came from in terms of just having been through the initial defeat by Germany, the rest of the war, and the rather spotty Liberation period, I would give them credit for being pretty broad gauge and reasonably willing to be able to forgive and forget, at least to work constructively with the Germans and others in Europe. "Forgive and forget" would be overstating it, but they were willing to take an objective view of where their interests lay, and to pursue these interests intelligently.

Q: Were we having to be careful or not, not to rake over the coals of the occupation time. There were all sorts of people who were tainted in one way or another by collaboration. How did we treat that?

FLOTT: First of all, there was not a policy laid down. There was the case by case action, by people of stature and experience, and the normal exercise of good sense. There was perhaps a feeling that you catch more flies with molasses than you do with vinegar and that, at a certain point, you have to let bygones be bygones in favor of producing results. The French government was very generous about overstating, if anything, the importance of the Resistance movement, partly because it got France off the hook of having been so largely collaborationist. The French political scene during the war was pretty much collaborationist. The extent to which this was the case is still coming out in the latest writings on the subject in France.

So the best way to expunge some of that from the record was to talk about how magnificent the Resistance had been. The U.S. government, of course, let the French run their internal affairs.

I don't remember any formal or hard positions we took on the subject.

Q: This was a very critical period from '47-51. Things were beginning to harden into the Cold War. What were our relations with the different labor movements – the Communists on one side and the Socialist on the other?

FLOTT: The largest trade union movement, the most broadly based one, was the C.G.T. While leftist, it was, of course, not totally Communist. Although obviously heavily infiltrated and influenced by Communists, C.G.T. leaders would deal in a civil way with their American trade unionist brothers, which was why the work of people like Irving Brown was so important. Irving Brown and other American labor people over there were good patriots who were willing to hear what the Embassy had to say on the subjects. So we felt, as an Embassy we felt, we had enough input into the process. On the other hand, the extreme Communists, the ones who went even beyond the trade union movement, criticized anything the Americans did. We made food deliveries under the Marshall Plan. They criticized that. They'd say that powdered eggs from America are bad for you. The French had had a bad harvest in 1947, and the Marshall Plan sent massive quantities of cornmeal as a substitute for flour. Cornmeal was new to them, and the Communists said that this is fed only to pigs. I remember in "L'Humanité", the French Communist newspaper, they ran a large cartoon criticizing the Marshall Plan. It showed a ship being unloaded and they included in the cartoon what they claimed were the three worst things the Americans were shipping to France – the three things the Communists wanted to criticize most. One was armament – showed a cannon being off-loaded; then big barrels of powdered eggs coming off, which would give any Frenchman indigestion just seeing it; and the third worst thing were cases marked Champagne from California – "Champagne de California"!

But the Communists couldn't go too far out; they could play on popular frames of reference and prejudices and things of that sort, but they couldn't get too directly anti-American, because the French people did regard the Americans as their liberators.

Q: Did you have any contact with Maurice Thorez, the head of the French Communist Party?

FLOTT: I certainly didn't deal with him directly. I may have met him at some reception, but I doubt it. He was not working the Embassies circuit! He was, after all, a foreign agent who had deserted from the French Army at the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, when Moscow was attacking French mobilization against the Nazis.

Q: Did we consider the French Communist Party, with Thorez as its head, the absolute tool of the Comintern or of the Soviets, or not at that time?

FLOTT: A tool of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? Oh, absolutely, no doubt about it. Now that doesn't mean that every single Frenchman who voted Communist, was equally in their pocket, but the leadership – there's no doubt about it. That's

been proven – there’s documentation of it both from defectors from the French and from the Soviet Communist parties. But the French Communists did get a substantial protest vote from some otherwise patriotic French people, especially right after the war.

Q: They’ve always been known as the most disciplined as far as their ties to the Soviets in Europe, I think.

FLOTT: Yes, I guess they were. Maurice Thorez is a complicated story. In 1939 the reason the Germans felt secure in invading Poland was that they were hand-in-glove with the Russians in doing so. At that point, when France went to war, along with Great Britain in September ‘39; Thorez first deserted from the French Army and secondly announced that this was a bourgeois, capitalistic war that the people should have no part of. But, needless to say, on June 22 of ‘41, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, Thorez changed his tune immediately. But there’s no doubt that once the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the French Communists became the most militant elements in the Resistance. They were willing to do anything to kill a handful of Germans, even if it meant the destruction of whole French villages and everything else. They went all out, which made them attractive in some ways to people around them who planned operations against the Germans. But the French, the bourgeois middle class French, were basically suspicious of the Communists, and with good reason. But it would be hard to deny that among the forces fighting in the Resistance, the Communists were the most all-out and militant – of late date, of course, after the invasion of Russia.

Q: Were there other Labor Officers?

FLOTT: It was basically Irving Brown’s people who came and went and there would be Foreign Service Officers in the labor attaché business. From where I sat, first at a very modest level in the Consular Section, and later in the Economic Section; we talked with them. All the people there at that time – we had a collegial relation with them – and anything we learned that might be helpful to them, we passed on to Irving Brown and his people.

Q: You left Paris in 1952?

FLOTT: Yes, September, 1952.

JOHN BERG
Locally Hired Employee
Paris (1947-present (1998))

John Berg was born and raised in Berlin, Germany. After living illegally in Nazi Germany for 28 months, he left for Paris in 1945. Since then, he has worked with the U.S. Army, the Marshall Plan, and at the U.S. Embassy in Paris. He obtained United States citizenship in 1980. Mr. Berg was interviewed by Richard L. Jackson on December 30, 1998.

Q: This is the oral history interview with John Berg conducted December 30, 1998 at the American embassy in Paris by Richard L. Jackson. Mr. Berg, as we were talking over lunch, could you begin by telling us a little bit about where you grew up and what the formative experiences were that drew you into this line of work?

BERG: Yes, indeed. John Berg came from Germany as a displaced person at the end of May 1945. Due to racial Nazi persecution, we lived illegally in Germany for 28 months, were liberated by the Soviets, and then came to France in the company of our friend's French prisoners of war. So, here we are in Paris, France. It's beautiful.

BERG: Mother and I then lived illegally for 28 months in Nazi Germany.

Q: Was that in Berlin?

BERG: It was mainly in Berlin. Sometimes, we went to other locations, other small cities, but I will say, if this ever happens to anyone, it is a lot better to do it in a large city than in a small location where you are instantly identified. So, about three months prior to the end of the war, some of our good friends, who had a house out in the country approximately 100 kilometers northwest of Berlin, had told us that if we could get there, we may live in that house, but should not leave it - just stay inside the house. Mother did go out now and then hoping and managing to get a little bit of food. She managed to do that. We had good friends there, French prisoners of war, who supplied a little bit of food, a little bit of bread, a little bit of this and that now and then.

Just about the end of April or beginning May of 1945, our friends came up to see us and said, "It's time to move out. The Soviets are coming." As far as we were concerned, we didn't care if it was the Soviets or not. Just anybody would have been better than the Nazis. Well, I listened to a detector radio, a small radio installation with headphones. I had a long antenna. I was aware of the different movements of the Allied troops, but sure enough, the Russians were the first. Their frontline troops were not very funny either. However, we did manage after liberation by them to see their commanding officer. The commanding officer gave us a free choice. He said, "We, the Soviets, could move you to the Soviet Union, or we could bring you back to the city of Berlin where you originated from, or, as your friends, the French prisoners of war, were being repatriated to their home country, France, you may join them." We preferred that option because the emblem for France has always been "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" and that was a good symbol. So, we decided to move with them to France. It took a month to get there. It was quite an experience. There were lots of transit camps. But all that was fair. Then we arrived in Paris, the beautiful city, even so quite different in May of 1945, but it was definitely liberté, égalité, fraternité. It was paradise.

So, our first thought was to see if we have any indication of what happened to my father. The Russians and everybody else said that they had lists, but whatever research we had done didn't lead to anything. There was no trace left. So, at that point, I told my mother, "Now that Dad is not to return, it will be up to me to support you." Because of being grateful to the U.S., my ideal was to work for Uncle Sam. Over and above it all, my highest admiration was for the U.S.

forces. So, I tried very, very hard to get a job for the U.S. Army. One problem was, I was too young. But then, due to the help of some friendly people, to whom I talked about it... I wanted to see the Jewish chaplain of Western Base Section, U.S. Army, in Paris. I explained the situation. The chaplain had been kind. He had once received a package that came from relatives in the USA. There was no postal service, so they had sent it APO to the Jewish chaplain, who forwarded it to us. He at that time said, "Mrs. Berg, if ever there is anything that I can do for you, don't hesitate to call on me." I did remember these words, went back to see the chaplain, and he in no time managed to get me a job with the U.S. Army in 1946. That is where I started. I worked for the Western Base Section, U.S. Army.

Q: Picking up English and French in the process?

BERG: French little by little. My parents had sent me to English language lessons since we had desperately tried to immigrate to Australia. So, by that time, my English wasn't all that bad. But you do forget it, of course, when you don't speak it during the war. But it all came back pretty rapidly. So, here we were, Western Base Section, U.S. Army.

I had a very small job. I was a supply clerk. But so what? It meant a job and it meant a salary. When the Western Base Section had accomplished its mission, there was one U.S. Army unit left here. I will forever be proud of having served that unit. It was the Corps of Engineers. The American Graves Registration Command, our command, established monuments, but mainly World War II cemeteries for our fallen comrades in arms. The ones who remained in Europe are approximately 40%. Sixty percent were shipped out through Carentan in Normandy to Cherbourg, France, where they were returned to the United States as per request of next of kin. The remaining 40% will remain forever in U.S. military cemeteries throughout Europe. One more time, I feel totally proud having served that unit because I did feel that I repaid my debt.

So, from 1947 until 1949, I worked for that unit. Then, their mission was accomplished. At that moment, I served as a passport and visa clerk, mainly getting visas which were required throughout Europe for the members of our command who had to travel to other European countries. So, at that time, when that mission was accomplished, the European Cooperation Administration under directions of the late Ambassador Averell Harriman, opened their office in Paris, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. It was the Economic Cooperation Administration.

I was fortunate enough to get a job there of similar kind. I became a passport and visa clerk for that organization. This job eventually brought me into the transportation field - passenger transportation, VIP receptions, whatever logistical support has to be given to VIPs. There, I served until October of 1953. The Marshall Plan had accomplished their mission and closed down. The administration had found that I was a worthwhile employee and integrated me into the Administrative Section of the American embassy in Paris. So, here I was. I had a relatively good job. I had a salary. I was able to support my mother. I was relatively happy under the circumstances.

The problem that remained was that, due to the fact that the Germans way back in 1937 deprived us of our original German citizenship, I served as a local employee at the embassy while my colleagues were French subjects, or British, or whatever else. I was stateless. I had no

citizenship. I had approached the Consular Service of our embassy to see what I could do to get a U.S. naturalization. That wasn't possible from this end.

Q: The Germans would have given you citizenship, but you, of course, would not have wanted that.

BERG: That is correct. They offered to return our original German citizenship at their embassy, but due to what they had done for moral reasons, I told whoever was concerned, "I can never stand again for Germany." I feel very strongly that whoever takes a citizenship has to stand for that country and that flag. I could not for Germany. Consequently, Mother and I remained stateless.

During my job at the embassy, the section was called the "conference attache for congressional relations." I had the good pleasure and honor to meet, assist, and accompany just about every congressman or senator coming or leaving France. Being that this was a good service to them, they all took an interest in me. The first reaction was, "John, where do you come from?" It wasn't all that funny, but I told them the story every time. So, they did mention at one point, "John, there must be something that can be done about it." My reaction was, "No" because through a legal way, I could not. It would have meant to give up my job, immigrate to the States, then work for four or five years, then become naturalized, and then hopeful and possibly get another government job.

Q: You have your mother here.

BERG: I was the only support for my mom. Consequently, I did not have the courage to tear out of the little I had gotten to start off with nothing. This I could not do. So, at that point, some of the congressional visitors... And I will say it right now: the first one who started it was the late Senator Jacob Javits, who proposed to introduce a bill in the House. He did that. The bill dragged along. After one year, my superiors at the embassy said, "John, the bill is going to die if nothing happens now, so you had better call Senator Javits and tell him to please reactivate." I didn't have the courage at first to do that, but being that they insisted very strongly, I did call the senator. The Senator told me he would reactivate the bill. I believe he did, but nothing ever happened. Meanwhile, the person, Senator Tom Harkin from Iowa... In those days, the congressman told me that "If Senator Javits introduced the bill on the Senate side, I will be happy to introduce it on the House side." So, with the private bill being on the Hill on the House and the Senate side, I think on the Senate side, it didn't get much beyond that point. But Tom Harkin defended it to the maximum extent. He has my thanks and my recognition for outstanding action for the rest of my life. He defended my case to an unbelievable extent. Then, believe it or not, after four years, in 1980, the bill was approved first on the Congress and then on the Senate side and then finally signed off by the President of the United States. So, here this outstanding accomplishment happened: John Berg was no longer stateless. He became the forever proud citizen of the United States of America.

Q: What a wonderful story. During these years as that was going forward, you continued to work at the embassy in Paris dealing with more and more volume of high level visitors. You had the Paris Peace Talks over Vietnam. You had almost every President, probably not only once, but

many times.

BERG: That is correct.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about the highlights of that?

BERG: The very important meetings here are the Vietnam Peace Talks with Phil Habib and many others which were held here in our embassy. This meant many, many important visits and lots of activities. But there again, I am proud to say that, it may be only one little part of it, but I did participate. So on that went through many meetings here. Henry Kissinger, who came and traveled incognito to negotiate, was in the Paris area. Many of the visits... Like you said, there were a lot of presidential visits and vice presidential visits, Secretary of State visits, unlimited. Again, I was proud to participate. As the years went on, I continued in the same field to work on the same activities. We just finished the latest Secretary of State visit here at the beginning of December of this year.

Q: That was Mrs. Albright's visit.

BERG: Yes. That was a brief visit, but it usually entails many details, a large support staff, traveling press, communications, and whatever goes with it. It is all fascinating. We're just ready for the next one.

Q: What makes a visit go well? I am sure that your long-term contacts throughout Paris, at the airport, with French officialdom, have got a lot to do with it.

BERG: That is correct. I think in the long run (This may sound funny to you.) that if they're not planned too far ahead of time, short notice is usually best. If not, we just have repeated and repeated advance meetings. They all boil down to more or less the same thing. There are very minor little divergencies like the plane is not going to come in at 1700 but at 1730. The number is usually identical. They're very numerous. The important part here is to have good contacts with our host government friends, mainly at the French Foreign Office, police authorities, customs, airport authorities, and take it from there. Glue it all together with a capable staff that we have at this embassy from the point of view of the chief of mission, deputy chief of mission, Political Section, Administrative Section, and the entire workforce. If they all work hand in hand, we can accomplish a very satisfactory visit.

Q: U.S.-French relations come and go. Sometimes, they are very strained. Other times, they are very close. Is that reflected at the working level when you're doing visits? Do you notice the difference?

BERG: To tell you the truth, not very much. They are, like we are, technical experts in a specific field as functionaries. If you have an opposition or if you have a leading support from protocol at the French Foreign Office, that can open unlimited doors. That is one of the reasons why the government keeps me in the present position. From the point of view of airport police, immigration, customs relations, that is based a lot on a long-lasting friendships among the people in that position, my own, and my colleagues. If you know how to handle their habits and their

preferences, you may give them a little here and they will give a little on their side. So, that is when you can do a lot of things. I am proud to say that I have a good number of friends on the French side who will continue to be as helpful. That is a very good feeling.

Q: Thinking back on all the visits that you've had, which ones stand out? What were the crisis moments for you? There have been some that must have kept you awake nights.

BERG: Yes, that is true. I think at the moment of the liberation of our colleagues from Iran who were then flown to the Wiesbaden Military Hospital, we had a very important visit here. I trust it was presidential. Our ambassador then flew out in the evening to greet our colleagues on their arrival in Germany. They then returned during the very early morning hours from Wiesbaden back to Paris. I remember spending the entire night at the airport. I will very proudly say it: airport and police authorities told me, "John, the installation is at your disposal for as long as you need them." This included their protective troops alongside from the airport all the way to the ambassador's residence. So, that is a good feeling. They were all available just to cover that very important event.

Q: The returnees from Wiesbaden were the ambassador and the President or the hostages?

BERG: Just the ambassador and the President.

Q: That was President Reagan.

BERG: Right.

Q: You have seen so many presidents come through. Do any details stick in your mind of your interaction? Your wall is covered with commendations from the White House from presidents and secretaries.

BERG: I am very proud of that, but I have been and will continue to be very devoted to every one of them. I have enjoyed every one of them. There are many, many events that can mark your memory. For instance, when Princess Grace of Monaco died in an automobile accident, Nancy Reagan was the White House lead to be present for the funeral in Monaco. A support delegation from our embassy went down to Nice and then on to Monaco to receive the First Lady and whatever officials who came in on the U.S. side for that funeral. The world's monarchy was represented there. It was a very outstanding event that I will never forget. For instance, after the end of the ceremonies, the First Lady had a Monegasque motorcycle escort to their close-by national border and then was picked up by French gendarmes from Monaco to Nice airport, where Air Force One was waiting for her and her delegation. On arrival, I usually tell the Secret Service that as a tradition in this country, the leading personality thanks, if possible by handshake, the commanding officer of the motorbike escort. Nancy Reagan not only did that to the commanding officer, but she shook hands with every one of the officers by number of 24. As each one of them were taking a picture at the end of this, that was myself where Nancy Reagan shook hands with me and thanked me for my action in Monaco. It was something to be very proud of. I was embarrassed because I left here in a hurry with no notice. I had curls on the back of my head because I didn't have time for a haircut. It was still a very, very, very impressive

picture for me, which I am very proud to have.

Q: As word of your efficiency began to get out in the U.S. Foreign Service, I am very well aware that ambassadors all over the place who transited Paris were calling you and asking for help. How did you field all the requests, establish priorities, and go out to meet some, but you can't meet them all? How did you make those calls?

BERG: I have a deputy and, if needed, we'll split it. He does one and I do the other. It is a decision of the front office here of who gets the top notch assistance and who may be in a secondary line. We can always manage with other officers from the embassy simply to go out and, on a courtesy basis, greet them and bring them into town. For me, it's usually a bit more because you eliminate immigration delays, you walk them straight through, and do it to the maximum extent. So, there you are. I am very pleased to say that, now having served the United States Government for over 50 years, I have received recognition for 50 years of active service to the U.S. Government. Again, this is something that I am very proud of. Ambassador Felix Rohatyn had set up a very pleasant reception in my honor for my 50 years. That was certainly very impressive. I received a very nice letter of congratulations on this occasion from President Bill Clinton. I am proud to have that letter. After a long career, I was pleased to have that recognition.

Q: One of your important clients is the U.S. ambassador in Paris, of whom you have seen many. You must have to adapt to very sudden changes of style and request. How has that work been over the years, thinking of the many ambassadors you have served with distinction: Harriman, Walter Curley, Joe Rodgers, all strong individuals with very different operating styles, I would assume?

BERG: You're right. They're all different. I've found every one of them most pleasant. When I think back to Charles Bohlen a long time ago, he was a great career ambassador. We did not have too many career ambassadors. Arthur Hartman was another one. I was pleased to serve him and his family. Other than that, they were all political appointees. I will say they were most friendly. Obviously, you have to adapt yourself to their demands and their style, but for as long as you do that, you are coming out alright.

Q: Which was the most challenging ambassador to work with in the sense of the demands?

BERG: It's hard to say. It was more or less identical. Obviously, the ambassador will ask you with a smile. If you then accomplish and do it with a smile, then that comes out identical, more or less.

Q: Making things go smoothly in an embassy like Paris, the largest - nearly 50 agencies, the team of ambassador and DCM and how well they mesh is very important. I'm sure your relations with each of the DCMs has been very important in setting the priorities on the big visits.

BERG: Absolutely.

Q: Has the division of work differed from different teams as far as you have observed or is it

fairly standard here?

BERG: It is fairly standard. The only difference is that we may have based on directions as they come in from the Department. Rules may be tighter now or less tight. This is based on politics and the financial situation of our budget, which imposes a difference now.

Q: Speaking of budget, you have lived through a period of unlimited post-war resources, reconstruction and building up the embassy and then in recent years, draconian cuts. We have closed most of the consulates in France. The staff of the embassy, American and Foreign Service national, has dropped off sharply. How was it to live through all of that and what has been the impact in terms of getting the job done?

BERG: That's number one: the job must be done. Obviously, at moments of budgetary crises, it becomes more difficult. We had periods where there was a question of being suspended because of a non-existing budget. But in actual fact, we had some of our people out... That we closed down the Consular Section for a while, which was more than embarrassing. But no budget - what can you do? Personally, I have never been affected. Yes, there was a salary check that wouldn't come in that followed shortly afterwards. So, I really can't complain. I think that if the budget situation is tight, everybody around the table has to do their maximum to economize. I have always tried to do that.

Q: You mentioned the Consular Section shut down briefly. Didn't most of the embassy itself shut during the closure of government in 1995?

BERG: Not the essential parts of the embassy. The Political Section, the Administrative Section, and the Economic Section continued to work, maybe on a reduced manpower, but we did continue to operate. It was mainly the Consular Section.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about security and the increasing impact of it on your life and the embassy's life? You had in Paris the assassination attempt against the chargé then, Chris Chapman. There was a military attaché killed in Paris.

BERG: Yes, that is correct. Sadly enough, one of our assistant army attachés was shot to death. There is a plaque in his memory here at the lobby of our embassy. Ever since, we have constant warnings to use different routes and different times to come to work. That is a nice theory, but how do you do that in actual practice? You necessarily come out of the building that you live in, you work at the same time, so that is difficult to do. But I think what needs to be done and hopeful that works is use common sense, look around, don't leave your name, don't leave an indication of where you are and who you are, use common sense. Obviously, we have severe warnings. The guards in front of this embassy have been reinforced. We have our own private guards. We have the gendarmerie out in front. I think that is about the best you can do. We no longer use official diplomatic plates. The maximum of our fleet runs with regular Paris license plates. That is about all you can do.

Q: In gaining that kind of change from the French authorities, do you have a lot of discussion with them of reciprocity - they give us this and we must get that in Washington, that kind of

thing?

BERG: Basically, I believe that is the case, but I am not personally involved in that. I have the good privilege of enjoying what has been negotiated. I will frankly say I take advantage of it.

Q: But this focus on security must have affected your job as you deal with so many VIP visitors from the presidents on down, getting them in and out of airports. How has it impacted?

BERG: We use the most secure routes. We vary our routes. We do not use the same at all times. I will say that the protection on the French side and adapting themselves to that security problem is very satisfactory.

ROBERT G. CLEVELAND
Economic Officer
Paris (1948-1952)

Robert G. Cleveland grew up in a family that traveled extensively abroad, spoke French at home, and had many European friends. He was appointed to the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included assignments in Bucharest, Paris, Sydney, Bangkok, and Belgrade. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

CLEVELAND: Needless to say, Paris was very different, very large, and very exciting. As a sidelight, when we left Bucharest on the Orient Express, nearly the entire Western diplomatic colony saw us off. In Paris, only an Embassy driver met us. The contrast between the warm collegial atmosphere of Bucharest, and the rather frenetic environment of a huge Embassy was striking.

Great things were happening; the Marshall Plan was beginning; the Cold War was developing apace, NATO was on the drawing board, the Coal and Steel Community began, and Paris seemed to be the center of it all.

I was peripherally involved in much of this; I started as number two in the Embassy Economic Section, with many routine duties, reporting on various aspects of the French economy, working rather closely with the Marshall Plan Mission to France, and sometimes with the Harriman Mission. One particular responsibility was transport and communications, which involved me in civil aviation and telecommunications very actively. For example I helped negotiate an agreement permitting Pan American to operate in France.

Q: Your biographic data mentions your involvement in the Central Rhine Commission.

CLEVELAND: That was an aspect of transportation assigned to me. “*Le Commission Central Pour le Navigation du Rhin*” was established in the early 19th Century by the riparian states to establish “rules of the road” for shipping on the Rhine, and to act as an appeals court for tort

cases. Germany, of course, had been a founding member, but during the early post-war years, the occupying powers acted for her. Thus the British and the United States had seats on the Commission, and I acted for the U.S. From the U. S. standpoint, it was not a very crucial concern, but it gave me an experience in multilateral diplomacy which was valuable and interesting. It was a small group, very collegial and friendly; it gave me the privilege of knowing a group of great people, and enjoying the delights, culinary and otherwise, of Strasbourg. It was good to get away from Paris once in a while!

1949-52 was the period when the cold war began to take hold, and much of our work was related to it. For example, I accompanied David Bruce to the French Foreign Office to propose the establishment of what later became COCOM; its purpose was to control exports of strategic items to Soviet bloc countries.

This international body became active very soon, and continued right down to the present.

Q: Did COCOM actually issue export licenses, or just regulate?

CLEVELAND: Its purpose was to reach agreement among the Western democracies on lists of items whose export to the Soviet bloc would be controlled or prohibited. Member countries were bound by its rules, but they issued their own licenses. While COCOM may not be as important with respect to the Soviet bloc as it was, I hope it will concern itself with other areas, having in mind Iraq, for example. Personally, I was glad to let others in the Embassy take on that work, as I preferred to be involved in more constructive activities.

Q: Does COCOM still have influence today?

CLEVELAND: It hasn't been dissolved; I hope it continues with the terms of reference I just suggested – slowing international arms traffic.

Toward the end of my tour, I was reassigned as the Ambassador's special assistant for MDAP.

Q: This was still Bruce?

CLEVELAND: By then, no. My first Ambassador was Caffery. He was succeeded by Bruce for two years, and then followed by James Clement Dunn. All three were great men; they had different styles, but they were real pro's and I admired them all.

Q: Well, they were certainly all famous men of their generation, or of any generation. This is a good place to put in any special comments on their techniques or other memories you may have.

CLEVELAND: I remember all of them. My main first impressions of Caffery were two: First was his insistence on a certain pomp and ceremony surrounding the Ambassador's office. But professionally, he was absolutely marvelous. For example, my immediate boss told me to write a long telegram on some subject, the substance of which I forget. When I brought the message to Caffery, he read it and asked why it was being sent.

He saw instantly that it wasn't worth a telegram, and I had to agree with him. He was the professional's professional, who could always separate the wheat from the chaff.

David Bruce was a man of great stature and impeccable judgment. He had enormous charm and warmth. He always seemed to know what to say and not to say in every circumstance. I remember one time in his office with a congressman, I made a rather tactless remark, and he was able to correct it gently, and got me out of the hole. I admired him for his leadership, judgment and kindness.

It was during Bruce's watch that French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed the Coal and Steel Community. David Bruce, with the advice of the then Treasury Attaché, had the imagination to see that this was an important and desirable political development. He convinced Washington that the United States should support the concept. This was despite a suspicion held by some in the Embassy that the Community would likely be some kind of European cartel, contrary to our interests. Tomlinson the Treasury Attaché, a brilliant man, had Bruce's full confidence, and this left our economic shop a little in the shadow where policy issues were concerned.

Q: Could you touch briefly on Dunn?

CLEVELAND: Personally, Dunn was a very experienced Foreign Service Officer of the old school. I wouldn't say he was as brilliant as the other two, but his judgment was sound, he was well-liked by the French, and he had a very successful tour. My job as his Special Assistant for MDAP was liaison with the Military Assistance Mission on supply matters. The French needs were for material to assist them in their fight against the Communist insurgency in Indochina. You may remember that in those days, the U.S. was unenthusiastic about continued French colonialism in Indochina, but we did give them military hardware based on broader policy considerations.

Q: Was this grant aid or loans at that time?

CLEVELAND: I think it was grant aid. It was during the period of the European Recovery Program (ERP), also called the Marshall Plan, helping France and other European countries recover from the effects of World War II. As I mentioned before, I was also involved in the ERP French Mission, and was lucky enough to become acquainted with many fine people in that work, including Livingston Merchant, Henry Labouisse. Barry Bingham and Francis Parkman. That was a great privilege.

Q: Was that the period when there were five American Ambassadors in Paris?

CLEVELAND: Paris was crowded with American brass. The Harriman Mission included two persons, including Governor Harriman himself, with the rank of Ambassador. There were also two other people with Ambassadorial rank connected with negotiating military base rights. This was in addition to Ambassador Dunn, who was the American Ambassador. It drove Jimmy Dunn up the wall. It was a strange arrangement. I particularly remember an engraved invitation to a charity event issued in the name of "The American Ambassadors in Paris." Mr. Dunn was

outraged, and took strong exception. Those were weird times. There were certainly too many high level people around, and this created plenty of personal conflict. For example, the general in charge of our military aid mission was an extremely difficult man, heartily disliked by the Ambassador and the economic aid mission director. Evidently, one of the reasons I was given my special assistant assignment was to keep the peace. Those were the days!

A few more points: The Embassy was grossly inflated with personnel. This was almost entirely Washington's fault. There was no coordination between Departments, or discipline by the State Department. The various Departments would send all sorts of requests for information or action, presumably cleared by State. Many of these were marginal, and some were impossible to comply with, even with our large staff. A horrible example, which I'll never forget, was a request for a list, including a technical description, of every telephone switchboard in France. The French themselves had no list of the thousands of such units. It looked as though some people in Washington didn't have enough to do.

Q: These weren't private commercial interests you were serving?

CLEVELAND: No. This particular matter was for intelligence purposes. While we're on the subject of coordination, there were so many U. S. agencies represented in Paris that there was overlapping, conflicts and confusion. Executive Orders establishing the Ambassador's overall authority were issued, and then ignored!

This was nearly forty years ago, but I hear that things haven't changed in that respect.

Q: Wasn't there an intelligence coordinator for the Embassy who was supposed to coordinate intelligence operations?

CLEVELAND: There was the CIA Station Chief, but I'm not sure he did much coordinating.

Q: But nobody on the Embassy staff? I had filled that function in Vienna.

CLEVELAND: I'm not certain.

Q: Let's talk briefly, so we'll have your slant, about French Governments during your stay there. It was a chaotic period, and the single thread, I guess, was Robert Schuman, wasn't it who was the element of continuity in the French Government?

CLEVELAND: The chief feature to remember about France at the time was that the French Communist Party was an important player in internal politics, and the perceived menace of Communism was the most important feature of our policy toward France. Internal French politics were not part of my assignment, but of course I was very much aware of the constant changes in government, caused primarily by shifting alliances among the many parties in the Assembly. On the other hand, in my constant dealings with the Government, including the Foreign Office and economic ministries, there were very few changes among the faces that I saw. Schuman was Foreign Minister, and Jean Monnet was in the background. Herve Alphand was at the Foreign Office, and Giscard was also active. De Gaulle came long after I left.

Q: Do you have any snapshots of those days in Paris?

CLEVELAND: One or two: A high level conference in Bruce's office with Secretary Acheson; it was attended by all sorts of brass from both Washington and Paris; its purpose was to brief Acheson for a meeting with Robert Schuman; the Secretary asked for suggestions and received many. He then made a brilliant statement of what he was going to say to Schuman. It was so clear and so right that I've never forgotten it. It put Acheson in my pantheon.

We met at the Gare de l'Est an American security guard from Bucharest and his wife on their way for home leave. Driving from the station to our home by way of the Champs-Élysées we encountered a Communist demonstration against the newspaper *Le Figaro*. Seeing our diplomatic plates, some of them broke our windows, and started to drag me out of the car until told to stop by a cadre. The security guard and his wife dropped to the floor of the car. Later, they said they wanted to get back to Bucharest, where things were safer!

Q: You left in 1952, after about four years.

CLEVELAND: Right. In the summer of 1952.

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
Economic Officer
Paris (1948-1953)

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman was born in New York in 1926. He entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included assignments in Vietnam, the United Kingdom (England), Belgium, and ambassadorships to France and the Soviet Union. He was interviewed by William Miller in 1987.

HARTMAN: Before I knew it I was beginning to think about what was going on and the plans for the Marshall Plan and by the end of that first year in Law school I got a call from a friend in Washington. He said, "How would you like to go to Paris?" Well that was a lot more appealing than continuing on in Law school, so I went and David Bruce was my first boss. I was hired as a young economist in the mission to France and I stayed there for between six and seven years and I entered the Foreign Service during that period.

Q: Was this the time of the Monnet Plan and all the great changes in Europe were taking place?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, in the mission to France we had a very unusual group of people; I would say, under David Bruce. We were headed, the team was headed by the treasury attaché who was a very young man who died rather tragically in his early thirties from a heart condition. He was then in his twenties, a brilliant economist and monetarist – monetary theorist and he was the head of our team. Then we had a Foreign Service Officer, Stan Cleveland who was the Foreign Service Representative and then several of us from the Marshall Plan mission.

It was during that period that we actually worked very closely with Jean Monnet because he was head of the plan in France and it was through him that the American foreign assistance was used; and despite the fact that the forth republic politicians were going in and out of office, Monnet was always there and kept his money going in the directions that he wanted. Also in 1950; this was the beginning of 1948 when I began there, but in 1950 we helped Monnet. I had a very minor part in that I must say, but David Bruce and Bill Tomlinson, the Treasury attaché had a big part in helping to draft the Schuman Plan Declaration. This was the first proposal for forming a united Europe and we were kind of a team at that point that included some of our distinguished colleagues from Bonn. It was a way of trying to integrate the former occupied territories of Germany into Europe and to once again establish a state in Germany and begin the process of movement away from a war-time organization. That whole period was very exciting right up through 1952 when the Coal and Steel Community was created. Of course then, we moved on because during this period other things had been happening in the world and we had to look at the defense side of things partially because what had happened in Greece and Turkey, some moves that had been made in Eastern Europe, and finally the invasion of Korea led the American government to think about creating an organization for the purpose of promoting the defense of Europe; NATO.

With it, what would happen to Germany? The French came up with the idea that they did not want them as full members of NATO but perhaps through a European defense organization, they could bring the Germans into this rather large task; they realized they had to as the Germans were right there in the center of a divided Europe.

So I was on the delegation to the European Army Conference, so you see my career sorted of melded into the Foreign Service and I left the Marshall Plan strictly speaking which indeed in France was virtually over in the four years that it was promised in 1952.

Q: How did that take place? Here you were, you're out of Harvard and you're working as Special Assistant to a very distinguished ad hoc group and you're not in the Foreign Service at that point. What was it that made you decide to go into the Foreign Service? Did you, was it a motivation that you had previously that you thought this was something you might like to do or did it happen because you saw the current action in Europe?

HARTMAN: No frankly not, you know a lot of things were going on at this time. You had the regular Foreign Service, you had this sort of *ad hoc* group of people who came in, some of them at very high levels. At the head of the European unit of the Marshall Plan you had Averell Harriman and Ambassador Katz and people like that, and David Bruce who not only began as Head of the Marshall Plan, but moved over to be Ambassador to France and then he was succeeded by Henry Labouisse and there were just a whole series of people who came in at time. In a sense, I suppose you could say that the more traditional Foreign Service began to be slightly overwhelmed and I remember having long discussions with people like Teddy Kellise and others who were in the embassy who belonged to the old Foreign Service who had come in before the war and I think its fair to say they were probably a little resentful of all these youngsters wandering around dealing in high policy, which we were. In any case, what happened was that with our world responsibilities growing and a feeling that the United States was going to

continue to play a role in world affairs, the expansion of the Foreign Service was very much in view.

Along came something called the Wriston Plan and I'm really a Wristonee. That is I came in; well there were two great waves I guess of people who came into the Foreign Service who had not started with the Foreign Service. In the immediate post-war period there were a lot of people who dealt with German affairs and who had been in, whatever they call it, Regional Directors in the occupation and people who had worked in the war effort in Washington. These people were brought in to the Foreign Service and that was kind of the first wave that took the Foreign Service beyond its core group.

The second wave occurred in the fifties, the early fifties when people like me and others who had an interest in foreign affairs got a taste of it and they said, "Well maybe I would like to stay in this work."

Q: At that point were you aware of the restructuring that was going on in the World order, not to mention the Foreign Service with Wristonization?

HARTMAN: Well I think we were all aware of it, whether we had correctly assessed what was going on or not is a hard question, one in fact that I have to answer this spring because I've got a speech to make on the fortieth anniversary of Marshall's speech at Harvard which is also my fortieth reunion time; and also I'm reviewing the fourth volume of the Marshall memoirs that are just coming out for the New Republic. You begin to think, "What was this then? Was this sort of a naivete' that suddenly struck a rather I country in terms of world affairs because really there was this burgeoning of relationships that took place in the post-war period and a lot of people like me who had no great experience in these things came in and began to see what the possibilities were. I must say that the one thing that struck me in that period were the international cooperation aspects. I think we were all very idealistic and some remarkable things were happening. Just the very fact that the way the Marshall Plan was put to Europe as a proposal and the way it was picked up by Bevin and others and played back to us, and then the way that the Europeans sat down and organized the response to us. We didn't participate, we had observers there and one of the little fascinating bits of history that I found out when I went as Ambassador to France in that house on Forty-one Faubourg Saint Honore]. A friend of mine from England came there and he said, "You know the last time I was in this house was in 1948," and he said "I was working for Lord Franks who was the head of the British delegation to this European Conference to respond to the United States and its' offer of aid." He said, "I can remember working all night in this big room down on the ground floor," where he said "we were stapling together our report because we had to issue it the next day." This was Eric Roll who has now gone on to become head of Wolberry's Bank and a few other things, but he was a figure for many years in the whole movement to create the OEC in Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and finally to bring Britain into the more regularized and governmentalized forms of cooperation in the European community.

Q: Let me take you back to pick up on two points that you've raised already. The first point really is motivation. You were at Harvard, the war takes place and you serve in the Far East – the "Hump" carrying material to China and you witness the end of a colonial period, a terrible

war with horrible devastation, a breaking of every previous mold; and then you go back to Harvard and finish and the career that seems to be before you is one of looking inward. The legal practice seemed to be what you were headed for, what was your sense of the world at that time as a veteran from the war, a terrible war with horrible experiences and a desire to come home and forget all of that. What was it that drove you out again to look at the world?

HARTMAN: By the way on that, on the latter point I had a very minor part in the war. I got in at seventeen and it was virtually at the end of the war when I got over there. So I didn't see any, I wasn't in any of the tough fighting or came back with all kinds of psychological scars. For me it was almost a lark. I spent time in India, I flew from something called DumDum airport to Chung King and Kung Ming. I came home, it was more a sense of adventure I think. The more I sat around that Law school, the less I thought of spending my life doing that kind of thing and when the offer came to go to Paris I jumped at it. I went over there and really – for me I had never really traveled outside the country, I was very young. It was more in the nature of the kind of experience where you could influence events, where you could be a part of history and it seemed so much more important and so much more interesting as a life then the other life which you could have which seemed kind of hum drum to me. I think there is a psychological thing too, you have to look at yourself.

My father was a businessman and I was clearly heading away from what he had done all his life so I think you have to add that in. There is always a personal element in anything like this. We were very close as a family, but the thought of being in that business which was paper making didn't strike me as something that would be very fulfilling so I was already going toward the law. I was heading away from that and then I guess France was even better and further away.

Q: Did you speak French when you went over there?

HARTMAN: I didn't. I had seven years of Spanish among other things which I never used in the entire Foreign Service. I landed there and sort of learned it on the ground and it was a lot easier than the language where I've just come from; which I also didn't have before I went either. I think basically my career spans the attitudes and reaction of Americans generally because a little later I went from France to Vietnam just after the Geneva Agreements. Here was another experience, seeing that the problems weren't as easy as they seemed to be in Europe. I mean Europe was, I think treated by Americans as a kind of a test case and it was probably the wrong lesson that we all learned.

Q: What do you mean by that?

HARTMAN: In the sense that when you, there was a devastated Europe and it needed what America could give. That was hope, enthusiasm, and money. It had the trained, skilled people, it had the basis and experience; it had all of the things that would make that American contribution a successful tool in an effort to rebuild and reinvigorate an industrial area.

Q: It had the ability to use it quickly?

HARTMAN: The ability to use it quickly, political leadership and even in the confused state that

some of those places were, there were vigorous people who had experience in the political process. I must say the more I think about this whole history, its that element of political leadership and skills that those people show that makes situations work or not work and result in disasters or successes.

Q: Turning to that point about political leadership. When you went to Paris, you were working under the tutelage of a very great Ambassador and skillful one, David Bruce and there were many others of great insight and intelligence. In a sense you had a leadership that was given to you on the European scene, you didn't have to seek it out to discover it. Was this a difference when you went to Vietnam, that you did not know the landscape or Americans in general did not know the political landscape?

HARTMAN: Well, I would say if you look at the French experience, with the exception of the Foreign Service Officers; I mean people like Woody Wallner who had been practically the last fellow out of our embassy in Paris before the war. When the Vichy government was set up, I think he went from Paris to Vichy and continued operating our mission there. You had that core of people who knew a lot about France and about the politics of France, and people like Martin Hertz who was in the political section. All of these people were very intense political animals and they threw themselves into trying to understand Fourth Republic politics which were kind of exciting, but a little bit of the sameness as these parting people turned over.

Then you had us, the sort of technicians on the other side of the house who would approach the problem mainly as an economic one and working again with Monnet through his connections with Schuman and Quai, and Pinet – the people who were running the economy. We kind of looked at the problem as one of “if you can get economic success, all this politics will work itself out.” There was a little tension I would say among the staff in the embassy between those who felt that more attention ought be paid to politics and that the United States ought to have more traditional relationships with France, and those of us who were “activists” saying, “Why don't we back this fellow he's got a good plan,” or they want to do something in this ministry, why don't we do that?” Let the politics follow this if I successful venture, if the infrastructure gets rebuilt, if the coal mines get going. That's going to change the political coloration of those parts of France that may be tending towards Communism or whatever else we were concerned about in those days.

Q: Describe the embassy when you arrived?

HARTMAN: When I arrived there we in the old building so to speak; Number Two Avenue Gabriel, I can't remember now who the first DCM was. It could have been Ted Achilles, I'm not sure. There were a whole series of distinguished deputies beginning first with David Bruce, then when Douglas Dillon came along, and then Amory Houghton and other Ambassadors came while I was still there and still working in the Marshall Plan mission to France which was in “B” building which was the next building up Avenue Gabrielle. We worked as a team primarily because this financial attaché who had his big office in the main building, as did the Director of the Marshall Plan mission.

Q: Was this a country team in the Eisenhower mode?

HARTMAN: It began to be a country team in the Eisenhower mode, it very much began to be a country team operation and indeed when we got further into the fifties and a military assistance group was established it had all the aspects of a country team. It had military representation, it had economic; the Head of the Marshall Plan mission. In many places, I can't remember now, I think in France as well, the Head of the Marshall Plan mission became the Economic Minister so that there was a complete integration of the embassy staff and the Marshall Plan mission.

Q: So the title in fact matched the power?

HARTMAN: The title matched the power and for awhile they tried it with the Economic Minister separate and there was just dog fighting all the time as he tried to establish his authority and of course he didn't have any money and of course he didn't have any way of dealing with the French in a position of power where he had nothing to give. So it was always the Marshall Plan mission chief who really had the authority. Of course David Bruce came in under another Ambassador; actually Jefferson Caffery was still Ambassador when I arrived. That was one of the treats of the day if you arrived when he did and watched him being sort of; what do you call it dog-stepped or something by the Marines up the main stair case.

Q: He was an old-style ambassador?

HARTMAN: He was absolutely an old-style Ambassador and I think very uncomfortable with what was going on.

Q: What was the size of the mission? Did you have the sense that the Embassy was groaning at the seams because of the post-war reconstruction?

HARTMAN: It was big, I can't remember how many we had. We must have had three or four of us. I started out in the trade division, but there was a finance division, a trade division, there was an overseas territories division with a couple of very interesting people in it who worked with the French despite this sort of basic American anti-colonial feelings, but worked with the French to reestablish ties with their African territories and Vietnamese. The aid programs had a kind of indirect affect through the time when finally Harry Truman proposed the Point Four program. The idea was that France needed these resources and those countries also needed to be developed and this was a way to do it. We kind of put aside a little bit some of our colonial feelings, although I think the French always felt that we were trying to get them out of these places. It was very tricky for any American to be working the French Overseas Territories Ministry as it was in those days. There was one man particularly; Bert Jolis was head of the division, he later went on to become one of the big diamond merchants of the world in Africa. Joe Sacks was a very unusual young man, he was my age and Joe went into this overseas territories work with a real vigor and got into French bureaucracy so well that years later he was actually working in the Ministry of Overseas Territories when de Gaulle came to power. De Gaulle found out that there was this American over there who was actually sort of running the finances of North Africa. Joe was out of there very quickly and went to Oxford and wrote his Ph.D.

There were a lot of experiences like that where things were really quite permeable and you had

Americans working in French ministries and Frenchmen; Robert Marshall was the head of the office that received the aid and later went on to become the head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe. There were a succession of people who were our interface and I remember a few years ago when I came as Ambassador to France finding that these people were all head of big banks, my life was much easier as they were old friends. It was really remarkable with the way they as young people also, slightly older than we were because they had been through the war most of them and their careers had been delayed by that as they had been off doing other things. They were a little more mature and I think they treated us as students, useful students because we usually could produce some money occasionally to do the tasks that they had. The real difference I think going; Freddy Reinhardt was one of our advisors in Paris and he went as Ambassador to Vietnam and he asked for me to come out there with him.

Q: You had worked closely together?

HARTMAN: We had worked somewhat closely together, he more as an advisor to Eisenhower when he had his first job as Supreme Commander and I was working on the European Army and then later helping to get the Federal Republic into NATO and so I worked very closely with Freddy at that time and he asked me to come out to Vietnam and work in an Economic job and I was in the Embassy, but also in the aid mission there and we had a combined mission. Actually the Embassy officers were in the aid mission building, we were not in the main embassy downtown in Saigon. My job gradually got on to the area of advising the Central Bank and there were quite a few things going on, they had a negotiation with the French and so I was a little bit on the other side, they were newly independent and also they had to negotiate with the French, and therefore we were with Lao and Cambodian and Vietnamese governors as well as they were trying to divide up a pot of money that clearly belonged to them. In any case, that was a tremendous change because there I was back in the Far East and I must say my ideas when I was first in the Far East were that; and particularly some stories I heard as we flew. After the war we touched down in Hanoi and that was a confusing period when the Nationalist Chinese were coming in there and the French were coming back and there was a lot of suspicion that we were trying to get them out and my first brush with that area, I must say I understood very little about it. While I was in Paris I read more about it and it was a time of ferment and the political debates were beginning in France as to what the policy should be.

Q: Is this in reference to their colonial possessions including Vietnam?

HARTMAN: Yes and one of the interesting things at that time is that the socialists were red hot colonialists and I can remember Guy Mollet; one of his governments, as a leading socialist took probably took one of the strongest positions against giving greater independence to Indochina and broke off the negotiations that had been going on in France for the independence of those three areas.

Q: What was the view of the French that you were working with in Paris towards Vietnam, your next assignment?

HARTMAN: Well, there was; I went there just after the Geneva agreements and of course there was a lot of resentment, that Dulles had really twisted arms to get those agreements through then

Dulles didn't like the agreement and sort of threw it over. I would say there was a basic suspicion among a great majority of Frenchmen that we were doing them in the eye. The thought that; I can even remember at the end of my period in France; the French saying "Well you know, yes you have helped us but you've given us only about as much money as we in turn have had to put into Vietnam to keep it from going Communist." It was a, we were beginning at that time I think to come into the realities of world politics and some of that was driven home. The history of France's relations with these territories became much more dominant. We after all had been dealing with the people who were willing to forget most of that and concentrate on building a modern state in France and felt that these were things that were just going to drag them down and be obligations. That struggle in France didn't straighten out until de Gaulle came to power and finally; although he may have mislead the French people at first, led them out of Algeria.

Q: Describe something of the life of a Diplomat in that time? When you were in Paris, you're as a junior person, but you are in a very heady position. You've got a great job, a very interesting one and you are working at the top. How did you live in Paris?

HARTMAN: We shifted apartments seven times.

Q: Was this before the war?

HARTMAN: This begins when we arrive there. I think my first salary was something like twenty-eight hundred dollars a year and went to thirty-three shortly thereafter. We had a housing allowance, but it was a modest one and France was still; this was 1948 – 1949 France was still – there was rationing when I first arrived. Buildings hadn't been rebuilt and it was kind of a mess. So we started off in a one room apartment then we had a child and on to two rooms and so forth. We moved in the six years or so I was in France, I think we moved about seven times, slightly up market each time I would say, even sampling a little bit of country life. We made many French friends, not many I would say personal friends – people we worked with; although kept them as friends over the years, and when I went back as Ambassador they became personal friends. The personal friends that we made at that time were much more in the sort of bowels of society and in the arts. They were young people like ourselves, sometimes in the neighborhoods where we settled.

Q: Some painters and sculptors?

HARTMAN: Yes, things like that and actually one went on to become a big banker, but he was our neighbor in one of the buildings that we lived in. He is probably my oldest and closest friend, he became head of one of the big banks. That kind of relationship you know sort of looking back on my recent experience in the Soviet Union where you come out with well maybe a couple of people that you can say you are acquaintances, or a Refusenik or two that you've gotten very fond of and terribly close to. No one in the society is really close to you. In France despite the fact that they have the reputation for standoffishness and cultural pride and all those kinds of things, really we have I think some very fast and close friends.

Q: What was the nature of Diplomatic life for you in Paris at that time? Did you have a strict routine with an old-style Ambassador like Jefferson Caffery?

HARTMAN: Well, I think that was another source of the resentment around; well not resentment, but differentiation. We basically didn't participate in the diplomatic life as such. I think all the time I was working on the economic problems of France as distinct from moving over to the problem of getting Germany into NATO or into a defense organization which started in 1952. All the time just working on France, I don't think I ever went to a diplomatic party. The ministries that we were dealing with, there wasn't a whole lot of socialization between us and; this is due to the fact that of course that we were very junior officers. The only exception to this is of course is David Bruce who had a great social life and was known. He was a remarkable man. I mean there he was, he could focus on the most mundane kinds of problems in the office and then turn around and go to some big ball out in Versailles dressed up in some eighteenth century costume. He and Vangelina were just absolutely marvelous that way and they were good for us as young people and I remember this and so does my wife all these years. What we learned from them going to parties at their house, seeing how they entertained, seeing the use they put entertaining to in terms of opening up closed areas of society – getting contact with people in a much more relaxed way. That stayed with us, so although we didn't really use it when we had kind of left bank parties that we went to in our home; but it was not in anyway a kind of diplomatic life, that was kind of reserved for the people in the "Embassy" part of things.

Q: Then you came back as Ambassador?

HARTMAN: I came back as Ambassador quite a number of years later and I had a strange combination of friends, many of them from this sort of left-bank life who used to come and see us and we'd go to see them not with my chauffeur driven car though or I'd be thrown out of the neighborhood. Then we had people who we became friendly with as Ambassadors, quite a different strata of society.

EDGAR J. BEIGEL
French Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1948-1970)

Edgar J. Beigel began working for the State Department in the Economic Division in 1948. In 1950, he joined the Bureau of European affairs, where he remained until 1970. Mr. Beigel was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

BEIGEL: At the end of that time I published an extracurricular paper on the Monnet Plan.

Q: Will you explain what the Monnet Plan was?

BEIGEL: The Monnet Plan was devised at the beginning of 1946, headed by Jean Monnet who gave his name to it, to break the bottlenecks in the French economy in five or six critical sectors, determine what they were and devise ways of breaking them; to survey the French economy, to measure where it was in 1945 as compared with 1929; and to try to project for four or five years.

I was interested not in the economics of this but in the political science of it. Was there planning in France before the war? What did it amount to? What happened during the war? What was the Monnet Plan all about? The French Information Service was very good in New York then and had a large office in Rockefeller Center and an extensive library of French documentation. So I wrote about the organization of all this and ended up having it published in the Political Science Quarterly, which is sort of a house organ at Columbia.

I showed reprints of that in the State Department when I came down in the summer of 1948, and the division chief in what was then the Division of Economic Development in the E area, said, "That's the kind of thing we are doing in this division." They hired me.

Q: Had you pointed yourself towards the State Department?

BEIGEL: Well, I had a notion about that. In any case, I had once taken the Foreign Service exam when I was still in the army in 1945, and actually took the oral. As I had passed the written exam they said, "You didn't really pass the oral, but you can come back in a year and take the oral again without having to take the written again." But I didn't go back as I was at Columbia. So I went into the civil service, in the E area.

Q: E being the economic area at State Department.

BEIGEL: Yes, it is now called EB.

For about a year or two I served in the Western European section of this division, which was organized on a global basis. The Marshall Plan had been invented in 1948 and we were very much involved in global allocations: how to cut up the pie, dividing appropriations among the European participants in the Marshall Plan. I developed a close relationship with the political desks in the Western European Division and in 1950 there was a Department reorganization and part of the E area moved into the geographic area. I moved over and joined the Bureau of European Affairs.

Q: I would like to move back to the 1948-50 period. In allocating the pie to the various countries, how was it done and what was the interrelationships? Did some countries have better presenters than others?

BEIGEL: I think we were smart about how to do this. We told the Europeans that they must form an organization, the predecessor of what is now the OECD in Paris, because we were advocating European cooperation leading up to "unification." Paul Hoffman, the Director of Economic Cooperation, ECA, which administered the Marshall Plan, gave many speeches on European unity. We said to them; you have this organization, tell us what your needs are. Great studies were made projecting for four years what they anticipated their overall balance of payments deficit would be. Each country tried to develop its own development plan.

The French, of course, were in the forefront having already invented the Monnet Plan. It was very simple in the French case in administering funds. In any case to divide up the pot of dollars which went for balance of payments assistance, the Europeans were told, "We are going in for a

\$5 billion appropriation for the coming year. We would like your recommendations of how that should be divided among you in terms of your respective national balance of payments projections.” They did that. They came in with the recommended division of the pot. Then the question was of adjusting these numbers depending upon what we knew about the programs of each country.

Q: The Eisenhower Administration came in 1953.

BEIGEL: Yes, the beginning of 1953. I was in EUR working on France, Spain and Portugal, mostly economic work on those countries, sitting with the desk officers. Then I became more involved with the military side, on the French side, beginning in 1950, because the NATO program started. The NATO treaty was signed in 1949. The big appropriation to build up European armies came after the Korean war began. I always sensed that there was a fear at the top here, in the White House, that something mischievous was going to happen in Europe. There was a great impulse that was shared with the Congress to build up the NATO forces, so that there was a massive 1950 appropriation. At the same time there was an impetus from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the rest of the government that we needed to mobilize more manpower in Europe for the NATO armies. We must mobilize West German manpower. That was anathema to the French. Acheson had to confront the French and British because there was that group of the three Western Foreign Ministers which was a residue from the war. He met with them and pressed to bring in German manpower. We had been secretly stockpiling equipment on our own – unilaterally – out of the appropriations to build up NATO forces. There was a famous stockpile for the potential German army if and when it was formed and that was when the French invented the European Defense Community proposal which after two years of negotiation failed.

Q: Let me ask a bit, because I want to bring you back...

BEIGEL: I was getting on to the Indochina part. In 1953 it was decided that what we should do in the case of France is change the way we attribute the local currency that accrued to the recipient government from Marshall Plan balance of payments assistance. In the beginning part of this aid was on a loan basis, but for the three or four years thereafter the aid was mostly grants to the recipient governments who sold the dollars to their importers and the local currency that the importers paid into the central bank became a resource for each national budget. The U.S. had a say in how they would spend that. With some governments there were great debates on what their national economic program was.

In the French case it was more or less cut and dried because the French had the Monnet plan calling for investments in critical sectors, and proposed to attribute the counterparts funds to these programs. Then Dulles said that what we really want to do now is to attribute these funds to the French military budget for their Expeditionary Force in Indochina and in addition, to their support of the three national armies in Indochina.

Q: The three national armies being the Cambodian, Laos and the Vietnam.

BEIGEL: Which the French always called supplétifs to their own forces. They always had natives in support of their army. But the idea was to create national armies because we were

promoting nationhood for those countries. The French gave support to the creation of national armies but they had their own interests, cultural and economic, in those states since they gained control of them in the 19th century. And of course they had been overwhelmed there by the invading Japanese forces. This was true throughout southeast Asia, British and French, the white man had lost face. Ho Chi Minh emerged at the end of the war with Japan and there is the famous history of all that. And then insurgency started. There was what I call the first Indochina war from 1945. By 1953 it was necessary to find out from the French the detail of the military budgets for French forces and for the national armies. There wasn't anyone in the U.S. Government who had a clue. I went to Paris and collected this information and focused attention on that.

Q: How did you get this information and how cooperative were the French?

BEIGEL: I first began to get the information through telex exchanges from the code room in the State Department in the old building on the 5th floor in those days. One could write a message to Paris and hand it in at the code room where it would be transmitted and shown on a screen in a small room off the code room. Paris received it through a military circuit through Frankfurt and, I imagine they had a similar screen in their code room. The people I was talking to, the Economic Minister, the head of the ECA mission, the financial specialist, were sitting in a room receiving this questionnaire. They would go around to the French and hand in the questionnaire. The French were very cooperative. They had a special Ministry for the Associated States which had a defense element in it that was backstopping the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina. I eventually went over and spent a week interrogating the French colonels dealing with this budget. I guess they were fascinated that this pipsqueak American could come over and ask them questions about their budget and argue with them, etc. The purpose was to find out where the water was in the budget and squeeze it. At the outset, however, that was not true. The first year it was simply a matter of attribution, but when it came around for the second year a great review exercise took place. I spent five weeks in Paris helping collect information early in 1954.

By then the Defense Department had a comptroller for the European theater who had his headquarters a block away from the embassy in Paris. I had an office with the comptroller's staff and in effect advised them on how to move things. This was considered a priority project for the NSC. And we collected this information and wrote a thick report. It came back and was submitted to the NSC with a covering political explanation and justification written by a superb member of the Policy Planning Staff who was a great Far Eastern specialist – Charlie Stelle, I believe it was. That was submitted to the NSC as a proposal from the Secretary of State who was very much concerned about getting it approved within the Administration. He didn't have any problems about the President. He had problems with George Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury who had a steely eye on all kinds of expenditures. In a certain sense, it may be fair to say, this presentation was designed to convince George Humphrey that we knew what we were doing.

The French had come to us in 1953, to our Embassy in Paris. Mr. Laniel, the Prime Minister, told the young American Ambassador, Mr. Dillon, "I'm taking a leaf out of Mr. Eisenhower's book. I'm trying to balance the French budget too. One of the things I am thinking of doing is dumping our \$300-400 million support (in francs) for the national armies of the three associated states."

This is the real reason I spent the five weeks early in 1954 collecting detail on their own budget projections. They were in effect paying for and administering those national armies. The Laniel statement was found to be incredible back here. Did he really mean that? Did Dillon really understand him? The Secretary's counselor, Douglas MacArthur II, had been in the Embassy in Paris in 1939, and at Vichy before our invasion of North Africa. He had known Laniel as a member of parliament. Now Mr. Laniel was Prime Minister. It was decided to send Mr. MacArthur over to speak to him. He went and the telegrams came back saying yes, Mr. Dillon had heard it right to begin with. So then it was a question of really fleshing out the justification to cover the subsequent year's funding.

The French would pay out expenditures on their own forces and on these national armies and give us a voucher and we in effect reimbursed them for the voucher. This was the mechanics of transferring that assistance to the French. The first year of the combined program amounted to \$785 million overall.

Q: When Laniel was proposing this was he proposing getting out..

BEIGEL: It wasn't a withdrawal; he was in effect saying that the French Expeditionary Force is staying there but I am going to stop paying for the national armies, would you like to pick up the additional bill? We said yes.

Q: But in a way it sounds like if you don't pick up the bill we are ready in the long run to get out of here.

BEIGEL: That was the implication. And of course there was always the question of the sticking power of the French. But in 1953 they were sticking. In fact their Supreme Commander, General Navarre, had devised what was known as the Navarre Plan. The spring of 1954 came around and all of this material had all been approved for a second year and was submitted to the Congress. Mr. Dulles went up to testify. This was the spring of 1954. Great presentation of the Navarre Plan- -in two years they were going to mop up Viet Minh and bring peace to Indochina, etc. Well, of course, the battle of Dien Bien Phu began early in the spring of 1954 and was going on when Dulles went up to testify. Not too much time went by when we realized what was happening. First thing we knew in the summer of 1954 there was a Geneva Conference. That whole second-year presentation came to naught. However, we were very interested that the French Expeditionary Corps not just leave. When the country was divided at the 17th parallel we were anxious the French remain there so that the Viet Minh not take over the entire country. We offered special \$100 million program of support for the French.

In any case I had been heavily involved in writing a very elaborate procedural agreement in the summer of 1953 to transfer a very significant – and these were big numbers in those days – amount of aid to the French relating to the Indochina war. At the same time, my colleagues across the hall were completing negotiations of the first Spanish defense agreement.

Q: Your colleagues across the hall were...

BEIGEL: The Spanish Desk. Having gotten very much involved in the French military budget,

from 1950 on, I became the resident expert on the French NATO program and particularly their budget and how it was related to what they were doing and what we wanted them to do and what our aid program would be, both on the military assistance side and the economic assistance side. And this went on for a number of years.

I had to choose whether I would work on Spain and Portugal, which became its own country directorate, or stay with France and the Benelux which were put together with France. John Leddy was then assistant secretary. It was important to him that I continue doing France, because by that time we were leading up to be evicted from France by Charles de Gaulle.

Q: What period?

BEIGEL: This is now up to 1965-1966. It was necessary to negotiate an orderly withdrawal of our military presence from France which became a major activity, for a year or more, of instructing Ambassador Bohlen in Paris on what he should be raising with the French and getting, on an overnight basis, clearances out of the Pentagon for all this which was another unique experience and operation.

Q: I would like to talk about this. John Leddy in an interview with Willis Armstrong discusses your coming in with this handwritten note from General de Gaulle for the President. Do you recall this?

BEIGEL: Oh, yes, what happened was when de Gaulle, who gave us some hints and we also had sources inside the French government so that we realized that what was about to hit the fan. When it did hit the fan it took the form of a handwritten letter that General de Gaulle sent to the President. He sent one to Adenauer, and I guess he sent one to Harold Macmillan which he considered his three principal allies. I think the General had asked the Foreign Ministry to draft such a piece of correspondence and he got it in due course. He saw what they had to suggest but wrote his own note which became a collector's item. There we had a handwritten note, a rather old-fashion way of doing inter- governmental business at the head of government level. That may be the handwritten letter referred to.

Q: We can come back and do this another time. Can we now talk about the phenomena of de Gaulle and how we dealt with him through the Department?

BEIGEL: Well, when de Gaulle left office in 1946, crossed the political wilderness as the French called it, and stayed there, there was a Gaullist party which other parties considered threatening; they got a lot of votes in some elections in parliament; there was a question of whether we would keep in touch with de Gaulle through our ambassador or DCM in Paris. I think Dillon, for example, would see de Gaulle every once in a while, just to maintain contact. When the crunch came in Algeria on the 13th of May, 1958 the Fourth Republic had diverted most of its ground forces from France and Germany down to North Africa. We had been giving various forms of support to the French forces while at the same time people such as Jack Kennedy, U.S. Senator, were speaking out very strongly about the need for self-government in Algeria. The government's problem was to behave in such a manner as to maintain a supportive relationship with France. When the crunch came, and the politicians of the Fourth Republic agreed that some

very serious step had to be taken, General de Gaulle was invited by most of the parties and political leaders to come back to Paris and become Prime Minister. He met with all the political leaders and the only one who gave him a hard time was a man named Francois Mitterrand.

Q: The Socialist candidate...

BEIGEL: Well, Mitterrand wasn't exactly a Socialist, but he moved into the Socialist Party later on. He was one of the center parties then. Conservative party, if anything. In any case, de Gaulle comes into office in 1958 and the first thing that happens is that Foster Dulles knows that here is a formidable figure. Dulles knew his history and knew how difficult de Gaulle was among the allies during World War II. Eisenhower, of course, was in a fortunate position of having been the Allied Commander in Algiers and then in the invasion of France, so he had lots of relations with de Gaulle. He had a special advantage that during the World War II period he had always maintained a good relationship with de Gaulle. De Gaulle understood that Eisenhower was subject to direction by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and by the President of the United States, so that the U.S. positions on whatever the subject was weren't invented by Eisenhower. They had a good relationship, in a personal sense. The first thing that happened was that Dulles went to Paris after de Gaulle was in office a month or two and talked to him about various things around the world. As I recall, without getting into the detail of this which is all very well known, he talked about nuclear submarine cooperation and de Gaulle said that he had agreed that the French should go on with their nuclear weapons program that had begun some years before he came back into power. While we wouldn't cooperate on the nuclear weapons program maybe something could be done about developing their nuclear submarines because we had already helped the British in that respect. That was all right with de Gaulle. He said they would be exploding their first nuclear test weapon sometime in 1960, his scientists had told him. We began a negotiation. I remember Dulles went back to see him at the end of 1958.

In the interval a very important event had taken place. We had landed forces in Lebanon in the summer of 1958 and the British had landed paratroop forces in Jordan. Also in 1958 there was in the Straits of Formosa a great to-do going on between the Chinese from Taiwan, who were implanted in the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu and the Chinese communists on the mainland. An artillery duel. We were anxious that the Chinese communists not invade Quemoy and Matsu and take them over, etc., etc. What later became known as brinkmanship was practiced. We made public statements to deter the Chinese. In the Lebanese operation I remember a French cruiser was sent out to the eastern Mediterranean and asked for some fuel from one of our oilers in the area. Our attitude can be generalized as, "please go away." We did not really want to associate France in this venture since the French had bad relationships with the Arabs in those days.

Q: Particularly the Lebanon-Syria relationship where they had been the mandated power.

BEIGEL: Well, and notwithstanding their historic interest in Lebanon going back to the Crusades. They had been the mandated country for Lebanon and Syria and they had fought with the British during World War II over that; they had given up the mandates, etc., etc. General de Gaulle by September 1958 – who had been doing a slow burn I'm sure – formulated a letter to Eisenhower, it may have been typewritten this time, and an identical letter which he sent to

Macmillan, saying that he was very disturbed by all of our unilateral behavior in the Far East and Lebanon. As you reflect on it: what if we had gotten into a war with Communist China which had then invoked its then existing alliance with the Soviet Union, then we had gotten into a tense situation with the Soviet Union and wanted in turn to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty. We could drag France into something that it had nothing to do with, etc., etc. So therefore he, General de Gaulle, was enclosing a little memorandum to suggest some new arrangements which amounted to having a council of the big three at the head of state level. They would meet to consider events all around the world. This was given its name by others, not de Gaulle as the Tripartite Directorate Proposal, which was not directed at NATO, it was global. (Later on, not at that time, de Gaulle made some speeches in France indicating among other things he wanted to have a say in the employment of nuclear weapons by the United States. Of course that had been something that the British Government had wanted and sort of got on a bilateral basis. That was an understandable interest of de Gaulle's.) This was something, of course, that the U.S. Government couldn't deliver on. The U.S. Government had mutual security treaties in a number of places – we had the Rio Treaty in the Western Hemisphere, we had several treaties in the Far East...

Q: We had SEATO and CENTO...

BEIGEL: So the answer Eisenhower gave was, well, General de Gaulle we have treaty relationships around the globe which you France do not have, and we are not elevating ourselves with several other self-selected governments above all these treaty partners, we are dealing with each set of treaty partners in its own right. Therefore we are very sorry we cannot accommodate you in that respect, but we will be very happy to have consultations with you. Dulles went back to Paris towards the end of 1958 and tried to consult with de Gaulle; we had elaborate talks at the ambassadorial level, but it all came to nothing in terms of what de Gaulle had been asking for. De Gaulle would periodically raise this with Eisenhower and he even raised it with Kennedy when he came into office. It finally petered out. One of the things that de Gaulle said at the end of his memorandum was: And by the way I will subordinate my future behavior in NATO to your giving me satisfaction on my proposal. At that time, no one knew quite what that meant.

We were conducting a negotiation with the French admirals who came over about nuclear submarines cooperation. Lo and behold we discover that General de Gaulle had announced that the French Mediterranean fleet, operating out of Toulon, which had been earmarked for wartime assignment to NATO command (just a paper transaction) he had withdrawn from that earmark. That was the first unraveling of French participation in NATO. Except this first unraveling only took the form of a statement; nothing happened in the real world.

Q: Well let me ask, this is the overall view, how were you and Western Europe looking at this and responding to it – the period from '58 up to about '65?

BEIGEL: We first learned about this from a press ticker. We used to have the French press ticker in WE – Agence France-Presse – for many years until it was discontinued. We learned about what was happening in France very quickly that way, it was a great advantage, but the price of paper made it impossible eventually. The first thing we had to do was alert the Assistant Secretary that this was what de Gaulle had just done. This was critically important because he was either on his way or on the Hill giving testimony to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

about this agreement we were going to enter into to assist the French in developing a nuclear submarine. One of the things you have to do in such circumstances is the President has to make a determination under the Atomic Energy Act that the recipient country is fully participating in a mutual security arrangement. If General de Gaulle is beginning to withdraw forces from their NATO earmark, he is no longer fully participating, particularly on the Navy side. The whole project of going ahead with that agreement was dropped there and then. The French, even years later under new leadership, never quite understood why all that happened. But it was all the working of the Atomic Energy Act.

In 1963, four years later, the NATO commander for the Atlantic was being changed so he went to all the countries to say goodbye. He called on General de Gaulle and told him that he was very happy that all the French units in the Atlantic were kept under their NATO earmark. General de Gaulle, some people believe, may not have realized that he hadn't removed all of them in 1959 and very promptly we got notice that the rest of the units were removed. So, the French Navy was no longer earmarked. But still all the other arrangements remained in place and, of course, by 1965...

Oh, very important...in 1962 the Algerian war wound up and General de Gaulle made speeches that people mostly didn't pay attention to; however it was one of my tasks to follow these things very closely. I must say that at that time we had a unique situation in which the Deputy Secretary of State, George Ball, seemed to have a special interest in French affairs.

Q: Well he was Monnet's man wasn't he?

BEIGEL: It's true he had a personal relationship with Monnet but he did have a very keen interest in France. He fully appreciated the significance of de Gaulle as President of France. When it was announced that de Gaulle was having a press conference, and this was always announced ahead of time with a great to-do, he was vitally interested in knowing that and knowing how many days it was since the last press conference. He wanted to know right away off the ticker what it is that de Gaulle said because these were important things covering a variety of subjects. This was no longer the case. This is part of the charm of being in WE during that period. In any case, we had hints that something was going to happen about France and NATO and noises began to be made about the command relationship. I remember doing a great research on the command relationship in World War II and getting help from a colleague who was working under the exchange program with Defense, a Foreign Service officer who was working in the Joint Staff. He got the Joint Staff historical section to prepare material for me on the command relationships in World War II involving French forces.

Q: At the very end of the war there were some real problems the French were following in their area...

BEIGEL: Well that is right, there were French forces in central and then in northern Italy and then at Belfort, and then eventually at Stuttgart. There were confrontations with de Gaulle at each place.

Q: They were following their own agenda, in a way.

BEIGEL: Yes. The French military did what de Gaulle wanted. He was the French commander-in-chief and not your allied super structure. There were certain problems which were not insuperable and were worked out. In any case, this was an element that was going on then. The time came when George Ball went over and saw de Gaulle and got some hints but still couldn't figure things out. Then in the winter of 1965- '66 we got an inkling of what was coming and it happened. We had to negotiate our way out of there. It was left that we then had in EUR, and had ever since 1950, an office dealing with NATO affairs across the board. One of the bureaucratic problems and questions that had arisen within EUR, back in the 1950s was how do the geographic offices and the desks relate to the NATO office in dealing with the NATO countries on military questions. In terms of the French relationship we never had problems, partly because I had been there from the outset and remained there and went out of my way to have good relations with the colleagues in the regional office. They had confidence that I knew what I was doing. When this drama came along it was really a country problem, but it had to be dealt with both in NATO and bilaterally, but of course getting out of France was in a sense a housekeeping question. All of the instructions originated at the WE level and would get the blessing of the Assistant Secretary or his deputy. We went through 1955, 1956, and then we had long interminable discussions with France about what would happen after that.

We did negotiate, strangely enough, continued use of the pipeline that the French had built across France from the Atlantic taking U.S. aviation and other fuel into Germany. The French had built it and were operating it under contract to the Defense Department. They said well, we want that to continue. There were also what were called NATO pipelines the French had built up into Germany.

We had five airfields used by U.S. fighter planes in eastern France, and other fields used by transports, lots of ammunition depots, and we had hospital facilities. Back 1964, during the Johnson-Goldwater campaign, the Pentagon wanted to deal with the continuing balance of payments deficit with Europe – things had turned around from the 1940s. (McNamara had earlier said to Kennedy that he would try to contribute a billion dollars a year to the reduction of the balance of payments deficit, by reducing net U.S. military expenditures abroad without denigrating our missions abroad.) So one question was to go to all the principal countries in Western Europe in the summer of 1964 with survey teams. The team I was associated with was headed by a Joint Staff officer who picked service officers from real estate offices in the European Commands to form a small team. They invited the State Department to send an observer and counselor with each team and go around and visit all the military facilities – one team per country. I spent six weeks in the fall of 1964 visiting all of our facilities in France. In our final report I was asked to write the section on our relations with the French and could say honestly that everything we wanted from the French from 1950 on, although lots of hemming and hawing and problems on the French side, but eventually all of our requirements were fulfilled; and it was only a year and a half later that General de Gaulle said there would no longer be any foreign forces or installations in France.

Q: When you got this handwritten letter in WE, what was the response for there is basically two ways of doing it – one was sticking it to them the dirty bastards or two, lets take the long view.

BEIGEL: I might say that a lot of people have forgotten but Foster Dulles once gave a very important speech, which he then put into a Foreign Affairs article, as Secretary of State saying we have bases available to us around the world, but we only operate with the consent of the host governments. I think that philosophy remained. There have been a lot of people who try to strong-arm governments in more recent years, but that wasn't the attitude in the 50s and 60s. When de Gaulle said that's it, there wasn't any doubt about that. The only national forces in France were ourselves and the Canadians. The Canadians had some facilities in France. The NATO military headquarters were also in France. One of Mr. Spaak's contributions...

Q: That was Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium...

BEIGEL: Was to get his government, which reluctantly went along, to offer to receive the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. That move was made. We had in anticipation of something going to happen, the Joint Staff and European commands had already made vast studies about relocation of our facilities. Also our military supply concepts were changing and if they had to do it over again they wouldn't have built the French line of communications the way it then existed. When we were invited to leave, the government agreed to that and preparations were made. We negotiated with the French the terms and we got out in two years (instead of one) in a very orderly way. I think de Gaulle once said to Bohlen that he was very pleased that we had been as cooperative about fulfilling what he wanted to take place. But we recognized French sovereignty fully.

Q: Going back a bit, in '54 and all how were you and others looking at the colonial situation of these powers? Did you see that France and the other countries were going to be able to hold on to this at that time?

BEIGEL: Well, if people thought about it at all they could see that this was going to be a very difficult situation. By 1956 the French protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco were coming to an end. The political situation being different in Algeria, the French thought they could pacify and hold on to what they had there. That turned out to be historically incorrect. Things, in fact, got worse. There was a lot of terrorist bombing in Algiers, for example. There was a need to pacify the city of Algiers. This was actually done by 1958, 1959. I went there in the spring of 1960, the negotiations were still proceeding, the secret talks that were sort of secret, no one knew really what was going on. It was somewhat like what we were doing with the Vietnamese in Paris for a number of years. The public wasn't really informed about the contact what was going on. I can recall in the spring of 1960 that the city of Algiers was pacified. We flew down into the desert to look at the oil wells. Meanwhile, while all this was going on, down in the Sahara the French were exploring for oil and finding it, and building pipelines, building macadam road down to take supplies. This was extraordinary, the French had developed an additional economic interest in Algeria that hadn't existed in 1954. I think it is fair to say people simply adjusted to the situation. It did not come as a great surprise.

Meanwhile in 1956, 1957, 1958, the French were doing things in tropical Africa, winding up their colonial regimes. I guess 1958 must have been the big year for independence to be declared throughout tropical Africa. The French pioneered this so that it had a very serious impact on the Belgians in the Congo. What was happening in French Africa around the Congo is what led to

the independence of the Belgian Congo. This in turn had an impact, by 1960, 1961 in Angola. The colonial war began then in Angola. I can remember reading interrogations or testimonies given by missionaries. One could see how the pattern developed. How the word got from one tribe to another despite language differences. In the French area of tropical Africa this really began, in that period, while they were still fighting to pacify Algeria...

Q: How did this speech, I can't recall the date, but everyone talks about the Speech Senator Kennedy made on the floor concerning support of Algeria. How was this viewed from within the EUR Bureau?

BEIGEL: Oh well, I think in the EUR Bureau, and within the Administration, certain materials were prepared at the request of Senator Saltonstall, the senior senator from Massachusetts at that time. I think it was Saltonstall who may have gotten up and made a counter-speech to the speech of the junior senator from Massachusetts. Saltonstall presented the Administration's line.

Q: Which was...

BEIGEL: Which was not Senator Kennedy's line which I would guess was that the French must wake up and grant immediate independence to the Northern Departments of Algeria, etc., etc. I can't remember what year that would have been – 1956 or 1957, somewhere in there. The French effort, which was a major effort, probably did not compare in its lethal effect to what we later were to do in Vietnam because the French simply did not have the kind of firepower deployed. They had a lot of units down there but it was small unit operations. I don't think they used the kind of bombing and artillery, and napalm that we used in Vietnam. We really beat up the Vietnam jungle much more than the French did. The helicopter, I might say, was a special thing because in the mountainous areas in Algeria, one way of living there was in caves and people would go into caves to seek refuge from French army units that were crawling around the mountains. They invented the gun ship approach of flying the helicopter and being able to shoot into the caves with automatic weapons. Of course, none of that resolved the situation. The Third World warfare that Bobby Kennedy was later to be a great proponent of was all a failure.

Q: Yes, the special forces and all...

BEIGEL: I think that continues to be a failure around the world wherever we employ it. But we continue to employ it. It is almost as if our professional forces need to be employed or they may wither on the vine in terms of appropriations and otherwise. This is a perverse aspect. It is frequently the case that a country's intentions are modified in accordance with its capabilities. When it is often said that the important thing about a power is to look at its intentions, not its capabilities, I think more people are discovering that that is false. At the time I recall wondering if the great build-up of our helicopter force when the Kennedy Administration came into office, McNamara came into office, great orders were pushed, we developed capabilities that we would then eventually employ in Vietnam. If we didn't have all that equipment, including the build-up of Navy sealift, if we didn't have that we wouldn't have engaged as extensively as we did in Vietnam. So the French were confronted with a similar situation. They engaged to the extent of their capabilities. Their intentions were beyond their capabilities.

Q: I wonder if we could go back to 1958 when de Gaulle came into power. This was not the revolt of the generals; that came a little later didn't it?

BEIGEL: Well that is right. The revolt of the generals was a more localized affair, just in Algiers, in the spring of 1961. It was soon brought under control by loyal generals.

Q: But how did we view the 1958 situation with de Gaulle coming in? What was being talked about in EUR at that time? Did we see de Gaulle coming back, did we feel it was a good thing or not? How did we feel?

BEIGEL: I suppose the fairest thing to say is that we were trying to keep up with what was probably happening as the rest of the world was. We didn't have any pipeline inside, that I can recall, the French Government or the Gaullist movement, we were strictly outside watching what was happening. An embassy has good contacts, of course, to learn what is happening, but it was seen that this was a situation as is always the case in a country like France that was going to be resolved by the French in some way. The really significant aspect of the developing political situation in a major western European country that foreign governments have any relation to is the international financial position of that country. If that country has a run on its currency, or wants to close its international markets, then other countries are concerned. There was, on a later occasion, in 1968, which was a strictly domestic development in France when the French to their surprise ended up with a general strike and their currency was under great pressure; at that time, for example, the Johnson Administration told the French Government that if they needed some standby credit to bolster their currency that we were prepared to get to that. While that helps bolster the self-confidence of a government that is under domestic pressure it's only in ways like that that other governments can really have any great impact in a country like France.

Q: Most of the time we are there reporting but try to stay out of the cross fire.

BEIGEL: We are concerned about the safety of our nationals that are in the country. If anything is happening in the country that would make it less safe for them. Of course, before 1958 came along that was not really the case. This was a quick couple of weeks, but the fuss was mostly in the churning around in the parliamentary scene, the political scene. It did not involve violence, mobilization, what have you. There was a case in 1961, the so-called revolt of the generals when we learned later there were in fact some units down at Pau; in the southwest, for example, where there was an airborne training center. There were some air force generals who were thinking about the possible mobilization of those forces. They would take paratroops up, drop them on the airports in Paris and other key places. That was at a time when they looked ludicrous at first. The then Prime Minister was calling on the public to get their hunting rifles and go out to the airport, or drive their trucks on the runways, or what have you. But clearly the French domestic intelligence service, the police intelligence service, had wind of all these things going on. The French have a very good civil, domestic intelligence service which works closely with their security service, which is the equivalent of our FBI.

EUR was bracing for what would happen. Our mission chief or DCM in Paris had talked with General de Gaulle every so often, as a kind of courtesy call. One keeps a benign contact with a person like that who is extensively out in the political desert, but you never know and this, of

course, was an example when the person crossed the desert and came back into power. And into much more power than he had immediately after the war in 1945. The important thing about de Gaulle was knowing him. The leadership here which had experience since the Second World War was in office and knew that de Gaulle was a difficult person to deal with and behaved accordingly. The Secretary of State, within a month or so after de Gaulle returned to power, was making a visit to see him, an official visit. He offered certain kinds of special cooperation to him in the military field, which I think we discussed before, which ended up collapsing partly because General de Gaulle gave the first indications, which were largely not appreciated, exactly what it was leading up to in this country, but were sufficient to put cold water on the development of some special cooperation that really called for his full participation in the NATO arrangements and planning. As he began to withdraw from that the response here recognized that, and certain things that could have happened did not happen. There was public confusion about all this, but the Administrations in office were quite conscious of what they were doing and why, even though they did not always articulate this. But this is always the case, even today the press will tell us our real policy is this but the Administration is not articulating it very well and sometimes for deliberate political reasons. That was the case with France during the whole Gaullist period.

Q: It seems that even looking back on history, and I would appreciate your point of view, that in foreign relations, particularly, there has been the impression in the United States that in crisis France is there, but in other times they play kind of the spoiler as far as we are concerned. Is there anything to this or....

BEIGEL: When you talk about crisis, they are crisis in our eyes.

Q: Well, I'm thinking of the Cuban missile crisis.

BEIGEL: So we take the Cuban missile crisis. This was a bilateral confrontation between ourselves and the Soviets. The resolution of that crisis came about with the mobilization of our conventional armed forces, air force, army and navy, to close in on Cuba. I think the Soviets were aware of this. Any military attaché in Washington who was paying attention was probably aware of what was happening, although on much of public opinion here the conventional mobilization was lost. In any event, it was the beginning of a naval blockade, the quarantine as it was called. And what would proceed from that with our conventional forces I believe convinced the Soviets that the show was over. People like Dean Rusk talked about nuclear confrontation which people like General Taylor, who was in a very critical position as military advisor to the President at that time, has since written was nonsense. It struck me as nonsense, but Dean Rusk used to make lots of nonsense about a lot of things. In any case, a belief that it was such a confrontation was mythology, but it did get around. This was enough to scare a lot of Europeans. After all if we had a confrontation with the Soviets and they were engaged in a defense treaty relationship with us where would that leave them. Well, they only had to think about that and not for very long as it was all over in a few weeks. There was then the famous episode which was subsequently written up in which Dean Acheson was mobilized to...

Q: This was after he was out of office.

BEIGEL: Oh, he was out of office, yes. He was just taken on by Kennedy as a special emissary. He was a lawyer on 15th street then. He was sent as a special emissary with some types from Langley, Virginia, with the aerial photographs to show them to General de Gaulle who, the story is, after looking at the photographs through the stereoscopic devices that would give him a three-dimensional affect, said, "Tell your President we are with you." One could say to himself, what the hell does that mean? I don't know that it meant anything in particular. It was a nice gesture, a nice statement.

That was in October 1962. It is interesting that in early 1963 when he was reminded that part of the French fleet was still earmarked for NATO commitment in wartime, de Gaulle immediately took steps to withdraw that paper commitment. He also in 1962, before the Cuban missile crisis, was already redeploying French forces from Algeria, but we already knew that he had made clear internally that they were not going back to Germany from whence they had been withdrawn. And from speeches that he made, to which people didn't pay much attention here, it was quite apparent that he didn't have any intention of rebuilding the French ground and air commitment to NATO. Once he had redeployed French forces from Algeria he was going to demobilize a lot of those forces, which he did.

When was the next crisis? We had already had some crisis before Kennedy came into office. There was the crises back in 1958 which I have talked about before, in the Far East and in the Middle East, which General de Gaulle told us he was very concerned about in terms of their implications for French security and invoking our security alliances with France to get them involved in something they were not really involved in. This just added, I thought, to de Gaulle's appreciation along those lines. And despite the statement that he made to Acheson, I don't think that fit into de Gaulle's pattern of thinking. The crisis in Czechoslovakia was in August 1968. At that time, of course, we made very clear, mostly by Dean Rusk talking on background so that public opinion didn't know who was talking, but he made quite clear to the press, in some extraordinary background press conferences, that we were not going to do anything about the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. That was on their side of the line. The NATO treaty was to defend NATO Europe. The President then came out and made some statements that were not written in the State Department, but were written by his Security Counselor, Mr. Rostow, a kind of warning to the Soviet Union that they should not pull a similar operation in Yugoslavia. There was a feeling then, a concern that that might happen. [I can recall looking up the minutes of the summit meetings between Chamberlain and Daladier, the summer of 1938, all of which were subsequently published. Reading the minutes of the French/British summits were rather interesting. It was apparent that Chamberlain did the same thing in 1938 as Johnson did in 1968. He made some statements warning Hitler not to move into other countries at that moment.] Well, that didn't turn out to be a Soviet plan. But at that time the French reaction – the French reaction?...Perhaps our relationship with General de Gaulle was sufficiently cool by then. For example, on the night of the operation...

Q: This was the invasion of Czechoslovakia?

BEIGEL: In August 20, 1968, the American Ambassador in London was invited to come to a cabinet meeting at Downing Street, which to my mind epitomized what was called the special relationship. The first thing the British cabinet thought of was consulting with the United States.

That is a measure of whether or not you have a special relationship. Now, what was the reaction in Paris? None whatsoever. Whatever the French were saying to each other inside their own government that night they were not talking to us. The Chargé in Bonn was invited to come around, if not to a German cabinet meeting, to the Chancellor's office. We were mobilized back here within the State Department that night.

The French reaction led to the what I would describe as a public confrontation. It was a personal thing with General de Gaulle who was of course at that time on vacation at his estate in eastern France. He deliberately called for a special French cabinet meeting to take place in Paris soon thereafter. The purpose of this, which became apparent after the fact, was so that he could issue a long 219enefited219 that he undoubtedly wrote himself saying well, what do you expect as the consequence of the Yalta Agreement the Americans made with the Russians. This was another manifestation of General de Gaulle's perverse interpretation of what the Yalta Agreement was all about.

Q: Was it perverse of the Yalta Agreement or perverse from at least our point of view of wanting to make France something special. One couldn't do much about the Soviet Union but he could certainly make sure that he was staking out...

BEIGEL: I don't know.

Q: But did you have this impression?

BEIGEL: One never knows what his motivations were unless he told somebody, wrote them down himself, and this never happened. His whole attitude about the Yalta Agreement, which was a very simple declaration on liberated Europe that called freely-elected governments in all the liberated countries in Europe. It is obvious that Stalin had no intentions of abiding by any such undertaking and that our side may have been naively idealistic in promoting such a declaration and making something of it. In any event that's all the Yalta Agreement that was germane to the Czechoslovakia situation called for. Self-government in Czechoslovakia as a liberated country. The Russians didn't have any intention of following that. So this had nothing to do with the Yalta Agreement. Nonetheless, General de Gaulle put out this great blast directed at the Americans as being responsible at Yalta for what was happening in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. It so happened that a participant at the conference at Yalta, and former American Ambassador in France, was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs for a year or so before he retired, namely Chip Bohlen. Dean Rusk asked Bohlen to prepare a counter-blast that was issued as a statement by the U.S. Government recalling what the Yalta Agreement was about, what the declaration was about. I can remember one afternoon, Bohlen's secretary frantically calling down to me, as a source of documentation over the years, please bring the Yalta Agreement to Mr. Bohlen's office immediately. I had to go down to get it out of the library and take it up. He figured I had all of this right at my finger tips.

The whole issue of spheres of influence, as if they had been agreed upon at Yalta, etc. which was all mythology, was all knocked down in this public blast. Although the leading paper in Paris had a two-page spread, by its foreign editor, explaining why de Gaulle was wrong about this and the Americans were right, it didn't affect most French politicians' thinking. Nor has it in the 20 years

since then. This mythology that de Gaulle implanted is really set in the French political mind, believe it or not. It was in this country as well because it did become an article of faith to the GOP that this was another nefarious action by Franklin Roosevelt; and that did not stop being a Republic Party position until, for some curious reason, Ronald Reagan made a public statement that it was all wrong.

In any case later that year it was decided that the NATO Foreign Ministers should meet at the United Nations. This was probably in October, two months after the Czech affair. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Debré, came (this was a closed session and in effect a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York) and characterized the invasion, and I think he also did so publicly, as just an accident on the highway of history. At one time General de Gaulle even made reference to nefarious broadcast by German radio stations that may have encouraged the Czechs in their Prague Spring approach to life. The Czechs needed no encouragement from foreign radios. This gave the flavor of how de Gaulle approached this. Of course, the real significance of all of this was that it brought down, like a house of cards, an endeavor that de Gaulle had undertaken as part of his own eastern policy, if you want to call it that. He had made visits to Poland and the Soviet Union and there was apprehension here as to what this would lead to. People like the Alsops, Joe Alsop in his column, even wondered if de Gaulle intended to reverse his alliances. Nothing like that happened, but it indicates how anxious some people were as to what de Gaulle had up his sleeve. As a matter of fact he was trying to create a new atmosphere with Moscow. France would play a role of bridging East-West differences, etc. All this collapsed with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. De Gaulle never publicly admitted it and never got to write about it in his second series of memoirs which ended just after the first volume was completed – he died with only the beginning of the second volume. That event in the fall of 1968 along with what had happened in the spring of 1968 domestically, I think, was very discouraging to de Gaulle. There is some reason to believe that in the spring of 1969, when he called for another referendum on the reformation of the French Senate and local government, he realized that he was going to lose that referendum. When he did he promptly announced his retirement from public life. He resigned as President. I believe that these events of 1968 he may have found very discouraging both domestically and for his foreign policy. So this was the real effect of those events even though in terms of French-American relations they certainly stirred up a lot of dust.

Q: Did you have the feeling that we were trying to mend fences with France and that de Gaulle didn't want those fences mended for his own personal or political reasons?

BEIGEL: No, I think he was convinced of his own policies and what he was doing. The fence-mending part refers to a number of people in this government, and we are now talking about the end of 1968. But from the period of 1964 on, when Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the Presidency (at the end of 1963 he gave an anonymous interview to a columnist of the Washington Evening Star, who was well-known in Washington as being close to Johnson, about relations with de Gaulle). The attitude here was that General de Gaulle had pushed himself away from the table and whenever he wants to come back to the table we would be perfectly delighted to resume the relationship. But it was up to General de Gaulle. I consider that that was a very significant statement and characterized the entire Johnson Administration's relationship with de Gaulle. I don't think de Gaulle and Johnson saw each other at all except at a memorial service for Chancellor Adenauer.

Q: ...the Kennedy funeral.

BEIGEL: They met at the Kennedy funeral, but at that time, Johnson had been briefed that Kennedy had been arranging for de Gaulle to make a visit to the U.S. possibly an informal visit to Hyannis Port and/or Palm Beach. It was ostensibly projected for the spring of 1964, so Johnson, knowing that, made some allusion to that and de Gaulle made it clear, not to the President, but before he left town he had the word passed that anything about a meeting would be arranged through the usual diplomatic channels. Well, that turned out to be a signal that de Gaulle had no intention of going through with a visit. It turned out that the only time that they did see each other was in Germany. It is interesting that a French satirical paper characterized that meeting in a cartoon showing a photograph of the two men standing at a table greeting each other; under the table the cartoon had them kicking each other in the shins. The French understood that that was the relationship, which was perfectly suitable to General de Gaulle who seemed to want to have an arms-length relationship.

He of course was heavily involved in Vietnam. He had already had his summit meeting with Kennedy in the spring of 1961 when he warned Kennedy that France had been through all this in Indochina and his only advice was: don't you go through it. Kennedy didn't pay any attention to that – Laos was the issue at that moment. Kennedy began building up the forces and I never knew what the full motivation was, whether there was any religious interest in the back of Kennedy's mind with the strong Catholic regime in Vietnam. Nothing was ever said about that or even suggested. We had this great military build-up in our capabilities that were quite suitable to use in that part of the world. When you have them you frequently use them. In any case, we got involved and General de Gaulle in fact, I think it was in 1966, went out to Phnom Penh and made a big speech which was interpreted as an attack on American interventionist policy in that part of the world. We weren't going to resolve this situation in that part of the world through military intervention, he kept telling us, and we kept not believing it until we convinced ourselves.

So there was that tension in our relationship which became increasingly polemical throughout the Johnson Administration, particularly after 1965. De Gaulle was watching this in Paris and not giving much support. There were Frenchmen involved in some of our negotiations, but that, I think, all came after Johnson and de Gaulle both left office.

Q: From your vantage point did you see a return to mending fences after the departure of de Gaulle between the United States and France?

BEIGEL: Well, when you mend fences you have to find which fences. Basic relationships between the two countries were in no way affected by these foreign policy differences. The basic economic relationship between the two countries, all the commercial, trade, travel relationships, were developing rapidly. There was a steady expansion in the economic relationship which is the fundamental relationship between the two countries. Then we had a very special and somewhat artificial situation, namely the military relationship. That was a relationship between governments. The public read about things in the newspapers. There were certain numbers of military personnel involved, but this was a very special thing. Of course as long as we had a presence in France, which went on until 1967, the French public in those parts of the country

where we were implanted, were aware of our presence. But that again was a rather special thing affecting a limited part of the French population. It affected practically none of the American population except some thousands of troops who were present there. Otherwise when de Gaulle, for example, invited us to leave, well this became a public event, a media event. There was interest in Congress but for the vast part of public opinion there was little overall impact, although there was more reporting on France in the newspapers. Bohlen in his memories said this was certainly the most traumatic event in French-American diplomatic relations since the end of the war. Certainly the most traumatic event during the Johnson Administration and during Bohlen's tour in Paris which covered most of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. This was a very significant diplomatic event. But it was a diplomatic event at the government level. When you talk about fence-mending there is the question of well, what about that military relationship? Well, that relationship was defined by the French; we weren't withdrawing anything. It was the French who were withdrawing. It was General de Gaulle, himself, who agreed very promptly to a publicly-known but classified agreement that he made through his chief of staff with the NATO military command, which was approved by the NATO governments. That is an agreement that for the last 23 years has, I guess you might say, governed French relationships with NATO under which all kinds of contingency planning takes place...

Q: It's basically a de Gaulle agreement with NATO which took immediate effect, we didn't have to wait for de Gaulle's...?

BEIGEL: That all happened right away. It was announced on the floor of the French parliament. The agreement wasn't revealed but it was announced that there was such an agreement and that has governed the French Government's approach ever since. The extent that you have contingency planning and exactly how it develops is up to each French Government to define, but the institutional framework was established then and has never changed. No French Government has ever contemplated the notion of simply restoring the paper commitment of their forces. All French Governments say well, you see all of these contingency arrangements come into affect only if the French Government agrees in the time of a crisis.

The historic fact is that participation by any NATO government in coalition warfare takes place only when that national government decides; there is nothing automatic about NATO going to war as a coalition of governments. The governments must all agree as national governments. That is the basic fallacy of all de Gaulle policy I NATO, in pretending that in some way the Supreme Commander, an American general, could order French forces into action contrary to the wishes of the French Government. I think it was General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Commander, who came back to a series of Congressional investigations, there were at least three separate Congressional investigations, in the spring of 1966, about the whole situation in NATO. He said at one of these hearings, "I cannot order a French soldier to cross the street without the concurrence of his own government."

There were some members of the French parliament who opposed de Gaulle's decision. There was a debate in the spring of 1966, in the French parliament, and a vote, but of course the opponents of this policy were in the minority and the subject has never been discussed since. One or two maverick generals have said or written that France made a mistake and ought to correct it, but nothing has ever come of it.

Q: But also there has been the underlying cooperation between joint military maneuvers, the whole thing, so that the structure is still there.

BEIGEL: That's right. In 1960 the first French nuclear device exploded over the Sahara desert. This had been a program which had been in effect some years before General de Gaulle returned to office. He simply reconfirmed that it should go on. The French began developing nuclear weapons all on their own. They began developing a bomber that would carry bombs, land-based missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead, and nuclear submarines. They were doing all of this on their own. When they had achieved their bombers (the French were superb in aeronautical design historically), we started talking about coordinating their nuclear force with allied, meaning U.S. and UK, forces.

The French said no, after we develop our various generations of nuclear weapons we will think about it. And that continued to be their view during the Gaullist period, and after de Gaulle departed that continued to be the French view. Other than whatever contingency arrangements exist about the use of the French tactical nuclear weapons with allied weapons, mostly ours, as far as the bombers and missiles are concerned they are all on their own. This coordination to my knowledge never existed while I was in the Department.

There was concern here that if you have strategic weapons that you are going to fire you want to coordinate them with someone else who is firing them, but that's mostly a matter of convenience and economy and not having your own missile suddenly knocked down by someone else's missile exploding...

Well, I always considered all of this, which was looked on with utmost of importance in our own National Security Staff to be a great charade. Mr. McNamara, who had a lot to do with developing this, has only since he left office come around to this view himself. Heavens, he said, don't ever think you are going to use any of these weapons. This is all a deterrent. We haven't really gotten over that. That historic period in our military armament is winding down but all so slowly. With the French it is very curious because the French decided that they would develop their systems. The Gaullist party, headed by Mr. Chirac, was hell bent to increase the number of nuclear submarines they would build, far beyond the number they actually built. Mr. Chirac was of the school that thinks you must have a huge panoply of nuclear weapons. The Socialists, before they returned to office in 1981, after something like 23 years, didn't know much about what was going on and were rather anti all of this. They sorted themselves out and endorsed the nuclear weapons program and have contributed to its further development. They have developed multiple-warhead missiles for their submarines so that the actual number of vectors, as I call them, or warheads that they could employ is up in the hundreds, far greater in number than the British ever dreamed of having, even with their nuclear warheads that are coming along.

So the question arises: if the Americans and Soviets reduce nuclear weapons and restrain themselves, where do the British and French fit into that? President Mitterrand, has articulated a position on all this. He considers that we and the Soviets are involved in over-armament by far and that the two super-powers would have to vastly reduce the number of their arms before they would get anywhere down to the dimensions of where the French would seriously consider

participating. I think the British have now elucidated a similar line. This is where we now stand.

You might ask whether there are disagreements and tensions as a consequences of all this. I don't think so. One of the very interesting things that we did in these so-called disarmament negotiations with the Soviets, was that when the Soviets talked about the French and British nuclear forces we took very explicit exception to their statements and said no way would what we were doing affect the British and French. And the British and French appreciated that position. In 1963 the French negotiated with Henry Kissinger a statement that was put out as a NATO Council statement recognizing that the British and French had their independent nuclear forces which contribute to the over-all NATO deterrent. That was a phrase which I think the French Foreign Minister invented but which we embraced. So the French were very grateful and have frequently referred to that phrase as the American acceptance, after many years, of the legitimacy and the valid contribution of the French nuclear forces to the over-all deterrent.

Of course Mitterrand has steadily said that French defense doctrine in Europe is one of strategic deterrence; that that is the salvation of French national security. He does not subscribe anymore than the French Government under de Gaulle did to what was developing then as the so-called graduated response of the NATO nuclear forces which was adopted as NATO doctrine. It had to be adopted unanimously and was only adopted after France withdrew from the integrated command and from those bodies that would adopt such doctrine. That doctrine, the current NATO nuclear doctrine, was adopted only in 1967 once the French withdrew. Mitterrand has said, and he said only a month ago, that in his view the NATO doctrine must change in the coming period. I foresee that we may have new tensions with France.

A. LINCOLN GORDON
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1949-1950)

Ambassador A. Lincoln Gordon taught at Harvard University and then held a variety of positions in the United States Government, specifically as an economic expert dealing with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. He was appointed ambassador to Brazil by President Kennedy in 1961 and held that position until 1966, when he became Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.

GORDON: In 1949 I went to join Harriman's staff in Paris as head of the Program Division. I had an immense amount of business to do with Richard Bissell, who was the third ranking man in the Washington setup after Hoffman and Foster, and was the key man in the presentation of the program each year to the Congress. He used to say that the year was divided into two parts: the Congressional presentation half and the working half. So we had all kinds of overlapping interests in various policy matters. And most of our correspondence was done either by Airgrams, did we call them Airgrams in those days?

Q: *Yes, we did.*

GORDON: . . . or by telegrams, cables.

Q: *And the cables I think you might want to comment. The cables at that point were, although they were administered by the State Department, . . .*

GORDON: They were signed by . . .

Q: *. . . by Harriman and here in Washington by Hoffman.*

GORDON: That's right. It was because they were the special series for the ECA, for the Marshall Plan. Yes, and then, of course, we had five-letter codes to indicate that. The ones to Harriman's office were called Torep. And the ones from Harriman's office to Washington were REPTO. Those from Harriman's office to the country mission were also called REPTO. The ones to the country missions were called TOECA, or was it ECATO?

Q: *ECATO?*

GORDON: Yes, TOECA, that meant Washington. That was the headquarters, and ECATO was from Washington to individual country missions. So those messages were signed by the heads respectively, just as in a State Department series they'd be signed by the ambassador at that end. But the telephoning was by shortwave radio, and it would fade in and out. We lived in a wonderful eighteenth century house in Versailles built by one of Louis XIV's courtiers. There was only one telephone in the house, and it was in a little cabinet, as if it were a public telephone. It was a very primitive instrument in a long and rather drafty hall. We were six hours ahead of Washington, and Bissell often had the notion of calling me about four or five o'clock in the afternoon Washington time, which is ten or eleven o'clock in Paris. Sometimes I would have already gone to bed and I'd be called down to this cold drafty hall and have to shout. My wife used to say, "You're shouting so loud you can be heard directly all the way to Washington." It would fade in and out. We often said, "Oh, let's put into a cable whatever it is you're trying to say." But the cable part of it did work smoothly. I suppose the cabling was also done by radio, come to think of it . . . No, I suppose most of the cabling was done literally by under-water cable.

Q: *I'm sure. Linc, I'd like you to speak to the flexibility the organization had. I don't know whether you recall this, but at one time, I think just before you were returning to Washington directly for Mr. Harriman. You had made a trip to all of the missions, and you were appalled, as I recall, at the fact that very mission was organized like every other mission.*

GORDON: Um hum.

Q: *And I was in a meeting, I was then the head of the organization and management office, and you said, "Why should this be so?" Do you recall that?*

GORDON: Yes I do, I do.

Q: That was a very important event in our organization.

GORDON: That I didn't know, but the logic of it seemed to me to be quite contrary to that. Take for example the business of the counterpart funds, which were a very important part of each mission's responsibility.

Counterpart meant the local currency equivalent when we provided a European government, let us say the Dutch government, with money with which to buy some sort of imports from the United States. In the case of farm machinery, for example, they would receive this money in dollars. The dollars would be spent to buy the farm machinery, but the government didn't use the farm machinery itself and it would acquire as a result some guilders, the local Dutch currency, from the farmers or the farm machinery distributors. Basically, the actual commercial transaction would be between some American manufacturer of farm machinery and some Dutch importers. So the Dutch government ended up with what we called the local currency counterpart of the original dollar grant. Six percent of it – was it six? Was reserved . . .

Q: I think so, at first.

GORDON: . . . to the United States government and was used basically for administrative expenses. Although it turned out in some countries that that was much larger than necessary, and I think we gave a lot of it back, didn't we? Most of it was in the hands of the European government concerned, but the statute provided that the use of it required the consent of the United States government. That responsibility was normally delegated to the country mission.

The purpose was partly to exercise some restraint on excessive government expenditures in inflationary situations – in France, for example, with a rather weak government under their then constitution, the Fourth Republic. There was always a tendency to do what we in the United States do now, to run very large government fiscal deficits. And they were not as successful at controlling inflation as we seem to have been in recent years, so that there was a constant battle to try to exercise some influence over the French to reduce those deficits. Control over the use of counterpart turned out to be a rather effective instrument, because we simply wouldn't release the counterpart unless there was restraint in the rest of the government budget.

JACK B. KUBISCH
Junior Assistant to the Ambassador
Paris (1949-1950)

Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch was born in Missouri in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Brazil, France, Mexico, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Greece. Ambassador Kubisch was interviewed by Dr. Henry E. Mattox in 1989.

Q: One of you two early posts was Paris, as part of the Marshall Plan operation, and you were an assistant to Averell Harriman?

KUBISCH: That's correct, in a sense. I was a very junior assistant.

Q: *But you were with, or near, or around Averell Harriman?*

KUBISCH: To some extent, yes.

Q: *Your impressions of him, please?*

KUBISCH: Well, my impressions of Governor Harriman, as he like to be called later, were always very favorable. He was a very dedicated and hard-working man, and I think he served his country admirably in his posts abroad.

Not to his knowledge at the time, we used to refer to him as "Honest Ave the Hairsplitter," because he was very meticulous about what he did and how he did it and very thorough.

I should add that my assignment was basically in organizational and management matters and in helping to establish ECA or Marshall Plan missions in several countries. I had been transferred to Paris to do this work because of some related work I had done earlier in my first assignment in Brazil.

Q: *What did you do exactly? What did you do precisely to carry out this responsibility?*

KUBISCH: In Paris?

Q: *Yes.*

KUBISCH: Well, I worked with the Administrative Division of OSR, the Office of the Special Representative, as it was called.

Q: *Who was Harriman?*

KUBISCH: That's correct. Ambassador Harriman. And I worked with the Administrative Division's personnel and others in setting up certain jobs and positions as the organization was being established.

I had several co-lateral assignments. I was sent to the Marshall Plan mission in Paris, which was really just a couple of blocks away to fill in when an administrative officer was absent from that mission for some weeks.

Q: *Before we get away from that, there is one thing that interests me. The reputation of Harriman. As I recall, he had a rather fierce reputation, did he not, of biting people's heads off and things of that sort?*

KUBISCH: Well, possibly. I think that there are probably others that are being interviewed who worked much more closely with Ambassador Harriman than I did, who would be better qualified

to comment on it.

But I do remember one occasion, in Paris, and I saw examples of it later, in Washington and in Brazil, when he came to Brazil once when I was there the second time in the early '60's, where he could come down on people pretty hard. I remember one meeting, he was present and presiding, and some of the senior officers, I was not one of them in Paris at the time, but some of the senior officers were saying they had had a meeting with representatives of other governments and countries in Europe. They were discussing a certain issue. They were planning to pursue this discussion with these representatives of other governments several days later.

Harriman said something to the effect about, "Well, have you worked out the United States position and do you have a draft of it prepared to table?"

One of the responsible senior officers, I forget who it was at the moment, said, "Well, no, we were going to go and see what the other governments thought."

Harriman did sort of have a semi-blow up saying, "You know, don't ever go into a meeting without your own draft to put on the table that you can show to others. Then you can get their suggestions and comments on it. And you can adjust it or negotiate it. But if you wait for them to put their draft on the table first, you are at a disadvantage." Words to that effect.

MELBOURNE L. SPECTOR

**Deputy Personnel Officer for European Region, Economic Cooperation Administration
Paris (1949-1951)**

Melbourne L. Spector was born in Colorado in 1918. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of New Mexico. After college, Spector worked for the United Pueblos Agency, as a teaching fellow. From 1945-1948, Mr. he served in the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in France, Mexico, Latin America, India. This interview was conducted by W. Haven North on September 12, 1996.

Q: They were people on the G.I. Bill, getting college benefits to study abroad.

SPECTOR: Yes, we got some of our very best people that way. In order to delegate that personnel authority, we had to have a personnel manual with all the rules and regulations. So I was put in charge of getting, as quickly as I could, a manual out. I had two very good people working for me, two ladies, and we got a manual out in about 60 days. Then with that, authorized the ambassador to Paris, the head of the office of the special representative, to have personnel authority.

I went back to the State Department towards the end of the year, because I did not intend to make my career with the Marshall Plan at that point. I was really not invited to make myself through the Marshall Plan. I was married in November of '48, working happily in the Office of Personnel

at State, and now in recruitment and handling our work on the logistics for the selection boards.

Then early in 1949, I got a letter from the Director of Personnel in Paris, whom I knew and had worked for previously in the War Relocation Administration during the war, asking me if I'd like to come to Paris as the Deputy Director of Personnel of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Needless to say, I jumped at the chance, and my wife and I went to Paris in April of 1948.

Paris was a wonderful place to be in those days because of, one, it being Paris, but two, the whole ferment around the Marshall Plan, and we all thought we were doing an important job for an important cause. Everybody was new. I like to quote Charles Mee in his book, The Marshall Plan. He says, "To be young, to be American were wonderful things in the late forties. To be one of Averell Harriman's aides or an aide to one of his aides was transcendental." Well, I was an aide to an aide to an aide, but I can tell you, it was transcendental. I think we did some very, very good things in the Marshall Plan.

In the personnel office, our problem there was really to, again, speed up actions and not take an interminable time to process things. After I'd been there two or three months, the Director of Personnel asked me to do a study in the personnel office. We had about 40 employees. The Marshall Plan in Paris had about 800 employees, and as you know, we had missions in all of the European countries of Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey. So I did what was an organization and management study of the personnel office, and I did it knowing all the people, and I did it with them. I didn't come in as an outsider. Being new, I knew them and they knew me. Instead of really coming out with a study that I laid on the desk and said, "Do this," we worked out the procedures and processes as we went along, which is the best way to do an organization study.

As a part of the administrative office in Paris, there was an Office of Organization and Management. The head of that was a man named Jack Kubisch, who left the Marshall Plan to make his way in the private sector, with a plan, he said, to come back at a higher level, which he did much later.

Q: When he was Ambassador to Greece.

SPECTOR: To Greece, that's right. He came back in as a deputy AID director. So they assigned me to the Organization and Management section, where I tried to put into effect what I considered to be a kind of sensitive way of doing management reform.

At the end of 1950, I came down with a bad case of hepatitis. I was out for about six weeks, and somebody gave me a book to read by Stewart Chase called The Proper Study of Mankind. That's a part of a quote from Alexander Pope, "The proper study of mankind is man." It turned me on to the whole subject of really a personal psychology as the basis of personnel, as the basis of organization. I resolved then to learn a lot more about psychology and about people in organizations if I were going to be a better personnel person or organization person. I actually went into some kind of psychotherapy with an American psychiatrist who was with the U.S. Public Health Service in Paris named Mottram Torre.

I had Dr. Torre meet with our whole organization and method staff in a kind of sensitivity-

training session, although we weren't calling it that in those days. What I was really trying to get them to do, and myself to do, was to be aware of the problems that the other people had in their organization. So when you went in, you weren't just coming in with all your brilliance and brains and finding brave new wonderful ways of doing things, but you were working with the people in the offices to find a better and more efficient way of doing it. I think we were partially successful in that. That's a philosophy I've carried down to this present day.

Q: What sort of direction were you getting when you were in Paris? Averell Harriman was in charge of the mission at that time, is that correct?

SPECTOR: Yes.

Q: What were the manifestations of his direction that you yourself were getting?

SPECTOR: To tell you the truth, Harriman did not care very much about organization or administration. I think he took it as kind of a necessity; it was there. He didn't care much about it. So we didn't get much direction from Harriman. Harriman was concerned, and I think he had to be, really, with the relationships with the Marshall Plan countries, the way they were organizing themselves to deal with the problem, which I think was his greatest contribution.

As Lincoln Gordon has said in his oral history interview, Harriman, General Marshall, and Paul Hoffman said, "You European countries decide what you want to do and how you want to go about it, and you organize yourselves into a group. We'll deal with that group, and that group will help everyone decide how the resources should be allocated to each country." Harriman worked out things like that.

Down at my level, I really did not get much from Mr. Harriman, although I had the greatest admiration for him. I think when I was working in Organization and Management, where I really worked more closely with the program was with Lincoln Gordon, who was then the head of program for the ambassador. By that time, Harriman had gone back to Washington to be the Coordinator of Mutual Security, and I think William Foster was the head of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Lincoln Gordon had just come from a trip to most of the missions, and he said, "I don't understand why every mission should be organized like every other mission and have more or less the same administrative resources to do their job. Why does every mission have to have an industry officer? Why does every mission have to have a tourism officer?" I'll never forget, he said, "That's like saying that a size 38 coat will fit every man."

So under the direction of my new boss, a man named Harry Fite, he brought over from the Bureau of the Budget in Washington a couple of budget persons, and the three of us tried to work out a new kind of budgeting of administrative resources to be more in line with our policies and goals that we had in consort with each country. This, I really think, was the predecessor to much later in the State Department, you may have heard about the comprehensive country program system that was tried in the early sixties, and went on even later in the PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation, which was run by Policy Planning and Coordination staff of the Department in the late sixties and early seventies.

We didn't get too far with it. Then the Korean War came along. The Korean War just changed all of our objectives in Europe. I'm not sure quite when NATO was being set up, but NATO was a big thing. Eisenhower was made the head of the military part of NATO. We gave some help to the NATO people in setting up their offices in Paris. Especially I remember meeting with General Gruenther on General Eisenhower's staff to help him set up a system for hiring of Foreign Service nationals, and giving him a general briefing on the salaries and so on that he could expect to pay for Foreign Service nationals.

But in 1951, I was asked to come back to Washington to become the Deputy Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration's personnel office in Washington.

Q: Before we move there, as you were hiring people, was there a concern that organizations like to get bigger? Particularly when you're hiring in a hurry and trying to put something together, I would think this would be a wonderful playground for people who wanted to build up empires and really have a lot more people or even tasks that maybe were inappropriate for what you were doing. Was there some control over this?

SPECTOR: Yes, we tried. For example, you couldn't set up a new position without having to go through at least two controls. One was the budget control, and we had a very good budget office run by a lady named Gladys Parson, who much later became a Foreign Service officer and started a women's program in the Department of State many years later. She was a very tough budget officer.

Then they had to pass muster of my organization section which we had to set up the job, and we had to satisfy ourselves that job was really needed. So we did have some kind of a control. It wasn't the firmest control in the world, because, frankly, we had a lot of money. As compared with the poor Department of State, we had all the money in the world, and we could do, so money was really not an object. It was just whether or not you had good management. Luckily, we did.

At the top of administration was Leland Barrows, who later became a Foreign Service officer and ambassador. He was a career public servant who had run many other organizations, and his deputy was Everett Bellows, another career administrative man. None of us were in there to build up big bureaucracies, frankly. But it could have happened.

Q: How did you deal with the various AID directors in different countries? Did they become their own little dukedoms?

SPECTOR: Yes, they were little dukes. One of the things that made them little dukes was that by law, they ranked second to the ambassador – by law – which, by the way, didn't make the deputy chiefs of missions very happy around the circuit. These were powerful men, men like David Bruce, Tom Finletter, former Secretary of the Navy, Zellerbach, of Zellerbach Paper, who was our mission director in Italy. So these were men who had run big organizations and thought they knew what they were doing.

I would like to get on this money question for just a second, because there built up a kind of

envy, I think, on the part of the regular Foreign Service to the people who were in the Marshall Plan, and I think, probably, for good reason. I think our jobs were probably graded a little higher, whereas the rank in the Foreign Service was in the person. They had to wait for their promotion by the selection boards, and State Department was perennially underfunded and probably cut down the number of promotions based on the funds available. In that Marshall Plan people could also travel. I'm talking now about traveling for business purposes. But there was lots of money for travel. We had the counterpart funds to be used for that, whereas the State – then and now – and I'm talking in 1988, probably still doesn't have the necessary funds for the travel it ought to be allowing its officers to use.

Q: You might explain counterpart funds.

SPECTOR: When grants were made to these Marshall Plan nations, they were supposed to match the grants with their own local currencies, which then were to be put into a fund and to be used jointly under the command of the Marshall Plan people and the country itself. Ten percent of those funds, I believe was the amount, was set aside to be used for administrative purposes by the Marshall Plan people. That was a great deal of money, and the first few months was used pretty wildly. We were always having meetings in Paris of the industry officers or the agriculture officers or the labor officers. The champagne flowed very freely.

A man who showed up at every one of those parties was Art Buchwald, who was the local food editor for the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune. That's how we all got to know Art Buchwald. He had a very small salary of \$200 or \$300 a month that came out of the Army Stars and Stripes, and Art used to come and freeload.

On the other hand, I think the Marshall Plan was good for the Foreign Service in that because it had this kind of money, it was able to take a more liberal interpretation of the rules and regulations of the Foreign Service. For example, in 1948, when you were accumulating time toward your home leave, if for any reason when you were at post you had to return to the United States for compassionate leave, say a death in the family or whatever, the Foreign Service made you start your home leave all over again from the time you got back to post. You could be 18 months toward your 24 months of home leave, and if you came back with the approval of the Department, your home leave began all over again. That was strictly because of trying to save money. The Department then was badly, badly managed of what financial funds that it did have.

We said, "This is ridiculous. If somebody returns from compassionate leave or any leave approved by his or her superiors, there's no reason to begin again." So we got them to change the regulations. State didn't want to do it because of their "lack of funds," but we did it, and they had to do it because of equity. I think from that standpoint, we were a good influence on the Department, because then the Department budget people could go to the Congress the next year and say, "Look, we just have to have more funds because we can't allow our people not to have the same things that the people in the Marshall Plan have." So we were always a step ahead, and the State Department came up behind us. I think from that standpoint, we did good things.

We used to use the Marshall Plan Act to amend the Foreign Service Act. Later we were able to get through much better medical care for dependents and medical travel, using the Foreign

Assistance Act, and therefore amend the Foreign Service Act.

Q: When you were in Europe and working on personnel, were you getting suggestions or examples that came from the various missions that you had then put into practice? Was this a constantly evolving situation as far as personnel management?

SPECTOR: I think we got ideas about better recruitment. I don't remember getting any real ideas, frankly. Maybe we were just numb to them; I'm not sure.

I would like to talk about one thing, Stu, that I did in my job in organization. There were two foreign information programs going on in Europe. The Marshall Plan had its own large information program. Of course, as I told you, having all this money, both dollars and counterpart, they were able to issue magazines, able to have fairs of all kinds of information, able to start scholarships sending people back to the United States for training, and you also had the Department of State's cultural information program as part of the Department of State. So you had, really, two information programs going in all of your diplomatic missions. You had the Marshall Plan's information program, and you had the State Department's cultural and information program.

I was sent on a trip to Turkey and worked out with the ambassador there a trial run at combining those two information operations into one and under one head, staffed both by Marshall Plan and State Department people. I think this was really a forerunner to the United States Information Agency's operation, because it was fairly clear that you didn't need two or three different information programs going.

I think that's about all I can say about my sojourns in Europe.

Q: You were going to talk about the problem of communists in personnel. We are talking about the beginning of the Cold War and the start of the McCarthy era and all that.

SPECTOR: Yes. You're talking about early 1948, late '47, when they were talking about the Marshall Plan Act. One of the ways that I believe the administration felt that it could get the Marshall Plan Act through was to impose a very, very severe security clearance test for anyone that was hired by the Marshall Plan. It was probably the most severe of any in government at that time. No one could work for the Marshall Plan who had ever been a member of an organization that advocated the overthrow of the government, and that meant that the Attorney General had a list of such organizations, and some of them were pretty far-fetched.

Q: The Black Dragon Society was one of them.

SPECTOR: Right. There was the famous Washington bookshop which caught an awful lot of people.

Q: It was a cooperative, really, on the liberal left.

SPECTOR: Right. But it was on the Attorney General's list. Actually, I had been a member of

that shop, so you can make exceptions. I joined it because it was in the building where I worked, and I went in there to buy books. By signing a card, you'd get ten percent off on buying a book.

But what we did, though, which was very interesting, is that we hired people on a very quick security clearance. There were already files being built up by the House Un-American Activities Committee. There were also files by the FBI. We did what was called a quick name check, and if those people did not show up on those name checks, we hired them and sent them overseas. Later was the full FBI check. These were by the FBI, not by anyone else. As you know, a security clearance can be made by many other than the FBI. The Civil Service Commission and many departments had their own, but ours were done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They could take three or four months to come over. I think we had a fraction, a tenth of one percent, maybe less than that, that ever were turned out by the full security clearance.

Only much later, in 1964, did AID put in the idea that they had to get a full security clearance before anybody was hired by the AID agency, which has held up an awful lot of people.

I would like to speak to that for just a moment. I think one of the bad things that have happened in the last 30 or 40 years is that we have confused a security clearance with a qualifications check. In the old days, probably before World War II, personnel officers had personnel investigators. These were people that weren't checking security; they were checking on your references, checking on your qualifications for the position. They weren't checking on your honesty, about whether or not you had filled out your forms correctly. But later that became a security check, on whether or not you were a security risk, whether or not you were going to harm the federal government. So you had this job taken over by investigators, rather than by personnel officers. I think that's still a mistake that we make. When you're looking to a background today of a John Tower, to be Secretary of Defense, they're concentrating on whether or not he was a womanizer or whether he drank too much, but I think it would be more apt to concentrate on what kind of philosophy he brings to his position of Secretary of Defense. What are the requirements of the job of Secretary of Defense? That's how you begin this thing. Then what kind of qualifications and experience should he have?

Q: Before we go back to Washington, were you involved in the recruitment of foreign nationals, too?

SPECTOR: Oh, yes. We recruited quite a number.

Q: Where were they coming from? What type of people were they?

SPECTOR: I must say, in those days, it was mostly secretaries, messengers, because we did consider our work classified. I don't think we used very much the higher qualified people. We did use them in the information program. There we could use artists, performers, writers, and you weren't dealing with classified information. They were recruited out of the usual places, out of academia, out of newspapers, magazines, motion picture studios, and so on. So we had Foreign Service nationals working for the Marshall Plan. Probably some are still working around the world that started back then.

Q: What were the people that you were hiring doing for the most part? You said that the Marshall Plan was essentially getting the Europeans together to figure out how to help themselves, and we would supply the wherewithal. So what were we doing?

SPECTOR: In a country such as Turkey, we would help them with their agriculture, even though all of the wherewithal came through the Marshall Plan. But we based it on recommendations from the European group itself. But you helped them in agriculture, gave them ideas on industry, on labor relations. You tried to influence them as best you could. You couldn't tell them what to do, obviously, but you'd influence them. Of course, if you had a little bit of leverage behind you of the money, because you had something to say about how much money they got, you could make some influence on them.

Q: You say you couldn't tell them what to do, but if we were in a position to say, "Okay, we'll give you the money if you do this, but we won't give you the money to do that," that's telling them what to do, isn't it?

SPECTOR: Yes, yes. It was a little bit of both. You tried to work back through the European community, too. You'd try to speak with the same voice. They were probably getting the same advice out of Paris from the overall European group as the mission director or his people were getting in Ankara. That's why you needed coordination back in Paris. The people in Paris coordinated in two different ways. One, they were coordinating the work of their missions, but they were also working with the European Economic Community.

Actually, dealing with the Marshall Plan countries, the advanced countries, you have to make a distinction between the United Kingdom, France, Germany on the one side, and dealing with Greece and Turkey or Ireland on the other side. Even today, Greece, Turkey, and Ireland are developing countries, whereas the other countries didn't need an awful lot of advice. They already had institutions and they had the human resources, and all they needed really was the capital, some coordination, and some help with directing resources, timbers for coal mines, as Lincoln Gordon said. But really, to some of those countries, maybe the biggest thing was just the financial resources. But Greece and Turkey were something else, and Southern Italy, as distinct from Northern Italy.

Q: Did our staffing reflect this?

SPECTOR: Yes.

Q: Because sometimes the largest staffs tend to end up in London and Paris, and not in Ankara and Athens.

SPECTOR: See, that was the point about the thing with Lincoln Gordon. We began to cut staff in places where there was really no need for that. I remember we cut Belgium badly, we cut France, but we did not cut Greece, we did not cut Turkey, because they needed the people. Now, whether we did it as well as we could have done it, that is something else. It depends an awful lot on the mission director, as it still does.

To jump to 1973 when I was working for the State Department on staffing the whole world, that was my job working under Bill Macomber, I found out that Italy had 15 officers in its economic and commercial section, whereas Germany had about six. You compare our relations with Italy and Germany. The difference was that in Italy, you had an ambassador named Graham Martin, and Graham knew how to get people, and he liked to build up big staffs. (Laughs)

ELIZABETH A. BURTON
Statistician – Marshall Plan
Paris (1949-1952)

Statistician – NATO
Paris (1952-1954)

Elizabeth Burton grew up in Washington, DC. After graduating from Sarah Lawrence College in 1941, she worked for the Board of Economic Warfare until the end of World War II. She then worked as a statistician for the Marshall Plan in France. Throughout her career she also worked for AID, NATO and OPIC. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: How about in France, was that different? Paris was eating better?

BURTON: Yes, it was perfectly all right. There were no cars, because gasoline was in short supply. So the French were awfully nice to us, because we had everything. We had the silk stockings and the hooch and the gasoline and the cars.

Q: How were you able to tap into this?

BURTON: After I started to work, which was in the fall of '49, I had access... I bought a car, which the French couldn't do. I bought it in dollars, so I had a car and gasoline, and stockings.

Q: In '49, what were you doing?

BURTON: I wasn't doing anything to begin with. Then I realized I would run out of money eventually, and if I wanted to stay in Paris, I'd have to get a job. So I sniffed around through friends and connections. They were recruiting for the Marshall Plan at the Talleyrand at that time, and I went in there and got a job as a statistician in the Central Programming Office.

Q: It was the Hotel Talleyrand, wasn't it?

BURTON: Yes.

Q: Which was the center of American activity, or was it the center of the Marshall Plan?

BURTON: It was the center of the Marshall Plan, and gradually became the center for all of the

international diplomatic operations, not to be confused with the embassy, which was on the other side of the square.

Q: Who was the head of the Marshall Plan when you started in '49?

BURTON: I can't remember, but I think it was Lincoln Gordon.

Q: What did they hire you for?

BURTON: As a statistician.

Q: This goes back to your finding out about the sewers of Antwerp?

BURTON: I don't know what it was. I don't know why they hired me, but they did. Maybe it was just that they had three slots to fill, and I was one of them, fortunately. Once I got in there, I could sniff around and find other things as need be.

Q: What were the sort of things that a statistician was working on?

BURTON: I can't remember. I remember editing papers that they gave me. This was a small office, and I think that anything you were equipped to do, you did.

Q: What was the work? Was it assembling statistics on various things?

BURTON: I'm sorry, I can't tell you. I simply don't remember. I was very new. I was getting used to things and trying to figure out how the cable system worked, things like that. I was working for a very brilliant man whose name was Ostrander, who was handling the German distributions of the Marshall Plan stuff. So I just did whatever he told me, I guess.

Q: Can you characterize the spirit of the people working on the Marshall Plan?

BURTON: Yes, they were very excited with what they were doing. There was a very competent woman there named Mary Painter, who was apparently famous in the economic field. She died only about three years ago. She had constructed a new system for something in economics. But they were young, and they were enthusiastic. I worked with Tom Shelling, later of Harvard. He taught me how to use a slide rule. It was almost like a post-graduate group. A lot of very bright, attractive, young people.

Q: As you traveled about France, what was your impression of where France was?

BURTON: Looking back on it now, I realize that France was still in a pre-World War II state. And by that I mean it was in a medieval state as well. Anytime you got to a small village in the country, there wasn't much difference between it and the Middle Ages. If you went into a house, plumbing, everything else like that. But I didn't realize it at the time. I do now, because of the vast difference between then and now. But it had remained absolutely untouched, I would say, since the early 19th Century, the Proustian days almost.

Q: Did you have any contact with the international community while you were doing this first job? The French, the British.

BURTON: Not professionally. Certainly socially, yes. I knew quite a few French people from the French Embassy here, and they were very nice to me. I had entrée in France that was, at that point, spectacular. But even then I didn't realize that. They were just old friends and they would ask me for lunch, that kind of thing. So I had a view of Proustian Paris that I didn't realize I was having.

Q: This office basically was serving more or less the same way, I take it, that your economic warfare office was, supplying statistics or information on demand.

BURTON: Oh, I think not. No, no, I think it was far more than that. The Programming Office was the hub of where and what they were distributing to the Marshall Plan countries. Everything that was allocated to the Marshall Plan was siphoned through the Paris office, so that it was an extremely important hub of what was going out. But I was just too young and too inexperienced to have much part in that.

Q: When you were back in Paris, your job was NATO. You were doing that from when to when?

BURTON: I think it was probably from around 1952 to maybe 1954. There, I really did take care of the statistics. All of the statistics that came in from Washington for all of the NATO countries, like off-shore procurement and military assistance and defense budgets, all of that came over my desk. And I stashed it away and kept it, so that if anybody came into the Marshall Plan office there and wanted to know what we were doing for Turkey, or if the defense minister from Turkey came to see the head of the NATO staff, they would have to come to me to get the latest figures.

Q: Did you find this a form of power?

BURTON: No, not particularly. It was just a service. But I cornered the market. Oddly enough, I've made most of my jobs in my life. It's a question of getting in and sniffing around to see what needs to be done and doing it. Then, usually, if you propose it right, they'll accept it. This has happened to me two or three times.

Q: Were there any particular problems in early NATO that you saw?

BURTON: No, not at all. There were the great NATO meetings in Paris twice a year, which meant that we were literally working 24 hours a day. The big noises would go in the front offices, the officers and whatnot, and they'd come out at 7 o'clock in the morning, in deciding what they were going to do, how much money they were going to give to this, that, and the other thing. They were just, at that point, rearming Germany. And it was very exciting.

Q: Did the French play much of a role, from your perspective, or were you pretty much tied to the Americans?

BURTON: I had nothing to do with the French, as such. France wasn't any more important than Turkey or Austria or any of the others. We just happened to be located there. Of course, the French kicked us out later and sent NATO to Brussels.

VIRGINIA HAMILL BIDDLE
Passport Clerk
Paris (1949-1954)

Mrs. Biddle was born in Nebraska and raised in Missouri. She was educated at Briarcliff Manor Finishing School in Westchester County, New York. In 1930 she was married to Charles W. Biddle. Joining the Foreign Service in 1946, she began her long and interesting career as Clerk/Typist at the US Consulate in Bermuda. Subsequent foreign postings include Tangier, Paris, Bangkok, Palermo and Rome. Mrs. Biddle conducted her self interview in 1994.

BIDDLE: It was February when I arrived in Paris, grey, damp and drizzly. My room at the Louiemont, where reservations were made for me, was cold, but I was reluctant to move because there was something about the shabby charm of the place that appealed to me. I liked the friendly staff, the cherry chambermaid, Marie Louise, and the little chubby cherub faced, beribboned war veteran who ran the lift so dexterously with his one arm, and even the sad eyed but obliging concierge. And it was so convenient to the embassy.

At first I was temporarily assigned to USIS, United States Information Service, known in State Department jargon as the long arm of the embassy, where my immediate supervisor was Anita Lauve. The offices were then in the annex. It was just a short stroll up the Champs Elysees from our embassy and only cobblestones away from the Elysees Palace and the British embassy. An American Baroness Pontalba from Louisiana, then a French colony, had it built in 1842 and it was called the Porta La Belle Hotel. Her architect, Ludwig Visconti also constructed Napoleon's Tomb. In 1876 Edmond de Rothschild bought the house and added a glass canopy which was considered the dernier cry of architectural fashion at that time. He died in 1934 when his son, Maurice, moved in, but only shortly. During the Nazi occupation it housed the Luftwaffe Club, and after the Liberation, the British Forces Club until 1948 when it was bought by our United States government. The offices retained a certain by-gone grandeur which I like. But I was not to be there long.

My assignment was to be in charge of the files under Miss Agnes Snyder in the passport division of the consular section of the embassy. Miss Snyder, who had once studied to be an opera singer, was a handsome woman with aquiline features and always beautifully coiffed grayish white, and sometimes blue, hair. She was a vibrant and vivid person no one ever forgot, and well known for being a hard taskmaster and the perfect classroom was the passport section. But she often displayed a very generous nature, especially at Christmas giving us all lovely little treasures found in the flea market she haunted on holidays.

In due time the note of introduction, South Trimble, Jr., my sister's brother-in-law, had given me was presented to his friend, David Bruce, who was then ambassador at the embassy. Within a few days an invitation was received to a reception at the embassy's residence, then at No. 2 Place Iena. As the Bruces were both collectors, the residence was beautifully furnished with choice pieces arranged with distinction. David Kirkpatrick Este Bruce was tall, silvered haired and distinguished. He greeted me graciously and asked about South. I replied that he was indeed very well. We both agreed what a highly regarded and fine man he was, especially for his fine legal matter, so much so that all who knew him, even those who did not, were stunned and shocked when he became an innocent victim of the violent crime wave in Washington on New Year's Eve in 1974. When I mentioned to the ambassador how pleased I was to be assigned to the embassy he smiled and in his soft southern accent said, "Well, just let me know if anything goes wrong." He had a reputation of always being very considerate of his staff. Many of his friends compared him to Thomas Jefferson, one of his own heroes. His wide knowledge ranged from fine wines to 18th century antiques to history and international politics. The man most young diplomats cared to resemble. He became one of the most outstanding diplomats of our country. And as everyone knows, the only one who eventually ever handled the so-called triple crown to the prestige posts of France, Germany and Great Britain. His wife, Evangeline Bruce, was tall, slender, willowy and chic. She was dressed in black that evening with a long rope of pearls tied in a knot. She had a delicate oval face, amber eyes, a cloud of luxurious chestnut hair. Everyone was struck by her beauty. When a child in China where her father was a Foreign Service officer in Peking, she could have been one of the beauties of the tale of the Ganges. She was erudite and elegant and so punctilious that her friends said they felt her thank you notes were written as she drove away from their functions in the car.

Peeking out from under the buffet table were their lovable floppy eared and sole eyed spaniels who played an enormous part in their lives. Their children, Sasha and David, appeared with their nanny, meticulously dressed in French and English clothes. Looking then at that lovely little child, Sasha, who but God would know that while still in her twenties she would chose to end her own earthly life in 1976. Tish Baldridge, the social secretary to Mrs. Bruce was here and there introducing and chatting with guests. It had been a pleasant occasion and I enjoyed myself very much.

Jacque de Marquet. a French born, naturalized American, to whom the Duke de Richelieu had given me a note when I was assigned to Tangier, had just returned to Paris from his lecture tour in Belgium and invited me to a concert one Sunday afternoon. It was held in a small, two-hundred year old concert hall where our seats were just above where Napoleon sat. Chopin and Liszt used to play here and the acoustics were said to be marvelous. Before M. de Marquet returned to Tangier, we went out to Neuilly for lunch and again for dinner. He was very fond of Neuilly.

At long last my effects arrived. They had presumably been held up by strikes. Argeti who packed them in Tangier was so concerned he wanted me to let him know at once and in what condition they were. So I spent my weekend unpacking and getting settled. Of the apartments I had seen, none seemed satisfactory. Strikes occurred frequently, especially in winter, to complicate the transportation situation. As the Louiemont was just behind the embassy, I could be at my desk in five minutes without being confronted with the problem. Not being skillful with the skillet, I was

not eager for domesticity. In every corner of Paris there were tucked away numerous small restaurants which were fun to explore. Eventually I joined a club on Rue du Faubourg Saint Honoré where I frequently had meals. I found it a pleasant place to entertain friends. Or there was always the American embassy restaurant to go to when funds were low. Therefore, I decided to stay at the Louiemont. When arranged with a few pieces of my furniture, my small coca cola ice box tucked under a dressing table in the bathroom, became a boom. Antoine from the valet would bring up a hunk of ice for it about twice a week and in the hot weather and the bedroom became a little salon. I kept cool drinks and tin things in the ice box and planted some drawf ivy to grow over the old wrought iron balustrade and I was quite happy there for my entire duty in Paris, for four years.

Margaret McCollough, who I had known in Bermuda, invited me to visit her at Monte Carlo over the Easter holidays. I was to stay at her hotel, the Monte Carlo Palace and we were to take an excursion from there to Nice, Cannes and ancient Aires. I was very much looking forward to the trip and the pleasure of seeing her again. Margaret and her friend, Gladys von Hessenstein, met me upon arrival which happened to be my birthday, April 5. My room looked out over a lovely park with the famous casino beyond and had been made gay with fruit, flowers and birthday gifts. After lunch we took a bus to Nice which has the supreme advantage of being able to go anywhere from it by any route on 101 agreeable and delightful excursions. At Cannes I was interested to learn it had been discovered by an Englishman, Lord Erdman, who gave his name to a carriage. He fell in love with the place, lived there for 30 years and there he sleeps for all eternity.

We arrived back to Monte Carlo in time to quickly change for the champagne dinner I gave to celebrate my birthday. Margaret had tickets for a Monte Carlo ballet afterwards. The next day we drove to Menton, the peaceful town on the border of Italy. Here it seems the curve of the coast is gentler and the colors of the landscape softer than elsewhere. It has long been a favorite resort for the English escaping the rigors of winter and Queen Victoria pointed the way.

Another day we drove up into the thyme scented hills behind Monaco to see the impressive trophy of Latrube, the allegorical statues. This memorial intended to endure for all time, was a hundred years afterwards destroyed by wars that raged. Aires was an astonishing little village on a rocky pinnacle rising up to the void. It presented a picture of silent desolation amidst the chaotic mountains. The Prince of Sweden had his home here with his mistress during the war.

On Easter Sunday we went to the Principality of Monaco. A tiny kingdom enclosed by mountains in a theatrical setting. It was like a scene from a Gilbert and Sullivan opera. Moored in a little port below were palatial yachts. A whole forest of masts rose out of the quay. Sentries were like toy soldiers dressed in their colorful uniforms with white and red feathers coming out of shiny helmets glistening in the sun. Flags were flying everywhere for Prince Rainier, the 31st ruler of Monaco with 142 titles, was to have his coronation the following week. Margaret, who had lived there with her husband before the war, knew the Aide to the Prince so was invited to his reception. The event of 1956 was his marriage to Grace Kelly, one of the most glittering stars in the Hollywood firmament. The general atmosphere of Monte Carlo was one of great refinement and elegance. It is considered the neatest and cleanest city in Europe and appealed to me more than any other place on the Riviera. It was pleasant to have a lazy aperitif on the

flowery terrace of the casino, listen to the music and recall the days when foreign visitors wore crown jewels instead of cameras.

The next morning I rose at 5:00 to catch an early train back to Paris. Through sleepy eyes I watched through the window the Province landscape unfolding. The countryside was a blaze with apple blossoms in full bloom and there were lovely stretches of pine forests and groves of twisted, silver gray olive trees that Renoir loved to paint. Perched on the heights in the distance were visages of old forts and crumbling ramparts. I dozed, and when I woke it was midnight and we were in Paris. It had been a glorious Easter and a very happy birthday with delightful friends who had done so much to give me an unforgettable glimpse of the French Riviera.

When I was back at my desk in the embassy, shortly after this trip, a cousin of my brother-in-law dropped in to see me, General Edgar Hume. His name had been legend in the family for a long time. One of his chief claims to fame was the fact that he had heroically rescued the famous works of art in Italy and hid them during the war. In our brief chat I mentioned how much Mildred enjoyed going to President Truman's inaugural ball with him and how much I had enjoyed reading his article on Italy in the National Geographic. And he informed me that he was having another article in the same magazine. That night he left for Japan and by coincidence via Monte Carlo.

Jacqueline Cramer, my Swiss friend, suddenly appeared in Paris with her daughter one day. Over a drink at the Crillon, she invited me to visit her at her home at Celigny on Lake Geneva when we have a holiday the end of May.

In early May I received a letter from Andre Trealay asking if I would like to join him at Biarritz. He was going there to attend a pony fair. But I sent word that I could not come before my next holiday, the 18th. So he telegraphed that he would wait there until then. He wanted me to see the coast along Biarritz which he said he preferred to the Riviera.

When the date arrived, he met my train at Dax and showed me where the parents of the pony he was giving me were breed. In a pretty meadow under water where some horses were grazing. He, himself, had the slim figure of a fine horseman and rode on horses whose pedigrees were as undoubted as his own. We lunched together in a quiet rustic inn on the regional dishes of the country. The pate was made on the place. He saw the goose killed. I learned a lot about the pate that comes from France and is a luxury item in America. The delicious duck, also from the same place, was a cross between a wild and tame one. This was followed by pound cake topped with strawberries and served with champagne. Voltaire called it a civilizing drink and said it reflected the brilliant soul of France. Someone once said that gastronomical dining of the past was one of the few pleasures left in modern life.

After lunch we drove to Bayonne where we entered the Basque country. It

had a wonderful 13th century cathedral. Was the city of the English and French queen, Eleanor of Aquitaine and known for its chocolates, ham and bull fights. Then a little passed Bayonne, was Biarritz. It was the fashionable spa of the 19th century made famous by Empress Eugenie, Queen Victoria and Edward VII, and still retains the baroque atmosphere of the second empire.

After a few miles down the coast, we came to St. Jean de Luz. Here was the true Basque. A fishing village, peaceful, picturesque and languorous that had retained all of its Basque characters, the strange baffling language and simple local pleasures. They had their own cuisine, paella, and their own sports, palota, played by the world's best players including priests. Louis XIV and Marie Theresa of Spain were married here.

An old friend, Robert Gillmore, we affectionately call Gilly, had a villa near and invited us to luncheon. I loved watching the waves constantly breaking over the rocks of the scenic coast line and felt fresh and exhilarated by the sea breeze. Now I could understand why Andre preferred all this to the Riviera.

In a recent edition of the New York Herald, I noticed a photo of Mrs. John Hubbard, nee Helen von Stadt, with whom I had met and became friends with on board a ship to Tahiti. She was being decorated by the French consul in New York with the highest honor of the French government. She had told me that she had been made Commodore, having already received the Legion de Merit, then the rosette. Only one other woman in America received the same honor. It was a tribute for devoting so much to the restoration of Moi Maison. My French friend, Yvonne St. Leger, drove me out there one Saturday afternoon. I so enjoyed seeing all Mrs. Hubbard had so generously contributed towards this charming and historical place.

The work at the embassy was becoming terrific. When the war in Korea first started, the newspaper bannered alarming headlines. People were coming each day to inquire what to do. One day, Mrs. Woolf, whom I had met on the Mauritania, came in quite upset. I explained that we had received no instructions from the Department and finally calmed her over lunch at Rumplemeyer's. For about ten days during this episode I was just quickly having a coke and sandwich at noon and rushing back to the office and staying until 8:00 at night. Fortunately, it all eventually subsided.

On the Fourth of July, the ambassador gave his usual reception in the gardens of the lovely old mansion at 41 Rue du Faubourg Saint Honoré, originally bought for use by the ambassador but now used by USIS. Anyone who could present an American passport could come, so there were masses of people. We were asked not to bother to shake hands with the Bruces as they would have so many hands outside the family to shake, so we didn't. The Converse Hettingers had just been transferred to Paris from Tangier so we went together. A steady stream marched up to shake hands, warmly beam and march to a long buffet table where the food is waiting and enormous trays of alcoholic beverages. Only hats are seen on this occasion as it is too crowded to show off a dress or suit.

Although I was very much enjoying my work at the embassy, it had become exhausting during the hot summer months when so many people come to Paris. A quiet get away from it all holiday in a cool spot was all I wanted at that moment. So over Bastille Day, July 14, weekend, I went to Fontainebleau. As many officers were given training here during the First World War, I thought my brother Harold may have been here. So I wrote him from the grand hotel, the Aigle Noir, where I stayed. Here I am able to enjoy the miraculous and marvelously healing attractions of the country. Robert Lewis Stevenson has left us one of the most moving tributes to Fontainebleau in

the English language--"The vigorous forest air, the silence, the wilderness, the tumbled boulders, the great age and dignity, a certain grasp the air, the light, the shapes accord in happy harmony" all is very true. He had been one of my favorite writers since childhood. I had grown up with the "Child's Garden of Verses" a dear friend had given me when I was very young. He died in Samoa and wrote his own epitaph, now in every anthology of English poetry. Eloquent in his untroubled acceptance of the end of physical life and his ardent faith in the world to come.

My life was different in Paris than Tangier. I was fulfilling myself with other things. I joined the American library and began reading the history of France by Andre Morua, which became my bible. French lessons were resumed twice a week with Madame Marshorn, who also taught at the Sorbonne. We were both delighted one day to discover we had lived in Japan at the same time. As I had been wanting to know more about French art, literature and music the British embassy sent me Andre Michelle, who had taught French literature in French at Harvard. Part of my course in culture endeavor was to go on ventures in the countryside's historic sights with only French speaking people and a French guide. There was a vast difference between a tourist staying in a Ritz Hotel suite and what a young person who lives there sees of that same country. The two perspectives are totally different. To know the language, the customs, the habits, to seek out the hidden spots and to taste the simple pleasure of local life is to come to love a country. Above all it means understanding the people and true familiarity with a foreign country and its people in such a precious personal and emotional experience one carries it deep in the heart all through life. One of the advantages of the Foreign Service is that one remains long enough at each post to acquire a more thorough knowledge than a visitor can.

One of the most ingrained French habits is holiday en mass in August. They virtually close down their country for a month in a single minded effort to get away from it all. If the Parisian who stays behind locks himself out of his house on August 1, chances are he will not be able to get back in until September. And locksmiths are not the only absent tradesmen. But for me, this was the best time to enjoy Paris when one could really feel the heartbeat of the city. Nothing is dead here, least of all the past which forms an integral part of the present. On Sundays, Andre Trealay was showing me something of his Paris and the surrounding country. Being with Andre was a liberal education. He told me so much that enhanced my appreciation. One Sunday we followed the narrow streets up to Montmartre, the once artistic quarter where young Utrillo and Picasso and so many other painters and poets lived and created. From here was a breathtaking view over the whole of Paris. Another Sunday, to admire the infinite and beautiful detail of Gothic architecture of the famous religious edifice, Notre Dame. They say one should really see it first from a small point coming under the Pont De La Tournelle or from this bridge early in the morning when there is a direct light on the flying buttresses or late in the dying day when it is so illuminated against a flaming sunset. Then we wandered around the La Cite, the oldest quarter in Paris, founded before the Christians and retaining much of its old charm.

A Sunday was spent at Chantilly, famed for its chateau, forests and great stables. There was so much to admire in the museum of this chateau that it could be visited and revisited. I lingered longest over the superb illuminations of the world famous book known as the Duc de Berry. Afterwards roamed through the forest. Andre loved to walk and so did I.

The next Sunday we went to Compiègne which evoked memories of Bonaparte. Napoleon met

Marie Louise here in 1810 and chose it as a residence after his second marriage. It enjoyed its most brilliant days during the second empire and its royal residence is more ancient than any other. Louise XVI, when Dauphin, came here in 1770 to meet his fiancée and bride, Marie Antoinette of Austria. The most visited part of the forest is the Armistice clearing where there is a monument commemorating the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918.

On September 6, 1950, I wrote home: My ponies have arrived. Offspring of the ponies Andre had shown me near Dax where they had been breed. They were being kept in a small ménage near the Bois by M. Gager, who at one time had been in charge of Cote's stable. It proved to be easier to find a place for ponies in Paris than myself. They were a handsome pair. Half brothers and so well matched. One had a list and one had a star on his forehead. Both had a pair of white socks and their tails were cropped which made them look very smart. I called them Fussy and Frisky, appropriate names, I thought because each one was just that. Gager was training them and giving me driving lessons in French. He spoke no English, so obviously I had language lessons as well. Although I was learning to handle the reins properly, I never could learn to roll my "r's" convincingly. The two seated trap was yellow and black. On the harness over the leather shades of the horses eyes in little brass letters were my initials, VHB. The equipage was terribly chic.

Every Saturday and Sunday morning at 11:00, I was driving along the quiet roads of the Bois. It was great fun. Eventually when I gained more confidence and became more proficient in handling the ponies, the groom, Albert, accompanied me. He was an endearing little old man, actually fitted into this small trap more comfortably than Gager who with ruddy red cheeks from his native Normandy was rather rotund and robust, but always cheery and chatty. This rare recreation was one of my greatest pleasures in Paris.

On one Saturday when I went driving, I noticed all of the buildings and buses along the Champs Elysees had the familiar Moroccan flag flying in honor of the visit of the Sultan. All the traffic was stopped to allow his grand entourage to pass as he was going out to Bagatelle to stay with his son, Mouli Hassem, his official visit over. Also from Morocco one day came Bill Chase, the tall, good looking chap who with another American, Jay Hazelwood, ran the Paradise, a rendezvous for every one in Tangier. It was like a ray of sunshine to see him and hear all the news from my former post. He said Jay would be going to Egypt with Countess LeFay, she takes him everywhere.

One evening I invited my French friend, Yvonne St. Leger, to Pruniers for dinner. It had become my favorite for seafood. Afterward I had tickets booked a week in advance, it was so popular, to hear Maurice Chevalier. I had always adored him. Now 62, but like an ageless aperitif, light and zestful with the same magnetic smile. He had a love of life and romance. "Louise" was the only song he sang in English and his mangled English became more of his charm. The day of his death--he was buried January 5, 1972--seemed a little less gay because he was gone. He was more than an addition to the theater, he was an addition to life. When I was describing his performance to Gager in French on my drive through the Bois the next morning, he said he knew him quite well. In fact Chevalier had given him his photograph.

About mid-October, Miss Synder, my supervisor in the passport section sailed for home leave on

the America with her great friend, Miss Shipley, then head of the Passport Division in the State Department. She would not be back until after Christmas so she left us all her usual lovely little gifts. The news of the attempted assassination of President Truman at Blair House which reached me in early November, was a terrible shock but so great that he escaped.

Mario Sinwa, who lived in Marrakech, I met for tea one Sunday afternoon at the George Cinque, always gay with Americans. She wanted me to take her to lunch at the Marshall Plan cafeteria. It was very simple, but everything American interested her. It was just across the street from Patue and where a woman I knew there, Odette, said she couldn't find an inexpensive place in the neighborhood for lunch. I suggest that we go there and she loved it too.

Then we went to the Folies Bergeres together one evening. Always a spectacle. Exquisite sets and nudes parading around with gorgeous accessories. The real bit of the entire show was the three Peters sisters, enormous colored girls appearing in costumes which accentuated their enormity. Their performance dressed in ballet skirts on a trapeze and again in toreador pants fighting a bull and finally in the voluminous djellabas the Arabs wear, was hilarious. They did a perfect takeoff of Maurice Chevalier with his usual rakish straw hat singing, "Savoir, savoir, savoir." That was wildly applauded.

The Countess Dabars, who arranged parties and receptions at USIS, invited me to her home for cocktails one Sunday afternoon. She said she would like me to meet some of her French friends and relatives who had homes in the country. I thought it was very kind of her. She was of Japanese origin and like many women of her race gentle and refined and elegant in her simplicity, pale and fragile as a flower. In mutual admiration of her oriental country gave me an immediate rapport and we became very fond of each other.

Christmas was approaching and I had some accumulated leave to take. Yvonne St. Leger was going to her daughter in Tunis and wanted me to join her. Then Mr. Davies, the old padre in Tangier who had been on a brief holiday in Paris, invited me to spend Christmas in England where he was now living with his married daughter, whose husband was with the British government in Lagos. A telegram came followed by a note from Sheila Green who I had known in Bermuda and was also back in England and asked me to come there saying it would be just like Bermuda all over again where we had such a happy time together. I more than appreciated these kind friends thinking of me at this special time, but I really wanted just a rest somewhere in the sun. Our consul in Tenerife, the Canary Islands, wrote it had a delightful climate and one could swim at Christmas and it was very quiet, just what I wanted. But, alas, all my efforts to get there were in vain. I did manage to get as far as Madrid but the planes were all booked and though I went to the airport and waited in the pouring rain for a last minute cancellation, no luck. Then I decided to go to Malaga where my friends the George Palmers were on post. They made reservations for me at the Minermar Hotel and after an all day train ride arrived there at midnight. The next day I drove out to Torremolinos to the Santa Clara Hotel which I had heard was so charming, operated by Mr. and Mrs. Saunders. He was English and she was Danish. They were completely booked, but kindly tucked me in a room for the night. I changed to another the next day. The food was excellent and it had a cozy atmosphere, mostly English guests. Much to my surprise and delight, I found Gilly Gillmore there with his French companion, Madame Dorne. And it was heavenly to find blue skies and bright sun. When Madame Dorne heard I was

unable to get to the Canaries where Andre Trealay was vacationing, she exclaimed, "Why you can't leave Andre there alone over Christmas, you must telephone." So I got a telephone call through to him on the 23rd and we finally spoke together on Christmas morning. He said he would join me as soon as he could get reservations, but it was a week before we heard on New Year's Day that he would be arriving January 3. Such was the communication and transportation service in Spain in those days.

On Christmas Day the Palmers gave an eggnog party. A lot of the guests at the Santa Clara were invited as they had lived there before finding a house and knew the Saunders well. They asked me to stay on for lunch with their house guests, the Morrisons I had known in Tangier, and the consulate staff, including a courier in for the day who made a priceless remark a propos to making his plane that "the mail must go through, come rain, hail or olive oil." It was a cherry party as we gathered around the Christmas tree with the Palmers' two young children. Then we all drove back to the Santa Clara for the party the Saunders have every Christmas night. The British Consul gave the traditional toast. The New Year's Eve party was equally gay. I was doing the Lambeth walk way into the wee small hours of the morning. After that I slept until noon every day until Andre came on January 3, his birthday. That evening I gave a birthday party for him. There were nine of us, including the Palmers. Champagne and a beautiful birthday cake and all sang happy birthday to him. We were able to have a few walks along the beach together and a drive with Gilly up the Costa del Sol before I had to leave two days later. This time the little Santa Clara Hotel was the only one there and Torremolinos was just a tiny village asleep in the sun on the main road between Malaga and Marbella and La Linsa. But now, like others caught in the touristic boom, it has swept head long to the present and one of the fastest growing resorts in Spain and the charming little Santa Clara is no longer there. And dear George Palmer died in the summer of 1976.

When I returned to the embassy, my desk, of course, was covered with work. Also Christmas cards had accumulated. One from the Duke of Tervare from Tangier asking me to let him know if I ever went to Seville. He would give me a note of introduction to his friends the two DeCasso sisters. I was sorry to hear from the Duchess of Richelieu that her husband had been desperately ill while in Paris last May and had taken him to Geneva where he had been in hospital twice and now home in New York with double pneumonia. A friend of Andre's to whom he had introduced me, Count Robert Dillon was in Paris for a few days from his chateau near Toulouse. He was interested in the breeding of my ponies. I took him for a long drive one Sunday. It was getting nippy now so I wore a newspaper around my chest under my heaviest sweater and coat to cut the wind. But regardless of the weather I was always in the Bois with my ponies at 11:00 every Saturday and Sunday morning. They say the Bois is one of the places in the world "en souffler esprit," where the spirit breathes. It warmed my heart to hear the little children clap their hands with joy when they heard the clip-clop of my ponies coming.

I was very distressed to receive news that my dear brother, Harold, was in hospital with TB. I wrote him that every time I went to the Madeleine for flowers, which was often for no matter how deep the winter it was always spring among those scented stalls, I wished I could be placing them by his bedside and hoped he was faithful to his communions as there was so much power in prayer. Besides my regular communions at 8:30 on Sunday, I tripped around the corner to the little British embassy church on Wednesdays at the same time. These brief devotions helped

sustain me all day long at my desk.

Count Dillon invited me to dinner one evening and was very anxious that I see the film, "Gone With The Wind," with him. Even though I had seen it over ten years ago in Honolulu, I shared his enthusiasm in watching again this romantic epic, probably the most legendary production in Hollywood history. It has remained one of the most popular and successful pictures ever made.

Whenever Dillon came to Paris we often lunched and dined together. I found him quite delightful. Although his English was limited and so was my French, it was no bar to a fluent conversation. He had a good looking serious face and was very courteous and conservative. A country loving man who walked with the erect grace of the aristocracy he represented. He was of Irish origin and came from one of the oldest families of France. He always appeared deeply concerned about something and one evening spoke to me with great earnestness and enthusiasm of his desire to go to South America on a mission for the French government. And he did eventually, to Quito, Ecuador. One of his reasons was that he felt that the Russians would be here within a year and he wanted to close his enormous chateau because he said he would never sell it. If the Russians came, he advised me to escape with my ponies to his chateau and said I could be there in ten days. I thanked him for wishing to rescue a damsel in distress, but laughingly said, "I could just see myself with my possessions on the back seat of my pony trap flying over the border like Scarlet O'Hara in "Gone With The Wind."

Mildred had been in Seville then came to Paris for a brief visit before we went to Luxembourg for Easter weekend. Mrs. Truman had given her a note of introduction to Perle Mesta, who was then our minister. Madame Mesta was not there at that time, she was spending her Easter holiday in another part of Europe. However, her colored butler with true southern hospitality had invited us into the residence for a cup of tea. It was then that I saw her fabulous collection of Mason porcelain birds which were perfectly exquisite. She very kindly sent an invitation for my sister to return the following week again. Luxembourg had a fairy-like charm with its cobblestone streets, medieval castles, ruins of fortress walls, watch towers and turrets. During the war the Grand Duchess Charlotte, by will of her people, went to the United States for the duration. When she met President Roosevelt he said to her, "Don't worry my child, I will take you home again." Those words appeared across the face of a special commemorative stamp of Luxembourg printed below the likeness of the Grand Duchess and her benefactor, the late President. For many Americans, Luxembourg is a place of pilgrimage. About three miles from the city is Hamm. There on a gently sloping valley is a field which is forever America. Below the serene town lies over 5,000 servicemen, each with a marker. One cross by itself is inscribed: "General S. Patton, Jr., General Third Army, California, December 21, 1945." This is where he was laid at the head of his men following his death in a car accident after the war was over.

It was a great shock to receive the very sad news of the death of Mr. Clay Merrill after a short illness in Bermuda on May 8 and saddened me deeply. I felt I had lost my best friend in the Foreign Service. I immediately wrote to dear Mrs. Merrill because I knew what this great loss would mean for her.

One evening a French friend, Robert Jevey, and I went to see the "Consul" a play I could very well appreciate.

As Paris was celebrating its 2000 years celebration at this time, 1951, there were a lot of interesting events going on. Alice Poole, a long time friend which whom I had lived in a little Japanese house in Honolulu and former keeper of the prints at the Art Academy there, paid a visit. We went to the Louvre together to hear a concert of early French music.

In June I was promoted to receptionist in the passport section and was so happy. No more lifting of dossiers, pushing and pulling of drawers, looking at a desk piled high with files. I was still kept busy, but now there was an occasional lull where there never was before. Now my job was to answer inquiries and pull the cards and files on people who needed passports or renewals or any other service our section gave; type letters to be given to other embassies for visas; and I was also beginning to take a few applications. So I was learning bit by bit more citizenship work.

The Consul General, Mr. Grey, called all those who had been promoted to his office to congratulate them as soon as he had returned from his holiday. The inspector had arrived and asked the usual questions--how we lived, who are our friends, how we get our exercise, etc. To one question, "What is your goal in the Foreign Service?" I answered, "To become a vice consul," which he duly noted. I also mentioned I should like to be considered for a post where I could save some money. I thought Paris very expensive. I spoke of Bangkok. He said that Colombo, Ceylon was also a delightful post and a differential, meaning more money was allowed for living there.

Edgar Hume paid me another surprise visit at the embassy, this time in uniform emblazoned with ribbons and medals and looked so handsome and young. He said he was spending most of his time now in Korea, but was in Paris for a medical conference. He needed letters to obtain visas for Syria and Lebanon. I was glad I could be of this small service to him.

Count Dillon was also back in Paris, too. We dined one evening around the corner from my hotel at la Truite in the picturesque Cite de Retourro entered by a grilled gateway. It became one of our favorite restaurants where we often went with Andre who was now having the cure at Vichy. He wanted Andre to bring me to his chateau and show me his country in September.

On the Fourth of July the Bruces gave the usual reception for the Americans. Princess Pignatelli, whom I had met, asked to go with me. She was a Biddle from Philadelphia. Her first husband was a Spanish grandee and her early life with the court in Madrid sounded glamorous. She divorced him and married a Frenchman who she also divorced. Then she retrieved the title of the first husband.

Mrs. Merrill was leaving Bermuda on July 18 as she had been appointed assistant conference officer at our embassy in Geneva. In early August I made reservations at the Louiemont for her and her two colored servants who were accompanying her. She was to arrive on the America due just as I had planned to take my holiday to Dillon's place, but I realized I could not leave while she was here, nor, of course, wanted to for I was anxious to see her and more especially as she was bereaved. I met her at the boat train in an embassy car and we were together the entire time she was in Paris. We both shed tears when we spoke of Mr. Merrill. She wanted to revisit all the little places where they had been together here in 1949. For diversion I took her up Faubourg

Saint Honoré to enjoy the shop windows created by Madame Baumel for Hermes. They always had an incomparable charm and fantasy of their own. Parisians go to see a new Baumel window as they go to see a new play.

I introduced her to Miss Synder and they had a very long conversation. She told her what a good job I had done under Clay in Bermuda. I hoped it bore some weight. When I mentioned that they both had astrology in common, Mrs. Merrill immediately drew Miss Synder's horoscope and that was a bond at once.

For years I had wanted to go to the Balearic Islands and at last I was to have my dream holiday to Majorca. At Brentano's I was delighted to find a book, "Polonaise" on the life of Chopin which I read on the four hour Air France flight to Palma. An attractive American woman, Mrs. Chamberlain, had a car and chauffeur waiting for her when we arrived at the airport in Palma and kindly offered to drive me to my hotel, the Victoria. There I had a room and full pension for 150 pesetas plus 17 percent tax, about \$3.75 in those days and considered an extremely modest price even then.

Mrs. Chamberlain had mentioned that she had rented this furnished villa with five bedrooms and two baths for ten dollars a month and also had the services of a maid and a gardener.

The hotel was perfectly situated where one could watch the life on the Mediterranean from spacious terraces bordered by flowers and shaded by pine trees. During the day it was a gorgeous sight to see the colors change on the cathedral which loomed up in the distant. One of the four famous gothic ones in the world. And at night enchanting while dining on the terrace to watch the boats going to Barcelona brilliantly lighted. Palma reminded me a little of Tangier with its Spanish influence and slightly Moorish flavor.

The day after my arrival, I took an all day excursion to Valldemosa and Soller. Valldemosa had been immortalized by George Sand, the romantic French authoress and Frederick Chopin, the great Polish pianist and composer ever since their historic winter there in 1838-39. Majorca had made a virtual shrine of their quarters which they occupied in a deserted monastery in which the monks had been evicted in 1935. Their three cells opened on to charming little garden patios where they contemplated the rustic panorama and drew inspiration for their greatest works. Here George Sand wrote "Spiridon" and later published "Un Hiver a Majorque" in which were the finest descriptive writing of her whole career. She was the first writer to adequately succeed in conveying the charms of the Majorca countryside most vividly.

Another who came many years later, also enamored of the beauties of the island, was His Imperial Highness the Archduke of Austria, Louie Salvador, but known in all of Majorca simply as S. Arduc. His exhaustive knowledge was revealed in the wealth of impressions since he did not sell his publications but gave them away as presents to his family and other chosen people, they have a special value in their rareness.

Chopin, although in fading health, with the aid of a pitiful Majorcan piano was composing his most dramatic and exquisite inspired by the wonderful atmosphere of the monastery. There was still a trace of the monastic life within the walls. The smell of incense and solitary silence.

Among the compositions created there were his famous preludes.

After leaving Valldemosa the stretch of coast line to Dael was magnificent. Beautiful vistas of the sea on one side and hills covered with pine and ancient olive trees on the other. It was no wonder that Gustave Durer was inspired by the Majorcan olive trees to illustrate one of the best traditions Dante's Divine Comedy. For him Majorca was a corner blessed by heaven. Dael attracted many writers and artists including the well known writer Robert Graves who for 47 years has been voluntarily exiled in his home Canelluno, the house far away, and has done so much to help preserve the place from becoming spoiled.

We drove on over the craggy mountainside to Soller, a picturesque little village in a rich valley of fragrant orange and lemon trees surrounded by high mountains. An amusing Toonerville type of tram clanks its way to the nearby puerto. On the return to Palma we stopped to visit one of the old historic Majorcan country mansions.

The next day I climbed up through the pine woods to the famous 14th century castle of Bellvere that overlooks Palma. It is a rare type of construction in Spain, a circular design with simple lines descended from the gothic. As there were still many Arabs here at the time, Moorish slaves who were skilled artisans were employed in the construction of the castle giving it a Moorish influence. The archaeological museum in side was of great interest.

One day I took a bus trip to Formentor. The zigzag road was perilous in places, but with fantastic views of majestic beauty and absolutely unforgettable. There was a luxurious hotel on the white sandy beach with extensive gardens and circled by mountains with the great panorama of the Bay of Pollensa. It was a perfect setting for a vacation retreat where one could enjoy the peace and tranquility for which the island has always been renown.

Sitting beside me on the bus was a most interesting English girl, Machin Goodall, who breeds, trains, sells and shows her own jumpers. She had won a thousand prizes since the age of eight and her grandfather had been huntsman to the Queen. Of course, I spoke of my precious pair of ponies in Paris. So we found much to talk about.

The only sign of Americanization that I saw were two little sweat shirts on two little Spanish boys which had blazed across the front, "New York Giants." The island then was relatively unspoiled. I had never enjoyed a holiday so much for so little money. After a smooth flight with champagne and lunch, I arrived back in Paris to find the sun shining. It was the first time I had returned to Paris from a holiday when it wasn't pouring with rain.

The Richelieus were back in Paris and in early October they invited me to lunch at the Cert Enter Ala. I enjoyed seeing them very much, but was distressed to hear that the Duke has had leukemia since 1948. The Duchess came up to my hotel room to look through my "Vogues" to find some models for having some clothes made here. She said she was getting too fat to order from Bloomingdale any more. They will be returning to the States in the ship they always sailed in, the Mauritania and asked me to look them up when I came to New York in the spring. My home leave was due March 15.

George and Ruth Palmer were also in Paris about this time and we had a good get together over cocktails at the Crillon. George invited me to come to Malaga and said he would send me to Granada where the Good Friday celebrations were really worth seeing. George's parents gave a delightful party on Avenue Foch to which I was invited. Ambassador Palmer and George both served at our embassy in Afghanistan together. The only time father and son have ever served at the same post at the same time.

One of the French employees at the embassy and her husband drove me to Bourg St. Leonard one Saturday where there was a chateau that Count Dillon very much admired and wanted me to see. Madame de Forcefeel received us for about an hour and said she had seen me driving my ponies in the Bois.

One day in early December I happened to see Mr. Plitt, who had been our minister at the legation in Tangier, as I was going to lunch with a friend and went up to speak to him. "How do you do, Mr. Plitt? Do you remember me?" I said. When he replied, "Yes, sure. Virginia Biddle," my friend remarked, "You have a good memory." Then with a smile he said to her, "Yes, I always remember the outstanding members of my staff." The sudden unexpected compliment slightly embarrassed me and I blushed a little as I walked away. I never thought that I had been particularly outstanding, but it was evident that he was still in the diplomatic service, though he was then in Paris with NATO and staying at the Crillon.

My English friends, Muriel and Reg Cope I had met at a coffee at Bishop Chambers invited me to a cocktail party that the St. George's Society gave at the Cert Enter Ala. Among the guests was Lady Diana Cooper. I had seen her as the Madonna in "The Miracle" when I was in boarding school, and she hadn't changed a bit since then. The same beautiful blue eyes, exquisite skin, tall and graceful and very feminine with every movement so effortless. She was simply dressed and wrapped in a gorgeous sable coat. I could hardly take my admiring eyes off of her.

Christmas 1951 in Paris was quite active. Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce gave a huge cocktail party for 1500 Americans. Mr. Grey, the consul general, gave a beautiful party at his home for all the consular sections. Young 14 year old Hugh Cope was home from school, Tonbridge in England, for the holidays, and we often went clapping through the leafy Bois in my trap. He adored my ponies. On Christmas Eve, Muriel, Reg and Hugh and I attended midnight services at the British embassy church. Then they all came up to my room at the Louismont for fruitcake and eggnog and helped to light the teeny weenie candles I had tied with ribbons to my teeny weenie Christmas tree. The next day they invited me to tea and to hear King George give his first speech over the wireless since his illness, and I stayed on for dinner.

JOHN GUNTHER DEAN
Economic Analyst, Economic Cooperative Administration
Paris (1950-1951)

Ambassador John Gunther Dean was born in Germany in 1926. He came to the United States by way of Holland in 1938. After serving with the OSS during

World War II, he graduated from Harvard in 1947. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1951, his career has included positions in Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bamako, Paris and Laos.

DEAN: I got one offer from the CIA, and one job from Mr. Harriman, with the Economic Cooperation Agency in Paris. Mr. Harriman had in pre-war days been owner of a mine in Silesia where my father was on the Board of Directors. I was interviewed by Lincoln Gordon, who became later Assistant Secretary of State. He was a Harvard Professor and worked with Mr. Harriman. He said: "Why don't you come to Paris, to the headquarters of the European Marshall Plan? We'll put you in the Program Division. That is where economists are working on some very exciting ideas." My father urged me to accept the job offer in Paris. As for the offer to work in the CIA, my dad thought I was not cut out for it: "John, as a human being, you need applause. When you work for the CIA, you can't get applause. If something works, they will never admit it. If it fails, you might get the blame. It's a "marshy" atmosphere. Since the job in Paris has been offered, why don't you take it?" I took the assignment in Paris. It was one of the best learning experiences one can ever have.

Q: It was a very exciting time, too.

DEAN: It was a terribly exciting time. They needed people who had ideas. I worked with brilliant people: Tom Shelling of Harvard and his model building. He was one of the officers in that section. I was assigned as Program Officer for Greece and Turkey in the European Headquarters of the Marshall Plan. Jimmy Houghting, who became Professor at Pennsylvania University, was in charge of Italy. John Lindeman was Director of the Division. Henry Tasca was in charge of Finance. He was one of the people starting the European Payments Union, which was the forerunner of the European Currency (EURO). The European Payments Union was a step toward the convertibility of the European currencies. Every country had a line of credit which it could draw on. These increments were known as "tranches." Settlement of debts was in dollars. This mechanism permitted multilateral trade. Greece and Turkey were heavy borrowers and I spent quite some time in visiting specific projects for which requests for funding had been made. I went several times to Greece and Turkey.

Q: What dates were you there?

DEAN: September 1950 through December 1951. John Craig, who is still very much alive, was my buddy. He is a very intelligent man and made his entire career in the Economic Aid business. I learned much at the ECA European headquarters. Our office was located next to La Concorde in Paris, in what was known as the home of the great French diplomat Talleyrand. In 1950, Averell Harriman had been replaced by Abe Katz, as the chief in Paris. The people working in that office included some of the best academics and leading business people. Many of my colleagues and bosses were bright and brilliant. I learned something about economics, about business projects, finance, politics, central planning, and different cultures. The Marshall Plan was market oriented and promoted free enterprise. We in the U.S. benefited from obtaining new markets for our products, and Europeans profited from U.S. dollar credits to buy needed commodities and food to reconstruct their countries after 6 years of war. It was probably one of the finest periods in American diplomacy.

Q: I have been Interviewing Arthur Hartman.

DEAN: He was working with Ambassador Bruce on the bilateral side of the Marshall Plan for France.

Q: Yes. Did you have the feeling you were all true believers? Jean Monnet was sort of the guy...

DEAN: I went over once to Jean Monnet. He spoke English and never needed an interpreter, a role I often was asked to play. I went to his house on Avenue Foch, as a notetaker. The people who worked on the Marshall Plan, whether it was Arthur Hartman on the French side of the Marshall Plan, or in the European Headquarters side which I was on, were mostly believers in the need to build up Europe and maintain a close link between the two sides of the Atlantic. We all thought we were doing something useful and important. We were building a new world. There was no doubt that part of our job was to help Europe maintain some form of capitalism, a free enterprise system, and above all, democratic rule. One has to remember the spirit of the times. In the post-war period, the governments in France had included communists. There were also communists in other countries' governments. Governments in Europe were debating whether they were going to follow an authoritarian form of ruling with significant central government interference, or maintain a more democratic way of building up Europe. By 1950, Europe was already divided by the Iron Curtain. You remember what happened to Masarik in Czechoslovakia?

Q: A coup which really turned the...

DEAN: It was a big change. The Czechs at one point had said "Yes" to the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan provided the essential foreign exchange for these countries to feed themselves and to get their industries started again. Was it altruistic on our part? It was good common sense. We, at this point, helped to make Western Europe choose a path which is similar to ours. As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, the Marshall Plan also brought about some painful changes. Why? Because they were the largest exporters of tobacco to Central Europe. In many part of Europe, people smoked Greek and Turkish tobacco. During the Second World War Gis handed out American cigarettes – Maryland and Virginia blends. People got accustomed to smoking American-type tobacco. They preferred it and bought American cigarettes. But the Marshall Plan helped Greece and Turkey to rebuild their economies. We suggested new ways for the Greeks and the Turks to earn foreign exchange by exporting or by substituting domestic production for foreign imports. For example, we helped the Greeks to export and sell their grapes on foreign markets. In Turkey, we built a steel mill in Zanguldak, replacing some of the imports they could make cheaper themselves. In certain parts of Europe, without U.S.-provided foreign exchange and the Marshall Plan, people still did not have enough to eat. The U.S. provided badly needed wheat and corn to feed Western Europeans who did not grow enough grain immediately after the war. The Marshall Plan also provided modern technology. The concept of productivity was pushed by the Marshall Plan and it took hold all over the world. All of us who were involved in ECA felt we were doing something useful and it made our lives worthwhile.

Q: Oh, yes. I mean, what are you here for?

DEAN: You have to give a purpose to your existence. When I accepted the job in Paris, I had not yet passed the Foreign Service Examination. I was not part of the U.S. Foreign Service. It was more of a contractual arrangement. Yes, Paris was not only a wonderful professional assignment, but I also met my wife there. To be precise, I met her on the ninth of February 1951 and it was one of the luckiest moments in my life. We have now been married 50 years.

Q: What was she doing?

DEAN: She was working pro bona at the French Foreign Office, what is called the “Quai d’Orsay.” At the time, I had an old aunt who died in the States and she had left me \$5,000 in her will. With that money, I bought a car and it gave me a nest egg.

Q: You could get a pretty good car for \$1,000.

DEAN: It was a brand new Ford. In those days, I could park near my office. One day, I found on the windshield, a paper with “Yankee, go home.” I said: “These French are a bunch of unfriendly people who are ungrateful for what we are doing.” Soon thereafter, I was invited to the home of the president of what is the equivalent in France of our Supreme Court. They gave a party and I was invited. The friend who got me the invitation had been a school mate of mine in Paris. At that party I met my wife. That was the luckiest moment of my entire life. But I was suddenly transferred to Brussels, Belgium and I was not going to see my future wife for a while. The job was with the Marshall Plan to Belgium and I was assigned as industrial analyst. It was also the first time that I came across corruption in government. My immediate boss accepted a bribe in order to give a contract to a certain Belgian company. A colonel in the Army Judge Advocate Corps came to Brussels to investigate. I was queried. What was my relationship with my boss? I replied: “Why are you here?” The Colonel claimed that my boss had deposited \$15,000 in an American bank which was equivalent to what the Belgian company had paid him for getting the contract. It had never occurred to me that somebody who served his country could accept a bribe. One of the redeeming features of the Brussels assignment was on occasion to see one of America’s great ambassadors at work: Robert Murphy.

Q: He was a major figure, particularly in World War II.

DEAN: In 1951-52, he was the U.S. Ambassador to Brussels. He was truly a role model for an aspiring young Foreign Service Officer.

Q: I want to capture one thing. You were talking about currency and economics. Did you have the feeling that behind whoever was coming out ahead industrially, the basic thing that you were trying to do was to integrate a Europe so that basically the Germans and French would not go at each other again?

DEAN: I think this was part of it. I also believe that the immediate post-war period threw up these great leaders in Europe who realized that Europe has to work together if Europe is to play a role again on the world scene. Roosevelt had never got along too well with De Gaulle, but De Gaulle knew how to lead his nation. He understood that France could never be a major player

without the full cooperation of Germany. De Gaulle started his rapprochement with Germany for strictly national reasons. On the German side, Adenauer fully understood that Germany, after World War II, needed to work closely with the rest of democratic Europeans to become “acceptable” and this meant in the first place an alliance with France.

In Italy, the U.S. helped the Christian Democrats to pursue a pro-European policy, and the Treaty of Rome is the corner stone of today’s European Union.

Q: Particularly in the elections of 1948.

DEAN: Yes, there was discreet advice given to the Italians to join the fledgling European Community. This brings me to an important point. In the immediate post-war period, U.S. foreign policy seemed to me primarily oriented toward mutual benefits. We were interested in helping Europe to get back on its feet because only one country had won the war: the United States. While the British were among the victors, Britain was basically exhausted. The Russians had won the war but their country was partially destroyed and they had had 26 million casualties. So, the only ones who emerged as the great victor from the war was the United States. By pursuing a policy of mutual interest toward Europe, our policies became highly acceptable to the Europeans. Americans were perceived as friends, in some countries as liberators. The Germans found out that while we had fought the war under the slogan of “unconditional surrender,” once the war was over, we behaved with a great deal of understanding for Germany’s problems. We held out our hand in friendship to the Germans. We provided funds under the Marshall Plan to build up and reconstruct Germany. But the U.S. also benefited from the reconstruction of Europe. American firms established branches in Europe and we invested in new industries in Europe. We helped to feed Europe and at the same time increased our market share for U.S. agricultural exports. It was a great period for U.S.-European cooperation in the mutual interest of both parties.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about how – we are talking about 1950-1952 – the Soviet Union was perceived? At that time, the coup in Czechoslovakia had happened. We were fighting the Korean War, which we felt had been inspired by Stalin and all. How did we feel about the Soviet Union?

DEAN: Let me be very frank. I am not a Soviet expert. My knowledge of the Soviet Union comes from my very interesting two years in military intelligence.

Q: We are talking about this particular period.

DEAN: The impression I get – and I did not voice it a great deal at the time but I felt it then and still feel it’s true today – is that there was a certain amount of fear and distrust of each other. That fear was magnified when in the immediate post-war period, some European governments had to include communists in their government. In the Resistance movement of some nations, the communists had been in the lead fighting the Germans. In France, De Gaulle asked Maurice Thorez to come back from Moscow and he put him in the French Government. In the areas under Russian occupation or control, the Russians shipped back to their country whatever they needed and was still standing. They helped themselves without any real pangs of conscience. As a result,

while the governments in the areas under Russian influence may have been imposed by the Russians, they did not make that many friends in the local population. The distrust of the West of the Communist world and vice-versa may have undermined certain wartime agreements. Distrust and fear existed on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Europeans had a different problem. Part of the population was communist. Sometimes, as much as a third of the population was. For example, in order to avoid civil conflict, De Gaulle had no option but to put communists in the government and later on remove them. The best example of a European statesman who managed to “balance” the West and the communists was Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. He did not want to be under Soviet control, so he worked with the West and ended up as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned world. In the European Headquarters of the Marshall Plan we quickly started a Yugoslav section which helped Tito to remain independent while still following a number of Marxist policies. But they were national Marxist policies!

Q: This was again 1948-1949.

DEAN: Yes. Not everybody perceived in that particular period of time – and I’m talking about the period of 1946-1951- that there was national Marxism, and then there was communism with nations subservient to another power, i.e. the Soviet Union. I want to open a parenthesis, because my name is very much attached to Southeast Asia. In the summer of 1947, Ho Chi Minh came to Fontainebleau, France. He wanted to be part of the French Union, which was comparable to the British Commonwealth. That process would eventually lead to independence. There were some key people in France who favored that process for Vietnam. It must be recalled that the United States had worked with Ho Chi Minh during the Second World War. Major Patty of the OSS helped the Vietnamese to fight the Japanese military. The French were politically too weak in 1947 to grant Vietnam membership in the French Union which would lead to independence. Instead of fighting, Ho Chi Minh wanted support to create an independent state with some linkage to France. He also represented national Marxism. Maybe some of the great scholars in our country will contradict me, but we in the U.S. have a tendency to equate communism usually with subservience to the Soviet Union. Many communists were also ardent nationalists. The Chinese are a good example.

Q: You were in the Program Office. What were you doing? Were you basically trying to figure out ways to get more money out of the system to go to “your” country, as opposed to one of the other countries?

DEAN: We tried to explain to much higher ranking people, both Americans and Europeans, what projects in the countries for which we had responsibility made sense. For example, in Turkey, the Turks imported steel though they had both coal and iron in ample supply. ECA helped to find them financing to build a modern steel mill at Zanguldak. That was one of the projects I worked on. In Greece, I searched for markets for their grapes and how to package them and transport them to new markets. When I worked with representatives of the European Payments Union in Paris, I would submit papers to justify the granting of credit, if needed, for the balance of payments of specific projects. My colleagues did the same for the countries they represented in the Program Office. The Program Office was a kind of planning staff. Decisions were made on a much higher level.

Q: When other people were saying “Belgium needs this” or “France needs this,” did you say “You’ve got to think about Turkey and Greece?”

DEAN: No, not really. We were just one section in this European Headquarters of ECA. There were many other sections: a financial section, a political adviser’s office, etc. We were something like the geographic bureau in the State Department. Obviously, we hoped that our program would also contribute to building democracy. Greeks and Turks have different ways of negotiating. When a Turk says: “Yes,” it’s yes. When it’s “No,” it’s no. In reply to a leading question, Greeks have a tendency to waffle. But it’s easier to strike a deal with the Greeks. They are more flexible and are quite compromise-oriented. Our role basically was to help these countries to move economically forward so that politically, they would shun the extremes. We were more sensitive to potential threats from the extreme left and perhaps, at times, more permissive on the dangers of the extreme right, i.e. the Colonels in Greece.

WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM
Clerk – Typist
Paris (1950)

William J. Cunningham was born in California in 1926. After serving in the Navy from 1944-1947, he received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of New Mexico in 1948 and his Master’s in 1950. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949 and his career has include positions in Prague, Paris, Tokyo, Taipei, Phnom Penh Saigon. Mr. Cunningham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 17, 1997.

Q: You were in Paris from 1950 to when?

CUNNINGHAM: I was in Paris from May of 1950 to November of 1950. I was first assigned to the budget section of the embassy and worked for a man by the name of Nicholas Fortucci, at the time I believe a local American hire of the Embassy. Nick was a very good boss, had a sparkling sense of humor, and was a good mentor to a young guy like me. Nick’s supervisor was a man by the name of Arthur Scharff, the Embassy Budget Officer. Scharff was an opera buff and a wine connoisseur, always going off to some wine tasting experience in the South of France.

After a couple of months I was shifted from the budget section to the accounting section of the embassy where my boss was a woman by the name of Jessie Hairnet. We were under the general supervision of Joseph A. Dagenhart who was the chief disbursing officer at the embassy at that time, and also the chief disbursing officer for all U.S. Foreign Service posts in Western Europe.

During the time that I was in Paris the war broke out in Korea and the embassy in Seoul of course was evacuated, but in great disarray. The government fled to Pusan. MacArthur staged his landing on the west coast at Inchon in September of 1950. A short time later the

government moved back to Seoul after it was retaken, and the embassy moved back with it.

That led to my transfer two months later from Paris to Seoul.

JOHN C. LEARY
Vice Consul
Cherbourg (1950-1953)

John C. Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. After receiving both his bachelor's degree and master's degree from Yale University in 1947 and 1959, respectively, he served in the United States Army from 1943-1945. His career has included positions in Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo, and St. George's. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in November 1998.

Q: Cherbourg is a post that doesn't exist any more.

LEARY: That's correct. It was a small consulate post and it existed then because Cherbourg was quite an important port. In particular, we were shipping most of our military cargo that was going to Europe through the port of Cherbourg. The French had a military unit there acting as the receiving depot and we had daily two or three merchant ships coming in unloading tanks and different types of equipment.

Q: This was the period not long after the Korean War had began and the Cold war was very much a reality in Europe.

LEARY: In fact, the Korean War actually began shortly after I had arrived in Cherbourg.

Q: And France was a very important and loyal member of NATO. The headquarters was in Paris.

LEARY: That's correct. One of my more interesting experiences in Cherbourg was the arrival of General Eisenhower to take over command of NATO that had been established with its headquarters in Paris. Many American officials traveled on the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth in those days and they would arrive in Cherbourg and get on a boat train to Paris. At 7:30 one morning, my wife and I and the consul and his wife and the Mayor and the Super and all the local officials went down to the docks to meet General Eisenhower. So we drank champagne with him at 7:30 in the morning.

Q: That's some return to Europe. This was in the days also before there were flights and the people would routinely take the ships.

LEARY: Right. Later on I became very much involved in HICOG policy matters and I used to read the reports of the negotiations for our delegations, the GATT negotiations for example, who

traveled by ship to Europe.

Q: So you were the number two. There were two officers at the post.

LEARY: Yes, the post had been a one man post before I had arrived. Actually, a young woman had been assigned as vice consul about three months before my assignment and she found the small provincial town of Cherbourg rather difficult and requested a transfer and was sent to Paris. So I was appointed as the next vice consul and for the first time we had two officers at the post.

Q: And I suppose that on occasion you were in charge while the consul was away?

LEARY: Yes, somewhat to my surprise, the day we arrived happened to be a Sunday and the consul met me at the dock and informed me that the next day he was starting a long delayed leave. So, I would be in charge. And I didn't have any orientation training at FSI so I was kind of perplexed, but fortunately we had a very good local staff, including one gentleman that I recall very fondly, named Paul Barbet, who was the senior local. He knew the consular work backwards and forwards and he held my hand and got me through that rather nervous period.

Q: Had we had a post in Cherbourg for awhile?

LEARY: My impression was that it was a post-War thing and it actually closed in 1956. At that time we shipped most of our NATO supplies to the West coast of France, through Bordeaux and the amount of American shipping coming in to Cherbourg was declining drastically. So, as an economy measure, the post was closed.

Q: But while you were there it was a busy post.

LEARY: Yes, it was quite busy. It was busy in some ways. I must say that having joined the Foreign Service expecting to be involved in matters of high policy, being assigned to a small provincial town was something of a come down. We enjoyed our life there but the work was mostly involved with shipping and seamen, and dealing with ships that came into port.

Q: Both American flag vessels and foreign flag?

LEARY: Well, the only foreign flag vessels that we really became involved with were those that were carrying American official travelers. The Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth principally and in addition a few others that had occasion to come to port. It's my recollection that we did have on the books legislation, as far as typical travel was concerned, the requirement to travel on American vessels. This being a post-war period, there were waivers which enabled most of our World War II allies to carry passengers as well.

Q: Later on, I guess it was the United States that was on a kind of North Atlantic run.

LEARY: Yes, in fact when we came home from Cherbourg we traveled on the United States from The Hague. And then they were beginning to reinforce the requirement that American

travelers travel on American ships.

Q: Did we have a consulate there in The Hague?

LEARY: Yes. That was a much bigger and more active post. Cherbourg was a small town with about a 35,000 population. A very good big deep water port which was why the Queens came in there. And they could come in at any time of the day or night. Whereas in the home port of South Hampton they had to arrive at particular tides, so they had to time their arrival at South Hampton. But they didn't have a specific time to drop off their passengers in Cherbourg. Furthermore there was a regular boat-train service between Cherbourg and Paris. It in fact met the ships at the dock and passengers left directly from the ships to the train. Of course, the process worked in the opposite direction as well. Our little consulate was there to facilitate the travelers and occasionally deal with any visa problems or lost passport problems and so forth and then make sure that official travelers made the proper connections.

Q: Did the consulate in Cherbourg have a consular district as well in the town itself?

LEARY: Oh, yes. It covered most of Normandy and Brittany. It was of course very much involved in the D-Day Landing on June 6, 1944.

Q: The commemoration of those Landings.

LEARY: And the Cherbourg was at one end of those landings. It was quite a battle before we were able to secure the port of Cherbourg after the landings. During that period, there were a number of commemorations of the D-Day landing and dedication of monuments, etcetera. We usually had American VIPs, including General Eisenhower and General Ridgeway, come down for those. In a small post the consul and the vice consul were usually included in those events. One in particular, a very moving experience, was to attend the dedication of the U.S. military cemetery on Omaha Beach, at St. Laurent sur Mer. It was beautiful and moving experience.

Q: The period that you were there was less than ten years after the landing at Normandy, so they were still getting organized in terms of the cemeteries and...

LEARY: That's right. We still had the wooden crosses in the cemetery at the time. Now there are stone crosses. I was back there in 1979 and saw the large monument with dioramas of the landings and descriptions of the battles that took place.

Q: Besides the two of you at the American consulate, were there other American officials or facilities in your consular district?

LEARY: We had about, ten miles outside of Cherbourg, a small U.S. Army detachment, a signal corps detachment manning what was known as the cable head. During World War II the Trans-Atlantic cables had been cut and one of them, which had run from New York and ended in Germany was picked up after the War and the end of the cable was brought into Cherbourg where it connected with land lines. We had a signal corps detachment of about four officers and 40 enlisted people who were in the service there to make sure that the cable was operating

properly. That became one of the principal communication lines for U.S. federal government communications with Europe, including State Department. So that gave us the opportunity to associate with the members of the military. That was the only Americans presence that we had, except for some American Battle Monuments, people who were at the cemeteries. We had cemeteries at Omaha Beach and another one in Brittany.

Q: They were basically responsible for the graves and were beginning to organize memorial installations.

LEARY: Right. The maintenance of the property.

Q: Okay. Anything else that we should say about your first post at Cherbourg?

LEARY: One thing that might be interesting although it's not about me, it's about the consul who was in charge at the time that I arrived. His history was interesting and perhaps typical of some of our long-time, what we called staff corps employees. His name was Leslie Weisenberg and he had gone to Europe in World War I with the Army. At the end of the War, he, and I suppose the General, had the opportunity to take their discharge in France and he decided to do so. He had been there for several months and had never seen Paris or any other sights. He went to Paris and he told me that he enjoyed himself for a few weeks, then he ran out of money. At that time the Versailles Peace Commission was beginning to work and he applied for and obtained a job as a clerk with the American delegation. After that ended, he managed to sign on with the embassy in Paris and worked in the embassy in Paris until World War II. In the meantime, he had become a Foreign Service Staff officer. First a vice consul and then a consul. When France fell, he was interned with other staff members of the American embassy in Paris and was eventually returned to the United States. In 1944, when we liberated Paris, he was one of the first people to go back to work in the embassy. In about 1948 he was assigned to Cherbourg as the officer in charge of the consulate.

Q: What did he do after Cherbourg?

LEARY: Well, he was not anxious to leave France. He was married to a French woman and had property in France and so on. He did do a couple of other posts, as I recall, one was in Switzerland, and if I'm not mistaken he might have been assigned to a French-Canadian post as well. But he used to tell a lot of stories about the inter-war period. Including the time when due to budget problems and the staff was asked to go for a month without pay. That wouldn't happen any more.

Q: Well, when Congress doesn't act when it's supposed to act. So he had something like a 30 year or 30 plus year career almost all of which was in France.

LEARY: That's right. There were several other people at the embassy at that time who had similar experiences. A fellow that I didn't know too well, but decided on our budgets and a lot of the senior consular officers in Paris, some of whom had been there for decades.

Q: And home leave wasn't routinely taken every two years.

LEARY: That's right.

Q: Particularly in the inter-war period.

LEARY: Right.

LAURENT E. MORIN

Economic Officer

Le Havre (1949-1952)

Economic/Commercial Officer

Paris (1952-1954)

Laurent E. Morin was born in Augusta, Maine in 1920. He joined the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included assignments in Algeria, France, Japan, Iraq, and Washington, DC. Mr. Morin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

MORIN: With that, there was no question of returning to Algiers, and the Department sent me to Le Havre, France, where I was economic officer. Le Havre was a small consulate, there were four Americans. It was basically a maritime post. We had ships coming in all the time, seaman hanging around the office, American tourists stranded there, that sort of thing. Our lives revolved around the ships. Although I wasn't suppose to be the consular officer, we all were. I spent time at the jails, hospitals, etc.

One of the most demanding jobs was the meeting and greeting of the big liners. That was before American officials were required to travel on American flagships and before people used planes to any extent. So every ship that came into Le Havre had somebody on board. We had all the Cunard ships, the French liners, the American liners, and the Dutch liners. Invariably there would be somebody on board we had to meet. Our job was to go aboard, find them, tell where they were to be housed in Paris, pass on messages, help them get their cars off, get through customs, etc. You would have the sort of problem where an army family would have adopted a German baby, gone home and come back without a visa for France for the kid...visas were not required for Americans but were required for Germans. You got into that sort of problem.

Often these ships got in early in the morning so often we had to be there at 6 in the morning. We would sit behind the custom lines and watch for diplomatic and official passports and nail the people afterwards. But we didn't have a sign saying "American Consulate," that would have been lethal. Every tourist on the ship would have been after us.

Everybody went by ship in those days. I remember meeting Mrs. Roosevelt, Philip Jessup, Perle Mesta, and all kinds of people coming through. As another example of the kind of problems you get into, a young lady was coming in. Her husband, a military officer, was to meet her. He had

sent a message to us saying to tell his wife that he was on maneuvers and she would have to drive across all of France and half of Germany by herself. I told her that and she nearly passed out. She said she didn't even know what side of the road they drove on. Well, I found somebody, some other army type, who was going out that way and he agreed to lead her all the way across to where she was going.

And the seamen, of course, were a horrible problem. In those days American flag ships were running from the Persian Gulf to Le Havre to deliver oil to the refineries in Le Havre. It was an 18-month hitch for these sailors. It was terrible because the ships would turn around in Le Havre in 24 hours. In Saudi Arabia, the Saudis would not let them ashore. So they were caught on the ship for 18 months, and they had all these problems. As a ship started coming near we would get a notice that there were so many people on board who were sick. A doctor was needed to examine them to make sure they were sick and not just trying to get out of their contracts. Some of them would skip ship and go to Paris and live on their pay for a month or two and then come back trying to get a job. This created all sorts of problems. In France if you break a seamen's contract you can go to jail. They don't mess around. We favored the seamen by saying that the shipping agent was responsible for them even though they had deserted their ship for extended periods.

Not only did we help people coming into France, we also helped people leaving France. We would have the hitchhikers, the destitute, the American tourists, seamen, etc. Le Havre was the nearest port to the US so they would all gravitate down to that point thinking they could get some job on the ships. Well, that is not allowed anymore, the unions put a stop to it. In the pre-war days that was the way our Foreign Service people used to get across as the government didn't pay passage for home leave.

One day I had a call from a woman who said that she and her friend were running out of money and didn't know what to do and wanted to come to see us. My boss, the consul, Sabin J. Dalferes, was a Cajun, an old FSS consul from World War I, a real colorful character from Lafayette, Louisiana. He and I received these two women and it was pretty obvious to me when I took a look at them that they were lesbians...one was very butchy in her dress and the other was very feminine.

They started talking. The very female one had had a job in Germany with the US Army. When her friend showed up the Army fired her on the spot. They were now running out of money. Their families would have very little to do with them. The family of the feminine one offered to give her a one way ticket but nothing else. They were just really hard up. They didn't know what to do. They were in Le Havre and broke.

Then they started telling us she had lost her job because the Army thought they were lesbians. Dalferes got very uncomfortable with this and asked if this had something to do with the Well of Loneliness.

Q: The Well of Loneliness was a novel in the 1930's which treated lesbianism in a very discreet way.

MORIN: The more masculine one got up and said, "Absolutely not, I am not a lesbian, I'm a hermaphrodite" She paused, "Do you want me to prove it?" She started undoing her clothes and Dalferes almost fell out of his chair. "Oh no, no," he said. She continued, "Now look, I'm in love with this woman. She is the only person in my whole life who has ever given me the time of day. I am not going to be separated from her. We need help."

Both of us were very sympathetic to them. We managed to find them very cheap lodgings in Le Havre, and later I found out that Dalferes had paid for them. Eventually we made arrangements with US Lines to give them passage with the one ticket the family would pay for. We went aboard ship and saw them off. Dalferes gave them some pocket money.

About three or four months later we get a letter from the masculine one which said, "I have been operated on and now we are married. I want you, Mr. Dalferes and your junior consul, to know that you were the only people who ever were nice to us and we really appreciated it. We can't give you enough of our thanks."

Anyway, that was the kind of work I did in Le Havre. I was there for a while and then the Department decided to change the consular district and transfer the northern departments of France to Paris. I then went to Paris with them.

Q: You served in Paris from 1952 to 1954.

MORIN: Right. My wife was quite ill. Those times we didn't have much in the way of support from the Department, no medical support for dependents, no education allowances. My wife fell ill and had a very difficult pregnancy in Le Havre, and I had to send her home at my own expense. By the time she got back six months later with the baby, son Lee, I was in Paris.

Q: You had two Ambassadors while you were in Paris. James Dunn, who was one of the old hands of the Foreign Service and Douglas Dillon who was more of a contemporary figure. Did you have any contact or observe how they operated and managed?

MORIN: No, I never saw them. This was such a huge operation in Paris. I didn't know the Ambassadors. Everybody was invited once to the DCM's house. That was about the extent of that kind of activity for my level.

Q: What were you doing in Paris?

MORIN: I was in the economic section. I started off with straight economic reporting. That was not a very well run operation. I wasn't very happy there...nor were a lot of other people. It was large and our boss, who was a fine reporter on his own, just didn't administer anything. He did all the work, working until 7 or 8 every night. But there was no feedback, instructions or anything.

After a time I was transferred to the commercial section. I was the assistant commercial attaché and I enjoyed that a great deal. It was a very nice operation with a wonderful boss, Patton Allen. Among other things, I was the one who received all the visitors that no one knew what to do

with. When the receptionist at the main lobby would get a nut of some kind they would be sent to the commercial section. But it was a fine job and I enjoyed it. Paris was terribly expensive for us in addition to my wife's trip to the States and coming back at my own expense. For instance, at the Embassy commissary you could only buy things on account...you couldn't use cash... that was to control things. If you didn't settle your bill at the end of the month, you were red-lined and then you couldn't buy anything else there. This was a very common occurrence for me...not being able to settle at the end of the month. So we ended up buying on the local market a lot more than we needed to if we had had more capital.

For instance, coal was a real problem. We had a coal burning furnace in our house. Coal on the open market was sold by the five kilo bag which worked out to over a \$100 a ton. You could buy coal for \$50 a ton from the Embassy if you bought two tons at a time. I was never able to put \$100 together.

Also, we were obliged at a great disadvantage to buy our francs at the official rate of 350 to the dollar while the black market rate was over 500. The embassy was very strict about this, although the military and others accommodated their people.

Q: What you are saying here is something that I empathize with completely because I went through it too. Americans in certain places were living very splendidly but in other places they really were hurting. The gay diplomatic life was not that fancy when you were trying to support yourself. This really inhibited our ability to get around.

MORIN: Exactly, and in Paris particularly where you had such a large operation, so much brass and high level officers...that upper class in the Embassy was a world by itself. We had very little contact with it in the ranks. It was like being in the Department, there were so many people. Also that was a very trying time in the Foreign Service anyway. This was during the McCarthy years and while that affected the senior officers more than it did us, we still felt it. We had the visit of Cohn and Schine coming through Paris.

Q: These were two aides of Senator McCarthy who made, in diplomatic terms, absolute horses asses out of themselves by running around looking at what they considered subversive books. These were two young kids with lots of ego and no intelligence.

MORIN: Right. And they were made the laughing stock because all of their stories were picked up in the press all the time.

It was also the time of the RIF, the reduction in force of the Eisenhower administration. That affected the FSS officers of which I was still one then. Notices would come out periodically, listing the names of people who would be dropped. You had three weeks to get home if you wanted to get your way paid! Of course this news would come into the communications center and the secretaries down there would pass the word around. You had this going on all the time, people on edge not knowing what they were going to do if they got fired, which was what it was. So it was a very trying time for most of us.

But being in Paris, itself, was such a delight to me so I was able to enjoy it, but the Embassy was

not that great a place to be in. It was a horrible place for secretaries, for instance. Because as the girls told me, "It is fine to go to museums for a while, but after that what do we do the rest of the time?" The American males all went out with French girls. The American girls were left on their own and unless they were real extroverts, of which there were a few, they just didn't get around much. It got to be terrible for them; lots of tears.

Q: Although you were somewhat removed, did you get a feeling of how the Embassy was responding to the Vietnam situation?

MORIN: This was 1952-54. Vietnam was just barely starting.

Q: I am talking about the French side.

MORIN: The French were having their problems. We had a desk for Vietnam...for those three countries. So it was a concern to people and the Dien Bien Phu battle was during that period.

Q: Yes, that was in 1954.

MORIN: The thing that struck me about that was the French soldiers coming back from that area and from Korea earlier, would not be well received by the French population. I used to say to myself, "Well, that is just terrible, Americans would never react that way." And of course they acted the same way when our own soldiers came back from Vietnam. That used to shock me in those days.

We had other things too. There was the Rosenberg trial. Remember that?

Q: Yes, Jules and Ethel Rosenberg were accused and convicted of spying for the Soviet Union on nuclear matters. They were executed.

MORIN: There were lots of protests. The Embassy would be ringed by these police vans. There were signs everywhere of "Americans Go Home" and that kind of stuff.

Then I was assigned to Kobe, Japan. There the treatment was absolutely different. We had complete support. We could use all the military commissaries, PXs, schools, etc. and nice houses were available.

In Paris, my daughter went to a French school, which was all right because she was fluent in French and accustomed to French schools in Algeria, but for kids who were older they couldn't fit in. In French schools one had difficulty if you didn't speak good French. The French system, as explained to us by French teachers, was to favor the upper 10 or 20% of the children and not bother with the rest. The American school in Paris was quite expensive, and since the government didn't pay for it, people at our level just couldn't afford to send kids there.

LEONARD L. BACON
Consul

Strasbourg (1950-1954)

Leonard L. Bacon was born in Rochester, New York in 1907. He received his bachelors degree from Yale in 1928 and graduated from Harvard Law in 1931. He enlisted in the army in 1942 and joined the Foreign Service in 1945 and served in Switzerland, China, Germany, Laos, and Washington, DC. Mr. Bacon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Can we talk about your next assignment because it sounds quite interesting. You were sent to Strasbourg, is that correct? And what were you doing there? This was from 1950 to '54(?).

BACON: Yes. This was in the late summer of 1950. I was sent there to be a number two, but actually to spend all my time in the Saar. The Saar is a part of the very old French-German combination of iron ore in Lorraine, and coal in the Saar basin. Since the time of Louis XIV they've always been under one administration, in effect. Louis XIV captured part of the Saar and built forts in there. Of course, he didn't have much in the way of steam power at that time but the local French steel industry, and the German Saar coal mines would be sunk without access to either the raw material on either side. And after the war the French thought there was a chance to get the Saar back again under French control and they set up a special district which would be in economic union with France under the same French customs, French taxation, but would still have a cultural autonomy of its own. Although they did their best to make French attractive to Saarlanders, sent the Comédie Française there for performances, and so on, rebuilt the opera house. This worked pretty well for a while, partly because they benefited by the French repopulation law, which gave huge benefits to parents who had a certain number of children, at a certain rate of speed, and Saarlanders needed no encouragement that way, they'd have had them anyway, but they got the benefits. Eventually all of this began to pall, and Germany after the restoration of its economy, and its currency, began to look better and better. Long after I left a plebiscite was held, and as expected they voted to rejoin Germany and the French took it in good order. There was nothing much they could do about it anyway.

That was a project for which we had really no responsibility and we didn't have to do anything except to indicate our general support of French position on the matter, but a position which our support was not absolutely unbreakable. After about three years of that, I was sent to the NATO Defense College in Paris, the easiest transfer I ever made—just get in the car and drive. That has a course of about five months and I was directed to remain there as a member of the faculty for another three courses, back to Washington for career development unit in Personnel, and after a year of that to Laos as number two in the Vientiane embassy.

JAMES McCARGAR Political Officer Paris (1950-1954)

James McCargar was born and raised in San Francisco, California in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Stanford University in

1941. Mr. McCargar entered the Foreign Service in 1942. His career included positions in Paris, Kuibyshev, Moscow, Vladivostok, Santo Domingo, Budapest, Genoa, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 18, 1995.

Q: *AFL-CIO was very much involved.*

MCCARGAR: It was still AFL in 1950-51, before the merger, although the CIO had earlier joined the AFL in breaking out of the Communist-dominated WFTU, and forming the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Wisner put Offie in as a contract agent (i.e. undercover) with Lovestone. Then there was a break between Wisner and Offie. I've never known what brought it on. I have seen photocopies from Lovestone's papers (he sold his papers well before his death to the Hoover Institution) of letters to Lovestone from Offie, which were patently subversive of Wisner's efforts to control the relationship with Lovestone. Perhaps Wisner caught onto what was going on in his regard. Or perhaps Bedell Smith, who had been looking into the case, and had been in touch with the FBI about it, simply ordered Frank to get rid of Offie. So Wisner fired him. Offie's first move on being fired was to go to Wisner's house. He went into the kitchen, he took the cook by the arm, and he led the man out of the house, then and there. Leaving Polly without a cook. Typical Offie. Thereafter he was exceedingly, publicly, and scurrilously bitter about Polly, possibly because he blamed her for the break with Frank.

Offie then went off and formed something called Global Enterprises, which had to do with Italian oil and German steel. (Remember, this was the heyday of "offshore procurement" and the buildup of NATO.) Offie had an office in the Corning Glass building of Fifth Avenue in New York. By that time Bob Murphy had become Vice President of Corning Glass International; his office was on a high floor of that lovely building; Global Enterprises was just around the corner from Bob Murphy. Again, it's one of those things that I've simply never understood. As is known, Offie subsequently died in an air crash on the London to Brussels Sunday night flight. By that time, NATO had already moved to Brussels. Offie was late and called to have the plane held for him. They held it for him. So he got on the plane. The plane took off, it went straight up and then straight down. Everybody on board was killed, including Offie who now has, in the Foreign Service area of Rock Creek Park cemetery, a great big block that says OFFIE on it. So ended that story.

I must say Offie did a very peculiar thing. After my Vienna assignment fell apart, I made a mistake. I should have stayed with OPC, if we're speaking of career moves (though the CIA at that stage had no pension rights), but I felt very loyal to the Foreign Service. I really was very proud to be a Foreign Service Officer. I was admiring of the men that I had known in it. I had a lot of friends in it. And I enjoyed the work, most of the time. So I went back to the Foreign Service. With Wisner's help, I was assigned to the Paris Embassy on East European affairs. When Offie heard that I had been assigned to Paris, he called me and invited me and my wife to lunch and dinner on the same day, with whatever other guests we would like. We went to lunch (I had a tooth extracted that morning so I didn't eat very much), and then we went to dinner. He asked what else we would like to do, and I said, "I'd like to go to the circus." So we all went to

the circus. Then he said, "I have an apartment in the Rue de Ponthieu in Paris. You can have it for \$100 dollars a month for a while, until you get fully located." I took it and paid the \$100 dollars to some clerk in the Embassy, which I assume went to Bullitt.

And there I was in Paris. End of the great adventures. I had enjoyed my time at the OPC. The work was fascinating. I had a large staff. I had a budget of as many millions as I wanted to spend, and I couldn't spend it all. Even with the Albanian operation. I did plant officers in Greece and in Austria in hopes of later using them to in those areas. I had one amusing experience which should be recorded. I had a young man come in to see me who was to be a potential recruit. I had an idea of putting him in a shipping office in Piraeus in Greece. I mentioned this to him and he firmly rejected it. His explanation: "You've got to give a man a cover he can be proud of!" I realized we were up against a different view of things.

But those plants and the Albanian operation were the end of my OPC service. I went to Paris, to the East European Desk of the Political Section, with great pleasure – only to find that it was a bad move. Here I'd just been in charge of all of these very important matters, and I'd moved at a responsible level. Suddenly I found myself under a man for whom I developed very little respect, who was devious, and pathologically secretive. He wouldn't let me see any of the papers in the office –

Q: Who was this?

MCCARGAR: Landreth Harrison. He gave me minimal assignments and then complained that I wasn't doing anything. But besides exploring the exile communities in France, I did turn out a compendium on the Hungarian immigration in France and one on the Romanian. (These have since been declassified, and are available in the U.S. Archives; one who recently made use of the Romanian report, coincidentally enough, was Frank Wisner's daughter, as she prepared her doctoral dissertation for Boston University on Romania 1944-48.)

After the first year, Harrison had turned in reports on me which meant that I obviously had to go somewhere else in the Embassy. So I was sent over to COCOM, the Allied Coordinating Committee. I think it has just recently been abolished. COCOM was a Western European and U.S. committee concerned with the export of strategic arms to the Soviet Bloc. Sid Jacques, who was later killed in a air crash in Nepal, was the Chief Delegate, in succession to Nate King. Bob Brandin was part of that group, as was Gardner Ainsworth. Who died last year. The French had temporary buildings at that time spilling down from the Trocadero almost to the Pont d'Iena. Thank God they ultimately removed them. They were an eyesore. They were worse than the ones we had here on Constitution Avenue and around the Reflecting Pool.

Q: I remember seeing them. They really turned our stomachs.

MCCARGAR: Exactly. Anyway, we would meet there almost every day and go over these detailed lists: what do we do about left-threaded widgets, and what about right-handed earphones. This item and that item.

Q: This was basically trying to keep strategic material out of the hands of the Communist states

and armed forces?

MCCARGAR: Yes. I respected the purpose of it all.

Meanwhile – this all came out later – I started getting official letters from FP, from Foreign Service Personnel. For example, I was advised that for the period when I was in Hungary I was placed in the lowest 30 percent of my class. Then came a letter from Durbrow, then Chief of Personnel, saying that I was in the lower 10% of my class – this for the period when I was at OPC.

Later I found out what had happened. I should add that Bob Miner, who later became an Ambassador, was then in the Embassy in Paris. Having been in the Embassy at Athens during the Albanian operation, he was one of those who was witting as to what I was doing at OPC. He was assigned to my Selection Board in 1952. I had been promoted in June of 1947, thanks to Arthur Schoenfeld (i.e., before my Pond work). Thereafter, I learned, my record was a blank until I got to Paris. There, after my first year, Harrison had slaughtered me with the support of Phil Bonsal, the Counselor for Political Affairs, who didn't know what I was doing anyway. But Bonsal's way of doing things was automatically to support the section chiefs under him. Here I was, as I say, having done all these very important things, having had this great authority, being a clerk in the office of someone for whom I had no respect. And since I still felt that the assignment was – if only minus Harrison – one that called on my experience, and one that I had requested via Wisner, I didn't feel that I could ask for another one.

Selden Chapin, by that time Ambassador to the Netherlands, invited me up to The Hague. He wanted me to join his staff there. With my genius for doing a strange mixture of right and wrong things, I refused on the grounds, which I held private to myself, that it was not sensible to tie your career to one man too much. I knew that it was also possible that Selden would get into some trouble, which he did eventually. So I refused it. I stayed on in Paris and suffered there – an oxymoron if there ever was one.

Miner was called to my Selection Board, and he told me what had happened. The Boards all had public members. These public members were not cleared for Top Secret and Secret materials – nor were any of the officials members of the Boards cleared for such matters as the Pond or OPC. So all these people would look at my record which said nothing about what I had done for the Pond in Hungary, or what I had done at OPC.

What Bob Miner didn't know was that Chapin had written a letter in 1948 (to Durbrow) noting that I had not been promoted, and saying in effect, "Something's wrong here. This man did things that were thoroughly authorized". A memo was sent to EUR and Randy Higgs, who I thought was a friend of mine, replied that EUR had no objection to honors being bestowed upon me, or whatever. But EUR thought the people who had authorized these secret actions should step forward and say that they were responsible. As it happened, the Pond had turned in a magnificent letter of commendation, which to this day I have never seen because, as I found out years later, from a memorandum to Secretary of State Cy Vance, signed by Ben Read as Under Secretary for Management, that commendation "was withheld from my personnel file." No explanation was given by the Under Secretary for this action, and none was asked for by the

Secretary of State. My questions about this over the years have simply been ignored by the Department of State.

So there was this long blank in my record, followed by damnation from Harrison (which I had contested, but my reply was not in the file) and a “doing well” from Sid Jacques for my brief period at COCOM. According to Miner, the public members kept saying, “But what does this man do? What has he been doing for these years here? There are four years here that aren’t really covered”. Obviously my few months in Genoa hadn’t contributed to my record at all. The Government members – most of whom, except for Miner, didn’t themselves know, as I have mentioned (only that my work was highly classified), said “We can’t tell you.” The situation became so bad that Jerry Drew, by then Director General of the Foreign Service (and who not only had known me in Budapest, but was witting of both the Pond and OPC) took the extraordinary step of appearing before my Selection Board in his official capacity. A very unusual thing. He spoke to my Board, and said, “You cannot do this to this man. He has done things that we can’t tell you about, but they’re of great value for the country,” and so forth. The result was that I was in the lowest 10 percent of my class for two years running.

I had a cable from Bill Boswell, a friend who was in FP at that time (his brother, an Army officer, and I had been in Moscow together), saying he needed to see me in Washington before a certain date. So I got on a plane. I knew my Paris assignment was almost over. So I flew back and I saw Bill. He said, “You have one more year to regain your standing in the Service, and you can’t do it. It’s not possible. You can’t get from the lowest 10% up into something that won’t select you out in one year.” So I resigned. Presumably I blotted my copy book again, because I resigned in February or March, but I made it effective in October, taking advantage of all my accumulated leave – as you could do in those days. Personnel kept writing me letters saying “Please make it effective now,” and describing their budgetary and other difficulties. My feeling was, “You’re kicking me around. Why should I do you a favor?” I let it go to October, when my leave and pay ran out, and that was the end of it. So ended my Foreign Service career. To my sorrow and chagrin, I must say.

JACOB J. KAPLAN
Board of European Payments Union
Paris (1950-1959)

Jacob Kaplan was born in Massachusetts in 1920. After graduating from Harvard, he served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. He went on to work as the head of the economic section on Southern Europe and contributed to the beginnings of the Marshall Plan. He worked with the ECA and the Board of the European Payments Union, and later was the head of the International Development Organization Staff in AID. Mr. Kaplan was interviewed by W. Haven North on March 22, 1999.

KAPLAN: Well, after two years at Yale I decided that I really did not want to remain an academic. I had grown up thinking I wanted to be an academic but as a result of my war time and

post war experiences, I began to realize that my real interests were in the application of economic analysis to real world policy problems. Hence, I went back to ECA in 1950. I soon found myself a member of a new staff that had been established to deal with European regional problems. Primarily, the staff served to backstop the OEEC. It also dealt with NATO, which had by then come into existence, and which became very important once the Korean war broke out in June 1950. Also, we provided some backstopping and support for the European coal and steel community which had just come into existence. It was a group of people, all of whom believed in the importance of European economic integration. We wanted to promote it and Dick Bissell, the ECA Deputy Administrator, set the staff up for exactly that purpose.

Q: Which was in the State Department?

KAPLAN: Within the ECA, a European regional staff. Its first head was John Hulley, who had been a major contributor to the European Payments Union concept. He shortly resigned and I succeeded him as chief of that Division.

Q: What were you trying to bring about?

KAPLAN: We were trying to promote economic integration through specific moves. That had actually begun with the European Payments Union Agreement. The OEEC was a forum that conducted discussions and meetings on all sorts of issues, but its major decision making role had been in the division of aid. By 1950 that was no longer practicable. The real problem was that although European production was well above prewar levels, trade within Europe was still 15% below and European dollar balance of payments was still in serious deficits. Neither the Europeans nor we in ECA had any great confidence that the need for aid was going to end by 1952. It was important for the Europeans to get rid of their bilateral trade agreements, to learn to be competitive with each other. Maybe that would increase productivity sufficiently to give them enough confidence to free their restrictions on trade with the dollar area. That was the purpose of the EPU to which we were giving strong support. ECA had provided the capital to get it started. In 1954, I went to Paris as the U.S. Representative to the Managing Board and stayed there for five years. It was probably the best work experience of my life.

Q: This was mainly putting together the Payment Union?

KAPLAN: Well, the Payments Union was together by then; it had functioned for several years, quite effectively. At the time, there were two issues. First, how was Europe going to get ready for convertibility and second, when were they going to reach the point when they could make their currencies convertible. The British were pushing for an early move to a very limited kind of convertibility. They wanted to reestablish the London financial and gold markets, which had been dormant because of trade and payments restrictions and because the British balance of payments itself was so weak. They had some hope they could reestablish those markets if the EPU were abolished. Most of their permanent officials had opposed its formation in the first place. Hugh Gaitskell, their Minister of State for Economic Affairs and later the Chancellor, overruled them. He was an economist by training and was persuaded by our very able staff in Paris that the Union would indeed be in Britain's interest, and so it turned out to be. The Bank of England and the Treasury civil servants were very unhappy about the whole affair and did not

cooperate terribly well.

The Germans were also restless, particularly Mr. Erhard, the Economics Minister, who preached convertibility at any audience who would listen, though he had not succeeded in persuading his own government that Germany should move to convertibility before the rest of Europe was ready to move. The OEEC convened a Ministerial Conference on Convertibility. Harold Stassen, by then the head of the foreign aid agency, MSA, brought me along as his principal advisor. We were trying to figure out a way to hold Europe together, hold European integration together, and to promote European integration at least until such point as they really were able to become convertible together successfully. The Conference was able to agree that the EPLI should be changed to provide more flexibility.

When I came to Paris, the first issue was negotiating changes in the EPU Agreement to establish the conditions under which a move to convertibility could be made. The British were given a veto power, the power to move when they were ready. By late 1954, their situation had deteriorated to a point that they put off any such move to convertibility. Then the EPU went on.

The Managing Board was the place where the most intensive economic policy coordination took place that had ever occurred up to that time. Country's situations were reviewed regularly. Every member of the Union had accepted an implicit commitment to keep its payments with the rest of the members in balance over time and the Board supervised that commitment. It reviewed a country's position when it was getting out of balance. It made recommendations, both to the surplus countries and the deficit countries and they were accepted and proved successful. It had become a very prestigious and influential body because it had dealt with several crises in its early days very effectively. It had thus acquired a great deal of clout. In 1957, the Board was finally able to get the French government to accept conditions that required economic policy changes in return for a special credit. The EPU incidentally did impose conditions on its credits. It invented the idea of conditionality, which the IMF later took over.

Q: These were conditions associated with...?

KAPLAN: They were fiscal and monetary conditions designed to help countries get their payments back into balance. In some cases, recommendations were made to surplus countries. They didn't get credits, but they had to give credit. They would get recommendations to remove trade restrictions that affected countries in difficulties.

Q: Were there other issues you addressed in that role?

KAPLAN: The Board had two major crises. One was with France, which had fallen out of step with EPU Agreement. The Agreement not only involved keeping one's payments in balance but also reducing quantitative restrictions on trade with each other. A companion European Code of Trade Liberalization required countries to free at least 75 percent of their trade in each of three major categories. The French had done so, fell back, later conformed and then fell back again. They were in economic and financial difficulties all through the '50s. The U.S. had provided them with a lot of aid and urged that they bring their economy into better balance. However, the governments changed every few months and none of them was willing to do anything unpopular.

So the problems just rolled on. They got involved in fighting in Vietnam and later pulled out. We paid most of their bills, including retroactive payments for bills for their Vietnam expenditures before they moved out.

Q: I gather we were supporting...?

KAPLAN: They were in trouble and we were still generous. But by 1957, the U.S. government had had it. The French had run through the very large reserves accumulated from our earlier aid and they were desperate for further help. We told them to go to the other Europeans, who were in a position to help. The other Europeans were willing but they insisted that there be conditions. Finally in the fall of '57 a new French government put together a program that seemed to be acceptable. The EPU was willing to provide them with some credit, and the IMF offered a little more credit. The Germans offered a substantial credit and the French sent a mission to Washington to seek some more aid from the U.S. The German Chairman of the Board pleaded with me to persuade Washington to provide something. It would be politically embarrassing if Germany were the only bilateral contributor. It would be embarrassing for the French as well as for the Germans. I did go to Washington and passed this message along. The U.S. did make a modest contribution to the package and the program worked fabulously well. De Gaulle took over shortly thereafter. After a lot of debate he decided to honor the EPU's conditions and the French economy and balance of payments thrived thereafter. All of this is told in a book about the EPU that I co-authored with Gunther Schleiminger. It appeared in 1989.

Q: It was called the European Payments Union: Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s by Jacob J. Kaplan and Gunther Schleiminger, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. Were there other issues?

KAPLAN: Then we had Turkey. Turkey had been a member of the Union from the very beginning, but it never removed quantitative restrictions on its imports. It kept asking for credit all the time, and none of the Board's members was responsive. Finally, in 1958, things had really gotten desperate. The U.S. had been providing substantial aid to Turkey for years and we were certainly not interested in increasing it. Turkey was then in real trouble and had huge debts. The Europeans had been letting them buy goods with export credit guarantees and the debts were enormous. An IMF staff member, a former Czech national named Ernest Sturc, had developed a relationship with the senior people in the Turkish bureaucracy. He went to Ankara and persuaded them to introduce a decent stabilization program. Mangoldt, the German chairman of the EPU Board, also went there. Thereafter, I got a telephone call from Washington saying that the stabilization program looked very good but that Turkey would need a financial package of X amount. The U.S. and the IMF can provide some, but how about the Europeans? Can you get them to fill the gap? Knowing the European attitude toward the Turks and their behavior up to that point I was very skeptical but said I'd try. I invited Mangoldt to lunch at one of his favorite restaurants in Paris and fearfully explained the need to finalize the operation quickly. To my surprise, he thought the stabilization program could succeed. This was a chance to bring Turkey back into being a full-scale member of the OEEC and thus to fill out the last gap in the European Community. So we wrote some numbers down, put together a package, and agreed to recommend all its components to our governments.

I guess there is no point in my now not telling tales out of the school. In Paris at that point a

Treasury representative held the rank of Minister in the U.S. delegation, of which I was a member. He was a retired banker who had little to do except exchange gossip and views with anybody who would talk to him. A friend of the Ambassador, he saw my reporting cables. I had reported my conversation with Mangoldt in an “eyes only” telegram. My Treasury colleague promptly drove to Frankfurt and related its contents to Emminger, then the key international person in the German Central Bank. Emminger had been angling for Mangoldt’s job for sometime and he proceeded to put the kibosh on the proposal before Mangoldt had a chance to approach Bonn. And so we had to recover, as we did. The Germans contributed a little less than we had suggested, and the other Europeans more. It was amazing that small countries like Belgium and even the French offered money. France had just been given a package itself. It offered a small sum if the others would agree. We thus were able to put together a package that was approved at an OEEC Ministerial Meeting and it all worked. We also set up a group to deal with Turkey’s debts. The European debts were almost all government guaranteed, while our debts were all private, some substantial, some very small. I remember 10 dollars owed to a bookseller in Philadelphia.

Q: Put together a rescheduling of the debts?

KAPLAN: We put together a rescheduling of the debts. The Europeans wanted them repaid as soon as possible. We were providing aid and didn’t want our aid money to be used to pay off European government debts. I was a thorn in the Europeans’ side, but after awhile we reached an agreement and it was successful. In fact, the debts were cleared off on schedule.

Q: Were there economic policy conditions?

KAPLAN: Very tight conditions that the Turks adhered to for awhile. They got into trouble again later on.

Q: Were there other issues?

KAPLAN: The other issue was the timing of convertibility. The British senior civil servants and the Bank of England had been recommending such a move for a long time. Finally, they had a new Chancellor of the Exchequer, previously the Minister of Agriculture, and persuaded him on the idea of moving fast. At the same time, the U.S. had just appointed a new Secretary of the Treasury, a former Secretary of the Navy, whose understanding of these matters was not yet very profound. The Governor of the Bank came to Washington, met with the Secretary, and told him what Britain proposed to do. Convertibility sounded wonderful to the Secretary. The Governor asked him not to tell anybody or it would all fall apart. The Secretary asked if he could tell the President. The reply was yes, but nobody else. None of the U.S. officials who had been involved in convertibility discussions for years knew about the move until the British told their European colleagues that they would act in a few weeks. It was all agreed. Despite the fact that they acted prematurely, it worked. However, the British ran into serious balance of payments trouble and had to be rescued by the IMF a couple years later.

Q: And you were in a very pivotal role in that location, weren’t you?

KAPLAN: It was a great role working with a great Board. Almost all of my colleagues except Mangoldt held key positions in their governments. They came to Paris for meetings once a month or more, if necessary, but otherwise had full-time jobs in key international financial policy roles in their governments. They were a sophisticated group, very committed to European integration and to making the Payments Union work. It was a great job, the most educational work experience of my life. I learned much more there than I did in graduate school. I also established valuable friendships.

Q: I'm sure you were learning in a very practical way.

KAPLAN: In a very practical way from wise men, with very good judgement and real commitment to getting constructive things done.

Q: So, from that you moved to what?

WILLIAM A. CRAWFORD

**First Secretary
Paris (1950-1954)**

**Special Assistant for International Affairs
Paris (1965-1967)**

Ambassador William A. Crawford was born in New York and educated in France. He received a bachelor's degree from Haverford College in 1936 and entered the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Havana, Moscow, Paris, and Prague, and an ambassadorship to Romania. Ambassador Crawford was interviewed by H.G. Torbert on March 23, 1989.

Q: Did you go to Paris when you left there?

CRAWFORD: I went to Paris.

Q: Did you do the eastern European job in Paris?

CRAWFORD: Yes. That's right. I did. I succeeded Norris Chipman in Paris. He had been in charge of liaison with the Foreign Office on Russian matters since 1946 and was responsible for following communist activities there. That's what I carried on with.

Q: It really didn't hurt your feelings to be back in Paris again?

CRAWFORD: No it didn't as a matter of fact. My mother was still living, but she died while I was there.

Q: It was comforting to be there at that time.

CRAWFORD: It was.

Q: Were there any great events that happened during that particular tour in the international field? Who was the ambassador?

CRAWFORD: I started out with David Bruce and then Jimmy Dunn, who was followed by Doug Dillon. So I was there with three of them. The Korean war broke out shortly after I arrived and the main question for a while was the setting up of the European defense community. That did not however, involve redirecting my reporting which was mainly on communist activities.

There had been in the late '40's a certain amount of strikes and other problems that created a communist treat there. While I was there however, the communist party was strong, but it was kept under control and didn't get out of hand. My job was to gain as wide an understanding of what was going on with the Soviet Union at the time.

JAMES M. WILSON
Air Force Representative
Paris (1951-1952)

USRO
Paris (1953-1954)

James M. Wilson, Jr. was born in China to American parents in 1918. He received a BA from Swarthmore College in 1939, graduated from the Geneva School of International Studies in 1939, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940, and Harvard Law School in 1948. He also served as a lieutenant colonel overseas in the US Army from 1941-44. Mr. Wilson has served abroad in Paris, Madrid, Bangkok and Manila. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: When you are working on these bases in Morocco, I've heard from people who were involved sort of from the Department of State side and they say that supposedly these negotiations would be between the United States government and Morocco for example, but the real negotiations were with the Pentagon lawyers they would say, which would be you and the Department of State. Did you find that?

WILSON: Well, no, I didn't in those early days. I've forgotten who our consul general was in Casablanca, but our consul in Rabat was Bob McBride. It was the first time I had got to know Bob. He was extremely helpful and became a good personal friend. In Paris, we worked as part of the embassy. Actually, I had two hats. I was "defense advisor" in the embassy and also had my hat in USRO. We worked very closely throughout Europe with a number of stalwart embassy types. Later, I got a third hat as "defense advisor" in Bonn.

There was a stellar group of FSOs [Foreign Service officers] in Paris. David Bruce was ambassador to start out with, Philip Bonsal as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], then James Dunn and then Douglas Dillon. On the USRO side, we had Harriman and then Bill Draper. Bill Draper's principal deputy was Ambassador Livy Merchant, and the political counselor/minister was Ed Martin. On the embassy side, Ted Achilles took over as DCM, and Chip Bohlen made a couple of cameo appearances. At the working level, Mac Godley, Matt Looram, and Dean Hinton. On the economic side, Harry Labouisse, Bill Timmons. In Rome, there were Ellsworth Bunker, Durbrow, Outer Horsey, and Tony Freeman. The list goes on. That's quite an array.

Q: I was going to say, absolutely. These are sort of the stars of the post-war American diplomacy.

WILSON: Exactly. In addition, of course, we had the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe] with Doug MacArthur first and then Freddie Reinhardt as political advisor. We had to work with all these people, not to mention the U.S. military forces themselves, our principal clients.

At time there were sharp differences between USRO and the embassies concerned, which had to be brokered, not to mention problems with the growing NATO bureaucracy. I remember my introduction to the word "infrastructure." A word taken from the French, meaning the bed on which railroad tracks rest. What was then a new word is now, of course, in much wider use with a broader definition. About all of our base construction became "infrastructure" and now "infrastructure" seems to include anything underlying something else.

Q: How did you find dealing with the French?

WILSON: The French are never easy, but we had some outstanding French representatives to deal with. The principal one was a gentleman by the name of François Le Duc. He was a career foreign service officer and also an expert in North African affairs. Later, he was an under secretary of foreign affairs and French ambassador to Austria and Canada.

I should back up a bit to your earlier question. There was a difference of opinion on the subject of whether we should be negotiating with Morocco or with France. I guess the chief proponent of "with France only" was Doug MacArthur. Pete Hamilton and I were of the opinion that we should at least consult the Moroccans under the circumstances. But we were overruled. Of course, three years later came full independence for Morocco, and the result was that we had to renegotiate the whole business all over again. There was an interesting cast of characters on the earlier negotiation. One of the guys we were dealing with on the French Ministry of Defense side was General Maurice Challe, who later on was one of the three general officers, who led the military revolt in Algeria. That was a very interesting series of negotiations... Where were we?

Q: You had gone back but let's talk about Libya and Tunisia. Did we get involved there?

WILSON: Tunisia, no; Libya, yes.

Q: Wheelus Air Force Base?

WILSON: Not during that time. Wheelus had been negotiated earlier. We took over, as I recall, from the Brits who had worked out arrangements with the Libyans after the liberation of Libya. It was not until later on when we had to renegotiate that I personally got involved in it. Morocco remained a problem until the Air Force finally decided that it didn't need the bases anymore.

Q: What was the problem with Morocco?

WILSON: The agreement hadn't been negotiated with the Moroccans.

Q: Morocco was considered a fallback place for what was it, B-47s, I think?

WILSON: B-47s, but it wasn't a fallback. This was a forward deployment. It was before we got into B-52s and before we got into IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles).

Q: When you were working with this was it was very much a cooperative effort with the State Department, the people you were working with and the Pentagon?

WILSON: Oh, yes, most definitely.

Q: I was just wondering whether you were getting anything from the people back at the Pentagon saying these wimps are not...

WILSON: In Paris, we were always fighting with the Pentagon and the State Department. I can remember a number of times when we had a combined assault on Washington from Paris. On one occasion (I don't remember what the issue was.), Larry Norstad, who was the air deputy commander of SHAPE at the time, decided that the issue needed a little personal massage in addition to a cable we had just sent. He called me in and said, "Come, get on my airplane." We took off and flew to Washington. We drafted and cleared the answer to our Paris cable and flew back to Paris, where everything was fine until the next dustup.

Q: Was there a feeling of we've really got to get this done in a hurry because the Soviets are up to something?

WILSON: Oh, yes, a real sense of urgency. We got an agreement with the French to establish seven or eight airbases in France, plus a major Army installation. Then some years later, of course, DeGaulle decided that he didn't want any of them anymore and invited us out along with USRO and SHAPE. By that time, the Cold War was well underway.

Q: Were you in Europe in 1956?

WILSON: No. About the last thing I did from Europe was the West German agreements in late 1954 after the EDF failed (the European Defense Force)...

Q: This was where it was...

WILSON: The EDF was David Bruce's baby, but the French vetoed it. Specifically, Mendes France came in as the new prime minister, as you may remember, and there had to be a major switch of signals. We ended up with something called the London and Paris Agreements which ended the official state of war with the western powers, which restored West German sovereignty and brought Germany into the Brussels Pact and NATO. I was very much involved in one of these at the working level. Right after that, I came back here, went to ISA, and set up the first worldwide base rights negotiating office there. It is still there [entitled Foreign Military Relations Affairs – FMRA].

ALBERT E. HEMSING
Marshall Plan Film Division
Paris (1951-1958)

Albert E. Hemsing was born in Germany and raised in the United States. He began working for the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall Plan in 1951 and entered the USIA in 1953. His career included positions in France, the United Kingdom (England), Germany, and India. Mr. Hemsing was interviewed by Robert Amerson in 1989.

HEMSING: Actually, I was co-opted into USIA, as were most of us working in the information program at the Marshall Plan's European headquarters in Paris. I had gone to work for ECA, the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall Plan, in 1951.

In 1953, two things happened. ECA became MSA, the Mutual Security Agency; reflecting the change from economic aid to Europe to military aid, under the pressures of the Cold War. Also, that year, the U.S. Information Agency was born. It took over, among other programs, responsibility for the information activities of MSA.

My first encounter with USIA, aside from noting that I had a new paymaster, came in the person of the Agency's first director Ted Streibert and that was a kind of 281enefi-comedy.

Shortly after taking office, Streibert announced a trip to Europe. Rumors reached us that his purpose in Paris would be to shut the entire MSA information operation down. Our information chief was Waldemar Nielsen. His deputies were Eugene Rachlis and Hugh Sutherland. Peter Handen, a cracker-jack architect, headed exhibits. Lemuel Graves ran press; Dick Driscoll was in charge of radio. Our executive officer was Jim West, who later married Mary McCarthy, the writer. Nils Nilson was in charge of motion pictures and I was his deputy. It was a great shop, not least because we had assembled a very able, dedicated European staff. We were housed in what had been a nightclub at 5 Avenue Gabriel, opposite the embassy.

Our strategy for the Streibert visit was to convince him that, in us, he had inherited a unique asset, one that could serve USIA well. Specifically, we would concentrate on our media accomplishments in support of NATO and the common defense of the Atlantic Community.

Not ten minutes into the briefing, Streibert began to fidget. He asked, “What is NATO anyway, and why should we be supporting it?” [Laughs] You can imagine how that took the wind out of our sails.

It was soon clear that our odd-ball operation did not fit into his concept of USIA’s country-by-country mode of operation, and we were finished.

So we asked Streibert to break the news to our European staff himself. This was to be done next morning, when we would assemble our 100-or-so employees in the only room large enough – the exhibits workshop. Though we had stressed that our “locals” were by no means all French, but came from some 10-12 nations, that point somehow got lost overnight.

So, next morning, Streibert eased into the bad news by starting off with: “Our two nations have been tied together by bonds of friendship since the days of Lafayette,” and on and on. Well, at the end of his remarks what finally broke the tense silence was a little Englishwoman. She adjusted the monocle she always sported, jumped onto a drafting table at the rear of the crowd, and sputtered: “Sir, I want you to know just one thing, one thing, I am British!”

And so ended our glorious adventure with what was the largest and, I believe, most effective information program America ever undertook in Europe.

My own work in Paris would, however, last another two years. Within a few weeks of Streibert’s visit, Nils Nilson was summoned to Washington. After his first dismal meeting with USIA’s film chief Turner Shelton, he quit. He went on to become a successful film and TV executive in Europe. That left me to finish the large number of films already in the pipeline. Chief among these were the 15 films of the Atlantic Community Series – one film on each of the NATO countries. Like most of our films, the series was designed for theatrical distribution. Its purpose was to introduce the peoples of the Alliance to one another.

In October 1955 I shipped off to Washington the original negatives of the 260 films ECA/MSA had produced since 1947, closed the shop, and left for Washington myself to work for IMS, the motion picture service of USIA.

Some years later, in Berlin, I got to know Ted Streibert better, when he made several trips there on behalf of the General Mills Company. I not only came to appreciate his prowess at the piano, but found that he had learned a good deal about the world since the days when he had been catapulted into USIA, fresh from the Mutual Broadcasting Company. I told him then how I thought he missed a bet in 1953. A smaller version of our ECA/MSA information shop would have served USIA well. We could have become the Agency’s media service center in Europe. Our group had learned how to communicate with Europeans on their own terms, something the Agency’s Washington-tied media staffs never quite got the hang of.

My four years in Paris have remained for me a unique and rewarding experience, even after 28 years in the Foreign Service.

Winston Churchill called the Marshall Plan “the most unselfish act in history.” So it was, one

that redounded to our immense credit and, of course, one that also promoted our own prosperity. Unfortunately, in the years that followed, our policy-makers drew many a false conclusion from the experience. The Marshall Plan was very much a success of a given time and place, a success that depended as much on the Europeans as on ourselves. Failure to grasp that fact, and our subsequent Cold War emphasis on military aid, led us into many a blind alley around the world.

Q: This means that when you were drafted into USIA, you were already an experienced overseas information officer, in effect. What took you to that point? How did you get from New York City, where you were born, into the overseas information business?

HEMSING: Actually, I had not yet learned what a regular USIS information officer does. I did know that the USIS officers I met around Europe during my Paris assignment had nothing like 5 million dollars a year at their disposal. That was the size of our film budget. These were counterpart funds, of course, local currency which the aid recipients put up to match our aid dollars.

Anyway, Harry was in Paris at that time, early 1951, on leave from the Guild to work with the Marshall Plan. He headed the rather ambitious ECA labor information program directed to Europe's huge trade union membership.

My first inkling of all this was a telephone call from Washington: did I "want to go to Paris to make labor films for the Marshall Plan?" My answer was something like "thanks, but no thanks." I felt that my four years in government had been enough.

But, when I reported the phone call to Esther that evening, guess what she said: "What, you turned down Paris!" So, we went to Paris. I remembered whom to call back in Washington only because he had the wonderful name of Ward Melody. To go to Paris, Esther gave up what might have developed into a real career at the New York Times. We did not foresee it at the time, but this was to be the first of several such sacrifices on her part.

We left for Paris in August 1951, on the Ile de France, first class. The Marshall Plan believed in supporting the use of "foreign bottoms." Esther's mother was quite inconsolable at the shipboard farewell. Having fled the Ukraine at age 15, alone, she could not imagine why any sane person would want to go back "there." My parents probably shared that sentiment, but left it unspoken. Also unspoken was the fact that my mother's heart was giving out, and that ours might be a final farewell.

I really should not take us to Paris without describing the job interview that got me there. Harry Martin came to New York to look me over, accompanied by Stuart Schulberg, head of the Marshall Plan's motion picture unit. Stu, I knew, was the son of B.P. Schulberg, the pioneer Hollywood producer, and brother of Budd, the writer. Later on, incidentally, Stu would become the long-time producer of NBC's Today Show.

We met at the Park Avenue apartment of Stu's mother. They offered me an FSS-3 position in the Foreign Service. Quickly calculating that at OWI the grades got better as the numbers went up, I allowed that I thought I was worth at least a 4 or a 5. While Harry choked on his bourbon, Stu

stage-whispered, "It goes the other way".

Q: I'm glad the Melody lingered on, so to speak. You went, then, to Paris, where you switched to the rolls of USIA, stayed there another two years, and then came to the Washington headquarters of the new USIA.

JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN
Administrative Officer, ECA/Mutual Cooperation Administration
Paris (1952)

Ambassador James G. Lowenstein was born in New Jersey in 1927. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in France, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and Yugoslavia, and an ambassadorship to Luxembourg. Ambassador Lowenstein was interviewed by Ambassador Dennis Kux in 1994.

LOWENSTEIN: There wasn't any room for me in Washington so they were going to send me to Paris where they needed some extra bodies.

So, a week later I found myself on a plane going to Paris and I was sitting next to a fellow who struck up a conversation and said to me, "Where are you going?" I said, "Paris." He said, "Why?" I said, "Well, I work for the government." "Oh, really? What do you do?" I said, "Well, you really wouldn't understand." He said, "Well, I might." So I explained to him in very simple terms. And then I said, "Well, where are you going?" He said, "I am going to Paris but then I'm going to Lisbon." I said, "What do you do?" He said, "Well, actually, I am the American Ambassador to Portugal." That was the tactful way I began my Foreign Service career.

Anyway, I arrived in Paris and was originally assigned to the lowest form of life there, in what was called the administrative services section -- specifically to the warehouse which took care of handling all requisitions for furniture for all ECA missions. While this was not very taxing intellectually, it was a wonderful introduction because the working hours were very unsupervised and the fellow who ran the warehouse, an American local employee, was a master at going around the bureaucracy and getting what he wanted. Hence I learned a lot. I also decided I would start life in Paris by living with a French family in order to perfect my French.

Q: How was your French before you got there?

LOWENSTEIN: Not too good, despite 6 years of study. But by the time I left it was quite acceptable, and my accent turned out to be particularly good.

Q: Did they give you any training?

LOWENSTEIN: No, no training of any sort. Anyway in Paris, in 1950 on \$3200, I was rich. I later rented an apartment that had been one of Randolph Churchill's pieds-a-terres for which I paid \$85 a month. I also had a car and really lived very well.

After about two months in the warehouse, the head of this administrative services section decided that I had had enough house breaking and began to move me around.

Q: Who was your boss?

LOWENSTEIN: My boss was a man named Malcolm Pitts, a very experienced civil servant of the old school. He had been a depression baby and had gotten a job in the civil service, worked his way up, working most of the time in Denver, Colorado with the property management agency. He decided I was a spoiled brat when I arrived, which was absolutely right, and for that reason had stuck me in the warehouse. Then he relented, and he and I soon became very close friends.

He decided to take me a little more seriously and began to move me around through the other parts of this operation one of which was called organization and management. It was run by a fellow who seemed very old and wise to me. I think he was thirty. He seemed wise because he had gone to Harvard Business School and wore a homburg. His name was Jack Kubisch. He later became a Foreign Service Officer and was Ambassador to Greece among other things.

Q: Wasn't he Assistant Secretary for Latin America?

LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

Q: And he was the head of AID.

LOWENSTEIN: No, he wasn't head of AID, but he had been head of an AID mission. Actually he was head of the AID mission in Ceylon when I was there.

Q: He was a career AID officer.

LOWENSTEIN: He was a career AID officer who transferred over to the Foreign Service.

Then all of this came to a head when Malcolm Pitts said...and this must have been late June, 1950, about a week before the Korean War started, "Okay, the training is fine and now we are prepared to let you be administrative officer of the ECA mission in Iceland." At that time, the last thing I wanted to be was an administrative officer in an ECA mission. So I decided that I would rather just stay in Paris and keep training and see what developed and maybe my number would come up in the Foreign Service.

Well, the following week the Korean War started. Having escaped World War II, I knew that military service was inevitable and something I really didn't want to escape anyway. So I took two weeks off, came back to the United States, applied for various officer candidate programs with a first preference for the Navy, and then went back to Paris to wait for the call. By this time it must have been August because the next thing that happened was in late November. After Tito's break with Stalin, the US had decided to give economic assistance for the first time to a communist country, namely Yugoslavia. There had been a lot of congressional resistance to this,

so long negotiations ensued between the executive and legislative branches. Finally it was decided to give food aid to Yugoslavia, which had had a drought the year before. When the conditions were all agreed on between the two branches of the government, the food aid program was to be administered through the Marshall Plan but was not going to be called a Marshall Plan mission because Tito did not want to become a member of the Marshall Plan. He had turned it down on Stalin's orders in 1948. So it was called the US Special Mission to Yugoslavia. Instead of being given to someone from ECA to head, a former president of the American Red Cross, Richard Allen, was recruited. He collected a group of experienced ex-UNRRA observers. I am not sure what they were all doing at this point, but most of them had been with UNRRA during the war and had done this kind of work in Eastern Europe. In addition, there was one Foreign Service officer, Elmer Yelton, and a couple of ECA experienced accountant comptroller types. They came to Paris for a week of orientation before going on to Yugoslavia. During their time in Paris, about half way through, one of these men died of a heart attack. Mr. Allen called up, I think it was Everett Bellows, who was the executive director of OSR, the European Headquarters of the Marshall Plan, and said that he had authority to arrive with so many bodies and he was going to arrive with that number of people and not one less. He, therefore, needed a body and asked Bellows to find a body and get that body down to the station on Saturday night. This was Thursday morning, as I recall.

So I got the call. I said, "Well, first of all thanks very much but I really don't want to go, and secondly, I have this Navy problem." So about five hours later, Everett Bellows called me back and said, "We don't care what you want. This is not a request, this is an order and I will take care of the Navy. This thing is only going to last six months or so and we will get you deferred. You be at the station Saturday afternoon at 5:00."

So, I arrived at the station and found all the other members of the mission. I was at that point 22 and I think the next youngest was about 36 and most were in their mid-forties. They were a very experienced group. They knew that there would be two people in Zagreb, three people in Belgrade, and one person in each of the Yugoslav republics. There were two particularly bad republics for climatic and isolation reasons. One was Montenegro and the other was Bosnia-Herzegovina. A third was Macedonia, but the person in Macedonia could easily drive down to Salonika for the weekend. Then it turned out that the fellow who was in Montenegro was only an hour from the coast, so the least desirable, it was decided was Sarajevo. When I arrived, the decision had already been made by unanimous consent of the others: I was going to Sarajevo.

Finally I was told that my officer candidate class would start in early January, 1952. I was asked whether in the interim I would like to stay in Paris and be assigned to something called the Temporary Council Committee of NATO which, of course, delighted me. This Committee was known colloquially as "The Three Wise Men." The three wise men were Harriman, for the United States, Monnet for France and Lord Plowden for Britain.

Q: Who was Plowden?

LOWENSTEIN: Lord Plowden had been...I can't remember what he had been before then. He was later the author of the Plowden Report on organizing the British Foreign Service. I think he had been Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, or he might have been Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs. Anyway, he was one of the great wise men in Britain in the field of foreign relations and at the same level as Harriman and Monnet.

The task of these three men was to figure out how to get NATO to divide its resources. What came out of this was first of all what are called the Lisbon goals, which were goals set for the various countries at the Lisbon meeting in December, 1951 or January, 1952, I can't remember exactly when. And so something called the Annual Review was born. It existed as long as I have known anything about NATO affairs. All of this was hammered out at what is now the OECD headquarters at the Chateau de la Muette, which was then headquarters for the OECD. The U.S. delegation to this committee was very high powered. I still have the list at home. Henry Tasca, Lincoln Gordon, Charles Bonasteel, Harriman, Milton Katz and two young aides. One was Fred Chapin (later Ambassador to several countries) and I was the other. It was really a sort of glorified messenger boy operation -- collating papers, running back and forth to the Chateau with stuff for Harriman, proof reading, the executive secretary of a delegation kind of job. But you were hanging around with the great men, and Fred and I became very close friends. In the evenings we would go about together with our group. There was a huge group of young Americans around ECA headquarters in Paris in those days. A lot of them were messengers, some of them were junior executives, and some of them worked in the ECA Mission to France. Among those who worked in the mission to France was Arthur Hartman, which is how I first met him. Another was Paul Douglas, the son of the Senator from Illinois. I still see some of this group. Some went into government after that but many didn't stay very long. The after hours activities were a lot of fun. Fred and I had something to do almost every evening, although we usually didn't finish work until 8:30 or 9:00.

Q: What were your impressions of the operation and the three wise men?

LOWENSTEIN: My impression, not only of this particular operation but also of the ECA mission to France and OSR (the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan) was that this was the most competent group of people I had ever seen. The trouble is that this remains true. It is still the most competent group of people I have ever seen. I thought the US government was going to be like this throughout. Sad to say, it hasn't been quite that way. It was a tremendous agglomeration of talent. All of these people seemed to be devoted to getting done what they had to do. I didn't see any bureaucratic backbiting. That is what struck me at the time.

Q: How do you account for that?

LOWENSTEIN: I don't know. Maybe I was too far away from it being so junior. But the atmosphere was totally different from any other organization that I have ever seen. Everyone was highly motivated. It just seemed to me that nobody was paying any attention to regulations and directives, or their next jobs. They were conducting themselves as though the "bureaucracy" didn't exist. I remember when I was finally leaving to come back and go into the Navy, it was just before Christmas, and someone on Harriman's immediate staff said, "Look, since you are going back anyway, would you mind taking this package of documents?" I said, "Sure, what is it?" He said, "Well, it is the US part of the NATO Annual Review." It was highly classified, but nobody paid any attention to it. It was stuck in an envelope and given to me to be turned in when I arrived in Washington, which I did. So it was that kind of operation.

I left Paris a couple of days before Christmas, went to Washington to check out, and then spent Christmas at home.

Q: Did you have much to do with Harriman directly?

LOWENSTEIN: No, very little. He would bark at me occasionally, "Where is that envelope I told you to get?"

Q: How big was the delegation?

LOWENSTEIN: Well, the delegation must have had ten people on it, plus Fred and me. The other representatives had delegations of the same size. We never saw them because we were staffed out of the OSR building.

It is true, I think he was devious. He did a lot of things that sometimes didn't make any sense. I remember once I was in Europe, I can't remember where Kissinger was but he was off somewhere with the President, and I was visiting some friends in the French countryside for the weekend between two meetings. I got a call from Sonnenfeldt. It was a Saturday night. He said, "Henry wants you to arrange a private meeting with Oliver Chevrillon, who was then the editor of a magazine called Le Point. And he wants to have dinner with him Monday night in Paris and doesn't want anybody to know about it. He wants you to pick a quiet restaurant where he won't be seen. And you can't tell anybody in the embassy about it. So you had better get it done right away and send me a cable at such-and-such a place."

So, I thought this might be a bit of a problem. I managed to get to Paris on Sunday on a train that got in about 11:00 at night. I was staying at the Travelers Club and they had a phone book, so I looked up the address of the magazine and walked over to the office at 8:30 in the morning and waited for somebody to open the door. I went in and asked for Mr. Chevrillon, who later became a friend of mine. At that time I didn't know him. He came out and I said, "I need to see you alone." He said, "Why?" And I said, "I can't tell you until I see you alone." So I saw him alone and conveyed the message. I said, "Now the problem is how are you going to know that I am for real? Here is my card, but under the ground rules here you can't call the embassy and confirm all this. What you can do is call Mr. X [the political counselor whom we both knew] and he will tell you that indeed I am who I represent myself to be and indeed I am in Paris. But you can't say anything else." And so that is the way it went and the dinner took place. But all of this was totally unnecessary. He could have called the DCM in Paris and said that he just wanted a private dinner, but this had to be done this way without anyone in the embassy being told and all that nonsense. Now, I assume that this was really Kissinger's idea and not something Sonnenfeldt dreamt up or put words into his mouth. But, anyway, that is one of those incidents that seemed very curious at the time.

I remember a couple of years later when I was involved in starting a foundation in the French-American field, one of the first French who was involved in this project was Chevrillon. So later on we had many chuckles about this first meeting and about this strange character showing up at his office at 8:30 in the morning and going through this routine.

STANLEY D. SCHIFF
Consular Officer
Strasbourg (1952-1954)

Stanley D. Schiff was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his Bachelor's degree from Rutgers University in 1948, and his Master's Degree from Columbia University the following year. He served as a First Lieutenant overseas in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. Entering the Foreign Service in 1949, his postings include Baden, Strasbourg, Liverpool, Trinidad, Pakistan, and Brussels. Schiff was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 9, 2000.

Q: You left there in '52. Whither?

SCHIFF: Strasbourg.

Q: That was a regular Foreign Service assignment?

SCHIFF: Yes, at the consulate.

Q: You were in Strasbourg from when to when?

SCHIFF: '52 to '54. Then the Department had two things going. One was, legislation that the Department had to administer, a change in the Seaman's Visa Program. Individual seamen were going to have to be issued visas. This meant that certain parts of the world – and they thought that Liverpool, England would be one – would be just overwhelmed with new visa activity. Strasbourg was not a terribly active post at that time. I think there were only five of us there. Our only claim to fame was that the Council of Europe was there. So, the decision was made to cut our staff by one and I was the one. So, I was sent off to Liverpool to run the Seaman's Visa Program. When I got to Liverpool, the U.S. Congress had to back off this initiative.

Other governments were about to do unto us what we proposed doing to them– namely, impose obligations on individual seamen to get their own visas instead of doing them en masse – so there was a backtracking on that and that program never saw the light of day. Consequently my assignment when I got to Liverpool changed. Instead of doing visas, I was fortunate and I got to do a variety of things, including economics and labor reporting.

Q: Let's go back to Strasbourg first. What sort of work were you doing there?

SCHIFF: I did the consular work. We issued non-immigrant visas. There was a considerable number of American troops stationed in the area not too far away. They generated a demand for consular services of various kinds. That was part of my task.

Q: Strasbourg was French. How French was it?

SCHIFF: It was French.

Q: How did the French treat you at the time?

SCHIFF: The relationship with the French was fine. It was a period when relations between Alsace and the rest of France were very strained. There had been volunteers from It was alleged that some Alsatian had volunteered for the S.S.. There had also been Alsations who had been pressed into the German military. There was a trial in France during that period of people who had been involved in a massacre in another part of France. There were Alsations who were accused of having been participants in that. So, there was an intense animosity between other parts of France and the Alsations. There were stories we heard about Alsations going to Paris where their tires would be slashed or their car would be covered with graffiti. But in our own relationship, there were no problems. The language that they spoke, many of them, amongst each other, was more Germanic than French, but certainly the educated ones spoke French and spoke French with us.

Q: Who was your consul there?

SCHIFF: George Andrews.

Q: Were you doing any political or economic reporting there?

SCHIFF: No, it was strictly consular work. We had two other people doing political and economic work.

Q: Your consular work was concerned mainly with GIs stationed nearby?

SCHIFF: Yes. Marriages, births, renewing passports, etc. Then the non-immigrant visa business. I also did some commercial work, but there was not much of that.

Q: There wasn't much non-immigrant business, was there?

SCHIFF: There was some. Of course, you had to be careful at the time. There was concern about people using a non-immigrant visa as a means of immigrating. Also, of course, there were people who were being screened for their participation – whether they were French or in some cases at that time we covered the Saar as well, so we were getting Germans – in Nazi activities. But it wasn't a voluminous business by any means.

Q: Did you have the feeling that there was a lot of sorting out between the Germans and the French at the time?

SCHIFF: Yes. This became a remarkable period in European history. You had the first of the European Union initiatives – the Schumann Plan, the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community... I still think in retrospect that Europe was fortunate in having had a coincidence of five or six unusually gifted statesmen in office at the same time during this period

– people like Adenauer, Schumann, de Gasperi, Paul Henri Spaak. It was a remarkable collection. Then there was Churchill, of course, in England. Europe benefited from that.

Q: Was that area involved in French politics?

SCHIFF: There were a couple of things. One thing which was going on that we were interested in was the French reaction to McCarthyism. We had the same interest in my next assignment, which was in England. Of course, the left in particular was very vocal on the subject, but it was not confined to the left. We're talking nationally. Then there was the relationship between France and a European movement in general but particularly at that time the French attitude towards German rearmament. We were pushing hard for it and the French were very reluctant to see it happen, of course. So, that was a big issue at the time. And the role of communists in the government.

Q: How about the communists, this being a working area, the Saar and all?

SCHIFF: I don't think there was a significant communist membership. Alsace was largely agricultural at the time. There were pockets of industry, but I don't recall that the communists in that part of the country were a particularly important factor. They were there, but were not terribly important. There is a major university in Strasbourg. I don't remember hearing a great deal about communist activity there either.

JOHN W. McDONALD
Staff Secretary, Office of the Special Representative in Europe
Paris (1952-1954)

John W. McDonald was born in North Dakota in 1929. He graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1953 and served in the U.S. Army from 1951 to 1952. His postings abroad have included Berlin, Bonn, Paris, Ankara and Cairo. Mr. McDonald was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: What happened in '52 to you?

MCDONALD: A new institutional framework was created in Paris as a result of the Marshall Plan. It was called the SRE, Office of the Special Representative for Europe. Bill Draper, who had been General Bill Draper, became Ambassador William Draper. It was the U.S. first effort at regional structures in the bureaucracy in the sense that he, in setting up this new office in central Paris, next to the U.S. Embassy, had more power than anybody else in Europe did. More power than anybody outside of Washington and much more power than most people in Washington.

He was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. He was the U.S. Ambassador to the OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was created at the request of General Marshall to be basically the structure that the Marshall funds would flow into, and he was responsible for all Marshall Plan money and the allocation of it. There were aid missions in

Western Europe and embassies in Western Europe but all the money went to him, all the power resided in him. It was rather a unique structure.

My boss in Bonn was asked by General Draper to be his Executive Secretary for this new institution and my boss took me along with him. So I moved to Paris for two and a half years.

Q: This would be '52 to '54?

MCDONALD: Yes.

Q: And Draper's organization was called?

MCDONALD: SRE, Special Representative in Europe.

That eventually, a year and a half or so later, became something called USRO, which is the U.S. Regional Organization. The membership in NATO and the OEEC remained with that office. Draper left, but the regional responsibility for the money was passed to the missions. That was just too much for Washington to stand, they just couldn't stand adding that to the missions, to have all this power in one man. Draper had two people working for him at the ambassadorial level, Livingston Merchant, a famed American diplomat, and Ed Martin, I think, was the other Ambassador.

So there were three Ambassadors in one office, which is structurally rather unique, aside from the U.S. Ambassador to France. So there was a lot of power there.

I was a part of Draper's office, basically, as a Staff Secretary.

Q: You were Staff Secretary to him? Let's talk about this time. Draper was there, what, for about two years?

MCDONALD: Less than two years.

Q: Well, '52 to '53, probably?

MCDONALD: Something like that.

Q: Can you describe your impression of Draper and how he operated?

MCDONALD: He was a fabulous guy. I was a great admirer of his, a great admirer. It was a real privilege and honor to be working for him, and this was of course a very exciting period. These new institutions were just beginning to come on line and the Marshall funds were flowing. Just put this in perspective. In 1952, 3.25 percent of our Gross National Product went to the Marshall Plan. Now just think about that, 3.25 percent to Europe. Today, it is one percent for the world. So, I mean, that was a major U.S. commitment to Western Europe.

His office, basically, was responsible initially for the allocation of those monies with the

governments, and so forth. He was visited by everybody in Europe to plead their particular case about their particular needs. So it was a very action oriented office because he had the power in his own hands. He didn't have to go back to Washington for everything. That is the key difference than in later structures. He had the authority, he had the ear of the President, and he did it.

Q: Did you see how he distributed the funds? Was there something liked 30 percent to Great Britain, 30 percent here....

MCDONALD: No. It was needs based. In other words, people would come in and make a plea, we'd look for facts and figures, the staff would gather together a lot of information on their own. I was not a part of that process; I was paper shuffling with papers passing through and that sort of thing. But his staff came up with recommendations based on many interactions and contacts, and then a decision would be made, and it was non-appealable. It was just done. So it was a lot of power in one office. I think that is why it didn't last that long.

I thought it was extraordinarily efficient. There was never any whisper of fraud or misuse or diversion of funds. None of that existed. It was a very clean and a very pure operation as far as I was concerned.

Q: Did you have any contact with, say, our Embassy in Paris?

MCDONALD: No, none. This was regional. We had a regional viewpoint; we were working with regional organizations.

Q: '52, of course, was an election year and Eisenhower came in, who had been the first head of NATO.

MCDONALD: That is probably why Draper got the job, I would guess there may be some correlation there, because they were friends.

Q: Was there any concern about senatorial oversight and that sort of thing?

MCDONALD: Nope, nope. Now during that process something else happened, which one doesn't usually talk about. The agency changed. Mr. Stassen came in. He became head of, what was it, the Mutual Security Administration? And the verb "stassenation" came into being.

I was in Paris, this was in '52 under the McCarthy period, '53, when Cohn and Schine came to Paris.

Q: You might explain who Cohn and Schine were.

MCDONALD: They were two cohorts and hatchet men for Senator McCarthy.

Q: They were very young.

MCDONALD: Very inexperienced.

Q: Very inexperienced.

MCDONALD: And vicious.

Everybody in Paris was a Communist. They started out with that mindset. Everybody working for the U.S. Government in Paris, in USRO, was a Communist, and you had to prove you weren't. But they came through, and they made recommendations.

Then the Congress did a remarkable thing. Congress passed a law that said Mr. Stassen, personally, had a 30-day window in which he could fire anybody in this organization without appeal, and without giving a reason for that firing. Now that has never happened before in our democratic history, total power over everybody on his staff. And the word was, and I'm sure that it is correct, that every night he would take home a bunch of files, read through them, and come back the next day with red checkmarks and pass the word, "Out." No explanation to anybody, just "Out." I was there in Paris during that period. And my boss, the man who brought me to Paris for Draper, was on that list. His principal deputy, who was my next boss, who was responsible for implementing all this, on the 30th day, got axed.

Q: Do you have any knowledge, were there any rumors, of why these people ended up on that list?

MCDONALD: Well, in the case of both of these men I commiserated with, because I was very close to them, one, it turned out, had gone to UC-Berkeley, and had attended a couple of rallies in the late '30s or early '40s, that had some Communists in attendance. That was the only thing he could figure out, that somehow that had appeared on his record and that was enough.

The other man didn't have a clue. He had been District Attorney in New York City, had a very distinguished career, and he still, to his death, couldn't figure it out. It was pretty terrible.

Q: It really is incredible. And Stassen was supposed to have come from the more liberal side. What was he, Governor of Minnesota, or something, he was part of that, you might say, liberal North Central movement there.

MCDONALD: And nobody has ever, before or since to my knowledge, been given that kind of power for where all Government rules and regulations were out the window, no appeal, no nothing. They just destroyed them. Out.

Q: What did that do to the morale of your organization?

MCDONALD: It was terrible, it was terrible. And Draper, personally, fought for both of these men. Went to the President, went to the Secretary of State, no appeal, nothing. Not one was ever changed. So that is pretty sad.

Q: With the Cohn and Schine episode, did you get any feel for how that was viewed by other

parties, I mean, non-Americans?

MCDONALD: They thought we were crazy, absolutely crazy, they couldn't understand what in the hell was going on, in Paris or in Washington. And you know the double irony is, that you may have followed with Mr. Cohn, it turns out that before he died a couple of years ago, it turns out he was a homosexual.

Q: Well, actually, Schine was, too. It was pretty apparent at the time and these were considered, at that time, to be supreme risks for the McCarthy period and all that. And yet their behavior was almost flaunting their proclivities. I mean, looking at it.

MCDONALD: So it was really bizarre in that sense of the word. He didn't seem to be aware of it, so that was that.

Q: Did you have any impression of France at the time, or were you pretty well tied up in your office?

MCDONALD: Well, one story comes to mind. When I returned to Washington at the end of November '54, after eight years in Europe, I was given a new security examination, investigation. The McCarthy shadow was still there and one of the crimes I had committed that they unearthed was that when I was in Paris, I was living in the Communist sector. Now it turns out that the Communist sector of Paris is more than half of Paris, at that particular point in time. But I was living in an apartment that the Embassy, or the SRE had assigned to me. The Labor Attaché had formerly occupied it at the Embassy. It just happened to be opened when my family and I arrived, so they sent me there. I had no choice, I just went there. I said it was ridiculous, that the Government had put me in that apartment and they could not now accuse me of being a Communist because I happened to go where the Government sent me. But that is the level of concern they had in this security investigation.

So that is again the shadow of the kind of mentality that was taking place and this was in early 1955 at the State Department in Washington, DC.

FREDERICK H. SACKSTEDER
Senior Vice Consul
Lyon (1952-1955)

Frederick H. Sacksteder was born in New York in 1924. He received his bachelor's degree at Amherst College and served in the US Navy during World War II. His career included positions in Germany, France, Spain, Tunisia, and Mexico. Mr. Sacksteder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: He nixed the assignment so what happened?

SACKSTEDER: I was on home leave at my in-laws in New York state, when I asked to come

down to Washington “because we had to go back to the drawing board.” I pleaded to be allowed to go, and was told that this was impossible because they could not over-rule the Medical Director. I was offered a couple of assignments, including the post of senior vice consul at the American Consulate in Lyon, France, then a four-officer post. I chose the Lyon assignment, where I was to report in September 1952.

Q: You were in Lyon from when to when?

SACKSTEDER: From September of 1952 to September of 1955. Exactly three years. The principal officer was Claude Haines Hall, a formidable bridge player, as I was soon to learn. He was a very good boss, in the sense that he gave me a lot of responsibility. He also knew the ins and outs of consular work and post administration. And, insecure about his command of the French language and, by nature, not out-going, he gave me responsibility for the Consulate’s “out-reach” work, i.e. traveling the district, public speaking, representation. I usually represented the Consulate at ribbon-cuttings, fair openings, and similar events which normally ended with a banquet (known locally as a “gueuleton”). These types of events attracted prominent national figures from Paris. It was quite normal for French politicians to hold both national and local offices simultaneously. I like to tell the story of my initial call on the Mayor of Lyon, Edouard Herriot, a man well up in years, since he was a contemporary and political colleague of my grandfather. Herriot had held numerous high offices, which included Prime Minister, and was at the time President of the National Assembly, the approximate equivalent of our Speaker. I said to him Mr. President (you always use the highest title an individual has held), I am the grandson of Alexandre Dorin. Poor Herriot simply shook his head. How could his friend Dorin’s grandson be the American Vice Consul in Lyon? Eventually, he got the idea, but he was puzzled, whenever we met. Another example of this dual office-holding: One Saturday morning I was at the Consulate going through the mail when the phone rang. A very soft voice on the other end said, “Mr. Consul?” “Yes, sir.” “Mr. Consul, this is the Mayor of Saint Chamond. Could I ask you a favor?” The Mayor of Saint Chamond happened to be the Prime Minister of France, Antoine Pinay, doing a service to a constituent.

Q: What was the political situation in your area of France and what district did Lyon cover at that time?

SACKSTEDER: The Lyon consular district included between one fourth and one fifth of France. It extended, north to south, from north of Dijon to south of Valence on the Rhone river, and east to west from the Massif Central (the mountainous region in south-central France) to the Swiss and Italian borders, a lot of territory. Because very few American citizens lived in our district, we had a very light citizen services (registration, passport, notarial, protection) work load. With one exception, which was a U.S. Army depot and maintenance base at Moulins, in the Allier Department and about half-way between Lyon and Paris. We trained an American civilian employee at the base to supervise the preparation of passport applications and similar forms, and could provide services there largely by mail.

Antoine Pinay, who, incidentally, died recently at the age of 101, was not the only Prime Minister from the Lyon area while I was there. Rene Mayer was another, and a very prominent politician. I got to know him through a daughter of his who was married to a Lyonnais. We

became good social friends of the couple, and got to know the Prime Minister on his visits to his daughter. George Bidault was Foreign Minister during those years, and was also from the region. The American Vice Consul, representing the United States, was thus given the opportunity to talk at length with national figures at the receptions and banquets that invariable accompanied official events.

Q: This was the fourth republic?

SACKSTEDER: Yes, and a period of frequent changes of government but basically, political stability with the center of power hovering between left-of-center to right-of-center. A French saying of the time which translates as “The more it changes, the more it remains the same,” is appropriate.

Q: What was the political situation in France in general and then in your particular area, and what were our concerns?

SACKSTEDER: The industrial centers in our area, which included Lyon and its surroundings, Clermont Ferrand, and a couple of smaller cities such as Grenoble, had fairly large communist minorities. The rest of the district was generally conservative or “middle of the road.” The majority was markedly pro-American. People remembered the “liberation” by the U.S. Seventh Army, back in 1944. French organizations and authorities often staged events to commemorate wartime actions involving Americans, such as an annual ceremony at a memorial near Lyon recalling the death of an American air corps plane crew that crashed while flying supplies to the French underground forces. Let me add, at this point, that the Philip Chadbourn who served with me at Lyon in 1952-53 had been with the OSS and had parachuted into occupied France not far from Lyon, to help organize the “Resistance.” For this, he had been decorated in person by General De Gaulle.

A good example of the pro-American attitude in Lyon was the celebration of our national holiday. On July 4th, the French authorities, military and civilian, would gather in front of our Consulate. A detachment of soldiers would “present arms” as our flag was raised, while the military band played a pretty good version of our National Anthem, followed by the “Marseillaise,” and by a march-past of the troops. The reception, or “Vin d’honneur” which followed, was the occasion for speeches which always included mention that the Fourth of July was also a French Holiday! I have never had such an experience at another post or country, and it was symptomatic of the attitude of the French in Lyon at the time.

On the other hand, I remember the Communist-inspired protest in front of the consulate after the execution of the Rosenbergs...

Q: This was for espionage in the United States.

SACKSTEDER: Yes. The French Communist Party staged demonstrations, including a big one in front of our Consulate. The police turned out in force to make sure that nothing untoward happened, but the local authorities told us, “Let them vent their supposed anger- everyone knows that these people were executed for wartime espionage for the Soviets.” This, for me, was yet

another unique experience.

Q: What was the Consulate's main activity?

SACKSTEDER: Commercial work. This included regular reports on certain commodities and manufactured goods, i.e. briar pipes (for smokers); textiles; walnuts (grown in quantity in the Isere river valley near Grenoble). Because shipments to the U.S. were still covered by consular invoices, I had to sign hundreds every week. The fees collected from this activity would have been sufficient to pay the cost of operating the Consulate. But, of course, these were remitted to the U.S. Treasury.

Political reporting, for which we were well placed because of the opportunity to meet with major political figures when they "came home" from Paris was through Embassy. Largely by means of informal correspondence with the officer covering internal political affairs in the political section, Martin Hertz. Occasionally he would ask us to look into a specific topic, which we would do by contacting local politicians, the officials in various Prefectures with whom we were in regular touch, or friends and acquaintances in the business world. The Prefet in each department is the top-ranked authority, and is a member of career service. He (they were all male then) represents "The Government," although administratively he is under the Ministry of the Interior. Each Prefet has a Secretary General and a Chief of Cabinet, themselves aspiring prefets, and it was with the latter that I, as Vice Consul, had the closest contact. As they and their families lived in the Prefecture palace (and some were indeed palaces), I could reach them, in case of need, day or night. I made some fine friends among them. Indeed, for many years I was in touch with one whom I met shortly after arriving in Lyon. Jean Taulelle was a little older than I, had been an officer in the Army taken prisoner in 1940. He was a POW for five years. When he was assigned to Villefranche, in the Beaujolais wine region in 1953, he was the best friend the U.S. could have. He later had a brilliant career in his chosen field ending in Paris as, first, Prefet of Police, then Prefet of the Seine (Paris) and simultaneously Mayor of Greater Paris. This post became an elected post only later when Jacques Chirac was elected Mayor.

Q: Did you run across in Lyon the French intellectual establishment, so well known in Paris, and recognized as having great influence, and, also, well, known as left-leaning in thought and looking down on the U.S.

SACKSTEDER: There was virtually none of that in Lyon. Perhaps because Parisians, and other French, looked down upon the Lyonnais. They said Lyon society was "closed" and "unfriendly," and I found that this was the case with respect to the French from other parts of the country. It was far from the case for us or other's in the Consular corps. And the Lyonnais did not apologize for their lack of intellectual pretensions.

I mentioned that I had the opportunity to take on a good deal of responsibility while at Lyon. This came about for the following reason: at this time the U.S. had a small one-officer post at Nice, where the work load was light and, and the official residences very comfortable. The supervising Consul General at Paris, who at that time, was Frederick B. Lyon, a very senior officer, asked Consul Hall to take over the post at Nice when the incumbent had to be away, sometimes for many weeks at a time. This left me in charge at Lyon. Although still an FSO-6, I

was the senior among the juniors. And in due course I was entitled to draw "Charge pay," which was half of the difference between my modest salary and that of my Consul, a senior FSO-3; a very welcome, if well-earned, bonus. During these extended periods in charge at Lyon I could tailor my agenda to what I was most interested in, namely reporting, representation, and outreach. A friend of good friends was a senator by the name of Michel Debre, a strong supporter of De Gaulle, who was later Prime Minister. A hotly debated issue at the time was the formation of a European Army, which might include a German contribution. The Gaullists were strongly opposed. I believed that this would be good for Europe and a step in the direction of European integration. My friends asked me to debate the issue with Senator Debre before an invited audience. I cannot say that I made too many points against this very skilled debater, but I did convince some of the audience of the advantages of such a move. And, of course, history eventually proved me right.

These three years at Lyon were not only most pleasant, but also very instructive. It was my first real foreign service post, following the unusual and far from routine assignment as a Kreis Resident Officer in Germany. Let us close this chapter on a gastronomic note. The year 1953 proved to be one of France's finest wine years of the century; Lyon and its surrounding area was host to numerous great three-star restaurants, including the so-called "Field Marshal of French gastronomy" Ferdinand Point, of "La Pyramide" in Vienne. The annual Lyon International Fair was usually the occasion for a U.S. Department of Commerce official exhibit, and an influx of American visitors. One such was "Punch" Sulzberger of the N.Y. Times publishing family, and then attached to the paper's Paris bureau. He seemed more interested in Lyon's restaurants than in the trade fair pavilion, so we had some pretty memorable meals. On his last day with us, we had a three-star lunch "Chez La Mere Brazier" and a dinner at Vienne at "La Pyramide." Not long after, I was among the many mourners at Point's funeral. He had "given his liver for his country."

In August 1955, I was again in charge. A new Principal Officer had arrived, and was enjoying his first detached duty at Nice. Lyon was hit by a violent thunder/hail storm, an unusual occurrence in the city itself. The worst hit area was a section called "Croix- Rousse" just upstream from the point where the Rhone and Saone rivers joined, and the site of some of Lyon's most renowned silk mills. Acres and acres of glass sky-lights were smashed by the hail, exposing extremely valuable machinery to the elements. The Prefet called, told me there was urgent need of tarpaulins, and asked if the U.S. military could supplement what the French had on hand. Several phone calls to the Embassy and to the depot at Moulins, and the first of several plane loads were being loaded and flown to the Lyon airport where the French Army had trucks waiting. This prompt response doubtless saved millions in potential damage. Prefet Massenet asked me to accompany him to meet the arriving U.S. Air Force transports, insuring voluminous press coverage of the event. As this was taking place, my household effects were packed in lift-vans that were at the railroad freight terminal on a platform and not covered by tarps. When these finally reached Washington and were unpacked several months later, we found humidity and mold had damaged most of the contents beyond repair. I was not as fortunate as the Lyon silk mills.

HERBERT DANIEL BREWSTER
Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Paris (1952-1955)

Herbert Daniel Brewster was born in Greece to missionary parents on December 4, 1917. He received a bachelor's degree from Wesleyan University in 1939. His Foreign Service career included positions in Athens, Ankara, Istanbul, Beirut, Berlin, Naples, and Paris. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 11, 1991.

Q: Let's go back to Paris; you were in NATO from 1952 to 1955. What was the relationship between Greece and Turkey that you were dealing with?

BREWSTER: Greece and Turkey were both admitted to NATO in November of 1951. That was the time when NATO was set up in Paris; Lord Ismay, the NATO Council, the whole shebang. We had nine officers who worked with Burke Elbrick and Edwin M. Martin: Martin Hillenbrand was "Mr. Germany;" Joe Scott, Mr. Italy, and so on. I was assigned to the two newest members that came in. The significant part was that they were new boys on the block and not very welcome. The Danes had voted against them, they had to be pulled around. What you were basically doing was having two-thirds of GTI suddenly a part of Europe.

Q: GTI being Greece, Turkey and Iran?

BREWSTER: Which is what we were a part of. It was like saying "You are now Europeans." They had a time adjusting. They both sent in first class teams to make the best impression on others; it was their first multi-lateral venture. Frequently they would come to us and say, "Well how are you going to vote on this?" "Tell us what that meant." "How do you see this as an issue that will affect us?" We were the listening "colleagues" where we could sit down with them and say, "Come on now, don't hold this one up just because of that word. This is what's being achieved." It was breaking them in. I was assigned primarily because I had been in Turkey and Greece and it made good sense, and I spoke the one language.

Q: I remember many years later I was in Naples talking to a man, in the position you later became political advisor to, saying that really the Greek-Turkish combination was strictly that they were both keeping their eye on the other and that the Soviets were not the prime concern of either. What was the attitude here in the early '50s; how did our Greek and Turkish representatives look at the mission of NATO?

BREWSTER: They liked it; it was bringing them into a new club and the club was influential countries where you could see people -- foreign ministers would come by. It was bringing them in from the outposts. And they weren't mad at each other; they were both as good as they could be but they didn't have bilateral problems. They didn't have overflight problems and things of that sort in any major way. They sent in their best teams in an effort to impress the other teams, the donor countries, that "we're deserving."

Q: So they weren't at each other. But this was at the height of the Cold War, the Korean War was

not yet over; how did they feel about the Soviet threat?

BREWSTER: The Turks never spoke about it that I can think of, and the others -- I think it was just a reflection of their own guerilla war. I don't think they were worried about a Soviet thrust, but they were glad to follow what was being designed for Europe even though they were on the periphery of it: the strengthening that was being done in Germany, the role of Germany, the role of France in it. They were tag-Enders; perhaps 10% of the effort was devoted to Greece and Turkey, the big issues were amongst the big countries involved.

Q: Things had not settled down at that time; NATO was still growing, still in its early development stages.

BREWSTER: There were big issues between the Germans and the French, in the rearming of the Germans. That was key.

Q: How did you find your role? You had your two clients there; did you find yourself spending a lot of time with other Americans, and maybe other NATO representatives, acting as the friend in court for the Turks and the Greeks? Explaining their interests and desires to people maybe looking askance at these people from the periphery coming in?

BREWSTER: No, I didn't sense that. In my contacts with them I didn't want to be interpreting what I thought the Greeks wanted. I didn't want to be in the role of an advocate because with a Greek or Turk you never know whether what they are saying is the position or whether they are going to go back and revise it. And then the boss says, "You never should have told them that." Bingo! There is so much in play on that side. But I was there at their beck and call; had they not come in I wouldn't have been there, that job would not have had to be filled. It came at a very good time and led in to the Turkish desk officer job.

Q: Did you get any feel about how the American circle at NATO felt about France and France's role in NATO?

BREWSTER: I don't have enough...

JOSEPH F. DONELAN, JR.
Consular Officer
Paris (1952-1955)

Joseph F. Donelan was born and raised in New York City. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II he attended Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955 and served in France, Japan, India, as well as Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance and later Assistant State Secretary for Administration. Mr. Donelan was interviewed in 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy

DONELAN: As you know the Department had a central Budget Office which consisted of two arms; one for the Departmental and Foreign Service budget and the other one for Finance. The finance people were the bookkeepers and accountants for the Department of State and the Foreign Service. Finance administered all fiscal and accounting regulations; updated and revised systems and devised new systems of funds management and accountability. It was the technical fiscal operation of the Department. I came back as Director of that office after having been Budget & Management Officer in Paris for four and a half years. The Paris job had been a great experience, and while I would have preferred another overseas assignment, this Finance job really offered opportunity to make changes in the Department's operation. In fact my first initiative was looking back overseas in the direction of fiscal operations in the European embassies. And the idea was predicated on the fact that the PTT (Post, Telegraph & Telephone) government monopolies in the European and North African countries were extremely efficient in moving the mail, in fact a letter could be mailed one day in Paris and be received in anyone of the other countries by the next day, and the French were particularly efficient as I recall - you could mail a letter in downtown Paris in the morning and be quite certain that it would be received at a suburban address that same afternoon. The second major consideration that Paris was in itself a large operation, for a long time the largest Embassy in Europe, it had an available skilled and educated population, and the French nationals already employed by the Embassy were very able and clever people.

The idea was very simple, instead of all these embassies and offices in Europe madly writing checks, paying bills, and engaging in foreign exchange transactions with local banks, centralize the operation in Paris and get the benefit of the economy of scale and the skilled workers available. I assigned Dennis Collins, who had worked with me in the Paris budget and fiscal operation, to the project. Denny who was fluent in French and had served in several European countries was a natural for the job, visiting a number of the posts, confirming the efficacy of the PTT systems in the various countries, and discussing the possibilities with our colleagues in Europe. As a result of his work we decided we could set up a regional finance center in Paris.

Q: Well, in your making the decision, I'm a little interested, there must have been some turf battles or crockery broken when you move an office from one place to another. How did this sit?

DONELAN: In all my years in the Foreign Service whenever there was a squeeze on resources, the first place Ambassadors and senior personnel in the Department looked to take cuts, was in the administrative area. It was natural to protect the so called "substantive" side of foreign operations, and since the raison d'etre of "administration" is to support program operations, it's hard to fault that approach, even if you happen to be in charge of administration. In fact I always considered it a basic responsibility of administration to press constantly for the most economical and efficient methods of operation.

In this case we were coming up with very substantial personnel reductions for all the posts in Europe and north Africa, probably an average of one or two American positions and three or four foreign national positions.

Q: And that's about it.

DONELAN: Yes, and there were very substantial initial net savings, for a very modest investment of people and equipment in Paris, and more over the years.

RFC maintained bank accounts in all the currencies of the serviced countries; issued salary checks for Americans and foreign national employees - all types of allowance payments for American employees - paid all recurring bills for the missions themselves and the employees - rent, light, heat, power, local country purchases, etc. All of this for starters. Denny went back to Paris and ran the operation. He was inventive and innovative. Over the years he developed the system and operation far beyond my original concept. And you will recognize how unusual this is, but the Department finally came to understand the uniqueness of Denny's position and gave up trying to transfer elsewhere. Denny finished his career in Paris.

Q: Did you have any particular difficulties in the Department, in your office? Or did you find that what you were doing was not fairly routine work?

DONELAN: The routines of the operation pretty much took care of themselves, regulations were written and changed, the systems people were pretty good about coming up with improvements and from time to time the office came up with real advances. Another facet of my job was liaison for the Department with the Office of the Comptroller General which as "the watchdog of the treasury" was responsible to the Congress, and the Treasury Department which of course was the source of all funds appropriated by the Congress.

People were funny of course, and whether we recognize it in ourselves or not all of us resist change almost automatically. There was always some selling to be done before launching something new and different. You won some and you lost some. I had informal discussions with some banks about the idea of setting up a totally free checking accounts for all American employees in the Foreign Service; we in Washington would then write all American salary checks and automatically deposit the funds in a selected bank, splitting up the business among banks interested in providing free service. Would have been a great saving for the Dept., I always kept a checking account myself in Washington, the banks thought it was a great idea, but it bombed out. People in those days just wanted to receive their checks in their little hot hands and that was that. This type of thing is now commonplace. Another thing whose time had not quite come.

and this idea was several years later was to use an "exception" method of fiscal reporting. In other words instead of sending in voluminous accounts to the Department through the pouch which was the custom, taking forever....would be to cable short excerpts which simply gave pluses or minuses against the one or more allotment accounts which the posts had available. Actually about a half dozen or so Foreign Service posts, the large ones, given their size and staffing, expended most of the funds...so if you got wire reports from these posts you knew where you stood financially...most of the other posts were so small, even if you didn't hear from them it wouldn't matter all that much. The communications system couldn't handle the load...nowadays it would be a piece of cake. But it was fun, even so dry an area as fiscal reporting.

But, and I think this has been part of my satisfaction, generally when you came up with

something new and something different people would accept it and work with it.

Q: So the innovation was usually accepted if it was demonstrated?

DONELAN: That's right, and actually it was a great time to be in the Department and the Foreign Service. This was reasonably in the post WWII period and you remember that prior to WW II the Department of State and the Foreign Service, was a very small organization. We owned practically no real estate abroad, very few embassies, and several of the first ambassadorial residences abroad were gifts from American citizens, I think Doris Duke gave us the old ambassadorial residence in Paris. WW II triggered a great many US government operations abroad, the operation of the Marshall plan alone brought at first hundreds and then several thousand American and foreign national employees onto the payroll; then came USIA, the information program which became integral to overseas operations. ...and pretty soon, Treasury and Customs people were abroad, Agricultural, etc. ... You know when I was in Paris, I believe twenty some US government agencies were represented...of the Embassy population, only 1 in 5 was a State Department employee, but the Department of State was charged with providing administrative support to most of these agencies.

So it was in this period that the Foreign Service had to learn all about administration. The Department actively recruited experienced administrative personnel; that's why people like Graham Martin came to work for the Department of State. Graham had been a Colonel in the Air Force and previously with the Public Health Service at the National Institutes of Health.

I mentioned Henry Ford earlier. Henry had worked for the Bureau of the Budget before the war, but was recruited by the Department after service in the Air Force. When I came in in '49 not the, you know the tail end, but close to the tail end of recruiting, the Department was learning the hard way about administering large groups of people in many strange places. Again, a long way round, but yes, innovation was accepted.

Q: So you weren't having to, in a way, beat down an entrenched administrative bureaucracy? There really wasn't one there?

DONELAN: You're absolutely right, and quite candidly a lot of free wheeling was possible, and you got into funny positions sometimes but there weren't a lot of people breathing down your neck when you were in charge of something. They came later particularly when and if something went awry! And sometimes the things you ran into were fascinating; I remember the then head of the Passport Office, the famous old lady.

Q: Ruth Shipley.

DONELAN: Yes, Ma Shipley. As Director of Finance, I watched the flow of things pretty carefully, like for instance the flow of checks from some offices which normally received payment for services. A funny thing had happened. The flow of checks from the Passport office had stopped. No answers. We finally got someone to look in her desk. She had stacks and stacks of checks that had come in. They had been addressed to her, and delivered to her, and she stuck them in her desk drawer. And, of course the fundamental rule in government (as in any good

business) when you get a check deposit it right away. Well, she had some checks, some of them were as I remember several months old, and perhaps one or two several years old. But anyway that's beside the point. You found little pockets like this once in a while but generally speaking, I feel that the Department was an exciting place to work because if you came up with something good, people were really quite willing to try it.

RICHARD T. DAVIES
NATO Staff
Paris (1953-1955)

After graduating from Columbia college in 1942, Ambassador Richard T. Davies served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1947, Ambassador Davies has held positions in Moscow, Paris, Kabul, Calcutta and Warsaw. He was interviewed by Peter Jessup on November 9 1979.

DAVIES: And we got to Paris and...

Q: *Was the NATO commander (Alfred) Gruenther then?*

DAVIES: I guess it was Gruenther. But I didn't have anything to do with the NATO command per se. Yes, it was Al Gruenther, it must have been. It was only later that the Air Force general came.

Q: *Norstad.*

DAVIES: Yes, Lauris Norstad. But I was working there for Hugh Cumming, who in turn was working for...I can't remember the name of that very nice Italian Ambassador who was the Deputy Secretary of Political Affairs, and Lord Ismay - "Pug" Ismay - was the Secretary General, a wonderful old gentleman. I don't know whether you were ever there or not, in the Palais de Chaillot, where NATO has offices.

Q: *Once or twice.*

DAVIES: It was one of those temporary buildings which I guess like the temporary buildings that we used to have down here on the Mall had been built many, many years earlier, and there is nothing so permanent as a temporary building.

Q: *And that Ambassador to the governments-in-exile during the war was on active duty was General Anthony Biddle Duke wasn't he?*

DAVIES: Yes.

Q: *As a liaison?*

DAVIES: He was, yes. I can't remember now what his title was, but he was around there. Well, it was a very active place at that point. NATO was really getting cranked up.

What they wanted us to do was, they wanted us to set up a section there to analyze what was going on in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. There were two of us: Frank Meehan, who is now our Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, and I, working for an English international civil servant, Bill (William) Newton, a former BBC correspondent here in Washington, who is now retired and still as far as I am aware living in Portugal.

Well, no sooner had we gotten there to do this than Hugh Cumming, whose idea this was, was transferred. I can't remember now whether he went to Indonesia at that point as Ambassador, or whether he came back to head I & R [INR] (Intelligence & Research in the Department of State). It was one of the two, but I think it was the former, and then later he came back to head I & R, as I remember it.

Well, he left, and (Ambassador) Vinton Chapin - one of the many Chapins that have adorned our service - came to replace him. A very fine man.

But the whole idea was ridiculous - to try to set up inside NATO, with three officers, a section which would do research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a time when the member states - first and foremost the United States, but also Great Britain, France and others - were in a position to provide massive amounts of information. However, the position was that this was an international body, and they weren't going to give us their information. That of course rested on the very accurate perception that the International Staff of NATO was not a safe place to store any classified information.

Q: Was your particular product for American eyes only, or...

DAVIES: No, this was for...

You know, there was an International Staff composed of representatives of all the member countries.

Q: So your product was for everybody?

DAVIES: For everybody, yes. It was turned out as I say by... The head of the section was an Englishman, and then there were these two American Foreign Service officers. But it went to everybody, and it was recognized by the Americans and the British and the French and the other national foreign offices that you just couldn't trust NATO to keep a secret.

JOHN A. LINEHAN, JR.
Visa Officer
Paris (1952-1956)

Ambassador John A. Linehan, Jr. was born in Gloucester, Massachusetts in 1924. He entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in France, Canada, Australia, Liberia, Accra, and Washington, DC, and an ambassador to Sierra Leone. Ambassador Linehan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

LINEHAN: We left Washington and arrived in Paris, where we were not met on arrival. The next day I called on the consul general, having been assigned to the Visa Section. He was Freddy Lyon, a very nice person, whose wife, a lovely lady, I still see occasionally. He said, "I don't know whether you have a private income or not. But if you don't, you'll find it very difficult to live in Paris." I went home and told my wife, "Maybe we should just go back to the U. S. and forget it." But we didn't.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about the visa work you were doing there?

LINEHAN: It was rather interesting because I arrived in Paris in January, 1953. That was just before the inauguration of President Eisenhower, bringing the Republicans in after many years of Democratic administrations. They decided to improve and streamline things. Among other things they sent a team to Paris which decided that the Visa Section could be reduced in size from 66 employees -- most of whom were French, of course -- to 26. This was a major change. I might add that at that time the consul general, who was in charge of the whole Consular Section, and I, who was at the bottom, were the only Foreign Service Officers. The others were Foreign Service Staff Officers, about 22 of them.

We never quite achieved the level of 26 employees in the Visa Section because the Ambassador discovered, not too long after, that some of his French business friends had to wait as much as two weeks to get a visa for the States. We had to do something to improve that situation. There were many problems which came up, and people demanded to see the consul. Two of us were assigned to handle this problem. One was the officer in charge of security problems (French Communists, or whatever). I was the other who was appointed to play the role of the consul. You know, I was pretty new but when people demanded to see the consul, they saw me. The reason that the two of us had those jobs was that we spoke French, which few of the staff officers did.

That was a great job. I met all kinds of people. I issued visas to Christian Dior; to Elsa Schiaparelli, who was a famous hatmaker; and to Barbara Hutton, the Woolworth heiress, among others.

Q: Hadn't Barbara Hutton lost her citizenship?

LINEHAN: She'd given it up. She was carrying a Danish passport. I should tell you that after I'd been at post two weeks, my boss called me in and said, "OK, I guess it's time for you to start issuing visas. You can issue one today." I said, "What am I going to do?" He said, "Well, you have a business visa applicant. He has an appointment. You come in and talk with him and see if you feel that he's a bona fide visitor." So the guy came in. He was not too tall and rather swarthy looking. He had an Argentine passport. We chatted. He seemed legitimate to me. So I issued him the visa. Well, a few days later my boss called me in and said, "You know that first visa you

issued? Well, you signed the visa stamp in the passport but you forgot to sign the form that goes along with it." So Mr. Onassis had to come all the way back from Nice to Paris to have this corrected. I didn't have a clue who Aristotle Onassis was but I found out quickly enough. That was the first visa I ever issued.

Anyway, I handled all kinds of visas for two years, both immigrant and non-immigrant. Then I spent about eight months handling passports with a woman who was rather famous at the time -- Agnes Schneider. "The lady with the blue hair," as she was called.

Q: She was sort of the doyenne of the Consulate in Paris. She was there for many years.

LINEHAN: Correct. I met a lot of people in the passport section whom I enjoyed meeting. My favorite was Olivia De Havilland, the actress, who had married a Frenchman and had a son named Mark, the same as my son's name. We compared notes about the difficulties of dealing with French pediatricians. Then I did general consular work. Certainly, I had a good grounding in consular activities. When the consul in charge of other consular duties, consular invoices, deaths, estates, and what have you, went on leave, I replaced him. He, by the way -- if Agnes Schneider was the doyenne -- was the doyen of the male officers, having been there since he got out of the U. S. Army in 1919. Except for two years, he was still there in 1956. Anyway, that office had been working on an agreement with the French Government under which the French gave us the title to our World War II cemeteries located in France. They had done so earlier for our World War I cemeteries. When the day came to sign the treaty, since I was in that office at the time, I went with Ambassador Douglas Dillon to the Quai d'Orsay [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. He was a stiff, not very communicative type. But on the way he said to me, "What are we doing today?" I explained to him that he was going to sign this particular agreement with the French. When we arrived at the Quai d'Orsay, I was interested to see the way he turned on the charm. We went up to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then Christian Pineau. The Ambassador introduced me, and the Minister turned to his aide and asked, "Qu'est-ce qu'on va faire aujourd'hui?" [What are we going to do today?]. I thought to myself, "Aha. This is how high diplomacy is carried on." [Laughter] We signed the agreement and all was well.

Q: What was the atmosphere in the Embassy at the time?

LINEHAN: It was an enormous Embassy. I think that, at the time, it was probably our largest Embassy in the world. To give you an example, there were four Americans in Paris with the rank of Ambassador: to France, NATO, the Marshall Plan, and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. In addition, there were two ministers, about 11 first secretaries, 22 second secretaries, but only one third secretary -- me. I was the only one with that title. If you were down at the bottom, as I was, you led your own life. We had very little to do with the diplomatic community.

Q: While you were doing the consular work, do you have any feel for the political situation at the time? What was happening?

LINEHAN: In 1954 the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. As was typical of

French politics at that time, there were frequent changes of government and a great deal of political unrest, if you want to call it that. This was also the time of the conviction and execution of the Rosenberg's in the United States.

Q: You're referring to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted of passing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union, a cause celebre around the world, particularly for the political Left, which was very critical of the United States.

LINEHAN: That's right. We had found a house after some difficulty -- housing was hard to find in France at the time -- in the suburban town of Nanterre, which also was known as a Communist working class town. First of all, when Joe Stalin died in 1953, the town was draped in mourning. Secondly, when the Rosenberg's were executed, there were posters all over the place, with President Eisenhower pictured with teeth in the shape of the electric chairs. I have to say, however, that nobody ever bothered us in that town. We stayed there until May, 1956. I've never forgotten the little merchants around town who sold us bread, wine -- whatever. They had never said anything more than "Good morning" or "Good afternoon." All of a sudden, they were saying, "Are you leaving us?" -- as if it were a real tragedy. When we stopped at the store of the lady who sold wine -- the *marchande de vin* -- she said that she was sorry that we were leaving and asked where we were going. I said that we were going to Quebec, Canada, very near where we come from in the United States. She said, in true French fashion, "But it's so far from Paris."

Q: What was our view at the time of the Soviets and the French Communist Party?

LINEHAN: To give you a bit of the atmosphere, my wife went to the gate of our house one day. Somebody was soliciting contributions for something that sounded pretty legitimate. It turned out that she had made a contribution to a quasi-communist women's affair. Of course, I had a big fit about that. In the atmosphere of the time anything to do with communist organizations was something we were all afraid of. It was, after all, the time of Senator Joe McCarthy, a "Red Scare" period. The Soviets were regarded as the enemy. The French Communists, or communist organizations, or quasi-communist organizations were things that we were concerned about. That's why we had an officer [in the Visa Section] who dealt solely with this problem.

Q: Did you feel -- perhaps not you particularly -- but did the Embassy feel any of the heat of McCarthyism at all?

LINEHAN: Only indirectly. While I was in Paris, we had a visit from a fellow named Roy Cohn, who had a partner named David Schine. They made a visit. They objected, as I recall, to some of the American magazines we had on display for visitors in the Embassy waiting rooms. This was pretty stupid, I thought, but it was that sort of thing. But I did not feel any heat directly.

Q: I recall Cohn and Schine's visit to Europe. It was just awful. Here were two -- to use modern terminology -- "gay" boys bouncing around, spoiled brats, having a wonderful time. And everyone was kowtowing to them.

LINEHAN: And accusing people right and left of things that simply weren't real.

Q: *They were very nasty people.*

LINEHAN: Well, it was the time, and I'm sure that you remember, that you wouldn't be caught dead wearing a pink shirt or a pink tie.

Q: *Of course, people nowadays do that right and left. Even wear lavender. Well, at that time did anyone talk about De Gaulle, or was he just sort of a presence over the horizon?*

LINEHAN: He was very much a presence in France, but still, at that time, in seclusion. We had a very happy relationship with our landlady, from whom we rented our house, and her family. We saw each other regularly. In part this was because we paid the rent in cash, because they were getting more money than they were supposed to get [under the rent control system]. So usually we went to their house at the end of the month for "une soiree" or they'd come to our house. I've never forgotten the husband saying -- he was director of the storage and refrigeration section of the famous French fur company, Revillons Freres. He said, "We need a strong man. We need to get rid of this constant bickering and change." I must say that I was quite surprised at the strength of his remark. Consequently, it didn't surprise me particularly when De Gaulle came in.

WILLIAM J. GALLOWAY
Special Assistant, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1952-1956)

William J. Galloway was born in Texas in 1922. He received a BS from Texas A & M University and served in the U.S. Army as a captain overseas from 1943 to 1948. His postings abroad have included London, Paris, and Vienna. Mr. Galloway was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: *I am trying to keep this focused on this time you were there.*

GALLOWAY: The time I was there. In Paris I was special assistant to Livy Merchant. Moving from London to Paris, we had a change of scene, change of characters and change of organization. The organizational changes sought to consolidate U.S. regional activities in Europe. The new permanent North Atlantic Council, the continuation of U.S. military aid programs as well as economic aid programs, and U S representation to the European regional economic organization, first the OEEC and later the OECD. Retired general William Draper was designated to head all U.S. elements in those areas. We had our offices in the Hotel Talleyrand. Under Draper was a Deputy, a retired air force general Anderson, and then Livy Merchant. All three had the rank of Ambassador. Draper was the U.S. member of the permanent North Atlantic Council which had been given the Palais de Chaillot for its new headquarters; de facto, Merchant was the working permanent representative.

Lord Ismay arrived on the scene and began the establishment of a permanent staff and secretariat for the Council. In one of his earlier meetings, Ismay noted that he was not yet fluent in French, but rather had a command of the language somewhat like that of his old boss, Prime

Minister Churchill, which he described as English words with French endings. He promised to improve his own fluency. I should have mentioned earlier that from the beginning of the establishment of NATO, it had been agreed that all of its meetings and discussions would be carried on in English and French without interpretation; however, documents would be published in both languages. Subordinate committees were formed under the Council, including a Political Committee. This was where I did most of my work, serving as the U.S. member or alternate. By the time I left in '53, the Council and its staff were well established. Their authority was recognized and accepted in a manner that focused member governments attention more than had the earlier Council Deputies. They gained more influence as time went on, and there was evidently the reality of political authority over the military. Eisenhower had served his term as supreme commander and then was persuaded to come back and accept the presidency of Columbia. That must have been '53. He was succeeded by, who was the airborne commander?

Q: Vandenberg?

GALLOWAY: Vandenberg. No not Hoyt Vandenberg. No it was, he later went out to Korea. He was famous for carrying a grenade.

Q: Oh, yes, Ridgeway.

GALLOWAY: He succeeded Eisenhower. There had been speculation that Gruenther would take over, but I think that in the hierarchy of the army there may have been an inclination to show that there were competent senior officers other than Eisenhower and his followers who had grown up in NATO. Ridgeway was certainly a senior four star general following Eisenhower's five stars.

I have neglected to record that Doug MacArthur II had been Political Adviser to Eisenhower throughout his tour as SACEUR, where he became, along with Gruenther, the third member of the inner cabinet.

It was only natural that he would be named from the State Department to that post. So, both he and I profited in the long run from George Perkins' moves back in 1950. I went with Spofford and MacArthur with Ike. That pretty well blew away the cloud Wahwee had cast over me when I had recommended MacArthur for the assignment as Deputy of Regional Affairs when he was already Director of Western Europe his long held goal.

Q: Now during this time, in June 1950, the Korean War started. You know people you were working with, how much was the Soviet threat perceived to be imminent?

GALLOWAY: I don't think it had much effect on European perception of the imminence of the Soviet threat. Certainly the other NATO governments fully supported the United States in its decision under the UN to help preserve South Korea. I remember the working group meeting following the U.S. decision. The UK representative, Derek Hoyer-Millar, his voice choking with emotion, made a brief but powerful statement complimenting the U.S. for acting the way a great power should. That was warmly received by the others. Indeed, several NATO countries

were able to send forces under UN auspices to join with the U.S. They were in fact token forces for the most part, but they did emphasize the policy of their governments. I don't think that event in itself affected to any considerable degree the attitude toward the Soviet Union. Some of my colleagues speculated that the Soviet Union was beginning to learn how to work and act internationally. It was involved in the four power occupation of Germany. It was involved in the four power occupation of Austria. It had the satellite countries under military occupation. It had its hands full. There were no serious Soviet threats, moves or announcements to raise the threshold in Korea, except for Krushchev's blandishment later on.

Q: That's not now.

GALLOWAY: In this early period, the NATO powers just held to a steady course. The fact that Soviet forces and the Allied forces were cheek to jowl in Germany and Austria was a state of affairs that existed, and it stayed pretty much that way until a later time when the first opportunity suddenly came on the Austrian treaty.

Q: In '54-'55. Was there concern on the part of the people of particularly the French Communist party, the Italian Communist Party?

GALLOWAY: Not after that one election.

Q: The '48 election in Italy.

GALLOWAY: That was the height of concern. I think the way that election came out removed many of the undercurrents that had been running around in western Europe. Moreover, that event had the ancillary effect of encouraging other political parties in the various countries to reinforce themselves and assume more prominent roles in the political swim. In France it worked to such an extent that everybody wanted to organize a party and take part in the government. Of course, they had a succession of prime ministers and new governments during the fourth republic. They were just being French; however, the French civil service is an excellent bureaucratic administrative body. Our experience through NATO contacts with the French at the diplomatic levels was solid and continuous. We had very few disputes per se with the French. Frequently they wanted to add some petty little thing or some *cache* that would make a passage more French in tone.

Q: Use of the language, something of that nature.

GALLOWAY: Yes, but those things were soon understood by everybody, and we were able to deal with them without difficulty.

Q: Well then, in '53 where did you go?

GALLOWAY: In '53 I was there in Paris in the Hotel Talleyrand, our headquarters, and MacArthur had gone back earlier. Let' see. Did he go back or did he stay? I guess he stayed until a little later. When was the election, in '52?

Q: '52. Eisenhower came in January of '53.

GALLOWAY: Well, that's when MacArthur came back, when Dulles was named Secretary of State. One of the first things he did was to position somebody at his elbow who had a very good relationship with Eisenhower and his immediate staff, and that was MacArthur. He had built that kind of relationship during those years in Paris.

Q: MacArthur had the job of counselor of the Department of State which depended on what the Secretary of State wanted it to be. I mean every administration the job changes, but the title stays the same.

GALLOWAY: Yes. It is sort of like the Lord Privy Seal in the British cabinet. It can be given any responsibility wanted. In fact, when MacArthur was Counselor, it probably wielded more power in the State Department than any of the geographic or functional bureaus. That was because his relationship with the Secretary of State very quickly became close and cordial, and the Secretary fully trusted him and depended on him to help with the White House. General Andy Goodpastor was Eisenhower's main chief of staff, and he and MacArthur had grown up together in SHAPE. Well, anyway, MacArthur sent a message to Livy Merchant asking if he would let me come back to be his special assistant. I was a bit reluctant, although I never told him that. Anyway, we formed a very good working relationship. I had become accustomed to having all kinds of new and unfamiliar things thrown at me that I somehow managed to muddle through, and I got along with people pretty well. I guess being a general's aide for a period of time in the army helped prepare me for this kind of thing because I got to be very comfortable in the position of special assistant or aide or whatever.

Q: Let's get this at the beginning. You were doing that from '53 until when?

GALLOWAY: '53 until '56 or '57 I guess.

Q: All right. Well now, when you were there, how did Douglas MacArthur work? How did he use you? How did he operate with the department from your perspective?

GALLOWAY: It became obvious to the other high level officials in the department soon after Mr. Dulles took over, that MacArthur was going to be one of his primary actors and agents. When I came back to be his special assistant, there were just he and I and three secretaries in the office. It was probably best that there were no more players than that because we could move from one thing to another without trampling on any institutional lines or activities. MacArthur handled himself very well with Dulles and the White House. The other two who came to be the principal advisors on the staff of Dulles were Livy Merchant who had been brought back as Assistant Secretary for European affairs and Bob Bowie who was head of the Policy Planning Staff, fresh from Harvard..

Q: Also part of that is the legal advisor, too.

GALLOWAY: Herman Fleger had a special tie with the Secretary though long friendship and the legal profession. So, whenever anything legal was involved, the secretary would say let's get

Herman in and see what he thinks. Herman would join in, and he would usually go along with whatever these other three fellows cooked up. I don't think he was a lawyer of great international renown or experience, but he was a fine man, and he wanted to do anything and everything he could to help. He was not overly active, but when asked to do something, he was always available to help. These other three, MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie were the main actors in that period. In fact, somebody, I think it was somebody in the secretariat had coined a name "Macmerbo." For two or three years when the question arose as to who was handling something for the Secretary, the answer was, "Macmerbo."

The Secretary had so much trust and respect for these fellows that he would hand them just about anything. When it came time, and this is digressing, for the SEATO treaty to be negotiated, instead of assigning it to Walter Robertson who was Assistant Secretary for the Far East, he asked MacArthur to take it on.

Q: Did you get any feel for Walter Robertson? He was very much a creature of the right wing of the Senate. I have heard that it was explained that you do whatever you want in Europe but don't mess with, particularly don't play around with China, or anything else like that.

GALLOWAY: That was essentially what happened in fact. Walter Robertson, if you cut it to bare bones, was the Congressional protection of Chiang Kai-shek. That's about what it amounted to. He was a Virginia patrician. He was very closely tied to the conservative elements in the Senate and the House. He was a fine gentleman with enough ego to enable him to operate pretty well at that level, but also without unnecessary or undue sensitivity. For example, when the Secretary gave MacArthur the job of negotiating the SEATO treaty, it did not seem to disturb Robertson at all.

Q: Yes. Well, his concern again was Chiang Kai-shek.

GALLOWAY: I was there with MacArthur from '53 until '56, and it was one of the most active jobs I have ever had. It covered as broad a horizon of activities as I have ever been called on to handle. As things worked out, I think the first time he went off on a visit, the Secretary asked MacArthur to pull things together for him which led to or established the precedent that whenever the Secretary was going off for a four power meeting or any other kind of meeting whatever, MacArthur would be the man to get all the preparations done.

Q: Often sitting at his elbow too. I have seen pictures.

GALLOWAY: Yes, that's right. It did not seem to cause a problem with other senior career foreign service people or other high level officials in the department. Even senior people like Chip Bohlen and George Kennan were somewhat left on the sideline. Kennan was even more left out. With Chip it didn't seem to matter too much because he had his own reputation. He had his own group of people, including me from my desk officer days. He confided with me about his outlook. He said, "Galloway, when you get into a high position in government, once you get in, one quality which will give you considerable help is to be a little lazy." Chip followed that axiom pretty well. He paced himself. He was a brilliant man, and his background and experience had traveled with him. He was about as authoritative on the Soviet Union and what

was going on generally as any person around in those years. He spoke Russian and served as interpreter for the President or the Secretary whenever they were meeting directly with the Russians. He was at Yalta. His credentials were such that he didn't feel threatened by latter day activities.

Q: Kennan felt that he had won the policy planning and I think he felt sort of left out to pasture, didn't he? When the Dulles administration came in he didn't...

GALLOWAY: Well, even before that. I don't know that to be absolutely true, but that was what I picked up in the halls. As I mentioned to you about the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Jack Hickerson and Ted Achilles worked directly with the Secretary. If either George or Chip heard about something and asked what it was all about, the Secretary would smooth things over or just ignore it. That was in what is now the old state building. We were up on the sixth floor. The Secretary's office and the office of Kennan had a connecting door. Kennan mentioned that from time to time. I think Acheson had the door locked, but he treated Kennan such that, I think, made Kennan feel that his position and his contributions were appreciated. In fact, Acheson just listened and then did what he, himself, decided. He did not ask Kennan to take on any special role in the department. That was perhaps the thing, I suppose, that irked Kennan in those days. As you know, even under General Marshall, Kennan was there as head of the policy planning staff, and then Dean Acheson became Secretary.. I was titular head of the Swiss desk at that point. Socially, I was on the roster for the Swiss, the Belgians, Luxembourg, and a lot of the NATO people as well, so I was having quite a high old time in my social activities. I remember dinner at the home of the Swiss Minister, who, incidentally, was married to the sister of Henry Wallace. I don't remember all of the guests other than George Kennan and his wife. After dinner the break came for men to have brandy and cigars while the ladies repaired elsewhere. Kennan more or less dominated the conversation. Anything that came up, he had an opinion. He got to talking about the State Department, speaking along these lines, "You know it has been very difficult, very hard." He went on, "You know, it has been very difficult in the State Department for some time now because of the people there, Bob (Lovett was Under Secretary under Marshall) and I are the only two with general competence." From the standpoint of a practitioner of diplomatic activities, one could sense the ego of the speaker and his flawed judgment in making such a remark openly. Talleyrand certainly would not have condoned such a statement in the circumstances; moreover, it was so patently untrue. As the department operated in those days, he did various things but did not exercise any general authority. I remember he conducted a few seminars, got people in from the outside to talk about issues. He made one contribution on the actual wording of one of the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ted gave him credit for that. Otherwise, Ted and Jack bypassed him to work directly with the secretary which suited the secretary. George Kennan was obliged to endure a bruised ego.

Q: Yes. Well, I think it got in his way from a career point of view too. I served with him in Belgrade near the end of his diplomatic career. I felt he took things too personally. I was way down below a chief of the consular section. He saw things in terms of rebuff to George Kennan rather than policy.

GALLOWAY: He was that way with the planning staff, too.

Q: Well, he has been there, in his way, he was probably where he belonged at Princeton...

GALLOWAY: As a historian. I don't know how good a historian he is.

Q: Well, he was a commentator and acting as sort of one of a number of academics who made, I mean not necessarily correct, but strew out the diplomatic plant as far as discussion goes.

GALLOWAY: Something I noted during my period there in the department with MacArthur was that Kennan seemed to enjoy little respect from his contemporaries.

Q: He was not... I mean this comes through very clearly from the interviews. He obviously was a powerful person and he had a distinguished career, but you don't get eyes lighting up. When they talk about MacArthur or when they Bohlen, or George Kennan. Did you have problems? I mean MacArthur was one of the sort of the old line of the foreign service of the imperial ambassadors. Was that a feature while you were dealing with that?

GALLOWAY: Yes. And MacArthur had probably twice as much adrenaline as anybody else. When the Secretary asked him to do something, he didn't hesitate to use whatever means was necessary. He tried to be cooperative and helpful, and generally it went that way for people who worked with him. He never tried to steal other people's ideas. He never tried to put anybody down or anything like that. He wasn't playing politics with his fellow workers, but he was darn well going to get done what the Secretary asked him to get done. I became imbued with sort of the same idea. I was working with him for about four years. He led the way and I followed in his footsteps. I suppose I didn't make or gain a huge host of comrades myself. On the other hand, I tried to make him available to all levels of the department. I tried to make it possible for anybody who had something being blocked or held up by somebody up the line to look to us for help. I tried to help them out and sometimes got MacArthur to take a hand. I did try to keep in touch with all of the echelons.

Q: Did you find yourself trying to smooth things over sometimes?

GALLOWAY: Not very often. Not as much as you might think. Doug's colleagues, particularly those serving in senior positions, could observe in meetings with the Secretary when he, Merchant, Bowie and others were there, how discussions were conducted. It was not very formal. Usually, there were three or four participants doing most of the talking, going back and forth, with the Secretary chiming in from time to time. He, or one of the others would contribute most of the substance of what emerged as the decision, and, more often than not, it was left for MacArthur to carry it out. It was during this stage of implementation that I learned about a strong trait of his character -- I found him to be very loyal, very loyal indeed. I did not find him to be standoffish to other people in the department. He respected the integrity of the institution and the people working there; he understood generally that they were working institutionally, and not personally. So, he was always willing to help out when a worthy cause came along. I think that because we sometimes moved like a whirlwind and were involved in so many things, the impression was that we were running and stomping over everybody. We did that only rarely, but for the most part our work was carried out and in a manner which bruised few people.

RUDOLPH AGGREY
Information Officer, USIS
Strasbourg/Lille (1953-1954)

Youth Activities Officer, USIS
Paris (1954-1960)

Ambassador Rudolph Aggrey, whose father immigrated to the United States from Ghana in the early 1900s, entered the USIA in 1951. His career included positions in Nigeria, France, Zaire, and ambassadorships to Senegal, the Gambia, and Romania. Ambassador Aggrey was interviewed by Jack O'Brien in 1990.

AGGREY: After Lagos I was assigned, first, to Strasbourg, and then to Lille, in France, as a part of the very important United States Information Office Agency operation in France at that time. And I had the pleasure of working for three different country PAOs, first for Bill Koren, then for Lee Brady, and finally for Bill Cody. And I think that each of them, in their own way, contributed a great deal to my growth and development. And I must say that each of them allowed me to do what I was able to do. And I had wonderful experiences and keep very, very fond memories of the days in Paris and in France.

Q: At some point, was there a question about your fluency in French?

AGGREY: In Nigeria there was a question about my ability to serve in France, when I applied to go to France. When I came back after the Nigerian assignment, I didn't know exactly where I was going. I was told, "Well, you want to go to Europe but you don't speak French." And I asked that I be tested because I had had an interesting experience.

When I was in graduate school, my master's degree was held up for six months because, reportedly, I had not passed a French reading examination. I vowed that I would never fail another French examination, and I spent six months preparing for that exam. And while I was in Lagos, I studied French with a tutor. Before I came into the Foreign Service, I took special conversational French courses at Brooklyn College.

Q: Now while you were in France, you were -- I don't know whether you were established -- but you were director of the youth affairs office there.

AGGREY: Yes.

Q: And that was unusual. I don't think we had such an office in most posts. I know we didn't. How did that come about?

AGGREY: Well, it was the first of several offices. And I think they were established in London,

and perhaps in Beirut, and one or two other posts thereafter. It came about because Lee Brady, who was country public affairs officer in France while I served in Lille, visiting the post, saw that I paid particular attention to students and youth in the program that we carried out there. And he felt that was a public USIA should address especially and with more thought and programming.

So when an opportunity came, he appointed me as the first youth activities officer in Paris. And in 1954 I began that program there.

Q: Well, that must have brought you a lot of satisfaction.

AGGREY: It brought me a great deal of satisfaction. It enabled me to travel throughout France. I made contacts with every French university, every French youth organization, the whole spectrum. And we developed special programs of seminars, lectures, exchanges. And the program grew and developed to the point where, in addition to contacts with French youth, we began contacts with youth of other countries, for which France, and particularly Paris, was a cultural sort of homeland, for Francophone Africans, for Asians, for Middle Easterners, for persons from Latin America, as well.

And then that led to the development of a cultural center in the Latin Quarter, on the Rue du Dragon, which developed a reputation for the quality of its programs and its outreach.

Q: And you were director of that?

AGGREY: And I was founding director of that center, between 1957 and 1960. While in Paris, I went on temporary detail to Vienna on one occasion, and I spent three months in Morocco, helping that post with some programs and projects.

CARL F. NORDEN
Economic Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1953-1956)

Carl F. Norden entered the Foreign Service in 1938. His career included positions in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Suriname, Cuba, Chile, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Spain, Iran, France, and Venezuela. Mr. Norden was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1991.

NORDEN: But I didn't go back. At that point, personnel, Bob Woodward or somebody, took pity on me and said, "Listen, this guy is just getting married, don't send him someplace like that." ...what happened. So instead of that, I was sent to NATO in Paris.

Q: And this was again a financial job?

NORDEN: Yes, pretty much. An economic job. A difficult job. My boss was an Englishman; his

boss was a Frenchman. The Englishman, I remember, was very brilliant, but he had some peculiarities. He once broke up a staff meeting, walked to the window, and said, "Oh, what a beautiful boy!" But I did some special jobs there. I got into a quasi-financial job, an economic job. I did a study in spare time. We had a lot of spare time there, you see. The annual review took a lot of time and it was hard work, but when you weren't on the annual review, you had time for projects. And I got into a project comparing the growth rates in Russia and the NATO area. Other people did the same thing later, but I did the first one. And I came to the conclusion that the Russian growth rate was going to slow markedly. And it did. But it wasn't a very popular paper, because the British, for some reason, didn't like it. If the British didn't like something, you might as well forget it.

Q: Well,... I suppose... or not. Well, you were there about two and a half years, weren't you?

NORDEN: NATO?

Q: In Paris, yes.

NORDEN: Two years. I had three children born there, twins.

Q: I had twin grandchildren, so I wasn't quite so...

NORDEN: It was very interesting. It was very tricky. You had to be very careful about taking a position on anything, because you stepped on the Greeks' toes or the Turks' toes or, you know, that kind of thing. But they were very nice, nice people, very nice people.

JEAN MARY WILKOWSKI
Assistant Commercial Attaché
Paris (1953-1956)

Ambassador Jean Mary Wilkowski was born in Wisconsin in 1919. She received a bachelor's degree from St. Mary of Woods College in 1941 and a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1944. Her Foreign Service career included positions in Trinidad, Colombia, Italy, Chile, Switzerland, and Honduras, and an ambassadorship to Zambia. The interview was conducted by Willis Armstrong on August 23, 1989.

Q: Fifty, fifty-one. This was after the Marshall Plan and after that election?

WILKOWSKI: Not quite, AID was still operating there. There wasn't anything major going on in Italy which was trying to get back on its feet economically. It was before the "Miracle" of the sixties." You remember that Norman Armour's daughter was married to Ambassador James Dunn. He headed our Rome mission. The big thing in Milan was the annual Trade Fair and the Ambassador always brought up a big delegation from the Embassy. Dunn was a good Ambassador. His wife Mary was very gracious and had a good sense of humor. She agreed to

have the Italian Garden Club name a rose for her. They told her, "it did well in beds!" The Zellerbachs came after Dunn. Different people -- very political and less Foreign Service oriented.

Milan was Europe for the first time. It was a wonderful introduction and made me decide in favor of taking the Foreign Service exam. I was assigned to Paris, took the exam there and then came in. I was Assistant Commercial Attaché in Paris.

Q: This was about '52, '53?

WILKOWSKI: Fifty-three to fifty-six. Then I was sent on TDY from Paris over to Geneva to the GATT Tariff negotiations. Our Ambassador in Paris was Douglas Dillon.

Q: Yes. I know him, as a matter of fact.

WILKOWSKI: Graham Martin was our administrative / consular officer there. I got to know him well, in fact, did some cost of living work for him.

Q: What did you think of Graham Martin?

WILKOWSKI: He was a very controversial figure and a secretive man, as you probably know. He was last living in North Carolina.

Q: I think he is.

WILKOWSKI: I think he used very bad judgment in that case of the classified papers left in the back of his car.

Q: Very intense man, I thought.

WILKOWSKI: Very intense man. Former newspaperman. Not a bad Ambassador, I don't think, but he made strange friends, like Michele Sindona in Italy. I don't believe he ever learned a foreign language, but he did know how to use people -- staff and outsiders -- and he relied heavily on them for information. I think he was a good collector of facts, a good analyst. There was something mysterious but likable about him. I felt kindly toward him. It was he who later asked me in the early '70s, if I wanted to become an Ambassador. If I did, Washington was asking him what he thought of me. [Chuckle] He would recommend me if I wanted to be an Ambassador, he said.

Q: Well, he did have good judgment.

WILKOWSKI: Thank you. Strange, he always acted as though he was playing a CIA game. He had that inclination to clandestine kinds of operation, secretive, so you never really knew the whole Graham Martin. But he had a soft spot, and he was always very good to me and quite frankly I tried to please him and merit his approval and respect.

Q: I knew him. I found him a very decent guy, really.

WILKOWSKI: Indeed. That's what I want to say. He was very much interested in other human beings. When he was retired and would come wandering into the Department, he would always make a point of looking you up. And it wasn't just for old times sake. It's because he was genuinely interested in others and their work in the Foreign Service.

Q: He was a warmer person than he ever got credit for being, I think.

WILKOWSKI: Oh, yes, he was. He was, and his wife, Dottie, was a lot of fun.

Q: I didn't know her.

WILKOWSKI: In sum, Graham Martin was a mysterious, unfathomable character, who seemed to delight in this image. He seemed more off-putting to men than women.

Q: He was a strange man, more strange than a lot of CIA people. [Laughter]

WILKOWSKI: He dealt with Foreign Service people very fairly, I believe.

Q: Yes, within the Service on a career basis, he was very fair and reasonable.

WILKOWSKI: I think so. He wouldn't hesitate to recommend people. For example, there was a young man working for me. He called me down and asked me what I thought of him. He wanted to recommend him as a Consul General, and I said, "Yes, I thought he could do a good job, but..." and as we were trained to do, listed the positive and the negative with emphasis on the former. Well, he got this consular post, and then almost immediately pursued a negative trait. It set Graham's teeth on edge. The man was a long time getting his ambassadorship. Indeed, he was a DCM for a very long time.

Q: You had acquired Italian. How about other languages? Did you have Spanish when you were in Bogota, and Italian later, and French?

WILKOWSKI: Well, I was a French minor in college. Indeed, that's one of the projects I'm working on now is trying to encourage exchange scholarships between France and the U.S. When I left college, I had no French-speaking ability though I knew Cornielle, Racine and Moliere. My first speaking language was learned in Bogota. I had to transact business in the Embassy economic section in Spanish. I worked with the coffee producers, exporters and shippers, and so I had to learn Spanish to get the trade trends and statistics. I acquired Spanish, Italian and French. During my tours in the Foreign Service I was interested in languages, and I think I have some facility with them.

Q: You did that as you went along. That was sort of part of your job to learn the local language so you could make it go.

WILKOWSKI: Yes, part of my self-education.

Q: Did you take special language training while you were in those posts?

WILKOWSKI: Yes. I always went in for the course at post in Bogota, on my own in Milan, and in Embassy classes in Rome and Paris, also at the Foreign Service Institute. I took intensive Spanish before I went to Chile, and a refresher before Honduras. I think the greatest lessons I had in Italian came from buying a farm with another Foreign Service Officer in Tuscany. I had to deal with the plumbers and the carpenters and the electricians and the real estate people.

ELDEN B. ERICKSON
Industry Reporting Officer
Paris (1954-1956)

Elden B. Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army in World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His Foreign Service career included positions in China, Algeria, France, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. Mr. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You served in Paris from 1954-56. What were you doing there.

ERICKSON: I was industry reporting officer which was the best job in the Embassy.

Q: What does an industry reporting officer do?

ERICKSON: I reported on ship building, automobiles, motion picture industry, and all phases of industry, which at that time was still recovering after the war.

Q: Did you feel a bit like a country cousin coming into the big city or did you always maintain your view that these people were a bit precious?

ERICKSON: No, I think I have always maintained my country view, no matter what. But it was such an exciting city and exciting life. For me it was an exciting job. I went to ship launchings all the time. I represented the Ambassador at the Cannes Festival one year. I had a new convertible and I was asked to escort Kim Novak from her hotel to the casino. Burt Lancaster invited me to Maximes for dinner. For a young person it was rather exciting.

Oh, Mrs. Clark (Lewis Clark was Consul General), was one of a number of Vassar girls of the same class who married Foreign Service Officers. I think there were six of them. I don't remember who they were now, except one of them was Marian Achilles. Ted Achilles was at that time Minister in Paris. Mrs. Clark wrote to Marian Achilles and said, "Erickson is coming to Paris and I want you to take care of him. If you need any fill in for a black tie dinner, for a party, for anything in French, you just call on Eric and he will be there." So what could I do? It turned out I was often called, maybe an hour before dinner or something. But not just for emergencies, they invited me to other things too.

Q: What were American-French relations like at the time?

ERICKSON: I think de Gaulle was out by that time. He was, because in Algiers he came down to give a speech at the Place du Gouvernement. I went to it and walked out. It was so anti-American I couldn't stand it even to listen to the whole thing and then report it. It just made me boil and I left. So I know he was not in when I went from there to Paris.

Also, one of our employees at the Embassy...her father was the concierge at the Parliament...got me a pass so that I could attend all the sessions of Parliament. It was a period of unsettlement for France.

Q: There was the Geneva Conference and the settlement with the Vietnamese and all that.

ERICKSON: I was at the National Assembly the night that Mendes-France submitted his resignation. He said to his fellow deputies that they would live to regret it. It was an interesting period too.

Q: At your meeting with French officials and industry people how did you find their feelings towards the Americans?

ERICKSON: It was generally very good at that time, I think. There were always the French who were not all that friendly towards Americans. But I think basically our relations were quite good. Ambassador Dillon was the ambassador at the time. I think he certainly was well respected and did a lot for our relations as well.

Q: What was your impression of the French intellectuals? It seems to be in no other country that you have such a so-called class of intellectuals that seems to be important? Did you find that it was important?

ERICKSON: Yes, in France it is important.

Q: He was editor of Le Monde?

ERICKSON: I'm not sure. I had met him and should know, but I don't remember.

Again, the Ambassador had a party every Thursday night and we took turns going and got to meet and know people in those days. I have a feeling today you are so security minded that you don't get to meet the people that you used to.

Q: Was the impression you got that the French intellectuals were viscerally from the Left and that the Americans were just culturally a wasteland?

ERICKSON: Yes, that was the impression. But I don't think we took that all too much to heart. That was just the way it was. Maybe we should have.

Q: I think it comes with the territory.

ERICKSON: I had landed in Normandy and I spoke French at that time. When we went through the countryside they brought flowers, Calvados, etc. I had such a warm feeling for the French that I probably always leaned to the pro-French side.

Q: Were there any major political developments during your tour?

ERICKSON: I think Mendes-France...it was more internal France...well not entirely. But internal France was more important at that time than France-US it seems to me. They were really going through a difficult time.

Q: It was sort of the last gasp of the Fourth Republic. What were your impression of Douglas Dillon as Ambassador?

ERICKSON: I thought he was just super in just every respect. I think I probably felt that because he read every word of my industry reports and often called me in to ask about them.

Q: He was an economist wasn't he?

ERICKSON: Yes. This was the time that they had the Wriston program to convert FSS to FSO simply by writing why you thought you should be one. I was converted from an FSS-8 to an FSO-6. When they called me in I originally said that I was happy the way I was and didn't really plan on staying in. So there was no point in converting. They said that I probably wouldn't be able to do economic work if I didn't convert. So I went ahead and did it for that reason, not because I was desperate to become an officer. I still was not planning to make it a career. I just kind of drifted on and since I enjoyed it all the time I didn't leave.

Q: As an industry officer, what was your impression of the possibility of integrating Europe?

ERICKSON: I think we all felt that that was part of our mission. Not to just integrate Europe, but to integrate us with Europe as well. But it had to start with their integration.

Q: Did you feel that it would work?

ERICKSON: Yes, there was a great feeling at that time...they had just started up at Strasbourg, the beginnings of the integration. And the coal, steel community, the three European communities were formed, it seems to me, at that time.

Q: What about de Gaulle? Was he seen sort of hovering in the wings?

ERICKSON: As far as I remember, he was seen as totally finished by that time. Especially when the Algerian Rightists turned against him.

Q: So people weren't waiting for him to reappear?

ERICKSON: No.

Q: Also I take it from what you said he didn't seem to be somebody who was going to be helpful to the situation, at least as far as we were concerned?

ERICKSON: To the contrary as far as the U.S.

C. DOUGLAS DILLON

**Ambassador
France (1953-1957)**

Ambassador Dillon was born in Switzerland and raised in Europe and New Jersey. He was educated at Harvard University and served in the US Navy in World War II. He established the Wall Street Investment firm Dillon Reed and Company, becoming its Vice President and Director. A member of the Republican Party, he was appointed to senior positions including; Ambassador to France (1953-1957); Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (1959-1961); and Secretary of the Treasury (1961-1965). He died in 2003. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Robert D. Schulzinger in 1987.

DILLON: No, because Eisenhower did not call on Dulles, the way Dewey had. Dulles had nothing directly to do with the campaign--although Eisenhower knew he was very good. After Eisenhower was elected, very early on, he turned to Dulles and asked him to be Secretary of State. That was in mid-November. I think it was early December when I got a telephone call from Mr. Dulles, who was working at the Commodore Hotel. I went there and had lunch with him, and he asked me if I would be interested in being ambassador to France. He told me at that time-- that the President-elect had, in effect, given him the right to nominate-- to suggest-- one person for one of the major embassies. The President had reserved for himself the other two or three major posts. Foster Dulles was always particularly interested in France, because he had studied there as a youth, and his wife had been there, and they had gotten together there, and he had a real understanding and love of France. So he was interested in that, and he thought I could do the job. This was a surprise for me because I was so young for that-- at that time I was 42 years old. He did say that there was one problem-- that it was very delicate-- it was a major thing that was very close to this heart, and that was the European Defense Community-- the EDC. He was going to appoint David Bruce, who had been in Paris before as ambassador, to head a special mission which would be located in Paris, but would be assigned the whole of Europe, the members of the Coal and Steel Community. Its primary and really sole purpose would be to try and help with ratification of the EDC in all the European countries. So, that was how I came to get my first assignment.

Q: And this came as a surprise, you say?

DILLON: Yes, because I hadn't asked, hadn't expected anything like that. When he did call me, I thought that he wanted to talk to me about something, but I didn't think it would be anything like

that. I thought it might be a special job within the State Department or something of that nature, which would not be surprising, but this thing was quite a surprise.

Q: Was there anything that happened while you were being confirmed that was noteworthy, or was that a pro forma process?

DILLON: Well, except for one thing--it was very pro forma.

Q: Did you testify before the Foreign Relations Committee?

DILLON: Yes, I did. There were two things that may be of some interest. One was that at the convention the governor of New Jersey still tried to play all sides against the middle-- he has very close to Taft, and he established some relations with him, and so the Eisenhower people were not very pleased with the governor. And so when this appointment came up, they neglected to tell the governor that I was going to be nominated, and like all things, it was leaked in the press before it was announced. At the end of December it was in a column by Joe Alsop, who was an old friend of mine in boarding school and college. I hadn't seen much of him since then-- but he got this story from somewhere and wrote a column about it. The governor blew up because he hadn't been properly taken care of, but nobody paid much attention to that. The confirmation proceeding was more or less pro forma. I found it interesting, because I got up there and was put in a little anteroom next to the room where the Foreign Relations Committee met.

Q: Was this in January?

DILLON: It was announced in January; this must have been-- maybe the end of January or early February, something like that. I found a very good looking and attractive lady there, surrounded by all sorts of photographers. It turned out to be Clare Luce, who was also waiting to be confirmed, so no one was terribly interested in me. They wanted to take our picture together-- they got a sofa and we were sitting properly on the sofa. She said "that's not the way to sit-- you've got to put your knees across like this, otherwise nothing will show in the picture but your legs!" So, I got my first indoctrination on how to behave in front of the camera from Clare Luce. And she went in and came out in two minutes flat, everything was fine, then I went in. I can't really remember what happened, I had one really good friend on the Foreign Relations Committee, whom we'd known-- not closely, but we visited back and forth - Senator Fulbright, who was not the chairman then; he was a young fellow. He was a very good friend. Anyway, I was confirmed, and studied diligently in Washington to get more caught up on the details of the French political situation.

Q: Tell me a little bit about that, the preparations for this.

DILLON: Well, there were just a lot of briefing papers at that time, there was nothing very detailed, just briefing papers, and we did have evenings with the Bruces who were at their Washington house, and they tried to tell us, including my wife, about problems and about what we could expect in Paris. It was about this time that my wife started to study French. She wasn't very good in French. I could read French: I could understand it when it was spoken to me by one person speaking directly to me but I was very rusty in speaking it myself. I had an accent, but I

could get along. So I didn't have to do much special studying at first, I did what I could. We took a fellow with us when we went across on the boat. We went on the America--the last time we went on a ship, and we took lessons every day for a week. We got to Paris about the 10th of March.

Q: I see. Tell me about your relations with the rest of the Embassy staff. Did you know them before? How did you work with them?

DILLON: I knew a fellow before who was there-- he left shortly afterwards. He as the CIA station chief, a fellow by the name of Robert Thayer. I didn't know any of the others. A whole group of them came up to Cherbourg or Le Havre, I've forgotten which. They had a special car on the train, and we all rode back together. That's where I first met them-- it was very pleasant and very nice. The deputy chief of mission had been there a brief time, four or five months, I think, to be ready for the turnover, which they knew would take place whether a Republican or Democrat was elected, because there was an interim appointee serving. That turned out to be, from my point of view, quite helpful. My immediate predecessor was a very eminent professional Foreign Service Officer. He was quite put out at being sent to Paris on an interim basis like this, and he let everybody know it, including the French. So they were glad to have me come as a person who was really interested. That was Ambassador James Dunn, who had been a very successful ambassador in Italy, which he loved. When David Bruce was called back in February of '52 to be Under Secretary of State, he had been pulled out of Italy and sent to Paris, which he didn't like at all.

Q: I see.

DILLON: He brought up his Italian residential staff, and even some Italian wines. After Paris he went to Spain, which he liked, and did very well.

Q: Who was the deputy that you spoke of?

DILLON: The deputy was a fellow named Theodore Achilles. He did very well there, and later-- he left during my final year-- he was ambassador to Peru. He was active for a long time since then-- he was a very fine Foreign Service Officer and he did very well.

Q: Tell me how you organized your days in the early days.

DILLON: In the early days I found, right away, that nothing started very early. We found a girl who was sort of a failed actress of the Comédie Française, a very good, intellectual, single woman who spoke beautiful French. She came to the house every morning, and I would take half an hour with her reading the French newspapers and talking about them in French with her, which helped my accent and my vocabulary.

Q: And that time was this?

DILLON: About 9:00 or 9:30, and then after that she would take on my wife. I would get things together and go down to the office, and get to work about quarter to 10 or 10.

Q: Was your residence in the same building as the Chancery Office?

DILLON: Oh, no, it was a long way, well not a long way, it was about a 10 minute drive. The residence at that time was a building at No. 2, avenue d'Iena, which was just across the Seine from the Eiffel Tower, and the Chancery, of course, was on the Place de la Concorde. I would come down and read the cable traffic, which was the first thing I did-- both incoming and outgoing. The procedure was, that all outgoing cables were signed by the ambassador though he doesn't usually see them. In a big embassy like Paris there would be a large stock of cables every day. Unless they were important they wouldn't get to the ambassador before going out. All the important political messages, and very important economic ones did get to me in advance, but they were a small part of the overall traffic. After I would finish with the cable traffic, I would probably meet for a few minutes with the Deputy Chief of Mission, whose office was nearby, and see what was up, and we just took it from there. It was a kind of a new life for me, because I'd been more on my own before, but here I found that there were lots of things to do that were representational. I had to go and be present at the laying of a wreath, or the opening of this or that, so generally I was very busy. The other thing that changed was that the French at the Quai d'Orsay worked late, and if I had to go to see them, which I did quite frequently, my appointment would generally be for something like seven o'clock in the evening.

Q: There are even references in the Foreign Relations volumes that have been published of your meeting with people in their apartments as late as 10 and 11.

DILLON: That was really special, I guess!

Q: You met with Mendes-France at 10 at night during EDC ?

DILLON: But I do remember that just as a standard thing, that after I'd come back, I'd dictate my cable report to Washington on what happened, and I'd get home about 8:00 --8:15. Dinner in France was never before 8:30, and sometimes you'd be a little late. There was a slack period of a couple of hours at lunchtime. If I did not have something special, I generally went home for lunch, and had lunch with my wife, and that would take an hour and a half to rest and eat something, because nothing happened, everything sort of stopped. But then the French continued, just normal, without anything special, until 8:00 PM. The entire Embassy didn't stay that late but my part of it did, because the people there, my immediate staff, had to do the same thing I did.

One of the things that made my job interesting, particularly in those years, was that for one reason or another, the State Department at that time, probably on account of Secretary Dulles, with his interest and knowledge where French statesmen were concerned, such as Bidault, liked to carry on the major relationship-- through the American Embassy in Paris, rather than through the French Embassy in Washington. Now, that changed later, and they now do most of it through the French Embassy in Washington - where the State Department - where the Assistant Secretary who'd be handling matters could talk directly to the ambassador, and say himself what he wanted to say. But during my time, for one reason or another, they handled it more the other way, so we had more to do. When they handle matters in Washington, the Assistant Secretary or the

Secretary if he's doing it, could talk directly to the ambassador and know what he said but he has no way of knowing what the ambassador reports to the Quai d'Orsay. If you do it the other way they can't know exactly what I said, but I have to report what I said, so they have a pretty good idea, and they know exactly what the top fellow in France, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was told and what he said, verbatim. They happened to like it that way, and followed that procedure during the four years that I was there.

Q: Describe what would happen when the Secretary of State or a high American delegation would come to France. How would that change the routine of the Embassy?

DILLON: Well, the only high delegation or person who ever came when I was there was the Secretary of State. The President went to Geneva but didn't come to Paris. It wasn't like it is now, when they have so many special envoys, and of course in those days, they didn't have jet planes, so it took much longer to go back and forth. Communications just weren't as rapid. When the Secretary of State came, he stayed with me in the residence, and he had his assistant there, and everything revolved around him, because he was there for a purpose, which usually was for a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] meeting. Or like the time he was trying to deal with Suez, it just revolved around him and around that meeting, and so the bilateral things with France were put on hold unless they had some special thing that had to be done, other than just attend meetings. We would put all our facilities at the Secretary's disposal, it would take two, three, four days before he completed his work and left Paris.

Q: Let's talk about the substantive issues of your time in France and if that you can reflect on some of the personalities. In reading the record the first thing that came up was the French intense interest in the Rosenberg case. The Rosenbergs were set to be executed and were executed in June of 1953, just a few months after you arrived. How did that affect your work, and what did you do with that?

DILLON: Well, it didn't affect my work. It was not a very pleasant experience, because, as it was coming up to the time that they were to be executed, the communists and their supporters stirred up a tremendous amount of excitement over there. I don't think it was probably a very popular thing anywhere, but certainly not among the intellectuals in France. At the actual time of the executions, there as a tremendous sort of a riot, I guess you'd call it --demonstrations, maybe, that's a better word-- in the Place de la Concorde, and the French had to turn out all sorts of police of different types. It was like a battlefield. They advised me to not be there. We went out to the country, and they sent someone with us to be at the house-- some security people-- for a couple of days, and nothing ever happened out there.

Q: Who actually advised you --the Foreign Ministry?

DILLON: I think it was either that or the Ministry of Justice; that as it was going to be a difficult thing, it would be just as good not to be around. There as a certain amount of rock throwing, and what-else throwing, and there were about 10 or 15 police that were injured and in the hospital. I remember when I came in the next week, I went to the hospital, and thanked them, and some French police officials there liked that very much, and we never had any trouble after that. It didn't drag on. I don't recall anything much after the big initial demonstration.

Q: Did the French government officially want the American government not to execute the Rosenbergs?

DILLON: No, nothing from the French government officially over that.

Q: There are some letters from you in foreign relations of the United States, saying how much of a problem it was causing in France.

DILLON: Well, it was, at the time. It was in all the papers, and everything like that. Of course, looking at these letters that have been published now, you're way ahead of me-- because I haven't seen them!

Q: Well, as you say, maybe you didn't write them.

DILLON: Well, no...

Q: They were signed by you.

DILLON: Well, I did--I think so-- anything that's serious. There's one very interesting thing that I found out that's probably appropriate to say here which developed quite often, during my spell there. The Embassy staff in Paris felt differently from the Bureau of European Affairs [EUR] of the State Department. There were a number of people in EUR who were basically rather unfriendly to France and things French, and liked-- were very taken with-- the Germans. That was the period when McCloy had just left and Conant had just gone there, and Germany had just come on with Adenauer, as the big wonderful place. EUR still remembered the French from the Vichy days, as a lot of them had served there, and they were not friendly at all, so we often had differences of opinion. When the time came to send a telegram back that differed with the view of the State Department, (as indicated by) the telegrams we'd received, Achilles or my people from the political department, which was headed by a man named Bob Joyce, who was also very good, always would come to me for approval of their reply. They would come and say-- "this is what we feel, and we want to write a telegram, but would you please send it under your name?" What they meant by that was to send it personally-- you would write in the telegram, "I." The use of the word "I" always meant it came from the ambassador personally. If there was a "we" in it, it came from the Embassy over the ambassador's signature: "we think this," "we do this," "we do that,"-- that was a sort of code way of doing it. They wanted me to say "I" because they wanted to protect their own hides, back in Washington, because where they went for their next post depended on what the people in Washington thought of them. If they could blame an ambassador for telling the State Department to go to hell, that was all right, so many times they would ask me to do it in this way. I was glad to. It was just a sort of protection for the staff that made me aware of the advantages of a non-career, politically-appointed ambassador. When you get that sort of a relationship between career people on an Embassy staff and the Department, they are often scared to say what they really think, if the people in Washington don't like it. And so it was an advantage to be a political appointee. There may be some disadvantages, too, but this was a very real advantage, and we made full use of it.

There was another thing that I would do. Secretary Dulles, as I have said earlier, was very interested in France and had a very good understanding of some of the French political figures. Sometimes I would get a directive from Washington to do something. The Embassy should tell the French this or that, something that we did not agree with. I would in those cases, send back to Washington a telegram addressed to the Secretary. That would say "eyes only--Secretary," but that didn't mean only him. It went to about 20 people in the department, but not to 200. But I would say in it: "re: Your so and so," which was the one that we had received from the Bureau of European Affairs-- I don't agree for this reason or that. I don't intend to carry out the order unless you specifically tell me to." That happened three or four times, maybe five or six times, and I don't think he ever told me to carry out the original directive.

Q: Can you recall some examples?

DILLON: It's hard, but it was usually-- probably having to do with the EDC. We, the Embassy staff and I, had a running disagreement, from the time I got there until the final National Assembly vote, with the Bruce Mission on our appreciation of the prospects for EDC in France.

Q: Why don't we talk about that for a while.

DILLON: And, so we were constantly getting these: "can't you do this?" or "can't you do that?" and we'd say "No, we can't do this, it would be counterproductive."

Q: What did the Embassy try to do regarding EDC?

DILLON: What we tried to do was to carry out American policy, which was to favor the enactment of it. But very early on, we decided that, after checking with all the people-- we had much broader contacts in France than the Bruce mission did; they were talking primarily to the Monnet-type people, who were very interested in EDC and they took their evaluation at face value. We had much broader contacts, and we came rather quickly to the conclusion that the EDC would never be ratified in the French Assembly. So we were always trying to advise Washington to prepare a fall back or at least to have a thought out position for when that happened. It turned out at the end that we were right, and that the French, when they did turn it down, wanted immediately to make amends and be friendly, and that's when Mendes-France said they would join the Common Market, and they relaxed the objections they had to German rearmament and German admission to NATO, and so forth.

Q: What was your opinion of the way Mendes-France behaved in that EDC controversy?

DILLON: I think it was perfectly all right because he did just what we knew was going to happen.

Q: I see.

DILLON: When I'd been in Paris about two or three months, and I'd met all sorts of people and people from different parties, I said to Achilles and the people in our political division that I wanted to meet General de Gaulle. He replied: "That would be a good idea but it just hasn't been

done-- the American ambassador just doesn't talk to General de Gaulle." And I said: "How come?" "Well, he said," "ever since Ambassador Caffery, who had a fight with him, no American ambassador has had any connection with General de Gaulle." So I asked him how we could get in touch with him, and he said, "We don't know. But we think that the station chief here might, because they have some contacts with him that might help." So, I got over the local head of the CIA, who was a different person from the man who was there at the time when I arrived a couple of months before.

The new station chief happened to be a man I had known since my college days, a fellow New Yorker, a fellow by the name of James Hunt. So I said, "I want to meet de Gaulle," and he said, "Sure! That would be wonderful-- that's just right. We have good friends on his staff, that we talk to all the time." So they arranged that the next time de Gaulle came to Paris I would meet de Gaulle. The reason why the American ambassador had no contact was that Caffery had insisted that, after de Gaulle resigned and was out as prime minister or whatever he had been after the war, if they were to see each other, it was up to de Gaulle to come and call on the American ambassador at his Chancery; and de Gaulle said "No, if the American ambassador wants to see me, he comes to see me." And so that was a total break, and it had continued ever since. I thought that was nonsense and said, "Well, I'll go see him." So I went up and saw him during the summer of '53, at the Hotel La Perouse, and met in his small sitting room. He gave me a time about 9:00 at night, so I went after a light supper and we talked until about 10:30 or 11:00. He was very interested. He liked the opportunity to talk very much; he wanted to explain; and he talked about the war and how he'd been a great burden to President Roosevelt. He said that he felt very badly about that because Roosevelt was carrying all the burdens of the world on his shoulder, but he, de Gaulle, was responsible for France, and he had to think of France first, and let Roosevelt think about the world. And that made some difficulties, and he said he felt Roosevelt was a great fellow.

We talked about what was going to happen in the future of France, and he was rather glum about it, because the French were feeling pretty terrible at that time, and he had no idea then that he'd ever come back! We had a very nice talk and I said I'd like to keep in touch with him, and would he permit me to see him when he came to Paris, which was about every six months, and he said certainly. At these times we only talked for about 20 minutes, because it was usually just general conversation.

So we started a relationship then, and then the Embassy staff people expanded their relationship with the Gaullist representatives in the Assembly and the Senate. --Senator Debré is the one I think of. We had a pretty good relationship there, and we knew what they were thinking, and what they felt, and we knew where they were going. That was one of the main reason for our thinking on EDC-- we felt that with the combination of the Gaullists on the right and the communists on the left, there could be not be a majority for the EDC. I also had a very good friend in France who went back to Haut-Brion days, and that was the mayor of Bordeaux, Chaban-Delmas. During that period he was a member of the Gaullist party and was Deputy. Later he headed the government a couple of times and also served as Minister of Defense and as Minister of State. We always talked very frankly, because I'd known him in Bordeaux, and he liked me and liked Americans and so often-- well, not too often, but maybe twice a year - he would come and have lunch with me at the Residence, or we would have supper with him and

his wife, which was unusual with French people. So I had a very close relationship with him and he has a very knowledgeable and important member of the Assembly.

One other thing, also, which I think is interesting: from day one, when I got to Paris, and I went to call on people at the Quai d'Orsay, or any other ministry, I never took a note-taker or an interpreter with me. I was always on my own.

Q: Did you then write up your recollections immediately afterwards?

DILLON: Yes, which made me very busy. It had an advantage. In the beginning my French wasn't all that brilliant, but in the Quai d'Orsay, most of the people there understood enough English, so that if I had difficulty I could say what I wanted in English and they could understand it. I could understand their French, so we had perfect communication. But the advantage of that, I think, was very great, since I didn't have a note-taker, then they didn't-- maybe they felt that just wasn't cricket. I don't know if they would do that now, but that was the way it was then. I'd see Bidault and it would be one-on-one, and he'd tell me things he never would have said if he'd had his own note-taker with him and certainly not if I'd have had mine. I think that was very helpful in developing a good and useful relationship.

Q: Getting back to the question of German rearmament. After EDC was defeated, the French had a very close vote on allowing German accession to NATO. Did you have any role in that?

DILLON: Well, we were very strong for it, because of the fact that the turning down of the EDC made this essential. And, it was, we did whatever we could. They knew we felt very strongly about it, at least the leaders. Most of them felt we were right.

Q: There's some evidence in the written record of your thanking Secretary of State Dulles for not commenting on it, immediately before. Had you told him before, to lie low?

DILLON: Well, the French, as one knows, don't like to be told what to do, most people don't. The French react a little more violently to someone telling them publicly what to do, and they're perfectly capable of, even if they want to do something, changing it and doing the opposite if someone tries to tell them what they should do. So I think that probably figures in with that, and I think that Dulles understood that about the French, so if I mentioned that to him, he would have understood. I don't remember that particular thing now, but it sounds reasonable. He would have recognized that. From the United States domestic political point of view it might have been a good thing to tell the French what to do, to show you were doing your job, that you were doing something, but in getting the task done, it was more important to lie low.

Q: The other big issue of the first year you were there, of course, was Vietnam. In 1953/54 came the climax of the French war in Vietnam. What was your role and the Embassy's role in American aid to Vietnam and American participation in the Geneva conference?

DILLON: Not much on the Geneva conference. We hadn't really any role. I think the main thing, where we came in, was telling the French that we wouldn't do some of the things they wanted us to do. The thing I particularly remember is Dien Bien Phu. The French had an idea, that, if we

wanted to, we could send half a dozen B-52's from Clark Field, and in one day - one night - they could destroy the encircling Vietnamese forces and the siege would be over. And, of course, I don't know - we hadn't had much experience then, but we've seen pretty clearly since then, that it doesn't work that way. They did ask for help, and we did tell them no. Eisenhower decided not to do it, I guess partly because he thought it would be ineffective.

Q: Did you remember, in the Embassy's view, whether that was the right thing to do, or did that make it more difficult?

DILLON: Well, it made it more difficult for us, but we had no particular military expertise. We did talk to the military people about NATO things, but I don't recall ever asking them about Indochina. We just reported the French requests to Washington, and got the answers and reported then to the French. What I recall most vividly about Dien Bien Phu was the French reaction afterward. Particularly with the more conservative people, there were people that wouldn't talk to us. It was at times unpleasant. It didn't last too long, but for awhile, you'd go to dinner and get in an elevator to go to some apartment, and other people in the elevator would turn their back!

Q: How long did that last?

DILLON: Well, I remember that one occasion That was two days after Dien Bien Phu. I think we felt it for a month or so, and then it died down, but it was very strong, particularly in the more conservative area, with ones who had Army connections, something of that nature. The French felt it very deeply. There were many in France who felt that they had been let down, that we'd had it in our power to very easily prevent this humiliating occurrence. It was just that France felt terribly humiliated.

Q: And what about the Geneva Conference?

DILLON: We didn't have any, as I remember, input in that. I don't even remember anyone at the Embassy being there except possibly someone from the political section.

Q: There's a reference in the documents to your being recommended as an advisor to the Conference, but it doesn't indicate that you were there.

DILLON: No, I didn't go for some reason.

Q: Do you recall being recommended as a member?

DILLON: No, maybe it was in Washington.

Q: Yes, it is in Washington.

DILLON: Yes, because it would seem natural, but for some reason I wasn't asked.

Q: After Geneva, or course, the United States supported the government of Diem, while the French, for a while were still supportive of the Emperor Bao Dai. Did the Embassy in Paris take

part in those discussions?

DILLON: I'm sure they did, but not on a very high level. We had an extraordinary Embassy staff, particularly in the political section-- Robert Joyce was the head of it. The number-two fellow in the political section was a man by the name of Bob McBride, who had been in Morocco, but he eventually wound up as our ambassador to Mexico, and did a very good job. And we had another fellow by the name of Martin Herz, who was more of a specialist in labor, but also in the Far East. He later served in an important capacity in one of the Indochina countries and ended as ambassador to Bulgaria. There was another one, Mac Godley, who was ambassador to the Congo and later in Indochina, these were all junior career officers who later rose to top. They made a very capable staff. They had relations with their opposite members, which would be like the head of the Asian Affairs section at the Quai d'Orsay. I, personally only met with the foreign minister or deputy foreign minister and maybe once or twice, with the director general of the foreign office, that was all. I didn't have relations at the lower level.

Q: So you were not a participant in any of these discussion about Diem or Bao Dai?

DILLON: No. I do remember that they went on, but I wasn't directly involved, I remember seeing cables about them. I didn't feel strongly about it myself because I didn't know anything about it.

Q: I see. Maybe we'll talk about this a little later when you were Under Secretary, because there's also some evidence from the documentation, especially with the background you had in economics, of leaning on the Diem government in '59 and '60, to enact some reforms. I wonder if, at that time, could you recall the arguments between the United States and France over Diem?

DILLON: No, I didn't.

Q: Why don't we talk about Suez now, because that was the next big episode of Franco-American dispute. When did you learn of what was happening with the French and Israel?

DILLON: Well, I'd learned ahead of time, because Chaban-Delmas, who was in the government then-- I don't know just what his position was-- came and had lunch with me at the Embassy residence, and told me that this was a very serious situation.

Q: Do you know about when that was?

DILLON: That was, I would say, about the 20th of October, something like that. It was about 10 days or two weeks before our elections.

Q: Yes. The invasion was on the 29th.

DILLON: Yes, if the invasion was on the 29th, it was probably a week before. And he told me that there as going to be an attack if President Eisenhower didn't come out strongly and force Nasser to do whatever it was they wanted at the time. I don't remember exactly what the details were that we were supposed to do, but the effect was to adopt the Anglo-French position rather

than the position we had had. He didn't say who would make the attack first, but did say that there was going to be a joint operation with the English.

Q: But if it was going to be with the British, he did not mention the Israeli connection?

DILLON: I don't recall, I am quite sure he did not. He did mention the British, he might have mentioned the Israelis, but I don't really recall that-- if so, it would be in the telegram regarding our meeting. But, this was not going to take place until after the election. And it would take place within two or three days after the election. unless the President, immediately after the election, did what they wanted, made the sort of statement about Egypt that they wanted. So I felt this was something that had to be reported back, on a very private basis. So I sent a telegram, reporting it in detail, to Secretary Dulles through the back channel, which was the CIA channel, and just for him and Allen Dulles. He took it seriously, but not entirely seriously, because Chaban-Delmas was not the head of the government, just a part of it. The action which the government of the United States took as a result of my report was to instruct Ambassador Aldrich to go and see Eden, and ask him directly if any military action was being planned.

Q: Yes.

DILLON: And, of course, the British said "nothing." So then our government had the French saying "yes," the British saying "no," and having been closer, being good friends, they believed the British. That was one reason for the very violent reaction against the British on Dulles' part. But, we did have that one warning which should have prepared us a little more, but I don't think it did.

Q: Did you tell anyone else at the time-- beside Mr. Dulles--was there anyone else in the Embassy, who knew?

DILLON: I'm not sure. I think I probably must have told Achilles, since I always told him everything. I think I would have, and of course I told the CIA station chief there, Jimmy Hunt, who sent the telegram for me, but no more than that.

No one else in the whole Embassy political staff knew; and the same thing in Washington. It would not have circulated in the State Department, except to people Dulles may have personally asked to look at it. He may have shown it to others, but I just don't know. So we did have that advance notice. The next big difference came after it was all over were, when the British were still maintaining that they'd gone in there to separate the Israelis from the Egyptians. In two days, I guess, after it was over, Pineau, then Foreign Minister of France, called me to the Quai d'Orsay and told me the whole story of the French-British operation. So I reported that back home. That could be reported by regular channel. And that made the Department eight times as mad at the British, because the British were still saying "no" and not telling us the truth.

Q: Were you aware at the time of the meeting at Sèvres with Ben-Gurion? You learned about it when it became public, with everyone else?

DILLON: Yes. that is when I learned. Well, and also the British coming back and forth. The top

British government people were meeting with the French, and I wasn't aware of those meetings at all. You got the feeling that something was going on, maybe, but the only real thing was when Chaban-Delmas spoke to me. I never have found out whether he gave me a wrong date on purpose to put us off, thinking we'd find out about it, or whether the date was changed, or whether he didn't know the date.

Q: He may have not known the date, and also.....

DILLON: Well, one of those three things.

Q: The French and British coordination, militarily, apparently was very bad before the war. They were supposed to go in some days after the Israelis went in, but they kept changing their plans. He either didn't know, or was aware of a different plan.

DILLON: I think that probably was what it was. The next thing of interest in the Suez operation was, that while this was going on, when they were in there, moving ahead, I got a call from Mollet, the Prime Minister, from his office, "would I come over right away?" It was about midnight, I guess, maybe later, one o'clock in the morning, when I got there. They had the whole French cabinet in the room, and I was in a sort of reception room outside it, and the prime minister's office was on the other side of the reception room. Mollet came out of the cabinet meeting and showed me a tickertape. It was a Tass announcement that they would use rockets on the British and the French if they didn't behave. It was very threatening and the French took it pretty seriously. They were in contact by phone with the British government, and Mollet asked me "What about the United States government, what would you do, if this happens?" And I said, "Of course, that violates the NATO treaty, we'd be at your side." But he said "Can you get someone in Washington to confirm that right away?", because Washington has been very unfriendly". And I said: "No, I don't see how I can." I don't remember what the time difference was, it was eight or nine o'clock at night in Washington, and there was no way I could see that I could get someone in any quick time in Washington to answer a thing like that. So I said: "We always live up to our treaty obligation, and here it is". Mollet went back in to talk some more to the cabinet members. Then there was a phone call for Mollet. He took the telephone in this anteroom where I was sitting. There were just the two of us there, and he was talking to Eden in London and arguing with him. Eden told him he had decided to stop the operation, and Mollet didn't want him to stop. But the British were in command and Eden said they'd made the decision they were going to stop. Mollet was very discouraged, and I asked him "Where are your forces?" and he said "They're down here almost all the way to (naming some big town) right down in the middle of the Canal. They are just entering that town, Ismailia, or something like that". And I recall very well that in the next day or two we found that the British-French forces weren't within 25 miles of where they thought they were. It was the fog of war, I guess, and the lack of communications, they were just nowhere near there, which has always impressed me a great deal. It seems, since the British shared the same information, that Eden was making his decisions on information that was totally wrong.

Q: Yes. What about the aftermath of Suez? How did that affect U.S.-French relations?

DILLON: Well, I was quite active in it. It was upsetting. As you know, the United States put on

an embargo on oil, and it was getting cold at that time of year in France. The oil embargo hit very hard, because there was no fuel and no coal. There was no heat in the Quai d'Orsay. In the foreign minister's office there was a little electric heater, right by his chair like that, so he could get a little warmer, wearing a coat or something like that to keep warm. It was really quite, quite difficult. You'd wear a coat in your office, and it was no fun at all. The French were feeling great resentment. They told us that they'd come clean on this thing immediately, but said we've agreed to get out and we're on our way, but we can't do it overnight. There were just wild to get these damn people off the beach and stop this embargo.

Unfortunately, at the time, Secretary Dulles had taken to his bed for his first cancer operation, and so he was not functioning. The State Department was being run by Herbert Hoover, Jr., and I don't think he had the same judgment.

They were very tough on this and we were urging them to drop this embargo and they wouldn't. Finally I sent a telegram asking if I could come back and see the President, because I thought it was so important. I got word back that yes, the President would see me in Augusta, so I got on a plane and flew back. When I landed in New York and picked up the paper, I found that the embargo was over! I don't know if my coming back had something to do with it, but I've always felt it did. But anyway, I talked to Eisenhower about a number of things, nothing unusual about that, but it was the first time I'd had a one-to-one meeting with him, so it was quite daunting.

Q: Did you bring someone with you to that?

DILLON: No. At that time we had a new Deputy Chief of Mission who was getting ready for the next ambassador-- that's a good habit they have on replacing the DCM six months or so before the arrival of a new political appointee. This fellow was Charlie Yost. I was debriefed when I was in Washington for a little while, and someone from the State Department came around and said: "Would you go on a radio talk show about France and the U.S., and say what's happening?" I said "Do I have to?" and he said it would be good, so I went on the talk show. The questioner asked me there whether the French and the British were pressed into stopping because of the opinion of mankind, or if they were frightened in some way because of the Russians. I said "It's quite clear to me from the conversation with Mollet the night the operation was stopped that they were scared by the official Tass report threatening the use of rockets. They never showed much interest in the opinion of mankind." That was the fact of the matter. I went back to France, and at that time, Mr. Dulles was recovered somewhat, enough to come over. He came over for the December meeting of NATO. The first day he got there, the very next morning in the Paris Herald, there was the headline on front page "Ambassador Dillon Says Suez Was Ended Because of the Russian Threats," not because of the American pressure in the UN. Oh! was he mad. I'd never had anyone quite so mad at me in my life!

Q: What did he say?

DILLON: He said, "Ah, why did you talk like that?" I had no excuse. I shouldn't have said this; it was the truth, but I shouldn't have said the truth. At times, it's best not to talk to the media but just say you don't know anything-- I learned that later, but that was my first lesson, and a very rough one.

We always used to have dinner for the Secretary when he was there, at the Embassy, and we'd toast the different people, and he would say "thank you" to the ambassador, but this time when we had the dinner he never mentioned me or thanked us. It was terrible and most embarrassing for everyone at the dinner. But it didn't last very long-- I don't know, it was maybe 10 days to two weeks later-- I got a telegram from Secretary Dulles asking me if I'd come to Washington to run the economic side of the State Department.

Q: Let's talk about that in a little bit, but I want to talk about Algeria, and then maybe some overall impressions of your career in France. The Algerian War began in '54. What was the Embassy's role in reporting, and your reaction to it?

DILLON: We reported on it as it went, but I had never been there myself. I had gone to Morocco when the French gave them independence, which they did in '55 or '56, while I was still there. They were working toward independence for Tunis and Morocco, and I felt they were trying to behave in pretty responsible way. I think the Embassy as a whole, in the early stages of the troubles in Algeria, was favorable to the French government position, and felt that they should try to work out something, maybe not total independence, but some sort of association or something. We tried to support them, I made some sort of speech in '56 over there that the French took to be very supportive. The French press thought I was crushed pineapple or something, after that! I think it got more difficult in later years. There were some advantages after de Gaulle came in, because he was able to handle that. I don't remember if we ever sent anyone down to Algeria during the time I was there. We were pretty supportive of the French.

Q: Were there other major issues in the four years you were there, other than the ones we've discussed so far?

DILLON: No, I don't think so. One thing I did while I was in France which is probably of some interest: I made a real effort to visit different parts of France, and I found that they were very interested in receiving the American ambassador on an official, local basis. I thought it was very helpful, because you could prepare some sort of a speech which I did with the help of this girl who came to help me with my French. She also worked on speeches. The Embassy would help prepare a French speech, but no matter how good they were, they didn't know how to put it in really good French, and this girl did. She would do that, so that the speeches I delivered were more colloquial, more proper French than a translation from English to French. So they were quite good, and they worked very well. By doing that, in my four years I managed to visit and spend the night in some 65 of the 90 departments of France. I felt that you build up certain understanding and good will that way.

In one particular case, I remember going to visit southwest France, and we went to Toulouse and called on the former president, Auriol, and had a fine visit with him, and then went on Carcassonne, where we were received by and stayed with the prefect of that department. When we got there in the afternoon, he said: "Do you mind if they have a reception for you at the hotel de ville?" Since that was usual, I say, "Well, fine." And then on the way, he said, "By the way, I think you ought to know the entire conseil municipal is communist." So, I was sort of scared. And he said, "Well, that won't make any difference, that's something else again, but they will be

very glad to see you and very happy to see you." It was one of the nicest visits I had. The conseil municipal thanked America for helping them during the war, because that was still the thinking of that in those days. We talked with them and had champagne the way they do and then departed. It was totally friendly, and that was the first time they had seen official Americans in God knows when. So, in that way, I think it is helpful to get around the country. It is one of the jobs that an ambassador can do, and I think-- to get more up to date now-- I think it's more important now, because ambassadors have less to do of the actual diplomatic work in the capital wherever that may be, because more of the diplomatic work is done in Washington or by special people that they put on jet planes and send over to do important jobs.

Q: There is one other issue, maybe, that's relevant to the time, and that's the origin of the Common Market. Did your office have anything to do with that, did you?

DILLON: Yes, we were strongly for that. That again was at the time of Mendes, and he agreed to go ahead with it, and of course that was, I think, also certainly one of the fallouts of turning down EDC and ending the war in Indochina in a way that didn't make us very happy. The French wanted to help in other ways they could, and they decided that the Common Market was an alternative. They already had the Coal and Steel Community. That had worked, and the Common Market was an alternative to the EDC. Joining it showed that they were good Europeans.

Q: Did you personally do anything to encourage them?

DILLON: Oh, yes, all the time. I met numerous times with Monnet on that. We didn't talk to him early about the EDC much, but did talk a great deal about the Common Market, and that sort of thing. Of course the lines were pretty well drawn. In the opposition were Gaullists and communists but they were alone and unless they could get some other support it would pass, and it did.

Q: What do you think was your most significant accomplishment as ambassador?

DILLON: I think creating in France and in the French people--government people-- a better understanding of the United States and of American policy, and in setting up a working relationship that was really quite effective and quite good. There's one minor thing that I wouldn't like to call a great occasion, but it was indicative of the fact that in those days the ambassador could do more things that he can now. We had for a long time wanted very badly to get permission to put atomic weapons in Morocco, and the French had to say yes, before we could go ahead. I wish I could remember exactly what it was that the French wanted, but I remember going over and seeing Maurice Schumann in his office at the Quai d'Orsay at his request. He had some request for us, which was something I knew we could do. So I said, "Fine, but how about you helping us out?" He said, "What's that?" and I said, "As you know, we'd like to get atomic bombs into our bases in Morocco." He thought about it a minute or two. They must have talked about it before, because he said, "Okay." I then went back to the Embassy and called General Norstad the Commander of NATO, and of our forces in Europe. I asked him "How quick can you do it?" and he said, "We can do it today." I said, "Go ahead, you have French permission." Since he was the NATO commander, he could do it in no time flat. I sent my report back to the State Department thinking I had made quite a coup, getting what we had wanted for

so long. And would you believe it, they blew up all over --everywhere! They said I had no authority to do this, even though it was what they wanted! But it was sort of fun, to be able to accomplish something overnight. It did show that, if you were willing to, at that time an ambassador could do some things that would be inconceivable now.

Q: What was your greatest frustration as ambassador?

DILLON: I think that could be that we were continually having scraps of one sort or another with the Bureau of European Affairs. It wasn't really frustrations, it was a nuisance all the time. I was not frustrated by failing to get the EDC, because I felt that was unrealistic at the time to pin all our hopes on it. When it got turned down, it was terrible, but the end result was getting EEC, the Common Market, and getting Germany into NATO. I'd say another frustration was when I felt so strongly that I came back to see the President about the oil embargo.

Q: Anything you would have done differently?

DILLON: I'd like to make clear that what we did in Paris was a team effort, and I had a very fine team, and we worked together. No one person accomplished this. If you have a good team, you have to work with it. I was glad to be able to, and the Foreign Service team seemed to like working with me.

Q: Would you recommend the Foreign Service career to someone in your family, or recommend it in general?

DILLON: At that time, which was the late '50s --all through the '50s-- I would say, certainly, yes. Today things are a little different and I would hesitate to offer anything. One problem is the terrorist situation, which has totally changed the life of Foreign Service people in many parts of the world.

Q: You had children with you when you were in France? How old were your children?

DILLON: No, they were grown up. But I have a daughter who as married the first year I was there, the summer of '53. She had a child, and then came over there with the child; the grandchild was born in '54 and came to live with us in early '55, so she had a couple years with us.

Q: Let's go back a little bit about U.S.-French relations. Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. Did you have anything to do with advising the President about how that would characterize American-French relations?

DILLON: Yes, because Eisenhower never liked him very much during the war. He'd been a nuisance to Eisenhower, and a nuisance to Roosevelt. Eisenhower had a memory of him as a difficult fellow, but we were perfectly ready to work with him. There were some great advantages, because, almost immediately, he made clear that he was going to settle the Algerian situation and all the other colonial problems of France, which was very good. But the problem

arose-- I can't remember exact dates, but not very long after, no more than the next year-- that he proposed the idea of a Triumvirate: France, England and the United States were going to run the world. It would be sort of a private triumvirate. He believed we had a special relationship with England. At the beginning he just wanted to be part of that. We knew in the State Department that that just wouldn't work. You just don't have a triumvirate, and there wasn't any duumvirate, even though the British often talked of a special relationship. We were very friendly with the British but the effects were exaggerated. We were friendly with them, but we certainly didn't try to run things with them. So we turned de Gaulle down, and that was the end. As soon as we did that, he said "Okay, I'll show you." And he proceeded to do so; he pulled out of the NATO command to keep us out of France. There could be no American bases in France, and so forth. But that was his reaction. He was either going to be part of the group that ran the world, or he was going to be by himself.

Q: Did you personally have a view of what would happen when de Gaulle became President in '58?

DILLON: I didn't think he'd ask for this triumvirate, but I was convinced when I came back--that was one of the things I reported-- that the Fourth Republic was very shaky and the chances were that there'd be trouble and some sort of an upheaval which would change the Constitution and the electoral system so they'd have a different kind of government in France. So when De Gaulle came back, it wasn't exactly the way I thought it was going to be, but it didn't surprise me. That was when they came out with the Fifth Republic, which was quite different from the regime at the time of my stay in Paris.

EDWIN MCCAMMON MARTIN
Marshall Plan
Paris (1953-1957)

Director of Development Assistance Committee, OECD
Paris (1968)

Ambassador Edwin McCammon Martin held a variety of positions during his long and distinguished career at the State Department, serving as Assistant Secretary of the Economic Area, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and as ambassador to Argentina. Ambassador Martin was interviewed by Melbourne Spector in 1990.

Q: I'm still not clear about the organization. What was your relation to the Marshall Plan then, when you were in Paris?

MARTIN: It was beginning to phase out by '53. It was pretty much phased down, but there were still aid programs, and we did have a substantial staff under me that represented the U.S. there and was working on the aid programs, and the OECD was an active organization for leadership and coordination of the program. Then we had a substantial defense staff that was working on

defense programs. But they did not replace the two ambassadors under the overall ambassador. They just had me as a deputy with the personal rank of minister. I was also, for the first two years, head of the political section. Then when George Perkins replaced Hughes in '55, he thought we ought to have somebody else head the political section, and I was just his deputy.

I think the working relationships everywhere there in this period were quite good. Two of the young people I had on the political staff were, as I mentioned before, Bob Fearey, also a young fellow named Bob Miller, whom we've been close with ever since. He, later on, became ambassador to Malaysia -- we stayed with them when visiting there -- and ambassador to Ivory Coast, and Deputy Chief of the Office of Management at the State Department, and now is vice president of the National Defense Colleges. But there were some really able people there working with us.

I did want to mention a couple of incidents. One of the most important things that I think needs correction is the situation at the time of the Suez crisis. This was '56. Dulles made some unfortunate comments about the British and the French for their intervention in the UAR-Israel war. It was a mistake, what they did, but he publicly denounced them in rather unfortunate language. It was a press hurrah. The general press comment was, "Is NATO collapsing?" From the way the three countries were talking to each other, you might have thought so.

But in that period, we did three things. One, we had two or three times a week what are called informal meetings, at which there are no minutes, and we just talked about the Soviet invasion of Hungary and what our reaction should be. We agreed in that period for the first time on how nuclear missiles could be launched, what the instruction channel was for NATO to launch nuclear missiles, a fairly important subject.

Q: *Fairly.*

MARTIN: We agreed on a much enlarged additional -- I think to \$3 billion infrastructure program, building NATO airfields, NATO communications systems and networks, that sort of thing. So in terms of concrete results, NATO had never been working together at its level more smoothly and effectively.

A second point that I want to make is that in this period, about this time, the French finally rejected the idea of a European Defense Community. This incensed Dulles, who had been since the middle Forties a great protagonist of European unity, before he ever got involved in international affairs, really. There was to be a NATO ministerial meeting, which we had two or three times a year, but this was the big and long one, the December one.

I was called back to work on the speech he was to make there, and met for several hours with him on a Saturday afternoon at his office, and for several hours in his home on Sunday. Each time he took a book from his bookshelf to get a quote to use to persuade the French they should change their minds or else it was a disaster, and the quote was from the same book, The Federalist. The idea that the uniting of the 13 colonies, described in The Federalist in 1780 was comparable to the unification of the independent countries of Europe, struck me as total lack of reality.

There are two other side stories, one which I forgot to mention, but I'll mention it here. One, the difficulty Americans have understanding the French is considerable. During this period of the Suez crisis, the French attitude was as exemplified by a story I heard from a wealthy American woman who had lived in Paris for 15 years, thought she was more French than the French, they wouldn't deliver her a newspaper; if she got in a cab, and the driver found she was an American, he'd force to get her out. They wouldn't deliver coal. She got her best French friend and said, "What is this? I'm more French than the French. Why are they treating me this way?"

"Ah," she said, "you must understand. We French think the English are tradesmen, the Italians are wops, the Germans are Huns, the Spanish are beneath contempt. We don't even like each other. Why should we love Americans?"

My second story is, that shortly after the Germans were admitted to NATO, Ambassador Hughes had one of his luncheon parties, which he had many of and beautifully. My main problem was conveying what he learned from his French friends to the embassy at these social affairs, because he had lots of them and learned quite a bit. I sat next to an American woman of a similar sort, who had lived there a long time, and was wealthy. She had, on her right, the just-arrived German General who was commander of European ground forces based in Fontainebleau, to show that they were really integrated. After the luncheon, she said, "I can never remember names unless I can see them. What is on your card?" So she read it, and then turned to the person on her right, "Oh, he took his card. Who was he?" I told her who he was. "Oh," she said, "that explains it." She had been telling him about a trip she was about to make to visit the antiquities of Egypt, and she had asked him -- I had heard her do this -- did he know Egypt. His reply, very quickly and quietly she said, was, "Only from the maps." He had been Rommel's chief of staff when Rommel was preparing to invade Egypt and never got there. (Laughs) Just very blandly, "Only from the maps."

Q: Speaking of Americans in Paris, when you were there, did you ever know an Ambrose Chambers, "Brose" Chambers?

MARTIN: Yes. He was one of the people I had to fire when I was cutting the staff from 800 to 400, and many of them took it unkindly.

Q: "Brose" was a very good friend of Averell Harriman.

MARTIN: Was he?

Q: Yes, a charming man. Did you ever go to his home?

MARTIN: I don't remember it.

Q: He was in Cole Porter's home.

MARTIN: Yes, I do remember that. I think I was there.

Q: He was Cole Porter's lawyer. When the war was over, Cole never wanted to go back to Paris, and he said, "Please sell my home." So "Brose" said, "Well, I'll buy it," and bought it for \$50,000, a beautiful house with a garden and gold bathroom fixtures.

MARTIN: Yes, I think I do remember that. We had a lovely apartment bought with Marshall Plan counterpart at 89 Avenue Kleber, a lovely location, and four or five bedrooms, staff rooms up above on the top floor, and we could give a cocktail party for a couple hundred people, seat 40 people in the dining room. It was very luxurious.

Q: Where was your office located then, in the Talleyrand?

MARTIN: The office was in the Talleyrand, looking out over the Place de la Concorde. But, NATO was quartered then in the old temporary U.N. buildings right at the Place de la Trocadero, just half a block away from an apartment, and that was where the meetings were.

Q: I may have mislead you when I said Trocadero.

MARTIN: Yes, overlooking the Eiffel Tower, right there in sort of temporary buildings. We did decide, before I left, to build a building for ourselves. Security was not easy to maintain there.

I'll just mention one other thing. I haven't mentioned this, I believe. When I had a full FBI clearance for getting the personal rank of minister, as deputy to Ambassador Hughes and Minister to NATO, they checked out a book I had written in 1948 on The Allied Occupation of Japan. I had been asked to do a paper for a conference for the Institute of Pacific Relations. Then they asked me to enlarge it to a book, and it was published by MacMillan and Stanford, relatively short. Bob Fearey wrote the subsequent one carrying it through the peace treaty later on. Mine was first phase; his was second phase.

Well, because it had been published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, which were suspicious, they said, "Secretary Dulles will have to read and agree that you may have the title of Minister."

Time went on and time went on, without Dulles finding time to read the book. Hermann Pollack was the administrative officer for the Bureau of European Affairs and was responsible for personnel reasons. He suggested that I just give up having the personal rank of minister, and I said, "No thank you, I will not." It wasn't until '55, after two years in Paris and several years in Washington, handling top-secret NATO military matters, that I got word that he had approved it.

Q: You had to wait how long?

MARTIN: Two years. Two years in the job. Also, in '55, I was Wristonized and became a Foreign Service officer. At that time, I had been a reserve officer in Paris, and came into the Foreign Service as a Class I officer. So that legitimized things.

MARTIN: Now we get off to Paris. In late '67, the head of AID, Bill Gaud, called me to know if

I'd be interested in taking the job of Chairman of DAC (Development Assistance Committee) in Paris. [Gaud was Chairman of the PCC Board in the late '70s.] I had had no contact with DAC at all since helping to set it up, and I didn't know what it was doing, how it was functioning. But I made some calls, got some documents sent down to me, and decided that it was an active affair, and that I would be willing to be nominated. The nomination went in, and I was elected in January of '68. The elections were in January of each year by the governments of the 14 donor countries which were members of DAC. Having been elected Chairman of it in early January, I went to Paris on the 7th to check out the professional and personal situation for our move there, attending a DAC meeting to make a statement about my background and objectives, and then returning to Buenos Aires.

We went to Washington on January 20 for 4 weeks of personal and official business, including a visit to Ottawa to meet their aid staff dealing with DAC. We left on February 18 for Paris "by direct transfer from Buenos Aires" but actually going via Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo, Manila, Sydney, Canberra and Bangkok for get-acquainted visits with both donor and recipients of aid, and to New Delhi for the UNCTAD meeting, the major UN forum for developed-developing country confrontations. We got to Paris March 23.

I don't know that it's necessary to go into a lot of detail about DAC, but I would say that it was, in many respects, the most fun job I had, and a very unique one. [1968 was very much a "getting your feet wet" year. So long as the chairman was a U.S. citizen he received the salary and other benefits--house, staff, car and chauffeur, entertainment allowance--of a Chief of AID Mission in a Class 1 Embassy. The U.S. also paid for a secretary. The OECD paid for the staff of 15-20 professionals.]

Although I had a staff of 15-20 professionals provided by OECD I did not report to the Secretary-General of the OECD in any way. However, I always sought to have a good personal relationship with him and keep him informed of important developments. Sometimes the Secretary-General was unhappy about this independence.

Although I had been a founder of DAC, I had lost touch entirely with it for six years, the transition was facilitated by the fact that my predecessor was Willard Thorp with whom I had, as noted, worked closely when he was head of the E Bureau in the late '40s and early '50s. He gave me lots of good advice.

As a bureaucrat, there were several special advantages. One, my job was to be as critical as I could of the participating governments in order to improve their performance with major help from the professional staff, for which I had no administrative responsibilities. It had a staff director, whose office was next to mine and whose secretary shared an office with my secretary. He was responsible for all administrative matters. I had brought Louise Hughes, my secretary from the E Bureau to ARA to Buenos Aires, then to Paris, but shortly she had family problems and had to leave, but a very good secretary from the OAS succeeded her.

The OECD published each year a 200- 300-page report on the development effort by donors over the Chairman's name, a draft of which the governments could comment on. Although the staff drafted most of it I was responsible for every word in it. It was published in two or three

languages and parts translated into a couple more, widely distributed.

I was expected to travel and visit the battlefields which were in the developing world, and the capitals of the DAC members to persuade them to do a better job. The OECD paid my travel expenses, first class, everywhere I went. My wife had to go on my salary, often tourist class, in which she thought the people were more interesting than first class. (Laughs)

RALPH E. LINDSTROM
Economic Financial Officer
Paris (1954-1957)

Ralph E. Lindstrom was born in Minnesota in 1925. Following high school, he entered the U.S. Army, serving in the Office of Naval Intelligence. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Harvard University in 1950 and entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Kabul, Hong Kong, Oberammergau, Moscow, Nairobi, and Dhahran. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 28, 1994.

Q: When you left Kabul where did you go? You left in 1954.

LINDSTROM: Then I went to Paris, which was my first choice, and I guess they felt I should be rewarded after that hardship post, and really got a very nice assignment as an economic financial officer in the office of the Treasury attaché. The Treasury rep, Don McGrew, who was famous for his skills in that area, and for being a good training officer. So I worked for him for three years, a very interesting assignment, and my main contacts were in the Ministry of Finance. These were the post-Marshall Plan days, so the French were still somewhat beholden to us and very willing to give out confidential information on the state of their balance of payments, etc., which is one of our higher priorities. At that point, I had never really studied economics to speak of. I had taken one course at Harvard. It was a rather badly taught course in those days and I barely passed the thing, and had no further interest in it. But I learned a lot about the balance of payments from this reporting, and from Don McGrew. So it turned out to be a rather rewarding assignment. I got good ratings on that. And one of the other persons I worked for, and more directly, was Dean Hinton. Both Dean and I were the two FSOs who worked for McGrew and he was quite an able person obviously in his own right, and I got along well with him. He only recently retired, I believe. There were other people around, Harry Bell, who was very good in the economic field too. And Jack Tuthill came in as economic counselor and took a liking to me. We had just had the Wristonization program and we had to take on three very senior people in various parts of the economic section. Jack was getting very annoyed and I didn't like being used as sort of his private spy or anything like that, but sometimes people do that. He said, "You know, I can't understand, what is so-and-so doing, and so-and-so doing? I don't see any written work, or anything like that, why don't you nose around and find out." So I did talk to these people, and they said, "Well, we're still busy unpacking, and getting my wife settled and that kind of thing." So it was quite apparent they weren't doing much of anything that was of any value. He managed to get one of them transferred down to a consulate, I guess it was either Nice

or Cannes. I can't remember which one. I guess it was in Nice, and he turned out to be a disaster there. He and his wife got into all sorts of sexual affairs and that kind of thing, and were an embarrassment to the United States. By and large we had a pretty good embassy and Amory Houghton came in as ambassador. He was a political appointee but quite sympathetic, and interested in what we were doing in the economic-financial side, as well as in the political side. In the political side, of course, we were already beginning to have troubles with the French. de Gaulle was in the background and some of our officers were able to talk to him, or his people, from time to time. The NATO relationship was getting somewhat strained, but that hadn't broken apart yet while we were there.

Q: What was your impression of the French bureaucracy in the financial field?

LINDSTROM: First rate. They're the best in the whole world.

Q: Yes, that's the reputation.

LINDSTROM: Again I learned something by dealing with people like Ash Stuart(?), who later rose to the top in the World Bank. That's one of their elite services. They really are marvelous.

Q: How did they treat you as an American, although they might be beholden. I mean you're neophyte to this field and here you are up against world class...

LINDSTROM: They treated me very well. I always had to speak French. My French was by then fairly good, but I know these people spoke English better than I spoke French. But it was always in French which was good practice for me, and enabled me to keep my self respect in dealing with them. That was a very positive experience.

Q: What was the embassy like?

LINDSTROM: It was a huge embassy, and I guess still is, but generally a very supportive and friendly embassy. We had many friends there. Our first couple of years there we were not eligible for embassy housing so we lived out on the open market up in Montmartre, which was very nice and we enjoyed it. Later for financial reasons primarily, we moved to embassy housing on the other side of Paris, because the housing allowance wouldn't really cover too much when you're living outside. McGrew, the Treasury man as I said before, was really top notch, and to his credit they always allowed me as a third secretary to maintain these high level contacts with the French financial officials. They thought my reporting on this was very good, so that was a morale builder too. So often more senior officials try to do it all themselves.

Q: So you didn't feel, as sometimes one does, lost in the embassy?

LINDSTROM: No, I don't think I did at all looking back on it now.

Q: There's this traditional thing about saying the French are very unfriendly. Did you find that speaking French?

LINDSTROM: No, I never did, and never have. I never found this to be a problem. But the French do like to use their own language certainly in the diplomatic level, and I don't see anything wrong with that. We tend to use English on the diplomatic level in our country.

ROBERT H. MILLER
U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1954-1957)

Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam)
Paris (1968-1971)

Ambassador Robert H. Miller was born in Port Angeles, Washington in 1927. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in France and Vietnam, and ambassadorships to Malaysia and the Ivory Coast. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: *You then moved over to Paris still in NATO affairs.*

MILLER: That's right. I went on a Foreign Service Reserve appointment to the US Delegation to NATO, which in those days was still in Paris, and was low man on the totem pole -- 3rd Secretary -- in the political section there.

Q: *This was from 1954 to 1957.*

MILLER: Yes. And it was while I was there in that Delegation that I was "Wristonized", the next career uncertainty I -- and many colleagues -- faced.

Q: *Wristonized being the program...*

MILLER: Henry Wriston, a former president of Brown University, had been asked by President Eisenhower to study the State Department -- the first of a number of such studies after the war -- to ensure that its organization and personnel systems were adequate to the immense challenges of the post-war world and the unprecedented position of leadership in which the United States found itself. Among other things, the Wriston Committee found that Foreign Service officers' long service abroad caused them to lose touch with the country they represented, while the civil servants in the Department were making policy analyses and recommendations without having any contact with foreign governments and societies. Wriston thus found that both services were working in their respective vacuums. He therefore recommended their amalgamation into one Foreign Service in which officers would be required to serve both at home and abroad.

As you might imagine, the recommendation, which was accepted by the Administration, caused great uncertainty and dislocation for both the Foreign Service and the Civil Service -- in my own case, the third time in the first five years of my career. Foreign Service officers, who regarded themselves as members of an elite service selected by a rigorous examination process, resented

opening the floodgates to the "hoi polloi" of the Civil Service. Many civil servants, who by personal choice or family situation preferred working in Washington, faced the major disruption of overseas service if they wanted to continue their careers with the State Department.

Q: What were the issues facing NATO at the time you were there?

MILLER: Well, two big issues were hot in NATO while I was in Paris. One was how West Germany was going to be integrated. When I arrived in Paris in the summer of 1954, the French National Assembly had just turned down the European Defense Community concept. That was the point at which John Foster Dulles threatened an agonizing reappraisal of all of our policy. But very quickly the idea was developed, and I don't recall whether it was a French idea, German or British idea or our own, but it was one that we accepted very quickly, which was to bring West Germany actually into NATO as a full member under certain safeguards: that it would not have nuclear weapons, it would not have the so-called ABC weapons -- atomic, biological or chemical weapons, and that it would have a force ceiling of twelve divisions or something like that. But that was the one big issue -- how to get West Germany integrated into the NATO structure. After the fall of the EDC idea everybody rapidly coalesced around the idea of actually bringing Germany in as a member of NATO.

The other big issue, and that was the issue I was working on, was the NATO annual review of defense programs. Every NATO member was questioned by its peers on why it couldn't do more in terms of contributing forces to the NATO military structure -- the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

It was the buildup of NATO forces and the integration of Germany into NATO that were the two big issues of NATO at the time.

Q: Again from your point of view, were there any countries that seemed to be quite delinquent or very difficult to deal with from the American delegation point of view?

MILLER: France was always difficult to deal with. It was winding down its war in Indochina and getting deeply involved in the Algerian conflict. So it had a lot of problems which created issues within NATO, both with respect to its force contribution and kind of strings it was insisting on with respect to force contributions. For example, it was demanding that we provide it military and economic assistance in Indochina as a price for its cooperation and force buildup in NATO. It also was very prickly on the subject of the use of French territory by foreign (US) forces. NATO Headquarters, both military and civilian, were on French territory at the time. But also the logistics lines of communications and oil pipelines were being built across French territory. France was insisting on much more unilateral control over those multilateral structures than most of the rest of us felt they should have in a multilateral alliance. So, I think France was probably the most difficult.

ELIZABETH A. BURTON
Coordinating Committee (COCOM)

Paris (1954-1958)

Elizabeth Burton grew up in Washington, DC. After graduating from Sarah Lawrence College in 1941, she worked for the Board of Economic Warfare until the end of World War II. She then worked as a statistician for the Marshall Plan in France. Throughout her career she also worked for AID, NATO and OPIC. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

BURTON: I think around '54, yes. If they needed a job done, they would look around in Paris. It was less expensive, I guess, to get somebody in Paris, if they could find them, than it was to recruit from the United States. Then I had an offer of a very good job over in the Coordinating Committee, which was a secret committee at that point. It was located in an old hotel off the Faubourg Saint-Honoré, with a very small staff. It was a committee of the war allies to keep strategic materials from getting to the Sino-Soviet bloc. We set up a system of licenses and checkpoints and got the other governments to cooperate with us. So that if we had a notice of a shipment coming in that might have been transshipped in Rotterdam or Godinya, we'd notify the Dutch government and warn them about it, and maybe they'd catch it, and maybe they wouldn't. We acted as the regional center to disseminate this information to the embassies, and they, in turn, would notify the cooperating governments to stop these shipments if they could. They would go down and check the ships and check their manifests, and sometimes they stopped them, and sometimes they'd already gone.

Q: When you're talking about stopping shipments, what are we talking about?

BURTON: Ball bearings, for instance, or copper rod, at that point, and theodolites were another one. I had a couple of CIA people working for me that were quite remarkable. One of them could read Russian upside down about nine feet away. He had perfect eyesight. I'd say, "There's a report of some ball bearings coming in to Rotterdam headed for diversion. Why don't you go out and see what you can find?" And he'd come back the next day and say, "They're gone; they're already off."

Q: These were efforts by the Soviet Union to get these things.

BURTON: Yes, they wanted the things they were missing. There were people, just like the drug trade, that were in diversion activities. We worked very closely with the drug people, actually, because usually people that are in one underhanded business are in the other, too.

Q: Was there much in the way of enforcement, if they would catch them?

BURTON: Yes, yes, a lot, but it was done by the local governments. For instance, I can remember my boss, Colonel Brown, going to Switzerland and intercepting a railroad shipment of uranium sulfate, the stuff you make bombs out of. He came back with a little vial of this "curry powder," and he said, "Betty, you're going back to Washington for Christmas. Will you take this with you and turn it over to X, Y, and Z." I said, "Sure," and I popped it into my pocketbook. I didn't think anything about it, and came home and turned it over to the people. Apparently, when they got it, the Geiger counter went through the ceiling. They never caught me at all coming into

the United States through Customs. They caught someone else with some radium on their watch, but they didn't catch me.

Q: Were there any particular areas where the system was particularly good at cutting out things, and other ones where you felt that there was considerable leakage?

BURTON: That's hard to remember. The leakage was through Rotterdam and Godinya, mainly, the shipments there. And then there were leakages in Switzerland, shipments that were headed for Austria. I don't know whether it was leakage, I wouldn't say that. I'd just say that they would get through Switzerland to Austria. And if they got into the Soviet bloc in Austria, they were gone, too. We had to catch it before they got there. So we had to have this advice ahead of time. It was a very elaborate check system of intelligence coming in.

Q: What was it called, the apparatus? Was it COCOM?

BURTON: Yes. It was short for Coordinating Committee. That's all it was called. And then there was the section that dealt with the committee itself, who sat in the sessions and decided, for instance, what would be banned from going and what would be on the forbidden lists. And then they would turn it over to us in the enforcement operation to see that it didn't get diverted.

Q: What was the secrecy about this?

BURTON: This was right after the war, after all, and I think they just didn't want the Soviets to know that they were getting together and keeping them from getting this stuff (not officially, anyway), and that they were cooperating so successfully, particularly with countries like Sweden and Austria that had supplied the Soviets with ball bearings. After all those years, suddenly they were not cooperating. Later on, we found that they ruined their markets and caused the Soviet Bloc to become self-sufficient, so this wasn't a very good idea.

Q: How did you get your intelligence? Where was it coming from?

BURTON: It's hard for me to remember. I just remember we used to get cables in. I would dare say it was CIA that was informing us. Also, the drug people, who were mainly operating out of Italy. We worked together; they would give us information, and we'd give them ours. There were, for instance, big operations in Vaduz, Liechtenstein, and places like that. There were groups of people that we knew were doing this, so that if they applied for an export license, let's say, out of New York, to ship copper, it would probably go automatically to CIA. The CIA would check up, and if these people were the people from Vaduz, they'd probably let us know, and say it's on its way, better watch out. I think that's probably how it worked, because we worked very closely with CIA.

Q: What was the feeling about Sweden? This was a major producer of things, and it was neutral.

BURTON: I can't remember any particular feeling about it. I do know that we ruined their ball-bearing export market to the Soviets, which was unfortunate for them.

Q: You were doing this until about when?

BURTON: Until 1958, I think. Then I decided I should come home. I'd missed too many boats, and I decided I needed to come home.

Q: In 1956, did the Hungarian Revolution intrude at all?

BURTON: Not in the slightest. The Suez situation certainly intruded on us personally, because everybody was scared to death. The only other big scare was the blockade of Berlin. General Rea O'Hare, who was the U.S. military attaché in Paris, was a close personal friend, and he was giving me instructions what to do and where to go to get out right away.

Q: The Hungarian Revolution and Suez were both around October.

BURTON: Suez made a lot of difference.

Q: What was the feeling, that Suez might be the beginning of something?

BURTON: Yes, Suez was a big business. Everyone was scared of the Suez situation. It was really scary. There was a threat of oil being cut off and all that, for France, England, everywhere.

Q: Were you noticing, as time was moving on during the '50s, a less-than-cordial reception of our efforts by the French?

BURTON: Life became more difficult and more expensive during the 10 years I was there. I suddenly realized what I was paying for lunch every day. It wasn't a question of getting a little snack somewhere. It was \$10 to go out and have a little of this and that and the other thing. And the parking became unspeakable. You had to have special arrangements for parking. Before that, you could park anywhere. The availability of everything became easier. Living there was very cheap. I had wonderful, wonderful apartments to live in, and I paid \$60 a month. And I had maid service for nothing that pleated my nightgowns and one thing and another. We lived high on the hog for nothing, nothing. I was living on a very small salary, and I didn't get any help from home. I was living very well, indeed.

Of some interest, the ready-to-wear (prêt-à-porter) was prohibitively expensive or did not fit Americans. Thus, everything that went on your back had to be made to order: garments, shoes, hats, lingerie. Imagine today fitting a nightgown! Stockings were available from the PX. My copiest made me a dress per season from the current collections. The Maisons de Couture (fashion houses) would lend you a dress overnight to wear to a party.

Q: You decided to go home when?

BURTON: About '58, I think it was. My parents came over, and I came home with them in the fall.

Q: In '58, what were you up to?

BURTON: Nothing. I didn't know what I was going to do. I just came back here with the idea of transferring over to something here in Washington, which is what I did.

Q: You mentioned that you'd been brought in to the Foreign Service under the Wriston program.

BURTON: Yes, that was by accident. I really didn't know what was happening to me. I was just living from day to day and enjoying myself, enjoying my work and my life. Paris in the '50s was an enchantment. It was just marvelous living there.

Q: Were you picking up any impressions, towards the end when you left, of De Gaulle?

BURTON: None. No. I wasn't much concerned. I never could understand French politics, to begin with. Just the surface repercussions. He was concerned with the glory of France and keeping it there. One can't blame him. He was a tremendous unifying element.

LUCIUS D. BATTLE
Deputy Executive Director, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1955-1956)

Ambassador Lucius D. Battle was born in Georgia in 1909. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Florida in 1939 and then served in the Navy until the end of World War II. Ambassador Battle's Foreign Service career included positions in Denmark, France, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Egypt. This interview was conducted by Dayton Mak in 1990.

BATTLE: Then I went to Paris for a year as part of the NATO staff. We had a lovely apartment overlooking the Eiffel Tower. But I had the same problem in NATO as I had in Denmark. I was the Deputy Executive Director, but I didn't have enough to do. I had known Lord Ismay slightly; he wanted a senior American in NATO. Bob Barnes was moving on; he had been the senior American on his staff. I had been requested twice for some jobs in the Department, but personnel had insisted in each occasions that it be approved by Dulles because I had been so close to Acheson. That infuriated me when I heard about these events. I never felt that I had any partisan political connections. I was a Democrat, but that never had anything to do with my appointments. I worked for Acheson as a Civil Servant and I considered myself as a career appointee.

After a while in Paris, I got a letter from Carl Humelsine, who by then had become the President of the Williamsburg Foundation saying that he was going to London for an award ceremony for Churchill -- the Williamsburg Award. So I went to London and told them that I didn't really have a job and that I wouldn't stay in Paris just to be in Paris. Just before this event, Dean and Alice Acheson had come to Paris and stayed with us in our apartment for five days. We had a marvelous time. We gave a cocktail party in their honor to which Lord Ismay and others came. I had told Acheson that I was not occupied. So Dean asked Lord Ismay how I was getting along. Lord Ismay replied that I was absolutely indispensable. He was impressed by the fact that I was

in the office before he came in and was there when he left at night. He thought that I worked too hard. So Acheson came back to me and said: "I don't understand what you are complaining about". So I said: "Dean, in the first place, Lord Ismay comes to work at 10:30 in the morning, then goes out to lunch a one, then has a little snooze, returns to the office about 4:30 and then stays another half an hour. So I am there before him and don't leave until after he does. That is why Lord Ismay thinks I work so hard, but I don't really!".

That really became a problem. So I left the Service and went to work for the Williamsburg Foundation for four and half years. It was a big change, but a very pleasant one. But I was too young to be doing that. I was only in my mid-thirties at that point. I had a few chances to leave and do other things, but I enjoyed Williamsburg. I became very fond of the Rockefellers -- Winthrop, for example. I used to go to stay at his estate in Little Rock. I was not totally unhappy, but I still thought I was not at the center of action. Nothing much was happening in my life and I didn't like that. I was in Williamsburg until the Kennedy era started.

I forgot exactly what started the next career move. I returned to the Department as Executive Secretary in 1961 and promised to stay there for at least a year. I was pledged to get Dean Rusk going and then I planned to move to something else. I re-Wristonized back into the Foreign Service. I had decided that I was going to stay in the Service. So George Ball asked me what job I would be interested in. I told him I would like to be the Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs which was then being vacated. That was the only job which I requested in all my years. Ball said I could have Morocco as ambassador, but I didn't want to leave Washington at that time. He asked whether I would be interested in the Deputy Administrator job in AID or the Deputy Under Secretary for Management job in State (that is now the Under Secretary for Management position). Ball told me that I could have any of the ones he mentioned. I told him that I would prefer Cultural Affairs. He thought I was a little wacky. It was more than just culture; Jack Kennedy was the President and it looked very exciting. So I went to CU and stayed there for two years.

ALAN FISHER
Motion Picture Officer, USIS
Paris (1955-1957)

Alan Fisher was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1913. He served as a photographer for Nelson Rockefeller's Inter-American Affairs program and as a war correspondent in Italy and Brazil. While most of Mr. Fisher's career was spent in Brazil, he also served in France and Vietnam. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.

Q: Was Bill Clark by that time head of the European operation?

FISHER: Yes.

Q: So he transferred you to Paris when he became head of the European operation.

FISHER: Yes, with Bill Cody. I never did collect the ten bucks. (Laughs) But I was all set to go. We were all going by ship when I got a call. It was a direct transfer. I got a call from Turner Shelton, saying he wanted to see me in Washington first, so I had to fly up. Then I spent a couple of days in Washington, then flew over and met Florence and Stephanie when they arrived by boat train from Nice.

I had a problem in Paris, in that Bill O'Brien -- do you remember Bill O'Brien? Bill O'Brien was a wonderful Boston Irishman who was Jack Conolly's assistant in New York. Jack Conolly was a wonderful, wonderful person. I worked for Jack in New York during the time that we had a RIF. I left that out, I guess, didn't I?

Q: Let's fix the date on which you transferred to Paris.

FISHER: I transferred to Paris in June of 1955.

Q: Just as the other side of this tape ended, you made a couple of remarks that I think were probably cut off. Would you repeat them now so that we can pick up the sequence?

FISHER: Turner wanted me to go to Paris as motion picture officer because he had problems there. It seems that Bill O'Brien had been motion picture officer there, and Bill was a wonderful, burly type. He had worked with Jack Conolly, who had been head of -- I guess it was Pathe Newsreel in Paris, when talkies first came in. Jack was a wonderful, wonderful person. Bill O'Brien had been one of his contact men. A newsreel contact man was personality plus, always, they all were. Bill O'Brien had been motion picture officer, and they had a pretty sophisticated staff in Paris that really were very snobbish. Bill tried to cut through it and they cut him down. So Bill left and I arrived.

Turner said to me, "When you get to Paris, you look over that situation and you do whatever you think you have to do. Talk to Bill Cody about it, he knows all about it." So I talked with Bill Cody, who was PAO then.

Q: Was this the American staff?

FISHER: The American staff was cutting him [Bill O'Brien] down. They could be very snobbish. They were all Francophiles, and they all spoke French well. If someone came along who didn't speak it well, they really had it in for him. All their staff meetings were conducted in French.

Q: This was the part of the thing that enraged Tom Sorensen when he was taking off after the European contingent.

FISHER: Yes. Hal Kaplan was there. He was information officer. Keith Bowman was deputy. Then John Mowinckel -- I can't remember whether it was Keith Bowman or John Mowinckel followed, but at any rate, I talked with Bill Cody, and he said, "There's a mess here." I'll just repeat, in effect, "You do whatever you think you have to do, that's all."

I found the situation whereby they had a contract with a French film distributor who was paid \$40,000 a year to distribute USIS 16-millimeter films in French, and he distributed them very much the same as we distributed them in Latin America, only he charged for them. So he was getting money from us, and he was charging admission from the French farmers and rural people, where they were showing the films, something like 50 cents admission to these things. It went against everything that I had ever learned about how to distribute our informational films. I couldn't understand why we were paying him \$40,000 a year for a contract. The reports that came in were very inflated, I could see that by looking at them. Finally, after six months or so, I just said, "I'm going to cancel your contract." The guy was devastated. I said, "I don't see why we should pay you." Well, he agreed with me and still kept using the films, and we just saved 40,000 bucks a year. But that's the way they operated, because they still had the old ECA mentality, where they paid for everything. It was a very interesting situation.

This was a Frenchman who happened to be cutting off the rind of his Camembert cheese at the time I told him of this decision, and he was so agitated, he ate the rest of it with the rind and all. (Laughs)

In Paris, it was pretty much of a set operation, distribution. I did meet a couple of film producers there. One, a member of my staff, was Philippe de Fels, who was my chief local. He brought in a friend of his one day and he said, "Monsieur Fisher, I would like you to meet my friend Jean Claude Bourdier."

So I said, "Oh, very nice to meet you, Jean Claude."

And he said, "Monsieur Fisher, you will have to excuse me because I do not speak English very well."

So my assistant then said, "No, Jean Claude does not speak English very well."

So Jean Claude said, "I do not speak English very well." (Laughs) I'll never forget that one! He stood corrected, wrongly.

Then I met an American film producer by the name of Tom Rowe, Thomas L. Rowe, who proposed that we do a film on the American Ballet which was coming to Paris. I made a proposal which Turner Shelton bought, and Tom and Florence and I went to Berlin to see the American Ballet Theater there and set up the arrangements for Paris, came back, and when they came to Paris, Tom was all set. We had a contract with them, and did a very nice film on the American Ballet Theater's Western Symphony.

Mrs. Fisher: The music was by Hershey Kaye.

FISHER: Hershey Kaye. A very, very good film which I'm sure is still in the library. We did another film in Paris on Kid Orry, a wonderful old-time trombone player in the early days. It was a very sensitive film that Tom did, and that then became a good film within the Agency. We had an awful lot of films in the Agency that were pretty dull.

Q: Yes, we did.

FISHER: And these two films really were entertainment films. Kid Orry was a black that went way back to, I guess, Kid Oliver and the old New Orleans days. A very interesting film.

Q: After you canceled the contract with this Frenchman who was distributing your films, did you then operate your own mobile units, or how did you get your stuff out into the countryside?

FISHER: He operated mobile units. He still continued. He took our films free.

Q: I see.

FISHER: He did it without pay.

Q: Without being paid, and just got his money by charging the people who saw the pictures.

FISHER: Sure. It was a very interesting situation. We had been paying and hadn't needed that.

After I'd been there about a year or so, 1956, then in '57, I guess it was, Bill Cody asked me whether I would take over the supervision of the print shop and the photography operation. We were doing a lot of work in both. We had a big print shop. I had had a little experience in it because Florence's father, my father-in-law, had an offset printing plant in Los Angeles, and we used to go back there on leave. It had always interested me. I had just a smattering of experience, and Bill asked me if I would take it over. I said, "Yeah, but I'll have to learn a lot about it." That was in addition to my regular duties.

So just about that time, Turner sent a telegram saying I was needed in Saigon because Charlie Mertz was leaving Saigon and they needed someone to come in and work that end of it.

JAMES F. LEONARD
Consular Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1955-1957)

James F. Leonard was born in Pennsylvania in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and served in the U.S. Army from 1942-1946. Mr. Leonard entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in China (Taiwan), France, Russia, and Syria. This interview was conducted by Warren Unna on March 10, 1993.

Q: Now this is the period that US troops were sent to stay in Europe when you were in NATO in Paris then?

LEONARD: You know, I think they must already have been there, because by '55 when I got to Paris because I don't recall any debate over that. I'm pretty sure. When I arrived in NATO they

had just had their fifth anniversary, but I don't think US troops, in fact, ever completely left Europe.

Q: *I see.*

LEONARD: I think they remained there in Germany and they simply changed roles from being occupation forces to being NATO forces as Germany became independent.

Q: *Now, you mentioned the Germans, and I once was told that the one person John Foster Dulles feared was Franz Joseph Strauss. He really distrusted him. Did he come into the picture when you were in Paris in NATO then?*

LEONARD: Not at all. I came to have a very similar feeling about him much later when I was doing arms control or even actually even before that when I was working on related matters in the State Department. But by that time we were into the '60s. In this period in the '50s, I don't think I understood anything of German politics. It consisted of Mr. Adenauer, and that was that. I doubt if I could have identified Franz Joseph Strauss for anybody.

Q: *He became Defense Minister eventually, didn't he?*

LEONARD: He did. But my focus was really very much on the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree on Eastern Europe. We had the Hungarian revolt in '56, while I was in NATO. We had the double crisis of Hungary and Suez. You know meetings around the clock and all that sort of thing, but of course no action of any kind.

Q: *Was there within the US contingent dismay with Eden and dismay with France at this time, and feeling that ...?*

LEONARD: One of my most vivid memories is the dismay with Mr. Eden on the part of the senior Brit in the Secretariat. He was a British Naval Captain, Lord Coleridge who was given to extremely strong language, British Naval language. He talked about the British government. He was after all an international civil servant. He was not a British representative there, but he, like all Brits in NATO thought that the Suez thing was just the most awful disaster and that the conniving with the French and the Israelis over that was utterly unprincipled and sick even. So we realized it was a controversial question. But NATO was not the focus of that, and in fact NATO was not a focus on Hungary either. There was every effort made to simply keep everything calm and business as usual and not show any signs of panic or any intention to make a move of any kind.

Q: *So the annoyance on the part of the US vis a vis France and Israel and Britain didn't disturb NATO. That alliance stuck?*

LEONARD: That stuck, yes. Our normal working relationships went right on, and I really don't know whether the ... I'm sure the British Ambassador kept a very straight face on all of this. You know I have no idea whether he would in talking with the American Ambassador acknowledge that this was a pretty dumb thing that they had done. But it was so evident that this whole action

had simply infuriated President Eisenhower that further comment was unnecessary. It was just a disastrous miscalculation on the part of the British and compounded of course by the fact that it gave the Russians cover for what they were doing in Hungary.

ALBERT STOFFEL
Economic Officer
Paris (1955-1957)

Albert Stoffel was born and raised in Rochester, New York. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Vietnam, Canada, Germany, and France. Mr. Stoffel was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1994.

Q: You've already mentioned that your next post was Paris where you were engaged in export control. Were you assigned to the embassy or to another one of our organizations there?

STOFFEL: To the embassy. The COCOM people, who were nearby, I forget the name of their building, they ran the United States membership in COCOM, the coordinating committee. The purpose of which was to prevent strategic goods from getting to the other side of the Iron Curtain.

My particular job was export controls in France. In other words, to make sure that American goods going to France were not diverted.

Q: Re-exported.

STOFFEL: What I decided to do, more than react to just what was called to my attention in that field. I arranged to get manifests for American shipping lines from the United States to France.

On one occasion I recognized some initials. There were two sets of initials on a case of automobile truck parts. I recognized one set of initials as belonging to an American owned company in Paris. I didn't know what the other initials were so I found out.

I called the American that I knew who had the parts business. He told me who the other initials were. And to make a long story short, we discovered that these truck parts were being diverted to communist China.

That's the kind of work I did there.

Q: Did the French resent your being there?

STOFFEL: No, I don't think so. I had very good relations with the Quai D'Orsay. There was a man by the name of Noel Maier, who was their representative on COCOM. We became good friends. Our relations -- I know of no difficulties arising.

Q: Presumably, you worked closely with our mission to COCOM.

STOFFEL: Oh yes, absolutely.

Another thing I did. In this case, I once took this embassy car up to this American company and took all their records back to the embassy to go through them. In the course of that, we discovered the extent to which this diversion was taking place.

MANUEL ABRAMS
USRO Director of Economic Affairs
Paris (1955-1958)

Manuel Abrams was born in Pennsylvania in 1919, and graduated from the City College of New York in 1939. His career has included postings in Frankfurt, Paris, The Hague, Rome, Brussels and Geneva. Mr. Abrams was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: I have you going to going to Paris, the USRO Director of the Economic Division, from 1955-58.

ABRAMS: That's right.

Q: What was USRO and what was it doing and what were you doing?

ABRAMS: USRO had originally been OSR. It was the regional organization based in Paris, for the Marshall Plan. USRO was the mission to the OEEC, the Office of European Economic Cooperation, later transformed to the OECD. In the OEEC, we were an associate member, in the OECD, we are full members. My job was to review the economies of the member countries and to report on developments in the U.S. economy.

Q: Which at that time were

ABRAMS: All the Western European countries were members of the OEEC, as well as Greece and Turkey. At the present time in the OECD, there are countries from outside Europe, but the only countries from outside Europe at the OEEC, were two associate members, Canada and the US.

Q: Who was the head of this program in Paris?

ABRAMS: At that time we had the tradition of political appointees, generally very short term. There were two directors in the period 1955-8: Fred Payne, an investment banker from New York, and John McCarthy, a businessman.

Q: When you were there did these political appointees play much of a role or were they just sort of birds of passing by?

ABRAMS: No, not a great role. When I first arrived there, the deputy, who was also non-career but a professional economist, played a big role.

Q: Who was that?

ABRAMS: Warren Shearer, professor from Indiana.

Q: How did you see Europe at this time?

ABRAMS: I was there from 1955 to 1958. It was a period when Europe was progressing very well economically except for a brief but sharp setback, the Suez Crisis. Its political significance, which I think has not been fully appreciated, was much greater.

Q: What were the repercussions on Europe?

ABRAMS: Interestingly, it split Britain down the middle, whereas it united France. There was no significant opposition in France to the French government's role in Suez. The US, after its initial highly negative reaction, played the role of faithful ally and agreed to supply the petroleum deficiencies. We made a commitment and we carried it through.

The important effect was on the French, particularly Gallist, thinking about NATO. Our public disapproved of our allies' (Britain and France) action was, in my view, a major factor in de Gaulle's later decision to withdraw from NATO's military army and to expel NATO institutions from France.

Q: It was the first of the petroleum shocks.

ABRAMS: This was a small petroleum shock, because it came at a time when we had a surplus of petroleum.

Q: Were you part of an international group?

ABRAMS: Yes, the Economic Committee where I was the US representative. This is where we discussed the economic effects of Suez. Every European representative made the most dire predictions. Initially we were without instructions but we tried to convince them that they were exaggerating the problem. Then, as I indicated earlier, we came to their assistance.

Q: Did you see different splits in the committee, political ones?

ABRAMS: No. The Europeans all sounded pretty much alike on that. It is not surprising that after the trauma of 1939-45, pessimism remained.

There was a study done at the time by a British economist named Mac Dougall which predicted that there would be a dollar shortage to the end of time. It happened to appear at the time of the Suez crisis and was widely accepted in Europe for a while. We still had a balance of payments surplus when the study appeared, but, as is well known, have run a deficit since 1957 or '58.

Q: Economists are like psychologists, you just pick the kind of answer you want and you can get it. Looking at it, your situation, you were paid by State or AID, how did you view Treasury?

ABRAMS: The Treasury had of course different interests from the Department of State or AID. The Treasury was more concerned with the US economy than the State Department was. The Treasury role I became more conscious of when I came back to Washington.

As far as the instructions went, I was not all that aware of what the problems with Treasury were.

Q: So Treasury wasn't something to get around?

ABRAMS: Not at the time, though it was true later on. Certainly.

Q: How was the backing from Washington?

ABRAMS: It was rather uncomfortable during the brief period when there were no instructions immediately after Suez. On the whole, Washington did very well in providing us with guidance.

Q: Did you feel any push for American trade then or did we have different goals?

ABRAMS: We didn't share the extreme views of the British economist I mentioned. We were not aware that we were about to be in deficit on our balance of payments. We even wanted to restrain our exports in order to allow the European countries to develop theirs. To some extent, we also overstated the dollar problem, and we were not actively pushing our commercial interests. Except in specific items where there was great political pressure from Washington. For example, we always pushed agriculture and we were always competitive in agriculture. But we agreed to permit the European countries to discriminate against US exports, something that would seem unthinkable now. We did that in the interest of the development of the European economies. Discriminate in the sense that they could have lower tariff barriers for trade within Europe but not for exports from outside Europe, including the US. Again there was the usual lag in thinking. It finally became clear in the latter part of the fifties that there was no longer justification for this discrimination, nor a justification for the inconvertibility of the European currencies. It required as much effort to convince the Europeans to make their currencies convertible as to convince them that they no longer needed US aid.

Q: How was the Soviet menace used in economic terms?

ABRAMS: In terms of the Europeans having to provide the resources for their own military buildup as part of NATO.

Q: What was the overriding principle. Did you see the development of the European economy as the best thing or was it the European economy in order to keep the Soviets out?

ABRAMS: The policy underpinning what we were doing was the belief that European unity, which began with the Coal-Steel Community would provide the basis for the resistance to possible Soviet encroachment. At the same time, this was very important in the thinking at the time in the early post war period, was that it would tie Germany to the West. There was still the memory of what had happened after the first world war, when the Germans made deals with the Soviets. So those two aspects, the defense of the West against the Soviets and the German question have played a big role in our support for European unity. While all this was going on, we had the start of European Coal-Steel Community and the negotiations which led in 1958 to the formation of the EEC.

Q: Anything else in the Paris period?

ABRAMS: No, the EEC was the last of the important economic events in the Paris period.

Q: As an economist, how did you feel about the EEC.

ABRAMS: I largely saw it as a good thing. Now I would be a little more qualified about it. This is where agencies like Treasury didn't fully agree. They were concerned about setting up an organization that would free trade among the member countries but maintain barriers against outside countries. They were concerned about the effect on the US. We in the State Department agreed that this was the case, but we considered the economic price was worth paying for the political and military advantages. I think we should have been a little more wary about the effect this would have on the US. Although I don't think it would have made any great difference as a matter of fact.

Q: Were the people in the mission pretty much agreed to it or were they doing it under instructions?

ABRAMS: Here too, the degree of enthusiasm depended on where you were located. This has always been true. In USRO there was somewhat less enthusiasm for the EEC than you would have found in some other organizations. We were in part influenced by the views of the countries who were not going to be members of the EEC.

At the start there was just six members and a number of the other European countries formed another organization, EFTA, for which we in USRO had more sympathy than the State Department in Washington did. But it was a small difference really.

L. DEAN BROWN
Internal Affairs
Paris (1955-1958)

Ambassador L. Dean Brown entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after serving in the Army during World War II. His career has included positions in the Belgian Congo, Canada, France, Morocco, Senegal and Jordan. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert on May 17, 1989.

Q: Then you moved on to a place, I guess, where I first laid eyes on you, and that was Paris, wasn't it?

BROWN: Yes.

Q: And there you were very active in the most chaotic political situation that I ever encountered.

BROWN: You know, a new government every week, and sometimes twice a week--the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the inability of the parties to govern; all the disadvantages that proportional representation gives to parliament, since anybody with five per cent of the vote gets people put in. All that disadvantage--a general corruption and malaise all through the Army. Don't forget, you are in the aftermath of their Vietnam, and in the beginning of their loss of North Africa. First in Tunisia and Morocco, and then the real sticky one of what to do about Algeria, which led to the end of the Fourth Republic. I left at the end of the Fourth Republic.

Q: And supervised it from Washington, more or less.

BROWN: Yes.

Q: Supervised the decay of empire. Do you want to say a little about your operations there (in Paris)? Because I think that was, to my knowledge, a very interesting job you did there.

BROWN: What I did was, I did the internal politics, minus the Communist Party, which we weren't allowed to associate with. It was handled by Walter Stoessel doing the liaison with other people, mostly the foreign office and the minister of interior.

No, I did the internal stuff, which meant that I went to the parliament just about every day, and talked to the deputies. But I guess the most interesting factor of it, when one thinks of how diplomatic history is made, with it was the role of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, a long-time British diplomat in guiding US policies. Our ambassador, Amory Haughton, after listening to Sir Gladwyn, decided that De Gaulle was not going to come back. The senior staff had been assured by various people that no, the Fourth Republic would go on and there wouldn't be anything even remotely like a coup or military takeover.

One of the problems was how, at the very end, to put De Gaulle in legally. That is, was how to get the assembly to vote for him. That was extremely difficult because all of the non-communist left was united against him, and the socialists were the key.

My boss was Bob Murphy (understanding in the Department). I got my instructions at home by telephone and often reported by phone; Matt Loomer (later Ambassador for Somalia) was the key figure on the French desk. I told the Socialists: "I have a message to you from Bob Murphy.

He wants to make sure that the Socialist Party at least splits in half in the vote on De Gaulle. Those who are adamant against him can vote against him, but everybody else really has to vote for." And they did.

Q: For De Gaulle.

BROWN: Yes. The French desk back in Washington knew all about what I was doing; it often passed on Mr. Murphy's orders. The embassy or at least part, did not.

I also did telegrams on what was going on; for instance, that the police had just had a national strike, and a prominent French political official had said had said; "This is the end of the Fourth Republic."

It was a very dramatic excerpt to witness a police raid at the National Assembly, and the assault of deputies in their offices. That's the least of it.

The military attaché, didn't believe anything that I said, or cabled. He sent a full colonel to sit in the office to watch me type, so that the attaché office could write a cable denying immediately what I was dispatching. The attaché kept asking me after; "Who are your sources in the French military?"

I said, "I'm not telling you my sources, any more than you could get the CIA to tell you their sources. That's one thing we don't do, because all you'd do is probably turn them in and get them arrested."

And another fine officer, Russ Fessenden, was doing our military liaison there. He told me what his French sources were saying; it was about the same.

Q: Considering the trouble that we later had with General De Gaulle, people today might wonder why we were so anxious to get him in. You've alluded to this.

BROWN: Well, we were trying to avoid violent confrontations in the streets. There was already a lot of violence in Paris; I was gassed many a time going out. We didn't want complete chaos from which the communists could profit.

Q: And there was nobody to do business with, or almost. I mean, you couldn't do business with anybody because they wouldn't be there tomorrow.

BROWN: They wouldn't be there, or they wouldn't have our policy. Their policies were idiotic; economic, political, and international; the country was starting to fall apart. I mean, everybody knew, who had ever read anything of De Gaulle, what he would do as president. He said it in book after book after book of what France has to be: an independent country with its own Army and its own power. So everybody would know that there would never be a European army or, really, that American officers would have control over French officers, which is what the French thought NATO was. So you had to expect that. But on the other hand, you needed order again. There is an old Arab proverb that says, "Twenty years of tyranny is better than a day of

disorder."

Q: That's a very interesting point. You've probably forgotten it, but I'll never forget I happened to be in Paris that first week in May '58, when De Gaulle was coming in. I was assigned to Washington at this time, but I was there temporarily, and I would see you come in to the Embassy from the Assembly every night, nervous as a cat and shaking, practically.

BROWN: I had a great couple of companions. My British opposite was Michael Palliser, who later became their permanent Under Secretary of State, the highest job in the British foreign office, and was knighted. My Israeli companion later took over the African department of the Israeli foreign office, headed the radio and is a professor now at Haifa University. I see him about every two years or so. We had some other ones, a good Dutchman. A small group.

We met regularly, about once a week, about six or seven of us, and this is where the prominent politicians of the Fourth Republic came for lunch. They were smart, and they wanted to deal with the people who were going to write political cables. They dealt with ambassadors, but here was a group whose good talks were held with no holds barred. We had Mendes France, Guy Mollet, and Mitterrand. We dined them all. It was a fascinating experience.

Q: Great! This is the kind of thing we're trying to get at in this oral history. You left Paris. Incidentally, who were some of the other people in the embassy? Bob McBride was there.

BROWN: Bob McBride was there most of the time I was there. Bob was the deputy political counselor who reported directly to Douglas Dillon, the ambassador. The political counselor was Bob Joyce, a nice man, but Bob was really in charge. The other officers there were Frank Meloy, later killed in Beirut. Frank was handling the Far East. Walter Stoessel was handling the Soviet affairs.

Q: Who was the minister?

BROWN: Well, several. Cecil Lyon came in later. Charlie Yost was there for a while. So these were all very good people.

Q: Yes. Then back to Washington after you got Mr. De Gaulle well installed.

BROWN: Yes. I was very briefly in RA, but only for about two or three weeks, and then transferred to Western Europe, to what was called French Iberian Affairs at that time.

Q: Interesting thing. There you were again still presiding over the liquidation of empire in all of Europe.

BROWN: Then, of course, Kennedy came in and we had the paratrooper, Jim Gavin, as ambassador. Jim had one idea that he was going to carry out, and that was that he was going to give the nuclear knowledge to the French, including submarine technology and the bomb. So this is what he aspired most of the time he was there. Of course, President Kennedy would have nothing to do with it. He liked Gavin, but he stopped it cold.

We did have a series of meetings with the French on nuclear submarines, in which our people couldn't say anything. But nothing came of that.

We did have, of course, De Gaulle's decision to get out of Algeria, which led to the coup of the generals, which almost succeeded, except that the conscripts in North Africa and Algeria refused to obey the orders of their officers; the result failed.

There's another little vignette of what goes on in the world, because where I was sitting in the State Department was two offices down from Bill Porter, who was in charge of North Africa. Bill was, of course, later ambassador to Algeria and later Saudi Arabia. Bill Porter was a great radio ham. He listened to short-wave radio, especially to the French military--Paris, Pau, and Algiers--we were ahead of the curve as a fast moving situation because of what Bill had heard.

Q: This was news broadcasts?

BROWN: No, no, no. These are the people chatting to each other on short-wave, one general calling the other, with mysterious words. "Are you ready to do this?" It was very clandestine. It was not the news, no. The news was all censored at that time.

Q: This was the State Department's NSA.

BROWN: Exactly. That's what it was. Instant NSA. Thank God for it.

Q: Absolutely. I worked with Bill. Of course, Bill was there when I was there. I remember I had to make a routine of coming in at 3:00 every Sunday afternoon to see if they had the cables going out, because if not, they would say they couldn't find me to clear them! [Laughter]

BROWN: Then, of course, you had the creation of the OSS, which led to a lot of killing in Paris.

Q: Creation of the OSS.

BROWN: It was a secret organization. Disaffected Army officers said that even if they had failed in the coup, they were going to carry terrorism into France. At that time, there was wide use of plastic explosives. Every police station had sand bags piled up about eight feet high around it. The police wore flak jackets and helmets; a lot were killed. De Gaulle's people organized a counter-terrorist organization which ran around and killed many OSS terrorists.

Q: This was almost Lebanon.

BROWN: Almost Lebanon. Yes. In the end, it broke the OSS. I met De Gaulle only a couple of times. I know who he was and what he is. I'd read his books. I was impressed by him. I mean, this was a man who had some idea of leadership, certainly a patriot, with a vision of where he wanted to see France go. He wanted it to be a modern country. He was the guy who said, "How can you run a country that has 400 kinds of cheese?" He was kind of right that way.

Q: *You put in nearly four years, didn't you, in WE?*

BROWN: Yes.

HERMAN J. COHEN
Consular Officer
Paris (1955-1958)

Political Counselor
Paris (1974-1977)

Ambassador Herman J. Cohen was born in New York City. After graduating from The City College of New York, he joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His career has included positions in France, Uganda, Zambia, Zaire, Senegal and Rhodesia. Ambassador Cohen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 15, 1996.

Q: *You were in Paris from when to when?*

COHEN: I arrived in November, '55, and stayed until about August '58.

Q: *What type of consular work were you doing?*

COHEN: I did visas for three years, but it was such a big visa section that I rotated around. I had the very important job for one year of dealing with refusable cases that could be very delicate. I also had one year of refugee relief.

Q: *Do you recall any cases that were particularly difficult on the refusing side?*

COHEN: We had two types of cases. In those days the French Communist Party was very big. Of course we were going through the post McCarthy anticommunism.

Q: *Oh yes, the McCarran-Walters Act.*

COHEN: McCarran-Walters. So for a lot of French people being a member of the Communist Party was perfectly legitimate and normal. They would come to us for a visa for tourist, business, immigration, and suddenly find themselves ineligible. We had to apply for waivers if we felt like it. These waivers were fairly routine, but we had a few tough cases. One was the famous French actor Yves Montand. Here I was a junior officer, pretty naive, wet behind the ears, and this case comes across my desk. I had better talk to somebody about this. He was not a covert member of the party; he was overt. It was public knowledge. So, I went to the political section. There was a gentleman there who was head of what we called communist affairs, Walter Stoessel, the famous Walter Stoessel. He was very nice, and he said, "No, we would be the laughingstock of the world if we refuse this guy a visa." He was one of the most prominent actors, singers, he was very

popular. We can't just be refusing visas to people like this. He impressed me because he said, "Okay, we'll take care of this. I want you to draft a message to Washington explaining why it would be very silly to refuse this visa." He put this responsibility on me right away, so I sent my very first despatch to Washington. Of course I showed it to him before it went out, and he thought it was good. So, it went out and we thought how could they refuse this. But a couple of weeks later, they said no, we don't want Yves Montand in the United States, and they turned him down. Then I had the very interesting experience of trying to explain this to him. He was married to an equally prominent film star Simone Signoret. She was also a communist. I didn't know what to do. I found out there was a lady in USIA who worked with film people. Her name was Cynthia Grenier. She said, "I'll tell you what. I know them personally. We will go over to their house and give them a full explanation." So, we went over. They were not angry or anything, they were just very concerned. Montand was very worried because he had a Hollywood contract to make a film with Marilyn Monroe. He said, "Look, I have got to get out of this problem. Can you explain how to do it?" So I explained defector status and all these things. Then a year later, he was able to get his visa. I had a few cases like that.

Q: That really tests the mettle. I don't think most young people would agree with the government, because the law wasn't really that popular or didn't make much sense in many practical cases.

COHEN: We also had the U.S. Army that was also still in France in those days before they got kicked out by DeGaulle. Of course, GIs were frequently getting married to local girls. A small percentage married women who ended up being ineligible for immigration because they had convictions for being prostitutes, that sort of thing. Those were the heart rendering cases.

Q: Yes, it was also difficult to ask the questions. Have you ever taken money for the act of love or something like that? It wasn't that easy. One had to steel oneself.

COHEN: I had one who had a conviction on her record for what they call violation of public decency. It was a felony. I said, "Now this can't be true; we can't stop this woman from going with her husband." So, I asked for the details. Apparently she was caught in the back seat of a car with a guy in a compromising position. The French convicted her on this. I wrote back to Washington and said, "Look, this is not a crime in the United States." They said, "I'm sorry but it goes on the basis of their law if it is a felony under their law." I guess they got her a private Congressional bill, and she was able to get into the US eventually.

Q: Well, particularly in those days, young officers learned everything about everything. More than you wanted to know.

COHEN: That is right. So, I found that job very interesting.

Q: During that time, did you get any feel about how the French, their attitude toward the United States in the perspective of developments within France at that time?

COHEN: This was 1955-1958, I found them kind of resentful of the United States for a couple of reasons. One is we hadn't suffered so much through the war, and they were still recovering. Secondly, it was the Marshall Plan days and we were really pushing them too much in telling

them what to do, taking charge of some of their economic ministries. They really resented this because they needed our money and yet they didn't like all the advice we were giving them. Also we had the Algerian problem.

Q: Yes, and Dien Bien Phu was in '54, and '55 was sort of near.

COHEN: I remember on the Algerian problem, we were sympathetic to the Algerian rebels because we were anti-colonial. The French didn't like that, so frequently we would have demonstrations around the embassy.

Q: It was a good entree into the Foreign Service. Did you have any feel because later you are going to end up having a lot of responsibility in Francophone Africa, did Africa cross your radar at all in your experiences or in talking to the French or something like that?

COHEN: Not in that particular time, it was strictly consular matters. I didn't get too much involved in foreign policy except for things like the Yves Montand case.

BERTHA POTTS
Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Lyon (1955-1959)

Bertha Potts was born in California in 1915. After receiving her degree from San Jose State College, she became a member of the WACS. Her career has included positions in Bangkok, Saigon, Lyon, Algiers, Vientiane, and Rabat. Ms. Potts was interviewed by Howell S. Teeple on February 19, 1999.

POTTS: I was assigned to Lyon in southeastern France.

Q: Ah, Lyon, the gourmet center of France.

POTTS: Yes, it was a gourmet center.

Q: That is a branch post?

POTTS: Yes, of Paris.

Q: There was a consulate there, I suppose?

POTTS: A consulate general. The consul general and his consul couldn't stand us. They didn't like the PAO and didn't like me.

Q: Who was the PAO, if I may ask?

POTTS: The PAO was Edward Murphy who was the most wonderful man and dear friend of

mine, who died a few years ago.

Q: What did you do in Lyon?

POTTS: I was simply an assistant to the PAO.

Q: A two man post, was it?

POTTS: Yes. For a while we did have a Foreign Service junior officer trainee. We also had for a very short time when I was first there a kind of cultural assistant, but she wasn't there very long. Nor was the trainee there very long.

It was getting along to the end of that tour, which was a bit more than two years, and I had to go up to Paris for some reason or other. When I got there the special assistant to Mr. Cody, who was the PAO at that time in Paris, told me I was going to lunch with him today and I should go buy myself a hat. Mr. Cody refused to take women to lunch who were not wearing hats.

Q: This was 1955-56?

POTTS: This is virtually 1959, we are almost at the end of my Lyon tour. Ladies wore a hat to lunch, especially when they went with Mr. Cody.

He said, "I have heard some good things about your work down there, Bert. Where would you like to go next?" I said, "Oh, if I had my druthers, Mr. Cody, I want to go to Algiers." He said he thought that could be set up. The next thing I knew I had orders to Algiers.

Q: Was Algiers then under our embassy in France?

POTTS: It was technically part of USIS Paris, but it was so isolated that we felt ourselves more a part of the consulate general.

Q: This was before Algiers was independent?

POTTS: Oh, yes.

PHILIP H. VALDES
Political Officer
Paris (1955-1959)

Philip H. Valdes entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included assignments in China, Korea, the Soviet Union, Germany, France, and Thailand. Mr. Valdes was interviewed by William Knight in 1994.

VALDES: Although I didn't know it at the time, I'd been selected for a job in [the Embassy in]

Paris.

Q: As a peripheral reporting officer?

VALDES: As part of the Political Section, dealing with the French Communist Party and contacts with the Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Ministry] on Eastern Europe, generally.

Q: You were not a "Russia watcher" in Paris, then? There were peripheral reporting assignments in other posts which were supposed to be focusing on Russian matters.

VALDES: Yes. This assignment partly involved [peripheral reporting on the Soviet Union] and partly involved following French Communist affairs.

Q: I guess that Norris Chipman would have been there [in the Embassy in Paris], wasn't he?

VALDES: He had been there.

Q: Perhaps he was already in [the Embassy in Rome]. Excuse me for interrupting.

VALDES: There had been two officers dealing with Eastern Europe and Soviet affairs generally. How they split up the work I don't know because the two positions had been merged into one by the time I got there. In any case, this assignment to Paris came through while I was still in Frankfurt. I left Frankfurt in July, 1955, to go to Paris.

I was in Paris for four years and then went back to the Department of State [June, 1959], where I was French Desk Officer for two years.

Q: After that assignment, unless you have something else...

VALDES: No. After that I went to [the Embassy in] Paris and, as I said, followed French Communist Party affairs. This was interesting, because it got me into French politics generally, covering elections and so forth.

Q: You obviously already spoke French, then.

VALDES: Yes. French was probably my best language. I also dealt with the French Foreign Ministry on Eastern European affairs. They had posts in Bulgaria and Albania, which we didn't have. The French were very helpful with us on those matters. We exchanged ideas on...

Q: Any particularly clamorous issues that you dealt with in that role?

VALDES: Well, yes, there was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. We were trying to keep in touch with the French on that issue. This was all rather tricky, because we were opposing the French on [the Anglo-French expedition to] Suez, [which happened at about the same time].

Q: Was De Gaulle in power at that time?

VALDES: I seem to pick good times to go to countries. De Gaulle came to power when I was in Paris, in May, 1958. That was a very exciting time.

Q: Also frustrating, as I recall, because he really wouldn't have much to do with the Americans.

VALDES: That attitude began to appear during the last year I was there. [For example, there were] his request for tripartite consultations and a reorganization of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] to give France a greater voice and the withdrawal from French participation in the NATO Mediterranean Fleet. That happened during the last year that I was there. It did make things very difficult. I noticed it, particularly later, when I was French desk officer, much sooner than we had two years earlier when the French National Assembly defeated EDC, the European Defense Community that the French themselves had proposed as a means of making West German rearmament palatable. (Dulles had predicted world catastrophe if the French didn't ratify EDC and felt that Mendes-France had betrayed us by not supporting it vigorously enough. As it turned out, the world didn't end, and the French came up with the more practical solution of proposing German rearmament with the entire German armed forces under NATO command).

After being French desk officer for two years [1959-1960] I moved to Soviet affairs and was really pretty much astounded at how much kinder people in the Department of State took to my new "clients," the Soviets, than they had to my old "clients," the French.

Q: The State Department considered the French a pain in the neck.

VALDES: That's right. They accepted what they considered bad behavior from the Soviets -- that was normal. It was all right.

Q: Do you remember when Matt Loomer got an award for handling the "difficult" French, and the French [Embassy] went to the Department and protested officially? [Laughter] I guess that was after your time. Maybe it was before.

VALDES: It was before. I replaced him.

Q: We got into hassles with the French over the Trieste negotiations because they had the Santa Margherita agreement with the Italians under which they would exchange information. So they were always trying to change the negotiating posture around, as the Italians wanted. We finally said [to the French]: "We understand that you have relations with Italy that make this role difficult for you. If you prefer, we'll continue on without you." Then they started to play ball. [Laughter]

When were you in Paris, Phil?

VALDES: 1955-1959.

Q: 1955-1959 -- that was the period which included the Suez Crisis [of 1956]. Any substantive or operational comments you would like to make about that period?

VALDES: It was a difficult period for French-U. S. relations, obviously, because we opposed the French and the British on it [their joint expedition to take the Suez Canal]. But the harmful effects didn't last very long, I must say. Once the Suez Crisis was over, we got back to business as usual, and when de Gaulle was pushing far more vigorously than the Fourth Republic had for an independent French nuclear force. While de Gaulle recognized that only the U.S. had the power to block any Soviet aggression, he was not convinced we would always have the willpower to do it. He didn't believe we would automatically risk nuclear destruction of American cities to save French ones. He also didn't believe U.S. policy decisions, or those of a European collective body, would necessarily be better for France than French decisions.

Q: So you were basically concerned with what you might call "diplomatic problems," focused more on external French issues than internal issues.

VALDES: Except for following French Communist Party developments.

Q: Anything else on that period?

VALDES: I can't think of anything.

Q: What came after that?

VALDES: I was on the French desk [in the Department of State]. That was sort of an extension of being in Paris, except, as I've said, I was surprised, when I got there [Washington, D. C.] to see the chilliness with which a lot of people [in the Department] regarded France -- mostly because of De Gaulle's attitudes and positions on things.

EDMUND MURPHY
Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Lyon (1956-1958)

Edmund Murphy began his government career in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in 1942. He held a number of senior positions in the Foreign Service, including Policy Officer for Latin America on two occasions, Cultural Attaché in Argentina, and Director of USIS Operations in Haiti, Colombia, and Finland, after which he was Senior Inspector for the Agency. Mr. Murphy was interviewed by Allen Hansen in 1990.

Q: This was still fairly early in your career. In January of '56 you went overseas again, this time to be the Branch Public Affairs Officer in Lyon, France?

MURPHY: That's right.

Q: What can you tell us about that assignment? That must have been a very nice place to be.

MURPHY: Well, Lyon itself is a rather cold and foggy place. It doesn't have a very attractive climate, but it was an interesting place to be. I still have contacts with people there. It was the second largest city in France, and it had in early times been famous as a center of silk cloth manufacture. It was the silk center of Europe, but that industry had declined a lot in favor of more heavy industry and it had become a rather smog-ridden town as the industry blackened the buildings and took some of the sheen off of the beauty of the place.

Q: It was really an industrial city.

MURPHY: Yes, it was an industrial city, but it was a challenging assignment because we had such a large part of France to cover. We worked north to Dijon, east to Switzerland, south to St. Etienne and west to Clermont- Ferrand. I was on the road a great deal of the time when I was in Lyon because we developed and sponsored programs in most of the major cities of that whole area of France.

Q: What kind of programs did you have at that time?

MURPHY: Well, one of the programs that we ran in all these places where there was a university was an America days program once a year. So we organized a program of several days consisting of musical or other performing events and lectures and seminars and social events involving all the faculty and administration of the universities in Dijon and Grenoble, Clermont- Ferrand and Lyon.

Q: How much staff did you have for all this activity?

MURPHY: I had an American secretary part of the time and one American assistant. Then later USIA added a trainee. During my stay there I had two different American trainees who had not previously been on an assignment.

Q: So breaking those trainees in, and then covering that vast area really kept you going.

MURPHY: Oh, that was a busy time, and it was not easy in those years. For one thing, France still had a critical housing shortage as a result of the war and we couldn't find a place to live. We ended renting a crumbling, drafty chateau 14 kilometers out of town.

But another thing was that the communist party was fairly strong in that part of France, and frequently we had to deal with municipal officials who were communists and who, needless to say, were not very friendly. When we made protocol calls, they used to try to show us where Americans had bombed hospitals, schools, nurseries, churches and the like, never mentioning which of them might have been bombed by Germans or referring to the fact that American intervention had helped to save France.

Q: Yeah.

MURPHY: But anyway, we put up with quite a lot of stuff to work some of those cities. And

France wasn't having too easy a time.

One of her major problems was that North Africa was falling apart -- specifically Algeria. There was a strong nationalistic movement through most of that country. It was very closely tied to France economically, and France had a lot of internal problems with that. There were a lot of incidents of terrorism by Arabs, who eventually, of course, succeeded in throwing off the yoke of France, partly because the United States supported the nationalist movements in Africa.

I think one of the things I remember was the Hungarian attempted revolt against Russia which was crushed ruthlessly. Refugees streamed out of Hungary and a lot of them landed in France. The agency sent us a Hungarian- speaking assistant at that time to try to take care of some of that overflow out of Hungary.

And the other event was the Suez crisis. I don't know whether you remember that, but because Nasser was very threatening about the Canal, England and France got together and decided they would try to provoke an incident that would justify intervention on their part, and they arranged with Israel to create an incident. Israel bombed the Egyptian Army in the Gaza strip and as a result President Abdel Gamal Nasser nationalized and closed down the Canal. This was terribly serious because France was dependent on oil from the Middle East which was shipped through the Suez Canal. But that incident was what England and France wanted and it justified their intervention. They were moving towards intervention when President Eisenhower stepped in and stopped the whole thing.

Q: So they had another reason for loving the Americans?

MURPHY: The French were absolutely irate and I will never forget that I gave a party sometime during that event and I got rude notes from Frenchman who said they didn't come to the party because American policy prevented them from getting gasoline. I still hear from one of those Frenchmen, who was at the Sorbonne for several years afterwards and a prominent literary professor in France, specialist in American literature. Now he's quite friendly.

Q: Was that period also when the French insisted that the NATO troops leave France? Or was that before or after?

MURPHY: I think that was after. To return to the subject of my experiences in France, like any USIS post, we have "cultural presentations" to program in our area, e.g., military orchestras, American performing artists (Andre Wat, an American concert pianist, was one), and distinguished visitors like then Senator William Fulbright, who came to receive an honorary degree from the University of Dijon. One of our "out of routine" programs was participation in the annual gastronomic fair in Dijon. Each country had to present some typical dish at the various receptions given when the French Foreign Minister (Maurice Couve de Murville) visited the fair. Bertha Potts, who was my assistant at that time, and I decided we would do an American Thanksgiving feast, preceded by old-fashioned (American bourbon being considered typical despite the French name) and popcorn. We were able to get American turkeys from the commissary. Bert supervised the roasting of turkeys and dressing and she made the popcorn, while I prepared the old-fashioned and some cocktail snacks and helped to serve. It looked as if

the French appreciated our efforts and even our food, thanks perhaps to the generous supply of bourbon.

While I was in Lyon, the city celebrated its 2,000th anniversary, and the 200th anniversary of the birth of Lafayette. We participated in these events, as we did in the funeral of Mayor Edouard Herriot (a former President of France) in a mass ceremony in Place Bellecour in the center of Lyon, a magnificent public spectacle of unforgettable mourning for one of France's heroes.

WILLIAM D. MORGAN
Staff Aide, USRO
Paris (1956-1958)

Consul General
Paris (1978-1981)

William D. Morgan was born in New York in 1925. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester in 1949 and a master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1953. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. Mr. Morgan's Foreign Service career included positions in Lebanon, Paris, and Montreal. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: After your acceptance in the Foreign Service what happened to you immediately?

MORGAN: You won't believe it. I got a call from Washington. I was told that I was being assigned to Paris. My wife went through the ceiling. She said, "We're joining the Foreign Service, aren't we? We just came from Paris. You're a French major. They're not going to assign you to Paris." Well, I said, I had been fully accepted into the Foreign Service, and that was it.

Q: How did you feel about that assignment to Paris, since you had just returned from Paris?

MORGAN: I more or less felt the same way that my wife did. I thought that I would rather go to Africa, Tokyo, or some place else. My wife and I arrived in Paris as a just-married student couple. At the end of our first month there in 1949, we didn't have a penny in our pockets. We had just cashed our last Travelers Cheque for \$10. She had no job. So we lived a student's life. You know, France was wonderful in 1949 and 1950. The French were not what they are today. They were really defeated. The country was in a state of chaos. They had lost a war, not only psychologically, but physically as well. But the Marshall Plan was operational and my wife got a job working for it -- the ECA (Economic Community Assistance?). She made \$2,500 a year, and that took us very nicely through the rest of that year and paid our way home. I think that we came out a couple of hundred dollars ahead and managed to travel all over Europe. I don't mean to say that hamburgers cost five cents, but things were easier to do then on such an income.

My assignment as an FSO to Paris 1956, was a matter of going back to that world, in part. However, in those few years Paris had changed considerably. The country was certainly on its

way up. It had benefitted a great deal from the Marshall Plan. My assignment was as Staff Aide to the Ambassador to USRO (United States delegation to Regional Organizations). These were NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and COCOM [Coordinating Committee of trade with Communist countries]. We had a number of ambassadors assigned to Paris in one capacity or another at the time. I think that there were seven of them in Paris at the time, including our Ambassador to France, of course.

Not far from where the American Embassy on the Place de la Concorde, is, was, and hopefully always will be, the Hotel Talleyrand. It is called a hotel -- in French, a private home for the rich -- and was built at the end of the 18th century. It was named for Talleyrand, a subsequent owner who was then French Foreign Minister. It is a magnificent place. Ironically, my wife had worked on top floor for ECA in 1949-50. I was assigned there in 1956-8 to USRO, during my very first tour of duty in the Foreign Service. It was headed by Ambassador Burgess, a former Secretary of the Treasury. NATO Headquarters were in Paris then [1956], at the Palais de Chaillot, in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower. That is where all of the NATO meetings took place. I was the official liaison officer with the Secretariat of NATO. I only focused on the NATO part. There was another officer who handled [liaison] duties similar to mine with OECD. We had little to do with COCOM, a term you may never have heard of. Until very recently COCOM controlled trade with communist countries. But you were particularly concerned with our relations with NATO.

Q: Yes, let's talk about that.

MORGAN: The job I had was Staff Aide to Ambassador Burgess. As a lot of people know, whatever the Ambassador wants [his staff aide] to do, I did. More specifically, I more or less "managed his desk," made sure that the right telegrams got there, and ensured that they were acted on. I did that sort of typical, secretarial work. I also had a job of liaison with the NATO secretariat, which kept me very close to the Secretary General and Executive Director of NATO, concerning meetings, agendas, and that sort of thing. I would then report back to the State Department. We had an office back in the Bureau of European Affairs in Washington which followed NATO affairs, OECD, and so on for USRO. This office gave us our instructions. The [NATO] agenda items covered an enormous range of subjects. They were military and political and often were very complex.

It was not at all unusual for the weekly meeting of the NAC, or North Atlantic Council, which was attended by the ambassadors of each member state of NATO, to cover 15 or 20 agenda items. Some of these were minor issues,, but others were of great consequence in our emerging military and political struggle with the U.S.S.R. Obviously, NATO was formed as a military organization, the North Atlantic Alliance, to combat the threat as perceived from the growing Eastern European and Soviet military forces.. The military aspect of the alliance was the first and foremost consideration. Anyhow, agenda issues, for example, were the common standards of the caliber of the guns and the inter-operability" of weapons systems. NATO had a large, military staff. Our own Delegation was like an Embassy. It had Political, Economic, Administrative, and Military Sections. The Military Section was particularly large. Military matters usually accounted for a good part of the agenda at meetings of the NAC. Remember, of course, that the

heart of the military element of NATO was SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Armed Forces Europe). NATO was the political, government-to-government base to whom the different Armed Forces ultimately reported.

Q: What about the size and composition of the USRO staff in terms of numbers?

MORGAN: The State Department element of USRO amounted to 40 or 50 employees. Our files were enormous, because we had NATO documents classified COSMIC, TOP SECRET, and lower, as well as our own U.S. similarly classified. Remember we were government bureaucracies. We had rooms filled with documents like that. As an anecdote of the things I did,, once I left two of these rooms open during a weekend when I'd been called in by the Ambassador when the Soviets invaded Hungary. I got a nice fist-full of "pink slips" [security violation reports] showing violations for that.

The Military Section probably had about 30 people. We also had representatives from the Treasury Department. Our OECD responsibilities were handled separately. However, we had economic issues with NATO. I even sat on the International Staff (of NATO) Budget Committee. There were a lot of financial issues that were dealt with by our Economic Section.

Remember, those were the days when NATO was mainly a security entity protecting Europe and North Americas. The United Nations had begun a few years earlier but really, in my mind, hadn't defined itself practically and certainly had to separate itself from military alliances, although the UN Charter authorized them.. It hadn't gotten into some of the issues in which it is involved today. NATO was the major "power" organization.

Q: What about the internal situation in our Delegation to NATO?

MORGAN: Well, there are always personality and policy conflicts in any large organization. However, I must say that most people that I dealt with--that is to say, within the USRO Political and Administrative Sections--were very reasonable. They had a job to do. You really didn't think in terms of personality differences complicating what we were doing--fighting over "turf" and things like that. We had more than enough to do. We were there every night until 6:00, 7:00, or 8:00 PM, and often on weekends, constantly taking on the next issue. Bob Miller, for example, was a junior officer colleague in the Political Section. We remain good friends to this day. There was also John Stutesman. These people were all good friends.

The only issue which comes to mind where there were differences brings a smile to my face. This involved the military. I think that it was hard for our military to handle an assignment to what amounts to a diplomatic mission. I think that some of the colonels assigned to USRO tended to think that it was still World War II and that we were about to attack the Soviets, who, in many ways, were the new Nazi enemy. . Therefore, they had trouble appreciating some of the evolving--what shall we call them?--different approaches to issues which were emerging with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. Stalin was no longer around, so it was no longer the "old" and as directly threatening militarily Soviet Union. The Soviets were scientifically becoming more significant and, most serious of all, had near or perceived nuclear parity. Also, I don't think that we had a person on that Delegation who really knew very much, first-hand, about

the Soviet Union, and I wasn't one of them...yet.

Our military were also having a lot of bureaucratic trouble with these questions when translated to turf. I remember one officer who asked me one day, "Bill, I do not understand the difference between the State Department's ranks and the military. Can you tell me whether I 'rank' that State guy or not? Now, I'm a lieutenant colonel, and he is a second secretary. How would you compare the two?" And I, being compulsively friendly -- he was a fine colleague and friend -- but probably not giving him the answer he wanted, said: "Actually, colonel, they are incomparable." He looked at me, laughed, and said: "I know what you mean." It was an attempt really to compare two historically different "families," if you will. Of course, this was soon after the end of World War II, and I still well remembered that I was a lowly enlisted man. It wasn't that long after a really wonderful, military victory. The soldiers were heroes, and these officers were heroes. The military were assigned to Paris in a diplomatic not military setting and all of what goes with it. It was often a case of trying to fight battles, if you will, when there wasn't any clear definition of the ground on which they were fighting. They were facing an "enemy", sometimes, who turned out to be fellow Americans. State Department people can be "arrogant," "difficult," taken with their own power or perceived authority at times. This could be difficult for our military colleagues to understand or tolerate.

I must say that most of the American military assigned to USRO were very skilled and professional at doing their jobs, although there was this little competition problem. Ambassador Burgess' rule, if there was any question about it, was to get rid of incompetent staff as he made clear when they left. But that is the only issue I can remember. I don't recall any other "personality: strains.

Q: Can you recall any specific instances where the diplomats opposed the military over a particular issue?

MORGAN: The short answer is, "No." The longer answer is that some things were rather "technical." For example, we had a discussion which probably continues to this day on what kind and size of airplanes NATO should have. What tactics should we have? Should Belgium or the UK do this, or that in using its air force assets?. There were questions like that. An example of a non-military one involved Iceland, which at the time had a communist government or, rather, a coalition government in which the communists participated. Iceland was not permitted to attend the meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Of course, they received all of the documents. But I had to make sure that the Icelandic Delegation received no documents from our Delegation that were classified above, I think, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, or something like that.

That's not really an answer to your question about issues that divided the State Department from the U. S. military. However, this is an example of some of the realities affecting what we were doing in NATO in those days.

I think that most of the "problem" issues involved the size of NATO forces, their status in the various host countries, and how much we could or should share with our allied, for example, in terms of our own military intelligence or classified documents. In other words, to what extent were the NATO countries really our allies and what U.S. laws limited our sharing of

information? The French were our allies but, if you remember, about that time they pulled out of the military structure of NATO. They just said, "goodbye." (or said goodbye to us!) This was after I left, but not too.

Q: As a matter of record, could you tell us who the members of NATO were at that time?

MORGAN: Gracious. There were 15 members. They included the United Kingdom, France, Canada, West Germany, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, Turkey and Greece. Because the last two were constantly squabbling over Cyprus, we were forever going to NAC meetings on Saturday (at least I remembering it interrupting my weekends) over the Cyprus conflict.

Q: Inside NATO, what was the perception of the Soviet threat during your time in USRO?

MORGAN: In NATO? The organization as a whole?

Q: Yes, and especially the U. S. Delegation.

MORGAN: Within NATO as a whole, the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat to the security of its members. That perception was part of an ongoing tension that continued until the fall of the Soviet Union. But still one nation perceives such tensions and threats differently. France, for example, looked at NATO as an ideological, Anglo-controlled entity. Germany saw the Soviet threat as directly on its border. Germany considered itself -- most realistically -- to be the potential battlefield. And it was. That's where the Warsaw Pact troops were amassed. That's where the battle lines were drawn. That's where the "trip wires" were. Norway and Turkey bordered directly territorially on the Soviet Union. Denmark and Greece bordered on the Soviet Union by water. Maybe that's the answer to your question. Those closer to the Soviet threat felt it with greater immediacy. Britain was always very sophisticated in its approach and was just getting over losing its empire.

Much of the answer to your question relates to the United States as the leading world power. We had the money, we had the forces, we had the resources and the will to face down the Soviets. Every one of the NATO countries, Canada included, had its own bilateral issues with the United States. Some of these were and perhaps always will be emotionally based: Jealousy and envy. I've always considered foreign policy to be driven by emotional considerations -- often cultural, and religious, and historical, but from the "heart and the gut". Britain, for example, was going through historic agonies at this time. There was the Suez crisis in 1956, following Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. There was a perception in Britain that we were no longer their "friends," if you will, and could not be trusted as we were allies in World War II. Also, there was that feeling, and so much of this is feeling, that the British were dependent on us under the Marshall Plan, although they handled this matter very admirably--and most of the British were able to accept this. There was this feeling of "National pride," and it continued to manifest itself in NATO.

Now, we were together and were united in one particular cause: the defense of Western Europe and the tradition of Western Culture. But that didn't mean that other causes or questions were not

out there at the same time. There was a comparable feeling among the French, for example, it was called by the French the "Coca Colonizing" of France. Namely, the U.S. was in France to overwhelm French culture with American. In fact, we were -- intentionally or not -- proceeding to do this very thing, by example and strength and influence of our way of life.

All of those things were issues. Whenever the Soviets "behaved themselves," so to speak, or at least didn't "bark out loud" in antagonistic attacks against us, these issues would come up. On the other hand, when the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 occurred that really brought NATO together, just as failing marriages are often brought back together by tragedy. That sort of thing focused the attention of the NATO members. Otherwise, we bickered. We had to do an awful lot of bilateral "fence mending."

Then there was something else I would like to interject here which, to me, was very important. I remember about half way through my tour at USRO in Paris -- and that would have been about 1957--a fellow by the name of Joe Wolf arrived. He was the new Political Counselor replacing Jack Tuthill. Joe was a very vigorous, driving, overwhelming, arrogant, and all of those wonderful words: a powerful, self-confident, intelligent FSO. He met with the Ambassador, of course, but eventually he met with the more junior officers, including myself and others in other parts of the Mission who were part of our Delegation to NATO. He made it clear that he was there for one, simple reason. The State Department and the President wanted a new definition for our NATO relationship. NATO had been founded as a military, security/defense organization, to confront the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, we had some internal differences, and there were the realities of an evolving Europe, and an evolving Soviet Union to consider. Now, when did Stalin die?

Q: 1953.

MORGAN: Right. So Stalin was already dead, but the Soviet Union still had not become a more open, less threatening society under Malenkov and then under Khrushchev. However, the Soviet threat was becoming more "political" and "ideological," if you will. And the Soviets, of course, were extremely good in claiming bilaterally and in other relationships that they were just "one of the boys"; "Peace loving," as was their favorite word. They suggested that now that they had gotten rid of Stalin, things were much better and that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat. All of this was going on. So Joe Wolf said that he had come to USRO to present our new policy toward NATO. That is, in addition to being a strong, military alliance, NATO was also a political force and that our Delegation would take the lead and be part of expanding NATO's role as a political body. That would, for example, involve culture, anti-KGB (Soviet secret police) efforts such as using ballet performers as intelligence operators -- such efforts would be more complex, sophisticated penetration of NATO efforts at resisting the communist thrusts at Western security and unity. The KGB was proving itself to be much more clever, politically. In other words, they were using forces as effective as arms and military threats. That was the significance of Joe Wolf's arrival message.

Q: *You mean that Joe Wolf addressed such issues as infiltration as a communist "soft" invasion?*

MORGAN: Yes, but I would say that he was more particularly addressing the issue of unity

within NATO. He indicated that we should not "back away" from issues. We should "face up to them." Avoiding political discussion within NATO would be dangerous. It would result in fulfilling Soviet ambitions to destroy NATO or at least weaken it from within. This could be prevented only through "political" unity or increased cooperation, understanding, and discussion. So then the agenda for the NAC meetings became much more "political." We didn't have an "anti-KGB" section, but we did discuss what kind of relations we should have with the Soviet Union, because most of the NATO countries had bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. So there was an examination of some of the things that the Soviets were doing and how we would react to them, how we could counter them, what we anticipated from them, and how we could defend ourselves as a group of countries. Really, NATO was the only practical, evolving, strong, Western group which could ensure that the Soviet and communist threat would not become a reality.

Q: Could you give us some concrete examples of the threat as perceived?

MORGAN: Yes. One of the best examples which sticks in my mind is the Soviet Army Chorus. What a threat they were! [Laughter] They sang loud and they were honorable members of the Red Army. But could we let them into our countries? This kind of question went on for many years--an artistic expression, if you will. Now, what other examples are there? The arts come first to mind, because the Soviets are very good in such fields. In fact, when I returned to the U. S. from Moscow--I'm jumping ahead a little bit--I was involved in negotiating cultural exchanges, such as film, theater ("Hello Dolly"), and other efforts of impresario Sol Hurok. This was about the only positive expression of the control of cultural exchanges. "Ideology" is probably the word that best describes this question]. There were issues involving the press, the concept of "disinformation" information deliberately falsified to serve a political purpose programs which the Soviets engaged in very successfully. The question was how the NATO countries as a group could react to such developments.

Q: How about our own efforts in the U. S. Delegation in engaging in propaganda?

MORGAN: Well, we had an Information Office, headed by a PAO, or Public Affairs Officer, with a staff, including press officers, and so on. I'm sure that they were fine and did their work. However, maybe they engaged in the more traditional, public affairs types of activities. They didn't engage in "propaganda," per se. It was largely a press office. They had no "cultural" program at that time, except on a bilateral level in our embassy. But that was only involved in activities in France. At the same time, how proper would it be for us to be engaged in all of these things when we had an Embassy in each of our NATO countries doing the same thing in a bilateral context? As I recall it, I remember issuing press notices to counter something which had appeared [in the media]. We would do something in consultation with our other information people.

NATO had an enormous and very effective information section. Our people would work with them. I guess that the real answer to your question is that NATO, of course, engaged in a lot of press activity, informing each country, in turn, through its own government, what NATO was and why we belonged to the organization. The question might be asked, why are we dumping all this money down a rat hole? We really didn't have that problem, because it wasn't a rat hole.

"The enemy", and its efforts were as clear as a bell. I don't remember that money was a problem for public affairs activities information. .

Q: How did you feel personally about the NATO presence in Europe and how did you perceive the threat of the Warsaw Pact in real terms?

MORGAN: This was probably affected by my age. I was young, at the time. Secondly, there was the fact of Soviet behavior. They were undoubtedly and measurably a threat. This was easily documented by their very actions constantly and consistently. The Soviet threat was also big--bigger than we thought, as we discovered. So I never personally gave the matter a second thought. I was sure that we were on the right track.

Q: Did anybody question it?

MORGAN: No. I don't think that anybody, to this day, has questioned it. One could argue that it really wasn't so much of a threat, especially now that the USSR and its allies have collapsed. I think that it actually was a threat at the time, though perhaps not as great as we thought. Certainly, we were right to evaluate their growing weaknesses, especially economic. In the late 1950s, when I was in USRO, the Soviet threat brought our allies together, after a very devastating war. It gave the United States a definably honorable role to play. We had to be careful, however, about being the big, too strong partner--as we were, and at times acted as if we were.

However, there was so much contact with the NATO countries. American Congressmen traveled all over these countries. NATO was--and is--an alliance. It provided another, tangential prop or support to our world leadership role.. It helped us to assist a lot of other countries--Greece and Turkey, for example, on the Cyprus issue. Events in Iceland, Italy. Our activities in NATO gave strength to countries building on a democratic base. We were all forced, all the time, to remember that we were Western countries with a certain tradition which had just gone through, in some cases, a devastating war. Look what World War II did to Germany in that regard. NATO, OECD, and the Marshall Plan turned a severely damaged country around. This provided a means, a setting for them to get their stability, democratic institutions and honor back. It provided us a means to restore the French. In a negative sense, NATO gave France an opportunity to be French again--by kicking us all out! It permitted De Gaulle to be De Gaulle.

Q: Could you talk about some of the other delegations to NATO, your personal interaction with them, and your impressions of them.

MORGAN: Well, first and foremost is Great Britain. We tend to be looked at by many as their allies, or at least a country very close to them. This is based on a common language, background, and so forth. I think that I knew more of the people in the British Delegation [than in any other]. I think that we had the best relations with them, despite the Suez Crisis of 1956.

In terms of France, I had no particular reactions to the French whatsoever. I had virtually no contact with them at all. They were getting progressively more difficult and separated from NATO, at least the military part. .

Scandinavia. I went to high level NATO meetings attended by the presidents and prime ministers of all the countries. There were meetings of this kind, I think, twice a year--once where the Heads of Government came. President Eisenhower represented the United States on one occasion. There were also regular meetings of foreign ministers. One of the foreign ministers' meetings was held in Copenhagen, which I had the great pleasure of attending. I had a great time. I hadn't been to Copenhagen before. It happened that I had worked with the Danish foreign minister, Per Hækkerup, who had come to New York as a grantee when I was assigned there. He had come to the U. S. under a leader exchange grant. Imagine, little me alone with the Foreign Minister, his wife and family, for the day at their small unpretentious home outside the capital. I have a lot of nice memories of dealing with the Norwegians and the Danes.

However, it was different with the Icelanders. I remember one time calling the Icelandic Delegation. They were considered to be "communists." In that sense, I was in a somewhat false position. I remember the Icelandic Ambassador saying, "Oh, Mr. Morgan. It's good to hear you." I said, "Well, you know, sir, I can't call you or speak to you." He said, "I don't speak to you, either. It's OK." So we went on. I had something important to tell him. He wasn't supposed to talk to me, nor I to him, but we had to talk. I can't remember what the issue was. However, there were those little memories of "impossible" situations solved by a nice ambassador on the other end of the phone.

The Italians. They were in a state of constant confusion. They were delightful people, but you never could get anything out of them. I'd call and try to get some information from the Italian Ambassador. I was never sure whether it was going to be correct or if the position was going to be undone by somebody else in the Delegation. I don't mean to be trivial about it. They were fine and wonderful colleagues, but I remember never being certain if the little piece of information that I had obtained from them would prove correct.

Most of the others I dealt with on business. For example, I was responsible for following all of the heads of government meetings--about security issues, passes, follow-up documents and so forth. I can remember stopping at the entrance to the Palais de Chaillot with President Eisenhower on one side of me and Secretary of State Dulles on the other. We all had our identity badges hanging from our lapels, except President Eisenhower. The guard stopped him. He said, "You have to have a badge." It was all very embarrassing to have the President of the United States stopped. Finally, they turned to me and said, "Mr. Morgan, will you authorize the President of the United States to come in?" I said, "Of course I will." The President seemed somewhat annoyed. There were little things like that. I presume that you wanted me to make these remarks personal. Maybe they are not up to the higher level of your question.

Q: It's extraordinary that the guard would not let the President of the United States in. What did the President have to say about this?

MORGAN: He was furious with his staff aide because the staff aide had left the pass back at the Ambassador's residence.

Q: Let's go to some more "saucy" parts. You were in USRO from 1956 to 1958. The Warsaw

Pact invaded Hungary in 1956. What happened inside the U. S. Delegation?

MORGAN: Well, it really was something. I received a phone call at home from the Ambassador, asking me to come into the office. He told me what had happened. There were just the two of us at the Delegation office for the rest of the day. He called me at around 11:00 AM, and we left there at 7:00 PM that night. I remember because the office was dark: that's how I got a security violation. During the day it had been nice and bright in the secure rooms. I didn't have to turn any lights on.

I remember the Ambassador talking over the phone many times in the course of the day to the Secretary General of NATO and to other ambassadors.

Q: Who was the Secretary General?

MORGAN: Lord Ismay, a retired British general. However, let's get everything in its proper-- my-- perspective. I spent most of the day running back and forth to the file room, finding telegrams and looking up various things. We didn't talk to the State Department in Washington over the phone in those days the way we do today. Well, a lot of this stuff could not be discussed over the phone. Clearly, the Embassy communications people had been called in. Our USRO communications were handled at the Embassy. I would run back and forth to the Embassy to pick up telegrams and other communications and bring them back to our office. The regular telegraphic "take" was obviously coming in.

The substantive answer to your question of what the U. S. Delegation did in response to the Hungarian invasion is that we went through a period of incredible frustration on everybody's part. What could we do--what could NATO and the United States do? A lot of the answers to such questions we discussed at great length. What were the intentions of NATO and the United States? As I remember it, we didn't get any answers. "We", was of course telegraphically between our embassies and the Department. But "we" were the Ambassador and I at times. We were there alone a great deal of the time. "I" was a sounding board, but it felt good.

However, I think that it was near the end of that day. The Ambassador was almost weeping in total frustration. We had the Political Counselor, Joe Wolf, in the office, as well as our Deputy Chief of Mission, Frederick E. ("Fritz") Nolting. Other people drifted in and out of the office. I mostly remember the Ambassador and me. He wondered what we could do. Obviously, he wasn't asking me for real advice!.

Let's go back to a much more important question. What was really happening? What were the Soviets really doing? What were their intentions? What was the Hungarian reaction? What was the Hungarian Government doing? What were the forces involved? I remember calling in the senior military man in our Delegation and getting what you might expect from him. He said, "Sir, I don't know. I can tell you where our troops are. I can tell you where our forces are in Germany." And that sums it up and I don't blame him. He gave what he knew..

I might be confusing my stories here, but it's not that important. I found out very soon--I don't know whether it was that day or very shortly thereafter, maybe the next day. The Ambassador

said: "Well, the bottom line is, there is a country between us in NATO and Hungary. It's called Austria. The real question is whether we are prepared to invade Austria. Or, an equally serious question is, what are the Austrians prepared to do about it?" I don't remember factually what it was, but I seem to remember that the Austrians just said, "No." If I remember my history correctly, they were still waiting to implement the peace treaty of 1955, the four-power agreement on Austria's position. That treaty provided that Austria was a neutral country and certainly not a member of NATO.

So it was not a simple matter of invading Hungary. How could you get to help whom and against whom?

Q: Do you remember considering an option to move military forces into Austria?

MORGAN: Oh, yes.

Q: Who would the players have been in that scenario?

MORGAN: I don't remember it all, but obviously that was an option. However, when you consider options like that, the decisions then are very clear--invasion. I think that the real answer to your question is that this whole question was resolved quickly. Or, somebody else might say, we "surrendered," or the Soviets "won," or whatever. As I remember it, the event was over with. The young Hungarians who climbed up on Soviet tanks were killed. I think that this happened at the end of that first day. It was all over. Then it became almost academic. You don't invade any place, any time. You don't invade under those circumstances, unless a war is going on, unless you are there to help or support a government or a very large force which had risen up in opposition to the Soviets.

Q: There also must have been a lot of confusion during that day, and then it ended before a major decision could have been taken.

MORGAN: Yes. You could use the word, "fortunately" in this connection.

Q: How did you feel about it?

MORGAN: At the time I felt very frustrated. What the hell do we have NATO for if we can't do something?

Q: How did you feel when it ended?

MORGAN: Well, I don't exactly remember. I probably felt relieved. That is a bureaucratic answer. I might have wondered how many more Sundays I would have to come into the office. More seriously, as I reflect back, this was all very disheartening. I didn't consider that it had been a "failure" of NATO. I think that it became a reality. Did we want to go to war with the Soviet Union? That was the bottom line question. Were the Soviets prepared? They were talking about atomic bombs flying back and forth. That has always been behind most "hand wringing" decisions over the past 35 or 40 years.

Q: Do you remember the reaction of the military people in our Delegation?

MORGAN: No, I don't remember. I don't remember any strain after the fact or any internal tensions. What were the odds? What were we dealing with? Also, there was a definition. Brezhnev, with his Doctrine, hadn't come into power yet in the Soviet Union. But there was a definition of what the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union was. The Hungarian uprising happened in "their" sphere. If the Soviets had come into Germany, it would have been very easy to answer the question of what to do. Or if they had gone into Greece. But they went into a country in "their" area. I hate to use the term, "sphere of influence." I'm certainly not going to blame Presidents Roosevelt and Truman or anyone else. There was a general agreement that things that happened on "that" side of the line were a Soviet responsibility.

Q: Well, certainly, Hungary was a Warsaw Pact country.

MORGAN: All right--there's the real answer to your question. It's as accurate as any other.

Q: How about the Suez crisis of 1956?

MORGAN: I arrived in Paris in June, 1956. If I was in Paris at the time, I don't remember any direct involvement in this matter. I remember very well the years involved to get the British and French...

Q: If you arrived after the Suez incident, you must have noticed the wedge that came between certain NATO countries.

MORGAN: Between us, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. I certainly remember the British and the French squawking like crazy about the "duplicitous" nature of the United States. They said that we couldn't be trusted, that we were a horrible country, and so forth. I don't remember any particular feeling within NATO. I went on to the United Kingdom for my next tour. There, of course, the memory of U. S. behavior at the time of the Suez Crisis lingered on. However, this usually came from the very conservative, older people who still resented Britain's losing her Empire. But there was no such feeling in NATO, that I recall. Maybe a few words here and there.

Q: Can you think of any other memorable experience during your time at USRO? Then you also worked for a time under Ambassador Amory Houghton?

MORGAN: The most memorable thing was that my wife and I found ourselves once more in Paris. This time we had two children. Our son was just a couple of months old, but our daughter went to kindergarten and first grade in Paris. That was a very happy experience. We lived right on the Champ de Mars, under the Eiffel Tower. We had a little Dauphine car--our very first. We lived a very lovely, personal life. We had good friends, we did a lot of traveling around. My wife had friends in the American community. The French weren't terribly welcoming, but we learned that--or she learned it. Also, and far more important, it answered the question in her mind--and in the minds of many wives and mothers--as to whether children could get along in the Foreign

Service. She had wondered what she could do, how she could live--especially in a country where what is spoken is not your first language, and things are "different." Living under the Eiffel Tower was an aspect commented on by all kinds of friends and relatives. That was a very "plus" part of the assignment. Another "plus" part--and maybe you sensed this from my answers to your questions about NATO--was that the Ambassador and my colleagues were pleasant, professional people.

However, Mike Rives, who was Staff Aide to our Ambassador to France, Amory Houghton--a very distinguished, wonderful man--went on home leave. Then his father died, and he was gone from Paris for about three or four months. So I was designated to replace him, temporarily. I think that this was the "off" season in NATO, the "mois d'août," or the "month of August," when most French take their vacations. We used to say that the biggest secret we had in NATO was that during the month of August, when everyone goes home, the Soviets could take over Western Europe if they set their mind to it.

That job was totally different from my job as Staff Aide to Ambassador Burgess in USRO. It was much more personal, more involved, and much more "traditional Foreign Service," if you will. Amory Houghton was a wonderful man and a complete gentleman. He had been President of Corning Glass and Steuben Glass and all that. He was a very warm person--he trusted me with everything. Fortunately, Charlie Yost was the DCM -- Deputy Chief of Mission, number two in the Embassy. When he was briefing me on my new duties, he said, "Remember, you will know more than anyone in this Embassy about that man. You will know more of his weaknesses. You will know more about things that you can't tell anybody, and you won't want to tell anybody." Not that Amory Houghton was a "dirty old man." Yost said: "The hardest part of your job--and the most important part of your job--is learning the integrity you must show at all times being close to power."

I did, indeed, learn this, but it was also a lot of fun. The job was an active one. I would have the French Foreign Minister on the phone. All kinds of things happened, if you want me to describe associations with powerful people. There was Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who had previously been Consul General in Algiers prior to the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942 and who handled negotiations with the French looking toward an orderly Allied takeover of that area. But at the time we're talking about he was deeply involved in the negotiations with the French independence movement in North Africa, which he conducted from his base in Paris. He had an office around the corner from mine. He was "the" U.S. expert on French-North African affairs, and most respected. He went to the highest position in the Foreign Service: Career Ambassador. There were contacts of that kind in my job with Ambassador Houghton.

The NATO experience was interesting, involving the consideration of Soviet behavior and all of that. But there was a far more direct and personal relationship with Ambassador Houghton.

One day Ambassador Houghton buzzed me. I went in. He said, "I've got Secretary of State Dulles on the phone. I want you to hear this." Often that is what staff aides did with Dulles: they transcribed what he said. You could be sure that he had somebody on the phone in the Department listening in and also taking notes.

The subject matter might have involved the Suez Canal or North Africa. I remember that it was a very important issue at the time. Ambassador Houghton said, "No, Foster! It's wrong, Foster. No, it won't work. I can tell you that it won't." Then Ambassador Houghton said, after Dulles had said something, "OK, you're paid to be the boss." The Ambassador hung up and said to me, "Who the hell is running the show around here? That railroad has no one in charge of it." So you got these little, marvelous bits and pieces--unusual for an inexperienced officer.

The other story was far more personal, far more heartening. Ambassador Houghton had cancer of the larynx. He had had an operation for this condition before he came to Paris. He had a box-like affair in his throat. He would exhale air across it in his larynx. That was the way he spoke. He could talk, and it came out all right, but it was a very difficult process, and you obviously had to listen carefully. He had difficulty in talking, as he was blowing air. He had trained himself. Perhaps he had some other device to help him.

On every July 4 we had a routine. Every American Ambassador at the time did this. And I was associated with the routine when I returned as Consul General. You went to the grave of Lafayette, the great French leader who, in effect, "won" the American Revolution for us. The American Ambassador always made a speech on the occasion and deposited a wreath of flowers. The flag was displayed. This was a traditional event. You also had to bow a little bit to the Comte de Somebody, who was Lafayette's heir, supposedly. In my time he was a pompous jerk. The Ambassador asked me to draft a little speech on the occasion. He said, "I want it translated into French." The Ambassador took French lessons every day at the residence. At 6:00 AM every day, if I remember correctly, the French teacher arrived. As the great day approached, the Ambassador said, "I'm going to try to give the speech in French." So I translated it and then had a French speaker do a "real" translation. So the Ambassador had the English and the French versions when we got to the grave side--just he and I in his limo, flag flying--and maybe a military attaché to make the ceremony "look pretty."

I watched the Ambassador at the grave side. He reached into his right pocket, where he had the English version. He looked at it and then reached his hand into his left pocket and took out the French version. Then and there I choked up. I was on the verge of tears at the effort the Ambassador was making. He got about the first line out and then put it back in his pocket. He had memorized the speech in French. That's a personal anecdote, but the memory of it stays with me clearly to this day.

Q: What was your interaction with the "locals" the French?

MORGAN: The "locals"--or Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), as we call them today--are a very interesting subject. I talked a little bit about this in my previous interview. We had the World War II phenomenon with FSNs who were local employees of the Embassy or the Consulates--people who went to work, in many cases not particularly well trained. They perhaps did not speak English very well. After all, 1956 was only about 10 years after the end of World War II. A lot of the French "local" employees of our Embassy and Consulates were not very competent. I certainly have complete respect for "local" employees who were competent, and I could name them. However, an awful lot of them were getting "desperate." They were in their 50's. Some even recognized that they knew that they had probably exceeded their level of

competence. They were going to "hang on" to their jobs for obvious reasons. So we did have some problems.

Now, as far as the Staff Aide to the Ambassador in Paris was concerned, there was no problem whatsoever, because the Staff Aide and the French "locals" get along, by definition. I knew that there were all kinds of things going on, and they reached me. Very properly, they formed a union, but it was very ineffective. I was involved in that. The Administrative Counselor and the DCM were obviously very much involved but I had a piece of the action..

The answer to your question is that this was the beginning of "troubled times." When I was in Paris as Consul General (1978-81), they were reaching their peak. Many of our local employees were then in their 60's and were being "encouraged" or forced to retire. I understand that the Foreign Service Nationals in our posts in Germany were in an even worse position than the French.

Q: For the record, can you explain what "Foreign Service National" means?

MORGAN: We used to call them "Foreign Service Local" employees. That was part of the problem. Understandably, they didn't like to be called "locals," which had a pejorative implication and was used at times in a pejorative sense. The "Foreign Service National," to use a politically more correct term, is usually a citizen of the nation where the post is located. He or she is hired by the American personnel officers and section chiefs to perform essentially clerical or secretarial, unclassified--from a security classification standpoint--functions. The jobs are usually labor intensive--in the Consular Section, for example. However, they have continuity. The FSNs stay on for many years. The American junior officers at the post come and go. The Ambassadors come and go. The Foreign Service National is simply "loaded" with knowledge. Sometimes, he or she has the wrong kind of knowledge. In Beirut, for example, they sometimes gave out misinformation, because egos were involved or there were conspiracies against certain groups, or whatever. So you could have a negative side to Foreign Service Nationals.

However, I would say that the positive side was first and foremost. They were loyal to the United States, with some exceptions. They sometimes were put in jail. However, I'm thinking of France. They were bureaucratic, but that word comes with the language.

In consular work we may have supervised them better. However, we certainly recognized that they were passive in their attitude. Also, remember well that they usually were in direct contact with the public. In the rest of the Embassy, this was not so much the case. Yes, there were receptionists in direct contact with the public. In the Political Section some of them went out and made contacts with certain political parties. For the most part the Administrative Section had the largest number of Foreign Service National employees--budget and fiscal, general services, and all that. They did mainly staff work, if you will.

About this time, or certainly in the 1960s, we reduced significantly the U.S. Foreign Service Staff corps in the Foreign Service. We now have, in consular work, for example, only Foreign Service Officers. Foreign Service secretaries and communications experts are specialists in what continues as a Staff corps. However, a lot of the clerical work at our posts that was formerly

done by the Staff Corps is now done by Foreign Service Nationals.

Q: What was special about NATO--your Paris assignment at the time of which we are speaking? What did you learn from it?

MORGAN: Well, hopefully, I learned how to be a Foreign Service Officer. I think that I learned more about the traditional Foreign Service, and from a very important vantage point in Embassy Paris. In USRO I learned a lot about international relations and politics and power. One of the most important things to learn in the Foreign Service is how to be around power--how to be around rank, privilege, snobbism. How to be around an awful lot of things that you were not necessarily taught at home. In French society you would be taught about them. Obviously, lots of Americans are very conversant with power and all that but who don't come from IBM (International Business Machines) and Amory Houghton's background, and the like. Now, that style of operation has to be done well and most professionally -- and above all as a real representative of the United States. Every so often we "lost" a few people who "sank" into the local background, as occasionally happened, for example, at our Consulate in Nice France. Like associating with Grace Kelly, the Princess of Monaco, and David Niven and the glitterati. It goes to their head, if you will.

I think that my wife and I learned that right away. If you're standing next to the President of the United States, so what else is new? More importantly, you learn the techniques of how to get along--how one writes, organizes, defends oneself. If you can't talk on your feet, understand why the other person thinks the way he or she does--differently, because they are from a different culture, you're in trouble professionally. Somehow, you have to relate to those around you, and empathize with them. At the same time you must remember that you are there to protect your own country. Therefore, you're trying to learn how a different culture or political setting works, so that you can better defend your own country and better explain your own society. Those are the American representatives who are the best. You know, there were 15 NATO countries and France by itself. You were exposed to a lot of very important, learning experiences. You also learn how to survive. I learned very, very quickly that good personal relationships are vital. You might be transferred to another post, but maybe that other person will come back and haunt you some day.

JOHN W. TUTHILL
Minister of Economic Affairs
Paris (1956-1959)

Ambassador John W. Tuthill entered the Foreign Service in 1940. He was ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development from 1960-1962 and to Brazil from 1966-1969. Ambassador Tuthill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.

TUTHILL: In 1956 I was asked to go to Paris as Minister of Economic Affairs. I protested, saying I didn't know French. I had three years of high school French. I found the German scene

something I knew about. But I was ordered to go and I did. That was in 1956, and that was a time when the European Army idea was collapsing.

Q: What did they call it?

TUTHILL: European Defense Community.

Q: European Defense Community. Where it would be one large army with maybe at the brigade level, various national units.

TUTHILL: That's right. And it was lost in the French Parliament under Mendes France. It was probably kind of a naive idea, because they never got over questions about such items as hats, you know. The Italians insisted upon those hats with feathers.

Q: Feathers. The Bersaglieri. [Laughter]

TUTHILL: [Laughter]

Q: I think I was talking to Douglas MacArthur, who was saying that the idea was raised by the French with the idea that nobody would ever accept it, it was so almost absurd. And then it caught fire to a certain extent for a while.

TUTHILL: Conant was in favor of it. Once I got into Paris, I became involved in the role of the French in European unity. For the first time, I met this man.

Q: You're pointing to a picture of Jean Monnet.

TUTHILL: That's right. It's funny. The other day -- well, I've done this a couple of times for the Monnet Foundation, because I had a long relationship with Monnet. Then there's a man in Britain, Francois Duchene, who succeeded -- oh, in any event, he was the second head of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Francois is now writing books and articles. He's writing about Monnet's role in the OECD and the European Community.

When I left the service, I had several boxes of documents, and unlike Kissinger and a lot of other people, I turned mine over to security. I said, "I want you to go through these. I want you to declassify the ones that I can take home and put in my own closet, and you can keep the rest." Of course, they reduced the documents to those in a very small box. I left the service in '69, after all and hadn't time to examine these declassified documents.

But when Francois Dechene, who was an old friend, came and said, "What role did Monnet have in terms of the OECD?" which I had negotiated on the American side, I said, "Really very little." He said, "When did you first meet Monnet?" I said, "I think in 1958. But here are all these documents. Go over and sit down and read them." Well, it just shows how faulty one's memory can be because Duchene started picking up memoranda of conversations of Monnet and myself in '56 and '57 and the whole question of how to establish a new Atlantic relationship between the United States and the unified Europe. [Laughter]

So now this particular interview can be a little more accurate - thanks to Duchene. It's quite clear that after coming to Paris in the summer of '56, through '56 and '57, I was seeing Monnet quite regularly and became a convinced advocate of European unity. I was skeptical at first, but I became convinced that we couldn't have any long-term adequate relationship between the United States on one side and the individual European countries on the other, that technology and developments and everything else had made the idea of a U.S.-French or U.S.-German or even U.S.-British relationship of interest and of some importance, but that this was not a balanced viable long-term relationship.

Q: To develop this a little further, what would technology and all have to do with a relationship, say, with France?

TUTHILL: Well, the fact is that because of technology, the individual European markets were not large enough. We have a market of 240 million people; they have 40 or 50 million people. In many processes in the industrial world, the smaller market had to have access to a larger one.

Secondly, in the military field, it is ridiculous. In the first place, the French and the British are developing their nuclear forces, and there was no country in Europe that could balance the buildup of the Russians in conventional and, ultimately, in nuclear arms. So because of technology, both in economic and industrial field and the need for markets, and in the military field because of the relationship with nuclear to conventional warfare, it seemed to me that the national state was inadequate.

Incidentally, some of us are now talking about what we should do with the 100th anniversary of Monnet's birth, and I've stumbled on the idea that in Monnet's life, the villain of his time was excessive sovereignty. This is the big break between Monnet and De Gaulle. With De Gaulle, the nation was everything, and with Monnet, the nation had to give up sovereignty to have a sensible world wide relationship. And it seems to me that in the commemoration of Monnet, we can combine his fight against excessive sovereignty with one subject which can only be resolved in the international field, and that's environmental issues, especially in Europe, but even in the United States, the United States and Canada and other countries. Speaking in terms of the ecology, the nation state is obviously unable to resolve the issue. Just think of the Rhine in Europe. You cannot resolve it without giving up some of your sovereignty.

Q: Would you call yourself a disciple or a convert because of Monnet, or was this something that came from both your own examination and also from instructions from Washington?

TUTHILL: Well, not instructions from Washington, because they didn't really come through until the Kennedy Administration and George Ball as Under Secretary. Then we did have coherent instructions on that, because Kennedy accepted the idea -- critically at first, but then later he accepted it. No, I think that bit by bit I became convinced that the individual European states, acting separately, did not represent a firm alliance relationship with the United States. They were too small, we could push them around, and a lot of people want to push them around. I heard the other day a lecture by Taft, the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Q: This is William Howard Taft IV, I believe.

TUTHILL: Something like that. And he said quite explicitly, "We don't really want to deal with a unified European military group; we want to deal with individual states." This is a short-sighted, small approach. It's going to result in a lot of unbalanced bilateral relationships. So that, no, gradually I think that the very force of the problems that confronted us, pushing me towards advocacy of some kind of unification.

No question that Monnet influenced me very much, because Monnet, when he left the Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg and prepared for the Rome Treaty with the Common Market and Euratom, established an Action Committee for the United States of Europe, and he always said the key word was "action." Monnet was not a great philosopher; he had a great instinct for political power. And on his action committee, he had in all the European countries the two main parties -- the conservative, mostly Christian Democratic parties, and the Socialists or Labor parties and the trade unions. And he said to me, "You know, I'm not going to worry about governments. If I get agreement between the two major political parties in each of these countries and the trade unions, the government has to go along. So I'm not going to worry about the governments. I'm going to deal with the loci of power in country by country." So Monnet took what was a general idea on the part of a certain number of Europeans and a certain number of Americans and was the great do-er or action man.

But in terms of Washington, to come back to that, the Kennedy Administration, once Kennedy came in and George Ball became Under Secretary of State, there was a group -- I called it a conspiracy, but I'm using the word "conspiracy" in kind of a facetious manner. There was a small group of us who were convinced that European unity was definitely in the American long-term interest. With Rusk and with Ball and with Kennedy, then I had instructions from Washington which were consistent with my own convictions. [Laughter]

Q: Under the Eisenhower Administration, did you feel that you were preaching to deaf ears, or were you preaching on this as far as what you were reporting back?

TUTHILL: Well, it was kind of a mixed scene, actually, with Eisenhower, because Eisenhower recognized in the military field the need for increased unity. It was under Eisenhower that I negotiated the OECD agreement. And when the Kennedy Administration came in, George Ball came to me. I had known George when he was a lawyer here in town, and he said, "Look, this thing was negotiated under Eisenhower, and perhaps we ought to start all over again and renegotiate it under Kennedy."

And I said, "That would be very foolish. The way it's been negotiated under Eisenhower, it's open for all sorts of constructive work. It depends entirely on the role of the American government. If we get behind it, we can get the coordination of the economic and financial policies that we're talking about, increased and improved aid to the developing countries and that sort of thing."

I didn't get resistance from the Eisenhower Administration. Towards the end of that administration, I became more involved. John Foster Dulles had died, had been succeeded by

Chris Herter. Doug Dillon was the number two man in the State Department. Dillon had been ambassador in Paris when I was there, a good ambassador. Dillon, while not a strong advocate of European unity, wasn't against it either. He was the one that made it possible for us to negotiate to change of the OEEC into the OECD. So I didn't get resistance from the Eisenhower Administration, but I didn't get the clear policy line that I got once Ball and Walter Heller, Bob Roosa and Jim Tobin came in with the Kennedy administration.

Q: Looking back on it, did you feel that your advocacy and belief of our participation in the OECD that you were able to play a role there? You were sort of, in a way, writing some of your own instructions?

TUTHILL: Oh, yes. I think that's always the way in the Foreign Service. Sometimes you pose a question to Washington and then go back to Washington to prepare the reply. That was pretty much possible during the Eisenhower Administration, because Chris Herter, a good man, was Secretary of State but not really interested very much in this. Dillon as number two man, who looked more or less favorably, and Bob Murphy as the number three man in the State Department. So we had people who were serious and devoted, even though they didn't have the conviction that I had as to what should happen, so that once we got the OECD, (if we jump from that to 1961 when the OECD started), these were, for me, really very thrilling days, because we had the new team. In the first place, George Ball was the key one. But the economic advisor, Walter Heller, Jim Tobin, you know, at Yale, the Nobel Prize winner, Kermit Gordon and Bob Roosa.

DANIEL L. HOROWITZ
Labor Attaché
Paris (1956-1960)

Dr. Daniel L. Horowitz graduated from New York University, completing a Master's Degree in Political Science and Labor Economics. He served as the first labor attaché in the American Foreign Service. This interview was conducted in 1994 by Herbert Weiner.

HOROWITZ: So much for the EUR period. Unless you have any further questions, let me move on to my assignment in France in 1956. I should say that for about a year, ten months in 1954 and 1955, I again was on leave of absence, spending most of it in Italy, part of it at Harvard in Cambridge, and continued my research for the book that eventually was written and published, so that I didn't have a continuous period from 1951 to 1956, but had this interrupted by the 10 months of leave. In any event, by late 1955 it had been decided that I would be assigned to Paris.

I succeeded Dick Eldridge, who had been Labor Attaché at the Embassy in Paris from 1944 until his transfer in 1955, more than eleven years. Let me take just a moment to talk about Dick Eldridge. I think he deserves some underscoring as one of the bright stars in the early period of the Labor Attaché Program. Eldridge had known France intimately over half a lifetime by the time he became Labor Attaché. He had been a volunteer in the French Army in the First World

War and had served in France for the International Chamber of Commerce for a number of years. During the period when he was Labor Attaché he was intimately associated with the whole range of trade union, employer association, government, and political people. Eldridge was regarded in France as an intimate associate of all those interested in the political-labor situation and was accepted as such by the French. His relations on the American side were extremely good; he was highly respected by American officials in the Embassy, the State Department in Washington, and elsewhere.

He had one ideosyncrasy, which perhaps might be called a limitation and yet didn't limit his influence, and that was that he hated to write reports, and he wrote very little. Part of this was an inhibition against writing; part of it was that he did not trust the distribution system and felt the kind of analysis which he usually embarked on would end up with a lot of people who knew nothing about the French situation and would misuse the information. One of his favorite methods of reporting was to tear a restaurant menu in half, use the half as a post card and scribble comments and insights on the French situation [and send it] in the open mails which he felt were safer frequently than the classified documents. He was well regarded throughout government. A few people, perhaps more interested in form than substance, more concerned with having the reporting requirements fulfilled than the insight and influence which grew out of Eldridge's relationships, were critical, but they were few and had little influence.

In any event, my coming to Paris to replace Eldridge represented an interesting challenge but a rather different one from what had been frequently the case for Labor Attachés assigned in a new post; that is, the Embassy and the State Department recognized labor as a vital and fundamental influence on the stability of the country. Trying to step into Eldridge's shoes was a considerable challenge, but at least it didn't represent the necessity of convincing people that labor was important. In any event, I went about developing my associations on the French scene, trade union, employer association, political, government, and journalists. The latter were useful, from the Agence France Press and some of the important newspapers from Le Monde to others. They were worth cultivating as they followed the labor-political scene intimately and were quite knowledgeable.

In any event, over time my associations were wide and close, and the test of the role that a Labor Attaché can play came dramatically, when in 1958 the French military in Algeria rose up against the French Government. The Government was faced with a rebellion in which de Gaulle eventually came back to power. The background, of course, was that the French had been attempting to hang on in Algeria for years in a military situation where the Algerian nationalists had been attempting to fight free, and increasingly frustrated by the march of events, the military finally revolted. May 13, 1958, then became the crucial date, the date of the uprising, and during the following approximately two weeks, there was utter chaos in the country. Keeping up with events, attempting to report on developments, to analyze what was happening then became a difficult task, because the normal channels were closed for normal operation of government and the political parties. It turned out that the only people in the Embassy who had the kinds of contacts that were meaningful in this situation were myself and one of the young political officers, who had intimate contacts with various political party people. In any event, this period was a rather dramatic one, not only for France, but personally for me in that it meant a lot of chasing about, little sleep, reporting all hours of the night. It became rather dramatic with time

that there was no way that the government could gain control of a situation that was rapidly running out of the normal channels of administration, so much so that when de Gaulle announced his availability for return to power, and that he would be the only one who could save the situation for France, there was little that the political parties felt they could do to prevent this.

The one dramatic gesture which was attempted by the Communist CGT was to announce that they would call a general strike throughout the country in order to defend democracy and prevent de Gaulle from coming to power. They made this conditional on the agreement of Force Ouvriere, the Independent Social Democratic Trade Union, and of the Christian Democratic Trade Union, CFTC. It was during that dramatic weekend when the political parties, feeling they could do little to overcome the situation, and the Socialist Party executive committee met during the evening of Saturday to urge that Force Ouvriere go along with the request of the CGT to call the general strike. It turned out that Force Ouvriere played the crucial role of holding the line against the Communist assumption of leadership. The CFTC had decided that it would do, whatever the Force Ouvriere decided to do: It would follow along in the general strike if the Force Ouvriere did; it would oppose it, if Force Ouvriere opposed it.

The Force Ouvriere Executive Bureau met during the night of Saturday to Sunday and Robert Bothereau, who was then the General Secretary, took the position and succeeded in convincing his executive to go along with him, to oppose the general strike. His position was that if a general strike was called, the Communist Party, the CGT and the Communists through them, would then become again the group which would claim to have defended democracy, and that since the workers had no arms, the situation would turn into a Spanish civil war telescoped into 24 hours in that the military first would intervene, and the workers would be overcome with a great deal of violence. Again, the Communists would be able to play the heroes, but the result would be not that de Gaulle would come to power, but the most reactionary and anti-democratic military officials would, in fact, take power, destroying the trade unions as well as democratic institutions.

Bothereau, who had had the reputation, and had been criticized by some Americans, of being too mild-mannered, too introspective to be effective as a leader against the Communists, turned out that night to contradict all of the generalizations that had been made about him. In any event, once the Force Ouvriere decided not to go along with the general strike, to oppose it, the CFTC going along with them, the CGT, the Communists, were forced to pull in their horns, cancel the general strike call, and simply have a demonstration strike of 24 hours in industry. De Gaulle did come to power, of course, with the approval in Parliament of the traditional political parties who felt they had no alternative but to go along.

What was interesting is that there is little reference when this period is discussed by historians to the crucial potential role which this call for a general strike might have played and would have played had Force Ouvriere not played the role it did. At the time, however, it was recognized for what it was, and again labor dramatically became a crucial element in at least not saving the pre-existing democratic institutions, but keeping the situation sufficiently within control to have a transfer of power to de Gaulle within at least the formal institutions of pre-existing government.

Q: Dan, did Irving Brown play a role in these events, and can you describe what his

relationships might have been with Bothereau at the time?

HOROWITZ: Well, yes. Irving Brown, as I discussed earlier, had been very much in contact with the anti-Communists in the French trade union scene, during the famous effort of the Communists in the winter of 1947 to 1948 to destroy the French economy and prevent it from recovering through their general strike. During that period when those who were opposed to the Communists left and organized Force Ouvriere, Irving Brown was very much involved with these people whom he had known quite well in the previous year or two, working at that time within the CGT. He continued, of course, to have important relations with the Force Ouvriere people throughout the succeeding period. That he played a particular role that night, no. This was Force Ouvriere alone. This was Bothereau alone, and the decisions made were not influenced particularly by outside elements. They were determined by the Force Ouvriere trade union officials.

What was interesting and useful was that having, as I had by that time, free access through long-time association with trade union leaders in the Force Ouvriere, I could call and did call Bothereau at 12 at night or two in the morning and discuss whatever developments were on the horizon at the time. It should be kept in mind that when this crisis started on May 13, the political parties realized that they were in a situation in which they could no longer function as they normally did. What was required because of the expectation that dramatic developments might call for a drastic response (the landing of the insurgents on the mainland was feared), what was required they felt was that there be contact throughout the country with the masses of people, and the political parties could not serve that function. Only the Communist Party had that kind of structure. What did exist, however, were the trade unions, and here the Socialist Party, in agreement with other parties, called on Force Ouvriere to use its machinery, its structure, to keep in intimate contact with the people throughout the country, and it did this by calling out Force Ouvriere to turn its offices into a 24-hour alert system. All Force Ouvriere offices throughout the country, all local unions, all regional unions, all provincial unions, went on a 24-hour alert. They were the means through which communication could be effected from the center to the country, from Paris throughout the provinces. It dramatized the fact that the machinery of the trade union movement is uniquely structured to serve the kind of political function which normally is not required in a democratic country but which fit the requirements of that emergency situation.

After the advent of de Gaulle to power in May of 1958, there were no dramatic changes on the labor scene for the next following years in that the same kind of competition which existed before continued. De Gaulle did turn things around in Algeria in the sense that he did eventually give Algeria independence, and while it was a slow and painful process for France, nonetheless it was achieved within three years.

As far as my own assignment was concerned, in the period immediately before my transfer in 1960, I was slated to go to the National War College. This assignment was changed when it was urged on me that instead, I accept an assignment to India, where it was felt the situation was tense as a result of the policies of the Nehru Government in playing a third-world role of neutrality leaning toward the Soviet Union. The trade union picture in India became terribly important as the independent trade unions, the trade unions independent of the Congress Party, mainly Socialist unions -- the Hind Mazdoor Sabha trade union organization (HMS) -- could

play a crucial role in whether or not the general political scene swung more definitely in the direction of the Soviet Union. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha, being a Socialist-oriented trade union organization and very much a minority, nonetheless had a very vital importance, because its principal strength was in the transportation field -- the longshoremen, stevedores, railroad unions -- and it counted for a great deal as a result.

ALAN W. LUKENS
International Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1956-1960)

Political Officer
Paris (1961-1963)

Ambassador Alan W. Lukens was born and raised in Philadelphia. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Turkey, Martinique, France, Morocco, South Africa, Senegal, and Kenya, and an ambassadorship to the Congo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

LUKENS: Then at the end of '57 suddenly a call from PER came asking me if I'd be interested in working on the International Staff of NATO in Paris. So I jumped at that and headed off to Paris at the beginning of '58.

Q: What were you doing in Paris?

LUKENS: I was on the International Staff of NATO, one of a handful of young men who were assistants to the Secretary General, Paul Henri Spaak. I was the only American there and it was a bit of a dog robber, "gofer" job but very interesting. I met lots of people, and Eisenhower came over to the Summit Meeting during that period. We were in the old Palais Chaillot on the Seine River until it finally moved. It was an interesting way to see how multilateral organizations worked, and I think it was worthwhile.

Q: First, could you give me your impression of how Paul Henri Spaak worked, and how effective, or not effective, he was?

LUKENS: Spaak was very much of an European. It was a funny kind of a situation because you remember NATO was first in England and Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General, was very British oriented. And then when NATO moved to Paris and you had Spaak, a Francophone, running it. He had a funny little fellow, whose name slips me, who was a Frenchman, very secretive type, who was his Directeur de Cabinet, and it was very hard to find out what was going on in his office, although that was sort of one of my surreptitious jobs to help out the U.S. delegation from the inside. I worked directly for a wonderful Britisher, Lord Coleridge, a grandson of the famous Samuel Coleridge. He was a retired navy captain, a wonderful man. But his world and what he did there were totally different from Spaak's. Spaak was Mr. Europe. He had the original idea of European integration and so on and he tried to put that into effect. But he

ran into resistance from the Anglophones -- pretty much from us, from the Canadians, from the Brits, although the Germans, French, and Italians, kind of hopped on board with him. I think in the long run he had the future spirit of Europe, and he was probably a good man for the position at that point.

Q: But the way he was running this, as you saw it, was really for European integration rather than a military organization?

LUKENS: In those days the Americans were so dominant, we were so dominant on the military side that the Europeans chose to pretty much use the political side, the civilian side, for their purposes. I'm not sure you can blame them, but that's kind of what happened. So Spaak used the International Staff of NATO to begin to develop European unity and work on those channels. Sort of let the military side to the Americans which was the way it had originally been set up.

Q: Did you see any problems, that you were dealing with at the professional level, going off in different directions?

LUKENS: Some of it was a little esoteric. I was Secretary for a bunch of committees that were planning for the great days of disaster, petroleum planning, overseas shipping, internal European transport. We had meetings every couple of months, or twice a year, of all the NATO countries. All of the civil servants from their respective areas would come in and we'd develop these papers, argue over moot points, and all of this was a little remote because nobody really thought if another war came that anybody would be sitting around a table figuring out how NATO should organize train transport in Europe, for example. I think, hopefully, since then it's become a little more realistic than it was at that time.

Q: Talk about realism. Right now we're talking in November of 1989 and tremendous things are happening in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union, and we're really re-thinking the whole NATO structure, will Germany unite. It's a time of great ferment as we're talking, but one of the questions that I think future historians will ask, and that is, how seriously did we think of the Soviet Union as a threat? And how realistic was that threat?

LUKENS: Well, I think we took the threat very seriously. How realistic it was is perhaps another question. I think one of the problems with NATO, and problems with the whole European structure with SHAPE and everything, is that the conventional wisdom kind of gets handed down from generation to generation. Perhaps that's going too far, but each turnover pretty much continues the same thing. When we were there, they developed nuclear planning committees and there were various developments on weapons and this and that, but basically the focus of NATO was on the Soviet threat. There was very little advance thinking, or wondering what might happen if the threat changed. The threat was taken as a given and everybody worked on that rather than thinking how change could be brought about in the Soviet Union, or what we would do for contingency planning if something happened; as it has now.

Q: Well, how about the thinking about a integrated Europe? As you say, Paul Henri Spaak was really putting his interest here, and you were acting, I assume, although you were attached to his staff, obviously you had your liaison with the United States. How interested were our people at

that time in '58 to '60 on the American side in the integration? How realistic did they think it was?

LUKENS: I don't think they were that interested. Of course, during that period de Gaulle came in and became the great leader in France and then eventually showed his antipathy toward the UK and the US, but balanced that with his rapport with Adenauer and trying to build up the esprit de corps of Western Europe which he considered, of course, to be France and Germany, with Benelux and Italy sort of trailing behind. I think we didn't give it much thought (European integration), we just considered NATO as more important. I remember arguments going on while the Europeans wanted to do it this way, or they wanted to transfer something to the Western European Unions. This is still happening. And we would block it and say this is a NATO affair, it should be kept in NATO. I think that's pretty much what went on. I don't think we ever came out expressly against European unity, but somehow we didn't want to muddy the works of NATO.

Q: By the way, were you all looking at the French internal situation at the time?

LUKENS: That was all kind of a separate drama. We were right there in the middle of Paris, during the famous 13th of May, '58 when all hell broke loose in Algiers and de Gaulle as a result of that came into power. It was very dramatic, and nobody knew whether there'd be an invasion of North Africa by the right wing or not. So, of course, that was very much the background, even though business went on almost too much as usual right there in the NATO Headquarters.

Q: At least under Spaak he was keeping everybody's eye on a hand on the helm, full-speed ahead, and let's let the French situation take care of itself more or less.

LUKENS: Yes, well I don't think there was much that NATO could do about it, except that basically Spaak and de Gaulle's viewpoints were somewhat similar, with Spaak being more of a diplomat and thinking more of central Europe per se, and de Gaulle obviously fixing on France. But, nevertheless, they were on somewhat the same wave length I would say, and I don't think Spaak was displeased to see de Gaulle come in.

Q: How about on the American side? How did the official Americans feel about de Gaulle?

LUKENS: I'm not so sure in that period. When I went back to Paris -- we'll talk about that later -- I saw a lot more of it at that point about how to deal with de Gaulle. At the beginning I don't think that much had happened, because that was before the Reform of the constitution and so, as you remember, he was just Prime Minister at first before the referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic was ever made.

Q: So in Paris you were there...I have it from '61 to '63. Is that right?

LUKENS: Yes. I went there when General Gavin was Ambassador, Kennedy's Ambassador. He'd picked him out. He'd been a hero in the war, the 82nd Airborne.

Q: Yes, one of the first men to jump into France on D-Day.

LUKENS: Yes, and a very nice guy. What had happened...they kind of kept this from me. I was supposed to go and be the African expert in the Embassy, I thought. I got over there at the end of the summer. I went to the Embassy, and called on Ambassador Gavin as I was supposed to do the first day, and he asked me about my war record. And that was all he ever asked. I said, "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador," and went back to my desk. And then I was called back in, a couple of hours later, and I discovered that most of the people in the Embassy had never even met him. And he said, "Okay, you'll do." And I said, "What do you mean, Mr. Ambassador?" Well, it turned out that he had set it up for me to be his Special Assistant, so that I would be so busy with that, that I wouldn't have time to worry about the past. He agreed in principle, but not until he saw me. So that's when I became his Special Assistant and that was a very active time, both personally and for Franco-American relations.

Q: Let's first talk about...more known as General Gavin, and known by many as Jumping Jim Gavin. Could you describe how he dealt in the Embassy, and his style of operation.

LUKENS: His style was military. He looked the part. He was beautifully dressed, lovely wife, nice kids, a beautiful collie. They were very photogenic. All the French papers made a big fuss over them. He didn't speak any French, and that was an enormous amount of work for everybody, trying to prepare speeches. Unfortunately, he didn't take much interest in the Embassy per se. He considered that the things would be done for him, and they were. Fortunately the DCM, Cecil Lyon, was a wonderful person -- is a wonderful person, he's still living. He kept things going, and he was an enormous help to me.

But most of the time was taken up, basically, with doing the movie, The Longest Day.

Q: Darryl Zanuck did a movie, Lyon wrote the book, and...

LUKENS: I forget who did it.

Q: And Zanuck did this movie of the D Day invasion.

LUKENS: And they had the premier of the movie that we all went to, there in Paris, and he was tied up with it. The other mistake that he made, frankly, was that he wouldn't give up Arthur D. Little. He had been chairman of the board, and he went back about once a month for board meetings. I guess they paid for it, it wasn't that, so much, but it was a bit of a distraction. But people liked him. He certainly had the "présence," and we went all around the country and did this and that, to the wine festivals. It was interesting to work for him. But the frustrating thing to him was, that he took the President's representative idea very, very much to heart. He came up with the idea, for example, that the way to win the hearts of the French was to give them a nuclear submarine, and he sent a private cable to Kennedy asking for this. And about a month later, he got back a kind of blah answer from the Desk Officer, saying the idea was sort of stupid. And that made him absolutely furious. He said he was the President's Personal Representative; he should have direct access, and he shouldn't be answered by some minion in the State Department; and, "Why didn't they take his idea seriously?" And this kind of frustration with the Washington bureaucracy, and the State Department, kind of built up in him. The result was

that...I don't think he was really happy, and he didn't really stay very long.

Q: How did you see him dealing with the French? De Gaulle, but also the rest of the French government?

LUKENS: Well, of course, Kennedy's idea was a little naive; and that was, that the only way to deal with de Gaulle was to send another General. Well, when he first saw de Gaulle, de Gaulle kind of knocked him down by saying, "Well, you were just a colonel in those days," and made it clear that the fact that he was another general didn't cut much weight with de Gaulle. That wasn't to say de Gaulle was rude, of course not. But there was a little bit of a put-down there that meant that, "sure they were both generals, and they had both fought in the war, but that really had very little to do with Franco-American relations these days."

Q: What was the situation with Franco-American relations then, as you saw it?

LUKENS: My memory is perhaps a little hazy on this question; there are many more experts than myself. But it was a very tricky period because it was when de Gaulle was getting ready -- I forget exactly when he did it -- to move NATO out of Paris, up to Brussels, and break down the enormous American apparatus which we did have in France -- bases all over, and the headquarters of SHAPE, and even the PXs right in the city of Paris, and so on. I can't remember when he exactly surprised us with that idea but his whole idea of French independence, and France not being a kind of satellite of the United States, permeated de Gaulle's thinking. So we had one kind of rough period after another.

The other problem was a little bit of an internal one, a little touchy, and that was between Gavin and Norstad. Norstad had succeeded in the military better than Gavin had.

Q: Norstad was SHAPE commander -- was Air Force.

LUKENS: He was SHAPE commander, Air Force, and he got his fourth star and Gavin never did. Gavin, as you will recall, quit in '58 or '59 when he didn't get promoted. And then, he was the one to, sort of, take up the refrain that the U.S. was behind the Russians in the sputnik period, and that's what caught Kennedy's fancy. It wasn't that he was a Democrat, but he was complaining about the administration. So there was a little bit of irritation there, between who was responsible in France -- whether it was Norstad or Gavin. I used to see this in my humble position as Special Assistant, about who would call on whom, and the precedents, and the protocol. Norstad was very relaxed about it, but Gavin wasn't.

Q: How long did you hold this Special Assistant job?

LUKENS: I did it until Ambassador Bohlen came, and then he chose Bob Anderson, who had been in the Embassy and I moved over to be the African man in the Political Section.

Q: Could you describe Bohlen, and how he operated?

LUKENS: Well, it was like night and day. He was an old pro, the French liked him, they

believed in him. His French was perfect. He knew what he was doing and he knew you weren't going to change de Gaulle overnight and we had to live with it. But there were ways of managing this change so that we would not lose our traditional friendship with the French. Under Bohlen the Embassy opened up to all different areas, it was much less protocolaire. Not that he didn't know what his protocol was -- I don't mean that -- but everybody in the Embassy really began to take off, whether they were the Russian expert, or the African this and that; he let everybody do his thing and the time that had been spent under Gavin -- I hate to use the word wasted -- but organizing his itinerary, writing his speeches, all of that stuff, was not devoted to much more substance.

Q: This is something that sometimes gets lost, and that is, by political appointees and sometimes career appointees too; but an Ambassador, if they come in, can demand a tremendous amount of time in order to give them support, whether writing speeches, arranging things, and all this, which you might say, can be their due, but at the same time it means the Embassy turns internal, and is jumping to the Ambassador's will, and he or she is the front person and much of the rest of the work is inhibited.

LUKENS: That's absolutely right and it's compounded when you've a language problem too. I mean a career Ambassador in France whips through anything in French as quickly as English, whether he's making a speech, reading newspapers, or what. Now you have a political one and you have to have somebody translate absolutely everything for him. Another distinction that I saw, in this case, and that I've seen in others, is that a political Ambassador believes that the USIS operation is to build his own image, and to toot his horn enough to win friends for Uncle Sam. So USIS would be a good example of the difference between how they had to work -- the USIS officers -- under Gavin and under Bohlen; completely focus on a new idea of working with the French and not just building up the Ambassador's image.

Q: This isn't off the course because I hope people who read this will understand how things work. But often a political Ambassador will think in terms that it's very important to get out and meet the people really almost as a political candidate, rather than to further American policy -- that if you meet enough people, shake enough hands, and get a high profile somehow this rebounds to the good of the United States which is really not the case.

LUKENS: That's absolutely right and that is very much the case there. I mean, as Gavin went around, looking very photogenic from town to town, everybody loved it, and he laid lots of wreaths but it had very little to do with the French political internal scene.

Q: What type of work were you doing after you left...

LUKENS: When I was still in Paris?

Q: In Paris, yes.

LUKENS: In the African Section; that was fun, because de Gaulle, at that point, was making a big fuss over the Africans. They had their independence and the French were trying very hard to keep them in their sphere. So there'd be one African state visit after another and I knew some of

the people...Bohlen was not very interested, but he was very helpful. He didn't have time to attend all these events. I remember being invited -- I don't know whether it was Bohlen's invitation I got, or mine from the Central Africans -- but when President Dacko of the Central African Republic was in Paris, they held a big fancy gala at the Elysée. I was the American representative and after I went through the line and shook hands with a very austere de Gaulle, I got a big bear hug from President Dacko saying, "Mon-cher ami." And as I walked out the door - they were alone in the room -- I sort of turned around and I saw de Gaulle call a flunkie obviously to ask who I was. And a few minutes later the flunkie came easing up to me, when I was having a glass of champagne, and sort of said, "Who are you?" So that was kind of funny. That whole period was very interesting in Paris, and I got to know people at the Elysée and at the Quai d'Orsay who were working on French Africa. Then my old friend, who had been Governor General in Brazzaville, Yvon Bourges, became the Minister of Defense so that was fun. I enjoyed that period very much.

Q: How did we view the French relationship in Africa? Was it one where we said, "Okay, they're more or less doing the right thing and right-on," and stay out of it, and just monitor what was happening in Africa? Or did we see opportunities?

LUKENS: What I was pushing for then, and I did later as Ambassador in Brazzaville, and I always have, is that there are so many things that we can do that don't require money, only require a gesture. The way the French would handle every African visitor to Paris was just extraordinary. I mean, perhaps going beyond what we would ever do, in setting them up with this and that, but at least the airport arrivals, and the motorcycles, and the things that appeal to them. And we don't seem to be able to handle this kind of a thing, and it doesn't cost any money but it makes people feel good. I remember writing a whole cable about how the French did it, suggesting that this would be helpful if they would learn this kind of a thing in Washington. We could do something for these countries, and maybe this is superficial, but that's the way life was, rather than suddenly an "all or nothing", waiting for a hundred million dollar aid program; but when you didn't get it, give them nothing. There was never any question, and I don't think there still is, of supplanting the French in those areas. But the Africans want another string to their bow. And when the Soviets began to come in in some of those places, we didn't want them to be exclusively French or Soviet. And I think some of the French began to realize this; that they were in a better position if the British and Americans and Germans at least were there also, allowing a little bit more flexibility to the Africans, and reducing the dilemma that faced the African leaders.

Q: Well, at that time, were the French a bit suspicious of American motives in Africa? Because we had made a big deal in Africa, the Kennedy administration. Kennedy, of course, had made that statement, as a Senator, supporting Algeria and so all of this must have concerned the French. What reflections were you getting from the French?

LUKENS: Soapy made the remark, "Africa for the Africans." Oh, well, the French were very suspicious, but you had different gradations. I think in Paris...and that was one of the things I did in my job, was to try to persuade some of the French that basically we were not going to supplant them. That it was in their interests to have an American presence in those countries and not to be so worried about it. I think we made some progress with the French diplomats and the French

officials. There was much less progress, and it's still a problem, with the French commercial sector. They had complexes, they were very, very jealous of anybody coming in and they didn't want to break up this good arrangement that they had, and still have in many places. I just came back from a trip to Abidjan, Ivory Coast. It's still very much a problem.

Q: Can you describe a little of the atmosphere within the Embassy about the attitude towards de Gaulle? Here's a dominating figure and one who was controversial then and still is...I'm talking about within the officer staff.

LUKENS: It's hard for me to recall exactly that. I mean he was the dominant figure, you're absolutely right, and nobody knew what to do about him, or how to play with him. I think we all felt that Washington was playing with him -- that's the word. That the Kennedy administration did not realize the depth of French feeling, and they were being a little bit too flippant in their remarks about France in Algeria and in its former colonies. But there were ways of saying these things without hitting the French head on. And these remarks that went on weren't really doing much good. They may have made a few Africans feel good, but were basically more designed for domestic use in the U.S., and therefore there were lots of better ways to handle de Gaulle. I think when Bohlen got there the situation did improve because he was able to manage that problem. It's hard to remember exactly what people thought about de Gaulle because he was so ambiguous and you couldn't think about anything French without thinking about de Gaulle at that time.

W. GARTH THORBURN
Assistant Agricultural Attaché
Paris (1956-1961)

W. Garth Thorburn was born in New York in 1928. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1954, his career has included positions in France, Brazil, Columbia, Nigeria, India and Turkey. He was interviewed by Allan Mustard in 2006.

THORBURN: Horace told me, he said, "I don't think you're ready to go overseas. If I had anything to do with it, you wouldn't go." I said, "Well, do you have anything to do with it?" He said, "No." I said, "Well, would you schedule my program?"

So the program was scheduled, and I left for Paris in June of 1956. I went to Paris and my principal officer was Paul George Minneman. He had a PhD from, I think, Ohio State, the first PhD that Ohio State gave in agricultural economics. He had served with OFAR (Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations) with the State Department and was one of the officers, senior officers, who decided to come to FAS rather than stay with State Department.

He was an excellent leader. I learned a lot from him. He was a good economist, had a good sense of duty. I spent five years there, then I was transferred to Sao Paulo, Brazil, as the agricultural officer in Sao Paulo.

Q: Could we stop in Paris for just a minute, because, of course, you were in Paris at the time

when the European Coal and Steel Community was being formed, and there was a lot going on at that time to try to make sure that France and Germany would never go to war again, and the seeds were planted for what later grew into the European Community and then the European Union. Could you talk a little bit about what you were doing at that time and how events were unfolding that led up to the trade disputes we've had since then, since you left, with the European Community and European Union.

THORBURN: Well, my job as the third person, third officer, in the attaché office, was to gather trade statistics and to do reporting. Paul Minneman was basically responsible for policies and working with the Ministry of Agriculture and the foreign office as far as trade programs were concerned. We went through a very difficult transition period, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was headquartered in Paris at that time. General De Gaulle came in as president and didn't like that, so I think NATO was transferred to Brussels.

We had a lot of civil unrest and there were demonstrations on the Champs Elyseés and at the Assemblée nationale at that time. Basically, though, I was not too involved in policies as far as the question that you just posed.

HENRY E. MATTOX
Vice Consul
Paris (1957-1958)

Henry E. Mattox entered the Foreign Service in 1966. His career included positions in Nepal, the Azores, Brazil, Haiti, the United Kingdom (England), Egypt, and France. Mr. Mattox was interviewed by Ambassador William N. Dale in 1993.

Q: *Well, Henry, I think except for one question I have. Way back in your career when you were in Paris. I think that concludes the questions which I was thinking about. Back when you were in Paris, which I guess was your first post really.*

MATTOX: Yes.

Q: *You were there at a time which was a forced retrenchment really in France's imperial holdings. Did the French that you came in contact with, and I realize that at that time you were a Third Secretary, seem to blame the United States appreciably for their forced withdrawals, Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia, and so on?*

MATTOX: When I was there they really hadn't withdrawn from Algeria yet.

Q: *No, I didn't mention Algeria.*

MATTOX: No, I know, so they still had an empire. They still had one little remnant anyway. I don't remember any agitation against the United States. There used to be a riot a week. It would

come right down the Champs-Élysées, and go right by the embassy but nobody ever did anything to the American embassy. They would go riot over against the Chamber of Deputies. French society was split right down the middle over the question of Algeria, in the general sense that you posed, of empire.

As we know, eventually the man who came to power, De Gaulle, on a promise of retaining the empire actually turned right around and shed the nation, to its vast relief, of the empire. I guess I would have to say the number of riots that I saw there, none of which were directed against America, or the American embassy, all of that would indicate that there was no perceptible resentment of the United States in response to the question you have just raised.

THOMAS R. DONAHUE
Program Officer, Free Europe Committee
Paris (1957-1960)

Thomas Donahue grew up in New York City and attended Manhattan College. He received his graduate degree from New York University and a degree in Law from Fordham. Since completing Law School, Mr. Donahue has worked with the Free Europe Committee, the Service Employees International Union, and The Labor Department and has served as President of the AFL-CIO. He was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle in 1997.

Shea: Good afternoon. I am Jim Shea. It's the afternoon of April 9, 1997, and we are here in the office of Tom Donahue, the former President [and earlier Secretary-Treasurer] of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Committee for Industrial Organization], who is now working for the Center for Dispute Resolution. Tom, can we ask you to tell us a little about your background, especially your connections with international labor.

DONAHUE: Sure. I have worked in the labor movement since 1948 and became involved relatively early on with the Labor Attaché Program and with people who worked in international affairs, because I spent three years, from 1957 to 1960, working in Paris. I worked for Radio Free Europe and the Free Europe Committee in Paris and consequently came to have an interest in what was going on in the international labor world and in the Labor Attaché Program.

In my early years in the movement, I knew lots of people, many of them were just names to me but they were names of some reputation, who were going into the labor attaché field in the late 1940s and 1950s. Then, through the years, working for the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and later for the Federation (AFL-CIO), I had a lot of ongoing contact with people who worked in the Labor Attaché Corps all around the world. I have always been interested in it, and I have always lamented the fact that it has by now become a fully career Foreign Service group of people. I thought that the early concept of the program of drawing from the labor movement people who had experience in labor was a sound concept. I wished always that that system of the Reserve [Foreign Service] Officer could have continued. It is obviously impractical for a lot of other reasons, but it had great virtues in putting into the Labor Attaché Program, as it

did in those early years, a group of people who were already knowledgeable about the labor movement in the United States and consequently had some standard or a sense of the mission of the labor movement by which they could judge what was going on in the labor movements of foreign countries.

Kienzle: Were you involved in the early years in assignments of people from the labor movement into the Labor Attaché Program?

DONAHUE: No. I didn't go to the AFL-CIO until 1973, and my early career was with the Service Employees Union. George Meany didn't ask other people outside the AFL-CIO to comment on the assignments. But I knew a number of the labor attachés, and since I was very young when I started working in 1948, these people were largely my heroes. They were people whom I looked up to. In reviewing the list of people you have interviewed, I see a number of names there from the earliest years of the program of people for whom I had enormous respect.

Shea: Who was the Labor Attaché in Paris at that time?

DONAHUE: When I was there in 1957 I think it was Dan Horowitz. At that point he had an assistant. I can't remember what his name was.

Shea: Did you travel to Italy during those years and did you know Tom Lane at that time?

DONAHUE: I did. My role in Radio Free Europe and the Free Europe Committee was as the program officer and liaison officer for the Eastern European and Central European unions in exile. They had a headquarters in Paris. The *Force Ouvrière* had given them space in their offices on Avenue du Maine in Paris, and the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, ICFTUE, existed at that point. I worked with all of those Central European exiles and consequently traveled all over Western Europe and was in contact with a number of labor attachés who worked in the area.

Kienzle: Paul Bergman would have been the Assistant Labor Attaché in Paris at that time.

DONAHUE: Paul Bergman, right.

Kienzle: Could you describe in a little more detail your work with Radio Free Europe, because that certainly is relevant to the international labor function.

DONAHUE: The International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile had been established, I guess, sometime in the early 1950s, in 1952 or 1953, with the assistance of the ICFTU and *Force Ouvrière*, and the people who had made it up were the national representatives of each of the countries in exile. It had its headquarters in Paris. The president of it was a man named Franciszek Bialas, who had been the leader of the social security workers in Poland during the pre-war period and immediately after World War II. The Secretary-Treasurer was a man named Arno Heis, who was a Czechoslovak trade unionist living in exile. Essentially the Free Europe Committee provided financial support to the ICFTUE to enable them to publish their national journals, which they did and to publish trade union studies of conditions in their home countries

and to publicize those conditions in the West. Consequently, I had ongoing contact every couple of days or every week with these people and with their programs. Additionally, I served as a kind of liaison between the Free Europe Committee and the ICFTU, the exile organizations and the AFL-CIO. So I used to travel up to Brussels frequently and meet with Mr. Oldenbroek at that time and then with his successor.

Shea: Was that Otto Kersten?

DONAHUE: It was before Kersten. It was Oldenbroek, I guess. It was probably Oldenbroek all the while. He and Bialas were great buddies. He had great respect for Bialas. It's funny I just came from the memorial service for Al Shanker, [the late President of the American Federation of Teachers], where I saw Stefan Nejinski and we were talking about those early years. I remember Bialas always used to say to me, "Do you know Stefan Nejinski?" And I said, "No, I don't." Stefan had just then been appointed an Assistant Secretary of the PTTI [Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International]. He said, "He's a splendid man, splendid man." I never see Stefan that I don't think of "splendid man." He drummed it into me. "He was a splendid man." He was a fellow Pole obviously.

Kienzle: Who funded the Free Europe Committee?

DONAHUE: In those years, we said it was funded by "your truth dollars." The advertisement for Radio Free Europe was, "Your dollar buys a minute of truth behind the Iron Curtain." In more recent years, it has been revealed that there was government funding. It was CIA funding—or supplemental funding—for the Free Europe Committee.

Kienzle: Was that a private organization?

DONAHUE: Oh, it was a totally private organization.

Kienzle: It wasn't connected with the ICFTU?

DONAHUE: No. It was a private American organization, which was the official sponsor of Radio Free Europe. It had three divisions: Radio Free Europe, Free Europe Press, which was producing printed materials for dissemination behind the Iron Curtain, and the Free Europe Exile Relations Division, which was where I worked and where we funded and assisted exile organizations to put them in contact with their counterparts in the Western world and to enable them to tell their story in the Western world.

Kienzle: Was Irving Brown involved?

DONAHUE: Irving was in Paris in those days, and of course I went to see Irving quite frequently and chatted with him. It seems to me that during that time, probably sometime in 1958 or 1959, Irving came back to the United States and was in New York setting up the African-American Labor Center and representing the AFL-CIO at the UN. Mel Pitzele's son came over and ran the office in Paris for a year or so. He worked with Irving. But, yes, I used to see Irving frequently and talk with him about the things we were doing. I just finished reading a book, which Ben

Rathbun has produced on Irving Brown, called, "*The Point Man*."

Kienzle: Care to comment on what you think of the book?

DONAHUE: It's a contribution to the literature in the field. Ben is a good friend. I think it's a worthwhile contribution. It will provide some information that was not previously available, since Irving was one of the most secretive of men. And it does give a decent appreciation of his life and his contribution.

Kienzle: Which was?

DONAHUE: Which I think was enormous.

Kienzle: What about your evaluation of the work of the Free Europe Committee in historical perspective?

DONAHUE: I think for that time it was indispensable. Just as I think the work of the Congress of Cultural Freedom and other organizations that operated in that milieu was important for that time. Later revelations that this was somehow CIA financed does not bother me a bit. I think that, as citizens, this was the best money we ever spent. It has become fashionable in later years to somehow be critical of the Cold War. I don't think the United States created the Cold War. World conditions did that for us, and I think that our efforts in that Cold War were obviously successful, so I think we ought to be proud of it instead of debunking continually the people who were variously engaged in what are now dismissed as "anti-Communist initiatives." I think that the creation of the assistance that the AFL and the CIO gave, the assistance that the Free Europe Committee and others gave to the Free Trade Unionists in Exile was critically important in keeping the hopes of workers in those countries alive. I think the contribution of Radio Free Europe to the Cold War, if you will, was enormous and delivered minutes of truth behind the Iron Curtain that kept people informed about what was going on in the Western World, and one of the effects of the work of Trade Unionists in Exile and other groups in exile, the national representations in exile, was to keep alive in the Western World the plight of those nations and to ensure that people growing up in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, understood what had happened in Central Europe and understood the consequences that had flowed inevitably from a Communist takeover. So I am very proud of the work that our nation did in those years and of all of the various pieces of our national effort.

Kienzle: Did you serve at any other time abroad?

DONAHUE: No.

Kienzle: That was your one living experience abroad?

DONAHUE: Yes, I arrived in Paris in late 1956 and I came home in May 1960.

Kienzle: Could you tell us how you were selected for the position?

DONAHUE: That is interesting. I had worked for seven years in a local union in New York City, Local 32B of the Service Employees [International] Union. I had gone to law school at night while I was in the local. I graduated from law school. The future as I perceived it in the local union was not very promising. By that time, I was the contract director of the union and negotiated the [collective bargaining] agreements, but there were four officers above me, who were about 15 years older than I was and I was about 30. I didn't see that I was going to make any progress staying in that local union.

Shea: Did Dave Sullivan head up the local?

DONAHUE: Dave Sullivan was the President of Local 32B then and was my mentor in the trade union and remains my hero in the trade union movement. He was an Irish immigrant, who came here in 1926 and was an elevator operator at the start and became active in the union. He then led the reform faction in the union to oust a racket dominated leadership in 1940-41. In any case, I had spent seven years in the local and it did not seem to me that there was much of a career path there for me. I was then offered a job in New York by Ed McHale, who was the labor officer of the Free Europe Exile Relations Division of the Free Europe Committee.

Kienzle: Ed McHale later served as Labor Attaché in Australia.

DONAHUE: That's right! He was later a labor attaché and his brother Bill was also a friend of mine. So Ed convinced me I should come to work at the Free Europe Committee. I was there about six months and an opening came up in the Paris office. Jim McCargar, who was then the Director of the Paris office, was in New York; I worked for him a bit there and he asked me if I was interested in going to Paris. It turned out that at that point in my life I was, so I went to Paris. I did the labor [portfolio] in Paris. Ed McHale did it in the New York office.

THOMPSON R. BUCHANAN
Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1957-1960)

Thompson R. Buchanan was born in California in 1924. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in international relations in 1947 and served in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Mr. Buchanan entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in Paris, Frankfurt, Moscow, Bujumbura, Libreville, and Leningrad. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 15, 1996.

Q: Then you left Frankfurt in 1957 and went to Paris.

BUCHANAN: I was sent as the so-called Soviet expert on the International Staff in the Political Division in NATO when we were in the old Palais de Chaillot. My boss was Bill Newton who had started with the BBC overseas services and served in the US in World War II. Later Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh was my super boss. We held a biannual exercise on the analysis of

Soviet/East European relations, with Soviet experts coming from each of the member states, with the text drawn up in French and English. As "international servants," we were theoretically expected to be independent, but all of us went, of course, to check with our embassies once or twice a week to get the party line. But, generally, we were pretty free to do what we wanted. I wrote a number of papers including one I remember on what we should do in the Middle East. I didn't have any personal experience in the Middle East but nevertheless had strong views. I remember Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh saying with a certain amount of delight, "My God, I didn't know we could do this sort of thing," and the paper was sent around to the 15 nations. I had in those days gone back from Class-4 to Class-5 with all my Class-5 colleagues. If I had been a Class-5 in our huge Paris embassy, I would have been doing the equivalent of cleaning the latrines. So, this was a much better experience.

Q: You were there from 1957 until when?

BUCHANAN: To the end of 1959.

Q: How did we view the Soviet Union at that time?

BUCHANAN: I don't think my ideas had changed that much. I still saw myself in a battle to prevent the communists from taking over the Middle East and the Third World. Not too many of us saw any great opportunity at that time to negotiate agreements with the Soviets. But I was beginning to differentiate the essentially ideological dimension of Soviet policy from the more traditional behavior of the Russian state. What was usually referred to as Soviet expansionism was often, I thought, only the traditional behavior of any great power trying to carve out its own sphere of influence. And where do you find your potential allies? Obviously among the enemies of your major enemy, among the more anti-American states in the Third World.

Q: You mentioned you did a paper on the Middle East. In 1958 when you were there was when we did send our troops into Lebanon at the time there was essentially unrest and Nasser, etc. What was your and NATO's perception of Nasser and things that were happening in the Middle East?

BUCHANAN: Depending on the individual, some, of course, saw Nasser as a communist agent, while for others he was an obstreperous nationalist. But in the eyes of many he was what the communists would have called "objectively an ally of the Soviet Union." A very simplistic view. People who had served in the Middle East, of course, had generally a more sophisticated view of Nasser than those who were Europeanists, who like many French and British officials resented Nasser treading on their imperial toes.

Q: Did the civil war that was going on in Algeria intrude on...

BUCHANAN: It intruded a great deal because de Gaulle was coming to power at that time. You had demonstrations in Paris, you had police on each corner with submachine guns, back-to-back. You had threats against members of the NATO staff by the OAS, the Algerian militants, and some of my friends went into hiding.

Q: Oh, yes, the white settlers...

BUCHANAN: Particularly the right-wing military in Algeria who were determined to hold on to Algeria and prepared to trigger civil war in France. They felt de Gaulle had betrayed them, which he did to some extent when he went to Algeria, and they were determined to bring him down. There were large rival demonstrations, Left against Right, organized in Paris. On one occasion, Phil Valdes, who was our "peripheral reporting officer," in the Embassy, and I went to a large meeting of some 15,000 Communists in the Vel d'Hiver stadium. The crowd clapped on command and marched out singing "The International." Phil and I were standing in the square discussing the event when we suddenly sensed an eerie stillness around us. Looking up we saw that everyone had vanished except for a three-deep phalanx advanced on us of CRS troops, that the French had flown in from Algeria to ensure order. They were the toughest bunch of thugs I had ever seen. They looked like each had swallowed an FLN guerrilla for breakfast. We thought better of holding up our diplomatic passports, and fled with the rest.

On July 14, Bastille day, I remember taking my two kids to the Place de la Concorde to watch the parade, and perhaps see de Gaulle. I pushed then up on the wall near the Orangerie when a policeman came along and began tapping me on the head with his billy club when I tried to explain that I just wanted my kids to have a chance to see the parade. We got down.

When my two years at NATO were drawing to a close, the Embassy wanted me to replace Phil Valdes, and my wife and I were delighted at the idea of extending our stay in Paris. But, as I mentioned earlier, Washington had other ideas, bringing me back to work in the recently established planning unit, with the acronym U/CEA, Communist Economic Affairs, to counter communist infiltration in the Third World.

DAVID A. KORN
Political Officer
Paris (1957-1960)

Ambassador David A. Korn was born and raised in Missouri. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in France, Lebanon, Mauritania, Israel, and India, and ambassadorships to Ethiopia and Togo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

KORN: I grew up in Joplin, Missouri and attended the University of Missouri. I served in the army during the Korean War, but I was in Europe -- Germany and France.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

KORN: I was in communications in Paris, actually. I was demobbed from the army in France and stayed on there and went to the Institut de Science Politique in Paris.

Q: Your first assignment was to Paris. You served there from '57 to '60. What were you doing

there?

KORN: I was a political officer. There was supposed to be a rotation program at the beginning with junior officers rotating throughout the embassy. I started out in the political section working for Bill Whitman who was in charge of everything beyond Africa -- everything else outside of Europe, African, Latin America and Middle Eastern and so on. Mr. Graham, who was supposed to be doing Africa fell ill so I stayed on and did his job during the entire time I was there.

Q: This was the time when things were really beginning to hop in Africa wasn't it? From '57 to '60. From the viewpoint of the embassy in Paris how was this whole process looked at? Particularly on the French side.

KORN: The Ambassador, who was Amory Houghton, did not look favorably upon it at all. I recall being called in by him once and being asked whether I felt this was a good thing. He obviously hoped I would say it wasn't -- all these countries becoming independent. But we proceeded to do our reporting. The ambassador did not try to interfere. It was clear that the French Territories were moving towards independence. There was no reporting required that would run counter to that.

Q: Was it people saying that we had bigger things to worry about like NATO and this is just going to...or was there a feeling that the African countries were not up to it.

KORN: I am not sure where Ambassador Houghton's attitude came from. I was just a very junior officer, I was given no overview or was aware of the embassy's concerns. My focus was on Africa. I got to know all of the African students, many of whom eventually attained important positions in their countries. I also got to know the African leaders who were in Paris. My reporting was all on Africa and there was no attempts to influence it.

Q: Were you dealing at the lower level with French officials at the Quai d'Orsay?

KORN: I went over to the Foreign Ministry from time to time. The relations there were handled by Whitman or other senior officers.

Q: Give us a little feel for this time. A junior officer in Paris reporting on African affairs would essentially seek out African representatives or...

KORN: Student leaders. There was a large West African student population there as well as some from North Africa. Each of these territories had governments and the heads and other leaders visited periodically. Some of them were members of the French National Assembly. I would present myself and talk to them. I would also try to assess French attitude towards the territories by getting to know the journalists working on Africa.

Q: I guess Algeria was out of your purview, wasn't it? It was part of metropolitan France at that time.

KORN: In Algeria the war was going on but I didn't work on that.

Q: Were you there when the then Senator Kennedy got up in the Senate and talked about looking again at Algeria and all that?

KORN: Possibly, but...

JOHN A. MCKESSON, III
Political Officer
Paris (1957-1960)

Ambassador John A. McKesson, III was born in New York March 29, 1922. He received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from Columbia University. He then entered the U.S. Navy, where he served for four years. Mr. McKesson entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in France, Iceland, Germany, Vietnam, and Senegal, and an ambassadorship to Gabon. This interview was conducted by Arthur Day on May 7, 1990.

Q: After Saigon you went back to Europe?

MCKESSON: Yes, I was assigned to Paris. I was there from 1957 to 1960. My first year there was the last year of the Fourth Republic. My job there was in the internal political affairs section and I got to know a number of deputies in the National Assembly, journalists and so forth. In May '58, the events in Algiers brought the return of General de Gaulle and the general elections a few months later swept out of office an awful lot of people like Mendes France and others, many of the ones I had gotten to know. A whole new wave of Gaullist deputies came in which the embassy then proceeded to cultivate. It was really a very fascinating period.

Q: From your vantage point in Paris in the embassy, what was the impact of the May military mutiny in Algiers?

MCKESSON: It was most interesting because I happened to be at the National Assembly on May 13th when General Massu had formed his Committee of Public Safety and announced that they had taken over power in Algeria. This was coming off the AFP [Agence France Presse] ticker which was right in the lobby of the Assembly and of course all the reporters and diplomats like myself were watching this, and shuttling between the ticker and the Assembly itself where the debate was going on for the investiture of Pflimlin, who was to be the prime minister. Ironically, nobody, none of the deputies, even discussed what was happening in Algiers. They kept talking about Pflimlin, and finally the first person who even mentioned anything that was happening in Algiers was a Communist deputy who got up and said, "Shouldn't we be talking about this Fascist coup d'etat that is taking place in Algiers?"

Eventually, as we know, de Gaulle came back. My recollections of de Gaulle's return might be of interest. A few days before he was actually asked to come back he gave a press conference at the Rue Solferino and I was able to witness it as a representative of the embassy. The room was

packed, of course, with correspondents from all over. The striking thing was that where he gave the press conference was just a couple of streets from the National Assembly, the Palais Bourbon, and that on the bridge going from the Place de Concorde, all in front of the National Assembly and all around where he was giving his press conference was filled with tanks, armored cars and riot police, as if de Gaulle was going to attempt a coup, to march out of there and take over the government or something. It was all a bit ridiculous, he was just giving a press conference. At the end of the press conference everyone went home and all this police paraphernalia and tanks and everything was withdrawn.

Q: That was the conference in which he announced his readiness to...?

MCKESSON: That's right, he of course moved like a past master in several statements, moving from one thing to another, to assume the powers of the Republic, and finally when he did meet a few days later or a week or two later with Pflimlin, who had been invested by then, the meeting was an absolute *dialogue des sourds* as everybody reported. Pflimlin wanted him to disavow everything that was happening in Algiers first, and de Gaulle's position was that it was better to try to solve the situation than to start laying blame. Anyway, after this dialogue of the deaf de Gaulle went home in the wee hours of the morning and the next morning he issued a statement that he had begun the process of assuming power, which of course irritated Pflimlin no end, but there was not much he could do about it.

Q: Do you remember what your impression was at that time, of de Gaulle and the impression in the embassy? Were people gratified to see someone coming along like that?

MCKESSON: It was very interesting. The feeling in the embassy at the lower level, Dean Brown and myself and others, was certainly understanding of de Gaulle and we were willing to be quite open-minded. There was at the higher levels a feeling that traced back to attitudes of Robert Murphy who had his run-ins with de Gaulle in North Africa and the fact that, in later years, as I found out when I went to work in the Executive Secretariat under George Ball and Dean Rusk a couple of years later, there were people in Washington who were very anti-de Gaulle. George Ball was one of the leading advocates of being tough to de Gaulle. I, myself, had gotten to know a number of Gaullist deputies during that period, people like Habib Deloncle, people like Baumel, people like Peyrefitte and Olivier Guichard and a number of others, and without exception all of these deputies, senators or assistants to de Gaulle (Guichard was working in the Elysée as de Gaulle's special assistant, *chef de cabinet*) were uniformly friendly to the Americans and I never had any problems in getting information from them of a general, normal diplomatic nature, or getting opinions from them; there was never any hostility of any kind.

Q: Did it seem to you that this was really a necessary move in France at that time?

MCKESSON: Oh, I think unquestionably in that respect if de Gaulle had not moved back in peacefully there would have been a military coup of some kind. What would have happened after that would have been hard to say, but it would have been much worse for France. I think most French, other than some diehards, would recognize that de Gaulle's return in 1958 was the only way this situation could be resolved.

Q: France was quite split, I suppose, at that time. Did you detect this?

MCKESSON: The interesting thing was that in May of 1958 there were relatively few Gaullist. The Gaullist Party still existed, but it was certainly a minority party; the majority of politicians, of course, were against any return of de Gaulle for he was opposed to the party system and I would say that the majority of Frenchmen were not particularly interested or in favor of de Gaulle; they sort of saw him as the hero who had saved them during the war, but as the Algerian crisis got worse and worse, and they saw themselves faced with this virtually insoluble position with the Army controlling Algeria, the Army itself was sort of pushed to call for de Gaulle. Most of the generals did not want de Gaulle, Salan did not want de Gaulle. Massu was one of the few Gaullists, and certainly the majority of the colons in Algeria did not want de Gaulle. It was really very ironic that de Gaulle... It is well-known historically that as the crisis got worse and each side saw no other outcome but a civil war with the Army moving in, which nobody wanted, de Gaulle seemed the only alternative. At that point de Gaulle's name was mentioned more and more and was accepted by everyone as really the second choice of almost everybody, the only one who would satisfy both the Algerian and metropolitan French, partly, of course, because nobody knew what de Gaulle's policy in Algeria really was, and everybody was assuming, or wishing, that he favored his or her view. De Gaulle played on this very beautifully and only very slowly revealed his position in the coming months and years.

I might add one detail about de Gaulle, concerning his linguistic abilities. I was at the reception given by President Johnson on the 8th floor of the State Department when all these various chiefs of state came to Washington for the Kennedy state funeral, and I was standing in line close to Johnson (I was in S/S at the time) to help out as needed, and all these various heads of government or state would come by the receiving line and Johnson would shake hands with them and they would move on. When de Gaulle came, Johnson took him apart and they moved away from the receiving line for about five minutes together. I was struck by the fact that they must have spoken English as Johnson did not speak any French. De Gaulle, if he had to, could obviously carry on a conversation in English.

Q: By the time you left Paris, de Gaulle was well-established?

MCKESSON: De Gaulle had been established, during the period the Algerian war was going on. There were two very close calls, the Week of the Barricades which nearly toppled the government and the *Putsch* of the Generals, two years later. In both cases de Gaulle went on television with his uniform and made a very impassioned speech which was very moving and turned the situation around.

L. MICHAEL RIVES
Ambassador's Aide
Paris (1957-1961)

L. Michael Rives was born in New York, New York in 1921 and raised in New Jersey. He received a bachelor's degree in French from Princeton University in

1947 and entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in Frankfurt, Bonn, Hanoi, Vientiane, Guatemala City, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Phnom Penh, Djakarta, and Montreal. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 25, 1995.

Q: You left there in '57 and went to Paris, at last. You were in Paris from '57 to... ?

RIVES: '61.

Q: When you first went to Paris, what were you up to?

RIVES: For four years I was the Ambassador's aide.

Q: Four years! Good heavens! Who was the ambassador when you first arrived?

RIVES: It was Amory Houghton.

Q: For the whole time?

RIVES: Yes. Ambassador Yost, who was the DCM, put my name out to be the Ambassador's aide, because he knew I spoke French. So I went to Washington and met the Ambassador. I got there just before him. And he gave me what I considered the "two-martini test." He enjoyed his martinis. He always had two before lunch. I barely got to lunch!

Q: Could you describe France in this period?

RIVES: When we got there we were still recovering from the Suez [Crisis]. The French did not...

Q: Which was October of '56.

RIVES: Yes. They did not appreciate what we had done in Suez. The first year I was there, de Gaulle took over. [Before] '58, it was one Prime Minister after another... it was absolutely incredible. The Ambassador said to me once, "I can't remember who's Prime Minister today!" But it was interesting. Very *mouvemante*, changes of government, a lot of upset. Of course, there was the Tunisian Crisis with the Americans, and Algiers was getting worse and worse...

Q: How did the Ambassador operate?

RIVES: I thought he did a good job, but he was criticized by a lot of people. He had no tongue -- he had lost his tongue to cancer -- so he had difficulty; he spoke with a lisp. He was very self-conscious about that. (You could understand him all right.) And, of course, he didn't speak French fluently. He had been studying it, he'd known it years before, but because of the lisp, his accent wasn't good at all. He would not use it officially, so I went with him everywhere.

The thing that he was criticized for was that he only went to see de Gaulle when he had something to discuss, or when de Gaulle summoned him. For that reason, I think, he made a very

good impression on de Gaulle. I think he was the only Ambassador who has ever gotten the Grande Cross of the Legion of Honor, when he retired. A lot of Ambassadors there would try to call every week, which is what we used to do in Indochina. If you did that to de Gaulle, you never saw de Gaulle again.

The Ambassador also believed that he was the Ambassador. Ambassador Yost, the DCM, of course, was very important, because of his knowledge of foreign affairs and the French. And so he used to listen to him very closely for a long time. It was only after about a year that he was confident enough to make his own decisions.

He believed that he was the Ambassador. He didn't like Secretary Dulles at all at first, although they became very good friends. At one point... You may recall, Secretary Dulles used to like to send "special ambassadors" right and left. Every time anything happened, he would send a special ambassador. That happened once too often in Paris, and the Ambassador said, "Mike, get me Mr. Dulles on the phone." He got Mr. Dulles on the phone and (he told me, "Stay where you are.") he said to him, "I was sent here to be Ambassador, and I'm doing my best. If you don't like what I'm doing, please replace me. There will be no hard feelings. But there will be no more special ambassadors. If I'm Ambassador, I'm Ambassador." So that was the end of that.

He was also a good golfing partner of President Eisenhower.

Q: I was going to ask about that. Would he call the Eisenhower connection in?

RIVES: I don't think he ever used it.

Q: But it was known?

RIVES: Oh, I think it was implicit in that telephone conversation. But, as I say, they became very good friends and he got to admire Dulles tremendously.

Q: At that time there was a situation in Paris where you had the Marshall Plan Ambassador and a couple of other Ambassadors... the NATO Ambassador... How did he deal with that?

RIVES: He got along with them very well. He was very easy-going. He didn't like to cause problems. He and the NATO Ambassador at that time were very good friends, anyway. They had known each other in the past. But the NATO Ambassador's wife was extremely ambitious, self-conscious of her position, and there were a few ruffled feathers, occasionally, when she would announce herself as the "wife of the American Ambassador." That didn't go over well with Mrs. Houghton at all. So we had a few ruffled feathers once in a while, but other than that...

Q: As Staff Aide, you must have been with the Ambassador almost all the time, weren't you?

RIVES: Yes. Every ambassador uses his staff aide in a different way. I was with him at all times, but he would almost never ask me to do any work for him. He would call in a political officer, or someone like that, even for speeches, although I was perfectly willing to prepare for him the boiler plate, that kind of stuff. But I took care of him, and when we traveled, I took care of all the

finances and that sort of thing. These very rich men, sort of like Harriman, didn't believe very much in carrying money around with them, so I would have to pay for everything, and he would reimburse me when we came back.

Q: How did the Ambassador deal with the rest of his staff, the political and economic counselors, and the others?

RIVES: He was very good. As I say, he felt very strongly about that, and having been head of Corning Glass in the early days, when he had known every person in [the organization], the first thing he did when he came to Paris, was to visit every section of the Embassy, from the garages to the roof, and every outlying building (of course, we had I don't know how many buildings in Paris). The French were very impressed by that. I used to ride up in the elevator and people would say, "C'est la premiere fois. Je n'ai jamais vu un ambassadeur..." They were terribly impressed and pleased.

Within the Embassy itself, his door was pretty much open. He had a small staff meeting every day; he had a large staff meeting once a week, but most of the important officers could walk in any time. But they had to walk in through my office, and I controlled that.

Q: Did the Ambassador ever tell you, don't let so and so in?

RIVES: No, he never said that.

Q: This was before Algeria...

RIVES: It was during Algeria. Our first crisis was what was called the Tunisian Crisis. Some Americans were shipping in arms through Tunisia. That was when Dulles sent one of his special envoys over, but that one was all right, for it was Ambassador Robert Murphy, whom the Ambassador got to admire very much and hired afterwards. He was put in charge of Corning Glass International.

We went from that to Algiers, and things got more and more hectic in town. On a regular basis there would be demonstrations and parades down the Champs-Élysées, which would then swing towards the National Assembly across the Seine, but the French would always have police there to stop them. I would stand in my window next to the Ambassador's office, and as the crowd stopped, every time there was the same thing. There would be a cry of "l'Ambassade Americaine!" And the crowd would just turn around and shoot for the American Embassy, at which point the special police, the CRS, would come out from under the trees where they were hiding, and they would form in front of our Embassy and stop them.

Q: What were they after with us?

RIVES: Just reaction, you know.

Q: What were we doing?

RIVES: We weren't doing anything at that point, just sitting on the sidelines, encouraging them to reach some kind of agreement, but that was about it.

Q: What was the feeling in the Embassy... Paris has struck me, during the de Gaulle period, in other interviews I've done, as at least at other times, a very divided Embassy, under de Gaulle, particularly. Some felt, this is what France needs; others felt he was really taking France down the wrong course. How did you find it at the time you were there under de Gaulle?

RIVES: Well, before de Gaulle took over, the Ambassador went to call on him. After we left de Gaulle that first visit, the Ambassador said, "I will never talk to that man again, he was so rude!" And he really was. It was incredible. Ambassador Yost said to him, "Don't say that, because you're going to be talking to him one of these days." And, of course, he was.

Once de Gaulle became President, he was still de Gaulle, but he was a very impressive person. Obviously, his tone changed... I was very fortunate, because until the very end, I was always the interpreter whenever the Ambassador met with de Gaulle. (Although I am not an interpreter...I can translate, but I am not an interpreter as such.)

I would say that when I was there, the Embassy was almost entirely in favor of de Gaulle.

Q: Well, it had seen what had happened before.

RIVES: Yes. I won't say we missed the boat, but twice just before de Gaulle took over, [we were forewarned]. I went to a big dinner one night, organized by the Station Chief. At that dinner was a General Petit, a huge French General, very handsome, who commanded in Morocco later on. During the course of that dinner (there were ladies present, and servants), he virtually told us that there was going to be a change in government.

So the next day, we all got together in the Ambassador's office, and we reported this. There were the Station Chief, the Political Section Chief, and myself, I guess, who had been at the dinner. We sent a telegram to Washington saying we'd been told de Gaulle is going to take over, but just cannot believe that a General of the French Army at a dinner would give us that kind of [information].

There was no reaction, so two days later, I was called by this General and asked to meet with him. He wouldn't meet with me in the Embassy or publicly, so I invited him to lunch in my apartment, and he told me the same thing all over again. So we sent another telegram. The Ambassador ended it the same way again. He said, "Take this for what it's worth, we can't believe..." It would be like General Marshall saying he was going to overthrow Roosevelt. But that's what happened. I guess they were tipping us off, alerting us.

Q: How did the Embassy react to the takeover of de Gaulle?

RIVES: On the whole we were all pleased. Things were getting so bad it was almost civil war. I think it was partly thanks to President Coty, of course, who made the public gesture and asked him to take over.

Q: What about our relations with the French group that's so important there but in other countries might not be, the intelligentsia? I've always had the feeling there's a certain amount of disdain for the Americans, if not outright hostility.

RIVES: I think that depends on the people at the post there. We had a very good group there, I must say, and the Ambassador and Mrs. Houghton played a tremendous social role. They entertained tremendously, and they were very popular. When you did it in that way, it played into the hands of the intelligentsia, if you want to put it that way.

One thing the Ambassador would never do, and we could never change him, he would not discuss business at a dinner or at a luncheon. The Foreign Service rule for giving luncheons is so you can discuss business, but the Ambassador just would not do it. When we were having cigars after dinner, then he would discuss business. But he would never sit around the table...never. Never. We beat him on the head for that, but he wouldn't do it. Cecil Lyon, who became Minister-Counselor after Charles Yost left, used to do most of the business at luncheons.

Q: How did Ambassador Houghton deal with Cecil Lyon?

RIVES: Oh, very well, they were very good friends. He was a great admirer of Ambassador Yost, and he was very fond of Cecil Lyon. And Randy Kidder was his Political Counselor.

Q: You had a very strong Embassy.

RIVES: Very good. And we had John Emerson there, who was removed, unfortunately, unfairly.

Q: He was hit by the McCarthy times.

RIVES: Yes. He ended up as Consul General in Nigeria. The Ambassador offered to keep him in Paris, but Emerson said it wasn't worth the effort.

Q: Not only this time, but earlier on, could you talk about the McCarthy era, how you saw it at the time.

RIVES: I went through it, and I was not amused by it. It started when I was in Bonn, and in Indochina. Some of the people I admired most -- Sam Reber, who was Number Two in Bonn when I was there, he suffered for it, and, of course, there was Charlie Thayer, whose career was ruined, and the officer who went to Peru for years, he was in Bonn when I was there. Then, when I came back from Indochina, I was called in and accused of being a homosexual. I am told that every bachelor went through this.

Q: This was the standard procedure: if you weren't married, obviously you were a homosexual.

RIVES: Yes, I went through that... I was so mad, I got a lawyer, my father got me a very good lawyer, and the lawyer said to me, "Tell them to put up or shut up." So I did that, and they were so mad. I was alone in the room, and the security man had a witness -- there were two of them

and myself -- and they tried the usual thing. I've realized since then that it's the way police do things, you know. They had a file, and they said, "Oh, we've got all this stuff on you!" (which was a lot of nonsense), and I told them to put up or shut up. Then I wrote a letter to the Inspector General of the Foreign Service in which I expressed my outrage and told him that I thought the methods they used were Gestapo methods, and I wouldn't stand for it. And so I was delayed in my assignment to Guatemala for five months while they investigated the investigators.

Q: Which must have put you on somebody's list.

RIVES: Well, anyways, then I was cleared and went to Guatemala. But I was not amused by that.

Q: It was a horrible period, this, and Scott McLeod, I think, was McCarthy's boy. In all this, did you have the feeling that the Foreign Service was worth it and you would persevere...

RIVES: Well, I was enjoying myself. I liked the Foreign Service. Maybe I was naive, but I think most of us who entered it in those days entered it with the feeling we were going to do something for our country, maybe, or try... It wasn't until about '75 that I felt that the atmosphere in the State Department had completely changed.

Q: I came into the Foreign Service in '55, and this was after most of the McCarthy stuff, but particularly Secretary Dulles, we very definitely had that idea that if you came in, that you couldn't really depend on the Secretary of State to stand behind you if you got into trouble.

RIVES: That was true of almost every Secretary of State, I'm sorry to say. But it was particularly true of him, yes. But I don't think you let that kind of thing...

Q: We had a period of both Marshall and Acheson. That was before, and that set a standard that was never reached thereafter.

Well, in France, the opposition to de Gaulle, did the Ambassador make an effort to see people who were on other sides?

RIVES: Oh, yes. Yes. Particularly the other officers did. They had no political sanctions.

Q: What was the view of the Communist Party of France, Maurice Lareze, and all that, at that time?

RIVES: I don't know that we had, and I'm sure that the Ambassador had no dealings with them, probably because they didn't want to deal with us. But the political officers did. I think the Embassy generally felt that the communist vote was more a negative vote of displeasure than a vote for the communists most of the time, because when the crunch came on important questions, de Gaulle always got majorities.

Q: You stayed as the Ambassador's aide the whole time. I would think in a way, career-wise, people would be saying you had better not do this too long.

RIVES: Well, originally, we agreed that I would leave after two years. And then when the two years were up, I forget, there was something going on, the President was coming on a State visit or something, he kept saying, "Do you mind holding on for another ...?" And I kept holding on, holding on, holding on...

GEORGE L. WEST
Political Counselor
Paris (1957-1959)

George L. West was born in Seattle, Washington in 1910. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1933. His Foreign Service career included positions in Paris, Godthab, Stockholm, Helsinki, Luxembourg, Frankfurt, and Bonn. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 9, 1990.

Q: That was the fall of 1956.

WEST: Yes, fall and winter. On the one hand we wanted to bring the French and British back into circulation again, because, of course, that had been quite a bone of contention, particularly with the French as far as Eisenhower was concerned. Then on the other, there was the Hungarian thing.

I then went to Paris as a POLAD, and that was a fascinating job.

Before going, I had broken in our Ambassador-designate to France, Amory Houghton. I flew over, he took the boat, and I greeted him at Le Harvre.

My offices were at Camp DesLoges. I was assimilated, Major General, I had my own car and chauffeur, a Navy man, two stars on my license plate, all that military stuff.

But I would nearly always spend the morning out there. I first was with George Decker, a four-star General, who came back to be Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Then I was with Williston B. Palmer.

I would be at the embassy staff meetings every week. I would meet with a group, and I would be at the USRO staff meetings every week. Then I would meet them, the military political officers in the embassy, there were two, and the political officers of USRO (United States Regional Office), it was the backstop for our NATO delegation and the OEC and all the rest of them.

Then I spent about half of my time away, going all through the European Command area, which was not only all the NATO area, but wherever we had military assistance missions.

I'd be down in Morocco. I'd be in Ethiopia. I'd be in Tehran, Turkey. A lot of it having to do with

military assistance. Back in the old business with Morocco about the bases and stuff there.

But it was a very, very rewarding job. I think I got nice recognition from it.

Then I was to go to Cambodia as DCM. Bill Tremble had been named as Ambassador there. But this posed a family problem.

Also in that job in Paris I worked very closely with General Norstad because, technically, I was political advisor to SAC Europe.

Norstad wore two hats: the other being SHAPE, as the Supreme Allied Commander. Also he was the Commander of U.S. Forces in the European Command. Normally, his Deputy in that capacity voted the stock. In other words, he was at Camp DesLoges. And there were these four-star Generals who were Deputy to Norstad in his U.S. command. He did get into the U.S. side of things quite a bit with respect to Germany and Berlin. And there my background... He used me a great deal more than he used his own Political Advisor, although the two of us were together.

I was there with two different guys. We met once a week over at SHAPE. First was Ridgway Knight and then Ray Thurston. With respect to Thurston, Norstad used me primarily to go to Berlin and things like that for him. We did an awful lot of travel.

LEWIS HOFFACKER
Political-Military Officer
Paris (1958-1960)

Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker was born in Pennsylvania in 1923. He received his bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1948 and then his master's degree from Fletcher's School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949. He then served in the US Army from 1943-1946. His career has included positions in Teheran, Istanbul, Paris, Algiers, and Leopoldville and ambassadorships to both Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Ambassador Hoffacker was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 17, 1998.

Q: You went to Paris from when to when?

HOFFACKER: '58 to '60. Political-Military Affairs. I don't know how that happened, but it happened, and I was glad to see Paris. That was a great period to go. Political and Military Affairs was fun. The Algerian and NATO crises kept bubbling over.

Q: In Paris in 1958, when you arrived there, had DeGaulle made his announcement? He hadn't made his announcement yet -

HOFFACKER: No, I guess he withdrew...

Q: Because he withdrew in the '60s, under Johnson.

HOFFACKER: I was there when he withdrew the fleet, but I spent most of my time there dealing with our bases. We had bases all over, which bothered DeGaulle, of course. And we had to keep some sort of working relationship with the French authorities. And so I dealt with that side primarily. Bill Connett was my boss, a regular guy. He handled the big stuff. I had a feeling at the time, although I enjoyed Paris and France very much - how could you not like those things? - that I wasn't really cut out for EUR. I was more the Third World type, by instinct. European diplomacy was glacial and very complex and so forth, and I'm not glacial or complex. I'm simple and I like to move around a little bit. Africa coming into its own was exciting. It so happened that while I was in Paris the Department remembered that when I left the African seminar I said I'd like to work in Africa. They took me up on that and sent me to Oxford. I studied African affairs there with one other Foreign Service officer, Bob Hennemeyer.

Q: I've interviewed Bob, too. Let's still talk about Paris, '58-'60. Were you dealing with the Quai d'Orsay?

HOFFACKER: Yes.

Q: How did that fit? I mean, were they difficult to deal with?

HOFFACKER: Yes, but the French are often difficult, and not just because DeGaulle was their boss. It takes a while to get used to them. I got used to them. I spent most of my career working with the French, in Africa certainly, then in Paris. They are by definition tedious and they have a chip on their shoulder as their international clout is diminished. Uncle Sam is something of a threat politically; this fear was manifested in a lot of ways. In their negotiations on base agreements and on incidents, they were a hassle. They were very hard to get into an easy relationship; but that was the job, to have a relationship with them, and we didn't throw up our hands.

Q: While you were there in this '58-'60 period (I think it was around that time or a little before), Senator Kennedy had talked about "the Algerians like independence" and all. Did that happen on your watch?

HOFFACKER: No, I wasn't there at that particular time. I know what you're referring to, and when we get to Algeria I will refer to Teddy Kennedy in that same context.

Q: How about this '58-60 period? Did you find there was rather solid leftist - I think you have universities, intellectuals and all - dislike of the United States?

HOFFACKER: Oh yes, naturally. Not just the commies, but others who didn't like our capitalism, didn't like our heavy weight. And then of course you had the Gaullist prejudice against us, so you had a lot of strong feelings which were not friendly. That's all right. You're not out there to have "localitis," to flip because they want you to flip. You protect your interests, and you hope you can agree with them, but if not, you have to disagree if your interests are not preserved.

Q: Did you find the Embassy at all split in Paris - it was apparent at other times, and I don't know about this period - between those that were sort of almost pro-DeGaulle, by saying that all right, he may be a tough guy, but by God he's holding France together, and those who couldn't stand him?

HOFFACKER: Well, I didn't see anything that sharp. We all accepted, I think, without exception that DeGaulle was good for France. They had so much instability, at least he provided stability, in his own way. He's a rough customer to work with, but at least he was *our* S.O.B. And in the crunch the feeling was that he would be with us, and it was proven later that he lived up to his word on Cuba. In the Cuba crisis, he was with us. In the big crises, he was with us. That means a great deal because you could count on him. All you have to do is read his speeches. All this was there. If you didn't like his speeches, that's another thing, but you had to read them, and there it was. He was very predictable. So I didn't see any split. In every embassy you have people with localitis, and I hope I never had it, because I fought it all the time. That's a good reason to move people. I never fought that policy of ours of frequent transfers.

Q: You were there from '58 to '60. Who was the ambassador?

HOFFACKER: He was from the Corning Glass Company family. Political ambassador. Why can't I remember?

Q: Well, don't worry about it.

HOFFACKER: But number two was Cecil Lyon. He ran the Embassy.

Q: Yes, I was going to say that Cecil Lyon was a son-in-law of Joseph Drew. He had been an ambassador down in Latin America somewhere.

HOFFACKER: Yes, he was old school. And that's what DCM's in London, Paris and Rome were designed for - to run the embassy while the ambassador did his thing.

THOMAS W. FINA
Economic Officer, United States Regional Office
Paris (1958-1960)

Thomas W. Fina was born in Pennsylvania in 1924. He received a bachelor's degree in 1948 and a master's in 1950 from Harvard University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. His Foreign Service career included positions in France, Italy, Belgium, and Brussels. Mr. Fina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 21, 1992.

FINA: I was assigned to Paris, to our delegation to the OECD.

Q: OECD was what?

FINA: The Office of European Economic Cooperation which was an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan in which we had called upon the Europeans to work together to develop coordinated economic plans for the recovery of Europe. We were members of that group. It had evolved a great deal by 1958, of course. But the OECD was a very lively place where countries presented their plans, and we talked about what was going to happen. We had a staff in the American delegation to the OECD which looked at what the various countries said they were doing, and what their economies looked like, and critiqued them. Our job was to look at the Netherlands country report, or the Belgium country report, and say, "Ah hah, their GNP has been growing too slowly. They're not going to put enough into infrastructure, or they're unrealistic about this, or their hard currency reserves are growing too fast, and then in the course of the review of that country's report and plan, the United States as well as other countries would raise these questions. I found that a supreme bore because there were too many people in the delegation and I had nothing to do. It seems to me that I had a couple of countries, I had the Netherlands, maybe I had all of Benelux. But it wasn't a job, and while I liked the substance all right, I felt that I was wasting my time. So I went down to see my boss, and asked if there weren't something else to do? He suggested I go to the library and study up on my countries and told me that in Paris there were a lot of things that I could be doing. Well, that didn't satisfy me. I don't sit around doing nothing very easily. These were nice people, very competent, far better economists than I. They're still my friends. But about that time we had an inspection, and the inspector interviewed all of us peons, and when he got to me, he asked me things inspectors ask, and I said, "Well, I think my job ought to be abolished, because this is a waste of time. We've got too many people here doing this. My job could be merged with two other guys, etc." A couple of weeks later I was summoned into the presence of the Ambassador. "I understand that you said that we were overstaffed." He wasn't too happy. What could I tell him? I thought it was a disgrace to waste taxpayer's money in that way. So I told him that he undoubtedly couldn't know what was going on beneath the stairs, but there were just too many people there. Well, presently my job was abolished, which made me very happy.

But what I wasn't happy with, they transferred me to COCOM. COCOM was the so-called Coordinating Committee. It had a name which was supposed to be completely misleading to everyone. But it was a semi-NATO body, representing all of the NATO states, plus Japan. Its purpose was to maintain an embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc and to China. It was a very busy place. I didn't know much about it, and I was dead set against taking the job, and I resisted. But the Chief of Personnel in Paris said, "You got the job."

So I went around and met my new boss, Hal Levin. He was a very nice and extremely able person whom I hadn't known before. I settled into the job which turned out to be terrific. I had a wonderful time. Not because I was convinced that all of our embargo items made sense. They didn't, but a lot did. But one reason that it was such a good job from my point of view, was that it was so filled with electronic and mechanical technology, all of which interested me very much. And practically no one else knew an electron from a hypoid gear. So I had a fine time. I was fascinated by what we were doing, and it was my first exposure to multilateral negotiation. A lot of language questions were involved too that interested me: what terminology to use in French, because all of our documents were in French and English. What are the proper French terms for

the these various English terms? I had a lot of fun with trying to come up with what I thought were really the right French terms because the interpreters were...what shall we say, they were basically liberal arts interpreters. And they really didn't know anything about technology. I found that a very exciting job, and got involved in a very fascinating negotiation about the shipment of communications cable to the Soviet Union, which I guess was the high point of my career in COCOM.

The French were trying to sell some 16 or 32 pair cable to the Russians, and they were maintaining that it couldn't be used for strategic purposes while we maintained that it could. That went on for months and months, and finally I led the negotiation on a French train going down to Dijon, during which the French were going to demonstrate to us that this cable was used in their rail communications.

Q: Talking about you were on a train.

FINA: They brought a bunch of technicians from the railroad, and from the French PTT, the Post and Telegraph. We argued the case all the way down, and we argued the case all the way back. By the time we were approaching Paris they had given in. They agreed to our interpretation of what this communications cable should do, and could do, and what we shouldn't do with it. I think we got in at 3:00 in the morning, and I was absolutely elated because it was a big issue for us and something that I had carried through from the very beginning. As soon as I got home I called Levin at 3:30 in the morning to announce triumphantly that "We won." "Tell me about it in the morning." Anyway, that was a very good experience, I enjoyed that very much.

That assignment came to an end in 1960. Without my having asked, the Department transferred me to Bologna, to the John Hopkins Center of Advanced International Studies. They had a branch there, a school that specialized in European integration affairs, which was run by Professor C. Grove Haines who had been a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies here in Washington. Haines had created this idea of a school that would bring together graduate students from Europe and America in roughly equal numbers together with an international faculty to concentrate on the study of European integration. This was 1960, only two years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome.

Well, I thought going to Bologna was a great idea, but I didn't believe in European integration. I thought that it was highly improbable. The conflict between the French, the Germans, the Italians, the age-old rivalries seemed to me more likely to prevail than some idealistic scheme. It turned out that my experience in Bologna completely changed my views on that. I left Bologna convinced that the new Europeans really had something. The Bologna Center brought political and academic leaders from all over Western Europe, whom Haines had recruited to give regular lectures on what was going on. They excited me and thrilled me, about what they were doing to deal with the problems of post-war Europe. And since I had been very much interested in European history as an under-graduate student, what they were doing just made so much sense in terms of their interests, and the interests of the United States, that I got very excited about it.

After that assignment of an academic year in Bologna, I was transferred to Luxembourg, where the United States had a small mission to the European Coal and Steel Community which had

been the first of the three community bodies that eventually became the European Community.

ROBERT E. BARBOUR
Political Officer
Paris (1958-1961)

Robert Barbour was born in Ohio in 1927. He graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1948 and attended The George Washington University. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1949, his career has included positions in Iraq, Japan, Vietnam, France, Italy, England, Spain and Surinam. Mr. Barbour was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then back to your time in Paris. How was the return of de Gaulle seen in the Embassy? De Gaulle had been sort of a thorn in our side in World War II and right afterward.

BARBOUR: Our feelings were, as you say, somewhat ambivalent as he was a very difficult person. And Amory Houghton practically never saw him; had seen him only once in his days in his tent and very rarely afterwards. We did, however, have a very good relationship through Cecil Lyon, the DCM, with the Prime Minister, Michel Debré; they got along splendidly and saw a good deal of each other. But attitudes towards de Gaulle were ambivalent. On the one hand there was the personal and personality side, which was very much present on our minds... (phone interruption).

Q: You were talking about de Gaulle. Cecil Lyons was really the man, at that time, wouldn't you say?

BARBOUR: He was the man for most senior level dealings with the French government, but that did not go up to de Gaulle, whom we did not see very often. The Ambassador saw the Foreign Minister, who spoke excellent English, Couve de Murville. Cecil Lyon dealt with people below that level and occasionally got interested, I was happy to see, in things related to the Far East and black Africa. But our attitude toward de Gaulle was colored by the ambivalence I mentioned, on the personal side, the history of difficulty, and on the other hand what he represented for France. What he represented for France at that time we liked very much because France under the Fourth Republic was not much help to anybody. What we wanted was a much stabler, more positive looking ally. That is what de Gaulle offered, indeed brought; little did we realize that he would throw us out some years later.

Q: Was Vernon Walters there as the Military Attaché at that time?

BARBOUR: No, that was much later. He came twice with President Eisenhower as Lieutenant Colonel Walters, the interpreter.

Q: Let us talk then about black Africa. This was the period when black Africa was coming into its own.

BARBOUR: The French were pretty well out of Indochina, although still interested in Cambodia and Laos. Their remaining place in the world was in Africa, North and sub-Saharan. They had given Morocco its independence and Tunisia its independence while remaining in a fairly happy way there. Algeria was a department of France--"from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset, it's all France, never to be alienated." But on November 1, 1954, the Algerian insurrection broke out, and when I was there it was going full steam. Black Africa, then, represented, I guess, a different kind of hope for them because the French had a longer history in black Africa, they were deeply ensconced there and there was no sign of political unrest or anti-French attitudes in their French territories. Shortly after he took office, de Gaulle made a trip through French Africa and proclaimed the Community, the constitution provides for the Community, in which the African territories were to have a more or less independent relationship while still dependent on France in certain ways. As he went through black Africa all the African leaders signed on except one, Sékou Touré of Guinea. In a speech in de Gaulle's presence in Conakry, Sékou Touré said his Guinea would have nothing to do with the Community or any ties to France after that, it was one hundred percent independence. So de Gaulle returned to France and said, "So be it,"; Guinea was cut off. Sékou Touré was a very pronounced leftist Marxist demagogue anyway, and the French pulled out brutally, lock, stock and barrel. What they couldn't take with them they dismantled; it was a brutal departure, intended, of course, to indicate to the rest of the Africans what would be in store for them if they didn't like the Community.

So the Community had its day. I forget how long it lasted, but during the period it lasted General de Gaulle was President of the Republic and of the Community, and on July 14, in another two years, you had the President and the Chiefs of State of the Community. There were a lot of nice perks in it for them, belong to the community and you got your subsidies, you got this, you got that, all kinds of good things. They made it worth while. But then in the fall of 1960, I suppose, de Gaulle went to Dakar--the Senegalese had been restive--and made a speech, a landmark speech, which put all the African states on notice that if they wanted to be independent, they could be independent. He said, "Go, its okay, go," so they went. They all became independent; of course they are still in many way dependent on France, but there are no institutional ties.

Q: Were you getting any reflection of this from your contacts in the Quai d'Orsay? Why did de Gaulle first say you are either in my Community or out in the wilderness, then change to you can leave, we won't be revengeful?

BARBOUR: I think they considered they would maintain the form and let the substance go. The implication, of course, was for Algeria which was the French preoccupation at the time. If we let these states become independent then what does that mean for Algeria. De Gaulle never said, I don't think, that Algeria could never be independent but he gave that impression. So the African states adopted a new identity and became less closely tied to French policies.

Q: How did the French diplomats in the Quai d'Orsay deal with you on these things? Did they think we might go fishing in their waters, or anything like that?

BARBOUR: They were unquestionably ambivalent. On the one hand they thought, quite rightly, that we could never supplant them because of the cultural ties, that we would never really try for

economic reasons. They were right on both scores. But they hoped we would be mindful of French interests and I think to a large degree we were. So I don't recall any acrimony or tension over black Africa, over Laos, yes, but not over black Africa.

Q: What was the tension over Laos?

BARBOUR: Various Laotian crises--SEATO, France was a member of SEATO--when it looked as though we were going to get involved in a larger conflict in Laos and the French didn't want to. Remember this was 1961, the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, and there was a lot of muscle flexing and there were various Laotian crises. One of these brought the Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd to Paris for a ministerial meeting on Laos. Can you imagine such a thing today? There used to be a fair number of these things. SEATO saber rattling. The French position was that we were complicating the Laotian crisis and didn't really know what we were doing. Their position was consistently that they understood what we Americans were doing but thought we were wrong; and that was what they maintained. So we had a lot of conversations with them on the subject of Laos. It was not accidental that the people we dealt with in the Foreign Ministry on Southeast Asia and on French Africa were either people who had been integrated into the Quai d'Orsay from other Ministries or, in the case of Africa, were in the other Ministries.

Q: So they brought with them a strong commitment to these areas.

BARBOUR: They did, but I think that for their Minister they represented an annoying distraction. I don't think we had any routine contacts with Couve de Murville on either subject.

Q: Were you there when the Kennedy Administration came in?

BARBOUR: Yes.

Q: This must of made an impact, because Kennedy as a Senator had made at least one speech about how Algeria should be free. During your time there how did you deal with this?

BARBOUR: It was ambivalence in reverse. They knew the Kennedy policy and were very worried about it, but the person was wildly popular. They liked this new President and his wife who spoke French, who knew France and things French. They were very popular, very popular. I think that applied to the government as well. He got on very well with de Gaulle when they came in May of 1961 on a real old-fashioned state visit. My place at that time was in the Quai d'Orsay, where they stayed; I didn't sleep there but I stayed there with them all day in to late night, every day they were there. I was the liaison between the party and the Quai d'Orsay or the security as far as the minutiae of the visit were concerned. It was wild and hectic and interesting. Kennedy and de Gaulle, I think, got along well. De Gaulle thought of him as an interesting young man; I think the chemistry was good. Their concerns were, of course, Europe; I don't recall whether they talked about Southeast Asia, they may have, but it certainly wasn't on the top of the agenda.

DOROTHY A EARDLEY

**Special Assistant for Atomic Energy
Paris (1958-1963)**

Mrs. Eardley was born in Wisconsin and raised in Wisconsin and Illinois. She attended Rubican Business School before entering the State Department, where in 1951 she was assigned as Clerk-Stenographer at Djakarta, Indonesia. She subsequently was posted to Berlin, Chengmai, Paris, Libreville, Colombo, Ankara, Ottawa, Jeddah and Kigali. She also had temporary duty assignments in Djibouti, Reunion, and Johannesburg. She retired in 1980. Mrs. Eardley was interviewed by T. Frank Crigler in 2008.

Q: Well, why don't we talk about how you got from there to Paris.

EARDLEY: I'll tell you what Washington told me; that since I'd been at a one-man post, I needed to be at a large post. But I didn't want a large post. I went though, and I loved it from the day I arrived. So, never judge a book by its cover.

Well, for one thing, I didn't think I could afford it. I had to go back on base salary. I'd been at a hardship post. Twenty-five percent helps a great deal. I was supporting my parents just then, because all my brothers and sisters were married and had families. I didn't want them to have to give up any of their hard-earned money, so I chose to do it this way. But boy! I gave them ultimatums. I said, "If I ever hear you're not giving them moral support, you're gonna pay." They took care of my parents, all right!

Q: Where in the embassy, then, were you assigned?

EARDLEY: The Special "Asst" for Atomic Energy. That's Special "Assistant" for Atomic Energy. The special assistant to the ambassador for atomic energy. Max Eisenberg, was his name. I liked his wife and daughter. I liked him all right too. He meant well. He just was lazy.

Q: So that meant you didn't have much work to do.

EARDLEY: None. And so he was all in favor of my learning French, and so was I. I had already enrolled in the *Alliance Française* during my lunch hour. In those days I didn't eat lunch anyway. I was overweight, and I was trying to keep my weight down. So, I went there every lunch hour, on a pass. I rode the Metro. It went a little over my hour, but he wouldn't complain at all. And that's how I learned French, in eight months. I read and write French. Strangely enough, when I got to Gabon, which was right after France, one day one of the locals in the embassy said, "You're not an American." I said, "Oh yes I am." And he said, "But you have a Parisian accent!" I didn't know that. I still don't. I don't sense it. I took that as a great compliment. I'd finally arrived.

Q: How did the atomic energy section or office fit into the embassy? Was it part of the Political Section?

EARDLEY: It was an entity all its own.

Q: Who did it report to in Washington?

EARDLEY: I don't know that it ever reported anything. He would report to the ambassador. That's all.

Q: So you weren't busy typing reports that you had to send in.

EARDLEY: Oh, no. I think that's how (political section chief) Kidder discovered me. He could see that I wasn't doing anything.

Q: Did Mr. Eisenberg have contact with others in the community, outside the embassy?

EARDLEY: Yes, he was interested in music. I don't know whether he himself played an instrument. I don't think so. But his daughter may have.

Q: He didn't have lots of people from other embassies coming to call on him?

EARDLEY: No, no. I don't think they had the equivalent in other embassies. The Atomic Energy Commission, though, used to be stationed in Paris. Then it moved to Vienna. I think it's still in Vienna.

Q: Tell me more about how you worked in the political section with Mr. Kidder.

EARDLEY: I loved it. I was so glad when he asked for me. I can't be idle. I am now, but this is a different kind of idle. I don't think they had anyone in the atomic energy thing after I was moved. But I loved working with Ambassador Kidder.

Q: He was not someone to sit around idle.

EARDLEY: Oh, we worked till eight o'clock every night. Yeah, I got called in after hours too, because the Algerians kept threatening to blow up the Place de la Concorde. And we were right there on it. I'll never forget the last time I was called in. I think it was five in the morning. I drove across there. When I got up to the Champs Elysees, the tanks were all lining both sides of the Champs Elysees with their turrets pointed. And I thought, "Is it going to be safe for me to drive across the Place de la Concorde?" There was a bicyclist going by . . .

Q: This was at five in the morning?

EARDLEY: Well, that's when Algeria would threaten to blow up the place, and evidently there'd been a new threat. That's why I was called in.

Q: When would that have been approximately? Was that in 1961, or . . .

DE: Fifty-nine or sixty-one. Sixty or sixty-one.

Q: I take it that the threat came to nothing, though.

EARDLEY: Yeah. But I asked this bicyclist, I said in French, “Is it gonna be safe for me to drive across there?” He said, “Oh sure.” I got across and got into the embassy, parked my car right inside the embassy entrance, and I got inside. The minister, Mr. Lyon, was waiting for me, and Kidder was waiting for me, and so we got busy.

Q: Doing cables?

EARDLEY: Yeah. That I think was the last really bad threat that they had. That’s when what’s his name, de Gaulle, decided to rid himself of all the countries under French control. He forced independence on all those Sub-Saharan African posts who didn’t want it, they weren’t itching for it, and they weren’t ready for it. Gabon was one of them.

Q: When you were working for the political counselor, how much did you have to do with the front office, the ambassador, and the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) at that time? Did you see a lot of them?

EARDLEY: The DCM, yes. That’s how Lyon swiped me from Kidder.

Q: And so you actually went to work for him?

EARDLEY: Yes, my last year there I worked with Ambassador Lyon. Strangely enough, Lyon and Kidder both became ambassadors at about the same time. Kidder was designated for Phnom Penh. He asked for me to come there with him. I said I’d love to. Okay, they cut my orders, they even threw in home leave, which I wasn’t quite entitled to. (I was not in Gabon two full years, but they threw that in.) Kidder got to Bangkok, but he was not permitted to present his credentials in Phnom Penh. So my orders to Phnom Penh were canceled. Oh, I was furious!

Q: But let’s back up to how you worked with Kidder in Paris.

EARDLEY: Kidder and I worked beautifully together. So did Lyon and I. You had to sort of straighten out Lyon once in a while. He knew everyone, Lyon did. Well, I guess Kidder did too. Did you know his wife? Quite a character. She was not pretty, but she was liked by everyone and she was a character. I think she liked me all right. Anyway, I would love to have gone to Phnom Penh.

Q: When you say “they,” the Kidders, knew a lot of people and were liked by everyone, you mean within the embassy or among the French?

EARDLEY: Oh, all the way, yes, yes. I was also borrowed a lot while I was in Kidder’s office. Whenever the secretary of state came to Paris I was borrowed to work with him and anyone else, any other VIP who came. And when, in 1961, John F. Kennedy came, I met all the Kennedys. They were sort of related to Lyon, so they all had to call on him when they came through Paris. First there was John — no, Ted I think was the first one. He was a red-faced, a scared to death guy at that time. He was just married. I’ll never forget when he walked across my desk. This was

when I was Cecil's secretary.

Q: Walked across your desk?

EARDLEY: Well, in front of it. He was scared to death. He was out of his league. But they all had to call on the minister. One of the minister's daughters was married to Hugh Auchincloss.

Q: Jackie's family.

EARDLEY: Yeah. And then Robert Kennedy was attorney general when he came to Paris. He worked out of the Crillon Hotel, so I got to see him only once. He sent his dictation over to me with a courier.

Q: You mean on tape?

EARDLEY: No, it was scribbled. He should have brought his secretary with him. Anyway, I guess he made his call on Lyon.

Q: Do you remember what kind of problem or activity they were working on when they visited Paris at that time?

EARDLEY: I have no idea, no idea. I know what John F. Kennedy was working on, because he pulled a surprise on us. We thought we had put him on a plane at Orly — no not Orly — Charles de Gaulle airport, to go back to the United States. He didn't. He went to Vienna and met Khrushchev. That was the time when Khrushchev slammed his shoe on the table. And at three o'clock on a Sunday afternoon, I got a call to come back to the embassy. "The President is coming back!" So, I poured coffee down me. I'd been drinking martinis ever since I got home from church. Another secretary and I went to Georges V Cathedral every Sunday, and then we came back to my apartment and drank martinis the rest of the day. We did it every Sunday. So, I was loading myself with coffee after that telephone call. They told me to be at the embassy by six. I got there by six, sober, and they didn't get there till ten-thirty that night. Now, the President did not come in to the embassy, but his two aides came in. They dictated until seven-thirty in the morning.

Q: And you stayed awake?

EARDLEY: Sure! I loved dictation.

Q: Who were the aides, do you remember?

EARDLEY: Have no idea.

Q: Was the secretary of state along on that trip?

EARDLEY: I think he had already left. He had preceded them.

Q: To Vienna and back?

EARDLEY: No, no, no! No! The secretary of state had nothing to do with this Vienna thing. This was later. The President did this on his own. He was gonna talk turkey to Khrushchev.

Q: Tell me more of your adventures in Paris. Where did you live there?

EARDLEY: I lived on Rue Maspereau *[phon.]* the first two years. The second two years I lived in Boulevard St. Germain, west -- left bank. Then, the last year, I lived behind the Arc de Triomphe, in Rue des Acacias. I guess that was the name of it. I liked that. I had a one-floor, ground-floor apartment, and I loved it.

Q: What were working conditions like in the embassy? Were the offices ancient?

EARDLEY: What do you mean?

Q: The building was old, wasn't it? Was difficult to work in?

EARDLEY: Heavens, no! I didn't feel it was old. I liked working there. I had no problem.

CECIL B. LYON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1958-1964)

Cecil B. Lyon was born in New York in 1903. He graduated from Harvard University in 1927. He joined the Foreign Service in 1930 and his overseas postings included Cuba, China (Hong Kong), Japan, China, Chile, Egypt, Poland, Germany, France, and Ceylon. He was interviewed in 1988 by John Bovey.

Q: Now tell me about your assignment to Paris and what was going on there when you arrived. It was a pretty exciting time, '58.

LYON: It certainly was. And I think the nearly six or seven years that we were there, were not only the most interesting but the most stimulating, the happiest years of my whole career.

Just before I leave Chile...I've been reminded of something I think slightly amusing. Secretary Dulles administered the oath when I was made Ambassador to Chile and my father-in-law, Mr. Grew, was present. And Dulles said, "Lyon, a lot of people think you're too young to be an Ambassador but as you've lived in the shadow of your distinguished father-in-law, we think its probably all right. You've gained knowledge from him." And I couldn't resist saying, "Mr. Secretary, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumor of my youth is grossly exaggerated." Actually I was 53 years old, which wasn't all that young. When I was in Paris and President Kennedy came upon the scene, and he was appointing all his peers and didn't want old Ambassadors, I suddenly got too old to be an Ambassador again.

I had thought that, when we got back to Chile, Elsie would love it. She hadn't been well, and I thought the change and everything would give her a shot in the arm. But it didn't. She wasn't at all well, so, as often happens when you get the thing you have longed for many times, it wasn't all that gratifying. I was worried about her and after about two years -- she'd gone home to see the doctors -- I got a telephone call from Loy Henderson. He said, "You've always said you'd rather be Minister in London than an Ambassador anywhere." I said, "Yes, and it's still true." And he said, "Well, we can't send you to London but what about Paris?" I said, "Paris! Whoopie! I'd love it." He said, "What about Elsie?" And I said, "I know she'd love it too." He said, "Call her up and call me back tomorrow morning." Well I tried to get Elsie but she was staying with her mother: "Oh, Elsie has gone to bed and we can't disturb her." I told my mother-in-law the important news, but that didn't impress Mrs. Grew, so I never got through to Elsie. But I got Loy, and, naturally, I accepted. I thought Paris would also give Elsie a shot in the arm, with the shops and I knew she loved Paris and getting some nice French clothes, and the music and the opera and everything. It would really cure her. So I came back and we started off. I, of course, consulted with the Secretary on my way through. And I remember his saying to me, "You know, Lyon, I don't know what the ranking thing is, Minister to Paris, or Ambassador in Chile..." I don't remember the word he used but I said, "I don't care, sir. I think, wherever we are, the most important thing is the work, and I think the work in Paris will be terribly interesting and I also love Paris." He said, "So do I." And then he said, "I think we're going to have more problems with France in the next few years than with any country we've had since the war." He was very astute and he also said...

Q: This was still in the period of the Fourth Republic?

LYON: Yes. But he also said, "Keep an eye out for that fellow de Gaulle." Of course, as you know, de Gaulle was then living down in Colombey les-Deux-Eglises, ostensibly out of things. One reason I was sent to Paris was that we had a political appointee there, and Charlie Yost, who was one of the most brilliant Foreign Service Officers, was Minister. He was holding the hand of Amory Houghton, who couldn't have been a nicer man or more intelligent.

Q: What time of year was it, do you remember when you arrived? It was just before the May crisis.

LYON: It was March, 1958 and, if you recall, de Gaulle returned to power in May, 1958. It was still the Fourth Republic; governments were falling after a couple of weeks. I think Churchill made the remark, "Oh, the situation in France was terrible, they had one government after another. It was such a bore I had a stroke." Well anyway, Ambassador Houghton met me at the airport very kindly, and drove me to Paris. He'd never seen me before in his life, he'd taken me on sheer faith and assurances from others. I later learned, many, many years afterwards, that it was David Bruce who'd suggested that I go, and I must say I am eternally grateful to him.

Some people thought, "Oh, my goodness, he must have done something terrible in Chile, from having been Ambassador to go to Minister, No. 2 in Paris." And the Chileans didn't understand it, in fact they were a little bit annoyed. And the Foreign Minister said to me, "We can't understand why you're going to Paris as Minister. We understand that your predecessor there has

gone as Ambassador to Syria, a country from which we receive immigrants." And I said to him, "In the Foreign Service you go where you're told. Its like the Army and you just do it." I didn't tell him that secretly I was simply delighted to go. There was also the fact that my salary was going to be reduced by about \$7,000 a year. But anyway, I was so happy to be in Paris that I didn't give that a thought. As I say, Mr. Houghton didn't know me from Adam but he was a very nice man. He didn't speak French. He had an impediment with his speech so that even his English was at times difficult to understand. He'd had cancer and he'd had half his tongue removed, but I never did sort of say, "What did you say?" because I knew it was so difficult for him to talk anyway.

He drove me in and dropped me at 10 Emile Deschanel, which was the Minister's official residence, a charming house, and I was really just walking on air. But immediately when I got to Paris, France was all entangled in problems with Tunisia.

Q: The Sakiet incident took place after you got there then?

LYON: I can't remember the exact date, but we were already worrying about it then. It may have happened just as I got there. Algerian rebels were crossing into Tunisia to take refuge, and the French bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet. Bourguiba was frantic; he thought the French were going to invade Tunisia. He appealed to the U.N., where France was censured. We and the British accepted the French feeler for our good offices. Bob Murphy and a man from the British Foreign Office, Harold Beeley, came over. They shuttled back and forth between Paris and Tunis trying to calm things down.

Q: I was on the receiving end in the Department during that time. I had the Moroccan and Tunisian desk.

LYON: Well, you probably remember more of the details than I do. Of course, we all admired Mr. Murphy -- he was a wonderful Foreign Service Officer -- but it was not a wise selection, because the French remembered him from the wartime days in Algeria and the landings of American troops. De Gaulle and he didn't exactly hit it off.

Q: Yes, I remember all too well. Did you have a feeling that the Murphy-Beeley Good Offices Mission, in effect, served to weaken the Fourth Republic and to diminish its prestige? I've often wondered whether the advent of the Fifth Republic wasn't speeded up by the demonstration that the Fourth couldn't hack it in North Africa without third-party intervention.

LYON: Well, you were closer to that than I was.

Q: I always thought it was a terrible mistake for the Fourth Republic.

LYON: You did? You're probably right, but the Fourth Republic was so darn weak anyway.

Q: Oh, I agree, and in that sense the whole mess led to a good thing. It probably helped bring in the Fifth Republic, which certainly was an improvement for everybody, even though we had our problems with it.

LYON: Then they had trouble with Morocco...

Q: De Gaulle, of course, was disgusted by our mixing in.

LYON: There was one trouble after another in North Africa and France was in a terrible state.

Q: Both Morocco and Tunisia were already independent. But as I remember, the Moroccans caught the fever from the Tunisians and made trouble for the French troops there.

LYON: Yes, they were having troubles with the French.

Q: The French always had problems in Morocco and Tunisia but I don't think they were ever as bad as the war in Algeria.

LYON: But, in any event, in May when de Gaulle came back to power it was really remarkable. We got there in March and he came to power in May. I remember that Dulles came over about a month after he was there to brief -- sent by Eisenhower -- to brief de Gaulle and bring him up-to-date on our relations and problems of the world. Actually it was the only time I'd seen Dulles rather nervous. We were sitting around with the Ambassador; Burke Elbrick was the Western Europe Assistant Secretary of State, he came with Dulles, and Loomer of the French desk. We were going over how Dulles would talk to de Gaulle; and everybody was giving him advice, and I said, "Butter him up, Mr. Secretary." And Dulles gave me a scathing look, as if to say, "Me butter anybody up?"

But then we got to the meeting and General de Gaulle said, "Alors, Monsieur le Secrétaire. Qu'est-ce que vous avez à dire?" Dulles was doodling and there seemed to me to be an interminable silence before he spoke.

Q: He must have inherited this from his uncle. Wasn't it Lansing who was doodling all during the Versailles conference?

LYON: Lansing, his uncle, yes. Well, in any event, he was a great doodler and I thought, "Oh my goodness, won't he start to speak?" and was waiting and waiting. And then he started and he did a tour d'horizon of our foreign policy and it was absolutely superb. I've never known anything like it, without a note, it was just all off the top of his head. It had been agreed that they wouldn't have interpreters because Dulles spoke French and de Gaulle thought he spoke enough English, he wouldn't need it. But it hadn't been going very long when de Gaulle said, "Oh, my English is too rusty," he used a French word, I think its rouille. So Claude Lebel did the interpreting. And I was a note-taker, and the other note-taker for the French side was Charles Lucet, who later ended up as Ambassador in Washington and head of the Western Europe division of the Quai d'Orsay. But anyway de Gaulle sat there. He was very nervous. He kept stretching his neck. And every now and then he'd write a note on a piece of paper, but only, I think, very few times. I think Dulles talked for about three-quarters of an hour. It was terrific. And then he stopped and de Gaulle answered him, absolutely perfectly with just these few notes he'd written. It was a wonderful exchange of views and I was so pleased that it had gone so well.

That night we all dined at the Embassy with the Ambassador, Dulles and his staff or the people who had come with him. The Ambassador made a few nice remarks; then Dulles made some nice remarks and he said, "De Gaulle is an extraordinary man. He's in retirement for years, and, while there, he thinks." You'll remember he had been in retirement, first after 1946 and then again after 1953, in Colombey-les-Deux Eglises. And he said, "When he comes back to power, he puts his thoughts to work, and uses them."

Q: What was the Secretary's emphasis, on the communist menace?

LYON: Yes.

Q: And what about de Gaulle's?

LYON: De Gaulle more or less answered him. But I don't think he said anything about getting out of NATO. I think he supported the North Atlantic Tripartite concept as against the NATO organization.

Q: That all came to a head later but at this point...

LYON: I think he mentioned it even then. He was very worried about Algeria, of course; he talked about Algeria.

Q: Did he say anything, do you remember if he said anything specifically about the U.S., UK, French directorate? You remember the famous memorandum.

LYON: Not yet, not then. But, of course, that all came to a head later and caused us so much trouble.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Secretary inherited the Rooseveltian detestation of de Gaulle?

LYON: I didn't. And I also had the feeling that de Gaulle himself had mellowed a great deal. He didn't seem to have any resentment vis-a-vis us, although we know he did after reading his book. But that certainly didn't come out. He was very gracious, de Gaulle, and very receptive and thanked the President for sending Dulles, and he hoped that the President would come on a visit. No, I don't think he showed any sort of resentment, or I didn't get the impression of it, even though we know he harbored some resentments from the war.

Q: De Gaulle never unveiled his plans before he was ready to move.

LYON: No, of course he didn't, and he had the ability to cover up with double talk, as with his plans for Algeria.

Q: Actually there were plenty of internal reasons for his holding back, but we'll get back to that after we've talked about the assassination attempt at Petit Clamart.

LYON: Let me say just one thing about tactics. I think a lot of people when they called on de Gaulle and wanted to sell something or get him to do something, they thought he was agreeing with them if he didn't answer them. But often he really wasn't agreeing; he just wasn't making any comment at all. Don't you think that was true?

Q: Absolutely.

LYON: I think a lot of people were fooled by that. On the other hand, some people always said, you know, that once he'd made up his mind, he never changed. But I think we know he did. In the Algerian thing, he changed very considerably. At the beginning it was total surrender for the Algerians and all that, and then he worked it out by getting more lenient.

Q: Yes, maybe, but I've never been able to decide whether he meant all that stuff he told the French and the military in Algiers -- "Je vous ai compris" and all that. I had a feeling that he knew damn well that at the end of the affair, Algerie Francaise just wasn't going to wash.

LYON: Oh, I think he did know, and he was so wise. I think he handled it very well.

Q: Yes, he was very farsighted, and astute too.

LYON: I think Frenchmen, when he came in, thought, "Oh, he has all the answers." I don't think he had all the answers, but I think he knew how to wait and move slowly, and move a little bit here, try an idea and then if it didn't work try out another one. You hadn't got to Paris yet, but people were relieved that he was in power -- we'll leave everything to papa. We'll let him worry about it -- and he was quite prepared to worry about it.

Q: Did you have any echoes of the Debre thesis that what we were out to do was to kick the French out of Algeria so the imperialists could inherit the oil?

LYON: Oh, did I not!

Q: No, no, I mean, do you have any feeling that this was very widely believed in France?

LYON: You know, everybody was saying we wanted to get them out so we could get the oil. And I'd go out to dinner and French people would attack me with this. And in those days I was able to say, "Don't be silly. We've got oil running out of our ears," which we did have then, though we later didn't. And then I'd throw out some remark and one Frenchman would agree and one would disagree and they'd get into a fight, and then I'd back away. I'm glad you mentioned that.

Q: On the left, though where this Debre thesis should have been popular, I always had the feeling that Algeria was more like Vietnam for us with the left wing. I don't know whether they bought the Debre thesis or not.

LYON: I don't know whether they did, but I know that all the bankers and people like that -- the leading upper crust -- had this feeling.

Oh, I'm so glad you mentioned Debre because about a week or two weeks before de Gaulle returned to power, I was invited by a delightful American, a retired diplomat who lived in Paris whom you probably knew, Louis Einstein. Louis Einstein was a widower; he used to give stag luncheons and he very kindly used to invite me to them. One day he called up and said, "Debre is coming to lunch tomorrow and I think you ought to know him." So I went to lunch and we hadn't been there very long when Debre started this attack that we wanted to get the French out because of the oil. And I went back at him hammer and tongs and poor Louis Einstein, the host, kept getting more and more embarrassed and trying to change the subject and talking about Czechoslovakia where he'd been Ambassador, but Debre and I went at it full, full, force. After the luncheon, we came down stairs and I had a car and he didn't. I said, "Can I give you a lift home?" He agreed and then he said, "You know this has been interesting, let's get to know each other." I wasn't going to let that slip. I didn't know he was going to become Prime Minister the next week, but I immediately got him for lunch again and we really became very good friends. And when I used to accompany the Ambassador, when he was Prime Minister, he would sit there, as you mentioned the other night, with that little boyish face and his head slanted to the left, and he'd say the most outrageous things, and I'd think, "This man is Prime Minister. He shouldn't be saying these things about Algeria and everything." Then I would think...and you couldn't tell whether what he was saying was his own idea or whether it was de Gaulle talking. They both talked very much the same, and they both had the same ideas and their thoughts were absolutely linked together.

Q: Its curious, though, isn't it? With Debre the quality of greatness just wasn't there, was it?

LYON: No, but he was a bright man. I remember once when he'd just come back from Algiers, and he was all thrilled. They were putting up a sort of line of defense -- an electric wire defense on the border -- and he was most enthusiastic about it. He turned to the Ambassador and said, "You ought to go to Algeria. Have you ever been to Algiers?" The Ambassador said, "No." "You ought to go." And Mr. Houghton sort of backed away and said, "No, I can't." "Well you ought to go, Lyon." I said, "I'd love to." I thought it was just talk. He said, "I'll arrange it" and I thought he never would. I got back to the office and the telephone was ringing, and the French official said, "The Prime Minister wants us to make arrangements for you to go to Algeria." So I immediately accepted, and I stayed with Paul Delouvrier the Delege General (High Commissioner) for Algeria. I had a most interesting time.

Q: Did you go with French escort?

LYON: Entirely.

Q: We were still going back and forth to Algeria when I was there in 1961. I made the last trip which it was possible to do under French aegis. It was just before independence.

LYON: We had a French plane, and French escort everywhere I went. And I must say I admired those young French officers, the ones who were sort of out in the field running things in the outlying areas.

Q: The Affaires Indigenes people? They were first class.

LYON: First class, and so wonderful for a young man to have such responsibility. I remember thinking how interesting for them.

Q: I shouldn't hog the conversation here, but that was the only French administrative thing, that was really first class in Morocco during the difficult days. The military staffed the Affaires Indigenes and they were wonderful.

LYON: They were wonderful. Sort of a super Peace Corps.

Q: Pure paternalism, but it was very good. Can we go to the Eisenhower visit and the terrible bust-up?

LYON: One more thing first. I think it was on May 13, just before de Gaulle came back to power, that there was a general insurrection of the French military in Algiers. The British Minister in Paris, Jerry Young, had been Third Secretary in Peking when I was Third Secretary there, so we were delighted to work together. I was sitting in my office late at night and he came rushing over. He said, "Cecil, they're going to land in Paris, they're going to take Paris." And I said, "Oh, don't be silly. I've come from Latin America. We have those things in Latin America, but we don't have them in France." He said, "Well they are, they are." He was terribly worried, you see. And just then the telephone rang, Burke Elbrick in Washington on the other end, "How are things in Paris?" They were all excited in Washington. I said, "I'm sitting here in my office, looking out on the Place de la Concorde, the fountains are playing, all the lights are on, everything is fine, don't get worried." They didn't want to hear that, they wanted to hear that some terrible thing was happening.

Q: In a way, it was a preview of the thing that happened three years later, the putsch of the Generals -- Challe and company -- in Algiers, April 1961.

LYON: When Ambassador Gavin was there and I had all my trouble about our intelligence gathering. Another thing about Algeria. I never could understand the French insisting that it was a Department of Metropolitan France.

Q: "Partie Integrante de la France."

LYON: Which was crazy because it really wasn't, and you had to have a visa to get in there. Now you didn't have to have a visa to get into Normandy, or Brittany.

Q: Now what about the Eisenhower visit which took place in September 1959?

LYON: That was a great occasion and de Gaulle was insistent that everything should go perfectly and smoothly. I think he wanted to bury the hatchet as far as the troubles they had during the war. And I had charge of making our arrangements so I got to see a lot of his aides. We worked everything out, and everything had to be submitted, every tiny detail, had to be submitted to General de Gaulle himself to approve for that visit. And then he went out to the

airport to meet General Eisenhower...

Q: Was this an echo of his wartime relationship, or was he this way with all the visitors?

LYON: I think he wanted to bury the wartime relationship.

Q: Well, the wartime relationship wasn't always bad, you know.

LYON: Well it was with FDR.

Q: I mean the relationship with Eisenhower.

LYON: It wasn't too bad?

Q: No, he said that Eisenhower had given in, don't you remember, on the question of taking Strasbourg and de Gaulle said, "You're a man who recognizes when he's made a mistake."

LYON: Anyway, as they were coming in from the airport there were lots of cheers, and I think de Gaulle said, "You see how much you're loved here, you're respected here." And Eisenhower, with his usual tact said, "Ah, but I think a good deal of this is for you, General de Gaulle." The visit was a tremendous success. I remember going down to one of the receptions at the Hotel de Ville; there were crowds and crowds. I was a little disappointed because I felt de Gaulle was going out of his way to be nice, and sort of reaching out to Eisenhower, which was not in the nature of de Gaulle's character. And it was usually in the nature of Eisenhower to be outgoing, but I felt Eisenhower was sort of holding back a little, that he wasn't going out to be friendly with de Gaulle as much as de Gaulle was going out to be friendly with him. And I remember the last night was spent in Rambouillet, the President, de Gaulle and their respective staffs. I think Eisenhower's son was with him and Scowcroft. I think he was there but I'm not sure.

Q: Oh, Brent Scowcroft.

LYON: And the Ambassador. They all spent the night and they had a dinner at Rambouillet, a stag dinner, and they very kindly invited me to go. I got out there about 15 minutes ahead of time. I was alone and I was waiting in a sitting room, and Debre arrived. Debre and I were having a nice little chat and suddenly the door opened. General de Gaulle walked through, nodded at us, and loomed over the table where he had arranged the gifts that he was going to present. He was giving a Houdon bust of Lafayette, I think, to President Eisenhower and he had a gift for each of the visiting team. And he looked at the card for each, to be sure that everything was correct. I thought this infinite attention to detail was interesting.

Q: Father Christmas.

LYON: Well, yes, but for a busy man! And yet he never seemed busy. He always seemed to have plenty of time for everyone; and calm, and he was never rushed. We were talking, I think, the other night about his blindness. He'd had cataracts and he'd had the operation. He didn't think it was proper or appropriate for the Chief of State to wear glasses. But he couldn't really see

without his glasses. I remember once at the dedication of the Place de l'Etoile. It was a circle, and he got out of his car and he started to walk where he thought was straight ahead, but there was a crowd there and he kept bumping into the crowd and the aides kept nudging him because he couldn't see. Also, Pompidou told me that when de Gaulle became president and Coty left the presidency, he and de Gaulle drove together to the Arc de Triomphe and placed flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Then de Gaulle drove back to the Elysée with Pompidou, which was a great mark of respect for Pompidou. Pompidou said the streets were lined with crowds but that sometimes, surprisingly enough, French crowds can be quiet, they don't yell or demonstrate. They often do both but I mean they weren't making any noise and de Gaulle turned to Pompidou and he said, "Pompidou, est que il y a de la foule?" The streets were packed with people But he couldn't see that far. And then at the time of the Kennedy visit, we all went to lunch at the Elysée and de Gaulle gave gifts to the President and Mrs. Kennedy. He suddenly found himself all alone and he grabbed me by the arm and said, "Regardez, Monsieur le Premier Conseiller," as he called me, "Voilà," and he pointed to the ceiling on which were painted three or four scenes. He told me what each scene was, and he didn't have his glasses on so I knew he couldn't see it but he must have memorized it at some point. He had a fantastic memory, as you know. They tell me he'd write a speech, read it over once, and say it without a correction.

Q: I remember the speech he gave about the gold standard.

LYON: Was it wonderful?

Q: Well, it wasn't very sound, I guess, but he had memorized, I suppose, ten pages from Jacques Rueff's book about the gold standard and he just reeled it off as though it was his own stuff.

LYON: Well, you know, they say he could read anything over once, and that was all he needed to give it without a mistake.

Q: Let's get back to the other Eisenhower visit and the collapse of the Summit in May, 1960.

LYON: Do you want me to talk about the Summit?

Q: Yes. Where were you during all this ghastly episode?

LYON: Well, we were there, of course.

Q: Were you present during the meeting?

LYON: No, no, I wasn't at any of the meetings. But Chip and Livy Merchant were both staying with us, so we had a pretty good rundown of it. And Elsie has actually written that up somewhere; she made a very good description of it all. Chip came home one day and said, "Well there's no summit." As you recall, Khrushchev was there and it was just after the U-2 incident when the Russians had shot down the U-2. Eisenhower had taken the blame, but Khrushchev insisted that he apologize. Eisenhower refused. He said he was sorry it happened and, "I take the blame." De Gaulle was a little inept, in that he should have let Eisenhower speak first. But Khrushchev, as you know, rose up and cursed out the United States, and cursed out Eisenhower,

and then wouldn't go on with the Summit unless Eisenhower apologized, which he didn't.

But it was at that meeting, as I recall, that de Gaulle proved himself a good ally and said to President Eisenhower, "Well, come what may, we'll be with you all the way."

Q: The incident took place a few days before Eisenhower came to Paris, didn't it?

LYON: Yes, only a few days...

Q: It was in the public domain, though before he arrived?

LYON: Oh, yes. And in the States Eisenhower had said, "It's all my fault, I'm Chief of State."

Q: That's when we had that famous morning with Acheson at the War College that I told you about.

LYON: Oh, really? In any event, this is where I made another gaffe. It's surprising I lasted as long as I did in the Service. We were all dining at the Residence that night with President Eisenhower and his people and everyone was a bit downcast. And I said, "Well, there's one person who will be very happy that this has happened." And the President said, "Who?" And I said, "Eisenhower." He said, "What?" And Bohlen said, "Cecil, what are you talking about, what do you mean?" I said, "My God, I mean Adenauer." So you can see what a successful career I had.

But anyway, the President was supreme. He didn't seem terribly concerned, I mean he was concerned, but he said, "Oh well, you have these things happen, and you've got to take them." He was rather philosophical.

Q: You're talking about Eisenhower?

LYON: Yes, not Adenauer.

Q: Eisenhower was not easy to rattle.

LYON: But Adenauer, you know, was against the Summit and he didn't want it to be held at all, as I recall. That's why I was thinking of Adenauer.

At the dinner Eisenhower made a remark I have never forgotten. He said everyone always says, "You must be under great pressure, and don't feel stress."

Q: MacMillan, I gather, was practically reduced to tears about the thing.

LYON: Who?

Q: MacMillan. He had staked everything on this.

LYON: The German names remind me of when I was head of German affairs. Somebody called up the State Department and they wanted to speak to Mr. Sechsauer. And I was head of German affairs and they thought Sechsauer, Adenauer, Eisenhower, he must be in German affairs. So the call was put through to German affairs, and they said, "Do you have a Sechsauer in German affairs?" And the operator said, "No, since Mr. Lyon has been here we don't even have a coffee break."

Q: Tell us something about the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of '62, and the Acheson mission.

LYON: Well, you've asked a very pertinent question, because that was one of the most exciting times in my stay in Paris. As I recall, it was an autumn Sunday. I was at home with flu. The telephone rang and Washington told me a very distinguished person would be arriving that night at 12:00 midnight or 1:00 a.m. or some dreadful hour, not at Orly but at an American airfield way out to hell and gone, I don't remember which one.

Q: Evreux maybe?

LYON: It probably was Evreux. And I should meet him. Something must have been said that gave me a hint that it was Acheson because I wasn't surprised when I got out to the airport and Acheson stepped off the plane with a couple of people; one was Sherman Kent. I don't remember who else was with him, but I think there were one or two.

It was very funny, because I was in bed with flu, but things got so exciting, and I was so involved that my flu vanished. Acheson said he had to see de Gaulle right away and it was then 2:00 a.m. in the morning, or 1:00 a.m. in the morning. I said, "I know he's at Colombey- les-Deux Eglises but I'll call the Elysée immediately in the morning," and I did. I explained what it was, and I was able then to explain who it was. I said, "He's been sent by the President on a very special mission and he has to see President de Gaulle as soon as possible." I was told the President would see him the moment he got back from Colombey- les-Deux Eglises, which was about 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon, I think. And I said it must be kept very hush, we don't want anyone to know he's here. So they arranged for us to enter a side door.

Q: Excuse me. Had it already become public before Acheson got there?

LYON: No. The crisis had become public but we wanted to keep his visit absolutely quiet because he was going on to London and Bonn, as I recall. We went in to a sort of side entrance, through the concierge's room, and then we went down through the cellar. I must say, I don't know that we actually went through the cellar, but Acheson in his book describes it, saying that we climbed under water pipes; he embellishes it greatly. Then we went up some back stairs and General de Gaulle greeted us. And they had brought, as I remember, visual aids, so Mr. Kent had the visual equipment set up with a big map to show about the missile emplacements and so on. Acheson explained, and then Kent explained, and they all gave the technicalities of where the missiles were within Cuba. They showed them photographs which had been taken by our planes, or some sort of flying satellite.

De Gaulle was terribly impressed: the old soldier, you see, was coming out. And he got up and looked at the visual aid very carefully, with his glasses, and he said as I recall...Schlesinger describes it a little bit in his book -- he wasn't there, but he evidently read the telegrams which I sent -- and he said, "Well, you told me after the event, but of course, at times independent nations must make their own decision. But whatever happens, France will be with you all the way." And I almost kissed him. And, of course, Acheson was supremely happy. Acheson went on to London and he showed the same things to MacMillan or whoever was Prime Minister and then on to Germany.

I heard later that neither of those leaders came forward so strongly. They didn't say, "We'll be with you all the way." They agreed but they weren't quite as forthcoming. So it was good; even though de Gaulle was a terrible pain in most things for us, in the crisis he did come through and supported us. That's about all I remember of that.

I remember that poor Elsie thought that she had to wake the Secretary -- no, he wasn't the Secretary then, he was just a private individual -- about 10:00 or 11:00 and she did. He was very nice about it. But he didn't have to get up that early, because we didn't go until about 2:00. Elsie was very upset but I think Acheson went back to sleep.

Q: Reading Viansson-Ponte's wonderful history of the République Gaullienne, I'm impressed with the frequency of the assassination attempts on de Gaulle and the political effects of the incident at Petit Clamart -- you remember Bastien-Thierry and all the military fanatics and other gangsters. That business and his miraculous escape seem to have whizzed up the machinery after August 1962 in consolidating the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Do you remember: was there any reaction in Washington, or in the Embassy?

LYON: I think everybody was shocked. We knew there were constant attempts to assassinate him. Pompidou and Olivier Guichard and all those people who were his aides -- Pompidou was de Gaulle's aide before de Gaulle became President, when he was still Prime Minister -- and they all would tell me they couldn't do anything with de Gaulle. Secretly he probably thought it would be a good thing if he were assassinated, that he'd go down in history as even more of a hero. They'd tell him that something was going to happen, or that they'd heard rumors that somebody might try to assassinate him somewhere but he'd go there anyway. He'd insist on going, nothing could put him off. And during that terrible thing at Petit Clamart, which you recall, but people don't remember now, he had to drive through a square and at two corners of the Square they had trucks lined up with machine guns in them. His car had to drive through a stream of bullets, one coming from the right and another stream coming from the left, and the car was pretty well pocked with bullet marks, one just behind where his head would have been. You heard that they got him down on the floor but I heard that when his son-in-law, who was sitting in the front seat, told the General to duck, he sat up even straighter. But who knows, we can't tell those details.

I do remember another attempt when he was motoring down to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, which was something like a four or five hours drive if I'm not mistaken. Finally they got him to stop driving and they flew him down. But this time he was driving along and it had been raining, and they saw a little sort of flash on the roadside. They all hopped out to see what it was, and it was a fuse leading back into the woods to a bomb that had sort of fizzled out because of the rain

or the wet ground. And de Gaulle looked at it and he said, "Alors, it's either a jest and in very bad humor, or its dangerous. Let's get the hell out of here," and they all rushed to the car and drove off.

Q: Let's backtrack for just a minute. We've mentioned the Tripartite Memorandum but we haven't gone into any great detail about that. That was in '58 as I remember.

LYON: September 24th was the famous memorandum, in which de Gaulle suggested a planning group of the three allies, France, Great Britain, and the United States. We were very concerned about that. I think de Gaulle was aiming to get back on the old wartime footing of the three. I think we thought it would cause trouble in Germany. I'm not sure it would have. I thought maybe Adenauer could have been talked to because he had established such friendly relations with de Gaulle. Of course, in 1958 they hadn't advanced to the point they did later. Then, as a way to avoid getting in too deep, we suggested, as General de Gaulle had been out of things for a long time, that he be given a briefing by the military so he would know the present status of all the atomic bombs, etc., etc. Then they couldn't decide who would give him the briefing. The Commander of NATO wanted to give him...

Q: Where were you at this point? Were you in Paris?

LYON: I was in Paris, yes. And the Commander of SAC also thought he should do it. So they fussed about that for a long time, and then it was suggested that it be done at rather a lower scale. Joxe would go from France and Bob Murphy, who was the Deputy Under Secretary of State would be our man, and the third man would be Lord Hood, who had same job in Washington that I had in Paris. Well, let's make a sort of summary of it. It never worked out. A lot of people claim that we never answered the letter and for some time we had difficulty finding the answer. But we had really answered de Gaulle. I think Chip was the one that dug it out and found that we had because he was convinced that we had.

Q: It was a rather evasive reply.

LYON: It was an evasive letter and de Gaulle was put out by it, and I always felt as I did about the atomic question. De Gaulle wanted to develop his little atomic bomb. He said it would only be enough "to pull off an arm". That was his expression. He knew it couldn't be very much but he wanted to have it, and he wanted us to help him, but we never would. President Eisenhower said to Ambassador Houghton, "I'd like to slip him one under the table." But what was it -- the McMahon Amendment? -- that prevented giving help.

Q: I don't remember. Bombinette, I remember was the French expression for the first French atomic weapon.

LYON: The what?

Q: His bombinette -- de Gaulle's little bomb. I remember one of the indiscreet imps at the Elysée telling me about General de Gaulle's discussion of the bombinette with Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador. Nothing can cure the French sweet tooth for indiscretions, especially when there is

a victim involved. Vinogradov had been smart enough to keep in touch with General de Gaulle during the "passage of the desert" before 1958, when he was still at Colombey. I think they may have known each other during the war in Algiers. Anyway, he came in sometime in the early '60's, under instructions from Moscow to protest the French atomic experiments in the Sahara and to warn against expanding the French weapons program. Vinogradov took the tone of comradely sorrow instead of the usual Soviet bluster. He told General de Gaulle it was a pity France was wasting vast sums on a program that could serve no purpose. He said, "Let us suppose that with this bombinette you are working on, you were to succeed in destroying one Soviet city -- say Kiev or Odessa -- what would be the result?" De Gaulle waited politely for the Ambassador to answer his own question. "In retaliation," Vinogradov said, "France unhappily would be wiped off the map (La France serait rayée de la carte)."

General de Gaulle thought this over for a minute. "But in that event, my dear Vinogradov," he said, "you and I would die together wouldn't we? Nos mourions ensemble, n'est-ce pas?" I always remember that -- and lots of other remarks -- when people try to tell me that de Gaulle had no sense of humor.

LYON: You are right, he did have a good sense of humor. Guichard told me that once he was talking with Boegner, in de Gaulle's outer office. Someone had blundered and Boegner exclaimed, "That fool. I'd like to liquidate all the fools in the world." At that point le grand Charles entered the room and said, "Un vaste programme."

In any event, I felt we could have been a little more forthcoming. After all, if we considered France worthy to be an ally, why not help them a little with the bomb? But another argument was, if we help them, then we'd have to help Germany, etc., etc. As you know, we never did anything about it.

Q: There are some people who think that de Gaulle never really expected anything from that Memorandum about the Tripartite Directorate..

LYON: I think he was probably too sensible.

Q: He may have been feeling the pulse for the future, and he would have been very surprised if we had gone along with all of it.

LYON: I think that's probably right because he was no fool, in my opinion.

Q: Tell us a little about the Kennedy visit in '62.

LYON: That was the most delightful visit from the point of view of Franco-American relations. I was so proud. I think all Americans were so proud to have that dashing, bright, young President come to France accompanied by the ravishing Jackie Kennedy.

Q: I remember it very well.

LYON: Everybody remembers it. And I remember going to a luncheon which the American

press gave for Kennedy, and with his usual wit he got up and said, "You ask who I am? I'm the young man who came to Paris with Jackie Kennedy." De Gaulle gave a wonderful dinner out at Versailles where they really laid on the dog, the table was covered with gold cloths, and beautiful china, and fountains playing, and wonderful music. It was really like the old days of Versailles, and looking over across the table and seeing Jackie sitting on the right hand of President de Gaulle, speaking flawless French, made one awfully proud to be an American. I think the visit was a tremendous success.

Q: Was there any really substantive business?

LYON: I don't think so. I think it was just a sort of state visit.

Q: He was on his way to Vienna, really, wasn't he?

LYON: Yes. As you know, when General Gavin came as Ambassador to Paris, he was convinced that he was going to improve relations with France, that the President wanted to improve them. The President secretly really was a great admirer of de Gaulle. So I have been told by my son-in-law, who was the President's brother-in-law. But it never worked and as you know, Gavin got disillusioned and retired after two years. But I must say that was very early in de Gaulle's return to power and I had a feeling that things were really going to get better. But we had plenty of trouble ahead.

Q: What were the effects in Paris when the OAS (Organization Armee Secrete) went crazy at the end of the Algerian crisis, just before independence.

LYON: Well, we mentioned how de Gaulle was constantly being threatened. He wasn't the only one. I remember there were all sorts of bombs...plastics, weren't they called? -- being set off all over Paris. Beaumarchais at the Foreign Office had the front of his building blown off. Beuve-Mery of LeMonde -- building was plastiqued. I had a terrible scare because Joxe, who was then Minister for Algeria and was handling the negotiations with the Algerians came to dinner one night; and after, he lingered on, talking with me after most of the guests had left. He and his wife went out and there was no car to drive them home. The car hadn't come for them. And he called up some garage, I don't know what it was, I suppose it was some government garage and kept saying, "Joxe, Joxe, the Minister for Algeria." They evidently didn't get his name or didn't know. And then, finally, a car came up and usually they had a policeman sitting in the front seat. This car didn't have any, and I was terrified as he drove off because I was afraid something might happen to him -- kidnapped or something. And I said, "Please telephone me the moment you get to your house." And fortunately, about fifteen minutes later, he did telephone. But that was the sort of nervous state we were all in.

Cy Sulzberger, of the NY Times, was a very good friend, whom I used to see a great deal of. He wrote an article that was pretty critical of the OAS, and I thought, "My God, they'll do something to him." He came in the day he had published the article and I said, "Look, I think you ought to tell the police to give you some protection because you may be plastiqued." He said, "Oh, bull" or something; I mean he used a stronger word than that. And I said, "I think you should." He said, "I wouldn't hear of it." So I got the CIA man, and I said, "I'm worried about Sulzberger." So

he arranged with the French police to put some guards on his house, and a few days later Cy came in and he said, "There are a lot of goons around my house. Is it you who did that?" I had to admit it was; he writes about it in The Last of the Giants.

1960 didn't start very well for me. I got a polyp in my right eye and I went to a French doctor, and he said, "This isn't going to hurt," and he stuck something in my eye. I felt that he'd stuck a dagger in it. And then he bandaged it up, and he said I could take the bandage off the next morning which I did and there was still a little bump in my eye but it had moved slightly. And I called him up and I said, "Should there still be a little bump?" "What bump? No, no, there shouldn't." So I rushed down to see him, and he said, "We'll have to give you another operation." I lunched with the Ambassador that day and he said, "You're a fool. You hop on a plane and go home right away," which I did and I saw my own doctor and I had the operation, it was very minor. And then I was starting back for Paris and I got to the airport, and I ran into Raymond LaPorte and I said, "Why are you going back? He said, "I'm going to Paris to have an operation on my eye." And I felt like saying, "You're going in the wrong direction." But I didn't and he looked at my eye and I had a patch on, and he said, "What's that?" "Oh," I said, "I've got a little conjunctivitis or something." I didn't dare tell him and I never told the French that the first doctor had not been successful because I knew it would have been a scandal that they'd all start talking about.

Q: Who was LaPorte?

LYON: Raymond LaPorte, oh, I should have said, Consul General in New York -- the French Consul General, and he was going back to Paris to have the operation that I'd just come to the States for. Well anyway, it was cold, and dreary, and horrible when we got back and I was scheduled to go off on a trip to Africa. It was just before the African French colonies had gained their independence. The Military Attaché was also accredited there or those colonies were under his observation and he used to take a tour of them every year. I went off with him feeling pretty grim with my eye and a cold. We spent the first night in Algiers. Freddy Lyon was the Consul General there but I wasn't able to see him because I was still sick, but I was beginning to feel better and better. The next night, as I remember, we spent in Tamanrasset where I got up early the next morning to go to very early mass. It was pitch black; it was where Pere Foucauld had been. I'd never heard of Pere Foucauld before I went to France but he was quite a character. He'd been an aristocrat, and sort of a playboy, and he traveled disguised as a rabbi all over part of Africa where the French weren't allowed to go.

Q: A rabbi?

LYON: Yes, I don't know why, I've forgotten, but I remember that made an impression on me. In any event, he later became a priest and a very good one, and a missionary, and he had lots of converts. And in this little chapel I've never felt so near to God. It was dark, and slowly it got lighter, and there was only one other person there besides the priest and me. And it was quiet in the desert; it was really terribly impressive.

Amongst other people I saw the famous Abbe Youlou who, you may remember, presented President Eisenhower with a baby elephant. The first one died, and then he got another one

called Dumbo. You may not remember, but we had the great problem of getting this little baby elephant from Paris to the States. Because some General had shipped his dog on the plane and got a lot of criticism, we didn't want to have some scandal come out of using the Army plane to transport an elephant to President Eisenhower.

Q: Was it accepted? Did it get to the States?

LYON: It finally got there and the President didn't know what the devil to do with it and he finally gave it to the Washington Zoo. Abbe Youlou was in Brazzaville, wasn't he? I think so. And before I left Paris, Pompidou, with whom I'd become great friends -- I'll talk a little bit about that later -- said, "Oh, when you get to Brazzaville, be sure to go over to Leopoldville because we -- that was the Rothschild Bank -- own the ferry." Did you ever know that? Well anyway, I did go over. I had lunch with the Consul General and I felt that things were very tense. I kept thinking how wonderfully the Belgians had developed that country, except they hadn't educated the people enough to take over really, they'd kept them rather down. But I saw the first reactor I'd ever seen, the first atomic reactor I'd ever seen, I saw in Leopoldville in the University. And when I did get back to Brazzaville that night, they all told me I was very lucky to get back because there'd been riots. I'd seen a few riots but they didn't seem to be serious; but they'd become quite serious and plane connections had been stopped, and apparently the ferry was stopped after I came back.

Q: This was before the period of the massacre at Stanleyville and all that business, wasn't it?

LYON: Yes, it was just before the Belgian Congo got its independence and, oh yes, I think it was about the time of all that trouble. I remember Bill Burden was our Ambassador to Belgium and he was constantly sending wires about it, of which we kept getting copies in Paris.

I talked to Youlou and he was insistent about wanting to be invited to the United States. And I said, "Well, you know, the President is very busy and we'll have to see if we can arrange it." But he evidently thought he'd convinced me, because he invited me to dinner that night. And he never showed up at the dinner -- it was at a restaurant -- but he sent two of his Ministers instead, and they sat one on each side of me, and each one whispered to me at some point that they wanted to go to the United States too.

You can remember that period, just when the colonies all became free. I was very impressed that their leaders seemed to want primarily the symbols of power and strength: and black limousines, and beautiful houses, and trips to the United States. Of course, de Gaulle spoiled them a little bit, by constantly having them come to Paris where he'd treat them in the royal manner. Remember all those visits?

That was an interesting thing about de Gaulle, to watch the way he managed his presidency. You will recall that about every six weeks he'd take a tour around the country -- to a different part of the country -- and he'd make speeches, and he'd dine with the local officials, and he'd try out ideas and if they didn't go down very well he'd try another idea. Then when he got back he'd put these ideas into play. He also used to have a visiting Chief of State come about every month. And for a man his age it was remarkable that he was able to do all this and still run the country

because he'd have to have dinner parties for all these people, and he'd have to take them hither and yon. I was always impressed with all that.

And another thing that I was impressed with. Some of those African countries had such wonderful government buildings, and schools, and hospitals, and I thought, "It is quite a thing to just give all this away." Because the French had invested a great deal in Africa.

Q: Where else did you go besides the two Congos?

LYON: Well, I went to about all the French colonies.

Q: Really. Senegal?

LYON: Mali, Niamey, Chad -- is Ouagadougou Chad?

Q: No, Ouagadougou is the capital of Upper Volta. The country is now Burkina Faso.

LYON: But I remember it was one of the grimmest places we'd been in. We spent one night there and we were supposed to leave at 9:00 the next morning or something like that. And usually there'd be stragglers getting out to the plane in most of the places when we were about to take off. There wasn't a straggler the next morning. They were all out at the airport about half an hour ahead of the time we were supposed to take off. Funnily enough, my nephew, Peter Moffat was Ambassador in Chad...

Q: Yes, I know.

LYON: ...and he liked it and he found it interesting. He was an awfully good sport.

Q: Don Norland was heavily involved in the Chad too, still is. That's really a mess.

LYON: Oh, that's Chad, I was talking about Upper Volta, wasn't I.

Q: Yes, that's Ouagadougou, that was Don Dumont, as I remember. Did you go to any of the naughty countries like Guinea which had opted out of the French union. Did you go to Conakry?

LYON: I went to Conakry, yes.

Q: Did you meet Sekou Toure?

LYON: I met Sekou Toure.

Q: Was Nkrumah staying with him then? The longest house guest in history. He fled, you know, from Ghana in 1966 and Sekou Toure took him in and I think he was there for many years until he died.

LYON: No, I don't think he was there. But some of those countries I found fascinating and I also

was impressed with what respect most of the leaders had for France still. They were still very loyal to France, and as you know, Houphouet-Boigny...

Q: That's a country I wanted to ask you about, yes, the Ivory Coast.

LYON: Cote d'Ivoire. That was almost like being at a party in France. You'd go to a dinner and the women would all be dressed in French clothes, and they were very pro-French.

Q: Well, I gather that the Ivory Coast is still more or less of a star exhibit among all those declining economies. They're not as well off as they were, but they're pretty good by comparison with the others.

LYON: Well, of course, the French poured a lot of money into those colonies.

Q: They still do.

LYON: I don't know if there is anything very substantive that I can say more about that journey.

Q: We were going to talk about Pompidou then.

LYON: The '62 journey with Guichard.

Q: Oh, Guichard, okay, the trip to Algeria.

LYON: Olivier Guichard, who had been in de Gaulle's cabinet, one of his assistants. I got to know him very well. He later became Minister for Planning National Economic Affairs. He was in charge of the Sahara desert area where the oil was being developed. And he invited me to go on a trip with him, and it was rather fascinating. We've always heard that in the desert there's no water. We got to places where they were drilling and water would be spraying up 20 feet high out of the desert. And I remember in one place, Ghardaia I think, we spent the night there. And we had a lot of the sheiks to dinner and I said, "Don't you hope they find oil here?" And they said, "We'd rather find water," which was very wise.

And then we stopped to visit the man who developed those wonderful tractors that climbed over the dunes, I've forgotten what his name was. It was a very interesting trip.

Q: This was in '62?

LYON: '62.

Q: The Evian Agreements were approved in April, and then in July Algerian independence was approved and became official.

LYON: Another de Gaulle official that I purposely -- its a little awkward to say, that I purposely, specifically cultivated, was Pompidou. Pompidou had been de Gaulle's Chef de Cabinet before de Gaulle became president. I mentioned earlier that when de Gaulle after taking over from Coty,

had Pompidou drive down from the Arc de Triomphe with him, I thought, "Now that indicates Pompidou is going to be something more important later." He went back to the Banque Rothschild where he had been before being taken on by de Gaulle. I used to see him; I'd have him for lunch, and see quite a lot of him, and his wife would come. And then, of course, he did become Chef de Cabinet, Prime Minister and it was very useful to be able to see him. He later became president but I wasn't there when he became president.

Q: After that there was a kind of rift with de Gaulle, I think.

LYON: Oh, there was quite a rift by the time de Gaulle resigned. Do you remember, for three or four days de Gaulle disappeared when the troubles were stirring? I think that's when it was. I'd already left Paris, I didn't get into that. Before all this I remember Pompidou once saying to me that it was awful that the United States was dominating Europe. I said, "Come on, we're not dominating Europe, we're not trying to dominate Europe. Why would we have worked so hard to build a united Europe if we wanted to dominate it?" He said, "You can't help but dominate it because you're so rich, and you're so powerful, and you've got all these American companies all over the place." He changed after he became president, he was very friendly to the United States and I think really one of the most outgoing presidents...certainly more outgoing than de Gaulle.

Q: I remember sitting next to him at your house at lunch. I think he was back in the bank or still an aide. He was charming to me. I felt as though I was talking to someone my own age, my own station.

LYON: He was very agreeable. I thought so, and I always talked very frankly with him. And as I say, I was cultivating him on purpose. After he became Prime Minister, Madame Pompidou said to me, "Why don't you ask us for dinner anymore?" I said, "Come on, I'm not the Ambassador. The Ambassador wouldn't like it if I had the Prime Minister to dine, and lunch, and things like that." She said, "Oh, but we'd like it." I didn't say anything to her -- but I must say that whenever the Ambassador left town I scurried over to see Pompidou who became a really good friend. Norman Armour said I invented Pompidou because he came to lunch so frequently when Norman was there.

But I had a terrible let-down with him once. He'd invited us (I think it was when he was in the bank) he'd invited us to dinner and after dinner -- it was small tables and we were all sitting around -- and he said, "Cecil, Francoise Sagan would like to talk to you." And I thought, "Oh, la-la, mes beaux yeux!" He took me over to Francoise Sagan, and all she wanted was to get a visa for some friend of hers who'd been denied a visa because of drugs, as I recall, or something like that. So that was a terrible blow.

Q: Well, I think we've just about done it. I would like, if you have anything to say on the subject, to hear about de Gaulle's attitude toward the United States and Indochina.

LYON: Oh, I can tell you exactly what he said. I accompanied Rusk when he went to see de Gaulle during the Vietnam troubles, and de Gaulle said, "Get out of Vietnam."

Q: Do you remember when this was, approximately?

LYON: Well, it was during the Rusk encounter. But he said, "You get out of Vietnam." He didn't say it quite as bluntly as that, but he said, "Whatever you do, it will be considered a White Man's war against the Oriental, and I can't give you stronger advice," and he kept making it stronger and stronger. So that's what I remember about his attitude about that.

Now would you be amused to know why I stayed so long in Paris?

Q: Sure, go ahead.

LYON: You can either rub this off, or not, but its sort of interesting. I think I had been there about four years when Peter Moffat, our nephew, was assigned to Paris and as you know, they never allow members of a family to stay at the same post. That's why I had to get out of Japan because I married the Ambassador's daughter.

Q: Oh, really, and it extended to the nephews!

LYON: Oh, yes. But they said, "However, as Lyon is going to be transferred shortly, we think it would be all right." So Peter came, Peter stayed two years and went, and I was still there when he left.

Q: Yes. Peter worked for me, of course in the Third World part of the Political Section.

LYON: Anyway, when Gavin came to Paris, immediately, or shortly after he was there, there was one of the usual uprisings in Algiers, riots and things. And he was very concerned because his intelligence hadn't informed him that this was going to happen, and he said it put him in a very embarrassing situation.

Q: Was that the Challe Putsch in Algiers?

LYON: It must have been '60 or '61 when Gavin came. Incidentally, Mrs. Kennedy's mother in her book, says that the reason Jack, as she said, sent Gavin to Paris was he thought that sending a General to work with a General was a good idea. Well you know de Gaulle's feeling about Generals. He couldn't care less. But in any event Gavin was very upset and I...

Q: He and de Gaulle got on very well though, I think.

LYON: Oh, I think so. I was already assigned as Consul General in Hong Kong, and I was supposed to leave six weeks after General Gavin came. But in any event, thinking that my successor Durbrow was going to be there shortly, I said to Gavin -- I tried to say it politely -- that we didn't have any intelligence as the Army had. And I said, "You're the intelligence, and I'm the intelligence, and our staff are the intelligence, and we have very good relations..." Well, to make a long story short, I told him that really we had very good relations with the Foreign Office, and the Deputies, the press and almost everyone else, and that nobody had known it was coming. If they had known it was coming, it wouldn't have come; they would have stopped it. And he just grunted. I thought really, I'd been not rude, but I'd been awfully frank with him, but I did think it

would help my successor. And a few days later he asked why I had to go to Hong Kong, and I said, "Well, I've been here quite a while, and we rotate officers, and things like that." He called up Chester Bowles and said, "Why does Lyon have to go?" After a lot of talk, it was decided that I didn't have to go. So I stayed happily on for another three or four years until nearly seven short years had passed.

Q: When I left in '65, Bob McBride was already there, and of course Ambassador Bohlen, who had arrived in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

LYON: I was only two years in Sri Lanka, and then I had about a year kicking around, as I told you. What was the date of Kennedy's death? Have you got it in your head? It isn't very important.

Q: It was in '63. It was just about a year after the Cuban Missile crisis. Okay, would you like to tell something about the Kennedy assassination and the effects of that in Paris?

LYON: Oh, Lord yes, that was something, wasn't it? On November 22nd Elsie and I were scheduled to go to a cocktail party and then go on to dinner with the Joxes at the Jockey Club. We were just getting into the car and the telephone rang, and I've learned over the years not to answer the telephone at moments like that. I was taught by Jimmy Dunn. He said, "It's never anything important. If it is, they will always call you back. It's usually inviting you to a dinner that you don't want to go to, or some such thing, and there's no nicer sound than when it just dies down -- the ringing of the phone." So I said, "Elsie, don't answer it." We went to the cocktail party. We drove up to the Jockey Club, oh, I don't know, an hour or so later. And the door man said, "You're American. Your President has been shot." I dropped Elsie, and I rushed back to the Chancery. I didn't know whether he was dead, or just wounded or what. I got into the Chancery, and rushed to my office, and the telephone was ringing. It was Burin de Roziers telephoning de Gaulle's condolences. It was the first call we had, and it was from de Gaulle, which I thought quite remarkable. Ambassador Bohlen was away, he was on his way somewhere to shoot. We got him off the train at...

Q: He was going to Strasbourg, wasn't he?

LYON: He was going to go hunting with some French friends. Maybe it was Strasbourg. We got him off the train at Nancy. The telephone never stopped ringing. We put a book in the hall, which they do in France, so people can sign condolences. Immediately a line of people went round the block -- you were there, you remember.

Q: Oh, of course. I was in charge of the ceremonial arrangements for Notre Dame. It nearly killed me, 48 hours without sleep, because it had to be synchronized, it had to be exactly the same time as the service in Washington. The seating protocol and invitations were incredibly complex. I tried to beg for time. I said, "Can't we put it off for another day?" Mr. Bohlen said, "No, no. You just get back to your desk."

LYON: Well, anyway, as you know, everybody was crying, every shop window immediately put out a photograph of Kennedy decked with crepe. I've never seen such an outpouring of affection.

I and other members of the staff got hundreds of letters. The Ambassador got thousands of letters. Oh, it was such an outpouring of affection, and I think we all felt absolutely stunned, shocked. I don't remember ever feeling quite so depressed. And then I got angrier. It annoyed me furiously, because this man had given such inspiration especially to the young. Well, that's it. Then, as you say, you arranged the TeDeum at Notre Dame.

Q: I still remember what Ambassador Bohlen said. They stopped the train at Nancy and the station master came on board and he said, "Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, j'ai une chose terrible et solennelle a vous annoncer."

LYON: Did Chip stay for the service, or did I attend?

Q: No, no, the Bohlens were there.

ROBERT BAUER
Media Officer, USIS
Paris (1959-1961)

Mr. Bauer was born in Austria. During the Nazi period he was a devout anti-Nazi, and worked with the French in providing anti-German broadcasts to the world. He came to the United States in 1939, working initially in Cincinnati broadcasting to Europe, and subsequently with the USIA and Voice of America. During his career with USIA Mr. Bauer served in Vienna, Teheran, and Paris, and in Cairo and New Delhi he served as Cultural Affairs Officer. In Washington, he was the first Director of USIA's Foreign Press Center. Mr. Bauer was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1989.

BAUER: Then they sent me to an absolutely non-job in Paris: media officer, which meant nothing--sort of a radio officer, film officer, and so forth. It was a leftover from the days when it was necessary. When Ed Murrow came through and they made a cut in the West European program I immediately volunteered my job, to the surprise of everybody. People tried to get into Paris. (I speak French very well, you know.) They transferred me to Washington. On the morning of my transfer to Washington I got a phone call--we were on the way to the boat--it was Bill Cody calling from Washington asking if I wanted to go to Bonn as number three officer, because they found out I speak German. (Laughter) I said, "It's a bit too late. I'm on my way. Thank you."

Q: How long were you in Paris?

BAUER: About one year and two months.

Q: So you felt no sense of accomplishment in what you say was a non-job.

BAUER: It was a non-job. Literally. This was literally a waste of taxpayers' money.

Q: Was that because the IO and the CAO did everything?

BAUER: The French had their own radio correspondents here. What could we do for them? And whatever had to be done was done by the IO or the Assistant IO.

Q: So how did you occupy your time?

BAUER: By trying a few things that had nothing to do with reality. It was a shame. In fact, when they assigned me there, Mowinckel was the deputy PAO, and said to me, "You shouldn't take the job." I said, "What can I do? They assigned me here."

HARRIET CURRY
Secretary, OECD
Paris (1959-1961)

Ms. Curry was born in Annapolis, Maryland, daughter of a Marine Corp family. She was raised at military posts throughout the United States. She was educated at The George Washington University, after which she worked with a number of non-governmental organizations. After joining the State Department she served as Secretary and Assistant to United States Ambassadors in Brazil, Senegal, Israel, Jamaica, Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Syria and Pakistan. She also had several assignments in Washington.

CURRY: I was in the Department of State. The arrangements were made for me to transfer to the Department of State, from ICA. I had a job in the Department for nine people, but I was sort of the low girl. I was the lowest of three girls in one office. That wasn't much fun, because even my boss thought I was smarter than that. But, it was the way things had to be worked out.

Q: Then, what happened? You came into the Foreign Service, and wither?

CURRY: Then, I went to Paris. I loved that. I hadn't thought I wanted to go to Paris. I didn't go to Paris on my trip to Europe. I was afraid of the French, for some reason!

Q: Harriet, you were in Paris from when to when?

CURRY: From 1959 to 1961. 1959 was vintage year. It really was. I went in March and the chestnuts were in blossom. Then I worked with AID/ICA people. Again, it wasn't the embassy, but it was a State Department job. I'm trying to think what they called it.

I was stationed in an office in the Hotel Talleyrand. There were four male officers and one lady economic officer. The men all smoked cigars in the office which was a big room with partitions.

The three secretaries complained about their cigars, but it didn't help. They seemed to think we were being unreasonable.

Q: What sort of work were you doing?

CURRY: Nothing very interesting, but I loved being in Paris. I enjoyed it very much.

Q: Do you remember any of the officers, and who they were?

CURRY: George B. Gardner was the head of this office. The others were Ed Hermberg, Robert Brungart, Abraham Katz and I am afraid I forgot the lady's name. All were under John Tuthill.

Q: Tuthill was later ambassador to Brazil. Did you get any feel there for our relations with the French?

CURRY: No, I was too dumb. The only thing I knew was I liked being there, and I liked them. My family and friends couldn't understand why I liked the French, but I had some very nice acquaintances. I had a good landlady, which was unheard of, and a good concierge.

JACQUES J. REINSTEIN
Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs
Paris (1959-1963)

Jacques Reinstein was born in 1911 in Savannah, Georgia. He attended the University of Basel, Switzerland, the Alliance Francaise, Paris, Georgetown University, and American University. He then joined the Department of State in 1936 as an Economic Analyst and Assistant to the Secretary of State. After a long career in the Department of State, he was sent to France as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2001.

Q: Well at the conclusion of that you received your assignment to Paris then.

REINSTEIN: At the conclusion of that I received my assignment to Paris, much to my surprise. I had been angling for other jobs. They almost had me at one time slated for Iceland. I had asked for Canada because I had kids to start in college and we had two elderly, widowed mothers and we didn't want to get separated too much. Paris was absolutely wonderful. I couldn't have asked for a better assignment.

Q: And there you were minister counselor for economic affairs from '59 to '63.

REINSTEIN: Yes.

Q: Four good years. How many ambassadors did you have then?

REINSTEIN: Three ambassadors. When I went there Eisenhower was still president and the ambassador was Amory Houghton, who is I guess the grandfather of Corning glass. Houghton had had cancer of the tongue and they had to remove part of his tongue, so speech was difficult for him, particularly as the day went on. Toward the end of the day it was hard for him to speak and hard to understand him. One of the effects of this was that some of the public speaking tasks that would normally have fallen to him came to me.

I hadn't been in the habit of doing much public speaking and so my first assignment was to substitute for the ambassador at a dinner of France Amerique on the hundredth anniversary of the birth of General Pershing. This really was the top crust of Paris society. I had two secretaries. I had an American secretary who dealt with classified matters and I had a French secretary. The French secretary was married to what I still call a "white Russian" – a native Russian – white is the difference from red Russian, but her father had been on the staff of the standing group.

Q: Oh. The military standing group.

REINSTEIN: Let me identify the standing group. In principle the NATO military reported to the military committee of NATO. In practice, the matters were run by the standing group, which were the representatives of the three major powers – the British, French, and ourselves – which was located in Washington. One of the things you have to remember is that the NATO organization was at one point spread all over. You had military in Washington, the political part in London, the economic part, essentially, in Paris. The unification of all those different parts in proximity to one another really didn't take place until after the so-called French initiative. So things were really spread out. As a matter of fact, the military committee was still located in Washington when I went to Rome in 1967 some years later. One of the first things I did after being named senior deputy commandant of the NATO Defense College was to call on the chairman of the military committee who was actually an Italian at that point. The standing group were the British, French, and ourselves and they really basically ran the NATO military establishment and they ran it very well, too.

My French secretary's father was on the staff of the standing group and so when he had that job she went to Western high school and then he went back to Paris and he was sent back to Washington as the French representative of the standing group and at that point she went to George Washington University. So she was extraordinarily fluent in English...

Q: And knows this town.

REINSTEIN: And also came from a very fine French family and knew how things were properly done. The embassy, I must say, had a small but extremely effective protocol section. They were locals. When you were giving a dinner it was very important to get people exactly in their right notch.

Q: Because they knew where they belonged and you better know it, too.

REINSTEIN: The fellow who got his "Legion D'Honneur" earlier outranked the one who got it later *[laughs]* and you had to get that right when you were seating people and things of that

matter.

Q: Back to your speech. May I ask you a question?

REINSTEIN: Yes.

Q: Did you speak in French or English then?

REINSTEIN: Oh, I spoke in French. I had to. I worked with my French secretary on that speech. We may have started in English and moved over to French. It was really finally very fine toned and I sat at the table with a charming couple, a delightful couple. I became good friends of theirs. One of the things I must record, incidentally, is a visit that Cecil Lyon and I paid to Lafayette's country home. We had an experience very few people had and I think it's well worth recording, but not at this point. Anyhow, I gave my speech in French without using any notes and it was a resounding success.

Q: Good.

REINSTEIN: I enjoyed it so much that whenever there was the possibility of giving a speech I would give a speech in French. My first wife, Rachel, and I had both studied in Paris and she had worked in Paris, too, for an American law firm office there. So we were fairly close to being bilingual. My French was better than that of anybody else on the American staff of the embassy.

Q: Who was your DCM at the time?

REINSTEIN: Cecil Lyon.

Q: Cecil Lyon, yes.

REINSTEIN: Cecil was the DCM all the time I was there. I had several experiences that I shared with Cecil that I think I should record on the famous visit to the Chateau at Lafayette's place. Also I will record my activities as an agent of the French hierarchy during Vatican Two which might be worth recording.

Q: Okay.

REINSTEIN: As I say, my French was really extremely good. I finally did get to a 5 language rating.

Q: Good.

REINSTEIN: I had an interesting time about that because I had both French and German and I always got rated higher on German than I did on French. This came about – and you've been through this yourself, I'm sure, on this testing – I tested for French and German both at one time. On the French part of the examination they give you a newspaper article which you're supposed to translate and I got caught up on one of those tricky words that looks the same in both

languages, but has different meaning, and I flubbed it because it was about an obscure quarrel between the French Wholesale Grocers Association and the French government and it had to do with price fixing. And I missed the point of the article. When they gave me the German exam they gave me an article on nuclear weapons. Well, I worked on nuclear weapons all the time. I had a nuclear weapons security classification, I knew the concepts, and I knew the technical language. I breezed through that so I got a much higher rating in German than in French, although my French was basically better than my German. But I had to use them both. I went to Germany very frequently. When I was director of German Affairs we always had meetings and every time I went to a NATO ministerial meeting I would go over and spend a week or so, and sometimes go for longer, in Germany. Of course I had to go out for dinner every night and the dinner conversations tended to be in three languages and I found that very tiring. Two languages are easy to handle, but to go around switching among three languages I found at the end of the evening I was just absolutely worn out.

Q: Let's talk about some of the big issues you faced in Paris because you were there in quite interesting times, when Europe was being born, actually.

REINSTEIN: That's right. I arrived there just in the first year of the European common market and it was just in the process of sort of settling in and making its first decisions and the British were quarreling with it. That was one of the things that was going on that was very disturbing to the Americans. The second, it was just at the point when they were going through the decision about what to do with the OEEC, whether to have the Americans and the Canadians just join.

Q: The OEEC actually arose from the Marshall Plan, didn't it?

REINSTEIN: That's right. It was a European organization. It sort of developed into an economic coordinating organization with an excellent staff. It didn't make sense to continue with that. There were two possibilities. They didn't pick the one I wanted. One possibility was just to have the Americans and the Canadians join and enlarge it. The other possibility, which was the one I wanted, was to form something like a Group of 7; in other words, to let the Europeans have an organization which could deal with all the technical issues in which they were interested, many of which had no interest to us at all. We were not interested in inland transport. It was a nuisance for us to have to send somebody to a meeting and we didn't particularly care to support that financially. So there was constant pulling and hauling between us and the Europeans as a result. Of course from the viewpoint of the Europeans, what could be nicer than to have a requirement that you have a ministerial meeting once a year in Paris. Whatever specialized ministries there were were delighted to have an organization which required them to go to Paris once a year.

Q: Not in Iceland, but in Paris?

REINSTEIN: That's where the headquarters was, in Paris. Iceland had nothing to do with it. Iceland was a member.

Q: Were they a member of the OEEC? I think so. Go ahead.

REINSTEIN: I always have a little bit of a mental block about Iceland because I remember during World War II President Roosevelt issued a finding that Iceland was part of North

America.

Q: We could send our ships up that far then to guard convoys.

REINSTEIN: No, no, no. The thing was that under the Draft Act the draftees were not allowed to serve, except in North America. And we had bases already in Iceland and our forces were mixed regular army and draftees. You didn't want to be forced into a situation where you had to pick people and we had to take out the regular army guys and say, "Well these guys can go to Iceland, but the draftees can't," so he issued a finding that Iceland was part of North America. I have real difficulty thinking of Iceland, which I visited several times, as being European and not North American.

The other possibility which I saw, and which I think would've been the sensible thing to have done, was to set up something like the group of seven – I would've had maybe a couple more members, maybe nine, but left out the smaller countries, the peripheral countries.

Q: How my Dutch friends would have screamed at that.

REINSTEIN: Well, they would've been included. Oh, yes, they would've been included.

Q: They would have insisted on it. [laughs]

REINSTEIN: The Italians would've been in. But we couldn't have a serious economic organization dealing with economic policy in Europe without the participation of the Benelux countries. In terms of their economic clout and their intellectual clout they were really very important. Greece and Turkey. Iceland, no.

Q: Portugal.

REINSTEIN: Portugal, no. The actual idea of the group of seven was first put forward at a much later date by an organization I was later connected with, the Atlantic Council of the United States. They were the first people to put forward the idea of having such an organization. When I went to Paris they insisted that I come over immediately so I would have an overlap with my predecessor, Jack Tuthill – John Elliott Tuthill. And I had to fly over and they only allowed you a very small amount of accompanying luggage in those days and one of the decisions I had to make was to take my white tie. I figured my effects will arrive before I have to wear a white tie. Ha! I hadn't been there very long before I took over the job from Tuthill and lo and behold, what happens? The President of the United States arrives.

Q: Oh this is President Eisenhower?

REINSTEIN: Eisenhower. Eisenhower came twice, in September and again in December – and of course had white tie dinners. I had bought a white tie, which really wasn't necessary – I could've rented one – but anyhow I found myself under the requirement of going to a white tie dinner very shortly. As a matter of fact, I think it was the first white tie dinner I went to. I think it was '62. I was in Paris for meetings while I was still in German Affairs when de Gaulle came

into power. It was quite a shock. It was a shock to a lot of the French people. I observed the morning papers being sold this announcement and people were buying the newspapers and looking at them quietly, but there were no sounds of enthusiasm. I was there again on the fourteenth of July *[laughs]* and that was probably the last time they had Moroccan troops in the fourteenth of July parade. I watched from the Hotel.

Q: Spahis, was it?

REINSTEIN: Spahis, yes. They came along and it broke up. It was quite a scene. Then I found myself at the embassy in Paris when President Eisenhower came over and I sat next at dinner to the man who led the armed revolt in Algeria, General – gosh, I can't remember his name for the moment. I tried to engage him in conversation and I told my wife afterwards it was like trying to bounce a croquet ball. I would say something and try to elicit a response, but I couldn't engage him in conversation. I guess he had to be there but he didn't want to talk to an American.

Q: His mind was on other things, maybe.

REINSTEIN: His mind was on other things and he didn't want to get involved in talking to an American, I guess. Later on, after the fall of the uprising, people were really badly divided in France. You really had to be very careful. You couldn't tell who was on which side. All the people that were in the resistance were opposed to de Gaulle and had been right along; they were his bitterest enemies. Of course they had connections with the OAS because the OAS loaded up with people from the resistance who had stayed in the army and fought in China and then wound up in Algeria. I must say that aspect of life in Paris was a very difficult one. It was the period when the common market was just getting started. It was interesting to be there for that, to follow it, to report to Washington on what was happening. Of course you had the argument that sort of went on between the British and their friends, the seven, and the common market people, the six. The fighting between them got really quite nasty and it was very disturbing to the Americans who didn't want to have the Europeans quarreling among themselves.

Q: Did we stay out of that fight or did we indicate our positions?

REINSTEIN: We were basically pro-six.

Q: No common market.

REINSTEIN: No common market. On the other hand, at one stage we took an initiative in which I became involved. You got to work on all kinds of things in a place like Paris in the job I had. The Americans came up with the idea of having a committee look into the question of what the effects were of setting up the common market on the nonmembers. They came up with an interesting idea of having a committee of experts chaired by a minister, and the minister was a Dutchman who eventually held down every international job there was. I'm trying to remember his name.

Q: Not Joseph Luns?

REINSTEIN: Luns, yes. Luns was the chairman of this committee. Well, the U.S. member was John Leddy, who had gone back to Washington for a while, but John didn't find it convenient to come to all the meetings. The representation should have been through our delegation to the OEEC and NATO. Unfortunately, the principal economic guy in that delegation was pro-seven and so they couldn't trust that delegation to represent the United States effectively *[laughs]*. So when John couldn't come I was designated to serve in his place and so I in effect carried on functions which really were more appropriate for another delegation than the embassy. We did turn out a report, I think, finally and it rather discounted the British claims that there would be serious adverse trade effects. Of course it was very difficult to make the argument because the first round of tariff cuts were generalized, so all they did was reduce the tariff to everybody; and you could hardly make an argument that that was trade distorting. That was one of the things that I did.

I was involved in the setting up of the OECD.

As a matter of principle, I had managed to refrain from working on Christmas day. I was asked to work on Christmas day once by Harry Hawkins and as much as I loved and respected him, I said no. This is the one day that I give to my family. Well, that got broken.

Q: This had been '58, was this?

REINSTEIN: This would be in '59. See '58, '59 I was in the senior seminar. I went to Paris after the fourth of July. I didn't want to get involved in going to that god-awful fourth of July party they used to have. We were closing up shop and I got a call from the foreign office; the head of the economic and financial division wanted me to come over right away, so I went over. They had had this meeting in December, for which General Eisenhower had come over, at which they had decided to set up the OECD and agreed to have a conference to do that. The conference included about eight or nine countries. It didn't include all the people who were in the OEEC. It was kind of handpicked. There was something like eight or nine countries. That conference was to be held fairly early in January of '60 and when I got to the foreign office Woermser said to me, "We're the host country and so we have to send out the invitations. Since your government has been so responsible for setting this thing up we'd like to make sure that the invitation we send out is something that is acceptable to you. I'd like for you to get the drafts and I'd like for you to have Washington look at it." Well, I can't remember whether it was a handwritten draft or what – it was in French, of course – and we sat and we looked at it and having been through all the background I had, I had pretty good ideas of what American views were on things and there were things in the language which I thought would bother Washington so I redrafted them and finally he and I and his secretary were...

Q: Sitting around and drafting this thing on Christmas Eve.

REINSTEIN: Yes. Nobody else was around very much. The secretary had to type it up. We had had, of course, large plans.

Q: For Christmas Eve, I'm sure.

REINSTEIN: And for Christmas day. Two of my kids were there. Anyhow, he said, "We've got to get this out. Can you get this back to Washington and get them to look at it the day after Christmas and give us some reactions?" So I said, "Yes, sure." I can't remember whether I sent a warning telegram when I got back to the embassy that warned them that this was on the way and that they would have to get a quick response. I may have done a two-sentence telegram, a NIACT, to wind up the troops. Anyhow, I took the draft back to the embassy and then went home. There's an American Catholic chapel in Paris and my kids were still mentally in Washington and they wanted to go there for high mass so we went to midnight mass there.

Q: We went to mass there on our honeymoon. But go ahead.

REINSTEIN: I think that's about the only time I ever set foot in the place. Well then we went home and we had a kind of first celebration. Then we were invited to our French families' dinner, a big Christmas dinner they have after high mass, midnight mass. Well, we arrived there at about the time of the meat course and around about four o'clock in the morning when we were getting around to brandy...

Q: No shortage of wine there.

REINSTEIN: No shortage of wine. Rachel had lived with them when she was a student at the Sorbonne and she lived with them again when she was working in Paris. She was a member of the family. The first time I met them was when we went to Paris for the peace treaties in 1946 with Rachel's brother, John Campbell, who worked in the Department and was for many years associated with the Council on Foreign Relations. He was their top political guy for many years. He had met the family once years before. Anyhow, we were invited around for dinner, and what an experience that was because there were four daughters and they all recounted the liberation of Paris, all talking at the same time.

Q: [laughs]

REINSTEIN: At least one of them, maybe two, were on the Place de la Concorde at the time the fighting took place.

Q: When the bullets were flying.

REINSTEIN: When the bullets were flying. By the way, I don't know how many people know this, but some of those bullets landed in the American embassy. There are two bullets that tore through a portrait in the office of the DCM, which is over on the Concorde side of the building and that's never been repaired. Those bullet holes, the tears, are preserved.

Q: It's fitting. It's very fitting.

REINSTEIN: I must say, having four French girls telling you all of this at the same time, and old Paulette said at one time she was sitting on top of an American tank coming in.

Q: [laughs] Well, back to Christmas dinner now.

REINSTEIN: Finally, at about four o'clock in the morning I said, "I've got to work and I'm afraid I've got to go home." So we left and I went home and got a little bit of sleep and then went down to the embassy and got the duty secretary. Of course the first thing I had to do was translate the French text into English. I got that done up properly and then I discovered that the girl had no plans. They were serving up a meal in the embassy cafeteria, I guess, for the people who had to be working. So I took her out to the house and we had Christmas lunch and went back and I got out two telegrams: one giving the text to which the French wanted agreement, and the second commenting on the changes that I had made which I thought they would've wanted to have made to get them to focus on what I thought the issues were and to tell them to get their answer back pronto on the twenty-sixth; and it came back approved.

Q: It may have ruined your Christmas, but it was a triumph in many ways.

REINSTEIN: You never know in the Foreign Service, at least in the Foreign Service as it was then, what will come along. And in a place like Paris you could get involved in practically any part of the world except maybe Latin America. But we got involved in all kinds of things all over the world. The economic division was kind of a catch-all place.

Q: How large was your staff, by the way?

REINSTEIN: Local and American, sixty people.

Q: That included the commercial officer and agricultural and all these people?

REINSTEIN: The commercial section was about half of it, and of course you had a large number of locals.

Q: Yes.

REINSTEIN: At one point we thought we were going to get a major cut in our appropriations, and do you know what we were going to do? We were going to let all the Americans go. Washington gave you your limits; you then had to figure out how to live with them. As it turned out we didn't have to do this. But our thinking was, if we lost our French personnel we could not replace them. We had investment of years in all of their connections, whereas the Americans came and went. If you sent them home, alright, you may have to work harder but they would eventually send you some more people.

Q: Which brings up another question: were you there when we began to worry about the balance of payments?

REINSTEIN: Oh, we were worrying about the balance of payments before that.

Q: I remember Secretary Dillon, in the beginning of the Kennedy administration, was very strong on balance of payments problems.

REINSTEIN: Well they had been worrying about it before. We had the Secretary of the Treasury in the Eisenhower administration who kept talking about it.

Q: That would've been George Humphrey probably.

REINSTEIN: Yes, it was George Humphrey. Humphrey was regarded as such a stupid fellow that nobody paid any attention to him.

Q: Well I remember you had a good connection with Treasury.

REINSTEIN: Periodically I would go over and have a lunch with them at the Washington Hotel and give them a general view of what we were doing and what we were worrying about and things like that, and just background in case I needed to talk to them about anything. I was in touch with them. I told them once, "We haven't had lunch for a while. I'd like to have lunch with you." I said, "I keep hearing Mr. Humphrey is talking about a balance of payments problem. Can we talk about this at lunch?" My god, these guys came with charts. What the charts demonstrated was that Humphrey was talking through his hat. That's what the experts thought. They were wrong. Humphrey was right.

Q: Humphrey was a smart old codger.

REINSTEIN: He put his finger on what was the reality.

Q: So that was a constant problem with you from then on, I presume, in the back of your mind.

REINSTEIN: Well, I was sensitive to it, of course, as minister of economic affairs. One of my jobs was to push American exports and American investments, too, and protect American investments. We had our problems with the French on some investment problems. There was a series of required reports we were supposed to send in once a year and one was on American investments and on the opportunities and the like. Well, we were having some problems with the French and at that point the minister for finance and economics had a very bright, young guy as his chef de cabinet who also worked part-time in the ministry. They had one part-time guy on financial matters.

Q: Only one?

REINSTEIN: Yes. He held both jobs. I went around to see this guy and I said to him, "We have certain reports we have to make for Washington. I'm just at the point where I have to make a report on American investments and the atmosphere for American investments and I'm puzzled as to what to tell them. I'd like your suggestions." You know, instead of sitting around and drawing up stuff based on newspaper articles and so on.

Q: Just ask his advice.

REINSTEIN: Yes. "What do you think I should tell them?" I got a pretty frank answer. There were problems but they were not that significant. I mean, yes, you'd get noise and stuff like that,

but that basically we should not be concerned about investments between the U.S. and France, that the general atmosphere between them would be satisfactory. I don't know that we had a treaty which governed our relations at all. Of course some of these things actually came within the scope of the OECD, I guess, which was one of the most useful international organizations ever dreamed up by the mind of man. Thank heavens they don't demonstrate against that one.

Q: And yet it doesn't get all that great publicity or anything else.

REINSTEIN: That's one thing that makes it effective.

Q: Probably so.

REINSTEIN: Now, where do we go from here?

Q: You were there, of course, when General de Gaulle was smarting over his exclusion from our nuclear arrangements with the British. Did that factor in at all to the French reaction to you or not?

REINSTEIN: No. Jack Tuthill got himself involved in nuclear matters. We had a guy who just recently, in the last month, died, who was the fellow who handled the nuclear matters there. He operated somewhat independently. Tuthill tried to control him. I knew this fellow personally; I had worked with him in Washington on other matters, I think. I decided nuclear matters really don't have anything to do with my job. I've got so many things to work on it's useless for me to spend any time getting involved. Obviously, as a member of the top staff of the embassy you got involved in discussions with the ambassador at regular meetings and things and got exposed to stuff, but there was no spillover. You see on the economics side basically we were pro-six; we were supportive of the common market because the common market was just what we had been looking for, hoping for, and we wanted to get some kind of European political organization. We wanted to get the French and Germans together. We were encouraging all the things that went along that way. Our basic national interest was in supporting the European movement. We had connections with Jean Monnet.

Q: You were in Paris when de Gaulle vetoed the British entry into the common market. What was the reaction among your French friends there?

REINSTEIN: Well, the most frank reaction I got was from the head guy in the Ministry of Economics. He said, "Well, I didn't expect it to go through, but I didn't expect it to wind up this way." It was a shock to people who actually worked on it.

I should put in a little background here. At one point there appeared in my office, without any particular notice, somebody from Washington – Arthur Hartman – who was maybe working for Doug Dillon then.

Q: No, he was working for George Ball.

REINSTEIN: George Ball, yes. He said, "George has persuaded the British to apply for

membership in the common market,” and this was going to happen and we were to keep our mouths shut and not criticize it.

Q: I was standing next to George Ball in Bonn in January of '63 when word came in that de Gaulle had vetoed it and he said words that I will not use on this tape, but he was very upset with that.

REINSTEIN: Actually, it was foreseeable.

Q: Yes, I know.

REINSTEIN: It was foreseeable. Despite the injunction that I received from the department after the negotiations, one of the things was that the French told me, and in my absence Don McGrew, a lot about what went in in the negotiations – we were one main source of information – at some point I sat down and I wrote a telegram – I can't remember what date it was, an analysis of the problems in the negotiation, what we saw as being the principal issues standing in the way of an agreement and the possibilities of their being resolved. My conclusion was that it was unlikely that all the major problems could be resolved and the negotiations would not come to a successful conclusion.

Q: So you had already, in your mind, reached that conclusion.

REINSTEIN: And I communicated that to Washington. I took it in to Cecil Lyon down the hall. He hated it. Cecil always liked to be positive and said, “Can't you say something positive?” I said, “Cecil, this is an analysis of what I think may happen and I think it's bad; and I simply owe it to Washington to give an honest appraisal of the way we see it.” Walt Butterworth was our representative in Brussels and I saw Walt a certain time after that and he said, “You know, I used to keep that telegram of yours in my in-box.”

Q: Butterworth was my minister in London for a while. He's an honest man. Maybe a little too much so at times, but he's an honest man, and a very bright one.

REINSTEIN: I met him first when he was a USCC in Spain during the war.

Q: Yes, that was some time ago.

REINSTEIN: A very, very able guy.

ROBERT ANDERSON
Political/Economic Officer
Bordeaux and Paris (1959-1961)

Political Counselor
Paris (1962-1968)

Ambassador Robert Anderson entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included posts in Shanghai, Bangkok, New Delhi, Bordeaux, and Paris. In addition, he served as ambassador to Benin, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Anderson was interviewed by Horace Torbert in 1990.

ANDERSON: Then it came time for me, finally, to go abroad again. And William L. Blue -- dear Bill Blue, with whom I served in India, was in personnel at the time -- this was in '59, when it came time for me to go out -- and I decided that I really ought to learn a foreign language, preferably French. And so we figured that I'd spent ten or eleven years out in the Far East, and I was gradually moving westward, but not fast enough. And so my dear wife said: "Look, let's go to France where you can learn the language."

So Bill Blue found two assignments in Paris. They weren't in the embassy, they were with international organizations. And I said: "No thanks." And he looked at me as if I were half mad. I said: "If you have an opening in one of the consulates, anywhere, that is where I'd like to go, because I would like to learn to speak French and I don't want to be in Paris with 55,000 Americans. I want to be out in the provinces, where I can really come to know France and try to learn the language."

An opening came in Bordeaux and that's where I went. That really changed my whole career. They, frankly, were the two happiest years of my career, in a way. I can say happiest, because I didn't have any earthshaking responsibilities in those two delightful years to try and not only learn the French language and the countryside, but to appreciate the finest wine in the world.

I became very, very close friends with Jacques Chaban-Delmas, still mayor of Bordeaux today, and Prime Minister when I went back years later under Sarge Shriver, which I'll get to when we next meet. Chaban put up with my inability to speak French when I first got there. But after six months, I then gave my first speech in French. I'd had a tutor and worked every day and was determined to learn it and did, finally, which was a tremendous thing for me to focus on. I enjoyed it very much.

Q: You had had, presumably, the standard no-speaking education (inaudible)? [Laughter]

ANDERSON: Yes, I took all the French they had to offer at Yale, and the result of that was you couldn't speak French when you finished it, because you don't learn a language through your eyes, you learn it through your ears; and that's the only way to do it.

Bordeaux was a tremendous experience for me because I learned about France. The people who go to Paris, and stay there for four to five years, don't know anything about France, really. Paris is so different. I had told them in Washington, Bill Blue and others, "If I do well in Bordeaux, and if I learn the language, I would then like to have a crack at Paris, if an opening comes."

Well, an opening came. I spent two years in Bordeaux and then went to Paris in April, 1961 for two exciting years.

Q: Just to clear that up, what did you actually do in Bordeaux?

ANDERSON: As the number-two man in the Consulate General, I was assigned as the political/economic officer. It was a small post of four officers. We had more than enough to do, I can assure you.

I was next assigned as a commercial officer in Paris, working for a very remarkable economic minister in the beginning. He was Jacques Reinstein, a hard taskmaster, but so bright and stimulating.

This was a very active period in the formation of the European community, of its common agricultural policy, of its common commercial policy. We also had our bilateral problems with the French in trade, quotas, you name it.

Right after I arrived, President Kennedy came over for his state visit to General de Gaulle. Jim Gavin was our ambassador. I was assigned to his visit as they needed somebody who spoke French. I was camped out at the Quai d'Orsay in the President's quarters, to take care of anything that came up. My wife, bilingual in French, was assigned to Jackie Kennedy, to do anything she could to be helpful.

Ambassador Gavin saw me during the President's visit and followed a couple of problems I had to deal with. He decided to change his special assistant and decided on me. Jack Reinstein successfully blocked the transfer. When the next special assistant didn't work out, General Gavin went to Cecil Lyon, his deputy, and said: "I'm going back to Jacques Reinstein. And I want Bob Anderson down in this office by December 1." He went to Jacques and said: "That's the end of it; there's no more discussion. Bob is going to move and work in my office."

And Cecil told me, he said: "You've got to save the name of the Service. Two of our members have fallen. You must go and do the job." And he couldn't have been nicer. Basically, what General Gavin wanted was a chief of staff. Well, that is the Minister's job.

It was a very delicate job in terms of my relations with Cecil, whom I liked and respected and with Randy Kidder, the political counselor, with whom I've been so close ever since. They were very senior; I was very junior. They all were 100% behind me and I was able to do the job to satisfy General Gavin.

Here again that shows that if you are given a challenge and can cut the mustard, as we say, you will be given new challenges and move up the ladder.

General Gavin was one of the most amazing men I have ever met. He had mixed reviews as Ambassador to France. A lot of the things that the press wrote were superficial, unfounded and unjust -- they didn't really know what they were talking about. He had the respect of the intellectual community and the scientific community, for example, like no one I have ever met.

Q: What was his background in the military originally? Was he an engineering officer?

ANDERSON: He was a tremendous airborne combat officer, with his last job as head of research and development in the Pentagon. He broke with Eisenhower because he felt that the Administration was not giving enough attention to research and development. He retired and made President of Arthur D. Little and Company. Two months later, Kennedy asked him to go to Paris. The board let him go for 18 months or something like that, and said: "If you don't come back then, that's it," which is why he had to leave; because he had five daughters and needed the A.D. Little income.

One example of his imagination, he called me into his office one day and said: "Bob, I've just been reading some things about the laser beam. You know, we ought to think more about this, all of us. You know, I can envisage that one day the medical profession may be able to use this to save our eyes and the brain." This is unbelievable; we didn't know much about the laser then, mind you; this was 1962. And this man saw this back then.

As far as the Foreign Service was concerned, he considered one of our biggest weaknesses to be our lack of training. He said: "In the military," he said, "people are able to earn advanced degrees because, you know, we're a war-fighting machine, and so when we're not at war these people can spend maybe a third of their career or so in training. You poor people don't have this leeway, because the Foreign Service is always at war, basically, the war of diplomacy."

One other item concerning Paris and the CIA. This is something they do occasionally, and I was up in arms about it. Some of us may have an excellent source, and then without telling us, the Agency will try to recruit the source.

Q: On an exclusive basis?

ANDERSON: Yes, and pay him.

Q: And pay him, sure.

ANDERSON: I think that is the dumbest policy imaginable, and have made myself very clear on a number of occasions, to the Agency. What it did once in my career was to jeopardize an invaluable source, who had been close to us for years. We almost lost him because he felt insulted. The source happened to be a friend of mine of over 20 years. One did not need to pay this source.

Q: Bob McBride had the same observation from being there a little earlier.

ANDERSON: It was an insult to an outstanding gentleman.

Q: Yes.

ANDERSON: When I left George in the summer of 1965, I went to the European Bureau, where John Leddy was Assistant Secretary. I was Acting Director for Western Europe for the first year. When they reorganized the Bureau, I became the Country Director for France and the Benelux for two years. In the summer of '68, I went back to Paris.

A rather momentous event happened at the time in which our Bureau was deeply involved. It was the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure, the Atlantic Alliance. We faced many challenges working with the Hill to make sure the Hill wouldn't completely destroy our relations with France, which we all felt had to be maintained somehow in the face of de Gaulle's onslaught.

Dean Acheson came in as a Special Assistant to the Secretary, you may remember. And young Larry Eagleburger was assigned as Dean Acheson's Staff Assistant by Ball's office. An excellent choice. Acheson's mission was to focus on: "All right, de Gaulle has done this, now what do we do?" George Ball was the point man on this whole subject.

Q: Ball left in what, late '65, early '66?

ANDERSON: No, he stayed on most of the time when I was in the European Bureau.

Q: Well, Nick Katzenbach was there for about the last year or so of the administration.

ANDERSON: Yes.

Q: Or a year and a half.

ANDERSON: Yes, that's right. And Larry moved in as Nick's Special Assistant. He took my old job with Nick Katzenbach, as a matter of fact.

Q: Meanwhile, you had Chip Bohlen in Paris all this time?

ANDERSON: Yes. I should have mentioned, earlier that I worked for Chip Bohlen in Paris.

Q: Well, I thought you probably overlapped with him.

ANDERSON: Yes, and very much so. I was with him for -- October '82 until the summer of '83, when I came back. And I should have mentioned that because our two families couldn't have been closer. When he first came, I was there as Special Assistant. Chip didn't know whether he wanted one, and he didn't know me from Adam. Cecil Lyon stayed on as DCM, and told him: "Look. Use Bob. He'll be fine. You'll like him."

One thing I had to do for General Gavin, was to draft his telegrams of meetings with de Gaulle, Couve de Murville, and others. He would come back, and then unload. In order to have his reports treated in the State Department and elsewhere in Washington, in a logical manner and effective manner, I arranged them subject by subject. It wouldn't, for example, be one telegram of a meeting with de Gaulle on umty-ump subjects.

Q: Separate telegrams?

ANDERSON: Separate telegrams, which Washington liked. So the question was how was this

going to be done with Chip Bohlen. You know, he always dictated his own telegrams. He said at the beginning: "I'm not going to have anybody else do that for me." His drafting was not, frankly, the tightest and cleanest in the world. He was a marvelous conceptual thinker, but tended to wander off on occasion. [Laughter] Eventually, he had me mark over his telegrams. He'd dictate a draft of a meeting, I would separate out the subjects, edit his handiwork. It worked out well. He loved it. The Department liked it.

One little sidelight, with Chip Bohlen, which -- I don't know whether it's part of history. He loved to gamble. Maybe this was well known.

Q: I knew it. He and Tommy always had these high stakes poker games running, which I never played in and wouldn't have thought of playing in. [Laughter]

ANDERSON: In France, of course, Chip had to make his calls on various notables. He couldn't wait to go down to the Midi, to make his official visits. And he always took Avis, his wife, and Elena, my wife, and me with him. The next visit was to Nice and Cannes. While there we went to the casino in Cannes. Avis, his wife, was concerned about this, because she was always concerned about the household budget. She refused to go with him to the casino, but she said to me: "All right, Bob, stay with him and make sure he doesn't over spend."

Off we went to Chemin de Fer. He did pretty well and loved it. I did get him to agree to one thing. I said: "It'll make life a lot easier for both of us, Mr. Ambassador, to lessen the pressure from Mrs. Bohlen. Now, you won this amount of money. Will you please give it to me?"

"Why do you want it?"

"Because I'm going to put it in the safe at the embassy and this is going to be your gambling account. When we go out again to gamble, you can use this money without drawing on the household budget. If you keep winning, Mrs. Bohlen won't be so disturbed. So we established "the Bohlen gambling fund," very discreetly. [Laughter] I'm very sorry I forgot about Chip Bohlen. You must prompt me.

Q: You're doing great. You don't need much prompting. Well, we're still, I guess, back as country director.

ANDERSON: Yes. There are two stories I have thought about during that period. One has to do with de Gaulle's withdrawal from the military structure of NATO. You remember the Harmel Plan?

Q: Vaguely.

ANDERSON: Pierre Harmel was the Belgian Foreign Minister. And Stevie Davignon was his Cabinet Director. Harmel had been in the States, and was trying to develop a plan whereby the 14 allies (minus France) could have a doctrine to operate in light of the acts France had taken. We had some thoughts to contribute to the Foreign Minister. He was taking the boat back to Europe to draft the doctrine later known as the Harmel Plan.

Our Assistant Secretary, John Leddy asked me to pass on our thoughts to Harmel in New York before he left for Europe. He was staying at the Pierre Hotel. John didn't give me much notice to get up there, as usual. When I arrived at the Pierre. Harmel and Davignon had just left to catch the ship.

So I flagged a cab, reached the ship just as fast as I could, got on board, found them, and said: "John Leddy has these thoughts."

The Foreign Minister said: "Well, come on. We'll go up in the bar where we can go over them." When the time came for all visitors ashore, we held the ship, in order to give the Belgian Foreign Minister the United States' views on his plan. I can't remember what the specific points were, but they were important and were included in the plan.

ANDERSON: Yes. Now the only other thing I'd like to mention just now for a minute is the student riots in France in May, '68. It's the only time I ever had a difference of view with Chip Bohlen. I was the Country Director for France/Benelux, and the point man on that whole subject as far as the European Bureau was concerned.

When de Gaulle left the Elysée nobody knew where he was going. The President was in Texas. Dean Rusk was home under the weather -- I think it was the only time he was not in the State Department in eight years. Nick Katzenbach, the Under Secretary, was in Texas with the President. The president was going to have a press conference. Larry Eagleburger and I were in my old office, in Katzenbach's Suite, where I used to be with George Ball. Larry was Nick's Special Assistant. We did up the press guidance for the President to use in Texas, and phoned it down to Nick, and the President subsequently used it.

I can't remember where Chip was, and whether he was back as Under Secretary for political affairs or whether he was still in Paris.

Q: He was in Paris until sometime in '68, but I don't know --

ANDERSON: Yes. Then Shriver --

Q: I guess, yes, February, '68 he left Paris.

ANDERSON: Okay. Well, then he was back in Washington. I talked with him about de Gaulle's mysterious departure from Paris. Chip said he felt that de Gaulle had given up, and would resign. That's the only time I ever took issue with him. I said: "That does not sound like General de Gaulle; he just wouldn't do that. He's up to something. He'll be back. Something's going to happen."

Q: You know, I've forgotten this entirely.

ANDERSON: Well, he went to see General Massu, who was the Commander of the French forces in Germany. What he wanted to do was to make sure that Massu was going to stand behind him; because you remember, at the time of Algeria Massu was not exactly a de Gaulle supporter. So that's what he was up to. That was the one time Chip and I didn't agree on something, and I happened to be right on that particular one.

I don't know why Chip felt that, because that was so unlike de Gaulle, you know, to just quit and go off to Colomb   les Deux Eglises.

Q: As I recall, in an earlier conversation we had, you were talking also about a relationship with Rusk and his visit to de Gaulle, in which you and Ed Beigel did a special...

ANDERSON: Thank you for reminding me of that. This was in the spring of '66, right after General de Gaulle withdrew from the military-structure of NATO, which obviously concerned not only us, but the other allies. People really didn't understand a lot of the things going on in this man's mind. A fantastic book, called *La Tragedie du General*, by a Jean Raymond Tournoux, was published. It was a very thick tome, carefully researched, and its contents never denied by de Gaulle. It was essentially a book of quotations by de Gaulle, of his private and public pronouncements. Most of them were private.

Ed Beigel and I sat up for four nights, just before Secretary Rusk was taking off for the spring NATO ministerial in Paris. We thought that selecting different quotes of de Gaulle might give a better feel of who this man was; what was making him tick. It was about a 25-page paper that we came up with which we finished just before the Secretary boarded his plane.

He sent word back, actually, from the plane, saying, "This is great. I'm learning things." He made the staff traveling with him read it, then later gave a copy to each allied foreign minister, before the NATO ministerial started, suggesting they might want to read it. Anybody who's seriously interested in trying to understand General de Gaulle ought to get this book and study it. Our language people could probably have done a hell of a lot better job than Ed and I did, but time was of the essence. We both felt this was a modest contribution to trying to figure out what was going on in General de Gaulle's mind.

The summer of '68, I returned to Paris this time, as political counselor. Sarge Shriver asked me to join him as one of a number of changes he wished to make in the embassy in reorienting our activities in France.

Sarge Shriver, in my view, was the right man at the right time having come there during the events of the summer of '68 after which General de Gaulle would never be the same again. For example, he finally realized that he could not contain Germany by himself. This led to the very private luncheon with Sir Christopher Soames, the British ambassador in Paris, where de Gaulle threw out, for the first time, the desirability of maybe reinstituting talks to have the United Kingdom enter the Common Market. (The British leaked this. I don't blame them for leaking it after de Gaulle's veto in January, 1963. They wanted to make sure he wasn't going once again to play games with them.)

De Gaulle was infuriated that this luncheon leaked in London. The actual negotiations for the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market did not start until Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle as president. Nevertheless, de Gaulle realized that Germany could not be contained, and that maybe the United Kingdom was just about as antisupranational as France. In my own view, I think the British are more antisupranational than France, if you think of what's going on today in the Common Market.

That being said: I wanted to make a couple of points about how Sarge Shriver reoriented the embassy. He was very imaginative, and totally dedicated. He had more ideas per minute than any man I've ever met. He might have ten ideas. Eight of them might be questionable, but one or two might be superb, and that's great. He was one of the more stimulating personalities I've ever worked with.

Q: Did you have a problem on the ideas that weren't good, quieting him down?

ANDERSON: Absolutely not.

Q: Good. Just did them anyway?

ANDERSON: No. He would knock some of his own ideas down himself. One of the things that we did at the very beginning of Sarge's stay had to do with your favorite sport, tennis. At that time, we were trying to build up a respectable Davis Cup team. We'd been in a disastrous situation for four or five years. Donald Dell, Arthur Ashe, Stan Smith, Charlie Pasarell and Bob Lutz were the top candidates for the Cup team. They came over to France, and we arranged a month-long tour throughout France.

Those of us in the embassy who spoke fluent French went with them to various cities where we'd speak at lunches and dinners and help them out. Needless to say, I volunteered not only because of my love of tennis, but because of the new French friends I found in the provinces.

They did a wonderful job, and were tremendous ambassadors of the United States in the provinces where there had been virtually no contact with Americans since 1958 when de Gaulle came to power. That's the way he wanted it in order to try and give the French people self-respect again. With the Americans all over France in different bases, what he wanted to do was to reduce the French thinking about the United States and Americans, and have them start to think about themselves.

I can't fault him on that, frankly. He did succeed in having the Frenchman regain confidence in himself. I think that was a vital necessity if France was going to continue as a world power, or even an important regional power.

Q: You were also having some military conversations, weren't you?

ANDERSON: Military conversations started before Sarge Shriver arrived in France, and continued between General Lemnitzer, who was the SACEUR, and General Ailleret, who was the equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for France. They worked out very

confidential arrangements of cooperation between NATO and France in case of a conflict. If France decided to enter a conflict, certain things would happen. But the French insisted -- and this is the main point always at issue -- that they were going to decide unilaterally if they were going to enter the conflict.

If this had been made public, de Gaulle would have complained and nothing would have been done. I think we always have to remember that with our French friends military-to-military relationships have always been easier and more productive than political relationships which really is quite understandable because usually military-to-military relationships, many of which are contingencies, are not cast over the front pages of the newspapers as are political relationships.

Another wonderful program in the embassy was our youth program. I had a youth officer assigned to the political section and gave part of the section's representation allowance to the officer to use as he or she saw fit.

One program we started was an exchange of French Parliamentarians and U.S. Congressmen under 40 years of age. For the first exchange about ten American congressmen and their wives came to France and spent a week or ten days, if you can believe it. We had excellent meetings in Paris and out into the constituencies of their French counterparts. The next year, the same French Deputés came over with their wives to America. A similar program was arranged in Washington, and then they in the constituencies of their U.S. hosts. The speaker of the House of Representatives today, Tom Foley, was one of these people. Because of this experience, Tom thinks that the French are absolutely fantastic. And Don Beigle, then a Republican congressman and now a Democratic Senator from Michigan, was another participant. We had some very wonderful people in this program who came to appreciate France and made their judgments based on knowledge of the country and its people, not on the misinformed, emotional reactions we so often see.

Something happened in this program for which I was almost thrown out of France by some senior Gaullist Deputés who were friends of mine. The young French députés, who came over and went up to Capitol Hill. When they saw the facilities that our congressmen have, such as separate offices, separate telephones, and staffs, their eyes bulged. In Paris, when I was there, the French Deputés had to line up to use about three or four phones in one large *salon* in the Parliament building. It was very beautiful with gold and red damask curtains, but not very practical as they didn't have separate offices or separate staffs.

I would like you to know that today there is a separate building and each member of the French Parliament has his or her own office and staff, as a result of the first visit of the young Deputés to Washington in the late 1960s.

Some of the old codgers, some of my friends who were in the Parliament then, like General Pierre Billotte, for example said: "You are trying to ruin this country. We can't afford this. These young people don't need all of these facilities. I didn't ever have them when I was a *député* for 20 years."

I said: "General, I'm sorry. I don't agree with you; they can do a better job this way." Every time I go to Paris some of my friends take me over there, as they consider it a small memorial that I gave them. It's right behind Quai d'Orsay.

Q: It isn't called the Anderson Building yet?

ANDERSON: Hardly.

Another thing that we started -- this started, actually, before I went there with Shriver, but we built on it a little bit. When I came back to join George Ball in 1963, I was concerned over the lack of people at senior levels who really knew anything about France. We had difficulties getting the ideal number twos, political counselors (Randy Kidder was an exception) and economic ministers.

I talked this over with Chip Bohlen and he said: "What we've got to do is build up a cadre of people who gain experience in France at an early age, and know something about France, so that later on the personnel system can dip into the files and find a DCM that at least speaks fluent French." It was unbelievable the lack of senior people who had any real background on France, and it's this way today, not quite as bad, but almost. So what did we try and do?

George Ball got behind this, along with Bill Crockett, who was the number-one administrator of the Department at the time Ball was Under Secretary. We arranged with the *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA), which is the elite graduate school formed after the war by Pierre Racine, from which any person aspiring to enter public service had to graduate, to allocate one slot for an American diplomat to go there. And Crockett funded it. It was a one-year program. The point was that we wanted a bright, young FSO already fluent in French to go there and absorb France and things French along side the future leaders of France. I think of the contacts he'd make.

The next step, following one year at ENA, was going to be to assign the class-four or five FSO as Principal Officer at one of our Consulates in France for two years. In this way, we could find out if he could run an office. Put him in Lyon as consul general; if he can't run anything, it doesn't matter anyway, because it's not going to break the bank. Peter Tarnoff was our first man. I just wish he was still in the Service, because he could have been the DCM, and eventually our ambassador to France. He was superb. He went through ENA, and was an excellent consul general in Lyon. The system has not continued the way we wanted it to. It did for four of five years. But this was the idea that we wanted to have work out, so a higher caliber of people who understand France could be available to fill the key jobs.

Q: Strangely enough, your friend Johnny Jones built up a very similar system in Italy, which was functioning when I was young. It's totally destroyed now because of this business of bidding for jobs.

ANDERSON: This is a pity.

Q: It is too bad.

ANDERSON: In recent years we failed to send students to ENA as the State Department says we don't have money. Well, this is inexcusable. For example, the Germans send 40 students every year. Now you think, this has been going on since World War II, practically; think of the number of Germans that are close to the number of French. And at the level they are now, they're Ministers, bank presidents and corporation heads. They pick up the phone, the old-boys club starts to operate. De Gaulle wanted to have this done as another way to try and prevent France and Germany from being at loggerheads. I think it was a wonderful initiative.

Q: Frenchmen would go to Germany, too?

ANDERSON: I don't think the Germans have an ENA, but there are French students who attend other institutions. To continue on with ENA for a minute, which we built on when Sarge Shriver was in Paris. We instituted a graduation present for six students from ENA, to come to the United States after they graduated. They could come for six weeks and visit anywhere they wanted. It was separate from the Leader grant program, but the same idea. We did this for a few years, and then formed an alumni association, so we could stay in touch with these ENA graduates as they moved through their careers. This was an extremely valuable contact for the United States.

Henri Alphanand was French ambassador here, and went back as Secretary General of the foreign office. He never was pro-American, and managed to change with the political climate throughout his career. Charles Lucat, his successor here, was excellent.

When Alphanand heard about this program, he complained: "Oh, here's the United States trying to subvert these young Frenchmen by offering them a trip." This actually happened before Shriver arrived in Paris, because I was still back in Washington, and Charles Lucat was Ambassador. Lucat asked me to come over and see him. We had a drink together and he said: "Bob, I've received this telegram, and I don't think we can continue this program."

I said: "What? This is ridiculous."

He said: "I know." And he showed me the telegram.

I said: "Well, what's the problem? Is it because we pay for it?"

"Well, yes. They think you're bribing these people."

I said: "All right, Charles, do you agree this is a good program?"

"Yes."

I then commented: "I think, too, it's wonderful. It helps U.S.-French relations. So you pay for it. But still let them come. Don't deprive them of this experience, after they've gone through this terribly rigorous course." And that is what happened. So we were able to continue it and the French paid for it. We overcame Alphanand's objection, because we weren't paying for it.

To return to one thing I said on our efforts to try to understand France more, to have officers develop more contacts with the French people in this new atmosphere that I described earlier. We instituted a program, whereby in the Paris consulate district, the members of the political and economic section had to visit specific parts of the district four times a year.

I never heard such bleats out of some members of the political section, all of whom are ambassadors now. That was one of the most star-studded sections in history; Mike Glitman, who just completed the TNF Treaty negotiations; John Gunther Dean; Andy Steigman; and Bob Oakley. We had a whole stable of them. They started to gripe about getting out into the countryside in a staff meeting, saying: "But look at the telegrams that are coming in my in-box."

I said: "Gentlemen, I couldn't care less about your in-box or your telegrams. You are to go out. You're going to learn something about this country. Paris is not France. You're going to meet mayors. You're going to meet members of Parliament out in the provinces. You're going to meet chambers of commerce leaders. I want you to learn about France and profit from this." They really were unhappy with me. And I said: "If you don't, it's going to be reflected in your fitness report. I'm sorry." I was very, very disturbed by their narrow view.

The long and the short of this story is that after they went twice, I couldn't keep them in the office. They loved it. They later came and thanked me, and said: "We now know something about France."

And that reminds me of one thing. When I arrived in Paris on August 15, 1968, Perry Culley, my dear, wonderful friend, was Consul General. He met me at the train station, because I brought my family over by boat and took the train from Le Havre. I had had no vacation, and those five days were going to be my leave. We drove to the front gate of the embassy, and Perry said: "Bob, I'm afraid you have to go into the embassy right now." I wasn't even allowed to go home and drop my family off at the residence, where Randy Kidder lived -- you know, the house with the elevator at Leopold II.

Q: Yes.

ANDERSON: My three children and wife went on with Perry to the house. And I went up and Shriver looked up and said: "It's about time you got here."

I said: "What are you saying?"

"Look, I'm supposed to take off for Sardinia right now, and Eunice and the children are waiting. I've got to go. Good luck." He took off one hour later, and left me virtually in charge.

Q: Woody Wallner had just left ahead of you.

ANDERSON: Woody was there, but winding up as DCM. Ten days later, the Russians went into Czechoslovakia, and I was there in the embassy with Shriver in Sardinia, and Woody's replacement not yet in place.

One of the first things we did was to reduce the political reporting of the American Embassy by 60%. I had been on the receiving end in Washington earlier, and the quantity of telegrams was overwhelming. As often happens, and you know this as well as I do, our political sections like to compete with the newspapers. Newspapers are paid to get the scoops ASAP. We're paid to analyze. I did not want to try and beat the wire services with some minor scoop. Eliminating this type of marginal reporting enabled us to devote more time to go out into the country, to learn more about France and to develop new objectives to improve our relations with France.

There was a cost-cutting effort to close USIS offices in the provinces and operate only out of Paris. We fought that and won, because the USIS offices in France, for the first time now, were going to be able to have some effective contact with the French people. We therefore didn't want to lose this tool.

There are a couple of amusing stories about Sarge and Eunice Shriver. One had to do with a stag lunch at the residence -- the old residence at Number Two Avenue Iena. There were about ten of us. One thing that you would never know as you went into the residence was where the dining table was going to be. It was like a floating crap table; it moved into different rooms, depending upon what the children were doing. There were usually no rugs on the floor because they would impede the mobility of the fire engines, the bicycles and the tricycles.

Two French Cabinet ministers came on this particular day. One was a very dignified, senior Gaullist minister, who always wore a bow tie, he was sitting at Sarge's right. One of the Shriver children came in. I was at an angle where I could see the child, I think it was Anthony. As he came in through the door, I watched his eyes. They were focused on the bow tie of the French minister. He came towards the French minister, and his right hand started to go up. I broke into the conversation, and I said: "Mr. Ambassador, Anthony's on your right. Get his arm, quickly." Sarge saved the day, and the bow tie of the Minister remained tied. [Laughter] That's just one little example.

Another story involves Eunice. She had very definite views on the people she'd like to sit with at dinners. A very large, important dinner was scheduled. Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister, was going to be there. And Alphand had come back from Washington -- no, at that time he was already the Secretary General of the foreign office. And then Arthur Ashe would be there along with other tennis people. It was a large dinner with a number of round tables in different rooms.

Eunice asked my dear wife, Elena, if she would come over and arrange the seating because she didn't have much confidence in the lady that was hired to do this sort of thing. So Elena did the job and came home to change for the big event. This was one of the few black-tie affairs the Shrivvers had. As a matter of fact, Jackie Kennedy was there with her sister. It was quite an evening.

We returned to the Residence and walked in a little ahead of time. And there was Eunice moving the place cards Elena arranged.

Q: In France, of all places.

ANDERSON: I know. She wanted Arthur Ashe and other friends at her table, not Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister. And she started to put Couve, the Foreign Minister, someplace. Alphant, who had been placed in the outer regions, nearly walked out.

Elena and I finally persuaded Eunice to place Couve at the number one table, but lost on most other counts. This is the way they were. Sometimes they'd get away with it, sometimes they wouldn't.

Incidentally, a little vignette on Couve de Murville, that comes to mind. It involves Sir Harold Nicholson, whom you know?

Q: Yes.

ANDERSON: Well, Couve de Murville has an Anglophobia the likes of which I've never seen. I'll never forget, for example, after de Gaulle pulled out of the military structure of NATO, there was a U.N. session in New York and Dean Rusk invited Couve and the French delegation, as we always did, to a small bilateral lunch up at the Waldorf Astoria apartment of our Ambassador. Couve refused to speak English; he wouldn't use one word of impeccable English. He just sat there, sulked and spoke French, and insisted that it be translated.

Q: Oh, I've heard Alphant will do this.

ANDERSON: I found out one reason that he's this way. It involves Sir Harold Nicholson, and it's a true story. When Couve was a young man, Sir Harold wanted to have a tennis professional, somebody to come and teach his children tennis. Couve saw the ad Sir Harold placed in the papers. He was accepted and went to Sir Harold Nicholson's to teach tennis and be a companion to the children. He was treated like a servant. He was not considered part of the family, and had a room out in back. Couve never forgot this. This may be an important little footnote to history that explains, in part why Couve feels the way he does about the English. I thought that this might be interesting for somebody to check into this further if one wanted to.

I believe I mentioned to you about Jacques Chaban-Delmas who was Prime Minister when Sarge Shriver was there. I told you before I had become very close to him starting in 1959 when he was Mayor of Bordeaux. I used to see him often as Prime Minister, always of course with Sarge's prior approval. He was delighted to have me see Chaban. I would usually be asked to come to the Matignon, where the prime minister had his office, and would go up the back stairs to see him, whenever he had something he wanted to discuss.

I'll never forget when France sold a number of Mirage aircraft to Libya back in '68 or '69. And you know, we were concerned about this. I went to see Chaban, at his request, and as far as I know, this has never been written. But he said: "Bob, look, please tell your people not to be so worried about this. They can't fly them. We are going to train their pilots. That's going to be in Dijon, France. It's going to take a long time, number one. And number two, they're not really going to ever be able to really fly them. I don't think they will ever become a military factor. And through this, a sale of 100 Mirages, we may be able to exert some political leverage on Libya."

This is so typically French. That is what he told me, and I reported it to Washington. I must say, Washington's temperature lowered. I haven't followed the entire history of the 100 aircraft -- but as far as I know, they have never become a potent military factor for Libya.

Q: They didn't seem to prevent our bombing (inaudible) some years later.

ANDERSON: I agree, but I don't know if any of those aircraft are still operational, because that's a long ago. They bought them in '68 or '69.

One other tidbit about Chaban-Delmas, when my wife and I were transferred -- this jumps up to 1972 when I was going to Africa as Ambassador to Dahomey. I wanted to pay a farewell call on him. And so he and his wife invited Elena and me to his private apartments at the Matignon. The four of us were there alone together. He was thinking about running for the Presidency then, but his new wife didn't want to have anything to do with it; she was the sporting type and just wanted to return to her life in the southwest.

And I was trying to find out his future plans, and asked: "Well, you've been prime minister now for quite a while. How much longer are you going to be here?"

He said: "Yes, I have been. Let's see." He looked up at the calendar on the wall, that had Xs marked for each day. He continued: "I've been here for X years, X months, and 16 hours." [Laughter] He looked at his watch, and said: "I can't wait to get out. Really."

His dear wife, whom I saw a couple of months ago here, had told him: "You'd better just move on." But she did let him make a run at the Presidency. Giscard d'Estaing did not play fair on this one. He falsely accused Chaban of not paying his income tax, which just wasn't correct. That eliminated him as a contender.

Q: Well, is he still mayor of Bordeaux?

ANDERSON: Yes, and still a member of parliament. Michel Jobert. I might say one brief word about him. He was subsequently Foreign Minister, but under Pompidou, he was the secretary general of the Presidency. I came to know him well.

He was born in Morocco. He has an American wife. The son went to the American school, very bright. Yet, he never really liked the United States that much. I think one of the things that became a little difficult was his relations with Henry Kissinger, who was then in the White House. They both had strong personalities, and just couldn't get along very well. I've seen Jobert many times since, and he still has a chip on his shoulder, as far as we're concerned; I don't think that will ever leave.

I remember once he called me over to the Elysée. He said: "The President is very upset by this *Newsweek* article. Why did you all do this? You didn't tell us this was your policy."

I found it amazing that a man of his intelligence, and Pompidou's intelligence, could focus on a

Newsweek article, and consider it was American policy. But that happened so often. I just had to tell him: "You can tell your President that that is not our policy. We told you what it was last week. And just because *Newsweek* writes something different, it, doesn't mean our policy has changed."

And then an amazing thing was that he had all the secrets of the state on his desk, and said: "Fine. I'll go in and tell him." He left me sitting there alone with all the papers, commenting as he went in to calm Pompidou down: "He's really angry." He's angry at you, too."

I said: "Well, don't be angry at me; I didn't have anything to do with this. And ask him not to become so upset by *Newsweek*."

One item, to do with President Nixon's visit, when Sarge Shriver was Ambassador, and General Walters was our Defense Attaché. There was a beautiful dinner at the Elysée palace, that de Gaulle gave for President Nixon. General Walters was the translator for the toasts. When de Gaulle spoke, Walters stood behind President Nixon and did the translation. Then when Nixon spoke, Walters translated Nixon's toast into French. There was a slight difficulty here. General Walters became so enthralled with what de Gaulle and Nixon had to say that his rendition of what was said was horribly translation.

And Henri Alphan and I were sitting near the end of the table and we looked at each other and there was the press and everything else. And we said: "Wait a minute. Dick's enthusiasm had run away with itself." We had to rush out and tell the press: "You can use what de Gaulle said in French, and you can use what Nixon said in English, but translations must be reviewed before release." Dick was such an admirer of General de Gaulle that on that particular evening things just got out of hand a little bit with the dear general. I still consider him one of the most brilliant linguists I have ever known.

Now, on Sarge Shriver and Nixon. Nixon asked Shriver to stay on as Ambassador, and Sarge accepted. Everybody was pleased with the job he was doing, and he stayed on through '69. Two or three young Democrats then came over and really worked on Shriver to run for the governorship of Maryland in 1970. Much to my disappointment, he succumbed, resigned and went back. The reason that I'm even more disappointed is, that these young Democrats hadn't done their homework properly. By the time he returned to Maryland, he was too late to register, and couldn't even run for the governorship.

So he resigned as Ambassador of France and couldn't run as governor for Maryland. I have been very disappointed in that because I think he would have been a tremendous asset to stay on there, rather than have poor Dick Watson represent us, because Dick was a --

Q: Man of complexes.

ANDERSON: He was a very sick man. He had a terrible alcohol problem, as we all know. And it finally did him in. I was very close to him. I can't say too much about distinguished things that happened while he was there. I think the main thing is we were able to persuade the French to cooperate with us on narcotics. Dick worked the Interior Minister, who at first didn't want to

have anything to do with it, saying: "That's your problem, not ours."

But we persuaded our French friends, including President Pompidou, that this was, indeed, going to be a French problem, and it was going to affect their youth. You may remember the movies, *French Connection I* and *French Connection II*. *French Connection I* was a direct result of the cooperation we worked out with the French and illustrates the depth of our cooperation.

Q: Who, by this time, was your DCM there?

ANDERSON: Watson wanted a change immediately. Perry Culley came back this time as DCM. His background was more consular and administrative. Perry and I couldn't have been closer, and had worked well together previously. Perry was the one Dick Watson wanted when told by the Service that I couldn't move up from political counselor to DCM. John Burns, who was Director General of the Foreign Service, and a good friend, said: "That's something we don't like to do, if we can avoid it." I wasn't that senior then, and that was fine, because I loved my job as political counselor and knew I would enjoy working with Watson and Perry.

GILBERT H. SHEINBAUM
Economic Officer
Paris (1959-1962)

Gilbert H. Sheinbaum was born in New York on April 20, 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from New York University in 1950 and served in the U.S. military from 1951-1953. Mr. Sheinbaum entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in Laos, Vietnam, Denmark, Madagascar, Malawi, the Philippines, and Switzerland. This interview was conducted by Tom Dunnigan on September 6, 1995.

Q: You were next assigned to Paris. That was a reward for your service in Laos or normal?

SHEINBAUM: Well, of course, when I was leaving for Laos in 1957, it seemed like everyone in Personnel, probably not including Pat Byrne (the desk officer, later Ambassador to Mali and Burma), felt sorry that I was being assigned to Laos. I wasn't at all unhappy about being assigned to Laos, as I mentioned before. I was simply unhappy about going into disbursing, but in the end that turned out to be a good thing as a start in the Foreign Service. When I left for Laos, they said, "Oh, don't worry, we'll take care of you the next time." But who would believe that? So when my orders came in for Paris, it took the code room twenty-four hours to convince me that they were legitimate orders because I had seen them play around in the code room dummyping up orders for other people, and I could not believe that I was really going to Paris.

Q: But you had home leave in between, I think.

SHEINBAUM: Home leave, yes.

Q: Good. Now in Paris, you arrived in 1959, you had two ambassadors, Amory Houghton and Jim Gavin, I gather. And you were assigned there as economic officer this time.

SHEINBAUM: I was economic officer; the assistant civil air attaché, and the transportation and telecommunications officer. After I'd been there only a couple of months on the job, my boss, Bert Colclaser, the civil air attaché and a very experienced woman in civil aviation, an aviation lawyer, went on home leave for three months. Well, that made it more interesting for me because of unexpected things I had to do. Like, suddenly, negotiation of an amendment to the Civil Aviation Agreement between France and the United States. That really was demanding in terms of both what I knew about civil aviation and with my French, but it all worked out well. I also did have some things to do with surface transportation. I think the most interesting aspect of my stay there, aside from the social life, was having done a rather lengthy report on the embryonic development of the French SST, supersonic transport, about which the United States knew very little. Even though I was not technically qualified, I was able to use various sources I'd developed for the report, and they put all the details in laymen's terms for me. That report brought to Paris Najeeb Halaby, then head of the FAA. And he came out because nobody knew that the French had progressed so far, as I reported, and the Kennedy Administration was pondering whether or not we should develop an SST, a very costly venture if we went ahead. In the end we didn't. I think that was a wise move because, as we now see, the British-French Concorde, while a remarkable achievement, didn't really do much for the industry's long-term interests. And it never repaid the massive investment. Perhaps, on the technical side, it may have been useful for research, and we probably benefited from that as well. It was a very satisfying experience for me.

Q: And economically, it hasn't paid off.

SHEINBAUM: No, that's what I mean.

Q: Now, when you arrived, in '59, had France recovered from the upheavals of 1958, the student revolt and all the other things that had gone on?

SHEINBAUM: Well, yes, it was fairly calm there - at first. De Gaulle was in full control at that time. It was rather remarkable. I had arrived only a year or so after those events and I was surprised in a way to find France -- only fourteen years after the end of the war -- in such good shape. And spiritually, the arrival of de Gaulle on the scene had brought great relief that they had a strong man running the government. Not everybody agreed with him, but even most who didn't were grateful for the fact that they did have stable government. Then you had the Algerian business the following year, and that was a remarkable development.

Q: I want to refer to that a little later. Who was the economic minister at the embassy at that time?

SHEINBAUM: Jack Reinstein.

Q: Jack Reinstein, oh yes. With a great German background, too -- and French. And de Gaulle had put in an austerity program, as I recall. Was that successful?

SHEINBAUM: To a certain extent, but I don't think I'm equipped really to comment on it because, in retrospect, I haven't studied it in detail. All I know is that the French economy seemed to be very stable during all of the '60s long after I was there.

Q: Well, I would say, from many visits to Paris, is that austerity does not seem to be in the French character very often .

SHEINBAUM: Well, de Gaulle was not in the French character either for that matter. But he lasted for a long period of time, eleven years, not including his first appearance on the scene as the war was ending, but he did provide the stability that was needed and he had some great ideas to make the French, the Fifth Republic, a very stable . . .

Q: I would imagine he will go down as one of the great Frenchmen of the century.

SHEINBAUM: Of course. And his relationship with Adenauer -- not always smooth -- was often tenuous but nonetheless they made remarkable achievements for Europe.

Q: Now you were there in Paris when the French had their first successful nuclear test? What did that do to morale? Did it improve it? Were people unhappy with it?

SHEINBAUM: I don't remember, Tom. I don't have any recollection of reactions.

Q: How about the Common Market, which was then beginning to roll? Were the beneficial effects appreciated by the French?

SHEINBAUM: I think so. I think the French, perhaps more than the other participants in the Common Market, the other five countries at that time, were hesitant about the Common Market. I'm not sure of de Gaulle's substantive views on that himself, but the Common Market agreement had already been signed and he seemed to want to move ahead, feeling that was the way to go, probably as a major element of a strong Franco-German relationship that would obviate the possibility of friction that could lead to hostilities. So it was NATO and the Common Market together.

Q: While you were there, Gil, were American businesses welcome? Could they be established easily and were the French willing to cooperate with them?

SHEINBAUM: The French were particularly interested in our technology and business management abilities. Those were very strong factors. Now I was only involved really in the field of civil aviation and transportation and communications and there was a great deal of interest in American technology and having American companies coming over. Naturally, the French were very protective of their companies. I remember, there was a big story about Machines Bull, the French company that, I think, was partially owned by the Government -- it may have been all state-owned for all I know -- but nonetheless, while they were very protective of their own market, they were also very interested in getting a hold of our technology and being able to compete in the export markets. There was technology that the Americans could provide

that they could not. So I could not make an overall judgment in every sector of the economy, but it seemed to me that American businesses were flourishing there even though American goods were - at that time - expensive for Europeans as the dollar was very strong. There were some restrictions, but nonetheless there was great opportunity for American business.

Q: That has been somewhat reversed.

SHEINBAUM: I would say yes.

Q: During the latter part of your tour, the French were deeply involved in the troubles in Algeria with the revolt of the French generals and so forth. What was the reaction of your French contacts to that? Were they happy to see the French out of Algeria? Did they want to stay?

SHEINBAUM: When I arrived in Paris, I didn't know any French people aside from those I knew in Indochina -- what some still call Indochina: Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia -- and had come to live in Paris for the first time in years. So a small group of six or eight French families gave me immediate access to the French social way of life. Of course, they themselves felt like outsiders because most of them had spent so many years in Indochina. But their views were rather ambivalent about Algeria. I think they saw the handwriting on the wall: Algeria, somehow or other, was going to go the way of Vietnam, but not necessarily in an identical fashion.

Q: France couldn't hold on to it.

SHEINBAUM: That's right. And also they resented the attitude of the French military, or rather those in the French military who were defying de Gaulle and were de-stabilizing the country. That they resented. By that time, after six months or more in Paris, I did have other French friends who resented this intrusion by the military into the private lives of the French in France. I remember I didn't think I would ever see Paris the way I saw it for several days when the streets were cleared, when there was nobody on the streets, when buses were lined up to block the bridges, tanks in the streets, the military . . . Despite curfews, I had to make a couple of runs at night down to the embassy - past rows of tanks and other military vehicles - because of commercial aircraft that were scheduled to come in, and we had to get messages to them to divert since the runways were blocked. It was a very spooky feeling, much in the way that Washington was spooky in April 1968, after the assassination of Martin Luther King.

Q: I remember that.

SHEINBAUM: I came back suddenly to Washington in April 1968 from Vietnam with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. I was his Staff Assistant. We were here for three days and there was nobody on the streets the first two days. Who would have ever thought there would be a situation like that here in Washington or anywhere in the States. It was a spooky feeling. In France from then on the military, not only in Algeria but throughout France, had a much lower influence on government policy.

MICHAEL E. C. ELY
Treasury Office
Paris (1959-1962)

Michael E. C. Ely was born in Washington, DC on August 26, 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in international affairs from Princeton University in 1952 and a master's degree in public affairs from Harvard University. Following his studies at Princeton, Mr. Ely served in the U.S. military for nearly two years. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Kuala Lumpur, Algiers, Mogadishu, Rome, Tokyo and Brussels. Mr. Ely was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

ELY: But Paris, where I arrived on a cold November day in 1959, was very different, and nobody looked after you there. If you didn't speak the language in Paris 1959, you were high and dry. It was much less of an international place than it is now, and the French did not speak English, nor would they.

De Gaulle had come in in '58. This was at the winding down of the great post-war period. The Marshall Plan was phasing out. The OECD ended just shortly after I got there, and we set up the OECD instead. The French were in the European Community, and France was moving toward a more independent, self-confident stance.

But the deep divisions in French society were very apparent, even then. And the relations between France and the United States were very ambivalent. The French were intensely suspicious of our role in Algeria. They were intensely ambivalent about what we did in Indochina. De Gaulle disliked the Atlantic Alliance, which he thought was a tool of American predominance. The French had dreams of 20 years before, when France was considered the most powerful nation in the world. That was nearly gone. It was an illusion, but the French still had it.

And French society was still riven by the very factors that are being purged only today; that is, who did what during the occupation? Nobody was telling the truth. It was a society very much like recent society in the Soviet Union, based on lies. The Communists said that they had started the resistance and won the war. De Gaulle said, no, no the Free French had won the war. And in point of fact, neither did. The Allied forces, primarily American, won the war. But nobody was going to admit this.

On the right, Americans were unpopular because of our open-democracy populism, open culture, and prosperity. And sooner or later, whenever you were talking to a prominent French person, someone would start mentioning the almighty dollar. The almighty dollar...

While on the left, which included not just the Communists and the trade unions, but the entire academic community and almost all the intellectuals, Americans were seen as representatives of a rotten capitalist society. First, you get the Nazis, and then you get the capitalists, and we represented the capitalists.

So, while Americans were personally well treated and well regarded, as a country the United

States was very unpopular. In the Foreign Ministry, the nationalists disliked us because France had become too reliant on the United States. The Atlanticists were purged by de Gaulle, which meant the friends of United States were taken out of the Foreign Ministry and even out of the government.

While for me, as a junior officer, it didn't make a lot of difference, this was not an easy period. I had a terrible time finding a place to live and learning the language. Eventually, I got 12 weeks of intensive French. I'd had a year in college, and that's the only formal French I've ever had. But that gave me enough so I was able to get going.

At about that time, de Gaulle, in one of his typically monarchical gestures, decided to free French Africa in 1960. And all of a sudden, these countries were cast loose. Not exactly cast loose, but made formally independent. The embassy had to find somebody to mark on that, and I found myself immersed in the problems of these newly emergent countries, with their commercial and financial ties with France.

Q: It must have been a fascinating time. This was just before the Kennedy administration came in, wasn't it?

ELY: Exactly.

Q: Well, to go back, what were you doing when you first arrived in '59?

ELY: I spent my entire three years working in the treasury office for Donald J. McGrew, himself a subject of considerable oral history. McGrew had been the deputy to Tommy Tomlinson, who had been a very important figure in the Marshall Plan and OECD in the great days of the late '40s and early '50s. Tomlinson died, allegedly of overwork, in 1955, I believe. And when Tommy passed, McGrew replaced him. McGrew had already been there for ten years and stayed on for another 15.

Q: He was subordinate to the Treasury or to the embassy? What was his relationship?

ELY: Well, that requires going back a little bit. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was framed to make the Foreign Service presidential, not State Department. And the Foreign Service was to represent all departments of the U.S. government -- Agriculture, Treasury, and any other department with overseas functions. Treasury never accepted this division; it would not give up its personnel system and independence to a system that it didn't control, would be dominated by the State Department. Treasury never joined, and Agriculture quickly broke away. Agriculture had its Corn Belt constituency that felt that it really had to control their foreign agricultural service; they couldn't let the State Department run that. So the Treasury attaché in Paris was from another agency. By 1959, it was quite clear that the original concept of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was forgotten. The White House would have had to give the concept full support. It never got it. So it became a reversion to the State Department, overall, providing the top political or economic people in the embassies, and other agencies putting in their own people for their functions.

McGrew was innovative and unusual. He was the deputy chief of the economic section. And the economic minister in Paris in those days was an important person. And indeed, Jack Tuthill, who's on the board of my Jean Monnet Council, was a close contact of Monnet himself.

Q: He's also the subject of an oral history interview we've done.

ELY: He left just before I arrived, and he saw a great deal of Jean Monnet and all the big actors of the post-war period, like Robert Marjolin.

Anyhow, I worked for McGrew, and he trained me. He had what he called McGrew University. Art Hartman was, I think, two people before me. Very intensive. You had to know French very well, both how to speak it and then all the technical language. Required a great deal of persistence. And you had so much contact work to do. You had to call on and get to know, officials and then do your work by phone, if possible. In those days in particular, the French didn't like telephones very much, and they wanted you to come around. And they insisted on doing everything in French, even if they were bilingual. A phony atmosphere in which to operate, but still exhilarating and interesting.

My work on former French Africa brought me into contact with whole sections of the government where we had never had contact before -- the Ministry of Cooperation, which was the French aid agency; the Ministry of Education, which ran the education system in that area and was paranoid about the English language replacing French, a paranoia that turned out to be misplaced.

Q: Once French gets in, it stays.

ELY: Seems to, doesn't it. Although it was partly mistaken; part of the French deep suspicion of Americans both replacing the French with our economic and financial power and making Africa part of the anti-Communist battlefield, reflecting the way that the United States tended to see the world: It's us and our allies versus the Soviet Union, so let's get in there before the Russians do. Well, it turned out this was heavy-handed but not inaccurate. The Russians were behaving worse than we did, and they quickly moved into Guinea; they moved into everywhere they could.

Q: They tried it in Congo and Brazzaville.

ELY: That's right, and they did get into Angola and other places. The Russians were quite ready to turn Africa into a Cold War battleground.

Q: You were dealing with French agencies that the normal American diplomat doesn't deal with very much. I know nothing about the French political spectrum, but did you find these agencies - - Coordination, Education, and all -- sort of dominated by what I would put sort of to the left of the spectrum? Maybe the Education more the intellectuals, and the Coordination more the technocrats? How did you find it?

ELY: Well, for one thing, France was and remains an intensely elitist society. And the peak of the elite you find in the government, and the peak of the governmental elite you find in the

inspecteurs des finances. And I found myself running into these people everywhere I went. The inspecteur des finances is a supertechnocrat, protected, powerful, privileged, overworked, brilliant, and usually quite condescending. Learning to deal with these people was one of the most useful things I acquired.

Q: Let me ask a technical question. Here you were, you had not had much French, and although you had been through Princeton, we don't train people the same way they do in their school systems.

ELY: You mean the one-upmanship and put-downs?

Q: Yes, and all this. How did you deal with these people?

ELY: Well, it took me a while, and I was baffled at first. But, typically, you'd go down to the Direction des Relations Extérieur et Communiqués Extérieur, and there would be a 32-year-old inspecteur des finances, in his miserable back office lit by a single yellow light bulb, wearing an old blazer and a sweater, and smoking a Gauloise, and the ashes are going down the front of his shirt. You sit down and he looks at you and he asks you your business. And then he says, "Well, I'm glad you have that, because...", and he explains it to you, because obviously the Americans have an imperfect understanding. "It's one, two, three, four, and five. And this is the way these all go together."

And after a while, you say, "That's wonderful. I hadn't understood it that way. But don't you think it might be one, two, three, four, five, and six? It's even better that way."

Then he looks at you, and he says, "Aha, I have a worthy antagonist." And he starts dealing with you seriously.

Q: Everything fits into a form, doesn't it? As an enjoyer of French movies, I find that they see systems, where I don't think Americans see systems.

ELY: Yes. It was a revelation of sorts dealing with these people, because they were very good and really smart. They also have an institutional set that is totally different from anything that we do. And a relatively small number of people, working very, very hard, do the work of a much larger number of people in American administrations. We have a resolutely non-elitist view of government service, where we put in political appointees clear down to the assistant secretary level. The French wouldn't dream of that. They have their corps of loyal, protected, and powerful civil servants, who are put through a series of cream separators, weeded out, and then they start at the top and work up. A totally different system, that it makes the American system seem populist, bumbling and top-heavy in comparison.

Over the years, looking back, I find that the systems reflect the cultures. I don't think we could operate with the French system. I think they might do a little better if they had something a little closer to ours, but that's an observation that I can't prove.

Q: At the time, did Treasury sort of have a different view than "the embassy" did about where we

were going? A different French policy?

ELY: Not at that time. This was a time when relations between State and Treasury were very close. John Leddy, who had been assistant secretary for European affairs, went over to be assistant secretary of the treasury. We exchanged people quite a bit, and my presence in the Treasury office in Paris was part of an agreement that had been made about ten years earlier. Although there had been very deep divisions between Treasury and State in the early post-war period, where Treasury argued that the Europeans should have gone into massive devaluations and massive trade liberalization (something they were never going to do), by the end of the '40s, this had been patched up and State and Treasury saw eye to eye on lots of things. By the '60s, this had broken down. Treasury views on the international payment system tended to be very conservative. State was becoming more innovative, and the two finally fell away. Now they have reverted warring kingdoms, and cooperate on the basis of mutual advantage, and are basically hostile to each other. They look to different constituencies and speak only when required. Relations between State and Treasury are bad, and I don't see any structural reason why this should improve. Personalities make things better or worse.

There is no overall control of U.S. foreign economic policy anymore. Indeed, there's no longer a willingness to admit that foreign economic policy is foreign policy. The Congress in particular wants to break trade policy away from other aspects of foreign policy. Most-favored-nation for China, the Uruguay round, the primacy of STR, the taking of the commercial function away from State to Commerce. The whole foreign economic policy process is now fragmented and pulls together only at the Cabinet level in the White House.

Q: I want to drag you back to the 1950s, early '60s. We had two ambassadors while you were there, Amory Houghton and James Gavin. I've heard, in other interviews I've done with people who were in the embassy during this time, that the embassy was sort of divided into Gaullists and almost anti-Gaullists. Did you find that there was an ambivalence within the various officers in how they looked at de Gaulle?

ELY: Yes. I wouldn't say there were pro-Gaullists and anti-Gaullists, but there were those that deplored de Gaulle, and those that said, "Look, this is very French, it's necessary, and you've got to take it into account. Don't think that this guy's going to go away, and don't think that by opposing him, you can overcome him. Gaullism speaks to French people in its own way, and we'd better take that into account."

De Gaulle was in the process of making himself very unpopular with Americans, and, indeed, the anti-French feeling began about the time that I got there, and was increasing by the time I left in '62. I guess it reached a peak in '64 when de Gaulle pulled out of NATO. Well, it started to crest then. The French were, of course, playing both sides of the street. They were playing their American cards, their European cards, and their election cards, all the East-West cards, and doing their customary tightrope act in the search for national prestige. This was and is much resented. Mitterrand does the same thing now, where he says he wants the United States in Europe, but the Americans are going to leave anyhow, so he wants to make a special deal with the Germans.

Q: Again, I speak as an outsider, but a retired Foreign Service officer. Looking at this, it all seems like the French are sitting around doing things more to annoy us or to be different. And I'm sure that's not an accurate thing, but is there something, do you think, within this that makes...

ELY: You have a couple of things. The French will maintain that they see things differently from us, that they have a long-term view of Communism, civilization, and all, which is opposed to our ahistorical populace's innocent, unconsciously nationalistic view. So they're wiser. And then, second, the French have a very deep-seated sense of frustration and inferiority, which (as inferiority feelings often do) takes the opposite form; that is, superiority and anxiety, resentment. This is dying off now as the French get their self-confidence back. Many people would argue that de Gaulle was a necessary phase in recovering that self-confidence. They didn't have it in the early '60s. This was one reason that being an American was sometimes an unpleasant business among the French. You have to remember, this was the time of Sartre, and Sartre was a Communist...

Q: He was a philosopher.

ELY: Yes, and a very influential person. The entire Sorbonne, all the universities, were full of Marxists, all of whom had a dislike and contempt for the United States and all it stood for. Even though they might have had some nice personal feelings on the side, institutionally they were anti-American. It was in 1964 that Michel Debré, then prime minister, managed to make a speech celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Normandy landing without mentioning the United States, which took quite a bit of acrobatics. Well, he was a firm Gaullist, and the Gaullist view was that the Free French had won the war; they had liberated Paris and the Americans had come in afterwards, which was total distortion. We got the liberation ready and politically stepped back to let him liberate the city for his own political reasons.

I was chargé d'affaires very briefly in 1984 at the 40th anniversary of D-Day. This was when Ronald Reagan came to the Normandy beaches, with Mrs. Reagan. And my wife, who is an interpreter, went out to Normandy to interpret. I was sitting alone in the DCM's office; our entire embassy was out at the beaches doing administrative support for the president and his party. A French historian was broadcasting over French television, showing scenes where the Allies had landed. He started saying what a bloody business it had been, both the landings and the subsequent fighting, and the very heavy casualties on both sides, and how the Americans had lost 1,000 here, and the British had lost 4,000 there, and the Germans had lost half a division here, and here's where they... the German tanks, and here's where the Germans holed up and 600 of them fought to the last man, and the ones who were about to be captured blew themselves apart. Finally, this was truth, this is what actually happened, told by a French historian to Frenchmen. And I came to the conclusion, that period of French history is over. The French no longer feel that they have to lie to justify themselves. And that now the whole [question of] who collaborated with whom during the occupation was finally coming out when they brought out the first film on that, *Le Chagrin et la Pitié*, back in the mid-'60s.

Q: The Sorrow and the...

ELY: The Sorrow and the Pity; it was about collaboration. The right wing and the left wing took turns bombing the movie theaters. They both disagreed.

Q: I realize that you were a junior officer there, but did you get any feeling about how the ambassadors, both Houghton and Gavin, were responding to this difficult period? Was there a difference?

ELY: Houghton was a patrician from a nice family, a lot of money, and he was very much of a gentleman. If there were some problem or tragedy in the embassy family, there would be tactful help from the ambassador, in the form of money and support: a very patrician and responsible approach. He had a slight lisp and he spoke French with an accent, and the French made continual fun of him, they denigrated him and ridiculed him, which was quite unfair; he was a prince. And as a result he had little impact on the French, and virtually none in Washington.

Gavin was quite different. Gavin had been a division commander during the Second World War, a very famous paratrooper, and he commanded the 82nd Airborne.

Q: Yes, and he jumped at Normandy.

ELY: He jumped at Normandy, and he jumped again at Arles. And he was decorated. Gavin had been an orphan, a complicated person, very intelligent, rather driven. He was supposed to speak French, but didn't speak it very well. He taught French at West Point. He knew the language, but he didn't speak it. Lots of Americans were that way in those days.

His primary policy preoccupation was whether or not, and if so, to what extent, the United States would cooperate with the French in their independent nuclear-weapon capability. Gavin felt strongly that, since this was going to happen, and since its impact in terms of American interests was ambiguous, that is, certain aspects would be good, and other aspects bad, we should cautiously cooperate with the French, and in particular provide them with computer capacity and either air refueling technology or maybe even the tankers, so they could fly their Mirages to and from the Soviet Union.

This caused a very deep policy division back in Washington, which was poisoned by the deep resentment people felt for Charles de Gaulle and the anti-American policies that he was orchestrating. The resentment went so far as to make, in my view, rational discussion of Gavin's opposition impossible. Eventually, Gavin was overruled and he quit. I think he probably ended up, as many ambassadors do, as a prisoner of his own concepts. He was prepared to go further in defending them than they merited. That independent nuclear strike force was supposed to be, and was, a threat to the Alliance by facilitating an independent French role.

The French eventually did exactly what they wanted, in the sense that they were able to claim the benefits of the Alliance without having to belong to it, and were able to play both sides of the street. And it was to our great credit that we kept the Alliance together, and it was not to their credit at all that Western Europe survived this damned period until the Soviet system finally collapsed.

Anyhow, I never had any culture shock in Kuala Lumpur, but I had plenty in Paris.

Q: One last thing about this French view. You were dealing with these French-speaking African countries, the liberation there. In the middle of this period, the Kennedy administration came in. This was where we were making at least very large gestures and all.

ELY: Was Soapy William our assistant secretary for African affairs?

Q: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

ELY: And John Gunther Dean flew into independent Mali and established the first embassy there before the Russians could get there.

Q: How did this play, from your perspective, and also with the French? You'd already alluded to it, but let's talk a little more about it.

ELY: Well, we were trying to get both sides to avoid unintended confrontations. For example, we put an AID mission into Cameroon, and the first thing they did was set up an import program and brought in Caterpillar tractors, which they figured were needed, putting the local French Caterpillar tractor dealer out of business.

Q: Oh, God.

ELY: Now this was not very intelligent. Then we sent an educational mission. I grabbed those people and took them around to the Ministry of Education, where the director general of the ministry sat these people down and filleted them, although they didn't understand this at the time. I had to explain afterwards that they were being viewed with intense suspicion by the French Ministry of Education, and since the French Ministry of Education, at least for then, was very much in charge of things down there, they should be very careful in their relationships with them, and be very open, very cooperative, and understand that they were moving onto what these people thought was their turf.

Q: And very sensitive turf, at that.

ELY: Very sensitive.

Q: Anything -- language, culture.

ELY: All these things. La Mission Civilisatrice (the Civilizing Mission of France) was and remains at the heart of every French person. Since they tend to think that their civilization is better than anybody else's, it's extremely important to them.

So I did this sort of honest brokering, which was very cross-cultural; it really got me inside the mind of these French civil servants. They're brilliant, overworked, underpaid, paranoid, suspicious, and always thinking ahead in terms of the interests of France, as defined by them. I found it was fascinating.

Q: Again, this is nuts and boltsish, but I think this was a very interesting time. You had these American educators coming out who must have been up against real cultural shock. How did you prepare them, and how successful was this when they were going to come up against the cultural vehemence of the French?

ELY: I would give them briefings and would try to say, "Well, look, fellows, I'm not speaking for the French government. Because I give you their viewpoint doesn't mean that I believe this. I just want you to know what you're getting into." And then say, "They've been down there for X years. The French looked on Africa back in the '30s as their strategic reserve for the Second World War. They'd put investments in there to grow cotton, to kind of raise rubber, rice, become self-sufficient. This colonial mentality is still alive. They put a lot more into Africa than the British did, in terms of education and infrastructure and all. It hasn't paid very well. And now the area's becoming independent. And there's a lot of sensitivity about it. Be careful of the French; don't consider them your friends."

Well, the Fund back in those days had a much clearer mandate than it has now. We were still on something like fixed rates. This meant that countries were supposed to keep their parities essentially pegged, although nominally, to the gold relationship to the dollar. It was also a time where we were getting more deeply into Vietnam, and the dollar as a reserve currency was coming increasingly under question, where LBJ was trying to fight a war in Vietnam without raising taxes. Inflation was creeping up in the United States, and the collapse of 1970 was being prepared, slowly. And the American administration did not understand very well what was going on. The French were buying gold from us, which put us under pressure. There was a lot of anxiety about the functioning of the international system and the dollar as the centerpiece of it, but not much in the way of consensus on what to do about it.

The State Department E Bureau in those days was quite influential. It was a powerful bureau and had ideas about what might be done. State recognized that the international financial order was under pressure, and that this had profound foreign policy implications, and was looking for some sort of creative international method of getting at this problem. In the end, State was unsuccessful.

The problem was basically Treasury. Treasury should have been doing what State was trying to do, but Treasury was trying to maintain the status quo; that is, to patch up the existing system essentially by exhorting our allies not to rock the boat.

The French were being financially aggressive for essentially political reasons.

Q: What was their motivation, do you think?

ELY: Well, de Gaulle, by this time, was trying to bring down the Anglo-Saxons. He had gotten himself into a psychological, moral set by which he was locked in combat with us for...how should I say, not domination of Europe, that's too simple, to reduce American influence, but particularly to reduce American prominence in Europe. American presence was desirable only up to a certain point. Beyond that, it became inimical to French interests.

Q: Today is July 17, 1992, and this is a continuing interview with Michael E. C. Ely. Mike, on our last tape, we were talking about your time in Paris from '59 to '62 as the financial/economic officer. And there were two things that I found where the tape had jammed. So if you don't mind, we'll go over them again. One was, you mentioned an episode where you were briefing U.S. educators before they were going to French Africa. Could you tell me what transpired on this?

ELY: Yes, well, this was one of the first missions to Francophone Africa after independence in 1960. A group of AID educators was going off on a survey of the area to see what kind of education programs they wanted to put in. I told the Ministry of Cooperation about these people and asked if anybody had anything to say to them. I was referred to the director general of cultural programs in the Ministry of Cooperation, who turned out to be a very senior official from the Ministry of Education who spoke perfect English. And I took these bureaucrats over to see this fine, distinguished, highly educated and intelligent French civil servant, who proceeded to fillet them alive. And he did it so skillfully, they didn't even notice. It was almost a parody. He said, "Well, you know, we've been in this area for a long time, we've worked very hard, we've tried to give the people there a knowledge of French culture and language. This has been a long-term and difficult assignment. We're proud of the job that we've done. And I hope you'll keep this in mind, because really they don't need more languages, they need to learn one language. And the language they need to know is French. If you start competing programs, this is going to cause confusion, and it could cause friction and misunderstanding. So we hope and advise prudence and caution on your part."

So we walked out, and the people said, "Wasn't he nice!"

I said, "Well, he wasn't being nice. There was nothing nice at all about that. He was saying, 'Stay out. We don't want you.'"

He'd also said, "You know, this is Africa entering the Cold War. And we've noticed that where you go, the Russians go, and the other way around. And the last thing we need is to have this area turned into an area of rivalry. Soviet-American rivalry would cause all kinds of problems for them, for you, for us, for the Africans. So keep this in mind," which, in effect, meant, Would you kindly stay out.

Q: Looking at it from an American policy point of view, it sounds like the man was making two very valid points at that time, which was '59 to '62. One was that if the French were putting a big effort there, what was our business trying to move them to the English thing? And the other one was, I'm not sure but whether there wasn't some correctness in the idea that the Soviets and Americans sort of followed each other around like snarling cats or something, in different parts of Africa.

ELY: Well, yes. The French motivation was quite complex. We started off when John Gunther Dean parachuted into Bamako. He was the first person to open a mission there. He got there a couple of days after independence. This was very macho behavior on our part, and this was highly regarded. This was the Kennedy era, and this was considered a really aggressive, straight-forward, patriotic, American staking out of territory. And Mali, after Guinea, was the most leftist

and militant of the former French colonies.

The French also were worried that our presence there would dilute their influence. They would say, quietly and aside, "Well, look, we have a lot of domestic political support for our programs in Africa now. It's selective. It's trading companies with some political parties and its ministries. If you guys muck around too much, you're going to undermine that support, and you're going to make it harder for us to keep a presence there, a presence that is favorable for Western interests in general, and yours in particular." This turned out to be a slightly disingenuous argument. French policy toward those areas was being run out of the Élysée Palace by de Gaulle and his people, and not by the flour millers in Bordeaux and the people that were selling surplus French butter and things of that nature to the Africans.

Also, the French had been practicing a kind of regional policy. They had a single currency for West Africa, for Equatorial Africa, and for Madagascar. This was linked to the French franc through a special account in the French treasury. And the operation of this mechanism prevented the kind of catastrophic inflation and overvaluation of currencies that you got in Ghana and in Nigeria, and kept the countries of Francophone Africa in some sort of a loose economic confederation -- they could always trade with each other, and it promoted economic stability and perhaps some political stability in the area as well.

The French were worried about this system, as well they should have, because if you looked at it very closely, you could make an argument that it tied the Africans very closely to France with a mechanism that virtually ensured that their currencies were overvalued. And when they had an overvalued currency, it made it very difficult for them to diversify their outside contacts.

But the judgement was made in Washington that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. And I think this was correct. In point of fact, Africa's gone its own way, and neither the French nor us have been able to do a great deal affecting its destiny. The Africans are going to have to do that. They have understood that point now, and they're trying themselves to decide what they want to do. The continent is in very bad condition, partly bad luck, partly Africa.

Q: There was another account that you gave that we missed the last time because of a tape problem. Could you tell me your impression at this time of how you dealt with and the importance of the French intellectuals. One always hears of the French intellectuals, which in no other country seem to play a role. But there always seems to be this group that is pronouncing judgment, usually derogatory, on the United States. How did you work with and assess the importance of the French intellectual at that time?

ELY: Well, intellectuals in France have a much different role than they have in the United States, for a whole series of reasons. I once read an account of someone who overheard some disgruntled workers saying, "Let's go get Jean-Paul Sartre and organize a demonstration and march on city hall." The workers and the intellectuals tended to recognize each other. Intellectuals are admired in France. They tend to be literary people, skillful in language.

In those days, and even now in some respects, to a man, they're of the left. In recent years, for various reasons support for Marxism among the French left has diminished, but there's still a

residual anti-American flavor that you can find very clearly in *Le Monde Diplomatique*. If you read that every month, you'll see there's not an article in there that is anything but critical and hostile to the United States. It is written by certified, old-fashioned intellectuals.

The intellectuals have two or three quarrels with the United States.

One is that it's the land of capitalism. First, you defeat fascism, as happened in the Second World War, then you go on and defeat capitalism, as embodied in the Great Satan United States, with its manipulated voting populations, its powerful corporations that dominate the political process, its manipulated media, its exploitative advertising, its crass, materialist values.

In addition to being a crassly materialist capitalist country, the United States is disorderly. It has no common culture. In fact, it has no culture at all.

It is excessively pluralistic, too rough and tumble, nobody is in charge. It's a government not of people or principles, but of laws, and the laws are a facade, and the hollow protections of the U.S. Constitution are a mockery. Basically, Americans lynch blacks, they have race prejudice, they have a repressive society, unfair and unjust.

This was, in the '60s, a virtually unanimous verdict of the French left and the intellectuals, shared, incidentally, by the far right. The far right also found American society populist, untidy, materialistic, dangerously and unpleasantly popular and democratic.

So the far left and the far right, really almost a hundred percent, felt that the United States was a very bad country, full of bad people, and a source of most of the world's ills. As an American, I found this very hard to swallow.

The left talked about exploitation, prejudice, and repression, and the right talked about worshipping the almighty dollar. And both liked to depict Americans as ignorant, materialistic, greedy, selfish, bombastic, obsessed with violence, and quite prepared to carry the Cold War to a pitch that would be dangerous for the entire world. In other words, the Americans would have blown us all up.

Q: How did they see the Soviets?

ELY: The French saw the Soviets as the people who had won the Second World War. We were late in, and we and the British had conspired to turn the force of Hitler's armies on the Russians. After the Russians had blooded the German war machine, the Americans landed late in the war and claimed the victory. The Communist left and the Gaullist left also said that it wasn't the Americans that liberated France, it was the Free French and the unions and the Communists. The Americans came along later while this was all happening and consolidated the victory. Michel Debré, in 1964, managed to make a speech celebrating the 20th anniversary of D-Day without mentioning the United States. Astounding!

Q: These people were important, weren't they, even in the Gaullist government, as always there? How did you, on your part, and others in the embassy deal with these people? Sounds like they

were people who weren't going to be tamed by words or deeds or anything else.

ELY: It was difficult. The universities were a hundred percent Marxist in those days, and USIA had to deal with those folks. In the government ministries, by and large, the people that I dealt with were sympathetic; they were friendly enough. Some of them were quite nationalistic and didn't like the United States, but they always treated me reasonably well. There was some tendency to condescension, but that's because these people were *inspecteurs des finances*, the elite of the elite of the elite, powerful and protected. And here I was, a foreigner not speaking perfect French, trying to deal with them on subjects in which they were masters. So there was some tendency to condescend, but by and large, I was well treated.

De Gaulle did purge all American elements out of the Foreign Ministry. People who were known to be pro-American were either sent off to obscure consulates, summarily retired, or given undesirable assignments of some sort so they would retire, and only people of known nationalist or Gaullist persuasion could be advanced to high ranks. So the ambassador and senior people in the embassy were always dealing with unpleasant people. Couve de Murville, while not a civil servant, was a foreign minister. Couve was an extremely unpleasant man, cold, icy, formal and uncooperative. And his deputies and senior people tended to take their cue from him. So, at the highest level, you seldom got a friendly hearing.

On the other side, however, the French would frequently take you aside and say, "Look, you know, this is temporary. We're your friends. We understand. These things will pass. Our countries have so much in common. Never forget that, deep down, we are with you. When the time comes and we have to be counted, we'll be on your side."

And even de Gaulle would say that sometimes, too. I guess he was sincere, at least he was when he was rational. Toward the end, he became almost irrationally anti-American.

RICHARD B. FINN
Political Officer
Paris (1959-1963)

Richard B. Finn was born in Niagara Falls, New York in 1917. He joined the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in Japan, France, and the Philippines. Mr. Finn was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: You left for a four-year assignment to Paris as a political officer where you served from 1959-63. What were you doing in Paris?

FINN: I had two jobs, two years each. The first one was as POLAD to USCINCEUR -- Political Advisor, United States European Command. General Norstad was SACEUR and CINCEUR, Supreme Allied Command Europe and Commander-in-Chief Europe for American Forces. His American role was carried out 90 percent by a 4-star Army General, in the case of my period there, Charles Palmer. He was a very nice man. The military were a fine group of people to work

with. Very receptive of the POLAD idea.

Our main role, really, was military assistance. We didn't make policy -- where to store nuclear weapons and what kind of weapons, etc. But I traveled all around with the General as far to the East as Pakistan, the Khyber Pass, to Ethiopia and North Africa, and to Scandinavia. There weren't all that many problems, but, of course, the governments wanted all the weapons they could get for the best price they could get. They treated us nicely.

We did a lot of work on that kind of thing. I am not sure that my role was all that important, but we got all the State Department cables involving these areas and would show them to the General and his top staff. If they were trying to do something in Turkey, for example, we might tell them that it might not be a good idea to do something in a certain way or at a certain time because our people in the Embassy at Ankara felt the Turks would not react favorably to it.

That was the time too in 1959 when Khrushchev was invited to come to the United States by Eisenhower. I remember going to the General and asking if he had heard the news. Eisenhower had asked Khrushchev to come to the United States. The General said, "There it is, there is not going to be a war in my time in Europe."

Q: How did you view the "Soviet menace" at that time from your position within the NATO Command?

FINN: The Berlin Wall, as you know, went up in 1961. Like you I am a diplomatic creature of the Cold War. The Russian menace and danger was a given and all accepted it and believed it. There was a period of considerable tension, I think, when the Wall went up. But no one was fearful of imminent war, I think. I think the Gary Powers over-flight of the Soviet Union, the U2, came along then too.

Q: A running sore or something like that?

FINN: Yes, a little more than a running sore maybe, but a force that any moment could blow up. The Allied role was to be ready for anything and to keep the pressure on to try to prevent a blow-up without being inflammatory or provocative.

Q: You were there two years and then moved over to the Embassy. What were you doing there?

FINN: I was the Pol/Mil, political/military officer in the Embassy. Most of our embassies had, and probably still do (1992), the big ones anyway, a political/military officer. I had one officer with me. I was separate from the political section but very closely connected with them. My job was really to work with not only the MAAG -- we had a MAAG, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, we had the military attachés and, of course, we did have the huge American and Allied military command right in the suburbs of Paris. So there was a lot of military activity of one kind or another.

I suppose my main problem was dealing with the French on the one hand as a sovereign government and then dealing with the American military on the other hand when there were

bilateral problems between them, American warship visits to France for example.

The major problem the French had in my period, both when I was in POLAD and when I was in the Embassy, was the North Africa problem, the independence movement in Algeria. There was a threatened insurrection there. One night when I was at POLAD, the four top generals in the insurrection in Algiers declared they were going to fly into Paris and try to rally the forces against General de Gaulle and throw out the de Gaulle government. That was a very exciting time, although I am not sure I realized it at the time.

Q: What were the American forces there going to do? Sort of sit back to one side? What was the feeling within the NATO Command during this particular period of instability within the French Government?

FINN: I don't think anybody on the official American side felt that General de Gaulle would give in. I don't think that many people felt that the rebellious generals, or the cause of Algeria Francaise were worthy of support or that the generals were going to succeed. But they were top officers, they were like the Chief of Staff of the various armed services. The crisis blew up in a hurry. That they were going to do this was announced in the afternoon and they were to come in that night.

I remember I was rather slow about the whole thing. John Bovey, who was the acting political counselor in the Embassy, called me up about 9:00 P.M. and said that I ought to get in there as we should all get together to see what was going to happen and decide what we should do about it. So we did.

I am trying to remember exactly what happened. I can't recall that the generals flew in.

Q: No, they didn't.

FINN: Whatever it was it blew over. The bulk of the army remained loyal to de Gaulle. So within a matter of hours, certainly within days, there was no great threat of this rebellion taking place. But it was a pretty exciting event.

I remember another time the Russians closed the road from the western zone to Berlin, claiming they had to repair the road. It wasn't a complete blockage. So we had the problem of what to do about it. The Russians after a while caved in and allowed traffic to resume, but they insisted upon examining all the contents of every truck that came in and out of Berlin. We didn't want them to do that. That sort of thing happened from time to time. It was much more a situation of petty harassment than a threat of war.

Q: How did you feel in dealing with the French military at this time? Did you feel that they were somewhat distant from the NATO forces?

FINN: No. A lot of that sensitivity, it seemed to me, was in the higher political echelon, General de Gaulle himself and, of course, the people who succeeded him. The French military, like a lot of military, were very nice people. Bright, pleasant. Military people -- as you probably know,

certainly it was my experience as an FSO -- had their own sense of diplomacy and camaraderie. The American military in Japan or France often got along with the foreign military better than they got along with Washington. So I have to answer that I liked the French military. I found them a very pleasant group of people.

Q: The one big thing when you were there would be in October, 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. How did that hit you at that time and what was the reaction in the areas you were dealing with?

FINN: What happened there, Dean Acheson was sent over by Kennedy to talk to de Gaulle. I don't think I knew that he had even come and gone. He flew in in a special plane. He and Bohlen, the Ambassador, went over to see de Gaulle immediately. De Gaulle was the soul of cooperation and understanding. Anything we wanted, any support we needed from him, he would give us. So it was total support.

Bohlen was a superb Ambassador in many ways. He was very bright, probably a genius at languages. He had marvelous French and his Russian was probably equally good. He had a great feel for the French. I think he had served there as a younger man. Perhaps he had studied Russian in France for a while. He and Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister, were pals -- they played golf together. So, in that context, we in the Embassy did not feel the French prickliness and sensitivity as much as many of the American community did. I found with the Quai d'Orsay people, if you wanted something from them you worked for it. You had to keep pressing them to do it.

This was very different from dealing with the Japanese where the pressures and tension, and policy differences and logic were really very minor. The Japanese were very self-centered about anything they did -- what were they going to lose and what were they going to gain, and always in mind that they had to get along with the Americans.

But you earned your salt if you got deals out of a French diplomat. But the overall atmosphere was always quite good.

ROBERT J. RYAN, SR.
Counselor for Administration
Paris (1959-1964)

Ambassador Robert J. Ryan, Sr. was born in Hatfield, Massachusetts in 1914. He joined the Foreign Service in 1937. His career included positions in Washington, DC and Paris, and an ambassadorship to Niger. Ambassador Ryan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: Can we move then to Paris?

RYAN: Sure.

Q: You went to the War College from 1958-59. Then you went to Paris where you served from 1959-64 as Counselor for Administration. How did you get this job?

RYAN: It went through the personnel process. Glen Wolfe [ph] was then Counselor for Administration and was being moved. In the personnel process my name was one that was discussed. One day I got a call from the Personnel Office, when I was down at the War College, saying that Ambassador Houghton was in town and they would like to have me talk to him because I was one of the people being considered for the Counselor for Administration job in Paris. So I met with Ambassador Houghton and a few days later I got the word that I was to go to Paris as Counselor for Administration. And not only Counselor for Administration, but as Executive Officer of the US Mission to NATO and the US Mission to the OECD and UNESCO. That was designed to give some focal point in Paris for administrative activities. Each of those other organizations had an administrator officer who worked with and under me. As Executive Officer I was able to sit in on all their staff meetings. I was learning things in those staff meetings and passing them information on what was going on in the Ambassador's staff meetings. This helped to bring about a better integrated American community in Paris.

Q: I am sure because these separate missions were separate.

RYAN: Yes, and the American Ambassador didn't want to trample on them and didn't want to be involved with them at all. But nevertheless there were common problems and they were mostly in the management and administrative field, so it was logical to have one guy in the person of the Counselor for Administration and Executive Officer to do these functions. When I went to Paris it was the largest embassy in the world...there was the great buildup that occurred after the war. One of the things that I knew I was going to get involved in was the cutting back of the size of the Embassy in terms of (a) personnel, (b) such things as automobiles, buildings, etc.

We had some success in doing that. I remember when I got to Paris you had three other chiefs of mission and they had deputy chiefs of missions -- I think there was something like 14 or 15 people with private cars and chauffeurs. That wasn't at all necessary, so we set about, with the help of the inspectors, deciding that only the ambassadors and the deputy chiefs of mission needed individual cars with chauffeurs and that the other officers would be serviced by a pool. We set it up and it worked out fine. It had been a great waste of money because we found for the most part, these officers were just using these cars to go to social events and in a couple of instances the wives were using them for shopping, etc.

We were also able to cut down a couple of buildings. We were able to reconstruct 4 Ave Gabriel in such a way that we actually joined it to 2 Ave Gabriel, the main Embassy building.

This was the time we were moving into the computer age and we had been selected to be the regional finance center for Europe so we were involved in setting up a computer center in Paris that could become the regional finance center for Europe and also Africa. At the same time the Department was dealing in antiquated communication procedures and it was decided that in Paris we would go into a computerized operation so we went about the development of the necessary plans that involved putting the new computer operation in a different section of the Embassy because we had to keep communications going while the new thing was being constructed.

Ultimately the new computerized communications center was inaugurated during the period of Ambassador Jim Gavin. It was the state of the art operation at that particular time.

We also were involved with the Ambassador's Residence. There was a building at 41 Faubourg St. Honore [ph] which is between the home of the President of France and the British Embassy. It had been used by the Germans during the war as a club. We took it over for offices and was used by USIA and a few of the regional functions in Paris when I first got there. But we were developing plans to use that structure as the Residence of the US Ambassador and to do that we had to work closely with John Rooney, who was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the State Department, and with Congressman Wayne Hayes, who was Chairman of the European segment of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

That whole operation took a period of two or three years to develop. It involved working on arrangements to sell the existing Residence of the Ambassador on Ave Gabriel, and developing plans for remodeling 41 Faubourg St Honore. With the proceeds from the sale of the original Ambassador's Residence, we were able to get a good portion of the money that was going to be needed to remodel 41 Faubourg St Honore. Then there were some additional contributions made and some other financial arrangements worked out so that ultimately 41 Faubourg St Honore was remodeled and is now the Ambassador's Residence.

But it did not, at the time, require any separately appropriated funds. At one point Rooney was against it. Ambassador Houghton and I talked to him when he came to Paris and finally got him to go along with it so long as we did not have to go before his committee and ask for additional money. We were prepared to do that because Ambassador Houghton had worked out through a couple of sources ways of getting some additional funds that could be transferred from one pot to the other to do this, and then through some public subscription they got money with which to buy the furniture for 41 Faubourg St Honore.

During the time I was in Paris, these various activities took place reflecting the changing scene in Paris as it relates to the American presence there and the work of the American Embassy.

Q: From your point of view in dealing with them, could you compare/contrast the three Ambassadors in Paris during your tour? There was Amory Houghton (1957-61); James Gavin (1961-62); and Charles Bohlen (1962-68).

RYAN: Each Ambassador is different. Ambassador Houghton had been President of Corning Glass and had a very long affiliation with the Republican Party. He was a heavy contributor. He was a very able man; an easy man to work with. He had some handicaps: (1) He had a throat problem causing him to speak with difficulty; (2) He was not able to speak very much in French so that anything that he did with the French had to be done through an interpreter. He delegated a lot of his substantive work to his Deputy Chief of Mission.

I think it reflects the wise policy of the Department of giving a very able career guy to a political appointee as the deputy. If the political guy uses good judgment he will let that career man run the embassy and deal with a lot of the substantive issues. Cecil Lyon was the Deputy Chief of Mission and a very able man -- fluent in French. So Ambassador Houghton and he had a very

close working relationship.

Ambassador Houghton also worked on the principal of delegation of authority. He let the various ministers and counselors run their shops. We reported to him and had to give him written reports from time to time and had regular staff meetings. But he pretty much let us run our show. If we needed him we went to him and he would willingly help us. But he and Mrs. Houghton were a joy to work with. In fact, I still maintain contact with Mrs. Houghton.

He, Ambassador Houghton, had the advantage of the political party affiliation with, not only the President, but with others, so that from the standpoint of the Paris Embassy he was one of those people who, if he wanted to, could not only call the Secretary of State, with whom he was on excellent terms, but he could call the President -- and everybody knew that.

Then General Gavin came. He had been a hero in Paris because he had headed up one of the airborne divisions that flew into France on D-Day. He was received in Paris as a hero. I remember Cecil Lyon and I went to Le Havre to meet him. He and his wife and children came over on, I guess the SS United States at that time, and we went up to Le Havre to meet him. He was mobbed at the docks by the media. Then we came down to Paris on the train and when we got into the station in Paris there was a mob again with television and radio. He had to give an interview. He had been taking French lessons and was quite sensitive that his French was not very good, but he had a speech which he gave in French and then he responded to questions.

General Gavin brought a bit of a military gaullist bearing to the Embassy and a military type of organization and operation. But quite frankly, I didn't find him that much different to deal with in my work than I did Ambassador Houghton. I would say about Ambassador Gavin that he was a visionary. He was a man of the future. You could understand how he headed the Arthur D. Little Company because he had that sort of a mind. But I can remember talking with him about things...looking into space, computers, etc....and his whole demeanor would almost take on a different atmosphere as he started to think. You could see his mind jumping ahead. He really was a man of the future and was a joy to deal with.

He, too, recognized his strengths and weaknesses and used the staff. Cecil had a good relationship with him as did the rest of us. We had no problems. There was no backbiting either under Houghton or Gavin. We all worked together as a team.

As a military hero he was well regarded by the French. As a strong supporter of President Kennedy, he had an in at the White House. So, here again, you had an Ambassador who had the ear of the White House and to the extent that we needed things in Washington, if we got the Ambassador involved in them, we generally could get it.

From a money standpoint that was a period when we didn't have all that much trouble getting the appropriations out of the Congress. Sure they might cut us a few \$100,000 here and a few \$100,000 there, but we had already built that into the budget so we didn't hurt at all. We ran into the problem, and I guess they still do today, that you would come to the end of the fiscal year and scurry to find a way to spend the money.

Ambassador Bohlen was a career diplomat. A real, knowledgeable, savvy guy, who was recognized by the French; who had earlier served in the Embassy in Paris; whose French was flawless; who had served in Moscow (had been one of the original Russian hands in the Department) and knew about communism. He brought, again, very special characteristics to the post of US Ambassador which were: (a) very well received by the French and (b) he knew how to run the Embassy.

I think the principal problem of having an Ambassador like Bohlen is in the political and economic sections because the DCM and the Ambassador were so strong in those fields and tended to take away some of the functions of the Minister for Political Affairs and the Minister for Economic Affairs. But, aside from that, you were dealing with first rate professionals and when you went in with problems you got decisions made and you went on with your business. It worked out very, very well.

For me, it was a pleasure to work under each of the Ambassadors. I think each in his way accomplished an important mission in terms of US-French relations.

Q: You were there during a very photogenic period when President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline came. There is the story that the President said, "I was the person who escorted Jacqueline to..."

RYAN: Yes, I was there when he said that.

Q: How did that trip go?

RYAN: Again, as the Counselor for Administration and with the conference section, which is under me, we had an important role to plan in planning the visit. We were in on it from the first word with the White House and the State Department with advance people coming over to set up security arrangements, communication arrangements, and to deal with the French on the total program.

When President and Mrs. Kennedy came...the visit was an important one, of course, and was viewed by the French in that way. Mrs. Kennedy, because she spoke French flawlessly, I guess, and because on State occasions it is the wife who sits on the right hand of the Chief of State, she was a big hit with de Gaulle. The President, and I think rightly, played on that and let it run its course.

That visit went off very smoothly. There were a lot of details involved in planning and executing the visit. One little humorous story that I tell...Tish Baldrige was the secretary to Mrs. Kennedy. Tish had earlier been the social secretary to Ambassador Luce in Rome and is now one of the country's foremost experts on etiquette. Well, the Kennedys had a valet and a maid for Mrs. Kennedy. We had made arrangements that the last group coming out of the place where they were staying, the guest house, would be the maid and the valet. We had made arrangements to get them to the airport by a separate route so that they would be there when the Kennedys arrived. Well, unbeknownst to me, Tish Baldrige decided that they should be part of the entourage that was going out to the airport. In doing that, because no one had planned on that,

they got separated.

Fortunately we had enough sense to put one of our French speaking employees from the conference section in the car with them. He was able to steer the driver along the route that we had arranged, but they got to the airport after the departure ceremony and after the Kennedys had gotten into the plane, doors had been closed and they were preparing to leave. Out of the corner of my eye I saw a car come up and try to get through the security. Fortunately the French speaking employee with them was able to talk to the people and get them to agree to at least let them get through the barrier to the next one.

Seeing this, through the Secret Service walkie-talkies we passed word to the plane and to the French that this was part of the Presidential entourage. Here you had this car with two Negroes in it with the Kennedys' effects, etc. and the security police were not about to let these people through to get on the Kennedy plane. Anyway we got them through. The door to the plane was opened and up the steps went the maid, valet and baggage. They were going on to Vienna and if they hadn't had the baggage they would have been in trouble. We would have had to arrange to ship that over in another way. Well, that was one of the little stories that developed.

Another one that comes to mind involves President Eisenhower. We had worked with the French for one of his visits. One of the first things that came up was that the White House wanted to bring the bubbletop (car with a plastic top so he could stand up and be seen but still be protected) to use for the President. We discussed it with the Chief of Protocol and the other people on the French side and they all agreed. So over comes the bubbletop. We are at the airport and waiting for President Eisenhower's plane to arrive and get word that it is in the vicinity.

The Chief of Protocol comes to me ashen and says, "Bob, the President just told me that President Eisenhower and he have to ride in his car." I said, "But we have been through this and you people agreed." He said, "Well, the President tells me and we just have to do it." I said, "Well, I can't make that decision." So I went and talked to Jerry Bean [ph] who was then the top Secret Service man. He said, "Hell, no. We haven't had any chance to check that car out or know what is in it. No way." I said, "Jerry, it is the President of France's car and I don't think they have any bombs in it."

I talked to the Secretary of State who was there and to the Ambassador and they felt they couldn't over rule the Secret Service. Finally, the Secretary of State said, "Go talk to Jim Haggerty, who was the President's press secretary." And here the plane is about to land.

I explained it to him and he said, "Well, you have a problem haven't you Bob?" I said, "Yeah." He said, "Let's go talk to Jerry." He said, "Jerry, Bob has just told me about this problem that we got with the French. I have to tell you honestly if it were put to the boss he would say we will use President de Gaulle's car." With that Jerry let out a couple of profanities and said, "But, if we get into any trouble, you guys and the Ambassador and the Secretary of State are all in this with me. If anything happens I am not going to take this rap alone."

So, here is the Chief of Protocol biting his nails. Finally I went over to him...this whole thing probably didn't take longer than five minutes, but it seemed like an eternity...and I said that it

was okay to use the President's car. So then we had to get someone to remove the bubbletop from the lead situation and get it away from everything.

So the two Presidents get in de Gaulle's car and de Gaulle had a handle that they could use and President Eisenhower got a tremendous reception in Paris.

That was the time that Khrushchev came to Paris and you had the Gary Powers U-2 incident. But back to the car business...President Eisenhower was going some place in Paris and the Ambassador called me with a chuckle and said, "Bob, you are going to be interested to hear this. The President is wondering if you could make arrangements with the French to let him borrow de Gaulle's car for a couple of hours this afternoon while he goes on this particular visit." I said, "Well, I think that can be arranged, but give me ten minutes." So I call the Chief of Protocol and tell him what is wanted and he thought it would be all right but he would have to talk to the President. About five minutes later he calls me back and says that it is okay.

By the time I got on to the phone to the Ambassador to tell him that it was okay he said, "I know it. The car is out front."

An illustration of some of the little things that can happen at the spur of the moment that one just has to handle. Fortunately in both of these instances it worked out correctly. Had it not, somebody's head might have fallen.

RALPH S. SMITH
Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Lyon (1959)

Assistant Press Attaché/Special Assistant to Ambassador for Public Affairs, USIS
Paris (1960-1964)

Ralph S. Smith was born in Yonkers, New York in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1948, retired in 1953 to pursue a career in journalism, and then joined USIA in 1959. His career included positions in Greece, Belgium, France, and Washington, DC. Mr. Smith was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1992.

SMITH: After my wife and I had lived in France for nearly six years, however -- from 1953 to 1958 -- we felt an increasing nostalgia for the U.S. and for the Foreign Service; and while remaining on the best of terms with my father-in-law, we decided we should try to re-join the Foreign Service while we were still young enough to do so.

Q: You were in France at a very interesting time. It included the high point of the Marshall Plan and also the establishment of the NATO operation. So you were there in the early days of both of these programs. In any case, your Paris experience must have pretty much stamped you with a journalist background when you came back into the Service.

SMITH: Yes. In those days it was not possible to re-join the State Department laterally from the outside, in any case, but I was able to join USIA; and that is how I came to do so.

Q: *What was your first assignment with USIA? And what year was that?*

SMITH: That was in 1959, as Branch Public Affairs Officer (BPAO) in Lyon. I was there for about a year before being transferred to Paris.

Q: *What were your accomplishments as BPAO in Lyon?*

SMITH: Well, we had an across-the-board sort of program: a press operation, films program, library, visiting American performers, cultural exchanges, and so on. And once a year we put on a really big show at Vichy -- the foremost watering place, where French people went to relax while taking the waters for real or imagined liver conditions. During the Franco-American Journée we put on while I was there we had a lecture on Franco- American relations by André Maurois -- no mean achievement, since he was really the pre-eminent French man-of-letters! We also had the U.S. Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra, over from Germany -- at that time, better than any French orchestra outside of Paris!

Q: *I would like to ask you a couple of questions in that connection. The period when you were serving in the private sector and also still in the period when you went back to the government with USIA, was a period when the communist influence in French was really at its peak. The French always, of course, have been very concerned about the intrusion of American cultural techniques and philosophy and therefore the denigration, in their estimation, of French culture. How much of that kind of French snobbery or critical attitude did you run into in the course of your informational efforts?*

SMITH: It was there all the time, a constant concern. I remember trying to meet this problem head-on with a book exhibit we put together for Vichy, and which was later shown elsewhere in France. At that time many French people considered there had been a veritable invasion of France by American books -- which were marked "Traduit de l'américain" ("Translated from the American"). So we put together an exhibit we called "Traduit du français" -- a display of paperback books published in the U.S. which had originally been translated from French. I must say we did not have to wait long for an impact. At the inauguration of Traduit du français I overheard the Mayor of Vichy, a man who was friendly to us, saying to another high official who was not so friendly, "Look, here's proof that the Americans aren't barbarians!"

When it was possible to appeal to the French in a cultural vein, we found it was definitely worth the effort. Another example, this time in Lyon: For some reason, Lyon was the capital of French humorists -- including even some who did cartoons for Paris papers. There was a humorists' organization there which I got to be acquainted with because they wanted to hear some American jokes on their radio program. Fortunately, my wife Lilian and I were able to assemble quite a number of translatable items from contemporary jokes which had been provided, on an urgent basis, by our nieces and nephews in the U.S. I recall that shaggy-dogs and ghahtlies were big at that time. Anyway, when I delivered them over the airwaves they were well received by the Lyonnais radio audience -- to the point where we felt encouraged to take a next step and go

graphic: Together with our local sponsors, we put on a big exhibit of photo-enlarged cartoons -- half from The New Yorker and half by Lyonnais artists. Naturally, we called it L'HUMOUR DE NEW YORK A LYON. It enjoyed considerable local acclaim, and later we felt doubly rewarded when my colleague Jack Stewart, PAO in nearby Geneva, came by with a van and carted off L'HUMOUR to be shown over there.

Q: *How long were you in Lyon?*

SMITH: For a year.

Q: *Where did you go from there?*

SMITH: To Paris.

Q: *This was what year now?*

SMITH: 1960. I stayed in Paris from 1960 to 1964. First I was assistant press attaché, handling mostly economic matters. Later I was special assistant to the Ambassador for public affairs.

Q: *Who was the Ambassador at that time?*

SMITH: James Gavin, an Army general who had played a prominent role in the Normandy landings. He started his career as American Ambassador to France with that great advantage. However, he didn't speak much French; his hearing was slightly impaired, which made it difficult for him to learn French. So for that reason and various others, I was assigned to him full-time as a public affairs special assistant. We traveled around France a good deal. We made many trips to different parts of the country. I would write short speeches for him to read, and help out generally with relations.

Q: *Did he try to read them in French?*

SMITH: Yes, and he succeeded in doing that. Also, he had a very attractive wife, Jean Gavin. I would say that he was very successful as a well-liked public figure in France. In fact we had such a degree of PR success that it sometimes made people smile. I remember one occasion when we went to visit an orphanage. Gavin was photographed holding a baby, and it appeared next day -- a very large photo -- on the front page of France-Soir, which was the largest-circulation paper in the country.

Gavin also was on friendly terms with de Gaulle. His attitude toward de Gaulle was different, I would say, from that of the average American official at the time.

Q: *He was more at ease with him?*

SMITH: He was more at ease with him; I think he understood de Gaulle a little bit better in view of his own military background. He made it a very deliberate policy to try to get on with him. And I would say he was fairly successful, to the extent that anybody could be.

Q: That in itself is a public relations plus. So you stayed there through to '64. What was your position in Paris in early 1963?

SMITH: I'm not certain of the dates, but after Gavin left there really was no need for the special assistant position, which had been set up to take care of his particular needs. When he left he was replaced by Chip Bohlen. Of course, Bohlen was the consummate skilled, experienced diplomat, fluent in French, and didn't need a special assistant to help him out with public relations. So I was given a different assignment: I became Dick Monsen's deputy, on the Information side, in USIS. [Years later, in the 1970's, I served with Dick again on the editorial board of the Foreign Service Journal.] This was very enjoyable; what I did was to maintain constant liaison with the other sections of the Embassy -- Political, Economic, and Political/Military -- so as to produce a stream of short written and verbal bits of policy guidance. The idea was that each member of USIS would then be able to discuss, supposedly in a knowledgeable way, the main issues between the United States and France.

Q: You indicated earlier that you were rather disturbed about the separation of USIA from the State Department; so why don't you go ahead and say more about that right now?

SMITH: I think the USIS staff had at least as much talent as any other section of the Embassy -- maybe more. They certainly knew better French than most people in the Embassy. And yet, I would say that by belonging to a different organization they remained a breed apart -- almost but not quite the equals of the line officers, and with not quite the same degree of entree. I remember, in this connection, when our colleague the British press attaché was transferred away from Paris. His next assignment was as head of the political section in Moscow -- and I know that at least some of us in USIS thought, "Wow! I wish we could do that."

All the same, we had a really interesting time in Paris, and I don't mean to detract from that in the slightest. One particularly interesting experience for me, I remember -- though sadly, it was in the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination. Arthur Schlesinger was writing a book about the Kennedy Administration. He came to Paris in this connection, and I was assigned to him as interpreter when he interviewed André Malraux. Malraux was certainly the most prestigious intellectual figure in Gaullist France, and naturally I hung on every word he said -- mostly personal recollections about Kennedy and Jacqueline Kennedy. But I confess that what I particularly remembered afterward was his mannerisms. Malraux moved about compulsively as he spoke, and it seemed to me there were moments, as he sat on the couch, when his feet were actually at a higher level than his head.

WOODWARD ROMINE
Political Officer/Ambassador's Aide
Paris (1959-1965)

Woodward Romine was born and raised in Indiana. He graduated from Wabash College and later pursued studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His

primary assignments in the State Department were as Political Officer in Washington and abroad. His foreign assignments, all European, include Warsaw, Paris, Strasbourg, Vienna and four posts in Germany. In Washington, Mr. Romine dealt with French relations as well as Refugee and Management matters. He is a graduate of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Mr. Romine was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1998.

Q: Following Poland you were assigned to Paris. Is that correct?

ROMINE: Right, as a Political Officer.

Q: And that was a fairly large section, so you obviously had an area of specialization within the Political Section.

ROMINE: I came to follow the development of the European Communities from the political side. This had been very much in the domain of the Economic Section up to that particular point.

Q: We should specify 1959.

ROMINE: Yes, right, in 1959. They had just completed the Rome agreements where they had really written the charter of the thing, and the Political Counselor at that time was anxious to have someone in the Political Section who would follow it from that point of view complementary to the real economic things, and I was assigned to do that. It was a fascinating time.

Q: At that time in Paris you had three embassies, major embassies, the bilateral one and the NATO one, but you also had the mission to the European Communities.

ROMINE: That was just beginning. At the time I arrived, as I recall, it was still in the embassy where Jack Tuthill was the Counselor for Economic Affairs; he was the Economic Minister at that time, but he left shortly thereafter and was replaced by Jack Reinstein and then returned to set up the sort of OECD operation, which he did for a year or so. We had a number of these things, but we were interested, of course, in how the French looked at this thing, and the French didn't always look at it the way we thought they ought to look at it.

Q: How did you go about covering the political aspects?

ROMINE: Well, I learned, of course, who was in charge of these things, and he was a fascinating man. His name was Jean Francois Pensé, and he was a young man, and he had worked on the combining of the two communities, the coal and steel and -- what's the other one? He was up in the Western European section of the Foreign Ministry, and it was with him that I made my first contacts and watched the growth of this thing. There was a feeling at that time in the Foreign Ministry--but I think it changed--that the President of France, M. de Gaulle, didn't look on this European Union movement all too favorably. As a matter of fact, he did, and he encouraged the French to do things that many other people.... One of the things that occurred after I arrived: de Gaulle came out and proposed that, in addition to discussing economic developments, the

Communities establish what he called a small secretariat which would be based in Paris in which they would discuss not only economic developments but political matters. Well, people were horrified at this. At least, people said they were. Here was a thing that they were trying to promote, a good, growing economic union, and here was someone who was French trying to get in there and influence the thing politically and get these countries to do things in the political field -- it was never really quite defined what it was going to be -- that they weren't supposed to do, because they were to talk only about economic matters. The matter was sort of quietly shelved, but what was interesting about it was that the French were right about this, that they were going to have this union and knew that at sometime they were going to have to have political discussions about it, and they never gave up on this, and this did cause a certain amount of friction, I think particularly with certain parts of the Department at that time which felt themselves very much out of the European Communities but who wanted very much to push it in the direction they wanted it to go. The French understood this, and we had always friendly but animated discussions about that, but they always assured us that this was going to happen. I think they were always very right.

Q: How did this fit in with de Gaulle's famous directorate proposing . . . for the three?

ROMINE: That proposal came somewhat later and, of course, it didn't fit in well with what the smaller members of the Communities saw or the members of NATO. He was going to have the three big NATO members, excluding the Germans, of course, make these decisions about what you were going to do not only just in Europe but, I think, all over the world. Well, the smaller people didn't go for this, and I think they also felt that probably nothing would come of it.

Q: At the time, of course, there were purportedly strong views within Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere in the French government with pro-Gaullist and anti-Gaullist factions and so on and so forth. How did this impact upon your services?

ROMINE: Well, most people were cautious in expressing any views about the President that would be too strongly opposed. A number of my colleagues at that time had different relations and talked to a number of people in the Ministry who were very, very much opposed to the General, particularly in matters of atomic weapons, on the direction that the French government was expected to take, which was nearly always characterized--when I say the French government, I mean the President--as anti-American and anti-British to a certain extent. There were also certain reservations about the efforts made by de Gaulle to create a better relationship with the Federal Republic, that is to say, a bilateral relationship, a Franco-German relationship somewhat outside of the NATO context. The French did a lot of this, and this did cause a certain amount of concern, but at the same time it was also recognized that these were astonishing steps being taken really to reconcile the French with the Germans. So that came into a great deal of our work. Among other things that I followed at that time, I followed a great deal the development of French nuclear power, followed the debates in the National Assembly which was led by Michelle Debray, an extraordinary man, very tough and always knowing exactly what he wanted to do and what he wanted to say. I went to one of the debates where he got up and defended the whole idea of the French building their own nuclear establishment. This came well before they had decided to nuclearize electrical power and that sort of thing in France, and he laid it out very well indeed. First of all, if France is going to be a great power in this world, it's going to have this nuclear

capacity. And then he went at great length into the economics. This was the thing where we had criticized them very harshly and, I think, unwisely in many places. We claimed that this was going to bankrupt the French, and we couldn't have done a better thing to urge them on the way more. He, in this whole debate, laid it out very well, why this wasn't going to bankrupt them. It was going to create a whole new industry, it was going to create jobs; and he really carried the whole assembly with him that day except for the Communists. It was an extraordinary performance, and they had laid the groundwork. They had gone all over France to small industries and that sort of thing saying, "You're going to be a subcontractor here for this kind of thing, and look at the jobs this is going to create," and it was an excellent preparation for the decision which, I think, most people wanted anyway to be accepted.

Q: Meanwhile as a background obligato, the events in Algeria were taking place. Did that impinge at all?

ROMINE: Well, this was just a terrible and tragic thing from all points of view. Yes, they did impinge on it, because we saw this growing. I had known a number of officers who had served in the French army and were career people and who, when it became clear what was going to happen in Algeria, finally had to resign. But I always felt that there was no great overwhelming support for staying in Algeria as long as they had to fight that war in France. It seemed to me that de Gaulle recognized this early on, even when he made his famous tour of the officers' clubs in Algeria, but of course there came the moment when the generals in Algeria came into open revolt, and that was a very dramatic moment. They marched the people down to the Ministry of the Interior not far from the Embassy there, and I remember them walking up the street there, and we were sort of hanging out of the windows and they would wave to us. I don't recall whether they were distributing arms to them -- I don't believe so. I remember frantic appeals to them to go out and tell the troops if they came to put down their arms and not to do this, but they never came. It was a sad time that divided a lot of people.

Q: So you continued dealing with Francois Pensé as your main interlocutor?

ROMINE: Yes, until he left and went off to Morocco to take over the French aid program there, and then he was replaced by a man called Sannajay, who was an excellent officer. I think later on he went on as the Ambassador to Chile, but in the meantime he stayed in the Foreign Ministry and then was shifted to de Gaulle's staff where he was sort of his Chef du Cabinet--how do you say that?

Q: Chief of staff?

ROMINE: Well, he was kind of his special assistant for European political developments, a man that you could always talk very frankly with, and he was willing to reply frankly. That was the thing I liked about the French. Don't go to the Foreign Ministry or go to a French official without knowing exactly what you're going to do and what you're going to say, because otherwise they would have you. He drafted at one time a long French paper on how the European Communities should develop and, among other things, once again saying that there must be a political element in this, and you can't just have a union like this. He was very kind and gave us this paper right away, long before it came out. Later when we were talking, he said that the French always

appreciated discussions with the Americans because with us they always knew where they stood and that sometimes it was very unpleasant but they never felt that they couldn't be as equally frank and candid. For them this was a valuable thing, because they always felt that they knew where they were and where we stood on these matters. We compared this to certain other of their allies -- and I won't say who.

Q: During much of this time soon after you arrived, it was Ambassador Gavin who came. How would you characterize his service in France? It was preceded by considerable media attention because of the new Kennedy administration and the General's laudable military service.

ROMINE: I would say that he had a pretty good grasp of what the French were going to do, particularly from the point of view of nuclear development. I admired him for that, and he pushed this, and he felt that the United States should be helpful to the French this way rather than being unhelpful, because his view was that they were going to do this. So I think from that point of view, he did well, and I don't think that what he wanted to do was well seen in Washington. That's my recollection of it. I think finally he was ready to depart. He didn't feel that he was getting anywhere on this particular thing. It seemed to me that that preoccupied him as much as anything, what was going on then with Franco-American relations, that we were facing something that they were going to do and that we should be helpful to them, that this would ease things for us. I think he had a hard time. A great deal was expected of him. He was expected to speak French fluently and that sort of thing, and I believe that it always bothered him, that he didn't do this as well as he would have wished.

Q: Then Ambassador Bohlen arrived, and he characterizes in his book, if I recall correctly, that it was the best embassy he had ever served in, that the machinery ticked over very well, and clearly you were a major part of this.

ROMINE: That was a nice remark in his book. I think everyone who served there and who read the book felt pleased about it. But, of course, he gave excellent leadership to the Embassy. He always would let you know where he was going, what he wanted to do, but he was willing to leave the responsibility to his various section heads. I always liked that. Working closely there in his office, you could see this, and he listened to what his officers had to say.

Q: We should point out at this point that he selected you to be his aide, his personal assistant.

ROMINE: Yes, he did.

Q: So you were peculiarly well qualified to see how he operated.

ROMINE: He had, I felt, a great feeling of what he as an ambassador should be doing and, of course, to convey what the United States felt and picked up from the French what they felt. But he had certain very good relationships with people right up at the top, including the President of the Republic and the Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville. He would then allow his other officers to pursue their work and do the things that they were doing and would review this with care and make comments on it; but they always felt that they had free rein with him to do the things as they saw. I always liked that about him.

Q: During your final three years in Paris where you had a bird's-eye view of what was going on as Assistant to the Ambassador, what wisdom did you derive from all this?

ROMINE: The Ambassador himself was a man who really was at home in the field of foreign affairs. Someone might laugh at this, but he was a man at great ease, and one of the things that impressed me the most about him was that he had for years always been in contact with the leadership of the country, starting way back with Franklin Roosevelt, when he acted as his interpreter. I always felt this gave him a great confidence in himself and put him at ease with nearly anyone that he would meet, and that, of course, helped him a great deal in the things that he did and the relationships that he had. It was always an easy relationship, but he always understood the importance of the formalities that needed to be observed, and he always was able to put everyone at ease and he himself was. That was one thing. I learned that we could disagree, and frequently did disagree, with the French, but that you could disagree in ways that it wasn't taken as a personal thing. I enjoyed that very much.

I want to digress just a little bit and go back to when I first came to Paris during the time of Ambassadors Houghton and Gavin. A wonderful person there whom I enjoyed the most and who I thought was also an excellent diplomat was the DCM, Cecil Lyon. During a time when it was quite unpopular and not done very much to follow what was going on in the Gaullist camp or the right side of the political spectrum in France, Cecil Lyon had been careful to do this. This earned him not only the respect of the people who later took power in government but also a great deal of their affection and regard. I remember this very well. Years later when I was in Washington and we were celebrating the 20th anniversary of NATO, Michelle Debray came -- he was the Minister of Defense then -- to represent France at this meeting. He greeted him at the airport. He got into the car, and the first question he asked us was whatever happened to Cecil Lyon, because there was a man who, regardless of how other people might have looked at it, always kept in touch with us and followed things up. I always remembered him as a man who did things like that, who looked beyond things just outside of what was fashionable to be looking at.

I found mostly people were sympathetic with what de Gaulle was doing, and I do think also that even those who were not in sympathy with him still felt he could stir them in their pride of being French. He was very successful in doing that. There was criticism. I did meet a number of people, but not regularly or officially, who were members of the opposition, either socialists or radicals, that sort of thing, and they were sparing in their criticism of de Gaulle and also sometimes slightly amazed that Americans would speak to them in a way which indicated that they thought that de Gaulle had done certain things that were positive. You could always bring this up with the question of Algeria and that sort of thing, mainly because it had been the left. At the beginning it was very pro-Algerian--not pro-Algerian, but supposedly sympathized more with them--but even before de Gaulle took power had had to govern and begin to preside over the struggle that led eventually to the independence of that country.

HOWARD R. SIMPSON
Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIA

Marseille (1959-1965)

Howard R. Simpson was born in 1925 and raised in Alameda, California. In 1943, he was drafted into the U.S. Army and served in the European Theater. He returned to the United States in 1945 and continued his education in California and Paris, France. Mr. Simpson joined the Foreign Service in 1951, where he served in Vietnam, Nigeria, France, and Algeria. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 10, 1994.

Q: This is always a problem and all of us have gone through this, the mind set of trying to think the best about a country and basically we're suppose to be disinterested observers and there are things you'd rather not know about, I mean, talk about or you discount when they're very important. I came out of Yugoslavia, was 5 years there and we tended to discount the nationalities problem. Right now it's become a world problem. So we move to your next assignment which is basically France where you served from '59 to '64, what were you doing there?

SIMPSON: I was the Regional Public Affairs Officer for USIA working out of the American Consulate General in Marseille, that gave us responsibility for the public affairs programs, the information programs and the cultural programs throughout the whole area of Provence from the Italian border to Toulouse and up into the mountains and some of the other provinces including Toulon and Marseille and Montpellier and some of the other cities. The Consulate General was a fairly small operation but even in those early days it had its DEA contingent, I don't think it was called DEA then, the narcotics agency or whatever.

Q: Particularly because Marseille and the Corsican Mafia and that whole business.

SIMPSON: And it was quite a change from Nigeria, because very soon after I got there I was assigned as a member of the official US delegation to the Cannes festival. Which meant I would go over there and be sort of the official working staff for the delegation. Because the delegation was a political appointee who the White House would come up with, someone at the last moment who sometimes knew nothing in particular about films, so it was sort of a pay-off deal. But I'll tell you a strange thing happened on my first assignment to this job, I was not informed by either the Embassy in Paris nor by the Motion Picture Export Association that there was a big freeze in relations between the French government and the Motion Picture Export Association and that the MPEA had blocked all the American films that they controlled, that were going in. Because of this dispute I was thrown into this as a sacrificial lamb. I arrived at the Carlton hotel in Cannes where we were housed courtesy of the French government, with a station wagon full of duty-free liquor for a cocktail party with the intention of making contact immediately with the Motion Picture Export Association representative in Cannes...who was not available. He was part of the freeze out on this thing and he was playing hard to get up in Paris and wasn't going to come down until later in the game. And so innocently, because everybody else was doing something, the Russians, and the Mexicans and the Italians and everybody. I decided to throw a small cocktail party in my room including Van Johnson, who had been invited there, and Tina Louise and a few other Americans and all the American pressmen; people from Variety and all that. Well the amusing thing was the night before I had gone to a film, sat in the official delegation

seat and come out of the showing and I'd seen Van Johnson standing on the curb. And I thought, well here's another American and I thought I'd go over and introduce myself and I walked up and I said: Mr. Johnson my name is Simpson, Howard Simpson and I'm one of the official American delegates. He turned to me and said "so what?" Well the reason for his attitude was that he had been invited by the French, and he too was unaware of the freeze that was going on. He had arrived and there'd been no ticket waiting for him and he'd been forced to buy his way into the showing and he'd been totally ignored, hadn't been invited to anything so the two of us went back to the Carlton terrace and had a drink together and discussed our joint misfortune and that's where this idea for this little cocktail party started. And in the middle of this cocktail party up in my room, there was this knock on the door and somebody came in and said there was somebody who wanted to see me. So I went out and it was a representative of the Motion Picture Association of America, Fred Gronich, who later turned out to be a close friend of mine, but he was furious because this is not in the tactical operation that was going on. The Americans were not to give any parties or to show that they were actively involved in the festival. And so it was amusing, we didn't have a clash but he said you shouldn't have done this and I'll explain everything to you tomorrow. And so that was my initiation to the Cannes festival but I ended up going to 6 of them. And believe it or not the last time I was in Paris and the offer came up again and I turned it over to my younger assistant because your liver and the tension and everything else that builds up...the 6th fleet comes in. Every time there's a festival you can be assured that the flagship and a couple of carriers are going to arrive, and your phone will start ringing, the admiral's aide will be asking for tickets, you know all this other sort of thing. But that was just a sidelight of it.

Q: Was this De Gaulle's France at that time?

SIMPSON: No, not quite. I'm not sure I'll have to check the date on that.

Q: Well it'll have to be because '59, De Gaulle was...

SIMPSON: I'm just trying to put it in context with the Algerian war. Yes it was, yes it was. And I'm trying to remember when he pulled France out of NATO, do you remember?

Q: It was during Lyndon Johnson, it might have been a little later.

SIMPSON: But, the whole Marseille, this was the beginning of a long time relationship with Marseille, not only because of future assignments but it came as sort of a favorite spot of mine, of ours. In fact we're going over there in 3 weeks time. And it's a unique city, a lot of people will bypass it because you know it's a tough sort of dirty port town. It's got a lot of guts and a lot of charm.

Q: It reminds me I was Consul General in Naples and it's the same.

SIMPSON: That's right, a lot of people don't appreciate it.

Q: How did you find that area of the French press dealing with them we were getting involved slowly into Vietnam at that time, just getting the American story to the French.

SIMPSON: That was very difficult because number one the French, particularly the regional press in cities like Marseille, don't have that much space to play with. And as far as international news or policy things like that, very little even of their own things, they kept to a minimum. So it wasn't a question much of placement, it was more a question of talking to people and making sure they were exposed to certain visitors if they were interesting and had a certain authority. There was a, you had to be very careful if you didn't realize that you were always considered an official, some people tend to relax and talk more freely with their friends in the media. Only to see it appear the next day as an official statement or something. Marseille being one of the main cities of France, you had the usual visits of the ambassador which would call for a whole new setup and different appointments. And as I say, part of the public relations responsibilities there would be handling the 6th fleet relations with the local press and getting them to visit the ships and all that sort of thing. And, in fact, the local newsmen were very helpful on a number of occasions because at one point, I didn't find out from the Embassy but I found out from a newsman who called me from Nice. He said, Simpson, I don't think you're aware of what's about to happen here. And I said what's that, and this was in August and that's a bad month in France or anywhere else.

Q: Oh yes, everything shuts down.

SIMPSON: You know the beaches are full and I said what's that and he said, from what I hear your 6th fleet Admiral is planning to land marines on the beach at Nice in August as a sign of American readiness for America Day. I knew we had been working on this America Day which was a fairly simple sort of cultural thing but somewhere along the line, after a few drinks I guess, somebody had agreed, or had given the Admiral the idea that they agreed, that it'd be a great thing if the marines came ashore in full regalia on the pebbled beach of Nice as a sign of American readiness to defend Europe and all this sort of thing. You can just imagine, I blanched and immediately called Paris and called the attaché and said what the hell is going on? Well the Admiral wants to do this. I put down the phone and then called Chip Bohlen, who was ambassador at the time, and I got in touch with his office and passed the word of what was going on and I gave my arguments that #1 this was uncalled for in the context of this America Day and #2 it would be a disaster on that beach because the French authorities would have to take everybody off the beach and people had paid their money to come south for their vacations. So, anyway, the upshot of it was that Ambassador Bohlen agreed, the word was flashed to the flagship canceling that. And as luck would have it 3 days later I would have to make an official call on the Admiral in Toulon. To say it was glacial would be an understatement because he wasn't very happy with the beach thing. He knew who was behind it. But as I say that was an example of a French pressman tipping me off to something I hadn't been told. It would have been a major disaster, I'd have been carrying the can on that if it had happened.

THOMAS D. BOWIE
Labor Attaché
Paris, France (1960-1962)

Thomas D. Bowie was born in Minnesota on September 1, 1917. He received his BA and MA from Carleton College in 1938 and 1940 respectively. His career has included positions in Spain, France, Poland, Italy, and Saigon. He was interviewed by James Shea on February 25, 1994.

BOWIE: Well, you know I'm not the best person to answer that because I was a regular foreign service officer brought to do that work, as you can see from our conversation. But I can tell you when I was sent to Paris I saw a real difference right away. I had been Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs in Saigon and then after going to the Army war college was sent to Paris as labor attaché. Shortly after I arrived and Dan was showing me the ropes, somebody from another organization came up to him and asked indignantly "When is this garbage strike going to be over?" As if Dan were somehow responsible for it. And I could tell the difference. Your standing as a political officer was the same no matter who you were or what your career experience was, so long as you did your work effectively. The labor attaché just didn't come through like that. I got the feeling some officers in the Embassy didn't quite know what to make of labor officers, and the prevalent anti-labor views in the US were broadly shared by individuals in the Foreign Service. "Your Mr. Meany..."

Fortunately for me, the DCM in Paris was an old-time Foreign Service friend--from Warsaw days. It was nice to know he was there.

Some high-ranking FSO's knew perfectly well what to make of the labor function. That should be emphasized. They worked very effectively with it. I'm not going to name names because I might be unfair in leaving out some sterling characters but I have to say that some of the most traditional foreign service officers were the most supportive and the most interested in the labor program.

When I came to Rome in 1962 there was a great deal of dissension over the desirability of the Italians' forming a center-left government, taking the Socialists into the government. The labor aspect was particularly acute because the Socialists had left the question of trade union affiliation of their members unchanged; labor leaders in the Socialist party would remain in the CGIL. Well, I remember thinking that as far as I could see that was an unresolved problem and we were just going to have to recognize that it was going to be there. The international relations department of the AFL-CIO told me the center-left formula was "rubbish." I had been in the economic section in Paris and the DCM, the minister, in Rome, said that they proposed to put me in the political section in Rome. I said that wherever the labor attaché was, whether in the economic section or in the political section or reporting directly to the DCM and Ambassador, I thought the work would be pretty much the same. Of course I would be glad to go wherever they put me. But I had to say that I was going to be the bearer of bad and contradictory news about the center left as far as the labor situation was concerned. There was a possibility that that could be washed out if it were filtered through the political section, obviously in favor of the center left as a political solution. So, I wondered about that before we even got started. In a couple of weeks he told me I should report directly to the DCM and Ambassador but "if you don't get along with the political section, it will be your fault."

That was fair enough and so I tried very hard, using techniques of close consultation and

occasional joint drafting. I also was careful not to tread on the vested turf interests of the political people. But there were also pitfalls with some economic specialists who occasionally might be disapproving and complain about my reports, although they would be cleared through the economic section, political section, and the Ambassador. This was during times when the economic policies of the Italian government were being attacked and perhaps sometimes slightly attenuated by local trade union forces and the economic agencies of the US government were especially sensitive. Sometimes, too, congressional delegations would have a special axe to grind over interpretation of local labor statistics. I remember how they seemed to require a lot of explanation. I'm sure I'm not adding anything new, but merely adding a bit of color to the experience we're discussing. Where there were friendly personal relationships and where trust and understanding had developed substantive questions were easier. These varied with the change in individuals throughout my long stay in Rome.

In general the labor function was more appreciated when you could do something helpful, whether for the business people calling having labor problems of one kind or another, the military, and so on. Once there was a huge general strike throughout the whole province of Leghorn over dismissals of local employees of the US military base there. The military called the Ambassador. He and the DCM called me in. I saw that it was the opening steps of the procedure that offended practically all the Italians. What to do? Well, the Ambassador and DCM were the kind of persons who would listen. My idea was that the concept of a fresh start might help things. Tomorrow would be the opening step instead of today. I remember to this day throwing around the imperfect subjunctive in talking with the labor representatives involved. They bought it. The Ambassador persuaded the military. It worked. I suppose it also helped the stature of the labor function.

But I must cut matters short and not begin talking about my boo-boos. We'll draw a veil of charity over them. Maybe some of these problems are eliminated when the labor officer has other reporting responsibilities and is operating cheek-by-jowl in a smaller and close-knit staff.

Q: How long were you in Paris?

BOWIE: Two years.

Q: I see. And how was the feeling in let's say with your contacts with the French trade unionists.

BOWIE: They were very profitable. I dealt with all the non-Communist trade unions. But you remember I was sent there without a lot of preparation so I was trained on the job as labor attaché in Paris which was a great contrast to the experience of my predecessor, Dan Horowitz, who thank goodness stayed on for a good long time to help me get my feet wet.

Q: Ah, . . .

BOWIE: I had the advantage of speaking French well, and having gone to school in France so there was a certain entrée there. And then I had those good contacts whom Dan took great care for me become acquainted with before he left. I had a whole array of contacts not only in the labor movement but in the employer associations and journalists. The biggest thing that

happened there was the uprising in Algeria and that was a great crisis.

It is interesting how the Force Ouvrière, the French UIL, to facilitate identification, which was definitely primarily Socialist oriented, was the closest to the AFL-CIO while the Christian oriented union was the one the CIO --UAW--was greatly interested in. But that wasn't a great problem. It was really in Italy where those differences were more marked. There were a couple of secretaries general of the then CFTC. One was Maurice Bouladoux. He was a somewhat touchy person and would take offense rather easily. I remember accompanying him to the airport when he and one of his colleagues was going to the US on a visitors grant. And the airplane was a little late and he was already feeling kind of negative and he said "ça commence mal. . ." (It's starting out badly. . .) I always remember that. It became a kind of family saying in our own family. But Eugene Descamps was the second secretary general. One of his parents was a Socialist and one was a Christian union member. And he's dead now I got to know him well and when I left he gave me a book with his calling card saying, "In the name of the Confederation and en témoignage personnel d'une féconde collaboration et d'une profonde sympathie." I was pleased with that. No value to that gift, just treasured words.

WINGATE LLOYD
Economic Officer
Marseille (1960-1962)

Wingate Lloyd was born and raised in Philadelphia. He attended Princeton, Johns Hopkins (SAIS), and the University of Rangoon. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and served in France, Cameroon, Morocco, and Portugal. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were there from '59-

LLOYD: After about three or four months of language training, I arrived in Marseille in January of '60, and left in about February of '62.

Q: Yes. What were you doing?

LLOYD: I was the economic officer in a post. There was a consul general; then another fellow older than I who was doing political work; and I was the economic officer; another colleague was doing consular work and there was an admin officer. So there were five of us altogether, five American officers.

Q: Who was consul general?

LLOYD: A man named Donald Edgar who had been consul general in Alexandria. He'd served in the Middle East and in Europe and was, I think, rather disappointed that his last post was going to be as consul general in Marseille. But he was in his probably mid-50s, had a good time, seemed to enjoy himself, and did a good job.

Q: Did we have a consulate in Nice in those days?

LLOYD: We did have a consulate in Nice, yes. It had only the department of Alpes-Maritimes, because of the tremendous number of American visitors. Our consular area had all the rest the southern part of France, all the way to the Spanish border. I had a great time traveling on behalf of American commercial interests.

What I really did in Marseille was to learn French. My friends had been assigned to Paris in their first posts, and I envied them. But the French wouldn't talk to them because the French were bored with Americans. In Marseille I remember an evening where some French friends brought us along to a party. The people at the party said, "You're Americans! How interesting! We don't know any Americans, and you speak some French. How very interesting!" Well, it really gave my wife and me a leg up on understanding in depth the culture and the language. My French improved rapidly as I came to be able to work in the language. I gained a real insight into France, French culture, and the different sides of French culture.

At this time, one interesting aspect of life in France was de Gaulle. Remember the coup was in 1958. He became president on the promise that Algeria will always be French, and he went back on that during the time that we were there. There was outrage in Algeria, outrage in France. De Gaulle was being pilloried by the public as it became increasingly clear that Algeria would someday become independent.

Q: Of course, Kennedy became president at this point, and his one foreign affairs thing was making a speech in the Senate being sympathetic towards freedom for Algeria. Did that have any repercussions or anything?

LLOYD: No, by far the most important repercussion was that there were Bouvier families in southern France. There was a Bouvier family in every village or they turned up a Bouvier trace of some kind, and they all wanted to be part of the Camelot story that was going on in the United States. There was no memory of that speech by Kennedy.

Q: What in economics, I mean later Marseille became known as sort of an area for the drug traffic, but how about-

LLOYD: It was the largest port in France, and it became increasingly important as France's ties with the African countries began to diminish. As a port it was important; as an airport it was important. But the most striking feature was the arrival of the colonial settlers.

Q: From Oran?

LLOYD: The "pieds noirs" (black feet) from North Africa. The OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrete, Secret Army Organization) was active, the Organization of the Secret Army as it was called. They were a terrorist organization set up by French right wing forces determined to keep Algeria French. I remember going to people's houses and being warned by someone that "you will meet someone tonight whose name you'll be introduced to him as Pierre. That's not his

name. Don't ask him what he does, or where he's been, or why he's here. Just talk to him about everyday events." But they were nervous about having an American official in contact. There was a lot of clandestine movement, I think, between Marseille and Algeria.

Q: Did we have any brief on this? I mean was it just something that was their problem, or did we have a stand on any of this?

LLOYD: I don't think we did. I'm sure that EUR (Bureau of European Affairs) had a policy toward the decolonization of Algeria. The pressure on France from foreign settlers was not really important at that time. There was not yet a wave of Muslim immigrants coming into France. Instead it was a group of dissatisfied, angry Frenchmen who had lived in what they considered to be part of France across the Mediterranean for two, or three, or four generations. I remember talking to many of them, to their wives, about their despair at leaving a life that they'd known, that their grandparents had known, that they thought would always be guaranteed to them. The forces that were in play within France were very strong, but it was very much an internal French issue, I think.

Q: Were we under instructions to keep out of it?

LLOYD: I suspect so. It's something I didn't get into. I don't think the consulate was brought into these issues very much. I was doing some consular work in the area, which I found very interesting, and again, something that was helpful in terms of understanding the people and in building my knowledge of the language.

Q: Did you have any particularly unusual consular cases? The area, the Riviera, and all that, brought a lot of fairly well-to-do Americans, and I would think they would get into trouble.

LLOYD: Yes, they did, and they also died from time to time. There was a normal run. We had American ships calling; we had the Sixth Fleet calling in Marseille. It was a constant area of activity for the consulate, escorting the officers from the ships on calls on the local leaders, and so on. Once when a U.S. embassy officer from Berne died while on vacation in Corsica, I remember going down there to help his family through that process and get him out of there. It's challenging to do consular work when you're not in your office. You don't have a typewriter, and you're carrying seals and documents the best you can.

Q: Yes, yes.

LLOYD: But I found that interesting. As I say, it opened a window on French society. The people in southern France are, as you can imagine, a mix. In Marseille there were a lot of Greeks, Italians, and Corsicans. So it was a cosmopolitan group.

Q: In Paris, of course, at the embassy if you're dealing with matters, you end up having to deal with the intelligentsia. Was there a comparable group in Marseille?

LLOYD: Not really. We didn't know any academics that I can think of. We knew a lot of business people, some who were our age, in their 30s perhaps, a little older than we. We got to

know a couple of families, a man who was the president of the chamber of commerce. He was importing spices from Africa. Apparently the standards for importing spices allowed no more than a certain amount of rat excrement to be included in the spices. The people he was exporting to in New York found a higher percentage through a certain size screen. I learned a lot about rat excrement-

Q: (Laughter)

LLOYD: ...and about the screens and the complaints, the classic trade complaints.

Q: Yes.

LLOYD: So his was a family business. They'd been spice importers from Africa for three or four generations. I got to know this family, a very nice family, quite well. They had children who were only slightly younger than we were. I. So we were included in some of their family gatherings, which was very unusual for Americans-

Q: Yes, yes.

LLOYD: ...for a foreigner to be included in a provincial French family.

FREDERICK Z. BROWN
Consular Officer
Nice (1960-1962)

Frederick Z. Brown was born in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania in 1928. He joined the Foreign Service in 1958. His career included positions in France, Thailand, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cyprus. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

BROWN: I left the congressional relations job in July of 1960 and I was assigned as vice consul, deputy principal officer, shall I say, at the American Consulate in Nice, France. That assignment was actually made the year before, when I was still in personnel. And I will never forget, sitting in personnel, as the assignments were being passed around and a gentleman, Phil Chadbourn, who later was charge in Vientiane, ended his career in Marseille as consul general.

Q: He was there many years.

BROWN: Yes, Phil retired in place. In Marseille. I think he lived in the Riviera.

Phil Chadbourn at that time, in 1959, was head of foreign service training, FST. I remember, Phil Chadbourn coming into my office with someone from Far Eastern Personnel, I can't remember who it was at the time, and sitting down at my desk, and saying, "Fred we have just the assignment for you. We need a couple of bright young fellows to go to a place called Cambodia.

Do you know where it is?" I said, "yes, vaguely." "We need somebody to go into Cambodia and language training. It is a fascinating job. It is a very sleepy place, but interesting people. And would you be interested in spending a year in Cambodia and language training?" Well that was about the last thing in the world that I wanted to do. I wanted to mainstream into the things that were really happening. Of course, in retrospect, had I taken Cambodia and language training, I would have been there from 1960 to 1963/4 and it would have been absolutely fascinating. I would have been lined up to go back in the waning days and maybe get killed.

Anyway, I didn't do it. The job I applied for was Kinshasa or one of the constituent posts in the Congo which was then undergoing a pretty bad time. I said, that's where I want to go. I want to go where the action is. I remember Bill Harrop coming in with the assignment sheets for the paneling session and I said, "Hey, did I get the Congo." He said, "No Fred. You don't want to go to the Congo. Where you want to go, is Nice." They handed me the paper and I said, "Well Nice is kind of uninteresting." He said, "Fred, you want to go to Nice."

One of the reasons why, I learned later, that I was assigned to Nice was that I think I was well regarded by the system at the time and the principal officer in Nice at the time was known as, shall I say, not a strong officer. And I think it was thought that what he needed was an energetic, highly motivated, hard charger to go support him. I think it worked out that way. Because I definitely got those vibrations at the Embassy in Paris. So I ended up going to Nice, against my objections.

Well as it turned out it wasn't a bad place to be.

Q: What were you doing?

BROWN: It was a two man post. I'm not sure if it is still there. It has been opened and closed several times since. I really did all of the work. The principal officer was there for representational purposes only and I was vice consul. I did a great deal of classic consular work. A lot of non-immigrant visas, a lot of processing immigrant visas for Marseille, the consulate general issued the immigrant visas. But I did a lot of non-immigrant visas, including some very distinguished people; Rudolf Nureyev. I did his work when he defected from the Ballet Russe. He joined the Ballet Russe de Monte Carlo. A lot of protection work. A lot of notariats, a lot of citizen services. We had 3,000 American citizens living in my district, on the Cote d'Azur. which was the province of Alpes-Maritimes, and I can't remember if we had the province to the north. But we had Alpes-Maritimes which was the main one, which contained from the Italian border all the way over to St. Tropez. So it was a rather glamorous district. We had a lot of very interesting people there. Authors, artists of various sorts, singers, etc. But I was also accredited to the Principality of Monaco and in that capacity had the opportunity to see Princess Grace and Prince Rainier a lot. I was then single and I dated the nanny of Princess Grace who was then having her first or second child. Albie or Stephanie, I can't recall. But I saw a lot of the Rainiers, dinner at the palace. I also did, in addition to the normal consular work of which there was a great deal, the home port of the Sixth Fleet was there. The Naval Support activity was Ville Franche-Sur-Mer and I was charged with the responsibility of working with the Naval Support activity whose office was up on the third floor of the consulate building. So I saw a great deal of the Sixth Fleet, Admiral Donald McDonald and his staff. My closest American friends at that

time were the flag rank officers and captains of the Sixth Fleet.

Q: How did you find the naval officers? How was their knowledge of local politics and problems?

BROWN: I found them very enlightened. To be honest with you. There were some people, I guess, who were not so enlightened. But what I liked about Admiral McDonald and his staff was the fact that they relied on me to guide them in protocol matters. And every time there was a new ship in port in Villefranche, or there were port calls at Cannes. And the aircraft carriers used to come into Cannes because that was a bigger, and a wonderful place for shore leave. Much better than Nice, really. Because you couldn't really anchor off Nice, you could anchor off Cannes. I would escort the captains of these vessels or the commanding admiral of the group to calls. I can remember precisely where we would go. If we were in Cannes, we would call on the mayor of Cannes, and the Sub-prefect in Grasse, and if they called in Villefranche, we would call on the mayor of Nice and the Prefect of Alpes-Maritimes, located in Nice. If they called in Antibes or Menton, I would go there, meet the captain and take him ashore and take him to the appropriate people. It was always very meticulously done. Very carefully done. They were very assiduous in their respect for local customs and practices. My recollection is that it worked out very very well.

Q: Your next assignment was somewhat out of this world. You went to Thailand.

BROWN: Something happened on the way to Thailand. At one of my farewell parties, and I can remember exactly just what one it was, in Cap d'Ailles or Menton, it was a lobster. It was a lovely farewell dinner, as only the people in the Cote D'Azur can offer. Champagne and so on. It was either a lobster or a soupe de pistou, a bouillabaisse, which must have been hepatic. Because 21 days after that party, I came down with hepatitis. I spent from July of 1962 until November of 1962 with a very severe case of hepatitis, which delayed my arrival in Bangkok.

JOHN HOWARD BURNS
Political Aide
France (1960-1965)

John Howard Burns was born in Oklahoma in 1913. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Oklahoma in political science in 1935. Mr. Burns entered the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Juarez, Rio de Janeiro, Port au Prince, and Frankfurt, and ambassadorships to the Central African Republic and Tanzania. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 1, 1995.

Q: Well, you left there and went to Paris from '63 to '65. What were you doing in Paris?

BURNS: I was the so-called "political aide" to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, then General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. Although I was listed as a member of the Embassy staff, my office was at SHAPE headquarters, several miles south of Paris. The Ambassador to NATO,

Thomas Finletter, thought that my position should be attached to his Embassy rather than to that of the French government and there may have been some justification for that; not that it really mattered. My "boss" was General Lemnitzer but I enjoyed also being on the staff of Ambassador Bohlen because he was an old friend. I also occupied Embassy living quarters in Paris and was provided an Embassy car and driver.

Q: What did your job consist of?

BURNS: There was an immense amount of cable traffic, incoming that is, from all the NATO capitals. I would sift through that every morning and shortly thereafter see General Lemnitzer, reporting whatever I thought might be of interest to him or important to the military operations of the alliance. I attended his staff meetings and worked closely with his Chief of Staff, General Parker, and his personal aide, General Orwat, with whatever questions a day might bring. It was not a position for which it was easy to write a job description. I followed Walter Stoessel, who was a highly attuned European political officer, which I was not. I frequently seemed to be turning up in jobs for which I felt totally unqualified: Consul General at Frankfurt, Ambassador to the CAR, and this one at SHAPE.

Q: Well, this is what Foreign Service officers do!

BURNS: Yes, adapt.

Q: How did General Lemnitzer use you?

BURNS: I would occasionally write a telegram for him and, as I noted, I worked very closely with his immediate staff, which included his speech writer. There was a collegial atmosphere around General Lemnitzer's office and he was a very engaging individual with a great sense of humor. I think he enjoyed having me around because I did not fit the military mold. I would dare laugh out loud in staff meetings, which no one else would except General Lemnitzer himself. He would! And often. I really enjoyed working for General Lemnitzer. He ranks in my mind with Consul General Blocker for doing, in my opinion, his particular job as nearly perfectly as it would be possible for one to do.

Q: How did the Americans on the staff at NATO look on Greece and Turkey as far as an instrument of NATO?

BURNS: That had ceased to be a topic of discussion before I got there. They had by that time been long in NATO. General Lemnitzer showed a great deal of interest in that wing of the alliance.

Q: How about de Gaulle and NATO at that time?

BURNS: You have touched on something that was of special interest to me. De Gaulle was, of course, jealous of, and actively opposed to, the essentially dominant influence of the United States in Europe and especially in the NATO alliance. He withdrew French military forces from NATO and I began to think a lot about, and study, the idea of moving SHAPE headquarters out

of France, before we were told, in so many words, to do so. After a lot of thought I presented the idea to General Lemnitzer and it won his immediate interest as it did that of the US Ambassador to France, Charles Bohlen. But Ambassador to NATO, Thomas Finletter, and his deputy Elbridge Durbrow, were anything but interested and the chief of staff at NATO, General Parker was also opposed. They would not even discuss the subject and consequently it died as neither General Lemnitzer nor Ambassador Bohlen was going to carry any flags for the idea however much it may have interested them. Of course, a year or so later the headquarters were moved to Belgium, whether at the direct request of the French or not I do not recall. It interested me a great deal at the time but thirty years later it seems of no importance whatever, which, I might add, is true of many things. Mr. Blocker's "Rule 7" might be amended to read, "Don't take things (rather than yourself) too seriously".

Q: What was your impression of how Ambassador Bohlen worked?

BURNS: I was not closely enough involved with the work of the Embassy to qualify me to express an opinion. Plus the fact that the Ambassador was a personal friend, and I such an admirer of his, that I would be prejudiced in anything I might say about Ambassador Bohlen.

Q: Well, what was Lemnitzer's view of de Gaulle at that time?

BURNS: I would just term it completely correct. He recognized de Gaulle's lack of real support for NATO, and regretted it. But he accepted it as one of the circumstances with which he had to work. He never expressed personal opinions about political leaders, or questions, of member countries of NATO although his political perceptions were what I would term "razor sharp". He saw de Gaulle from time to time and de Gaulle respected him, decorating him at the time of his retirement.

Q: How did we view the Soviet threat at the time you were there?

BURNS: It was central to everything we thought and did. Almost every aspect of US foreign operations was governed by what was perceived as the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, there were quite a number then who viewed it as having perhaps a disproportionate influence.

Q: Was Berlin...

BURNS: A constant sore, constant. Some sort of crisis was continually arising, usually provoked by some action of the Soviet Union. But certainly the West, and especially the US, was not hard to provoke.

Q: Did you get involved, from your aspect as political adviser to the military commander, on how to play the Berlin situation?

BURNS: No, we didn't use the word "adviser". I was the political assistant. And I might say General Lemnitzer didn't need any advice in the political field. He had excellent political antennae and was an extremely sensitive thinker. I often said, "General Lemnitzer needs a political adviser like General Eisenhower needs a military adviser". And in whatever case, in

every Berlin crisis, by the time everyone who felt he had a right to express an opinion had done so the result resembled the finale of "Oklahoma".

Q: At this particular point, what about the Germans? Were there any problems? I'm talking about the West Germans.

BURNS: None whatever. On the contrary they were the most responsive and cooperative of any representatives at SHAPE.

Q: What about the British?

BURNS: Equally so. The only stresses at SHAPE were provided by the French.

Q: Did you get involved in nuclear issues?

BURNS: Not to any extent. The principal question which comes to mind was of France's development of its "force de frappe", which meant, of course, a nuclear capability.

Q: At that time was it sort of the feeling, "Well, we've got military parity and stability and it's probably unlikely that there will be a war?" Or what was the attitude?

BURNS: After the Cuban crisis there had been what might be termed a certain lessening of tension. But Berlin continued explosive, and capable of precipitating a serious crisis at any time. As far as European politics affected the work of SHAPE, Berlin was the leading question.

JAY P. MOFFAT
Aide to Ambassador
Paris (1960-1965)

Ambassador Jay P. Moffat, a third generation Foreign Service Officer, joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Japan, France, Switzerland, Trinidad, and Morocco, and an ambassadorship to Chad. Ambassador Moffat was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: I always thought we should have been more up on things. Keep moving on. You went to Paris as a Political Officer. 1960 to 1965.

MOFFAT: My initial 6 to 8 months was as staff aide to Ambassador Gavin and I moved from there into the Political section.

Q: Ambassador Gavin was an interesting person. He was put in there specifically by President Kennedy because he had been an Army officer -- the youngest paratroop Army General. The first to jump on the morning of D-Day. The idea was both to get away from putting just a rich fat cat in but also somebody who could appeal to the de Gaulle government. Yet, it didn't seem to have

been terribly successful. That was my impression. How did you see it?

MOFFAT: I think you have to recreate the ambiance of the time. Anything Kennedy did was terribly exciting and the press was all agog. This nomination was part of that. And maybe more was expected of it than could be carried by any individual. Gavin was a very honorable man, and I think he probably didn't really want to serve in Paris. But he felt it his duty. I know he felt very sensitive about not speaking French. And he would sometimes say that he minded deeply but that he was willing to be humiliated if necessary because it was his duty. But Kennedy and perhaps at the beginning he himself did not realize that de Gaulle was not about to have a special relationship with anyone. He came closest with Bohlen, who followed Gavin. I will talk about that in a minute. We tend to forget now but back then the French government at the direction of General de Gaulle was trying to wean the French people, and by extension French policy, from U.S. influence. And we were under a tremendous barrage of anti-American propaganda. The government-controlled radio and television held our country up to ridicule. They had a weekly program I remember, like Sixty Minutes, called Cinq Colonnes à la une (Five Column Headline) with five vignettes. One time four of the five vignettes on this program were anti-American. Racial problems, this and that. We squawked and the next week they included an item on churches in New England to make up for it. What de Gaulle was up to was essentially distancing France from the United States. Other than the visit by Kennedy and Jackie Kennedy to Paris, which was high theater at that time, lots of emotion and all the rest of it, other than that, we were already started on what took on a more and more strongly anti-American tinge.

Q: There is nothing like being the staff aide to the Ambassador to get a feel of things. You are sort of off to one side that you're there. What was our feeling towards the French? Are these just the French? I've heard this so many times, in the Foreign Service. You sort of shrug your shoulders and say the French are always going to be contrary. Or did you see this as a deliberate campaign?

MOFFAT: I think President Kennedy had an absolute fascination with the French. And felt that perhaps he could personally do a lot in the relationship. I don't think he could, because de Gaulle had made up his mind the way he wanted to go. The Embassy was again in this sort of ambience of the time. We were sent a scholar, Nicholas Wahl. He was a French expert from Academia. He was supposed to straighten the Embassy out. He knew France better than we knew France, etc. although we had some real experts there. There was this absolute fascination with de Gaulle the man, with France the country, and so on from Kennedy on down. And every one was going to try -- the Kennedy visit was quite something in terms of theater and public mood. It was the first trip out of the country for Kennedy, as President. It was the time when Jackie Kennedy was made so much of.

Q: I can shut my eyes and remember that she looked so smashing.

MOFFAT: And there is the famous line that he was the man who came with Jackie. There is an interesting insight to the early Kennedy administration. We were all roped into running the mechanics of the visit, and it was a zoo because the Kennedy people all came and they were all chiefs and no Indians. They were all tossing off dicta and orders but there was no one in their party who took care of any sort of details. I think maybe with time they got that sorted out.

Q: Looking at the early period. Were you the equivalent to the country team just sitting around figuring out how do we do to the French. Or was it a feeling that this was de Gaulle's policy and really we're not going to change it.

MOFFAT: At the beginning I don't think anybody knew. It was still slowly coming to light. I went on to the Political Section which was very large and very subdivided. I was the man for Asia, which quickly translated into the problems of Red China, which the French went ahead and recognized, and of Indochina where first in the case of Laos and later increasingly with Vietnam and Cambodia we got very much involved with the French and did not always have congruent policies.

Q: What were you getting. In the first place were you dealing with French officials at this level.

MOFFAT: I was dealing with French officials and the representatives official and unofficial of the countries involved. A lot also with journalists, scholars and with the resident communities of those countries. The Vietnamese for instance had 20 thousand-odd people in the Paris area. They all wanted to be president. They all wanted to tell you about it.

Q: I was told at one point that there were more Vietnamese doctors in Paris than there were in all of South Vietnam.

MOFFAT: They all had a solution which involved their going back and taking over! I am sure many other people have said it more eloquently, but de Gaulle's policies of distancing himself from the United States and taking an independent role was not entirely shared by a lot of the French officialdom who were still imbued with Atlantic cooperation and a conviction that France could not be entirely independent. So, there were a lot of French officials who did not agree with their government's policy and that made them quite easy to talk to. It removed the méfiance that you got officially. And for instance on North Vietnam, where the French kept a Delegation General, they provided us with information which was of great use to us back then. Dealing with the French officials was tricky but it was fun. Your own energy was the only limiting factor in getting around and talking to people.

Q: De Gaulle's recognition of Communist China, you were in the Political section at that time.

MOFFAT: Yes.

Q: Were people in our Embassy sitting around prior to this saying okay what can de Gaulle do, one that will be startling, that is in the realm of possibility and will be sort of sticking it to us? This must be almost number one because we were spending so much effort to keep Red China unrecognized and out of the UN.

MOFFAT: Your question presupposes that de Gaulle did it to spite us, if you will. In that case I think de Gaulle did it with good and sufficient reason of his own. And I think in the light of history he made the right decision. I don't want to get into that. But I think he read the realpolitik tea leaves and decided that this was a good thing for France. And it was unnatural not to do it.

But on that one we called it somewhat badly for Washington -- until fairly late in the game we thought he wouldn't recognize partially because Chiang Kai-shek was with de Gaulle the last World War II "colleague" still going. But again when French television, which is government controlled, finally had its ten minute children's program going to China for a trip we knew the decision had been made. You often got clues from what the government decreed should be purveyed to the French public.

Q: Were you getting, from the level you were dealing with, from the French officials that was of much interest coming out from China or do you feel that the French had put their initiative in there but it was just sort of there, it was no great opening?

MOFFAT: No, no great opening. And a little bit later you had an absolutely incredible situation where some of the French diplomats were spat on and yelled at by a Chinese crowd egged on by the government. But de Gaulle took it and did not make a case of it. I can assure you that if the Americans had done that or anybody else there would have been a real rumpus. I cite that just to show that the French did not have an easy time. I left in 1965. But they had not come up with anything easy or particular interesting. I think de Gaulle didn't necessarily expect much in the short run but wanted the investment in the new policy of opening to Red China and this was a long haul sort of thing not necessarily to be crowned with any immediate benefits.

Q: What were you getting from your contacts in the French foreign ministry and elsewhere about the situation in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia?

MOFFAT: Initially after transfer into the political section I was involved in the Laos negotiations. You may remember there were the "three princes" as they were called. Particularly Souvanna Phouma spent a great deal of time in Paris. Governor Harriman and Michael Forrestal of the NSC would shuttle over and we'd go round and round wooing the neutralist Souvanna. We got deeply involved in that and the French were very much involved. Everyone had his own agenda. Souvanna would pull into town and the Russians would wine and dine him and the Americans would wine and dine him and French would wine and dine him -- and then the British would do it. And that took an enormous amount of time and energy. We got some wonderful anecdotes out of it and the Lao are wonderful people and it was great fun. Eventually at least for a while it had a happy result. It was sorted out and agreements reached in Geneva. The French were quite helpful because they had wanted us to play the neutralist card as it was called back in those days and go with Souvanna rather than Phoumi Nosavan, who was our man, or Souphanouvong who was the Communist man. So we were pretty close with the French on that. They had their own agenda but it included cooperation with us. On Vietnam we were quite far apart. It was the time of Nhu and Madam Nhu, and coups were going on and the French were interested in protecting their surviving assets, if you will, in Vietnam their presence and influence in the north and south and their vestigial (but very significant to them) cultural assets, schools and things like that. They thought we were wrong in our policies in Vietnam and they didn't hesitate to tell us. But Vietnam was still very much a political question in France and there were plenty of Frenchmen who thought their own government's policy a bit short-sighted. From both the right and the left we were being bombarded. There were major demonstrations outside the Embassy and it was a very lively time. The French were not happy with our policies.

Q: Did you find that the French officials you were dealing with, were they basically in accord with the French policy or were they doing their duty but you didn't feel they wanted to see someone get involved there or what?

MOFFAT: They had a bureau in the Quai d'Orsay which was our normal vis-a-vis called Asie-Oceanie. Within that there was an office for Indochina. Those people we dealt with were businesslike and not terribly involved in the ideological aspects of the greater picture. There was even Madame de Gaulle's niece in there. It was the sort of relationship you would have with colleagues who are working on problems of interest to you and they were certainly open and friendly. At the top there was a Breton called Manac'h who was head of the entire bureau who was very open very friendly -- but certainly could not be faulted by any side for partiality. He was a real pro, an unsung hero at the time. I remember I had to deal with him just before the recognition of Red China was announced. We had been given one story by Pompidou that they weren't going to do it. Clearly they were going to do it, and there was great confusion. Manac'h just said this is the way it is. A very estimable man. Higher than that in the Foreign Ministry and in other ministries, and in the Presidency itself there were other people for whom the controlling issue was whether French independence and/or Atlantic cooperation and so on. For some of them the merits of the case in Laos or Vietnam or Red China or whatever were subsidiary to the need to keep the Atlantic world together. For some of them it was very tough to be kicking us in the teeth. Even today, however, I hesitate to name names.

Q: When did de Gaulle pull France out of NATO?

MOFFAT: That was in 66, after I left.

Q: There was already a distance in there.

MOFFAT: Yes, the process was well begun.

Q: One other thing that was in your direct realm of responsibility, the decolonization of Africa. How were we seeing what the French were doing it seemed to be almost nasty in some countries that did not agree with France.

MOFFAT: Well it was nasty at times. As an Embassy Paris tended to focus on the big questions of the day. For me on Asia and Alan Lukens and Peter Sebastian on Near East Africa there was a lot of room to play because the rest of the Embassy was preoccupied. (I did Africa when the fellow wasn't there). Algeria was an exception in having the highest levels of Embassy attention. When I got to Paris in January 61, we were expecting the parachutists to drop out of the sky from the revolt of the military down in Algiers. It was near the end of the long tortuous process of Algeria's fight for independence and it really tore the French apart. There were bombings all the time in Paris all through our first six months or so. You could lie in bed at night and hear booms, as the plastiques would go off in the town. I was in the Quai d'Orsay when a plastique that had been hidden in the diplomatic pouch went off in the courtyard killing the poor fellow loading it. It really was very, very traumatic for the French. Algeria had been part of France unlike the rest of Africa. It turned Frenchman against Frenchman. It was highly significant. Kennedy's connection with Algeria and other things played into this.

Q: Kennedy as a Senator had talked about a free Algeria. This was probably the most well known pronouncement Kennedy made as a Senator.

MOFFAT: There was a feeling that we should pay more attention to Black Africa. Indeed the minister at the Embassy went down by military plane and visited most if not all of the francophone countries. Back then there was tremendous suspicion among the French that the United States would try to replace France in Black Africa. France was still running its black African countries. Almost every month there would be a visit with flags up and down the Champs Elysée for yet another black chief of state. de Gaulle had failed a couple of years earlier in his effort to have a French Union. Starting with Guinea, of course, and then the others, the francophone Africans acceded to independence. For the first few years it was a very very qualified independence. So we ran up against the suspicions of the French. That made it fairly tough. Also, French Africa was run out of the Elysée, the presidential palace. Foccart was really in charge of African affairs and he was a very difficult man to get to talk to. In a way he was not entirely of the government. He was an outsider. So it was a period when the U.S. was coming to know black Africa a little better but French black Africa much less well than the other parts. It was a period of great French suspicion of our intentions.

Q: Was there a problem, because one of the things when Kennedy came in was the new broom and the new look and all that, and you had Governor Mennen Williams when he was in charge of African Affairs, someone was much more prominent than any one has been since in charge of that area? Was there a feeling among you in the Embassy that the Kennedy administration and those around it were too big mouth and they were talking about doing things that would certainly arouse the suspicions of the French that we had something else in mind?

MOFFAT: Well it could have been. "Soapy" Williams as he was called was always through Paris because he was constantly visiting in Africa. It was a good and pleasant way to get there. He did a very good job. Not much money and a lot of mirrors and the rest of it. I don't know, that's beyond me. He was put there because they needed a place to put someone who had been a potential candidate for the presidency. They were sticking such people all over the department. I think Soapy Williams may have led the administration -- he wanted to make something of the job -- rather than reflecting the administration's wanting to do something.

Q: Could we go back to Ambassador Bohlen. Compare and contrast how he operated. How you saw him.

MOFFAT: For us as professionals in the Embassy, he was a wonderful boss and if you'll look in his book he cites the Embassy Paris of that time as the best he ever worked in. Everything came together and seemed to click. We had one problem. Oversimplifying, there were Gaullists and anti-Gaullists as we called them in the Embassy. I was in the Anti-Gaullist category but the persuasion of the other levels above me alternated going up. We used to wait until the "Gaullists" were on leave or something to get our cables out ... But anyway that's another story.

Q: Did the Centrists in the Embassy speak a unified language?

MOFFAT: Not necessarily. It was more a way things were cast. There were some people who retained an admiration and fondness for de Gaulle and there were some of us who saw him as the devil incarnate and so of course we phrased our things differently. But Bohlen had a very professional embassy and was a wonderful boss and gave great latitude to people. In response for the most part they did not cause him any grief. He had only one weakness. He could not write the English language, and we all had to rush to get to his own cables before he would send them out. He understood de Gaulle. He was frustrated by the difficulty in dealing with him as anyone would be. He rolled with the punch and knew the limits and I think got the maximum out of that relationship that could be gotten. I know de Gaulle from his side was a great admirer of Bohlen and enjoyed dealing with him but that didn't make him change his policies. It made life a little easier, however, and we got the maximum out of it that we could. As with King Hassan of Morocco, whom we will come to later on, de Gaulle could not have a real and a normal relationship with anybody. Both men transcended normal relationships. They could have warm personal ties but they operated in a different dimension and didn't deal with mortals the way other people do.

Q: Was Vernon Walters there when you were there?

MOFFAT: He came through to interpret but he was not permanently assigned. As you must know he has a lot of anecdotes about de Gaulle from his interpreting days.

Q: I have heard in other interviews being done that that particular Embassy as being the most professional one. An awful lot of people, some you might call stars but more than that these were just a very very professional Embassy at a very difficult time.

MOFFAT: That's true. And we were big enough. We had one fellow who sort of went off his head, a mid-level political officer. We were numerous enough to carry him. Although he still was there, he wasn't functioning as a productive officer. You don't always get such flexibility in a small post. Other than that, yes, you are right.

Q: How well did you feel you were backed up -- this was a difficult time, difficult reporting, that you were backed up by the Department of State, both at the sort of the desk the bureau and Secretary's level?

MOFFAT: Well, I was backed up by a different part of the department, the Far East Bureau. We were I think well treated by that Bureau, but by the time I left we were getting into the phase of "How do we get out of Vietnam -- how do we deal through other than official channels?" That was a little bit hard. We were over in Paris and this sort of thing was not communicated to us through normal channels. Actually when I left I was replaced by an officer who was an old 01. This will mean nothing to an outsider but was four or five grades higher than I was.

Q: The equivalent of a major general or something?

MOFFAT: Not too long after there were negotiations in Paris. Before that there were reportedly preliminary contacts using our personal country house I turned over to another member of the Embassy. Things were beginning to cook. I felt a little out in left field in my last few months. I

was already over my time but if I had stayed on that would have had to be sorted out. Not that the US government would necessarily have done so.

G. RICHARD MONSEN
Information Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1960-1966)

G. Richard Monsen was born in Utah in 1921. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Paris and New York (the United Nations). Mr. Monsen was interviewed by Hans Tuch in 1988.

MONSEN: While I was the Information Officer there, one incident occurred that sticks in my memory as rather historic and interesting -- the 1960 summit conference.

Q: I am particularly interested in hearing your comments on that because I was in Moscow at that time and preparing for the visit of the President and subsequently the U-2 affair. I think this is when you were in Paris and having your experience there. So please go on.

MONSEN: When the conference first started we knew nothing about the U-2, but it had just barely gotten underway when the news broke that the U-2 had been shot down.

Q: That was May 1, 1960.

MONSEN: I remember it was sometime in May in 1960, but I don't remember the date. But in any event, there were no meetings of all the chiefs of state held during the whole summit. Khrushchev was meeting privately with de Gaulle, and Eisenhower met with de Gaulle and so on. Late that afternoon Khrushchev called a press conference out at the old NATO headquarters at the Palace du Trocadero in Paris. Andrew Berding, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, had been my boss in IOP earlier. I rode out to the press conference with him, and we sat in the audience there when Khrushchev came out and in short order denounced the United States and said that the conference was off and he was on his way home with all kinds of dire words about the United States.

Q: And President Eisenhower was uninvited?

MONSEN: Yes, was disinvited you might say.

Q: Disinvited.

MONSEN: This was about 6 o'clock in the afternoon. Although I was the Information Officer in Paris at the time, for the conference I had been designated as the Policy Guidance Officer. That meant giving guidance to our Voice of America and our IPS representative who were covering the conference, and also sending back guidance cables to Washington. Andy Berding told me, "Dick, I'm going to have dinner tonight with Bill Cody" (PAO in Paris). He said, "I'll drop you

off at your office in the Embassy, and I want you to write the best damned policy guidance you've ever written." And he said, "After Bill and I have had dinner, we'll come back and I'll look at it." Everything that was sent out had to be cleared through Berding. Needless to say, I went back and worked like hell while Berding and Cody went out to dinner.

I should say parenthetically at this point that I had been in Paris slightly less than a year. At that point I had not been getting along too well with my boss, Bill Cody, even though he had selected me for my job. I had been having a rough time with him. I simply couldn't seem to win his confidence.

In any event, Cody and Andy Berding came back from their dinner. I had just finished writing this guidance cable, so I handed it to Berding. He read it over and said, "Dick, that's absolutely on target. Just what was called for." And he handed it to Cody and said, "Bill, what do you think about this?" Bill was always more of a cultural officer than he was a political officer, but nevertheless he read it and said, "Yep, fine, fine. It's fine."

So the cable was sent off and that became the Agency guidance on that. From that day on Cody was marvelous to work with. I never had another moment's problem with him. Anyway, that's a rather personal side effect of the conference.

Q: That was an interesting period, the period that followed. With the U-2 shot down and our relationship, the Soviet-U.S. relationship, really went into a nosedive.

MONSEN: Oh, yes.

Q: It had been building up through the spirit of Camp David and then we had had Nixon over in the Soviet Union and Khrushchev had been in New York and Washington. This was supposed to be sort of the next step with Eisenhower visiting the Soviet Union, and our preparations had gone forward for several weeks. And then the nosedive similar to the one that the U-2 took, the relationship took.

MONSEN: Yes, we noticed that also in another sense. In the spring, earlier before the summit conference, there was this movement of trying to effect a thaw and improve relations with the Soviet embassy in Paris. We organized an Evening in Paris. We invited a whole group of Soviet officers and their wives, not to the embassy residence but to the old Rothschild mansion. That, by the way, is now the new embassy residence but at that time was where USIA had a lot of offices. We had a big hall there and invited the Soviet diplomats and their wives to come over for a film showing. I remember we showed them the old film Marty, and we had then a short program of jazz and a few other things and afterward drinks and hors d'oeuvre and stuff were served. So it was all a very jolly, congenial sort of a gathering. They were supposed to have reciprocated with a similar one at their embassy, but then after the U-2 they never did. So I never got inside the Soviet embassy.

Q: This really started the cold war again. Let me ask you, there are really three assignments that you've had which are, I would say, unique for USIA career officers to have and they're out of the ordinary. One of them came really right after your Paris assignment. You became the USIA

adviser at the United Nations in New York when Arthur Goldberg was the Ambassador to the United Nations. But that particular position in this case encompassed a number of jobs. So I think this is a very interesting thing for you to relate.

WELLS STABLER
Political Officer
Paris (1960-1965)

Ambassador Wells Stabler was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1919. He entered the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Palestine, Italy, and France, and an ambassadorship to Spain. Ambassador Stabler was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: ... assigned to Paris where you served for almost five years.

STABLER: I was there from September, 1960 to July, 1965.

Q: How did you get the assignment and what was it?

STABLER: Well, in early '60, the question came up about the replacement of the officer in the Political Section in Paris who dealt with internal political affairs. At that time I was serving in the Office of Western European Affairs and Bob McBride was the Director. One day, out of the blue, he asked me one day if I would be interested in being the head of the Internal Political Unit in the Embassy in Paris. Obviously I thought that would be quite an interesting position and accepted with alacrity.

We then took off in September, my wife and four small children ranging from the ages of 1 to 6, I think it was at the time, for Paris. I then took over as head of the Internal Political Unit which consisted of myself, an assistant, and an officer who did purely biographical work. I had a secretary who was an American who had lived in Paris for years, spoke fluent French and who was really an absolute gem as far as Foreign Service Secretary are concerned.

At the time that I got there Randy Kidder was the Political Counselor and John Bovey was the number two man, who also did African affairs. Amory Houghton was the Ambassador. He was a political appointee of Eisenhower and was only there a few months after I arrived. He left Paris the day before John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President. Shortly thereafter Kennedy named General James Gavin, the President of Arthur Anderson Associates, as US Ambassador to France.

Q: What was the political situation when you arrived, because this was a very turbulent period. If someone wants to report on French internal politics, you probably picked the greatest period since 1789.

STABLER: Of course, by the time I got there de Gaulle had been firmly entrenched. The Fifth

Republic was then underway. So many of the old line political leaders of the Fourth Republic were out of office. About all of them were studying ways and means whereby somehow they could get back into power. The Gaullists, so-called UNR -

Q: That was his party.

STABLER: Well, that was the Gaullist party. I think it was called the Union Nationale de Rassemblement, something of that sort. It was one of these organizations that was put together because of the position of de Gaulle. A great many people rallied around. There were other political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies, but the Gaullists were by far in the majority.

My job really was to report on what was happening in the internal political picture. I spent quite a lot of time at the outset in establishing contacts with some of the leading Gaullists - not at the governmental level because those Ministers and so forth were dealt with by more senior officers in the Embassy. But I established contact with a group of some of the younger Gaullists who apparently wanted to establish communication with the Embassy. It was interesting because quite a number of these people, although they looked upon the United States with a certain degree of hostility because - my theory has always been that de Gaulle in order to revive the glories of France, etc. had to demonstrate France's total independence from the policies of any other country. But to be credible he had to demonstrate independence from the country which perhaps mattered most to the Western world at that time and that was the United States. So some of de Gaulle's attitude and that which was echoed by his followers was one of putting the United States at arm's length. They were very critical of American policy. I never had any personal problems with them and they seemed to be quite anxious to talk. I met with a lot of them over a period of time. I found particularly interesting that a great many of these, I don't remember the numbers now, had at one time had Leader Grants to the United States. So they were very familiar with the country, basically admired Americans and benefited from their stay in this country. In fact, in some of the political organizations of the Gaullist party they tried to copy some of the things we did in political campaigns - the idea of door-to-door canvassing at the grass root level. Some of these young Gaullists endeavored as time went on to get out amongst the people and establish a much closer identification between the party and the grass roots during campaigns, which was never the case at all in the politicking of the Fourth Republic.

De Gaulle was very much in the ascendancy and one of the reasons that General Gavin was selected as Ambassador was the fact that he had been a young General in World War II, had parachuted into France with his airborne division at some stage during that war, and had replied :Nuts" when at one point, possibly at Bastogne, the Germans demanded surrender. The thought was that as a World War II General he would get along well with General de Gaulle.

Q: I think he came in on D-Day. I think he was one of the first people to land.

STABLER: Maybe so. I think it was the 101st. Although he spoke no French at all and absolutely no previous experience in diplomacy, the theory I assume was, although it was never specifically stated, that here was a General in France that anticipated the liberation of France and you have a General as President of France and the two ought to get along very well. Well, that

really didn't prove to be the case since he spoke no French. That, I think limited the ability to have direct, one-on-one conversations with de Gaulle and I just don't think that he was obviously up to the stature of de Gaulle in terms of international relations. In any event he was only there for a little over a year -- I can't remember exactly how long, but it wasn't all that long.

Then Chip Bohlen came and things changed because de Gaulle had very great admiration for Bohlen and Bohlen spoke fluent French and he knew what he wanted.

It was a fascinating period. I got to know many of the leaders of the Fourth Republic -- former Prime Ministers, etc. who were extremely anxious to maintain contact with the United States. They, obviously didn't play the role that they used to and therefore the Ambassador and DCM didn't really have time for them. Therefore, they were not only willing but very happy to have contact with even as modest a figure as a First Secretary. I found it most interesting. I kept the Department informed of some of their thinking, but the fact was that they were by that time completely out of the game and had really no influence whatsoever in what was happening in the Gaullist government.

One of the people that I used to see very regularly was the Secretary General of the Socialist Party, the SFIO, Guy Mollet who had a considerable political career and been Prime Minister at the time of the British-French invasion of Egypt back in 1956.

But as an aside...I always found it a little strange with the way we do business. A lot of these people, such as Guy Mollet, and there were others who were leaders of the Fourth Republic, had what you might call a fiduciary relationship with the United States and they indeed received some financial support from the US government. I would go to visit Guy Mollet and we would have a nice chat. The telephone would then ring and he would look up and smile at me and say, "Well, one of your colleagues is here to see me." We would have this revolving door act between myself and someone of the CIA station in Paris. He wouldn't know that I was there and I wouldn't know that he was coming. I found it quite frankly a rather embarrassing situation that the United States government would do well to avoid.

Q: Was there any discussion about the CIA doing this type of thing...they were still politicians weren't they?

STABLER: Yes, they were. Some of them, if not all of them, were in the National Assembly as the Chamber of Deputies was called in the Fifth Republic. I don't know for a fact whether they were still being kept on the payroll or whether the previous relationship enabled them, the CIA people, to receive perhaps a better degree of information than I had. I really never knew. I am not sure to what extent the Political Counselor in Paris knew all the details. I wouldn't necessarily tell the Political Counselor that I had an appointment with Mollet or former Prime Minister Antoine Pinay or whoever it was I was seeing, even with Francois Mitterrand with whom I had some contact, not much, but some...he was not my favorite in any event. I would go about my business as part of my mandate. But even after this occurred there was no coordination. It was one of those awkward things that I have always thought about because I always felt somehow one could avoid that type of embarrassment, at least not do it on the same morning.

Q: You mentioned Francois Mitterrand was not one of your favorite people. He is now the President of France and has been for some time. How did you feel about him?

STABLER: There was the feeling that he was somewhat of an opportunist; a bit "tricky"; now on this side of the situation, now on the other side. At the time I would see him he was not a Socialist. I think he was what was called a Radical, but certainly not in the Socialist camp. Later on he became a Socialist and their leader. I think the feeling was that his position on matters was never very clear and you were never really entirely sure where he stood on issues. People such as Guy Mollet, a Socialist; Pinay was in Independent; Maurice Faure was a Radical; Jean Lecanuet who was Christian Democrat, people of that sort you knew where they stood because they were what they were and in the political groupings they had been in for a long time. It was always my impression that they were much more solid than Mitterrand. The only difference is, of course, that the other gentlemen I speak of -- Mollet is dead, Pinay may be dead - the last time I saw him he was a very old man, Maurice Faure, I guess, is still around -- only Francois Mitterrand is President of France, so whatever he did, he obviously did quite successfully.

Q: You were there during the very last part of the Eisenhower Administration.

STABLER: Yes.

Q: Did you get a feeling how Amory Houghton and others felt towards the Gaullist government and all at that time and was there a change when Gavin came out?

STABLER: I don't think there was a great deal of change. I was there only the last months of Amory Houghton and he didn't speak French either. He had an extremely able DCM, Cecil Lyon, who spoke very good French. I wouldn't say that there was a great deal of difference in the relationship between the US and France, Eisenhower and de Gaulle, if you will, and the beginnings of the Kennedy-Gavin-de Gaulle relationship. At least it wasn't obvious that there was any change. I think it became somewhat more critical later when de Gaulle marched out of NATO and when he refused the British entry into the Common Market. But then also a very significant point - when, in spite of all the differences we had with de Gaulle, he did stand up and was counted during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: October, 1962.

STABLER: Dean Acheson came over to brief de Gaulle and de Gaulle in effect said, "We are with you." And I think that made a big impression. Also de Gaulle's personal participation in the Memorial Service in Paris for Kennedy and I believe he also came to the United States for the funeral. So in spite of all these major political problems with the French, the basic alliance, this sort of love/hate relationship that has existed between the United States and France was reconfirmed.

Jumping ahead a little to the assassination. It was interesting to see the lack of certainty on the part of the Gaullists as to what they should do. I happened to be in Nice at the time that Kennedy was assassinated attending the Gaullists' - UNR's - National Congress and was at a cocktail party given by some of the UNR members when I got word that Kennedy had been assassinated.

The American Consul in Nice, Paul DuVivier I think it was at the time, and I immediately withdrew from the cocktail party. The next morning I went to a plenary session of the UNR in a huge big hall and as I walked down to my seat it was interesting to me to see who amongst my French Gaullist friends would stop and say something to me and which would somehow look the other way. It was surprising that some of the ones I thought the least friendly turned out to be the warmest in their expressions of sympathy and some who I thought were friends turned out to be rather chicken-livered.

Q: Why would there be a problem?

STABLER: Well, again, it was the whole question of the relationship of the United States. They were mixing up their human sentiments with their belief that somehow the Gaullist party was not all that close to the United States. This was even more apparent on the stage of this hall where there was a flag pole of one sort or another. When I came in the French flag was flying right up at the top. One could see that there was a discussion going on, which seemed to relate to the flag. It was only during the course of the morning that they apparently resolved their problem and brought the flag down to half staff.

Again this was this sort of love/hate relationship. Some obviously said what did this have to do with us, this is the Gaullist party congress and why should the French flag take into account at all what's happened. They did resolve this but it obviously took them some time to do so.

This, I think was not untypical of the dichotomy in their thinking in terms of the Gaullists at different levels. I think in the case of de Gaulle that he would not stoop to be quite so petty about something of this sort. I mean the grand gesture was part of his make up. There was an extraordinarily beautiful Memorial Service for Kennedy in the Cathedral of Notre Dame which my wife and I attended. De Gaulle came and it was really a very emotional moment in which de Gaulle most willingly participated. Of course that was in 1963.

Q: Can we go back then to an earlier period?

STABLER: Yes, I want to go back because it was a very important development. In the fall of 1961...because all during this period, from the time I got there in 1960 and '61, one of the major issues that de Gaulle had to deal with was this problem of Algeria. That had become an amazingly difficult thorn in the French side, the rebellion in Algeria, the inability of the French, in spite of large French forces, to bring it under control. There were very strong feelings on the part of many Frenchmen that it must always be "Algerie Francaise." Finally de Gaulle, recognizing that this was certainly not going to be resolved by force of arms, declared that he was going to leave Algeria for the Algerians. He had gone down to Algeria at some point and had made a speech from a balcony and, of course he was rather good sometimes with conundrums and the famous statement he made as he addressed the crowd, mostly French settlers or "pieds noirs" and said, "Je vous ai compris," -I have understood you. Well no one to this day really ever knew what he meant by that...I have understood that Algeria must remain French or I have understood that we aren't going to win this one and Algeria will become independent?

As a result of all this tension, there was the famous revolt of the generals in Algeria in the early fall of 1961. This was a very serious matter because these five generals and a good many of the units in Algeria turned against de Gaulle and rebelled against the central authority. That night Michel Debre , who was then the French Prime Minister - a Gaullist, of course, and a very faithful servant of de Gaulle - .appeared on television...it was a wild appearance, he was unshaven...and urged the citizens of Paris to go by whatever means, horseback, car, whatever, out to Orly and Le Bourget, the two big airports, to prevent the landing of the aircraft that was expected to bring troops from Algeria to seize power in Paris. It was a very tense moment. I was in the Embassy and we heard noise of tanks coming across the Pont de la Concorde by the Assemblée Nationale on the Place de la Concorde . One really didn't know at that point whether these were tanks of the forces loyal to the generals or what they were.

It turned out that they were tanks and armored cars of the police forces and other forces loyal to General de Gaulle which had simply come into the Place de la Concorde to establish positions there. The night was extremely tense. I will mention one particular incident that I mention because it was perhaps not untypical of what happened.

There was a gentleman by the name of Maurice Ferro whom I had known in Washington when he was a correspondent for the great French newspaper, Le Monde. When I got to Paris I resumed my contact with him. He was an avid Gaullist and he was instrumental in introducing me to many of the younger Gaullists who at that time had no ministerial positions but who were movers and shakers in the UNR and with whom I met many times. A number of them became good friends and some of them became Ministers later on. One of them became Minister of Interior, another a Minister of Posts, I think one of them became Secretary General of the UNR. All of them were dyed-in-the-wool Gaullists.

That night of the generals' revolt, I had a telephone call from Ferro asking if he could urgently meet me. I suggested that we have a drink at the Crillon bar and talk about things there. The thrust of his message was, "I am, of course, a loyal Gaullist; the generals are about to arrive in Paris, they obviously will arrest me and my family and goodness knows what will happen. Could you give me asylum?"

I said that unfortunately the United States had a policy against that, but that I would at least offer him and his wife safety in my house. My wife was away at the time. So they came to my house and spent the night there. By the time I got up at 6:00 the next morning, they had left because by that time it was known that the generals had failed to rally the citizens of France. They had not been able, therefore, to transport their rebellion to the mainland and it was already beginning to peter out even in Algeria.

I mention this only because as a result of this action by Mr. Ferro he was finished. The Gaullists said they wouldn't speak to him again. He had shown lack of faith and the white feather had been exhibited and he had denied his master, in a sense, believing that somehow de Gaulle wouldn't triumph. I don't know how many Gaullists suffered this way, but he certainly was finished. I never saw him again.

Q: From your point of view how did the Embassy react to this situation? How did they see it?

How were they calling it?

STABLER: Well, of course, it was difficult because the only information that we had came really through the French television. I don't remember what was coming out of the Consulate General in Algiers. It was very timely as they knew what was happening. So, all we could do was to report what it was we were seeing and hearing in Paris. I think, if I recall correctly, the general view was that de Gaulle would probably carry the day because of his extreme basic popularity in France. While there were many Frenchmen who probably were - whom they used to call "pieds noirs" in Algeria - or had served in Algeria and had strong feelings in that direction about Algeria, but they didn't represent the majority of the French people. I think most of us probably felt that it was most unlikely that the generals would carry the day and that de Gaulle would be successful in putting this down. I don't recall now and I can't tell you because again the Ambassador was around...

Q: The Ambassador was whom then?

STABLER: Gavin. I don't recall to what extent we really did anything or said anything beyond letting it be known that our support was with de Gaulle. There was no question about that. I don't remember what may have come out of Washington at that time, but I seem to recall that the French government, de Gaulle and Gaullists, were very appreciative of what they considered to be our support for de Gaulle at this particular time.

Q: France was still in NATO at the time.

STABLER: Everything happened very quickly. Everything was over very quickly. The tense moment was that night and once nothing developed there then it was sort of down hill as far as the generals were concerned. The only way they could have imposed their will was by pushing de Gaulle out of office -- by capturing de Gaulle. That didn't happen. Once that failed, then the rebellion, itself, began to peter out as far as Algeria was concerned.

There was no question then that they would have been able to set up a regime in Algeria and have it stick for very long without the support of the Metropole, supplies and what not that would be needed. Plus the fact that there were many units in Algeria that didn't respond to the generals' call. So I don't have any knowledge of what, if anything, our military...or NATO would have done. As I recall the Departments of Algeria were included in the original NATO boundary, because that was one of the things the French demanded.

It was relatively short-lived and you remember the generals were ultimately arrested and put on trial, etc.

This incident of course enormously strengthened de Gaulle's hand. He then was able to carry out domestically a number of things. It seems to me that at this point that there were then certain constitutional developments that took place in France which more or less perfected the Constitution of Fifth Republic in terms of the direct election of the President and things of that sort which, up to that point, had not been enshrined in the Fifth Republic.

Q: After the 1961 night of the generals and all that, the next thing that occurs to me would have been the Cuban missile crisis where the United States and the Soviet Union were nose to nose. It looked like there was a very strong possibility that it might result in a nuclear war. How did we view that from the Embassy at that time?

STABLER: The news coming out of Washington was increasingly threatening in terms of what seemed to be building up. The Embassy role in this at that point became one of being sure that the French were aware of what actually was happening. Of course, this type of situation was handled, obviously, at the very top level and beyond the news reports coming out of what was happening, the recognition in Washington was that it was important that we bring all our allies on board and make them aware of actually what U-2 pictures showed. That, I think, was the mission that Dean Acheson had in coming over.

It seems to me that at the time the missile crisis took place Bohlen was there. I think that was true. He hadn't been there very long. So he then accompanied Acheson on the call on de Gaulle. The object behind this was, again, as I say, to take to de Gaulle the evidence we had. My recollection is that he rather pushed the evidence aside and said that we could be sure that France will stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States in a war situation. I think this was a very important aspect of the US-French relationship to know that in spite of all his varied differences with us and many other areas of the world on how things were being done...the idea of US hegemony and the like, which was part of the reason they left NATO...on major questions of war and peace the French remained our loyal ally. I don't think that anybody had any doubt that what de Gaulle said was what he meant. That was one of the very important milestones in the French-American relations.

Q: In your dealing with the politicians, was this reflected too?

STABLER: Yes, don't forget that the Fourth Republic politicians deplored everything that de Gaulle did. Therefore, they took the view that de Gaulle was mistaken in his attitude on everything. They obviously supported the United States. They probably didn't pay much attention to what Europe would do when he said they were with us. The Gaullists, themselves, I think were guided by what the General said. So some of them may not have been so much with us, but they obviously followed the leader. I think on the whole that you would say that the French political class, in any event, was clearly behind us and were supportive in this particular situation. I am not sure, now that I look back on it, to what extent the French people were really aware of the gravity of the situation.

Again, it came and went with a certain amount of speed -- about a week. Then the horizons cleared again and we got back to business. Then it was after that de Gaulle began taking positions with respect to NATO and keeping the British out of the Common Market. So his major blueprint carried on in spite of these various ups and downs -- the Algerian thing, the missile crisis, the assassination of Kennedy, and the like. One has to draw a distinction here between the Gaullists and their attitude towards the United States and policy followed by de Gaulle and the attitude of the Fourth Republic politicians all of whom were, of course, increasingly frustrated because the years of participation in the goodies of government were gone. They were essentially non-players. De Gaulle paid little attention to them.

In all of this there appeared to be an increasing public dissatisfaction with the somewhat imperial nature of the Gaullist regime. And in spite of at least one assassination attempt on de Gaulle which I recall, which rallied people around a little bit, as the elections approached for the National Assembly in 1964, there was a very strong feeling...because one of my functions was to keep in close touch with the so-called political journalists, many of whom were products of the Fourth Republic...most of these commentators had the feeling that as the elections were approaching the dissatisfaction with de Gaulle was increasing and that there was a good likelihood that the Gaullists would not get a majority in the next Assembly and would have to make some sort of a deal with some of the parties of the Fourth Republic who might begin to show life again.

The Political Section of the Embassy was fairly convinced that the Gaullists would not demonstrate the strength they had before. There was, however, a group which was a public opinion group, IFOP - "Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique" - run by a man named Sadoun, a very nice fellow, whom I knew well. Apparently the Gaullists had commissioned rather secretly a public opinion poll in connection with this election.

Again, it is one of those things that is sort of regrettable, but there we are. At the time that I was preparing messages that would seem to indicate that possibly the Gaullists wouldn't do very well, the CIA station had managed to get a copy of the public opinion poll which they didn't share with anybody, which showed that the Gaullists would really do much better than expected. I wasn't made privy to this, so I went out on a limb somewhat and called it wrong.

The Gaullists really did extremely well which was a great surprise to most of the political commentators. But I will say that most of the political coverage was done by people who were fashioned, brought up in the Fourth Republic and who perhaps didn't have a great deal of love for the Gaullists because they were not as privy to what went on as they were during the Fourth Republic.

So the upshot of all this was that the Gaullists did quite well which was foreseen in this opinion poll. The polling institute was fashioned largely on the model of American public opinion institutes -- Gallup and others -- and introduced a whole new element into French political life because they turned out to be remarkably accurate.

That only demonstrates that the talk that one heard from many who were believed to be well in touch with what was going on reflected a dissatisfaction to what was happening in France...the character of the Fifth Republic. The dissatisfaction with the somewhat patronizing attitude of some of the Gaullist party leaders who were in the saddle and nothing else was riding except that. This irritated people. It cast over the situation the feeling, in any event, that there was growing popular dissatisfaction.

Well, that was 1964. It was so many years after that...I think it was about '66 or '67...when indeed all of this erupted and the students began to demonstrate. So, it was there, but hadn't yet simply come to the surface. I think some of us who dealt with these issues...I found this message I prepared on what I thought might be the outcome of the elections was one obviously which I

didn't sign off myself...and I don't mean to say that anybody else shared the lack of vision that perhaps I had... but there wasn't any strong objection on the part of those who read the message - maybe that was misplaced faith in my abilities. But there didn't seem to be any strong sentiment that perhaps that wasn't correct.

But it did again show the unfortunate lack of coordination that exists in embassies between various units. If I had access to the public opinion poll, in light of my recognition that the polling organization was pretty good, I would have been forced to take another look at what I thought was the situation.

Q: How did Ambassador Bohlen operate and how well did he use the Embassy? How effective was he in dealing with de Gaulle and the French government?

STABLER: I think when Gavin left and Bohlen came there was a general feeling that the Embassy was now in the charge of a real professional and would pull together in a much better way. I think that by this time -- I can't remember if Randy Kidder was still there, about to go or had gone -- we had a new Political Counselor, Norman Anschutz who had not had much experience in that particular area. Cecil Lyon was there as DCM with Bohlen for a while. When he left Bob McBride, who was very much a professional, came. The general feeling was that the Embassy would pull together and it operated in a much more coordinated way with some of these institutional imperfections that we don't seem to be able quite ever to deal with.

Bohlen turned to his staff. He knew who they were and used them. He also knew what he was doing. He had good relations with the French government and clearly had the respect of de Gaulle. So, while the circumstances basically didn't change, the ability of the United States to report, to influence to a certain extent, improved. Any foreign government is certainly inclined to deal with an embassy more effectively when it knows it is well lead. When the ambassador is not quite up to task then things begin to fall apart a bit and more is done in Washington, or what ever. One felt that when Bohlen came that things would concentrate more in the embassy. Bohlen was there during the missile crisis, when Kennedy was assassinated, etc. The fact was that he was there was an important factor in the stature of the Embassy vis-a-vis the French government.

We had very good relations with the Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville who was obviously an instrument of de Gaulle, there was no question about that. Eventually, I guess, he became Prime Minister at one point. Michel Debre was a tough character. He was enormously loyal to de Gaulle and carried out de Gaulle's wishes. I met him much later when he was no longer Prime Minister and found him delightful...very intelligent person and at that time no longer in office and able to take a slightly different view of things. I guess he was succeeded by Pompidou who was an enormously intelligent man and later became President of France. [I will go into that later on. I was assigned by the Department to accompany Nixon when he went to the Pompidou funeral in Paris -- he was President and died in office.]

There was not a great deal that the Embassy could do in trying to shift de Gaulle away from certain basic things. De Gaulle decided in order to demonstrate French independence and his position as the glory of France that he would leave NATO. That was a policy that he was going

to follow and there was not much that could be done by anybody to keep him from shutting the British out of the Common Market. At that particular time we were still very much in support of the idea of a United Europe and the Common Market was part of that so the extension of the Common Market to include the British would be very much part of our policy line at the time. But those were problems on which de Gaulle was adamant and there was nothing that anybody could do to talk him out of it.

Although there were difficulties created for us by de Gaulle's rule in France, still France became a much more formidable ally and a better country as a result of what he did. After all, France was at the very bottom as a result of the war and their whole behavior and performance of that. De Gaulle brought France back up to a position of certain strength and prominence in world affairs, which I would think would be a much more valuable asset than a France that was totally divided under the Fourth Republic. That France could never make up its mind about anything, and the musical chairs that they played, which in that instance was a great deal more important than, for example, the political games that are played in Italy and haven't made a great deal of difference. In France they were simply wishy-washy and couldn't make a decision about anything.

Q: Within our Embassy, economic and political reporters, maybe even CIA and military, did you find a division? De Gaulle raised a lot of hackles in the United States and people can't help but every once and a while not look at the great good even though they are professional Foreign Service officers, but to personalize these things. Was this a problem of having Gaullists and anti-Gaullists within our Embassy?

STABLER: There was a great deal of frustration and annoyance with de Gaulle over some of the things that he did. No question that the military found it quite exasperating when it came to their efforts to have the same type of relationship with the French military that they had with the British military, for example. It became increasingly difficult as de Gaulle's policy changed. You couldn't find a great many prominent military people who thought that de Gaulle was their idol by any means. And, I think that also on the political-economic side there were certain divisions within the Embassy as to whether this was a good or bad thing. I think those of us in the purely internal side of the Political Section...as far as I was concerned, it was my feeling that what de Gaulle was doing in terms of building up the Fifth Republic was a good thing. Even though de Gaulle caused some problems, still his creation of a system which showed some stability and which was rationalized so that you weren't having these perfectly horrible political games with all these parties and inability to keep a government together, etc. was a very positive development.

His system came closer to our system. The difficulty was that in the French system there was the Gaullist party and then all the other parties. The lack of stability came from the fact that you had no alternating majorities -- which may be the trouble in Spain today, the fact that the Socialists are in power but there really isn't a viable alternative. In the case of France, you had the Gaullists, which didn't have any meaningful opposition - that came later, of course, when the Gaullists unhappily fell apart. Now you have the Socialists in France that are relatively well knit, but you did not have a viable alternative at that moment.

So, for the internal political side of France, I think the Embassy as a whole believed that this was

a good development. Those dealing with external affairs would, of course, find considerable frustrations in terms of French position on foreign policy matters which very often didn't coincide with others. We have talked about the military side.

On the economic side, there were problems in French relations towards their colonies in Africa. We had problems with the French concerning economic bilateral relationships. They were perhaps not as serious as the military side. So what went on in the Embassy was a reflection of what was happening in France itself in the different positions that they took on different questions. There were many of us there who had to admire de Gaulle's ability to run an extremely difficult country.

I, of course, had nothing to do with de Gaulle, but just an amusing episode. When the Kennedys came to Paris in 1963 for the State Visit - I had known the President before and had known, perhaps slightly better, Mrs. Kennedy - but this doesn't matter, I think all the diplomatic officers were asked to the huge big white tie reception at the Elysée Palace following the State dinner. My wife and I went through the line and the Kennedys were very nice and greeted us warmly, particularly Mrs. Kennedy. Then we went into the large reception hall. The waters of the Red Sea parted as the two Presidents walked along, stopping every so often to speak to someone. I was standing at the corner where the line had opened up. As they walked down the corridor, Kennedy stopped to talk to somebody and de Gaulle who was a little ahead of him happened to stop where I was standing...we were shoulder to shoulder. So, I said a little something to him. I may have even said something to the effect that it was a little hot in there, which it was. He said he thought it was too and something to the effect that "tout le monde est ici" - everybody in the world is here. That was the extent of our exchange.

Out in the corridor just by the front door as we were leaving you have no idea the number of diplomatic colleagues, foreigners and Americans, who rushed up to me and asked what de Gaulle had said to me. I said, "Well, he said it was quite hot." They obviously thought I was getting the latest and last word on the Common Market or NATO or something. I was sorry to have to disappoint them.

Q: Dealing with internal affairs, what were our standing orders as far as dealing with the Communists?

STABLER: We had, of course, an officer in the political section who handled communist matters which was not only involved French relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries but also reported on what was happening in the French Communist Party. We had somebody with both Soviet Union and Eastern European background. At that time the standing order was no contacts with the diplomats of the Soviet Union. Maurice Thorez was then secretary general of the French Communist Party. As I recall, at that particular time, there was no contact with the Communist Party. I must say that my mandate as head of the internal political situation covered everything but the Communist Party. That was always dealt with by a different officer. So what was reported was what observers said, what Thorez said, and what could be learned from whatever source about the French Communist party.

Q: What was our feeling about the whole communist threat of France? Did we see it as a viable,

political threat?

STABLER: No. I think that the days of the communist threat had been years before. By the time the Fifth Republic had come into being and de Gaulle was firmly in power the Communist Party was not a major threat. Of course, the Communist-controlled labor confederation- the CGT- was big and had great influence in the various trade unions. But the whole thrust of the Fifth Republic had been to diminish the position strength of traditional parties and the communist control of the labor movement. The Communist Party was not, at the time I was there, a serious threat. There were strikes, but I don't recall anytime during the five years I was in Paris when one was concerned about the potential of the Communist Party to do any serious damage. The elections results gave them small numbers. They were stronger, of course, than the Socialists at that time. They still were watched with considerable attention because they were clearly a Stalinist party, supported by the Soviet Union and therefore represented potentially a threat. But not a serious threat during that time.

Q:I can remember we had youth officers who were to make contact with the youth of the country because they were considered to be the people who were to come up. And we did this in 1967. How did this kind of approach affect your work?

STABLER: Let me just say one more thing about the Communists. One always has to remember that the entire Communist Party position to take over Western Europe, had been also considerably compromised by the uprising in Budapest. So that still had a considerable effect on the activities and strength of the Communist Party.

There was disillusionment on the part of many who had been in the Communist Party by the Hungarian events. Perhaps a little bit less than in Italy because the French Communist Party was much more Stalinist, much more rigid than the Italians who after Budapest were more disillusioned by Communism.

I don't really recall that in France, at the time I was there, that the Bobby Kennedy syndrome had really much effect on what went on in France. I don't recall, for example, that any youth officers were specifically designated. I had an assistant, Francis de Tarr, a Foreign Service Officer who had studied France in the previous Republics and who had as an undergraduate written a book on the Radical Socialists. He was somewhat younger and kept in touch with some of the younger political people. He was very much affected by his own intimate knowledge of the Radical Socialist leaders of the Fourth Republic. I think he had some trouble in equating with de Gaulle because he had an in depth knowledge of one of the major elements of the Fourth Republic.

I don't recall that he was designated to deal with youth, so-called. We had a very active Leader Grant program. One's efforts always were, of course, to try to identify potential younger leaders we thought would have a future and bring them into the Leader Grant program. The thrust of it all was not to preach to the converted but to find people who had serious misconceptions about the United States. We believed - and this was a principal objective of the Leader Grant Program - that by inviting such people to the US, by letting them travel around and see the country and meet a whole range of Americans, the Grantees might come back with a better appreciation of our country. We aimed at people in their middle 20's and 30's who perhaps would play a leader

role in the future in France. I think that on the whole we had considerable success with the Leader Grant Program. I know that several of those Grantees became Ministers in a Government under de Gaulle and that their attitude towards us was much more friendly than if they had never been to the US.

Q: One more thing before we leave France, I never served in France and like other places except even more so in Europe, the intelligentsia, which we don't have in the United States, at least one that plays a role...within Europe everybody knows what/who it is. Could you talk a little about our dealings with it and how they looked upon the United States and how we evaluated this?

STABLER: There was a division within the intelligentsia -- those who supported de Gaulle and those who thought he was an aberration. You would see this reflected in Le Monde, which is an interesting and thoughtful newspaper. The writers had mixed feelings on the subject of how France should be governed. Also mixed feelings in terms of relations with the United States. There was no difference between them and other elements of society with equal levels of education. When I traveled in France I never experienced any degree of hostility about the United States. I think the average citizen looked upon the United States as a friendly country.

The intelligentsia regarded de Gaulle as somewhat of an upstart and not quite in their sort of mold. Bohlen, I think had a certain contact with a lot of these people. But, again, I am not sure to what extent they really influenced the course of events. They wrote an enormous amount of literature, of course, about every subject known to man, but I don't think de Gaulle was to be dissuaded from what he thought was the right course of action by the preaching of some of the intelligentsia who didn't agree with his views at all and others who did. They didn't play a very significant role in terms of what de Gaulle was trying to do. He set his course and on he went.

But I think those five years were very interesting years because of the position that I occupied most of the time that I was there -- head of the internal political unit. Towards the end I was acting political counselor for a short period of time. I left in July, 1965. I didn't sit in the councils of the Ambassador, in terms of being head of a section. Apparently they were satisfied with what I was doing, but it was largely a reporting responsibility and not one of collaborating with the Ambassador and setting or recommending policy. I worked hardly at all with Gavin. I worked more with Bohlen because, again, one was dealing with a professional. And Bohlen was personally responsible for my promotion from FSO-3 to FSO-2. He went to bat for me and I received it.

Q: A very important promotion under the old system. The equivalent of going from a colonel to a brigadier general.

STABLER: Bohlen apparently was amazed when he learned I was not a FSO-2 (I didn't know this until later) and personally went to bat for me. So I think I got FSO-2 just shortly before I left Paris -- then FSO-1 followed fairly quickly there after.

DONALD R. NORLAND

**Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris (1961-1963)**

Ambassador Donald R. Norland was born in Laurens, Iowa in 1924. He joined the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Morocco, the Ivory Coast, France (NATO), the Netherlands, and Guinea, and ambassadorships to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Chad. Ambassador Norland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: *I was just going to ask. From '61 to '63, you were in...*

NORLAND: From '61-'63, I was in the U.S. NATO delegation in Paris.

Q: *What were you doing?*

NORLAND: I was in the Political Division.

Q: *By this time, you were what rank?*

NORLAND: Well, let me see. I had gotten that promotion. I was a Five. Maybe I was a Four by then.

Q: *Captain, major level.*

NORLAND: Yes, that's right. In NATO, there was an Economic, a Military and a Political Division. And in NATO there was an institution called the Political Advisors' Committee, POLADS. Do you remember that?

Q: *Yes.*

NORLAND: Well, a lot of people have been assigned to it.

Q: *No, but explain what it is.*

NORLAND: It was the weekly meeting of representatives, the so-called political advisors of the permanent representatives of the then-fourteen NATO countries. Their mandate was to talk about non-NATO areas, to coordinate policies and share information. The so-called PermReps, permanent representatives, the ambassadors, talked about the major NATO problems; force structures and armaments, as well as the major political issues and what we were doing to counter the Soviets. But POLADS existed to talk about non-NATO issues and areas. And one of those areas was Africa. But the level of discourse was generally uninformed and there was so little interest except for the French and British, the result was a desultory discussion. There was no particular agenda; we were just comparing notes.

And the most frustrating thing at NATO was that there was little room for individual initiative. I might sit there and say, "My God, we ought to be talking to our allies about a Cuban initiative, or

a Chinese visit." I couldn't raise it unless we had instructions from Washington. Everything said in POLADS was of interest only if it was on instruction.

Now you could have some interesting discussions behind the scenes with people, but there was not that much interest in Africa or the Third World generally. Much more interesting, was Eastern Europe or the Middle East. The agenda depended on the person who represented the country in the POLADS. But it was generally boring, almost mechanical. I can remember the language of the weekly telegram: "Request instructions on the following agenda items for the POLADS meeting on Tuesday." And you'd get back a telegram saying, "Here is what you answer; here is what you're authorized to say." And you didn't go beyond that.

Q: A major issue during the time you were there was the Congo.

NORLAND: Well, no, the Congo was a little bit before. I was still in Ivory Coast in the fall of '60, when the Congo really broke. In '61, there was still some effect, it's true, but the most important issue in my time was the Cuban Missile Crisis. And I did hear Dean Rusk when he came over. I guess we were all allowed to sit in, but it wasn't usual that you could sit in and hear the high officials.

And, as you know, the other thing is that the staff was filled with people who were not Foreign Service; they were Washington bureaucrats, who had agreed, very reluctantly in most cases, to have one assignment overseas, in response to the requirements of Wristonization. They were there reluctantly, and they didn't have a sense of unit organization or cohesion. Many of them were not even communicative. (I'll give you names if you'd like; some of them are still living.) And they wanted to treat this like INR or like the PM Bureau.

Intellectually, it was really not very challenging. I had had considerable experience dealing directly with chiefs of state -- with chiefs of small states to be sure. But when the French officials came to Abidjan, they were often of ministerial rank, and I'd dealt with them. In Paris, maybe I'd get a deputy office director as an interlocutor; so it wasn't very exciting.

But we did have a good experience in France. We lived near Versailles. We couldn't afford anything in town; the prices were astronomical, by our standards. I mean, a \$600 a month allowance didn't go far and ours would have been close to \$300. As a sidelight illustrating the charm of the Foreign Service we looked for housing a little farther from Paris. One day, I stopped at a housing office in the NATO headquarters, and someone had just put in an invitation to people to live in a country house on the edge of Versailles, in a town called Chesnay...a house we would share. We looked into it and it turned out to be a small chateau that had been built by a brother of Louis XVI. It was an historical monument, but the family happened to be in financial straits. It had been the country house of a fairly well-known French painter named Jean-Louis Forain. And the family was willing to divide the chateau in two; we would live in one-half; they the other. This meant improvising a kitchen and a bathroom upstairs. But downstairs was a salon where they had any number of Forain paintings, some of them sitting on easels. So we lived in an artist's former studio. And there was a glorious park behind it. One kilometer down the road was the Porte Saint-Antoine, which leads into the gardens of Versailles, where I sometimes did my jogging. I had the most wonderful sense of getting closely acquainted with Versailles. A couple

of other colleagues lived in Versailles, because they couldn't pay these Paris prices. Among them Al Reifman and Abe Katz, economic advisors at OECD; another officer assigned to NATO secretary general Luns, was Pete Van Campen. We would car pool which was always interesting. It was always hard to get to Paris if you didn't car pool, because there was no good public transportation. There was something called the PV, Paris-Versailles, a taxi; you paid a couple of hundred francs, in those days. To have easy access to Paris was very nice.

And so I enjoyed my tour but not because of anything that happened in NATO. NATO was pretty prosaic.

Q: Did you get any feel for how de Gaulle was viewed, sort of in the corridors of NATO at that time?

NORLAND: He was making himself highly unpopular. I may have mentioned this before, but it's a theme in my career: I had gone to school in France, and I was at home in the French language and culture. I did not agree with de Gaulle's extreme nationalism that led him to say in 1966, shortly after I left, "You will remove all American military installations and NATO headquarters from France," including the headquarters in which I was working.

That sentiment was building while I was there. He refused cooperation in the military aspects of NATO, although the French permanent representative, the ambassador, was still there. He just didn't participate in certain aspects of the military deliberations. It was quite extraordinary.

And then there was de Gaulle's military philosophy... Do you remember the two phrases that described that philosophy? One was: "Défense à tous azimuts." It meant defending all 360 degrees of the compass. In the modern world, you had a hard time keeping a straight face. The other was: maintain the force de frappe, his own nuclear force. I could not really see that that was very sensible. There were a lot of differences in the French delegation on this. Socialists, for example, did not agree.

And then we did have a major spy scandal. I knew one of the people accused of having spied for the USSR during this period. He did it, in part, because of the force de frappe and the potential for serious confrontations that could result. That's written up in a recent book.

Q: From what you were getting, how did we view the Soviet threat during this period?

NORLAND: Well, this was the time of the Berlin Wall. No one questioned the need to fully mobilize. I was also representative on the Committee for Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) of NATO. We were trying to combat the Soviets on a psychological plane. I don't think there was any question that they were using every possible means to weaken us. This was the high point of their efforts to penetrate by spying. Their military was really nervous. I had the feeling that they were probing, although not irresponsibly. It turns out they were probably conservative. But we were fairly alarmist. It was a way of life. We focused our intellectual and other resources on how to confront this great danger.

Now the French government, at the same time, was very shaky. There were rumors about French

generals in Algeria conducting a coup in Paris.

Q: Yes, with paratroopers. Were you there at the time?

NORLAND: I was there.

Q: How was NATO responding? There were a couple of nights where they expected paratroopers over the thing.

NORLAND: That's right.

Q: From your vantage point, how did you see that?

NORLAND: It was alarming, there's no question about it. We listened to the news, we read the papers. I can remember huge headlines saying the paras were coming. There was an assassination attempt against de Gaulle; he narrowly escaped death at a crossroads south of Paris. One understood what was meant by instability and insecurity.

This family we lived with, by the way, was almost our same age; they had the same number of children, and our children got to know one another. We ended up communicating on many different levels. I think one of the reasons they wanted an American family was because of a sense of insecurity. One host talked about being certain that his children got an American education so they would be able to live abroad during an expected upheaval in France. And he was a strong Gaullist. He had fought with the French resistance and made a remarkable record, I'm sure. But there was a fundamental insecurity. The French were talking about not being able to remain in France. We felt also that the NATO forces, which were right next door to us in Rocquencourt, within a kilometer of the headquarters...It was a formidable military machine, and I can't say that I ever worried personally. I felt that we could always move about without concern about roadblocks or whatever.

We drove to Switzerland for vacations at almost every opportunity, especially at Christmas. I happen to have a Swiss sister-in-law, and her parents had a pension in the province of Vaud, a little village called La Praz. It was a pension, with family cooking -- and a great relief to be able to spend time there. You know the atmosphere of Switzerland. Calm. In spite of any alarms that might be sounded outside, you had a good feeling.

Q: One last question about your time with NATO. What was your impression of the American military there?

NORLAND: Well, I saw General Norstad from time to time.

Q: He was the SHAPE...

NORLAND: I believe he was head of SHAPE at the time. We interacted a little bit with the military, and were in a position to see what they were doing. I never really got deeply involved. I'd had my own military experience, so I was sensitive to what they were trying to do. We were

providing the necessary leadership. I felt that the U.S. was doing a good job. One of my most frequent contacts with the military was the PX. It was called Bel Manoir; again, within walking distance of where we were living. And you could see the way they could mobilize warehouses full of goods. That was symbolic of the abundance that we brought to the effort. The U.S. didn't skimp in efforts to make it a going operation. So it was quite a shock to be told, in 1966, that we would have to pick up and leave.

The point I meant to make earlier, which I think is worth reiterating, is that there has been created over the years, partly as a result of our exclusion by resident French officials and civilians in the colonies, by the way the French treated us in NATO (the attitudes toward non-French-speakers, for example), a significant anti-French feeling in the American bureaucracy. We've never really been able to fully understand and to sympathize with or appreciate French policies and motivations. And I feel this has been overdone. I understand, as I have said, that their military policy was often ridiculous. But I do feel that we have a great deal to learn from the French, especially in the Third World. Not in the way that they conduct their bilateral relations, but in their willingness to get to the root of an issue. They studied the culture. They became anthropologists. They became adept linguists. They really did get to know those areas. And in our areas of concern, we've not wanted to consult or to benefit from their knowledge. This is one of the things that I find regrettable: we don't get the most out of them and their experience. We rather look at them as rivals. And that's not the proper approach, it seems to me.

Q: *Well, you left NATO in 1963.*

NORLAND: Right.

ROBERT L. FUNSETH
Consular Officer
Bordeaux (1961-1964)

Robert Funseth was born in Minnesota and raised in New York State. He was educated at Hobart College, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Cornell University. After service in the US Navy, he joined the Foreign Service and was sent initially to Iran, being posted in Teheran and Tabriz. He subsequently served as Political Officer in Lebanon at the time of the US Marine Corps landings in Beirut after which he served in the Department dealing with United Nations Affairs. He also served as Consular Officer in Bordeaux. Mr. Funseth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

FUNSETH: Never. Never. Then there was a personnel system just about that point in time I was in UNP and my recollection is that Personnel came up with a new requirement that in order to get promoted to almost anything you had to have experience in all cones [skill area, such as political, consular etc.]. I'd been a political officer, I'd had information experience, but I hadn't had consular experience. So I was told in Personnel that before I could go back into a political job, I'd have to be a consular officer. So I wound up being assigned to Bordeaux for that reason.

Q: You were there from '61 to '64.

FUNSETH: I originally went out on a two-year tour to be a vice consul in Bordeaux and then be transferred to Paris as a political Officer. While I was in Bordeaux, they changed the tour. I think a few weeks before I went on home leave, in order to save money, the Department ruled that I wasn't eligible for home leave until after the third year. So I stayed another year in Bordeaux, lost out on a transfer to Paris, and then subsequently was stationed in the department.

Q: What were you doing in Bordeaux?

FUNSETH: Well, in Bordeaux, originally when I arrived there, it was a four-person post: principal officer, deputy principal officer, a vice consul in charge of sort of the citizenship side, and a vice consul in charge of the visa side. I was that number three. The number two position got abolished in some sort of an economy way and again, as always happens, the function to be abolished--the deputy job was the reporting officer. Well, the principal officer said to me, "You're going to do the reporting and do what you've been doing." So I did and, as it turned out in that period, each of the principal officers left the Service after one year. So I was in charge of the post for extended periods. I had three principal officers in three years. It was '61, '62, '63, '64.

So I basically, became the deputy soon after arriving, and had so many changes in the principal officer slot, was acting for a long time. So I really was in charge of the consulate. Interesting post. One of several that lays claim to being the oldest post in the Foreign Service. Dates back to the Continental Congress. Indeed, the first consul was wealthy, came from a prosperous [family], was a ship agent from Georgetown and had enough money to build a very handsome building called the Fenwick House, which was the offices of the French line. Pretty much since then we've had a post. It was closed during World War II.

Kennedy was President; one of the most popular American Presidents since Thomas Jefferson in France. He and Mrs. Kennedy made a big impression on the French people. DeGaulle had come back to power. The mayor of Bordeaux was a speaker of the French parliament--a distinguished French political leader by the name of Jacques Chaban- Delmas, who'd been in the French Underground, had been mayor of Paris during the occupation. The story of "Is Paris Burning?" is tied in with this guy, a real hero.

Our consular district was south of the Loire river, the whole southwest of France including the Basque country to Toulouse, that whole area. We had some American military installations in the area. Bordeaux was an important port. When I arrived, General Gavin was the Ambassador. He was succeeded was Charles Bowen. Cecil Lyon was the Minister under both while I was there.

It was personally interesting for me. I visited La Rochelle, where my ancestors came from, on my mother's side, who had emigrated to Quebec in the 17th Century. At least my grandmother's family were Huguenots. I read recently that in order for a Huguenot to get an exit permit, they had to convert to Catholicism. In my mother's family, they were Catholics, but probably both of them were Huguenot families who were leaving the area, and they emigrated to French Canada

in 1628, I think.

I learned a couple of things. I am again reminded of the role a Foreign Service local plays. It was something I commented on in my retirement.

Q: They're called Foreign Service nationals employees now.

FUNSETH: Right. In Tabriz, for example, there was a man there named Mohammed Ali Asouf, who was hired when the post was opened during World War I, and every time we closed it he'd take the seals home and the consular files. Then, when we reopened, he'd come back. I never felt that we were really fair to them as employers. Then in Bordeaux, we had this man; his name was Robert Artisian. He has since died. He had worked for us for many, many years; was our senior commercial employee. I remember the department of Commerce thought he was the best one in the world; he generated more export opportunities. But, again, during the occupation he had taken the seals home and classified papers under great personal risk, buried them under his house, and then when we reopened. He said that after the War, he hadn't heard anything. He finally got a letter and he thought it might be a thank you. It was a letter to inform him that the years when the consulate was closed would be subtracted from his years of service for purposes of retirement. I helped, among others, to get him an honor award to recognize his great service during that period.

Another thing I remember, we had a lot of locals [foreign service nationals] who were on sort of temporary [hire]. I converted all of them to permanent employees. Another thing I first learned that I didn't really grasp the full meaning of until recent years. The first inkling I had--I'm talking about the French occupation then. I was walking with Artisian near the square in front of the opera house and, not using the acronym, but the full words, Artisian points to this prominent Bordelais and says, "That son-of-a-bitch was in the SS during the occupation!" I remember talking to him about it and got the impression that an amount of collaboration and going along was quite prevalent in Bordeaux and there weren't that many people in the Underground. There were people in the Underground. Another time I was with Artisian and he pointed out a little old French lady carrying her baguette of bread going home and he said, "You see that woman? I always had at least one and sometimes three downed American pilots in the basement of her house. She was part of the Underground spiriting American pilots out through Spain." That was the first sort of eye-opener I had. The extent of cooperation with the Nazis was more than I realized.

Q: It's still an issue in France. It's almost one they don't...

FUNSETH: Sure, they're now addressing it! It was a factor. I remember the deputy of Bordeaux was the sort of super [Gestapo ?] in several provinces. He had a deputy who was a very senior officer, and a talented, attractive guy. If you've ever met any of the French civil servants in the prefectural service of the ministry of Interior. They're absolutely top flight and comparable to the Foreign Service. Competitive, it's considered a real plum. But this guy had been associated with the Vichy regime. So he was capped. He wasn't going to go any higher than he had.

There were a couple of things, a lot of things in Bordeaux, but of course there are a lot of things

you really remember. I remember DeGaulle running for reelection, meeting Chaban-Delmas. I remember when I was acting principal officer, DeGaulle made this gesture to Germany. It was the first big effort for sort of a Franco/German Entente. He invited Adenauer on a state visit to France, the first German Chancellor. There were mixed feelings in France. He wanted him to go outside of Paris. There was no place that was eager to have this German Chancellor, although it was nothing against Adenauer. But again, it was '61, '62, '63. Chaban offered Bordeaux. It was quite interesting, the lead up to Adenauer's arrival. There was a big debate in Bordeaux. I remember going up to, there was sort of an International Club coming out of the EEC, I suspect. I remember this big debate about welcoming Adenauer to Bordeaux. I'll always remember this young French professor stood up and said, "I can't join in any welcome as a Frenchman to a German chancellor coming to Bordeaux. But I can welcome him as a European welcoming another European."

I remember Artisian telling me he was coming to work and the bus driver--you can just see this bus coming down this narrow street and the German flags on all the flagposts because this was the road out of town to Modesque's residence where Adenauer was going--is shouting to everybody and nobody: "Every time I see one of these flags, I want to drive my bus into the lampposts and knock the goddamn thing down!" And Adenauer arrived. As acting principal officer, I had the honor of meeting him. I was presented to Adenauer and I realized it was a historic occasion, this arrival of an unknown.

Another thing that I'll always remember about Bordeaux. Well, a couple of things. I arrived there in September, and November 11 is a big day. (France doesn't celebrate World War II. They celebrate World War I.) There's a suburb right outside of Bordeaux called Tolerance and I was told by the principal officer that Tolerance always laid a wreath and flowers on the remaining graves of the Americans from World War One, and the American Consulate was represented, since 1918, in this ceremony every year. I was a new arrival, so I would have the honor of representing the United States of America. The reason I had the honor was it usually was a cold and rainy day. I remember going to Tolerance - a little city hall - and we marched through the streets. Cold, drenching rain. We laid a wreath on the American grave, then on the French, and then went back to the city hall, the auditorium. There was a French liqueur, Perneau, or something like that. One of the highlights of the day was it was all you could drink and all the veterans, and I gave my first speech in French. I remember it was a good speech. Talked about how we're still bound together, the fight for freedom, and all that. The mayor of Tolerance was the town doctor. He got up and gave a speech in response to what I said and said he didn't disagree with what I said, but, "We must also remember the sacrifices." He remembered, I think it was his father. But the railroad station was on the other side of the river in Bordeaux. They hadn't built a bridge across it. He said, "I remember seeing my uncle going off to Verdun and he never came back." I think he was the one who said there was a village between Bordeaux and Toulouse. There's a monument. "Every man over 18 was killed at Verdun." It was interesting. First, he was right; remember the sacrifice. But it was also illuminating. Here was this man who had not fought in World War One, but probably in World War Two, and they were defeated in World War Two, but they hadn't forgotten Verdun.

But it also demonstrated to me within a month or two after I arrived there, that there was great affection and admiration in that area towards the United States. On the Fourth of July,

spontaneously, not organized, I remember going down--I'd heard about it but no one had really said anything--driving down to hoist a large American flag in front of the consulate on the fourth of July. American flags all over Bordeaux! Ordinary people had faded flags; banks had flags! We were the only foreign flag flown over the city hall at Bordeaux on our National Day! Huge American flag flying over the city. It was affection and admiration and real genuine feelings towards the United States.

Q: How were the American soldiers doing there? This was close to the time when basically DeGaulle . . .

FUNSETH: Very well. Yes, but that was not a popular decision in France.

I suppose one of the things I'll remember forever was when I was in Bordeaux, Kennedy was assassinated. You'd probably never forget it no matter where you were, but here I was in Bordeaux, the American consulate. I remember someone called and I turned on the radio and got the news and went down to the consulate. Thought I oughta be there. You know, the good old Foreign Service regulations tell you what to do when the President dies! Anyway, we were in a lovely old building. There are a lot of these in Bordeaux. Built in the 17th and 18th centuries by people associated with shipping - handsome residences - in which the business would sort of be on the first floor and the negotiation or whatever would be upstairs. Well, this building that we were in, the Barkley's Bank building, occupied the ground floor. We were on the *première étage*, which had been the living quarters, then on the second floor the bank manager had his apartment. The office I had was registered as 17th Century--a beautiful room! Anyway, I went down there, and as I'm going up the landing, I meet the manager of the bank. Tears in his eyes! Throws his arms around me. Then I remember on Thursday or Friday, it seems to me, I read in the regulations: the black crepe you're supposed to fly on the front. I sent an employee down. All of our employees were in various degrees of emotion. But I remember, I think it was Christianne Lumatay, I sent to the department store to find some black crepe. She came back and told me that when the salesgirl recognized she was from the Consulate, she opened her eyes and said, "*Pour le Président?*" Christianne said, "Yes." And the girl, tears flowing down her cheeks as she measured out the crepe, in memory of Kennedy. We had a line of people that never ended signing the book--all walks of life. We decided to have a memorial mass at the time of the mass that was taking place here in Washington. The consul general decided he wanted it in the cathedral. So I went over and saw the Archbishop. There's another church in Bordeaux that's a very special church. He thought it ought to be there, and he was afraid the cathedral which seated thousands of people--I think it was to be at five o'clock--that people wouldn't be able to come. Because of work and going home; it was an awkward time. We wanted it at the exact time it was taking place here. So he was afraid it wouldn't be full and this would be mistakenly seen as somehow lack of respect or affection which wasn't the case. Anyway, we decided to have it at the cathedral which, incidentally, is the site where Eleanor of Aquitaine was married, across from Jacques Chaban-Delmas' *Hôtel de Ville*. If you've ever been in France, the veterans' organizations, I remember they called up and said they wanted to be there and wanted to form a guard of honor and would we review them? So, we drove over, my wife and the consulate general and the other consuls and their wives and we went to the city hall first and there were some of the guys I'd seen in Tolerance all lined up; most of them from World War One. Then we walked over to the Cathedral. It's 300 years old and it's sort of settled several feet below. I don't know where they found the flag because we provided one. All of our flags were borrowed and

indeed I provided the flag that had flown in front of our consulate to put over the coffin that they had, as they do in Europe, for the person to be remembered. They had this huge American flag in the entrance and as we walked into it, you could hear this music being played on this organ--like a hymn. At first, I didn't recognize it. I mean it was familiar, but it was the Star Spangled Banner played by the organist like a hymn. The Cathedral was packed. They had this huge flag for a king, to cover the coffin and a 10 foot candelabra and seated next to it. You just felt that Kennedy's body was there. And then that night there was a rural parish outside of town and they were going to have a memorial service at 8:00 in the evening. The priest called and asked if someone from the Consulate would go. I went out. It was as magnificent as the one in the cathedral. Yet here it was just a rural parish with farmers coming in, and it was packed for Kennedy.

Q: It's really very difficult in these days to duplicate this. Kennedy was under the new generation. A new hope for everybody. I mean, as realists in the Foreign Service, I've always been sort of amazed. I was in Belgrade at the time and we had a memorial service at the Catholic cathedral, which was small. It was packed with communist officials. The first time many of them had ever been in church except when they were baptized. Did troops cause a problem for you, or not? I mean, American troops.

FUNSETH: We had no incidents. We took care of their citizenship needs. We had no problems with American military. They were still there when I left. It was the supply line. One of the largest ammunition dumps in Europe was south of Bordeaux. They all come through the port of Bordeaux. It was a logistic lifeline. Then in La Rochelle there was a port.

The other thing I hadn't--I just thought of it--reminding me, I was a Naval officer in World War II. But in both Bordeaux and in La Rochelle were [these bunkers]. I tell you, they really looked ominous when you see them. These huge concrete things. You can't destroy them. They're built so powerfully. I don't know what they do with them in Bordeaux. In La Rochelle they use them as an underground boat marina. But I mean there's just something stealth-like about them.

Q: What about the communist party? Is it very strong in Bordeaux?

FUNSETH: It was strong in Bordeaux. That's a good question, Stu, because I remember this big election I covered. I was the only foreign consul that certainly did it. But, also having been a newspaper reporter, I suppose, I went to all the rallies. They had big rallies and DeGaulle's Party, and the radical socialists, and the socialist's home. And I went to the communist's. It was an open meeting. Very interesting. They were all held in the auditorium in the city hall. Public auditorium. And the communist, I think, was the last one. You know, you'd go in, and it was decorated with the party flags all over the place. And then, whoever they were supporting--DeGaulle or whomever else. But for the communists, they'd taken down the French Flag and the communist flag was flying over. A different group of people. It sort of reminded me of a volunteer fire department. They had the auxiliary. It was very much of a social thing. Husbands and wives and children and the junior auxiliary. "We have to raise money because we don't have the money that the bourgeoisie and the capitalists do", I mean the jargon was all different. But there wasn't much talked about *Vive La France*. It was mostly *vive* the people. There was a lot of talk of Marxist/Leninism. You know, that famous head of the French Communist party for

decades was still head of it.

I'll always remember at the end of the rally when they were talking about how we need money so our candidates can compete against the capitalists. There were four very attractive young French girls from the Communist Youth League who were collecting the money. They had a hammer and sickle flag and people were giving their money to the Communist party. The communists controlled the labor unions. CGT, the docks and the shipyards. The Marcel Darceau Aviation plant, where DeGaulle was building his nuclear strike force, the "force that flopped", was CGT dominated. They never were a significant voice. The Bordeaux area was pretty strong DeGaullist and radical Socialist.

I have to remark on the difference between General Gavin and Charles Bohlen as ambassador. There was a wine-tasting competition, *une tasse de vin*, or whatever, at this wine drinking fraternity. It was a trade promotion. At the time of the harvest, they dressed in robes. Like honorary degrees at a distinguished college, people try to bring in distinguished people. Huge luncheons or dinners at a chateaux, 400 people, fantastic wine. When Gavin came down--it was the first year I was there. They give you this glass of wine and you smell it and you're supposed to guess what it is, and unless you give the right answer you cannot become a commandant of the *vignerons*. But it's all part of a joke. I mean, the guy whispers in your ear what it is and you go through the motions and smell it, and then you say what year it is and what the chateaux is. I remember an unnamed person in Paris called me and said General Gavin's schedule was down to the minute. You know, the ambassador arrives one minute, everything minute by minute. Well, the head of the ceremonies was the owner of the Chateaux Gloria, which was then not marketed in the United States. I remember encouraging him to market it because it's across the street from Beshville. It's a darn good wine, but it doesn't sell for the same price. His name was Henri Martet. He also owned the Bordeaux football team. Anyway, I remember telling the Embassy, "You know, I haven't been here very long but . . . I mean, I have no idea. Tell him not to worry about it! When he gets here, we'll tell him. We probably won't decide until that day." Well, that wasn't good enough for General Gavin. I was so embarrassed. Finally, we bugged them and bugged them and Martet told us what wine it would be and what year, and we conveyed that and the visit was a great success.

Then Bohlen came. Totally relaxed, you know. The question never came up. I sort of told him to stay loose on it and then, I think it was the chateaux where he was staying. (I think Joan Kennedy was there at the same time). Anyway, he was great. We gave him a background of the chateaux. He was fluent in French. He stood up and went through the whole thing. Swirled the glass around, bouquet and the name of the chateau, and the whole works.

Q: I take it the whole time there, there weren't any major issues that the embassy was particularly concerned about in Bordeaux, that they were pressing you on?

FUNSETH: Well, you know, yes, it was the whole period of DeGaulle, this business of Adenauer coming down was a big event. But we were primarily a consulate promoting trade and commerce, protecting American citizens, and issuing visas. We did weekly political reports on developments in Southwest France, which covered quite an area. Basque separatism. I remember we reported on it when the French still didn't recognize they had a problem with the Basques!

And they did. We reported on that, the DeGaulle thing, Adenauer, there were elections in that period. Trade promotion. We were a very good post on trade promotion, protection. We had a lot of American citizens living in the area. I remember the University of California established a junior year abroad at the University of Bordeaux. Very impressive! They had a lot of resources. It was a very interesting

Q: Sounds like you had a good, solid . . .

FUNSETH: Three years. It was a real great, and I've always been very partial on these constituent posts. I remember there was an election there and, because we were closer to what was going on--I can't remember what the outcome was--read all the local papers. We subscribed to every newspaper in the province, primarily probably for trade opportunities, but also just doing your job so you understood what's going on. And absorbing all that. I remember I called the election much closer than the embassy did. We just knew more of what was going on. In Europe you have prominent political figures come back home. I mean Marcel Foureaux, the head of the Socialist Party, was Mayor of a nearby town. Each of these mayors were important political personalities in Paris and they came home a lot. We had more access to Chaban-Delmas than people in Paris did. I thought, in our area, and I'm sure the other consulates did, we certainly promoted trade. We had a good cultural and information program and represented the United States.

Q: We'll stop at this point now and next time we'll pick up when you left Bordeaux.

WILLIAM V.P. NEWLIN
Special Assistant to the Economic Minister
Paris (1961-1964)

Mr. Newlin was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He obtained degrees from Harvard University and the Fletcher School and, after serving a tour with the US Army, joined the Foreign Service in 1960. A generalist, Mr. Newlin's service took him to France, Guatemala and Belgium, where he dealt primarily with European Organizations and NATO. In Washington his assignments concerned Trade, Law of the Sea and other economic matters. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were in Paris from 1962 to when?

NEWLIN: To 1964.

Q: What was your job in Paris?

NEWLIN: They had a new system then. Junior officers when they went overseas rotated throughout the embassy. I went to Paris on the Queen Mary at government expense, first class with my three children. We had a lovely trip over. On the boat with us was another guy who had

been to Harvard Law as a graduate student. He was unmarried, but he and I were friendly. Here are these two Harvard graduate degree guys arriving in Paris. We are taken in hand by the personnel officer. We both want to know what we're going to do. He said, "Oh, you're not going to do anything. You're here to observe. You're going to be sent around throughout different offices in the mission and you'll observe what they do and learn – except when you're doing visa work. Then you'll be really working. But the rest of the time, you're just supposed to really observe." You can imagine how that struck us. We were at the beginning of our diplomatic careers ready to change the world and we're being told that we're being put on hold. But I had met a guy before I went out who was interested to learn that I was going to Paris. He wrote for "The New York Times." His name was Ed Dale. He wrote economic stuff. He said, "I've got a friend in Paris in the embassy. I'll write him and tell him to look out for you. His name is Jacques Reinstein. He is the economic minister-counselor there." I said to this personnel guy, "Okay, but I'd like to talk to Mr. Reinstein." He said, "You can't talk to Mr. Reinstein. Don't be ridiculous. You're you and he's the third guy in the embassy." Then we went to lunch. I called Reinstein's office. His secretary put me right through to him. He said, "Oh, I've been waiting for you to come. What are you doing for lunch?" I said, "Nothing." We had lunch together. He said, "I want you to work for me. I want you to work very closely in my office as my assistant. When can you start?" I said, "I don't see why I couldn't start now." He said, "That's fabulous." I said, "But I've got this thing with the personnel director." He said, "Don't worry about the personnel director. I'll take care of the personnel director." I guess I called him. I said, "I've just had lunch with Mr. Reinstein and he has told me to report for work at 2:00. He says that he'll arrange details." Pasqual could barely speak, he was so furious. But that's where I started. I started as Jacques Reinstein's flunky in the Economic Section. He needed a flunky. He was very disorganized. He was brilliant. I had great respect for him and was very fond of him, but he was very disorganized. It was very hard to work for him. It wasn't so hard for me to work for him because he took me as his alter ego. The guy who got off the boat with me and I were the most junior persons in the embassy. Therefore, I posed no threat whatsoever to him. I didn't mind when he spoke bluntly to me. I had no ego that I was protecting. So, we got along just fine. I, of course, sat in on all these meetings, which was a very interesting thing to me. I view perhaps that what Pasqual said was going to happen, happened. But in fact, it didn't quite. Reinstein really needed an assistant and I became that assistant. It was a great deal more than just looking over his shoulder. Then I would work closely with all the guys in the Economic Section, who came to see me as an ally working with Reinstein. They'd come to a meeting and Reinstein would say to do a paper one way. The guy would say, "Yes, we could do it that way, but if we did, we'd bump into this problem." He'd say, "Yes, you're right. Do it this way." He'd end up with three or four ways he had said. The guys would come back to me and say, "Alright, Newlin, what in the world does he want?" We'd go through our notes and try to figure it out. If we couldn't figure it out, the guys would say to me, "You're going to see if we can sort this out." I would go back in and say, "I'm thinking about that talk you had with Mike Ely. You guys were talking about a lot of things." From my talk with Ely, I'd know how he wanted to do it. I'd say, "Ely thinks this, this, and this. How would that be?" Reinstein would say, "Yes, except make this this." I could take that back to Ely and it would clarify things. It was an interesting position which clearly put me into the substantive loop, albeit in a peripheral way.

Q: Jacques Reinstein has made quite a name for himself in the Foreign Service. He was responsible for setting up the economic course, which was sort of the pearl of the State

Department educational system.

NEWLIN: Yes. He was a very, very bright guy. It was a wonderful experience. He was a lonely sort of a guy who needed to have people around him. He couldn't possibly eat alone. If he didn't have someone to eat with, I kind of had to keep myself free so that he could say, "Come on, Newlin, let's go to lunch."

Q: What were you gathering about the economic situation in France at this time and American interests there?

NEWLIN: The big issue then was the beginning of the Common Market. The French were beginning... We weren't quite sure how the Common Market was going to play out. There was the common agricultural policy. My recollection of it is that Washington did not wish to believe and did not wish to hear that we really were going to be faced with a common tariff and that we were going to be the outsiders in Europe. It was very clear to the embassy that that's exactly what was going to happen. Reinstein would report that that was what was going to happen. Washington would come back and not wish to hear it. Reinstein had good relations with the top economic guy in the foreign office and the top French guy in the economic office. I think he was very well informed. I think that Reinstein kind of made himself a little bit unpopular in Washington. He kept coming back with this bad news.

Q: Who was our ambassador?

NEWLIN: It was Gavin. Kennedy had just come in and he picked Gavin, who had liberated France. 81st Airborne.

Q: What was your impression of the French bureaucracy and how they dealt with the United States? This was high de Gaulle times. De Gaulle was staking out a separate course. Was this reflected at the professional level on the economic side?

NEWLIN: That's precisely what we were dealing with. They were staking out their separate course and they were not listening to us. They had no intention of listening to us. They were going to stake out their course. They were negotiating with Europe and they were negotiating with England. We had views on how they should do this negotiation and they didn't give a damn to hear our views. I think that that's quite what we were dealing with.

Q: One of the interesting things is when a junior officer comes to an embassy, you're the new boy on the block, your antenna are out there. You're picking up emanations that maybe the older hands don't pick up. What was your feeling with Reinstein and others that you were observing about dealing with France? Was France just a pain in the ass? Particularly de Gaulle... Was it a matter of admiration for France and we were going to work things out? How were we coming at it?

NEWLIN: It's all of the above. I don't want to say that France was a pain in the ass and I don't want to say that we had admiration for France and we thought we were going to work all this out. In Washington, there was still the feeling that France was going to do what we wanted them to

do, that basically we were so much more powerful than they that we were going to be able to call certain shots.

Q: George Ball was pretty much in control of things. He was a great Europeanist.

NEWLIN: Absolutely. Ball came over several times. I sat in on Reinstein's talks with Ball and had some time with Ball as a fly on the wall. Ball got it, but there were people in Washington who didn't get it.

Q: Did you have any dealings with the French bureaucracy?

NEWLIN: Not very much. I didn't have to arrange Reinstein's representational stuff. Most of the time, it was done in restaurants. I didn't do that kind of thing.

Q: Did you have any feel for the bureaucracy? I'm told that the crème de la crème of the French system is people dealing with economic matters.

NEWLIN: Yes. They had very bright people. They had very bright people who were doing the "chef de cabinet" (office director) job.

Q: That is the aide but more than the aide. It's a professional person who holds the Department together.

NEWLIN: Absolutely. Reinstein liked to think that I was his chef de cabinet. But in fact, the people that I was dealing with, who were the real chefs de cabinet of the people that he wanted me to be dealing with, knew the issues much better than I did. It was hard for me, particularly at the beginning, to see these guys one on one and really have a very intelligent conversation with them about what they were working on. They knew it so well and it was all so new to me. It was new to me when I left, too.

Q: It takes years to build up an expertise in something like that.

Sometimes a junior officer brought in to be the staff assistant to the head of a large section... How did you find dealing with Mike Ely and the other people in the Economic Section? Did you find you had a problem?

NEWLIN: No. They were very nice people. We were very lucky with the people who were there. Tom Smith was there, a lovely man. I posed no threat to any of them. I was in a position to be helpful to them and wanted to be helpful to them, wanted it to work. They wanted it to work and I wanted it to work and Reinstein wanted it to work. Having me there helped make it work. I didn't feel that we had anything but a good relationship.

Q: How long did you keep the job?

NEWLIN: I guess about a year and a half. Finally, they kind of found me and decided they had to do something else with me. They sent me to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). I

worked with John Auchincloss. There, Thomas Finletter was our ambassador.

Q: He at one point was Secretary of the Air Force.

NEWLIN: Yes. The issue there was the multilateral force, an absolutely cockamamie idea. I always thought it was a cockamamie idea. I thought that when I was there. I think it now. That was what we were trying to get everyone to agree with.

Q: Within the NATO and American embassy community, what were you picking up about the view of de Gaulle?

NEWLIN: De Gaulle was very aloof and very stubborn. De Gaulle was going to do it his way. It was just shortly after that that they moved the NATO headquarters. We were still in Paris when I was there. De Gaulle essentially threw NATO out.

Q: Was there a lot of gnashing of teeth?

NEWLIN: Yes. That's my recollection.

Q: Were you there during the assassination of Kennedy?

NEWLIN: Yes.

Q: How did that play out?

NEWLIN: Oh, it was a terrible time. It was the time you could say the French were the closest to us. There was a great deal of sympathy in France for the American loss of Kennedy. They had admired Kennedy. Of course, they admired Mrs. Kennedy. At every level – I can't speak for the de Gaulle level – there was an outpouring of sympathy and understanding in France. In fact, to an extent after this Trade Tower bombing [September 11, 2001], our French friends, many of them, made a big effort to call us, send us notes, send us sympathetic things that had been written about it.

Q: How did you and your wife find Paris?

NEWLIN: We loved it in Paris. We lived right in Paris. We lived in the 16th. We would have rather lived on the Left Bank somewhere, but we had these three kids. We had to have a biggish apartment. The easiest place to find biggish apartments is in the very bourgeois 16th. We early on found quite a good jeune fille au pair who stayed with us the whole time and in fact came back to Washington with us, which had several implications. Of course, she didn't speak any English, so it meant that the kids all learned French very quickly. French became the first language of all three of them. Our oldest son learned to read first in French. My wife and I just loved living in Paris. We had gone to the University of Grenoble in the winter of '55-'56, part of our extended honeymoon. We had gotten to know a lot of young French people there. They were back in Paris when we came back, working in junior jobs in the various ministries. Very shortly after I started working with Reinstein, I gave a cocktail party. We invited all these people. Maybe we had been

there four months. We were well settled into our apartment and this was our first big function. I sent Reinstein a list of the people who were coming. I gave a little squib on who they were or who their daddies were. I put them in context. He was quite flabbergasted. He said, "Newlin, what is this? You have just come." Well, I explained that it was just the Grenoble mafia. It turned out that those people who we knew in Grenoble all had come back and their daddies had been interesting people or they now were doing interesting things. It had nothing to do with my having worked very fast in my first four months in Paris. It was just that we had kept in touch with these people. They were there and we had picked back up with them. But we had a lovely time in Paris.

Q: As it comes to all men, in 1964, you had to leave-

NEWLIN: Well, we haven't quite finished my Paris tour. Just before I left, they decided that I had never done any visa work and that everybody had to do some visa work. I had to do some visa work. I'll tell you something that happened when I was in Paris. Twice when I was in Paris, people encouraged us to be interested in consular work. One was when Perry Cully, the consul general, came in. He got all the junior officers together and said, "You guys think you want to be political officers and you don't. Look around you. The best and the brightest all want to be political officers. If some of you will let yourself be consular officers, you'll have interesting work and you will rise in the Foreign Service more quickly. Don't forget that." Also, John Auchincloss said essentially the same thing. He said he had been in a consulate in Italy somewhere. I heard him talking Italian to his maid. He said, "I had a wonderful time. That was very interesting work. You really had things to do." I had this one little brief tour with the consular section and the visa section. I probably made a bigger influence, a bigger change on what went on there than anywhere else. When I came in, I was "framed" by the young officers who were running the Non-Immigrant Visa Section. They told me how to deal with students. They said, "Students are a real problem. They want to go over there and just knock around footloose and fancy free. Of course, you can't let them. You've got to have enough money to live over there. Therefore, you've got to prove they're going to come back. You need this and that and this and that letter to say they're going to come back. You've got to have notarized things from their university that they're coming back. B, you have to show that they're not going to become public charges. \$400 is enough to show that they won't become public charges." So, of course, this same wad of \$400 got passed from student to student. It was just preposterous. You come in with \$400 and you've satisfied the requirement. It's just ridiculous. You come in with all these letters in handwriting from somebody. You've got no idea who it is. It says he's going to come back and therefore he's met the requirements, so you send him off. So, these guys all evacuated. They all left. I was left as the senior American officer in the Non-Immigrant Visa Section. I had been there two weeks longer than the guy who was behind me. So, I got to train a bunch of people. I said, "When students come in - you can recognize a student - your job is to use that as an opportunity to clear out the waiting room. Students don't need to take very long. You want to send them off enthusiastic. So, establish to your satisfaction that they're students and get them out of here. Tell them to have a good time." I didn't make them scrape together \$400. I didn't make them get a whole bunch of useless letters. I think that was the way to treat students and I think that was a good thing to do. I don't know how long it lasted after I left.

Q: Of course, you knew the French would come back for the most part. Some of them would get

jobs. The present president of France, Jacques Chirac, went to the United States as a student. At one point, he was working in McDonald's or someplace flipping hamburgers.

NEWLIN: That was not something that was in our control. I didn't want to try to fight that losing battle.

Q: In some other countries, you've got real problems with the students because they don't come back. But when you're dealing with the French, they come back. What's the point?

NEWLIN: I just didn't think any of these people were trying to emigrate to the U.S. If they were, they could surely get their wad of \$400 and letter saying that they were going to come back. There was nothing that was being done before that would prevent the serious one who wished to emigrate from doing so.

Q: It was also one of these bureaucratic things that gives the officer a feeling of power and makes for ill will.

NEWLIN: That's exactly what I thought. The other good thing that happened to me in the visa section is that I got to give the Beatles their visa for their first tour in the U.S. They came to the office to get their visas.

Q: Were they quite renowned at that time?

NEWLIN: Yes.

Q: Did this cause a lot of stir in the office?

NEWLIN: Yes, absolutely. I decided how we would deal with the... There was another officer there, George Lowe. He took two visas and I took two visas. We had a lottery in the office to see which of the French staff were going to get their autographs signed. One person was going to be allowed to get autographs done. The Beatles were very cute about doing that. We made it quick for them, of course. But I said, "What's it like being a Beatle? What do you like the most?" They said, "The nicest thing about being a Beatle is not having to do things like this. You get people who do stuff for you."

Q: Time moved on. 1964. Whither?

NEWLIN: In '64, I came back to the Department and was assigned to the Trade Agreements Section of the Department in the Economic Office.

ANTHONY GEBER
Development Assistance Advisor, OECD
Paris (1961-1967)

Anthony Geber was born in Budapest, Hungary on February 18, 1919. He immigrated to the United States to attend college and was subsequently, was drafted into the U.S. military. His Foreign Service career included positions in Djakarta, Vienna, and Seoul. This interview was conducted by Thomas Dunnigan on August 24, 1993.

Q: After your interesting time in the Department, it was off to Paris and into the OECD for you, which seems to flow naturally from what you have just been telling us.

GEBER: Yes. Having become a development expert by then, and having worked on the creation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), my next assignment was to the OECD in Paris. I became the development assistance advisor to our mission at the OECD.

Q: Were programs coordinated among the donors and the receivers?

GEBER: No, not really. DAC did not coordinate programs of donor countries in individual developing countries. The Secretariat prepared information on the direction of the donors' aid -- by regions, I believe -- but DAC's main preoccupation remained the volume and terms of aid provided by its members. Other topics discussed in DAC related to various aspects of the effectiveness of aid. One of the most important activities of DAC was the periodic examination of each member's aid policies. This was a procedure used in several other committees of the OECD. The Secretariat prepared an analytical paper, in consultation with the given member, on its aid policies. On a set date the member country made an oral presentation of its policies and the other members were invited to comment and critique the policies; usually two or three member delegations were designated as lead questioners. After such a meeting the Secretariat revised its paper in light of the discussions and issued it in its own name. It should not be surprising that the final paper could not include criticism to which the member delegation strenuously objected; still it was a reasonably objective evaluation, and whatever criticism the paper contained was often welcomed by the responsible aid officials for strengthening their hand in their internal battles.

I must tell you an amusing story. It was the day of the examination of the French aid program. The American delegation was designated as one of the lead questioners. We prepared to be rather critical of French policies in the aid field: the overwhelming portion of French aid was directed to the few francophone countries of Africa; much of the aid consisted of the salaries of French civil servants and teachers who, whatever good they did for those countries, they also helped maintain the French infrastructure there.

The French delegation was headed by Andre deLattre, an Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and an inspecteur des finances, that fabulous breed of French civil servants, who, if they survived their elite and rigorous training, excelled among their peers. M. deLattre made a brilliant presentation of the French aid program, anticipating all critical questions, explaining as best he could why things were as they were, and promising improvements in the future, and all that in the most beautiful and articulate French. So, there was not much point in asking the questions we had prepared, and Sy Rubin, the head of our delegation, asked only why deLattre, explaining the constraints on the French program, used repeatedly the English words, "pressure

groups". DeLattre replied that if would have had to use a French expression he would have said, "lobbies".

Sy Rubin, with the rank of Minister, was sent by the foreign aid administration in Washington, which took over the backstopping of DAC from the State Department. I served for a while on the delegation representing State but after three years doing DAC work I switched to become trade advisor to our mission. Not long after that change I was elected chairman of the Trade Committee Working Party, a subordinate group of the OECD Trade Committee. The Trade Committee met twice a year and its members were trade officials from the members' capitals, whereas the Working Party was a standing committee, its members from the resident delegations. Its function was to do the preparatory work for the Trade Committee meetings.

The main agenda of the Trade Committee and its Working Party in my time was two fold. We were working on non-tariff barriers, such as government procurement practices, customs nomenclature, border taxes, etc. with the objective of setting forth guidelines to harmonize members' practices. The other part of the Trade Committee's agenda was to try to coordinate the members' positions on trade issues in relations to developing countries. This became increasingly important after the developing countries, dissatisfied with their role in GATT, created the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In the first meeting of that organization in Geneva the developing countries took a highly confrontational attitude toward the developed countries, and the latter found themselves in considerable disarray.

It was not easy to make progress in the Trade Committee, or generally in the OECD. Two examples will illustrate. As I mentioned, eliminating or reducing non-tariff barriers was one of the main topics discussed in the Trade Committee. It was decided to attempt the formulation of a code or set of guidelines for non-discriminatory government procurement practices, such as open bidding procedures. It was not an easy task, most countries, including the United States, having national laws and practices which they were reluctant to modify. The Working Party had numerous meetings, and the Secretariat draft paper was revised several times. Finally, it seemed there was general agreement, and prior sounding suggested that at the next meeting of the Working Party the proposed guidelines would be approved to be forwarded to the Trade Committee and from there to the Council to be issued as an OECD Recommendation to the member governments. At the meeting one representative after another approved the document until we came to the delegate from Portugal who in a long statement declared that his government could not approve the guidelines because there is a great deal of difference between his centrally governed country and the federally constituted United States; therefore these guidelines would have a differential impact in the two countries. No pleading that at least he should abstain, which would have allowed the application of the recommendations to the other members, could persuade him to desist from his objection.

The other illustration occurred in connection with coordinating OECD members' positions on trade issues concerning developing countries. The question before the Working Party was how should OECD members vote in UNCTAD on resolutions pushed by the developing countries against which OECD members have objections; it was understood that UNCTAD resolutions have no legally binding character. The US representative argued that OECD members should stand on principle, and should vote against resolutions to which they object. Other members were

more inclined not to aggravate unnecessarily the confrontation with the developing countries, and go along or abstain on objectionable resolution. That point of view was most concisely and perhaps somewhat cynically expressed by the French representative, who very solemnly declared that the French government is prepared to support and will abide by any UN resolution of which it approves.

Still, one should not belittle the usefulness and accomplishments of the OECD. For instance, on the question of granting preferential tariff treatment to developing countries, one of the urgent demands of the Third World, the United States found itself isolated in its opposition. It was in the OECD, in a four member task force, that a scheme for a generalized system of preferences (GSP) was worked out which made it possible for the United States to adopt such a system. Similarly, a dispute between the US and the European maritime countries over the rate setting in maritime trade was resolved in the OECD.

More generally, the reviews of member countries' economic policies, and subsequent publication of the findings, are acclaimed throughout the world by economists in and out of governments. Many important studies, on fiscal policy, on labor, etc. are useful to policy makers and academics. A development research institute, initiated by the Kennedy administration, did excellent work and provided a bridge between the OECD and developing countries. Every once in a while we got together in the US mission to ask ourselves what we have accomplished. Very often the feeling was, "not very much". But when we looked back over a two or three year period, we could see that whereas earlier there were issues which countries considered their sovereign right and could not be subject for discussion in a multilateral forum, they began to realize that an exchange of views was in their interest. Just the fact that the OECD brings economic experts and policy makers from capitals together has its value. I remember a story a very distinguished pre-war president of the Hungarian National Bank, who later was consultant to the German Bundesbank and the World Bank, told me. It was in the 1930's, when all over the world trade barriers were raised, multiple exchange systems were introduced, that a friend asked him what good it does to attend the monthly meetings of central bankers at the Bank of International Settlement, since the bank is completely ineffective and had no enforcement powers. His answer was, that the fact that the central bankers had to look each other in the eye every month prevented them from doing much worse. The OECD has done better than that.

Talking about a former Hungarian bank president, I have one other anecdote I would like to tell. In preparation for an UNCTAD meeting the Trade Committee tasked the Trade Committee Working Party to prepare a study of developing countries' trade policies with a view to demonstrate that their generally practiced protectionism and import substitution policies are hurting them as much, if not more, than any trade policies of the industrialized countries. Such a study would enable the OECD members to take a less defensive position in UNCTAD.

It was clear to me that the OECD Trade Committee Working Party was not qualified to undertake such a study, even with the help of the Secretariat. I was greatly relieved when I found out that the World Bank has engaged a small group of very competent economists to undertake such a study. This I learned from the director of the World Bank's Paris office who also told me that the head of the team will be shortly coming to Paris. I thought that the best way the Working Party could comply with the awkward mandate of the Trade Committee, is to invite the World

Bank representative and the distinguished economist charged with the study, have them brief us on how they plan to proceed, and report that to the Trade Committee. I tell this little story because at the meeting I as chairman, flanked by the Paris office director of the World Bank (Mr. Arthur Karasz) and the World Bank economist (Mr. Béla Balassa). We were sitting at the head of the conference table and chatted in Hungarian.

Q: The Hungarians taking over the world!

GEBER: Well, Hungarians were known as nuclear physicists and as orchestra conductors, so now you can add economists.

Q: May I ask a question Tony? During your years there did you notice a developing cooperation among the European countries because the Common Market was beginning to gel at that time? Was there ever a tendency for them to speak together or coordinate their policy ahead of time for meetings?

GEBER: The European Community (EC) was represented by a separate delegation in the OECD which functioned the same way as the country delegations. Furthermore, at least before any major meeting, members of the EC held a coordinating session. Member countries could still speak for themselves. While this arrangement fostered the cohesion among the members of the EC, it allowed less flexibility for its members to speak their own mind. Mind you, this was still in the days when the EC consisted only of the original members of the Rome Treaty and when de Gaulle did everything in his power to keep the British (and others) out of the EC.

One thing that I meant to mention, it was interesting to see the European bureaucracies and how they differed. The French were absolutely magnificent. They were self-assured, they could engage in discussions expressing their personal views, they didn't have to have detailed instructions, etc. The Germans were in the old European tradition mostly not economists but legally trained and had to stick to the letter of their instructions. I think next to the French some of the best people were the Dutch.

May I go back for a moment to my days in Germany.

Q: Of course.

GEBER: I do not want to take away the great merit of such really farsighted Frenchmen as M. Monnet and M. Schuman, but the beginnings of European cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community, has probably as much to do with US and British policy in Germany, as with Mr. Schuman.

Q: The Schuman Plan.

GEBER: M. Schuman undoubtedly had the vision of Franco-German cooperation in the post-war world, but I had some insight into workings of the French bureaucracy to believe that it somewhat grudgingly accepted the European Coal and Steel Community as a defensive measure. Realizing that dismantling in the Ruhr was coming to an end around 1947 and that the British

and US were willing to join forces and build up the German coal and steel industry, the French decided that they had better join the Coal and Steel Community. I suspect that they still had in mind that thereby they can still control German steel capacity. The Maginot line mentality disappeared only slowly.

Q: You were in Paris during the high years of President de Gaulle. Was his imprint noticeable at all on any of the work that you did or any of the attitude of the French?

GEBER: We felt it much more personally in our private lives than in our official life. I cited to you the statement made by the French representative on UNCTAD resolutions. Generally, the French were no great believers in coordinating OECD positions vis-a-vis the developing countries. All that had a de Gaullist flavor. But on the whole they were quite cooperative in the OECD. It was an institution to their liking and they were pleased to have it in their capital. Also quite a few of the French officials who represented France in the various meetings and in the Secretariat had friendly feelings toward the US. Among them I would count Ambassador François Valéry, the head of the French delegation to the OECD and the son of the famous French poet, Paul Valéry. It was a different story with NATO which de Gaulle sent packing to Belgium.

Q: He did while you were there.

RICHARD J. DOLS
Consular Officer
Bordeaux (1962-1963)

Richard J. Dols was born in Minnesota in 1932. He joined the Foreign Service in 1961. His career included positions in France, Canada, New Zealand, and Swaziland. Mr. Dols was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Your first post was Bordeaux where you served from 1962-3. What were you doing there?

DOLS: Consular work. Remember that was the time when we had a big military establishment in France. We had military bases everywhere. So most of our business was concerned with citizenship problems of one sort or other. Lots of them.

Q: These were American soldiers marrying French women?

DOLS: French women, reports of birth, dual national problems. The soldier who comes in and says, "The French are trying to draft me." "Why are they trying to draft you?" "Oh, my mother is French." "Were you born in France?" "Yes, I was born in France." "How did you get US nationality?" "Oh, my father was an American soldier." "When were you born?" "Nineteen forty three." "Where were you born?" "Lille, northern France." "Nineteen forty three and your father was an American soldier in Lille? Are you sure about that? The invasion didn't take place until 1944, was he a downed flier?" "No, he was an infantry man." A light goes on. "Well, maybe he

wasn't my father."

There were many cases like that. What happened is that he wasn't the father, the American soldier who arrived later on and married the French woman with the child and they went to the States and he was derivatively naturalized when his mother became naturalized. So what do you do with the French government? They want him for service. Well the solution was send them to Germany on a quick transfer.

There were constant problems of that sort. A lot of dual national problems.

Q: I was going to ask. This is a little slice of life that we forget about. This was when France was still fully in NATO. What was your impression and those who worked with you on this of dealing with the French authorities on this? Was it difficult?

DOLS: They were cooperative. The Alliance greased the skids for cooperation on everything. Chaban, later the Prime Minister, was the mayor of Bordeaux in those days. He was very friendly. He was an influential politician even at that time. So we got good cooperation on the local level. The police intelligence types helped us with criminal problems.

Q: So you weren't feeling the strains that de Gaulle brought?

DOLS: That really all happened after my time.

Q: One last thing, this was sort of the height of the Kennedy period and all that. Kennedy had made an extra effort on France. Was this reflected even in Bordeaux?

DOLS: It was indeed. John Kennedy was the topic of conversation among all the Bordelaise elite, at least. They loved him. They thought he was absolutely the greatest.

Q: You then came back and they grabbed you for legal work.

DOLS: Yes. We had just completed negotiations on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. What they needed was somebody to draft the final report of the delegation because these reports provided almost the only behind the scenes documentation of what happened during the negotiations and was, of course, an aid in interpreting in future years the Convention. The Legal Adviser's Office was naive about this. They realized that if you write the report, you have the only background on negotiations and you can fashion things appropriately to the national interest. So that was the project I worked on. In fact, I did it solely by myself.

Q: This consular convention, which is still basically the governing consular convention...

DOLS: The universal one.

Q: What was the American attitude about this? Did it go the way we wanted? Were there disappointing things in it? Were there compromises in it that we felt weakened it?

DOLS: It was a long, long negotiation on an agreement with hundreds and hundreds of provisions. We were involved with up to 50 other countries in the negotiations. We didn't get our way on everything. I would say this that our position was surprisingly enlightened, it wasn't a narrow national interest position at all. The Legal Adviser's Office realized that on consular law questions you find yourself on one side one day and the other side of the issue the next day. So what you really ought to do is try to fashion an agreement that serves the best interest in the purest sense. Don't let it be driven by current issues, in other words.

Q: Well, it is quite true. There are problems in every category and are constantly changing. For example, like your Frenchman being drafted. We have the same problem in the United States. We get very hot if somebody tries to draft an American citizen, but we draft foreigners ourselves.

DOLS: Indeed.

THOMAS F. CONLON
Consul
Le Havre (1962-1963)

Thomas F. Conlon was born in Illinois in 1924 and received his BS from Georgetown University in 1948. He served overseas in the US Army from 1943-1945. Upon entering the Foreign Service, he was posted in Havana, Surabaya, Singapore, Saigon, Le Havre, Manila, Nice, Canberra, and Bangkok. In 1992 Mr. Conlon was interviewed by Arbor W. Gray.

Q: But, of course, much of the Vietnam controversy lay in the future. You left Saigon in 1962.

CONLON: Yes, I was assigned as Consul at the American Consulate in Le Havre, France. This was a small post--two American officers and five French employees--essentially providing consular service in Northern France. This was an opportunity for me to travel through much of the area involved in the Normandy invasion of 1944 and the subsequent liberation of France. I took advantage of this opportunity. Some six weeks after I had arrived in Le Havre in August, 1962, I was told by Consul General Herb Fales in Paris that, for budgetary reasons, it had been decided to close the Consulate and that I would probably be assigned to the Embassy in Paris. The final decision on closing the Consulate was delayed, however, until May, 1963, largely because of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It turned out that the Consulate in Le Havre was needed to issue "Navicerts" to French merchant vessels entering the quarantine area the U. S. had proclaimed around Cuba. The French, of course, continued to have regular freight service to Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies. Meanwhile, my wife and I had become concerned over the spotty kind of education our children were getting in French schools and decided to ask for an assignment to Washington.

It was easy to arrange an assignment to the Department of State, where I was posted as Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, as the Vietnam desk was then called. We left Le Havre in late July, 1963, on the SS AMERICA, and arrived in New York in August. From there we

went down to Washington, D. C.

NORBERT L. ANSCHUTZ
Political Counselor
Paris (1962-1964)

Norbert L. Anschutz was born in 1915 and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. He entered the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in Greece, Thailand, France, and Egypt. Mr. Anschutz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 13, 1992.

Q: Your next assignment was to Paris from 1962-64. What were you doing and how did you get that assignment?

ANSCHUTZ: With the change of administration there were naturally widespread changes throughout the Service. I was offered the opportunity to come back to Washington as Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, but I wasn't interested in the job. I really wanted to continue in the activities in political work. I wanted to go to Paris, not so much because it was Paris, but to improve my French. So in the course of human events it was decided that I should go to Paris as the Political Counselor with rank of Minister. It was a direct transfer in 1962.

I was in Paris just long enough to go broke but not long enough to achieve a great deal, because I was then requested to go down to Greece to become DCM by Harry Labouisse, who had taken over as ambassador in Greece. So in the spring of 1964, I went with my family back to Athens.

Q: During the time you were in Paris, what was the political situation there -- 1962-64?

ANSCHUTZ: The political situation was in a way quite tense particularly because of the Algerian situation. This was also a period when de Gaulle's policies vis-a-vis NATO led to the removal of the NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. That move began about that time.

Q: Had de Gaulle already made his pronouncement regarding NATO before you arrived?

ANSCHUTZ: No, I think it was during the period I was there. I think it was very interesting because one had the whole problem of the Gaullist approach to Algeria and the even more conservative elements of the military who were resisting any kind of change in the Algerian arrangements. It was also a period of activity with regard to the Vietnamese war, because the French were very much beleaguered in Vietnam and it was an issue...

Q: You mean the Algerian war?

ANSCHUTZ: No, the Vietnamese war.

Q: I thought they were basically out of there by 1962.

ANSCHUTZ: Well, they were still lingering and trying to extricate themselves. There were a series of negotiations with regard to Vietnam during that period, some of which were held in Paris.

Q: In regard to Vietnam, in 1962 Kennedy was just beginning to start putting in the special forces and this type of thing. The French were telling us it was a big mistake, they having gone through that. Dien Bien Phu was in 1954. How were we receiving the French advice about Vietnam?

ANSCHUTZ: My recollection is that they didn't strongly discourage us from assisting there. I think they had a view as to personalities in Vietnam, but I think broadly speaking they, as I remember it, did not try to dissuade us from doing something in Vietnam. We had the whole issue not only of Vietnam but China at that time and what the Chinese were doing with regard to Vietnam.

Q: Was this the period when de Gaulle recognized China?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. I remember talking with various people at the Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere, I coming to the conclusion that de Gaulle was going to recognize China. Chip Bohlen, who was the ambassador at that time...I advanced this view in staff meeting and Bohlen very cavalierly discounted that possibility. I was amused because afterwards Cecil Lyon, the DCM, said, "Well, you know Chip never knows what he is against until he finds out what you are for." Unfortunately I proved to be right about that.

Q: That was a severe jolt to our relations because the recognition of China in those days was a real litmus test as far as we were concerned.

ANSCHUTZ: That was correct.

So, we had the NATO issues, we had China and Algeria, and, to a certain extent, the Middle East. There were an adequate number of issues to justify our presence.

Q: On the NATO issue. When you got there was the severing of the French membership in NATO seem to be something that we just accepted.

ANSCHUTZ: There wasn't much that we could do about it, but the basic factor, of course, was the unwillingness of the French to integrate their commands into the NATO command structure. That led to a fall out with regard to the location of the headquarters and the decision of taken to move to Brussels. The French, as I remember it, were leaning much more to the European Union type of approach to the military. Also the French were very aggressive in their cultivation with the Russians. They were speaking of Europe to the Urals. They were making a great effort to find accommodation with the Russians at that time.

Q: What was the impression that you got from the Embassy when you got there of their feeling about de Gaulle? Was he a good thing as far as America was concerned?

ANSCHUTZ: I think de Gaulle was respected and to a certain extent deplored because of what many considered to be his megalomania. But there was no question but that he was a very able fellow and was respected as such. But our relations with France under the circumstances were always rather delicate.

Q: I have heard that there were times in the Embassy when you had people within the Embassy who were pro-de Gaulle and others were anti-de Gaulle, that the Embassy was sort of split on this from time to time. Did you have any feeling of that?

ANSCHUTZ: I wasn't aware of that, no. As I said, de Gaulle was respected as an extremely able national leader, but one, of course, whose views were frequently antithetical to our own...and to many other people too.

Q: What about Charles Bohlen as ambassador? He was always considered as one of the great stars of the Foreign Service. How did he run the Embassy?

ANSCHUTZ: He was certainly one of the stars of the Foreign Service. He had served in Paris before and was certainly well known and highly regarded. He was, I always thought, among other things, one of our foremost ambassadors in terms of dealing with the public and third parties. He was a handsome, personable, intelligent man and as such was an excellent ambassador. He had a tendency to be rather opinionated, in my opinion, but he had the vast background and experience. I think his period as ambassador in the Soviet Union and his tours in the Soviet Union and his participation in various types of negotiations involving the United States and the Soviet Union had given him a great deal of prestige. So that all things considered he was, in my opinion, a very fine ambassador. I found him at my level sometimes to be a little bit top heavy, but nevertheless, I certainly felt he was an excellent ambassador.

Q: I had the impression talking to people who served with him in the Soviet Union who said that he harked back to an earlier time when he had had relations earlier on with almost all the heads of the Soviet Government and when he moved into a period where Kremlinology was a little harder to penetrate and you examined it in a different way, his impressions were based on his personal relationships. I would have thought that this might have carried over from what you have said in a way to figuring out the way things were going because he would not be using the political section the way a less prestigious ambassador would.

ANSCHUTZ: I think I would agree with that. I think that was probably true. They say that he had a great deal of confidence in his own opinion. Because he had great professional, personal prestige, he had relatively easy access to senior people in the French context which other perhaps might have had. Armed with that access, he was able to form opinions which owed much less to his staff than another ambassador might have done.

Q: Were you there during the Cuban missile crisis?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, I was.

Q: What was the atmosphere early on when this thing was developing?

ANSCHUTZ: The attitude of the French press to these stories?

Q: This had been in October, 1962 and de Gaulle was one of the first people to give us very strong support in this. Was this sort of a surprise?

ANSCHUTZ: I don't know if it was a surprise. It certainly was welcomed because gestures of sincere collaboration with the French were never likely to be rejected. So I think that one was pleased about that. I remember that Acheson came over as a personal emissary of the President and was received by de Gaulle and was assured that the French would do what they could under the circumstances.

Q: What was your impression of French politics that was going on underneath de Gaulle? Were you able to get good access to the various French political parties?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, we did have access to the French political parties. I remember, among others, we had access to people like Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, etc. We did have reasonably good contact with French political leaders.

Q: Were we able to talk with the French Communist Party at the time or was this out of bounds?

ANSCHUTZ: I think it was pretty much out of bounds. To a certain degree we had some insights into the French Communist Party as a result of the work of the Labor Attaché. But in terms of sort of an ongoing dialogue, I don't remember that.

Q: Were you there when Sargent Shriver became ambassador?

ANSCHUTZ: No. Bohlen was there when I left.

Q: How about the Algerian crisis? How were we viewing the situation there? Did we think it was going to be resolved in the French favor or did we feel they were fighting a rearguard action?

ANSCHUTZ: I think we felt they were fighting a rearguard action. I think Bill Porter was our consul general in Algiers at that time. He was a very able officer. I think that we felt that the French position ultimately was untenable and that we welcomed evidence of compromise or softening of the French position at that time.

MARGARET J. BARNHART
Consular Officer
Paris (1962-1964)

Margaret Barnhart was born in 1928 in Greensburg Pennsylvania. She graduated from Goucher College in 1950 with a major in international relations. Since

joining the Foreign Service in 1961, her career has included positions in France, Japan, Israel, Thailand and Brazil. Ms. Barnhart was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

BARNHART: I was in Personnel briefly, because there was a travel freeze in 1962, and for all of us who were planning to leave in February or anytime up to July, travel was frozen. By then I knew I was going to Paris. I had already turned it down once, since I really wanted to go to somewhere exotic, but I went to Paris as a consular officer in 1962.

Q: How did Taylor Thompson operate as Director General from your perspective?

BARNHART: Well, I didn't see too much of him I was more staff aide for Joe Satterthwaite.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

BARNHART: I was there from July 14, Bastille Day, '62 to November, October or November of '64.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

BARNHART: I was first assigned to the Visa Office over in the Talleyrand Building. I stayed there for a year, and then I wanted to do Welfare Whereabouts work, but they didn't like women to do that. However, they let me do it, and so then I spent the second year doing, first, Deaths and Estates. Three of us handled Deaths and Estates. Then, I moved into the straight Welfare Whereabouts, visiting jails. They didn't think women could do that. I think Mary Cabarini went later and said she was the first. I've been to all those jails.

Q: Let's start with the visa type. Were there mostly French, or were there other people who were in jail?

BARNHART: They were mostly French. I did immigrant visa work to begin with. I spoke some French by then, learning it through the FSI. I had an excellent staff of French nationals who were of great assistance.

Q: NATO, we had troops in France in those days?

BARNHART: Yes, we did, but we didn't have access. Eventually we had access to PX but basically we didn't see much of the military there.

Q: I was just thinking that this would generate a certain amount of visas.

BARNHART: Didn't really. There were a few, but nothing like some of the other posts I went to, at that particular time.

Q: What about Welfare and Whereabouts? In the first place, Deaths and Estates. What sort of things, any particular cases or problems?

BARNHART: We cleaned out estates. I mean, we went through everything, and tried to get it before the local authorities. You would get a call, for example, that someone died in a hotel room. You go there immediately, console the widow or kick out the masseuse girl, if there is one, and collect the valuables. Those were just temporary chores. But there were a lot of Americans living in Paris and quite a bit of estates. Oh, there were different types of deaths. There was an American 21-year-old who was killed when someone jumped off the top of Notre Dame. We had to go right away and contact the family and so forth. It was a little messy. Essentially, we pick up all the effects that we can of these people, unless there is a next of kin right there. Also, we tracked down people. I can't remember all the things, but it was just very, very busy. I was there at the tail-end of the Orly airplane crash, so we were still settling some of those effects.

Q: This was a plane from the United States?

BARNHART: Yes, it was the Atlanta Group.

Q: It was the Atlanta Group, yes.

BARNHART: And it had crashed just before I arrived, so there were a lot of unclaimed things there still, and I dealt with that. They were not identified. There was a lot of jewelry and some money that Treasury - the burnt pieces of money they reimbursed or whatever it was. So there was a healthy amount left there that no one had claimed, so we sent notices out. And then it came to the point that it would have to go to the state of the deceased, which would be fine but there were one or two people on that plane who were from Ohio, and their family didn't agree that it would all go to Georgia. So we worked on things like that. Finally, as I recall, they all agreed that it would go to Georgia for a memorial, which it did. It was fascinating work. I loved it.

Q: I was just thinking that in France, in Paris particularly, in those days I would think you would have a certain number of particularly men living with some French woman or something with a wife back in the States, and trying to unsort those things.

BARNHART: I had one of those, a really bad one of those in Japan.

Q: We'll come to that.

BARNHART: I remember other deaths. Someone died alone in an apartment. I can't think who or the circumstances, but we sent back the effects to the family. The family said, "We were over visiting him, and we left a box of candy with him and you didn't send it back to us." We didn't see a box of candy. Even if we had, we probably wouldn't. We were responsible. We were a temporary conservatory of an estate. Someone training me said, "Don't even throw out paper bags, 'cause some people put money in paper bags, so you go through everything." And the only things I would ever dispose of were small items which would cause distress to the family. That really turned up in Tokyo. I don't know what you call them now - the transvestites, I guess. And also, I certainly would keep if there condoms in the wallet of a young kid or something, that sort of thing, or bloody clothing.

Q: I remember getting one with condoms which at the end were shaped in, I think, a rooster in one and Stalin with his mustache was the other.

BARNHART: Anything that would be an embarrassment was disposed of. In the Welfare Whereabouts section, I dealt with the tourists that came through, every day. I remember once two very nice young girls came in and needed money, and I sat them down. The way I handled most of these young kids was: "Well, now, isn't that nice? You're broke? (Yes.) Have you cashed in your return ticket? (Yes.) Your family told you you couldn't do this all by yourself? (Yes.) Let's call them." And sit them down, put in a long-distance collect call and try to get the family to send via American Express a ticket. We had a private group, American charities or something, who provided money for us to hand out in emergency cases, but I tried to get the family to do it. Sometimes it was sad. We had to tell nationals when we had a message someone had died, their mother, father. I kept Kleenex around, and all kinds of things. But I liked that work because you could help people.

And then, of course, there was the time - this was fun - when I came back from lunch and my secretary, a French girl, said, "Oh, look, Miss Barnhart, some man came in and gave me this little cosmetic bag with jewelry in it. He said he found it at the airport. It had dropped out of a suitcase, a piece of luggage." She hadn't opened it. I spread it out on my desk, and there were a lot of pearls and a lot of diamonds and some gold PT boats and shamrocks, and I thought, uh oh, isn't that fun? What did I do next? So I looked at it all, and it was beautiful stuff, but I thought, well, this looks familiar, I mean in a sense. So I called the administrative office that handles the conference people, that handles VIP visitors. I didn't get into that too much, but Ethel Kennedy had been in town, and they said, "Oh, yes, what do you have?" I said, "Tell me who was in town." "Ethel Kennedy." I said, "Well, did she lose anything?" "Yes, we'll be right down." And I wouldn't give it to them. You know, I have it on my desk, it's my responsibility, I wasn't going to just hand it out. And so I had it identified. I had Mr. Van Cleef or Mr. Arpel, one of them, in saying, "I made this and this." And we got hold of Ethel Kennedy, and she called me from Switzerland. "Give him the jewelry. I'm so glad it's found. Give the jewelry to any pilot, because we're going on to Rome and I'd like to have it there." I ended up wrapping it up, sending it down through the classified pouch to the Ambassador. Actually it had been a robbery. There was one earring missing, which he apparently had taken to a jeweler, and the jeweler immediately became very suspicious because there had been a hotel jewelry robbery. So he panicked in thinking he had taken it out of the bag. She probably didn't lock her bag.

Q: How about Americans in jail in France? Did you have many of those?

BARNHART: Yes, not too many though. I remember visiting a couple of Americans in jail but not any great number. We had some poor veteran who kept - we repatriated him, I think, probably five times. He never could stay in one place long enough. He got a lot of disability checks, but they'd be in Marseilles when he was in Paris; they'd be in Paris when he was in Marseilles; and we kept sending them back. In those days if you were repatriated - you probably know - we had a stamp on your passport. You paid back or you didn't travel. And you always did pay it back. But it caused a lot of trouble. But those were days in Paris, and it was fun.

Q: *Who was the Ambassador when you were there?*

BARNHART: Gavin was Ambassador when I first arrived. He was succeeded by Charles Bohlen, a career Foreign Service Officer.

Q: *Did you ever run across him?*

BARNHART: Yes, the Ambassador and his wife always included a few junior officers in the various representational activities. It was a friendly embassy.

Q: *You were there until '64?*

BARNHART: Right.

STEPHEN H. ROGERS
Economic Officer
Paris (1962-1964)

Ambassador Stephen H. Rogers was born in 1931 and grew up in Long Island, New York. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in India, France, the United Kingdom (England), Mexico, and South Africa, and an ambassadorship to Swaziland. Ambassador Rogers was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing in 1994.

Q: *So you finished at Harvard with your masters degree in 1962 and then what happened?*

ROGERS: Then I went to the embassy in Paris.

Q: *Did you already have French or did you go to French language training?*

ROGERS: I had French in high school and at Columbia. In fact Kent and I met at the French House at Columbia, so we had that link also to French. But I had studied French at the Foreign Service Institute, I don't recall for how long, during our first tour in Washington. It was a very good program, as you know. FSI always has had very good language programs.

Q: *It is always much better when you can start with a good foundation, which it sounds like you had than starting totally from scratch because often the length of training is not as long as it should be.*

ROGERS: The important part was conversation at FSI. I had the grammar and a certain amount of vocabulary. Conversation was not part of high school French in those days.

Q: *Unfortunately that is still the case in many schools. But the FSI does give you a chance to develop your ability to use the language in everyday settings.*

ROGERS: Yes.

Q: In Paris you were again an economic officer. What sort of responsibilities did you have?

ROGERS: Well, I worked in the part of the economic section that was headed by the Treasury Attaché, Don McGrew, a person who is still remembered who was there in the embassy maybe 20 years. He had been there 12 or 13 when I got there and he stayed many years later. Don knew French and knew the French and new France very well. He never lost his Toledo accent in French, but he was very effective, had good contacts, very skeptical of what the French were doing a good deal of the time. He never became Frenchified, never lost his sense of US interests and the objectivity of dealing with the French. But that also was a good experience, working on financial matters, economic analysis and some specific issues.

Q: The Treasury Attaché's office was part of the economic section?

ROGERS: Yes.

Q: And particularly responsible for macro economic reporting, financial analysis, monetary matters?

ROGERS: Yes. And for AID. For the first year I was there a large part of my responsibility was for our liaison with the French Ministry of Cooperation and others on aid matters in Africa, which was quite interesting. It got me to Africa on one occasion for a conference of the ambassadors and AID mission directors from the French speaking countries in Africa. There was an interesting issue there that might be worth discussing. It was a question... You know, we all know, that France has maintained very close official and commercial relations with most of its former colonies in Africa, and the question that we had and seemed relevant to how we treated the French on aid matters in Africa was whether these programs were essentially for the benefit of France or essentially for the benefit of the African countries. There were some in our missions in Africa who felt that much of French aid, or most of it, was self-serving and should not be recognized as aid in the same, more objective sense, that our aid was thought of anyway. Now we all know that all aid programs are self-interest as well as in the interest of the recipients at their best. But this became quite a debate and I wrote quite a long telegram on the subject making the point that whatever the motivations were, whatever the returns to France were, these programs certainly seemed from my vantage point to be providing resources in teachers, in administrative help, in trade credits and in all sorts of ways that had to be beneficial to the receiving countries. It was paternalistic, there was no question it was and I would guess still is. But I argued that these were real aid programs in that sense. And that telegram became something of a subject of discussion at this conference I went to in 1963 which was held in Lagos.

Q: So that was still quite early in the independence of the former French colonies. Many became independent in 1960-61.

ROGERS: That is true. From this perspective, it seems as if it was immediately after. At that

time I wasn't thinking of it in terms of it being quite so new. And the French relationship with those countries had been established...I think Guinea had gone its own way, I think the others had fallen into line, with the relationship that the French accepted.

Q: They were getting the advantage of the flow and transfer of technology as well as money, those countries that were continuing to cooperate and have a good relationship with Paris.

ROGERS: Right. The French certainly sent hundreds, probably thousands, of teachers, in particular, to these countries, or kept them there when they became independent.

Q: Of course, soldiers as well and businessmen.

ROGERS: Yes. I think the French had never denied that they feel that they have a special relationship and occasionally special responsibilities and even authorities in these countries. We have seen that.

Q: We have seen that many times, not just in former French colonies, but in...

ROGERS: They have expanded a little bit in recent months. Personally, I think we can be rather pleased that they are willing to take on that responsibility.

Q: They also have a great deal of expertise and knowledge of the countries. They are not coming in as total neophytes.

ROGERS: Right. So, that in any case, was a large part of my responsibilities in the first year I was there. It became important enough that AID had decided it had to have their own man there, so they sent Denis Baron, a fine AID officer, out there to serve that purpose. So in my second year in Paris I was working on other issues.

One thing we, the Kennedy enthusiasm and energy had an impact on us, specifically in the AID area. There was something called the Middle Level Manpower Conference. The administration had decided that the problem in development was very much focused on developing the capabilities of middle level managers. We got instructions to press the French to send a high level delegate to this conference, which was to be held, I think, in Puerto Rico. It was just the kind of thing where cultures clash -- the enthusiasm and idealism of this approach, "get something done; do something dramatic, quickly at a high level" -- and the French resisted. They couldn't see sending a minister or anybody at that level to this conference. We had phone calls from high level people in the White House on weekends and everything to try to get the French to send someone. They finally sent a Mr. Boisdevant. Mr. Boisdevant, I guess, was a good man, but he was not a minister and did not serve the political purpose that we were looking for.

So there were issues like that, that I got involved in that were interesting.

Q: You did some of the reporting about the French economy?

ROGERS: Yes. It was fairly routine. Whatever the Weekly Economic Reports were at that time,

that kind of thing. We did that all around the world, I guess, at that time.

Q: It was a fairly early period in the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, and, of course, the European Community was moving along. Were you involved with either of those organizations?

ROGERS: Not at that point. If I could go back a little. In TAD, the Trade Agreement Division, we were very much involved in the GATT and how to absorb the creation of the European Economic Community. And that was a major issue of the 12th session of the contracting parties that I went to. But in Paris, I don't recall that I had very much to do with either of those organizations.

Q: But, your next assignment brought you into contact with both of them.

ROGERS: Yes.

Q: You finished in Paris when?

ROGERS: In 1964 we returned to Washington

PETER K. MURPHY
Consular Officer
Paris (1962-1965)

Peter K. Murphy was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1936. He received a bachelor's degree from Boston College in 1959 and served in the U.S. Army from 1959-1960. Mr. Murphy joined the Foreign Service in 1962. His career included positions in France, Argentina, Italy, and Germany. He was interviewed on April 4, 1994 by William D. Morgan.

MURPHY: My first assignment at the Embassy was to the Passport and Citizenship Office of the Consular Section. At that time, the office was located on the ground floor of the main Chancery at 8, Avenue Gabriel on the historic *Place de la Concorde*. I still get a thrill just thinking that I once went to work every day in such a historic location ! We are indeed fortunate in the Foreign Service, aren't we!! How any of our peers from university days can boast of such "work" experiences, Bill!

Q: That is very true! Were you assigned to the Passport Section of the Embassy based on your experience in the New York Passport Agency?

MURPHY: I suppose that was the logic of the assignment - if there is indeed logic to most Foreign Service assignments!! I seem to recall that the Office of Personnel in the Embassy had a lot to do with the assignments of new employees within the Embassy in those days. At that time, the Consular Section in Paris was an enormous entity. We had a total, I believe, of 18 or 19

officers and at least 30 Foreign Service National employees..... or "Locals" as they were called then..... (since we are recording history) !

The Consul General was Herbert Fales. To a newly arrived officer at such a large Embassy, the Consul General was a daunting personage indeed ! We peons rarely saw him in the office - - and, I soon got the impression that his job seemed to consist mainly of acting as the Embassy liaison with the large and influential resident American community in Paris.....at those days about 52,000 strong in Paris and the surrounding area. You must not forget that this was before NATO was invited to leave French territory by General de Gaulle. I had the distinct impression that the Consul General spent much of his time at luncheons and attending receptions and formal dinners. Come to think of it - - I don't think that it was far from the truth!!

Fales had a deputy named John Gossett, the Deputy Consul General (his actual title). It was he who was responsible for the daily operation of the Consular Section. There was also another interesting officer - whose name I have forgotten - who was a professional psychiatrist. This fellow was assigned by the Department to Embassy Paris at the insistence of Miss Frances Knight (of Passport fame!) to examine cases of lost passports in an attempt to determine the main reasons why young American tourists and students were losing their passports with such frequency. You remember, Bill, that we are speaking of 1962 - about the beginning of the discovery of Europe by American university students. The Embassy in Paris was experiencing the first wave of American student backpackers - and visitors to European Youth Hostels. European youths, Germans especially, had been traveling and seeing the world in this manner for generations - but our young Americans were just beginning to arrive in droves. The days of the "Grand Tour" - both for the British and the Americans had come to an end. Transatlantic fares were beginning to become more reasonable. Passage by ship from New York was even cheap as I have noted in my personal experience. The State Department seemed to be at a loss to understand why these young people managed to lose these "valuable documents" - passports - with such frequency. We tried to explain - - via Airgram - the normal mode of communications at the time - that most of the young people we saw in Europe carried their passports sticking out the back pockets of their blue jeans or shorts - - and were thus easy pray for pickpockets. The Bureau of Consular Affairs (Passport Directorate) thought there must be more to it - so the psychiatrist was sent to Paris. Needless to say, I don't believe it was a very successful study. The numbers of Lost Passport cases simply increased in leaps and bounds during the next ten years..

Q: I take it that behind this was an assumption that the young people were selling their passports?

MURPHY: Well, there was a suspicion of sale of passports, but I never did see much proof of widespread sale - in Western Europe, at least. The document was, of course, quite valuable in the Middle East and in certain parts of Asia. Our goal in Paris was to attempt to devise ways to impress the traveling public - and especially the youth - the value of the Passport and to suggest ways it should safeguarded. We attempted to encourage CA to mount a media campaign in the United States - to no avail. Such a step was considered, at the time, to be far too revolutionary.

Q: How did this work, Peter? And what was your other work in Paris like?

MURPHY: When we finished interviewing a person who had lost their passport and a determination of citizenship made - the applicant would then go on to a second interview with our in-house psychiatrist. It was his task to attempt to discover the reasons the applicant thought so little of the document that he/she did not guard it with his life!

Life in the Consular Section in Paris was a far cry to what it is today, Bill. For example, we young officers were never allowed to sign a letter destined to the United States. Such letters were signed only by the Consul General or by the Deputy Consul General. I am sure you well remember how it was: one simple reply to a logical question reached the desk of the responsible "signer" with 1) the original letter 2) the draft reply 3) the original reply with about five back up copies containing the names of the drafting officer plus those who had cleared the letter and permitted it to be typed in "final form". There was an Embassy File Room - which kept track of every piece of paper generated by the entire mission!! How often those letters were returned to the drafter with a request of a word or phrase change. Thank God for Word Processors! It is so much easier today.

Q: Was this process a local Paris directive?

MURPHY: Yes - I believe it was local. When a letter arrived at the Embassy, it took almost two to three weeks for an answer to get out because it was typed in the bowels of the Consular Section and slowly wound its way up to be approved by various officers before it reached the desk of the Consul General or his Deputy for signature.

Q: Was this restriction over fear that you might say something?

MURPHY: I think it was. I think basically we young officers were forbidden to sign letters out of a fear that we might state something on paper which was contrary to government policy. I guess it was thought that such a letter might end up in the hands of a Member of Congress ! We were, however, allowed to write directly to Americans resident or traveling in France.

Q: Maybe it really did have something to with Congressmen?

MURPHY: Maybe so.

Q: Was this only in the citizenship and passport world?

MURPHY: No, this procedure was in effect throughout in the entire Consular Section.

I worked in the Passport Unit of the Consular Section for almost a year. I liked the work very much. If you can picture it - - we were six officers interviewing all Passport applicants at desks! Our customers sat before us - - and we quizzed them - especially regarding possible Loss of Citizenship. We had a raft of questions we posed: regarding voting in foreign elections, acceptance of foreign citizenship, seeking the "benefits" of a foreign citizenship in the form of privilege, position or financial benefits (French Social Security, for example). I had very interesting customers from time to time. Several were elderly members of the "Lost Generation" who had been in Paris since the turn of the century. Most of them were dying off by the time I

arrived - but a few characters were still about. Picasso also came in to the office one day - and I recall that a colleague asked for his autograph on the back of a check. The artist obliged with a small sketch - which must be worth a fortune today! I met John Marquand, the writer; Lionel Trilling, the critic, as well as many of the noted artists and actors of the day.

Q: How many resident Americans would you say there were in Paris in the early '60s?

MURPHY: Residents.... at least 50,000.

Q: Not just students passing through?

MURPHY: No, these were businessmen, their families, the large US military contingent at NATO Headquarters plus a very large population of wealthy citizens who had lived there for years.

Q: And died there.

MURPHY: And were born there and died there; and fell ill, and were thrown in jail, and were robbed and married.....every facet of consular work was represented.....even Shipping and Seamen - - as the port of Le Havre was within the Consular District and, of course, the large steamships were still crossing the Atlantic to New York in those days.

The remnants of the "Lost Generation" who visited the Embassy were very colorful - and really extraordinary characters. Several used to line up each month to collect their Social Security checks. (This was in the days before direct bank deposits were in effect!) I well remember the periodic visits of Raymond Duncan - brother of the actress/dancer Isadora Duncan. Raymond was about 78 years old at the time and he would traipse in to the Consular Section with a group of followers to collect their checks. It was indeed a sight to behold: six to ten men and women - in the dead of Paris winter - dressed in wool saris hand-woven by themselves at the Isadora Duncan Cultural Center (rue du Dragon) on the Left Bank near the Sorbonne. The French got a big kick out the spectacle. To me they seemed like a group of Old Testament Prophets strolling the city streets. We had many strange visitors to the Embassy.

The Passport and Citizenship work in Paris was very heavy - especially due to the presence of the US Military at the NATO bases near Paris. The Military even stationed three enlisted men within the Consular Section to help us with the hundreds Reports of Birth and new Passport applications received from the bases. (You must remember that this was the height of the Baby Boom era - - and the US military were certainly contributing!).

Each action carried out in connection with the Passport and Citizenship work was recorded (by manual typewriter) on a 6 x 8 card for our permanent files. Thinking back on the system of keeping track of citizenship cases, it seems extraordinarily old-fashioned. You must remember, however, that there were no computers, FAX machines or instant communications. For example: a case of suspected loss of nationality was investigated in Paris; written up on an Operations Memorandum (OM) and dispatched by diplomatic pouch to CA in Washington. By the time the Passport attorneys got around to answering the communication - at least four months normally

passed. In the meantime, if the person had to travel, a Limited Passport was issued - *"To be Extended in Validity upon Receipt of a Determination of U. S. Citizenship from the Department of State in Washington, DC"*

I learned much about citizenship law during my time in that unit in Paris. I also learned a lot about the State Department bureaucracy - - as well as the press. I vividly recall my boss being recalled to Washington for a major gaff involving passport/citizenship work. The British-born, naturalized American actress - Elizabeth Taylor - had informed the Embassy that she wished to renounce her U. S. citizenship. In order to accommodate her wishes that there be no publicity about this act, the Consul (Aaron Coleman) actually went to her hotel room to have her execute the necessary documents of renunciation. Such a legal act should have taken place on the Embassy premise, according to the lawyers in the Passport Division of Consular Affairs. The affair was reported in the international press and Mr. Coleman was reprimanded and ordered to return to Washington. (You can see - Bill - there was no fooling around in those days! If you broke the rules, you paid the price! Personnel would never have the "audacity" to take such punitive action these days, don't you agree?)

After about a year in the passport and citizenship unit, I was assigned as number two officer in the *Office of Deaths and Estates*. (I'll be there were not many embassies at the time with a separate office dealing only with deceased American citizens!) My supervisory colleague in that office was Margaret Barnhart. The office was comprised of Peggy, myself and a French secretary. Poor Cecile Tallibert - our secretary! She shed tears with every widow or widower who walked through the door!. She was very sympathetic to all of our clients. When I first was assigned to the job, I thought I would be bored silly as I didn't think we'd have all that much business.... but in no time at all, I found business to be booming!. I'd wager we had an average of three or four deaths a week at that time.

Q: *And it wasn't simply the death or the widow? It was the estates and the complexities?*

MURPHY: Even more than that, Bill. I don't know if this system existed elsewhere in Western Europe at the time, but in Paris we worked with what we called "Living Death Cases". Americans - usually resident in Paris - would seek us out to introduce us to their American or French attorneys and also to leave with our office a copy of their Last Will and Testament. We were often given instructions on the disposition of the physical estate in France - - and also detailed instructions for the disposition of their remains and subsequent memorial service.

Q: *You had some responsibility, I presume, over their wills and their estates.*

MURPHY: Yes - according to regulations, we were obliged to protect the estates if no family member was present. We were also charged with dispatching remains in accord with the family's wishes. From time to time, I recall some of the odd experiences I had in that position.

You'll enjoy this little anecdote: a very strange and very wealthy woman who lived for many years near the *Quai d'Orsay* came to see me one day. She insisted that I visit her apartment - together with her French *Notaire* - to take an inventory of her estate and to review her Last Will and Testament. She wanted to be absolutely sure that her government fully understood her Last

Will in detail. No sooner had we three gathered in her luxurious apartment overlooking the Seine, than she started giving instructions: "This piece of furniture, this Louis XV chair, will go to the Louvre; and this table or painting will go to the National Gallery in Washington. We went through the entire apartment, taking note of the disposition of her possessions. When we arrived at the beautiful, mahogany-paneled library, and she said, "Now, Mr. Murphy - you see those volumes of Shakespeare on the left. The third volume contains my husband's ashes. When my time comes, I'd like the Embassy to give the funeral director orders to cremate my remains. Then I want my ashes to be mixed together with those of my late husband - - - and then flush us both down the toilet!" I was absolutely speechless - - but later was assured by her *Notaire* that it was all perfectly legal under French law - and that her Will contained exactly those instructions!

I feel I should comment here on an extraordinary event which occurred in *November of 1963* while I was assigned to Paris - the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We all recall "*where we were*" when we received this momentous and devastating news. I had been invited, along with a few others from the Embassy, to attend a reception at the British Embassy on the Faubourg St. Honore. A group of us arrived at the Chancery at approximately 8:00 PM to be ushered into a room full of perhaps 150 people - and which was as quiet as a morgue! Not having heard the news of the shooting in Dallas, we thought it all very strange - - until our host informed us of the news flash that had been received at the Embassy a few minutes before we arrived. We, of course, left the party - and went back to our chancery on Avenue Gabriel - where we received confirmation of the shooting - and eventual death of President John F. Kennedy. The next few days were frantic at the Embassy - for the entire staff. Endless lines of people formed outside the Embassy - to express their condolences to our government and the American people by signing a Condolence Book which had been opened in the office of the Consul General - just inside the main Chancery of the Embassy. The Ambassador asked the six youngest officers of the Embassy greet the public for the four days before the funeral in Washington. Being one of the officers chosen, I shall never forget experiencing the sincere sympathy and general outpouring of affection for our nation as I spoke with French people from all walks of life during those very sad days. Everyone waited in the same line....no matter what their station in life. The entire French Cabinet came as a body; Mme Yvonne De Gaulle, the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, and hundreds of others. I especially recall the presence of many of the old mayors of small towns along the Normandy coast - (towns liberated by American Forces during World War II) - who told me, with eyes full of tears, that they would never forget the heroic sacrifices of our men during those dark days in French history. The day of the State Funeral in Washington, the French government and diplomatic corps attended a Funeral Mass held at the Cathedral of Notre Dame - the very heart of France and the central focus of French history throughout the ages. . Together with other Embassy officers, I served as an usher at the cathedral on that occasion.

It was also during this trying period that I first met my wife, Jacqueline (Senouillet). Working in the Embassy Personnel Section, she, too, was pressed into service with the reception of the French public visiting the Chancery. Thus - this very sad occasion held a silver lining for me!

Q: Peter, let me stop here. As the reader will discover from your subsequent assignments - many of them in consular affairs - that you have seen tremendous changes in the Consular Function over the years. I would like you to cite some of the differences between those days in Paris and today. One - we've just cited some incredibly, almost if not illegal, functions that you performed.

Secondly, you experienced a tremendous bureaucracy at the time in Paris, by having your letters delayed and delayed in getting to the American recipient. And, thirdly, a sort of direction, I would argue, that failed to involve the officers and the troops in the leadership of the Consular Section. Do you want to summarize at this point, or look forward from the days in Paris, where you just stopped the clock and gave us some very wonderful insight into what it has evolved into today, at least in terms of those things?

MURPHY: The differences between then - and now - in the consular field are tremendous - as you say, Bill. As I was fortunate to have served twice at our Embassy in Paris, I am in a rather unique position to make a comparison. Even today, I am relatively familiar with the personnel composition of that Mission. One of the major differences between my first and second tour in Paris, Bill, is the size of the staff - both American and French. Layers of useless bureaucracy have been eliminated - very justly so, in my opinion. While consular workloads have indeed increased greatly - the number of people providing the public with service has diminished. You might ask: What has been lost with these cutbacks? For one thing - no consular officer in Paris (or in any large post these days) receives the public in a private office - at their desk - as in the "old days" - Granted.....a certain charm and graciousness has indeed been lost. However - budgets do not allow for such niceties. Of necessity, the Department of State has had to cut back. "Speed - efficient provision of services" - are the key words these days. "Diplomatic form", if you will, is sorely lacking in most consular sections around the world today. The pace and tenor of the work has also changed. The days of the *Grand Tour of Europe* are over. Today's charter flights from Dulles Airport, JFK, Logan and O'Hare are filled to capacity with young - and also older - Americans seeking the pleasure of a holiday or study in a foreign land. Nowhere is too remote or too uncivilized for many Americans today. Often - the more remote and uncivilized - the better!! The services our government offers the public have - of necessity - been reduced. We no longer, for example, accept the public's Last Wills and Testaments for "safekeeping"; or hold their mail in the consular section until they get around to picking it up; or arrange for them to be invited to the Ambassador's garden party. Those "extras" have long gone out the window. The American Consular Service today provides the American public with direct assistance when they are in serious need - and when no other source of assistance is available on the spot. Heroic lengths are often gone to in order to provide the citizen with adequate protection. Think of the work in which we have both been involved over the years: the Jonestown suicides, various airplane tragedies, the drug arrests - and overdoses; horrible automobile accidents, heart-rendering suicides, abandoned families, orphaned children, tragic deaths. Most of the citizens we have aided in such circumstances are most grateful at the moment for our invaluable services - - and then never want to hear our name again. This is natural, of course, as we remind them of a very black chapter of their lives.

A second major change in Consular Services is the inclusion of all officers in formulating solutions to meet an extraordinary situation. As I mentioned earlier, in 1962 no one in the Embassy ever asked my opinion or advice about any subject whatsoever. It is perhaps symptomatic of the evolution of American society that in today's normal Embassy - while there is still a sense of decorum and order in the ranks - all officers are more likely to actively participate in the work-life of the Mission rather than carry out a function with unquestioning obedience. In addition, today all Embassy officers participate in "Consular Duty" - that is, being available in off-duty hours in order to provide assistance in emergency situations. Formerly only

consular officers participated in such work; today it is a given at any Mission that all officers - even from AID or USIS - share the extra work involved.

Embassy Paris - in 1962 - 1963 - was one enormous bureaucracy which had been added to constantly since the end of World War II. Every agency of our government was represented: from the Agriculture Department - - to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. My professional life at the time was confined to the Consular Section - providing assistance to Americans in difficulty; serving as Consular Officer duty officer - - and also, by the way, having a wonderful time as a bachelor in the city of Paris!! Only once in my entire tour did I attend Ambassador Charles (Chip) Bohlen's weekly staff meeting. I recall sitting against the wall - far from the Ambassador - wondering who half of the attendees were! In those days, it was considered rather an innovation to invite at least one - and sometimes two - junior officers to such a "high power" staff meeting. I guess the purpose was so that we could observe "first hand" how Embassy policy was formulated! In any event - I recall being appropriately impressed by this gathering of these wise men (signs of the times - not a woman was present out of a group of about 30 people). I also recall almost choking on the cigarette and cigar smoke which filled the Ambassador's conference room! Needless to say - I was not invited to say a word - and, of course, would not have dared offer an unsolicited comment! It simply was not done in the early '60s. How times have changed !!

To return to your question, Bill: it is obvious that today's U.S. diplomatic Mission is smaller in size than those we knew at the beginning of our careers. Over the years, our national financial constraints have dictated a major reduction - - but, I believe that even if funding was not a constraint, our embassies in post World War II in Europe were far too large. We often overpowered host nations with the sheer size of our official presence in their country. I saw this in country after country. The most shocking example - at least to my mind - was our Embassy in Havana, Cuba. The chancery is a seven story building dominating the city and the ambassadorial residence is almost on a par in opulence with the White House. I am convinced that a smaller Mission allows all officers to fully participate in the work of their own Sections - - and also to learn what is going on in the rest of the Embassy. This kind of a situation offers the individual officer more responsibility - and a greater opportunity to expand his/her knowledge of the various Foreign Service functions.

Q: Also some modern devices have come to help some of this.

MURPHY: Exactly, Bill. The major improvement, of course, is in the field of communications. A United States embassy no longer sends Dispatches or Airgrams or Operation Memorandums (OMs) - all those antiquated means of communication which were sent to Washington via Diplomatic Pouch.....with replies returned months later! I do believe that most posts retain, however the One Time Pad as it is reputed to be the most secure means of cryptographic communication in times of emergency. I recall having slaved over the OTPs for hours in Cordoba, Argentina. This was our sole means of secure communications with either Buenos Aires or Washington. Such antiquated forms of communication were not in evidence in Paris, however - - although they might have had them stacked up in the classified communication areas!! In the Paris Embassy, we had a central Embassy File Room, and a copy was kept of every written communication that went out to Washington or to any other post in the world. This was

an enormous bureaucratic process which no longer exists. Today, of course, everything is computerized.

Before leaving Paris, Bill I would like to comment on one aspect of the Mission which I feel was unique and which - in all large Missions today - I believe is lost forever. I am speaking of the Personnel Office - - and especially two Personnel Officers: Shirley Green Fine and Eileen Kerley. At a large Embassy like Paris, new arrivals experience great difficulty getting settled after arrival. I well recall how much time and effort I personally expended in assisting three young newly arrived secretaries who were staying in my hotel after arrival at post. I was in the hotel for about a month before finding affordable lodgings - - but these young women, none of whom spoke a word of French - spent many months in the hotel. I know that they were initially very homesick and often cried themselves to sleep at night. None had ever been abroad before and so I felt obliged to do what I could to assist them. But my resources - and wallet at the time - were both limited. The Personnel Officers at the Embassy, however, went out of their way to make newly arrived personnel feel at home. I am sure their kindness towards newcomers was nowhere found in their official "job description" - but these officers arranged evening get-togethers for all the new arrivals; they set up luncheons with other young people at the post; new arrivals were often called on weekends to see if they were in need of anything or invited for an impromptu evening supper. Everything possible was done to assist them find housing. In short - - the Personnel Officers at the Embassy did what today's Family Liaison Office is supposed to do - - with the exception that they had a full time job on their hands. I shall never forget their assistance and kindness to me!

While we have taken a short break from this chronological history, Bill, I would also like to add a few comments on modern communications. Just take this project you are engaged in - for example - Diplomatic Oral History. Can you imagine how much our national history has been lost over the decades simply because this history was never recorded? I really admire and encourage you and Stu Kennedy in your Georgetown University project - - as it is most necessary and will, no doubt, be of great value to future historians. It is not, of course, what we record individually but what the historians eventually piece together from the bits and pieces they gather from a reading of several such reports. We all know full well that when a cable or report is sent to Washington from a post in the field, the text is never the "full story" of the subject involved. It is tainted not only by the author's own cultural, educational and social baggagebut often such reports are geared to elicit a hoped for reply. Operational reports of whatever nature are often falsified, exaggerated or just incomplete. Intelligence dribbles away as it moves up the chain of command! Some reports from the field, as we know Bill, are written to please the recipient!! I'll bet even Marco Polo's reports from China to the Doge back in Venice were written "*with an aim to please the Master and to tell him what he wanted to hear.*" As proof of this - we have only to take a close look at the tone - and often the content - of cables sent directly to the White House or to SECSTATE - and often marked EYES ONLY!!

How often have you really been "debriefed", Bill, upon returning to the Department from years spent abroad? I am sure you'll agree that no one in the State Department ever has the patience or the time to speak at length about political, social or cultural happenings in foreign lands - which took place last year.. Besides, their IN BOXES are always overflowing!! The desk-bound State officers have more to do than to listen to officers passing through Washington. I'll admit that I

too felt the same way when I was assigned to Washington - - and was obliged to receive officers fresh from the fields for "debriefings". I'll wager the same holds true for officers returning to Whitehall and at the *Quai d'Orsay*! In my 32 years of service, the only valid debriefing I participated in were conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. No one in State had the time to listen - unless there was some major crisis involving either the Congress or - God forbid - the White House!! Following my initial assignment to the Vatican in the mid-80s, I spent two full days at Langley participating in some of the most interesting de-briefings imaginable. The people with whom I spoke were intimately familiar with my reporting - and knew all the characters about whom I reported. I spoke with experts from all geographic areas of the world - - and I consider that the majority were true experts in their fields. (What they did with all of their information I provided is another matter! I haven't a clue!.) I was, however, most impressed with the sessions - - and also personally gratified that someone else in the world felt that the reports I had written - or had authorized - had some value and contributed in some small way to the formulation of United States Foreign Policy. (Perhaps this is a rather selfish way of looking at things - - but doesn't everyone like a bit of job satisfaction!!)

Q: That is very true - and a good observation, Peter. To get back to Paris: The Embassy bureaucracy was there, in your view, because of what? The antiquated days in which we lived, or was there some reasoning behind this extensive bureaucracy in protecting the individual?

MURPHY: No, I think that our government - as all governments - was hell-bent on keeping records. Records are necessary for the good and benefit of the individual citizens. The importance of maintaining accurate birth, death, marriage, citizenship, passport matters, visa records is quite obvious in the conduct of an orderly society. In the early '60 - while I was in Paris - I experienced the cumbersome manner in which records were created and stored during that era - and then sent on to the National Archives. Today - all that has changed - as I am sure it will change again by the year 2,500.! Modern communications - with the advent of computers, satellite communication, Internet, e-mail, have all improved to such an extent that we are no longer bound by mountains of paperwork. How much easier it all seems in today's world.....except when your computer crashes!! In addition, Bill, the bureaucracy was a remnant of the "war years" - when all governments in the Western World directly controlled the destiny of its citizens. At time of war - it is logical that government grow in size and in power - as individuals are incapable of facing such a disaster alone. The key is to know when to downsize following a national emergency! I think that the past twenty years for our nation has been a period of "*forced downsizing*" not just in government but also in the private sector. "Uncle Sam" must take a back seat during peacetime and allow the people to have more say in their own lives.

JAMES D. PHILLIPS
Rotation Officer
Paris (1963-1965)

Ambassador Phillips was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his Bachelor's degree from the University of Wichita in 1957 and his Master's in 1958. After serving in the US Army from 1953 to 1955,

he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Postings throughout his career include Paris, Elizabethville, Luxembourg, The Gambia, Copenhagen and Casablanca. Mr. Phillips then became the ambassador to Burundi and Congo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 5, 1998.

Q: It is hard to recreate those times. This was the real peak of the Cold War. You were in Paris from the summer of 1963 until 1965?

PHILLIPS: No, I was there from the beginning of 1963. In those days one went to Europe by ship and I think I may have sailed in late December of 1962 and arrived in January of 1963.

Q: What was your job?

PHILLIPS: There was a system of rotation for new junior officers designed to give you six months of experience in each of four different sections of the embassy. I started in the consular section doing routine work. Then I was transferred to the political/military section and then to the economic section. My boss in the political/military office, Jack McGuire, became a life-long friend. In the economic section I worked for Stanley Cleveland who had a major influence on my career. He was an intelligent, dynamic officer who has unfortunately passed away. He took a special interest in me and convinced me to try to become an expert on the European Community. About this time Ambassador Chip Bohlen needed a staff aide and Cleveland recommended me. I spent my last year in Paris working for Chip Bohlen.

Q: What a great experience. Before we move to that, what about the political military side? We still had a lot NATO bases in France. Was there any feel for how the French felt about what we had there or were you too far down the feeding chain?

PHILLIPS: There was no doubt the French were uncomfortable with the status quo. The U.S. had military bases throughout France and there was an American military clinic and PX in the heart of Paris, within walking distance of the embassy. There was a large and imposing NATO headquarters establishment in the Paris suburbs. The French felt smothered and France constantly tried to find ways to assert its independence. Relations between the United States and France were strained to say the least. Ambassador Bohlen had a good personal relationship with De Gaulle but could not do much to change the course of events. In 1964 France recognized Red China and the Taiwanese were forced out of their embassy to make way for the Chinese communists, which didn't help. I knew relations were sour, but as you say, I was too low on the feeding chain to realize that France was on the brink of pulling out of NATO.

Q: Can you describe your impression of Bohlen and how he operated?

PHILLIPS: He was very professional in everything he did, especially in his dealings with figures like De Gaulle, Dean Rusk, George Ball and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He had complete self-confidence. He was a representative of American gentry in so far as there is such a thing; born to a prominent family in upstate New York, educated at all the right schools. He was brilliant, but he was also generous and kind. He would invite my family once or twice a year to

dinner or lunch with his family. He was a wonderful person to watch in action. He rarely lost his temper and always kept his sense of humor. He was one of the last of a vanishing breed of ambassadors. He could pick up the phone and call Kennedy at the White House. He would argue with George Ball over the phone and I would sometimes be privy to the conversation as a note taker. So I got to see him in action and I would sum up my impressions by saying he was a consummate professional.

Q: Were you in this position when De Gaulle announced that he wanted the United States to pull out of France?

PHILLIPS: That happened after I left in 1965. Bohlen's strategy was to keep French behavior in perspective and not overreact to it. He constantly emphasized that France had its own agenda and had a hard time adjusting to its post-war status. He contended that we needed patience and diplomacy in reacting to French pretensions.

Q: Did you find as the ambassador's assistant and a junior office a division over De Gaulle among the staff there?

PHILLIPS: There were hawks and doves. Some argued for a more confrontational policy but there was not a deep division. There were extraordinary people in the embassy at that time. Cecil Lyons was the DCM. Perry Culley was the consul general. Bob Anderson was head of the political section.. They all knew France and understood the situation and generally accepted Bohlen's leadership.

Q: Did you run across French officials at all or prepare things for the ambassador?

PHILLIPS: The ambassador had an executive assistant who was my boss who did most of the front office substantive work. He had more contact with the Quai d'Orsay and other ministries. I went through the telegrams each morning and selected ones I thought the ambassador should see and put them in the order I thought he should see them. I would also work on his schedule. If he couldn't go to a particular function I would make sure that he would be represented by an appropriate officer. All of the military attaches were Army generals or Navy captains. So I had fun as a former enlisted man sending generals to ceremonial functions beginning with mass at 7:30 on a Saturday morning.

Q: As an ex-enlisted man myself there is something about speaking on behalf of the ambassador that is kind of fun. What about congressional delegations?

PHILLIPS: They came in huge numbers and often it would fall to me to escort them around. In those days there was a congressional liaison office at the embassy because there were so many congressional delegations coming through. A mainstay of the office was a wonderful young man who is still there named Johnny Berg, and I worked closely with him. I think I saw the show at the Lido a dozen times because congressmen always wanted to go. There is one story I can tell that shows what kind of person Bohlen was and how things worked in those days. A visiting congressman went on his own to the Crazy Horse Saloon where they had a pretty risqué show featuring an American football theme with scantily-clad cheer leaders using the American flag as

a back drop. The congressman, whose name I don't remember, came to Bohlen and complained that the flag was being desecrated. Bohlen told me to get two seats for the show and he and I went. They were using the flag as the congressman described, so afterwards Bohlen asked the owner of the Crazy Horse to use red, white and blue bunting instead the actual flag. The owner agreed and that was the end of that, or so I thought. About three weeks later, Ambassador Bohlen called me in and grinning sort of sheepishly said he couldn't help wondering if the owner had really kept his word about the flag. He said he thought we needed to go back to check. So we saw the show again and I believe he was a little disappointed that it was in strict compliance as far as the flag was concerned. We had no excuse to keep on checking.

Q: You were at the embassy when President Kennedy was shot. What happened there?

PHILLIPS: I was at a dinner party the night he was shot, November 22nd. Somebody at the party came late and said the radio reported the President was injured. I left the party to get more news. I walked to the Champs Elysées, close to the Arc de Triumph, at 11:00 p.m. to see if I could get an early edition newspaper. As I got close to the drug store just across the street from the Arc I could see several hundred people milling about outside and they were all sobbing, these were French people, and I thought the news must be really bad. Of course by then they knew he was dead. So that is how I learned. Everyone remembers where they were that day. I was moved by the French reaction, by the outpouring of grief. I was at the requiem mass at Notre Dame which De Gaulle attended. It is indelible etched in my mind.

...

Q: You left the European Bureau in 1971, right?

PHILLIPS: Yes, I came back from the inspection assignment in 1970 and worked in the European Bureau until the summer of 1971. Then I was assigned to Paris. It is interesting how that assignment came about. Allen Holmes followed internal French political affairs at the embassy, which is among the best jobs in the Foreign Service. Ambassador Arthur Watson, a political appointee who was a son of the founder of IBM, operated without any reference to State Department bureaucracy. He would only deal with Nixon and Kissinger and Rogers. He wanted to move Allen Holmes up from the internal job to be overall head of the political section. It violated personnel practice to move a middle-grade officer into a top Embassy position even at an ambassador's behest. But Ambassador Watson wanted Holmes for the job, so he simply moved him into it. Personnel was enraged and refused to fill the position Holmes had vacated. I got a call from Perry Culley, who by now was DCM in Paris, and he asked me to take the job. I spoke French and had just come from the successful Vietnam inspection assignment and Watson wanted me too. I have an iron rule of never saying no to Paris, so I accepted.

Q: When were you in Paris?

PHILLIPS: I arrived in the summer of 1971 and I stayed until the summer of 1975.

Q: You were in internal politics?

PHILLIPS: Yes, I did internal politics for two years. Do you remember the big student uprising

in 1968 in France?

Q: *In June of 1968.*

PHILLIPS: I should begin by saying that the internal political position in Paris traditionally attracted good officers. Allen Holmes turned out to be a Foreign Service star. Other successful officers such as Wells Stabler and Dean Brown had the job. The attraction was the close contact with French politicians, journalists and intellectuals. The events of 1968 made it even more interesting. Washington did not want to be blind-sided by another massive uprising in France so the Department devoted more resources to following the French political scene. This meant more representation funds, which meant I could make extensive contacts within what the French call "la classe politique." As a result I became very knowledgeable about French politics. I was nominated for the Director General's reporting award for my analysis of the 1973 legislative elections, which I predicted the right-of-center parties would win. I called the election results accurately, within a two seats margin of error. A lot of people thought the Socialist would win that election. But I rightly predicted the right would hold on to power in 1973.

Meanwhile the United States was experiencing its own political upheaval because of Watergate.

Q: *You are talking about the Watergate period.*

PHILLIPS: The Watergate period. Sometime in 1973 Ambassador Watson got involved in some fracas with an airline stewardess. It got in the papers. I think he had been drinking too much. This was the sort of scandal the Nixon White House didn't need and Watson had to resign. He was replaced by John N. Irwin, who happened to be Watson's brother-in-law. Jack, as he was called, had married one of Watson's sisters. Jack was serving at the time as Undersecretary of State, working with Henry Kissinger who was Secretary. I don't know what the chemistry was between the two men or why exactly Jack left Washington, but he did accept the assignment to Paris. Shortly after he arrived he decided he needed an executive assistant who spoke French and knew his way around Paris and he offered me the job. I accepted with great reluctance because I really did not want to leave internal politics. But I accepted and spent my last two years in Paris as the Ambassador's executive assistant. First I worked in that capacity with Jack Irwin and then with Kenneth Rush, who President Ford named to replace Irwin when he took over from Nixon.

Q: *Let's go back to the 1971-1973 period. Relations with France are unique. There is a theme that seems to run through these interviews among those who deal with the French of both admiration and terrible frustration. Here you were inside the monster. How did you find dealing with the French political class?*

PHILLIPS: It was very pleasant. No matter how the French appear collectively to the outside world, individually they can be charming. The politicians, the journalists, the academicians were by and large friendly. For example, I had lunch on several occasions with Jacques Chirac and with Francois Mitterrand. Of course they did not hold the positions then that they held later. Mitterrand was the leader of the Socialist opposition at the time and his chances of ever winning the Presidency appeared dim. He was happy enough to be invited to lunch by someone from the embassy. And so were other young socialists who eventually occupied positions of power.

Chirac was an assistant to President Pompidou and he hadn't yet made it big on the national scene. The so-called centrist politicians were pro-American and were totally accessible. Only the communists were hard to see, and that was largely the fault of embassy policy.

Q: Was it because you weren't allowed to or you couldn't reach them?

PHILLIPS: You could reach them easily enough. And if you went through a tedious Embassy clearance process you could meet with them. But contact with the communists was mainly handled by the CIA. Everything was so predictable in those days you didn't gain a lot by taking a communist out to lunch. You knew you would get the party line. But the socialists were very open. The Gaullists were difficult on policy issues, but individually there were easy enough to get along with. Those most friendly towards the United States and the ones we worked most closely with were the parties of the center. The Radicals, the Giscardians, the Christian Socialists, and so forth - remember France has a multi-party system. The center parties were pro-European Community, less nationalistic than the Gaullist and more pro-American than the Socialists. They were critical of DeGaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO, for example. Neither the center- left nor the center-right was virulently anti-American, but both were suspicious of United States policies.

Q: Did you find the suspicion was the official policy or when you got to know them was there much interest in what we were doing?

PHILLIPS: No, not really. I could actually write a book on this. The French, since World War II, have had a terrible inferiority complex that often plays out in relations with the United States. France was genuinely opposed to what we were doing in Vietnam. But then no Europeans particularly liked our Vietnam policies. But in addition, the French did not want to see us succeed where they had failed. There was also a French tendency to side with third world countries because they saw them as underdogs. But at the same time most Frenchmen, regardless of party, were defensive about Algeria. Remember the French exit from Algeria in the early 1960s was a traumatic national experience. It caused a deep split in French society that nearly resulted in civil war. French politicians did not like to be reminded of Algeria and they certainly resented any comparison between their Algerian experience and America's Vietnam experience. So there was jealousy and some hypocrisy combined with the very real concern that U.S. dominance in world affairs would undermine French culture and its place in the world. The feeling was summed up by De Gaulle's insistence that the world acknowledge "a certain idea of France," which makes no sense to a non-Frenchman, but which resonates across all ideological lines in France. He was appealing to the French pride in France's history, to its sense of grandeur. But this said, France was part of the west as opposed to the communist east. The average Frenchman loved American movies and jazz, and most French people were sincerely pleased to spend time with an American who spoke some French. So there was ambivalence about America, if not exactly a love/hate relationship, that still exists today.

Q: In regards to the Gaullists on NATO, was it implicate that the French thought that they could have independence from NATO but that if they needed help NATO would be there to protect them?

PHILLIPS: Well, they would not admit it in those words, but that was the case. DeGaulle had a

policy he called “tout azimuth” which meant that French missiles were aimed both east and west. The policy was meant to show that France believed in a threat from the United States as well as from the Soviet Union. But this policy didn’t survive De Gaulle’s departure. There was a feeling that the United States was a hegemonious power that posed a threat to French culture and influence. French policy accordingly was to try to weaken United States influence in general, but not to make it so weak that the U.S. could not defend Europe if needed. The official who most personified this approach was the Foreign Minister, Michele Jobert. Jobert, who was married to an American woman and knew America very well, was extremely difficult to deal with. He saw himself in competition with Henry Kissinger for attention on the world stage. He made life difficult for American diplomats. He was very critical of U.S. policy towards Europe and of course Vietnam. His attitude came partly from adherence to Gaullists ideology and partly from political ambition. He knew President Pompidou was ill and he thought that playing the anti-American card would make him popular enough to have a shot at succeeding him. He actually ran for president when Pompidou died but only got about three percent of the vote.

Q: What about on the left side? We had the Kissinger government. They were very suspicious of the Kissinger State Department. He was both NSC and Secretary of State. He was very leery of socialist governments in Europe. How did you find the socialists and what kind of emanations were you getting from the European Bureau about them?

PHILLIPS: Kissinger was fearful of the socialists throughout Europe, but especially in France. In France they could only win power through an alliance with the communists. Throughout this period the communists averaged about 20 percent of the vote in local and national elections. The socialist averaged less, but even if they were to win as much as thirty 30 percent of the vote they would still need communists votes for a majority. Kissinger was very upset when the Salazar regime fell to a socialist government in Portugal. He was prepared to do anything he could to thwart the left in France, but there was not much he could do. Until Mitterrand took over the socialist party no one seriously gave a socialist-communist alliance much chance of winning power. But Mitterrand was one of the most cunning, Machiavellian political leaders of the late 20th Century. In 1964, the socialist candidate for President got about five percent of the vote, and that’s where the Socialists were when Mitterrand became party leader in 1965. He gradually made the Socialist party the largest party in France. He flirted with the communists but never actually let them get too close, and he used his formidable intelligence and debating skills to present a coherent vision of economic reform. He handled the communists deftly, in effect slowly marginalizing them. Of course the communists were marginalizing themselves to a large degree by blindly supporting Soviet policies that were becoming more and more unpopular in France. By the time a left coalition won power the Socialists were dominate and the Communists were very much the junior partner.

Q: What year did the socialists come into power?

PHILLIPS: The socialists came into power for the first time in the early 1980s.

Q: Did you find that the communists being the running dog of Moscow, were not really a power to be reckoned with?

PHILLIPS: They held a unique position in French society for many years. The communist party

was both a kind of religion and the main social organization for many working class Frenchmen. It was their support system when they got fired or became ill or needed money. It was very strong in blue collar districts. But nationwide it could never win more than twenty percent of the vote. While it was very unlikely that the communists would come to power in France on their own, they formed a large enough voting bloc in the National Assembly to be a force to be reckoned with, but reckoned with ironically more as a bogeyman than as a political partner. The Gaullists and the Centrists used the communist threat to argue that the left was unfit to govern, and this tactic worked until the economy changed dramatically. Blue collar workers started getting better salaries, working conditions improved, immigrants started doing the lion's share of hard menial labor. This led to a less militant French work force and workers began to see their interests better served by the socialists than the communists.

Q: Were you reporting and watching the building efforts in the socialist ranks during your time there?

PHILLIPS: Oh, yes. We were following the socialists very carefully. We saw that they were beginning to make progress. We saw that Mitterrand was a consummate politician.

Q: While you were in France did you find yourself under pressure to explain American policy under Nixon and Kissinger? I would think the theme of their policies would be respected because the French always tried to look for themes.

PHILLIPS: I didn't deal with much the foreign office. I dealt with the politicians and the journalists. My contacts were interested in the game of French politics and they had little time for foreign policy issues. If we sat down to lunch and I said, "I saw Mitterrand on television last night," that would get them going and they would talk non-stop. Their only interest in U.S. policy was how it impacted on French politics.

Q: What about the French press?

PHILLIPS: The French press is quite different from the American press. Le Monde is the journal of record and while it tries to be somewhat neutral it has a pro-left slant. The rest of the papers are party organs. Le Figaro is establishment Gaullist, for example, and Combat is socialist. You knew in advance exactly what line most papers would take on a given subject. The journalists I dealt with, political analysts such as Bernard Lefort, were the James Restons' of France. I had an expense account that allowed me to invite them to nice restaurants for lunch or dinner. They were very sophisticated and well aware of the inconsistencies in French policies. They were also quite cynical about the politicians. The politicians themselves were willing to explain their positions to me. There were never any shouting matches or acrimonious arguments, which might have been expected given the sometimes tense relations between France and the United States. But then I was dealing with party leaders, not rank-and-file hotheads. Speaking of my expense account, there was a family joke that my job description should be "lunch-eater" because I frequently invited people to lunch. When I got a promotion in 1992, someone at school asked my youngest daughter Catherine, who was seven or eight at the time, what I got promoted to and she said in all seriousness, "dinner-eater, I guess."

Q: This brings up another subject. You were dealing with these two groups, the political press and the politicians. Did you get involved with the French intellectuals?

PHILLIPS: I mainly dealt with people from the political class which includes some intellectuals. The political class consists of some several thousand people, mainly living in Paris. It includes the politicians themselves, political junkies that follow them, print, television and radio journalists and a few people from the universities. The ones from the university were really on the fringes. They would write analytical and historical books, but were less involved in day to day politics. I had contact with people like Philip Alexander, a prolific author and radio commentator, who was clearly an intellectual as opposed to a politician. But the kinds of intellectuals you may be thinking of, like Jean Paul Sartre, weren't among my contacts.

Q: Did you find any of this approach that I have found in looking at French movies, this Cartesian way of looking at things. Americans thinking this is the way it happened because it happened. The French think there is always a great plan behind events. Did this enter into the political scene at all?

PHILLIPS: Yes it did. I think without falling into the trap of characterizing a whole people one way or another one can say that some specific French character traits do exist. And such traits were pervasive among people I dealt with. For instance, if Kissinger so much as mentioned Africa in a speech, my French friends would study it, analysis it and ponder whether it meant America was about to challenge French influence in their former colonies. They would always see minor pieces of the puzzle as part of some master plan. I would explain that Kissinger's speech writer probably just wanted to get in a plug for Africa at the behest of someone in the State Department African bureau. But they would remain unconvinced.

Q: Given the events of June 1968 for internal politics were you looking at the students?

PHILLIPS: Yes, we were. We had contact with student groups. We had a program which I think worked extremely well. It was managed by USIA and was called the leader grant program. Now I believe it is called the international visitors program. An embassy board selected young French leaders for one month travel grants to the United States. I was a member of the board and was able to nominate candidates. Because of my job a disproportionate number of my nominees were selected. Let's say we had 25 grants in a given year. Ten to 12 of those would be my nominees. I would try to pick young men and women who had been active student leaders. We hoped that exposure to the United States would give them a more realistic idea of America.

Q: What was your impression of what the French University was teaching? Was it pretty Marxist? Leftist?

PHILLIPS: The philosophy and history departments had a very left of center bent. The professors were strongly influenced by the intellectuals who emerged after World War II, many of whom were communists, or were deeply influenced by working side by side with communists during the resistance. The universities were a great strength of the left.

Q: You came a couple of years after the 1968 period. Were the student leaders following the

same pattern that happens in other countries in that they were much less active after they left the university life?

PHILLIPS: Sure, because you have to make a distinction between the regular universities and the Grandes Ecoles, such as Science Politique and ENA. Acceptance at one of these prestigious graduate schools automatically assures a promising career in government. A lot of the leaders of the 1968 student uprising were very bright and were co-opted into the elite graduate schools. Many of them ended up as high ranking government officials.

Q: What was your impression of how Dick Watson, the ambassador, dealt with the French government?

PHILLIPS: I don't have much insight into that. When he dealt with me, it was mainly about who was going to win the elections. Since I could tell him what he wanted to hear, that the Right would win, I always found him to be very congenial and jovial. I think he was very difficult for some people in the embassy to work with. He had a bit of a Jekyll and Hyde personality. At times he could be charming and he often showed genuine concern for his staff. He never spent a penny of his representation money. It all went to us so we were never out of pocket for our entertainment needs. He would give wonderful parties at the residence and make sure that junior officers were invited. But he could also be very difficult. I think he was frustrated because he wanted to run the embassy like a business, which really can't be done, and because the French were so often uncooperative. I don't think it was an especially happy time for him.

Q: Wasn't it Watson that told a Marine guard to chop down a tree?

PHILLIPS: That is a true story. Our administration officer was named Pete Skoufis, a wonderful person. He had one lapse in taste though. He bought this artificial tree that he wanted to put in the beautiful entrance hall of the embassy. Of course security wasn't what it is today. People could actually walk into the embassy without going through security, but there was a marine guard on duty around the clock. The tree was made out of rubber or plastic and was supposed to look like a palm tree. Even from a distance though it didn't look real. I don't know why Pete bought the thing. He probably got it out of a catalog and thought it would liven up a dark corner of the entrance hall by the staircase. Well, Ambassador Watson hated the tree. Rumor had it that Watson would stay late sometimes and have a few drinks and maybe get a little tipsy. He hated the tree and came down the staircase one night and saw it standing there and on the spot ordered the Marine guard to take the fire ax and chop it down.

Q: Moving on to when Jack Irwin came and you were his special assistant. What was that like?

PHILLIPS: You have to understand that Jack was an entirely different kind of person than his brother-in-law, Dick Watson. He was a Rhodes scholar, a lawyer and a complete gentleman. He was from Iowa, and I think his family had some money, but nothing like the Watson money. He ended up in New York as a lawyer where he met and married one of the Watson girls. Just before he came to Paris his wife died, so he came as a widower. I guess she had died about a year before he came. He had a son and daughter in college, so he came by himself. He didn't speak French well and was not by nature a very outgoing or loquacious person. But he had great dignity. He

was extremely pleasant to work for. I think his life in Paris was probably a bit lonely. He spared no expense to give wonderful dinner parties. He was just the opposite of the French stereotype image of an American. He wasn't brash or loud and he was always beautifully and conservatively dressed. He had the reputation of being one of the best ballroom dancers in New York society and women loved to come to his parties. He had the cache of being part of the IBM family. He was learning French and making real progress. But it was an especially difficult time because of Vietnam and Watergate. Relations with France were not improving. President Pompidou was still alive and Foreign Minister Jobert was Jack's main contact and, as I have noted, Jobert was a difficult man. Jack tried to introduce a more civil tone in U.S.-French relations, but he got little support from Nixon who was on his way out. Kissinger preferred to operate independently of the Embassy. If he had something to say to Jobert he would call him directly. Moreover, Jack didn't drink wine, which can be problematic in France. He did not have an easy time in France, but he made a valiant effort. I believe with time he would have been very successful. He was winning the respect of French leaders and he had a superb grasp of the issues.

Q: What was your role as special assistant?

PHILIPS: The Ambassador had his DCM and his political and economic counselors so I didn't get involved directly in formulating Embassy policy, but I did try to make sure the Ambassador saw the right people. I would go with him on most of his official calls. I tried to get him to meet politically attuned people so that he would understand the political dynamics of France. I did that too on the social side. I worked closely with Allan Holmes who was the political counselor, with John Condon who was the Labor Attaché and with Jack Kubisch, and later Galen Stone, both of whom served as DCM. I helped Jack run his office so that he would be free to devote his time to substantive issues. Because we were often together, I was his closest confidant in many ways. But I don't want to exaggerate the position. All of his top people were first rate and he worked closely with them.

HOWARD IMBREY
CIA, Worldwide Information Services
Paris (1963-1966)

Howard Imbrey was born in 1921 in New Jersey. He received his BA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1942 and served in the US Army during World War II. His career has included positions in India, Sri Lanka, the Congo, France, Belgium, and Italy. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 21, 2001.

IMBREY: Well, they sent me to Paris, where again I was undercover with a news firm. Since then, '63, when a law was enacted which forbade us from using a news organization as a cover. In those days it wasn't forbidden. So worldwide information services was doing commercial public relations all over the world and they got me a post as its representative in Europe, stationed in Paris.

Q: So, what were you doing?

IMBREY: I was handling all the many, many African agents. Now, try to meet an African on the streets; everybody in Africa, white and black, played their own role. But, if a black happens to be passing through Paris one can get at him in a cafe, a movie, wherever you like and nobody thinks anything of it. So, I was handling about ten to fourteen agents regularly from various parts. If anybody had a problem seeing an agent they sent them to Paris and I would debrief them. That was my role.

Q: Paris was sort of the mecca for so many people in Africa anyway.

IMBREY: Oh, yes, all the French West Africans regularly came to Paris anyway.

Q: Did you have any problems with the French? I mean did the French know what you were up to?

IMBREY: They probably did. I guess I can't be too naive about that, but they never bothered me, they never talked to me about it. Incidentally, I had French friends who knew me in Bombay, or even Addis Ababa. They knew I was CIA and they could have easily have told the government and they may have.

Q: I mean, basically, were you sort of under constraints to keep it to Africans?

IMBREY: Not really, I had one very good agent, he was a Frenchman, but he was also very interested in Africa. Let's see, he was the head of a Christian organization that worked with students in French West Africa and I saw him regularly and I contributed to his program. So, nobody raised any problems. He himself was not particularly unhappy about the arrangement.

Q: Well, this was a time when France was going through a period of fairly strong nationalism with De Gaulle.

IMBREY: Right, and that was the time that Guinea said no to De Gaulle, where everybody else said yes. So, we were dealing with all the yes countries and not much to do with Guinea. I did, of course, have agents in Guinea that I was seeing regularly. But the French would have approved of that.

Q: What were we trying to do, just get reports and keep in touch?

IMBREY: Oh, no, again this was all against the Soviets. Most of the agents that had been developed in these various countries were watching what the Soviets were doing in shipping, penetrating the national organizations. This was the era of mass organizations. Do you remember that? The youth, the WFBY, all these mass organizations, and the Russians were playing a heavy hand developing agents and contacts in those mass organizations.

Q: And we were, too?

IMBREY: We were, too.

Q: At this stage it almost feels like if the FBI hadn't been around the communist party of the United States might have collapsed?

IMBREY: Yes, there was something like that, yes. We didn't have that many. After a while Africa was never a great priority and certainly not at the time of Kissinger. I went to a lecture by Kissinger at the War Department and some young officer asked him a question. He said, "Dr. Kissinger, which is one of the important countries as far as American policy goes?" and he said, "India is important, Pakistan is important", and he went around to France and somebody finally piped up and said, "What about Africa?" and he said, "No, not important."

Q: Did the Soviets have a plan or was this just general mischief making or something?

IMBREY: Sure. They were out to use the mass organizations to get them out on the streets in various countries of the world. Prague was the head of the WFBY for example, and they had a lot of people going to Prague to get the people out in the streets in support of the Soviet policies in Czechoslovakia and you know the Americans went there and ruined it for them at one point.

Q: Our concern in those days was mass movements and that sort of thing. We're not really talking about the terrorists?

IMBREY: No, mass organizations were very important and then Sukarno started the third world operation. What was that called? The nonaligned.

Q: Nasser, and Tito and Sukarno and Nkrumah and the Bandoon group.

IMBREY: Which later became the tri-apartheid conference under Castro.

Q: Were the Soviets putting considerable amount of money and effort into Africa?

IMBREY: Gee, I can't say.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling that [words indistinct]?

IMBREY: Dingaparsamonia [as heard] is always there and I can't believe they could have put too much into it. No.

Q: Did you get any feel for your counterparts the Soviet people running these checks? How did you feel about them?

IMBREY: Suave, talented group, could get along anywhere. They were just fine and nice people. Not at all devious.

Q: Did you ever sort, not really let your hair down, but sit around in a bar and chat with them for a while?

IMBREY: With one the name of Devorkian in Addis Ababa who was the chief of the KGB establishment there. He was a very nice, well-spoken man, good English. We spoke of niceties, not politics.

Q: You were in Paris from '63 until when?

IMBREY: Until '66.

Q: You were married?

IMBREY: Yes, yes. I was married in Bombay in '48, '49.

Q: So, this must have been a kind of delight for both of you, living in Paris.

IMBREY: My wife did not mind a bit. She had a background in France. She speaks good French, so she enjoyed it.

STEPHEN PATERSON BELCHER
Cultural Affairs Director, Dragon Student Center, USIS
Paris (1963-1966)

Stephen Paterson Belcher was born in 1916. He worked for the Civil Affairs Division of the U.S. Army and then for the State Department before USIA was created. His Foreign Service career included positions in Egypt, Nigeria, France, and Tanzania. Mr. Belcher was interviewed by Jack O'Brien in 1988.

BELCHER: Yes. And then transferred kicking and screaming to work for USIS Paris, as Cultural Center Director running the Dragon Student Center, but on the African payroll. European budgets were going down as the Agency had to open all these new posts in Africa. Paris was having to close Branch Posts. There were people who had spent three or four tours in France and were now being assigned to these ridiculous little posts in Franco- phone Africa.

Q: Who was PAO in Paris?

BELCHER: John Mowinckel. As I say, I hadn't really wanted to go to Paris, because when my wife was evacuated from Cairo during the first Suez crisis, she got a glimpse of how USIS posts in Europe are operated. Mostly the people are hiding from visiting Americans. Now, we liked the bush. We liked the third world. But the African Area felt that so many African students were in France getting naughty Marxist ideas, perhaps USIS could do something about this in France. USIS Paris was willing to accept this contribution to its staff even though it was paid for by another geographic area.

I think this was perhaps rightly resented by the Paris CAO, my boss and a fine man, Doug

Schneider, who was practically binational. He had been in France before the war, and then worked for the OWI. He thought it was unethical for USIS to be subverting their ex-colonials right there in the metropole. This was undermining France. I had to be careful what I did. But I had fun.

There was a very creative Executive Officer in Paris who taught me how to budget for a seminar. I should overplan and submit an enlarged budget, with a third party accepting the contract for it. Thus, I would get more money than I really needed and could just keep the extra money in my safe at the Dragon Center, for emergency use. Other people at USIS Paris had a hard time getting any reimbursement for representational expenses. I had no problem whatsoever. At the drop of a hat, I could turn on a lovely little reception down in the basement. We had one of the most exciting places imaginable at that time. There's a lot of great American talent in Paris at any time of the year. You can draw on this for lectures, concerts, exhibits, what-have-you. Poetry readings, music, you name it. I would try to have a hook, to attract Africans.

And I would try to take advantage of Black Americans who were resident in Paris. Of 15,000 Americans, I think it was, who were resident in the Paris Consular district, at least one thousand were resident Blacks who had never had much to do with the American Embassy. I wonder whether even Josephine Baker was ever invited to an Embassy reception. Before I came, there had been the March on Washington and a parallel March in Paris on the Embassy. This was the first time the Blacks in Paris had ever done anything with the whites. It was organized by the American Church on the Left Bank, and it was a nice, peaceful, mingling of Blacks and whites.

Q: Reel Two of the interview, by Jack O'Brien, conducted on the 29th day of September, 1988. To you, Pat.

BELCHER: I had been describing my work as Information Center Director at the Dragon Center on the Left Bank in Paris in the '60s.

There was a lot of interest in France in the American Civil Rights movement. And we had quite a few notable American Blacks coming through Paris. Among them was Roy Wilkins, head of the NAACP. He gave a talk at the Dragon Center and then we were asked to invite some African students to meet him at the DCM's home, where he would answer questions. Luckily, I was again assisted by Ms. Yvonne Williams who selected the students carefully and it went very well. Wilkins was a very distinguished white-hair gentleman. A useful exchange was conducted. The students were seated on small gold folding chairs and trays of croques monsieurs and sandwiches would come around. But of course, the vast majority of Blacks in Paris -- Americans and Africans, would have been distinctly unhappy in those elegant surroundings. Again, Yvonne Williams gave me a lot of good advice on how to handle some of these situations. The DCM's soiree was the appropriate thing to do with Roy officially, but she thought we might also expose him to some other aspects of the Black community in Paris. They were part of his parish too, after all. So we took him to Butterfly McQueen's, one of Paris' black nightclubs, arriving about 11:00 at night. It was dimly lit, the people were fairly far gone. The bartender recognized Roy as a familiar face, shook his hand and gave him a basket of chicken wings. Slowly, others recognized this father-figure, soon drunks were falling all over him. So he was exposed to a slice of Paris he had never seen before. That was a good education for him.

Among other visitors we had were a group from SNCC (The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) who had been so active in the southern Civil Rights movement. This was after the Mississippi summer project when three American whites had been buried in a levee in Mississippi. Some of the volunteers had been doing voter registration and were given a trip to visit Sekou Toure of Guinea by Harry Belafonte. So they went out to Guinea and saw Africa. They had a great time and Sekou Toure treated them like the heroes they were.

Art Bardos was the PAO in Guinea and he said, "Flying out of here, your plane goes home via Paris. If you have any problems in Paris, just phone Pat Belcher at such-and-such a phone number." So we got accustomed to getting phone calls, "Hello, I'm at Orly and I have 27 cents. What do I do now?" We told them to come in, and we put them up in our apartment on the Left Bank. We had some quite distinguished visitors - Julian Bond, John Lewis for example. Some times my kids would compare notes about people who would be sharing their room. "My guy's been arrested 23 times. How many time's your guy been arrested?"

They held press conferences. We went around and met the media. They had quite a good time in Paris on their way home, and I think we got some good mileage.

We even had Martin Luther King coming through. A committee of resident Americans was formed to sponsor a speech he decided to give as a fund-raiser for his Southern Christian Leadership Foundation. I was perhaps as high on the official list as they got, of resident American sponsors wanting to put their names down as co-sponsor. He had won the Nobel prize and was going to be going through Paris again later on, to collect it. He came to Paris with Harry Belafonte to give the speech. As a member of the organizing committee, I had gotten a promise early on that he would not touch Vietnam. His talk would be entirely about domestic Civil Rights problems. At this time, progress was being made, and he was a hero. As I understand it, Ambassador Bohlen sent a classified cable back to Washington about whether or not it would be appropriate for him to attend this public fund-raising speech at the Palais des Sports. The Department saw fit to reply in an unclassified message that attendance at the event was not part of his mission to the Elysée Palace. Well, this message went to every official activity in France, the least NATO platoon or whatever. "Don't go to the Martin Luther King speech!" So some of the tickets we sold were turned in. Other people turned them in for cheaper tickets in seats where they'd not be so visible.

I think my wife and I were the only Americans to sit in the most expensive seats. And I discovered that no one ever paid for their seats in that area -- these were for the celebrities and movie starlets and darlings of the publicity firms around l'Etoile. So we were in elegant company at the boxing ring from which Martin Luther King was to give his speech.

Harry Belafonte had arrived in Paris a few days early, to make sure the acoustics were suitable. He's a professional! Paris had never heard such acoustics in the Palais. He also learned from somebody, not from me, about the exchange of telegrams about the Ambassador's attendance and he spilled this to the press a day before the talk and concert.

Well, it went off well, though I regret to say, some of the American students were outside getting

signatures to petitions about Vietnam and it made me livid! But once inside, Harry gave a great performance. The talk was good. Afterwards there was a party by the organizers, and partying continued for the visitors, so they had problems getting their plane to Lille the next morning and had to charter a plane. So they didn't make much money.

Q: Did Ambassador Bohlen ever get questioned by the press about this by the French press?

BELCHER: I have no idea. I don't think so. But four or five months later, when things had closed down for Ambassador Bohlen (France had withdrawn from NATO; Vietnam had become a very real issue; American-French relations were not good at all) I got a surprise.

The Ambassador didn't have many opportunities to meet with French groups but he gave some talks at the Dragon Center, and we could get a few meetings with student groups. His French was excellent. He got every nuance in even the most needling question. Once I was driving home with him after such a talk at the Cite Universitaire, and I had my surprise. In the car, he said he was sorry he hadn't gone to that Martin Luther King talk, as he looked back on it. He should have gone.

Q: You had how long in Paris?

BELCHER: About three years. But I wonder if I could backtrack a bit about one small thing about Cotonou. When I left there, it turned out to be the weekend of the Kennedy assassination.

Q: Twenty-five years ago now!

BELCHER: We were going on a direct transfer to Paris by boat. One of those occasions where the family was put in a basket and hoisted up from dockside, over and onto the deck of the small French freighter-cum-passenger ship. We were the only Americans abroad. We went slowly up the West African coast to Marseille, stopping at just about every major city along the way. The assassination was on a Friday. We set off on Sunday. The ship's crew was very considerate and offered us the Purser's cabin if we wanted to hear the short wave broadcast of the funeral. Stopping off at the ports, I was able to check into what was going on. It could not have been more moving. The Africans personally were so hurt by it, so sympathetic. There were evidences of all kinds -- people signing guest books, memorial services, national days of mourning.

DENISE ABBEY
Cultural Officer, USIS
Paris (1963-1967)

Denise Abbey began her career with the War Information Program in 1944. Her career included positions in Italy, Austria, Germany, and France. Ms. Abbey was interviewed by Lew Schmidt in 1988.

ABBEY: At the end of the 3 ½ years I was told that I was now ready for foreign assignment

again. I went in to find out what it was. And they said Paris. And I said, Paris, France? And they said, yes, Paris, France. I said, do you mean it? Well, yes. You're not going to change your mind? Well, no. But I thought if they'd ever read that I'd had Rome and Vienna and Heidelberg that they were never going to let me have Paris as well!

At any rate, I got out of town in three days. Went out to the West Coast. I said I'll go immediately if I can have two weeks to visit home. My father -- I didn't know then, but it was in the last months of his life. And I'll always be glad that I took those two weeks to visit him.

And then I flew to Paris and I arrived in Paris to be met by my retiring predecessor who said I have three messages for you. Your PAO Doug Schneider says greetings and don't come to work until Monday. (It was a holiday weekend.) Two, here's your mail. And three, I have the refusal of an apartment for you. Now, everybody who went to Paris had to wait one, two, three years and never got an apartment. And here I hadn't left the airport and I have the refusal of one. I said, there's no refusal involved. Dorothy Stansbury who recently passed away, she was Dorothy Ward and she was marrying Ed Stansbury. And she would move in with him so her apartment would be free. So I went to a hotel for a couple of nights. And she said this is silly. Come and stay here and then you can just stay on when I get married. So I had a wonderful apartment on the Avenue de Suffren. As I said, if the Eiffel Tower ever fell over it would have demolished it.

I lived there for 3 ½ years and used it for all the entertainment that I could and had many entertainments. Because in Paris I was working with the department with Ann Eckstein in the cultural part which was sending French people to America and receiving certain Americans aboard, especially the would-be teachers of French in the U.S.A. Now, they were not allowed to teach French in France. Only French-born could teach it. But they could be assistants d'anglais. And they would get the French experience and then go back. And we had 100 or more of them every year.

We had to divide them around about France. And immediately they came and we told them their assignments, 80 percent of them would just howl and cry because they weren't going to be in Paris. Well, two months later we would have a meeting and 20 percent of them were howling and crying because they got Paris and not the other places because everybody in the other places had the most marvelous experiences.

The program in Paris was largely dealing with the educational people and others, but mostly educational, whom we sent to the United States. And as I remarked, what I learned there was it's very, very difficult to break through the French, well, ego we'll say. They're egoistic. Their family, their own group. Nobody else gets into it unless somebody breaks into it. They came to America and they were simply stunned at the reception, at the openness, everything done for them. Please come to my home and like that. And they went back to France to decide, oh, we will do this too. And then all of their friends looked at them like they'd lost their buttons and they gradually froze up. However, if an American who had received them came to France, then there was not enough that they could do for them. And that I must say. Because they broke through that shell.

The years in Paris included the Kennedy assassination. And that had a most extraordinary effect

on Paris. The entire people for once came out of their crust and did stop Americans on the street to commiserate. They came to the embassy in such quantities you couldn't believe it. The embassy spent days emptying the flowers to the hospitals. Because they brought the flowers until the embassy was just piled with them. The newspapers, the whole thing brought a personal reaction that was absolutely unique in anything I've ever heard of French reactions. And it was a magnificent occasion too.

De Gaulle, of course, came to the United States. But they had this requiem mass in Notre Dame on Monday which was the day I believe of the funeral here. And Mrs. de Gaulle was the hostess. And the whole of the diplomatic corps was there. And they filled right straight across the crossing of Notre Dame and all of the public came in. And the embassy people got in the main part. But of course there's five. And Anne and I got there and the French soldier usher waved us in. And we went into absolute darkness. There wasn't a soul there and we couldn't understand. They'd just opened this aisle. And so we got in the front row before the diplomatic corps. Then we heard the thousand pouring into the side aisles and naves, only breathing and movement.

And the whole service was magnificent of course. The church group came in. And then at the end of the service the Bishop of Paris led them out and he broke with all protocol. He stopped by the ambassador to speak and commiserate with him. And then the whole parade went out. So for several days there Paris was not Paris. It just was an adjunct of the sorrow in America. It was a completely unexpected and almost unknown reaction. It was very great.

MICHAEL H. NEWLIN
Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Operations
Paris (1963-1967)

Ambassador Newlin was born in North Carolina and was raised there and in the Panama canal zone. After graduating from Harvard he joined the Foreign Service in 1952 and was posted to Frankfurt, Oslo, Paris, Kinshasa and Jerusalem, where served as Consul General. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Newlin served in several high level positions dealing with the United Nations and its agencies and NATO. He served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1981 to 1985 and as US representative to the United Nations Agencies in Vienna., 1988-1991. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

NEWLIN: I was in Paris, oh something funny. Personnel developed sort of hiccups over this assignment because it was all handled outside regular personnel procedures. But finally when they got the word that Finletter agreed, they did not want to second-guess him. Eventually Personnel called me and said, "Mike we are ready to write your assignment orders to Paris. We are in the process of trying to save money, so we are going to assign you to Paris for five years to save money of transferring you after four. Is that agreeable to you?" I said, "Yes that sounds all right."

Q: But you owe me.

NEWLIN: I said, "Yes." So that was where we were. We were going off then in 1963 at that time for five years presumably. In those days most people traveled to Europe by ship. So we were supposed to go on an American ship, the old America. While we were docked in New York and people were waving goodbye, I could look down and see that the crew was leaving the ship. A spokesman made a public announcement, "There is a slight difficulty with a dispute with some members of the crew, but we will soon be at sea. We advise the people on the dock to disperse, and we will soon be at sea." Well the America never sailed again. The upshot of it was three days later we went over three docks and sailed on the old Queen Mary. That was a very nice introduction to our thing in Europe. We were met in Paris by the head of the political section, John Auchincloss. It was a very interesting assignment indeed. Finletter of course, had been Secretary of the Air Force under Truman.

Q: Thomas K. Finletter.

NEWLIN: Yes, Thomas K. Finletter. He and Eleanor Roosevelt were with Adlai Stevenson the very liberal wing of the Democratic party. The deputy chief of mission was a very interesting fellow called Durbrow. I don't know if you have ever heard of Durbrow, but he was a cold warrior if there ever was one. Anybody that he disagreed with, he call a goddam UN loving twilight sleeping son of a bitch. 'Twilight sleeping' in those days were narcotics given women in labor. I had the impression Durbrow used the phrase rather than comsymp or comdupe. Since I came from IO, I was under somewhat of a suspicion, and since my wife was born in Czechoslovakia, even though she had risked everything fleeing communism he always sort of regarded her with some misgiving.

Q: When you arrived there, what was sort of the political situation in France vis a vis NATO, I mean at the time you arrived?

NEWLIN: At the time we arrived, it didn't really come to a head so much, but de Gaulle was very much on his campaign to increase France's role in the world and independence. Actually while I was there, the NATO mission was really the focus of a lot of activity in that regard. When I first got there in '63 it was not so. I will say right after we got there, just a few weeks after we got there, the Auchinclosses invited us for dinner. They had a beautiful place on the Champs de Mars. When my wife and I got there, the people taking our coats told us in French, "Kennedy is dead." We were just stunned.

Q: November 22.

NEWLIN: November 22, yes. So we went in, and they had the radio on, so during the entire evening we were listening to the radio as to what was happening in Houston and Washington. That was a tremendous shock.

Under Finletter, we had at that time I arrived a project called the multilateral force. I don't know whether you have ever heard of that. This was a scheme to associate the West Germans with nuclear weapons so that they could defend themselves in case of a Soviet attack. The ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) would be on surface vessels that looked like merchant ships.

The United States would control the nuclear missiles but they would be on ships that you could move around. Of course this is something that would drive the Soviet crazy. Finletter was just hell bent on this idea. The minister for political affairs was Phil Farley. He had reservations and said Finletter sounded like the ancient mariner in his dedication to the multilateral force. The French and perhaps some other delegations were not going to have any part of this, but still we spent a lot of time on that.

It became apparent that political life in Paris was divided into segments between the twice a year de Gaulle press conferences. Three months leading up to his press conference there were all these rumors and speculations about what he was going to say. The press conference would take place and for the next three months everybody was speculating as to what some of his oracular statements meant.

Q: I would like to ask you. What did you do. Was your focus on sort of the French association to NATO or was it you know were you looking at the Germans and other people there? How did you go about doing what you were doing?

NEWLIN: Okay when I got there, the political military thing was really sort of the State Department interaction with the American military presence which of course, was very large indeed. SACEUR was just outside of Paris. We had air bases and other military facilities as well as large related infrastructure such as pipelines. So I was involved with sort of liaison with the military from a political standpoint. Once we got an instruction from Washington that instructed the mission to go and see SACEUR, who was General Lemnitzer, and persuade General Lemnitzer to involve himself in the Cyprus dispute since other efforts to solve the Cyprus problem had been to no avail. So Finletter gave me the telegram, told me to go out and see Lemnitzer, and carry out the instruction. So I got in a car and went out and after a great deal of security and questioning got in to see Lemnitzer. I showed him the telegram. "This is what Washington would like you to do." It had been cleared by the Pentagon. Lemnitzer looked at me and said, "These are the God Damnedest instructions I have ever seen. I am not about to get involved in the Cyprus dispute." So I said, "I will report back. If you would like to call Ambassador Finletter, please feel free to do so." I went back, and Finletter and Mrs. Finletter were waiting for me at his residence, I reported, "Absolutely no sale on that."

I got involved in other things such as the NATO infrastructure program as well. The alliance decided to build an integrated radar program to shield Western Europe. It was very expensive and at the time no European firm was capable of taking on such a huge undertaking. At the end, the contract went to Hughes. We were very close to the Germans and assured them we were working on the multilateral force. Then however, Kennedy's death changed everything when LBJ became president. Finletter decided he had better go off to Washington and try to ingratiate himself with LBJ and bring LBJ up to speed as to where the multilateral force thing stood. Somehow he managed to get a rather small meeting with just LBJ and a few people in the oval office. While LBJ was a master of American politics, he had had little experience in international affairs. So LBJ agreed that yes, Finletter should go right ahead, full steam ahead and work with other delegations and broaden the effort and so forth. Finletter came back very much encouraged. But I thought to my self, well, I wonder about those in Washington and elsewhere who have doubts about this project. I mean even though LBJ gave him his blessing to mount a major

diplomatic campaign on this, I just wondered about it.

I guess I had been in Paris 18 months or so, my wife one morning at breakfast came in with the Herald Tribune, and said, "Finletter is out and he is being replaced by Harlan Cleveland." Of course I had worked very closely with Harlan in IO before coming out. So that meant that Durbrow was out too. The first thing that happened was that Harlan's personal political advisor, Tom Wilson, who was not a foreign service officer, but was soon assigned to the mission came out on reconnaissance. I briefed him about the whole situation. Finletter and Durbrow were out. The third ranking person was Phil Farley, who was a brilliant person but rather prickly. In the Department he had been in what was then pol-mil. He had made a lot of enemies in the Department because of his very strong views, including making an enemy of Cleveland. So when I got to work that morning at the elevator downstairs Phil Farley said, "Well I am looking for another job. I am not going to work for Harlan Cleveland." I said, "Now Phil calm down. Harlan Cleveland is one of the most intelligent and creative people I have ever worked with. With you as his deputy here, we would have it intellectually over all the other delegations." Then I made the same point to Tom Wilson when he came out. I said, "Don't let Harlan fire Phil Farley without meeting and talking to him. I think it would be good." Fortunately this was the way it finally worked out. By that time when Harlan came, de Gaulle had really begun his anti NATO campaign. He had decided that he didn't want to go so far as to kick the North Atlantic Council which was composed of ambassadors of almost all European countries, he didn't want to go that far. But he decided he would kick out SACEUR – the military headquarters. There were a number of ambassadors on the North Atlantic Council, who said, "This is all right. The military HQ can go to Germany or Belgium, and the North Atlantic council would stay here. Well if the North Atlantic Council was supposed to manage crises and the military was off in another country, that wasn't going to work. Some Ambassadors didn't want to leave their beautiful homes in Paris. So at any rate it was finally decided that we would have to go to Belgium where NATO was welcome.

Q: Well up to this point two things. One, in the first place, this multilateral force with these ICBMs and all on ships. I mean it never happened, but how did it strike you? It must have been a nervousness about this because...

NEWLIN: There was a nervousness about it. At first I thought it was a good idea because it would reassure the Germans presumably. That is what it was meant to do. It would reassure the Germans and dampen any future thought that they ought to try to develop nuclear weapons themselves. But I did see that it possibly had quite a bit of security problems associated with it. On the other hand it would certainly complicate the strategic planning of Moscow because they would certainly make every effort to find out which ships these things were on and where they were stationed and where they were going. These would be surface ships made to look like merchant craft. Of course there would be security problems both at sea and if the were allowed to dock along with regular merchant ships. I have already mentioned what the Norwegian reaction would be. While I worked on the project loyally with Finletter since it was his main interest, I wasn't too sorry to see the thing evaporate after LBJ came in, and particularly when Finletter left, the thing died.

Q: Well did you have any contact with the French military or the French civilians dealing with

the French military?

NEWLIN: I did not. My main military contacts were with the American military, and planning for their departure and all the problems associated.

Q: Well it was huge.

NEWLIN: We had air bases.

Q: We had supply lines running through France.

NEWLIN: Yes, we had a big pipeline running from Cherbourg or Le Havre running through France to supply the oil and gasoline that we used in Germany. George Ball sent a telegram saying that we wanted ironclad assurances from the French that that pipeline would not be touched. I remember the Ambassador to France at that time was Chip Bohlen. We were at dinner when this came up. He said, "Ironclad jock straps? Where are you going to get anything like that?" Finally we had to face the fact that both the North Atlantic Council and the military were going to Belgium. The Belgians were marvelous. They managed to put up in six months or less a new headquarters for NATO in a suburb of Brussels plus building headquarters for SACEUR and all of the military further away down near the French border. So at that time, that was in '67 I guess it was. Personnel said to me, "Well Mike, you have been in Paris for four years and you are assigned for five. What do you want to do? Do you want to just say you are through with NATO or do you want to finish out and go to Brussels for one year?" I thought it would be interesting to see how this works out, so I said I would like to go on to Brussels. So we packed up and went off to Brussels for the fifth year of our assignment.

ALAN G. JAMES
Political Advisor, European Command
Paris (1963-1968)

Alan G. James was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1920. His Foreign Service career included positions in the United Kingdom and France. Mr. James was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 20, 1994.

Q: Now where were you the Political Advisor?

JAMES: At United States European Command. Let me explain the command structure. In 1963, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Europe, was General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, a capable, avuncular soldier-diplomat, known affectionately to his staff as "General Lem." Lemnitzer had been Chief of Staff, of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I saw General Lemnitzer frequently and enjoyed his hospitality. He was a fine man and soldier. He was also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). His NATO headquarters was designated Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). Since General Lemnitzer, like his predecessors, devoted most of his time to NATO business, his deputy, a four star Air Force

officer de facto ran, U.S. European Command, EUCOM. However, if a major crisis arose in the EUCOM area of responsibility, Lemnitzer would come over to EUCOM and take command. His NATO and U.S. headquarters were only some 10 miles apart. This he did during the Congo crisis of 1963 or 1964 when EUCOM aircraft airlifted Belgian paratroopers to the Congo to protect and evacuate Europeans.

General Lemnitzer had his own political adviser at SHAPE who was called Foreign Affairs Adviser in deference to allied sensibilities. His adviser in 1963 was John Burns, an accomplished Foreign Service officer who later was Director General of the Foreign Service. Lemnitzer was fastidious about not mixing SHAPE and EUCOM business.

I was POLAD to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief at EUCOM who was known as DCINC.

Q: Who was that?

JAMES: When I arrived at EUCOM the DCINC was General J.P. McConnell who a year later became Chief of Staff of the Air Force. McConnell was a tough, smart officer who had survived a number of crashes and did not at the age of about 60 when I met him, land an airplane very gently, as I can attest having been his passenger several times. McConnell was proud of his service with Lord Mountbatten in the CBI theater during the war.

As POLAD my principal responsibility was to ensure that the DCINC and his senior staff (on which all services were represented) were apprised of significant political and economic developments in the EUCOM area, which was more extensive than that of SHAPE; it included parts of Africa in addition to NATO Europe. From the Embassy in Paris I received a broad selection of telegrams daily which I used to brief the DCINC and senior officers. I gave briefings on political issues of concern to the Command, for example, in contemplation of moving the headquarters from France to Germany after President de Gaulle ordered U.S. forces to leave France, I gave a talk on the German constitution and political system. I also accompanied senior officers on inspection trips to Morocco and Libya, where the Command had special interests, and of course frequently to Berlin.

In addition to keeping my military principals informed on political issues, I sent frequent reports to the Department about the political concerns of the Command. That was a time when there were pressures in Congress to draw down forces in Europe because of budgetary concerns. I represented to the Department the apprehensions about draw downs of McConnell and Lemnitzer. Burns showed Lemnitzer one of my letters to the Department which the General thought a cogent analysis of the military's objections to a significant draw-down.

McConnell left EUCOM around the middle of 1964 to be Air Force Chief of Staff. His successor was another four star Air Force general, Jacob E. Smart, who had commanded the U.S. Air Force in Japan and, as I mentioned earlier in the interview, commanded the bomb group in Italy during the war of which my squadron was a part. Smart is a courtly South Carolinian, gracious and cosmopolitan. He had a distinguished war record. He planned the first air raid on the oil fields of Ploesti and later won a DSC for gallantry. He was shot down in 1944, I think, and was a POW until the end of the war. He was delightful to work for. My wife and I enjoyed his company

immensely.

Q: You were just outside of Paris?

JAMES: Yes, near St. Germain-en-Laye, at a base called Camp des Loges, where, it was said, there had been a military encampment since the time of Caesar. That's where I was from the summer of 1963 to the spring of 1967 when U.S. forces left France and the headquarters moved to Germany. Smart was DCINC when President de Gaulle decreed in March 1966 that U.S. forces and NATO should leave France.

Our Embassy in Paris had advance, but very brief, warning of de Gaulle's ultimatum, a fact incidentally, that Ambassador Bohlen did not mention in his autobiography "Witness to History." A night or two before Foreign Minister Couve de Murville called Bohlen to the Quai d'Orsay to receive a note formally requesting the departure of U.S. forces, a senior officer of the Foreign Office called the Minister, Robert McBride, and Political-Military Counselor, Jack McGuire, to the Quai d'Orsay to inform them of the General's plans. With such advance warning, Washington could at least be prepared to make a quick riposte to the French demand to withdraw. April 1, 1967 was the deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces and EUCOM. NATO was allowed somewhat more time.

For the next year, I shuttled between EUCOM and the Embassy constantly, attending Ambassador Bohlen's staff meetings, being briefed by my friend McGuire on Embassy contacts with the French, and generally gathering as much information as possible to be useful to Smart and officers at EUCOM. McGuire, who had preceded me as POLAD at EUCOM, was splendidly helpful. He was bright, precise and ebullient. I enjoyed a most agreeable association with him. I was supposed to replace McGuire in the Embassy sometime in 1966 but Bohlen did not want any of the players to change. So he froze McGuire's and my transfer for a year.

I passed to General Smart information I got from McGuire about French requirements for withdrawal and other information that would assist EUCOM in executing withdrawal of U.S. forces and the long, complex line of communications that stretched across France from the Atlantic to the Rhine.

This was a lively if depressing time, for being expelled from France was not a happy prospect for our military friends or us civilians close to them. John Burns at SHAPE, and McGuire and I arranged for our principals, Generals Lemnitzer and Smart and Ambassador Bohlen to compare notes regularly. Bohlen was a tower of strength during this trying time. Often these consultations took place over luncheon at Bohlen's residence. He had a talented chef and our political-military camaraderie was made closer, more congenial and I hope more productive by sharing the pleasures of the Bohlen table and cellar.

Q: Had there been any intimations that this was going to happen before you got this leaked word? Were you thinking, well, de Gaulle, we better start thinking about getting out of here? Or was this pretty much a bolt from the blue?

JAMES: I recall that it was a complete surprise to us all.

As I have said, McGuire and I were very friendly and talked regularly even before this crisis. I know he would have told me if he and his superiors had an intimation or were predicting that this would happen. In retrospect, it seems clear that given de Gaulle's vision of France, his obsession with fear of domination by the United States and NATO, and his insistence that France should not allow her independence to be diluted, it was only a question of time before he sought to dissociate France from the military side of NATO and order U.S. forces out of France. But when the blow fell we were all shocked and surprised, military and civilian alike.

Q: You're talking about the French military.

JAMES: No, I mean the U.S. military. I would not venture to guess whether the French military were surprised. Our military plan for all sorts of contingencies and presumably they had a plan for just this sort of emergency, that is, for winding up the line of communications, LOC, moving stocks from France to other NATO countries, and withdrawing headquarters and subcommands. But I do not remember any officer at EUCOM saying, well it has finally happened. General Smart I can attest was taken aback by the news.

Q: What about the reaction of our military? You got two days and all of a sudden, you know it's going to happen. Military being military, although it's NATO, it really must have been, "Goddamn the French!" or "What the hell!" or something. How did you work on this?

JAMES: At EUCOM, de Gaulle's decree was regarded as an arrogant act. Expelling U.S. forces and NATO would, it was generally felt, make defense of Europe more difficult because, among other things, the LOC henceforth would have to run parallel and not, as military doctrine required, at right angles to the potential battle line. And there was resentment; we had after all gone to the rescue of France twice in this century. However, senior people at EUCOM were sophisticated and knew how to conduct themselves without much, if any, tutoring from me.

I have the recollection that not a few French officers were chagrined by de Gaulle's decision. Those we knew at EUCOM seemed to be. The French civilian officials I knew deplored our eviction. I think particularly of the French liaison office for assistance to allied forces, headed by a distinguished civil servant, Pierre Dambeza, and his deputy, Louis de Beauchamp, a Proust scholar. Both were friendly to me and senior officers at the Command beyond the demands of protocol. They were too correct to criticize the General's decision openly, but I thought they regretted and were saddened by it.

Dambeza gave a splendid farewell party in his Paris apartment for senior Embassy and U.S. military officers. Lemnitzer and Bohlen both attended. Smart was sick, I think, and did not attend. It was an imaginative affair that showed genuine esteem for the United States and its representatives. Dambeza created, in miniature, the LOC which ran, as if from the Atlantic to the Rhine, from one room in his apartment to another. In each room were laid out the specialities, the cheeses, wines, pates, pastries, of the particular region of France through which the LOC actually passed. It was a lavish affair and a Lucullan delight, but most of all it was a gesture of amity that we all deeply appreciated.

Whatever their feelings about the decision of the French Government, the American military got on with the job and did it smartly. The word went out from EUCOM that the General's timetable would be met. There was little time to bemoan the fact that we would have to leave.

Q: Did you have to help put out brush fires of resentment, such as, well, if we're going to pull out of here, let's do this or that, or make it hurt, or anything like that? Was that a problem?

JAMES: I did not detect a disposition in the U.S. military not to uncooperate or to drag their feet. Ambassador Bohlen and Generals Lemnitzer and Smart would not have tolerated it. They made sure that the evacuation went smoothly and that the public attitude of U.S. forces was politically correct throughout that difficult year.

General Smart left EUCOM before we moved to Germany. His place was taken by another four star Air Force officer, David Birchinal, who had been Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He obviously was a capable officer, but I did not enjoy with him the close rapport I did with Smart. He was a bit of a cold fish. I don't remember much about my dealings with him, except that I took an instructive trip with him to Madrid where he went to talk with the Spanish military. Birchinal was keen on Spain joining NATO, and didn't seem to accept the force of what I told him repeatedly that as long as Franco was alive, Spanish membership of the alliance would be politically unacceptable to the Europeans.

I made a couple of trips to Stuttgart before the headquarters moved to reconnoiter, meet our Consul General and get a line on any political problems the Command might encounter. On one visit to Stuttgart, I was introduced to the Minister President of Baden-Wurttemberg, Kiesinger, who later was Chancellor of Germany for a brief time. Kiesinger was most cordial. He liked Americans. It seems his daughter was married to an American and lived in the United States. Kiesinger welcomed the prospect of EUCOM being in his state and I think saw to it that things went smoothly from the German side. We spoke in German, mine being a bit rusty but Kiesinger was tolerant.

We moved out of Camp des Loges quickly and smartly. Actually, we beat de Gaulle's deadline by a couple of weeks. EUCOM was operational in France until late one afternoon, decamped over night, and the next morning was operational in Germany. We occupied a former panzer kaserne where an American army unit had been based, known as Patch Barracks. This place was a few miles outside Stuttgart.

I stayed with the Command for a couple of months and then returned to France.

Q: Then you moved to be Political Counselor in Paris.

JAMES: No, political/military counselor

Q: You were there from when to when?

JAMES: From May 1967 to September 1968. Ambassador Bohlen left in January 1968, by which time most of the elements of the LOC had been removed and surplus stores sold to the

French. Technically, removal of the LOC did not occur within the time de Gaulle allowed. The French were understanding, however, about the difficulty of dismantling the LOC within 12 months and gave a de facto extension. I think their main interest was that EUCOM leave within the time set. After Bohlen left, the Minister, Woodruff Wallner, became Charge. President Johnson did not appoint a new Ambassador until around May 1968 when he selected Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy's brother-in-law.

Shriver was in office only a week or so when Robert Kennedy was assassinated. He immediately left Paris to return to the States to be with the Kennedy family. In his absence, I was designated to represent him at D-Day commemorations that year. But I am getting ahead of myself. We should talk about that event later.

Q: That was '68.

JAMES: And three months later I was transferred to London.

Q: Let's talk now about your time as political/military counselor at our embassy in Paris. What was your main responsibility at that time?

JAMES: I must preface my response to that question by noting that the fifteen months I was political/military counselor in Paris were far less hectic than the preceding ones had been for Jack McGuire. I cannot say that I was frantically busy.

My brief was to deal with the political/military office of the Quai d'Orsay. One activity on which I spent a good deal of time was arranging for overflights of French air space by the USAF after U.S. forces were withdrawn. I presented the annual plan with rationale to the director of the political/military office. A month or so later I was called to the Quai to receive the approved plan which was considerably scaled down from what the USAF had proposed. I assume our Air Force people were not too upset, at least I was not asked to go back to the French and argue for a more generous schedule.

When I returned to Paris in May 1967, closing the LOC was progressing well. The U.S. military presence in France was fast disappearing. As I mentioned, closing of the LOC, removal of equipment and stores, was not completed by April 1, 1967, but the French had granted a de facto extension. They seemed satisfied with progress, at least there were no complaints at the political level. I made a number of inspection trips to LOC facilities to assess progress. At none of the bases I visited did American officers I met express any feelings of wanting to get back at the French. All were carrying on correctly. It was particularly interesting to note how many former U.S. installations were being converted into industrial operations by French companies or American subsidiaries.

I also saw Dambeza a good deal and talked with him about the sale of surplus U.S. equipment to the French. That, it seems was a business that both sides considered profitable.

Among my other duties was a certain amount of reporting on matters peripheral to the closing of the LOC, such as French attitudes toward cooperation with NATO after leaving the integrated

military structure.

Q: What about dealing with the Quai d'Orsay? How did you find relations were at that time? The French professional diplomats, are they difficult to deal with? How did you find them?

JAMES: On a personal plane I did not find them at all difficult. However, I found Gaullism uncongenial politically, and thought it much harder to represent U.S. interests, present U.S. positions to the French than was the case during my subsequent posting in London where I dealt with officials more attuned to the United States. As political/military counselor I dealt mainly with two or three officers at the Quai, the principal one being the official who at risk to his career alerted the Embassy in March 1966 to de Gaulle's impending demarche to the U.S. and NATO.

I found these men intelligent, well-informed and precise. The Office Director, in particular, exemplified the exquisitely trained French bureaucratic elite. Quai officials were always cordial to me. They spoke good English but insisted, as you can imagine, that official business be conducted exclusively in French.

I cannot generalize about attitudes at the Quai, but I sensed that those with whom I talked and negotiated were Atlanticists at heart, not dyed in the wool Gaullists.

Q: I've never served in France, but my understanding is that the "intellectuals" play a major role in French social and political life. What was the attitude towards the French intellectual at that time in our embassy? Did you have any feel for that?

JAMES: I cannot offer much enlightenment on that subject. The French intellectual establishment was considered brilliant in the 1960s, and Embassy officers acknowledged that fact. Ambassador Bohlen cultivated French savants, along with other segments of French society. You know, he learned Russian at the prestigious Ecole des Langues Orientales in the early 1930s. So he knew his way around French intellectual circles.

There was an excellent U.S. cultural center in Paris. I forget the name. In those days it was popular with the French generally. Whether an "intellectual" or an academecien would have frequented it I don't know, but it was more intellectual and aesthetic than a simple library. In addition to a wide range of books on the United States, the center mounted excellent art exhibits and had a serious lecture program. I was impressed by the Maison...

Q: Lafayette or something?

JAMES: Maison Franklin or Center Franklin. We had talented, literate officers who were able and did communicate, linguistically and intellectually, with French writers and political thinkers. Among the latter I think of Raymond Aron.

Q: Were you there during the embarrassing episode when one of our planes was taking pictures of French nuclear facilities, and the French caught us at it?

JAMES: I don't think I was. I think that happened while I was in London.

Q: You were there when the generals' revolt happened in Algeria, weren't you?

JAMES: No, that was a little earlier.

Q: So, by the time you were in as political/military counselor, de Gaulle was well in power. There was no problem.

JAMES: Oh, that's very true. Algeria gained its independence in 1962. By the time our War College group visited Algeria in 1963, I can attest that the troubles there had ended. When I entered the Paris Embassy four years later, civil unrest in France caused by diehard former French settlers in Algeria was over and de Gaulle was firmly in power. That is, he was until the so-called evenements of 1968 when France was almost paralyzed by a student rebellion and subsequent industrial action by the unions.

The events of 1968 were outside my area of responsibility, but all of us at the Embassy were affected in one way or another and were concerned. The political, economic and cultural sections were most immediately concerned and did the main reporting. The student takeover of the Sorbonne and spreading strikes slowed down French public life for several months. The situation deteriorated to the point where it looked as though there might be anarchy. The state seemed to be in danger.

There was widespread malaise and defiance of the established order. Not having had his subtle, conciliatory Prime Minister, Pompidou, on hand at the outset of the troubles to counsel moderation and find a way out, de Gaulle took a hard line and refused to deal with the students and strikers. Matters worsened and use of force by the government seemed possible.

By late May a crisis atmosphere prevailed in Paris. Tanks or armored personnel carriers surrounded the Elysée Palace. Then de Gaulle disappeared from public view. I remember that Vernon "Dick" Walters, our Defense Attaché, and later Ambassador to Germany and Deputy Director of CIA, was trying to find out where de Gaulle had gone but wasn't having any success. My eldest son Gray, who was locked out of the Sorbonne where he had been attending classes, occupied himself by taking painting classes offered by Madame Debre, wife of Defense Minister Michel Debre. Gary was at Madame Debre's the afternoon de Gaulle disappeared. When he came home that evening he told me he knew where de Gaulle was; he had gone to Germany to talk to the troops, Gray said. It appears Madame Debre had told him the secret. Her husband had gone with de Gaulle.

I was patronizing and refused to credit Gray's account, but later could have kicked myself for not having dashed off a telegram to Washington and beaten Walters to the punch.

A day later it was revealed that de Gaulle had made a tour des popotes, a swing around the army messes, to sound out French commanders in Germany and eastern France on whether they would back him if he refused to step down and stayed firm against demands of the students and strikers. He obviously got the assurances he wanted, for shortly after returning from Germany he made a masterly radio address to the nation. I remember that Wallner called the staff to his office to hear

the speech and watch the crowd that was massing in the Place de la Concorde and side streets which grew to close to a million. The air was figuratively electric. Then de Gaulle spoke, his voice being piped to the crowd by loud speaker.

I do not remember his exact words, but they were something like: "Je me retirerai pas. Je reste." At that declaration a tremendous roar came from the crowd, Gaullist to a man (and woman). After the speech, the crowd began marching triumphantly out of the Place de la Concorde up the Champs-Élysées. It took several hours for the last marchers to reach the Arc de Triomphe. We had just witnessed a brilliant display of de Gaulle's charisma. His bravado carried the day. Student and union resistance soon collapsed.

A couple of weeks later I represented Ambassador Shriver at D-Day commemorative ceremonies, as I mentioned earlier. It was an "off-year" but the Gaullists made it a special event to celebrate their recent victory and show their strength by gathering massively at the landing beaches. Thousands of bemedaled French veterans came; virtually every prefet from northern France was there, resplendent in full dress uniform. There was a sea of Tricolours. I made a little luncheon talk at the Mairie of St. Mere Eglise which the accomplished linguist Dick Walters thought not bad. I spoke again at Utah Beach. I can't remember what I said but my brief remarks went over well with the crowd which was ready to cheer anything one said.

Q: What was the atmosphere in the embassy at this time? Because here you had de Gaulle, who was both a towering figure, but did not view the United States with the kindness that we might have expected. Did you consider it a divided embassy on how to view de Gaulle at that time?

JAMES: The embassy was not divided under Bohlen. Embassy officers regarded de Gaulle for what he was, a towering figure, as you say, a leader under whom France had begun to grow into an industrial power. From the late 1950s when de Gaulle returned to power, France entered the modern technological age and we all acknowledged de Gaulle's accomplishments. But we thought him frustrating and his political and military policies misguided. We deplored his suspicion of the United States and his shortsighted view that France should stand apart from the military side of NATO.

Bohlen did not impose his views of de Gaulle on embassy staff. He did not need to do so, for one naturally accepted that Bohlen's attitude was valid and sensible. We took our lead from him. He was the consummate diplomat and dealt with de Gaulle as effectively as anyone could. He showed us all how to live with Gaullism. Patient, dignified himself, he was an example to us all. I believe de Gaulle respected Bohlen, who assuredly played an important part in preventing U.S.-French relations from getting any worse than they were made by de Gaulle's actions.

Q: Did you see a splitting after that, when Wallner was the Charge when Shriver came in? Did the inspiration at the top sort of go and then any sort of...it's too extreme to say Gaullists and anti-Gaullists within the embassy, but something of that nature.

JAMES: There were no Gaullists among embassy officers. After Bohlen left, Woody Wallner became Charge and carried on in Bohlen's style, insisting on absolutely correct dealings with the French and avoidance of provocative or critical public statements about the General or the

French government. Wallner was a most estimable man, witty, and dedicated to the Service. I enjoyed him and admired how he dealt with Prime Minister Pompidou on a number of complex problems.

I cannot say much about the morale or attitude of the embassy under Shriver. I was there only a short time after he arrived. He had big shoes to fill after Bohlen and I doubt that he filled them with any special distinction.

Although I found Gaullism uncongenial and misguided in many respects, I confess to feeling great admiration for the General. He gave France much to be proud of and restored a fair measure of its amour propre after years of defeats and national weakness. He had extraordinary personal courage. He tried and in a good measure succeeded in reducing internal divisions. I felt honored to shake his hand at the 1968 reception he gave at the Elysée for the diplomatic corps.

Q: So you left there when?

JAMES: September of 1968.

ROBERT H. MAYBURY

UNESCO

Paris (1963-1968)

Professor Maybury was born in Pennsylvania and educated at Eastern Nazarine College, College of Idaho and Boston University. A recognized leader in the field of chemistry, he taught various aspects of his subject at a number of universities in the United States and was the recipient of several organization grants for research at Harvard and other universities. During his career Professor Maybury served with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris and in Lagos, Nigeria and with the World Bank as Executive Director for Chemical Science and Development, heading missions to several African countries. Professor Maybury was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2013.

Q: Today is the 24th of January, 2013 with Robert Maybury.

Bob, where did we leave off?

MAYBURY: I told you that, after six years of teaching chemistry at the University of Redlands in California, I had a sabbatical at Harvard in 1961 under a National Science Foundation faculty fellowship. While working in the laboratory, I got a telephone call from Albert Baez who had been a professor of physics at Redlands, but had gone earlier to Paris at the invitation of UNESCO to set up the Science Teaching Division in the science sector of UNESCO. His call was to invite me to consider coming to Paris to join him as the chemist on the team he was assembling in the Science Teaching Division in the Science Sector of UNESCO. The team

would have specialists in each of the basic fields: chemistry, physics, biology and mathematics. I agreed to discuss this with Helen and, as I said earlier, after returning to Redlands to complete the next academic year, in June 1963 we took our five kids to Paris where I began my work with UNESCO.

Q: Sort of setting the stage, looking at the world in the 1960s, where were the significant centers of chemical research in the world?

MAYBURY: At that time I would say one of the top centers in chemical research was the University of California at Berkeley. The other top U.S. universities in chemical research were Harvard, Columbia, University of Chicago and several state universities in Iowa, Indiana, Ohio and Washington. Worldwide, Oxford and Cambridge were also important and, to a lesser extent the German universities were coming up, but I can't think of any in particular other than University of Bonn. In Sweden it was the University of Uppsala in sciences. These are the chemistry research ones I can think of.

Q: Japan?

MAYBURY: Yes, Japan was certainly prominent. France, the Sorbonne probably.

I am a little ahead of myself but when I went to UNESCO in Paris, I was invited to have a laboratory at the Sorbonne. One of the professors there came and saw me at UNESCO and he said, "If you are going to be a bureaucrat you shouldn't let your chemistry die so I am going to give you a laboratory there." He did, but I never found the time to go there and use it. I got too busy being a bureaucrat. The Sorbonne was prominent as an international university in chemistry research. As were the ones I just mentioned: Uppsala in Sweden, Cambridge and Oxford in England and to a lesser extent, the University of London.

Q: What was your initial impression of the office in UNESCO you were coming to and what it was like?

MAYBURY: At that time, UNESCO stood high in the world's esteem. It was still close enough the time it was founded by the group of diplomats and world scholars such as Julian Huxley that it was still widely and popularly recognized. The director general, Rene Maheu, was well-known as an international figure. UNESCO's entry into science education was welcomed quite widely, although in UNESCO itself, Albert Baez did face some disagreement from colleagues in the education sector who thought he should set up the science teaching division in their sector and not in the science sector. This proved to be an issue of contention for years.

The head of the science sector in UNESCO was a Russian scientist, Professor Victor Kovda, an academician in Russia and probably one of the leading geologists in the world. I also remember that the biology division was staffed by several outstanding scientists. Other than myself, there were no other chemists in the science sector at that time; I was the first chemist to appear on the scene there. Since there was no chemistry division, it was not organized like a university, but was organized more along program lines. As the director of the new science teaching division, Albert Baez was held in quite a bit of esteem in UNESCO, including among the educators.

Baez brought in an Argentinean physicist, Nahum Joel, to be the specialist in physics education in the science teaching division. Joel was a good physicist, but not of world class. For that matter, neither were any of the others Baez brought in to complete the staff of the division of science teaching. Hence, in the science teaching division, I met no world class scientists of the kind I had known at Harvard, so I would say the scientists in that division were very much like those I knew in the American Chemical Society, where I was the Member-at-Large of the science education division.

As for the rest of the science sector at UNESCO, I found several scientists who were world class. One was the distinguished biologist, Rita Colwell, a woman who later became head of the U.S. National Science Foundation and is now a leading professor at the University of Maryland. She was one of the most highly distinguished scientists in UNESCO at that time. She was very approachable and I had several opportunities to talk shop with her.

Of course, for me UNESCO was totally unexplored territory. There was a very fine Nigerian scientist, Stephen Awokoya, who had been the minister of education in Nigeria prior to joining UNESCO. At that time, no African country was considered anything other than hopelessly undeveloped, but Awokoya stood out for his qualities of leadership. He had been an Oxford graduate in physics and in UNESCO held a diplomatic position as Deputy Director General of the science sector. He was personally both sincere and friendly and took a liking to me. As the years went on, I was beginning to wonder whether perhaps I should try to get back into chemistry at a university, but he would say to me: “Bob, you are the top chemist here, so remember, bring that to your work and help build the chemistry program here at UNESCO.” This describes quite well the atmosphere that I found at UNESCO, especially after Albert Baez resigned in about 1968.

Q: UNESCO later had a problem but at that time it was riding high, would you say?

MAYBURY: It was riding high. The first problem occurred after I had been there for about six years and I think it had to do with Israel. Israel felt UNESCO had mistakenly blamed Israel for damaging one of the holy places in Jerusalem, so Israel momentarily withdrew in anger from UNESCO. Eventually, that got resolved. Since I wasn't working in the front office of UNESCO, I only knew that the various national delegates to the general conference of UNESCO had voted in favor of the UNESCO position, but the government of Israel was unhappy about this and withdrew.

Back in the U.S., events like this always seemed to produce a very negative impression of UNESCO, in part, I believe, because the Jewish lobby here was very strong and pointed out that UNESCO did not take the Israeli position on this, even though the general conference of UNESCO had voted against the Israeli position. I began to get some understanding of how UNESCO stood in the eyes of the U.S. public, for I had occasion to return to the U.S. on leave every two years. During those visits home, I would present talks to various universities about UNESCO and was generally received with great respect by people who introduced me to the audiences.

As time went on, I became aware that the political position of UNESCO in the U.S. was increasingly, what shall we call it? contentious, not always given top ranking. I remember well how in the spring of 1963, the Los Angeles papers carried an article announcing that Robert Maybury was leaving the University of Redlands to join UNESCO in Paris. That period was at the height of the anti-UN period in California and not only there, but all through the U.S. there were signs reading "Get the U.S. out of the UN and the UN out of the U.S."

Anyway, after this announcement appeared, an organization in Los Angeles called the truth squatters, organized by one of the right wing groups in California, traveled out to Redlands with the intention of warning the students about the "communist" organization UNESCO and accusing me of being a traitor to the country for going to UNESCO. I didn't have to meet with them to defend myself or UNESCO; the students themselves took this group on and, rising up as a whole, told the group point blank that they did not want their anti-UN message on the campus. It was quite a wonderful thing to see the students defend me. They had just elected me that year as the professor of the year, so I was already held high in esteem among them. They recognized with pride my being asked to come to UNESCO. I remember this incident well.

Q: When you arrived in UNESCO, what did you see your immediate task?

MAYBURY: Well, as I told you yesterday, I had responded favorably to the invitation from Albert Baez to come to UNESCO because I saw going there was very much a response to Kennedy's famous words.

Q: Ask not . . .

MAYBURY: Exactly, that's it. I said to Helen, here's a chance I have to live up to the message of those words. After all, in Redlands I had a wonderful situation - - I had received sizeable grants for the research I was doing; I had a very good laboratory and even had a post-doctorate working with me; I had undergraduate students working on research with me. So, as I said earlier, seeing that I've had such a favorable situation, I really should reach out to others in their need. And Albert Baez was offering me the chance to do this.

Q: Did the upper reaches of the UN look down upon you and give orders? Or would you say UNESCO was pretty much on its own?

MAYBURY: No, there is no hierarchical relationship in the United Nations, with the UN considering itself superior in operational power, or for that matter, in juridical status, to its specialized agencies. As for our day by day relationship with the UN, there was no occasion for us as individual scientists and staff members to get orders from a UN official. A specialized agency like UNESCO operates under general policies set by its governing council, a group of individuals selected by its member states. There are of course on-going relationships of each agency with the main UN, but these are determined through periodic consultation and negotiation. In our actual day by day work, we had no occasion to have any contact with the United Nations itself, although as I will mention later, I did have several occasions to work cooperatively with an officer of the UN in planning or implementing a particular scientific project or program.

Albert Baez had been a colleague and personal friend when we were at Redlands, so I enjoyed a very comfortable relationship with him at UNESCO in Paris. He just let me plan the program as I wanted to. When I arrived in Paris, he said, “Bob, I think the main thing for you to do during the first period you are here is to organize a chemistry pilot project in a region of the world you choose. Since I have started the physics pilot project in Latin America, why don’t you choose Asia?”

I agreed to organize the project in Asia and spent my first year planning the program in detail. By the way, having a secretary those days meant the lady would come and sit in your office, take your dictation and then go to her room and type the letters for your signature.

As my first step in planning, I got in touch with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris and ask the person in their science education office for information about programs for upgrading science teaching in each of the sciences. I also got information about such programs in other countries, including the Nuffield Foundation’s program in England and programs in Australia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. With Professor Kovda’s encouragement, I decided to have the first planning meeting of the pilot project in Moscow and corresponded with leaders of the national chemistry curriculum improvement programs, inviting them to the planning meeting.

In the years I was at Redlands I had been active in the American Chemical Society, so I knew quite a few chemists from other U.S. universities. As word got around about my going to UNESCO, I heard from some of these chemists saying they’d be interested in spending some sabbatical time with me at UNESCO. When I heard from a professor of chemistry at Grinnell College saying he would like to come for a full academic year, I agreed he come and work with me getting the pilot project started. I was pleased that the Assistant Director General of UNESCO, John Fobes, worked out a legal contract permitting a visitor to work voluntarily with me in UNESCO, the contract providing a fee of one U.S. dollar and covering insurance and other technical, administrative aspects. Later that year, a second person (a professor of chemistry from Tufts University) joined me for his sabbatical year under this arrangement.

In preparing for the Moscow meeting, I got publications and aids from all the national curriculum improvement programs that had agreed to participate: the Nuffield Chemistry program in England; two programs in the U.S. - the Chem Study program based at Berkeley and the Chemical Bond Approach program based on four U.S. colleges; a chemistry program from Czechoslovakia; a USSR program on the chemistry curriculum; and a chemistry curriculum improvement program in Australia. All these materials arrived in my office at UNESCO and I loaded them into large aluminum containers to take with me to Moscow.

The USSR National Commission for UNESCO in Moscow then reached agreement with the National Pedagogical University in Moscow that they would serve as host for this meeting planning the pilot project. The professor from Grinnell then helped me to load the large containers of the curriculum materials into the taxi cab to the railroad station, where I boarded the sleeper train for Moscow. I traveled nonstop to Moscow, going first through the Berlin Wall, then into Poland, and finally to Moscow. All these containers with the curriculum materials and

also some chemical equipment were with me in my sleeper compartment. On arrival in Moscow, I took a cab to the hotel and then to the university to meet the scientists I had invited to the meeting.

I had requested each curriculum program to send a scientist to the meeting. At the meeting, the scientists asked: “Where will this project take place?” and I replied we had decided to organize it in Asia. When they then asked “Well, where in Asia?”, I asked them about their suggestions of places they knew in Asia. However, most knew no more about Asia than I did, so the issue of the project location was left open for the time being. They then decided that the nine Asian countries should select participants from among science educators. Since China was not a member of the UN at that time, this meant Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Iran, Korea, South Korea and Taiwan. They also agreed to call it the “Pilot Project on Chemistry Teaching in Asia.”

The plan for the pilot project called for UNESCO to convene the project for one full year in a laboratory somewhere in Asia. Each country would select a participant who, after the year at the project, would return to his/her country and take a leading part in upgrading the chemistry curriculum in the schools of the country. The plan also called upon UNESCO to recruit the instructional staff for the project from among scientists who were leaders in improving the teaching of chemistry and place them at the project’s laboratory for a full year. This proved to be one of my most challenging tasks once I returned to Paris from the meeting. I eventually contacted individuals I knew were chemists who were leading reform projects in chemistry in their countries. These turned out to be from the U.S., Europe and Australia.

I returned to Paris after that meeting and finalized the draft of the planning document the participants had prepared in Moscow. My next responsibility was to plan my travel to all the countries that would be invited to send participants to the project. On this trip, I would be traveling over the next month or two and spend two or three days in each country. Since planning a trip this extensive meant I would have to contact the national commission for UNESCO located in each country of the countries in Asia, I asked the Bureau of Member States in UNESCO to help me make appointments with the delegate of each of these countries, who sits permanently there in UNESCO in Paris.

At this appointment with each delegate of an Asian country to be involved in the pilot project, I explained the purpose and plan of the pilot project and then requested that he inform his country’s National Commission for UNESCO about the date and purpose of my visit. That purpose, I said, was to meet appropriate science education people and ask them to identify a scientist or science educator in their universities or teacher training institutes whom they would send to the pilot project as a participant.

Thus began my typical life, I would say, as a staff member of UNESCO, primarily working on the planning of this pilot project. This consumed most of my first two years and included the long trip to all Asian countries to explain the pilot project and assist their UNESCO offices to select participants to the pilot project. I also began forming useful links with individual scientists, one I remember well was Pradit Cheosakul, the Minister for Science of Thailand and a member of the executive board of UNESCO. I remember when he was a delegate to the General Conference of UNESCO in Paris, how he came to my office and invited me to join him at lunch.

That's when he informed me that Thailand would provide the laboratory and classroom at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok as the headquarters for the pilot project.

I also remember that another of the first tasks Albert Baez asked me to take on was to arrange a link between UNESCO's program in chemical education and the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). Baez wanted of the science disciplines in the science teaching division to have a link with its respective international scientific union. These unions had existed for probably a hundred years, but most did not have a committee for education in their respective science. Hence, I wrote to the president of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, who at that time was Lord Todd, an eminent professor of chemistry at Cambridge University in England, and explained UNESCO's interest in establishing an appropriate link between our science teaching division and IUPAC. Lord Todd then invited me to come to Cambridge and sit with him at High Table to discuss this matter. During that luncheon, I explained our hope for a meaningful link between our division and IUPAC and he agreed at once to set up a IUPAC committee on chemical education, appointing its first chairman, Ronald Nyholm, at that time a professor of chemistry at the University of London. Nyholm eventually was knighted to become Sir Ronald Nyholm.

During my time at UNESCO, I got to know "Ron" Nyholm very well. Whenever I went to London to talk about the IUPAC chemical education committee, he would say "Come up the back door, Bob," meaning I should go to the back door at the University of London and use the elevator that came up into his office. The first thing he'd do when I arrived was to say "Come in, Bob" and then he'd pull open his desk drawer and get out a bottle of sherry and we'd have a sherry together as we talked business. I got to know Ron Nyholm very well and he became an exceedingly effective chairman of that IUPAC committee. The committee exists to this day, meeting regularly whenever IUPAC convenes its annual meetings. That committee has become a very major supporter of improving chemical education globally.

So now the UNESCO chemistry pilot project in Asia was off to a start. I had completed various organizational matters - - selecting the scientists to staff the project, accepting participants from each Asian country, and signing the agreement with the Thailand government for a laboratory at Chulalongkorn University. Finally, I signed a contract between UNESCO and Dr. Lawrence Strong, professor of chemistry at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana, U.S.A., to be director of the pilot project for its first year and arranged for him and his family to travel to Bangkok. He had been director of the Chemical Bond Approach project, one of the two major curriculum improvement projects here in the United States. Associating with him that first year in Bangkok were several chemists from other chemistry curriculum improvement projects, including Frank Halliwell, head of the Nuffield Chemistry Project in England, who traveled back and forth between London and Bangkok many times that first year, and Yaroslav Zyka, professor of chemistry from Charles University in Prague, Czechoslovakia, who also traveled back and forth many times to be part of the teaching staff at the pilot project.

The plan of the pilot project called for participants to develop audiovisual teaching aids to accompany the text, so I needed to find a specialist in making 8 millimeter films. When I learned about Dennis Seegalar, the top film maker of the Shell Chemical Company in London, I met him and his superiors at Shell, reaching an agreement with Shell to release him for a limited time to

join the staff at the pilot project in Bangkok. He spent many, many weeks there working on teaching the participants how to make 8 millimeter films on specific aspects of chemistry. Those films were then sold to chemistry teachers of many countries through national chemical societies.

One other teaching aid developed in the pilot program was programmed instruction, a popular method at that time. It was espoused by a top educator at Columbia University, so I signed a contract between UNESCO and him to spend a month or so at the pilot project working with Lawrence Strong and the participants to develop programmed instruction material in chemistry. This is how the pilot project brought the staff scientists and participants together with outside experts to develop innovative teaching aids as well as updated subject material in chemistry.

Q: What were you finding out in the field?

MAYBURY: In my visits around Asia, especially on that first visit to inform each country about the pilot project, I realized I had made a sensible decision to get involved in promoting the improvement of chemistry internationally. For what I was seeing now just added to what I had seen in those two previous missions abroad that I described to you last time we met: the first in 1962 when I went to Pakistan for USAID, and the second in 1963 when I went to the Central American countries for the NSF, namely, how sad developing countries can be when you get into their science laboratories. That was even true at the research level. They are so out of touch with the main currents of research. They lacked the appropriate periodicals in the libraries. They don't have really up to date equipment and the general atmosphere of doing research in a Third World country is a very bleak atmosphere to say the best. I had already seen this in both my previous visits overseas.

Q: How in general or maybe in specific terms, how did you in UNESCO push your programs and improve the schools and all?

MAYBURY: As I indicated, I had responsibility for the chemistry program of the science teaching division and carried this out by working along two lines: first, I cooperated with the Committee on Chemical Education of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) that Lord Todd had created in response to my request. Over the years I was in the science teaching division, I worked continuously with this IUPAC committee. I would go over to London to meet Ron Nyholm, the committee's chairman, probably two or three times a year. One significant way this committee cooperated with UNESCO was for Nyholm and his colleagues, who were themselves scientists from several different countries, to identify an appropriate scientist who could be an advisor to the editor of a new UNESCO periodical entitled New Trends in the Teaching of Chemistry. In turn, I found it useful to participate in the annual meeting of this IUPAC committee wherever they convened. From funds available to our science teaching division, I was able to provide a grant each year to the IUPAC committee for activities they developed in cooperation with chemical educators in many countries.

The second line I pursued in carrying on the division's work in chemistry was to support the chemistry pilot project based in Bangkok. I had to do the early planning and follow-up work and then travel to the countries in Asia that agreed to participate to help select the participants. I then found the staff members of the project, especially the person to be its director. After the close of

the project's first year in 1966, Dr. Lawrence Strong, its director that year, returned to his college in the U.S., so I had to find a replacement for the project's second year. This was Ted Watton, an Australian chemistry professor from the University of New South Wales. I had him come to Paris for briefing before he took up his post in Bangkok. I also traveled to Bangkok several times over the next two years to support him in his work there.

After the two-year period with Watton as director, I had to find a scientist to take his place and found Dr. Yaroslav Zyka of Charles University in Prague, Czechoslovakia, who had been active in improving the teaching of chemistry in the schools of that country.

In recounting these different actions of mine in response to your question about how we pushed our programs to improve science teaching in schools around the world, I realize I should have told you right up front - - even before I started describing what we were doing in the science teaching division of UNESCO - - how Albert Baez constantly entreated all of us working with him to keep in focus one fundamental viewpoint on our work: he knew very well that our group of six or seven scientists was the total manpower of UNESCO's science education force, but to think this small group could manage changes in science education at millions of schools and thousands of universities around the world would be preposterous. Instead, he entreated us to recognize our limited size, especially in view of the enormity of the educational problems we seek to help resolve, and thereby understand our necessity to be "catalysts" - - that is, to influence change by practical steps we can take with others, these steps often time being as little as to raise their awareness of a problem, or to get them to view a problem from a different perspective.

So I believe sincerely that my working along these lines I've just outlined - - cooperating with the IUPAC committee on chemical education, and planning and managing the UNESCO pilot project on chemistry in Asia - - was the catalytic way I tried to place my limited abilities and resources behind efforts to improve the teaching of chemistry, whether in the schools and universities of the Asian countries, or elsewhere in the world. I know from contacts and correspondence I had as the pilot project was concluding, around 1969 and 1970, that there were beginnings of concrete efforts to improve science teaching in several of the countries whose scientists had been involved in the pilot project. Let me mention just one of these - - the setting up of a UN Development Programme (UNDP) project in Thailand to establish the national center for science education improvement.

In addition to what I have just told you about my work in UNESCO, there were a number of other very interesting assignments I had while a member of the science teaching division in UNESCO. In January 1964, I was asked to represent UNESCO at the Pugwash Conference that convened for a week at the Udaipur Palace in India. This international conference is convened every two years with representatives of major international organizations to discuss the hope of disarming nations and devoting their resources to peaceful enterprises. I was assigned to a working group, which included Indira Gandhi, who at that time was still a regular citizen of India. I prepared a report on the conference proceedings for submission to Dr. Kovda, the head of the science sector at UNESCO.

In early 1969, the Director General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu, in one of the staff meetings I

attended with Alfred Baez, brought up an Israeli request for a meeting on improving science in the schools of the nation of Israel. Maheu pointed to me and said, “Maybury, you be the person that liaises with the delegate from Israel.” Why he picked me I don’t know, but he did.”

The next thing I knew, David Avidor, the delegate of Israel, came to my office and began a series of discussions we had repeatedly over the next month or so as we planned that meeting in Israel. I gave him a list of scientists I knew from different countries that he should invite to it. I then traveled to Israel for the meeting in the summer of 1969, when I met David Avidor, Golda Maier, Aba Eban, and David Samuel of the Weizmann Institute. I enjoyed a very good interaction with Israeli scientists and Israeli political people and found that UNESCO stood very high in reputation. I had opportunity to present a paper describing the progress of the chemistry pilot project, with an Israeli participant being present.

Another interesting assignment I had over the years I was in the science teaching division was to serve as project officer for several UNESCO projects financed by what are called extra-budgetary sources, these being the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and various governmental and even private sources. The UNDP provided funding to UNESCO projects that provided technical assistance to a country’s science ministry or universities. One of these for which I was the project officer was the UNDP/UNESCO project assisting the University Grants Commission in New Delhi, India; another was the Science Faculty of the University of Islamabad, Pakistan; and a third was the National Teachers Training College, Teheran, Iran. I traveled at least once a year to India, Pakistan and Iran for discussions with local officials responsible each project.

I served similarly as project officer for UNESCO post-graduate courses in science, financed jointly between UNESCO and governments of the host countries. Each of us in the science teaching division were assigned responsibility for each such course that lay in our particular discipline, mine being in chemistry. Hence, I visited once a year the post-graduate course in analytical chemistry at the University of Lyon, France, and the course in chemical engineering at the University of Kiel, Germany, and the course in organic chemistry at the University of East Anglia, England.

Amidst this busy, but most rewarding schedule of contacts with scientists in many countries, in 1969, I received a message from Dr. James Rutherford, Executive Director of the Harvard Physics Project at Harvard University, asking if I would take leave from UNESCO and serve as the Acting Executive Director of Harvard Project Physics, replacing him for one year, beginning September 1969. He wanted to devote the year to study of the many papers and documents from the laboratory of the Nobel Laureate, Enrico Fermi, an Italian scientist who played a critical role in developing the atomic bomb. Rutherford had visited Madame Fermi in her home in Italy, where Fermi’s papers had been stored after his death. Rutherford brought back to Cambridge all of Fermi’s writings, photographs and other material so he could develop a film on the life of Fermi for use in training institutes for teachers who use the Harvard Project Physics program textbook.

Since I had been working at UNESCO since 1963, I was ready for a sabbatical leave, so I was pleased to have an opportunity to become involved in a major science curriculum project.

Harvard Project Physics was funded by grants totaling some millions of dollars from U.S. government and private foundations. The project is based on a holistic approach to physics, especially the cultural and historical aspects of physics. Its co-founder was Dr. Gerald Holton, a professor of physics at Harvard whom I had gotten to know. He is one of America's leading intellectuals, a lot like Julian Huxley, and quite widely respected by universities and government organizations as a scientist, physicist, and a truly socially concerned person. I served as the acting executive director of Harvard Project Physics for the full academic year beginning September 1969. Not only did I have opportunity to work closely with scientists and educational specialists involved in developing the course text and teaching aids, but also to discuss with secondary school teachers their interest in teaching Harvard Project Physics. Being away from UNESCO and being at Harvard proved a comfortable respite from my administrative work at UNESCO.

In the fall of 1970, I left Harvard Project Physics and returned to UNESCO in Paris. Meanwhile Albert Baez had retired and an American engineer, Harold Foecke, was now the director of the division of science teaching. Harold Foecke made several very basic changes to the division, beginning with renaming it the Division of Science and Technology Education and altering its goal to include promoting technology education at the secondary school level. He asked me to continue my responsibility for education activities in chemistry. Since the chemistry pilot project was about to close, I traveled to Bangkok to cooperate with the project staff in preparing a formal study of its accomplishments and recommendations for further UNESCO efforts to improve chemical education. As I mentioned earlier, I also cooperated with the local UNDP office in developing the project document for a national science education center in Thailand. This document outlined the goals, working plan and staff personnel for the science education center, which would be supported by a multimillion dollar grant from UNDP.

On returning from Bangkok to Paris, I was continuing to work at UNESCO when I received a call from Dr. F. Champion Ward, a senior Ford Foundation education officer. He was in Paris and asked me to meet him at his hotel to discuss a Ford Foundation proposal. When we met, he invited me to consider undertaking a one year study of Ford Foundation projects for improving science education in developing countries. Ford Foundation would meet my travel and maintenance costs and provide my income for the year. I accepted the invitation and, on obtaining a leave from UNESCO, I traveled to Ford Foundation headquarters in New York to discuss the plan for this year of work. Between September 1972 and September 1973, I was to travel to five countries, Turkey, Lebanon, Philippines, Argentina and Brazil, spending two months in each country interviewing the people who had participated in the science education projects funded by the Ford Foundation over the past 20 years.

PERRY J. STIEGLITZ
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1963-1967)

Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Marseille (1968-1970)

Perry J. Stieglitz was born and raised in New York. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. His career included assignments in Laos, France, Thailand, and Belgium. Mr. Stieglitz was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1992.

STIEGLITZ: When it was time for me to leave Laos, to my great joy my next assignment was as Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer in Paris. I went to call on the Prime Minister to say goodbye. He graciously received me. I asked, "Altesse, is there anything I can do for you in Paris?" He replied, "Oh, no." And then he added, "Yes. Once in a while, look after my children."

Q: What year was this?

STIEGLITZ: This was in 1963. I got to Paris at the very time the branch posts of USIA were being closed. As you recall, we kept opening and closing branch posts, and this was a period of closure. Lee Brady was the PAO. I hadn't been there more than a few weeks when Lee called me into his office to tell me he was giving me the best possible assignment. He explained what it was, and I agreed it was the best. He put me in charge of all cultural and informational programs throughout France, outside of Paris.

Q: Were you still based in Paris?

STIEGLITZ: Yes. I had an apartment in Paris and an office and assistant at the embassy, but most of my time was spent going about the country, creating and directing cultural and informational programs. It was glorious.

In good weather, I would drive. During the winter, I would take the train or fly. As a consequence, I got to know France far better than most Frenchmen could ever hope to know it. I got to know the mayors of the cities, the publishers and editors of the newspapers, the directors of the museums. With Helen Baltrusaitis at our embassy in Paris, we put together some outstanding American art shows and sent them to the various museums in the provinces.

Mym Johnston, who had been in Paris for a while, was asked to work with me, and the two of us occupied ourselves with this activity for four years. I received a USIA honor award for what we accomplished.

This was during the years of General de Gaulle. The French television was strongly slanted in an anti-American way. Every night there would be another anti-American story telecast. I remember at one point calling on the publisher of one of the two newspapers in Strasbourg. During the course of our conversation. I asked about how much anti-Americanism there was in the region. He said, "Virtually none." I queried, "How does that happen?" He replied, "Here everyone watches German television."

The programs went extremely well. The climax was American month in Toulouse. The city did not share General de Gaulle's anti-Americanism, and so the officials took the opportunity to go all out to support our program. Among the many activities was an enormous exhibit of American art at the great Musee des Augustins, and Menotti operas at the Opera House.

Q: Who were the singers? Did you have an American cast?

STIEGLITZ: We had Marie Powers herself who originated the role of the Medium. We also got the traveling company of "Porgy and Bess" who gave several performances at the Opera House. That scored a tremendous success -- the Toulouse audience was wildly enthusiastic about the American performers.

We had an Alexander Calder exhibit at the secondary museum. Best of all, at the university we had a series of lectures. We brought speakers in from Paris, particularly eminent French authorities, who spoke on American history, political science, and other subjects.

Q: How did you find any French professors who would have a reasonable attitude towards the United States?

STIEGLITZ: That proved to be no problem. In the upper intellectual echelons, evident in the universities, many French deplored the General's attitude. Professor Jean Baptiste Duroselle of the Sorbonne was a leading authority who helped me enormously in this matter. We had some very big names coming down to speak in Toulouse. To my great satisfaction, the last group of speakers drew a capacity audience in the largest auditorium of the university.

Q: And was the audience favorably disposed?

STIEGLITZ: Mostly yes.

Q: Did you find that outside of Paris the anti-American influence produced and encouraged by De Gaulle then was less pervasive?

STIEGLITZ: For the most part. On the other hand, I had one bad experience in the city of Amiens. We had an excellent three-day program scheduled there with concerts, art exhibits, lectures, etc. Charles Bohlen was our Ambassador, and he, of course, was superb. He lent his complete support to my programs. Also, he was my star American attraction who would come and preside over programs where I particularly wanted him to be. In his honor, the Prefet would generally have a dinner and perhaps other events.

Q: Bohlen preceded Shriver?

STIEGLITZ: Yes, he did.

What happened in Amiens is that -- it was Hubert Humphrey who was Vice President at that time -- and Humphrey came to Paris and spoke in Paris the week before our Amiens program. The result was disastrous. Humphrey spoke of the Vietnam situation and made a great pitch for what the Americans were doing in Vietnam. During that time, many Americans themselves were shouting their protests. The French students, liberals, leftists were all well aware of this. By the time of the Amiens program the situation in that city became tense. To my chagrin, the very nervous Prefet in Amiens at the last gathering, a luncheon at the Prefecture in honor of the

Ambassador and Mrs. Bohlen, made the decision that the Bohlens had to leave the city by a back route so that no one would see them. This I thought was disgraceful. Actually Humphrey was most indiscreet in coming to Paris at the time and stirring people up.

Q: He probably went on the insistence of Lyndon Johnson and had no choice.

STIEGLITZ: I suppose you are quite right, and I am blaming the messenger. That was my worst moment in those four years. Most of the other program was highly successful. Artur Rubenstein played for us in Nice, Isaac Stern in Montpellier. They volunteered.

At the end of four years, I was sorry to be leaving Paris.

Q: You left when?

STIEGLITZ: In 1967. But I have to mention this. While in Paris, I knew the Lao Ambassador, and one day at the Lao Embassy, at a reception, I saw this young woman enter the room. I was literally smitten at first sight, and asked who she was. She was the daughter of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Q: She had not been in Laos when you were there?

STIEGLITZ: No, she hadn't. She was working at UNESCO in Paris, and when I met her, she had just separated from her husband, a French count. Her mother was friendly and invited me to a party. From then on, I lost no time in trying to advance my friendship with Moune Souvanna Phouma. Near the end of my stay in France, Moune left to return to Laos to be Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She had been educated at the Institute of Political Science in Paris, and was therefore well qualified to be in the government.

Then someone from USIA Washington came to Paris to speak to us about our assignments. In those days everyone was supposed to be going to Vietnam. He assured me that my position would be in Saigon. I said that I would prefer to go back to Laos -- that I had learned some of the language and could be more immediately effective there. I did not mention my personal reasons for wishing to go to Vientiane, but by great good fortune, the cultural attaché position in Vientiane fell open just at that moment. So I went from Paris back to Laos to be the Cultural Attaché at the Embassy.

After Moune and I were married, we left within a week. The people in Washington couldn't have been kinder -- my next post was as Branch Public Affairs Officer in Marseille.

Q: I met you when I was there on the inspection tour in 1969.

STIEGLITZ: Right. You came to our house. It was, of course, the perfect assignment. And, as it had been in Paris, my work involved much traveling, but this time exclusively across southern France. We would just go between Monaco and Bordeaux -- a tough life. Again, our program, I think, was good. We were able to do a great deal with information and culture. At that time we had our landing on the moon, and the Moon Rock became accessible for exhibits which attracted

much favorable attention.

Q: One of our high points in the Foreign Service, I think, at that time.

STIEGLITZ: I am sure that it was. Then I continued to have very good art shows. We had excellent exchanges with the universities. I, myself, would be invited to give lectures, which I was always happy to do.

During the two years we were in Marseille, the Consul General was another old friend from Laos, Philip Chadbourn.

Q: He was there the night I was at your house.

STIEGLITZ: Philip was often with us, and he liked to travel with us. Those were lovely years.

JOHN L. LOUGHRAN
Deputy to Political Advisor, NATO
Paris (1964-1966)

Ambassador John Loughran was raised in Philadelphia. After attending Lehigh University, he joined the Marine Corps and served in World War II. Since joining the Foreign Service, his career has included positions in Germany, France, Liberia, Gambia, Senegal and Somalia. Ambassador Loughran was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1988.

LOUGHRAN: It ran to '64. During that period, John Burns, later the Director General of the Foreign Service, had been posted to Bangui and had known us in Bonn, our interests in Africa, and asked me to come to Bangui as his DCM. The Department resisted and wanted me to stay for the full four-year tour in Bonn, which I did.

At the end of that tour Burns was transferred to be the political advisor to General Lemnitzer at NATO headquarters outside of Paris in Rocquencourt. When he arrived, he was given the opportunity to select his deputy, and he asked for me; the Department agreed.

Q: So your plans changed again.

LOUGHRAN: My plans changed again. No Africa, but back to Paris, which, I must say, was another choice posting. The French were thinking of pulling out of NATO, not totally, of course, but having the Western Allies remove all of their bases from French soil. Ambassador Burns was my number one for a year, and then was posted to Washington in '65, where he became the Director General of the Foreign Service. He was replaced by Bill Crawford, who had been our ambassador in Romania. So I had a year with John and a year with Bill at the NATO headquarters. I worked very closely with Ambassador Bohlen at the embassy and with General Lemnitzer at SHAPE headquarters. For a relatively young man, it was a rewarding assignment to

be associated with many outstanding military officers. Working with Ambassador Bohlen was a rare opportunity. He was a man whom I admired greatly: calm, thoroughly professional, dedicated to our national interests and a very warm human being.

DOROTHY M. SAMPAS
Spouse of Foreign Service Officer, NATO
Paris (1964-1966)

Dorothy M. Sampas was born in Washington D.C. in 1933. As a foreign service spouse she lived in Ottawa, Paris, Iceland, and Washington D.C. After re-entering the Foreign Service she had positions in Brussels, China, New York, and an ambassadorship to Mauritania. Ambassador Sampas was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in October 1998.

SAMPAS: For summer and home leave in the United States, and then off to Paris, where Jim was assigned to our delegation to NATO at Porte Dauphine. So he had a regular job in a regular office building. He shuttled back and forth on the subway.

Q: You were there from '64-'65. I can't remember, was this the time when De Gaulle sort of said, "Thanks a lot, but take off?"

SAMPAS: Yes, that was 1966 with actual departures to be in 1967.

So, yes, things were already changed. I don't know that the staffing had been very much reduced, but it was in the process of being reduced, and people were in the process of moving off - to Brussels, as it turned out. NATO would move to Belgium.

Q: Were you able to do anything on your dissertation while you were there?

SAMPAS: Yes, yes, I found an interesting little library that specialized in international questions not too far from the Arc de Triomphe, where I could work on things, and it was helpful. I enjoyed that very much.

Q: I'm not very knowledgeable about French politics, but a theme that I hear during this period and even unto this day was this problem of who collaborated, who didn't, and France - what you were playing with I think would be in a way sensitive - not secret sensitive, but I mean just plain sensitive to people. Did you find yourself running across this?

SAMPAS: Yes, indeed, those problems and concerns were not very far below the surface of many French men of our age and French women of our age, too. I didn't get, in my dissertation, I really didn't get beyond the year 1940. By the end of June 1940, France had collapsed. But clearly some of the people who were making life difficult for France just before that time made it even more difficult for France during the war. And I don't know how long it will go on that the French continue to discover one or another French officials involved in war crimes. It could

happen several more times still.

Q: Really, until actuarial tables will take care of it. Did you find that, as you were looking at this, was there a strong left-right movement in the French body politic in the just before the war years?

SAMPAS: As a member of a family involved with the embassy, I don't know that I ever actually met an actual communist in those years. I must say, I didn't look for any, either. There were right-wingers around who had hidden their past somewhat. I only found one woman in all the time that I was there who brought up the subject of Franco-German wartime collaboration. But, of course, you had a major socialist-communist-democrat coalition sweeping the French elections in 1936, and a more centered government by 1939-40, with a number of officials ready to accept defeat by Germany. So that certainly was a strong left to right movement.

Q: I would have thought that an American looking at French history and at the concentrated level of a Ph.D., you would have found some quite interested in what you were doing. Did you find this, or were you sort of off doing this in a lonely fashion?

SAMPAS: Mostly I was doing it in a lonely fashion, because Jim was associated with our NATO delegation. They don't really get into the bilateral social relations that an embassy does, so I really didn't have a great many contacts with the French themselves. I had some. I still had a couple of friends with whom I'd gone to school in France, and so from time to time I'd get together with them and talk about things, but they were busy, really. One of them, my best friend, had joined the French diplomatic service and was preparing to go to Moscow, so she didn't have a lot of time to waste on her other specialty, which was America. But I think I could have asked that friend for an introduction into French society more generally. I suppose in some ways I was trying to protect the friendship.

Q: I can understand. It's just that the French put such a weight on their intelligencia and all, and you were sort of rowing in those same waters, in a way.

SAMPAS: Yes.

Q: But did you, by being with a husband in NATO, I take it that this was in many ways not the traditional diplomatic post.

SAMPAS: It was for us, but I'm not at all certain that it was for the French, or NATO itself. The U.S. leadership there never seemed to take the initiative to introduce their people around. That's my impression. I don't know exactly why they didn't. Perhaps because the head of our mission to NATO then was a political appointee whose wife didn't participate in the way a Foreign Service wife might have. I think most of the French people involved in NATO were military people rather than foreign service people because their foreign service people would do only "that which we are trained to do, and that's foreign policy."

Q: De Gaulle was still De Gaulle, wasn't he, at this time? Wasn't it '68 when the students and De Gaulle did not get along, and he departed. But did you feel at all, just from the papers and what

you'd see, that sort of a - if not anti-American - a not very positive approach towards the United States?

SAMPAS: Well, I think that spirit in France of being very different from “Anglo- Saxons” has underlain the surface of French politics for quite some time. They tried to bury it a little bit in the years right after the war, the years of the Marshall Plan, but I had run into that very markedly in school there. You know, there's never a good word in public for an American political viewpoint. There were suspicions that the Marshall Plan was somehow designed to bolster the black market. The French are wonderful people, but they certainly have a way of spinning facts to their own view of life, and they're not the only country in Europe which has great suspicion of the United States. In fact, I think the Greeks have it just as much.

Q: I served four years in Greece. They're a peculiar breed of cat.

SAMPAS: If anything goes wrong there, it's the CIA's fault, right?

Q: Absolutely, absolutely. Did you, as you were working on your dissertation, did you find that you were up against - being an American and sort of looking at things in a practical manner - this came up, so-and-so coming up against the French way of those three reasons - I guess it's the Cartesian approach to things-

SAMPAS: Oh, yes.

Q: -and did this show up in how you-

SAMPAS: Oh, yes. We had a course that was supposed to help the foreign students understand France and the French a little bit more, and I got rather quickly fed up with this business of, you know, in every exposé or brief speech, you start with the givens and then you have the development - two parts maybe, three parts always better - and then the far-reaching conclusions, terribly far-reaching. And one day in this course, when we had changed professors, and I thought I could get away with it, I really gave them just a, you know, sarcastic view of this. They didn't like it at all. They didn't like this mirror held up to them. They do here, in this system of “logic,” a wonderful way to develop a point, if you're really going to do it honestly and well, but you often really have to jump. Suppose the in-between part, the development, doesn't fall into two or three easy pieces. Do you dare do four? Do you cut back? There has to be some sort of symmetry there, and if you miss the symmetry, you miss the whole point of this wonderful development that the French have fashioned for themselves. But you can also hide so much. If you forget - or deliberately ignore - something in your “givens” at the beginning, that fact simply doesn't exist for the argument. So it is a way for people to miss a point, and I feel that it is as often misused as it is well used. And yet, when we hear a wonderful little speech of 10 minutes here and 10 minutes there, you can really think it's marvelous. But I never heard a French ambassador give one of those little speeches we practiced at “Science Po.” We had two ambassadors of France when I was in Mauritania, and I knew them both, one rather well, and I always was waiting for one of these marvelous little speeches to start. But it never came about, never.

Q: Well, how did you find life in Paris? I mean, raising a child and all this, still quite young -

was this a problem?

SAMPAS: Oh, yes, the French always have a difficult administrative procedure for whatever was involved. But they do have some things that are thoughtful. They do have a system of schools for the very young that is, I think, better than anything we have because ours aren't state-run, except, I suppose, Head Start would be comparable. But it's just that everything in French life is just terribly complicated. The only thing that was easy was getting registered for school and the various courses within the school. You just show up. They don't know what you're doing there. You don't know what you're doing there either. And you tell them you want to enroll. Do you have your summary of previous work? Yes, here it is. Well, alright. Then you pay a very minimal fee, and off you go. When I heard of what a friend of mine had to go through to do her doctoral level examinations in Jungian philosophy, well, it would have taken a doctorate to find out which way to proceed. And I think I've been persuaded by her that that's part of the game. If you can manage to find your way to the examination room on the correct day, you're a success.

CORNELIUS D. SCULLY, III
Consular Officer
Nice (1964-1966)

Cornelius D. Scully, III was born in Pennsylvania in 1935 and raised in Washington, DC. He received a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Virginia in 1957 and entered the Foreign Service in 1961. His career included positions in Nice and Montreal. In 1992, he held the most senior legal position in the Visa Office of the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. Mr. Scully was interviewed by William D. Morgan on April 16, 1992.

SCULLY: In the spring of 1964, I was informed that I had been assigned to the American consulate in Nice, France, as the vice consul. So in July of 1964, I and my first wife departed and went to Nice. At that point, I sort of lost track of what was going on in detail in the bureau, and became much more involved in life in France and my function as a vice consul there.

Q: Princess Grace and all that.

SCULLY: Exactly.

Q: Which is a separate story, but let's keep the visa thread. You issued visas in Nice?

SCULLY: Yes. Nice was a small post, only a two-officer post. We did not issue immigrant visas, but we did issue non-immigrant visas. We had a small, but relatively regular flow of non-immigrant applicants, obviously primarily tourists, but the occasional student and a few exchange visitor visa applicants. We had the headquarters of IBM France in the Nice consular district, in a little town about fifteen miles to the west of Nice, and they had a very active exchange visitor program that they ran within their company for transferring junior executives over to IBM headquarters for various kinds of management training and that sort of thing. So we

used to get those.

Q: But none of this heady stuff that you'd been engaged in Washington really applied to your non-immigrant visa work in Nice?

SCULLY: No, not really. We also had an absolutely wonderful visa clerk, Foreign Service national employee. She was the Countess Olga Filatiev. She was the niece of the last head of the Imperial Russian Army Officers Association in Paris, who was murdered by the KGB in 1937, I think.

Q: So she certainly knew how to handle any communist applicants who would come in the front door. [Laughter]

SCULLY: She once said to me, we were discussing Kerensky, the last premier of Russia before the Bolsheviks took over in the fall of 1917, and I made the comment to her that Mr. Kerensky was living in New York or in the United States, in any event, and she looked at me with a very gentle smile and she said, "Well, you know, we believe that he's the one that brought the communists in."

Q: He did!

SCULLY: The Countess Olga Filatiev was at the other end of that spectrum.

IDAR D. RIMESTAD
Counselor for Administration
Paris (1964-1967)

Ambassador Idar Rimestad was born and raised in North Dakota. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included assignments in Moscow and Paris, and an ambassadorship to Switzerland. Ambassador Rimestad was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1990.

Q: You left ACDA in 1964 and you were then assigned to Paris as Counselor for Administration. How did that assignment come about?

RIMESTAD: I knew that I would have to move sometime in 1964. So I went to Bill Crockett around Christmas 1963 and asked him to keep me in mind for any overseas vacancies that might come open. He told me that Paris would be open in the Spring or Summer. He asked me if I would like that. I told him: "Yes, if I could get it. I would like that". I don't know what happened in the system, but I got a letter from Personnel saying that I been assigned to Paris. I went to see the Assistant Secretary for EUR with whom I had dealt before -- we all knew each other. I was a known commodity. The fact that the Deputy Under Secretary -- Crockett -- had recommended me for the job carried the day because there were a lot of people interested in the job -- most of them could have done it. There are a lot of people in the Foreign Service who can fill any

position adequately; you have to be in the right place at the right time. I was neither better nor worse than many others; others might have done the job just as well. But I was certainly qualified, having put together the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That had been the big leagues.

Q: Paris was a different experience from anything you had done before. How did you find the administrative side of the Embassy?

RIMESTAD: Big and bloated. Paris was going through a very difficult time when I arrived in 1964. Paris had been a huge post. When I got there, there were five Ambassadors and their staffs. We had the Ambassador to France, the Ambassador to OECD, the Ambassador to NATO, the Ambassador to UNESCO and then there was a small economic group which dealt with the Ministry of Finance with about a dozen people which was also headed by an Ambassador. We had to support all of them. These Ambassadors didn't talk to each other; each had his own niche and was separate. They might have talked to Ambassador Bohlen if they had a political problem, but essentially they were little principalities to themselves. Each had its own building a long ways from the Embassy. I visited each of them every week; I went to their staff meetings every week. I would return from these meetings and report to Bohlen if we had any problems -- most of them involved space. He didn't really want to know much about them. We got along fine.

Q: Did either Bohlen or Bob McBride, his DCM, interfere with your responsibilities?

RIMESTAD: No. McBride would want me to come up to see him periodically to brief him on what was going on and what my problems were so that he could be prepared if the Ambassador raised any questions. When the issue arose, he had been briefed for a month or two and knew the background. He was very good. We would have lunch often. I would go to his house for dinner and sometimes I would have breakfast with him. I kept him fully apprised. We were going through a shrinking process; we were trying to reduce staff; we were having space problems. We were redoing the Talleyrand building; we were doing a lot of things that were upsetting staff. We had to move them around or cut down on staff. Bob McBride just wanted to know so that if Bohlen raised an issue, he would be prepared to respond immediately instead of having to call me. He would call me after the meeting to make sure that he had told Bohlen the full story. He had a good memory and was almost always right in his responses to the Ambassador. But neither the Ambassador nor the DCM interfered with the administrative support I was providing either to them or the other four Ambassadors. Through my experiences in the salary-wage area, the Moscow Embassy and ACDA, I had become familiar with the administrative problems. They are usually the same wherever you are. Only the location varies.

Q: That is an interesting observation. Did you find a pattern of recurring problems that you confronted both in Moscow and in Paris?

RIMESTAD: Yes. Space, for example. In Moscow it was both living and office space. In Paris it was office space. We provided living space in Paris for about two-thirds of the Embassy staff. The other one-third went out on their own.

Q: How did you feel about the policy of government-provided housing in a post like Paris?

RIMESTAD: In Paris, we made a big mistake when we sold the Rhone Hotel. Cecil Lyon sold it because he didn't want the Embassy involved in house-keeping. It was a facility with seventy-eighty small apartments. We sold it for a good price, but then had to pay three times as much to lease other space. In a Paris which has such a high proportion of communication and secretarial personnel -- lower wage employees -- it is not practicable to ask them to find and pay for their own housing. The government has to get the housing for them. It makes for a more orderly way to transfer people to a post like Paris. Senior officers usually have sufficient allowances to pay for their quarters, but in Paris they were all in government housing. I agreed with that policy. Middle rank officers -- FSO-3 and above -- had adequate allowances to find their own housing. But there are two kinds of officers -- the ones who abhor any kind of government housing -- that is about one-third; the other two-thirds prefer government-provided housing. The trouble with the latter is that you cannot always meet the preference of each officer and his wife. In a government owned or leased apartment house, all apartments are roughly of the same size, so that an FSO-2 and a FSS-6 get roughly the same apartments. There isn't anything you can do about it.

Q: As a general policy, for those officers who had adequate allowances, you supported private leases.

RIMESTAD: I would support it in Paris, Rome, London -- the bigger posts, but not in the smaller posts.

Q: Were there any tensions among the various US agencies in Paris because of the housing situation?

RIMESTAD: Yes; it was always a struggle. They would all ask whether they were getting their fair share. Out in Neuilly, we had some two bedroom places and some three bedroom places. Everyone was assigned to that complex. If it was just a couple without children, we would not assign them to a three bedroom apartment regardless of rank. We needed the three bedrooms for families. Private housing was available; that is true in most European capitals. You just have to look for it. If you rent your own place, you are more apt to be satisfied with it than if it is government-provided. I saw people renting apartments on the left bank, which, if the government had provided, they would have had a fit. But having rented the apartment themselves, they found it unique and interesting -- right off St. Germain where all the "action" in Paris took place. The government would have trouble putting these people into such apartments because they would have objected. But having found the place themselves, they were happy.

Some of these problems are of course related to the allowances. For an FSO-3 or above, the allowances are such that he or she can afford to rent his or her own place. There is much to be said for letting people do as much of their own renting as possible. All the complaining nonsense stops. If something goes wrong with the water heater, it is their problem; they can complain to the landlord. The officer understands that.

Q: How many U.S. Government Americans were there in Paris when you got there?

RIMESTAD: There were 2,450 Americans.

Q: Was there much interaction among them, either professionally or socially?

RIMESTAD: The five groups I mentioned before were entities unto themselves. Sometime, the NATO political officers would seek the assistance of the Embassy. But essentially they were all independent. There were very few social interactions. Practically none. I would get invited to all the parties, but I think I was unique in the Embassy. The Ambassador and the DCM got courtesy invitations, but they never went. The Ambassador would send courtesy invitations to the other four Ambassadors, but they would never come. I was in fact the linkage among the five groups.

Q: Were any efforts from the other four units to pull away from the Embassy's support?

RIMESTAD: No. Not while I was there. No one ever mentioned the thought to me. The main reason was that they all had good office space. All were in nice offices. The only thing they might have done on their own would have been the logistic support and that was no problem. We had enough space and personnel services to satisfy them. They all had their own cars. Each Ambassador had his own car; NATO probably had a half dozen cars; OECD probably had two and UNESCO had one. The Embassy serviced them, but each unit garaged its own cars. The Embassy provided personnel, procurement, general services. Each of these four units had one American executive officer; they had no other administrative staff. They would come to the Embassy to get whatever they needed.

Q: Did you draw some conclusions from your experiences in Paris concerning the general management of overseas establishments?

RIMESTAD: Yes. I felt that Paris and all big Embassies were too big, too many people. We did too much business from these Embassies. We should be more like the Europeans. If there was a problem, some one from the Department in the capital city should be sent. With communications and transportation having made such giant strides, an official can be at an overseas post the next day to work on a problem. We used to be kidded a lot by the Germans and the British and the Scandinavians -- they would ask what we did with all of these hundreds of people. Why didn't they stay in Washington? When you needed them you could bring them over. I think there is a lot to be said for that. In Paris, 22% of the people in the Embassy were State personnel. The other 78% belonged to other U.S. Government agencies. Every US agency pushes to get into foreign affairs and to put its people overseas. The Paris representatives of many of these agencies didn't have enough to keep them occupied. They could take care of a problem when it arose. But so could have their representatives if they had flown from Washington. Such a system would not have required the officer and his family to be in Paris with all the costs involved. We should rethink the size of these Embassies and their functions because of the vast improvements in communications and transportation facilities today.

JACK R. PERRY
Political Officer, NATO

Paris (1964-1969)

Ambassador Jack R. Perry was born in Atlanta, Georgia in 1930. He received a bachelor's degree from Mercer College in 1951 and then served in the U.S. Army during the Korean War until 1954. Following his military service, he received a doctorate from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. Ambassador Perry entered the Foreign Service in 1959. His career included positions in the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Bulgaria. He was interviewed by Henry E. Mattox on July 2, 1992.

Q: Let's move on to Paris. You were at the NATO mission and then you were at the embassy. And you were there five years, all the time as a political officer. I guess you'd call this mid-level by this time.

PERRY: I guess so. Yes.

Q: What were some of your duties there?

PERRY: Well, at NATO, which was then at Port Dauphine, as you know, in Paris, I was on the international staff. I was not in the U.S. delegation; I was on the international staff, and I was supposed to be the Soviet watcher, I suppose you could say. A fascinating time to be there, because I reported for duty in July, and in October, Khrushchev fell. And, of course, the fall of Khrushchev was one of the biggest things in Soviet affairs for a long time.

I remember very well that there was another fellow on the international staff, whose name was Pierre Cerles, a Frenchman who had served in Moscow not too long before I had. And as soon as Khrushchev was ousted, he took it upon himself to write a memorandum to the secretary general of NATO, because I think he thought he really knew the Soviets much better than I did. It wasn't his job, but he did it, saying that Khrushchev was ousted because of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Well, I wrote my memorandum to the secretary general, saying Khrushchev was ousted for a whole bunch of reasons, including his personality and lots of other things, but it wasn't simply the Sino-Soviet conflict. So I remember the secretary general, Mr. Manlio Brosio, a very wonderful Italian gentleman, who said he had never had two expert reports that were so different. But he took them both and submitted them to the council, and we went on from there.

That was a very interesting assignment at NATO for two years.

Q: And then you moved over to the embassy?

PERRY: Yes, what happened in the spring of 1966 is that De Gaulle, who was then president of France, declared war, in a political sense, on NATO and on the United States, and decided that France would be better off more independent. And so he took France out of the integrated military part of the alliance. And it became very clear that NATO headquarters should move, which they announced that they would do right away.

By the way, the recollection that I will never erase of those days is that De Gaulle was having a

press conference, which, of course, everyone always watched with bated breath, and it was in the air that he might do something about NATO, so we all went. Of course, De Gaulle spoke in these wonderful phrases that simply rolled out.

Q: I remember very well watching him in the late fifties on the television. It was like listening to Moses making pronouncements.

PERRY: Exactly. He just gave out some of the greatest French sentences you'll ever hear. Well, I was not probably the best French speaker in the world, but I was all right by then, and I had sensitive political antennae, and it was very clear to me that he had just said that's the end of it with NATO -- to hell with NATO, as it were. And as we walked out, I remember there was a young diplomat from another country, and I'm not even sure what country it was, but he just simply said to me, "Well, there was nothing in that press conference, was there." He had missed the point.

At any rate, when NATO decided it would leave Paris, I decided I would leave NATO, and I was fortunate enough to be offered a job in the Political Section at the embassy. Charles Bohlen was our ambassador, and had a great interest in Soviet affairs at the embassy, of course. And so I went down and took the job of sort of the Communist watcher in the Political Section.

Q: And you were there for what, four...

PERRY: Three years.

Q: Let's get a little bit operational now. Bohlen was the ambassador, who was the political counselor?

PERRY: It was Richard Funkhouser.

Q: You had the Communist Desk, in a sense. Who were some of your colleagues, if you can recall?

PERRY: I can remember some of them. John Gunther Dean covered Asia. Peter Sebastian covered Africa. Bob Oakley covered, as I recall, the Middle East; maybe it was South Asia. Peter Semler came along and worked on Germany and Europe. We had Richard Long. Some of these people came and went, of course. Maynard Glitman, who went on to a very successful career in the arms control and military field. But it was a very good bunch; a number went on to be ambassadors.

Well, of course, working for Chip Bohlen, for someone like myself who had been in Soviet affairs by then for a pretty long time was a great privilege. For me, Chip Bohlen was and is *the* best diplomat that I ever ran across. I had the greatest respect for him and for his wife, Avis. I couldn't have asked for a better boss, and he knew the Russians so well that it was a real joy to be around him.

Now during my time in Paris, the way these things happen, Charles Bohlen's tenure ran out and

Sarge Shriver came in as his replacement. President Johnson named Shriver. That was my first experience with a political ambassador, and that was quite a different kind of show. It was a totally different embassy, and the Kennedy family style of operation made things really hop.

So I sometimes think that I had two tours at the embassy in Paris: one under Bohlen and one under Shriver.

Q: Yes. Well, that's interesting that you say that Bohlen was the diplomat par excellence as far as you were concerned. Could you tell us, for the record now and for whoever might be reading this in years to come, what it was about Bohlen, how it is that you formed this assessment of him.

PERRY: Well, a lot has been written about Chip, and I know in that book *The Wise Men*, for example, he figures very largely, partly because he represented, I suppose, a whole generation of diplomats. But if you talk about Soviet experts in the American Foreign Service, then surely Bohlen, Kennan, and Llewellyn Thompson would be mentioned by most people as the three greatest. Bohlen was a bona fide Soviet expert, in that he had lived there, he had studied Russia deeply, he spoke Russian really well. He was a marvelous linguist. His French was beautiful to hear, and his Russian I assume was; I never got to hear him speak Russian. But aside from his knowledge, his expertness when it came to Soviet affairs and Russian affairs, he was, of course, a cultivated man. He understood the European mind -- the French mind, the European mind -- I think, as well as anyone. When Charles Bohlen sat after dinner and talked to the French foreign minister, he was able, intellectually, to hold his own, I think, with any Frenchman -- in French, which not too many Americans can do, as you well know. Whenever I think of Chip, I think of that wonderful phrase that they applied to Ben Johnson: "O rare Ben Jonson." Chip was a rare personality, in that he had a zest for life and a wit that came across as with few other people that I have ever known. A marvelous, marvelous man. When he had his final staff meeting at the embassy, his final words were, "Well, at least you can say I didn't put any cigarettes out in the soup." And that was sort of typical Bohlen.

Q: When did he leave? In what year, roughly?

PERRY: It was either '67 or '68.

WILLIAM A. CRAWFORD
Special Assistant for International Affairs
Paris (1965-1967)

Ambassador William A. Crawford was born in New York and educated in France. He received a bachelor's degree from Haverford College in 1936 and entered the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Havana, Moscow, Paris, and Prague, and an ambassadorship to Romania. Ambassador Crawford was interviewed by H.G. Torbert on March 23, 1989.

Q: You went to Paris in '65?

CRAWFORD: Yes.

Q: *Was NATO headquarters still in Paris at that time?*

CRAWFORD: Yes. De Gaulle was gradually set on moving NATO out and finally succeeded. My job there was a liaison, as special assistant for national affairs to the SACEUR (SHAPE).

Q: *Who was the SACEUR?*

CRAWFORD: Then it was General Lemnitzer.

Q: *The whole time you were there?*

CRAWFORD: Yes. I stayed there for two years. It was not an easy job, particularly when I had been involved in so much action in Romania. I found that I had too many bosses. Although I was political advisor to Lemnitzer, I also had to report to Harlan Cleveland. I also had the rank of Minister at the embassy and so I attended Ambassador Chip Bohlen's meetings.

I was a liaison between an international organization and our own American side. This made it a little difficult, because I wanted to keep the Americans well informed, but there were some things that Lemnitzer, as the head of an international organization, didn't want to share with the embassy.

Q: *Did you find Lemnitzer a reasonably easy man to get along with?*

CRAWFORD: Yes I did.

Q: *He's a man of opinion, I know.*

CRAWFORD: He's a man of opinion, yes. He's rather old shoe, he's comfortable in general.

Q: *Did NATO move by the time you were –*

CRAWFORD: They closed down about the time that I left.

Q: *That was really quite different then the present job of ambassador to the NATO council or was there such a thing?*

CRAWFORD: Yes there was. That was the job that Harlan Cleveland had. I attended all his meetings and I attended Ambassador Bohlen's meetings. I was just down the hall from Lemnitzer and kept him informed on a variety of things.

My primary loyalty was and should have been to Lemnitzer, I suppose. I should have just kept it at that.

Q: *Who wrote your efficiency report?*

CRAWFORD: Lemnitzer wrote it. There were some problems that arose from things that I may have reported concerning his activities to Bohlen or to Cleveland. My job was not very carefully defined.

Q: *Does this job still exist?*

CRAWFORD: I'm not sure. I presume it does.

Q: *I had a minor variant of this job somewhat earlier of being political advisor to the commanding general USVA, that is the commanding general in Austria which was a separate European command in those days. I had a couple of other hats too. It was an uneasy relationship. It was a technically difficult relationship.*

CRAWFORD: It was technically difficult. I think I should have played it more smartly than I did.

Q: *Did you travel around with the general?*

CRAWFORD: I traveled with the general to some exercises. I went up to the tip of Norway – a few days of maneuvers up there. We were quite close, but I didn't feel that I had enough substantive work to do. It was somewhat demoralizing.

Q: *Then what happened?*

CRAWFORD: Then I was assigned to the Inspection Corps. I came back to work for Fraser Wilkins for a couple of years.

**JOHN E. HALL
Consular Officer
Bordeaux (1965-1967)**

John Hall was raised in Niagara Falls, New York. After graduating from Kenyon College, he joined the Foreign Service at the age of 21. Since joining the Foreign Service, his career has included positions in France, Iceland, Switzerland, New Zealand, Liberia and Canada. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

HALL: In 1965 I went to Bordeaux.

Q: *The rotational tour in Washington, was that focused in one area – in administration, or personnel management, or...*

HALL: No, well, I did not have the feeling that it was. Every few months my counselor in what was then PER/POD would call me and say, "You've been in this place for so long, what would you like to do next time?" And we'd talk about it. I didn't have the feeling that there was any rhyme or reason for it from his side, and there was certainly none from mine. I ended up, curiously enough, being Swiss Desk officer for several months, I worked on a special project that had to do with determining pay scales, if I remember, I worked in PER/POD itself in the European Assignments Division, assigning what were then called Staff Corps personnel. There were one or two other incarnations in there. I was on the Congo Desk - then the Zaire Desk - a while... So I sort of "flitted around" from place to place, and I think from my point of view, of course, this was all to give me a broad range of experiences. I never had the feeling that there was an organized plan. It just sort of happened.

Q: In Bordeaux, you probably did consular work, visa work, and a little bit of everything?

HALL: A little bit of everything, that's right. At the time that I arrived there, there were two junior officers, one of those two slots was eliminated when the other one left, taking the post from four officers to three. I did pretty much everything there was to do, including visa work. And again, like the Washington assignment, which was a mixture of different experiences, that was a very small staff, a lot of sink or swim. My superiors there were not terribly interested in the details of consular work or administration, which was good for me, although it left me feeling very inadequate many times, but it was baptism by fire.

Q: It also gave you a good chance to reinforce your French.

HALL: Without question.

STEPHEN T. JOHNSON
Staff Assistant, USRO
Paris (1965-1967)

Stephen T. Johnson was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1936. After serving in the US Army from 1956-1957 he received his bachelor's degree from Occidental College in 1960. He entered his Foreign Service in 1961 and his career included positions in Canada, Paris, Vietnam, Laos, Romania, and Kenya. Mr. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1997.

JOHNSON: I was assigned to Paris. I might add that my successor, who arrived about a week or so before I left, immediately hanged himself in the - committed suicide in the Sheraton Mt. Royal Hotel.

Q: Oh, my God! I take it wasn't the assignment.

JOHNSON: No. It might have been the in box. But he had psychological problems before, but this concerned Mrs. Hawkins, the consul general's wife, so much that she thought I might do it

too. So for my last week, after I had moved out of my apartment, I normally would have moved into the hotel, I had to live at the consul general's house so she could keep an eye on me. I kept telling her that I had orders to Paris, and the idea of committing suicide didn't come up.

In any case, I guess I had home leave. It happened that my parents were back at this time. I did some traveling with my parents and then got to Paris in late October of 1965. I was assigned to the mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], it was called the United States Regional Office [USRO].

I was a staff assistant to the ambassador, Harlan Cleveland. I was also called secretary of delegation. Each delegation had somebody that was delegated as secretary to be the kind of point of contact for paperwork and stuff.

Q: You were there from when to when?

JOHNSON: I guess I was there from about October of 1965 to about July or so of 1967.

Q: What was that mission doing at that time?

JOHNSON: Soon after I arrived, and I'm not to sure about all the timing of all of this, the basic thing, exciting thing that was happening at NATO was that President de Gaulle was kicking us [NATO] out. There was a large American military establishment in France at the time, basically the zone of communication and supply to our army in Germany. There was the NATO political headquarters. There was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe [SACEUR] NATO military headquarters in the Paris suburbs. The U.S. European Command [EUCOM], the United States Military headquarters, was also in the kind of suburbs of Paris. President de Gaulle was withdrawing France from the military establishment of NATO and at the same time booting us out. So all the ramifications of that were the principal preoccupation of the mission.

Q: Had de Gaulle made his announcement before you got there?

JOHNSON: No. That was after.

Q: Was this something that was expected? How did this hit?

JOHNSON: I am not that certain, but I don't think it was unexpected. He had given lots of hints. He had made himself pretty plain. I really forget the process, whether he made some public statement or what he did but it was soon evident. [During] the last meeting to which the French defense minister came, when the other defense ministers were all there, [he] was ostentatiously reading "La Monde" and turning the pages - crackle, crackle, crackle - of his paper while other defense ministers were making their statements.

Q: The French are very good at that kind of thing. They are still doing it. They just did it to Secretary of State Christopher. We are talking late 1996 when the minister of foreign affairs did the equivalent of that.

JOHNSON: Yes. It goes on.

Q: Particularly as the new boy on the block in this thing, one I think is always more sensitive to the emanations from where ever you are going. What were you picking up as far as the attitude of our mission towards the French? Was it sort of spit in your eye or were they mad? Or were they just saying "Oh, that is just the French"? What were you getting?

JOHNSON: I don't think they were mad particularly. It wasn't that unexpected. Obviously they were lots of very practical problems created by what the French did. At the same time, French-American relations at a personal level were never bad. Everybody had lots of French friends and obviously enjoyed living in France. It was this kind of official attitude.

Again, I mean de Gaulle in his heart of hearts, may have been tremendously anti-American, but in a sense, this wasn't an anti-American gesture. It was a gesture about France's place in the world. They were developing their idea about total defense and taking responsibility for themselves - just beginning to produce their atomic submarines with the ballistic missiles and the like. But it was a difficult time.

Of course, the people in the mission, on a personal level, were reluctant to leave Paris. There was a long palaver about where the political headquarters should go. Like most things, big diplomatic decisions end up being that you can't go there, you can't go there, you can't go there, so you have to go... Basically, you couldn't go south to Italy because that would be kind of on the flank. You couldn't go to Turkey or Greece. You couldn't obviously go to Portugal. You couldn't really go to Scandinavia. So it became the low countries or England, and they didn't want to move off the continent. So Brussels invited them, and they went to Brussels.

At the same time, there were lots of other NATO issues that were percolating along. My job was basically a paper shuffling type of job as a staff assistant to the ambassador, who was very hard working. I stayed until eight or nine or ten at night in spite of my wishing that he would leave.

Q: Harlan Cleveland. He also had a job in Washington, too.

JOHNSON: Before, he had been assistant secretary in IO. I am not too sure if he did something else in between or whether he just went to...

Q: He was a fairly major figure.

JOHNSON: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of how he operated?

JOHNSON: As a representative of the United States, it was very favorable. He was a very intelligent, serious man who always impressed me. A lot of the business of NATO is taken care of at weekly luncheons that the ambassadors have. He would come back from those and dictate a 95 paragraph telegram with sub-headings and everything just kind of right on through the whole thing. He had a great mastery of what was going on. He wasn't very good at telling jokes I

remember at NATO meetings. The British ambassador, as British ambassadors always do, outshone the American ambassador there.

Phil Farley was the DCM who was equally hardworking. His background had been the Atomic Energy Commission. I think later on he was at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. So the top team was very strong. From the parochial point of view of the staff assistant, the fact that these fellows stayed in the office until all hours of the day and night - I was supposed to stay with them - was a little bit off-putting. Because my job really wasn't that demanding in a sense. You know, checking the papers and the like, but it was long. I'd go to work at eight in the morning and get off at nine-thirty or ten and sometimes have to take the telegrams around to their houses and get the corrections typed in and deliver them to the embassy in downtown Paris at midnight or something. But it was an exciting time.

Q: What was the impression you were getting on the role of the British and the French?

JOHNSON: Well, the British obviously had very close relations with us. I'd say almost invariably we and the British agreed on things. They were a well prepared delegation all the time. They had good people. Some delegations impressed you as being strong in the sense that they knew their dossier; others weren't so strong. But the British, of course, sit next to us at NATO, as they do in most place because of the alphabet. I always thought that may have been... Anyway, the French because of the way things worked out always sat across the way. We were over here sitting right next to each other. You know, it may have affected things over the years.

But the British did well. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh was the ambassador. He died just a few years ago. He was a very able man. We did well with them. The Dutch delegation always struck me as being very strong and well prepared. The Belgian Ambassador D'Stock was the dean, and he certainly knew what he was about. He had always had what he called the D'Stock question. That was when we told the NATO Council about some attitude of ours, D'Stock would always asked whether we were telling them or whether we were actually consulting them. Very often when we wanted it to seem like it was the latter, it was in fact the former, given our own torturous way of arriving at decisions. That was always amusing. The NATO Council for the most part worked pretty well together. There was a great crisis going on.

Q: How about the Italians?

JOHNSON: Well, they were more like you would expect the Italian delegation to be. A little bit more free and easy. The Greeks and the Turks glowered at each other. A lot had happened at least in my snail's eye view. The Turkish ambassador seemed a lot more able man than the Greek ambassador. This didn't have as much to do with the attitudes of their countries, they just seemed to be better at it. The Icelandic ambassador never said anything. He wore dark glasses, and I always wanted to know whether he was sleeping or not. But it didn't really matter.

Q: How about the Germans?

JOHNSON: The Germans were quite strong-their delegation there at the time. They were just kind of getting into stretching their wings a little bit at the time. But the ambassadors worked

well together. We obviously had contentious meetings and the like. The ministerial meetings, particularly during the crisis with the French were exciting.

Q: What about Norway and Denmark?

JOHNSON: I really don't have much impression of what they were up to. I assume tagging along.

Q: What was the feeling that you were getting of the Soviet threat at that time?

JOHNSON: I certainly didn't have the impression that we, at least in the political headquarters in NATO, really thought that the Soviets were about to rush across the border. Let's see this was 1965-67. The military would tell us about all their divisions and things. They were very numerous compared to ours, and they certainly had a lot more stuff on the ground than we did. As to the question of what we would actually be able to do militarily, I mean, there was the "plan," and people would sometimes question if we would be just a road bump as they made their way to the English Channel.

But at least where I was sitting, there wasn't the feeling that this was going to happen any time very soon. It was more an abstract problem. All the time of course - by this time, the Vietnam War was becoming much more something that the public was talking about - we would make reports to the NATO Council about what we were doing there. There would be questions about that, and obviously the public was getting involved in the whole question of Vietnam.

Q: Did you move to Brussels during that time?

JOHNSON: No. I left before it moved to Brussels. They were making the plans and everything. I saw the plan for the present NATO headquarters. That was going to temporary for just a few years. Then there was going to be a permanent building in downtown Brussels. They are still in that provisional building, which has grown because of the greater number of delegations, out by the airport, and any plan for a permanent building in downtown Brussels is long gone.

CECIL S. RICHARDSON
Consular Officer
Paris (1965-1968)

Cecil Richardson was born in New York in 1926, and graduated from Queen's College. He served in the US Army from 1944 to 1947, and overseas from 1951 to 1952. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he was stationed in Dakar, Saigon, Lagos, Niamey, Paris, Accra, Brussels, Quito, Tehran, Lima, St. Paolo and Bahamas. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 5, 2003.

Q: Well, you left Niger when?

RICHARDSON: In March, early March 1965, yes.

Q: And then what did they do with you?

RICHARDSON: Oh, I was assigned to Paris which was great. I went around telling the French, "I'm going home. I'm going home." [Laughter]. Well, after so many years of learning French in the boonies, it was like going home because many of the people I had met along the way, when they came home, came to Paris so I got to see them and continue the relationship.

Q: Well, you were in Paris from '65 to when?

RICHARDSON: '68.

Q: '68, what were you doing?

RICHARDSON: I was, that was my first full-time Consular job, I worked exclusively in American services for three years. And that was a very satisfactory ...

Q: What did the American services consist of in those days?

RICHARDSON: Well, I guess it's kind of, anything pertaining to the welfare and protection of American citizens as well as citizenship and notariats. There were all kinds of situations where their welfare is in jeopardy.

Q: To Paris. What are you doing there?

RICHARDSON: I'm doing welfare and protection of which about, almost half of it was exclusively in death and estates. Let's see, yes, I would guess I did Death and Estates for about 14 months.

Q: Well an awful lot of American expatriates and tourists would come there and die.

RICHARDSON: Yes, well, the resident expatriates were no problem. If they're working for a company, the company looks after them. It's the tourists and the walking wounded, some of whose families pay them to stay out of the U.S.

Q: Remittance men. Yes.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Because they're too much trouble, it's less of a strain for the family to have them abroad than home.

Q: Yes.

RICHARDSON: But all kinds of misfortunes can befall a person. If you give me a couple of million Americans going through, you're going to get all kinds of problems. So it was a very active and interesting time.

Q: Oh, yes. I'm sure it was.

RICHARDSON: And very satisfying.

Q: How about people who were in trouble with the police? How did the French police treat them?

RICHARDSON: Correctly, correctly. I never had any instance where the, where people would claim that they were abused. The women were looked after in institutions where there were nuns. And the men were in ordinary prisons. Maybe the food wasn't very good, you wouldn't expect it to be. But I had no complaints about physical or even mental abuse.

Q: You were there from '65 to '68, which was sort of the beginning of the era of the college students who went off and had their wanderjahr or vacations and drugs and you know hashish and all were just coming in ...

RICHARDSON: Yes, if they were in France they were only transiting on their way to India and Nepal. I saw much more of them when I got to South America. That was the regular trek for them going down the spine of South America. There weren't any great problems in Paris. Drugs, there were. Mostly marijuana, I had some musicians who were picked up for marijuana and we had an active anti-drug outfit in the embassy. One of the several predecessors of the current DEA.

Q: Who was the consul general when you were there?

RICHARDSON: Perry Cully.

Q: Perry Cully was a social animal, wasn't he?

RICHARDSON: Yes, yes. He didn't have much to do with consular work.

Q: Yes, I was going to say, I suspected that. He was, he inspected me in Belgrade ...

RICHARDSON: In what year did you go?

Q: Oh, about '63 or something like that ...

RICHARDSON: Well, that's how he got to Paris, when he was an inspector he'd seen the home occupied by the consul general in Paris and he says "that's for me."

Q: Also he got there and he never left, I guess.

RICHARDSON: He didn't. He divorced Mrs. Cully and married an English nurse at the American hospital, so he may still be there.

Q: I don't know. How did you find social life there at the time?

RICHARDSON: Fine, fine. I was comfortable. Well, that wasn't nearly as important, the social life, I had French friends coming in from the colonies so I didn't make many, yes there were a couple of lawyers, people I had met on business that I'd have to dinner or have a drink with. I became friendly with a man in one of their intelligence services and we used to meet for coffee and drinks until he told me that he'd been instructed by his superiors to break off our relationship. Either they thought I was trying to penetrate them or they decided I wasn't worth cultivating. [Laughter]. I like to think it was the latter, not the former. [Laughter]. And there was a good bunch of Americans both in the embassy and among the expats. I recently did a WAE TDY in Haiti and the woman I was working for there is the daughter of somebody who was in the ambassador's office when I was there. Barrett was staff aide. Social relations were no problem. The real big thing for me there was not the social but the cultural life. I'd been in the boondocks, at this point, for nine years. The only music and opera I had seen was Chinese opera in Saigon and a German string orchestra. They brought out a string orchestra and that was it. For 9 years I had depended on recorded music and it was great. And movies, because Paris is a great town for films.

Q: Oh, yes.

RICHARDSON: So we went to the theater, we went to concerts, we went to all kinds of things of that sort only three weeks of the month because one week every four weeks I was duty officer in the Welfare and Protection Section. It was so active you didn't have one consular duty officer. Passports, Welfare and Protection, and Visas each had it's own and that was busy.

Q: How about when people came and they were in trouble and the place didn't have a consular post or something? In some distance, did you have trouble with that?

RICHARDSON: Well, the police were good about notifying us when people ended up in hospitals, automobile accidents miles away. If it was within reasonable distance, we'd go see them. We didn't have any problem and we had so many of them that managed to get into difficulty in Paris or in the immediate environs of Paris ...

Q: Yes, if you're going to get in trouble ...

RICHARDSON: And we had a lot of consulates in France. At this time we have none except Strasbourg today. But in those days we had Lyon, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, and Nice, so the country was well covered. I don't know what they would do now. But you were asking me about the kinds of trouble people get into. Well, my first day, I had just set up shop in Paris, in Welfare and Protection and this was in the days before everybody ended up in cubby holes. I had a proper office with a window and a beautiful tree outside the window in the garden. One of the clerks came in saying there's an American gentlemen outside who's very anxious to speak to somebody, to speak to an officer. So I said, send him in. My first client!

So he comes in, a well set up, trim waisted man in his upper thirties, early forties. Neat double-breasted blue gray suit. Obviously agitated, he opened this conversation with me with "I got no

satisfaction from that woman. I got no satisfaction from the police, but I damn well mean to get satisfaction from the American Embassy.” And that was his opener! So I said: Fine, fine, have a seat, sit down. What was his story? He had hired a “lady of the evening” the night before, had been unable to perform and had asked for a refund. [Laughter]. Of course she did not oblige him, so in high dungeon or whatever, he goes to the local police station about 2:00 in the morning and complains to the night sergeant. The night sergeant listens very sympathetically and says ah, Monsieur, that is really abominable. I’m going to ask my colleagues to come out and hear what the terrible things that happen to tourists in our glorious city of Paris. He goes in, wakes up the night crew and the emergency staff, and brings them to hear the story. He comes up and says Monsieur, tell my colleagues the terrible things that have happened to you. He tells the story and they all burst into laughter. So he is very T’d off when he comes to see me. What am I going to do? This is my first client in Paris. It was never so amusing again.

Q: Well, what did you do?

RICHARDSON: I let him talk himself out. He wanted someone to listen to him and not laugh. I was able to do that. [Laughter]. I was the first person who was able to hear his story and not laugh. And that’s the satisfaction he got. He had said he meant to get satisfaction from the American Embassy. And that was the beginning. There were all kinds of foolish things, but lot of real tragedies, too. Now, one, Texas. There’s a city in Texas called Paris.

Q: Oh, yes. At that time, particularly in Paris, the French had the reputation, it’s changed quite a bit, but had the reputation for being rather abrupt and not very pleasant to deal with, with Americans or foreigners...

RICHARDSON: Well, I’ll tell you about that because I certainly had lots of experience with the Parisians. Metropolitan French I would know best. I’ll tell you, my wife encountered any number of tourists complaining about the French being rude and brusque and her standard line was: “Stand still for a minute and observe the way they treat each other; it’s not anti-American. That’s the Parisian. He is impatient. He has little tolerance for even his own kind and God help you if you don’t speak French. You’re just so much worse off.” But there were times when there was, particularly amongst the intellectuals, strong feelings against things that represent American values. They’d call it the Coca-Colazation of France and of Europe, but at that time, the government, because we had supported them in Indochina and Africa, or they needed us, the government to government relations were fine, but the relations further down the line were lousy. At one event in Normandy where I represented the embassy, I was heartily booed by the crowd over the Vietnam War.

Q: You were there during the May and June of ‘68, I guess.

RICHARDSON: Yes. They had the general strike.

Q: Yes. I mean this is very exciting. How, what were you observing in this?

RICHARDSON: I was observing a degree of courtesy and cooperation among the Parisians that I had not encountered before. I saw people with gasoline stopping their autos and taking on people

walking. I don't know if they took money. I know I got into the habit and I would offer people a ride if they were going my way. I'd offer them rides and sometimes somebody would offer to give me a few frames and I would say, "No, no. Let's go have a coffee or buy me a beer or something like that." One day, there was a woman with a cane, because I think she had difficulties with a prosthetic device. I think that was one of her legs. She was walking with difficulty up a hill in Montmartre and I pulled up to ask her if I could her a lift. And she was very grateful, she got in and it turned out she was walking up this hill to visit her husband in the hospital.

Q: Oh, boy.

RICHARDSON: And I saw Parisians doing that, but of course there was no traffic, so there was none of the usual road rage and impatience. There was an incident though, I remember where an Algerian pompier, a gas station attendant, was killed because people got nervous and excited when the gas ran out. And another incident of violence, some protestors down in Lyon rolled a truckload of heavy stones and things like that down a hill, and it killed a policeman. I really thought "it was going to hit the fan now." But somehow they got through it. There were many demonstrations in Paris. One night my wife and I didn't get to the theater because we ran into a wall of tear gas and couldn't get through. But, that was an exciting time and much of my work consisted of finding people, tourists, particularly students, and trying to reassure their parents that they were fine. And I said for "God sakes. Write home." They said but there's no post office. Well, call them on the telephone.

Q: Did you have problems with students getting out there and joining the protests because this was many a student movement.

RICHARDSON: Yes, yes, but not much. Most were simple tourist bystanders.

Q: I was wondering whether they were getting picked up along with...

RICHARDSON: You know sometimes the cops would go through and they would surround a neighborhood or an area and make a complete sweep of everybody. And so the Americans caught up in it would complain they pushed us around, but they didn't really keep them in there. When they found that they were foreigners and they didn't have anything on them, they let them go. But, they'd hold them for a while, while they went through their papers.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

RICHARDSON: Chuck [Chet] Bohlen. He was the ambassador all the time I was there.

Q: He was always a thorough professional.

RICHARDSON: Yes. But, I saw him just once when I made a call on arriving.

Q: How did you find the French staff in the counselor section?

RICHARDSON: There were those hired right after the war, a few of them were still working. They had more middle class backgrounds than working class because right after the war, they were the ones who spoke English and they were from a different class and I had, we had one of those left. I'll tell you a story about her. One of the things that I was always doing in Death and Estates was collecting the personal effects of the deceased, packing them up and sending them off to the family. And she was very impressed with the packages, with my packing, how well, how neatly they were done. And she remarked on this to one of the other Vice Consuls and one Vice Consul of them said to her, "Well, it's very possible that he did this before the Foreign Service, maybe he was a shipping clerk or wrapped packages in a department store." And that was a very wild ... that was absolutely absurd, she thought. [Laughter]. Diplomats don't do things like that. So we had one person like that. The others were good solid people, but they were not of that class. One of them, who I was closest to, I could say she trained me in Welfare and Protection work, like any second lieutenant gets trained by a good sergeant.

Q: Yes, oh, absolutely.

RICHARDSON: Yes. I stayed in touch with her for many years.

Q: Well, then in '68 you left to go there.

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: Where did you go then?

RICHARDSON: I went back to Africa. I went to Accra in Ghana.

HARLAN CLEVELAND
U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Paris, France (1965-1969)

Ambassador Cleveland was born in New York City and raised in the United States and Switzerland. He was educated at Princeton and Oxford Universities. During World War II he served on the Board of Economic Warfare, after which he held a number of senior positions dealing with Italian economic recovery, US and UNRRA assistance programs in China and Taiwan and NATO issues. He also served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations and as US Ambassador to NATO. Ambassador Harlan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

CLEVELAND: So in '65 under rather dramatic circumstances, I went to the NATO job. Once I had been confirmed, then there were plans for the usual laying on of hands which usually took place upstairs in the State Department where our current ambassadors met. De Gaulle had threatened to start at that season the rhetorical barrage about the UN that ended up in the withdrawal of France from the military aspect of NATO. So somebody obviously had to say

something in reply to this big ploy of General de Gaulle. The person to say that was obviously the President.

So, my laying on of hands ceremony was suddenly promoted into the rose garden, and I helped draft the speech that the President gave on that occasion. It sort of set our line about being flexible about the French but adamant about our support of the UN, of NATO.

So when we got to Paris, it wasn't until two years later that we had to move the whole thing to Brussels. That is a story in itself that we'll get to. One of the first things I did in the mandatory calls on all of my colleagues, the other ambassadors to NATO, I called on Pierre DeLouisse, who was an older man, more de Gaulle's generation, had known de Gaulle very well. It was interesting that the French all through this period put at NATO their best foreign service people. The French foreign office was trying hard to make sure they didn't have any Goths in that because de Gaulle felt so strongly about French sovereignty being compromised by their membership in NATO. So, I call on Ambassador Pierre DeLouisse, and had an extraordinary experience. I had no sooner sat down on his sofa when Ambassador DeLouisse, still standing, said, "I hope you are not going to ask me what the old man means." I said, "Well Mister Ambassador, I wouldn't really want to bring negotiations up in this first courtesy call." He said, "Now look. You and I don't know each other yet, but we are going to have to work very closely together. We can do it two ways. We can sit across the table and glare at each other, or we can sit down on the same side of the table and we can gaze up at the great enigma and try to figure out what the hell he means."

After that, I never could treat him at arms length. He had shown such a human side of himself as a diplomat. He was more than a regular foreign service person because when he left that job, he was appointed by de Gaulle as head of the ORTF, the French radio-television monopoly. So, he had a good in with de Gaulle, and he was also a very popular colleague with both his personal sensitivities and he was also a very bright professional.

Q: Well, what was our reading at that time? I mean, all right, de Gaulle wants us out, so we get out.

CLEVELAND: No, he hadn't said yet that he wants us to go out. There was a rumbling about it. He didn't actually lower the boom for almost two years. They were being difficult about a lot of issues, especially military issues. It wasn't really part of their policy to object to a North Atlantic Council, they were just objecting to all these military commanders, and so on, being in the environs of Paris, and all the troops. So it wasn't until two years later that he finally said all foreign military will have to get out of France. That meant not only the troops doing various things, communications, aircraft duty and so on, but it also meant the supreme commander of NATO, an American and his whole staff will have to get out. There was then a period of uncertainty. Some of the allies were soft on France, and we were inclined to be, didn't want to offend France by saying the North Atlantic Council had to leave too.

But as the American representative on the North Atlantic Council, I was clear we were going to have to go. I finally got the State Department at my recommendation, to instruct me to ask one question in the council chamber. In the event of a war in which France remains neutral, how does

France propose that we keep closely in touch with our supreme commander who is going to be in Belgium? The French ambassador, who was a very good friend, I had told him ahead of time what I was going to be asking. He looked up at the ceiling for a moment and said, "You'll never get an answer out of the Quai d'Orsay on a question like that." I said, "I know. That is the idea." So, he absorbed the question and reported it to Paris and the military. After about three weeks of no answer, the Danes, the Greeks and others were inclined to be uncertain whether we should move or not. Everybody agreed to move.

Q: Well, I would imagine there would also be the problem that most just didn't want to move because Paris is Paris.

CLEVELAND: Well, I think there was some of that sentiment. We really didn't have that feeling. We were looking forward to the chance to see another piece of Europe, in personal terms. In fact our general experience was that we had a more fun time living in Brussels in a sizable house, but a lot smaller than the mansion that we lived in in Paris with a lot fewer servants in Brussels, but it was just a more congenial environment in general. The Belgians were more welcoming. They had us in their homes in a way that didn't happen in Paris.

Q: Well, you had the political alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and then you had the military. You were dealing mainly with the political side.

CLEVELAND: No, I was dealing with both. Remember I remarked before the decision was made by McNamara when I was appointed to make me his representative in Paris too. So, I was really reporting both to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. I had one of my deputies who was a civilian in the McNamara whiz kid think tank in the early part of the Kennedy administration, Jim Stanley. So I did a lot of business with the Defense Department as well.

Q: You were there from '65 to when?

CLEVELAND: To '69, almost five months into the Nixon administration.

Q: Had Greece and Turkey come into the organization by the time you got there?

CLEVELAND: Yes indeed. And the Greek and Turkish ambassadors happened to be extremely good friends. You would see them walking down the hall with their arms around each other and so forth. I had already been through one Cyprus crisis when I was in the State Department in the early '60s. In 1967 we had another one where at one point President Johnson had to send Cy Vance, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, at that point, over to try to make sure that the Turks understood that it was very serious violation of their friendship with us if they should invade Cyprus. I called Washington up one night to ask, "Shouldn't we get the Secretary General of NATO involved, get him to go down and make peace between these two allies, make the point that allies can't go to war with each other?" I had been really pushed into this by the Turkish ambassador who came to me in great alarm saying he thought the invasion would be tomorrow morning if I couldn't do something about it. So I went not as an envoy but as the American representative to the Secretary General. The problem is he had to go without having an invitation

from either of the two countries at the time he left. We had an American plane standing by at the airport, a military plane to take him first to Athens and then to Ankara. We were able to announce that evening that the NATO Secretary General was going down, not as another piece of the deterrent in fact. The combination with Vance we thought was the most effective ploy. But the interesting thing was when I called to make that suggestion, the crisis task force was working on Cyprus. I had assumed they had already been considering this, but I can't remember who I was talking to, said that we haven't really discussed that yet, but that is a good idea. I know they were getting quick instructions. It often happens, it does happen I think in diplomacy, the person on the ground can better figure out what his instructions ought to be than anybody else, and shouldn't be bashful about making suggestions.

Q: Well, this Cyprus crisis came about to a certain extent because of the colonel's coup in Greece. That was in April of '67.

CLEVELAND: Yes, they were becoming more militant about it. But the Turks had made very clear that they were going to take no nonsense. They kept the Turkish military force in the Turkish part of Cyprus. It was clear that if the Greek Cypriots tried to sort of envelop the whole island, that Turkey would get into it. They almost got into it on their own initiative as it turned out, so it was a very dicey, hairy situation.

Q: What, during this time, '65-'69, what was the feeling about the Soviet threat at that point?

CLEVELAND: Well, it was regarded as a maximum threat. They had this huge inventory of nuclear weapons. I suppose at that time there were 10-12,000 nuclear weapons in the world; almost all of them ours and theirs, a few in the hands of the British and French and Chinese. Our problem with the non-nuclear allies, particularly Germany, West Germany at that time, Federal Republic, was that their political leaders tended to overstate the probability of a nuclear reaction to anything. You hear politicians say that the first Russian soldier or, East German soldier, who sets his foot across the demarcation line, all hell will break loose.

Well, we had started at my suggestion really, a nuclear planning group which still exists. We were anxious to be able to cut the non-nuclear allies in on what nuclear war would be like and you couldn't deal with it. It was becoming a lot more clear that there was no way you could have a nuclear war that you could win. You'd shoot your own foot as badly as you would hit the other fellow's foot.

There had been an idea of setting up a multilateral force, MLF so-called, to be another nuclear weapons system, surface ships, but we needed another nuclear weapons system about as badly as a hole in the head. We finally suggested we set up a group that included some of the non-nuclear allies, who would be rotated, so the total number would be kept to fewer than the 15 members. We had 15, too big for conducting serious conversations in secret. We established this group. We had the first meeting in Washington, McNamara presiding, and the defense ministers from the countries involved. One of them was Turkey. To everybody's surprise, including the surprise of the security people surrounding us. McNamara suddenly dives into this capacious briefcase and pulls out photographs, satellite photographs, of a defense installation in Russia. The code name was a classification that in itself was classified at the time and way above top secret. You could

just see the security people blanching and fidgeting. But that was a case that we were taking this information sharing very seriously. Finally I said to McNamara, he really had to be personally present every time we met, otherwise it wouldn't work. He agreed to do that, and he did it.

Clark Clifford succeeded him. When the Nixon administration came in, Mel Laird also stuck by that principle. So we were dealing with nuclear policy by playing war games, by having simulated exercises. You had to assume that the enemy would come over into our territory first, but you couldn't assume anything about the defensive alliance. You couldn't assume a preemptive strike ahead of time or anything like that. We played a whole series of war games with these non-nuclear defense people as well as the French and the British. We never could play a game with these tactical nuclear forces where we didn't kill more people on our side than the other side. You might mess up an invading brigade, but you also messed up a number of communities in West Germany, mostly West Germany. So there was a sudden diminution of the nonsense coming out of the political leadership in the non-nuclear countries, particularly Germany. The plan worked, that is telling people the nature of nuclear war turned out to be a much better way of educating them than having them participate in a complicated surface force where everybody got to do different things.

Q: Well, was there any communication with the Warsaw Pact at this point? In a way, they must have been running the same games and finding out this wasn't going to work.

CLEVELAND: Well, no, there was not really any. Just intelligence people on both sides trying to figure out what the others were doing, but there was no real cooperation in thinking through. That was one of the things that bothered us, that they might think more highly of the possible advantages of using nuclear weapons than we were inclined to. Everybody in our camp was of the opinion that I came to, and that I think McNamara and some other top military leaders like Admiral Noel Gayler, who was the commander in chief of the Pacific did. When he retired, he said it was a weapon too big to use. I came to the conclusion, I started calling it not the ultimate weapon but the ultimately unusable weapon.

Q: Well, you had theorists and a sort of a lobby that was particularly powerful in scientific circles. Edwin Teller is the name that comes to mind. There were others who were playing games. If we lose two million, they lose three, and somehow we'll come out ahead on this sort of thing. Did you run across these people/? They tended to be more in the Nixon era.

CLEVELAND: Well, Teller actually was more active earlier in the argument about going from the A-bomb to the H-bomb. Yes, there was always this overestimation, and to some extent our own military politics and military dynamics tended to exacerbate the problem. The three services were competing for having nuclear weapons systems. The navy finally got the main deterrent system, the Polaris submarine and its successors. The air force had the bombers that were dual-capable as they called it. The army had the Pershing missile and other howitzers that were also dual-capable. I visited all the main military headquarters while I was in NATO. I learned a lot about the thinking, and the thinking often hadn't carried deeply enough, the analysis of what would be the effects of nuclear weapons both in the short term and the long term. Chernobyl hadn't happened yet, so they weren't thinking about the world effects of nuclear energy. Through all this time the Soviets, to answer your earlier question, were just being implacably the enemy.

They weren't really doing anything to help us stop thinking of them as the implacable enemy.

Q: Well, during the time before de Gaulle finally said, "Everybody get out", there was this point in '65 when France was in the military organization. Was the rest of NATO beginning to move around and come up with the idea we can't depend on the French forces and make contingency plans, contingency thinking?

CLEVELAND: Well, the French really took care of that. They were in a way ahead of the allies moving in that direction. Within the French military forces there seemed to be some division of opinion. The cooperation in the Mediterranean with the French navy was completely different. Even after de Gaulle's pull out, the French navy continued to be part of NATO exercises in the Mediterranean which obviously made military sense.

Q: I know when I was consul general in Naples in '79-'81 the French navy was right there. In fact they were probably one of the strongest contingents of the Mediterranean fleet.

CLEVELAND: Indeed the pull out itself, the French pull out itself, was vastly over estimated at first by the press and some comments coming from Washington. I argued in a series of increasingly eloquent cables that here is a guy who is doing something for domestic consumption and to some extent for Soviet consumption, but what he had carefully not done is do things that would really be harmful such as forbidding over flights over France and interfering with communications through France. Both cases would have put a crimp on keeping the Mediterranean and northern fronts as part of the same military system. I said the fact that they haven't done anything about either of these indicates clearly that de Gaulle has thought this through and is trying to make his public declaration without hurting NATO. Don't let's help him hurt NATO more than he wants to. That did finally prevail but it got a lot of argument.

Q: Were you finding that within the French military there was some disquiet about pulling out? I would have thought that being by themselves did harm the military readiness by not being part of the NATO system.

CLEVELAND: Yes, it did. I didn't pick up, but I wasn't really in a position to pick up any dissension in the French military ranks. De Gaulle was so much in charge, particularly as a military man. He was, in fact, a great thinker among strategists of our time, which was revealed by the fact that he was able to pull off this political operation without really hurting NATO. Gradually the French got more and more cooperative with military exercises, and so on, but it has never been an easy relationship.

Q: Did you find you were there at a crucial time, of having to work and tell everybody, "Cool it. Don't aggravate the French anymore. Do what we have to, but at the lower ranks, let's not go into a pout on this thing?"

CLEVELAND: I did that kind of education with my own mission and to some extent with the other allies and with Washington. Fortunately, the president's political instinct, President Johnson, and the advice he was getting from Dean Rusk and others, George Ball, was very much along the same line. George Ball was in public somewhat more exercised than others. He

regarded it as almost a personal affront.

Q: I'm told, I heard other people remark, that he wanted to be very tough at the beginning on this, and it was Johnson who said let's cool it.

CLEVELAND: Well, George had worked in France, had been a consultant to the French government. I think he almost felt personally affronted by the French getting off the wavelength at this point. It is true that the President was very clear on this from a very early stage which helped a lot. I was just trying to reinforce that from where I sat.

Q: How were the British and French taking this?

CLEVELAND: Well, the British were really pretty cool about it. There was no way in which they could challenge the French anyway, so they didn't. In fact, it wasn't even within the NATO circle. I think it was regarded more as a matter of French-American relations than it was anything else. Even the Canadian angle, which heated up when de Gaulle visited Quebec and said something to the effect of, "Vive le Quebec Libre." The rest of the Canadians always will regard that as an affront, but I didn't perceive their French relations as narrowly dicey as I thought our relations with France had come to be. I suspect that most of them felt that in the end that the relationship was going to be soured or sweetened by what the Americans did. That is what I was working toward.

JOHN GUNTHER DEAN
Political Officer
Paris (1965-1969)

Ambassador John Gunther Dean was born in Germany in 1926. He came to the United States by way of Holland in 1938. After serving with the OSS during World War II, he graduated from Harvard in 1947. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1951, his career has included positions in Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bamako, Paris and Laos.

DEAN: I did not attend the POLADs meetings, just the Science Committee. It led to my assignment to the American Embassy in Paris as the regional expert on East Asia. In 1965, Southeast Asia was one of the confrontation areas in the world. I welcomed my new assignment in Paris.

Q: So you were there from 1965...

DEAN: From 1965 to 1969.

Q: An interesting time. When you arrived in Paris in 1965, what was the political situation in France?

DEAN: Again, keep in mind that my assignment was East Asia Affairs. I was not reporting on domestic political affairs. While I was in Paris, during the 1968 upheaval, I was as much a spectator as anybody else. I was not involved in predicting it or writing about it. My main job in Paris, from 1965 to 1969, was dealing with Southeast Asia and how the French could help us in a situation they knew well. Most of my time was spent on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Q: President Johnson at just about that time was beginning to introduce ground troops.

DEAN: Yes. At first, we only had advisers to the Vietnamese military and civilian authorities, but we were moving towards sending American troops. We were very interested in talking with the French because they had decades of experience in dealing with the countries of Indochina. My main French contact was the Director for Asian Affairs in the Quai d'Orsay, the French Foreign Office, Etienne Manac'h. He was a most interesting person. He was far from being anti-American. He told me one day, with some sentimentality, how well he remembered when President Woodrow Wilson arrived in France in 1918 and how he, as a young boy, stood there waving a flag welcoming the American "liberator." He vividly remembered the arrival of the first American troops in France in 1917. "Lafayette, here we are." Manac'h considered himself all his life a friend of America. Born in Brittany, Manac'h remained loyal to De Gaulle and spent most of the war years as a professor at the French Lycee in Istanbul, Turkey. During my years in Paris, I went to his office every week. I was not a high ranking member of the Embassy, but he, as Chief of Asian Affairs, always received me with open arms. He even introduced me to the Foreign Minister of France, Monsieur Debré. Perhaps my ability to speak French and relay precisely what he told me was the reason for the friendly reception at the Quai d'Orsay. My lengthy reports on what Manac'h told me about Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam are still available at the State Department. France had maintained a Diplomatic Mission in Hanoi and the French also passed messages from the North Vietnamese to us. At this stage, the French still had a major influence in Laos and Cambodia. A few years later, Manac'h became the first Ambassador from France to Communist China. De Gaulle had confidence in him. Manac'h played a major role again at that post. Years later, when I was Ambassador to Cambodia, Manac'h transmitted my messages to Sihanouk when the Prince was living in Beijing from 1970 to 1975. Manac'h was the person who helped bring together President Giscard d'Estaing and President Ford, in December 1974, to entice Sihanouk to return to Cambodia to put an end to the war. It failed. But in the years 1965-69 we made friends in the French Foreign Office who tried to find ways to help us in the Vietnam imbroglio in which we found ourselves. We also started in Paris exchanging ideas through Manac'h with the North Vietnamese Delegation in Paris headed by Mai Van Bo.

Q: When you say you started negotiations...

DEAN: We had, thanks to Monsieur Manac'h, direct access to the North Vietnamese Delegation in Paris, one day, Manac'h said to me: "I would like you to meet the Editor in Chief of 'L'Humanité' (this was the leading French communist newspaper). I think he can help you get some of the mail out from Hanoi written by American prisoners." I went to see the Editor of l'Humanité, Monsieur André, who was living in one of the suburbs of Paris. He had two small apartments put together into one large one. On the wall, he had magnificent Picassos. Monsieur André said: "A French journalist by the name of Madeleine Riffaut is proceeding to Hanoi. Do you want her to bring back any messages from American prisoners?" I said: "Yes, by all means

it's very important that we hear from them and know what's going on at the Hanoi Hilton" (the place where our American prisoners were held). She went and came back with many letters written by American prisoners in Hanoi. These messages I was able to pass on to the families in the United States. Among them, was a tape with pictures of who is today, Senator McCain. At the time, McCain was Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Air Corps and had been shot down over North Vietnam. He had parachuted into a lake in Hanoi, and in the landing had broken both of his arms. Among the pictures, was one of McCain holding up both arms to show his bandages. Ms. Riffaut brought back that picture and it was taken immediately to his father, Admiral McCain, who was Commander of the NATO fleet in London at the time. Manac'h facilitated these contacts. He also facilitated contacts for me. He was telling me what the Representative of North Vietnam in Paris, Mr. Mat Van Bo, was saying. (A book on his Paris days was published by him in the 1990s in Vietnamese.) Much of what we learnt about Hanoi, before the Paris Peace Talks, came through Mr. Manac'h. Mai Van Bo was in one room, and I was in another room. Manac'h would go forth and back to find out what was the response to a specific issue. For example, in very early 1968, I came back from one of these meetings and wrote a cable saying: "I understand that the North Vietnamese are agreeable to holding talks on Vietnam in Paris." Whereupon, I received a thundering reply from Mr. Rostow "We will never go to Paris." Since in this exchange, I was just a reporter, I took Mr. Rostow's message back to Mr. Manac'h. "You tell me one thing, and look what I get back from the U.S. National Security Adviser." He said, "Don't worry, it has already been decided between President Johnson and President de Gaulle that the meetings will take place in Paris."

Q: A little background. You being the contact person, obviously, this was of tremendous national interest. Who was briefing you and telling you what you could do?

DEAN: Nobody, because I was mostly a channel of communications. In the Embassy hierarchy, I was in the Political Section under the supervision of the Political Counselor Richard Funkhauser. But Ambassador Bohlen had instructed me that on specific issues, I should report directly to him.

Q: I have to mention that that was an extremely able Embassy at the time.

DEAN: The DCM was Bob McBride who later went as U.S. Ambassador to Zaire. Serving with Ambassador Bohlen was one of the great experiences of my career. One day, Ambassador Bohlen called me into his office and said: "John, we've got too many Johns around here. I am going to call you 'Josh'." From then on, I was 'Josh.' In early 1968, it became apparent that what Monsieur Manac'h had told me about the convening in Paris of a conference to find a solution to the Vietnam conflict was about to happen. Ambassador Bohlen had near his office a "scrambler phone," that is a phone that was secure and which was used nearly exclusively by him if he had to discuss a sensitive issue with the Secretary of State. In those days, it was Dean Rusk. Ambassador Bohlen suggested that I could use it, if needed, regarding the arrangements for the Vietnam Conference. But before I ever used it, I got asked one day to come quickly to the Ambassador's office because a person in the Department of State wanted to talk to me. When I picked up the receiver, I heard a male voice saying that "Secretary Rusk wanted to speak with you." Next, I heard Dean Rusk instructing me to report back to him, by phone, when the location of the site for the conference was discussed in Paris by the French with the North Vietnamese.

Shortly after that telephone conversation, I talked to Monsieur Manac'h at the French Foreign Office and said: "I understand that there is an agreement on holding a conference in Paris, but do you have any specific site in mind? Manac'h left the room and went next door where the North Vietnamese Representative, Mai Van Bo, was waiting for him. Four different sites were under consideration. They were in different parts of Paris. Among them was the old Majestic Hotel, which was the place where the Peace Talks were held. With this information in hand, I returned to the Embassy and telephoned Secretary Rusk's office. Since I was passed on directly to the Secretary of State, I was too nervous to sit down and stood up during the entire telephone conversation. I discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each site, and passed on Manac'h's recommendation that the Majestic Hotel site appeared to be the best location for all parties. Mai Van Bo also agreed; so the site was settled.

Then, the question arose whether there were going to be two delegations or four delegations? This was an important decision. Were the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong of South Vietnam one delegation? Were the Americans and the South Vietnamese Government one side? Or were there four separate delegations? The decision had political, legal, and practical ramifications. The seating around the table would reflect that decision. I want to give credit to a colleague of mine because it was my colleague Jack Perry, who came up with a solution of the seating at the negotiating table, which left the issue open to interpretation. He said: "You know, you ought to have one big table and just fill the whole room with that table. Also, you need separate entry doors. One group enters through one door and sits on that side of the table, the other group enters through the other door and sits on the other side of the table; this fuzzes the question whether you have two sides or four separate parties. Manac'h went himself to the French Government store – house to find a table big enough to fill the room – and the conference room had two separate doors. Since there was a little bit of space between the table and the wall, two small secretarial tables were introduced, one on each side to divide the room into two halves. In this way, clearly, there were two sides. The South Vietnamese Government sat on the same side as the Americans, and the Viet Cong sat on the side of the North Vietnamese. The bathrooms were not separate. As a matter of fact, they could be used in a way of permitting negotiators to meet discreetly to hold confidential brief exchanges.

Q: This is always a problem as we get more women into diplomacy. I can't tell you how many times I have talked about personnel assignments, issues being taken care of, during the pee break.

DEAN: The U.S. Delegation was headed by Ambassador Harriman and Secretary Vance. Phil Habib came with them as the top Foreign Service Officer.

Q: Vance was not a Secretary, was he?

DEAN: He had been Deputy Secretary of Defense before that time. The lowest man on this delegation was Richard Holbrooke. In this delegation of 13 people, Richard Holbrooke and I often were the sole dissenters. We were negotiations-oriented. Since I was in liaison with the French, I looked to the French to help us find compromises acceptable to both sides. Richard went on to have a wonderful career in the 1990s.

Q: He is today Ambassador to the United Nations. He was quite junior in 1968.

DEAN: He was the lowest man on the totem pole. When Phil Habib arrived in May 1968, he stayed in my apartment for three weeks until he got his own lodging. Phil and I became close friends. In parts, I turned over my contacts to him. He became the American contact with Mai Van Bo and Manac'h. Phil spoke good French. He was one of the best and most decent officers in the Foreign Service. In 1992, I flew over to Washington especially from France to attend the memorial service at the National Cathedral for Phil Habib. I don't want to anticipate, but let me go back to something which was equally important. This occurred in January 1967. Robert Kennedy came to Paris and John Gunther Dean was made Control Officer for Robert Kennedy's visit.

Q: Robert Kennedy at that time was Senator from New York.

DEAN: He had been elected Senator from New York. In 1967, he was considered to be the front-runner for the Democrats in the Presidential election. My job during this visit to Paris consisted in picking him up at the airport and accompanying him in his official calls. While in Paris, he also received a tremendous amount of fan mail. He came with his friend, Bill van den Heuvel, who later served a short time as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva. As Control Officer, one of my jobs was to answer the mail for his signature. When he made official calls, I went along as his interpreter. One day, he asked to see the French Minister of Culture, Andre Malraux, who had just returned from seeing Mao Tse Tung in Beijing. We had a two-hour conversation where I was the notetaker and interpreter of that conversation. Robert Kennedy was very interested in what was going on in Beijing, what Mao Tse Tung was like, etc... They had a long conversation. (As I had mentioned earlier, I had met Andre Malraux back in Mali, and indeed he was very gracious in remembering that event.) It took several hours to write the reporting telegram on that meeting. Then, Marshal Juin, one of the great French military leaders of the Second World War, died. His coffin was lying in state at the Invalides which is the 17th century building housing the military trophies and history of France, built under Louis XIV. Napoleon's tomb is also located there. Kennedy said: Let's go and pay our respects to Marshal Juin. Get me a wreath with the inscription "From the Kennedys." The American Embassy's administrative staff got us the wreath. With the wreath in hand, we drove to the Invalides. Indian file, we advanced to the coffin, as French soldiers lined in parade dress the path to the coffin. I carried the wreath. Kennedy was in front of me. Then, I gave the wreath to the Senator, and the Senator gave the wreath to a French military officer with whom he advanced to the coffin draped with a big French flag. The Senator put the wreath on the coffin, kneeled down, and sobbed. It was very dramatic. The television was grinding away at a mile a minute. The many spectators were stunned by the gesture of sympathy by this prominent American political leader. The Kennedys came often to France. Robert Kennedy's mother, Rose, had come to Paris nearly every year. The French public was clearly impressed by Robert Kennedy's friendly attitude toward the French people and their leaders. As we returned to the Embassy, the Senator received a phone call from the French Foreign Office that he should come over for a meeting. At the encounter, there were four people in the room. On the French side was Mr. Manac'h, Director for Asian Affairs, On the American side, were Senator Kennedy, Bill van den Heuvel, Kennedy's friend, and Dean as the notetaker. Mr. Manac'h said that the French had received three days ago a message from the Vietnamese which was being held for this meeting, at the request of the French

Foreign Minister Michel Debré. It was what was then called the first peace signal from Hanoi. The message from Ho Chi Minh was: "If you stop the bombing of North Vietnam, we will come to the negotiating table." The date of our memorable meeting was the end of January 1967. The French Government wanted Senator Kennedy to transmit this message to the President of the United States. We are one year before any discussion about peace talks in Paris. I went back to the Embassy and realized that Senator Kennedy had been given an important message. I wrote up the conversation as a top-secret telegram. Before showing my draft to Senator Kennedy, I went back to see Monsieur Manac'h again. It was not easy to see him. He was terribly busy. I said: "Would you please read this? Is this what you told the Senator?" He said: "Yes, it's an accurate report of what I said." I showed the telegram to Senator Kennedy at 6:00 pm and he agreed to having it sent. The Senator returned the next day to Washington, and I flew to Egypt with my wife for a ten day holiday. Before leaving, the Senator wrote me a brief note; "John, if there is anything I can ever do for you – officially or personally – don't hesitate to let me know. Bob." Prior to the meeting with Kennedy, I had worked with a couple of very senior American personalities, one of whom was Mr. George Ball, who was interested in contacts with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. They had representatives in Algeria and in Egypt. I had also worked with Senator Claiborne Pell, who was the only former Foreign Service Officer in the Senate in recent times. The latter wanted to meet Mai Van Bo when Pell had come to Paris on a personal visit. This happened in 1966-1967.

In early February 1967, my wife and I went to Cairo. From there, we took a boat to Luxor. While in Luxor at the hotel, I received a phone call: "John, your name is on the front pages of the newspapers. Your telegram reporting on Senator Kennedy's meeting at which he received, via the French, the "signal" from Hanoi, is on the front page of "The New York Times." You had better get back to Paris because apparently the President is angry about the leak, and you are being blamed for the leak. You have a very good chance of being thrown out of the Foreign Service." I said: "How can I be blamed? I left Paris, went to Cairo, and I'm now in Luxor. I was not even around to leak anything." But I did fly back immediately to Paris. Fortunately, I had a fabulous Ambassador, Ambassador Chip Bohlen who was in Washington at the time. When this story broke, he defended me. The event is also described by Schlesinger in his book on Robert Kennedy. The newspaper reported that upon his return to Washington, Robert Kennedy went to the White House to brief the President on the 'peace signal' from Hanoi. President Johnson is alleged to have accused Robert Kennedy that the State Department was particularly friendly to him. The "peace signal" in January 1967 was the beginning of the fallout between President Johnson and the potential Presidential contender, Robert Kennedy. Fortunately, Ambassador Bohlen was back in Washington on consultation and he defended me. President Johnson was quoted as saying: "Who is that fellow, John Gunther Dean? Fire him!" Ambassador Bohlen pointed out that it could not be Dean because he left Paris immediately after Kennedy's departure from Paris and he was in Egypt at the time the story broke." The leaking of the telegram reporting on the Hanoi signal was traced back to one of the Assistant Secretaries in State, and that it was done for political reasons.

But this was not the only time I was in hot waters during my duties with the U.S. Delegation to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations. One day, perhaps toward the end of 1968, in one of my conversations with Monsieur Manac'h, I asked quite innocently: "Monsieur le Directeur, why don't you help us to extricate ourselves from this situation in Vietnam?" I also alluded to my

years in Indochina and the fact that the French also had been unable to cope with the Vietnamese drive for unification and Independence. Now, the U.S. was more and more involved in the quagmire. After that meeting, Monsieur Manac'h went to see the French Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, who was close to de Gaulle, and explained that Dean had suggested that the French help the U.S. to extricate themselves from the Vietnam imbroglio. Later that same evening, Cy Vance got a phone call from the French Foreign Minister to come and see him. When confronted by Debré with Dean's remarks made to Manac'h, Secretary Vance made it very clear that Dean was not authorized to put forward any ideas to the French authorities and that Dean had been speaking on his own. I laugh about this incident sometimes, and wonder whether the idea of a "brokered solution" in 1968 would not have been better than what actually happened. I continued working with Manac'h until my departure from Paris in the summer of 1969. I would like to say a word about Manac'h's deputy, Charles Malo. He is the only French ambassador who served twice as Ambassador to China. Since we were both young at the time, we enjoyed a close professional relationship. I have seen him again after our retirement from the Foreign Service. Malo is today one of the few people alive who could bear out some of the events I cite in connection with the Peace Talks. Whenever Manac'h was not available, I met with Monsieur Malo at the Quai d'Orsay.

Q: Did you find the French critical of the U.S. getting bogged down in Vietnam?

DEAN: Not at this stage. A few years ago, I appeared on French television. It's one of the shows devoted to the discussion of history. It's entitled "The Meaning of History." I was asked about the American involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia, and specifically whether the French did a better job in Indochina than the U.S. I replied that I did not think anybody did a better job or a worse job. Rather, the mistake was made in 1945 by all western countries, including France and the United States, who did not recognize that the time for overt political colonialism in Asia had come to an end. In 1954, Mendes France tried to extricate France from Indochina with the help of the Geneva Conference. Unfortunately, the U.S. followed in French footsteps and the U.S. also could not defeat Vietnamese nationalism and drive for unification. If anybody was wrong, I think it was the West for not seeing early enough the rise of nationalism around the world and the drive for an Asian identity.

Q: Being with this delegation that came at this time, what were you picking up from the attitude of Harriman, Vance, and Habib? What did they expect? How were things going? What did they want?

DEAN: I think most of these personalities wanted to find an honorable end to the confrontation. The military briefer every day was Colonel Paul Gorman, later four-star General, and one of the brainiest military officers I ever encountered. When I was in Vietnam in 1970, he was in charge of the 101st Airborne Division. In the course of his briefing, I would hear him say: "Our bombers hit a shipyard." Averell Harriman would inject, "What do you mean, shipyard? A couple of guys hulling out a few tree trunks, that's what you are talking about." There was certainly a will to work with the North Vietnamese. Both Harriman and Vance tried to find ways of meeting with the North Vietnamese, away from the limelight, in efforts to find a mutually agreeable formula. But It takes two to tango. In November 1968, delegation members and certain Embassy officials were all at breakfast at the Ambassador's residence when election results were coming in. By

that time, Ambassador Bohlen had been replaced by Sergeant Shriver, President Kennedy's brother-in-law. The results showed Nixon elected and Humphrey had lost. The negotiating delegation appointed by a Democrat, President Johnson, knew that meant the end of their tenure. When Cabot Lodge arrived, I continued my liaison work with the French, but the action was between the U.S. and the Vietnamese Delegation. Although Kissinger and Le Duc Tho received the Nobel Prize for their work in Paris, the meetings did not lead to a negotiated solution. The Paris Peace Talks led to the Vietnamization of the war effort: withdrawing of U.S. troops and letting the South Vietnamese face the North by themselves. As everybody knows, the war ended with the collapse of the South Vietnamese Government some years later, and the unification of Vietnam under Hanoi control.

Q: In 1975.

DEAN: Yes, But back in the summer of 1969, I received word that I should proceed to Saigon to work in the political section, as deputy to the chief of that key section.

Q: Who was this?

DEAN: Martin Hertz, later U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria. The State Department decided to give me a year off to recharge my batteries. I said: "I will go back to Indochina next year, if you so desire." I kept my word. Remember, I had spent 5 years in Indochina, from 1953 to 1958. Few people had served in the same area as long as I did. I had also spent four years in Paris working essentially on Indochina. I was tired and I wanted a change. I was sent to the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, the program headed by Robert Bowie. That was to be my seventh year at Harvard.

Q: Before we talk about that. I realize you said you were a bystander on domestic French political events. What did your fellow officers at the Embassy in May and June of 1968 say about the events of that time in Paris? How were they seeing these events? What were you getting from your wife?

DEAN: Nothing from my wife. Basically, my wife has always kept out of politics. As I told you, we got to Paris in 1965. You ask about NATO and De Gaulle's decision to have NATO move out of Paris, when the unexpected request came for NATO to move out of France to another country, the Belgian Government advanced a site in southern Belgium: Bauffe-Chievre. During the First World War, my wife's grandmother's chateau had been requisitioned by the Germans. In 1940, the German Luftwaffe made the same place its western headquarters and built a runway for aircraft on the adjoining land. When in 1945 the chateau was destroyed by Allied bombing, the Belgian Government took over the land, and in 1966 offered the site to NATO. The offer was accepted.

Q: You mentioned that before, about the property having been owned by your wife's family.

DEAN: Yes. That became the NATO Headquarters. Not only in Europe, but generally, my wife stayed completely out of politics wherever we were.

Q: What was the reaction within the Embassy? First, let's think about having France kick NATO out of France.

DEAN: The Officers at the Embassy usually worked at that time with their French counterparts. There was no anti-French feeling. We had many common goals with the French, but obviously every country has its own national interests. They do not always coincide. There was no fear or distrust of the French. We knew that De Gaulle had his agenda which might differ on certain issues with U.S. objectives. Ambassador Bohlen had been at the Yalta Conference and De Gaulle had not attended this conference where major decisions were made on the shape of post-war Europe. It was one of De Gaulle's great regrets not having been invited to that meeting. Was it Yalta or something else, De Gaulle had a tremendous respect for Ambassador Bohlen. Few people knew more about De Gaulle's relationship with Ambassador Bohlen than Robert Barrett, who was once my deputy in Lebanon years later. In 1968, he was Ambassador Bohlen's personal assistant. De Gaulle listened to Bohlen, and Bohlen listened to De Gaulle. It was two heavy-weights exchanging views. De Gaulle, who usually was quite protocol conscious, never turned down Bohlen's request for a meeting – day or night, week-ends or Sundays. The two men understood each other. That does not mean they always agreed, but they could work together very well. Ambassador Bohlen was a consummate professional. In 1969, De Gaulle had a referendum on decentralization of the French administration. His proposal was rejected by the electorate. He resigned and died in 1970. So, Bohlen's ambassadorship corresponded to the closing days of De Gaulle's life. De Gaulle respected professionalism and he respected the role Bohlen played in the Roosevelt Administration, where he was one of the experts on the Soviet Union.

Q: Was the Embassy at all divided about the De Gaulle decision to kick NATO out? I can see this going two ways. One, the diplomats saying "Okay, fine. So be it. We've got to deal with this." I can also see hardcore people saying "Screw this," arousing all sorts of francophobia and all that.

DEAN: Personally, I had a full plate-looking after East Asian Affairs at the Embassy. I was not involved in the reporting or analyzing of French domestic politics. The only time I was involved in domestic politics was in 1968 when there was a student uprising. Ambassador Shriver wanted to attend, as a spectator, a meeting at the French National Assembly, which he did, in the galleries. I did not think it was a good idea for the U.S. Ambassador to be seen at that point at the National Assembly, when a domestic issue was under intense debate. In my opinion, when there is a domestic political squabble, it is much better for the American Ambassador not to be perceived as being involved.

Q: Did you ever run across Vernon Walters?

DEAN: Very much so. We had different approaches to the problems of the day, but personally, we got along well. Since he was such an accomplished linguist, he was used by different American administrations for important missions. He came out of the military, rose to the rank of Major General, and then was appointed to positions at CIA and State. He worked well with his French counterparts, who had known him for many years, going back to the days he was Eisenhower's interpreter. Dick Walters (which is really what he goes by) spoke absolutely

impeccable French, and many other languages. On Vietnam, he was very much of a hawk. He said: “My day will be made when we march down Main Street in Hanoi.” Having said this, Dick Walters and I became good friends, although he would add: “Oh, John wants to negotiate everything. He wants to compromise. No, we have to stand our ground.”

Walters and I had different politics. He is an honest, decent, committed person. When you are friends, you can hold different political views. I differed with him on many issues, I start with the assumption that your adversary today is your friend tomorrow, and vice versa. Therefore, I always want to maintain contact with as many people as possible. I don’t believe in building walls around a people, which usually ends up by building up its leader. I believe that the art of diplomacy is maintaining contact and trying to resolve issues without the use of violence, if possible. For example, I fought in Vietnam in 1970-1972. Immediately after leaving Vietnam, I tried to negotiate with those who were backed by the North Vietnamese. Dick Walters has a more military approach. I had serious reservations about the use of military power in today’s world to solve serious international problems. With the development – with or without our consent – of more and more highly sophisticated technology, it became obvious to me that more countries will have lethal weapons of mass destruction. People knew my views when I was assigned to Military Region One in Vietnam as Deputy to the Corps Commander. I went to Vietnam with the U.S. military because I strongly feel that if your country needs you, one has the duty to comply with the decision of the President.

MARY CHIAVARINI
Consul
Paris, France (1965-1968)

Ms. Chiavarini was born and raised in Massachusetts. After Secretarial training, she worked with the Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington DC before joining the Foreign Service in 1944. During her career with the State Department, Ms. Chiavarini served as secretary to the ambassador and other officers in Naples, Tirana, Manila, Seoul, Prague, Rome, Singapore and Warsaw. After her appointment in 1957 as Consul and Secretary in the Diplomatic Service she served in Palermo, Monrovia and Paris. She also served as special “trouble shooter” in Nicosia, Dublin and Riyadh. Ms. Chiavarini was interviewed by David T. Jones in 2007.

Q: You transferred directly from Monrovia to Paris?

CHIAVARINI: Yes. Right.

Q: Okay. Well, why don’t you spend a little time and just tell me your initial impressions of Paris. Of course, that’s where we met. When did you arrive in Paris? You arrived in Paris in June of 1965, if I recall correctly. My wife and I arrived there about May or June of 1969. So you had been there and had a full range of experience before we arrived.

CHIAVARINI: I had a lot of experience with the young people because they were all into drugs. Some of the girls said they could fly. And they tried it, but they just ended on the ground, dead. I had one boy who had a fit of some kind in my office. I called his father in the United States. The father was not much help. He said, "That's just like him." I said, "Well don't talk like that about your son. I would like you to come over here and bring him home." He said, "Well, maybe he would." He didn't come and didn't take him home. He was so careless about his son. I just couldn't get over it.

I had another man who was a drunkard. He was a painter--and apparently quite a good one. Because some time later I met this woman in the United States, with my sister Polly, who was the wife of my brother-in-law. She gave us, one of his paintings. It's a lovely picture of a young girl. He used bother the hell out of me all the time. When I was the busiest, he would come in and want to see me for nothing. I would see him and listen to what his problems seemed to be. Well, anyway he took sick, and I called his wife on the phone and she came over. In the meantime, he had fallen into the river in Paris, or been pushed, I never was satisfied about that. But anyway, the police were satisfied, so what could I do.

Q: Did he die?

CHIAVARINI: Yes, he died.

Q: Before his wife arrived or after she arrived?

CHIAVARINI: She arrived after he died. I took care of her while she was in Paris. She appreciated that. That was why she gave me that picture and one to my sister. I always appreciated that. She took me to a large depository of his paintings. She was going to wait until he got famous to sell them. Which is all right.

Q: Yes.

CHIAVARINI: I don't know what she eventually did. I lost track of her. But it was always quite an experience with that man. He drove me nuts.

Q: Do you remember his name?

CHIAVARINI: Yes, Joseph Presser. His wife was Mrs. Agnes Presser.

Q: What was the Paris embassy like when you arrived?

CHIAVARINI: Oh, it was enormous, about four times bigger than the embassy in Liberia or any other place I had been. I grew into it as you know.

Were you there for, I used to call them *les eventments*?

Q: I was not there. They occurred in May of 1968. I didn't get there until a year after that. But before then I wondered if you could give your impression of the embassy and our personnel who

were there?

CHIAVARINI: Well, none of them liked Paris. They all felt the French were terrible. I never felt that way. I remember another time, a friend and I couldn't close the umbrella as I got into the taxi. The two of us laughed our heads off, but he didn't care.

Q: Who was with you?

CHIAVARINI: The taxi man. I remember how much we laughed at the sight of me trying to close the umbrella and not succeeding.

Q: Well, your story also amuses me because it was in Paris when I first started carrying a collapsible umbrella all the time. You were in charge of the American passports, welfare, American citizen services.

CHIAVARINI: Yes.

Q: How did you divide your work with the visa section, which was in the Talleyrand building?

CHIAVARINI: Well, I let them be, and they let me be. Harvey Cash was the head of it.

Q: Was there any competition for resources? Having young officers, having support staff?

CHIAVARINI: Not that I knew of. Maybe there was. Maybe you knew more about it than I did.

Note: During May 1968, there were a series of popular disturbances throughout France. Originally stemming from "traditional" student riots; these "eventments" expanded partly fueled by general grievances associated with French high level education but becoming wider when labor unions, often communist dominated, sided with the students. There was a significant amount of rioting and barricade building with concern over French political stability. The French government offered various concessions to students, the police and security forces retained control with limited violence, and the disturbances ended.

Q: Were you satisfied with your French staff.

CHIAVARINI: Yes, they were very nice. They were very good. They didn't seem to harbor the same resentments that a lot of people seemed to have against Americans or foreigners in general. Anyway, I remember being there all during the period of May 1968, and I used to work late. One evening I worked until about 8 o'clock, and I walked home. I lived on the left bank. While I was walking, I met a French woman and I said to her in my bad French. "Oh, I'm so afraid that the French are going to go communist." And she said, "Don't worry; it's not going to happen." And it didn't. But I remember that walk home. Right today I can just see myself with that woman. She had sneakers; she was just like we were. I had read that a lot of people wore funny clothes, and she was into funny clothes. I don't remember exactly, but I do remember the sneakers. She seemed to be like the picture of what you would expect to see as a French woman. And she had the feel that they were not going to go communist and they didn't.

I remember one day de Gaulle disappeared, and we were all worried that something had happened to him. But nothing did. He had just not wanted to bother with the problem because he was sure nothing was going to happen.

Everybody asked me, "How do you feel about de Gaulle?" I said "I like him; don't talk to me about him; I won't listen."

I remember once he was driving by the embassy and I waved to him and he waved back. I was so pleased.

Q: What were the circumstances in the embassy at that time -- when you first arrived before the "eventments" of May? Was the staff effective? Did you feel that you were integrated as part of the embassy?

CHIAVARINI: Well, I did. I really felt as though I was part of the embassy. I liked the work. I used to have my hands full of crazy people. There were young people coming in -- and one of them like that young man having a fit right in front of me -- falling on the floor and acting like he was nothing.

Q: Well I remember that there were endless people who had lost their passports.

CHIAVARINI: Yes.

Q: Do you think that a significant number of those were frauds? People who had sold their passports?

CHIAVARINI: I don't think so. I guess I asked enough questions to each one so that I felt satisfied.

Q: Were you arranging assistance for a substantial number of Americans who were living in Paris for long periods? For social security payments or problems of that nature?

CHIAVARINI: No. We had nothing to do with that.

Q: Was Dick Rand your assistant for the entire period?

CHIAVARINI: I think so. He lives here, you know.

Q: I haven't seen Dick in 30 years I suspect. But I know you are in touch with him from time to time.

CHIAVARINI: Yes. And Phyllis, I can't remember her French name.

Q: It is Villegeurix-Ritaud -- instead of Flashner -- her maiden name.

CHIAVARINI: Right.

Q: Do you have an appreciation or any comments on any other members of the staff in the embassy, not just the consular staff but other officers, economic officers, political?

CHIAVARINI: Well, who was the girl in the passport section? I have a painting of hers.

Q: I don't know. In the passport section there was... the only American women were Phyllis and Mary Ann Mysenberg. Other than those two I don't know any.

CHIAVARINI: Well, so far as Mary Ann is concerned, I hear from her. She is in London. She usually comes over around Christmastime. She spends some time with her brother in Colorado.

Q: Can you give me more of a sense of what happened during the demonstrations in May of 1968?

CHIAVARINI: Yes, I always tell this story: I waited, kept waiting for them to break in to my apartment. I lived out there in the left bank. They were organizing down in front of my building. I remember putting my fur coat on and my pearls and having an empty bottle so I could swing it over their heads if they came.

Q: Did you go to work every day then?

CHIAVARINI: I tried to. Yes, I did.

Q: Was there anything dramatic that happened at the embassy during that time?

CHIAVARINI: Well, if there was, I didn't hear about it.

DONALD A. KRUSE
Political Military Advisor, NATO
Paris (1965-1968)

Assistant to NATO Secretary General
Paris (1968-1970)

Donald Kruse was born and raised in Philadelphia. After graduating from Wheaton College in 1952, he joined the Army. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1957, his career has included positions in Canada, Luxembourg, France, Belgium, Israel, Italy and England. Mr. Kruse was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: In 1965, you went to France. You were a political military advisor to NATO?

KRUSE: Actually to the U.S. Commander in Chief in Europe--EUCOM, as we call it.

Q: You were there from '65 until when?

KRUSE: I stayed in Paris and moved down to the embassy to take a Pol-Mil job in the fall of '66 and then stayed on in Paris essentially doing pretty much the same thing, although it's a little different down at the embassy where you are really back to a State Department operation.

Q: Let's talk first about the '65 to '66 period and EUCOM. Who was the commanding officer at that time?

KRUSE: General Lemnitzer was the overall Supreme Allied Commander. At his EUCOM headquarters, the American-only command in St. Germain-en-Laye, he had a deputy who was a four star Air Force general, Jake Smart. On a day to day basis, we worked with Smart.

Q: Where did this command fit into the overall...

KRUSE: EUCOM was the overall joint command that oversaw our Army, Navy, and Air Force in Europe. It is currently in Stuttgart, as all of our forces moved out of France in 1966. In that sense, it comes right from the JCS to EUCOM and then out to these subordinate service commands. It was at this time in my career, after my stint with Alex Johnson, which got me very much into political-military subjects. This was a desirable assignment for me to get out to Paris and to be able to continue to work on what was essentially NATO-related issues. EUCOM was U.S.-only forces. As you know, there are times when we use our forces in Europe not to do NATO things, but to perform unilateral tasks.

Q: What would be an example of a non-NATO thing?

KRUSE: A recent example was when our forces assigned to the Sixth Fleet attacked Qadhafi, that was clearly an American-only thing--not under NATO authorization.

Q: As the reaction to the Czech invasion by the Soviets and their allies, was there any sort of cranking up or was it just a feeling that this was something we couldn't do anything about and we just watched to make sure that something else wouldn't happen?

KRUSE: My recollections are that the NATO military asked for guidance, what to do. I think NATO authorized some minor steps, maybe more intelligence information collection and moderate increase in readiness, but certainly no alerting. Again, the Alliance looked to the United States for what lead we were going to give. It wasn't too long before it was clear that the United States was not going to engage militarily. It was not a close call. The Alliance did not want to go to war with the Soviets over Czechoslovakia however sympathetic allied countries were to the Czechs.

Q: At that time when you were dealing with NATO, what was the general feeling about Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany? Where would they go?

KRUSE: There was a question as to how loyal their forces would be if there was to be a real encounter between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, how much real fighting we'd encounter from some of the Warsaw Pact nations. But given the examples of East Germany and then Hungary being crushed earlier by the Soviets, most people in the Alliance were feeling that as long as the Soviets were calling the shots the Warsaw Pact would follow their lead. It would not be possible to free the Czechs from the Soviet Empire.

Q: You weren't expecting a dissolution of this Alliance?

KRUSE: No. I think we still were pretty much of the feeling that the Europeans had come to terms with communism in the East and that was probably the way it was going to stay. Subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Empire, even West Germans told me that when they finally got to East Germany for the first time, they were appalled at just the mediocrity of everything, if not worse. They said, "We thought we knew our brethren. We thought we knew East Germany. We were just abysmally wrong in knowing how bad it was."

Q: Did you ever find yourself while you were with the Secretary General's office having a problem wearing the NATO hat rather than the American hat?

KRUSE: We tried hard to wear the NATO hat. Jokingly, you were called "the American spy." This has been typically a job that Americans handled. There would always be a person in the private office of the Secretary General. George Vest and other officers had been assigned to previous Secretaries General. I guess you do your best to serve the Secretary General. He knows that you're a career Foreign Service officer. He knows that the American must write an efficiency report on you. He knows you've got to show that you're doing things the Americans want. Everybody that works at NATO is seconded, if you will. There isn't any NATO nationality. Everybody has their national biases. But, sure, being the American and being in a strategic office, you do try to talk a more NATO line and understand the European situation.

Q: How did you find the Norwegians and Danes within the NATO context?

KRUSE: Not very strong militarily. We were always battling the Danes to keep their standards and equipment up. The Norwegians were maybe not quite so bad. The rhetoric was that they were strong allies. It's just that they didn't have much to contribute militarily. They had their particular views on nuclear weapons. Norway wouldn't allow nuclear weapons on their soil. That made them a little bit of a second class citizen. After all, the Alliance was based on nuclear deterrence.

Q: How about those two foreign friends, Greece and Turkey?

KRUSE: Well, they both liked NATO better than each other, that's for sure. There was a lot of question about whether they should ever have been allowed to come in--their aversion to democratic ideals. The Greeks have their great democratic traditions but during those years--the '60s--Greece was a military dictatorship.

Q: During this thing, the colonels were in the whole time you were there.

KRUSE: Yes. I often cite the examples, that both in Portugal, where a dictatorship was in force, and in Greece with the colonels, there was no doubt that the pressures of being within the Alliance helped eventually to destroy these dictatorial regimes.

Q: What was the attitude towards the Greeks and the Turks when you were there?

KRUSE: That they contributed to extraneous problems. I came to see that more in my later job when I was in Naples because we clearly could not conduct a regime of sensible exercises in the Aegean because of the Greek and Turkish views of what you can do there. So, it was a nuisance to us. More than a nuisance, militarily, it certainly meant we couldn't do things that we wanted to do.

Q: Were there any particular tensions at that time or were sort of the Turks and the Greeks treated with a certain (inaudible)?

KRUSE: The Turks were admired for their tough military. They contributed a lot of forces. Of course, it was essentially to protect their own country.

Q: They bordered the Soviet Union.

KRUSE: Right. The Greeks were not as formidable a fighting force.

Q: I don't think Cyprus did. It blew up in July of '74. The colonels came in in April of '67 and kept the lid on for that period of time. I was thinking that this might be a good place to call a halt for today. We've covered an awful lot of your NATO business at this point. We've covered really from '68 to '70 when you were assistant to the Secretary General. We'll pick up when you moved over from '70 to '73 at the U.S. Mission to NATO and talk about the differences there in your job and perspective and all that.

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Economic/Political Officer
Paris (1965-1968)

Mr. Weingarten was born in New York in 1936. He received his BA from Colgate University and his MSFS from Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas from 1958-1961. His postings after entering the Foreign Service in 1962 included Paris, My Tho, Belgrade, Brussels, Canberra and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1999.

Q: Well, you were in Paris from '65 to when?

WEINGARTEN: '68.

Q: *What was your job?*

WEINGARTEN: I was initially in the Economic Section with the financial part of it, and then after about a year or so (my boss and I didn't get along very well), I wound up switching to the Political Section, where I did internal French politics with Charlie Tanguy.

Q: *Well, let's talk a little about the economic side. What were you doing on the economic side?*

WEINGARTEN: Basically the balance of payments, France's balance of payments and its gold reserves and so on, all that stuff. It was really very interesting stuff, but it's very secretive, and it was very hard to get into the French Finance Ministry for example and find out what they were actually thinking about, although they did have liaison people who would have lunch. I remember a fellow I'd had lunch with who would explain to me what was going on in French and then explained to me again the same thing in English. So it was one of the things that made me want to get my French to a better level, which I did.

Q: *We've always had a Treasury representative over there. Did you find that there was a built-in tension between the Economic Bureau and what you were doing and the Treasury office?*

WEINGARTEN: Well, I was in the Treasury office actually. They had two Treasury guys there and two State Department guys, and I was the junior State Department guy. And as I say, I didn't get along with the Treasury representative, and so away I went.

Q: *What, was it personal or just -*

WEINGARTEN: He was a very difficult guy to get along with and had very little patience. His name was Don McGrew. He was in Paris for 35 or 40 years as Treasury attaché. He started there in '45 and lasted, I think, until maybe '80, about 35 years. Very difficult, very irascible, and as I said, had very little patience with rookies, learners, and so I went on to the Political Section.

Q: *You were in the Political Section from when?*

WEINGARTEN: Early '66 to '68.

Q: *A very interesting time in France.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes.

Q: *Could you describe the French political scene as you saw it, and then we'll talk about what you were doing?*

WEINGARTEN: Okay. Well, the political scene was dominated by General De Gaulle, who had a moral authority over everyone else in France by virtue of his wartime experience. It seemed to us that he was getting more anti-American as time wore on. And we interpreted such things as his visit to Quebec as a kind of effort to set backfires, if you will, that the United States would have to deal with. But General De Gaulle always kept that on a fairly high intellectual-moral

basis. People who worked for him, especially people in the political side of his administration were more fundamentally, it seemed, anti-American and really happy to see the United States take a reverse, take a setback. Students, of course, were very much anti-war. I think it's really about '67 that that started to pick up. The embassy had very close relations with the Socialists, including François Mitterrand and his people. And there was also at the time a centrist movement in France, the Centre Démocrate, led by a man named Jean Lecanuet, who was the head of that, and he was much more open to the United States. We also pushed very hard for European unity, which again was something that the French were holding back on. So the embassy tried to cultivate all three of those groups - the Centre Démocrate, the Socialists, and the Gaullists - and then try to fend off all the crank groups, people who would come and say, "We'll give you a safe house in Brittany if you give us some money." And I wound up being the CIA's front man... the person they would shunt people to. People would come into the embassy and say, "I must talk to someone very secretly." And they'd say, "Well, we'll send you to see Mr. Weingarten." And so I'd have to listen to all these crank stories. Some of them were pretty funny. I'm not joking. Someone did offer us a safe house in Brittany for blown agents. We got people who published newsletters that didn't go anywhere, just rants against General De Gaulle. So that was kind of funny. You never knew in the Political Section what you would encounter when you went to work.

Q: I can't remember, by this time had the Algerian business been pretty well settled?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, the Algerian business? Algeria, the French moved out of there in '62, and after terrible bloodshed and slaughter, the *piets-noirs* came back to France, and then there was a lot of turmoil from, say, '62 to '65, when a lot of people in France had a tremendous resentment vis-à-vis General De Gaulle, who they thought betrayed them. And so there were assassination attempts. I think the last one was in '65, when they tried to ambush him outside Paris. They blew his car to pieces, but missed him. But there were a lot of diehard *Algérie-française* people around at the time.

Q: Sometimes as a new Foreign Service officer, new to France and all, in a way, you're more sensitive to some of the currents that are going through an embassy, and I was wondering, particularly in the Political Section, did you see an embassy where there were those almost for De Gaulle and those against De Gaulle? Were these two sort of currents going on, or were we pretty much of one mind?

WEINGARTEN: I think we were pretty much of one mind, as I recall it. Remember that this is a big embassy in a big city, and it was not an embassy that tended to coalesce after work or on weekends, and I think that's pretty much the case for most big embassies today. No, actually, I think the one thing, the one glue that marked the Political Section and the Economic Section, and the entire embassy as a matter of fact, was the resentment that we felt much of the time against the French for the snide remarks and efforts to screw us up in North Africa or to play games with us elsewhere. And so there was... when we could get back at them in some way... I'll give you an example. At the time the embassy was completely open, no barricades. The fence was simply ornamental. And the political counselor was assured by the Quai d'Orsay, by the Americas director there, that nothing would happen. He'd gone to complain about the rise in anti-American activity, and about our Marines at a ceremony who were attacked by a crowd of French. So the

Americas director said, oh, no problem, and the day after that, a *lycée* professor came in with about two dozen kids to protest the war in Vietnam, and walked into the courtyard of the embassy, and they all threw inkwells up against the side of the embassy, through the windows, and one of the targets they got was the political counselor's carpet. He had this nice office on the courtyard. A couple of ink bottles went through there and got the carpet. And he was just beside himself with joy. He went over to the Quai d'Orsay, told them about this. They said, "Well, of course, we'll pay for the repairs." So he went out - I don't think he had an Aubusson carpet or anything like that, but he went out for the repairs and did not bother to get the low bid.

Q: *Who was the ambassador during this time, '66 to '68?*

WEINGARTEN: Charles E. Bohlen.

Q: *Oh, yes.*

WEINGARTEN: Really, the epitome of an ambassador.

Q: *As a large embassy and as junior officer did you have any contact with him?*

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes. We would go over to the National Assembly, and he'd want to see somebody, one of the deputies, and I would be sent to fetch the deputy, in effect, as the junior officer in the Political Section. We had 12 people in the Political Section. It was a big outfit. But no, I had contact with him, not daily. But to see him in action was really something.

Q: *What was your impression of how he operated?*

WEINGARTEN: Well, he had a tremendous presence. He was a man who had served in Russia. He'd also served in Paris in the late '20s, I think, early '30s, learned Russian at the Institute for Oriental Languages, knew Paris, spoke perfect French, was a real presence. That's the only word I can think of. He exuded authority. He knew that any Frenchman who would talk to him would know that whatever message he had to convey would be conveyed to Washington at a very high level. He was a very, very impressive man.

Q: *Who was the head of the Political Section?*

WEINGARTEN: Richard Funkhouser, Dick Funkhouser. He was the only political counselor when I was there. And he knew Paris, too.

Q: *Well, during those times, I think we probably had as professional a group as we've ever had in Paris.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes. I don't know. I served again in Paris in the '90s. Yes, you might be right on that. I think before then they always did. They always had a core of people with real qualifications, who knew France and who knew the language. Afterwards, I think they still kept... it's still such a sought-after post.

Q: Was there speculation among the junior officers about whether De Gaulle and after De Gaulle, thinking about the situation then?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, but you could not see any real challenge to De Gaulle except if he happened to be assassinated or fell sick and died. He was so far above the rest of the political world in France that he had no real competitor for president. So I think we did... We tried to look for young Gaullists or people we thought would play a role, or were young French political leaders. And we managed to pick people who have played a major role since then - not always to our advantage. One was Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who's now the minister of interior. We sent him to the States, and he was my project. And he's turned out to be one of the most fundamentally anti-American French politicians you could have. He was minister of defense during the Kuwait-Iraqi business, and had to resign his post as head of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship Society under real pressure, and finally resigned as Minister.

So we would look for people on the International Visitors Program who we thought might play a role in French society, usually in about 15 or 20 years down the road. And so who would replace General de Gaulle if he happened to pass away right then and there? We didn't do very much speculation on that.

Q: This was still the era, a carryover from the Kennedy time, when we had youth officers and there was a great deal of emphasis on youth. And of course, it turned out in, what was it, May or June of '68, youth was important. Were you still young enough to be kind of a youth officer in those days?

WEINGARTEN: A bit long in the tooth, but yes, we used to have a pretty active youth program run by a fellow who was a friend of the DCM, as I recall. I may be getting into personality.

Q: Well, personalities are all right. The time has gone on.

WEINGARTEN: Well, anyway, we had a couple of receptions, I recall, at the residence - well, not the residence, the building that eventually became the residence - but these weren't the kind of French people... these were kids who were the sons and daughters of the *haute bourgeoisie* and that sort of thing. I remember one time, it still amuses me, two or three of the other junior officers and myself were recruited by a Frenchman who would throw *cotillions* - he'd have parties, dances, once a month or so. As it turned out he was an insurance salesman, and what he was doing was starting to introduce people with titles and so on to people who had money, and what he wanted was some kind of spear carriers to just stand around on the walls - and participate, or course - but didn't expect any of them would have the knowledge of French or the family connections to make any kind of impression on any of these girls. So we'd go to these things, and sometimes they were kind of funny. You'd go out to a chateau on the Loire and have a big party - all of us in tuxedo.

Q: You were observing the mating and breeding ground, in a way.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, I really was. It was a kind of meat market, and it was a place where the girls with titles would meet guys who were from the *haute bourgeoisie* or vice versa - you know,

had money but not a title. And so they were very involved, and very sort of snobbish kids and that sort of thing. You know the rest of it was just... I lived in the Latin Quarter, used to meet people, go to cocktail parties and so on. So you got to know a fairly good cross-section of folks.

Q: How did we deal with the Communist Party at that time, and how did we view the Communist Party?

WEINGARTEN: The Communist Party was sort of in a ghetto of its own making. It only cooperated on a arm's-length basis with the Socialist Party, and then only in major elections. As far as seeing us, they had I think one or two people designated as liaison, and they would liaise with the embassy. And we had an officer, Jack Berry, who was our designee, basically, to see these liaisons. And then Jack Berry and I used to go to press conferences that Communist leaders would give. We used to follow what they said fairly closely, but we had very little contact - no unofficial contact with them at all, and very little official.

Q: Well, was the feeling that they were a tool of the Soviet Union?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes, very much so, and the French Communist Party particularly. It was really just an extension of Moscow. As it turned out, it was the one... all the other European parties in the '70s began to mark a degree of independence from Moscow, but the French Communist Party never did.

Q: When did you leave? You left Paris before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, didn't you? That was in August of '68, I think.

HARVEY E. GUTMAN
AID Attaché
Paris (1966-1967)

Harvey E. Gutman was born in Switzerland in 1921. From 1942-1946 he served in the American Army overseas. Upon returning in 1949 he received his bachelor's degree from University of Portland and later received his master's degree from American University in 1958. During his career with AID he held positions in Laos, Paris, Thailand, Morocco, Liberia, and Nigeria. Mr. Gutman was interviewed by Stuart Van Dyke in August 1997.

GUTMAN: In early 1966 I was assigned to Paris as the AID Attache in the Embassy, a State Department secondment. Our office was located in the suite of the Treasury attache. This gentleman ran a semi- autonomous operation, having held his position for over 20 years. My job was liaison and coordination with the various French assistance programs. I reported to the Bureau for Policy Planning and Coordination (PPC) in AID/W.

French aid was bureaucratically split up. Aid to the former African colonies was handled by the Ministry of Cooperation; assistance to the remaining colonies and French territories came under

the Treasury in the Ministry of Finance. Anything that pertained to North Africa, especially to Algiers, fell under the Foreign Ministry as did cultural affairs, worldwide. Loans were handled by a powerful, independent credit institution. Purely monetary matters fell under the aegis of the central banks, i.e. one each for West and Central Africa and for Madagascar, all located in Paris. Further, there was a special Office for African Affairs in the Presidency, headed by the shadowy Jacques Foccart, former head of the French secret services and close collaborator of General deGaulle. Reputedly, his main concern was maintaining pro-French regimes in the former colonies.

General deGaulle was President during this period and prone to take anti-U.S. positions to demonstrate France's independence. This was the time when France quit NATO and all American military installations were moved to other locations. French officials were under strict orders to speak only French in any official contacts and to avoid "franglais" which had been both chic and popular since World War II days.

The Embassy's Minister for Economic Affairs (the late Stanley Cleveland) introduced me to the major players in the various French offices. In the next few months I became familiar with French aid philosophy, plans and operations, especially in Africa and the various players in the bureaucracy. As instructed, I explained AID's approaches and operations. AID's objective was to make our respective aid programs complementary and to avoid duplications by coordination during the planning stage.

The Director of FAC (Fund for Assistance and Cooperation), a pleasant, slightly cynical gentleman, listened carefully. He picked up immediately on the term "coordination" and pointed out that instructions from the top specifically precluded the type of advance coordination that Washington was proposing but that the French aid missions and his offices were prepared to collaborate. "To sum up", he said, "coordination - non; cooperation - oui!".

France with her long colonial history and experience in development operations still considered the newly independent states as her wards. Many of the officials were veterans of the colonial service and had transferred that mentality to their new positions. When we discussed development funds, they remarked that their in-house term for project funds was "write-offs" (fonds perdus). They fully understood but had little concern for sustained development. Their policy line was that all members of the French Community were entitled to assistance. However, once France's contribution to an activity was completed, it was up to the host country to carry on or not, as it saw fit. Beyond this, they expected the African countries, in exchange for assistance (often tailored to French interests) and budget support, to endorse French positions in international forums and to perpetuate France's status as the privileged importer within the Franc Zone.

I found most of the French officials personally friendly but convinced that France's role and experience in her former colonies was sufficiently paramount to obviate the need for exchanging detailed data and program plans with AID. On the other hand, neither- in Paris nor in the field, did the French make the slightest effort to convince us of the correctness of- what they considered- tried and tested approaches to development in Africa. In sharp contrast, AID felt that France and other donors should share their programs with AID at an early stage so that they

could benefit from reflect our- frequently changing - new insights and priorities (ranging from project or sector approach to emphases on women, the rural poor, the poorest of the poor, etc.).

On the whole, French officials were disinterested in the details of American aid as long as we did not displace French importers and contractors. The only other sensitive area was a perceived threat of our trying to anglicize the cultural sphere. I had already seen in Togo that the French would try hard to keep us out of the education sector. To them, the intellectual area and, especially, the school system were the underpinnings of the very future of the French Community. The continued predominance of the French language was acclaimed as the essential "mortar" that bound the bricks of the French Community.

The Embassy was responsible for all bilateral economic matters (in contrast to multilateral aspects that fell under OECD/DAC). Throughout my tour, I spent considerable time, e.g. on the Laos currency stabilization fund to which the French contributed only reluctantly. We had ongoing difficulties reconciling U.S. and French requirement calculations. Many French officials who had seen service in Indochina before and during the war felt at best ambiguous about our successor role. Other financial matters involved various loans, e.g. a U.S. proposed moratorium on Chile's payments on all foreign loans.

It took AID/W a long time to understand France's unsentimental, pragmatic view of development as a means to her ends as opposed to AID which considered it the end per se. This reflected that, in contrast to France, we had few political and economic interests in Africa (except for preempting the USSR and China designs).

The outstanding official among my various counterparts was the Director of the Treasury (J. de Larosiere) in the Ministry of Finance who invited me several times for dinner at his house. (later on he became Executive Director of the IMF and President of the Bank of France). He was a member of the Corps of Finance Inspectors from which France - since the days of Napoleon - draws its senior civil servants. Supposedly, this institution served as the model for the Senior Civil Service in the U.S. though the latter never reached the mobility of its French counterpart.

Special letter of credit

My time in Paris paralleled a White House injunction against the purchase of local currencies, including that of CFA, the currency of the former African colonies that formed the French Community. (Guinea and Mali were the exceptions that had decided to go it alone, albeit with catastrophic consequences). The CFA, in turn, was fully convertible into French Francs.

We developed a scheme, called Special Letters of Credit under which AID would deposit a bloc of U.S. dollars with two of the largest French commercial banks. They would finance some of the letters of credits they issued for imports from the U.S. and credit AID's account in French francs/CFA. AID would then use these for program operations in Africa. Thus, AID's periodic reports to the White House would not show any direct conversions. The banks, of course, benefitted from the spread between the low interest rate earned the sizeable AID deposits and the high rate they charged their clients for L/C's. As a fringe benefit, I enjoyed a number of truly excellent luncheons in the private dining rooms of the two bank presidents involved.

Inauguration of the Central African Economic Community

During my Paris tour, AID/W nominated me the AID member of the U.S. Observer Delegation to the inaugural meeting of the Central African Economic Community in Brazzaville. I was a veteran as I had been assigned the same role on the U.S. Delegation to the East African Economic Community's initial meeting in Lusaka, one or two years earlier.

The dispatch of this State Department delegation involved the senior levels of State/AID. Congo/Brazzaville had cavalierly disregarded a number of covenants of the Vienna Convention, e.g. the incarceration of an AID officer (Stanley Berenson). The U.S. had suspended diplomatic relations and remanded the protection of its interests to the German Government. The team was met at the Brazzaville airport by the German ambassador in person. He was a friendly, gregarious gentleman with family ties to one of the German champagne dynasties (not Ribbentrop's). The U.S. Delegation benefitted nightly from his large supply of vintage libations.

The Conference achieved little as the French Central Bank could not come to an agreement with Zaire's (Belgian) advisors on terms for monetary and customs integration. The only other thing of importance that I recall is the Delegation climbing up the outside spiral staircase of a large government building. A soldier was stationed on each step. One suddenly dropped his rifle and loudly cursed in Spanish. This incident, confirming the presence of Cuban military, became the subject of an immediate NIACT.

Vietnam

A priority telegram from AID/W suddenly detailed me for 90 days to Vietnam as member of small program review team, drawn from all AID regions. The Ambassador (Chip Bohlen) was incensed that his concurrence had not been requested. The DCM who had just returned from Washington cautioned him that the President had ordered anything Vietnam-connected be given absolute priority. The Minister for Economic Affairs bet me a dinner that I would not make it back to Paris at the end of my 90 day TDY. I knew Saigon as I had been there on a temporary assignment while posted in Laos. However, this pre-dated the American build-up.

My first task involved the HQ administrative budget. I noticed a doubling of the building rent. I asked a colonel why the projection was totally out of line with the escalator clause.

"Don't you know who owns the building?"

"No idea, what's the difference?"

This building is owned by Gen. XYZ. If we antagonize him, he'll oppose our fighting here."

"Wouldn't that be just too bad," I said.

This short dialogue sums up the HQ mentality of those days (though certainly not that of the men in the boondocks).

Subsequently, our group of about ten AID officers was split up into teams. I was put in charge of the Delta Region. We were to establish what projects were actually underway and analyze what was being planned. USAID had lost track of just what was being implemented and projected.

Most of the planning and requirement estimates came from the military who were engaged in AID-financed civic action projects.

A brigadier general explained that he expected to double the number of schools that his predecessor had planned to construct. We asked about local labor availabilities in the light of the government's new draft quotas. We then posed questions regarding additional fuel needs and how they would be met with some 50 cargo vessels and tankers standing off-shore waiting to be unloaded, what about corrugated roofing, etc. The general referred the questions to a colonel who summoned a major who queried a captain.

Shortly after returning to Saigon, the USAID Director commended the team on a great job (I suspect this view was not shared by the military) and assigned me to a special task involving post-war planning. On completion of my part, I was transferred to the Multinational Projects Office which dealt with assistance from other Free World sources, titled so-called "More Flags" program. This activity was a White House priority in an attempt to increase the number of allies, joined in the fight against North Vietnam. Washington went to almost ludicrous length to augment the number of flag poles in front of the HQ building. When a Central American country offered a couple of tons of coffee, a joint Vietnamese-U.S. mission was dispatched to Latin America for the solemn presentation. It was of no importance that coffee was not used by the Vietnamese army.

At close of business on Day 90, I departed for Paris via AID/W.

The Program Office had asked me to hand carry the Mission's draft budget to Washington. The head of the Vietnam Office (Walt "Stony" Stoneman) literally gasped when he saw the four inch-thick submission. On learning that it covered 1400 projects, he sat down in stunned silence.

It is easy today to quarterback our Vietnam involvement. At the danger of being considered a troglodyte, going back 30+years in time, I understand our intervention, the domino theory and the validation of solemn commitments that we had made not only to South Vietnam but also to Taiwan, Israel, Korea and others. Of course, had we known then what we know now, our policies would have been different. AID played a vital and, in many aspects, very positive part. Roads were built, gigantic ports with industrial zones were constructed, the agricultural, health, etc. systems improved and above all, a large and varied body of technical knowledge was transferred. Whatever political systems prevails, the improvements of the country's human resource base and infrastructure that USAID's efforts have left behind will remain a contribution to the improvement in the living conditions of, especially, the rural population. So much for Vietnam.

Back in Paris, I collected my dinner from the Minister Counselor.

Helas, in fall 1967, the Assistant Administrator for Program Planning (Joe Saxe) arrived in Paris. After praising my work, he informed me that my job would be abolished. In spite of explanations, some members of Congress remained highly critical and continued to insist that the position was somehow linked to aid to France. Thus, the Administrator had decided to eliminate the slot altogether.

RICHARD W. BOGOSIAN
Consular Officer
Paris (1966-1968)

Ambassador Richard Bogosian was born on July 18, 1937, in Boston, Massachusetts. He studied history at Tufts University and graduated from University of Chicago Law School. In 1962 he entered the Foreign Service and his career has included positions in Niger Republic, Chad, Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. Ambassador Bogosian was interviewed by Vladimir Lehovitch in 1998.

BOGOSIAN: In any event, what this led to - and again, I consider this one of the great gifts of the Foreign Service, to have learned the French language –

Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: And so what happened then was, we came to Washington in the late fall and early winter, learned French, and proceeded to go to Paris, arriving in January of 1966. And Paris was my consular tour, and as you know that's a big, huge embassy, and as a result, what they did was make that a rotational tour, which is to say, for the first few months I worked in what was in the vernacular called "Welfare and Whereabouts," which is now called American Citizens' Services. Then I was notaries officer in the Passport Section and then, for about a year, visas. But the thing that made Paris a wonderful place to be a vice consul is, first of all, we were young and we were junior, so we had no social responsibilities. We couldn't take full advantage of Paris, because that meant money, and we didn't have money; in fact, there was an opportunity to get in with sort of a young, fast crowd of French people, but we didn't have enough money to do that. But we did have a wonderful opportunity to travel in Europe and so forth, and while we were there we managed to get up to Holland and over to Germany and down to Spain. And keep in mind that this was my one European assignment, so I was always grateful to have had that experience. When we got to Paris there was a fairly substantial American military presence in France, and as a result we also had the benefit of things like PX's and the American Hospital, when my wife was pregnant.

Q: *That was in NATO days, the days when SHAPE was in France.*

BOGOSIAN: It was all in France, the way God meant it to be.

Q: *Absolutely.*

BOGOSIAN: The only trouble was, so was De Gaulle. And in 1967, De Gaulle kicked us out. Now it's interesting in all my whole career I never served with a political ambassador, even in Paris. Our ambassador there was Chip Bohlen, and when the French were doing that, he said at a meeting of American embassy personnel, he said - this was rough for some of the Americans to see what was happening - and he said, "Just remember, there's more to French-American

relations at any given time than what the two governments are saying to each other.” And I always remember that in the various places I’ve been associated with.

Q: *Who was DCM at that time?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, we had two DCMs, and the first was a man, Robert McBride, who later went on to be ambassador to Zaire and to Mexico, and his name, I think, was McSomething-or-other, and I just can’t think of it right now.

Q: *Jack Maguire?*

BOGOSIAN: No, it wasn’t Maguire. Maguire was there, but he was the head of the Pol-Mil Section. He became ambassador to Mali. The second DCM was W. Woodruff Wallner - unforgettable. Jeez, I can’t think of who the DCM was.

Q: *Let me ask a follow-up question to that. Embassy Paris, from my soundings over many, many years, is traditionally, despite Paris, a very low-morale embassy. How was it when you were there?*

BOGOSIAN: It may have been, Vlad. I think the thing to remember is, in an embassy like that, when you’re a vice consul, it’s like working in the State Department, and you don’t necessarily know what people are thinking in some other part. There were like seven buildings. I’m not sure I ever was in all the buildings.

Q: *It may have been a high-morale embassy.*

BOGOSIAN: Well, I don’t know whether it was one way or another. I know that, speaking personally, in some ways this was the low point of my career because I was really coming to grips with whether we were going to stay in or not. I did get promoted, finally, in Paris.

Q: *Promoted? You mean after -*

BOGOSIAN: Yes, from 8 to 7.

Q: *Congratulations, I tied you. I was the champion.*

BOGOSIAN: Really.

Q: *Four years in class as an 8.*

BOGOSIAN: Really, I thought I was the last one of the group. But anyway, there was a friend of mine, a contemporary named Ron Freeman, who currently is, I think, the number two person in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and he was a young lawyer. He had gone to Columbia, and we were kind of friends, and he’d come in and he’d say, “Hi, Dick, are you still processing wetbacks?” And so it was not easy to see this guy move ahead as he was working for McKinsey and Company.

The thing about Paris was the following. First of all, Paris was Paris. You simply couldn't avoid all the beauty and interest of that city. Secondly, we had our third child there, so it was a period when our family was very young and growing, and we could take them here and there and enjoy some of the things that Paris and France had to offer. We had a lot of friends, and because they were part of a big embassy, it wasn't quite the way it is when you work all day with people at a small post and then you socialize with them. We really didn't see them that much. We had friends that were in USIA, with Treasury, with the military, and so in that sense we made friends, some of whom have remained close friends for all the years since.

There was a very diverse and interesting American community in Paris in those days, and we had some exposure to them. The other thing, frankly, was there was just this passing parade of people who came to the Consular Section, some of whom were more interesting than others.

Q: Dick, did you enjoy consular work?

BOGOSIAN: I enjoyed consular work the way I enjoyed administrative work, which is to say, there were parts of it that were very interesting, but I wouldn't want to specialize in it because there were too many emotional things that tear you to pieces. There was a Turkish man who had come in for an immigrant visa, and we had to refuse him because he was a convicted felon, and his wife was American, and she had left him and he wanted to join her, and we had to tell him he couldn't go. And he said, "You're telling me I'll never see my wife and children again." I frankly had no desire to go through that. I prefer the more voyeuristic parts of our profession, where you watch other people do things and not get involved directly.

I emerged from Paris feeling that everybody should have a consular tour so you'll have enough stories to tell for the rest of your career, because there were just innumerable incidents. I mean, I had to refuse a Nobel Laureate a transit visa. I think he was the first Frenchman to win a Nobel Prize in one of the sciences for years, and he wanted to go I don't know where, and he needed a transit visa, and finally after all my questions, he said, "Well, take your visa and shove it." And my boss came and said, "You know, you probably should have bucked that up to me." I said, "What could you do? He's ineligible." He said, "I know that, but sometimes it goes down a little easier when you're more senior." We had Americans who were in jail or on drugs, just people who would come in and they would tell you their story. The woman who came in, she was of some sort of Eastern European origin, and she flashed a Nicaraguan or a Costa Rican passport, and as I was refusing her, I said, "You want to go to America and live as an immigrant." She said, "No, I want to go and live as a tourist."

Q: Wonderful.

BOGOSIAN: So that's what made it interesting. And in contrast to some of our other assignments, after all is said and done, it was only two years, but two years can go by fast.

Q: So, Dick, what happened then. We're now in 1968.

BOGOSIAN: I would note one thing. If I had gone to Cairo, I would have been there during the

'67 War and probably would have been evacuated, so we kind of missed that.

Q: Did you stay in Paris for those amazing... Student uprising and - -

BOGOSIAN: No, that happened after I left. As it happened, our Baghdad assignment was two years and two days, and our Paris assignment was two years and two weeks, and as it happened as well, from Paris I was assigned to the Middle East bureau, to NEA, and as the CENTO Desk officer. I would note that this was at a time that when I had to have some major surgery done -

DENIS LAMB
Administrative Officer
Paris (1966-1969)

Ambassador Denis Lamb was born in Ohio 1937. He received his BS from Columbia University and MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1964, he was posted in Fort de France, Paris and Brussels. He was interviewed by Ray Ewing on September 19, 2005.

Q: Okay, so you got to Paris when?

LAMB: It was November '66.

Q: And you were assigned as administrative advisor to the U.S. Mission to the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

LAMB: That's right.

Q: About which you probably didn't know too much when you got there.

LAMB: I knew virtually nothing about the organization, and my responsibility was going to be to manage the U.S. contribution to the OECD budget. (Our contribution in 2006 will be \$92 million. Allowing for inflation and exchange rate movements, we were spending a comparable amount in the mid-60s.) There were internal administrative matters to handle as well.

Q: But the Embassy administrative section did the major part of the administration of the mission.

LAMB: Yes, general services and many aspects of personnel management services were provided by the embassy. I was fortunate that the embassy administrative counselors, Idar Rimestad and Jack Lennon, treated the mission and me well. As an inexperienced administrative officer, I appreciated their willingness to take me under their wing, show me the ropes, and help me avoid mishaps. For example, when the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks on Vietnam arrived in town, I received a call from someone in the motor pool who asked, "Would you consider loaning us one of the Mission's cars for a few weeks?" I had three cars. I hesitated and

then called someone higher up in administration for advice. “Whatever you do, don’t do that! These talks are going to go on for years!” [Which they did]. “Your ambassador will kill you!” So I declined to provide a car. The delegation to the peace talks managed without it.

Q: Well, why don’t you tell a little bit about the structure of the mission and some of the personalities and then maybe a little bit more specifically about the main things that you did as administrative advisor.

LAMB: The OECD was formed, if I can sketch in a little history, in the early Sixties. It succeeded the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was set up at U.S. behest as a forum to enable the Western Europeans to collaborate in (a) determining how to spend Marshall Plan funds and (b) liberalizing their economies so as to further European integration in its early stages. We supplied the money -- \$13 billion between 1947 and 1953 -- but were not members of the OEEC. When the Marshall Plan ended, the OEEC soldiered on, reducing intra-European trade barriers and working toward currency convertibility and the elimination of capital controls.

There was a study made as to what should happen to the OEEC when the Common Market was established by the Treaty of...

Q: Treaty of Rome?

LAMB: Treaty of Rome, 1958, I believe.

Q: Maybe 1957.

LAMB: The treaty was ratified in March of 1957 and came into force on January 1, 1958. At that point the machinery of European integration began to move. The U.S. decided that it would support maintaining an organization to succeed the OEEC, and join it, in order to accomplish several objectives. One was to bring Japan in as a full member of the successor organization in order to tie it to the West. (Similarly, we wanted to bring in Australia, New Zealand, and Finland.) A second objective was to keep an eye on the Common Market as it evolved to help protect our economic interests.

Arrangements were made for the European Commission, the Common Market’s executive, to have a seat at the OECD table, and to participate in committees and the governing Council. I must say that the Commission was somewhat wary of the OECD because they saw it as a rival. Decisions made in Paris, they felt, might preclude action in Brussels. That rocky relationship continues to this day. When I completed my tour as Ambassador to the OECD in 1990, I devoted a portion of my valedictory remarks to the Council to the issue of EC-OECD relations. The full text of those remarks is attached at Appendix A. This is the pertinent paragraph:

Over recent months, the Council has devoted considerable time and energy to the question of new members. This issue is important, but not critical. On the other hand, the question of the European Communities’ role in the OECD is critical and merits a fresh and careful look. The OECD will not be able to set and achieve ambitious goals unless the EC, as such, sees it in its

interest to participate. As present it, and particularly the Commission, does not. There are three problems. First, to some extent, and for reasons that are in part historical, the Commission has seen itself as in competition with the OECD. We should overcome its concerns in this regard. Second, the Commission, with its principal powers residing in the trade field, takes a particular approach to liberalization. It prefers to exchange concessions in balanced agreements rather than to embrace liberalization for its own sake. We need to find an accommodation with the Commission on this point. Finally, the Community will always have difficulty in representing itself in the OECD. The Commission is constrained by its mandates -- or the lack thereof -- and the Council of Ministers, by its very nature, can have no position on an issue until a final decision is taken. Recognizing these problems, we should nevertheless look for ways to enhance the Community's role in the OECD, beginning with full membership and arrangements for the Council of Ministers, represented by the country holding the presidency, to be heard in our precincts.

A third objective that the U.S. sought to achieve in OECD was to keep economic issues out of NATO, which for the most part has been the case. At one point, ironically, when NATO's fortunes were flagging in the Seventies, there was a U.S.-led effort to add an economic and social policy component to the NATO structure. The component was created but never amounted to much.

A final U.S. objective was to fold the stand-alone Development Assistance Group into the OECD as the Development Assistance Committee. At that stage the U.S. was by far the largest foreign aid donor and wanted a forum anchored in the OECD in which to persuade others to share the aid burden. In the early days I think that was successful.

Q: I'll just note on the latter point and also the role of Japan that you mentioned earlier, I was serving in Tokyo and I think it was in 1961 that I believe it was Under Secretary Ball came to Tokyo for a meeting, I think it may have been the Development Advisory Group at the time. It was seen, certainly by the Japanese, as one important step towards beginning to integrate them into the important industrial countries, developed countries. It followed a meeting of the contracting parties to the GATT in the trade area, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which I think was in 1959 in Tokyo but I guess that was, I don't remember the details of what was discussed at the Development Advisory Group, but it was moving towards Japan becoming part of the OECD rapidly.

LAMB: To continue my historical sketch, it is significant that the OECD inherited the structures of the OEEC. Whereas the OEEC was a decision-making body, the OECD was largely a consultative body, in which governments were urged to adopt sound economic policies or were brought together to share experiences about how best to manage a market economy. Large permanent missions and full-time ambassadors had less to do in the OECD than in the OEEC, yet they persisted. Jack Tuthill, who was the secretary to the wise men's group that looked into U.S. participation in the to-be-formed OECD and who became the first U.S. ambassador to OECD, wanted to fire everybody on the OEEC staff to achieve a fresh start.

In retrospect, this was a brilliant idea (although it did not address the problem of national delegations) but of course it never happened, bureaucratic inertia being a very powerful force in

nature. (Jack had a thing about staff. In 1967, when he was ambassador to Brazil, he and his deputy, Frank Carlucci, proposed to cut the embassy staff by 25 percent. This was dubbed “Operation Topsy,” and it caused quite a stir. As I recall, they did manage to cut back by ten percent or so.) I got to know Jack after I became ambassador. On his frequent visits to Paris we had many good conversations about the OECD and how to use it to U.S. advantage.

U.S. representation in the OECD is most effective when delegates from Washington come to Paris to meet with counterparts. So we inherited this rather heavy structure and had to figure out how to utilize it. That is something that I thought about long and hard, starting in 1966 when I arrived in Paris, and continuing through my tour as chief of mission in the late 80s.

The OECD also inherited a structure of sector committees (steel, paper, etc.) that had been part of the OEEC planning apparatus, but which served little purpose in the new organization. We worked to eliminate them, but had little success in battling their supporters in the concerned industries. Some of these committees were still in place when I became ambassador. I continued the fight and almost succeeded in eliminating the Pulp and Paper Committee. I failed, but concealed my hand so well that I received a handwritten note from Secretary of State James Baker, prompted by a communication he had received from the head of an industry association, thanking me for “saving” the Committee. (I did succeed in putting the committee on the skids. It was subsequently abolished.)

Another structure inherited from the OEEC was a pair of advisory committees for labor and business. These proved useful, both for the advice they provided and for the political support for the OECD that they generated. Labor in particular valued its connection with the OECD. George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and John Sweeney all participated personally in OECD work over the years. Through my administrative and budgetary responsibilities for the labor group I met the legendary Irving Brown, who represented the AFL, and later the AFL-CIO, in Europe. Seth Lipsky, a Wall Street Journal reporter, once called Brown “...American labor’s leading organizer, philosopher and strategist in the vast contest waged after World War II, in which free working men vied with the communists for control of European labor.” But his methods were often criticized, as was covert CIA funding for his efforts after it became public in the 70s.

Brown was a crusty type: he looked and acted very much the part of the man who hired goons to clear the communist-controlled Marseille docks so that U.S. goods could be offloaded to aid recovery after the war. He took a liking to me and, while keeping his secrets, related many stories of his exploits in sustaining and strengthening a free labor movement in Europe. President Reagan awarded Brown the Medal of Freedom in 1988, the year before his death.

Q: Earlier and then later, certainly part of it was large delegations, important, influential delegations, coming from Washington and other capitals for meetings at the OECD at various levels. Now in 1966, when you got there, how big was the permanent mission to the OECD?

LAMB: I think if you counted everybody, the drivers and secretaries and so on, it was over fifty people. State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, USAID and USIS were represented.

Q: USAID did the development?

LAMB: They did the development side, yes.

Q: And the permanent representative had the rank of ambassador at that time?

LAMB: Yes.

Q: And who was it?

LAMB: Philip Trezise. Phil was a skilled economist and a formidable Foreign Service officer. He'd been Wristonized, i.e., he had been a civil service employee and was integrated into the Foreign Service following the 1954 Wriston reforms. Prior to being named Ambassador, he was counselor for economic affairs in Tokyo.

Q: I think initially counselor and then minister-counselor. Somebody above him left and he moved up. I actually worked for him in that section for a few months.

LAMB: He had a longstanding interest in Japan. By the time I came to Paris, Japan had become an OECD member. Despite my youth and inexperience, the ambassador made me part of an informal front office team, which consisted of the ambassador, the counselor, a couple of other senior officers, and his staff assistant. (The Treasury DCM was, by design, not always present, nor was the head of the USAID section; we were a State Department cabal.) The group met for drinks after work and strategy sessions on Saturday mornings. Five and a half day workweeks were de rigeur in those days.

The reason for my presence was my OECD budget responsibilities. Mr. Trezise had the feeling that there might be waste, fraud and abuse to be rooted out. Well, waste anyway, probably not fraud, maybe just a little abuse. He also worried that the U.S. was paying more than its correct share of the budget. We had signed up to pay 25 percent, but there were certain activities that were to be funded solely by interested countries, and he was never quite sure that we were getting the right bills. So he wanted me to watch this closely and eventually do something about it, which I did. In time, I was able to save the U.S. a large amount of money. In recognition of my efforts, Ambassador Trezise put me up for an award with a monetary component. I recall that other officers on the staff, with whom I generally enjoyed cordial relations or better, were a bit miffed at this. They reasoned that by advancing U.S. interests in, say, trade policy, they were also saving the United States significant sums of money. They had a point, but I cashed the check anyway.

Q: Was there tension also in the way that you were treated as a key member of the team as a second tour, very junior officer? Presumably, there were people more senior to you that were not part of this inner group.

LAMB: Yes, that was something that had to be managed, but Ambassador Trezise's leadership was quite extraordinary. The informality of the arrangement was key.

Q: Most of them were probably just as happy not to be dealing with budget issues.

LAMB: Mission staff approached the budget from a singular perspective: they tried to look out for “their” parts of the organization. The Treasury Department wanted the economic department funded. Our two trade officers wanted the trade department funded. It was up to the ambassador, with my advice, to decide what he wanted to accomplish: what the overall mission objectives were, and how to meet the goals set for us in Washington. So there were some inevitable tensions involved.

Q: There must have been also with other countries, other delegations and the Secretariat directly because the United States had 25 percent of I guess the assessed costs of the OECD budget. Perhaps somewhat more for the special programs of interest to us that we had to defend. They were glad to take our money but they didn't always want to take our advice or influence.

LAMB: Exactly right. Trade-offs were made. We supported some activities we were not particularly fond of in return for the support of other members for activities we regarded as vital. This process of horse-trading was not always pretty, but such is way of politics and diplomacy. Another problem was that it wasn't always clear how much reliable information we were receiving about how our money was being spent. So a lot of sleuthing was required, which required establishing and nurturing contacts throughout the secretariat.

Q: Did you find a lot of Washington interest in all this or was it pretty much generated within the mission?

LAMB: As I recall, there was a lot of Washington interest, as there is in all matters pertaining to funding international organizations and who disposes of those resources. More broadly, on the substantive side, the Washington mantra was “unite Western Europe; more free trade” and OECD was viewed as an important instrument in pursuing both goals.

The OECD is not part of the UN system and the international organizations bureau did not deal with its budget. But the OECD numbers had to be folded into one Department request to OMB and to the Congress, so we were struggling within the Department for what we thought was appropriate financial support for OECD. Our back-up on the “country” desk in the European bureau was charged with making sure that we received a fair hearing and ultimately got as much of what we needed as was possible. (That back- up, by the way, was the infamous Felix Bloch, who was implicated in a Soviet spy scandal late in his career. I must say that he did not exhibit subversive tendencies during our association.) And I eventually filled that country desk job, too, so I got to know the game from both sides.

Q: In terms of the Paris game, was a lot of this done in committee, a committee of the whole membership of the OECD, the budget committee?

LAMB: There was a budget committee composed of all members -- eventually I became vice chairman of it -- where a lot of the work was and is done, but some matters that cannot be resolved at that level go to the Council, where the ambassadors sit.

Back then, in the budget committee, and later, whether in the OECD, CoCom, or other

international gatherings, I was always -- what shall I say, "moved" -- when I took the floor and made a statement that began with "The United States believes..." or "The position of my government is..." In Foreign Service circles we refer to this as "psychological income."

I must say I enjoyed advising the ambassador, sitting behind him in the Council meetings and seeing how that body worked. Finland was not in the Organization at that time, so the U.S. sat to the left of the French, as determined alphabetically by country names in French. The French representative was François Valéry, the son of Paul Valéry and himself a very cultured man. The secretary general was a phlegmatic Dane named Thorkil Kristensen who did not manage his meetings well, and who talked too much and not always to the point. When the secretary general began to meander, François Valéry would unfurl his Figaro and bury his head behind it. Not to be outdone, Ambassador Trezise would get out his International Herald Tribune and do the same thing. I was a bit embarrassed when it first happened. I didn't think that ambassadors should behave that way. Amusing to watch, though.

Q: Was that a model that you followed when you occupied the chair later on?

LAMB: No, my secretary general was someone you had to keep your eye on at all times, Jean-Claude Paye, a talented French diplomat who ran a tight meeting, or as tight a meeting as could be run with a gaggle of loquacious ambassadors.

Q: At the time, the earlier period, in the late Sixties, did countries generally take their responsibilities at the OECD pretty seriously? Were good people representing them? Maybe we ought to talk a little bit more about what the priority areas were that the OECD was working on at that time.

LAMB: On the whole, the representation was good. Some countries never seemed able to provide first-rate representation. I would mention the Greeks. I still don't know how they use the OECD. They tend to send scholars there -- not necessarily economists -- and their level of participation in meetings tends to be low (although this can be a blessing). The Yugoslavs were present in the OECD for political reasons ("not in Soviet camp") and to encourage economic reforms that never materialized. They were poorly represented. The Brits, the French, the Canadians, the Australians, the Belgians and the Scandinavians almost uniformly provided topflight representation. My Belgian colleague went on to become ambassador to the United States, as did one of my Italian colleagues. My Finnish counterpart went from the OECD to the UN in New York. One Japanese colleague was posted to China, another to the UN. The OECD was hardly seen as backwater; often it was a stepping-stone to more responsibility.

Q: Other than the Greeks and perhaps one or two others, did most countries fill the permanent representation position at the OECD from their career diplomatic service or from one of the economic agencies?

LAMB: Mostly from the diplomatic service. That had something to do with the OECD's origins, where a pattern was established. It also had to do with the multitude of subjects dealt with by the organization. If the foreign ministry didn't do this job, it was not clear exactly who would do it. None of the other departments of government wished to be managed by a potential rival for

substantive influence. But each was willing to take a certain amount of direction from the foreign ministry because it was seen as having fewer axes to grind.

I might add on that point, Ray, that in the early days, U.S. representation was entirely professional: Jack Tuthill, John Leddy, Joe Greenwald, and Phil Trezise. We reached a point later where we were switching back and forth between political and career appointments, and some of those political appointees were quite good. Today, some 15 years after I left the OECD and the Foreign Service, ambassadorial appointments to the OECD are largely political. Some very good and some not so good.

Q: Let's talk just a little bit more about the political side of the OECD. I think you mentioned a couple of things already. Yugoslavia was included basically for political reasons and to try to influence their economic system structure. Were there other political dimensions at the OECD? I suppose bringing Japan in was one?

LAMB: The overarching political rationale for the OECD, a rationale that disappeared in 1989 with the demise of the Soviet Union, was the great struggle against the Soviets or, as some saw it, against communism. We were trying use the OECD as a pole of attraction for the Third World, promoting democracy and free markets and demonstrating how that combination offered the best way to organize economies for the benefit of populations. We wanted to keep those of like mind in the fold and to attract others. We did not do as much in the way of direct contact with the Third World as probably would have been optimal, but we did do some and we were certainly out there preaching. This political rationale for the OECD is the reason why the OECD was so strongly supported by secretaries of state and other U.S. leaders.

Q: Within Europe, though and I think you alluded to this before, there was also the aspect of integrating, trying to hold together, those countries that were outside the European Community who either did not want to try to become members or were not able to or were not wanted. Some of them were part of the European Free Trade Area but others were not even that close.

LAMB: Yes, that's a very good point. One of the things the OECD did do was help keep the core members of the Community in contact with those on the periphery, the European Free Trade Area members and others. That was another important political dimension.

Q: What were some of the main issues or of concerns in the late Sixties? Your main concern, I guess, was the budget and U.S. financial support for the Organization. There are some other things that either you were involved with or the mission was come to mind?

LAMB: There were several things. The most important issue that we were dealing with at that time was U.S. trade deficits and resulting financial imbalances. The supply of dollars was high, which generated inflation at home, sucked in imports, and suppressed exports. (This is not the same issue that the U.S. faces today because we were in a fixed exchange rate regime then.)

We didn't have the option of floating our currency or devaluing (until President Nixon broke the link between gold and the dollar in August 1971) in order to bring our trade account back into balance. So we had an ongoing debate about the responsibility for trade deficits. And it was an

interesting question. Should the U.S. consume less or should its trading partners buy more? We were arguing, not very successfully, that the responsibility was shared. We would try to do our part if they did their part. However, we were regarded by the Europeans and the Japanese as profligate, as it was in their interest to do.

Secretaries of the Treasury and senior Treasury and Federal Reserve officials regularly used the OECD to push our case. The OECD featured a high level committee called Working Party Three (WP-3), a restricted grouping in which the Treasury took the lead, with participation by the Federal Reserve and State. The participants were the members of the G-10, a group formed in 1962 to provide supplementary financing to the International Monetary Fund. We used this forum to propound our arguments to the right people in other governments. Of course, they pushed back. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC), which, then and now, brings the head of our Council of Economic Advisors together with the heads of similar bodies in other countries, was also a forum for this debate.

[Let me add here that the dollar's problems predated the escalation of our involvement in Vietnam. The record shows that President Kennedy was concerned. But President Johnson's unwillingness to choose between "guns and butter" exacerbated the situation and later forced Nixon's hand. Some analysts ascribe three developments that occurred after Johnson left office -- the first oil shock (for which the proximate cause was the Six-Day War in the Middle East), the forced devaluation and then floating of the dollar, and stagflation -- to Johnson's lax fiscal policy. We will talk later of Europe's efforts to carve out a zone of currency stability after the world embarked on a floating rate currency regime in the early 1970s.]

We were also working the trade issues. At that time, the OECD served as a staging area for successive trade negotiating rounds conducted among the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), which was set up in 1947. To take just one example, opening up government procurement to foreign bidders, a framework agreement was scoped out in the OECD. Then the product was sent to Geneva to be worked on by the full GATT membership. (As the U.S. Trade Representative's office consolidated its position in the policy firmament, it preferred to negotiate within the GATT, where it did not have other agencies looking over its shoulder. The OECD Trade Committee continues to function and to do good work, but it does not play the central role in trade negotiations that it played in the mid-to-late Sixties.)

OECD's energy committee grappled with the West's growing dependence on Middle East oil supplies. The committee did not solve the problem but its members shared information and perspectives on how the world oil market was evolving, thereby laying the groundwork for the formation of the International Energy Agency in 1974, in the wake of the first oil crisis.

Q: At that point, it was essentially a study group, preparing notes rather than developing a plan.

LAMB: Rather than doing anything jointly, they were comparing notes, but it was thought to be quite useful.

Q: Now I notice in your notes and this brings us back, I guess, to one of the political rationales for the OECD, in terms of the Cold War, the whole question of strategic controls and CoCom

was launched within the OECD?

LAMB: CoCom was independent of the OECD and housed separately in a U.S. embassy annex on the Rue de la Boétie, but the U.S. delegation to CoCom -- one officer -- was part of our mission. CoCom was a group of countries that had agreed to control and limit their exports of technology to our adversaries -- the Soviet Union, members of the Warsaw pact, and others. Controls were the source of constant tension among the allies because the U.S. was quite willing to forego technology sales in the interest of security, whereas others were more reluctant to do so. So there were contentious negotiations about what should be maintained on the lists of prohibited products that CoCom drew up.

CoCom went out of business some years ago and was replaced by a similar grouping of countries, without, as I understand it, a permanent home or secretariat. I dealt with CoCom's budgetary and administrative issues. The knowledge I acquired of its workings proved valuable when I became involved in technology transfer issues later on in Washington.

Q: What sorts of budget issues were entailed with CoCom? Was CoCom's membership more or less the same as OECD?

LAMB: As I recall, the membership was more or less the same, although Spain was not a CoCom member. There were not many budget issues. The U.S. supplied office space for the secretariat and provided meeting facilities. This "in kind" contribution had to be valued and credited. The money had to be transferred from certain Department accounts to the U.S. embassy. It was, shall we say, complicated, but not particularly contentious.

Q: Unlike the OECD itself, which had its origin as essentially a European organization, CoCom I think was very much an American initiative.

LAMB: It was, yes.

Q: Does that mean the United States paid more than a quarter of the costs?

LAMB: I suspect that by providing in kind support we were paying a large share of a rather small budget, but that was the price of getting the organization going and keeping it in place.

Q: One of the things that's always struck me about the U.S. Mission to the OECD, from my limited vantage point, which essentially was as a visitor from both the embassies in Rome and Bern, Switzerland and also from Washington a little later, that the mission spends an awful lot of time, well, it's there all the time but anything that really is interesting people parachute in from Washington or from somewhere else and kind of take the chair or take over the discussions. Was that happening in the Sixties or was Phil Trezise a little bit more on his own?

LAMB: The OECD received about 50,000 delegates in 2005. So you are right. Visitors like you performed much of the work. But there were some important exceptions. For example, the OECD examines the performance of member country economies and makes recommendations for policy change. The mission, acting on instructions from Washington, handled this fairly

important activity. To take another case, although the trade committee was composed of delegates from capitals, its quarterly meetings were prepared by a working group made up of representatives from the permanent missions, which met more frequently. Other committees, including the environment committee and the consumer affairs committee did not require as much mission involvement. We provided our delegates to these two committees, and many others, with logistical support and we engaged other missions on their agendas between meetings. As it happens, Ambassador Trezise worked in the Council to establish the environment and consumer affairs committees and arrange for secretariat resources to support them. I can provide a fuller picture of what ambassadors do when we discuss what I did as ambassador.

Q: One other aspect of the OECD that struck me and I'm not sure, it surprised me when I realized that I believe the mission is really located in the OECD building. Or it used to be. Was that the case in the Sixties?

LAMB: It is not now the case, but the mission was co-located with the secretariat for many years, and that was my doing. When I arrived in Paris the Mission was housed in leased quarters in a hôtel particulier near the Porte Dauphine, on the Rue de la Faisanderie. Sometime before my arrival, the OECD undertook to construct a new headquarters building. As an inducement to governments to fund the construction, the secretariat proposed that delegations could be housed in this building if they wished, and that they would pay the going local rental rate. I advised Ambassador Trezise that we should take up the offer.

I had two reasons: first, I thought our situation on the Rue de la Faisanderie was precarious. It seemed evident to me that the site would be developed, as it was a few years later. Second, we would receive a 25 percent discount on our rent because that amount would flow back to us as income, just as we received, for example, a 25 percent share of the OECD's income from the sale of publications. The Organization would collect our rent and immediately give us a 25 percent rebate; in practice we would pay a net rental that represented a considerable saving over what the government currently paid to house the mission. The U.S. and four other delegations moved into the building. The others were comfortably situated and decided to stay where they were. The building we moved into, which was completed in 1968, is now being renovated to deal with an asbestos problem. During the renovation the U.S. Mission is being housed a few blocks away.

[A careful reader will have noted that, absent my maneuvers, 25 percent of State's rent check would have gone to the Treasury general account, along with the U.S. share of the receipts from publication sales and any other OECD income. The U.S. taxpayer would be unaffected either way. But we needed the money in our operating budget and, I surmised, the general account would not miss it.]

Q: And will the United States go back into the OECD building when renovation is complete or stay separate?

LAMB: I doubt they will go back. When you're well situated, inertia takes hold.

Q: And there are probably even more issues about security and things like that now than there were earlier.

LAMB: I agree and I think they'll stay put.

Q: You've talked about being part of the inner team with Ambassador Trezise. Did he have a deputy? One deputy, two deputies or how did that work at the time?

LAMB: At the time, the deputy was a Treasury official named Weir Brown, who held the job for 12 years. When I arrived to take up my duties, Mr. Brown asked me what I knew about budgets. When I said "Nothing," he was appalled. When I produced a report on how to achieve budget savings, his verdict was "convinced, but not convincing." Mr. Brown and I had a checkered relationship, although we eventually worked out our differences.

Eventually, the State Department took control of the deputy position. My deputies -- I had two during my tenure as ambassador -- were State Department Foreign Service officers.

As a participant in the State inner circle I acquired my taste for economics and economic policy. The conversations ranged over all of the issues of the day and the participants were smart people, and very committed.

Q: Now did you have much to do with other elements of the U.S. government in Paris? You had mentioned that you got help from the administrative section and the administrative counselor of the embassy. Did they kind of expect you to pitch in and help them with big visits, things like that?

LAMB: Yes, they did. One of my most interesting experiences was working on President Nixon's first post-election visit to Europe in 1969. I was asked to run the motorcades with a French counterpart, the préfet de police, Maurice Grimaud. Grimaud had handled the May 1968 student cum worker uprising very well. No student died and there were relatively few injuries. He was a man much admired by the French and by me. He had succeeded Maurice Papon, who was convicted in late 1990s of WWII crimes. Papon was also implicated in the massacre of perhaps a hundred Algerians in Paris in 1961. Grimaud had come in at a difficult time and been tested by a difficult situation. While meetings were going on and our motorcade was at rest, we stood around talking. [To be clear, French government restraint 1968 was also due to Prime Minister Pompidou. Through the Interior Ministry he controlled the riot police, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS). Although they were deployed, they were kept on a tight leash.]

In addition to the motorcades, I had a few other duties. One of them involved President de Gaulle's offer to lend his car to President Nixon for the drive in from the airport. This had been tentatively agreed, but when the advance team arrived I was asked by the Secret Service -- instructed really -- to tell French security that we needed to install our radio in President de Gaulle's car. In the glove compartment. This was hilarious, if only in retrospect -- the Secret Service insisting, the French refusing. At the end of the day the radio was not put in. The way it worked out was that President de Gaulle's car was in the motorcade, but President Nixon wasn't in it. He was in a black limousine without the presidential seal, somewhere else in the line.

Q: Which had a radio.

LAMB: Which had his radio in it. I was asked to interpret at the state dinner at the Elysée Palace but I was busy with one of my motorcades and missed the event. I was able to attend the dinner at the embassy residence on the following evening, when our president hosted President de Gaulle. When I arrived at the residence, I was assigned to interpret between Henry Kissinger and Pierre Messmer, the French minister of defense. So I sought them out and introduced myself. We interpreters were going to sit on little chairs behind the guests.

Q: Not eat.

LAMB: Not eat. We were known as chouchouters, “whisperers” in French. But Messmer and Kissinger were already talking in a kind of a Franglais. They could understand each other and they decided they would just proceed on that basis. So my official duties were over. But while I was standing around waiting to go to the basement and eat dinner with the drivers, Secretary of State Rogers came in a little late. It was rumored that the president’s people had let him oversleep. The secretary and de Gaulle greeted each other and started talking. I headed their way. Secretary Rogers started to introduce himself to me and so I told him who I was and said I worked for him. He seemed pleased to hear that. De Gaulle ignored me. I interpreted for the two until de Gaulle’s interpreter saw what was going on -- he’d been getting a drink -- and elbowed me out of the way.

I also met Maurice Couve de Murville, the French prime minister (and former foreign minister), earlier that evening. He had been a tutor for Harold Nicholson’s family in the UK, I later learned. So his English was excellent. As the reception line was forming to greet the French guests -- Couve and I were already in the room -- he asked me, in English, “Mr. Lamb, how would you translate ‘reception line’ into French?” Well, it turns out, there is no such thing. I somehow knew that. I told him, “I don’t think we do that in French.” So that was charming.

Q: I’m impressed that you’re interpreter level of French. Of course that’s FSI training, Martinique and then, did you use French a lot in the OECD, or mostly just living in Paris?

LAMB: It was mostly just living in Paris. We didn’t mention it earlier but the OECD has two official languages, French and English. But as you would imagine, the predominant working language is English. I was a borderline quality translator/interpreter, reasonably skilled in rendering French into English, much more tentative going the other way. I managed, but just.

Q: You have anything else in connection with the Nixon visit that you want to mention?

LAMB: Well, it was my first encounter with Bob Haldeman and John Erlichman. Erlichman was part of the advance group and I joined the meetings that DCM Robert Blake conducted with him and all of the people who were handling the substance and the logistics of the visit. I rather liked Erlichman. He was quite insistent on the president’s requirements, as he should have been, but straightforward and diplomatic. Haldeman I only saw during the visit and I did not particularly take to him. He was something of a martinet, I thought. Kissinger seemed absent-minded, which was a complete misreading on my part.

Q: Absent-minded professor?

LAMB: At one point he left his briefcase, jam-packed with classified material, at the site of a previous meeting. So I had to dispatch an officer to rush back and recover it.

I also had another interesting involvement with the embassy. Ambassador Shriver took a keen interest in youth and developed a program of contacts with youth leaders. He put one of his political officers, Jim Dobbins, in charge of it. I had gotten to know Jim when he was assigned to work with me for six months as part of his junior officer rotation. (This was a bad fit. I did not have enough work for Jim and he was thoroughly bored by what I did give him. Still, much later, when Jim was named ambassador to the European Community, he cited his OECD exposure as one of his qualifications.) Jim included my wife and me in events he organized for his youth leaders at the ambassador's residence. These were primarily social affairs, designed to size up young leaders for potential follow-up contact. A memorable feature of those evenings was the presence of the Shriver children, including Maria, dressed for bed and working the room with trays of hors d'oeuvres.

Q: You had mentioned earlier, in terms of Maurice Grimaud, the events of 1968. Were you involved with those as a resident of Paris?

LAMB: At the outset we were. We lived in an apartment on the 13th floor -- they have 13th floors in France -- of a building in the 16th arrondissement on the Right Bank of the Seine. Opposite us on the Left bank was a Citroën automobile factory, long since gone, which sprouted red flags at one point. We wondered whether workers would join the student protests in large numbers. (They didn't.) We stayed out of the areas where the protesters were concentrated on the Left Bank. Daily life went on almost normally, although I had to walk to work because the metro was shut down. Then we escaped Paris. Months before, a group of us, several couples, had rented a house north of St. Tropez. We were able to get down there before the gas ran out on the autoroutes. We spent several weeks of the worst turmoil in Provence. By the time our vacation was over we were able to get gasoline and make our way back to Paris.

It took me years to figure out that the événements of May 1968 were rooted in demography and prosperity. There was a large cohort of young people and more families could afford to forego the potential earnings of their offspring. As a consequence there were as many university students in France in 1967 as there had been lycéens in 1956. Unlike the U.K., France did not have a selective university admissions process. Anyone who passed the baccalaureat was guaranteed a place. The result was that the schools were overcrowded and poorly equipped. Daniel ("Danny the Red") Cohn-Bendit launched the student uprising at the University of Nanterre in the Paris suburbs. When the authorities closed the Nanterre campus, the locus of the revolt moved to the Sorbonne on the Left Bank. The students had legitimate grievances, but could not organize themselves to present them in a coherent way. They got carried away by the sheer fun of it all and May 1968 turned out in the end to be more about slogans than substance. The revolt was bound to peter out, which it did.

In March 1968, less than 700 miles east of Paris, a much more important uprising was launched by students, writers, and party reformers. It lasted until Warsaw Pact forces put an end to

“Prague Spring.” That destroyed the illusion that communism could be reformed, that Stalinism was a mistake that could be corrected, and that democracy and collectivism could be reconciled. As Tony Judt put it, although communism hung on until 1989, “...the soul of communism had died twenty years before: in Prague, in August 1968.”

Q: You left Paris in spring 1969 after being there two and a half years or so? Anything else you want to say about your assignment at OECD Paris, the first assignment?

LAMB: Thank you for your questions, which covered a number of things I hadn't really thought about but which needed to be addressed. I would only add that while working at OECD I was not charged with observing or reporting on things French, but I did note a few interesting things. For example, French concierges, long drawn from the ranks of World War I widows, were rapidly giving way to Portuguese immigrants. The French were well dressed: no casual outfits. It dawned me after a while that, despite vigorous economic growth over a decade or more, people could not still afford a wardrobe of leisure clothing. (Clothing differentiated by age was making an appearance: viz. miniskirts.) The presence of older men entertaining young women, some of them in miniskirts, in restaurants was a sign that living standards were not uniformly high just yet.

Although there were some impoverished arrondissements in Paris, many poor people lived in the suburbs and commuted to work by train or bus. I thought that was an admirable arrangement, which permitted the middle classes to live close to their jobs. How wrong I was. When immigration from North Africa increased after the war in Algeria and in subsequent years, and the immigrants were “housed” in the suburbs, they were isolated and forgotten. On reflection, it is probably better to have ghettos in the inner city, as we do in the U.S., where they do not escape attention, however episodic and inadequate.

But the overwhelming impression one had of Paris in the late sixties was of renewal, both human and physical. From the first post-war census in 1946 to the end of 60s, the population of France grew by almost 30 percent. By 1967, one Frenchman in three was under 20 years of age. Young people were everywhere. And bright facades were everywhere, too. French culture minister André Malraux's project to clean Paris's public buildings of centuries of grime was well underway.

As to French foreign policy in those years, President de Gaulle rejected U.S. leadership in 1966 when he withdrew French armed forces from NATO's integrated military command and expelled non-French NATO troops from France. This caused the relocation of NATO Headquarters from Paris to Brussels in late 1967 and the relocation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to Mons, Belgium. For the Lambs that meant no more cheeseburgers at the PX in Fontainebleau. In 1967, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's second application to join the EC.

WOODWARD ROMINE
Desk Officer for France
Washington, DC (1966-1969)

Woodward Romine was born and raised in Indiana. He graduated from Wabash College and later pursued studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His primary assignments in the State Department were as Political Officer in Washington and abroad. His foreign assignments, all European, include Warsaw, Paris, Strasbourg, Vienna and four posts in Germany. In Washington, Mr. Romine dealt with French relations as well as Refugee and Management matters. He is a graduate of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Mr. Romine was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1998.

ROMINE: Yes, of course, I took a year off and had a delightful year at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the ICAF, which probably for me was a good thing because it gave me a picture of the economic and infrastructure of the world that I didn't have as close a grasp on, and I enjoyed that. Then I did come back into the Department, and I worked for about a year in RPM and then went on and was the French Desk officer for a couple of years. This was a most interesting time, because this time they had the great student uprising in Paris with barricades going up and also the downfall of Charles de Gaulle. It was a fascinating thing, because no one at that time believed that anything was going to overthrow the President, and yet there were certain indications in some of the opinion polls that were just beginning to appear that things would not go as well for him, and they didn't. One of the reasons for it was that he ran this referendum on a two-based thing. One, as I recall, was that France was going--it had something to do with an international organization--France was going to go on in European matters and that sort of thing; but the other was that they would abolish the Senate. Many people felt that he could have won on the first thing, but in attacking the Senate, he finally took on long, vested interests in France, and they simply would not tolerate this. In other words, there were a lot of senators who were going to be out of jobs, and if you're out of a job as a senator, then you also give up your job as the mayor of your community and several other offices which you can hold--as they say, the accumulation of jobs. It's still being discussed in France today. In fact, I think I heard something about it yesterday on the news. People started to look at this. This was one of the things that led to their finally defeating him on the referendum. Of course, it was a strange thing. He had always said if he didn't win the referendum, he would resign. I don't think anyone believed that, but he was a man of his word, and when the referendum was lost, he left immediately. I think the French were probably a little tired of him. He had been in power for ten years or so. Secondly, politically he made a capital error, and it's one of the few times that I ever saw that he made a mistake like that, unless perhaps he was getting ready to go anyway and wanted to go out with a flourish.

Q: Did we have big bilateral questions in play at that time?

ROMINE: I don't recall that we had big bilateral questions in play at that time. We were most anxious for the European Communities to be upward looking, as we said--in other words, to encourage free trade and, of course, the free exchange of goods. Of course, large American sales to Europe were a very normal thing, and we did have the feeling that the French wanted to turn a lot of this within to be able to do the trading within Europe but not to afford any particular favors to the United States. This did cause some problems. One time Ambassador Bohlen went to Bordeaux, where he made a speech about the development of the European Communities, and he

suggested that the Communities, if they really wanted to grow and develop, should be an outwardly turned group--just this. That was all that he really said, but this caused a great deal of irritation and calls to him from high members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting that he was interfering in the internal affairs of France. I must say it wasn't pushed very hard, but still it was stated.

LESTER E. EDMOND
Counselor, US Mission to the OECD
Paris (1966-1970)

Lester Edmond attended College of the City of New York and received his Master's degree from Harvard. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1956, his career has included positions in Japan, Finland, France and the Philippines. Mr. Edmond was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: Where did you go after the National War College?

EDMOND: My next assignment was as Counselor of Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Phil Trezise, under whom I had served in Tokyo, had been appointed Ambassador to the OECD in the latter part of 1965 and he asked me to join the Mission after I was graduated from the War College.

Q: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. Counselor of Mission where did that put you in the hierarchy?

EDMOND: That was the third-ranking officer in the mission. The deputy was Weir Brown, who came from the Treasury Department. Treasury traditionally supplied the Deputy position. In recent years, the Ambassadorial position has been given to political appointees. In some ways being at the OECD was an unusual assignment. It's an organization that focuses on the broad range of economic activities that governments deal with on a day to day basis. It was the one place where twenty industrialized democracies - actually the ones of Europe plus the United States, Canada and Japan - worked together to deal with a broad range of economic and social questions which were of interest to them. The organization actually grew out of the Marshall Plan, when the United States encouraged European countries to cooperate in advancing European economic reconstruction rather than working individually. That organization became the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the OEEC, which in turn developed into the OECD. For a variety of reasons the OEEC had few accomplishments to its credit. But by the end of the 1950s, Europe had recovered and it was thought that a new organization should be established that would be a forum to foster cooperation between North America and Western Europe. The two had become the world's leading economic powers.

The European Economic Community, which had been established in 1957, could not speak for Europe since the EEC originally had only six members, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg. Britain and the Scandinavian countries were standing aside and Spain,

Portugal, Austria, Greece, and Turkey were not considered ready for membership. The OECD which had Ambassadors and permanent delegations from all of these nations, together with Switzerland, Iceland, Canada, the United States, and Japan, which joined in 1963, was seen as a place where the interests of most of the advanced market economies might be reconciled and common interests pursued. In reality the few commitments that members were asked to make were hedged with exceptions and in any event the OECD convention had no enforcement provisions. The institution, thus, was largely confined to consultation and studies. Subjects for consultation were many and varied i.e., economic policy, balance of payments, trade, education, agriculture, the environment, consumer affairs, anti-trust issues, almost any issue with the exception of defense.

The OECD had a sizeable and on the whole a very competent secretariat that supported the many working groups that were established to deal with the various issues. The working group members were drawn from the permanent members of the missions as well as representatives from capitals. The European countries drew more heavily on officials from capitals since the time necessary to travel between the capitals and Paris was not great. Every so often the working groups would hold significant decision making sessions and senior officials from Washington and others capitals would come and participate. It normally was not difficult to persuade even the busiest official to attend, as the lure of Paris was considerable. Almost every department and agency in the United States government, with the exception of Defense and the Post Office discovered that they had an interest in the subjects being dealt with by the OECD.

In addition to being a discussion forum for government officials, the OECD was a major research organization for economic issues. My primary responsibility was to supervise the activities of many of the working groups in order to assure that the activities being undertaken were consistent with United States policies and to help assure that the work being undertaken was of as high a quality as possible. With working groups operating in areas as disparate as agriculture, manpower, social affairs, education, science and technology, industry, energy, restrictive business practices, transportation - in other words, the entire gamut of government operations - the work was challenging and intellectually stimulating. Governments used the OECD to develop common views in controversial areas and the delegations attempted to direct the work programs of the various committees in directions that promoted the views and supported the positions of their respective governments

Q: You mentioned that for important meetings of working groups or committees, officials would often come from capitals. That would include, I suppose, Cabinet officers on occasion as well. Is that right?

EDMOND: Cabinet members did not attend the working groups. Their attendance was limited to the annual ministerial meetings. Even at those meetings, the US representative generally was at the Undersecretary of State level. We did have an official visit of Vice President Humphrey, but even that formed part of a broader trip that he was taking.

Q: The US mission to the OECD was pretty large, to have experts for these various activities of the organization. Were other delegations also well staffed, or did they rely perhaps more than our case to experts' officials coming from their capitals?

EDMOND: It varied. The larger European countries followed the same staffing practices that we did, but their permanent delegations were not provided the same autonomy that the US delegation enjoyed for the officials could actually participate in a meeting and return to their capitals after the conclusion of the session on the same or following day.

One issue which took a fair amount of my time was what was known as the Technological Gap. There was believed to be a substantial and growing gap in technology between the United States and Europe. There was concern that Europe was falling further and further behind the United States in technological prowess and that development would eventually lead to a substantially lower rate of economic growth in Europe with its becoming a technological backwater. It is difficult now to believe that this was a question of serious concern. It was feared that United States industry was going to dominate the world and international action would be necessary to prevent this from occurring.

Concern over the purported technological gap actually was one of the arguments used by supporters of the UK's membership in the EEC. The argument made was that Britain needed to join with the other Europeans so as to enhance their technological capability. This was an issue that if permitted to fester could very well have affected the United States adversely. We had a very gung-ho and ambitious Science Secretariat in the OECD who proved to be strong proponents of the need for Europe to take decisive action, and were attempting to promote courses of action that could have required American firms to transfer their technology to our OECD partners. Since the proposal called only for US firms to take action, it was widely supported by most of the other members.

Phil Trezise assigned me the task of engaging in protracted negotiations with the members of the Science Secretariat to attempt to revamp the parameters of the research effort so as to neutralize its possible adverse effect on US industry. These discussions proved to be difficult as the Science Secretariat relished being in the center of a politically popular program. While I was undertaking this effort Ambassador Trezise was discussing the issue with the other Ambassadors and the Secretary General. Of course, no proposal could be formally adopted by the OECD over US objections, but it would have been politically embarrassing to have had to veto a widely approved OECD document. The US veto would have been publicly portrayed as an act of ungenerous self interest. Eventually the OECD's technology gap report was issued with most of the objectionable features deleted and the entire technology gap issue disappeared from view. While researching this entire question in preparation for the discussions with the Secretariat and members of other delegations, it became clear that there was very little, or no hoarding of non-defense technological discoveries, which were either being freely licensed or were being made available through American investment in Europe. It became evident that the real objection was that American firms in Europe were making use of these technological advances and that the American computer industry, particularly IBM, was the principal target. There appeared to be a widely held view that a nation would fall behind technologically and economically if it did not have a domestically owned technologically advanced computer manufacturing facility. I became fully aware of this widely held view during my second tour in Japan.

During my assignment at the Mission I observed how an issue that would appear to have only

domestic implications could unexpectedly have international ramifications. The question of automotive safety had in this period become a significant issue in the United States. Ralph Nader's book "Unsafe at Any Speed" had savaged the design of one of the General Motors cars, possibly the Corvette and its poor accident and safety record. The outspoken Nader and his book had captured the attention of the American public and led to the introduction of federal safety standards for vehicles sold in the United States. The Europeans and Japanese awakened to the fact that our introduction of such requirements would, in effect, prevent them from exporting their cars into the United States unless they adopted the American standards. This could prove to be prohibitively expensive. The Europeans and Japanese argued that the unilateral introduction of the American standards without any consultations could well be regarded as a non-tariff barrier and should be considered in the Kennedy round of trade negotiations.

Phil Trezise asked me to try to come forth with a consultation program that would not delay the United States introducing automotive safety standards and yet would satisfy the Europeans and Japanese that we were not deliberately or inadvertently developing new non-tariff barriers. First, it was necessary to persuade Washington that it would be advantageous to enter formal discussions in the OECD on the grounds that the danger existed that we might be forced to use a forum such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which did have enforcement powers. The subject then was made the focus of OECD discussion for some months, with technical experts from capitals participating. As a result of these efforts the question came to be viewed as purely a technical one and not a politically motivated one. Although some unhappiness continued to exist on the part of European manufacturers, the issue faded away as a matter of controversy among governments and in fact may have encouraged the Europeans to introduce their own safety standards.

Q: Any other examples come to mind in the period that you were there in Paris?

EDMOND: Well, yes, the two issues just discussed were those where we tried to blunt activities that appeared to be disadvantageous to US interests. I found it possible to make use of the OECD to promote views that appeared to be consistent with overall US interests. None of my initiatives, by any stretch of the imagination, could be regarded as earthshaking but they were consistent with US positions. I personally am persuaded, without doubt influenced by my academic studies, that America has greatly gained from its efforts to achieve a highly competitive industrial structure. I believe that US efforts to promote competition that began with the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and continued under the "trust busting" policies of Theodore Roosevelt were important factors in promoting innovation and economic progress in the United States. The tradition of promoting competitive behavior has remained strong in the United States despite efforts by various administrations to weaken or even emasculate the laws, aided at times by a judiciary that often appeared unsympathetic to the need to promote competition. The benefits of competition were not that apparent to a Europe that primarily had been concerned with rebuilding the industrial base that had been destroyed in the War. Also the American tradition that equated competitive behavior with economic progress did not exist in Europe. e.g. the cartelization of German industry prior to World War II. I was authorized to promote, with the concurrence of Ambassador Trezise and the approval of Washington, an activity in the OECD designed to examine the implications of anti-competitive behavior on economic growth. I am unable honestly to say that this ever blossomed into a significant OECD activity, but it did get

the subject discussed by the member countries. I like to think that the OECD activity was one factor if only a minor one, that promoted the current active European Community anti-trust program.

The other issue that comes to mind was the introduction of the subject of consumer affairs. Actually, the idea of establishing a working group to examine the idea of consumer protection originated, I believe with the Netherlands delegation. A member of that delegation informed me of their thoughts and I concurred that it appeared to be a worthwhile OECD activity. There was then a growing interest in the United States as to the need to protect the consumer. A post of Presidential Advisor for Consumer Affairs, I believe, had been established and subjects such as the need for accurate product labeling; prohibition of predatory lending; sanitary conditions in food manufacturing facilities were being actively discussed. I obtained the concurrence of the Ambassador and the approval of Washington and pressed for the establishment of this activity within the OECD. The Netherlands delegation was delighted to receive the active support of a major delegation which considerably improved the likelihood of the activity being initiated. There may not have been too much opposition to this new undertaking, but there was certainly a lack of enthusiasm since it added a requirement for additional funding and placed an increased work burden on the Secretariat and the delegations. I am unable to tell you whether the activity continued after my departure or whether there were any accomplishments for which it could claim credit. I would like to believe that some governmental officials may have taken advantage of its efforts to support consumer protection.

Q: And what about the role of France? The OECD was headquartered, as it had been from the beginning, in Paris. Were the French more positive than they were in some other organizations of this period of the late '60s, or did they cause some problems on occasion?

EDMOND: No, I wouldn't say the French created any greater difficulties than did any other country. Their attitude depended on the subject being discussed, as was true for every delegation.. For example, on the technological gap issue they were strongly supportive of the Secretariat. At that time the French were deeply concerned at the failure of their national computer firm, Machine Bull. Their principal concern and sensitivity dealt with the use of the French language in the OECD so as to ensure that English did not overwhelm the use of French. Most of the members, the northern Europeans, Scandinavian countries, Germany, Japan the United States and Canada used English as their language of choice. In addition to the French, only the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Italians, and I think the Greeks used French in meetings and preferred their documentation to be written in French. The French delegation would protest vigorously if the English version of a Secretariat paper appeared earlier than the French version, which might readily happen since the bulk of the Secretariat worked in English.

In summary, the OECD is a largely unheralded organization that deals with issues that do not appear to have a lot of sex appeal or attract a great deal of public attention. I believe it rarely received public notice except on those occasions when it issued its annual forecasts of economic growth in the various member countries.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else that you'd want to say about this period in Paris from 1966 to 1970 or thereabouts?

EDMOND: Only to note that it was a great place to be for an observer of the European scene. You will recall that the year 1968 saw two significant political developments in post-war Europe. One directly involved France, and that was the so-called Paris Student Revolt that almost brought down the DeGaulle Government while the other was the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet armored divisions which obliterated the political liberalization movement in that country that has become known as the Prague Spring.

With regard to the Paris events, suffice it to say that a student protest movement broke out in Nanterre University. The proximate cause was the arrest of eight members of a National Vietnam Committee. One of the protesters was Danny Cohen-Bendit, a German student who proved to be a dynamic and articulate revolutionary. In recent years, he has remained a popular left-wing voice in the European political scene. In March, a number of students broke into the Dean's Office and occupied it. The following month, the eight students were to be brought before a disciplinary hearing at the Sorbonne. Student activists at the Sorbonne joined forces with the Nanterre protesters and there was a demonstration at the former University, which has a special place in the French educational system and in the hearts of the French people. It appears that the authorities may have overreacted. The much feared French riot police were called in and considerable violence took place and the police took some students into custody. This enraged the student demonstrators and thousands took to the streets on the Left Bank. Barricades were built by destroying cars; paving stones were torn from the streets and used as weapons. The Sorbonne had been closed, reportedly for only the second time in its history. The first was when the Nazis marched into Paris in 1940. The students demanded the reopening of the Sorbonne, the withdrawal of the police and the release of those arrested. The authorities would not agree to the last request.

What made these developments particularly dangerous for the Government was a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction among the workers. Workers in factory after factory in France went on strike and occupied their workplaces. Renault, Peugeot, Sud Aviation were only a few of the companies shut down. Then the strike spread to non-industrial workers with the department store employees and the traffic controllers at Orly Airport following. Finally a general strike throughout France was called with the strike leaders calling for occupation of Government offices. These strikes and demonstrations had been organized and led largely by self appointed and unelected leaders and not by the traditional unions. It is interesting to note that the Communist Party initially had opposed the student demonstrations and the worker strikes, stating that they had been organized by provocateurs. Only after they had received such wide spread support did the Communist leaders support them in fear that they would lose all influence. The non-communist union leaders and those of other organizational bodies began seriously to fear that anarchy and revolution might result and organized counter demonstrations to defend the government offices from occupation. General Charles DeGaulle addressed the French nation on May 24 in which he called for a national referendum calling for a mandate for renewal. Cohen-Bendit was deported on May 25 and on May 27 the Government announced a thirty-five percent increase in the minimum wage and a ten percent general wage increase. Elections were held in August, I believe, and the Gaullists won approximately 60 per cent of the vote. The crisis was at an end.

The Czech crisis I only watched from afar. The communists had obtained power in Czechoslovakia through democratic elections between the years 1945 and 1948. Economic conditions in Czechoslovakia continued to be difficult and the Czechs increasingly chafed at the authoritarian rule of the Communist regime. The Czech Communist Party named Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary and he began introducing a number of reforms and liberalizing measures that became known as the Prague Spring. These frightened the Kremlin, I assume, because the Communist leaders feared they might also be adopted by other Eastern European countries that they dominated. On the night of August 20, Soviet armor invaded Czechoslovakia and snuffed out the short lived Prague Spring. I have always noted the difference in the treatment that Soviets showed to Finland and to Czechoslovakia in the post World War II period. I continue to suspect that Finland maintained its independence because the Soviets knew that the Finns would defend themselves, even if such action appeared suicidal in nature in contrast to the Czechs who would far more likely accept the inevitable defeat.

CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs and Information, NATO
Paris (1966-1967)

Christian A. Chapman was born in France to American parents on September 19, 1921. He served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1945 and received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1948. Mr. Chapman entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Morocco, Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam, Luxembourg, France, and Laos. Mr. Chapman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then in the international side of NATO. I have you there from 1966 to 68. Could you explain what you did.

CHAPMAN: I had the longest title of my career. I was Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Information. The Assistant Secretary was German, Joachim Jaenike, who served just below the Secretary General. The Directorate had about a dozen officers at the Counselor level from various nationalities.

On the political affairs side, we chaired the many political committees, the committee system being the heart of the workings of NATO. This is where the fifteen member countries could on a regular basis compare notes on what was going on in the world and what each country was doing. The political aspect of NATO has never been sufficiently appreciated. It provided , and provides today at a time of extraordinary change, a mechanism for the allies to remain currently informed and moving in the same direction. It remains a very important function- one that historically has never been so successfully tried over so many years.

We were also responsible for a very large information effort with about a hundred people. Interestingly enough, while all fifteen governments in NATO actively supported NATO, politically they felt very vulnerable at home with their public opinion. The heart of the matter

was that all governments were under great domestic pressure to do more on the social side of their societies. Defense appeared to public opinion, even in the US, to take resources away from other purposes. All the governments therefore considered that this information effort was essential. So we had a big program. Busloads of people came to NATO every week and we gave them lectures and pamphlets and booklets, all sorts of literature and distributed widely information materials of all sorts.

Q: Who did you consider to be target groups? What countries or types of people were you aiming at?

CHAPMAN: Probably it was mostly the academic world. Students and teachers, grade schools to universities. But many other groups came through.

Q: The same kind of effort that has been made with the United Nations.

CHAPMAN: That's exactly right.

In 1967 De Gaulle threw out the military from France and the Council decided to move the entire organization to Brussels. I felt then and I feel now that had NATO been as fragile as it was perceived by governments, it would have broken up at that time. In fact the move from Paris to Brussels was remarkably well done. We closed our offices on a Friday in Paris and reopened on the following Monday in Brussels. Without missing a committee meeting.

Q: What was the feeling among the staff towards the French?

CHAPMAN: A lot of bitterness.

Q: How about with the French among you.

CHAPMAN: Our French colleagues were very embarrassed and of course we avoided making an issue of it with them. They were very unhappy and we had a lot of sympathy for them because it was a very difficult moment. They thought of NATO the way we did, as essential. De Gaulle was playing a political game. In fact while the French military was out of the command structure, they nevertheless retained a very close liaison. To this day it is so close that it is ludicrous for France to remain outside the military structure.

Q: So there wasn't any real break then.

CHAPMAN: There was a real moment of uncertainty when it could have broken up. And if one country had said, "Well yes we too want to take our distances from the organization," I think it could have started the unraveling of NATO.

Q: Did you have any feeling that other countries' leaders were thinking about this at the time?

CHAPMAN: The revelation was that despite the governments' anxieties regarding public opinion, they all stuck together very firmly. This was the best evidence that NATO mattered to

Western Europe.

Q: Do you think de Gaulle was surprised at this or had he counted on it?

CHAPMAN: I think he counted on it. He would not have made his decision if it would have broken the alliance apart.

Q: That would have left France isolated with Germany right there.

CHAPMAN: With Germany and Russia. De Gaulle was very realistic about the Soviet Union. In fact, allowing his military to work very closely with the allies was pretty good evidence and France remained in the Alliance Council. So it was a charade for domestic purposes.

SERBAN VALLIMARESCU
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1966-1969)

Serban Vallimarescu was born in Romania in 1922. He immigrated to the United States in 1940 and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. Mr. Vallimarescu worked at Voice of America before entering USIA in 1956. His career included positions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, France, Spain, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1989.

VALLIMARESCU: So I go back to Washington after this experience. Tom Mann eventually is replaced as assistant secretary by Jack Hood Vaughn, the former Peace Corps director, who was in the job for a year, after which he was appointed ambassador to Colombia or Panama. He is replaced by Lincoln Gordon, who had been ambassador to Brazil. At which point I go to Leonard Marks, who had replaced Carl Rowan, and say, "Leonard, please, three different assistant secretaries within less than three years is a little too much to adjust to. Send me overseas, please. I'd like to go overseas again." "Where would you like to go?" "Well, if you really ask me, I'd like to go to Paris." "Let me see if I can work it out." And he worked it out. I remember that the press corps, the journalists who covered the State Department, gave me a luncheon, which Tom Mann and Jack Hood Vaughn attended, at the National Press Club. And they represented a wide range, from Bernie Gwertzman to Jerry O'Leary, the New York Times guy -- there must have been about 20 journalists there. It made me feel good because they were people who were enemies, basically ideologically different, but they got together to say goodbye to me, and I was very pleased.

So off we go to Paris. This is June, 1966. There's a story there which show how bureaucracy works, or how some people in the bureaucracy work. We wanted to go by ship; we thought it would be nice to take four days by ship. We had made reservations on the SS United States. The kids were very excited about it. Alice was, too. But then we hear from the PAO, Lee Brady. He said, "No way. I need Val here, I want him by plane." It was only a two-day difference. There was a French religious holiday during that period we were talking about a two-day difference,

but Brady insisted. We had to cancel our ship reservations. We arrived in Paris on a Saturday. Monday was a holiday and I reported to the office on Tuesday. We would have arrived by ship on Tuesday. That was not a very auspicious start.

I was in Paris for three years as deputy PAO. It should have been a four-year tour. The reason it was not a four-year tour is that my second ambassador in Paris and I were not on the best of terms. I think he asked that I be pulled out. I know I asked to be pulled out. I don't know which of the two came first. This ambassador was Sargent Shriver. We didn't get along very well. My first ambassador in Paris was Chip Bohlen, and that was a great gentleman. And she was a great lady. But it was quite clear that Chip Bohlen's heart was always still in the Soviet Union, in Eastern European affairs.

It was a difficult period in Franco-American relations. De Gaulle had pulled out of NATO. Anti-Americanism was at its height in the media. All the more leftist elements were having a field day, going to extremes. They felt that de Gaulle had given them a green light. I was deputy PAO, but the job of our press, radio, television people was a very difficult one indeed because the French media were not very responsive. It was very difficult indeed. My children and my wife -- and I love Paris too -- were very happy. I was quite pleased with Chip Bohlen the first two years. But the last year I wanted to get out. The city is pretty, and everything is enjoyable, but if you go to work disliking the person you work for it's not fun.

Of course, we were there when the famous events of May took place in 1968 when the students sort of went up in arms and occupied various buildings and there were serious incidents between them and the police. De Gaulle went into exile, in effect, refused to have anything to do with it and then finally, after the thing became totally unmanageable, came back and order was reestablished.

But when Shriver came the whole embassy morale, the whole embassy spirit suffered greatly. First of all it started with his telling his DCM, who was a very nice gentleman who had kept the embassy together as chargé for six to eight months -- within a month or two after Shriver had presented his credentials, the DCM sees in the traffic, in a telegram, that the political counselor had been recalled to Washington, although he had another three years to go. The economic counselor was also being pulled out and the first he knew of it was in reading the traffic, as we call it. So the DCM walks into the ambassador's office and says, "Mr. Ambassador, what's this I hear about so-and-so and so-and-so being pulled?" The ambassador looked at him with a smile and said, "That's right. And you, too! You're leaving within a week." That's the way he fired his DCM. So it didn't help morale in the embassy.

As I say, the Sargent Shriver period was difficult for us. Now Sargent Shriver is a man with ideas a mile a minute, which is fine, he was an imaginative man -- but, you know, I developed for Shriver -- I recognized that I was no longer objective. Just as -- I always made that comparison -- just as in the days of the McCarthy era, it was enough for McCarthy to denounce somebody publicly as a communist, or whatever, for me to react and say, "That must be a nice guy." You see what I mean? It's sort of exaggerated, but with Sargent Shriver it was enough for him to have an idea for me to say, "Oh-oh, there must be something wrong with it." So I was not totally objective.

If you're still interested in anecdotes, I will tell you some which illustrate the Sargent Shriver way of doing things. Number one, he was always, always at least half an hour late for every appointment, whether it was with Pompidou or the minister of foreign affairs -- always at least a half hour late. You remember Guy Faure, who was minister of education. After 20 minutes he gave instructions that when the ambassador of the United States arrives tell him I'm busy. One day the ambassador calls into his office the PAO and me along with the information officer and press attaché. He said, "I'd like to know how you people feel I'm doing my job. Is there anything I'm not doing well?" The PAO said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, if you say so, yes. One of the things that is rather objectionable from the French point of view is the fact that you arrive so late for your appointments. Why?" "I used to campaign with my brother-in-law, Bob Kennedy, and we arrived at campaign meetings an hour late and nobody minded." That's the comparison he made.

One day at a staff meeting the PAO was not there so I was attending the country team meeting, which is all the counselors plus the press attaché. The press attaché was Bill Payeff, who has a marvelous sense of humor, sort of a Buster Keaton sense of humor. With a straight face he will say something and you're never quite sure whether he's joking or serious. Well, this was a few months before George Washington's birthday and the ambassador wanted to do something special. One of the ideas that was very good -- he had good contacts -- he was going to bring memorabilia from museums in the U.S. and exhibit them in the embassy chancery lobby and some of them in the residence. The other thing he said he was going to do for two or three days leading up to George Washington's birthday was to dress up the Marines in period costumes. (Laughter) There was a big silence. And then Bill Payeff, again with a straight face, said, "Well, that's fine Mr. Ambassador, but where are you going to get the men?" "What do you mean, where am I going to get the men?" "Well, all the men you'll need to hold down the Marines while you dress them up in those silly costumes!" Well, we laughed. The ambassador didn't think it was funny at all. But he didn't dress the Marines in the costumes.

Another story. The ambassador was a great tennis fan and he had a very good idea. The U.S. Davis Cup team was going to play in England. He was going to bring them to France and have them tour several cities in France and play exhibition matches and have clinics and end up in Paris. That was a fine idea. So at a residence party, where the Prefect of Paris, sort of like the governor of Paris -- a very distinguished old gentleman with a great sense of humor -- was present... Shriver thought he spoke French and insisted on speaking French even to the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, who was absolutely bilingual in English. He spoke good social French, but he didn't really speak French. I see the ambassador with the Prefect and him waving to me. I go over. He said, "Val, I need your help. I was telling M. le Prefet about my tennis plan and about the fact that these tennis stars would end up in Paris. And I thought we should have an exhibition match on the Place de la Concorde. (Laughter) We could paint the tennis court on the Place de la Concorde."

I turned to the Prefect and said, "The ambassador says that he would like to have this exhibition match on the Place de la Concorde." The Prefect laughed and said, "Oh, your ambassador has a great sense of humor." Shriver asked, "What did he say?" I said, "He said you have a great sense of humor, Mr. Ambassador." "What does he mean? I'm serious. Tell him I'm serious." "L'Ambassadeur est sérieux, M. le Prefet." "Then will you explain to the ambassador, please, that

there are certain problems to that. Number one, the Place de la Concorde is a historic monument, respected as such. One does not paint tennis courts or anything there. Number two, it is one of the busiest traffic centers because there are avenues coming from all over. It would create a massive traffic jam everywhere. And number three, it can't be done." "Mr. Ambassador," he said, "it can't be done for these reasons." "Oh, I see. Well then we could do it on the Place du l'Hotel de Ville." (Where the municipal building is.) So the Prefect says, "Will you tell the ambassador that for the same reasons -- it is also a historic monument and traffic also would be a problem." But then he winks at me and say, "Tell the ambassador that I offer him the Place des Vosges." The Place des Vosges is a jewel, but it's fenced with a garden -- trees, flowers in the middle -- beautiful. You can't do anything there, you'd have to cut down all the trees. So the ambassador said, "You thank the Prefect. That's fine. Val, tomorrow we go." I say, "All right, Mr. Ambassador, we'll go." So we drive out to the Place des Vosges. He gets out and says, "That son of a bitch! He was pulling my leg, wasn't he Val?" I said, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, he was." (Laughter) These were some of Sargent Shriver's ideas.

One of the sadder ones is that at another staff meeting -- again I was acting PAO...it was June, right after his brother-in-law, Bobby Kennedy, had been assassinated -- we discussed the Fourth of July reception. The ambassador said, "Eunice and I are going to do it differently this year. There's a very good rock band of young students, and we're going to have a rock band. Everybody can dance and it'll be totally informal. We'll take out all this old, dusty furniture and it'll be something like Paris has never seen." Well, all the counselors looked at each other. I'm public relations, public affairs. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I am afraid that the French would not understand the American ambassador giving a rock dancing party less than a month after his brother-in-law had been assassinated." He said, "Well, the show must go on." I said, "Yes, but also, Mr. Ambassador, the people who get invited to Fourth of July receptions are generally not great fans of rock and roll. They're the foreign minister, the minister of economy, the minister of education, members of parliament, members of the Senate, foreign ambassadors." "Well, does anybody else agree with Val?" They finally spoke up. The economic counselor said, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, I think it would be misinterpreted." So we had the usual Fourth of July reception. That was Sargent Shriver.

Well, I left after three years. The last year in Paris was when the Vietnam peace talks started. A good friend of mine, Bill Jorden, was sent by the president to be the official spokesman. We had daily press briefings, but we were only indirectly involved in this operation; we were supportive. There were lots of journalists from all over. There must have been about a thousand or fifteen hundred newsmen covering those peace talks. So it was an exciting time in many ways, but as deputy PAO I did feel a little frustrated because I was more of an administrator than I was a participant, and my cup of tea is to be right in there.

But we did have a visitor. We had President Nixon's first foreign visit in my last year there. That was quite an experience because the advance party was composed of people like Ehrlichman and his assistant Edward Morgan and we didn't know who they were. They were obnoxious, and totally inexperienced. I had been involved with three previous foreign presidential visits, but they thought they knew it all. The visit came off all right because USIS is professional. It was a great success.

So, we're back in Paris, July 1969, winding up in Paris, and getting ready to return -- this time by boat. It was the last trip that the SS United States made. After that it went out of business. It was a great trip. Well, not really. Alice was depressed because she didn't want to leave Paris. John, my older boy, had begun to go steady with a lovely girl. The younger one, Dan, played the guitar with friends in cafes. So they were sad. I was dancing, going around the ship playing ping pong, and these people all had long faces, my family.

PERRY W. LINDER
General Services Officer
Paris (1967-1968)

Perry W. Linder was born in California in 1931. After receiving his bachelor's degree from San Jose State College in 1952, he served in the United States Army from 1952-1955. His career has included positions in Hamburg, Kingston, Tegucigalpa, Paris, Contonou/Dahomey, Brussels, Amman, Athens, and Madrid. Mr. Linder was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in December 1996.

Q: And what was your next assignment?

LINDER: I was assigned to Paris, I mean, having been in Personnel and with the influence that one gains in Personnel, I had managed to set myself up for Paris. But along came BALPA, I don't remember what it stood for...

Q: Well, I think it...

LINDER: It was a reduction in force.

Q: Balance of Payments something-or-other, to reduce the cost of operating abroad.

LINDER: So anyway, the position that I was to go to in Paris had been abolished. And because I was in French language training, they decided to send me to Dahomey, now known as Benin, as Administrative Officer. And you know, in retrospect, it was a good change. I know I learned a lot more being Administrative Officer and got more satisfaction out of it, and I think progressed faster than I would have if I'd gone as a GSO to Paris.

FREDERICK G. MASON
Deputy Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1967-1969)

Frederick Mason was born in Waterbury, Connecticut in 1926. He graduated from Yale after serving in the Army during World War II. Since joining the Foreign Service, his career has included positions in France, Vietnam, Morocco,

Madagascar and Italy. Mr. Mason was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: You came into USIA in when?

MASON: Laterally, on the 12th of March 1967, which was the date of our departure from the Camp des Loges and the end of our military presence in France.

Q: We are now in 1967, you have joined USIA. Your first tour was where?

MASON: In Paris. Paris was where I'd been living anyway for four years in two or three different jobs. So, when the military moved out in March of 1967, I was ready to go right down to the embassy and the job of Deputy Information Officer as a Class V officer in the Limited Reserve. USIA at that time didn't offer either career Foreign Service status or Civil Service status, and so we were attaches only. I had sacrificed, in a sense, my civil service status to do this because, I thought, I was at last getting into the Foreign Service and felt my experience and age qualified me.

USIS was in the Rothschild building on the rue du Faubourg St. Honoré at the time. It is now the ambassador's residence. Howard Simpson stayed for another three months and was replaced by Max Kraus, and we moved into the Hotel Talleyrand, on rue St. Florentin and rue de Rivoli, on the corner opposite the main embassy building. I was there for two years. It was hectic, but it was interesting work. A lot of donkey work, dragging people around - visitors and such. I was frequently called on for that sort of thing, but I was also assigned as the Vietnam Information Officer, never having been to Vietnam, never even having had an orientation at USIA. Apparently, you were expected to know or find out everything about your assignment with no guidance from above. My career had started off in Verdun as a supervisory training officer and we went through many texts and examples of what to do and what not to do to be a good supervisor, how to train and prepare your employees, and I felt that USIA was not doing that. I never did have an assignment at USIA in Washington, until my very last one, 17 years later. Throughout my career with USIA in fact, I know that I was not being adequately prepared for each assignment. That's the first criticism I would have of it.

But I enjoyed seeing the big operators from Washington come through Paris. I took Averell Harriman through the Talleyrand because this had been his headquarters when he headed the Marshall Plan, ICA. His office was a huge ornate corner room occupied at that time by Lee Brady, our Public Affairs Officer (And I'm told it is now sealed off and empty as being too risky in case of an attack. Too bad.). He recorded a talk there for the Voice of America. President Nixon came through in his first visit overseas after his inauguration at the end of February 1969. I was one of the interpreters at the formal dinner at the Elysées Palace, and I was assigned to Mr. Kissinger. I sat behind him and the wife of a French Senator, and listened to the chit chat, which did not interest Mr. Kissinger. But it was an experience to be there at the table and hear General de Gaulle welcome President Nixon and have Nixon get up and give what was really a very, very fine speech. "We come to sit at your feet and learn," was the gist of it, which is not what de Gaulle had been getting from the Johnson Administration, and this, of course, pleased the French no end.

Behind him was General Walters, the Defense Attache, who was his interpreter. General Walters did not take notes. He would wait until an entire paragraph was completed before he would repeat the whole thing perfectly in French, to my great admiration. I worked with General Walters, in the sense that if I got queries from press people about Vietnam, I would send them to him or see what the army attaché or naval attaché or the people in their office could do to help them and brief them. So I was in there trying to defend American policy, which I didn't entirely agree with, but I did the best I could, without even the experience of having been in Vietnam.

Once the Sorbonne organized a debate outside Paris on the subject of Vietnam. The speakers included Olivier Todd, a left wing journalist in France, very much in the news himself and much liked by the students just before the 1968 student uprising at the Sorbonne in May of 1968.

It was just after the Tet Offensive and I was defending American policy and the truth was that we had won the battle militarily but lost it politically. I still maintain that in winning it we wiped out the Vietcong but left the North Vietnamese to fill the vacuum. They were coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and I still wonder if we couldn't have arrived at a negotiated solution with the Vietcong, who were Southerners themselves and as much anti-Northerner as the pro-American Thieu Government. Anyway, that is water over the dam. Back and forth this argument went and tough questions were asked. I don't know how well I did, but one student did come up to me afterwards and say, "You know, sir, back at the Sorbonne, there are quite a few of us who agree with you. But we don't dare say so." So much for freedom of speech at the Sorbonne. Anyway, this is the sort of thing I was thrown into without any experience, training, or orientation.

I did have a background in intelligence, where of course you don't talk about anything outside the office. In the local affairs with the mayors of the Paris arrondissements and of the surrounding communities, it was entirely cultural. It was not a political information program. I learned a great deal from this. Our ambassador was Chip Bohlen for the first year, and then Sargent Shriver. Bohlen was the perfect professional and Shriver was the political innovator who did unconventional things. I remember taking Eunice Shriver to visit a school for handicapped children, since this was one of her main interests, and I interpreted for her there. These were not substantive jobs, in that - well, I did interview journalists who knew a great deal about Vietnam and I reported on what they had said, which got up through channels into various parts of the embassy. So I learned a great deal, especially about Vietnam, before I went there.

Q: I would like though, Ted, if we could go back to Paris. What happened, were you involved in the student protest, the disappearance of De Gaulle? Sort of wondering what was going to happen...

MASON: Yes, we were covering it from day to day. I remember when he went to Germany to Baden-Baden to talk with Massu. We thought, "Uh-oh, this could end with the French army moving in and taking over." At the same time the students had taken over the Sorbonne building and the Odéon Theater. In fact, I went to one of their get-togethers at the Odéon. It was conducted in a heady atmosphere, with each student romantically imagining himself on the Barricades during a new French Revolution. They were all screaming at cross purposes, as if there had never been any free speech in France before. One was saying "Let's try the Yugoslav

way of doing things,” and another said, “Let’s try something else!” It was what you would expect from students. I remember how de Gaulle waited, very cleverly and very wisely waited them out and finally moved in at three in the morning in various places and took over their strongholds with a minimum of bloodshed. By that time the students had run out of steam. But before then when they were first tearing things apart, they tore down the superstructure of the metro openings, you know, in the Quartier Latin. I remember that I was duty officer that weekend and again, Mrs. Shriver wanted to see it and show it to her kids. I took them around and showed them the damage. With my wife, I had been out there and seen what they were doing from a safe distance. The police were very restrained, there was no breaking of heads. There was no Kent State. And it worked, it really did. Now, Cohn-Bendit is actually back in there as a member of the European parliament.

Q: Known as “Rudy the Red” at one time.

MASON: Yes. He can’t decide whether he has French or German nationality.

Q: He’s from Alsace perhaps.

MASON: No, I think he is from Germany proper, but his family came to France as refugees in the 1930s. He’s in the Green Movement now and before the French elections, a year or two ago, he was seen quite often on television and has become quite respectable. No, all of this was something I followed with great interest because I had been covering French politics as an intelligence analyst for years, you see, and all the colonial troubles.

Q: Was there real apprehension that the French army might move in and if they did what might this mean?

MASON: I think there was. There was a feeling of suspense, but I don’t know if it was more so than the feeling in April 1961 when the French Colonels, Salan, Jouhaux, Zeller, and Challe in Algiers set up their little regime. There people were afraid of paratroopers landing south of Paris. That was very touch and go. But it didn’t happen, again because de Gaulle was able to rally the contingent, that is to say the draftees in the French army, who would have resisted an order from those colonels to move. I think those two events were of somewhat equal importance. And in between them, of course, there were how many assassination attempts against de Gaulle personally? There was Petit Clamart, and there was the one on the way to Colombey les-Deux-Eglises, and another one down in Toulon and so on. Those were exciting days in Paris, and in both cases I believe direct intervention by the Army would have led to a blood bath and tarnished de Gaulle’s reputation. As it was, having extricated France from the Algerian morass, it was a great humiliation for him now to see his work turned against him by students who had not been out of their cribs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I guess he felt he was on the way out. The question that I always asked was why he dispensed with the services of Pompidou as prime minister just at that time and brought in Couve de Murville. Was it to let Pompidou keep his hands clean so that he could succeed de Gaulle more easily? Because the elections took place in the June of 1969, and de Gaulle didn’t run. He moved back into retirement and Pompidou won. And that is just when I left. So I concluded my service in France with the departure of the General.

At the end of two years in June of 1969 I was brought back to Washington and to the Vietnam Training Center at Arlington Towers, where I attended lectures that lasted two or three months. We had top flight speakers like Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, and experts like Chester Bain, who wrote a book on Vietnam. These were some of the people who helped us to flesh the subject out very thoroughly. So I can't say that I wasn't prepared to go to Vietnam and I appreciated that. I asked to be in the press office because of my French, thinking I could deal with the French press better than some of the others. But no, I was assigned as Reports Officer of JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office). JUSPAO was in the Rex building downtown. I arrived the first of October of 1969 in Saigon.

ROBERT B. OAKLEY
Political Officer
Paris (1967-1969)

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley was born in 1931 in Texas. He graduated from Princeton University in 1952 and served in the US Navy until 1955. Oakley joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served overseas in Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Vietnam, France, Lebanon, and as Ambassador to Zaire, Somalia and Pakistan. In Washington DC, Oakley served in the Office of UN Political Affairs, the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, as the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and for the National Security Council. Oakley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenney and Thomas Stern in 1992.

Q: *Your next assignment was to Paris. Was that an assignment that you sought?*

OAKLEY: Paris was not a post that I had requested. I guess it came as a reward for my tour in Saigon.

My job in Paris was in the Political section of the Embassy, reporting on African and Middle East affairs. I had some experience in Africa and some interest in the Middle East; in fact this became my first working relationship with Middle East issues - a subject that I would follow for much of my career. Chip Bohlen was my first Ambassador; he was followed by Sarge Shriver. The first was the most senior career officer; the second an extraordinary political personage. The same thing happen to me again after Paris when I served with the U.S. Mission to the UN where my first ambassador was Charlie Yost who was followed by George Bush. The chance to work for such special people was personally a very enriching experience. My first DCM in Paris was Chris Chapman who was followed by Bob Blake. The Political Counselors were Dick Funkhouser and Bob Anderson.

Let me make a few comments about the stylistic differences between Bohlen and Shriver. The first was an obvious super-diplomat; he was unparalleled in his ability to work with de Gaulle - to the degree that any U.S. official could work with the General. But he handled his ambassadorial duties in the formal way that he had learned in his career. On the other hand,

Shriver was just superb in his P.R. efforts. I just recently talked to Shriver; he told me that Bohlen had predicted that there was little he could accomplish in Paris. I told him that had he come a year earlier, that probably would have been true. He arrived just at the time that France was beginning to open up, thanks to the quasi-revolution of 1968, after which France's relations with the rest of the world changed dramatically for a time. The French began to look outwards and finally forced de Gaulle out of office. He knew that it was time for him to leave the reins to others. Shriver had a unique style; he went to the Left Bank to observe the anti-de Gaulle student riots - before he had even presented his credentials. It was that uprising that forced a change in French attitudes and in fact was the beginning of de Gaulle's demise and, as I told Shriver, it opened the door for an American ambassador to play a more important role in France. He agreed with that assessment.

In fact, Shriver acted as if he were the U.S. ambassador to a third world country. He went down into the pits with the coal miners; he visited the vineyards to talk to the growers; he would talk to the shop-keepers. He had many of the ordinary French people to Thanksgiving dinner. The Embassy was a real live place during Shriver's tour. Shriver set up a "youth committee" to sort of parallel the Embassy's structure. Ted McNamara, Frances Cook and I were part of this "youth" movement. On one occasion, during the transformation of French attitudes and in the middle of the student-inspired strikes and agitation, he had the President of Yale - Kingman Brewster - who was visiting, as the guest of honor at one of his typical *soirees*. The custom was that the guests would mingle briefly before dinner, eat the repast and then have a long, long discussion about issues of interest to his guests. For this particular dinner, he had also invited the Minister of Education, the President of the Sorbonne University as well as some of the radical professors and representatives of the student movement. It was a very lively evening, I can assure you! These kinds of events occurred frequently; on occasion, he would have as many as four events at the Residence in one day - a breakfast, a lunch, a tea, and a dinner - all very lively. On another occasion, he got Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of HEW, to come to Paris for one of these dinner sessions. Shriver would monitor the movements of all leading Americans; if they were in Europe, he would insist that they come to Paris where he would put them to work, allowing the French to express their views to our leaders and vice-versa.

For one Thanksgiving dinner, he invited movie stars, sports stars, coal miners, farmers, shop keepers - a real mixture of French society as well as the bourgeoisie such as the Rothschilds. Shriver had an extraordinary effervescence that somehow enabled him to bring together disparate elements of French society for lively, but civil, discourse. Of course, his style created an extra workload for us in the Embassy staff, but it was fun and we did not resent it. It was also an extra workload for Phyllis and some of the other wives; she was not a member of the Foreign Service at that time; nevertheless she became part of the Shriver entourage and she enjoyed the experience.

On the other hand; Sarge had some weaknesses. He was not a skilled diplomat; he insisted on speaking French which was atrocious. After the first time he had a meeting alone with the Foreign Minister, we got an anguished call from the Quai - the Foreign Ministry. John Dean - he was handling Far Eastern affairs in the Embassy - and I rushed over. We were told that it appeared that we had changed our entire foreign policy on Vietnam, Biafra and the Middle East. So we sat down with our French counterparts and reviewed the conversation that Shriver had

with the Foreign Minister. The review obviously called for major revisions in the “memorandum of conversation” which the French note-taker had drafted. That established a pattern; after each of his conversations with the Foreign Minister, we would sit down with our French counterparts and clear up any misunderstandings that Shriver may have left behind because of his unfamiliarity with the French language. As far as I know, he never knew what we had done!

Shriver was much more accessible than Bohlen was. His door was always wide open - to anyone. He just had a different style and was helped immensely by the change in French attitudes. I remember the Foreign Service inspectors coming to Paris when Bob Blake was the DCM and saying: “Isn't it bad enough to have an 'unusual' ambassador; is it necessary to have an 'unusual' DCM as well?” Blake had a personality similar to Shriver's; he was an extrovert, glad-handing his way through crowds; not terribly well organized but very smart. They were a real combination!

Bob Anderson, who was my boss for a while, had a lot of French friends. He let his officers do pretty much what they wanted; I could set my own priorities and reporting targets. That was a problem for me because I had to set my own priorities. With all the issues that were pending in the Middle East and Africa, I had to be quite selective; I could not possibly give full coverage to all. I was in contact with the Quai all the time, with other embassies, with the staff of the Ministry of Cooperation. One of our very good friends was the *Chef de Cabinet* to Foccart; he was a very important source because it was Foccart who in effect ran France's African policy. He was a young man who attended my first meeting with Foccart and thereafter our families became very close. This fellow was very open with me. One day, he called me and told me that Foccart was sending the Minister of Cooperation to Brazzaville. That puzzled me, but then I was told that the French government did not like the way things were going in the Congo. They were concerned that the government was too close to the communists. About six weeks after the Minister's visit, there was a coup in the Congo which brought in a new government. A few days later, my friend called to let me know that Foccart was sending the Minister for Cooperation to Bamako, Mali. I asked: “Just like he did to Brazzaville?” I was told that the French regarded the Mali situation as even worse than the Congo had been. In this case, it took only three weeks after the visit for the Mali government to be overthrown.

Sometime later, I asked my French friend about Bokassa, the horrible Prime Minister of the Central African Republic. I noted that I thought that Bokassa was a real threat and a terrible leader. I was then told that if we could find someone better in the CAR, the French would be glad to review the situation; they had not been able to find a better leader. I think these events and conversations were quite revealing about French African policies. They could and did manipulate the leadership in their former colonies.

I had a similar experience with the chief of the Middle East division in the Quai. Right after his inauguration in 1969, Nixon made his first Presidential trip to Europe. He came to Paris. The Quai official had not been very communicative, but when the visit was announced he came to me, under instructions, and said: “We are now going to try to work with the U.S. in the Middle East because we also are very concerned about Soviet penetration of the area”. So he gave me a complete run down on the briefing paper that the Quai had sent to de Gaulle for his discussions with Nixon. I was made privy to all of the details of French views and policies. I was able to get

that information to Kissinger and Nixon's staff before their arrival in Paris. They were very interested and that French initiative led to four-power talks - U.S., France, Great Britain and the USSR - that were subsequently convened on the Middle East. It was a fascinating process because the French shifted their policy 180 degrees; instead of working against us, as they had been, they decided to try and work with us. They had come to the conclusion that the situation in the Middle East had so deteriorated by 1969 that cooperation was by far the better policy. They hoped that Nixon would be a willing partner and in fact, for a while, we did work together on Middle East issues. The four power talks did get started in Paris; I think Dick Funkhouser was our principal representative, but I went with him to all the meetings. His counterparts in the other three embassies were their countries' spokesmen. We were trying to foster and support the UN sponsored efforts led by Ambassador Jarring which were supposed to lead to a peaceful resolution of the complicated Middle East issues. There were parallel talks being held in New York, but that was no problem; the coordination was very good and we never got our signals mixed up. Our Paris group worked on some details. Paris was agreed upon as the location for the talks because the French had been the originators of the idea of four power talks. It was a de Gaulle initiative. Eventually, the talks collapsed because we and the French just had great difficulties working together on anything, particularly something as sensitive as the Middle East. Kissinger's approach, as the NSC Advisor, was to work quite independently of the bureaucracy. Eventually, the talks collapsed; I won't say they were deliberately sabotaged by us, but the NSC did not give it much support. Furthermore, the Israelis did not like the formula very much; they were left out of the talks.

At the beginning, I thought that those talks might actually produce some positive actions and coordinated policies. I did not find that the French and the USSR sided against us and the British, as was expected by some; I would say that in a majority of the questions, the French sided with their western allies. That gave me some hopes that the four power talks could have some successes. But like the Rogers' plan and other State Department initiatives, the four power talks in the final analysis went nowhere. Of course, in early 1969, none of us knew much if anything about Kissinger and his *modus operandi*. But we learned! One day, my friend at the Quai asked me to come over and he let me see a reporting telegram from the French Ambassador in Washington concerning a conversation he had had with Kissinger. After reading it, I wrote an "Official-Informal" letter to Joe Sisco then the Assistant Secretary for NEA, reporting what I had read. He was very grateful for that information because he said that this was the first time he had really found out what the details of Kissinger's Middle East policy were.

I mentioned Nixon's visit. I was involved to some degree with the arrangements. The President made a point of meeting with non-governmental officials - union leaders, youth leaders, political opposition. He tossed all these disparate elements together which was a good approach. In Paris, he just listened for about two hours, trying to get a sense of what the French "public" thought was going on. I found it a fascinating session and an interesting approach to getting a "feel for the country." I arranged that meeting. But I also remember from that trip how difficult Ehrlichman and Haldeman were. They advanced the President's visit. They demanded an extraordinary amount of detailed planning, making the visit seem more like a movie script than a spontaneous visit. We would have to chart the room that the President was going to enter and then describe - step by step - exactly how he would proceed to his seat. We would go over every inch of the event time and time again; it was an agonizing experience for the Embassy. Everyone

charged with responsibility for a particular event had to draw these elaborate and very detailed plans.

I think in general my personal relationships with the French was quite good. As I said, after a while, several of the officials became quite open with me and we became good friends with a number of them. It made for very good collaboration. It takes the French a little while to extend trust to a foreigner, but once having done so, I found them quite easy to work with. I think we worked well together on Middle East and African matters. The existence of jobs in the Embassy concerned with regional affairs was very useful, particularly in the areas that I covered where France played a leading role. In many African countries they had the predominant role; in others they had important roles. It was in our interest to have officers stationed in Paris concerned with African, Middle East and Far Eastern affairs; the U.S. learned a lot about what was going on in those areas from the French - not only about what was going on, but also about what the French were going to do. Furthermore, African chiefs of state were coming to and going from Paris constantly; after I had become acquainted with their embassies, I also had an opportunity to meet with chiefs of state. That gave us one more point of contact with important African persons - of course, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we did care about Africa!

During my tour in Paris, the French were playing also a significant role in the Middle East and that made our liaison job in the Embassy a significant link in the process. Now the French have largely withdrawn from the Middle East, more or less, but at the time we are discussing, they were a significant player. I think our regional jobs were important not only because of France's roles in the areas, but also because it gave us an additional avenue for access to regional leaders who would visit Paris - that was true for African leaders, as I have mentioned, and Middle East leaders as well. It gave us another source of information of their perspectives on what was going on in their countries and regions. Since I also maintained contacts with the representatives of the African and Middle East countries in Paris, that was an additional source of information for us. Their ambassadors were considered among their top officials because France was an important country and the African and Middle East states used to send the best talent to represent them in France. These were very useful avenues for information collection and the expression of U.S. views on various issues. Since the U.S. had multiple channels to these leaders, there was always the theoretical risk of "mixed messages", but I never encountered such a situation. My main problem was essentially time; I didn't know what priority Washington gave to all of my contacts and work-load; I had to set my own priorities. I had more to do than I had time.

I earlier mentioned the student uprisings. I also mentioned that I had the "youth" portfolio in the Embassy; i.e. I was supposed to cover the comings and goings of the French younger generation. The student rebellion started in a courtyard of the Sorbonne University when two groups of students began to fight each other. The riot police then entered the University grounds trying to bring calm. Thereupon, all of the students turned on the police. That began to spill out of the University grounds unto the surrounding streets. More police came; more students came. That melee was joined by union rank and file members who joined the students. That brought police reinforcements from outside of Paris. The confrontation continued to escalate over a period of days. At one stage, de Gaulle left the country to meet with his generals in Germany; he was totally confused and didn't know what actions to take. When he returned, he found a situation totally out of control. I and others in the Embassy used to go to the Left Bank to observe the

action with our own eyes. Much of my information on events came from my friend in Foccart's office; he kept me abreast of developments. Foccart soon brought his friends together - most of them having been veterans of de Gaulle's resistance forces. They organized counter moves, led by Foccart and the Minister of the Interior. After about three weeks of total chaos, they marshaled their forces for a big march down the Champs-Élysées. This turned the tide.

It was interesting to us in the Embassy to watch this rebellion spread - from the Sorbonne to Paris to other French cities and then nation-wide strikes. Union leaders were opposed to the participation of their members in the general strike. It was not like the general strike of a couple of months' ago which was led by union leaders; in 1968, it was the membership that led the general strike. They held huge parades, led by standard bearers waiving huge red and black flags. Interestingly enough, the Communist Party leadership also did not support the strikes, but it was forced into support by its rank and file members. The union membership was in essence showing its dismay with ten years of authoritarian de Gaulle rule. They decided to act like "Frenchmen" and stand up for their own rights. So they did!

The change of direction in the Communist Party leadership was crucial to the outcome of the uprising. When that leadership decided to throw its lot with the rebels, it scared the hell out of the middle and upper French classes. The Communist made the uprising appear as its own; that allowed the government to capitalize on the fears of the majority of the French people.

From my point of view - i.e. as the "Youth" officer of the Embassy - , I found it most interesting to watch every major French professional sector - lawyers, doctors, professors, architects, etc - going through a similar process: the young professionals were in revolt against the leadership provided by the older generation. They viewed that leadership as authoritarian and rigid; they viewed the "professional" system as antediluvian - since its origins really stemmed back to the time of the French monarchy. So the revolution was not only in the streets, but throughout French society. All of the foundations of society were shaken; the younger generation was not willing to abide by the authoritarian regime that had been imposed on it by their elders - with de Gaulle being only a symbol of what in fact was a prevailing authoritarian process in all French institutions. The students, with whom we talked, expressed their hope that the American educational system could be exported to France. As always, these uprising had internal contradictions; on the one hand, we and the Soviets were being vilified because in the streets we were perceived as France's principal foreign "enemies"; on the other hand, the students wished for an educational system modeled after ours. Shriver played that for all it was worth; he was always ready to talk to the students about U.S. society and culture. He drew on his experiences in the Peace Corps; he reached out to the French youth and was a real asset for the U.S. image. The riots made no difference to Shriver's approach of trying to get American leadership together with French citizens; he just reveled in his efforts to bring the two communities together, whether through social events or just exchanges on the streets.

Another interesting aspect of the rebellion was the reaction of some of the senior French leaders, like Cabinet members. Although it was their generation and their institutions that were under attack, some of them were quite proud of their children who were rioting in the streets, building barricades and throwing bricks at the cops. They took great pride in their children who were behaving in the "typical" French manner - as history tells us. They thought it was wonderful! My

friend in Foccart's office told me that the Prime Minister was making a big mistake when he decided to crack down on the students, including not permitting some of the leaders back into the country. My friend's advice to Foccart was to keep repressive measures to a minimum, in part because he felt that the Prime Minister's tactics were leading to further deterioration of the situation, not an improvement. But his advice was ignored.

The Embassy did not take any special security precautions because the students and the workers were not targeting the Embassy. Of course, life was hardly normal; there was no gasoline, trains were not running, mail was not being delivered, no schools were open; very little of customary life remained the same. Phyllis finally said: "I think the strike will be broken soon because the women are becoming increasingly unhappy. They are shut in their apartments with the children. The men are having a great time occupying the factories; the women are going to start very soon taking the kids to the factories and dumping them on their husbands. That will bring the strike to a halt!" In fact, I think these domestic tensions did help end the strike. At the beginning of the revolution and for the following two weeks, people were very excited; they could join their friends in the streets and vent their frustrations without consequences. I have never seen a population so elated and on a "high". There was real comradeship; people were picking up hitchhikers, people were talking to each other - a real feeling of community, such as one might see in Washington in a snowstorm in one of our neighborhoods. It was very un-French - they usually do not speak to strangers or join in communal activities. But after that initial feeling of freedom, the consequences of service stoppages began to fray people's nerves. They began to wonder where and when it would all end. In light of recent events here in Washington, one can say that the French close their governments from below, we from above.

Let me expand a little on my role as the Embassy's "Youth" officer. Sarge asked in essence that a "Youth Committee" be established which would reach out to the younger Frenchmen - young Parliamentary deputies, student leaders, the young French leaders in all walks of life. At one time, he organized a tour of the U.S. for twelve of them, with transportation paid by some of his American friends - not the government. Fritz Stern came to Paris to pick up the crew and take them to and through the U.S.. The group consisted primarily of young professors and younger government officials who espoused anti-U.S. views, although they knew very little about us. We picked them very carefully. These were people who during the revolt had played key roles. Once this group got to the U.S., USIA picked them up and developed a program for them. The general concept was to expose these younger leaders to the U.S. so that they could talk somewhat more authoritatively about the U.S.. After they returned,, they were included in the *soirees* at the Residence as were many other younger French leaders. We would also include them in events in our apartments. Frances Cook and Ted McNamara, who were members of our "Youth Committee" were very active. I think I chaired the group, but it was an effort that depended on the work of all of us. Some of our more senior colleagues called it the "counter-embassy" because we used to cut across the standard lines of authority - sometime bypassing the Political and Economic Counselors. We used to quote the Ambassador as our authority which I am sure didn't make the seniors feel any better.

We met with the students continually in informal "bull" sessions. We were all about the same age. I don't believe I ever gave a formal speech, but we were in contact with those students all the time. It was great fun - for all of us, I believe. It was good for our morale; it added excitement

to our work, even though it was in addition to our regular duties, which as I mentioned earlier, in my case certainly, was already more than I could handle. Unfortunately, I had left by the time the twelve younger leaders returned from their tour of the U.S., but I am sure that my Embassy colleagues stayed in touch with them.

I use this example of the younger leaders' travel to the U.S. as an illustration of Shriver's *modus operandi*. I thought it was marvelous. Had he been in France before the 1968 uprising, his approach would not have worked. At one time, we managed to get a hold of a report written by one of the provincial *prefects* to the Minister of Interior asking for guidance on how to handle the American Ambassador on his visits. He said that, if it were not the American Ambassador, he would have arrested him for subversive activities! The French were mystified by this very unconventional American envoy; neither they or the Embassy had ever worked with or for such an ambassador. I think the Shriver approach - which was replicated by others in other countries - was a real worthwhile effort. I wished it could have continued. It was atypical, but very effective. It was not the customary "stuffed shirt" approach that the Department, ambassadors and embassy staffs usually take. It requires an unusual leader who will infuse "his troops" with his or her enthusiasm for the unconventional. I thought Sarge's performance in Paris was exceptional and well worthwhile. He had the right perception of what moves a country.

I had some knowledge of the Vietnam talks that were being conducted in Paris while I was there because many of my Saigon friends participated in them. Holbrooke was there, Negroponte was there, Habib was there. We had all worked together in Saigon. I did not know about Kissinger's involvement in these talks. At my farewell party, Habib confessed that while Phyllis and I were on leave on the Riviera and he was using our apartment, he conducted the first secret talks with the North Vietnamese there. John Negroponte was both the interpreter and the food caterer - he had to get it so that the negotiators could eat in our apartment - so that the meetings might be less exposed to public observance. That explained some of the residue that we found when we returned from the Riviera which had been a mystery to us; we didn't know where all the left-overs had come from. So at my farewell - which took place six months after those negotiations had been held in our apartment - Phil explained what had happened. Of course, we knew that Harriman was in town and we knew that some discussions with the North Vietnamese were being held. The fact that negotiations had begun was also helpful to the Embassy because it improved the atmosphere in Paris for the conduct of U.S.-French bilateral issues. Just the fact that we were talking to the Vietnamese removed a French psychological block in the way they looked at the U.S.. I think they were pleased that we were talking to the Vietnamese and doing so in Paris. I think the initiation of these talks helped change the French attitude toward the U.S.; they viewed us thereafter in an entirely different light.

The change in French leadership - from de Gaulle to Pompidou - did not make that much of a difference because both men had basically the same view; their styles were different, but not their objectives or policies. Pompidou was elected because the French revolted against de Gaulle's authoritarianism, but I don't believe that basic French policy changed much because of the change of presidents. I was there when the change took place, but I think the new French attitude towards the U.S. preceded the change in presidents. Before the actual occurrence, I think that most people understood that de Gaulle was finished; his views were no longer dominant after the revolution of May 1968. I think that even de Gaulle knew that his days were numbered.

He expected the referendum to be a vote on his style of government as did the people and they rejected it. It was an elegant way for de Gaulle to leave; I think he felt that he would lose the referendum, and when he did, it was a graceful and democratic way to leave the presidency. I heard that his staff was already packing their stuff in their offices even before the results of the referendum were announced. I suspect that de Gaulle was willing to give the referendum a chance, but I doubt that he had much confidence in winning support. He considered the French people ungrateful for his past services to his country, but I suspect that he was quite fatalistic at the end - "If they are not with me, what can I can do?"

As a summary of my tour in Paris, I think I should say that my first year was terribly dull. I was just working on Africa, not the Middle East. There was very little action. But then the Department for budgetary reasons had to cut back on staff. The separate Middle East position was abolished and I inherited that portfolio. Then the action began. Nixon was inaugurated in 1969 and that started a cooperative effort between us and the French on the Middle East, as I described earlier. Shriver didn't leave Paris until March, 1970. The riots started in May 1968. All of these events made the last years of my tour very lively. I had fun in Paris. So did the family.

JOHN H. ADAMS
Consular Officer
Marseille (1967-1969)

John H. Adams was born in 1939 and entered the Foreign Service in 1966. His assignments included initial positions in France, Israel, Trinidad, and China (Hong Kong). Mr. Adams was interviewed by William D. Morgan in 1992.

Q: John, let's take you back a little now, in your career. You've given us a very good tour d'horizon, as we used to say in Marseille, of the visa function today. But let's step back a little bit in history and, not necessarily chronologically. Give us some of the high points of your overseas career, some of the things that turned you on and kept you interested in consular affairs.

ADAMS: That's a very good question, bill. I think that, having the experience of starting out as a vice consul in Marseille, where the consulate has responsibility for most of the south of France, is probably one of the more idyllic assignments in the foreign service. It was a relatively small post, so I was able to do a little of everything. I did non-immigrant visas but I also handled immigrant visas. I did American citizen services work all through the south of France, so it was a great experience and I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Q: You even took care of sailors, maybe?

ADAMS: Occasionally, but there weren't that many shipping and seamen problems, as I came to find even during my more recent assignment in Hong Kong. That really is very much passe in the life of a consular officer.

Q: With all those ships?

ADAMS: Sad to say, there are very few American merchant vessels now plying the world. I think that my first assignment certainly helped to reinforce my attraction to consular work, doing it in a place like Marseille where I performed a variety of jobs.

GEORGE M. BARBIS
Principal Officer
Bordeaux (1967-1969)

Mr. Barbis was born in California and raised there and in Greece. He graduated from the University of California and served in the US Army in WWII. In 1954 he entered the Foreign Service and was posted to Teheran, Iran as Economic Officer. His other overseas assignments included postings in Thailand, Korea, France, Belgium and Greece, primarily in the Political and Economic fields. Mr. Barbis served on the US Delegation to the United Nations (1973-1975). His Washington assignments involved him in Southeast Asia matters and the US military. Mr. Barbis is a graduate of the National War College. Mr. Barbis was interviewed by Mr. Raymond C. Ewing in 1996.

Q: So, you went from Fort McNair, the National War College, to be principal officer of your own post for a second time. Where was that?

BARBIS: That was Bordeaux, France.

Q: Bordeaux, that sounds pretty nice.

BARBIS: That was a very cushy, if you will, post. A very pleasant post to be at. My introduction to Bordeaux was my call on Ambassador Chip Bohlen, who was then Ambassador to France, and we had a nice chat during which he gave me my marching orders. Unfortunately, he moved on and I didn't get to know him other than that one meeting. He certainly was one of the models in the Foreign Service over the years.

Q: Why don't you briefly describe what Bordeaux was like in terms of size and what your consular district was like? And, what were your marching orders from the Department and the ambassador?

BARBIS: Bordeaux, I believe, was the first consulate that our young republic established which gave it a very special standing in France. It was responsible, it is closed now, for all of the southwest of France with Bordeaux as the seat of the consulate and the other major center Toulouse which was inland, and extending all the way to the Pyrenees and the border with Spain. A lot of Americans resided there, either married to French spouses or who had just stayed on retiring there.

Bordeaux, of course, had passed its prime as a center of commerce and everything else. France is

a very centralized country but what made it interesting for me was the Mayor of Bordeaux, and that is quite an institution in the French system of government, [who] was Chaban-Delmas. [He was] a World War II underground hero, the youngest brigadier in the resistance, I think, before he was even 30 years old, but [also] president of the National Assembly, which gave him a national role. I developed a good relationship with him, he knew who I was and I could see him when I wanted.

Q: He usually came on the weekends?

BARBIS: Like most French politicians, many of them are mayors of their home town and have to return every weekend like clock work to be with their constituents and keep that contact up. Chaban-Delmas, of course, being one of the leaders of the governing elite, spent an awful lot of time in Paris too, but he did not neglect his duties as mayor. He was a very popular mayor. He was mayor at the time that I left, two years later, and had just been appointed prime minister. I guess I can say, not that I predicted he would be prime minister, but I certainly had written reports that I didn't need to write because people in Paris knew what was going on in France as a whole, as well as we in the consulates.

I guess I should say that being in charge of a provincial post is both an interesting experience and a disappointing one because whenever you would go to the capital, to the embassy, people were very busy. They were involved with their own duties and responsibilities and although they were polite and friendly and hospitable, etc. you were an outsider. And, although the ambassadors from time to time would call all the consuls--at that time we had Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, and Strasbourg, five consulate Generals in France--for meetings with the ambassador and the country team, still you didn't feel as though you were really part of the team.

Q: You were not in the center, you were on the periphery.

BARBIS: Exactly. Because the center of our relationship was officially in the capital between the government, the cabinet, the parliament and the embassy. And, although I think we played or could play a useful role in giving a different perspective, etc., our main role, as I saw it, was to project a good image of America in that community. We arrived in France at a time when nationalism was at its height...de Gaulle had announced the year before that NATO would leave, and was pretty much gone by the time we got there in 1967...and there was a lot of anti-American feeling, but that always exists in France. It is in the French national character to be against things. At the same time there was a tremendous amount of goodwill, admiration, affection, partisanship for the United States. The University of Bordeaux had a sister relationship with the University of California, Berkeley, so we had University of California students doing their year abroad at Bordeaux and vice versa. So, the president of the University of California came to Bordeaux while I was consul general there to visit the University of Bordeaux. The Rector of Bordeaux University had a dinner for him. I was at a round table with the Rector's wife, as the hostess, and the president of the University of California. He had been, and I can't recall his name, controller of the Defense Department. The Bordeaux Rector was a man of an older generation remembering as a boy World War I. He paid tribute to the role of the United States during World War I and was very emotional about it. Tears were rolling down his cheeks. All of a sudden I panic and said, "My God, the president of the University of California hasn't a

clue what he is saying.” It wasn’t being translated or interpreted and the president didn’t speak French. So, I quickly turned the menu over and started scribbling a summary of this very emotional tribute to America that he was saying, and passed it to the president, who was then able to respond in English. Some weeks later I got a letter from him on University of California stationery thanking me for saving the night by telling him how to respond. I mention this because there were many thousands and maybe even millions of Frenchmen who remembered not only World War II but World War I. Of course, all of that is leaving us. More and more Frenchmen don’t have any memory of our role in those two wars and what we did to help the French people to regain their independence.

Q: And they also don’t have the presence of an American consul in their city. The embassy is very busy, has many things to do and quite naturally pays most of their attention to the government in Paris, paying little attention to what is happening in the consular districts. So, we are losing that as well, that presence.

BARBIS: Some people argue that that presence isn’t important. But, having lived there and seen how people react to you, I think it did serve a useful purpose.

Q: Could we talk a little bit more about the reporting and other aspects of the useful purpose? Toulouse is, of course, the aircraft center. Was that something that you paid much attention to?

BARBIS: I would always go to Toulouse on a regular basis to call on the prefect, on the mayor and the various officials that were around. I remember going through the mockup that they had of the Concorde and feeling it was not very large; my head was bumping against the ceiling.

Q: And you are not that tall.

BARBIS: And, I am not that tall. I am not quite six feet. So, I thought it was going to be close quarters and pretty tight and friends who have flown on the Concorde have confirmed that. Certainly that was a big development for them. This was at a time when we were still trying to build an SST or had given it up because it was so expensive.

Q: Didn’t we have Americans involved there because the engine was partly American?

BARBIS: That’s right. I don’t remember having contact with any American engineers or others in connection with the Concorde, but Motorola did have a plant in the Toulouse area and I remember having frequent visits with them because there was some controversy over semi-conductors and our being in that market, etc. But, again, any commercial dispute or issue of that kind would be handled by the commercial section in the embassy and not by the consulate.

Q: Southwest France, of course, is adjacent to Spain and the Basque country. This was still the period of Franco. Did you get involved with Spain at all?

BARBIS: I visited Spain several times and had close contact with the Spanish consul general, but no involvement in the political issues there other than to report occasionally on Basque developments since that was the heartland of Basque country on the French side along the

Pyrenees.

Q: More on the French Basque area rather than Spain's.

BARBIS: Yes.

Q: You were there in France from roughly 1967-69. That was a time of great turmoil on the campus of the University of California in Berkeley, your alma mater, which had a sister relationship with Bordeaux University. It was also a time of campus unrest in Paris, I think too.

BARBIS: All over France. There was a general strike. We were completely isolated. Americans during that period who were traveling through Bordeaux couldn't get gas, couldn't change money and we would try to help them with that. There was no mail, no traveling going on to speak of. We weren't getting any pouch or anything. It was a pretty serious period of turmoil in France, not only with some violence, but also in that everything came to a standstill.

Q: Were there demonstrations or public expression of concern about what we were doing in Vietnam at that time?

BARBIS: No, there were not. I remember Nureyev and Fonteyn were supposed to come and participate in the May cultural program that Bordeaux annually sponsored and we were all looking forward to this with great anticipation. The night of the performance we went down to the center of Bordeaux where they have this grand, magnificent opera building, and there was nothing but a mob in the square in front of it. Of course the performance was canceled and the Royal Ballet had to leave town because they couldn't perform. So, it was a critical time for France.

So, we were affected by that. I had a vice consul whose parents were visiting and they couldn't leave the country. We finally managed to send them out by road to Spain and they were able to return to Boston that way.

Q: How large an American staff did you have?

BARBIS: There were initially the consul general, a consul, and a vice consul and later just a consul general and a vice consul, just two American officers. We had a consular section that the vice consul supervised of about four people, one who was full time on commercial activities, two on administrative. So, I guess total about ten or eleven, including a driver.

Q: You mentioned that the NATO headquarters had already been moved out of France and the French were not integrated with the military structure. Were there US military ship visits to Bordeaux during your time there?

BARBIS: No, never had a ship visit while I was there. I did have good relations with the local military people. They had several senior people. The equivalent of Redstone, the French missile development center, was just south of Bordeaux. It was a very secret operation and I remember when I left the Department being briefed by Ed Beagle, who was a long time political/military

man in WE [Office of Western European Affairs], telling me to do my best to try to get in. Well, I got to know the physicist who was the director of it, but he never invited me to visit the installation itself, so they kept their secrets in that respect.

Q: Sensitive subject I'm sure.

BARBIS: Yes.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else we should say about Bordeaux? I assume you had some good meals.

BARBIS: A lot of good meals.

Q: You probably didn't have the pressures of the Laos desk

BARBIS: No pressures, one of the reasons they sent me there, I guess. One interesting thing personally, was that you were entertained a lot by various chateau people, etc. and it was always embarrassing because they would produce these magnificent wines and I happened to have been born in a year of a great vintage and frequently they would serve wine from that year. We tried to serve American wines, which was kind of foolish so we gave it up, primarily because our commissary in Paris did not have a good selection, despite the fact that Mr. Bruce had been through there and had written books about wine and suggested wines that we could offer that would be acceptable. Since then, of course, California wines have reached the point of competing with Bordeaux wines.

JAMES DOBBINS
Consular Officer/Staff Assistant
Paris (1967-1969)

Ambassador James Dobbins was born in Brooklyn. After graduating from Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he joined the Navy. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1967, his career has included positions in France, England, Germany and an Ambassadorship to the European Community. Ambassador Dobbins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Well, you were in Paris from when to when?

DOBBINS: I was in Paris from '67 to '69.

Q: What were you doing in Paris?

DOBBINS: I had the ideal junior officer tour. I started in the consular section and showed so little aptitude that they got rid of me after two months. I don't think it actually was a lack of aptitude, but I clearly was exhibiting a lack of strong interest, and so they weren't that unhappy to

move me on. Then I became the aide, the staff assistant or special assistant, to the ambassador to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) for six months, Philip Trezise, who subsequently became assistant secretary for economic affairs.

That was very interesting, a completely different world, economics, economic policy and I got to see how a small multilateral mission was run and do a lot of interesting things, a good deal of writing, mostly reporting on meetings and keeping the administrative wheels running in this mission.

When the Vietnam peace talks came to Paris, I was moved to become, initially, the assistant secretary of delegation, and then the secretary of delegation, of the Vietnam peace talks. Originally, someone from the Diplomat's Executive Secretariat was brought out to run the equivalent of the Executive Secretariat of this delegation. A series of what was then called SS officers were brought out for the first few weeks. Then they decided I'd been there long enough and they turned that over to me. So, for almost a year, I ran the secretariat for the Vietnam peace talks.

Q: I want to go back for a minute. In the OECD ...

DOBBINS: Well, let me just finish on the tour. And then the last rotational assignment was in the political section of the embassy, working for Sargent Shriver. My brief was youth and youth affairs, which he was quite interested in. It was when the youth were about to overthrow the Fifth Republic. So as a first tour, it was really fun.

Q: Well, let's talk a little about the OECD. Did you get any feel? This is in a way the precursor of the European Union, or not?

DOBBINS: It was the offshoot of the Marshall Plan. The OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), split to become the EC (European Community) and the OECD.

Q: Did you get any feel for the relationships between the various powers and how the United States fit into this?

DOBBINS: A little bit. By then, the OECD had been expanded. Japan was a member, so it wasn't just a U.S.-European club, but it was largely U.S. and European. The issues tended to be rather arcane, and the European Union, or the European Community at the time, certainly wasn't acting as a bloc on the issues that the OECD was focusing on. The EC, of course, was the trade bloc, but the OECD really didn't do trade issues. It did other types of issues.

Q: De Gaulle was in power at that time?

DOBBINS: Right, and he had just thrown NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) out and the U.S. NATO headquarters was in the process of closing down. The U.S. base on the outskirts of Paris that we used to have a PX in was also closing when I was there. It was a difficult time.

Q: On the OECD thing, were there problems with the French at that point?

DOBBINS: Well, not in the OECD, that I'm aware of. There were certainly problems in our broader relationship with the French. I spent a week on the French desk prior to going to Paris. It was the week that Charles de Gaulle was in Quebec, declaring a free Quebec.

Q: Viva Quebec libre! (Long live free Quebec!).

DOBBINS: Exactly. And I was briefed on our policy toward France, which was, in the words of LBJ (Lyndon Baines Johnson), who had passed this policy onto the State Department, "We ain't getting into a pissing contest with Charles de Gaulle." So it was restraint and not rising to the bait of de Gaulle's provocations. And, of course, problems with the French were also apparent when I was dealing with the Vietnam issues, but in the OECD, nothing that I'm aware of.

Q: Then from the OECD you moved to the youth officer?

DOBBINS: No, I moved to the Vietnam peace talks.

Q: Vietnam peace talks. Were these the Harriman talks?

DOBBINS: Harriman was number one, Vance was number two, and Phil Habib was the senior Foreign Service officer. And Negroponte and Holbrooke were the other two junior officers.

Q: When you got into this world, how did you find that we were working? Did we think that things were going to work out here or something?

DOBBINS: Well, things obviously weren't working out by the time the peace talks took place. It was a very difficult time. I didn't have a lot of insight coming to the job, and so I found it a real eye opener and very exciting because it really seemed the most important thing in the world. Two thousand journalists had arrived with Harriman. Walter Cronkite would be standing outside the door, as we'd leave a meeting, asking for some comment, along with the anchors with all of the other networks.

So it was a very dramatic time. The delegation was very high-powered. As I mentioned, the junior officers, in addition to myself, were Dick Holbrooke and John Negroponte. Bob Oakley was in the political section of the embassy, handling these matters, as was John Gunther Dean. Phil Habib was my boss, he and Negroponte. Clearly, there were huge tensions in terms of the evolution of policy in Washington, big debates about how to proceed. The whole negotiations were handled with utmost secrecy. Everything was top secret, and then there were compartments within compartments, so that we conducted secret negotiations that were secret from most of the delegation and from most of the people who were seeing the regular traffic.

We had ostensible meetings with the Vietnamese where we traded talking points for hours on end, and then we'd have secret meetings with them in some other location, which were somewhat more substantive. And most of the people in Washington would be reading one set of traffic and unaware that a completely separate negotiation for compartmentalized distribution was taking place.

Q: Well, what were you doing?

DOBBINS: I was running the administration of the delegation, basically, making sure that people's briefing books were up to date, that they had the right papers, that incoming message traffic was being distributed, that outgoing traffic was dispatched - any outgoing message had to be approved by me before it would go to the message center. I was doing the sorts of things for Harriman and Vance that the executive secretary of the State Department does for the secretary of state and the other principals, on a much smaller scale, obviously.

Q: Did you have any contact with Harriman or Vance?

DOBBINS: Yes, we'd meet every morning. Vance did a staff meeting every morning. Harriman would not normally do the staff meeting, so I'd see Vance every day. I'd see Habib four or five times a day, and I'd see Harriman two or three times a week, probably.

Q: How did you find Habib?

DOBBINS: Oh, he was great. Very charismatic, very congenial, warm, tough, but in an affectionate way.

Q: Did you sit in on any of the meetings?

DOBBINS: Yes, as I said, we had regular meetings with the North Vietnamese like two or three days a week, and they would take place. My station was often in the adjoining room, as I would be in a room next to the room where they were meeting, so that if incoming messages could come in, I could decide whether to bring them in to Harriman or let them wait. If they had something they needed to get back to Washington, I would then get it back to Washington. I could take phone calls. So I was in and out of the room they were meeting in all the time.

I remember when one of the times I had to go in to bring Harriman a note saying that Bobby Kennedy had been assassinated. And then six weeks later, same room, same time of day I had to bring him in a note saying Martin Luther King had been assassinated. And you could see him each time sort of stunned. He was sitting there talking to Le Duc Tho or whoever the Vietnamese interlocutor was at the time and getting these dreadful bulletins from home.

Q: Were you getting any feel from the people who were doing this, bringing back how they felt about how things were going and how dealing with the North Vietnamese was going?

DOBBINS: Well, I certainly knew how dealing with the North Vietnamese was going, because I was privy to both formal and informal negotiations. Sure, there was lots of talk about the negotiations, and some insights into the Washington policy debates, which people on the delegation, were certainly protagonists in.

Q: Well, this period you were doing it was from when to when?

DOBBINS: When the negotiations started in '68, I can't remember the month, and my involvement lasted about 10 months. So it was probably all of '68, and of course it was at the same time that the French Fifth Republic was teetering, so it was a very interesting time, with huge riots in the street, a shutdown of the economy. I was young enough so I could pose as a student and in the evenings go over to the Sorbonne or the Odeon and listen to the speeches and stand behind the barricades and watch the riots.

Q: Was the feeling that the riots were going to topple the republic?

DOBBINS: It came very close. De Gaulle briefly fled the country.

Q: But it went to the Rhineland to talk to his troops, didn't he?

DOBBINS: He left the country to make sure that the army was behind him, and then he came back.

It was strange because there really were no casualties. The riots were very much a set piece, rather folkloric events during which the students would build barricades and the police would rush them and try to overcome them with sticks and batons and shields, rather than bringing up a bulldozer. I think the only person that was killed was a student who was running from the police, jumped in a canal and drowned. So, in a sense, one wondered what the fuss was about, but the seriousness of it was that the student riots, which as I said, were very folkloric in nature, eventually stimulated a Communist led general strike, which was a much more serious threat to the regime, because it was fairly rigorously followed.

Q: Did that have any effect on the Paris peace talks?

DOBBINS: Not much. It began to have an effect on life when gasoline gave out. It became more difficult to get around, but I don't believe it had any effect on the substance of the talks.

Q: By the time you left there, had anything happened?

DOBBINS: Yes, we negotiated a bombing halt. There was a bombing halt that was tied to certain concessions on the part of the North Vietnamese of a rather minor sort, and the main point was an expansion of the negotiations to include the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. So a two-way negotiation became a four-way negotiation. And then we rather foolishly engaged in a yearlong discussion of what the table would look like. But yes, when I was there we did have an agreement. The agreement was to halt the bombing, expand the negotiations. There were some other elements to it. Then I went to the political section in the embassy, and there was a rather prolonged hiatus in the Vietnam Peace Talks during which there weren't any talks, but the delegation stayed there.

Q: You were also there when all hell broke loose in the United States. I think of the political conventions of '68.

DOBBINS: Yes, the general feeling was that the world was teetering on the brink of something,

with both Kennedys, and then Martin Luther King being assassinated, with large-scale riots, protests, and similarly the same thing happening throughout Europe. I mean, it wasn't only in France, although France is where the '68 events were taken the furthest.

Q: When you moved to the political section, you had what, youth affairs?

DOBBINS: Yes.

Q: That must have been sort of the hot spot, wasn't it?

DOBBINS: It was very interesting, and, of course, Shriver was a fascinating and charismatic figure, Kennedy's brother-in-law, so he had a lot of aura, and he was quite interested in youth affairs, so it gave me a certain access, an entrée. Bob Oakley actually was my direct supervisor and was designed to sort of keep me out of trouble and doing something useful. But Shriver was interested and I would have a certain amount of contact with him as well.

Q: Would you be talking to people like Danny the Red and all? Did we have contact?

DOBBINS: Well, by the time I moved to the political section, the May '68 events had been pretty much over, so Danny the Red was probably either in jail or in exile. To some degree, it was talking to people like that. To some degree, it was talking to more conservative youth who wanted more contacts with the United States, working with French-American youth groups. To some degree it was just promoting to a youth audience certain embassy events. We had – a whole group of the astronauts came. The NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) guy programmed the astronauts, and so Shriver said, "We'll have Dobbins do a youth event." So my goal was do a youth event at which the astronauts would meet a selection of youth. That was my piece of the astronauts' thing, was a youth event for them. There were similar events.

Some of this was just publicity. Shriver generated publicity, but it was certainly fun and interesting and different. How significant it was in the grander scheme of things – whatever effects youth had had in '68 in France they never replicated themselves in the sense that youth never again became influential, per se. So I doubt the American embassy ever had a youth officer again who had so much access and was doing this job full time. But it was an interesting thing to be doing at the time.

Q: Well, the youth officer program started in the early '60s. I think Bobby Kennedy got that going. I remember I was in Yugoslavia at the time, and we were supposed to pick out the future leaders. Well, the future leaders looked like Marshal Tito. You just get older and the youths would sort of cycle through. Did you get any feel for how events in the United States were being portrayed at that time, particularly to the youth of France?

DOBBINS: I suppose so, in the sense that it was the same way that they were being portrayed to us. I don't know that the French press was any more sensationalist. I would say, first of all, that given what was happening in France, the United States seemed relatively tame in comparison in terms of the protests. And the youth movement in the United States, the French didn't think they had anything to learn from America in that regard. The United States was certainly more violent

than France, but there was a general sort of sense of *fin de régime*, the world unraveling.

Q: Well, did you find when you were doing this, was the embassy at all divided between de Gaullists and anti-Gaullists?

DOBBINS: I don't think there were any Gaullists in the embassy. During '68, I was in the Vietnam peace talks, and it was only in '69 that I was in the embassy. So I wasn't sort of in the middle of the debate on whether de Gaulle could last, or would he go under? There certainly was embassy reporting, and there undoubtedly was discussion within the political section of how to portray the depth of this crisis. Dick Walters was the defense attaché, for instance, at the time, and I think he was the one that found out that de Gaulle had left the country and gone to talk to the generals in Germany. So I think the embassy was doing some fairly sensitive reporting about how deep the crisis was and how likely it was to have any lasting impact. But I wasn't part of the political section at the time.

By the time I was in the political section, I don't recall arguments about our policy toward France. Our policy in France wasn't really very controversial. It was a rather restrained policy, given what de Gaulle had done. The effort was to try to maintain a relationship that was as civil and cooperative as possible, given the basic obstacles that had been placed in the path. I don't recall that there was a great controversy.

Q: It wasn't people saying, "Well, it will be a better world if we get rid of de Gaulle. He's anti-American and all this."

DOBBINS: Well, I don't think anyone had any practical way of getting rid of de Gaulle. I would guess that there probably would have been a feeling that we would do better under another leadership, and of course de Gaulle did resign shortly thereafter, and things did get better very gradually, although never completely.

Q: Did you have much dealing with the French officials?

DOBBINS: Very little. The only job in which I would have dealt with French officials was the last point in the political section, and there I didn't have a brief that would bring me over to the Foreign Ministry and bring me into contact. There were a few occasions, but not much. Occasionally I would accompany the political counselor, for instance, to the meetings he would have with more senior officials.

Q: Sargent Shriver, you were assisting him at one point.

DOBBINS: In this capacity.

Q: How did you find him?

DOBBINS: Well, he was a very sort of exciting, glamorous figure. He was certainly pleasant, hyperactive, a bit focused on his own persona and publicity, a big attractive family. He was an exciting and glamorous boss, and I wouldn't say he was warm, but he was certainly approachable

and always very pleasant.

Q: Well, then, you applied for Japanese training at the end of this time?

DOBBINS: Right. I came back and applied and was accepted and was going into Japanese language training, and then I had met my wife during the time I was in Paris.

Q: She was French?

DOBBINS: She was actually Norwegian, but she was living in Paris. So we had gotten back, I was getting married. I didn't marry when I was in Paris, but we met and then we were married, I guess, three or four months after I came back. So when they found out I was getting married, they changed the assignment and said, "Well, we'll find you another assignment." It worked out fine, because they put me on the Policy Planning Staff.

EDWARD C. MCBRIDE
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1967-1970)

Edward McBride was born in Savannah, Georgia. After graduating from the University of Georgia in 1959, he was drafted into the Army and spent two years in France. He received his Masters degree from Georgetown University in 1964. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1963, his career has included positions in France, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain and England. Mr. McBride was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

MCBRIDE: I was in Paris from '67 to '70. The most interesting to tell you the truth, those dates are easy to remember, is that I was there when France fell apart at the seams in '68. The events of May it was called and it was really an extraordinary time to be in France. I in my army days lived there when the Algerian issue came to a head and they were threatening to drop paratroopers into the Tuilleries Gardens and bomb the Champs Elysees. They were exploding those things in those days which the French called "plastique," which were these plastic bombs. So I had two very interesting incarnations in Paris, two remarkable times in French history.

Q: When you were in '67 when you went there, how were relations between the United States and France at that point?

MCBRIDE: They were fairly cordial. I mean I don't remember any big issues. DeGaulle was very preoccupied with his "force de frappe," his nuclear striking force. That caused a lot of upheavals. I think the relations in fact, were a problem but later after the demise of DeGaulle when he resigned and retired. The other issue then on the horizon which was a very painful part of our relationship was of course, Vietnam. Of course I was there also when the talks began, so

we were very much involved in all of this, and we saw our relations deteriorate fairly rapidly. It was ironic because the French who had done all of this before, and had created many problems in southeast Asia. They were very anti U.S. in terms of our approach to dealing with Vietnam and indeed southeast Asia, so it was a very prickly time to be there.

Q: What was your job?

MCBRIDE: The job that I went to fill was assistant cultural attaché, and it turned out that when I got there, there wasn't a job. I mean it was one of these get there yesterday, and when you get there, there was no job. That didn't bother me particularly because I thought I could find something to do. I had a great boss, wonderful guy. I have never forgotten him. He died not too long ago, Lee Brady. He was a wonderful man, and very cultured and a very fine officer. He lived a lot of his life in France, and knew and loved France very well. So he was the public affairs officer in those days. I went to see him after I had been there for awhile just doing odd jobs and kind of learning how an embassy worked, because I had never been working in an embassy before. So one day I just went up and said, "You know, why don't I work on music and art. How would that be?" I will just sort of focus on the visual arts and the performing arts, because that was good having the previous experience working in the exhibitions office in the fine arts. He thought that was a great idea and said get to it. So I made myself a wonderful little job that helped promote the visual and performing arts in France. We did some exhibitions. We brought, in those days there was a fair amount of money to support those things through the office of cultural presentations, and we brought performing arts groups. We did wonderful tours of American artists who lived in France. We organized shows which traveled around the country. We had about five or six consulates in those days, so we would do shows in museums in Marseilles or Lyon, Strasbourg, all over France. It was a wonderful opportunity to travel around France which was great fun for me and to use the arts as a means of communicating to the French. I mean they were very looking down their nose asking what do you know about art; what do you know about culture indeed. But in fact after 1964 it was a little bit more difficult for them to say that, so we did make some interesting points with the arts. And they were very particularly interested in the contemporary, so we did some wonderful exhibitions. The main thing for me that was wonderful out of all of this is of course I met all the creative people in that society. In any society, the creative people are the cutting edge of society, so it was wonderful to meet artists and film makers and impresarios and performers. It was a great experience and a wonderful way to learn. It made a very good basis on which ultimately build a career. So, after the Paris experience, I worked on the cultural side of USIA.

Q: What about, Probably more than any other country France emphasizes its culture, and you know, has tended to look down the nose at American culture because, you know I mean, you are always feeling somewhat challenged or just brought up to despise to or something. How did you find dealing with sort of the cultural leaders and intelligentsia and intellectuals whatever you want to call it, who were in the arts field. Was this a problem?

MCBRIDE: It certainly was occasionally a problem. It was not a problem that one dealt with day in and day out however. It was episodic. We were lucky in those days that there was a program pioneered by the State Department, I guess it was USIA actually, that would occasionally tap a very distinguished American, either an academic or cultural personality to come play the role of

cultural attaché deal with the very issue that you raised. It was very difficult to talk to people who had very distinguished pedigrees in whatever their particular interest. The French did admit and acknowledge that they were very pleased to have the distinguished people who were there. I served under I think two or three. I am trying to remember. When I went to Paris for the first time, the cultural attaché was a very distinguished sociologist named Lawrence Wiley who was a professor of sociology at Harvard and who had written two seminal books on French sociology. He lived in a little community down in southern France somewhere and spent a year and actually wrote remarkably insightful stuff about the French character and the French personality. So he was a distinguished man by any standard, including the French academic world which admired him. So as the cultural attaché he was able to disabuse many people of the issues you raised. I think by presenting some of the exhibitions that we did and bringing some of the performing arts groups that we did, it was relatively easy to disabuse the French of the notion that we were a people without culture because whether you like to admit it or not, I mean the New York Philharmonic is a pretty good orchestra and they did come to Paris and play very successfully. These exhibitions that were presented would draw record breaking crowds in museums in France. So it tended to be a problem occasionally when you had people who were not quite so well informed, but by and large it was not a big deal. But there was a certain intellectual arrogance about it that did permeate some of the relationships, but I never found it difficult or frustrating or anything, because you could always make the point by asking how could we have done this if we had no culture. Could we have produced a painter like deKoonig or like Rauchenberg as a matter of fact, or Jackson Pollock whom they admired enormously.

Q: How did the pop art go in France? I mean did they embrace it? I mean this was during a period of...

MCBRIDE: Yes, it was a very difficult period because we all knew French invented culture. So here you come as an upstart from the other side of the Atlantic, and bring to the table, actually what was sort of the hottest movement in the art world, whether the French like to admit it or not. But the thing that was interesting was that it had an instant appeal to young people. The young people absolutely identified with it and thronged to the exhibitions. The French cultural establishment after awhile, could simply no longer ignore it, and they had to come to terms with it. And they did that. To their credit. I think we now have very strong cultural ties with France. But the French ultimately looked at people like Andy Warhol and Oldenberg with his great big hamburgers and people like Rosenquist, and they liked them a lot, and they embraced them. Many of them were also Francophile, the artists themselves and loved to come to France. So they had a good relationship, and I think we basked in a lot of the reflected glory.

Q: On the music side, by any chance did you get the, USIA was sponsoring sometime in that period there, your hometown opera, not quite hometown, Porgy and Bess.

MCBRIDE: I think Porgy and Bess was one of the highlights of the three years I spent in France. We did it with the help of a wonderful man who actually was working as a contract employee for the embassy for part-time named Doda Conrad, who knew everybody in the music world. He was a quite remarkable man. We, with his help and with a lot of coercing of funds from here, there, and everywhere, persuaded the French government to mount a production of Porgy and Bess. I think I saw Porgy and Bess in France 47 times. I went on a tour with it. We went to 12

cities in France. We took an all-American cast, including the one who created the role of Bess. She was living in Sweden at the time, and she was in the production. We hired a wonderful American black guy who was living also in Paris in those days. He trained the chorus for all these performances, and he traveled around ahead of the company. The chorus all sang in English which was quite interesting for the French. We did I think something like 60 performances of Porgy and Bess spread over about a year. It went to almost every major French provincial city. It came to Paris and played at the Opera Comique for about a week. It was a huge success.

Q: Talking about culture, did you find yourself up against the foreign service culture with State Department foreign service and USIA foreign service and all?

MCBRIDE: Absolutely, and in fact, there was not a very good understanding between the traditional foreign service officer and the folks in USIA about what the role of either. And certainly on the cultural side it was a very difficult relationship. The Department I think, felt that diplomacy had nothing to do with cultural programs and USIA, and that what you did was to write nice reports and go out and interview political leaders and come back and do your cables back to Washington. To this day I think the Department still has a hard time dealing with this issue. It is getting better, and I think in the last year since the integration of USIA into the Department, I don't think the problem has gone away. But I sense that the climate is better, and I have talked to some people who are still working there. I think Evelyn Lieberman who is the first in fact leader of USIA who became the Undersecretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, certainly understood the role and the power of the cultural diplomacy. Certainly Secretary Albright spoke out on many occasions that she did. In fact one of the last things she did before leaving office was to work with the Department and the White House to convoke a White House meeting on cultural diplomacy. So I think things are indeed getting better.

Q: Well I would have thought, I mean I can understand in some countries where you might say the traditional foreign service would say well this is all very nice, but it doesn't mean much. But in France where you are dealing with a group of people who are the poobahs of foreign policy and everything else, intellectuals, they can be gotten by good wine, good food, and good art.

MCBRIDE: There is absolutely no question about that. One of the ways, I was involved in an event that proved it in spades was we were trying to work out how to deal with a Presidential visit in Paris while I was there. President Nixon was coming to France, and I was asked if I could do some sort of cultural event that would provide the sort of after dinner entertainment at the state dinner that the Ambassador was going to give. It was going to be given at the ambassador's residence hosted by the President following the dinner at the Elysee Palace that DeGaulle gave Nixon. I took on this assignment and had a lot of fun with it as a matter of fact. It was one of the great things about being in France. I got on the phone and called somebody I knew, and ultimately got together a musical evening that involved Yehudi Menuhin, the violinist, who came to play for the dinner with his sister, Hepzibah who was a very distinguished pianist herself. We had an evening that I don't think anybody who was there will ever forget, because the front row was DeGaulle and Madame DeGaulle and President Nixon and Mrs. Nixon all seated on this little sofa in this very elegant little salon in the residence. Menuhin played beautifully, an incredible concert. At the end of the concert DeGaulle leapt from his chair quite literally, went

up the two or three feet to Menuhin and absolutely almost smothered him with his embrace. Then he turned to the audience and gave this extraordinary speech about how as a young officer fighting for the free French from London, he had called on this young prodigy violinist that somebody told him about. His name was Yehudi Menuhin, and he gave a concert for the Free French, and they raised a lot of money. DeGaulle then looks at Menuhin again, gives him another bear hug and says, "And I have never forgotten that." So I think culture made its rather strong statement in that way. It was a great evening and everybody loved it.

Q: What about your contacts, your personal contacts with the French? How did you find this worked, because sometimes this is a difficult society.

MCBRIDE: They are difficult, but on the other hand if you are interested and want to make something of it, you can do it. It is discouraging sometimes because the French can be very arrogant and be very nasty, but then so can we. On the other hand because both my wife and I were French speaking it was a little bit easier to open doors. We did have a number of friends through other contacts so that in a sense we didn't have to depend on our embassy contacts exclusively for our social life. So we were lucky in that sense, and we knew a lot of people, and we got some nice introductions. I keep up with some French friends to this day, and I think we would have nothing but kind words to say about that part of our time there.

Q: What were you all doing and what were you personally seeing during what was I guess May, '68 and before. It was sort of the university student revolt.

MCBRIDE: Well it is interesting. It began, the official beginning now chronicled by historians was a performance of an American dance company in the Odeon theater. The students actually came in at the end of the performance and occupied the Odeon. They kicked out the Paul Taylor Dance Company which was performing there under one of our cultural programs. It was a remarkable evening. We were in the audience, and after it was all over, Paul Taylor who had fallen and broken his foot, and he was on crutches. Anyway we were sitting there; the evening had ended. The students had now occupied it and raised the black flag of anarchy above the theater. Hundreds of them were there, and they were sort of going at the American and the director of the theater. He was a remarkable French actor by the name of Jean Louis Barrault, who was himself a left-wing intellectual. He was therefore disposed to listen to what the students had to say. So we sat there until two o'clock in the morning listening to this incredible dialogue between the students and this distinguished grey head French cultural icon who was just sitting there listening to them.

Q: What attracted them to this...

MCBRIDE: It wasn't that. I think they wanted to draw attention to themselves. The Odeon Theater is in the heart of the Latin Quarter as perhaps you know, and that is where the university is, and that was therefore their home turf so to speak. They wanted something that was obviously going to generate a lot of attention and publicity. The fact that it was a foreign company, that it was an international festival, and the American company was there performing the context of something called the Festival of Nations which was an international festival. So the students were wise enough to know they would get a lot of publicity if they did something like this. They

needed to do something spectacular, and occupying a theater like the Odeon was really quite a bold gesture. It generated exactly what they thought it was going to do. It was on the front page of all the newspapers. The television was there. They stayed in the place for about two or three weeks before they finally left. So they made the point. I think that it was only an accident that it happened to be an American company that particular day.

Q: So it wasn't anti American.

MCBRIDE: No, no, not at all. They were just fed up with the terrible conditions that they were forced to put up with in overcrowded classrooms, and the terrible attitudes of the French administration. You know a rather fierce exam schedule, all sorts of things that basically related to their education and how difficult it was, the competitiveness of it all really eliminated a lot of very bright people. They just thought that was enough. You may recall, it is an interesting historical footnote there. DeGaulle was not in France when this happened. DeGaulle was on a state visit to Romania as it turned out. So the media got an interview with DeGaulle in Bucharest and said, "Are you going to cancel your trip and come back?" He said, "Certainly not. This is nothing but a little," and he used a wonderful colloquial French word. He said, "This is nothing but a little student "chienlit." "Chienlit," is the word he used. That was a rather vulgar expression for someone like DeGaulle to use. It literally means you are going to mess your own bed, foul your own bed. So he thought that was nothing to worry about, and he didn't actually cut short his trip, well until the next day. Then he saw that France was literally falling apart at the seams and he did come back. The rest is history. But that is just an interesting coincidence that this American company was performing in the Odeon when all this happened.

Q: Well did you find as this was going on, you being particularly having, well, let me ask you about ties to the students and faculty. Was this part of your beat?

MCBRIDE: It was indeed, and it is nice now to be able to admit it a little bit more. It was a neglected part of the beat. It was neglected because none of us in the embassy really had been doing our work on that. We suddenly find in the midst of all of this the ambassador got very interested.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MCBRIDE: The ambassador was Sargent Shriver. Shriver was quite a character himself and a wonderful guy. He is somebody else I still keep up with. He said that it was appalling that nobody in the embassy really knew the guy who was at the head of all this. He was the hell raiser called Daniel Cone Bendit. Danny the Red was his nickname.

Q: He is now in the European parliament.

MCBRIDE: Yes. Anyway, The Ambassador said, "Who knows this guy?" We were at a staff meeting. Nobody knew him. So we were quickly galvanized into something that only Americans would think of doing; we formed a youth committee. Everybody who was youthful was dragged into this service. We all were given our marching orders to go out and cultivate as many of these people as we could. We really were a little self conscious in our effort. I had a colleague at that

time, a guy named Jim Rentschler who ran what was the American Cultural Center in the Rue de Dragon in Paris in the heart of the Latin Quarter. So Jim Rentschler and I who were a little older than most of them, joked that we were the only people who had to lie about our age to get on the youth committee.

Q: What did you do?

MCBRIDE: We did go out and cultivate them, and they were very interested, because they were very pleased that somebody would take them seriously, that we were talking to them. They saw a good soapbox, and they used it. I mean we were used, and they were used. It was mutually beneficial. We were at least able to keep tabs on what was going on.

Q: Did you find looking at it that you were, I mean the embassy by making this move and all was a little better placed than say maybe the British or the Germans or something?

MCBRIDE: Oh there is no doubt we were. I mean I think we were certainly better placed than any of our European colleagues. I don't remember it well enough to know how well involved other embassies were, but certainly we were considered to be the people out front. I think it is an interesting testimonial to our non-career ambassador who saw that this was a big void and that we really ought to be ashamed not to know who the players were and where they were coming from. So I think Shriver deserves a lot of credit for what was then considered a fairly unorthodox approach to diplomacy and why were we worried about the students. Well we damn well should have been worried about them.

Q: Let's say prior to the '68 student business, by the time you got there, NATO had left. It was no longer in France and moved. DeGaulle had. What was the feeling you were picking up about DeGaulle from the embassy? Was it split or did they say that son-of-a bitch or...

MCBRIDE: You know I have absolutely no recollection. I know everybody was fascinated by his movements. As you know he ultimately retreated to the west coast of Ireland and sort of gazed out into the Atlantic for a long time. Then he came back and moved down to Colombey-les deux Eglises and kind of lived out his life there basically. But I must say that I just don't remember to be honest with you, and I am sorry that...

Q: Well, I am talking about the time he was in power. I mean was there...

MCBRIDE: Oh, he was the big voice of anti Americanism of course. I think a lot of people found his pronouncements to be annoying, often wrong. And yet he was clearly in charge. I mean the French loved him because he was a big father figure that they could look up to and he made France relevant in a way that it hadn't been for a long time. So I think he did in fact have a lot of popular support, but on the other hand particularly after the events of 1968, it turned out that the French suddenly looked up and thought God, you know this guy is ancient history. This is looking backwards, not looking forwards. By this time France was overwhelmingly youthful. There were far more young people now in France than the older generation. I think the older generation which was still more vocal and articulate in a way, but it was gradually being displaced by younger people who saw a different France basically they saw France's interests

certainly in a very different way than DeGaulle did and wanted to promote change and did so. But I think that is what the events of 1968 were all about basically.

Q: Well how did you find, prior to '68 events dealing with the French bureaucracy, because you did have a president who was anti American essentially. Did that set the tone or were you getting people saying oh well that's the president, let's get on with the business?

MCBRIDE: Oh I think we kind of got on with it. Occasionally there would be some irritant. They would get some instruction to do this, that, or the other thing. I don't know. But we had a huge education exchange program with France in those days. In addition to the cultural program we had an enormous Fulbright program. We had a lot of sympathy in the academic community because the U.S. was still regarded as a great place to go to graduate school, and certainly the French were no exception to that. The French academic establishment particularly, the ministry of education, were financial partners as well with us. They were putting a fair amount of money into all of this. So I think there was a line drawn between the official pronouncement and what actually happened because the French saw very clearly that their own self interests were at stake here. It was stupid to cut off your nose to spite their face and send somebody, you know a university somewhere in Romania when they wanted to go to MIT. That didn't make any sense at all.

Q: Did you get involved in the film side of things?

MCBRIDE: Not too much because we couldn't do everything, and I think it was a conscious decision. There were a lot of people who felt that the French cinema was at that point at its heyday. I mean those were the great days of French cinema. I don't think we really did an awful lot there. I can't think of a single film program that we actually got involved with.

Q: How about music? Did you get involved much in the way of youthful groups, jazz and that sort of thing?

MCBRIDE: Absolutely. We had a the cultural center in the Rue du Dragon and we had monthly concerts there, frequently with American jazz artists. Or we would do a mixed group of Americans and French people, French musicians. So music was a big force in the program and obviously a very popular one. People loved to come; the concerts were all full. We would also support visits if we could by traveling American artists whether we had any money in their tours or not. For example, if there were some big name conductor, I would usually try to get the ambassador to go to the concert if he would. And the Shrivens were very good about this I must say. They would usually give a dinner or lunch or something for Leonard Bernstein or whoever had come to conduct the French National Orchestra. We gave a wonderful dinner I remember one evening for Leyontine Price who came to sing Aida at the opera in Paris. So we did a lot with both popular music and classical music.

Q: How did Vietnam play? Things were beginning to pick up by sixty, toward the end of the time you were there.

MCBRIDE: Yes, the negotiations with the North Vietnamese began about the time of the student

demonstrations. I got involved in it when the breakthrough came, when France offered to host the peace discussion, and the delegations came and it went on for years as you know. By that time I was nearing the end of my time there, so although I was there when it got started, but I wasn't there for very much of it. I mean I moved on at that point.

MICHAEL B. SMITH
Economic Officer
Strasbourg (1967-1969)

Principal Officer
Lyon (1969-1970)

Ambassador Michael B. Smith was born in Massachusetts in 1936. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1958. His Foreign Service career included positions in Chad, France, and Iran. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 25, 1993.

SMITH: I went to Strasbourg.

Q: *You were there from 1967 to 1968.*

SMITH: I got there in January, 1967, and left between Christmas [1968] and New Year's of 1969.

Q: *So you were really there about...*

SMITH: Two years.

Q: *Strasbourg is sort of an odd town because, unlike many others, it doesn't have a city government. From what I gather it's really more like looking at Europe as a whole.*

SMITH: The reason that we had a Consulate General there in Strasbourg was, first, because the Council of Europe, at that time, was there. It still is, but actually it's being shelved in favor of Brussels, even though the French have built a magnificent center for it. So that was one of the justifications. Secondly, this sounds macabre in a way, but [we have a Consulate General there] because of all of the military cemeteries that we had there -- from Lorraine all the way down to Belfort and that area there. There was a very large number of retired veterans of World War II there. We had a very big...

Q: *World War I, too?*

SMITH: World War I, too. Thirdly, it was on the border [between France and Germany]. During the strike of 1968 this turned out to be very useful.

Q: *This is the French strike...*

SMITH: The events of May, 1968.

Q: *The student revolt and all that?*

SMITH: We were the only post in France still open, because Strasbourg is right on the Rhine River. Germany wasn't on strike, so all the diplomatic pouches and so on were rerouted to come through us. I mean, the rest of France was closed down. The Consulate General was a listening post, a four-man post.

Q: *Who was Consul General when you were there?*

SMITH: John Hay, a bitter man.

Q: *Tell me a little about him -- about working with a bitter man.*

SMITH: Well, he was a bright man. He came from Michigan and was a nice person who had had a terrible time. He had lost his wife, and I think that that was the problem. He sort of felt on the periphery of things. He didn't speak French very well. He was a career Foreign Service Office but didn't speak French very well. He loved Strasbourg but he was very opinionated. This was his last post in the Foreign Service. In those days they used posts like that as "pasture posts." He was very good to me. He sort of turned the Consulate General over to me. He thought that I was educated and all that sort of stuff, and I'd come from the White House and all that, so he liked that.

Secondly, I was enthusiastic and tried to help him out a lot. He couldn't have been nicer to us. He had a violent temper. He was a tough guy for many people to work for, though he wasn't for me. You had to learn to roll with the punches, and that sort of thing. He felt that he was not where he should be [in the Service], in the sense that he deserved better. Not that he didn't like Strasbourg. He loved Strasbourg. But he saw that it was the end of his career. He also had a drinking problem. He served on. I did not stay to see him leave.

What happened to me was that Sargent Shriver was Ambassador to France at that time. Sarge was going to make changes in the Consulates [in France] and was going to assign "young people" as Consuls General and use these positions as "testing places." So I got a call from Bill Buell, the Supervisory Consul General in Paris three days before Christmas of 1968. He said that the Ambassador had decided that he was going to change the makeup of the Consulates. He was no longer going to go along with the idea that these would be used for FSO's on their last assignment. They were going to be for FSO-4's, under the old system.

Q: *This is about the equivalent of a major [in the Army].*

SMITH: Yes. And young FSO's would go out to the Consulates and either make it or break it in running a Consulate. I was the first one to be assigned. I was transferred from Strasbourg to Lyon, which was the "pasture post" of "pasture posts." I was to put that Consulate back on the

map and I was to be there by New Year's [1969]. The reason I say this is that John Hay was on home leave at that time. So I never got a chance to say goodbye to him [before leaving, though I saw him subsequently]. Because of the legal requirement -- seals and all of that -- they had to bring someone down from Paris to whom I could transfer the property of the United States Government so that I could go to Lyon. I did that on December 31, 1968.

Q: Going back to Strasbourg, let's look at the political situation within your consular district.

SMITH: It was very conservative. This was the place which "rallied" to De Gaulle first of all during the 1968 crisis in France. Alsace-Lorraine is very French...

Q: Really?

SMITH: It is very French in the sense of "La Patrie" and allegiance to France, very German in its sense of order, and very clever, in that when they don't want the French or the Germans to understand what's going on, they speak in Alsatian. It's a proud area. It's interesting, for example, because Alsace and Lorraine had been taken from France following the Franco-Prussian War [of 1871]. In 1906 or 1907 the French "secularized" all of the schools [of the Catholic Church] in France. Since Alsace-Lorraine was not part of France at that time, the religious schools there were not secularized. So when France got Alsace-Lorraine back after World War I, the Catholic schools there continued to get the subsidies they had prior to 1870 and continued to do so until the time I was there. So my children went to Catholic schools in Strasbourg for the total sum of \$15 a month, all subsidized by the French Government.

Q: What areas were you particularly concerned with?

SMITH: I was assigned as an economic officer. That's what the Department wanted me to do, as I had just come out of this economics course. They wanted to boost the economic presence of the Department of State. So I was assigned to Strasbourg as an economics officer, following developments affecting U. S. investment. There was a lot of U. S. investment going in there: E. I. Lilley, General Motors, and Caterpillar, so that Alsace looked like a perfect place to invest in Europe. American businesses were in France, so they could always get French protection. But they were close enough to Germany so that they had the German "work ethic." And they would be on the Rhine River, which provided the cheapest transportation in the world.

I was there as an economics officer, following what they thought, at the time, would be a burgeoning corner of Europe for economic development. That has not turned out to be the case, for a variety of other reasons, but in any event I was not the only one coming out of the economics course to be assigned to one of the Consulates. But that was what I was supposed to be doing. Also, don't forget, we didn't have much else that we could do. It was the height of the Vietnam War. As a political entity we were not particularly favored, even in conservative Alsace, although there were certainly more supporters for our position in Strasbourg or Lyon than there were a year later.

Q: How did you find working with American firms there? Did they care about you?

SMITH: We had a wonderful relationship.

Q: *What could you do for them?*

SMITH: By and large they could take care of themselves. General Motors didn't need me. On the other hand, when they had a problem that needed a quick solution, they'd call us and say, "Look, we have a bit of a problem with the Prefet [Head of a French Department] or the Prefecture in getting a permit to do something or other." It was no problem. I'd just call the Prefet or his Adjoint [deputy] and say, "Look, GM has a \$350 million investment here," which was a big investment in 1968. I would add, "Some official in your office is holding up the permit. Could you help us out?" That was sort of easy to do. Of course, I was also there during the crisis of May, 1968. We helped out the American companies. They couldn't get food and at times they couldn't get across the border during the strike. We had a small Commissary there. I lived in the Consulate General in Strasbourg -- on the second floor. It was a beautiful building, constructed after World War II, like a chateau. So I performed that sort of function.

In Strasbourg the number of Americans was fairly small -- that is, of Americans not married to French, if you will, who had decided to live there. The number of the expatriates was on a relatively small scale, so they hung around together.

Q: *What about the Coal and Steel Community? Was it located there at that time?*

SMITH: No, just the Council of Europe.

Q: *Was that your beat also?*

SMITH: The Consul General was supposed to follow that. He kept trying to justify the maintenance of the post on those grounds. I kept saying, "The Council of Europe will never stay in Strasbourg and will eventually go to Brussels. Let's not try to justify the post on the Council of Europe. Let's justify it on more substantive reasons." We did, although I think that the Consulate General is closed now.

Q: *It probably is, as so many small consulates have been closed down. How did you find dealing with these international bureaucrats? This was still at a fairly early stage.*

SMITH: The Council of Europe in those days was not the most glamorous or prestigious of the European institutions. So you sort of had some "castoffs" in Strasbourg among the international bureaucrats. I found them exceedingly dull and, in many ways, irrelevant. I didn't pay a lot of attention socially to the Council of Europe types. They lived in sort of a ghetto. They all had tax-free status. Strasbourg tried manfully, urged on by the French Government in Paris, to keep the Council of Europe there. They offered the Council of Europe types all kinds of benefits to stay in Strasbourg. However, the Council was not a major force at the time. The one important role it played was as a sounding board for the British, who at that time were not members of the European Community and who paid their allegiance to the Community doctrine. Prime Minister Wilson came and said, "We want to join Europe" and all of that. That was his major claim to fame, I think.

When I was there, [The Council of Europe] was in sort of a ramshackle, temporary building. Now they've got an ugly, new monstrosity, which is hardly ever used, as they nearly always meet in Brussels.

Q: Let's talk about the "May Days" of 1968. Did you get called to supply other than administrative services? There was concern about the French armies on the Rhine.

SMITH: The French Army marched right past my bedroom window. First of all, we hardly felt the effects of the strikes. When the Embassy in Paris called and said that everything was closed down, this didn't mean much to us. In Strasbourg everything was open, nothing was closed, newspapers were delivered, television went on, and all of that. That is, all local stuff. Now, the services which depended on Paris did not operate -- the postal and telegraph services, for example. We immediately set up a mail drop in Kehl, which is just across the [Rhine] River [in Germany]. All of our mail came there, and there was no problem. The Embassy in Paris kept calling us, asking, "What's going on? How many rioters," and all that sort of stuff. We said, "Who? What?"

Q: How about the students?

SMITH: Students? The universities went out on strike, but in a very gentle way, shall we say. A lot of the factories such as Peugeot and Berliet went out on strike -- but, again, very gently. There may have been one or two demonstrations of more than 500 people in Strasbourg, but they were met with disdain. This is an area which in those days probably voted 90% against the communists. These were not people who were going to support "Danny the Red" [Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the student strike leaders in Paris]. The people [in Strasbourg] were not going to support him. Even in the universities, when they went out on strike, the strike did not affect us, as I was saying.

Now, as I said, we got calls from Bob Anderson, the Political Counselor in Paris, asking us, "What's going on? There must be something happening." We kept telling him, "Sorry, nothing's going on."

Q: Did you get involved in "Army watching," because this was a big thing. I take it that an awful lot of the French Army is within the periphery of Strasbourg, though it may have been in Germany.

SMITH: It was in Germany.

Q: But still...

SMITH: De Gaulle went over to Germany to visit the French Army.

Q: I know that.

SMITH: De Gaulle made his first speech, which was a disaster. Then, on the following Sunday

he made another speech, calling on everybody to rally around the Fifth Republic. In the interim, during that week, he had flown over to the [principal] French base in Germany and had met with the commanding general.

Q: *Was it General Massu?*

SMITH: Whoever it was. The general said, "We will support you but we won't fire on French people." So there was a lot of activity at about 3:00 AM, with the rumble of French Army vehicles below our windows, coming across the Rhine River from Germany and going to Paris.

Q: *Well, as you went over and looked at the French Army, were you asking them, "What are you going to do?" In the first place, when De Gaulle went [to Strasbourg and Germany], he virtually disappeared from the radar. Everybody was wondering where the hell he was, including our Embassy.*

SMITH: Actually, I didn't know where he was.

Q: *But did you know what the French Army...*

SMITH: I just called the Embassy in Paris the next morning and woke them up.

Q: *Good God!*

SMITH: So I said, "I guess you'd like to know that the French Army passed through Strasbourg at around 3:00 or 4:00 AM, going your way." At least they went along the main drag in Strasbourg from Kehl, Germany. Here's the Rhine River, and here is Kehl right here [opposite Strasbourg].

Q: *Kehl is in Germany?*

SMITH: Kehl's in Germany. But the main street in Strasbourg is the Avenue du Foret Noir, which then joins Avenue d'Alsace, and then becomes Avenue des Vosges. You have "Black Forest" Avenue and then "Alsatian" Avenue. And the Consulate General was on the Avenue d'Alsace. You could see these French Army vehicles coming down the Avenue du Foret Noir and continuing along the Avenue des Vosges. We didn't have any reason for thinking that they were going from Germany to Paris. Paris was 250 miles away -- that's a long drive. So we assumed that, while they might be taking up positions to quell uprisings, that wasn't happening in Alsace, so we assumed that they were going elsewhere. We could tell that some of these vehicles came from Germany, because of the markers on the tanks. But we had just had the May Day parade, with the same vehicles, and we were going to have another parade on Bastille Day [July 14], so we got an extra parade that year [1968].

Q: *Did the Embassy give you any guidance or ask you to find out anything?*

SMITH: No. The Embassy never paid any attention to us. You have to understand. We were unaffected by the strike.

Q: This was something that those Parisians did.

SMITH: Yes. So, to us, all of these were problems in Paris. Ambassador Sarge Shriver was sitting on the curbs, talking to the strikers, and all of that. It was another world, as far as we were concerned. Nothing was going on in Strasbourg. It was the only place in France that was unaffected, but everything was going on normally.

I went up to the steel factories in Lorraine, some of which were on strike, while others were not. The big concern of the workers was what they call the "SMIG" [Guaranteed Minimum Industrial Salary], the monthly salary for industrial groups. You had the "SMIG" and then you had the "SMAG" for agricultural workers. These people just wanted a raise. They weren't students -- they were workers. They just wanted more money, a raise. The "SMIG" was renegotiated every year with the big steel companies.

You just would not have known that this was a national strike, except for the fact that there were some inconveniences. You didn't get mail from Paris. The international mail went the other way. Instead of getting it from Paris in Strasbourg, we got it instead in Kehl and sent it to Paris. We drove our cars to Paris. Took two jerry cans of gas. You just couldn't get gas in many places. I would fill up the car -- you could get gas in Strasbourg. I would take two jerry cans with us -- 10 gallons. So that gave me 30 gallons of gas: 20 in the gas tank and 10 with me in the jerry cans. That would get us to the Embassy in Paris. We would fill up there, plus the jerry cans again. We took the old N4 highway.

Q: This points out how often, when you have a political crisis somewhere, many times it's really confined to the capital. People elsewhere are sitting around, thinking, "Big deal."

SMITH: It taught me a big lesson subsequently. We used to get all these memos from Embassy Paris. Charlie Tanguy [then First Secretary of the Embassy] would have had lunch with the Deputy from some godforsaken place, and this would go by an IMMEDIATE message to Washington. Who cared?

Q: It does put things into perspective. Well, let's go to Lyon. When you went as Consul General to Lyon, you were following in the illustrious footsteps of James Fennimore Cooper, who never really worked there but was assigned [to Lyon] as a sinecure, to give him a title.

SMITH: Right. He was the first American Consul in Lyon.

Q: You were in Lyon from 1969 to 1970. Could you talk about what you were doing? First of all, what was the situation?

SMITH: At that point Lyon was a city that was trying to find its future. It had had a dynamic mayor by the name of Louis Pradel in the great French tradition. He was the sort of heir to Edouard Herriot [Radical Party leader]. However, Lyon was in a sort of gentle decay. The textile industry was going down the tubes. That's where the "Jacquard Loom" was invented, which was the precursor to "punch card" textile machines. They had automobile and steel factories in Lyon,

like Berliet. Berliet was in terrible condition. Lyon vied with Marseille but was presumably the second largest city in France. It had a rich, cultural tradition, and the people were very proud of being "Lyonnais," not Parisians. It had a mixed political life, including conservative and radical elements. They had had a couple of deaths during the riots [of May, 1968].

For us, Lyon had three or four reasons [for maintaining a Consulate there]. Lyon was the only city in France which officially celebrated July 4. It was a city holiday. That was because of the aid which the U. S. gave to the French Resistance [during the German Occupation in World War II] in 1943-1944. The Resistance was headquartered in Lyon during World War II.

Q: This was at the Hotel Terminus?

SMITH: Yes, and Jean Moulin [Director of the Resistance in France, killed by the Gestapo] and his associates were all in Lyon. The old-timers remembered with great fervor the help that the U. S. had given to Lyon.

The Consulate was there because Lyon was a crossroads and was the second largest city in France. If you were going to have a consulate, it made sense to be there. Thirdly, it was thought at one time that Lyon would become a very major economic center in France, and so we should be there. Fourthly, I say cynically, it happened to be just 30 kilometers from Vienne, where the famous restaurant, La Pyramide, was. Therefore, somebody had to be in Lyon to take care of all of the Congressmen and Senators who came through to get a good meal. I say that cynically...

Q: But with a certain justice.

SMITH: I remember that very well. How could you justify a Consulate then -- particularly during the Vietnam period? We had two policemen in front of our Consulate 24 hours a day. I also had a policeman in front of my house, 24 hours a day. There was very strong anti-U. S. and anti-Vietnam feeling in Lyon, because there were a lot of Vietnamese students, by the way, at the University of Lyon. You couldn't, in a way, justify this. We did very little political and economic work. What Ambassador Sarge Shriver wanted done was to show the flag in a discreet way. Don't take on the Vietnam issue. Take on the other issues.

I was in Lyon at the height of the space program -- going to the moon and all that. There was a company in Lyon which had made the lenses which were going to be used in the cameras sent along on the moon shot. We parlayed the Apollo program like you never saw. We had Apollo VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII. We showed movies all over the place. We even had one of the "moon rocks," and thousands of people saw this crazy little stone.

We kept a reasonably low profile on political matters. I handled most of the work on economic matters. The Consulate in Lyon was a visa-issuing post. It was just a Consulate. The Consular District went up to Dijon, across to Clermont-Ferrand, and down to Valence. It covered 15 departments -- a pretty large area.

Now, did I do anything good for the United States? I don't know.

Q: Well, part of it is just being there.

SMITH: There was no question that the Lyonnais liked Americans personally. It was a great place for our kids. We lived in a Swiss-type chalet. The official residence of the Consul at that time was a Swiss chalet, right on the well-known Boulevard des Belges, which overlooked Lyon's central park -- something like the Boston Gardens -- with the world's largest collection of tulips. We had a wonderful time in Lyon. It's a city with an old, long-established upper class and, in those days, a working class. There was very little in the middle. That has changed significantly. Lyon has become a fairly vibrant, economic center. But I believe that we've closed our Consulate there.

Q: How did you treat the Vietnam War? This was at the beginning...

SMITH: I was very much in favor of the Vietnam War.

Q: At this exact period I was Consul General in Saigon. You supported the Vietnam War. How did you treat it and deal with it, because, obviously, you couldn't just duck this?

SMITH: I just faced it straight on. I would say that, to the best of my knowledge, the Vietnamese asked for our help against the communists. I would say that there is no way you can tell me that the communists are good guys. They have a typical, totalitarian system. We had a commitment and we intended to meet it. How would you like it if we didn't carry out our commitments [in Europe]? What would you think if you had a [external security] problem [at some time in the future] and came to us and said that we had a treaty commitment to help you? And then what would happen if we didn't meet our commitment? I never ducked the issue. I didn't raise the issue. I didn't go out and volunteer. I didn't want to be stoned or have something else thrown at me. I never ducked the issue but was very straightforward. I said to most of my French contacts, "We probably disagree." I went on television, radio, and all that sort of stuff. We had our talking points from the Department of State.

It wasn't until I got back to Washington that I saw that we really were not addressing the war correctly. I was always a supporter of the Vietnam War, right to the bitter end. When I say that we weren't addressing the war correctly, I thought that we had handled it badly in the military sense, that we didn't throw all of our muscle into it early on. I think that gradualism in war doesn't work.

As far as the French were concerned, I said that we were taking a stand here, and you can join us or not. Then I said, "We'll remember you." Then they started thinking.

Q: Particularly because a place like Lyon did remember.

SMITH: I would say, "You guys left us this problem." I kept going back to Dien Bien Phu and said, "We're continuing what you asked us to do. So don't come at me."

Q: How did you find the French Communist Party? What was its strength, what problems did it present, and how did you...

SMITH: Well, Lyon had a pretty strong Communist Party in those days. I think that Lyon and Marseille were the two big places [for the party] outside of Paris. However, they were pretty grubby, scruffy types. In those days Lyon was a pretty ugly city -- gray concrete and stucco buildings. You'd go down to the working class districts, and it was pretty grubby.

The communists never gave me any problems because I'd walk right in there and say, "Okay, you're in a communist labor union. I just want you to know that I don't believe in communism. I'm here to tell you a different story." They would say, "Well, Mr. Consul General, we are very honored to receive you" and all that. Whether they were communists or right wingers, they would always use that protocol stuff.

They never touched us. During the two years that I was there, they only splashed paint on our Consulate once, which was lucky. We had to close the Consulate a couple of times because there were going to be demonstrations against us, particularly when President Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia.

Q: That was in the spring of 1970.

SMITH: So we closed down. We sent our people home. Again, you depended on the "International New York Herald-Tribune" to know what was going on in connection with Vietnam. We were on the receiving line. I can't say that we faced any physical danger.

Q: What about the power and influence of the French intellectuals in Lyon? I take it that this didn't sound like very fertile ground for them. [Intellectual opposition to the Vietnam War] sounds like more of a Left Bank, Parisian manifestation.

SMITH: Lyon had its "Left Wing" element at the University of Lyon, but it was much less of a political university than [the universities] in Paris. Lyon had a major medical school. Students who want to become doctors don't have enough time to demonstrate. So the "Left Wing," intellectual element was really not a factor. I'm sure it was among the literary types, but Lyon was a very conservative city, even though it had a Socialist Party mayor and a long tradition of being anti-Paris. But that's because it was Lyon and not because Paris was pro-De Gaulle at that time, I would say. The Left Wing was there in Lyon, but so was the Right Wing. There were kooky Right Wing groups, I can tell you.

Q: Did you have Poujade or Le Pen supporters?

SMITH: We had the "juriste" movement. You had the anti-Algerian group, but it was relatively small. You had the "juriste" or secessionist movement, named after the Jura Plateau, which wanted to get out of France! [Laughter].

Q: Sounds like a non-starter.

SMITH: Then you had people in Clermont-Ferrand who worked for the Michelin [Tire Company]. That was a company town. Everything was owned by the Michelin family. I'll never

forget one time when I went to Clermont-Ferrand. I was paying a call on the head of the Michelin Tire Company. I went into this factory office. It looked like something out of the 1920's. All of the secretaries and the receptionist were women, of course. But they were dressed in long, brown smocks, practically down to their ankles. Their hair was tied back and they had horn-rimmed glasses. They were the ugliest women I ever saw in my life. You waited in the waiting room. In most cases in those days, if you went into a French corporate headquarters, there would perhaps be a picture of the president [of the company] and a picture of De Gaulle. In this waiting room there was only one picture on the wall. It was the portrait of the President of Sears Roebuck, because Michelin was the tire supplier for Sears. [Laughter]. They knew where their money was coming from, where their bread was being buttered. No picture of De Gaulle, no picture of Michelin -- just a picture of the President of Sears Roebuck.

Q: Tell me. Both in Strasbourg and Lyon, you got a pretty good look at French industry. What was your impression of French industry?

SMITH: It was terrible. They were never going to "make it." Now, what they were very, very good at, which history has since proved, is services. They were thinking ahead about how you provide services, as opposed to manufacturing. But the working conditions [in the factories] were appalling. Here was a country which had been unionized, in many ways, long before the United States, in which the unions were relatively much more powerful. And yet the "patronat" [the bosses], depending on which government was in power, were as reactionary as you could possibly imagine. You couldn't survive the working conditions, even in Mississippi. I was stunned. No worker protection against hazardous conditions. Technology was very sporadic. This was the time when Jean-Jacques Schreiber was writing about "Le defi Americaine" [The American Challenge]. They thought that we were going to take them over. The best technology came from the United States. If you went to the GM, Caterpillar, Timken, or Cincinnati Millicron factories, our technology was generations ahead of these guys, relatively speaking.

Q: When I was in Italy, I found that the unions were used so much for political purposes and maybe getting salary raises that they didn't get around to working conditions.

SMITH: I never saw them get around to working conditions. I was appalled. An American company could bring its way of handling workers, even if the company wasn't unionized, like Timken. It would be far ahead of anything the French had. The whole working relationship was much better. It showed. The workers dropped lifetime employment with Berliet to go and work for E. I. Lilley, which was a gamble.

I know that there have been dramatic changes in France since that time. I'm talking about conditions 25 or 26 years ago. French manufacturing has improved, and all of that. I was stunned at the lack of worker amenities, given the strength of the labor unions.

Q: You left Lyon after two years [in 1970] and went to a fascinating position where you were a staff assistant to the President, 1971-1973.

MAX W. KRAUS
Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1967-1972)

Max W. Kraus was born in Germany in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1941. Mr. Kraus worked for the Psychological Warfare Detachment of the U.S. Army from 1944-1949 and joined the USIA in 1956. His Foreign Service career included positions in Italy, Cambodia, the Congo, France, and Switzerland. He was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1988.

KRAUS: Russ saw what the situation was like and he got me an assignment to Paris. Even though it was a very expensive post, I did have all of these allowances and I was able to survive financially again.

Q: It is not exactly a hardship post.

KRAUS: It is not exactly a hardship post.

Q: So, those were the circumstances of your leaving VOA? I had not realized that you --

KRAUS: That was the circumstances under which I left VOA. Otherwise, I enjoyed my tour of VOA and would not have minded staying on until, in due course of events, I would get another assignment abroad.

Q: Russ was very good with the human side of the place. I have always appreciated that.

KRAUS: Yes.

Q: So, you went to Paris as what?

KRAUS: As information officer.

Q: Which involved doing what?

KRAUS: Information officer --

Q: I know, but --

KRAUS: As information officer, I dealt mainly with the French electronic media, radio and television, because we had a press attaché who dealt mainly with the written press. Although I got involved in that, too.

Q: Who was that --

KRAUS: At the beginning, it was Nick King. Then, after Chip Bohlen, who was my first ambassador in Paris -- left and was replaced by Sargent Shriver. Sarge decided that Nick King

was not the kind of press attaché that he wanted and he started shopping around for a new press attaché and finally settled on Bill Payeff.

In addition to dealing with the electronic media, my information section also did quick overnight translation into French of important documents from The Wireless File and distributed it to leading French newspapers -- especially Le Monde, which was always interested in full texts.

We also published a magazine called "Informations et Documents."

Q: Still do?

KRAUS: No.

Q: Paris has dropped that?

KRAUS: Yes, has dropped it on instructions from Washington. I mean, I was already familiar with Informations et Documents, because we used to distribute it in Phnom Penh --

Q: How about in Africa, too?

KRAUS: Yes, it went to all French speaking posts world-wide. I was the publisher of Informations et Documents, but we had two extremely talented French national employees, Pierre Ferenczi and Marc Saporta who actually did most of the editing.

When I came to Paris, Lee Brady was PAO. I had been told in Washington, you may think you are in charge of Informations et Documents, but actually that magazine is run by Pierre Ferenczi and Mark Saporta. They have known Lee Brady forever and ever.

They will deal directly with Lee. Your name will appear on the masthead, but you will not have anything to say. So, I moved rather slowly and did not try to mess with the copy that Ferenczi and Saporta had prepared. Gradually they saw that I knew what I was doing and voluntarily showed me copy before it went into the magazine.

In fact, the two collaborated on a two-volume comparative encyclopedia of the Soviet Union and the United States, where there were -- on facing pages -- always articles about the same subject in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Q: Fascinating.

KRAUS: They presented me with copies of this encyclopedia and wrote a dedication in it of which I am still very proud. They said, "To Max Kraus from the authors who only regret that they did not have the benefit of his collaboration and wisdom in the preparation of this work."

Q: That is mighty flattering.

KRAUS: The other thing that we pioneered in Paris, in television, were the television

cooperative projects -- where we would make a financial contribution to French networks exchange for direct projection rights of the programs in USIS centers.

The first case where we did this collaboration was in a wonderful series of documentaries called "The Great Battles of World War II," which was prepared by a team of Daniel Costelle, Henri de Turenne and Jean Louis Guillaud.

This team really pioneered the documentary technique where you take historical film footage and then intercut it with interviews with eye witnesses of the battles that they were treating. Costelle always came to me and wanted my help in locating French speaking American eye witnesses to battles.

Two of the eye witnesses I found for him were Bill Payeff, because Costelle was looking for somebody who landed on Omaha Beach in the first wave on D-Day, and Bill did.

Q: I did not know that.

KRAUS: Oh, yes, Bill gave a marvelous interview. I mean -- things that touched your heart strings -- how scared he was wading ashore and so on. I later on accused him of being one of the great method actors of our day.

Q: That was before he developed the belly?

KRAUS: Yes. Another much better known eye witness that I found for Costelle was when he was doing the battle of Italy. Our defense attaché in Paris at that time was Major General Vernon A. Walters who had been General Mark Clark's Aide-de-Camp during the Italian Campaign.

I took Costelle over to Dick Walters' office. Walters immediately started spewing out fascinating anecdotes in absolutely impeccable, accent free, slangy French. Costelle was drooling over this thing.

Finally, he said to Walters -- who accepted to be interviewed -- General, there is one request I have, either you agree to wear your full American uniform with decorations, when we interview you, or otherwise, try to put on a slight fake accent in French. Otherwise, nobody will believe that you are an American general.

Q: Apparently he speaks several languages just that way?

KRAUS: Oh, yes, he speaks German and Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. He is a fabulous linguist.

So, this was the first TV cooperative we did.

Q: That is an auspicious beginning.

KRAUS: Yes, and, when they did the Battle of the Pacific -- which, of course, required

considerable cost in travel -- we chipped in. Then, we continued to do other similar projects with French television.

I think the most memorable one was a documentary which was produced by Danielle Hunebelle, a French woman journalist, very experienced and also a documentary producer. Danielle had interviewed Henry Kissinger in the United States and got a mortal crush on him. She later on wrote a book in which she describes with utter candor her unsuccessful pursuit of Henry Kissinger.

Danielle had sold an idea to the news director of the second French television network, Jacqueline Baudrieri, who was running a weekly magazine called, "Le Troisieme Oeil," The Third Eye.

Hunebelle wanted to do a sequence called "La Societe Des Mes Reves," The Society of My Dreams -- where she would pick a young French factory worker and tell him, "You must have thought about countries that might interest you, where you might want to live? I will give you a choice of three countries that you want to see and we will take you there. I will follow along with the camera team and look over your shoulder."

Q: What an intriguing idea.

KRAUS: Yes. The young factory worker chose three countries; Cuba, the United States and Japan. Danielle had already told us, I will guarantee that one of the countries that he will choose will be the United States.

So, we gave her, I think, about \$25,000 for this project. We could not have asked for a better result, because the young factory worker said in the end, "Cuba, it is just one big jail. I visited a jail in Las Vegas and I would rather be in a jail in Las Vegas than a free man in Cuba."

Q: So, he went to all three countries?

KRAUS: Yes.

Q: Boy.

KRAUS: He said Japan may be all right for the Japanese, but it is not for me. But, the United States, there I could live happily. I think the reason why Danielle Hunebelle wanted to do this project is because, when she came to Washington, she hoped that she could have the young man received by Nixon and by Henry Kissinger.

Q: So she could see Henry Kissinger?

KRAUS: So she could see Henry Kissinger. Well, it did not come off, because Kissinger was not in town. But every time that Kissinger came to Paris, she called me up and said, you must tell Henry that I have to see him. She finally gave up her pursuit and Henry married Nancy rather than Danielle Hunebelle -- but, Danielle tried.

Well, of course, there are lots and lots of other anecdotes about Paris.

Q: So, let us have some.

KRAUS: The principal one is the change that came about when Bohlen left and Shriver took over. Because Bohlen was in Paris -- you know -- when de Gaulle was at the Elysée in his most anti-American period.

He had kicked out NATO headquarters and withdrawn from the military command structure of NATO and missed no chance of hitting us over the head. There was absolutely no way in which we had of working on common policies with the French.

So, Bohlen, who spoke absolutely fluent French, kept a very low profile, made relatively few public appearances, but kept in touch with the French government and reported his conversations back to Washington and briefed the French government on our foreign policy.

Then, Shriver came, who had no diplomatic experience other than the running of the Peace Corps.

Q: Which is not diplomatic experience?

KRAUS: Which is not diplomatic experience. He spoke execrable French, but, he is a communicator. Burnett Anderson, who replaced Lee Brady, said, actually Shriver knew much more French than he let on -- that he had told Burnett once -- my French is absolutely at the perfect level where I want it.

When I speak French, the Frenchmen understand me, even if they speak no English, and Americans understood my French, even if they knew not a word of it.

Shriver decided that he could not operate in the same manner as Bohlen. He very shrewdly decided that he had something which Bohlen did not have and that was the Kennedy connection. The Kennedy's were extremely popular in France. Shriver decided that he would make himself highly visible, do lots of traveling, make lots of public appearances --

Q: Redesigned the interior of the residence?

KRAUS: Yes, that among other things, too, and make himself the crystallization point of the very large reservoir of goodwill toward the United States that still existed in France in spite of de Gaulle's fulminations.

He was very successful in doing that. He would have been even more successful except for one thing. He was habitually and always late for everything, including for parties at his own residence.

We -- working guests -- arrived the obligatory fifteen minutes before the party started, and guests

would arrive and ask where Monsieur L'Ambassadeur was. We always alibied that he was unavoidably detained in the office by a very important telephone call from the Secretary of State.

It might have worked, except for one time, and that was that the residence in Avenue d'Iena had only one entrance from the street, and, in order to get to the family quarters, you had to pass by the rooms where the reception was taking place -- which were open.

About five or ten, sometimes fifteen minutes after the guests had started arriving, you would see Shriver sneaking in, in sweaty tennis clothes and make a dash upstairs to change. That, of course, does not go over well in a country where punctuality is the politeness of kings.

Shriver also was very unorthodox in his -- let us say -- public affairs programs. In fact, he drove his officers to distraction with some of his far out ideas.

For instance, Shriver had arranged for the American Davis Cup Team to come to France for a series of exhibition matches and clinics. He wanted to kick off this tour of France with a very highly and visible event where it would be covered by the press. He asked Bob Anderson, who was the chief of the political section at that time, to ask the French whether we could mark out a tennis court in Place de la Concord --

Q: Oh, my God.

KRAUS: -- to play an exhibition doubles match in which he would play. Of course, Anderson was laughed out of the Quai D'ORSAY, because, if you would mark out a tennis court, it would have caused the most monstrous traffic jam in history.

Q: Traffic is impossible as it is -- of course.

KRAUS: Finally, he had to settle for playing in the private tennis court of the French Senate in the Palais de Luxembourg, but only after we had made another attempt to mark out the tennis courts in the Place de l'Hotel de Ville.

Lee Brady did not go along with these unorthodox ideas of Shriver. Therefore, Shriver decided that he needed another PAO and Lee was permitted to go back to the states and Burnett Anderson took over.

Q: I do not think Bernie Anderson would be any more sympathetic --

KRAUS: Well, but -- he had a better way of handling Shriver. He kind of made Shriver think that he had decided it was a bad idea, but he did some very successful things.

For instance --

Q: You mean Shriver?

KRAUS: Well, Shriver suggested things. For instance, in the 1968 presidential election, we had a

big party in the Hotel Talleyrand -- an election party. We had converted the Hotel Talleyrand into an American style election headquarters with tally boards and everything else. We decided to invite all the Parisian V.I.P.'s, including show business people.

Shriver had even arranged to have a live donkey and a small elephant in the lobby. This was a wild success. The French television and radio did live broadcasts from the Talleyrand and it was a smashing success. So, Burnett knew how to handle Shriver, which Lee never did -- because, Lee is a crusty man who likes to do things according to the book.

The other very exciting thing in Paris was, of course, the events of May and June, 1968 -- the student riots on the Left Bank, which coincided with the beginning of the Vietnam negotiations in Paris.

You had the whole world press. I think it was the first example of media overkill in history -- for the beginning of the Vietnam negotiations. That, of course, was more or less a one day photo opportunity when the talks opened.

I was put in charge of accrediting the media for the briefings of the U.S. spokesmen, and, also, to set up a press working room in what is now the restaurant of the Hotel Crillon.

The press came for the opening of the Vietnam talks, but then stayed on to cover what was going on in the Left Bank, until Paris was paralyzed by the strikes. I mean, the airports were closed. The railroads were on strike. The Metro was on strike.

There were no newspapers being published and it got to be increasingly impossible for -- especially the television people -- to get their stories out of Paris. TV also was on strike.

For a while, they took their tapes up to Brussels by car and sent them from there. Then, gasoline started to run short and that became impossible. They finally went home. It was a very, very exciting period in France.

Q: How long did that period last?

KRAUS: May and June, 1968.

Q: What about some exciting adventures?

KRAUS: There are so many, I do not know where to begin.

Q: It is your choice.

KRAUS: One of the things that happened in Paris was that we had lots of visits from astronauts, who always came for the big Paris air show.

I was put in charge of their media relations. Later on, we got the first moon rock. Well, the Apollo 11 crew, of course, came over -- Borman was the first of the astronauts who came.

The, the Apollo 9 crew came for one of the air shows and then Apollo 11 came. That is a whole long story which I will not bore you with because it is in the manuscript of the book that I have written.

Then, after the Apollo 11 mission, NASA sent a moon rock to Europe, which was first shown in England and then in France. I was sent over to London to bring the moon rock back --

Q: Custodian?

KRAUS: -- to France. It was shown all over France. We had made an arrangement with one of the so-called radio peripheriques -- you know -- the radio stations that have studios in Paris, but their transmitter is outside of France with Europe #1, which had an especially good space commentator.

Europe #1 agreed to co-sponsor and finance the showings of the moon rock outside of Paris. I spent a lot of time babysitting the moon rock around France. Again, that is in a chapter of the book, so I will not repeat it here.

That was another highlight of my stay in Paris. I had a lot of fun.

Q: Is that enough that you want to talk about Paris?

CARL F. SALANS
Delegate, Vietnam Negotiations
Paris (1968-1969)

Carl Salans grew up in Chicago Heights, Illinois. He graduated from Harvard and received his law degree at Cambridge. He worked in the legal office of the State Department beginning in 1959. Mr. Salans also participated in the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. He was interviewed by Richard L. Jackson in 1998.

SALANS: Then in the fall of 1968, Governor Harriman asked that I come to Paris to help in the delegation there and the negotiations with the Vietnamese to try and resolve the Vietnam situation. So, in November, I think it was, of 1968, I moved to Paris and was here.

Q: Had the election probably taken place? This was the last months of the Democratic administration.

SALANS: The elections must have taken place. It was the last months of the Democratic administration, but there was still an effort being made on the part of Governor Harriman and Cyrus Vance to try to conclude an agreement with the Vietnamese before Mr. Johnson left office. That's my recollection. I remember working with the two of them to try to persuade everybody and then even into the first days of the Nixon administration, that an agreement could

be reached with the Vietnamese which would have been an agreement that would have in effect declared Vietnam to be a neutral country and keep the government that then existed in place with the addition of representatives of the North Vietnamese. In other words, I think the term was a coalition government, everybody recognizing that the likely outcome of this coalition government would be the North Vietnamese communist dominance of the government. But, the feeling was that was the best the United States could obtain anyway even if it continued to fight; therefore, why not do what was at least on the face of it an honorable settlement of the war which would give the non-communist parties in South Vietnam an opportunity to prevail if they did the right things, but which would have the risk in it that the North Vietnamese would dominate and eventually take over the whole country. That was felt by Harriman, Vance, and others who shared that view including me, that would avoid continuing the war and reach an outcome that was likely to be the result of the war anyway. Those were in the first days I was at the negotiations in Paris that was our principal preoccupation. This was not so much a legal job, but I think I was perhaps helpful in putting this sort of suggested solution in the context of historical continuity of policy toward Southeast Asia going back to the 1954 agreements and then the 1962 agreements, which made it a sensible and honorable solution and a solution which had been tried before in this part of the world.

Q: There was intense scrutiny of those negotiations by the press. Were they going on two levels, the open, public meetings and then there were the quiet meetings in safe houses that both the Vietnamese and we had direct contact?

SALANS: Yes, that is exactly what was happening; although, the truth is as far as I was concerned, I did not know for a long time that those secret meetings were going on. I don't know whether that was common in the delegation for the more junior people. I'm sure that Harriman and Cyrus Vance and probably Philip Habib knew what was going on. I'm not sure whether the Carl Salans and the Dick Holbrookes knew what was going on.

Q: In Phil Habib's own oral history, he describes intricate logistics of picking up Vance and Harriman and these safe houses out in the suburbs, how they would get figures as visible as Harriman and Vance without the press getting on to it.

SALANS: Yes, of course, I have read about all of that since, but I'm telling you that at the time and for a long time, I did not know that was going on even though day in and day out, I was in the Embassy delegation working with all these people. I simply didn't know. My activity was limited to what the public saw which were weekly meetings between the two delegations at I think it was called the Hotel Majestic on the Avenue Kleber, where statements would be made by each of the delegations. I drafted many of those statements on the part of the United States because again as I have said earlier, Governor Harriman relied on me to a great extent for drafting his statements. But those statements really got nowhere. They were just the public face. The real negotiation was going on between Mr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

Q: With Kissinger then, that was in the next phase when the Nixon administration came in.

SALANS: Yes, that's right. Because, by the time I got to Paris which was November, I think at that point while Harriman was still trying to reach an agreement, I think he saw the North

Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese were not going to agree on anything until the new administration came in and they could see what the policy of the new administration would be.

Q: Phil Habib alleged in his oral history that the new administration actually passed a message "Hang tough; you'll get a better deal from us." to the Vietnamese via that well-known Taiwanese.

SALANS: He passed this message to the South Vietnamese, not to the North Vietnamese. They passed this message to General Thieu who was then the president of South Vietnam. Again, I have read this since. I didn't know at the time that such a message had been passed, but reading the memoirs of people like Henry Kissinger and William Bundy, one sees that in fact that did happen and accounts for the fact that the South Vietnamese dragged their feet until the new administration.

Q: Did you notice a stiffening of their position?

SALANS: We definitely noticed a stiffening in their position as we sat there. As I said earlier, both Governor Harriman and Mr. Vance became less and less optimistic as the end of the Johnson administration came that they would be able to do anything because they could see that the South Vietnamese government was not prepared to go along, was dragging its feet, and they suspected if they didn't know that the new administration had told them not to make an agreement.

Q: I would think you as the legal advisor must have been frustrated. The delegation was meeting secretly and there are the open talks and the new incoming administration saying hold off, don't make a deal.

SALANS: Yes, I was very frustrated, and my frustration eventually led to my leaving the State Department and the decision to stay in Paris and go into private practice. It was extremely frustrating because I felt very strongly that in 1968 and early 1969 an agreement could have been reached which would have preserved the ability of the South Vietnamese, our South Vietnamese as opposed to the Viet Cong, it preserved their ability to survive if they could politically function properly without the war continuing. You could have negotiated with North Vietnam a coalition government solution. They would have been perfectly confident that with time, they could have prevailed, but you would at least have preserved a chance for our South Vietnamese to prevail and stopped the fighting at that point I think. When we saw what the new administration wanted to do was in effect to continue the war to save the "honor" of the United States as they saw it, I found that extremely frustrating and I quickly decided to come back to Washington to finish my career in the State Department and then to leave the Department altogether and to return to Paris to practice law.

Q: So you then stayed in Paris a little bit into 1969 with the new team.

SALANS: I did. I stayed all of 1969 here in Paris. I wanted to leave earlier. I remember going to Governor Harriman while he was still here, it must have been the end of 1968, and saying to him that I would like to leave because I was just so unhappy. He said to me that I should stay. He said the government needs people like you to stay and continue to fight for what you think is the right

position. You should stay. "I'm leaving," he said, "but you should stay." That sort of puffed up my chest and head a little bit and I stayed on for another year, but nothing changed and indeed I thought it even got worse in the sense that we began to extend the war into Cambodia, into Laos. The whole policy of saving the honor of the United States by intensifying the war under the guise of a withdrawal of American forces, but relying more on bombers and impersonal methods of warfare, I found an obnoxious policy, so I asked to be sent back to Washington. Jack Stevenson from Sullivan and Cromwell was then the Legal Advisor in the State Department. He wanted me back to help him run the office. So, I spent a year more, 1970-71. During this period, I was occasionally detached from the Vietnam delegation to perform specific functions on behalf of the U.S. Government elsewhere. I remember going to The Hague as the legal advisor on the U.S. delegation to negotiate the first International Aircraft Hijacking Convention. I remember the French delegation at that conference, heading by Mr. Guillaume, who is now a judge on the International Court of Justice, playing a very obstructive role, not wanting to surrender sovereignty by agreeing to extradite hijackers to another country. I remember being sent to Tripoli to assist Ambassador Palmer in negotiating the withdrawal of American forces from Wheeling Air Force Base in Libya after Qadhafi came to power. That was an interesting experience, because the Libyan Government had organized mobs of screaming Libyans outside the conference room, shouting "Go Home", and every time the negotiations reached a difficult point, a member of the Libyan delegation would get up from the table, walk over to a window and open it so we could better hear the howling mob. At the outset of the negotiations, Ambassador Palmer had to ask the Libyan delegation (whose members were all dressed in battle fatigues) to remove their submachine guns from the room, where they had brought them into the room and laid them on the negotiating table, to impress us. That was quite an experience.

Q: Before we get into that, there was quite a transition in the working composition of the delegation. Is it your perception that the new administration came in with considerable suspicion, replaced the Vietnamese speaking American interpreters, that kind of a thing? People like Phil Habib would have been phasing out in that period. Did you see that kind of reshuffle transition?

SALANS: No. There was of course a reshuffling at the top. Harriman and Vance left. I believe the first person that came in after that was Henry Cabot Lodge and then David Bruce followed as the negotiator. Then eventually Philip Habib became the negotiator. I think he was head of the delegation for awhile wasn't he?

Q: He describes in his oral history with a lot of indignation somebody he brought in to interpret who knew Vietnam that initially the incoming team didn't want to use. I think he said they turned it over to General Vernon Walters. He set up the safe house negotiations through French intelligence sources.

SALANS: I do remember that General Walters suddenly began to appear as a principal player in the negotiations. That I do recall with the advent of the new administration. At the lower level, I remember Philip Habib staying on. I remember Bob Miller staying on. I remember Dick Holbrooke staying on I can't recall the other...

Q: John Negroponte.

SALANS: John Negroponte stayed on. I stayed on during that period. At the level of interpreters, I don't remember that frankly. I don't see what the importance of that would have been at that level, but I certainly do remember Vernon Walters suddenly appearing and becoming more of a presence. He had an office not with the delegation but elsewhere in the Embassy. One would see more of him starting with the new administration.

Q: That was quite a crew, Dick Holbrooke and John Negroponte and some of the people who rose to the surface. You observed them in fairly intense activity in this period?

SALANS: I did. They were young at that time, as was I. We were all in our 30's although Holbrooke, I think, may have been in his 20's. I'm not sure. We were all young people. Holbrooke and Negroponte were extremely bright people. Dick Holbrooke even at that time was an aggressive young hawk type person, but much admired by everybody he worked with, an obvious star, as he later became. John Negroponte was a quieter person but also very bright, very imaginative. They were both devoted hard working people and as I recall it, very frustrated people in the delegation, as I was. I certainly had the highest admiration for them as I did for Bob Miller who was a more senior foreign service officer at that time. I remember a funny incident with Bob Miller. He was, from a hierarchical standpoint, below me in the hierarchy of the State Department. I was Deputy Legal Advisor which was the equivalent of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and I think he maybe was at the level of a desk officer, but Phil Habib asked me if despite that I would be willing to sit lower down in the delegation of the ranks when the delegation marched into the room where the famous four sided table was, would I be willing to sit and have Bob Miller sit in a higher order. Of course I said yes. It had no importance to me whatsoever. He was a wonderful guy and also I think deeply frustrated as I saw it. Peter Tarnoff and Jim Rosenthal were also involved in the Vietnam Peace Talk and they later rose to the heights in the Department.

ROBERT O. BLAKE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1968-1970)

Ambassador Robert O. Blake was born in California in 1921. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Managua, Moscow, Tokyo, Tunis, Leopoldville, and Paris, and an ambassador to Mali. Ambassador Blake was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

BLAKE: And then I went to Paris.

I had been told, again, that I was going to Vietnam to have one of the top jobs in the embassy there, head of the so-called "I" Corps operation. I was actually training to go there when I was told that I was to go to Paris, which, of course, delighted me. Sargent Shriver, the new ambassador in Paris, did not like the DCM who was there, Woody Wallner, a very capable

Foreign Service Officer, but older than Sarge. And so he asked for a list of names and chose me from this list to be his DCM. I had not met him but he turned out to be a very good friend, and my wife and I had two very fascinating years. I stayed there until Shriver left and then overlapped for a good six months with the new ambassador, Dick Watson.

Q: *Was De Gaulle still there?*

BLAKE: De Gaulle left office while we were there and Pompidou took over as President. And I saw a certain amount of De Gaulle and, indeed, got to know Pompidou quite well before he became the President. It was a period when our relations with the French, which had been extremely bad, began to improve. First of all, there had been the riots of the students in May, just before we got there. We arrived there just at the time of the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia after the "Prague spring."

Q: *That was 1968.*

BLAKE: Right. We were in Paris from 1968 to 1970. The United States was helpful to the French in a number of instances and the relations with De Gaulle began to unfreeze. Indeed, they were very much improved by the time of the visit of President Nixon to France just after his inauguration. This was as a part of a broader European tour, and Nixon did an excellent job. De Gaulle came out of these talks with a high regard for President Nixon.

Q: *And it was following your assignment to Paris that you were appointed as Ambassador to Mali.*

BLAKE: Yes. There were a lot of politics involved in that assignment. Not long after Shriver left, a new ambassador came in, who, of course, was a Republican. The ambassador went on leave to the States, when he came back, he told me that people in the White House were convinced that I was a card-carrying Democrat because I had served first with Adlai Stevenson and then with Shriver; they didn't want me in Paris.

This report was confirmed to me by the Deputy Under Secretary, Bill Macomber who, while he regretted it, said that there wasn't very much he could do and that I could have any embassy that was open at the time. He felt it was important for me to get to a new place, get established, and get this behind me.

THOMAS F. CONLON
Consul General
Nice (1968-1970)

Thomas F. Conlon was born in Illinois in 1924 and received his BS from Georgetown University in 1948. He served overseas in the US Army from 1943-1945. Upon entering the Foreign Service, he was posted in Havana, Surabaya, Singapore, Saigon, Le Havre, Manila, Nice, Canberra, and Bangkok. In 1992 Mr.

Conlon was interviewed by Arbor W. Gray.

Q: Did you return to Saigon from Manila?

CONLON: Only for about a week, enough time to pack up and head for Nice. Joan was still in Manila with the children, whose school year did not end until March, 1969. She stayed until they finished the school year and then came to Nice with them.

In Nice, although I was still very weak and could not put in more than a few hours of work per day, I was slowly recovering from hepatitis. Nice was an ideal post for this purpose. I would come into the small office, which had another American, Bill Holm, with me, plus seven very capable French employees, at about 10:00 AM, stay till about 1:00 PM, have lunch, take a nap, return for a couple of hours in the afternoon, leave the Consulate at 6:00 PM, have dinner at a local hotel or restaurant, and go to bed at 8:00 PM or so, unless I had a reception or dinner to attend. I paced myself carefully and recovered slowly but steadily.

Initially, when I was in Nice by myself, I lived in a hotel near the Consulate. However, I found a beautiful house, big enough for our large family, on the Moyenne Corniche East of Nice, with a fantastic view of the harbor at Villefranche. The kitchen was fairly primitive, as Joan regularly reminded me, and there were no domestic servants available. However, we found suitable French schools for the younger children. Some of them still remembered their French from Saigon and Le Havre, but the others more or less had to sink or swim. Actually, they did pretty well.

Our two eldest sons had completed high school with nothing better than "C" grades. I told them that, as they were of draft age, they should serve in the Army or another service and go through college after their military service, as I had done myself. I don't think that the boys much appreciated my attitude, particularly as they knew that many of their contemporaries in high school in Manila were going on to college in the U. S., where they could get deferments and avoid military service entirely under our truly iniquitous draft law, as many of them did. I had warned them that I could not see why we should spend the kind of money college involved, even then, when they had made so little effort in high school. After a couple of months in Nice they returned to the U. S., Paco joining the Army, where he served in an intelligence unit, and Terry joining the Air Force, where he served in communications. Both were assigned to Southeast Asia--Paco in Vietnam (in Bien Hoa and Cu Chi) and Terry at Nakhon Phnom, Thailand, on the Mekong River, at a Strategic Air Command base.

I mention family matters because a Foreign Service Officer, like everyone else, lives in both his official and personal dimension. Some of the problems, such as health conditions and the education of our children, are quite unique and unlike those facing our relatives and friends back in the U. S.

ROBERT H. MILLER
Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam)
Paris (1968-1971)

Ambassador Robert H. Miller was born in Port Angeles, Washington in 1927. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in France and Vietnam, and ambassadorships to Malaysia and the Ivory Coast. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You were then assigned to the Paris Peace Talks from 1968 to '71. How did you get this assignment and how did you feel about it? I ask this because in the Foreign Service one likes to move around a bit.

MILLER: Looking back on it, from the standpoint of a career pattern it may not have been the best career move, but I was pleased with the assignment. Phil Habib, who had been my boss for the latter part of my term on the desk, replacing Len Unger, asked me to join the delegation. He was the senior career State Department person, the Chief of Staff, of the Delegation. I was pleased. My wife and I loved Paris. We had spent three years there in the NATO delegation as junior officer and were delighted to go back. I thought that at least it was a constructive effort on Vietnam at that point. I have said, and it is probably true, that I stayed a year longer than I might have had the peace talks been anywhere else.

It did get frustrating, however. In the Nixon/Kissinger era which was basically the time I was there, from the Delegation standpoint and certainly with the benefit of hindsight, my view is reinforced that our negotiating positions were always too little and too late. Sometimes we would say on the Delegation that we had thought of everything but Washington had rejected it. Nixon and Kissinger had their own view about how to play this; how we should withdraw from Vietnam without dishonoring the soldiers who had lost their lives there. They could truly say that they were not responsible for getting us involved in that war. But anyway, it quickly became apparent that we were not negotiating, we were just going through the motions. The most interesting part was the times that we met privately with the North Vietnamese, which we did do from time to time.

Q: I wonder if you could explain what the setup was?

MILLER: When I joined the Peace Talks on November 1, 1968, the US and North Vietnamese governments had announced agreement on a bombing halt and on wider negotiations that would involve both the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese government. We were not anxious to have the Viet Cong and they were not anxious to have the South Vietnamese government. This issue led to the 12 weeks that were wasted on negotiating the shape of the table. There was an added factor, of course, that prolonged this delay in getting down to the negotiations: Thieu was determined if he could possibly do it to wait until Nixon became President. It is said that he was hoping that Hubert Humphrey would lose and that Nixon would win so that Nixon would be the one to negotiate. When Nixon did win, he was anxious that real negotiations not begin with Harriman and Vance but that they wait for Nixon's negotiators. So we had a hard time getting the South Vietnamese to agree to anything we negotiated on the shape of the table. The issue, which a lot of people didn't understand because people were fighting and dying in Vietnam while the weeks went by, was whether or not we would recognize the Viet Cong as an independent delegation, which we refused to do, and whether or not Hanoi would recognize the Saigon

delegation as independent which they refused to do. So we tried to come up with all kinds of devices and I can remember everyone drawing diagrams of tables. We finally came up with a round table with two separate little tables at the diameter with the tacit agreement that each side could describe the negotiation the way they wanted to, whether it was four sided or two sided. We said it was two sided, and they said it was four sided. Anyway this took 12 weeks before we were able to...

Q: This was more delaying action in a way...

MILLER: It wasn't a delaying action on our part. We were anxious to move ahead. But there was a real issue, the real political issue of whether the Viet Cong were independent, which we were convinced they were not, and whether the Saigon government was independent, which Hanoi at least, was determined to show was not the case. The South Vietnamese also employed delaying tactics because they did not want Harriman to negotiate a peace settlement with Hanoi; they wanted to wait until the Nixon Administration took over.

Q: Did you have any feel that the North Vietnamese saw that perhaps they would do better under the waning days of the Johnson Administration than they would under Nixon, or were they willing to wait it out?

MILLER: I am not sure about that. I really don't have any idea whether they thought they would get a better deal out of the Johnson Administration than the Nixon Administration. I think that their real view was, seeing what was going on in the United States, that if they persevered the United States would finally give them everything they wanted. The basic negotiating issue which kept agreement from being reached for so long was that the North Vietnamese insisted that the Thieu government be dismantled before they would withdraw their troops. We insisted that there be a mutual withdrawal of troops before elections were held to determine what kind of a government South Vietnam would have. Through many permutations and hundreds of meetings that was the basic nut that could never be cracked until, finally, at the end both sides did compromise and talk about the shape of the government that would emerge in South Vietnam--sort of a three tripartite government, as I recall, with elements of the South Vietnamese government, non-communist oppositionists and National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) people--before the troops were withdrawn. The whole negotiating position that we maintained in my view made it easier for the North Vietnamese not to agree and just hold out because we were gradually withdrawing our troops anyway under pressure at home.

Q: Your leadership under the Johnson period was who?

MILLER: During the brief period that I was there before the Nixon Administration came in, it was Harriman and Vance, with Habib again being the senior career person. When Harriman and Vance left--actually Vance stayed on a month into the Nixon Administration as continuity to get the new team started--it was Henry Cabot Lodge and Judge Lawrence Walsh, the Iran Contra Special prosecutor. Lodge stayed for about a year, as I recall. He and Walsh left and then there was an interregnum with Phil Habib as head of the delegation for a while. Then David Bruce was named and he stayed for a year or so. By that time, I left. Then Bill Porter took over the delegation for a while.

Q: Did you have any feeling that the various heads doing this made any great changes or were they under very tight instructions?

MILLER: Very tight instructions.

Q: What was your feeling about dealing with the North Vietnamese, both at the informal and formal sessions?

MILLER: We felt in the informal, private sessions which were away from the press, etc., that we at least had a better understanding of their true positions. The formal sessions at the Hotel Majestic where we would go out and brief the press generally on what transpired were really just so much window dressing. The informal sessions were more productive, but even so, they didn't really change positions. They allowed us to explore more thoroughly whether there was any negotiating flexibility in the other side's position, but that was really about all. But we were really under such tight instructions from Washington that regardless who was head of the delegation we didn't have any negotiating flexibility...what negotiating flexibility we had was carefully controlled from Washington.

Q: You had already had experience in the Vietnam Working Group where you knew you were dealing with nuts and bolts and things like this, but there were gods far above you who were handling these matters. Did you feel that you were doing anything in these negotiations? Was it difficult to keep up ones morale and stamina in doing this when you felt they weren't for real?

MILLER: Yes, toward the end, the last year I was there which was by no means the last year of negotiations, I felt it was time to move on and do something else and that as a delegation we weren't really contributing to any real solutions; we were just part of the Nixon/Kissinger negotiating process of 1) to maintain a basic level of political support in the Congress for the continuing effort in Vietnam and 2) as a cover for what Kissinger was really doing behind the scenes. A lot of what Kissinger was doing behind the scenes we didn't know at the time, at least I didn't know. It became discouraging although we continued to come up with negotiating formuli, which we would discuss among ourselves and present to Bruce, Habib and sometimes they would forward them to Washington.

Q: How did the growing demonstrations in the States affect you, especially those after the Cambodian bombing?

MILLER: They really didn't affect us very much. The subject may have come up in our negotiations or in our meetings but I don't recall that it had a big impact on us in Paris. We were kind of isolated from them because we were concentrating on trying to find a solution.

Q: Was there any time when you could sit down in an informal session with the North Vietnamese and begin to really talk about how this thing could be done?

MILLER: You could get to know them a little bit as human beings, their families and life in Hanoi under the bombing, etc., and talk about American baseball, etc., but we were under such

rigid instructions that if we had done our own so-called "walk in the woods" like Paul Nitze did in Vienna with the Russians on MBFR, we would have been jerked back immediately. If we had sent in a cable saying we had this informal conversation and said, if we did this would you do that, I think Kissinger would have had us drawn and quartered before sundown. The North Vietnamese, themselves, were under very rigid instructions also. So under the circumstances that kind of freewheeling exploration of negotiating positions would not have produced anything.

Q: Were there any military situations occurring during this period that had any effect on you?

MILLER: No, I don't recall that there were. One of the things that we were always concerned about, and Washington was concerned about, was a cease fire in place. One of the reasons, we were not anxious until close to the end to have a cease-fire in place was that South Vietnamese forces and remaining American forces would be at a disadvantage because the Viet Cong were everywhere and a cease-fire in place would have given them an advantage. We were concerned that the military situation remain relatively favorable and not deteriorate so that when it came time to stop firing, our side would not be at a tremendous disadvantage. But other than that I don't recall that there was any military action that we felt had a major impact, in a negative way, on the peace talks.

Q: Did the French play any role in what you were doing except giving you food...?

MILLER: For the most part they played the role of host and provided the site and food during the breaks between sessions, etc. They played some role in the background during the peace feeler time. Kissinger used Jean Sainteny as a messenger at some point to explore possibilities in Hanoi and there were other French people who played behind the scene roles. But once we were in the negotiations, I am not aware that they played any real role.

MAYNARD W. GLITMAN
Political Officer
Paris (1968-1973)

Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001.

Q: Then we move on to years 1968-1973. Political Officer, Embassy Paris, and you were involved in political/military matters, arms control and West European issues.

GLITMAN: This was a wonderful assignment. As you can see, it lasted for a long time. We really got to understand France, both my wife and I, as a result of living there and working there on those issues. When I came to the Embassy in Paris, we were still dealing with the aftermath of

the French withdrawal from the integrated military command structure and NATO's departure from Paris for Brussels. A lot of issues I worked on came as a result of that. My first thought was to look at these questions and see if there was some way that I could try to help mitigate the negative results of France's pulling out. I thought that if I had a goal to accomplish something while I was there, it would be to achieve that if I could. I began by looking at everything that General DeGaulle had done or said during the period as they were leaving. I found a possibility in his comment that France would be able to participate in some contingency planning with NATO countries, but this would be of a general nature and that they were not going to come back into the integrated command structure. But that phrase, "contingency planning," struck me as perhaps being a way that we could, if not get back to where we were with France at full participation, then at least have some element of cooperation working. I began to look at ways to see how we could foster that activity.

Another issue that I got involved in was to deal with the financial consequences for all of us in NATO, of France's decision to leave the integrated command structure and to effectively tell the U.S. to leave its bases in France. These bases, so called, were referred to as the "line of communication," which stretched from the Channel ports into Germany, were really crucial for us. If you look at the map, you'll see why very quickly. Assuming that an attack comes from the east, we needed to be able to move forces quickly from the ports into Germany. After France withdrew, we still had some possibilities through the Netherlands and Belgium. But most of the stuff would have to come down through Bremerhaven in Germany. Again, if you look at the map, that means that our supplies and reinforcements were going to be heading south, as the potential attack was coming from the east right across our line of communications. Whereas if our stuff could come from France, as it was set up to do, potential attackers, the Soviets, would have to go through our forces to get to our line of communication. We had pipelines, which had been put in during the Second World War, some coming from the Brittany and Normandy coast, and some coming from the Mediterranean coast of France. We did work out with the French arrangements for those pipelines, gas and oil, to continue to work.

There were problems, but nonetheless that continued to function. What we needed to do was pin down more detail, how these lines of communication would be kept open. In addition, we also had to continue working with them, so that if there were an attack, and I had no doubt that France would be on our side, that we could work smoothly together. Again, the contingency planning offered a possibility, we just needed to continue talking with them and making one another aware of how these things would work.

The French were not too interested in getting involved in exercises with us. That would have been one way to really prove it that we could work together. But they in time became more interested in working with the Germans. Germany was a full-fledged member of NATO, so through that, indirectly, we were able to get some activity together. And I worked very hard and continually tried to foster that, and in time we were able to work some things out. They are probably still classified, so I am not going to go into them. They are one of the few things that I worked on that were classified that were kept a secret for a good long while. Some of it has come out, but I am not going to be a person to put any more of it out.

Another thing that we had to do was deal with the financial consequences for us. We had all

these bases, they were in France and some of them were quite useful for other purposes. Some of them were hospitals for example, and the French government was essentially saying, "We want these." The question was do we sell them to France and how do we get paid for them. I got involved in trying to figure out a way to getting the French to agree to pay for the property we were leaving behind. This is one way where I could combine work with pleasure. I wanted to go out and see these bases and see what was being done with them. So we would drive around on the weekends, take the family, we had a micro-bus at that point; all five children. Our youngest daughter was born in Paris. We'd all hop in this micro-bus and I would look for baseball back stops. This is how we knew we were getting near a base, you'd see a baseball back stop. Because at that point there were no signs that this was formerly an American base. I discovered that some of these hospitals were being used by local French communities. They were making use of them. The airfields were good. Other things came up.

One story that I heard, the Air Force had a golf course at one of the bases in Normandy. We vacated the base and the Air Force said these greens are worth something, and that they, the French, should reimburse us for these. And the French said, "No, no, we are not going to do that." This may be another one of those apocryphal stories, but in any case. Apparently, the U.S. Air Force said, "Well, in that case we are rolling up the greens and taking them to another place." They began to do it and the French said, "Wait, stay right there. The French Air Force will buy this golf course." If it's not true, it ought to be.

Interesting things came up. When we were trying to figure out the value of some of these properties, we would look at the lighting, for example. Well it turns out we use a lot more lighting than the French do. So their argument was, "You may have three lights in this room, or 3000 lights in this facility, we only need 1500, we are not going to pay you the extra amount." While all this was going on, these details, I got into the international law cases. I looked up one called the Chestushowa Factory Case and I go into all these arguments about legal aspects of this and so on. We had these discussions about these properties and how we evaluate them and so on. It seemed to me in the end there was going to be a political deal on this. We had to come up with a number that would be good for us and good for them and settle this thing. Eventually, it worked out that the French defense minister was going to a visit in Washington so I sent cable back and I said this would probably be a good time to make an offer. What we asked for was I think about 100 million dollars. Our initial claim was about 300. Well, I am told that for surplus property normally it's nickel for a dollar, and we were going to get about 25-30 cents on the dollar, so we weren't doing too badly. And it opened up a way to a better relationship in general. So we settled that. The foreign minister told our ambassador, and this went into my efficiency report, that my work with this had been very important towards a settlement on that issue. We got over a hurdle there with no bad feelings about what happened to the property.

And as I said there were other things we did that I work on. Some ideas I came up with which lead to very much closer cooperation in terms of planning and working together. It unfortunately still hasn't returned to what it used to be, when they were a full member, but little by little we learned to work with them. I spent a lot of time when I was at NATO working with the French. I guess I'd have to say I'd always found them very worthy adversaries. You got to watch yourself, they are smart. But you can deal with them, you can work things out with them.

Let's see, what else about Paris? We had a good embassy, a good group of people there. Many of whom became close friends. Bob Frowik, who I first met when I was in Ottawa, he was in Montreal. He worked next to me in the political section. Allen Holmes, also in the political section. Bob Anderson, who was a Political Counselor. John Condon was the Labor Attaché. I had mentioned Joe Pressel, later became Ambassador to Uzbekistan. John Condon and Joe Pressel were two of the best contact people I ever met. They were just wonderful in getting out and meeting folks, getting useful information, coming back and reporting. Both became good friends of ours. There was a lot of social activity in Paris. You can imagine, lot of cocktail parties, receptions, dinners, lunches, on and on. We did a lot of entertaining at home.

We found a wonderful apartment, it was on the Rue de Rivoli and Rue Camboge, which puts it across the street from the Tuilleries and was two blocks from the Embassy. The kids had to commute to school, and I walked to work. In those days, before the troubles in Vietnam and so on, we had a side gate into the Embassy, so when it was raining I learned that I could walk under the arcades on the Rue de Rivoli, stay down till the metro but not use the metro, walk underneath the Place de la Concorde and Rue de la Royale, come up outside the station to Hotel de Crillon and then walk into the Embassy through the side gate so you would get a little moisture on you but not much.

That all ended while we were there when the dangers from Vietnam grew. In fact, I was assigned the task of going over the Embassy to see what we could do to strengthen security. That was an interesting job, because I got into the basement and to the back side of the building, trying to figure out where we would have to put up gates and so on. There was a security officer but for whatever reason the ambassador asked me to do this. It began to change. That side door was closed. If you go there, the last time I was there at least, it was a small fortress.

We had quite a good spirit in the staff there. In fact, everyone was happy to be living in Paris. Almost everyone. I can't imagine why anyone wouldn't be. It was one of the most wonderful times of our life. And the dollar was strong, at least until 1973, when we left. In '71 I think gold standard ended. It was good strong dollar, the prices were not bad and we were able to see a lot of the country. Traveled extensively through France. We both got to know it really well. Soon after we got there, without too much effort, we felt at home. You could spend the entire day in French and not feel out of place. It was automatic. It was a good place to be.

We had two ambassadors while I was there. Sargent Shriver, whom I enjoyed very much. He was interested in things. If you sent him a memo, he didn't just read it. He'd write marginal notes and he'd call you in and ask you to explain things, and he was active, encouraging. Some of the things that I mentioned that I didn't want to go into any detail on went through him. I had some difficulties with some of the other folks to get some of the key messages. Got in trouble with one of those guys afterwards, but I had to do it. He was blocking what I knew we needed. Just a presentation of this. And Shriver called me in and he looked at this paper that he had in front of him, which I had written but it wasn't really what I wanted, and he said, "This is too vague," etc. I said, "Yes sir, it is. How would you like to see a legal version of this, sort of a legal approach?" Shriver was a lawyer and he said, "Yes." I said, "Just a moment." I got in trouble for this. I went and I said, "here." And he said, "yes! That's what I've been waiting for." That paper had been sitting on somebody else's desk for a month and a half and he wouldn't let it go. He was really

ticked at me afterwards. Not Shriver, but one of my supervisors. Really angry. But, if I had not done that, we would not have gotten this message out and this program that we finally worked out with them, with the French, would not have happened.

He was always late to events, Shriver. But he couldn't help it. I accompanied him to receptions and people would surround him. He was a gregarious man, he enjoyed talking with people. He would head for the door, because he had another reception or two or three a night, and people would grab him. And he couldn't be rude. He was late, but I didn't hold it against him.

Ambassador Watson was probably one of the most difficult people I've ever met. Very hard guy to work with. There are tons of stories I could tell about him but I am not sure I should, he is gone. Just leave it at that, he was not easy to work with. And mercurial in some ways. I'll mention the one occasion I used the word to describe a situation. Remember I told you about learning from Howard Green the problems of being seen as provocative and how you should, if you see a situation as one that could become a problem then try to do things on a routine basis so that if you do it in emergency it'll seem normal. And we had a problem. One of the jobs I had was every year and I guess once a month in addition, we put in for over-flight rights. For American planes to over-fly France. When they left NATO we had to go through this drill with them. It was their sovereignty and they wanted to demonstrate that they would work with us but we would have to come in and say, these planes will be doing this on that mission.

I had attended a conference of political/military officers in Stuttgart with U.S. military as well as folks from embassies and they were concerned with over-flight rights in case of trouble in the Middle East. It occurred to me that when I put in these requests, they are usually for various types of flights. But if we thought we were going to have to over-fly with troop transports or something like that, again remembering that lesson about not appearing to provoke, it would be easier for the French to give clearance for a fairly large number if we had established a pattern in advance so that we when we do these over-flights and missions, and are going from here to there and we are practicing and exercising, and so I suggested that we move in the direction of asking for more over-flights in certain areas. I will say this, it will give you a feel for why Watson was hard to deal with. I explained this, that this concept came out of this conference and that I think we had a way to deal with this by every year, every time we put in these requests, we put in a request for this particular type of over-flight. You see what I am getting at? And I said, "If we skew the request in this direction, if there is a problem, it will be much easier for the French to accept, because it had already been accepting that kind of thing in great numbers." He blew up. He said, "I don't like that word 'skewed.'" It's not in the dictionary, and I banned it from IBM." Bob Anderson grabbed me, "I know it's in the dictionary, don't get on with him." And Watson said some other things which I won't be repeating. That was the end of that. But in fact we did eventually begin to make that move. I could only assume that at some point in the past someone had used that word at some meeting and he got angry or whatever was the case. I don't know what it was but he just took off. There were other funny stories, but as I said, I won't go into them.

Q: How about Mr. John Irvine?

GLITMAN: He was, if I recollect correctly, Watson's brother-in law.

Q: Oh, that's interesting. Arthur K. Watson's brother-in-law?

GLITMAN: Yes. John Irvine was a fine man. Calm, thoughtful. He knew his stuff but he did leave the impression sometime that he wasn't sure. But he had it right. You could talk to him, he'd understand it quickly but often I'd get the sense when he asked questions afterwards that he wasn't sure that he had it right, but he did. He was a good man.

Q: What was Watson's career? What was his background?

GLITMAN: He was a son of the founder of IBM.

Q: I'm sorry. I meant Irvine's?

GLITMAN: He was married to Watson's sister. I believe that's the tie-in. He was a lawyer, and had eventually become Deputy Secretary of State, either before or after this. But I liked him. As I said, he was an easy man to work with.

Q: How about some comment on Corps Diplomatique and life in Paris, just in general? We've learned about this fabulous home of yours...

GLITMAN: The diplomatic corps was large, as you can imagine. Many events, receptions, and so on. You'd get quite busy with it. They were a good group of people. I can't think of any specific example and events that stand out particularly. It was just a very busy place with lots of activity. Most of the people assigned there were very good, from all the different countries. Life in Paris. Well, what can I say? It was a wonderful place to live in a wonderful time.

Q: Did you have school-aged children? Did they go to school in Paris?

GLITMAN: Yes. The two older boys went to the American School. They were too far along and we felt, maybe wrongly, that they would be better off doing that than going to a French school. But for the three younger ones, we put them in the Ecole Active Bilingue, bilingual school, and it was in the Parc Monceau, you may have seen pictures of wonderful gilded gates. It was a wonderful school. What they did there was spend the first semester doing history in English and algebra in French or math in French and so on. You would take different subjects in a different language and then in fall you would switch around. Children very quickly became bi-lingual. My wife would go to pick them up at the school, and she would listen to them play with the French children, and back and forth, between English and French, whichever language seemed to best fit the need of the moment to describe something or make a point, they'd switch to that. They were very fluent, all three of them that went there. And they never lost their good French accents.

Our son, who was our youngest boy, he was able to read Le Monde, at least to pronounce the words, and then Herald Tribune, but here is an interesting thing. When we left Paris, we got on TWA and flew out. My wife and I tried to encourage them to continue to speak French and he just would not, not even on the airplane. In his mind, he was going back to the U.S. and he was not going to be speaking French. Well, he still speaks it quite well, but he did consciously try to

stop. Another thing that happened in his case was that he learned to write, the French don't go through printing, they start out with script. He had beautiful penmanship and when we got back to Washington, to Bethesda, they forced him to print. We had his old French books, written out with this wonderful hand. His handwriting is awful now, and the school system would just not make an adjustment for this student. Which is too bad. My handwriting is pretty awful, and his is still far better than mine, but it was, if you could see it, the child of five or six writing so beautifully, and then at eight or nine it looks not quite so good.

I had mentioned that I was able to walk to work while the kids were going to have to commute. That was true for two older boys, but Chris had to drive the three younger ones to school. Both of us, I am afraid, picked up some bad driving habits, driving around in Paris in particular. We had to make corrections when we came back to the States.

As you know, when we make a left hand turn, people line up in the left hand turn lane. But in Paris, they don't do that. They line up shoulder to shoulder and the whole side swoops across. It's great fun. That reminds me of a remarkable scene I happened to witness where Champs Elysées comes out into the Place de la Concorde. I was able to walk over to the Quai d'Orsay, across the bridge from the Embassy. On this occasion I had some business over there, but I was walking. You have to try to picture this scene. This is what I saw. Coming down the Champs Elysées, which is a very wide street, were a number of cars, blocked by some other vehicles that were cutting across the Champs Elysées, just before they enter the Place de la Concorde. There is a little street there. What happened was that there were buses in effect blocking the view of the people coming down the Champs Elysées, and blocking the view of what was below that. And those who were coming out of the Place de la Concorde, seeking to go in to the Champs Elysées, their view was also blocked. What I noted was that there was this line of buses across there that blocked their view. On either side of this line of buses blocking the view of those coming out of the Champs Elysées, the drivers had begun to spread out. In other words, instead of staying in the right lane or the left lane on both sides of this traffic, which they could not see, they had spread out to cover the entire Champs Elysées. So when the buses disappeared, you found lines of cars facing one another. And they had trouble sorting that one out. It was very amusing to see that.

We talked a little bit about the apartment. I should point out that it was a wonderful place. It took a month of negotiating to get the price down to where we could barely afford it. I made sure the contract was settled in dollars, so when French franc devalued we were able to handle that. That worked out fine. There were also some presidential visits, one very important presidential visit. That was the visit of President Nixon, soon after he was inaugurated. Each of us was assigned to a different event, to cover and act as liaison with French officials. And to preview the event in a way and make sure that everything was set up right. I was given the Petite Trianon, a palace where Nixon and President DeGaulle were going to meet. I was able to go out there and in effect walk through the building and see exactly where they were going to stand and sit. We had to report all that back to Washington in exquisite detail. President will arrive, he will walk up three flights of steps, turn to the right, go x number of feet, General DeGaulle will be there to greet him, they will then proceed to this room and that room and so on and so forth. But we got to see the entire insides of the building.

Couple of interesting things happened during that visit. One was that Dr. Kissinger missed his

motorcade, so he arrived late, and quite unhappy, but we did manage to get him in. We knew the building and we knew exactly where he should be. The other two things were while President Nixon and President DeGaulle were meeting alone the foreign ministers were also supposed to be meeting. But all the key interpreters had gone with the President and that left the need for someone to interpret between the American Secretary of State Rogers and the French Foreign Minister. That task fell to me. I was pretty nervous. The subject was Vietnam. It doesn't matter which way it was, French into English would have been somewhat easier, it may have been, I think that's the way it went. But I was not a trained interpreter. Taking notes and so forth. But there I was on the spot. Well, the discussion went on and there were some very easy short phrases and then at one point one of the participants dove into the matter, and begun going on at great length and I was falling further and further behind and as I was about to get almost submerged, drown in this, when somebody came in and said, "The two presidents are ready to receive you now." So I didn't have to do the translation. That was kind of an amusing escape.

Another thing I learned when I was in France and I put to use later on, and that is, the stuff that we were working on, the political/military side. I dealt with the Quai d'Orsay principally, but after a while I began to go over to the Defense Ministry as well, and meet with Michel Debré, he was Defense Minister and he had a foreign service officer, Serge Boisdevaix, from the Quai, working as his diplomatic assistant. So I spent a lot of time with Boisdevaix, and was fully in with Minister Debré as well. What I discovered during this period was that when you are trying to deal with some military problems, there are advantages to trying to keep diplomats out, and letting the military work with the military. It's a much better way to get things done. Because they get down to the brass tacks. They know exactly what it is that they need, they know how far they can go, and that was something that I found useful later on. If you are having trouble dealing with your diplomatic colleagues, see if you can make progress by letting the military do it directly. It did help move these things along in France, and also later on in NATO.

JAMES MOCERI
Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1969)

James Mocerì was born and raised in Washington, DC. He entered into the USIA in 1951. His career included positions in Bari, China (Taiwan), Sudan, and France. Mr. Mocerì was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

MOCERI: Well, the first think I heard was that I was to go to Paris for the Apollo 11 mission, because the Agency needed someone to set up a press operation in Paris to service elements of the European media. I thought, "My God, you're sending me? I'm a class two officer. I've had a fair amount of USIA experience. You can send any junior officer to set up a press operation, if you think you need a press operation in Paris for the European journalists. There are going to be 2,000 of them down at Canaveral for this event."

Well, it wasn't up to me to question, so off I went to Paris. Lee Brady was the PAO, and he offered me the services of Collette Gaudin as my staff assistant in their press center to be

operated under the joint auspices of NASA and USIA.

Even as we set up the operation I continued to think, "This is a Mickey Mouse affair. You (meaning the Agency) send a class four officer and give him the experience of working with the French. Fine. Okay."

Well, as you know, we tried to do the best we could there. I still thought it was so much window-dressing for the benefit of inter-agency relations, but the fellow from NASA, who was with me, thought it was a good operation. I had an arrangement with the Hamelle Photo Laboratory so we could get almost immediate reproductions of space pictures, excellent color reproduction, in any quantity and for European distribution. Kodak used this same firm for their own work. This arrangement was made possible through Collette Gaudin's contacts. And we had excellent cooperation from the Hamelle people. We did have some measure of activity with the press.

Maybe we provided some useful service, but I had my doubts about its importance. After all, the scene of action was Canaveral and NASA headquarters. What people did come in? The journalists that did come were those, I guess, that couldn't get permission or backing to go to the United States. [Laughter]

At that time, because there was talk about the problems of NASA funding, there was a solution: we make the space enterprise a North Atlantic joint enterprise. Get the Europeans to come in and share in the development of the space program, etc. And almost simultaneously, the Economist came out with the same sort of idea.

I asked Collette Gaudin if she could do something for me, because -- I said, "I have this idea and I'd like, before even mentioning it to Washington, to sound out important people in French life, to see whether the French would really respond to anything like this." I added, "Here's the kind of people I want," and mentioned a string of industrial categories I would like to have covered in arranging contacts.

Because I thought, you know, there's no point in my trying to present something like this to USIA and then eventually introduce it in government consultations in Washington, if I come to the conclusion that the Europeans really aren't interested in becoming partners in this kind of enterprise and sharing the financial burdens, as well as potential benefits.

Well, I must say, she did a superb job.

Q: *Who was this, doing this for you?*

MOCERI: Collette Gaudin.

Q: *Oh, yes.*

MOCERI: You may remember meeting her.

Q: *Oh, yes, I remember. She later died, unfortunately, of cancer.*

MOCERI: I knew that she'd had cancer. That was the last I knew. I didn't know that she'd died.

Q: She died about 19 -- oh, it was in the late 70s. I had written her a letter. I hadn't heard from her for some time. And then I got a letter back from Pierre, her husband. All it was, was one line, enclosed by black border, announcing Collette's death.

MOCERI: Well, through my assistant, Collette Gaudin, a luncheon was arranged, at one of the best restaurants in Paris, for about 20 people, all top-level executives in some of the major industries, like the metallurgical industries, the steel works of southern France, and people in the railroad administration. And she had done a truly extraordinary job of getting all these people to participate in what to be honest, was a meeting with a low-level Washington functionary.

So we had this elaborate French luncheon that I never tasted because I spent all my time talking about this proposal, this idea of mine, and trying to get their reactions to it. I thought my clinching argument was, "Look, would you rather spend your \$750,000,000 a year subsidizing certain West African countries, or put it into a future like space, along with other partners of the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements and the United States, under the conditions that you all share, according, at least, to the financial contribution?"

Well, there was not only interest and agreement. They were fascinated by the possibility. I don't think they were merely being polite. I think they genuinely saw this as a real possibility for the future, with certain potential that the French might well be interested in.

I came back to Washington, after the whole thing was over, and thought I should report to the head of IOP, William Weathersby. And I started to present this idea of mine. I explained the background and how I talked to Frenchmen. I had a list, then, of names and so on.

And he just -- I felt as if I had been blown out of the office. "Oh, come on. It's the silliest idea ever. You could never get Congress to even think of agreeing to anything like that. Because no matter what is said publicly, we want to keep exclusive rights to any technology that's developed, etc., etc." He gave all the reasons why my idea was ridiculous.

Fine, Okay. I forgot it. Let's forget it, then. I didn't pursue it. I didn't feel I had any right to go beyond the head of IOP. Theoretically, I had been operating under the umbrella of that office. So nothing, actually, ever came of that.

Meantime, well what am I doing here? It was disconcerting to be part of a corridor brigade. Jim Halsema had written to me in Paris sounding me out on my willingness to work with him in connection with an Arthur D. Little study. He wanted me to join him, as his assistant and serve as liaison with the A.D. Little team. So that was what I came back to. I thought it was a matter only of a few weeks' work, or a month or two. It drifted on. You know the history of that.

Q: I know. I got all involved in that. I thought it was the lousiest idea that we ever had.
[Laughter]

MOCERI: And obviously, there was a breakdown in communications on both sides. I tried to serve as an effective liaison, which meant getting to the Arthur D. Little people to understand what some of the Agency problems were. But, as you know, nothing came of that. And there I was again, without an assignment.

I made the rounds of the office. I went to people like Barbara White. I knew there was a vacancy in IOP as her deputy. Apparently, she wasn't interested, even though I'd helped her on more than one occasion in her career. I'd been partly responsible for her getting her first field assignment as branch PAO in Turin. Until that point she had occupied only staff positions in Rome. And she had worked under me in IOP when I was Jim's deputy, Jim Halsema's deputy, back in 1960-61.

FRANCES COOK
USIS, Staff Assistant to Ambassador Shriver's Wife
Paris (1969-1970)

Ambassador Cook grew up in West Virginia and Florida and attended Mary Washington College, earning her BA in 1967. She took the Foreign Service exam during her senior year of college and served at posts in Paris, Sydney, and Dakar, before becoming Ambassador to Burundi. Ambassador Cook was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin in 1986.

Q: Isn't that a coincidence? Paris pictures. You mentioned last time that you know the Kennedy family. Would you mind going back over that? You began working in the Kennedy campaign. How did you get to know the Kennedy family?

COOK: I got to know them through the Foreign Service. When I was in Paris, Sarge Shriver was the ambassador there. Before they went to France the State Department offered Mrs. Shriver a staff assistant Foreign Service officer position. I went there as a JOT on a regular rotational assignment. It was first encumbered by someone who, I think, was on second or third tour named Genta Hawkins (Holmes) who was a very good friend [Genta Hawkins Holmes was appointed ambassador to Australia in February 1997.]. You've probably heard of her. She's a wonderful officer. Then she moved on to the embassy and then I was asked to take the job. I had it for about a year. So it was technically... I think on the staffing pattern it showed as staff aide to the ambassador. It was actually Eunice (Shriver)'s aide. I think it was a watershed year for me in many ways. I think largely because most young people in the sixties were really very idealistic. One of the things that they idealized were the members of the Kennedy family. I obviously met a lot of the Kennedy family and their friends during that period. I developed a particular fondness for Rose Kennedy, whom I saw a lot and whom I saw even after the Shrivens left France. I'm an enormous admirer of Eunice Shriver's probably more than she even knows. But I watched how hard she worked. She worked so hard in Paris.

Q: Helping him in his work?

COOK: Both, but you know her special field is mentally retarded children, Special Olympics and so forth. She had a lot of assistants for that, who weren't part of the Foreign Service, working at the residence, so I sort of did the other things. But I watched how very, very hard she worked at it. She often would... When, say groups of American schoolchildren visited France on a school trip or something, she would have them to the house and talk to them about their responsibilities to help people because they were very privileged. Obviously they were if they were going to the school they were going to, if they were on this nice trip to France, and therefore they had been given privileges that most people in America never had, and they had an obligation to their fellow Americans because of this. She really lived that. She had an enormous impact on my thinking. The public image of the Kennedies is such a glamorous one, and they are glamorous. But they work incredibly hard.

Q: They're all hard workers.

COOK: Yes. Leaving aside their political views, they play just as hard as they work. They go at it full bore. She did a wonderful job raising those five children. Just to watch her operate and so many of the things that I later did, I realize when I became ambassador to Burundi, which was an enormous difference in scale between Paris and Bujumbura, I unconsciously was picking up a lot of her mannerisms just because I admired her so much.

Q: What year was this?

COOK: This was, let's see, I left Paris in '71, so it must have been '69 to '70.

Q: That was your first overseas assignment.

COOK: Yes. Rose Kennedy stayed at the house a lot. Really all the members of the family came through. We have stayed very close since. I come back for the family reunions still. I came back for - I was at Harvard when Sarge and Eunice had their silver wedding anniversary and I came down for it. The kids invited me. Then I came back from Egypt for Maria's wedding to Arnold Schwarzenegger one summer on Cape Cod. It's fun to see them all again, see the cute little babies grow up.

Q: Yes, of course.

COOK: Feeling very old watching the kids.

Q: And how well they're doing, too.

COOK: They are. They're all doing very well. As busy as they were, they both had 18 hour day schedules, both the Shrivvers, they still managed to spend more personal time, I think, with their children, one on one and as a group than many of the younger couples I knew in the embassy who had their first au pair girl. They absolutely had it in their schedule and they did it no matter what was going on. Sometimes people would start arriving early for a reception and they were still upstairs reading a story or something and that was that. They just had a tremendous amount of personal time with their kids. They had nannies and things, but those kids never had a doubt,

for a moment, about the love, and the understanding, and who mother and daddy were, and the amount of time given each of them.

Q: Did Rose give them a great deal of affection and attention?

COOK: She did and she gave them lots of just sort of wise advice. The great religion, I think, in the family comes from her. I remember one time I sent the driver to the airport to pick her up and he came back without Mrs. Kennedy. I said, "Oh, my god, what's happened?" He said, "She's at church praying." She goes, still, four or five times a day.

Q: She still does?

COOK: Yes.

Q: Does she really?

COOK: The Shrivvers had masses in the residence. It's one of the first ones I'd ever attended. They would have Jewish friends read the lessons. It was not an exclusive kind of religion for them, it was an encompassing humanitarian kind of view of religion. They were extremely devout and devoted to the Catholic church, but their view of religion was a very broad one. It was important to see what kind of role that played in their lives. But so many things that they did, some of the things, I think, I copied from her, eventually probably came from campaigning. But I thought it was just terribly effective and it always showed the concern for the smaller people involved in some big event. I never saw them go through a motorcade in Paris, that was the period, remember, when we were just sending astronauts up and they had always gone on these big world tours, so they'd all come to Paris. I never saw them go through one of those motorcades, for example, but they did get out of the limousine, and go back, and shake the hand of every motorcycle policeman, all the way in the back. I saw them do that kind of routinely and that's not the kind of thing the French would do.

Q: No, no.

COOK: Not even something, really, that many Americans would think about doing because this life can kind of go to your head. You've got chauffeurs and limousines and so forth and you can start thinking this is where you are. But you've got to realize that all the support is there for you, and they're putting their lives on the line for you constantly. Hours you ask them to work, whatever. She always did that. Go back and say something to the chef after a dinner. Constant...

Q: Those little touches that build morale.

COOK: It was remembering [the] people [who] weren't so important, because they're what make it all happen. I think that's so...

Q: It keeps you in perspective, too, doesn't it?

COOK: I think I would have wanted to do that, but I don't really know if it would have been so

ingrained in me, if I hadn't watched her do it. I've never obviously had an ambassador's wife who was more of a public figure, or who had more of her own role to play at the post. But she found the time for that. She also found the time, always, for the children. Those kinds of things are what really matter when it's all over.

Q: Absolutely.

COOK: I think it made a very big impression on me. It also made an enormous impression on me, I think, to watch how that kind of residence was run, which I probably in a small way tried to do. I learned protocol there and all these other kinds of things, so it's never been a problem to me, because it (diplomatic practice) just sort of came along that way, and it's something about which I'm very relaxed and comfortable. They're plenty of things to make you nervous about the public aspect of the job, but I've always been very comfortable with that side of it, simply because I worked in that house.

Q: That was your very first overseas assignment?

COOK: Paris was. I had three jobs in Paris.

Q: But before you went to Paris in '68?

COOK: I had a little bit of French that was it.

Q: Oh, really?

COOK: I came out of JOT training. I came in in the fall. I came in in September after working for Maurice Ferré. Then I had the JOT training, and then some months of French that was that. I went out in May. I landed right in the middle of the May events in Paris, May '68.

Q: Oh, you did. I see.

COOK: Then I had a year's rotational job as a USIS officer because I came into USIS, but it turned out, that year, the most interesting job was the very first one that I had, because another important thing happened in May of '68. That was when we opened the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. President Johnson was very proud that this was the smallest delegation he'd ever sent to a major international peace conference. How he did that, between parentheses as the French would say, is that they drew heavily on the embassy staff. So I was commandeered to work in our press center (because I was a USIS officer), which was the entire ballroom of the Hotel Crillon. I forget how many hundreds, I think at least six hundred journalists came from the United States to cover the opening of the Vietnam peace talks. Every journalist that I had ever heard of or seen on television the whole time I was growing up was there. Walter Cronkite, Charles Collingwood, you name it, they were there. And I was working with them a week after I got off the plane. It was a very exciting way to start. Then I was asked in the course of that year because my French was...

Q: This was your rotational?

COOK: Yes, but it ended up being my first six months in my job, I didn't really rotate because the needs were there for what I described. Even when I went on then to do some rotational work, after they closed down the major press room (after it was clear that we were in for a long haul on Paris), I was sent as the American government representative to the North Vietnamese press conferences. Now, they were held, the peace talks were generally on Thursday, and the North Vietnamese would give their press briefing in one place and we would give ours in another afterwards. But we would wait until theirs was over. So I had to go with a tape recorder and take full notes, on their press conference, and then call our delegation to give them a briefing on what they had said. Our delegation usually had the White House, and the person of - who was the national security advisor for Johnson, the two brothers? - Rostow. They usually had Rostow on the other end of the line and I would be doing a briefing. I had to basically fight with the journalists...

Q: You mean you were briefing Rostow?

COOK: Yes, he was on the other end of the line. I had to basically then fight the journalists because there were only a certain number of pay phones at this site where the North Vietnamese had their press conference, and I would have to compose my cable in my head from the time I left my chair until I got to the telephone, and then fight the journalists to use the phone. All I can say is, if somebody asked me to do that now, I'd be too nervous to do it. But when you're 22, you can do anything. The press conferences were only in Vietnamese and French. There was no English used, so I'd be translating and writing my cable in my head and running to the telephone and really, basically competing with the wires to try to do something. Then I would have to go back to the embassy, and I'd completely transcribe the entire text from French to English and do a textual transmission to Washington by *immediate* of the press conference. But it's the kind of thing - as I say I think probably I could do it now, but I think ten years after that, if you asked me to do that, I'd say, "I can't do that." It's the kind of thing you don't know you can't do, so you do it! So anyway I did that. Basically the first year I had a few rotational jobs but it was basically dominated by the peace talks. I was taken away for various things for that. Then the Shriver's asked me to come to the residence when Genta moved into the embassy and I went up there for a year.

Q: You moved into the residence?

COOK: My office was in the residence and it was the most fabulous office I'll ever have. I had a Roualt painting. Timmy Shriver is John Kennedy's godson, so we had the crucifix from the Kennedy funeral on the wall. We had, I think, a Picasso. I mean I'll never have an office with a Picasso on the wall. [laugh] I worked at the residence. Sarge was also doing a lot of stuff - that was the period, if you remember, the late sixties, when youth committees were very important in the embassies, and it was terribly important in Paris, because we'd just been through all the student riots. So that was the political thing I did, separate from what was going on at the residence. I worked there for a year. I traveled with Mrs. Shriver. I did political briefings for them. I did everything that you can imagine would go on with a family like that. Plus I met about everybody I think I ever wanted to meet in my whole life, in one year, and I was still only 23.

Q: Did you really? Hard act to follow. You went to many of the social functions, of course?

COOK: Oh yes. Yes, I went to most of them. All the people that as a high school kid, from Jackie Onassis to...

Q: You must have pinched yourself from time to time.

COOK: I did quite a lot. But it marked me more than I really thought it did at the time, and how I conducted to myself later. Then the Shrivvers left. This is in '70, and Ambassador Habib asked me to join the Peace Talks delegation. Because, again I think, because of this stricture on the size of the delegation, this very small delegation, (which were all comprised of Vietnam specialists plus a few lawyers) were being submerged by POW-MIA, congressional, family, state visitors. They were all coming to Paris, if you remember the period, trying to get information about their loved ones. The delegation had nothing set up to handle this, because they were less than fifteen people. The legal advisor from the State Department was handling it because he was basically the expert on the Geneva Convention and so forth for the peace talks, and he was getting so it was taking so much of his time he couldn't do what else he needed to do. So they asked me to come full-time on the delegation to do POW-MIA matters. So I became the only full-time member of the delegation who was not a specialist on Vietnam. Then I resumed the press conference activities, but in that case I had both the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, who were by there then, and the South Vietnamese. So I did three press conferences on a Thursday plus the cables and the briefings. So on Thursdays I did nothing but press things, but during the rest of the week I worked on the POW-MIA issue. Phil Habib being the kind of officer he is, didn't restrict me either just to handling visitors, but he sought my ideas on the policy once I got into it. I told you last week I got so interested in the subject that even though we were working seven days a week, I found I would check all the books on Vietnam out of the embassy library and take it home and read it at night. I got so absorbed in it. It is by far the best job I've ever had in the Foreign Service.

DAVID T. JONES
Rotation Officer
Paris (1969-1971)

David T. Jones was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and served overseas in the U.S. Navy as first lieutenant from 1964-1966. After entering the Foreign Service in 1968, his assignments abroad included Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Ottawa. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: From when to when?

JONES: The spring of '69 to the summer of '71. We arrived approximately in May of '69. We had just missed "les evenements," (the events) the uprising and the rioting that so characterized Paris in the spring. As students were rioting, they definitely would have had all the young

political officers (actually, we were multifunctional in a way, but we weren't coned. We were doing everything at that time, doing reporting. But they probably would not have objected for the young officers in the embassy to have been on the Rive Gauche just trying to get a sense of what was happening.

Q: What were you doing in between?

JONES: It was a combination of language training and as I was originally assigned to do an economic/commercial job, I spent time at the Department of Commerce. I also spent time taking the perfectly standard consular visa course. That's essentially what absorbed the period of time from the several months that we spent at FSI to the time when I left for Paris. Very fortunately, my wife and I went to Europe on the SS United States. It was very close to the end of that type of travel opportunity. It was a wonderful opportunity.

Q: What was your wife doing during this time?

JONES: My wife had been doing a variety of career-oriented jobs. After she got her Ph.D., which was approximately in December of '66, she went to do research. She did tobacco research with the Department of Agriculture in laboratories on the outskirts of Philadelphia at Radnor. Then when we moved in the summer of '68 to Washington, she worked again for the Department of Agriculture doing research on dairy products. She published a variety of papers in journals and left the Department of Agriculture to accompany me to Paris at that point. She worked at the Department of Agriculture until about April of '69.

Q: What was your impression of the embassy in '69 when you arrived?

Today is April 2, 1999. David, let's talk. You're off to Paris in '69. What were you doing in Paris?

JONES: This was the first tour. This was a standard first tour Foreign Service officer's exercise. It was my first experience in Europe. It was my first Foreign Service assignment really. Everything before that almost close to a year had been a combination of language training, visa training, passport training, familiarization also at the Department of Commerce, where ostensibly at least, I was appointed in Paris as a commercial officer. This was at a time when there was still a commercial section, an economic/commercial officer. There was still a commercial sector in the Department of State. When I arrived, I found actually to my great satisfaction that I was not going to spend two years being an economic/commercial officer. I was and would be still far more interested in doing political work. What they did in Paris with first tour junior officers was, I understand, relatively standard in the larger posts, to put you on a rotation. Essentially, you spent six months in four different sections in the embassy. So, the first of my tours of six months each was in the economic section. I never did go to do straight commercial work. There had been and there still is a commercial trade center in Paris. There is a big operation there. While I might have expected to go to it originally, I never went there. I just did straight internal analysis for economic affairs in Paris for six months.

Q: You were in Paris from '69 to when?

JONES: Roughly July of '71.

Q: Who was our ambassador at this time?

JONES: When I first arrived our ambassador was Sergeant Shriver. Subsequently, it was Arthur Watson. Shriver was a Kennedy connected operator. He was interesting and popular as ambassador in Paris both with the French and pretty much with the embassy. Shriver was interesting, articulate, vigorous, dynamic, did a lot of outreach things, was very interested in youth, which made younger Foreign Service officers interested and interesting. He was, however, also absolutely maddening in some of the things that he did. One of them was that he was always late. He absolutely drove people up the walls because he would not arrive on time for the things that he was doing. There is one little anecdote where he was out on a provincial tour. The ambassador would go out to different sections of the country and have meetings and give speeches and receive little awards and taste wine and all sorts of things of that nature. He arrived very, very late for something. He gave a remarkably extensive and profound apology of how deeply unhappy he was, how sorry he was he had been late and delayed. Of course, the audience forgave him. The next night, he, however, was also scheduled and he was also incredibly late to his next dinner, etc. He faced an audience and gave again an extended, detailed apology of how he had run late and done this and that, etc. This time, they were considerably less forgiving because he had perhaps forgotten that it was the same audience. They weren't all that thrilled. But as a dynamic presence in France and as a dynamic presence in the embassy, Shriver very much was that. On his Fourth of July exercise, for example, instead of having a standard Fourth of July, he put together circumstances in which people were dressed in colonial costume and organized games for handicapped children, which was very much an interest of Eunice Shriver. The Special Olympics, that were still evolving, were done by them. It was refreshing. He was different in that manner. He was not the kind of pinstriped ambassador. On the other hand, he arrived in Cardin suits wearing Guccis and looked every bit as elegant and expensive as any man possibly could.

Q: What was France like at this time? This was a year after the events of '68. This was their trauma time. How did you find France, particularly Paris?

JONES: I guess they sort of say that every young man should spend some time in Paris and every old man should go back and regret the time that he didn't take more advantage of being a young man in Paris. I guess you have to put it in the context of who I was and what I didn't know. I was remarkably untraveled to be a Foreign Service officer in the terms of 1999. Maybe in the terms of 1969 I was more typical in that manner. But this was my first European experience. It was also my first experience with the French, for whom intellectually I really didn't care very much. This was the France that had thrown NATO out of the country, led by Charles de Gaulle.

This was a France for whom many Americans didn't care very much in regard to their foreign policies. It was a France that seemed to be more interested in putting a stick in our eye than giving us a pat on the back for whatever we were doing. As I spent more time there, at least I

began to appreciate the rationale for what the French were doing and why they had done it that way. Although I never cared for it, at least I could understand it a little better. Although it will probably seem curious, I was not initially particularly interested in going to France. It wasn't my choice of countries because of the points that I have just outlined. But as a country to be in at the time, it was very interesting for some of the points that you raised and interesting also because it was the period in which de Gaulle, in effect, left power and arranged a rather grudging transition between him and his then loyal deputy, Mr. Pompidou. This left de Gaulle himself in a sort of semi-retreat, retirement, exile from which nobody knew exactly what he would do, or when he would do something, or what pronouncement he would issue upon the politics and the personalities of the day. As he was always ready and willing to write memoirs and more memoirs and announce in his Olympian tones what he thought was best for France, it did make things politically interesting because you didn't know what would happen. There was this process of transition from which de Gaulle, having lost a totally trivial referendum on a topic that, frankly, I can't even remember – the point was that de Gaulle always put these referendums as “do what I want or I leave.” This time with a sigh the French population decided on a tertiary issue that they had had enough. So, he up and left. The politics of the period were still relatively calm to the extent there was not rioting in the streets.

Q: There had been though in May-June of '68.

JONES: Yes. That was before I got there. There was still tiny, slight, distant echoes of what had happened, but there was not a renewal of it. The French government had managed to break the alliance between labor and the students. They had offered sufficient enough in the way of offerings and commentary to the students and given them certain changes in how the educational system was operating and promised more money and less crowding and things along that line and got the students off their backs. As a consequence, the students were never really able to restimulate anything on the level of the disruption and the popular unity between themselves and labor unions. Students riot every spring. Who cares? The students are rioting. As a result, the police will come out and set themselves up and put themselves in a position where the students start focusing on them and then they'll have a great riot. Some of the students will get tear-gassed and a few of them may get bopped on the head. A certain number of the CRS (French riot police) will have injuries that will be cited. That's springtime in Paris. But in '68, it was the combination of the students and the labor unions who were able to create much more havoc and upset and disruption in the city and elsewhere in France. But it had very substantially calmed in '69.

Q: Your first job was in the economic section. In an embassy like Paris, you're really down in the bowels of the economic section as a first tour officer. What were you seeing and what were you getting from your more senior colleagues about the French economy?

JONES: It might amuse you to note that I had the best office in my entire Foreign Service career when I was the most junior officer in Paris. I was sitting right above the ambassador's office looking out over the Place de la Concorde. Why did I have that office? Well, because the economic section wanted to preserve it and they needed to put an officer in it, so they put me in it. I have a picture of me against the Place de la Concorde looking out over this astonishing, memorable, historic view. What I think we did at this point – and again what you have is a young

officer trying to get trained and not so much in economics because I don't think they expected me ever to become an economist – was how to begin to be a Foreign Service reporting officer and analyst. So, a great deal of what I was doing was as close to the bottom rung of that level of the Foreign Service as you're likely to get: writing economic analysis from newspaper material to put into airgrams, not a telegram; on the lines of very classical dredge it out of the newspapers, new translations; this kind of work. What I think we gathered and what I would say that I gathered was that the French economy was doing reasonably well. It was, however, a very traditional government-run, centrally directed economy. The problems associated with it were not enormous problems. This was a sophisticated, high tech society. What I noticed as much as anything from that portion of it and from other times was how organized the French ruling establishment was, how carefully educated they were, how they had come up through great schools of one sort or another where. If you read their bio sketches, they had all been educated at the same type of very high level, very carefully trained, very professorial-type universities. They were all deeply enmeshed in the French way of doing things, in French culture, in French history, in the virtues of France, in every element of it – its language, its cooking, its wine, its cheeses... You go right down the line. Those people at the top were very, very, very French. You either liked this or you didn't like this. There are still almost 30 years later very, very positive aspects of what I could say are the French and France at that time. For example, they were and still are receptive to the use of nuclear power, something that we have managed to destroy as a basic source of power in the United States. The French were very practical about its development, its application, its utility for their society. If you want an organized and directed societal elite running society, that was certainly France at the end of the '60s and the beginning of the '70s.

Q: Was there still the “defi américain?”

JONES: Yes, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.

Q: Had that started?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

JONES: It essentially was a book by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, who argued that the American challenge, “le defi américain”, was a substantial challenge to Europe and France and the Americans were doing it better, that the French, the Europeans, were going to have to change their approach, their style, in virtually everything. It was not just by any matter just political. It wasn't limited to economics. It was, again, on top of almost everything else, cultural. The American cultural challenge was a worldwide challenge. You can shorthand it down to the “cocacolaization of the world”, but Servan-Schreiber didn't take that approach. It was a positive view that America was making this challenge and it was not an unworthy one. It was one in which the French in particular had to respond because they consider themselves to have a powerful alternative culture or a culture that they consider definitely superior to English/American culture. So, as a result, it was a challenge that France would have to meet and perhaps change to meet effectively.

Q: In our embassy in Paris, did you find a certain division among the officers, not necessarily according to France, but those that were almost Francophiles and those that were almost Francophones? Was there a fissure within the embassy?

JONES: No, I wouldn't say it was that clear a split. There certainly were Francophiles. There were people that adapted themselves more totally to French culture. These are the ones that whose clothes were more French in style, who worked very hard to get more deeply into French culture and French cooking and French wines and cheeses. In other words, they were trying to make themselves more effective interlocutors with the French by being closer to them as appreciators of their culture and their qualities. The other side of the group I don't think appreciated France any less but they believed that they would be more effective Americans if they didn't try to become second class French. There was no way that an American diplomat would become as French as the French and still be an American diplomat. If you attempted that route, you would be criticized implicitly by the French for not a particularly high quality French person. If you, in effect, did the equivalent – if they came to dinner and you served them chili and beans – they couldn't argue with you that your choice of wine had been less than exquisite and your soufflé had fallen. All they could say was, "That's an American meal. Maybe I don't like it. Maybe I'd rather eat anything else if it was made in France," but they couldn't claim that you were a second class or lacking a quality to being a real Frenchman. In honesty, there is nobody, unless you have lived at the very top of French society, that can be as French as a Frenchman. I think you could also overstate this division. There were certainly no sets of arguments in the embassy over "You've gone native." The French wouldn't let you go native at this point. This was still, if not daggers drawn, a recognition that we were still only a couple of years from the time in which de Gaulle and the French had expelled NATO from France and, in effect, absented itself from the unified defense planning aspect of NATO, although France continued to sit, as it still does, on the North Atlantic Council and in Council meetings at NATO. But it did make for tension. It made definitely for bad feelings. It left some residual problems for the U.S. military still being handled in France as they had closed facilities and rushed off to Belgium with considerable deal of speed and not as much planning as they might have liked to have had.

Q: What were you doing after the economic work?

JONES: The next set of work I went on to was to do consular work. In this regard I was relatively standard as a consular officer, although all I focused on or was focused on was citizenship services. I may be one of the rare Foreign Service officers who never issued a visa. Because of that, I don't have these endless visa stories.

Q: I would have thought in the consular section, particularly in citizens services, you would have had a French national staff who really were doing most of the work. I would assume they were a very competent staff.

JONES: There were. There were good professional longtime staff. But for American citizenship services, you also had a fair group of American consular officers. The biggest issue was the replacement of passports. This was the biggest citizenship problem. Occasionally, you had a

death. Occasionally, you had a certain number of people seeking welfare and support. You had individuals in the U.S. seeking missing children who were wandering around Europe somewhere and they vaguely thought, "Well, they said they were going to be in Paris in August" or words to that effect. So, you had circumstances like that. As a result, all of us as young consular officers met a fair number of Americans in circumstances that were difficult for them. What I did at that time was meet as my supervisor one of the smart, tough senior consular officers, a woman by the name of Mary Chaverini. Mary is one of these people that had a very untraditional Foreign Service career. She was then and certainly would be now one of the very few Foreign Service officers without a college degree. She started as a secretary, was a technician of one sort or another and became an officer. Through dint of absolutely relentless search for perfection and consummate attention to detail, she got very close to the top of her profession and finished as the consul general in Palermo after her tour in Paris. I was impressed by her professionalism and her exceptionally good judgment on risks of various people and her attention to detail and desire to see not a single error crop up anywhere. That bothered more people than not. It didn't bother me. I was able to appreciate this. But there was at least one young Foreign Service officer for whom she totaled his career by the type of Efficient Report that she wrote on him and who disliked her immensely and undoubtedly continues to dislike her. But other than that, she taught me a combination of patience and even more attention to precision and detail than I had appreciated before. There obviously were not many people like her. If I remember a story out of the consular section, it would be that I had been, if not duped, at least sympathetic to a young couple that came in with a lost passport story. They were certainly perfectly legitimate Americans. Mary insisted that they be issued a much more limited passport, a very short duration passport rather than a full duration passport. Subsequently, they turned out to have been involved in narcotics of one sort or another and were arrested later in their relatively short time in France. I recognized that one of the problems of being a consular officer is eliminating your implicit trust in your fellow citizens. You might be more suspicious automatically of some foreigner who is trying to get a visa from you, as you have every reason to be, but I think it's a little harder to be axiomatically suspicious of your fellow citizens who are legitimately presenting information showing that they are citizens. That was a bit of education.

Q: Did you get involved in any Americans caught up in the French legal system, prisons or other aspects?

JONES: A little bit, but not as much as some of my colleagues and friends. What you had at that time and what you still have is a lawyers list and we regularly referred people who had specific kinds of problems to this list of lawyers. I did go at one time to a trial. This was also at the point when the Vietnam Peace Talks were going on in Paris. There was a completely separate delegation within the embassy that was handling the Peace Talks, although I knew a couple of people in there. At the trial I attended the young man was facing the standard drug charges. I got the results of that trial and reported. In this case, I reported them to Ambassador Phil Habib, who was acting as our head of the Talks at that point, and stood there while he talked to the mother of the young man back in the State and conveyed to her the sad story that her son was going to spend jail time. I remember him saying, "Well, unfortunately, they also managed to bring in the fact that he had had a previous problem, which made the French even less sympathetic than they might have been." The French are not terribly sympathetic in their legal system. There are a number of people that suggest that French law is not to give you a guide to conduct but to assess

blame after the fact. That was more of an approach to their traffic laws, for example.

Q: This was the time, '69-'71, where all hell was breaking loose around the world because of our involvement in Vietnam. Did that manifest itself at all other than the Peace Talks? Did you find it was an embassy almost under siege by the French? How was Vietnam playing at that time?

JONES: I think there was the sense that it was winding down with the beginning of the Talks, with the fact that Johnson elected not to run again, with the suggestion that we were on our way out, although very slowly, rather than continuing to prosecute the war at the level which we had, let alone build up to prosecute it with even more intensity. I certainly don't think there was a great deal of sympathy in France for the United States. There might have been a degree of grim amusement. They had been there, and we thought we could do it better. The fact that we were now lying flat on our face in the shit from which they had only barely and unpleasantly extracted themselves amused them, maybe amused them a great deal. But there was also perhaps a degree of "I told you so-ism" or "If you had really wanted to do this job, why didn't you help us when we were asking for assistance" or "You were so arrogant as to tell us how to do the job and now you are in the process of screwing it up and getting screwed by it that we have already gone through."

Q: Were you having demonstrations?

JONES: Certainly nothing that 30 years later gives me a twinge. I'm sure there were demonstrations. The French are always demonstrating against something. Part of it is because their unions are intensely politicized. There was both a communist union and a socialist union at that juncture. The communists were significantly stronger as a political force in France at the end of the '60s and the early '70s. You had regular one-day strikes by the CGT, the communist union. But because they were not well financed and they didn't have real war chests, they couldn't go out and close things down for weeks and weeks at a time. Their tactic was the sectoral strike – public utility workers, transportation workers, one group or another that would come out and have marches down the Champs-Élysées. But so far as specific violence associated with it, I don't remember that level of violence. I remember confusion, certain periods of upset when the Metros were not working or the buses weren't working and you had problems like that. Then you would always have people asking, "Is this going to be a repeat of May of '69?" It just wasn't so. I suspect that you could go to the newspapers and say it was a much more volatile and dramatic period than I'm remembering it as, but I'm not remembering a level of personal drama. I'm not remembering any riots against the embassy – windows broken, stones thrown, or having to withdraw people from some of our outlying buildings. We were spread all over the city, at least six different annexes where our people were associated. I would say that there was a struggle on our part to get our culture not accepted but to have our culture get an opportunity to present itself more comprehensively. You had in the economic section, which I should have remembered at the time, various fights over appellation (names). We, in the past, had labeled our wines as "Burgundies" or "Bordeaux" or labels like that. The French were just simply saying, "You cannot possibly bring a wine to France that has that kind of label on it because it isn't from that region." We were, at that juncture, arguing with increasing pressure and some degree of success that our wines were winning international blind taste testing. As a result, slowly over the

last 30 years, our wine makers have become sufficiently confident of themselves that they're able to say, "This is a Napa Valley red" and they're not trying to label it in the way that the French quite correctly, although definitely irritatingly, were saying, "If this says 'Bordeaux' on it, it must come from Bordeaux." I think we've gotten past that. One of the successes of the last generation has been that American wines have sliced out a niche in markets around the world for a certain type of quality and effectiveness in taste.

Q: Where else did you serve in those two years?

JONES: They rotated us to each section. I spent a certain amount of time, maybe less than six months, in the administrative section. I did a certain number of studies for them of the nature designed to keep this young person busy and try to induce him into doing more work in administrative affairs. If anything, I was almost irritated because they gave me excessive praise for work that I thought was pretty trivial or certainly excessive praise for work that I thought was exceptionally easy and shouldn't have been praised at the level that it was.

But the most important work that I did in Paris and the most important work as a consequence for the rest of my Foreign Service career was done in the political section.

Q: In this period, what were you doing?

JONES: What I was doing was pretty standard internal domestic political section work. Let me talk a little bit about the political section. This was to me the equivalent of the "class the stars fell on" so far as West Point was concerned. During this period, in the late '60s and the early '70s, a man by the name of Robert Anderson was the political counselor. He went on to have at least a reasonably successful career as ambassador. Bob is dead now, unfortunately. Anderson was a very smart and very interesting man. As a person, you would not want Bob Anderson as your enemy. But as a friend, Anderson would be very interesting. He showed off in special ways but he also showed off in ways that were sufficiently clever so that you took a lesson. Anderson once was, so the story goes, reproached by a member of the Inspector General's staff for having given excessively high ratings to his political section members. Anderson turned around and figuratively tore a stripe off this guy and said that he had spent his entire career getting to the point where he would be political counselor in Paris and be able to select a team of the very best Foreign Service officers that he could assemble and that he had indeed assembled such a staff and that under no circumstances would he rate them less than exceptional. I could run down the list of these people and I will do so just to tell you how incredibly successful these people were. They were at that time almost all FS-03s, which is the 01 equivalent today.

Q: About the equivalent to colonels.

JONES: Yes, they were all colonel equivalents. All of these became ambassadors; Patricia Byrne, who was running East Asian affairs; John Condon, who was the labor counselor; Robert Frowick, who was the French communist and communist affairs officer; Alan Holmes, who has just retired; and Mike Glitman. Alan was the head of internal political affairs in Paris. Mike handled political-military affairs. Then there was also Andy Steigman, who was handling African affairs. Steigman, although he left the Foreign Service and has been out of the Foreign

Service for probably 20 years, was also himself very successful as an Africanist. Steigman was one of the very few people at the time who actually was so far out of step as to wear a beard. This was at a time when any serious professional was clean shaven. Today, it's a sort of generational change that people wear beards and they don't wear beards. I've grown a beard three times in my life and now I'm clean shaven. But at that time, I would not have worn a beard as a serious Foreign Service officer and Steigman was virtually unique in so doing.

Q: He is teaching diplomatic practice at Georgetown. He's written books on the Foreign Service. He's been sort of a professional's professional.

JONES: Indeed. I have not seen him in a long while, but I have a great deal of respect for him.

During that period of time, during the 6-8 months in which I was in the political section, which was also broken by going back to the consular section because they brought all of the junior officers back to the consular section to handle the summer rush and the summer flow of semi-catastrophes during July and August, I worked for both Holmes and Glitman being shared by them in this work. Each of them are exceptional professionals and most of the rest of my career was designed to find opportunities to work with one or another of them. Indeed, in the rest of my career, I worked for Holmes at least twice and for Glitman at least twice.

What I did as a political officer was, again, a very standard young domestic political officer reporting style. I did biographic analyses and ran the biographic files. I did a certain amount of analysis from newspapers, reading material and making presentations on the basis of this both either for political-military affairs or internal domestic affairs. Both Glitman and Holmes appreciated my writing style and gave me a certain amount of leeway in this regard. One of the interesting projects that I had was associated with the arrival of the new ambassador, Arthur Watson. He was one of the scions of the IBM empire, son of the IBM founder and a very senior Republican businessman. In contrast to Ambassador Shriver, Mr. Watson was obsessively punctual. He would run meetings in which if you were late, you contributed a dollar to a general fund that went into some charitable operation. It meant that you were on time. Watson was very tough on his more senior officers but also rather lenient and engaged with his younger, more junior officers. This was interesting also in a way. We had a certain amount of contact with him that was unusual for the time. He would pick up the telephone and call you directly, which, for somebody who was hierarchical and thinking as I already was, was surprising and flattering even. But for his senior people, he was very demanding and very tough on them. That made them less happy.

But one of the projects that Watson was engaged in was an assessment of everything that was going on in France that had a government connection whether it was being run efficiently and cost effectively. So, each one of a wide number of officers were sent out and required to do assessments on different aspects of American presence in France. I ended up looking at the American battlefield monument cemeteries throughout France. There was one that was far down in the south of France that I didn't get a chance to see. I visited as a result all of the battlefield cemeteries in northern France and also in Luxembourg. I went out on a trip with my wife in my then new car. This was a very interesting interview, reporting, gathering of information process. At the same time, it gave me some additional insights into how the American presence in Europe

is permanent. As a consequence of the report, I suggested that the cemetery operations could be run more efficiently, that they were really something of a sinecure for a fair number of older, retired noncommissioned officers (NCOs) that were getting relatively good salaries for a rather low amount of work, and that many of the cemeteries were not particularly heavily visited even 30 years ago. Certainly our World War I cemeteries were not. On the other hand, it also gave me an appreciation for the politics associated with this. You could give this kind of a job only to a naive, incredulous junior officer who would actually go out and not have an appreciation for the sacred cow status of the American Battlefield Monuments Commission operations throughout the world and in the United States. So, the embassy and I in particular got a blast back from Washington saying that, "This person doesn't know anything about what he's doing." By and large, that was the way it ended. Watson wasn't able to budge the Battlefield Monuments Commission to do anything. But it was an interesting experience for me personally to have had this opportunity.

Q: The battlefields came into a certain amount of prominence not too long before when de Gaulle had removed NATO from French soil. Supposedly the remark was, "Do you want us to remove our graves, too?"

JONES: Yes, there was that line, but it also was a throwaway line. The French just sort of shrugged it off. "You want us out of France? Shall we dig up our dead and take them home, too?" The 25th anniversary of D-Day was also at that time. That was 1969. There was a feeling that the French participation was very grudging, that it was not at a level that we would have appreciated. The French participation was "correct," but it was minimalistic rather than maximalistic.

I also participated in at least as an observer and viewer the July 14th marches and parades by the French. I was struck by the fact that these were the most militaristic parades that I had ever seen. My conclusion at the time was that it reflected the fact that France did not want to become a secondary military power, but it was forced to do so by geopolitical reality. In one of the parades, it was the first time that the Foreign Legion had participated in many years. They were back out again there. But a comparable American parade would have had floats and cheerleaders and marching bands and the girl for the day waving from a convertible. But this was a serious military parade that was marching right down the Champs-Élysées to the heart of Paris. That also gave me what I thought was a little insight on the French and the France of the day.

Q: Did you have any contact with the French officialdom at a lower level? Was there an attempt made on either part to get the junior officers in the French foreign affairs bureaucracy and the American and other embassies together?

JONES: No. We were not used as junior officers at the level in which we are now forced to use junior officers. We were very correct in most of our dealings with the French. As a matter of fact, there was an extended period of time in which our diplomatic list was limited. We were supposed to be matched with the number of diplomats that the Russians were permitted to have in France. This meant that actually for a number of months, I was not on the diplomatic list, and there was something of a scramble to eventually put me on the diplomatic list officially. I don't remember exactly when I was, but as a third secretary, eventually, I was slowly squeezed onto

the diplomatic list. It made for one interesting experience when I was sent out to do a little representational swing in an area of France. All of the political section officers were being sent out to do short regional trips to both show the flag a little bit and to get some insight to what was happening locally. Although I barely remember the specific details, I went up into northern France for a couple of days and had a couple of meetings. One of the meetings that I had was with a French provincial official who had hauled out the diplomatic list and was asking, in effect, "Mr. Jones, are you CIA," although he was not putting it that way. He was trying to make it clear that since I wasn't on the diplomatic list or at least not on the copy that they had, just who was I? It took me some degree of protestation, a relatively extensive effort to describe, at least to profess, that I was not otherwise connected, that I was a legitimate American diplomat and Foreign Service officer. After listening to me for a while, they were willing to accept this. Whether they believed it, I don't know. But at least they had had this young man squirming in front of them while they looked at this particular curious representation of American diplomatic life there. I'm not exactly sure whether they viewed me as a toad or a poisonous insect or whether they were just willing to say with a sigh, "All right, this American wants to listen to us. We'll give him the party line." That's what they did. They just talked to me about local circumstances of how things were operated and how things developed and the like. It was an interesting experience in that manner, giving me a chance to practice my French and have the chance to see another part of France. My wife and I – this moves into the social, cultural aspect of it – this was when we first became parents. We were parents of twins, which was a rather abrupt surprise. We had not anticipated twins. It was at a juncture when we did not use x-rays. People had gotten to the point where they didn't want to use x-rays anymore for fear and concern for the children. They had not really developed sonograms effectively enough and they weren't available, even at the American hospital in Neuilly. So, they did the standard listen to the heartbeats bit. Although my wife, who is not a very large woman and wasn't any larger then, was very, very pregnant and she was identifiable from 100 yards because they had never seen anyone quite so pregnant. We used to say that she was the most pregnant Chinese woman in Europe at the time. They would say to her, "One baby, Mrs. Jones. A big baby, but only one baby." It wasn't until the children were delivered that we realized that there were twins. Nevertheless, we tried as much as we could to travel within France. They were born in October 1969. We traveled with them and sometimes without them as much as we could throughout France. We traveled to Belgium, into Germany. We hit various places as extensively as we could around Paris. We traveled to a degree to the South of France, but we did not get as far south as Marseille. But elsewhere, we did what we could under the circumstances and appreciated the opportunity a great deal. This, too, was an opportunity where what they say was the truth, that there are two French – the French in Paris, the Parisian, and those outside of Paris. It wasn't a night and day exercise, but you came to realize that if you compared the Parisian with anybody, you compared them with New Yorkers. New Yorkers are unpleasant, hostile, irritating, difficult. You can get into an argument with any cab driver. They have no interest in you except for whether or not they can extract something from you. Although Parisians, although not exactly with the same characteristics, had the same level of indifference to anyone who was not a native-born citizen of Paris. Outside of Paris, it was much less so. They disliked Parisians. That always gave you something to talk about. You also got a deeper sense for the history, the culture, and the society and just what France was in comparison to other places in Europe or the world.

Q: Here you are under Bob Anderson. Did you have the feeling that we were reporting on the

internal politics out in the provinces but that the real game was being played in Paris and what was happening out in the provinces was interesting but more a practice run rather than the real game?

JONES: I think you've hit it absolutely. If anything, most of the officers were very reluctant to waste any time doing one of these regional trips. They were ordered to do so and they would do their one or so obligatory regional trip. But the action in France was then, as has been historically, centrally directed. This is a society that is run out of Paris. People have pointed out that at least at that time almost every country that had had a city of one million had at least a second city of one million or more. But France was the exception for this. In France, there was only one city of a million inhabitants or more and that was Paris. You could say that Paris was the center of everything. If the United States has an economic center in New York and a cultural center somewhere else and a political center in Washington, in France there was only one center for everything. It was Paris. You look at the roads and went out on the road and the roads all are marked in miles to Paris when you are looking in the direction of Paris. The center of operations, the center of whatever was happening, the center of our interest in France, was in Paris and what the French officials were doing. As the political section was broken down, it was broken down regionally and functionally, and those people with specific regional interests whether it was Africa or the Middle East or European communist affairs, or Russia, etc., we had our specialists dealing with those. If it was labor or political-military issues, we had an officer following those approaches. We found them in Paris. You weren't going to get anything that was useful in the way of information other than the general political feelings or sociological sense outside of Paris. You could get a certain amount of flavor. You might do it just to have an opportunity to go someplace else and get out of Paris for a while, but the conclusion was – and I believe accurately – that you would find all you really needed to know about what was happening in France from your connections in Paris. Those were domestic political connections as well. French office holders can hold office at multiple levels, not just on the national level. A member of parliament will be also a mayor. He may hold other ranks in between. So, these deputies in the National Assembly would also be able to be local spokesmen at the same time. This is a very curious phenomena. It must exist elsewhere in the world, but I haven't encountered it outside of Paris, where you have this kind of interconnection between local provincial and urban leadership and national leadership. Of course, France is not a federal state. France remains a very centrally directed country.

Q: How did we view the French Communist Party at that time?

JONES: We were very hostile to the French Communist Party. There was only one officer in the entire embassy, Bob Frowick, who was permitted to have any contact with the French communists. We did not deal with the French Communist Party in any official way other than this very tangential and not terribly frequent degree of association by Frowick, who had reasonably good contacts with them. Of course, it was much to their interest to be as open or approachable or willing to meet the Americans as possible. But I can't recall specifically that he did have occasional meetings with their most senior figures – George Marchais, for example.

Q: Wasn't the feeling that the French Communist Party was a tool of the Soviets or was there a different dynamic?

JONES: Certainly this was the most subservient Communist Party in non-communist Europe. There was no euro communism at that point, certainly not reflected in France. This was a slavishly Moscow-oriented Communist Party. They made it a virtue. This was a very, very old line, very Moscow-directed, Moscow-accepting Communist Party. They had themselves deep roots in French society from the commune. They certainly saw themselves as still potentially being able to gain power. They were running at better than 20 percent of the electorate and it seemed to be an unbreakable 20 percent. They put deputies into the National Assembly. There were substantial portions of the area that were clearly a “red belt” outside of Paris and in the Parisian suburbs. I believe that we did not want to be in the position of giving the communists any suggestion that we had the slightest degree of sympathy toward their interests and we certainly did not want to give the French government the slightest intimation that we had any sympathy with the communists. For that reason, it was made very clear to us as officers in the political section that only Bob Frowick would have liaison with the French communists. No one argued the case. There was an acceptance, more grudging than not, that we did have to know what the communists were doing. But there was no real interest in associating with them.

TERESA CHIN JONES
Institute Pasteur: Post Doctorate
Paris (1969-1971)

Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both civilian and military, Mrs. Jones' Washington assignments were primarily in the fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

JONES: 1968 and part of '69. David is in the foreign service finishing his A-100 training, waiting his assignment. I am finishing up at the Department of Agriculture. We were planning a family. I had arranged for a post doctorate at Louis Pasteur because I had a professor who was French and who had done it. For free people love you. I was going to embark on the diplomatic life. I never in 10,000 years would have imagined myself as a foreign service officer.

In 1969, after French language training, David was assigned as a rotational junior officer at US Embassy Paris. This was the assignment that set the pattern of his entire career in the Foreign Service and that resulted in my taking the Foreign Service test and entering in January 1974. The post doctorate was arranged through a University of Pennsylvania professor Madeleine Jouillie. It was complicated by the fact that I was pregnant and expecting twins, though I didn't know it until hours before they were born. As a result, I was certainly enormously pregnant even in the early months.

At Institute Pasteur, I had two PhD candidates who were wonderful young men but very different from US graduate students. They always waited for technicians to do the actual lab work while they thought great thoughts. It did wonders for my French to speak and give presentations in French but my accent must've troubled them as they kept urging me to go Alliance Française for polish.

I had little knowledge of Foreign Service work, though I did meet the Science Counselor -- who was pleasant and on the periphery of the Embassy. I still remember him talking about a sniffer system to detect acetic anhydride produced by heroin labs -- alas, acetic anhydride reacts with water to produce vinegar. So an overflight of the Marseille to Nice area only managed to map all the French restaurants. As an Embassy wife and one who spoke French, I was guaranteed a seat next to the minor francophone contact. It was fun and I quickly learned that the perfect ice breaker was to ask about the cheeses, the wine, and the politics of France. David loved the work and worked for people who became friends and who eventually set him onto a political-military arms control track that got him into the Senior Foreign Service -- with the success of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. One of his supervisors also mentioned me in his efficiency report and suggested that I take the FS Exam-which they had just opened for spouses.

The twins were a total surprise and inspired me to ask for an anesthesiologist in perfect French as soon as I heard. In fact, I was so ignorant that I had had labor pains all night before they induced labor. Boy, did I worry when I heard the midwife say "two heads, I feel two heads." I remember, praying fervently for "two bodies please, two bodies." There was non ultrasound then. We had twin girls, each about 5 and 1/2 pounds, named Martha (after David's Mom) and Lisa (after my Mom). I tied up the washing machines at the Embassy apartments for months doing diapers. I used to take notes on who did what. I also improved my French by watching TV. They had all the presidential candidates giving speeches all the time. As a result, I began to think that sentences were supposed to begin with "je constate."

CHARLES L. DARIS
Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks
Paris (1969-1971)

Charles L. Daris was born in 1938 in Massachusetts. He served in the US Navy before graduating from the San Francisco State College in 1963. He entered the Foreign Service in 1964. His overseas posts include Afghanistan, Vietnam, Western Africa, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Daris was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

DARIS: I was assigned back to INR to work on Southeast Asia but before I assumed my responsibilities I had the good fortune to be asked by Phil Habib to be part of our delegation to the Paris Peace Talks. I was the Executive Secretary of the delegation and I went on to do that for two years.

Q: That was really on an assignment? You were transferred to Paris?

DARIS: Yes we were transferred to Paris. It was a makeshift arrangement and no one, especially the French, thought that we would stay that long. For example my orders read “for the duration of the talks,” and that was 1969. We occupied a wing of the embassy and had a fantastic team there. At the time I arrived Henry Cabot Lodge headed the Mission and the incomparable Phil Habib was his deputy. Phil stayed the whole time I was there. Cabot Lodge was replaced by David Bruce, another splendid public servant. We had a sterling cast of all agencies represented by very skilled people. Unfortunately the format, as you know, was one meeting a week with mostly posturing so I have to admit that we had plenty of time to profit from France. Not that I regret having done that, but it would have been nice at the same time to have made more progress toward ending the war.

As it turned out, while I was there Henry Kissinger started sneaking in secretly to meetings with Le Duc Tho. Ultimately he involved small elements of the delegation – myself excluded -- in the talks that he was having with the North Vietnamese. Over time, these were to yield some results. The Thursday format at the elegant Avenue Kleber conference site, which the French very gamely kept providing us, was simply a front because the moment wasn’t ripe for negotiations. I still look back with awe on the collection of people that we had in that group. It was as talented a bunch as I’ve seen in the Foreign Service in one location and a lot of it was due to Phil Habib’s leadership. He selected the best and he kept morale up. He kept us at task and we all loved and admired him.

Q: You mentioned the side talks that were beginning after the 1968 election and the Nixon administration via Henry Kissinger who was then national security advisor. I suppose at some point the delegation, somebody like you as executive secretary, became aware that these side talks were going on. Did that sort of undermine the rest of the process or was it something that was essential that had to happen to get some new thinking and new vigor into the process?

DARIS: We were about 25 officers in the delegation. I think by the time he eventually brought some of us in -- and this was after I don’t know how many trips -- maybe four people were included in the substance of what was going on. My colleague David Engel, who was special assistant to David Bruce, was one of these; his splendid Vietnamese language capabilities were put into play as Kissinger’s interpreter. The rest of us knew something was going on but were not privy to the details and I guess that undermined our sense of mission a little bit. But we were left with continuing the facade, if you will, and that was worth it in and of itself. We prided ourselves in being professionals.

Q: And you were meeting with the Vietnamese delegation once a week and probably other times as well.

DARIS: Yes, we also saw our South Vietnamese colleagues socially.

Q: North Vietnamese too?

DARIS: No. There was no social contact. There were a few secret talks with them but not very many.

Q: And the same was true with the Vietcong delegation?

DARIS: Yes.

Q: At some point it became known that Kissinger was having talks in Paris with the Vietnamese. I was in Rome in September of 1970 when President Nixon made a visit and as I recall Kissinger came to Rome by way of Paris where he had had some talks and I think that was publicly known. Does that sound right?

DARIS: I don't think it was in the public domain that early. I left in '71 and I don't think those talks were in the public domain at that early point. They were happening, however.

Q: Was the delegation pretty much in place through much of this period? Were there people coming from Washington constantly to help out, or to second guess, or whatever?

DARIS: Oh, yes. We had an interesting setup. The presence became institutionalized. Governor Harriman and Cy Vance set up the talks in '68 before the change of administrations. The talks went on well into the '70s until the treaty was signed, in 1973. I left in 1971. We had temporary-duty interpreters and court reporters coming and going. The Legal Adviser's office always had a senior person there who would rotate. The Asia person in the political section in Paris sat with us in the delegation. John Gunther Dean, then Patricia Byrne filled the slot at the time. I had Air Force couriers at my disposal. There was a senior CIA operations officer, Bill Koplowitz, who headed a group whose work was dedicated to the Delegation and there was a senior CIA analyst specifically assigned to the Delegation. There also was a military delegation headed by a three star general; Fred Weyand was in that job when I was there.

Q: Most of these people had on the ground experience with Vietnam?

DARIS: Everyone had been to Vietnam except perhaps some of the technical specialists and the legal people.

Q: As executive secretary you coordinated a lot of the preparations. Did you actually participate in the negotiating sessions? You took notes I suppose?

DARIS: Yes, I was a member of the delegation. I attended the meetings and participated in the substantive work of the delegation as well as handling administrative liaison work with the embassy and sometimes with the French. I also helped out our Press Spokesman, Steve Ledogar, at his weekly press briefings after our plenary meetings. Things as I say were working almost automatically by this time. It was a reasonably satisfying experience professionally but with some obvious professional limitations, and it was those limitations that led me to forgo the tempting "for the duration" phrase in my original orders and opt to move onto another assignment.

Q: This in State Department personnel bureaucratic terms was considered a Paris assignment, not a Washington assignment?

DARIS: Yes, it was a Paris assignment.

Q: Anything else about the Vietnam peace talks?

DARIS: I think not. Nothing substantive occurs to me. It was simply not a productive time in the talks because it was not a time of movement in the war itself.

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks
Paris (1969-1972)

Ambassador Stephen Ledogar was born in New York in 1929, and received his BA from Fordham University. He served overseas in the US Navy from 1949-1952. Ledogar entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was posted in Montreal, Milan, Quang Tri Province, Saigon, Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He was Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 2000.

LEDOGAR: I was assigned to quit FSI and immediately go to Paris to the Vietnam Peace Talks Delegation on very short notice.

The so-called Paris Preliminary Conversations took place between May and November of 1968 between the United States and North Vietnam. Ambassadors Harriman and Vance headed the U.S. Delegation. On the North Vietnamese side, Xuan Thuy was in charge. Remember that Nixon was elected in November. The Preliminary Conversations ended just before the election. In effect, the agreement was that in exchange for a total cessation of U.S. bombing of the north, the wider talks would be organized. They would include two additional parties, the Viet Cong on the Communist side and the government of the Republic of Vietnam on the “good guys” side. But of course Nixon was not going to be inaugurated until January. In that period between November and January, the Paris talks were in a hiatus. We devoted ourselves to working out the procedures for those wider talks before the substantive exchanges began.

Q: Were you involved in that?

LEDOGAR: From the Washington end, but by the end January, I was over there in Paris.

Q: While you were in Washington during the late '68 period, you got involved in the preparation for the talks?

LEDOGAR: Yes. For our original U.S. delegation in Paris members were all pulled from their Washington jobs temporarily. Nobody knew how long the wider Peace Talks were going to take. One of the guys from my office in the State Department had been pulled out and sent over there. Everyone was on loan from his Washington job without families until I went over. By January of 1969 Washington realized that this was not going to be a quick negotiation. It was a real hardship

for someone who leaves his family and Washington responsibilities behind to concentrate and stick it out. It was also politically not very wise to have our people shuttling back and forth, rotating. But yes, I was in the State Department office that was backstopping the Peace Talks. I went to Honolulu for another conference on how to win the war and came back and started in the economic training course. Two or three days into it, I got a phone call saying that I was to go to Paris. The purpose was to go over there on a full-time basis to replace the guy, Jim Rosenthal, who was the first choice, but he was too important and was needed back on the Vietnam Desk. The Vietnam working group used the old bureaucratic trick that when you have a levy and you're required to contribute a person to a particular effort, the one person that you want to volunteer is the one who was transferred out and for whom you've already gotten a replacement. In other words, it was a slot out of the hide of the Foreign Service Institute at that time, not out of the Office of Vietnam Affairs. I went to Paris and was there for almost four years.

Q: You went out in January '69 and were there until early summer of 1972.

LEDOGAR: I should mention, to follow up on some personal notes, that in August of '67, I got married. By that time, I was in the Watch Center at the Pentagon. My wife was working here in Washington at the Arena Stage and at the Center Stage in Baltimore. We did not have children immediately. When in January of '69 we were transferred to Paris, she had to give six weeks notice to break her contract according to the Actor's Equity rules, and she followed me to Paris shortly thereafter and stayed for the duration.

Q: Can you reconstruct your feelings before you went out on how you thought the talks were going to go? Would it take a long time? Were you optimistic, pessimistic? Was this a sellout?

LEDOGAR: I did not feel it was a sellout, but by this time, having had the experience from Washington of dealing with the North Vietnamese during the so-called Preliminary Conversations in 1968, we knew that we were up against some tough characters who were going to play this forum for propaganda. Whether there would be substantive negotiations or not was not yet evident, but people knew that it was going to be hard. No, we certainly didn't consider it a sellout and we did not have any instructions that would suggest that in any way.

My predecessor, Jim Rosenthal, and later myself were sent out there to reinforce the press and public affairs part of the Delegation. The U.S. and world press descended on Paris in enormous numbers. There were thousands of accredited journalists. When I got there in January things were in transition. Cyrus Vance and General George Signius were kind of holdovers from the Johnson era. They stayed for one month to help the Republican-selected Delegation organize. President Nixon assigned Henry Cabot Lodge and Lawrence Walsh as Ambassadors. Since Johnson had Harriman and Vance, Nixon had to have two as well. The large U.S. Delegation to the wider talks included representatives of all concerned agencies. From the State Department, Phil Habib, who had been freed from his Deputy Assistant Secretary job in Washington, was the equivalent of political counselor and was career. There were senior military advisors that began with a series of four star generals. Fred Weyand was the first in 1969, and then Julian Ewell followed. Only later did we replace them with a three star general. The press spokesman of the Delegation in the Preliminary Conversation phase had been appointed from the White House. His name was Bill Jordan. But when the wider conversations began, Jordan's professional

deputy, Harold Kaplan, took over as the press spokesman for the new Delegation (Kappy was a USIA career officer who had had a lot of experience as spokesman in Vietnam). Henry Cabot Lodge had a prejudice against press spokesmanship and public affairs by USIA folks that was borne, he said, of his experience as Ambassador to Vietnam. Whatever it was, he acquired a distaste for career USIS public affairs officers. Lodge felt that they were all really aspiring to a subsequent career in the media, and therefore were too kind and gentle with the press. He had been well served by appointing a Foreign Service officer as Embassy spokesman the first time he was Ambassador in Saigon from 1963-1969. So, Ambassador Lodge had a prejudice in favor of using substantive Foreign Service officers to deal with the press. He thought that someone who really knew the politics could pick up the techniques of dealing with the press. So, Cabot Lodge insisted on an FSO as a deputy to Kaplan. That's how I wound up in the job.

Q: Was Frances Cook there at all?

LEDOGAR: Yes. She arrives soon on the scene.

Q: With Cabot Lodge, one always thinks of Barry Zorthian. Did Cabot Lodge not care for him?

LEDOGAR: I think Barry was the kind of fellow that Cabot Lodge thought might be looking towards a subsequent career.

Q: He became sort of a figure. He wasn't just a spokesperson.

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes. And Kaplan had been Zorthian's deputy in Saigon.

Q: Before we move on to what you were doing, what was the impression you were getting of Cabot Lodge? I've heard stories about him. One was that he was laid back. Two was that he was kind of distant, that he wasn't a hard driver of himself anyway.

LEDOGAR: He certainly was a sort of person that kept himself aloof. I thought he worked diligently. It was evident that he really cared, especially about the plight of prisoners of war and missing in action. We'll get into this business of when Paris became a center for wives of those who were POWs or MIAs trying to find out whether they were wives or widows. But Lodge had some idiosyncracies. He was a very nice person to work for. The curious thing is that shortly after all of this started, Hal Kaplan got an offer to go to work in private industry. I don't know whether he was just tired of the whole business, but he took the offer, retired, and left the press spokesmanship in my hands. I didn't have an awful lot of experience. I had done a lot of speaking around the country fielding questions, but not from professional newsmen. So, I had a baptism by fire.

A U.S. Delegation tradition had been established in the Paris talks that before each meeting - and we had weekly plenaries with the other parties - the Press Spokesman would meet with the Ambassador and give him ideas about what were the topics of the day, what might be on newspeople's minds, and if asked certain questions how he might handle them. Well, it was just the exact opposite. I would go up 20-25 minutes before we left to go to the Hotel Majestic meeting site and I got a tutorial from Lodge in how to handle the press - the wisdom of a real

professional. Everything from how and when you sat for cameras to how to keep your collar from rolling up behind you, how to use cue cards, and various other techniques... It was priceless.

Q: He was a consummate politician.

LEDOGAR: Yes, indeed. I thought since I was working so intimately with him that I ought to read more about him. I read a biography and was astounded at some of his accomplishments. His wife was an absolutely splendid lady. I know that he was criticized as a politician for not working very hard with Nixon the first time around, being too laid back. This was not the same kind of physically exhausting routine that I imagine it was on the campaign trail. Lodge lived in the Hotel Crillon, which was about 50 meters from the front door of our Embassy, where the delegation offices were.

I will say this about Lawrence Walsh. I think that he was a poor choice as Lodge's alter-ego because he was not suited for international diplomacy. He was a federal judge whom I had admired when I was a law student in New York. If I had time while I was in Law School when I was in the federal court neighborhood, I would just drop into his courtroom to see what was going on. He had a splendid career in that. But I don't think diplomacy, especially with Communists, was his forté. He was unhappy. A couple of times when Lodge had to be back in Washington and Walsh took the head of the Delegation role, he got flustered and was getting angry at insults and distortions, and he at times resorted to jargon himself. That didn't go down very well with anyone in that circumstance, getting into a polemics exchange with trained Communists. I think he soon decided that the Paris Peace Talk game was not for him and he glided away. Washington never did fill that slot. There was no real role for a second ambassador.

As the negotiations went on, it became increasingly clear that the other side was not only not interested in real negotiations, they were only trying to use the forum for propaganda purposes. In terms of their official negotiating position, they insisted on trying to achieve more diplomatically than they would have gained even by total military victory. If they drove all the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces into the sea, they would not gain as much as their negotiating position was requiring. Hanoi was demanding not only the title to South Vietnam and the elimination of all the South Vietnamese forces and the withdrawal of American forces, among other things, but also that this title be guaranteed by the United States and others. Moreover, they insisted on war reparations. So, it was an extraordinary negotiating position that they held onto for a couple of years. But it became increasingly clear that not much was going to happen, so the press corps started to slip away. Visiting media hotshots went home and the portfolio was left to the Paris bureaus of the various media. Our Delegation also adjusted in size accordingly for the long haul.

Q: You had the administrative talks about getting the expanded Paris conference together. Had that taken place?

LEDOGAR: That was just being completed when I arrived in Paris. I had watched most of it from the Washington end. It's very important that historians understand that what was glibly termed as an irresponsible "argument over the shape of the table" was not quite that bad. The fact

was that there was an interregnum between the end of the Johnson era - he had become a lame duck - and the Nixon administration. There had to be a change in the composition of the negotiations, the Preliminary Conversations had to end, and the South Vietnamese delegations (one from each side) needed to arrive. Importantly, agreements were needed on how the wider negotiations were going to be conducted.

I talked before about my analysis as to what the essence of the conflict was. That was not just my own, but everybody's judgement in the U.S. and South Vietnamese Administrations. It was not a question of four parties of equal legitimacy, but it really was a question of, on one side of the conflict, the legitimate South Vietnamese government and its Delegation and the United States Delegation which was allied to them. Those were the allied "good guys" from our point of view. On the other side, the Viet Cong was not an independent entity, certainly not a government as they fashioned themselves. They were a paramilitary organization that was trained and very clearly totally controlled by the North Vietnamese, who called all the shots. But they wanted to have it, to pretend that it was, the opposite; that there was this legitimate Viet Cong Government and just a few northerners who had big hearts and wanted to come and help them out in the guise of being volunteer "popular forces." The Communists never did admit that regular North Vietnam troop units were in the South. It's ludicrous to anyone who knew what was going on there. So, they wanted to have, if you will, a dynamic, four-sided table, each side occupied by one of the four parties to the endeavor. We wanted to have a two-sided table with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese arranging themselves however they wanted on one side. Clearly they were a single entity. As I said, we wanted a two-sided (our side and your side) configuration.

It was not as trivial as it was reported in the press and public. It was fundamental as to how the negotiations were going to be conducted, and it had to be dealt with before we could get on with substance. And, even if procedure was agreed to, you couldn't really get on with substance because the Communist side wouldn't let you until President Nixon was clearly in office and calling the shots. They would not deal with the lame-duck Johnson administration between November of '68 and January of '69.

Q: You had been dealing with this under the Johnson administration. What was your feeling about this new administration, the Nixon administration, and Vietnam?

LEDOGAR: As I recall, one thought that Humphrey would be softer on the whole Vietnam question than Nixon would be. As Vice President to Johnson and democratic candidate in 1968, Humphrey had been most uncomfortable supporting his President's policy there. People thought that he certainly wouldn't even keep as vigorous a line as Johnson did. One thought at that time that Nixon and the Republican administration would be tougher about a number of decisions, including military action against the North, including the risk of a wider war, including standing firm with our military forces who were in combat. I thought that it was going to be a turn to the hawkish side rather than a turn to the dovish side even beyond what Johnson had indicated he was willing to do. Humphrey, if elected, probably would have sought or taken more initiatives to try to wind the thing down even at the expense of some of our objectives. So, strictly in terms of the war effort, I thought U.S. interests would be better served under Nixon, but I'm not an admirer of President Nixon over Hubert Humphrey.

Q: Obviously, as you went there, you knew it was going to be a rough battle, but was the feeling “We’re going to be marking time until this thing is settled on the battlefield?”

LEDOGAR: I don’t recall thinking in those terms, but we certainly were extremely attentive to the military situation. In fact, one of the things about serving in Paris, as I did for a considerable length of time, was that it was a very clear-eyed place to observe the military conflict. You didn’t have a lot of the smoke and dust of Saigon and being so close to the military scene, and yet you didn’t have all the politics of Washington. We kind of had the best of both worlds. We had military and intelligence people on our Delegation who brought all of the information to us every day and we were able to follow the military situation each day even before Washington woke up. We had a very substantial military composition to the Delegation and that is what they did; they followed military developments, interpreted them, and advised us about how and to what extent they might be reflected in our presentations, in our positions, our recommendations to Washington, and so forth. Anyone of any senior capacity going back to Washington in those days from Saigon would go back via Paris and come in and brief us. Ambassador Bunker, John Paul Vann, and senior U.S. military leaders would all stop in Paris and talk to us about the situation. To the extent that I can recall that period and my own feelings, I, maybe in a triumph of hope over expectation, expected that something was going to break open. It turned out I underestimated the North Vietnamese ability to continue to stonewall for as long as they did, and they were taking very substantial casualties. We had periodic bombing halts and so forth. That was one campaign that we watched very carefully.

A good portion of our time was taken up with the phenomenon of a number of American officials and celebrities who came to Paris, sought meetings with U.S. negotiators, and tried to tell us what U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia ought to be. Many times I had to stand and answer these folks, including a couple of U.S. Representatives from Congress. They would come over and shake their fists and say, “Don’t you understand what the American people want?” I would just reply with some version of the following, while trying not to get into a shouting match: “Yes, indeed. I hear what you are saying. I also know the Constitution, and if you want to affect what my orders are, then you talk to Washington or you go to the voting polls and you affect U.S. foreign policy that way. You don’t come here and talk to the tip on the point of the negotiating pen and try to tell us to violate our instructions and bend things more in the direction that you advocate. Maybe you’re right about the American people and their attitude towards this, but until my instructions have changed, I’m going to pursue the policy as it’s laid down by the president and you wouldn’t have it any other way if you thought about it.” But that didn’t stop the people. They kept coming over, trying to tell us what was going on. The French, as the hosts for the negotiations, had undertaken to keep the atmosphere neutral, but they were having an increasingly difficult time because a lot of folks wanted to come over to Paris and demonstrate somewhere about the Vietnam War.

Then we started to get visits to Paris by delegations of American women, wives of U.S. servicemen who were listed as either POWs or MIAs. When it was quite clear that the Communist side was not going to negotiate on such things as cease fire, withdrawal of forces, and other major issues, we thought at least we should call attention to the plight of American POWs and the total malfeasance of Hanoi on their obligations under international law to release the names of those they had, to allow international observation, to allow for correspondence, and

so forth. They wouldn't identify who they held. There were very clear indications that the prisoners were being badly treated. Under the Johnson Administration we had a policy of playing the POW issue sort of low-key. Hanoi was very skillfully dribbling out a few POWs from time to time in big propaganda barrages where they would invite ultradove American critics of U.S. policy to come to Hanoi and there would be a big celebration of "progressive" American anti-war opinion and of the Hanoi righteousness. Then they would release to them a couple of prisoners. I think there were three groups of three that were released that way. The Berrigan brothers were involved in one of these sorry episodes.

Q: These were Catholic priests in the anti-war movement.

LEDOGAR: Yes. We learned a certain amount from talking to these few released fellows about how, when these anti-war figures, the Jane Fondas and others, came to Hanoi, treatment of the hundreds of POWs worsened. The decision was made in Washington that the U.S. would not go that quiet diplomacy route anymore. We were going to start not just talking in public but shouting about Hanoi's poor performance. The Paris Peace Talks were not getting anywhere. We had very reasonable proposals on the table that were categorically rejected. The proposals of the other side demanded a 120% victory before negotiations could even start. So, we spent a good portion of time in a crescendo of speeches, highlighting and discussing and otherwise calling attention to the POW issue.

Q: As the U.S. Delegation Press spokesman, how did you work? Did you go out there and read a statement and accept questions?

LEDOGAR: The most important thing was to be completely informed and to participate in the preparation and articulation of our public point of view. We quickly realized that the North Vietnamese were very anxious to have this forum, not for substantive negotiations but for public information. For them, it was a direct point of contact with the mainstream Western press. Even Western journalists who I discussed this with including a few I accused of favoring the Communist side in their stories were quite frank in saying the U.S. should not expect "fair" treatment or evenhandedness in Paris. They would say, "Look, you've got people who we can talk to in Washington, in Saigon, and lots of other places. There's no inability on your part to get your message out about Vietnam. But this is the only place where we have direct access to Hanoi officials. You bet we're going to favor them." It was a very tough job. I recall once I got very upset with one particular journalist for a major U.S. newspaper.

Q: Who was this?

LEDOGAR: His stories for 11 out of 12 consecutive weeks led with a propaganda statement by the North Vietnamese or Communist side alleging atrocities or some form of misconduct on the part of the allied side. Each week, they began like this: "Today, the Communist side accused the South Vietnamese of mistreating prisoners in tiger cages" or "Today, the Americans bombed the populated village of such and such, killing so many schoolchildren. The South Vietnamese denied it. Otherwise, at the 46th meeting of the Paris Vietnam Peace Talks, there was no substantive progress." That was the formula. I know that the journalists don't write the headlines, but the headlines reflect the leads and the leads in each case were what the Communist side

alleged. When I pointed this out, not only was there no remorse, the journalist said, “What do you expect? This is their window to the western mainstream press. You shouldn’t expect that you’re going to get evenhanded treatment here. We may try to treat the substantive issues in an evenhanded way when you both ever get around to talking about them, but if they want to use this forum to talk about a real or alleged atrocity or massacre, you bet we’re going to report that. That’s going to be the lead story if nothing else is happening.” It was very frustrating to be up against that. Also, we tried to adopt the policy of not responding, especially in the press conferences, to charges of atrocities. We didn’t always have all the facts at hand. That wasn’t the purpose of the Paris talks. We kept saying, “We’re here to negotiate, not to engage in polemics.” But after a while, that gets to be a losing game. You have to respond. This isn’t just American press. This was the whole international press corps.

Q: What was your impression of the press corps?

LEDOGAR: They were fairly responsible over all, quite ruthless, very competitive among themselves. The charge that they’d sell their grandmothers for a good story is largely true. I learned some curious things. Intuitively you might suspect that the ABC, NBC, CBS bureau chiefs would be competitors. It didn’t take long to find out that they were not competitors so much with each other there in Paris, as they were competitors with their respective colleagues in some other place like Beirut. They were competing for their local Paris story to get on their respective evening news programs, so they were inclined to hype it up and make it sound more newsworthy than the story that was coming from the Middle East or someplace else. Not only did they get their names on the air (“This is so and so from the Paris Peace Talks”), also, according to union rules, they had to be paid extra when their names and images and so forth appeared. They were very competitive. Then you find out that your intuition that the electronic media would be in total competition with the pen and pencil media was wrong. Sometimes they would work out little cross-media deals where one journalist from one responsible newspaper of record would conspire with a television journalist from a major network so that their versions of events would support each other. They’d come out with an angle on a story or sometimes push the envelope of truth. When a T.V. editor would say “What’s your basis for this?” The T.V. reporter would say, “Look at *The New York Times*.” They would cross-support each other by being able to refer their editors to somebody else who also had the same angle. There were all kinds of very charming and admirable things about journalists... But there is a limit to how far you could trust them.

Q: Was there a matter of off-microphone sitting down and having a drink with some of the major correspondents, talking about what was really happening or was it an adversarial situation?

LEDOGAR: Very much the former. I should have pointed out that that was the larger portion of my job, backgrounding the press. I learned that you have to be quite careful that, to the extent you can, you should make yourself available even when it’s inconvenient. Try to be sure that it is the journalist who sets the ground rules and you the person who agrees to them, and not you who imposes the ground rules. Otherwise, you get into this pernicious practice of them saying “a government spokesman who refused to be identified” or “who spoke under condition of anonymity” or something like that. So, I adopted the practice of responding to someone who said, “Could we kick the ball around a little bit?” by answering, “Sure, come on,” especially to

journalists who came in and out of Paris, as increasingly became the norm after the first few months. They wanted me to help them get back up to speed. They would ask me, "What are the ground rules?" I always tried to reply, "Whatever you want. I'll talk to you on the record. I'll talk to you on background. I'll talk to you on deep background. You set the rules. I would add that I would probably be able to say more in one circumstance than in the other. But if I find out that you infer in your story that I was the one who spoke on condition of anonymity, then next time you come back to town, I'm not sure I'm going to be available." Now remember a very important thing. I was very much in demand in Paris. If you were not an official spokesman whom journalists may in the future need access to, the whole issue of "ground rules" is moot. Picture a guy who happens to have been witness to a crime responding to a newsman who comes over and sticks a microphone in his face and asks, "What did you see?" The guy says, "Well, on background, I'll say so and so." That's ridiculous. He's a passerby and most likely, nobody is ever going to count on him as a source again, so what's the incentive to respect his confidence? But, in Paris, I had the ability to really turn off somebody who broke the ground rules. So, it was not just professional integrity. It was also a question of a source drying up.

Q: Did you find that the responsible reporters understood the impossibility of what the North Vietnamese were insisting on or were they just reporting on a day to day basis?

LEDOGAR: Yes. I found that they were quite aware of what was going on. I suppose if you had a litmus test, you would probably find at least as much anti-war sentiment among the American press corps as in the country at large - if anything, more, but I also found that for the most part they did not let that interfere with their reporting, their personal instincts. The thing that we found annoying was more the practices that they adopted of giving preferential treatment and attention to what the other side was saying even though it had nothing to do with the negotiations. They had requirements to file so many stories and they wanted to stay in Paris and be on the beat in case something did happen. They had to file stories, and why not report the propaganda and atrocity claims of the other side?

Q: During the early part of this period, early '69 to mid-'70, I was in Saigon. Everyone was chasing around trying to look at tiger cages and mistreatment of prisoners and this sort of thing. Let's talk about the POW issue and how you dealt with it over the period of time and some of the personalities involved and how we played this for the press and with the North Vietnamese.

LEDOGAR: The North Vietnamese were extremely skilled in handling the U.S. press and taking advantage of our public affairs institutions. It was really impressive to see how they knew the sore spots and were able to push buttons and get the kind of reactions that they wanted. I don't know where they got the training. But on the prisoner of war issue, as we raised the heat, there was increasing attention. We were pointing out that the issue of living up to the Geneva Convention on POW's was not something that was the normal part of negotiations. This was a humanitarian thing where they were in violation of international norms. We highlighted the fact that they wouldn't even identify the prisoners they held, no less give them basic rights of communication and decent treatment and so forth. We did all kinds of things to keep the issue in the spotlight. At one point, we gave the Hanoi side a list of 1,400-some odd names and said, "Would you check off on the list which ones you still hold?" Now, there were problems for them in that... Let's take the case of pilots who were shot down over the North and either parachuted

or survived a crash. Sometimes the citizenry would be the first one to get to these pilots before the government forces got there. The citizenry were a little bit upset about having been bombed. They would really mistreat the individual pilot and sometimes execute him or beat him to death. You might have a photograph of this fellow being led around, but then he was killed. Was that on orders of Hanoi? One doesn't know. But we do know that there were a number of folks that they published photos of as being alive and apparently in their hands who never made it out.

Then there is the question of in wartime, especially when there is a huge amount of violence with heavy guns, some people get obliterated, or a plane gets hit and goes down in flames into a cloud. No one knows if the pilot ejected. Then there was a question of some of the people that we had fighting in clandestine operations having used a "nom de guerre," (a different name that few people knew) so we had to put two names on our list, at least two names. So, you have a problem about getting an accurate account. No doubt about the fact that Hanoi was far from meeting the minimum standards. It was proven to our satisfaction that they had actually identified less than one out every three people that they held. They had allowed something like only one out of 10 to send out letters. They were supposed to allow each prisoner one letter a month in and out under the Geneva Convention. How many would receive letters? We had the testimony of one of our airmen who had been released to pacifists that a young Vietnamese soldier once came around to a cell at the Hanoi Hilton and handed one of the three POWs there a letter. They asked the soldier, "How come one of us gets to correspond with his family, a second is allowed only to receive letters, not to send, and the third is allowed nothing either way?" This young soldier, according to our former POW, said, "Well, that's simple. It's to confuse the enemy."

There were all kinds of malfeasance and shortcomings in Hanoi's basic responsibilities with regards to POWs. We took the position that this wasn't something that was negotiable. This was something that they should do because it's an international obligation. Soon, the wives of U.S. POWs and MIAs started coming over to Paris. Some of them were received by the North Vietnamese delegation and sent away with nothing. Some of them were just refused audiences and wouldn't be given access at all. A few of them received and eventually got word back that their man was either alive, dead, or unknown. We found that it was difficult to figure out a pattern of North Vietnamese behavior, but one thing that we thought we identified was that those wives who were seen by the press or the public or maybe other sources of intelligence as having come to Paris and gotten a briefing at the U.S. Embassy had less chance of getting in to see the Communists than those who did not. These women were brave and well-behaved and you had to have sympathy for them. But they were not very experienced in international affairs and didn't speak foreign languages and so forth. The very idea of not coming to their own Embassy to be briefed, but getting on the telephone and calling up the North Vietnamese themselves, was a little bit daunting. That's where we chose to have a young female Foreign Service officer there, a USIA officer, take charge, go out and meet these groups, and give them counsel and advice. She would take care of their basic requirements of food, lodging, and communications, maybe make the telephone calls for them, handle the transportation, and do all the things that you would like to do instinctively for these Americans in difficulty, but things which might be inimical to their chances of getting their audience if not done quietly. That's where this officer, Frances Cook, came in. When there were no American women in town trying to find out if they were wives or widows, Frances was attached to my press section and did some public affairs work that was not

directly related to the wives. But when a group came over, her primary responsibility was to get out and go meet them and to do all of these things for them away from the Embassy. Frances was first-rate.

Q: She's been ambassador to several places.

LEDOGAR: Yes. She integrated into the Foreign Service from USIA after the Vietnam Peace Talks and had a brilliant career.

Q: In these press conferences, how would you respond to... I assume that the North Vietnamese could come up with an atrocity a day. War is war. There may be truth or there may not be. You say at the beginning we weren't responding?

LEDOGAR: The basic U.S. instinct was to try to say, "We're not here to deal with charges about conduct of the war. We're not interested in your polemics. We're here to negotiate. As soon as you've got something of substance to say, go ahead." The South Vietnamese were less capable of staying aloof from polemics. The South Vietnamese had what may be an Asian, Vietnamese, or Buddhist instinct that a charge launched and not addressed takes on an air of credibility, so they often rose to the bait.

Q: It does in the journalistic world.

LEDOGAR: It does. But really blatant propaganda should be swatted down. We would say to our Vietnamese allies, "Don't get sucked in. Don't get into a pissing contest with a skunk." Often, and sometimes this was a very wise thing to do, the U.S. representatives would "no comment" the atrocity charge and we would leave it to the South Vietnamese Delegation to respond. They would deal with them fairly straightforwardly, summarily, and not get into "So is your sister" kind of responses. But a lot of the mudslinging was done at the press conferences which followed the weekly plenary meetings. The plenary meetings were usually on Thursdays. Each was followed by four press conferences given by the press spokesmen of each of the four Delegations in rotation. Each week, the order would change. The U.S. Delegation Chief would have brief contact with the press as we left our mission on the morning of the plenary. Then the second press contact was as we walked into the Hotel Majestic, where the meetings took place. The third was as we left. At these three brief encounters the Ambassador would make a one or two sentence statement, and take one or two questions as he walked by the microphones. Then there were the formal, sit-down, on-the-record briefings. When my turn came, I would go up and take questions from the international press until all questions were exhausted, so my briefings would sometimes last 15 minutes or sometimes 45 minutes. I would field questions in French or even Italian if somebody wanted, and paraphrased them, but I always responded on the record in English. Even the other parties kind of settled on English, although the North Vietnamese used more French.

It soon became the practice - in fact, almost immediately - that while the plenary meetings were not open to the press and public, we soon were briefing and even handing out copies of all statements that were made in the plenaries.

Later we'll have to get into the whole other series of contacts under the rubric of the Paris Peace Talks. Here I'm talking about our weekly so-called plenary meetings that were restricted but the content of which was made public after the fact. But there are various other formulations that one could have and at times we did use. One could have a circumstance where we had restricted meetings and agreed that we were not going to brief on everything. Now, that is more the meaning of the term of "restricted meeting." Where news of what took place was restricted, we would just say certain things, either by practice or by agreement among the negotiators. Or we could meet other than in the Hotel Majestic, where the formal rules applied. Then you get into the levels of secret talks. In other words, secret in that nobody outside even knows they're taking place unless a special effort is made to talk about aspects of them, either by agreement or by one side deciding to blow the cover of a failed series. Then there were the super-secret talks, ones that were taking place where even members of the Delegations didn't know that some of their own people were meeting elsewhere. So, we had at various times each of these types and sometimes several levels of conversations going on. What I've been talking about so far in this interview is the weekly meetings and the on-the-record press conferences that followed. There is a whole history to the other levels of contacts that were part of the Vietnam Peace Talks, which I'll be glad to get into later.

Q: Early on, what was your impression of the South Vietnamese delegation?

LEDOGAR: They were quite competent and professional. They were from a social strata that was clearly uppercrust. One couldn't help but wonder how democratic they were. Our South Vietnamese probably among themselves found U.S. conduct difficult. They probably chafed a little bit about "sleeping with an elephant." The Americans to them were so "big and clumsy." But I found that they were very cooperative. I certainly had an excellent relationship with my counterpart, Mr. Danh, who was their spokesman. Our families became friends.

Q: Did these elements stay about the same for four years?

LEDOGAR: Pretty much. They had a lot of stability in their delegation.

Q: What about the Viet Cong?

LEDOGAR: They were not very competent. The leader, Madame Binh, was a real dragon lady. But that doesn't mean she wasn't intelligent. She was quick on her feet.

The compromise in the dispute over this shape of the negotiating table was agreement on a set of three tables. A large circular table which was effectively divided into two areas by the proximity of two little tables that were set exactly 24 centimeters from the big one at points 180 degrees apart. Clerical folks sat at the small tables. In the allied semicircles the two allied Ambassadors sat side by side the two Delegations strung out (let's call that six o'clock), with the Americans to the left of our Ambassador and the South Vietnamese to the right their Ambassador. Thus the allied side occupied from about 4:30 to 7:30, so we were very close together. Our Delegations could communicate very easily with notes or something else. On the Communist semicircle, they did everything they could to separate their two delegations. The North Vietnamese were way over here at about 2:00 o'clock and the Viet Cong were way over here at about 10:00 o'clock,

leaving the largest possible gap in between the two in their semicircle. One result was that that made it very difficult for the two Communist delegations to be discreet about communicating between each other.

This was not a very urgent thing because all during the Vietnam Peace Talks, we worked in three languages. Every single word that we said was translated into French and then the French was translated into the opposite language. So, you had plenty of time, and plenty of time to get bored, especially if you understood all three languages because you'd hear things over and over again.

So, it wasn't that there was a lack of time, but with this huge space, especially if you kept a question short, if you tried to toss a tough or tricky question to the Viet Cong Delegation, there wasn't an opportunity for Madam Binh to get her instructions from the North. The North called all the shots. We played a few games like that. They demonstrated that in political terms the Viet Cong were rather pathetic with regards to their pretense to sovereignty. It was clear that they didn't really represent anything independent. They were just an extension of the Hanoi delegation, although they probably all were native southerners, from their dialects. If one of the Viet Cong delegates had to go to the men's room he always had to have a colleague escort lest there be a defection or an indiscretion of some sort. We had no social contact with them and seldom even saw them other than across the huge table. Even moving around corridors to and from the meeting hall, the French orchestrated it so that delegations didn't pass each other in the hallways. We each had our private offices for lunch break. The French did a very good job as hosts. They probably bugged the hell out of everything, especially the private offices, so that they could keep well informed.

Q: The North Vietnamese delegation.

LEDOGAR: The North Vietnamese Delegation was curious in that the Ambassador and ostensible head, Xuan Thuy, was a senior and competent professional diplomat. But from time to time, they had a visitor in Paris, a kind of commissar who was quickly recognized as a member of the politburo in Hanoi and the real force in town, Le Duc Tho. When he was in town, he always deferred in public to his Ambassador, who did all the talking. At times Kissinger was meeting in secret talks elsewhere in Paris with Le Duc Tho, but that's another story. As 1969 unfolded, it became clear that nothing was really going to happen by way of substantive negotiations. The talks drifted off into a total stalemate around June. Henry Cabot Lodge had made it clear that he wasn't going to stick with this for more than a year. The decision was made in Washington that when Lodge left, he was not going to be replaced unless there were some signs that the North Vietnamese were going to be serious. Lodge did have six secret meetings with the North Vietnamese during 1969. I did not attend those. I think they've been well written about. Then we went into a hiatus where Phil Habib was left in charge of the U.S. Delegation.

Q: What would you do?

LEDOGAR: We would continue to meet every week. At first, the North withdrew their Ambassador because they charged that there had been a "downgrading." Mind you, they had had Lodge and Walsh for six months and then Lodge for another four or five months. Then, as I said, around December of '69, Phil Habib, whom they had known as sort of a political counselor, the

senior professional, not a political appointee, was left in charge.

Q: During this time, during '69, was it pretty much laying out the boundaries? Was there anything constructive being done or was it just going through the motions?

LEDOGAR: There was a lot of going through the motions, but there was also a certain amount of repackaging that went on in the plenary dialogue. I attended all the plenaries and was a direct participant in working up the weekly U.S. presentations.

On the other side when they replaced their hard line new phrases, they always put new initiatives in the mouths of the Viet Cong Delegation, trying to make it look as though the southern Communists were the ones who were pushing events, but it was all dictated by and handed to them by the Hanoi delegation. Each time they came out with a new package, be it in seven or eight or nine points, it was very clear to us that it was a superficially more attractive packaging of the same old and totally unacceptable requirements. The Communists wanted immediate withdrawal of the United States forces and they would discuss cease fire only after U.S. departure. The Americans had to get out and had to guarantee the installation of Hanoi's government and pay war reparations. In substance it was just beyond the pale. But from time to time it was put in a less objectionable tone. Once when this occurred in October of 1970, we had a quick meeting within the U.S. Delegation after the Viet Cong came out with a "new" plan. By this time newly arrived Ambassador Bruce was in charge. He said, "Well, what are we going to do with this? People have already been touting it out on the streets and handing out copies to the press corps." One of our people said, "Well, you know Mr. Ambassador, our former press spokesman Harold Kaplan once used a press line in a situation like this. He said, 'It seems to us to be like old wine in new bottles.'" Bruce said, "Oh, I like that." So, we left the meeting hall and as usual Bruce stepped out front and took a couple of questions from the journalists. Somebody said, "Well Mr. Ambassador, what do you think of the new peace plan in Eight Points?" Bruce said, "I think it's like new wine in old bottles." We jumped into the car. I always rode back to the office with the Ambassador and Phil Habib because sometimes we met more press representatives that hung around in front of the Embassy. In the car Bruce said, "That was alright, wasn't it, Steve?" I said, "No, Sir, that was not alright." What we had wanted to get across was that this is the same old Hanoi stuff, but it's been repackaged in a new wrapper. He said, "Oh, well, what did I say?" I said, "Well, you said the opposite." Bruce chuckled and replied, "Oh, well, you fix it in your press conference. Tell them I'm an old man and I misspeak a lot." So, sure enough, by the time we got back to the embassy, it was already on the tickers that apparently something important had happened. The Ambassador had said in effect that it may look like the old stuff but it's a new product that we've got to examine. The stock market in New York even started to react. I was to give my on-the-record press conference later on that day. When I got up there was wild interest and animation. The questions were predictable: "Well, what did the Ambassador say? What did that mean, new wine in old bottles?" I said, "What the Ambassador meant to say was 'old wine in new bottles.' He was trying to connote that this Eight Point Plan in nothing more than the same dreary old substantive positions in new, perhaps more attractive, packaging." "Well, if he meant to say that, then why did he say the other thing?" Back and forth.

At the end of the press conference, I got a note passed to me and by a fellow from one of the

television networks. It simply said, "Steve, see Matthew 9:17." That was it. He signed his name. I went back after this was over and went to the Embassy library and got out the Bible. Sure enough, there was the parable - and it's actually in three of the gospels. As I recall the thrust is something like no more would a man who had found the light and adopted new ways return to his sinful old ways than would a... It goes on for two or three examples and the final one of them is, "Nor would a vintner put his brand new wine into leaky old wineskins." "Wineskins" is translated in the King James as "bottles." The whole point was that it's new wine going into substandard old bottles. That's not a very wise thing to do. Our recommended misquote would have met the case, but it did not reflect the Bible. So, I went in to see David Bruce and said, "Well, Sir, it turns out that even though you got bad advice from your staff, and you were under a lot of stress, you got the Bible right." He was pleased as punch.

Q: When did you see a change coming around? During this '69 period, I'm sure there were long telegrams going back and forth between the White House, the State Department, and the Delegation of what to say and how to say it. Who was calling the shots?

LEDOGAR: Well, there was an enormous number of cables going back. We reported every text and every word that was said. Harriman and Vance had rightly established back in the Preliminary Conversations in 1968 the point that tactics were to be left to the negotiators. The Delegation had a set of instructions and how we carried them out was our business, and we were not going to clear every word in our statements in advance with Washington. That pertained all the way through. We were mostly reporting after the fact, but there was a series of high level cables in which our Delegation chiefs, as any negotiator does, wrote for a different level. From time to time you write for the policy level, not the guys who are going through all the speeches and looking for little nuggets. The Ambassador says in effect, "Here is my analysis of the present situation. In the circumstances, this is what I recommend should be done. I recommend that I be instructed to do so and so." Those high level policy cables went back and forth. I was not in a position at that time in Paris where I was asked to make an awful lot of input on those. They were being written under the responsibility of the Ambassador, by his closest political advisors. I saw them all. I recall that they dealt with nuance and tactics. No one in 1969 was recommending that we change our fundamental position.

Q: One of the almost weaknesses of the American character in something like this is a matter of lack of long-term ability to hold firm. We keep trying something, maybe changing the wineskins, continuing to try to say "Maybe this or that will work." Sometimes if you do this and the other side holds firm, they can always see that at some point if you're trying to change and trying something, there is always something that's less strong than something else. It's just by nature.

LEDOGAR: That's true, and you're right about Americans having that weakness. We tend to start negotiating with ourselves when we don't get any real dialogue with the other guy. "Suppose I said it this way?" I suppose that we suffered a little bit of that. There were so many people looking at it, and all these words which were being published. Our fundamental principles were not very complex, though they were very controversial. We thought that there should be a cease-fire. We agreed to the principle of withdrawal of U.S. forces, but we thought the North Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn, too. We were willing to talk about a number of things, including postwar economic development. But until there was such a time as we had an

expression of willingness on their part to engage on any of these subjects, it was hard to get into nuance. Cease-fire is cease-fire.

Q: What were you talking about?

LEDOGAR: Who was responsible for lack of progress. Now, it's kind of hard to talk about this without noting that some of the things that were happening I learned about only later. I'll jump ahead with the story.

Q: What was your impression of our military reports from what was happening in the field and also from the CIA in Vietnam? You must have been looking over your shoulder all the time at what was happening.

LEDOGAR: Yes, indeed, we were. We had daily military briefings pulled together for the Ambassador and his folks by the military contingent of our Delegation, drawing on the reporting from Saigon as interpreted by experts who were all veterans of the conflict. I don't think that we had any judgements unique to us. There were a lot of disappointments and a lot of surprises as to how the other guy could take the punishment that he was taking and still come back. The Communist Vietnamese seemed to be logistical geniuses. They certainly were adept at camouflage and disappearance and tunneling, and a whole lot of other things that frustrated us. I can recall one of the sort of sardonic jokes: a young North Vietnamese fellow struggles for months down the Ho Chi Minh Trail carrying two mortar rounds in a knapsack. He gets into place near Saigon and there is a comrade with a mortar. The young fellow drops the two rounds down the mortar tube. Clunk! Then the comrade says, "Now go back and get two more." The whole complexity of the war would flood in all the time. In Paris we had an excellent position to observe, but I don't think we came to any unique conclusions. It was terribly frustrating that we couldn't seem to achieve basic military objectives, to draw the North into main force combat and deal with their forces. But could I go back to something we were discussing before?

I want to try to deal with this question of the different levels of the Paris Vietnam Peace Talks. In May 1969, there was a series of six secret meetings which Ambassador Lodge had with the North Vietnamese ambassador, Xuan Thuy. Each Ambassador was accompanied by a small group of assistants and interpreters and notetakers. I didn't go to any of these secret meetings. They got nowhere. Essentially they rehearsed the same substance, and the same stonewalling took place at those meetings as was the case in the plenaries. But I think they led to the departure of Cabot Lodge and the Washington decision to leave things in the hands of Phil Habib. He was career, and not a political appointee, but he was appointed to ambassadorial rank for this purpose by the President.

It was later revealed (in very early '72) that during 1970, after the six secret sessions Lodge had conducted, Henry Kissinger had five of his super-secret talks outside Paris with Le Duc Tho. It was revealed still later that this was done by Kissinger flying in unmarked aircraft to U.S. bases in Germany and then taking a small plane to a French military base on the outskirts of Paris. Kissinger would not even come into Paris; he would just go directly to a North Vietnamese safehouse in the suburbs and have conversations. No one in our Delegation knew about those meetings at that time. I wonder who beside Le Duc Tho were the other people on the other side.

They clearly were from the regular North Vietnamese Delegation. So, that's the first disparity. Some of the Hanoi Delegation were in on everything.

During the period when Phil Habib was Chargé before the arrival of David Bruce, there were several of these meetings. I don't have the dates in my notes here, but they were all revealed by President Nixon in January '72. I know that no one in our Delegation, not even Habib, knew about those Kissinger meetings at that time. When David Bruce arrived, we later learned that those super-secret Kissinger meetings continued. There was a series of about six of them that ended in August of 1970. I later learned that on our Delegation, only David Bruce knew about them, and that Phil Habib and everyone below him did not know. I say that with some purpose. Many of us suspected something was going on somewhere, but I don't know of anyone on our Delegation who would have bet that whatever was going on was in or near Paris. I had strict instructions never to talk to the press about secret meetings. Just stonewall on the whole subject. I think I was fairly consistent in doing that until after the full history of Kissinger's secret diplomacy had been revealed by Nixon. One time, in 1971 I think, one of my on-the-record answers to a question about secret meetings made the *New York Times*' "Quotation of the Day." The questioner asked why I wouldn't comment on secret talks when so much was leaking out or being revealed by Washington. I said I had no comment on why I had no comment.

Recall that there were these Delegation to Delegation secret meetings that were not at the Hotel Majestic, and then there were those super-secret visits to Paris suburbs by Kissinger. A lot of journalists seemed to be confused on that distinction. The U.S. defense attaché in the Embassy knew about the super-secret meetings. He was the one who had to arrange Kissinger's travel with the French. He was later director of the CIA - Vernon Walters. But we did not know anything about what he was doing to help logistically arrange for Kissinger and his small party to come to the Paris suburbs. By 1971, there had been six of these meetings. The series was then resumed in the spring of 1971. President Nixon listed the dates of super-secret meetings #7-#12: one in May, one in June, two in July, one in August, one in September. At this time, I think Kissinger was mostly meeting with Xuan Thuy.

For one of these meetings, however - July 12, 1971 - Le Duc Tho was on one of his periodic overt visits to Paris. He had been confronted by newspeople who said, "You know, Henry Kissinger is coming here to Paris from Islamabad and will be in town while you're here. Are you interested in meeting privately with him?" Le Duc Tho said something to the effect of, "Well, I for my part would be available if he wanted a meeting."

So, we had this extraordinary situation where Kissinger was coming to town overtly. But he was intensely interested in diverting the press from his trail. About two weeks later, we learned that he came to town not just from Islamabad, but having just been in China, the secret trip to Peking. He was very interested in covering all of that up. President Nixon was going to announce the opening of China 10 days or two weeks later from San Clemente. So, Kissinger had two tasks while in Paris. One of them in the face of the press frenzy was to keep all of the China stuff covered up. Another one was to get out of the limelight and meet secretly with Le Duc Tho. But the journalists were all over the place. They were following Kissinger's car on motor scooters and they had everything staked out. He was staying at the old U.S. ambassadorial residence and that was staked out. The problem was how to get into a secret meeting and otherwise cover up

this whole thing. I was very much involved in his plan because the press corps was kind of my responsibility. I was misled by Henry Kissinger into putting out untruths. It was quite clear.

Q: [Imitating Claude Raines] "I'm shocked" [laughter]!

LEDOGAR: Sounds like the movie "Casablanca." That was part of the game. In retrospect I don't resent being misled by him. A lot of well-known and honorable people were misled by him, but I thought that matters could have been handled in ways that did not necessarily sacrifice so much goodwill the Delegation had built with the press corps. You spend a lot of time trying to build that up and to deal with them in as honorable way as you can. Silence is not necessarily misleading, but to tell them that one thing is happening when exactly the opposite is happening is something they don't easily forget. But it was a very dicey period in which a whole lot of things took place. When it became quite clear that I was being used to mislead the press, I was annoyed. He wanted to throw the press off his trail. But it was not so much about the meeting with Le Duc Tho because that was accomplished rather neatly with the help of some U.S. clandestine operators who spirited Kissinger out of where he was and into the outskirts, and the newsmen who were right there staking out the house were not the wiser. It was the China thing that required throwing sand. So Kissinger had this flurry of activity where he was reported to be in one place and then he was reported to be going to meet Frank Sinatra in Maxim's and then he shows up on television at another restaurant with a very attractive young blonde journalist. By this time, I had just drifted away from the whole scene, figuring that enough was enough. I got a call at home and a newsmen said, "Where is Kissinger now?" I said, "I don't know." This guy, who was friendly, said, "I'll tell you where he is, Steve. He's in this restaurant having dinner with Miss So and So. We're standing out here waiting to see what happens next."

I did bump into David Bruce the next day. I kind of made some noises to the effect that I wished it hadn't been necessary to lie to the press, and that all that happened yesterday could have been accomplished without lying. Bruce said, "You know, he actually was going to meet Frank Sinatra at Maxim's, but it turned out that the restrictions on the airport were such that Sinatra couldn't get here from London and take off again before the 11:00 PM noise curfew at Le Bourget."

Now I'm going to jump ahead. David Bruce left Paris in '72. He was not terribly well. He had circulation problems and was told to stop sitting around the Paris meetings so much and to get out and keep active. He went on vacation for a while and then became our first representative to Peking, later Beijing. Then having completed that service, he was named by President Nixon to Brussels to the U.S. Mission to NATO. He replaced Donald Rumsfeld as U.S. permanent representative in 1974. I was there at the time. When a new Ambassador arrived, they arranged to gather the whole staff around, which was considerable. We had about 100 Americans. Bruce spoke to us as a group and then we all kind of filed past to shake hands. A number of our people had served with him before. He had been Ambassador to London for four years and to Germany and had led the Point Four Program in Paris and all sorts of Foreign Service postings. I came by and started to say my name and he just kind of looked up at me and said, "Steve, I want to see you immediately afterwards in my office." When the reception line was completed, I went down to his office and walked in and he said, "Hi, sit down. Good to see you again. Phil never knew." I was kind of stunned into silence. He said, "It's one of the toughest decisions Henry had to make,

but it was decided that it was best that the substance of those secret talks be kept the way it was kept.” He didn’t say, “Steve, we’re sorry we left you out there with egg on your face. Too bad it was necessary to throw people off our trail.” He just said, in effect, that not even Phil Habib knew at the time. That was it. That was the total conversation. I thanked him very much and we talked about some pleasantries and that was that. The point is, there had been occurrences that caused people to suspect that negotiations were going on in Warsaw in Peking, in places other than Paris... A lot of speculation but no hard facts. Some of my colleagues on the Delegation somehow or other later convinced themselves that they had known about those Kissinger meetings at the time they were going on in the subterranean level. My conviction is that they didn’t. The only one member of the U.S. Delegation who knew was David Bruce and he had been sent specifically to Paris to provide the cover of the weekly plenary sessions for the secret talks; and that 1972 revelation was indeed a very tough blow to Phil Habib, who in 1969 had been left in charge and yet was not even brought into the picture.

Q: Moving toward the end of these sessions, your group was going through the formalities. How did that play out?

LEDOGAR: It played out with business as before, no progress whatsoever. It was a little bit embarrassing to realize that all the time before the Nixon revelations in January of ’72, many of the people on the other side of the table knew about these because they were involved in them. All of us on the allied side, everyone except our Ambassador, were not in the picture. So, you realized that at least some of the North Vietnamese had been sitting there smirking at you and drawing their own conclusions.

Q: Do you think they knew or just maybe the top person in the Delegation knew?

LEDOGAR: They had to have at least four or five. They needed notetakers and interpreters and a senior advisor at hand. My guess is that in the Kissinger super-secret talks they probably had about six and we had six.

Q: But our six were all from Washington?

LEDOGAR: Yes, and their six were for the most part drawn from their regular Paris Delegation.

Q: Often on negotiations that are difficult, as we did with the Soviets, there would be a lunch break and everybody would get together and chat a little. This never happened during your time?

LEDOGAR: We never met during lunch break with anyone other than our South Vietnamese allies. I don’t recall the issue of informal contacts even coming up. No one was seriously suggesting, “Let’s wander down the hall.”

Q: How could you keep doing this? If things weren’t moving for more than a year...

LEDOGAR: It was very frustrating. Probably most of those on our Delegation who did not have the daily interface with the press and the responsibility to be on your feet and defending not just the negotiating position but also all the other aspects of American conduct of the Vietnam

conflict, were even more frustrated than as I. I would meet with journalists almost every morning of the week and then go out to receptions in the evening and run into a bunch of press people there - I had a budget and entertained my press contacts from time to time. I at least had something to do, but it was a very frustrating thing, especially when you saw the casualty lists. We had the question of the cost of the negotiations come up a number of times. People would say, "Well, how much does it cost to keep you guys here in deadlocked negotiations?" They thought that the Ambassador who was put up at the Hotel Crillon and the rest of us were living high on the hog in Paris. I developed a standard answer to the effect that as far as I could calculate, negotiations cost about the same price per year as one Huey helicopter, and we were losing at least one of those helicopters every day in Vietnam. Another line that I developed and I still believe is true is that any emotion, especially frustration or boredom on the part of a diplomat, should be likened to squeamishness on the part of a surgeon. It's unprofessional to be bored or frustrated. You have to get hold of yourself and make sure that you focus on what your responsibility is, and defend your position and make it clear that the other side is responsible for no movement, and not our side. That was a problem and it led to the departure of a number of our people who decided to seek other assignments. Life was too short for this, they decided.

Q: How about the events of May 1970 in Vietnam, going into Cambodia? Did that raise any blip on your work?

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes, and they raised a big blip on the radar screens of the American public. Many critics felt that the Cambodian incursion was a direct and vicious extension of the conflict on the part of the United States. This criticism had a negative effect. Similar to the Bay of Pigs, we got cold feet and we banked the military effort back so that it was indecisive. We took all of the heat of going into Cambodia, but we restricted ourselves to the first 25 kilometers and only for a period of weeks. What we did was militarily ineffective and yet we took all of the abuse for escalating the war.

I keep mentioning Phil Habib because he was my mentor and my direct supervisor. I can remember at certain points that he would point out the downside of acting indecisively in the military field. In 1972 there was a big allied offensive. It was one of the last ones in which U.S. forces were directly engaged. It was into Laos along Route 9 through the mountains to try to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Q: It was basically Vietnamese-run though.

LEDOGAR: That's right. It was entirely Vietnamese ground forces with U.S. air support. Again, we pulled our punch, fearing that this would be regarded as excessive U.S. force. So, we didn't really support them as they should have been supported, and the South Vietnamese got cold feet and cut and ran. It was a disaster and I remember Phil Habib waving his arms and saying, "By God, if you're going to do something like that, do it decisively." Any political-military expert will observe that truism, one that was always observed by the Soviet Union. When the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia, they came with everything. It may have looked like overkill, but there was nothing indecisive about a military move by Soviet forces. There was a lot of that indecisive sort of thing from the U.S. in Vietnam.

I should have mentioned that in June '69, President Nixon announced that as part of his plan, which became known as Vietnamization, the first tranche (slice) of U.S. troops would be coming out. I can remember keeping in my desk drawer a little chart that I had designed with the level of U.S. in-country troops on the vertical axis, 535,500 or whatever the number was, straight down to zero; and the months from '69 to '73, that would be the end of the Nixon administration, on the horizontal axis. You could trace a straight line from 535 thousand to zero in four years. As you plotted each successive Vietnamization tranche that was announced, although they varied in size and duration - in the next so many months, so many troops would come out - the plot wasn't far from a straight line. The rate of Vietnamization, in other words, was quite predictable. So, all this time, the last half of '69 and through '70, U.S. forces were coming out in significant numbers. U.S. troop levels were headed down.

There were the Saigon elections. A secret letter to Ho Chi Minh in the middle of '69 was later revealed. Ho Chi Minh died in September of '69. That was the end of the secret talks for a long time. Lodge departed in December of '69. Here I'm speaking from notes I pulled together which compile chronologically what we knew then along with what was later made public. David Bruce was named in July of '70... He did meet with his counterpart in November of that year, but that was not the super-secret level. That was Delegation to Delegation. It was in February of '71 that the South Vietnamese forces went into Laos. That was the first big test of Vietnamization. We later learned that there were Kissinger level talks in May, through September of that year. Of course, July was when Kissinger was in Peking and came through Paris overtly.

Q: I want to come back to you. You say you were there until '72. You left when then?

LEDOGAR: Late spring or early summer. I had some home leave and then I went to senior training at Stanford University.

Q: When you went up towards '72, were you there when we announced that we were going to renew relations of some sort with China?

LEDOGAR: Yes. That was announced in late July or early August of '71.

Q: Was everybody singing the same tune over and over again on both sides?

LEDOGAR: Pretty much, but we thought that that would be received as very bad news by the Communist side, that the U.S. and China were regularizing relations. Similarly, the fact that we had some ongoing contacts including meetings at high levels with the Russians, with the Soviets, we thought that that would be something that would encourage Hanoi to get on with this problem. But somewhere at the end of '71, we resumed limited bombings of the North. When David Bruce left in August of '71 and before William Porter arrived as head of the U.S. Delegation, there was a brief period when there were no talks at all. The other side, in effect, walked out. Weekly plenaries were also suspended in '72 between March and May. I was still in Paris at the time.

Q: What were you doing?

LEDOGAR: Not much. Our second child was born in Paris in March '72. The Delegation was reading the record of Kissinger talks, which was beginning to come out to those of us who were in the business. We studied what had and what had not taken place.

Q: When the Kissinger talks were revealed, did you have any particular problems with the press or was it that they understood you didn't know?

LEDOGAR: They understood that we on the Paris-based U.S. Delegation didn't know. Some of them might have figured, "Well, boy, those guys played this pretty cool because they always said 'No comment' to any question about private talks. Maybe they knew something." They were wrong if they thought that. We knew nothing.

Q: So, what was the status by the time you left in the summer of '72?

LEDOGAR: By the time I left, the super-secret series with Henry Kissinger became just restricted sessions. They continued and indeed began to produce results in the form of a draft peace treaty. The North Vietnamese insisted that they wanted to reestablish the cover of the weekly plenaries and I did a little bit of that, but then I started training my successor, David Lambertson, and started looking towards getting out of Paris. We did resume the plenaries in May. Then they were suspended later in that month. Then they were resumed in July. By that time, I was all but gone.

Q: Looking back on it, did you feel that the sessions that you had endured had cut out some of the ground that could be built upon for other sessions or were they sterile?

LEDOGAR: That is an interesting question. I think that we broke some of the ground, but whether or not we were merely reflecting decisions that had been taken elsewhere or whether we were actually doing something that helped to focus issues elsewhere is hard to say. You would have to sit down and compare the records of both series of meetings chronologically - the full transcripts of plenaries and the reports from the super-secret talks. I didn't have that opportunity. I pointed out that in '71, in about August, William Porter became the Ambassador. David Bruce had left. Porter brought a completely different style to the dialogue. He was a tough character and he believed that if something looks like a duck and waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, you ought to call it a duck until you have evidence to the contrary. He started using diplomatically harsh language in meetings with the other side. He started calling the Provisional Revolutionary Government the "Viet Cong" to their faces. He would trot out some statistics of the most recent elections in North Vietnam in which politburo member number one allegedly got 98.2% of the vote and politburo member number two got 98.1% of the vote and then the most junior person got only 86% of the vote, and these other curiosities of dictatorships pretending to be democratic. He affected a tough style. Instead of the U.S. Delegation working on the weekly statement from the more junior level on up the seniority line - where we would sit down and talk about what we had missed and one of the more junior officers would be assigned to draft something - we would all take a whack at the draft and refine it, gently smoothing it and sometimes pulling a punch with diplomatic niceties. Porter took the opposite track. He did the first draft of next week's speech and it would be in brutal tone, and we more junior types we

would spend our time saying, “You can’t say that.” It was very refreshing and satisfying. I don’t think the resulting frankness in tone did any damage. I think it probably helped to jolt the other side a little bit. They basked in this business of being international political figures, statesmen. Porter started calling them for what they were: insurgents and aggressors. It was satisfying.

There was a breakdown of neutrality in Paris in early 1972. The French, as hosts of the talks, had undertaken to keep Paris neutral and free of demonstrations about Vietnam. But by 1972, there was such enormous pressure from peace groups from all over the world, European ones in particular, to try to stage so-called peace demonstrations in Paris, that the French broke down and said, “Well, you can’t do it in Paris, but we’ll let you demonstrate in Versailles.” So, there was a convocation of thousands of people in the suburbs who came to Paris for this big event. By this time, anti-war sentiment was the majority public view. Convening for the demonstration were a number of responsible citizens, people of discretion who were not your typical anti-American or anti-administration, knee-jerk thugs. On the eve of the Versailles convocation, some of my friends in the press corps said, “Look, Steve, the best thing you guys can do is totally ignore it. We don’t want to have to spend our Saturday and Sunday out in Versailles covering this story. It’s not in your interests that we go out there and cover this anti-war crap. Don’t get provoked into reacting to it. That’s our advice.” So, I, of course, passed that on to Ambassador Porter. The next day or so we came out of one of the plenary meetings and as we passed the journalists on the sidewalks as usual, someone said, “Well, Mr. Ambassador, what do you think about this group of anti-war protestors that’s gathering in Versailles this coming weekend?” He feigned confusion and then said, “Oh, you mean that horde of Communist-controlled agitators? Oh, I don’t have any respect for them.” Well, you had in addition to William Sloane Coffin and the Vietnam Veterans against the war, a lot of seriously troubled American citizens of responsibility who felt that it was time to do something about the war. Some of the peace groups were deeply offended that an American Ambassador would say that they were “Communists.” Porter had carefully said, “Communist-controlled agitators.” We knew from intelligence that there was Chinese money helping to finance this Versailles event in addition to French Communist Party money and resources. We knew quite a bit about organizational details from our intelligence. It might have been better to have ignored the event, but Porter couldn’t resist it.

So the next day we had Delegations of protesting American groups at the American Embassy demanding to see Ambassador Porter. Now, back in 1968 when the Paris talks first started we, of the U.S. Negotiating Delegation working out of the U.S. Embassy, had made an arrangement, which was a sensible one, with our American Embassy hosts. Our business was negotiation. Their business was dealing with American citizens. We of the negotiating delegation should not usurp their responsibility. That was readily agreed early on when we had as Ambassador Sergeant Shriver in Paris. By this time, Arthur Watson was the American Ambassador to France. Suddenly, a bunch of irate American citizens were demanding to get into the Embassy and to confront the Americans they thought had called them Communists. There were American Vietnam veterans in their uniforms and medals. They were saying, “My God, I’m not going to take this. You called me a Communist? I just returned from fighting for my country.”

Well, this happened to be on a day when Porter was not in town and I was chargé. Watson insisted on seeing me. He said that he wasn’t going to pick up the Vietnam Talks Delegation’s dirty laundry and he insisted that by God, it was up to Porter or somebody on his Delegation to

deal with these people. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, whatever you wish; but please understand that you are changing an arrangement that has been in effect here since 1968." He was adamant and irate.

So, we decided that my then deputy press spokesman, soon to be my successor, Dave Lambertson, would go down to the Embassy lobby and meet this group. They had with them a protest which was supposedly written in blood on some parchment, and the protestors insisted upon handing it to us. This was in the grand lobby of the American Embassy in Paris. They handed the document to Lambertson and he took one look at it and saw that in it they called President Nixon some terrible names, and so forth. Dave said, "I'm not going to take that." He handed it back to them. The guy reached his hand out, touched it, but drew back just as Dave drew his hand back. The document fell to the floor. There was this confrontation. Lambertson was absolutely not going to back down and we were not going to give these people an audience on substance. So, that's the way it ended. Finally, they left. The parchment stayed on the floor for the char force to clean up. The group was dispersed. It was not pleasant. It certainly was very dramatic. I think it was unwise on Watson's part to break the distinction between the domains of the two Ambassadors. When you think about it, the proper vehicle for American citizens to affect policy is not through the negotiating team in the field, but rather through the democratic process.

Q: Well, I understand Watson was the ne'er-do-well member of the IBM Watsons and he was given Paris as an Ambassador in order to get him away from the IBM business.

LEDOGAR: He was very unpopular and difficult to work for. But it was his building that we were in. At the time, Ambassador Porter was not present. He would often leave the office early to go and use a HAM radio back at his residence and tune into the war. Porter was incredibly well informed about what was going on all over the place. He had this HAM network. It wasn't that he wasn't working. It was just that he felt that he didn't have to sit around the office and push paper. By this time, Habib was gone from Paris. Bob Miller was gone. Haywood Eisham was the deputy. It was not long after that I was out of there, and, after some home leave, on my way to Stanford University.

JOSEPH A. GREENWALD
U.S. Representative, OECD
Paris (1969-1972)

Joseph A. Greenwald was born in Chicago, Illinois on September 18, 1918. He received a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of Chicago in 1941 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. Mr. Greenwald's career included positions in Geneva, London, and Brussels. This interview was conducted by Horace G. Torbert on May 16, 1989.

Q: No, but at least we got a high proportion of competent people.

GREENWALD: Yes. Qualified people. They just refused to take those who weren't, and they made it stick. Those were the good old days. Things have changed, I guess, since then.

Anyway, this is the deal we worked out. So I did not then stay on in Washington to see the implementation. It took about five years before the legislation went through, but it did go through. It had some riders on it that I didn't like and wouldn't have liked to have seen, but fundamentally it went through, and the US carried out its obligation that we had taken on in New Delhi.

Then I went to the OECD as US representative, and I enjoyed that very much. Now that's a lot of multilateral diplomacy. It was interesting. I got into a much wider range of issues than just trade, obviously. By the way, that's one where I don't take the credit for, but where a policy was evolved on the environment -- it was the principle of "let the polluter pay." It had an economic base. It's gotten much more politicized now. But when it first came up as an issue in 1969 or '70, I guess, in the early days in Paris, the concern was that if government subsidized waste removal or environmental measures, that would put some firms, some countries' firms, in a better competitive position than if the company themselves had to pay. So to try to avoid that kind of adverse impact on some firms dealing with environmental problems, we evolved the principle there that the polluter should pay and that should be adopted by all countries so that everybody would be on the same footing.

I think for political reasons, that may have gone by the board. But people are still talking about it now, I'm happy to see. It is still an objective to try to have a level playing field in the sense that the governments don't subsidize excessively so that they give their firms an unfair advantage.

Anyway, that was one of the issues. But the first one that hit me as an interesting one in retrospect, I would just mention this. The one that the OECD had started with when Phil Trezise was still there in '68 was the concern the Europeans had about something called the technological gap. And it was related to a book by a man named Jean Jacques Servan Schreiber, talking about how Europe was lost, it was going to be overwhelmed by the United States. Well, the OECD took this on -- it was given to them by the ministers -- the task of demystifying it. In other words, to try to look at the facts, find out was there really an overall technological gap. Well, the report had been started, but it came out in my time in '69. And what it showed, not surprisingly, was the US was ahead in some sectors, Europe was ahead in other sectors. There wasn't really an overall technological gap.

What's funny in retrospect is nobody said a word about Japan. Japan was not a factor, was not considered, and looking at it from 1989, it is a --

Q: *Twenty years later.*

GREENWALD: Twenty years later. It was only a little while after that --

Q: *When the explosion came.*

GREENWALD: Yes. When the Japanese came over. What people, as you know, worry about

now is not a technological gap so much between Europe and the United States, but between Japan and the United States and Europe. But anyway, that was one of the interesting problems.

Then, as I say, we went on to environmental issues for the first time taken up multilaterally, which was an interesting -- anyway, it was a pretty interesting job.

But after three years of multilateral diplomacy, which included a lot of very boring meetings on budget and finance as well as work program, I was ready, I was looking forward to moving. The job that I wanted, the obvious succession, going back to my time in London, is to move to Brussels from Paris. Now, Bob Schaezel had been there for six or seven years, and he liked it and wasn't very eager to move. He wasn't a Foreign Service officer, so that there wasn't any pressure, in a sense, through the Foreign Service for him, even though he had been there a long time.

But finally the Department decided that it was time to move, so in '72, I went from Paris to Brussels, and Schaezel came back. I guess he actually left the Service, or maybe he did some special assignments and then left the Service.

Anyway, as I had anticipated, it was a very pleasant change because even though there were some interesting activities in the OECD, it still wasn't really where the action was.

Q: Just to divert a little bit there, how did the OECD get its assignments? Did you invent them yourself and sell them?

GREENWALD: Sometimes. You mean myself?

Q: No. I mean, I just wondered, who decided what the agenda was going to be in this sort of thing.

GREENWALD: Well, the way it went was that sometimes things would germinate, originate, in the permanent representatives, which was what we were in Paris. Sometimes, not all that often. Mainly they came from governments, and governments would be looking for a place to develop a policy, to get a joint policy among industrialized countries. That was the main function of the OECD. It was a kind of a pre-negotiation in broader organizations or sometimes where it only involved the industrialized countries, a program or a policy or a project would be put through like, say, the technological gap problem. That didn't affect the developing countries. It only affected the OECD countries, and they did what I call the demystification exercise. But governments would use the OECD for a kind of a caucus for broader organizations like the UNCTAD or the U.N. or the International Monetary Fund. That was one function.

Q: It had no real organizational relationship to the U.N., however?

GREENWALD: No. No organizational connection at all. Entirely independent, funded by the member countries. We paid 25% percent of the budget, which was good at that time. We were paying more in the U.N. We were up at 33%, 30%. We paid 25% there. It had, as I say, this kind of caucus function.

In addition, it had a very important function, depending on how it was used, in the financial and monetary field. For example, the famous group of seven that we have now really had its origins in the OECD. There was a group of ten. There was also a group of five. Economic policy committees. I remember in the time that I was there that people who were head of the council of economic advisors in the United States or chairman of the governors of the Federal Reserve System would use the OECD much more actively -- it isn't any more because there are other channels that have been developed. But the OECD was a place where they got together to discuss macro economic policy, interest rates, exchange rates, all the things that have become much more prominent now and which are done through similar kinds of groups, but it's outside the OECD framework. But at the time while I was there and through the 1960s -- the OECD, by the way, was only established in 1960 -- well, it was when Dillon was the Secretary of the Treasury. I think that was in the Kennedy Administration.

Q: Yes.

GREENWALD: Early 1960s. He and a man named Jack Tuthill and John Leddy were the ones who dreamed up changing the -- I should go back. The OECD was a conversion of the OECD to a more permanent broader organization. The OECD was set up in the Marshall Plan days in the 1940s and 1950s to play the role and did play the role of allocating Marshall Plan funds among the European countries. It was then the OECD, which stood for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. And that was its first task, to achieve the most efficient and effective use of Marshall Plan funds by all of the European countries coming together and deciding what to do.

It was also used to carry out a process of European liberalization, of getting rid of the quantitative restrictions, the quotas that all the Europeans had on for balance-of-payments reasons, and the controls that they had, financial and monetary controls that they had, again for balance-of-payments reasons. And by the early 1960s, convertibility had taken place. The European economies had come back, European currencies were now convertible, and most of the special restrictions that they kept on for balance-of-payments reasons were eliminated.

So Jack Tuthill, John Leddy, working with Dillon, decided that there was time to take this organization and make the United States instead of an observer, the United States and Canada, full members. Subsequently, Japan was brought in. Subsequently, Australia and New Zealand. It turned into, basically, a caucus of -- a club of the rich countries is what it was called.

ANDREW STEIGMAN
Political Officer
Paris (1969-1972)

Ambassador Andrew Steigman was born in New York on August 30, 1933. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1954 and served in the U.S. Army from 1955-1957. Ambassador Steigman joined the Foreign Service in

1958. His career included positions in the Congo, Libya, France, and Nigeria, and an ambassadorship to Gabon. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: Shall we move on then to Paris?

STEIGMAN: Sure.

Q: You went to Paris as a political officer from 1969-72. What were your responsibilities there?

STEIGMAN: There was a year in between, by the way, just to clear the record. I was a Congressional Fellow for one year before going off to Paris. I went to Paris by accident, by the way. I was really supposed to go to Brussels as a political military officer, but the position was abolished in one of these budgetary cuts, and I was in need of a job when Bob Oakley, who was then in the Paris slot, was asked by Charlie Yost to leave Paris a year early and join his staff as the Middle East guy at the U.N. So that position suddenly opened up, I needed a job and the timing was right. It was the Africa-Middle East slot in the political section. The political section in Paris had an internal and an external unit. The external unit was essentially regional specialists, one for Far East, one for Middle East-Africa and a couple for Europe, and I was the Middle East-Africa man.

Q: Again we're talking about '69 to '72. What was your impression of the French role? Let's talk about the Middle East. The American attitude has often been that the French were sort of a wild card in certain areas including the Middle East.

STEIGMAN: They were very much a wild card at that point. The French position, as we saw it from Paris, was that they wanted to be sure that they continued to play a role in any decisions that were taken on the future shape of the Middle East. The French had traditionally been a Middle Eastern power, and they really didn't want to be treated as irrelevant.

The U.S. position at that point was to try to keep the French involved so that they would not become a wild card. There was a regular four-power consultation going on in New York among the permanent representatives to the U.N. There was also bilateral consultation going on between Joe Sisco, who was then Assistant Secretary, and the French ambassador -- I think it was Lucet at the time -- who would meet fairly regularly. I tried to keep up a parallel dialogue in Paris with the Deputy Director for Middle East at the Quai d'Orsay, first Luc de Nanteuil and then Fernand Rouillon. And we had quite frank exchanges paralleling the Sisco-Lucet exchanges. Joe Sisco tended to edit his cables. Somebody would take notes on the meetings with Lucet, they would come back to him, and he would presumably do some editing to make sure that they reflected what he wanted to convey.

When the cables would come out, one was never sure whether Joe had done any editing on them or to what extent he had done any editing on them. We would play it safe. I would take a copy of the Sisco reporting cable, minus the comments, over to the Quai and Nanteuil and I would swap cables. I would show him Sisco's cables, and he would give me Lucet's version minus comments.

Q: You teach diplomatic history, and the whole idea is that you come out of a meeting . . .

STEIGMAN: Both sides understanding clearly what has been said or what has been intended. This was a very useful device because I would read the Lucet cable and comment on it, and he would read the Sisco cable and comment on it. We didn't leave text with each other. We just read them and then retrieved the text since they were all top secret, God knows why. But it was very useful because there was several times when either Lucet, who was fluent in English but that was his second language, had misconstrued something Sisco had said, or Sisco had not intended what he said and had edited his cable to reflect what he intended. It was very important that there be no misunderstanding. To our mind, that was the surest way of guaranteeing that there were no misunderstandings on the French side what Sisco wanted to convey.

Q: This is an excellent device which is normally not followed.

STEIGMAN: You have to have a very good working relationship to make this possible. Fortunately, this was in the immediate post-De Gaulle years. It would not have been possible two or three years earlier when the relations between the embassy and the Quai were much more formal and correct. We had really good personal relations. I worked with either five or six sous-directeurs at the Quai because I had a tremendous geographic spread, and I really knew them all very well. It was fun.

Q: How did we see the French role in the Middle East, your impression of the French role?

STEIGMAN: Well, the French really were not playing a major role at that point. My impression was what we really wanted was to keep them on the team to make sure that they were a part of a joint effort and did not go off on their own and to do anything independent as a wild card. That struck me as the real purpose of the whole thing. At one point, for example, when the U.S. proposed to temporarily suspend the four-power consultations in New York, something was going on and I don't remember what the reason was, but that was sufficiently important that it was something that the ambassador was asked to convey to the Foreign Minister, not something for me to do at the lower level, but to convey to the Foreign Minister and explain that this was a temporary suspension. The reason I remember it so graphically is because the Foreign Minister, Maurice Schuman, misunderstood what the ambassador had said. This was Arthur K. Watson, who was not the swiftest of ambassadors, anyway, and Schuman misconstrued what Watson said, and thought we were proposing to abolish the four-power consultations. I could see from his reaction that he was reacting too strongly. When he asked a clarifying question, the ambassador didn't catch the import of the clarifying question and reinforced the mistaken notion in Schuman's mind. I scribbled a little note and handed it to the ambassador and said, "He thinks we're ending this not suspending it. You've got to clarify." So Watson then clarified and Schuman said, "Oh, that's entirely different! That's an entirely different matter!" But the importance of it is indicated by the fact that the instruction to the ambassador was to explain to the Foreign Minister that we were suspending this so that there would be no hurt feelings. There was a real concern to keep the French on board.

Q: Well, now in Africa I assume the situation was quite different. In fact, we were delighted the French had their area of responsibility and we didn't have to worry about that. Was that the

attitude?

STEIGMAN: Yes, the general attitude was very much one that we wanted to have the French stay there. One of the things that we were constantly trying to -- this went on as well when I got to Gabon -- was to reassure the French that we had no intention or desire to replace them anywhere in Francophone Africa, that we were, as you say, delighted to see them there and encouraged them to maintain their presence and to increase their assistance in Africa. Again, there was very, very close cooperation and very good exchanges. We used to exchange a lot of information. We tended to have better information very often on what was going on in Anglophone Africa, where we put more attention, and I used to do an awful lot of information exchange with the French.

I would drop in on my French counterparts and bring them up to date on whatever I picked up from embassy reporting repeated to Paris to supplement what they were getting on areas of interest to them. I would ask them questions. We'd get cables out of the Francophone posts repeated to Paris, and I would go in and get the Quai's comments on what was going on, how did they see what was being reported.

Q: This is an aspect of diplomacy that's been all but lost and that is the exchange between diplomats of information that they are getting, not only close allies but ones that are maybe not just allies but on basically friendly terms.

STEIGMAN: You've got to do a lot of trading. Information is a commodity, and by and large information is either bought or bartered. Since overt diplomats don't buy information, you generally get it by barter. You barter something for it. You may barter friendship. You may barter hospitality. You may barter information. And if you're dealing with somebody whom you can trust with some of your information, the easiest way to do it is just a nice professional information exchange from which both sides come out richer. As long as you're not compromising your own national interests or doing damage to any of your own national programs, that's an ideal way to operate and it worked extremely well in Paris.

I say it would not have been possible two or three years earlier because the French would not have given any information so there would have been no reason for us to give them any. But with the post-de Gaulle opening, the French were willing to talk to us. I assume that David Newsom has been one of your interviewees.

Q: No, not yet.

STEIGMAN: Because David, who was then Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, used to come to Paris once or twice a year. We would do a two-day, all-day session with the French on Africa, and it was wonderful. We would have an agenda worked out in advance, and we would go over all of Africa, an hour and a half, two hours per area, per chunk of Africa with an agreement as to which side would lead on each subject. We would give an appraisal of how we saw what was going on, what the current developments were; then the other side would comment what it's information was, and then there would just be an exchange of impressions and views as to what was going on and what we might do about it constructively from both sides, were the

French planning to do something more in this area of concern to us, could we encourage them to do some more. It was really quite a frank exchange, and it worked very well because David has pretty good French, and the ground rule was each side spoke in its own language. I mean, everybody was reasonably bilingual but most comfortable speaking in his own language. David had no problem following and understanding the French and, in fact, he sometimes responded in French. But mostly he would make his presentations in English and they would make their presentations in French and the discussions would then tend to go back and forth after that. But these were very good open discussions.

We did this occasionally on Near East as well, not to the same extent and not as formally because Joe Sisco never was willing to give the French that much time. He didn't take the French that seriously. In the Middle East, as I say, he regarded them as a loose cannon to be sort of patted on the head and say, "There, there. You just stick with us, guys." He wasn't going to give them that kind of time. In fact, once when he was in transit in Paris, I got him to agree to spend an hour in the lounge of the airport with Luc de Nanteuil. Luc and I went out to the airport and he and Joe spent an hour in the airport exchanging views in the VIP lounge. But it was harder to get Joe to come into town.

CHARLES LAHIGUERA
Political Officer, UNESCO
Paris (1969-1973)

Mr. Lahiguera was born and raised in New York. After graduating from Georgetown University and serving in the US Navy, he entered the Foreign Service in 1963. Though he served outside the South East Asia, his primary duties concerned the Vietnam War and its aftermath, particularly refugees. His overseas posts include Germany, Curacao, Vietnam, France, Hong Kong, Thailand and Swaziland, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Lahiguera was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Well, then you're with UNESCO and you're working with UNESCO from '69 to '73?

LAHIGUERA: That's correct.

Q: What did UNESCO involve and where did it sort of fall within the political spectrum of the UN?

LAHIGUERA: Well, UNESCO is the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture. My impression was that it probably drew the most liberal, left wing elements of the international community into it. I was assigned there as the political officer. We had the permanent representative who was a gentlemen by the name of Pierre Graham, an excellent Foreign Service Officer and we had a member of the UNESCO executive board who was Ambassador Katie Louchheim. My responsibilities were on the program side. I had the cultural programs, the communications programs, I had relations with non-governmental organizations.

As far as contacts with other delegations I focused on the East Asian delegations, but I did have relations with all of the delegations. In those days we were very much in the Cold War so as a political officer in all the meetings we had to take into consideration unfortunately the Cold War elements. Every time we voted on a meeting we had to consider which China was going to be represented in the meeting, which Korea, which East Germany, which Cambodia. One side would attack and the other side would respond. In fact I suggested once to the Romanian delegate that we just do a prerecording and play it while we had coffee because it was something of a ritual. In the beginning of those days we still had our embassy in Taipei and we were concerned about the votes on representation with China. I had to make sure all the delegates were around and knew that we were going to have a vote on the Chinese question. I had an unfortunate task when we finally did switch sides. I was asked by my boss to go down and inform the Taiwanese ambassador. That was one of the iciest meetings I've ever experienced. My heart wasn't in it, but it was my job and I did it.

Q: Now who was the head of UNESCO at the time?

LAHIGUERA: The director general of UNESCO, the head of the secretariat was a gentleman by the name of Rene Maheu, a Frenchman. He was reasonably cooperative with the United States and with the United States interests. During my time there his term was to expire and he had been there quite some time and the question arose as to who would replace him. I can remember we discussed at the time Mr. M'Bow who came from West Africa. I believe from Senegal. I wasn't terribly enthusiastic about Mr. M'Bow. I was the only one from the delegation who was reluctant. I was supporting a gentleman by the name of Gardner from Ghana. We were pretty well agreed that it probably should be somebody from Africa. I wanted an Anglophone. We had a long dose of Francophone leadership. I just thought Mr. Gardner would be a good change. I was convinced by my boss, and we had a very free discussion about this, that this Mr. M'Bow would have a better chance of being elected. We didn't want somebody who was going to be sympathetic with the communist side. Eventually we went along with the consensus and Mr. M'Bow was elected, but didn't pan out very well. There was a lot of criticism of him during his tenure. I wasn't there and I really can't comment on it.

Q: Well, did you find that UNESCO, you mentioned, when you get into things dealing with culture and education, there very definitely is a what you call a French approach. You know, highly controlled, a great deal of emphasis on the French language often enough. Did you find this permeated UNESCO while you were there?

LAHIGUERA: They certainly encouraged things French, there was no doubt about that. One of my tasks in the communications area was monitoring the question of freedom of information recall. There was a great deal of support from the developing world, from the communist bloc and from even many of our friends in Europe for some sort of media standards which we viewed with some suspicion because it moved very much toward censorship. In that one area we had a lot of debate on adopting an international code of conduct. I've forgotten the name of it. Of course they drummed on aspects of wanting to outlaw pornography and racism. What they wanted to do was be able to have control of the other side and we were in favor of freedom of expression. On cultural things, it just amazed me all the time no matter what kind of subject you would raise, somebody would come up with a political angle to it. I found myself embroiled in

cultural things. The Arabs were forever raising questions about Israeli abuse of Arab religious and cultural sites. We had these constant storms where we often found ourselves as the only supporter of the Israeli delegation. Even the Europeans backed away from some of these things. I can remember the Israelis did tend to take us for granted and I can remember one time that we abstained on a vote against them and their ambassador came in shaking his finger at our permanent delegate saying that he would report us to Jerusalem because we had voted against them. I can't remember what the particular issue was. So, we had these many political fights over cultural things and over educational things.

Q: You were in the '69 to '73, you were there during the first half of the Nixon administration. Was there an attitude at that time? Later UNESCO became sort of a focal point of sort of American frustration against international affairs, thanks to Mr. M'Bow I think, but was there much of that at this time?

LAHIGUERA: Yes, while I was there we withdrew from the ILO (International Labour Organization). That had been triggered as I recall it by the fact that the ILO membership had decided to elect a Soviet deputy director and that so incensed our labor leadership that they advocated our withdrawal and we did in fact withdraw. But, I used that occasion to emphasize to many of the members of the secretariat of UNESCO and some of the other delegations that this could happen in UNESCO as well, that they could not continue to ignore our views on things if they wanted us to stay. I can remember in particular talking with the Japanese on this subject. They were very surprised when I expressed the view that someday we would leave if things continued on what I regarded as somewhat of a downhill slope. We also had complaints about getting greater American participation in the secretariat. We had a great deal of trouble getting Americans accepted in the secretariat. I had a perhaps exaggerated view of the secretariat's membership. I used to describe them as European intellectuals, the Soviet KGB members and American Quakers. Oh, and Third World son-in-laws of government officials. We would go to these meetings and listen to a tirade against the rich nations by the developing world. Then I'd get in my old broken down 404 Chevy and drive off and the African delegations would all get in their shiny new Mercedes chauffeur driven and leave the meeting. This was always a bizarre experience.

Q: Well, it would strike me that UNESCO would be a place to put your, you mentioned European intellectuals in a place that would bury them, you know, get them out of everybody's hair. The intellectual climate at that time was sort of socialist circles, which was sort of the stomping ground of the intellectuals, was anti-American. I would think this would be a good place to sort of beat up on us.

LAHIGUERA: Yes, well they certainly took every occasion. I was used to wearing flak jackets fortunately, and I needed them in this place. I can recall talking about putting people there to get them out of the way. We had an executive board member from the Ivory Coast named Dodier. The Ivory Coast is generally very sympathetic. They had warm relations with the United States at that time, but Mr. Dodier invariably voted with the communist bloc. We complained back to Washington who in turn complained to Abidjan, but we never could do anything about Mr. Dodier. So, you had this phenomenon that even representatives of countries that were usually friendly with the United States sometimes turned against us.

Let me mention an experience I had in the communications sector. UNESCO put out a magazine. They did a study on the arms race and arms reduction and sales in the world. I was responsible for the media and the magazine department. I discovered just by chance, they would put out this magazine in Spanish, English, French and Russian. I think eventually it may have come out in Arabic. I don't speak Russian. But I happened to notice that the Russian articles looked shorter. We checked it out. This magazine was published in the Soviet Union and the Russians extracted all the statements in the article describing any Eastern Bloc weapons production or sales. The article made it appear like we, the West, were the only manufacturers of arms and the only seller of arms in the world. So, we had a big row over that in the UNESCO magazine.

Q: What was American interest in UNESCO?

LAHIGUERA: Well, we did want to participate in preserving important cultural places, in fostering education especially in the developing world and fostering exchanges. In having exchanges in science and in developing science especially in the developing world. So, we were very sympathetic to this and we contributed. We were the principal donors at UNESCO. We paid the largest fee and we did support many projects. We were very much involved in Egypt with the preservation of Abu Simbel. The Nubian tombs if I recall correctly. I remember while I was there the question of the preservation and restoration of Borobudur in Indonesia came up and we were very interested in that. In Peru there was Machu Picchu. We were interested in supporting them. So, I felt there were many constructive things that could be done and we were perfectly happy to support, but invariably the other side would bring up political issues. We did not instigate political fights in this place. We spent much of our time defending.

Q: How was the social life in Paris at that time?

LAHIGUERA: Oh, you had an endless number of events. I can remember going to dinner and three cocktail parties in the same evening. I really got tired of it. Towards the end of my tour I just tried to not go unless I really had to see somebody or accomplish something. Cocktail parties are a great way of lobbying for something. If I had something on the agenda I'd go to a cocktail party and push for a vote or participation or something to get people to support our side on something. I was very interested in doing that. But if it was just another cocktail party and there wasn't any practical objective, I tended in the last year to shy away from them. I'd just had too many. In fact, you'll see I eventually volunteered to return to Vietnam because I felt that this whole thing was getting boring.

Q: Were you picking up anything about the peace talks there in Paris?

LAHIGUERA: Yes, one of my neighbors, Jim Rosenthal, was a member of the delegation at the peace talks and there were other people I did meet with. We did social things together. I did speak a lot with the Vietnamese delegation in UNESCO. They were a smaller community, so they were pretty close to what was happening in Paris. So, I did from time to time have some view of what was developing.

JOHN H. TRATTNER
Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Strasbourg, France (1969)

Regional Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1969-1970)

Press Attaché, USIS
Paris (1970-1974)

Mr. Trattner was born and raised in Virginia and was educated at Yale, Columbia and American University. Joining the United States Information Service in 1963 he worked first with the Voice of America, and then was transferred to Warsaw as Press Attaché. His subsequent assignments all in the press and information field include Strasbourg, Paris, Brussels, and Washington, D.C., where he served as assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and finally as official Spokesman for the Department of State. Mr. Trattner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: So in 1969 you are off to France?

TRATTNER: I was transferred out of Poland two or three months earlier than my assignment would have normally ended because the recently-arrived U.S. ambassador in Paris, Sargent Shriver, had decided to re-open U.S. Information Service (USIS) operations at some of the American consulates in provincial France. Those operations had some years earlier been shut down for reasons of economy. One was in Lyon, I think, one was in Bordeaux, and one was in Strasbourg. It wasn't a job I wanted. A year before my scheduled departure from Warsaw I had lobbied for and gotten onward assignment to the U.S. Mission to NATO, as deputy public affairs officer, to begin in mid-1969. This fit with my interest in European community affairs and the East-West relationship in Europe. But in late 1968, that assignment fell through due to various personnel timing problems elsewhere. So when Shriver embarked on his re-opening of USIS operations in provincial France, I was available. We left Warsaw in April for Strasbourg. We really regretted leaving Poland, and for a time were actually homesick for Warsaw.

On a personal note, leaving Poland early meant our older daughter missed the two final third-grade months of the school year. There would be no English-language school in Strasbourg, and we didn't necessarily want one for the longer haul, only a chance for her to learn some French first. Before we left Warsaw we had her tutored in French. But we only had two months for that, and it wasn't enough. She floundered a bit at the Catholic parochial school we put her in when we arrived in Strasbourg. During home leave that followed during the summer, she again had French tutoring and by the time we returned to Strasbourg in the fall, she was ready to really pick up the language. And she quickly did. She was then almost nine. She loved the school and thrived there.

Q: What did you find in Strasbourg, and how did the work contrast with Poland?

TRATTNER: Well, Strasbourg was and is one beautiful city, at least the central old city—sort of the epitome of a central European town. The food was legendary, the weather pleasant, the people interesting. But overall we didn't entirely enjoy what turned out to be our brief Strasbourg experience because of the internal American administrative obstacles we encountered. Shriver's quick move to re-open USIS operations in Strasbourg took the administrative people at the embassy in Paris by surprise, and they never caught up. The consulate had no office space for me, and no furniture, not even a desk or telephone. They had no housing under lease that we could live in, and there was no housing allowance that would help us rent something on our own. So we spent our entire time in Strasbourg living in the third-floor apartment of the consul general's house. If we wanted to do official entertaining, we had to use that house and borrow the consul general's china and glassware. He was not very cooperative, to put it mildly. No diplomatic title existed for me, although it had been applied for. But, meanwhile, that meant I could not get diplomatic plates for our car, and it spent the first five of our six months there sitting in the consulate garage still wearing its Polish diplomatic plate.

Q: Other problems there?

TRATTNER: No. And the things I just mentioned were just typical bureaucratic snarl-ups. But I would say that substantively my job in Strasbourg seemed like overkill. There was no real need for the services it entailed. The populace of Alsace was very friendly to the United States and U.S. policies. Much more so than in other parts of France. Many people in Alsace (and in the region of Lorraine, which was also nominally part of my territory) still remembered the liberation of France in World War II. A lot of Alsatians of that time had seen Patton's tanks at first hand, pushing the Germans out of eastern France. France, of course, had long shared with us all the important democratic and human rights values. Some very old people felt even more strongly that way, since they could remember the time after World War I when Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France after 75 years or so of non democratic existence as part of Germany. Given all that, there was hardly any need to go out and win the hearts and minds of Alsace, and not even any huge need to stage constant cultural events, place articles in newspapers, or stay in continuous touch with the media and the academic community. American films were shown everywhere, American books and newspapers were available everywhere, including university libraries. A sizeable number of Americans lived in Alsace. I felt superfluous and not very useful, and on that, I got similar vibrations from USIS colleagues at re-opened posts in Lyon and Bordeaux. What's more, the consul general was already very active on the press, cultural, and academic scene that was supposed to be my responsibility, and understandably resented my presence there. So my assignment to Strasbourg seemed a terrible waste of time, money, and people. However, there was one event that I felt was indeed worthwhile and did make a real impact, and that was the visit to Strasbourg of U.S. astronaut Russell Schweickart. He had been a crew member on one of the flights in the Apollo moon series, and his ancestors were Alsatian. But you asked about the contrast of my work in Strasbourg with my work in Poland. There was no comparison, of course, with what I and my wife felt had been constructive, challenging work and life in Poland. A life and work that involved us both.

Q: Well, the public affairs officer in Paris I assume had to be a high ranking person. Who was that and how did he or she react to all of this?

TRATTNER: Leslie Brady was the PAO in Paris at the time. I had spent a week of orientation in Paris en route to Strasbourg and first met him there. Soon afterward, he was succeeded by Burnett Anderson. They were both senior USIA veterans. USIS Paris was pleased to have these re-opened provincial posts and had expectations that everything would go well. After five months in Strasbourg, I told Anderson in Paris of my intention to request reassignment, and he convinced Shriver to transfer me to the embassy in Paris, where I retained my responsibilities in Strasbourg and the region. The idea in the switch was that I would now get some support for the work I was already doing, or trying to do in Alsace. We moved to Paris in November 1969 and for the next several months I traveled regularly to and around the Strasbourg region and continued carrying out what cultural affairs programs were possible with limited resources. Two things helped. One was a visit of several days to Lorraine by the American deputy chief of mission in Paris, an old French hand around whom we could stage a number of cultural events. The other was the exceptional public interest in moon rocks—small pieces of the moon's crust recently brought back from the first U.S. moon landing and sent by USIA to show in various parts of the world. USIS Paris received one of them and I took it to Strasbourg to put it on display. It was like carrying a semi-precious jewel. Six months after we came to Paris, the USIS job in Strasbourg was closed, and I became the assistant information officer in Paris. About six months later, I became the embassy press attaché and spokesman.

Q: Did you see any signs in Alsace and Lorraine or France generally of the consequences of the Prague Spring?

TRATTNER: I'd say there was a distinct relationship. The Prague Spring of 1968, and the Soviet squelching of it that August, was just one of the political and social developments roiling the European landscape in 1968 and 1969. As people who lived in eastern and western Europe in those years, we saw much of it close up. There was the adverse reaction within western European communist parties to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. There were the French student riots, mainly in Paris, in the spring of 1968, when it seemed possible that De Gaulle might be toppled, especially when a sizeable segment of the French labor force supported the students. When De Gaulle did resign a year later, I recall that many looked back to the riots as a strong preamble to the end of the De Gaulle era. But not of the Gaullist era. There was also the wave of anti-Semitism in Poland in 1968 and the struggle for power within the Polish communist party, connected indirectly to the six-day war in 1967 in the Middle East. There was the war in Vietnam. The U.S. was taking heavy criticism on that in Eastern and Western Europe alike. The French intellectual left, which seemed genetically suspicious of the U.S., was particularly vocal about Vietnam, and the Gaullist government was not above encouraging anti-U.S. feeling. That was part of its posture of French independence and what it saw as U.S. infringement on European sovereignty. Even De Gaulle's encouragement of a free Quebec had been part of that mentality. In ways hard to define precisely, some of these phenomena across Europe were linked to one another. Certainly, when we arrived in Paris, the student riots there were still a fresh memory and you heard people making the connection with what happened in Czechoslovakia just a few months after those riots. When we got to Paris, speculation abounded on what further developments might be expected there. The French government and the city of Paris had for

some time been on guard against possible physical assault against the American Embassy by anti-Vietnam war protesters. And the government was also wary of the possibility that further unrest among university students could morph into attacks on the embassy. Sidewalks around the embassy were sometimes barricaded with an impenetrable line of army trucks and busses and later this barrier became a permanent fixture. Finally, the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, which began in 1968, focused additional attention on the American Embassy as a target of demonstrations. More about that later.

Q: I would like to go back to one thing, Alsace-Lorraine. Was there a sizable German speaking area there, and if so, how did we treat that?

TRATTNER: French was the spoken and official language for all of that region, even though a number of older Alsatians did speak German among themselves. Much of the architectural style was typically central European, and there were some German-language publications. But the region was long since solidly part of France and French was the language spoken everywhere.

**Regional Information Officer; Press Attaché
Paris, France (1969-1970); (1970-1974)**

Q: OK, you were in France from when to when?

TRATTNER: From April to November, 1969 in Strasbourg and from then until July of 1974 in Paris.

Q: What were the major activities of the embassy in Paris when you were there? What was it working on?

TRATTNER: The Vietnam talks, important as they were, were a separate operation and, at least technically, were not part of the embassy's main preoccupations. But more about that later. About a year after we arrived in Paris, I became the embassy press attaché, and had extensive first-hand exposure to activities embassy-wide. In the area of French foreign policy and French relationships around the world, these included tracking the French hostility that De Gaulle had decreed towards British membership in what was then still called the European Economic Community. We closely followed developments within the EEC, NATO and such European international organizations such as the old Western European Union. This all related to U.S. support of progress toward European political and economic unity and our interest in Europe's own defense initiatives in addition to NATO. Other items on that list were the mutual and balanced force reductions talks that began, I think, in 1972 or 1973 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and another East-West forum, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Another key focus was France's view of the Vietnam War, which was distinctly negative and critical of the U.S., though it began to moderate under De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, but didn't really fade until some time after the peace accord on Vietnam reached in Paris in 1973. Part of the French antagonism to U.S. actions in Vietnam almost certainly was rooted in France's own earlier failure in Indochina, and you sensed bitter

satisfaction in some French quarters at our own floundering there. In fact, I can't tell you the number of conversations I had with French journalists, and not only journalists, just on that issue. Their typical view was that we were trying to replace the French position in Vietnam, trying to establish the same position the French had developed over many years, a sort of neo-colonialist position. Only they felt that we were doing it with typical American clumsiness, not the finesse the French had employed. Some even alleged that this was our real goal in Vietnam, not rooting out the communists. I would point out the big differences between what France had done in Vietnam and what we were trying to do, that France had been the colonial power there for generations and right up to the end had tried to preserve it by force, rather than understand the feelings of the Vietnamese and perhaps reach accommodation with them that might have allowed the French to maintain their position, or at least prolonged their presence. France had not done that, and had lost its way there, and finally had to leave. As for the U.S., I said we in a real sense had to pick up the pieces of the French failure in Vietnam, fill the gap, and try to preserve South Vietnam from the communist north, but that we had no colonial designs on Vietnam. I also made clear I had no illusions about our military failures and mistakes. It was an interesting exercise to make the argument, at least.

The embassy also spent time and effort on the goal of reducing French tolerance of heroin trafficking to the United States, the so-called French connection that at one point brought the U.S. attorney general to Paris to press for more cooperation in eliminating it. And there was a range of lesser French-U.S. bilateral issues the embassy was involved in.

Also while I was there, two summit meetings took place between Presidents Pompidou and Nixon, the first in December 1971 in the Azores, and the second in June 1973 in Iceland. By the time of the Azores meeting I was the press attaché at the Paris embassy and even before that had worked with the White House press office during Nixon's attendance at De Gaulle's funeral in the fall of 1970. So, with the approach of the Azores summit meeting a year later, the White House appropriated my services to handle the French press there during the meeting. Later, they asked me to do the same job for the meeting of the two presidents in Iceland. It was actually a mix of handling French journalists and helping the White House press office with the press that accompanied Nixon from Washington. In the Azores, that got me into things like taking a couple of hours to sightsee around the island with Dan Rather and one of his cameramen in a Volkswagen rented by CBS. The Azores meeting was the first of several summits Nixon had in that period with European leaders, in part to consult with them on his upcoming visit to China, but also to talk about security and disarmament issues. Also, France had been a go-between for the U.S. and the Chinese and played a role in arranging the Nixon visit. Further, I think Pompidou had recently talked with Brezhnev and Nixon probably wanted to directly hear about that. Those summits, incidentally, were the first of a number of encounters I had with Henry Kissinger. The second Pompidou-Nixon meeting, in Iceland, was basically about defining the direction that Atlantic relations would take in the coming three to five years. As I remember, the issues surrounding that were balance of trade, currency reform, the possible withdrawal of substantial American forces from Europe that Congress was threatening, and what else? Oh, arms control. It was Nixon's "year of Europe" and he envisioned a summit meeting of Atlantic leaders. The Iceland summit was to lay the groundwork for that, but it was inconclusive. Nixon by that time was being engulfed in Watergate, and Pompidou was visibly suffering from the illness that killed him the following year. But the idea of an Atlantic summit soon materialized in

the series of economic summit meetings that began in France in 1975 as a G-6 meeting.

Speaking of Nixon, I'm reminded of one or two of the atmospherics that have stuck in my memory of his meeting with Pompidou in the Azores. First, the Nixon advance team was intent on ensuring that Nixon would arrive second, not first, at the site where the initial meeting was to take place. The meeting site was a little house in the middle of the main town on Terceira, the largest of the islands. There was something nearly obsessive in the American advance team's intent to be absolutely certain that Pompidou's limousine would arrive first, and in the trouble they took to persuade the French side to allow it to happen that way. Then, second, in the discussions the U.S. advance team had with its French counterparts, I was assigned to eavesdrop on what the French on the other side of the table were saying to one another. The idea was to find out anything the French were secretly planning to one-up the Americans in some phase of the summit meeting. There was even a moment when I was sent with other Americans into the town on the night before the meeting to wander around near the meeting site to see whether any secret operations might be underway. This was really pretty astonishing, and I could only put it down to paranoia. It was very strange.

As for the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, as I said earlier the U.S. delegation was not formally attached to the embassy. It got administrative support from the embassy, but was not a part of it, and operated independently. It's not that there was a total wall separating them, just that officially the delegation had its own separate existence. Bill Porter was the head of the delegation, with the rank of ambassador, I think for most of the duration of the talks. I may be wrong about that. But Averill Harriman had headed the delegation when the talks began, with Cyrus Vance as deputy. Phil Habib was involved, too. The delegation had its own spokesman, even though that spokesman drew on one of my French staff for assistance, and he and I were in frequent touch. I filled in for him when he was away, and at some point the delegation dropped its spokesperson position, and the responsibility mainly came to me and, as I recall, another member of the Vietnam delegation. We kind of shared the work, but by then there wasn't a lot to do there; the talks had become quite routine, and press attention had dwindled. It rekindled when Henry Kissinger moved from the job of national security assistant to that of secretary of state and began a series of lightning visits to Paris as the talks reached their climax. I got involved with those visits.

But to go back a bit, as some will recall, the Paris talks on Vietnam were the result of Lyndon Johnson's suspension of U.S. bombing of Haiphong in March 1968 to encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Johnson announced at the same time that he wouldn't run for re-election. Beyond hoping to end its role in the Vietnam war, the U.S. thought that would also let South Vietnam stabilize its political situation. That would help it to rebuild infrastructure, and re-enter life as an independent entity. As things turned out, those were misguided hopes. But when the Paris talks began, American casualties in the war had risen to a staggering total and were a powerful incentive to ending it on at least ostensibly good terms, or the best terms we could get. Opinions differ about U.S. motivations later on in the talks, in 1971 and 1972 when Nixon was moving to seek re-election. As I recall, North Vietnam was worried that the so-called U.S. détente diplomacy with the Russians and Chinese would affect Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam's military effort. So Hanoi changed its tactics in the Paris talks, by agreeing to let South Vietnam remain in existence after the fighting stopped and negotiate an eventual

settlement with North Vietnam. I remember clearly that it was about then that press interest in the Paris talks began to revive and we had to increasingly gear up to respond adequately but carefully. During October 1972, two things happened. Nixon announced the U.S. was halting all its bombing of North Vietnam, and Hanoi announced details of a draft peace agreement. That's when Kissinger publicly stated that peace was at hand. His announcement surprised us in Paris because it seemed premature and rash, and because it came just a few days before the 1972 presidential election. Many people thought anyway that Nixon had maneuvered to boost his chances of re-election. They argued then and later that a settlement in Vietnam could have been reached earlier. There was a lot of skepticism among French and American reporters about Nixon's real purposes, as I've just talked about, and I spent time trying to respond to it, but didn't have much to go on. In any case, domestic U.S. anger about the war had by then gone even higher, and Nixon was under pressure to end it. South Vietnam had asked for certain concessions in an agreement and thought it had been deceived by the U.S. It was resisting the agreement that was now emerging, in which the U.S. committed itself to, I think, eventual military disengagement from Vietnam. When the U.S. told South Vietnam it would abandon its support altogether if it didn't come around, South Vietnam was forced to give up. That produced a peace accord, and it was signed in Paris by North and South Vietnam and the U.S., in January 1973. After the ceremony, Kissinger held a massively attended press conference arranged by the U.S. delegation and the Paris embassy, and I remember introducing him and being with him on the platform. Close to the end of the Vietnam talks, my staff and I had gotten more involved in the daily back and forth of news and rumors about the eventual outcome, and were providing the delegation with the extra public affairs support it needed. I guess that's why I have given you this long spiel about the talks.

In any event, fighting soon resumed in Vietnam, ignoring the existence of the [International Commission of Control and Supervision](#) established to carry out the agreement. It reminded me of what I had seen happen with the International Control Commission in Laos, when I was reporting on the Laos conference in Geneva years earlier. Within about two and a half years after the peace treaty signing, the U.S. had taken a lot more casualties, then militarily withdrawn from South Vietnam and closed its embassy, North Vietnam had defeated and taken over South Vietnam, Kissinger had received the Nobel peace prize, and Nixon had resigned. Anyone in active foreign service at the time was an especially horrified witness to how huge, destructive, deep, wounding, and sad this whole episode was for the U.S.

I should have spoken briefly about my earlier days in Paris. My work as assistant information officer was expectably routine, such as overseeing production of a magazine that USIS distributed all over France, assisting the information officer in various things, now and then sitting in for the embassy press attaché when he was absent. I'm sorry if I'm repeating myself, but in November 1970 I left that job and became the embassy press attaché, which among other things involved my moving to the embassy from the USIS offices two blocks away. Our third daughter was born about six months later.

Q: What was your impression of the French media, and how did we deal with it? What about the intellectuals?

TRATTNER: Well, first, I am hardly an expert on French intellectual life, and I'm not about to

give you an exhaustive riff on it here. That's a vastly complicated topic, with a very long history. Bookshelves are filled with it. A lot of discussion and observation over the years has focused on the French intellectual left. It was and is a deeply embedded part of French political, social, and cultural life. It has contributed hugely to the country's history and vitality, and also I would say to its legacy. If I think about the French left, I see passionate views, deeply-held views, a spectrum of sometimes brilliant writers, journalists, and political figures. And what else? Philosophers, film makers, artists, and playwrights. Then there's the left's own particular defense of French primacy and independence. And that was an intellectual defense, as opposed to political defense such as the positions of Gaullist governments over the years. As I think I suggested earlier, the position of the left on France's place in the world thrived on the belief that French culture was special and superior. Well, it is certainly special. Whether it's superior, well, superiority is hard to define. In any case, that belief automatically, or almost automatically, meant skepticism, or even cynicism, about American intentions in the world, and also some snobbery about U.S. culture and society.

You asked about French media. Several leading newspapers and magazines represented the French left in varying degrees, and they generally were considered to reflect the views of the socialist or communist parties. But I don't want to absolutely categorize any newspaper because there were many ambiguities in how the French press approached any issue. The newspaper l'Humanité was the daily newspaper of the communist party then. The leading daily in France was and is Le Monde. Not in terms of circulation or popularity, of course. But that newspaper in those days often reflected the views of the Gaullist government on foreign policy issues, and was also very much a newspaper for intellectuals. It tended to be critical of U.S. foreign policy. Le Figaro, which I think was France's leading newspaper when the Second World War began, was still a leading paper, basically conservative, with more centrist views on world affairs. There was Le Canard Enchaîné, the celebrated satirical weekly. For it, there was absolutely nothing sacred, except perhaps the fact of its own celebrity and place in the scheme of things. It lampooned everyone and everything, and was very widely read. And let's not forget the wildly popular photo journal, Paris-Match, and the English-language daily International Herald Tribune, written and edited in Paris, published and sold in much of the world, which continues to be an influential player on the European press scene, and has a unique niche among American media and publishing efforts abroad. I've left out many other newspapers, including some good provincial papers. French television was a government entity, with two or three channels, but not controlled by the government. There were a couple of strong outside broadcast channels, Radio-Television Luxembourg and Europe 1, which tended to be more objective and had significant audiences. Among the weekly magazines the big ones were Le Nouvel Observateur, devoted to business and political news, and there were L'Express and Le Point, both associated with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, who was a flamboyant, versatile, and resourceful French politician and writer. He co-founded the first of those two and patterned it after Time magazine, and founded the second during our time in France and modeled it the same way. He also wrote a couple of well-read books, one of them an international best-seller titled "The American Challenge."

Q: Did you have a lot of contact with the media in France?

TRATTNER: Yes. Even more than in Poland, as press attaché I saw them frequently. This happened either individually at lunch, or at parties and dinners we and others hosted as a regular

part of our work, and my wife and I were often guests at events given by French and other journalists. I handled the ambassador's media contacts, arranging a number of interviews of him by French journalists, was the embassy spokesman, and accompanied the ambassador on just about all of his official travel within France. One of the three ambassadors I served with was Arthur Watson, who was in the habit of flying his own plane around France, and I flew with him a couple of times. He always had a co-pilot, who was a professional. At the end of the Nixon-Pompidou summit meeting in the Azores, Watson, who had flown himself to the Azores, wanted me to fly back to Paris with him. But I wiggled out of it because I wanted to return on the French press plane.

Among French journalists I got to know was a reporter for l'Humanite, the communist paper, whom I sent to the U.S. for four weeks or so in USIA's International Visitor Program. That was especially satisfying, since he was the kind of person the program was particularly designed for. I could never have sent a Polish journalist on such a visit. This guy returned to France and wrote a series of positive pieces about the U.S. I set up or helped facilitate visits to the States for more than a few French journalists over the time I was there. Some of them went under U.S. official auspices, and others went on their own and paid their own expenses.

The resident U.S. press, and to a lesser extent French and other foreign journalists, gave us a lot of business. They'd call me for comment on issues or events, or asking to interview the ambassador or to cover some of his activities. Every day we distributed the USIS news wire to newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, wire services, and foreign media bureaus in Paris and to some extent in the rest of the country, and one of my French press office staff briefed the ambassador each morning on what was in the French press that day. We also sent a summary of the French press to Washington each day. I handled and sat in on all the ambassador's media interviews, arranged some of the media's contacts with other senior embassy people, attended the ambassador's small team meetings, and worked often with the embassy's political and economic sections, sometimes sitting in on their staff meetings. The press office was also called on to help arrange and deal with what I call the public dimensions of a constant parade of visiting Americans, both official and otherwise, and we would also deal with the expected and sometimes unexpected results of their visits. These visitors included a number of American editors and reporters, many wanting to talk with the ambassador. As you can imagine, members of Congress came through all the time, and I was usually involved in their visits. A number of U.S. Senators came through, such as Mike Mansfield, the majority leader at the time, and Barry Goldwater, who came as U.S. representative to the Paris air show, and Mac Mathias. I was involved, in one way or another, with all of them. I should mention then-Senator James Buckley of New York, William Buckley's brother, who walked into my office one day for a meeting and promptly stretched himself out at full length on the floor, explaining that he had back problems. So we conversed with me at my desk and the Senator on the floor. A couple of state governors who went on to become president came to Paris. One was Jimmy Carter, on a trade-seeking mission for Georgia, whom we included in a big reception we happened to be giving at home while he was there. The other was Ronald Reagan, on a similar visit to France. I handled his media contacts and news conference, and found that, unlike many another official American visitor, Reagan was easy to manage. There was also the visit of future president George H.W. Bush, making the rounds of capitals after being named as U.S. ambassador to the UN. And there was Richard Nixon (as president, not as senator). I've already talked about being

assigned to the two summit meetings he had with Pompidou, in the Azores and in Iceland. Nixon also came to Paris a couple of times while I was there, on one occasion to attend the De Gaulle funeral. That's when the White House press office first latched on to me to help handle the press. Then there were the two summits with Pompidou, and just before we departed Paris in mid-1974, the White House borrowed me to work in Jerusalem during Nixon's visit to Israel, and in Brussels where he stopped en route to Moscow. They wanted me to go on to Moscow as well, but I managed to get out of that one because by that time the packers and movers were literally at our door in Paris.

Q: Well, the communist side of things was not off limits to you all?

TRATTNER: No, not French communists. But there was an odd situation resulting from U.S. diplomatic practice of the time. Ordinary U.S. diplomats were not supposed to have any meaningful contact with officials of countries the U.S. did not recognize. In practical terms, of course, that mostly meant communist countries. It had been drilled into us, especially in Warsaw, that we had to be careful. So at a cocktail reception at the Polish embassy, for example, you didn't go out of your way to encounter anyone from, say, the East German or Chinese or North Vietnamese embassies or talk with journalists from those countries. If you were introduced, you would nod, maybe say something minimal, and move on. I think the idea was that, if you did anything more than that, the East Germans in particular might interpret it deliberately as a sign of possible change in the U.S. posture of non recognition, because the East Germans were anxious to establish parity with West Germany in the eyes of the West. Kind of ridiculous. Then, toward the end of our time in Paris, things changed. There was the Nixon visit to China. That didn't immediately result in diplomatic relations with Beijing, but it loosened things up. Another factor in the change was that the U.S. and East Germany finally established diplomatic relations in about 1974 and we opened an embassy in East Berlin. There was also new focus on the semi-annual talks between Chinese and American ambassadors in Paris, and there was also the fact of the Vietnam talks in Paris, where U.S. diplomats were meeting with North Vietnamese diplomats every day. So all that worked to ease the awkwardness about contact with diplomats whose countries we didn't recognize. It was a refreshing change.

Q: Was the communist party in France considered a tool of the Kremlin?

TRATTNER: Not really, when we were there, except perhaps in some minds on the French right. But they were still a powerful presence, with about 20% of the vote, and could partly cripple the country with labor strikes, especially in the transportation sector. Strikes occurred regularly. The party and its unions were a nuisance but never a threat. They were simply tolerated, sometimes angrily. Eventually the party began to wane and lose impact as the face of the French economy and politics bore less and less resemblance to what it had been before and after the Second World War. And the old ties with Moscow corroded in the face of the long east-west confrontation in Europe and as disillusion with the Russians set in. The situation in France roughly paralleled what happened to the Italian communists, though they were more of a real threat, of course, than their French counterparts. Also, the barons of the French party's glory days, such as they were, were growing old and dying and being replaced by less cunning but more realistic, though faceless, leaders. The party was beginning its decline before I got there and that continued while I was there. But it was still a distinctive feature of the French political

landscape.

Q: While you were there what was our attitude towards the socialist left in France? How did we view this?

TRATTNER: Well, the socialists were the main opposition party in the Assemblée, and the second largest political party, with solid and durable foundations. I mean that they were strongly rooted within the French left, the unions, part of the media sector, and, if I remember right, much of the academic community. When we were there, they had never gained a majority in the assembly or elected a president, at least in the Fifth Republic. But in the early 1980s, I think it was, with the election of Francois Mitterrand to the presidency, they were able to do both. In the late 1960s and first half of the 70s, when we were there, the U.S. attitude toward the French socialist party was what you would expect toward a large political party that played a very significant role in French politics and represented sizeable numbers of people across the country. They were serious, if unsuccessful, contenders for political power, and always had to be taken seriously by their opponents. They spent what seemed a lot of time embroiled in their own internal politics. I think the U.S. would have greeted their accession to power pretty much with equanimity, as was in fact the case when Mitterrand finally made it. Certainly, they were never thought of as any kind of threat to the established democratic order in western Europe. Our approach to the French socialists was not greatly different from how we regarded the British Labor Party or the German SPD.

Q: What was your impression of the French press and the reporters?

TRATTNER: Well, earlier I spoke about the press, about the media. As for individual journalists, they were by and large a fairly hard-working, conscientious group. There were many newspapers, magazines and broadcast media in France, so the journalist community was large. Many of these news organizations could be identified with particular political parties, viewpoints, and the kinds of readerships they served, more so than in the U.S., for example. Many reporters were specialists serving those viewpoints and readers, and did not range much outside those niches. But some stood above that, usually worked for nationally-read publications, and were widely read and well-known, such as Raymond Aron, the lead columnist at Le Figaro. I didn't really have the opportunity to get to know any reporters working outside Paris for provincial papers and the like, and mainly worked to establish relationships with some at the national media level who wrote for and had impact on readers important to us. There were probably 200 serious journalists working for established, serious organizations in Paris. They were experienced, reasonably friendly, self-assured, and established. With a handful of exceptions, they were very sharp, and you had to be on your toes when you talked with them.

Q: Were there any other events that engaged you during this time?

TRATTNER: As I said, President Nixon visited Paris two or three times while we were there. I think I already mentioned his attendance at De Gaulle's funeral, which brought perhaps three dozen heads of state to Paris. On these three or four day visits by a U.S. president, of course, most of the embassy was turned full time to a supporting role. My job was in some respects similar to what I did at the presidential summit meetings in the Azores and Iceland, but it was

also substantially different, because this time, in addition to personally assisting the president's spokesman in dealing with individual reporters and keeping the media informed, I had the lead for the embassy in accommodating the scores of American reporters, anchor people, TV and film people, and photographers traveling with the president. This was the White House press corps, and not only them but dozens of other Americans from around Europe. I wasn't alone, of course. I worked with the presidential advance team from Washington, which included White House communications agency technical people, and usually came in several waves over the two or three weeks preceding the actual visit; there was the advance team, the "pre-advance" team, and even the "pre-pre-advance" team. This often seemed like overkill to me, but such was the style of White House operations, and it was a style that had grown with every American presidency since the end of World War II. One key task was to provide a well-equipped facility for the phalanx of press to work in. That meant turning a large ballroom in one of the four or five best Paris hotels into a press room stocked with everything big and small that reporters need, including electronics, dozens of telephone lines, access to satellite transmission, and so on, plus a facility for the briefings and press conferences of presidential press secretaries and dignitaries that included the secretary of state. During the Nixon visits to Paris, I got to know the two people who successively served him as press secretary, Ron Ziegler and Gerry Warren, and that was why my help was requested for later Nixon travel abroad and for the travels of Presidents Ford and Carter. They just passed me along from one administration to the next.

Q: By the way, what about Ron Ziegler?

TRATTNER: Compared to the impressions I had gathered from all the bad press about Ziegler, he turned out personally to be a fairly ordinary, mild guy who didn't know much about France, or the French, or about foreign affairs, or the world generally. And why should he, given his own background before becoming Nixon's spokesman? I didn't really get to know him until toward the end of Nixon's tenure, by which time he had probably been softened up by all the adversity of that period. The Watergate business was in full cry and had begun to seriously nibble at Nixon and at Ziegler. One sign of Ziegler's isolation may have been in the fact that he called me one day during Nixon's last visit to Paris and said he had no one to have dinner with that night, and invited me to join him. Pretty astonishing. As it happened, my wife and I had another engagement that night.

Q: What was the evaluation that you were getting and your own opinion of Pompidou?

TRATTNER: He was a serious man without a lot of personality. At the meeting with Nixon in the Azores in 1971, he made time to mix with the press once as he entered the meeting site. Some of us exchanged a few words with him, and he was affable and relaxed. Just not a lot of personal charisma. But he had been a politician, and a pretty clever one, held a number of private-sector and public sector posts, and rose to become the prime minister under De Gaulle. When De Gaulle resigned the presidency in 1969, Pompidou pretty much directly succeeded him, though there was an interim president for about three months while an election took place. I thought he seemed practical-minded and bent on maintaining, but somewhat revising, the Gaullist approach and tradition but in far less pompous and exalted style. Pompidou was more of a realist than De Gaulle about France's place and ambitions in the world. More accommodating to the British and more willing to deal first-hand with his American counterparts. His party, as

you may know, went through a number of incarnations and name changes over the ensuing years, but remained coherent and in power as the big party of the center-right. We'll always remember Pompidou's first words announcing De Gaulle's death on television: *La France est veuve* – France is a widow. Pompidou himself fell ill not long after, and died just before we left France in 1974.

Q: Did you get any impression of the French political class? My impression from what I have seen is it seems to be so much disconnected.

TRATTNER: One good way to get into that question might be to note that our oldest daughter attended a very good parochial school in Paris for most of the time we were there, from age 10 to almost 14. Our second-oldest went to a British and then to an American private school. Those two now have French husbands and live in France. So, though it's been almost 35 years since we lived there, we still have strong, and now continually updated, impressions of the people of France. Our oldest girl made some close friends at her school, some of them the daughters of well-placed and well-to-do French families, and was often invited to their homes and their country homes for weekends and the like. Through that lens, we got an out-of-the-ordinary glimpse of the upper layer of French society, and formed our impressions in many other ways as well, of course. Generally, our impressions were good. Some of those families were politically and socially prominent, but they seemed to have little, if anything, in common with the glitterati social set who were the constant focus of the popular media. I guess you could say they were old money, and they lived gracefully but quietly. There were some impressive and memorable features to their life style, but they weren't flaunted. The same was true of a family living in our apartment building, whom we came to know through friendships that developed between their daughters and our middle daughter. Members of the political class whom I actually knew as part of my job, aside from journalists, were mainly people in government ministries or in government posts and cultural positions, like museum directors, in the provinces. They were like members of the elite anywhere; most had middle-class origins and had managed, by talent or connections or both, to get an education in one of the so-called elite schools that were feeders into the ranks of government and business. Similar to their counterparts in other countries, they tended to obey deep instincts that governed their work habits, social connections, and outlook. They protected their status and smoothed the way for those coming up behind them. Because of the structure of the French system, the national government operated not only at the national level but in the cities and provinces, and had hundreds of jobs to staff, a good number of them with people coming out of the elite schools. The most ambitious, clever, and intelligent would try to work their way upward into positions at the regional and national level of government, as big-city mayors, prefects, and officials of ministries in Paris.

Speaking of Paris, I have to say something about our apartment. It was an exquisite two-floor place in the seventh arrondissement of Paris, with views of the city in all directions. A five-minute walk from the embassy. The rent was beyond what we wanted to pay, but once we had seen it, we knew we wanted to live there and decided we would somehow have to afford it. We were lucky to have it, and later, we got even luckier when an embassy administrative officer, whom we'd invited to a reception, took a look at the apartment and decided to lease it long-term for the embassy. That apartment remained in the embassy stable for quite a while.

Q: How did your wife like the work and what you were doing in Paris?

TRATTNER: She supported and enhanced everything I did. I know that's a cliché for a lot of people, but I mean it truthfully. For one thing, as a hostess, she has wonderful insights into the mix of people that is right for each occasion, and how to bring them together and make it interesting for them, and she demonstrated this repeatedly in the entertaining we did. She was always moving among the guests, like any good hostess, but she also did it at the many other receptions and dinners we attended, where she could instead have stayed in the same corner talking with the same people for two hours. She gracefully and helpfully put up with my frequently long or late hours and preoccupation with my work, and spent as much time as she could out in the city. She made an already beautiful apartment into something extraordinary. And she managed two children's sometimes complicated school lives while settling our newborn third daughter into life.

Q: Were you picking up any bubbling from the university?

TRATTNER: There always seemed to be some restlessness in the universities. Some of it was about practical things like stipends or living quarters or class curriculum. Some of it was political. Now and then, it was directed against America, because of the Vietnam war. One day my wife and I were walking toward home in mid-afternoon and heard the unmistakable sounds of an approaching demonstration. It was apparently headed for the embassy, but we weren't sure. We knew that our two younger children were probably playing in the strip of park that ran along the river near where we lived, and even though our babysitter was with them, we were worried that the crowd might just sweep through where they were. Then this phalanx of kids came running across the Pont de la Concorde into the Place de la Concorde, just as we were about to cross the bridge in the other direction. Dozens of police with billy clubs were coming after them. They were going to pass us at close range, and maybe even engulf us, so we ran down the quai on that side of the river and escaped. But since we were wearing casual clothes, the cops wouldn't have distinguished us from the kids because they weren't only kids. There were many adults among them. The crowd, by the way, had never come near to where our kids were playing. I should add that while things like this were going on, the American Cultural Center in Paris continued to be a popular attraction, and a sizeable number of visitors there on a given day were young people, and university students. From what I saw indirectly in my own work, and what I heard from USIS colleagues, there didn't seem to be a noticeable diminution of interest in America among the youth of Paris.

I wanted to mention earlier a colleague in the Paris embassy's political section. I no longer recall his name, but he was, to my mind, what a truly effective Foreign Service political officer ought to be. That was because, beyond the traditional rounds of calls on government ministries and social contacts with officials and politicians, he spent a lot of time immersing himself in the country and the people. It was a part of his responsibilities, and he took it seriously. He traveled regularly around the country, sought out provincial and local officials and every kind of French man and woman, and talked with them at length. He was a close and skilled observer, fluent in the language, and he was able to correlate everything he learned. He put it all into descriptive mosaics that were the most beautifully worded, colorful, and informative reports that I ever read. What he gathered up in those trips truly informed his understanding of the country, its politics,

and its policies and this was reflected in what he wrote and how he performed as a diplomat. That skill is the true measure of the profession, as far as I'm concerned. There can't have been many like him, and I'm sure his reports were under appreciated in Washington. So I want to pay tribute to him here, even if I can't recall his name.

BURNETT ANDERSON
Director, USIS
Paris (1969-1977)

Burnett Anderson was born in Wisconsin in 1919. He entered the USIA in 1953. His career included assignments in Iran, Spain, France, and Sweden. Mr. Anderson was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on January 5, 1990.

ANDERSON: Next assignment was what might be called a troubleshooting job. I had gotten something of a reputation as a troubleshooter. In any event, Sarge Shriver wanted me in Paris, and I wasn't ready to leave.

Q: Sargent Shriver, we should note, was the American ambassador.

ANDERSON: He was the American ambassador. I managed to stave it off for a while because I wanted to continue working in Spain. I had been sent there for a five-year tour, and was finding it enjoyable and fascinating and rewarding. I'd gotten the language under good enough control so I could go out and lecture without having to read a speech and so on, and do the various things in the language of the country.

But Sarge, when he was reappointed by President Nixon for an additional year or more in Paris, then got insistent. Of course, Paris had its attractiveness, shall we say. In any event, I had no choice but to move on.

Q: You might explain, Burnett, how you happened to know Shriver.

ANDERSON: When I was working for Murrow principally, but also later under Rowan and Marks, I did an awful lot of inter-agency work, I was the number-two man on a couple of special groups. I was representative of the Agency on Bobby Kennedy's committee to work on young people. He had gotten that bug when he was on a foreign tour and had been, in effect, assaulted by a mob of youngsters in some Far Eastern country, and decided we should be doing more with young people. I sat on that group. I backed up Murrow and/or Wilson in the special group CI, special group for counterinsurgency, and several other inter-agency things, where occasionally Shriver was also involved.

Q: Shriver at that time was Director of the Peace Corps.

ANDERSON: He was Director of the Peace Corps. Also, I had had to see him occasionally about things that we wanted to do *vis à vis* the Peace Corps in terms of publishing something or

whatever, which he generally fought against, because he didn't want us --

Q: I think this deserves development briefly, at least. He was trying to preserve the purity of the Peace Corps, is that correct?

ANDERSON: Absolutely. It was an operation of good will and assistance, and he didn't want it in any way to be tainted by association not only with USIA or the CIA, but even trying to keep it removed from the embassies in the country where it was operative. I think the policy was sound, and I think the policy has succeeded.

But in any event, he did insist then that I come to Paris, and I acquiesced and made the move in the summer of 1969, succeeding Lee Brady, who was an old and accomplished French hand. Shriver was fun to work with, very vigorous. I don't think this was generally understood. He was, in his way, flamboyant. He was creative. I used to say, when I had to deal with him, I said, "When you're talking to Sarge, don't ever give him an idea or a proposition until you're solid with it and satisfied with it, because if you suggest something exciting, he'll be halfway across the *Place de la Concorde* with it before you finish the sentence." A great guy to work with. In that regard, you had to know how to work with him.

One thing he said -- and curiously enough, he meant it -- was, "You know, I am an idea man and I generate a lot of ideas, and I like to think that at least some are good." But he said, "That may be only two in a hundred. You guys have got to tell me the ones that aren't any damn good so that we won't be doing a lot of crazy things." And I had occasion from time to time -- it was really great -- to go over and see him or call him up about something, some piece of paper he had sent over which said, "Let's do this," or, "Let's do that," or sent some guy to see me who had some brilliant idea, and I'd have to go in and tell him, "Sarge, a lousy goddamn idea."

And he'd say, "Then we won't do it, will we?"

I'd say, "No."

He'd say, "That's what you're here for." So he did, in fact, really mean that.

He had a conception of the position that I thought was absolutely sound. [Charles] De Gaulle, you know, was president, and we were suffering so-called anti-Americanism to a considerable degree. There was an awful lot of terribly critical and inaccurate stuff on the TV that nobody had been able to do anything about and so on and so on. But he knew and understood that there is a basic -- what should I say? -- friendship or pro-American disposition at heart in the population as a whole. He was out to carry the message to De Gaulle through the people, and I think he did it very successfully. Indeed, by the time I came along, after I got into it, we were able to make some real strides with the TV of France, and gradually changed that terribly critical and distorted orientation, which is another long story that I won't try to go into here.

But I considered him an extremely effective ambassador and I became very fond of both him and Eunice. Beneath all the glitter and the play for the public and so on, warm, decent, generous, concerned human beings, both of them. I think when Sarge, from his pinnacle of power and

prominence talks about the people who are less fortunate, he's not kidding. He really means it.

Q: So you had a total of eight years in France?

ANDERSON: Yes. I thought I'd just go up there and last as long as Shriver, then move on. I never prepared to work in France. Spain was my first romance language. I had German and the Scandinavian tongues, and thought I was more or less naturally cut out for work in that area. But fortunately, I had the wit to settle right in and learn French, because then along came the famous Dick Watson, the younger scion of the IBM hierarchy, and his mottled career, but he wanted me to stay on. Then came Jack Irwin, his brother-in-law, who was as much of a gentleman as his predecessor was not, just a wonderful human being. Then Ken Rush, who had been Deputy Secretary of Defense, got the nod. We regretted that, because Jack had been, we thought, a marvelous, marvelous ambassador, but Ken turned out to be a very solid, very able representative, as well. He left in 1977 after the election, and shortly after that, I was assigned over to London for my last tour with the Agency.

JAMES D. ROSENTHAL
Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks
Paris (1970-1972)

Ambassador James Rosenthal was born in San Francisco in 1932. He graduated from Stanford University in 1953. After serving in the Marine Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1956. Ambassador Rosenthal's career has included positions in Trinidad, Vietnam, France, Central African Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines and an Ambassadorship to Guinea. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: You ended up at the Paris peace talks from when in the 1970s to when?

ROSENTHAL: From mid-1970 to mid-1972.

Q: What was happening during this period? What was your role?

ROSENTHAL: The role of the formal delegation was basically to conduct the public side of the negotiations. There were these weekly meetings in the Majestic Hotel. No negotiations went on in those meetings. We met every week; all four sides spoke. The transcripts were released to the press later and all would have a press conference later. Although the press wasn't in on the meeting, the whole thing was open. And so this was the public side of it, the propaganda side of it, and, in effect, the facade of it. Because the real negotiations went on secretly behind the backs of everybody, including me. I didn't know until much later that they were going on, with Kissinger and a few key people. I'm sure the head of the delegation knew what was going on. But those of us in the delegation were totally surprised when Kissinger made public his negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Totally. We had no idea.

Q: When did that word come out?

ROSENTHAL: It must have been in 1972.

Q: What did you do with this exercise in propaganda?

ROSENTHAL: You would prepare statements, you would prepare rebuttals, you would prepare additional statements. You might have a theme, like the POW issue on mail, for example. So we would all meet and decide what we were going to talk about that next meeting, and then we would coordinate with the South Vietnamese, and they would do part of it as well. Then we would try to figure out what the other side was going to say. In the meantime, you would answer a lot of questions from the press, official and unofficial visitors.

Q: What would you do with them?

ROSENTHAL: Like George McGovern, who would come and meet the other side. I remember that one particularly, because he was running for president at the time. He came out and met the other side, without us, of course. I was assigned to find out what went on. When they came back his guy told me nothing went on -- nothing new. That was a Saturday night. I remember it very well. Sunday morning, he had a breakfast with the press, and stated the North Vietnamese had told him something new, something very important and promising and it was a big story. Well, it's true that what McGovern described would have been a big concession on the part of the North Vietnamese. So the next Thursday -- the meetings were on Thursdays -- we asked them about this. "You reportedly said to George McGovern so and so, and so and so...is that true?" And they said, "No, absolutely not." It was really an interesting case study of somebody trying to pull something off privately for political gain, when it wasn't true. Or maybe it was just a misinterpretation. The least they could have done was say, "Hey, they told us this." We could have saved them an embarrassment, by saying no, we don't believe that's what they said. Or, they couldn't have said that, or if they did, it would be a major concession, and so on. But the McGovern group just stonewalled us, and went public with it. There were a lot of groups like that. There were POW families who came. There were all kinds of Senators and Congressmen -- peace groups of all kinds.

Q: Did you feel that a lot of these groups were basically trying to undercut you?

ROSENTHAL: I think some of them were. Most of them no -- most of them were pretty good. Almost every one that did visit the other side's delegation would come back because they would want to know, "What does this mean?" And we wanted to know what went on, too. In no case, that I can recall, while I was there, anyway, did any of the groups ever come back with anything of real importance in terms of a negotiating breakthrough. They didn't know, and I didn't know that there were secret talks going on. So, clearly, the Vietnamese would play these groups. They would try to lead them down the garden path a little bit, to put more pressure on us. But as far as I can tell, there was never any private diplomacy conducted through any of those groups. It was just propaganda. Many of them were being used by Hanoi.

Q: From what you are saying, it sounds like a pretty static situation. And to do it for two years --

this must have been a little bit wearying on the soul.

ROSENTHAL: Very. In fact, it was so wearying, I willingly went to the Central African Republic as DCM. Seriously, I was just goddamned tired of Vietnam. I'd spent a lot of time on Vietnam anyway, and I wasn't in on the secret talks, which were not secret by that time. So I figured, what the hell.

Q: Did you sort of have the feeling, as almost writing off Vietnam as a career place by this time?

ROSENTHAL: No, I didn't have that feeling. I just was tired of having spent a lot of time on it. Also, from a career standpoint, being DCM was my next move. So I went off to Bangui for two years.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point. I hope we can work this out. Let me stop here.

MICHAEL E. C. ELY
Economic Officer
Paris (1970-1972)

Michael E. C. Ely was born in Washington, DC on August 26, 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in international affairs from Princeton University in 1952 and a master's degree in public affairs from Harvard University. Following his studies at Princeton, Mr. Ely served in the U.S. military for nearly two years. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Kuala Lumpur, Algiers, Mogadishu, Rome, Tokyo and Brussels. Mr. Ely was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: You left Paris in 1962 and took an economic training course, then you served in Paris from '70 to '72.

ELY: That's right. And at that time, my old boss, the Treasury attaché, was the number- two man in the Economic Section. But that was changed by Dick Watson, the ambassador, and, to my embarrassment, I was made the number two, over my old boss.

Q: Must have been uncomfortable. Did this represent anything from the Washington side as far as Treasury being unhappy with this? Or the Nixon administration?

ELY: No, this was an arrangement that had always existed in the embassy from the early days of the Marshall Plan. The Treasury people -- Tomlinson and his deputy, McGrew -- who stayed on were very capable, energetic, hard-working people who were very active and broad gauged. They handled trade questions as well as financial questions. In the Paris embassy, you had this tradition of very close integration of Treasury and State.

In my first job, I worked in the Treasury Section. Actually, there were two officers, sometimes,

in the Treasury Section. My predecessor was Art Hartman, and his predecessor was Dick Vine, so there had been a lot of good State people working with Treasury there.

But this relationship was beginning to deteriorate by the time I got back there in '70. Dick Watson was a difficult and sick man. He didn't like the Treasury attaché, didn't trust him, thought he was gay because he wasn't married, and eventually just decided this is the way it's going to be.

Q: Watson came from the IBM family.

ELY: He was the younger brother of Tom, Jr.

Q: Well, he had his problems, too, didn't he.

ELY: Yes, he certainly did. He was the one that had too much to drink on a transatlantic flight and got into a shouting match with a stewardess, which was publicized.

He also did strange things around the embassy. He's the one that ordered the Marine guard to take down and destroy the Christmas tree.

Q: Shoot it or something?

ELY: He said, "Chop it up in pieces."

Q: What was the problem with that?

ELY: He was drunk and he thought it didn't look right. The admin. counselor had to send him a memorandum the next day saying that he had personally approved that Christmas tree. And he came back, "Okay, I owe you one."

He wasn't a bad man, but he was unstable, he had a drinking problem and he was arbitrary. At IBM, he played tricks on the senior management. He would organize groups of junior officers to do oversight of section chiefs. The section chiefs didn't like that very much. And he also ran people through a goals-and-objectives exercise that you could never quite get done, it was never quite right, it was always being sent back for a little more work. He kept people very much on edge. He would fine people for being late to staff meetings. You had to speak at staff meetings, but you had to know just how much. If you spoke too much, you got cut off, and if you didn't speak enough, the conclusion was that you didn't have anything to say because you weren't doing anything.

There were these minor harassment measures that were continually taking place, and people were rather unhappy.

Anyhow, I was direct-transferred from there, marriage still deteriorating, to Rome, where I ran the Economic Section.

Q: You served there from '72 to '72. In France, this was after de Gaulle by this time, wasn't it?

ELY: That's right.

Q: Did you see a difference in your dealings with the French government after the departure of de Gaulle?

ELY: Some attenuation. These were the Pompidou days. Pompidou was a Gaullist and he was very careful not to change any of the Gaullist policies of being outside of the military alliance, seeing France as an arbiter between the Soviet Union and the United States, being critical of the United States' Vietnam policy, generally critical of American social policies, economic policies, but with no animus to it, nothing *ad hominem*.

So the sting had gone down, but there was still a lot of official anti-Americanism around the circuit. And it bothered people in the embassy quite a bit. Indeed, the official anti-Americanism was stronger in '70 than it had been in '60, when I got there, because it had been around longer, it was deeper rooted, and people were getting ahead by being critical and unpleasant. In '70-72, nobody would speak English -- nobody -- and a lot of the French spoke it pretty well. Now, they'll speak English to practice if they can. Very little linguistic chauvinism is left in France.

It all started to change about '68, when French society was rocked to its foundations by a general uprising against the structure.

Q: This was June of '68.

ELY: There were the students, workers, everybody. And the housewives... on their balconies, beating tin cans with spoons.

It led to a widespread reform of the very coercive educational system, which has never been as good since. It led to administrative reforms. I guess the school system is the main thing. It used to be that only about 20 percent of the people in the 18-year-old cohort got a baccalaureate. Now, they're up to 55 or 60 percent, and the standards have come down quite a bit. But the intense elitism and exclusivity of the French system began to be reformed at that point.

Similarly, there was civil service reform. The liberalization of the university system was offset by the strengthening of the "Grandes Ecoles."

Q: The selective schools, the equivalent to bureaucratic war colleges, in a way?

ELY: Well, no, what they call the Commerce, Arts Métier, École Normale, ..., and several others. Because the universities are no longer selective and they can't fail anybody, the value of a university diploma has plummeted, while the value of a diplôme from a Grande Ecole went up. And that has caused further problems for French society, which it is now trying to sort out. It is the meritocracy that runs the country, even more now than ever before. It not only runs the administration, but it also tends to run a lot of the businesses, private as well as nationalized.

Anyhow, I had a nice, interesting two years. I was heading the General Economic Section. We

handled trade, transportation and technology questions, and U.S. sales of computers to the French Atomic Energy Agency, and things of that nature. We also handled energy and energy reporting. The French were running a very Gaullist policy vis-à-vis the Arabs, as if they saw the 1973 oil crisis coming. But by and large, I enjoyed it. It was strenuous.

CARL C. CUNDIFF
Economic Officer, OECD
Paris (1970-1973)

Ambassador Carl Cundiff graduated from the University of the South and received his Ph. D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1966, his career has included positions in Vietnam, France, Ivory Coast and an Ambassadorship to Nigeria. Ambassador Cundiff was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1996.

CUNDIFF: No. I arrived in Paris...I think it was late January or early February of 1970 after having Christmas at home.

Q: Your assignment to Paris was what?

CUNDIFF: That was with the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, which is an international economic organization of the industrial countries headquartered in Paris.

Q: Which started out in the Marshall Plan period. I've been reading the book by Richard Bissell, I think, and how he helped put together the European Payments Union and they were certainly involved in the early period in European integration. And many of the habits of European cooperation in receiving and disbursing and coordinating Marshall Plan assistance. Much later, by the time you got there, that was all in the past. But what sort of work were you doing in the Mission to the OECD?

CUNDIFF: I had essentially two types of assignments actually. One, for the economic counselor who was a State Department person. I attended a committee which reviewed the economy of each of the OECD member countries on a periodic basis and made economic policy recommendations. That was a fairly time demanding responsibility because there were a number of countries in the OECD and their economies are being reviewed all the time.

I also back-stopped the visits to the OECD by senior economists from Washington, mainly the chairman and the other members of the Council of Economic Advisors.

Q: You say you had two bosses. Under the economic counselor, you did the economic policy review.

CUNDIFF: Largely macroeconomic policy review of the OECD countries.

Q: Who was your other boss?

CUNDIFF: My other boss was one of the treasury representatives in the U.S. Mission in the OECD. Under that person I sat on what is called the "Invisibles Committee," which is a committee which is involved in monitoring the process of liberalization of foreign exchange practices among the industrial countries.

Q: By this time, the early 1970s, the work of that committee was presumably much less than it had been earlier when they were lots of controls and regulations.

CUNDIFF: That is correct. The work...there was probably less work to be done than there had been right after World War II when there were more comprehensive foreign exchange controls. But the fact is that even when I was in Paris in the early 1970s many of the members of the OECD still had restrictions on capital movements. And largely outward capital movements. And there were also restrictions in the services areas in regards to various services transactions such as: insurance, purchase and sale of real estate, film rights, intellectual property in general and this sort of thing.

Q: Was this true particularly in the less advanced OECD countries? Or were there some kinds of restrictions in just about every case?

CUNDIFF: There were some restrictions in just about every case. For example, in Canada, a very developed country there were restrictions concerning films and magazines-culturally related transactions. And in France there were restrictions concerning property in particular. And also a lot of property restrictions in a good many of the European countries.

Q: Let's come back to the other hat or other activities in the macroeconomic policy review and you say that this was almost continuous. Because at that time there was twenty odd OECD countries or even more.

CUNDIFF: I think about twenty-one.

Q: How much response did you feel there was in general to the recommendations or to the process of interaction that took place at the OECD. Did countries listen to advice or was it in some cases sort of preemptory in the sense that they knew they were going to be criticized or asked questions and therefore made adjustments or promised they would make adjustments?

CUNDIFF: I think it is a little bit of a combination of what you described. I think that countries were very seldom surprised by the analysis and recommendations from the OECD because generally speaking, the OECD staff would have already visited the countries - and spoken with the economists that they needed to see. And they would probably be making recommendations that would not come as a surprise to most professional economists. However, some of these recommendations obviously have political implications. And I think countries generally tend to be a little bit circumspect in regard to accepting advice coming from outside the country.

Q: One of your roles, I suppose, as a representative of the United States on the committee was not only to understand and participate in economic analysis - although a lot of that was probably done at least in the initial stages by the OECD secretariat or staff. But to kind of give a kind of political understanding and maybe interpretation that were being considered. And I assume you worked with other American embassies as well as agencies in Washington.

CUNDIFF: That is correct. We would share the Secretariat's work, its analysis and recommendations with Washington in advance of meetings. We would also share that in advance with our embassies in the countries concerned. And then we would take the reactions from the embassy and Washington and use that in our own intervention during the review of the Secretariat's work. Essentially you are correct. We would try to address the key policy concerns. Often this had to do with whether the country should be taking a more restricted fiscal policy or a more restrictive monetary policy or to the contrary and be a little more expansionist. And this...if you look at it in broad terms, the idea was to try to help countries orchestrate their growth and their economic progress in a way that would be beneficial to the whole global economy.

Q: Which part of the U.S. government in Washington did you particularly work with in this area? Was it the State Department, or Treasury?

CUNDIFF: Well, the three agencies. The State Department obviously, all the time. The office in the State Department was the European Bureau that was responsible for our relations with the OECD and with the European Economic Community. And then also close relations with the Council of Economic Advisors-the President's Council of Economic Advisors. And with the international monetary side of the Treasury Department. Also to some extent with the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC - the international side of that.

Q: You mentioned that you also worked with or for Treasury representatives at the U.S. Mission OECD in the "Invisible's Committee" area. Did Treasury have permanent people assigned to the Mission - or are these people that came from Washington?

CUNDIFF: The Treasury had, when I was there, two permanent and fairly senior and experienced Treasury officials.

Q: Who were, as you say, quite experienced and had other assignments in Europe?

CUNDIFF: That is correct.

Q: Carl, as you know, I came at least once...maybe more than once to Paris to the economic review when you were there. I look back on that as a very rich experience personally because it gave me a chance to interact with Italian government representatives. And I think I was also there in connection with when I was in Switzerland and to be able to hear and participate and get to know the issues and the people was really a very valuable experience. So I'm not sure I would want to do that work every week - or every day. But it certainly helped me in my responsibilities in the embassy in Rome. I thank you for whatever you did to make sure that people from the embassies could actually come and participate.

CUNDIFF: Well, that made it a richer experience for me as well. When embassies like yours in Rome were able to send an experienced officer to attend because even though people like myself had read the analysis by the Secretariat and had our instructions perhaps from Washington on individual countries, the fact remains that none of us could be as aware of what was going on say with the Italian economy as say someone like yourself who was in Rome.

Q: And Paris in the early 1970s was a good place to live and be?

CUNDIFF: Excellent place to live and be.

PATRICK F. MORRIS
Deputy Director, OECD/
Paris (1970-1973)

Mr. Morris was born and raised in Montana. Educated at Georgetown University, Mexico City College, and San Marcos College, Lima, Peru, Mr. Morris served in the US Army in Europe during World War II, where he was captured and imprisoned by the German Army. He joined the newly established Point IV program in 1950 and worked with that agency and its successors in various senior level capacities in Washington, D.C., in Paris and throughout Latin America. His final posting was in the Dominican Republic, where he served as Director of the US AID Mission. Mr. Morris was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: What was, you might say, the thrust of both the Jackson report and our desires to make the UNDP a more effective program?

MORRIS: I cannot, at this time, recall the details. We had conducted a thorough review of the Jackson report and supported most of its recommendations. So we were pushing to have it adopted by the UN hierarchy.

We were interested in improving the whole recruitment process and making sure that they improved their professionalism. Their programming was very amateurish. And Paul Hoffman, a wonderful guy, he was treated like a god up there and with reason. You know, here was a man who brought the Studebaker Corporation out of bankruptcy and turned it into a going organization and then went on to head the Marshall Plan in Europe. But Paul Hoffman was, by this time in his 80s, a venerable figure and a wonderful guy. He had, I cannot remember his name now, he had an assistant, an American, who had the second top job in the organization who was a professional in every sense of the word but they were just living within the realities of the UN system at that time and they, both Paul and whatever this fellow's name, both realized and they accepted the recommendations of the Jackson report in toto and were happy to have the United States pushing the other delegations to get it implemented. But as in any multi-national or even any organization that has multiple interests you get all kinds of different obstacles and people had already built up their little fiefdoms and they were resisting making any changes so

that even if Paul Hoffman had wanted to he would not have been able to do it without a very strong support from member nations and of course that is what we were engaged in.

And I was on that job for, let me see, '69, yes, I guess all of '69 and then I was offered a job in Paris at- U.S. delegation to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) as deputy director of the delegation to the DAC, which was the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. We had at that time four people on that delegation. And that was of great interest to me for two reasons. All the time I have been in the field I had become intimately familiar with the operation problems and I think that I had a very good understanding of what made a program work and how you made it work and what you had to do to make it work and so forth. But I had never had an opportunity to step back from the trees and see the whole forest. What was going on at the DAC looked at the development assistances worldwide. The United States had established, after the Marshall Plan in Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and within that organization there was the Development Assistance Committee that coordinated or attempted to coordinate the activities of all the countries in the industrial world that were providing economic assistance to the developing world. And I thought that that would really complete my understanding of development, both from a micro point of view and from a macro point of view. And so I was quite interested and in fact, it just happened that that particular activity was part of my responsibility in Washington; my office within AID had a responsibility for coordinating all international program activities. I had spent nine-tenths of my time on UN because the DAC was almost problem-free and we had routine requirements to provide the delegation in Paris with information and expertise whenever they needed it in particular areas that were under consideration by the DAC. So I had continuing contact with the DAC all the time I was doing the UN work and our delegate to the DAC at that time was Stuart Van Dyke. And Stuart asked me if I wanted to come to Paris and since I had spent my whole career in Latin America this was an opportunity to go to Europe, to work in Europe and in a great city like Paris. And of course my wife was delighted when she heard that I had an opportunity to take a job in Paris. So we went to Paris in January of 1970.

Q: And you were there how long?

MORRIS: Two-and-a-half years.

Q: What was your impression of the organization there? Were you up against the fiefdoms and-?

MORRIS: Probably; probably. But the play there was interesting because it had to do with governments pushing their own themes and it was great fun because part of the DAC process was that each year the heads of the various development organizations of the various countries had to come to the DAC to defend their programs; to explain their programs and to defend their programs. And so it was great fun to pick holes in everybody else's programs. And of course, you know, our programs were criticized and most of the criticism was political criticism; it was not development criticism. My interests, of course, were in the mechanics of development but this devolved on that level, at least, although we had lots of other meetings where we did get into the essence of development and we were- I think that the organization itself, OECD and the DAC, are absolutely essential to continuing interchanges between countries and among countries

on what they are doing, why they are doing it; it gives you insights that are really essential to make international assistance work.

Q: Did you pick up on, I mean, there were many other themes but the fascination of, particularly Scandinavian countries with Nyerere in Tanzania and all where he was really driving his country, it was my impression, into the ground using the Fabian socialist model but he was a great talker and you know, particularly Scandinavian countries fell in love with him, kind of.

MORRIS: Yes, yes. Well, you know the Scandinavians were in many ways above the battle, they are above the ideological battles and they really thought of their programs really as philanthropic efforts. But, you know, their own development models had evolved into socialist or semi-socialistic models which worked for them and so it made sense in their view to support similar efforts around the world. And, it is an interesting commentary, really, that Sweden at the turn of the last century, that is the beginning of the 20th century, was almost 100 percent rural and agricultural and during the progress of the 20th century became a leading industrial nation.

After I served in Paris I eventually went to the Dominican Republic and I cannot remember why but at some point I had the idea of comparing the Dominican Republic and Sweden, their advances, industrially. Probably one of the reasons was that they had comparable populations; very different in every other way but they had comparable populations and comparable land mass. Maybe Sweden is a little larger than the Dominican Republic but not too much larger. And the evolution of Sweden in the 20th century, alongside the evolution of the Dominican Republic, there is a difference of night and day. And of course I think in the minds of the Scandinavians they had accomplished great things following, you say a Fabian model. Yes, they are following a Fabian model and they saw no reason why this would not work in the rest of the world.

MORRIS: And the DAC. OECD has top notch staff but mostly provides statistical and economic development information reports; reports, reports. But all of this information is extremely valuable because it is all analytical, and it gives you insights.

You know the World Bank does some of this and you find a lot of World Bank reports being cited but I think that the OECD reports are just as valid and many times better reports on development problems than the World Bank reports are. In terms of U.S. development programs or any other country development programs, the DAC reviews did not really make much difference in terms of the direction that those programs took. The programs, each one of the country programs were pre-determined long before the DAC reviews took place and they continued on their way regardless of our reviews. I think they were useful in the sense that the people who ran the programs became aware of the professional judgments that were being made on their areas of weakness.

For example, we all played a game of how generous we were and the United States included- Well first of all, the funds for U.S. development assistance included our economic assistance to Israel, our economic assistance to Egypt, which took up almost 50 percent of the budget at that time. And those programs were politically determined.

Q: Well actually, we were not giving as much to Egypt at the time you were there because it was

only in the mid, late- '70s that we-

MORRIS: Well yes, you are right; you are right.

Q: But we were giving significant amounts to what is now an underdeveloped country.

MORRIS: Exactly. But we were counting it as development assistance. And of course by the same token the French included in their development programs a lot of their overseas territories that even had representatives in the French parliament.

Q: Yes, sure.

MORRIS: For example those Caribbean countries the French-

Q: Martinique.

MORRIS: Martinique, yes, and there are a couple of little islands off of Canada.

Q: Yes, yes, those two little islands.

MORRIS: Right. And they were part of the French development assistance programs and of course we would criticize them, that this was French, not overseas assistance, just territorial assistance.

Q: How about the Cold War? How did this intrude?

MORRIS: That is a good question. I think that for the most part we were all on the same page.

Q: Were the Soviets doing- Because the Soviets had quite a program in Africa.

MORRIS: Yes but they were not part of the OECD.

Q: Oh, that is right.

MORRIS: They were not part of the OECD. But you know, the thing is that we were in Vietnam and we had a large assistance program in Vietnam and obviously we included that and we got very, very strong criticism from everybody else for including Vietnam as a legitimate development assistance program. Privately I could agree that you cannot do very much legitimate development assistance in the middle of a war, just as we are seeing again in Iraq, where it is very difficult to justify any kind of traditional development assistance program when you have a war going on.

HENRY A. HOLMES
Political Counselor

Paris (1970-1974)

Ambassador Henry Holmes was born in Bucharest, Romania of U.S. diplomat parents. After graduating from Princeton University in 1954, he joined the Marine Corps. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1957, his career has included positions in Cameroon, Italy, France, and an Ambassadorship to Portugal. Ambassador Holmes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: I think he's one of the seminal figures in the administration of the State Department. You were in Paris from when to when?

HOLMES. From 1970 to 1974.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you arrived?

HOLMES: When I arrived the ambassador was leaving, and that was President Kennedy's brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver, who was just departing at that point. And the new ambassador, who was sent there by President Nixon, was Dick Watson, who was the younger brother of Tom Watson, both of them sons of the founder of IBM.

Q: How was Ambassador Watson? I mean what was your impression of him?

HOLMES: Well, Ambassador Watson - by the way he spoke very good French and played a significant role in putting IBM on the world map; I mean he was really in charge of its international operations - came to Paris with a singular mission. He'd had discussions with the President, and his mission, as he told us from the moment he got to Paris, was to close down the heroin labs in Marseilles, so that the pollution of American youth, particularly in New York, would cease. This was the much-ballyhooed "French connection." That was his mission, and he felt very strongly about it. This was what the President had spoken to him about, and all these other traditional Foreign Service diplomatic roles were not unimportant, but they were definitely of secondary importance, and this was his goal, to achieve this. And this unleashed quite a tidal wave of activity in the embassy, and he brought everybody into it. We had one DEA agent who was assigned to the embassy, and it was quite a big undertaking because he quickly discerned, after talking with the French Government, particularly the Ministry of the Interior, that there was really no interest in the French Government to do anything serious about this, that the feeling was this was an American problem and it was a demand problem, not a supply problem, primarily. And they thought it was greatly exaggerated. Yes, there may be some criminal activity in Marseilles, but this was really an American problem. So Watson and a number of us had many long discussions about how to turn the French around, because unless we had their cooperation there was no way that we could make any progress. So the USIS representatives suggested at one point, "Why don't we talk to French television and see if they're interested in using some of the material that we have, some films about what happens to children when they shoot up, and drug addiction and so forth?" And so we tried that, and I was very skeptical that we would get a hearing with French television, and they said, no, they weren't interested because having viewed the films, they said, "This won't have any impact on French audiences because this is very clearly an American setting and these are American kids, and it's obvious." But one man in the

French television said, "If you will show us the places in France where this sort of activity is taking place, we'll make our own film and show it." Well, again, we were very skeptical, but the DEA guy took a small French crew around to parts of Paris and Lille and Marseilles and several large cities in France, and sure enough, they actually produced a film and showed it on French television. And this caused a firestorm of response from the French electorate, and all of a sudden the French Government got interested in cooperating with us. And there were all sorts of discussion that took place, and eventually an agreement was signed between the minister of the interior or the minister of Justice and our attorney general that we would work with them in trying to close down the heroin labs, which were mostly the Corsican mafia. The morphine base was coming into Marseilles from Pakistan and Turkey, largely, and there was transformed into heroin, and from there it went through a variety of channels to the United States.

Well, we then had started a period of cooperation, and nothing came of it, largely because the police that were assigned to work with us in Marseilles were on the take, and they were frequently Corsican cousins of those who were actually in the trade. So then the French Government decided that they would send a non-Corsican very highly regarded police officer from Paris who had devised a way of producing... There had been a lot of bank robberies, and this man had devised a way of prediction where the next bank robbery would take place and was very successful, and so they thought that he might be able to use this methodology in Marseilles. So he went to Marseilles, and again, there was no reaction, primarily because he was frozen out by the local cops.

So one day, sitting in a staff meeting... We had a wonderful science attaché, who was a distinguished professor, and older man with white hair, who spoke up, "You know, it takes a lot of water to turn morphine base into heroin. Has anybody ever thought of checking the utility bills of the various villas in and around Marseilles?" So this very sensible idea actually broke the case. I mean it was incredible. The French police got onto that, and sure enough, within weeks they had busted dozens of these laboratories that were in villas scattered around the Marseilles area. This was a huge success, and it basically started us on the road to breaking the French connection.

Q: That's wonderful. Who was the head of the Political Section when you were there?

HOLMES: Bob Anderson was the head of the Political Section, Robert Anderson, who had been my boss in the Office of West European Affairs in the State Department.

Q: If I recall, I've talked to people who've served in France, and I think they point to Bob Anderson's political section as being one of the premier ones at any time of people, including yourself, who were there. Did you have that feeling, that you were with a particularly elite group?

HOLMES: Well, Bob spent a lot of time recruiting good officers for that section, and those that handled all the international portfolios, and we had an officer that dealt with west European questions, another one that dealt with NATO questions, another officer that dealt with Asian-Pacific questions, another one on Africa and the Middle East, a labor attaché. It was a very large section, very energetic people that he inspired, that he pushed very hard to get out and do their

jobs. And it was fun. I mean people were excited about the work that they were doing there, and Bob knew France. He had served there several times and spoke good French and his wife was fluent in French and they had a lot of French friends and entertained a lot. They knew a lot of senior political leaders, and he encouraged me to get out and find out what was going on, and of course the Socialists were in opposition.

We were not allowed to talk to the Communists, as was the case in most European countries, but the Socialists were a kind of a radical group, so I was trying to meet people in the Socialist Party, and I met the future minister of defense of France, a guy named Charles Hernu. I used to go over to the Socialist Party headquarters and talk with him and took him to lunch a couple of times. And I discovered at a certain juncture that he was also a contact of one of my Agency counterparts at the embassy, which could have been very embarrassing, but the two of us worked it out and made it very clear to Hernu that we were friends. I think probably Hernu understood what was going on, but he never revealed it.

But I still had a hard time getting my arms around the French socialist movement. I had a lucky break. I knew a lot of French journalists, and one man in particular who wrote for a left-wing magazine called *Nouvelle Observateur* called me up one day and invited me and my wife to an informal lunch at his little cottage in the country. And he said, "We will be a small group, next Sunday, and you probably won't know one of the people there, a sort of forgotten figure from the Fourth Republic named François Mitterrand." And I said, "Oh, I know who he is. I spent a year at the Sciences-Politiques, and certainly I'd be delighted." So we went for this lunch, and Mitterrand was accompanied by one of his young admirers, an attractive young woman, and we had a lot of interesting discussions at the table, and I asked him a lot of questions about his politics and his views. And he was showing off a little bit in front of his... the young woman who was with him. We spent probably three or four hours at table, and later we had a long walk afterwards. Mitterrand basically laid out his *Mein Kampf*, his plan for coming to power in France. It was quite extraordinary, because at the time he was a kind of forgotten figure from the Fourth Republic. He headed a small little splinter group called the Convention of Republican Institutions, and he was very specific. He said, "In a few weeks I'm going to call my party into a special congress. I'm going to ask their permission to join the greater socialist family, to reintegrate into the Socialist Party. They will give me that authority. I will then go next spring to a little town called Epinay, where the great socialist family will come together, the party. I will have about a hundred delegates of the thousand, and I will emerge as the first secretary of the Socialist Party with a program of cooperation with the Communist Party intact. And using that as a platform, we will increase our numbers in the National Assembly, and then after that I will run for president and I will become president of France." I mean he laid it all out - it was absolutely incredible - in detail. And I went home that night, and I wrote a little memo to myself, to the files, and I just tucked it away. When I left France several years later, about three years later, reassigned, he had achieved every step. And I went to Epinay, by the way. I went to that congress on the weekend and watched him operate. It was quite extraordinary. He did exactly what he said he was going to do, and he'd achieved every goal except that he hadn't become president of France because the first time he failed, in his first run for the presidency of France. Quite an extraordinary figure and great fun for me, I must say.

Q: As soon as you say the word Communist, I would have thought that would set off all sorts of

warning bells and "Don't touch this man" and all that.

HOLMES: Oh, it did, it did, it absolutely did. And it was a great concern in Washington, and they were very suspicious of Mitterrand. They did not believe what he was saying, that the only way to control the Communists in France was to bring them into the government. They thought that he would be taken over by them and that basically Moscow would tell him what to do and so forth. And all this came into very sharp focus in about March of 1981. This was about 10 years later. President Reagan had been elected, and the first trip of a senior member of his Administration to Europe was taken by George Bush, who was the Vice President. This was about March. And he had two places to go. One was to go to Paris because they were really worried because the French under Mitterrand had put together a government that had Communist ministers in the government, and you can imagine this very conservative American Administration was worried about that. I was, at the time, the senior deputy assistant secretary for European affairs. My boss was Larry Eagleburger, and Larry had other things to do, and he asked me to go with the Vice President on the trip. So 10 years later this thing was all coming into focus, and I went on the trip with the Vice President. He invited me to sit with him up in the cabin on the way over, and we talked a lot about what was happening in France, and he asked me how he should handle this Communist problem. And I told him that it was important that he be very clear with Mitterrand about the concerns of the US Government but that we had to be careful not to intervene too openly in the process. We did have some private conversation with Mitterrand so that he would understand that we would be required to say some things publicly that might be not appreciated in France. He said, "Well, why do we need to do that?" and I said, "Well, because the Italians will be watching how we handle this because we'd just been through this period of the almost historic compromise between Catholic and Communist Italy, and the Italians will be very surprised if we go and say nothing." And he said, "Won't that be very insulting to the president of France to have lunch with him and then on the steps of the Elysée to say some disobliging things to the French press?" And I said, "Yes, so my advice to you is that at the end of the lunch you and Mitterrand go off and have coffee together in a separate room, and you tell him what you want to say so there are no surprises." And that's exactly what happened. And the fascinating thing is we went right from the airport to the Elysée, and we arrived as the first cabinet meeting with French Communist ministers in the government was leaving the Elysée, and we arrived and went in and had lunch with Mitterrand. There were about 10 of us around the table. And Mitterrand spent almost the entire meal describing his plan of how he was going to "suffocate" the Communists by bringing them into the government and forcing them to do things, to participate in French government policy that was basically anathema to Communist doctrine. And I watched the Vice President as he went through this explanation, and he was extremely skeptical. By dessert you could see that he was beginning to think that this man might be able to do something. He was beginning to listen. And so afterwards he and Mitterrand went into a side room, they had coffee together, and on the steps of the Elysée Bush said just enough of a note of displeasure about the United States's great ally France having Communists in the government. He didn't overdo it. It was very deftly done. It caused some predictable commentary in the French press, but the Italian press reported it big-time. But, of course, we all know what happened afterwards. I mean, Mitterrand succeeded in suffocating the Communists. He did exactly what he had planned.

Q: Allen, did you find that in dealing with the Socialists at this time, the ambassador and maybe

even Anderson were saying "Don't get too friendly?" I mean, were we watching the Socialists? Did we really not like them within our orbit or anything of that nature at this point?

HOLMES: No, not really. Certainly not on the part of Bob Anderson, who was a professional. And at that point I was too junior that it didn't really make any difference from the point of view of any, quote, embarrassment to the US Government. In my view, this is exactly at the level of political discussion and enquiry that a political officer should do. And as it turned out, it was advantageous in getting some understanding of where the Socialist Party was moving.

Q: Well, as we watched with Mitterrand, you went to Epinay? Did we see the developments with Mitterrand moving into the presidency as a... How did we view that at that time?

HOLMES: I think people were concerned that in his attempt to create a working majority with the left - it was called the Union of the Left - that it would be Communist-dominated and that it would further loosen French ties to the Atlantic Alliance and that this would cause us problems. And of course at the time this was happening, we were beginning to creep out of Vietnam, if you will recall. Nixon, of course, was in office, and we were negotiating. The Paris Peace Talks were taking place, and there was still a tremendous amount of agitation on the left against American involvement in Vietnam. And I found myself defending our policy. I felt passionately that despite my own personal views on the wisdom of ever having made this stake in Southeast Asia, it was abhorrent to me that the American people treated the American servicemen who returned from Vietnam so badly. Here these kids had been drafted and gone and served their country and served their country well under enormous difficulties with enormous difficulties not only the war itself but the drug culture that was then prevalent in the armed forces, and I was absolutely outraged by the way our service people were treated by so many sectors of the American public opinion when they came home. And so I felt passionately about that. And that made it in many respects easy for me to defend American service in Vietnam. And I spent a lot of time talking to groups and arguing about it. As I say, the Paris Peace Talks were underway at the time, and we had at a certain point - and I can't remember what year it was; I was there from 1970 to 1974 - we had the opening of China at that time.

Q: Yes, it was '71, '72.

HOLMES: And I'll come to that in a minute, but just to finish up on the Vietnam piece - when a very well-known American general, Vernon Walters, Dick Walters, was our defense attaché there at the time, as a general officer - which was unusual. When he left, he was replaced by a brigadier general who had served in Vietnam. And at a certain point, *Life Magazine* came out with an edition where he was literally the centerfold, on bended knee, with a rifle in the crook of his arm, with the body of a Viet Cong at his feet, almost like a hunting trophy. This photograph was reproduced endlessly in the French press. This was our new defense attaché. This kind of stirred up a lot of activity for our USIS branch and the political officers.

At some point I should talk to you about the Chinese connection in Paris because that was a fascinating episode.

Q: Okay, but before we move to the Chinese connection, I would like to ask about dealing with

the left. You had served before in Rome, and my experience in Italy was that our opposition to the opening to the left was profound. I mean it was like either you believed in the virgin birth or you didn't believe in the virgin birth. And yet the Italian Communist was in many ways much softer. You know, they were sort of Italian, and like everything Italian, it wasn't quite as dogmatic. But when you move over to the French Communist Party, it was - I can't remember-

HOLMES: Yes, it was Maurice Thorez who was one of the leaders of the French Communist Party, and they were very hard-edged. They were tough.

Q: They were both tough and they were very much considered the tool of the Kremlin, in a way.

HOLMES: Yes, they were very tough. They had been born, of course, in the crucible of the resistance in World War II and had fought the Germans and then later us for political influence. Yes, they were a very different breed, and difficult to deal with, and played hardball, and played hardball in the French unions as well.

Q: Did you find the same sort of theology within the embassy in Paris that you did in our embassy in Rome about opening to the left, or was it different?

HOLMES: I would say it was more sophisticated, and obviously the same prohibitions existed. We were not allowed to openly have contact with the Communist Party. Most of the contact with the Communist Party was done indirectly. I would occasionally meet Communists, but most of my reporting was through French journalists and French Socialists. I mean, that's where I got most of my information about what the Communist Party was up to. I did not have regular contacts with the Communist Party. I think one or two trusted members of the "other Political Section," the Agency's group, did have some very carefully controlled contacts with a handful of Communists.

Q: But obviously you were reading the Communist newspaper.

HOLMES: Oh, sure, *L'Humanité*. Yes, absolutely. And they were very, very hard-edged and working very hard to maintain the strength of their constituency in France.

Q: How did you feel at that time about the French media?

HOLMES: The French media were terrific. That was a tremendous advantage for me as a political officer in Paris. Of course, I knew a lot about French politics and France. I already spoke fluent French, so I had an ease of access that was very fortunate from my standpoint. And I cultivated half a dozen wonderful French journalists, sort of across the political spectrum. First of all, I learned a lot from them, but also I met people through these French journalists. And we were frequently working the same side of the street in terms of getting information and putting it together, making judgments on where-

Q: But did you find with the media that it was very much in reading it each newspaper you read came from a particular spectrum of the political thing, or were there ones which encompassed more?

HOLMES: Well, it depends what you were reading. The sort of stodgy but highly professional what I would call newspaper of record was *Le Monde*, and *Le Monde* did not have any particular political label on it. It was just the most professional foreign policy daily in France, and they prided themselves on not having pictures or any glossy photographs. It was just a very straight kind of reporting, and some very talented reporters for *Le Monde*. *Humanité* was obviously completely the official newspaper of the Communist Party. You had satiric newspaper, like *Le Canard Enchaîné*, the "Duck in Chains." It was a marvelous newspaper, and there were some interesting tidbits that came out.

One experience that I never had in the four years that I had as a Foreign Service officer that I did see when I was there as a student is that in times of crisis French newspapers are picked up by the police. There is a special statute that allows them to do that when a national emergency is declared, and I can remember after the 13th of May, 1958, when the colonels' *Putsch* had taken place in Algiers and when there was this very nervous period of about a week when there was this negotiation going on with De Gaulle, when the police were out in the street and the army was out, and every morning the police would go out and hit all the newsstands and pick up those newspapers which they felt were subversive, including - I remember being amused - *Le Canard Enchaîné*.

There was a guy named Servan-Schreiber.

Q: *Oh, yes, Le défi américain, was it? The American Challenge.*

HOLMES: Oh, yes, *Le défi américain*? He had a weekly magazine. They had their sort of *Time* and *Newsweek*, which were *L'Express* and *Le Point*. And he, as I recall, published *Express*. And I saw him occasionally. I knew several people at *Le point*. There was a wonderful newspaper pundit named Bernard Le Fort, who was very plugged in with the senior French leadership. I learned a lot from him. I had a range of people. Some of these papers tended to be a little bit more conservative or a little bit to the left, but other than party rags like *Humanité*, they weren't slavishly devoted to a certain credo. They weren't doctrinaire.

Q: *The French media seem to be more out to impart information than, say, the British ones. In the British press you have to wade through sex and scandal to find out-*

HOLMES: Well, there are a lot of tabloids in England, but there are some great newspapers. I mean the *Financial Times* to me is a wonderful newspaper.

Q: *What about your impression during this time of the importance of dealing with the French intelligentsia?*

HOLMES: Well, it was important. That sort of outreach was of critical importance, and I think that Sargent Shriver did a better job of that than Dick Watson did.

Q: *I've heard people talk about Sargent Shriver and say, "You know, he's given a bad rap. He really had a very good feel for things."*

HOLMES: That was my view as well. I think he did, but then again, I only had a few weeks overlap with him, so I really wasn't in a position to gauge.

Q: I always come away with the impression that there's sort of a built-in disdain for Americans in the intelligentsia. Was this your impression?

HOLMES: Oh, sure, that absolutely is true, yes.

Q: How did one deal with this?

HOLMES: I mean, you just talked with people, you explained your government's point of view, you exchanged ideas. I never had any problems with that. Actually, one of the most difficult sort of discussion evenings I can remember spending in France was not with a Frenchman; it was with Mary McCarthy.

Q: Oh yes, she was the Catholic authoress.

HOLMES: Yes, and she was rabidly anti-Vietnam and anti-US policy and was an embarrassment. I had a knock-down drag-out fight with her that went on for about four hours after a dinner with a great deal of alcohol being consumed, mostly on her side, where basically her thesis was that any American that served in Vietnam, even if he were drafted - and they were practically all drafted; there were some volunteers; the Marine Corps still had volunteers - was *ipso facto* by association with that a war criminal. I mean, that was her thesis, and that's the thesis that she expounded in France when she talked to French media. And it was one of the most unpleasant evenings I can remember, and I'm sure she went away feeling the same way about me.

But I never had any problems. There was a very enterprising labor attaché that we had in our embassy named John Condon, and John had a lot of contact with the French intelligentsia, and he entertained in a nontraditional and much more appealing way than most Foreign Service officers. He would invite people for breakfast or for supper in his kitchen, and people would kind of come and go. It was kind of an open house, and he became known for that, and so he had terrific contacts, and I tapped into some of that. That was a lot of fun. So we had people that were out there really talking to French intellectuals, French labor leaders and political leaders, writers.

Q: Did you find that there was a curiosity about the animal American on the part of the intelligentsia?

HOLMES: People were trying to understand what was happening in the United States because of the reaction to the war in Vietnam in the United States. This was something that was analyzed and discussed and reported on in great detail by the French press.

Q: How were Nixon and Kissinger treated?

HOLMES: Well, now, Nixon was treated... I can remember friends of mine who were left-of-

center liberal political types and journalists more than once saying that we were committing regicide the way we were going after Nixon. They were appalled. They liked Nixon.

Q: Nixon and Kissinger were the most European of-

HOLMES: Well, they understood. They felt that these were two American political leaders who understood Europe and understood France - and *wanted* to understand more about their country. They were flattered about the attention of people like Nixon and Kissinger. It was very interesting. They were appalled by Watergate, and they thought it was a huge exaggeration on our part.

Q: You mentioned the Chinese connection.

HOLMES: I failed to mention something. I started out my first year in Paris of a four year assignment as head of a small internal political unit. At a certain point about the end of that first year, the DCM came to me and said that the ambassador wanted me to be his special assistant. I just absolutely did not want to do that. I had been a special assistant and I thought that I had moved in my career beyond that. I was strongly opposed to it. I tried to get out of it, and I basically was told that I had no choice, that it was a done deal, but that I would be rewarded. I said, "What do you mean 'rewarded?'" and he said, "Well, after you do this for a while, when Anderson leaves, he wants to make you political counselor." And I said, "Well, that'll never happen. I'm not senior enough, and it's a big section, and Washington will never permit it." And I was really opposed to this, but anyway, I was just told to shut up and grit my teeth and do my job, and this was good for the Foreign Service. So I did that for about six to eight months, I guess. I was his special assistant, and we worked a lot on drugs, you know, bringing down the French connection in Marseilles. And then eventually, to my surprise, when Anderson was leaving, he did put my name forward to be the political counselor, and there was a reaction in Personnel in Washington. They didn't want me to do this. They said I was too junior and so forth. And Watson insisted, and so finally they agreed. So I became political counselor, which then opened up a whole different range of international responsibilities and activities operating out of the political section of that embassy. And the Chinese connection was the big one.

Q: Let's talk about that.

HOLMES: This was absolutely fascinating because what happened was that when Nixon came out of China, after the Shanghai communiqué was published, everyone knew that there would be a long period before we would be able to effect the opening of liaison offices (they weren't called embassies) in Beijing and in Washington. And so in the interim, Paris was established as *the* official point of contact between our two governments. The Chinese selected Paris. Why? Because, Huan Chen, the Chinese ambassador there, was the senior Chinese diplomat serving abroad at that point. He was a member of the Central Committee; he was a veteran of the Long March; he was a trusted colleague of Mao and Zhou En-Lai. It was a very big embassy, very disciplined, with a few special characters. Anyway, when this was announced, our ambassador, Watson, was called back to Washington to receive special instructions from the President and primarily from Kissinger, who was still the national security advisor at that point. And Al Haig was a colonel working on Kissinger's staff. And he got all these special instructions on how to

handle the channel, and there would be no freebooting, that this was to be tightly administered, that he would receive instructions from the White House, not from the State Department, *et cetera et cetera*. Watson returned from that trip and called on Huan Chen and took me along. I was by that time political counselor, and he took me to see Huan Chen. Huan Chen had with him a man named Tsao, and after some initial pleasantries and some tea, Huan Chen told Watson, he said, "You and I will not meet very often, but for secondary matters I will appoint Mr. Tsao to handle the Chinese side." And so Watson said, "Well, for secondary matters, I appoint Mr. Holmes." So then that established a relationship that ended up - I must have gone to the Chinese embassy 40 times or so for many, many meetings on a variety of subjects. And by the way, we worked through a Chinese interpreter until I was able to get Washington to assign a Chinese language officer into our political section. And I spent a lot of time with Mr. Tsao, who was a very interesting individual. He was the hand-picked personal representative of Zhou En-Lai in that embassy. Zhou En-Lai, of course, had a big stake in the American relationship, and very frequently criticized inside the Chinese politburo.

Q: Oh, yes. This was the "Gang of Four" time. This was a very difficult time.

HOLMES: It was a high-risk venture for Zhou En-Lai. So Mr. Tsao was his personal rep. Tsao could be described as a blend of political counselor, station chief, and USIS officer. Those are sort of the press, the politics - that was his area. He was the only member of the Chinese embassy who seemed to be aloud to travel by himself, who wore a European suit. He always wore the same tie. I finally felt like buying him and bringing him a selection because I got tired of seeing the same necktie. But we had a file on this guy. He came from a Shanghai bourgeois family. There was an American college in Shanghai before World War II and he had spent a couple of years there, so I knew he understood English, and I knew he also spoke French, because he had served in Southeast Asia, in Cambodia. But until we got to know each other, he always insisted on working through Mr. Lin, his interpreter. And we both had very tight instructions. My instructions were actually written by Haig and sent, not through the Department but through special White House channels, and I was told always to go back through that channel and not to discuss anything but what I was told to discuss. It was very, very controlled.

But the interesting thing was that whenever I went to see Tsao we wouldn't get down to business. There was always tea and a period of munching on dried lichee nuts and candied apples. And so it was during that period, which was kind of informal, that Tsao, after a certain time, was absolutely badgering me with questions about what was happening to Nixon - obviously, Zhou En-Lai was very concerned - and whether Nixon would survive or not, and if he didn't, as it became apparent more and more that he might not, did that mean that we would all be fired, the entire administration, people like me? Would the embassy be fired? Would there be a wholesale roundup of all the accomplices of Richard Nixon? So, you know, even though I didn't have my little instructions from Al Haig, I spent a lot of time giving him basically Political Science 101 on the American government and our system and how it operated.

Q: I would think it would be very difficult, really, to give good comment on the Watergate system because most of us abroad - I was consul general in Athens during this time - I mean, we were at some remove. We weren't feeling how the heat was-

HOLMES: And so was I, and I was very careful not to speculate on what might happen to Nixon, but there were always a series of hypothetical outcomes. What I could explain to him were the impeachment process, how it worked, if it were to happen what would ensue, and our presidential succession system - the Vice President - the administration, how people were appointed. I gave him a lot of sort of fundamental information about our Constitution and the workings of our government, which I think was probably enormously relieving. I never speculated on, if such a thing were to happen to Nixon, what would this do to our policy to China. I never speculated on that. I never speculated explicitly, but there were plenty of opportunities for him to draw inferences from what I was saying, that although, yes, the opening to China had been done by the President on his visit to Beijing and, of course, Kissinger's role in this, but that this had become a part of American foreign policy. I didn't say that if Nixon goes and another man comes in the policy will remain intact, as sort of frozen in time, but the implication was that there was a commitment here to an opening to China that was broader than just the President operating out of the National Security Council. Anyway, it was a very, very interesting period. And of course I did report all of that, what this guy was saying to me. It was important that Washington understand that.

We had a couple of amusing incidents. When Nixon went to China, the Chinese gave two panda bears, which ended up in the Washington Zoo, and we gave a couple of musk oxen. And the musk oxen, at a certain point, got sick and had this terrible scrofula. And so here was this very secret channel of communications, and I was sending back a message encrypted about going to the Washington Zoo and finding out how they could treat the musk oxen. You know, this is really high policy. And then other things would happen, like one time we bombed Hanoi harbor and hit a Chinese ammunition ship. And Mr. Tsao made a visit to the embassy with a very grave face - there was a certain amount of theater involved because basically they wanted to get on with business; he had to carry out this *démarche* - and I told him solemnly the point of view of my government, and he said, "Okay, can we have some coffee?" And it was over. It was business as usual.

At a certain point I invited him. We'd had no contact with the Chinese. After I'd had quite a few meetings with him, I invited him to dinner at my house. I guess the occasion was that his wife had arrived. She'd not been at post. So I invited him and his assistant, Mr. Tsai, and his wife, who was the acupuncturist at the embassy, and Mr. Lin, the interpreter. They all came to dinner. And of course at this point we were bombing Hanoi, and we'd hit this ship. By that time we had a Chinese language officer, so that helped, and my wife was very concerned that they were going to stage a walkout. Oh, and her parents were there. That was what was interesting. Her parents were retired in Nice and had come up. He was a retired AID officer, and her mother was French, and so everyone was very fluent in French. And at a certain point in this dinner, Tsao discovered that he had served in Phnom Penh shortly after my father-in-law had, and at a time when our relationship was very bad, and a road that my father-in-law had started as an AID project Mr. Tsao had continued as a Chinese project. And this was an amazing coming together. They got along together like a house on fire, so much so that at a certain point toward the end of the dinner, Tsao got up and - he had been talking in French by this time, got beyond that point - but at a certain point he stood up and had something to say, and he said it in Chinese. And so I waited nervously for the interpretation to be something about bombing, but no, he wanted to insist - he knew that my parents-in-law were going back to Nice in a couple of days, but he

absolutely wanted to have them for dinner, and this was very important to him that he had discovered this wonderful person, and he just had to do this. So I inferred from all of this that the respect for elders was not something that had got completely washed out of the Communist experiment in China. We had a wonderful dinner afterwards. We went to a Chinese restaurant in Paris, and of course there were hundreds of them. This one was clearly in the hands of the Chinese Communists because when you walk in, nothing about ancient China but here was a tapestry of a dam being built, obviously in the '50s. And we had a wonderful, wonderful evening, and the ice was broken. We had developed a relationship with him that went a little bit beyond the more formal part of our dealings with each other.

Q: It's interesting, too, that you're talking about this almost unwillingness on the part of Henry Kissinger and Nixon to let go. I mean, this was their baby, and they didn't want the State Department... You know, they had to use you, but you were their tool and no one else's.

HOLMES: Yes, I think it was a question of control. It was their baby. They wanted to have absolute control of this channel. They didn't want a lot of... They didn't want it to become diffuse and become just another one of the issues handled by the Bureau of East Asian Affairs.

Q: Well, tell me, the whole time you were in the Political Section but particularly when you were a political counselor, one of the things about the French - what is and will be - has been that no matter what it is, the French take a different tack than the United States. It drives Americans up the wall. I mean, I had one man whom I interviewed who was in Belgium, Phil Merrill, who was saying-

HOLMES: Oh, I know Phil Merrill.

Q: -his children thought there was a breed of people called "Those goddam French" out there because every time he'd come home he'd talk about "those God-damned French." You must have been sort of on the point of contact where the French were always taking a stand different from the United States.

HOLMES: Well, not always. I think that this attitude toward the French is greatly exaggerated, and it's almost in inverse proportion to the truth of it. The less the diplomat who talks about the "God-damned French" knows about France and French policy, the more he's likely to say this sort of thing, because it's true, the French always have a point of view, very clearly articulated, you have to listen very carefully. And I discovered early on when I would go to the Quai d'Orsay to carry out *démarches* on a variety of subjects that it was very important to know... If there were twelve points to know about the subject, you might feel pretty good about knowing eleven of them, but if you didn't know all twelve, with absolute certainty the Frenchman would know the twelfth. And so you had to be intellectually equipped, and in terms of information, you had to have full information about the subject in order to be able to have a conversation. And once you got beyond that initial barrier, you could work things out with the French. I got to the point with the director of North American affairs, who was a senior French diplomat who'd been ambassador. His name was Saint-Léger - I remember him. I proposed that we meet once a week, and we did. We would meet every week. And on one occasion, after we got to know each other, he said, "Let's take a walk" - because it was a delicate subject we were discussing, one where

French interests were seen as diametrically different from ours. We went out, and we walked in the park. And when we got out in the park he explained to me. He said, "I asked you to come out and walk with me in the park because I've discovered that my offices are bugged and that the Gaullists are so catatonic about what I might say about what I might say to an American colleague, or anybody who comes to my office, that they're listening to my conversations with fellow diplomats. So from now on, I think we should walk in the park so that we can have a real conversation and I'm not nervous." I thought this was absolutely extraordinary, but the point is: the French bring a lot. Yes, they can be difficult as hell, but they also bring a certain intellectual rigor to a conversation, and there's a certain logic. Sometimes they call it Cartesian logic; sometimes it's not. But if you listen very carefully, if you take the trouble to understand their point of view as well as understanding your own government's views and objectives, you can make progress on subjects. I never had a big problem with this. And then there are certain things that are just insoluble - you know, this is our view, and that's your view, and I'll report it that way to Washington, and we'll see if at the next senior meeting maybe we can make some progress on that. But I never had trouble with this aspect of dealing with the French.

Q: How did we feel at this time about the French and the rest of the world and the United States and the rest of the world? Were we in basic agreement? Let's take the Middle East.

HOLMES: Look, the French never really accepted the dissolution of the French empire at the end of World War II because they always felt that they were a major power and that even though they no longer had Indochina and Algeria and other parts of the world, that because of their... The French always had a cultural policy. They had a responsibility to defend the French language, French cultural institutions, and that this gave them a certain entrée around the world, and they used it. They were basically working very hard to maintain influence. They were absolutely unwilling to accept a sort of second-class status, and one of the reasons for this was they were always afraid of Germany, and they were working very hard to develop this comity with the German nation and the twinning of the cities and kids, students, going back and forth and spending time in each other's *lycées* and *gymnasiums* and university exchanges, but at the same time they were working very hard to become an economic power and not have to always be the caboose of the European monetary system with the central bank of Germany being the engine. And one way to counteract that financial and economic prowess of Germany was for them to be able to maintain a certain status as a power in the world. And they were absolutely determined to do it. So this did lead to some conflict. They exaggerated, for example, and they continue to exaggerate to this day, I think, their influence in the Middle East. They had a kind of traditional role in Lebanon and Syria. There was a certain French influence going back to the early part of the century, French *lycées*. Even today in Lebanon there are Lebanese Maronites whose Christian names are French. And we always felt that we were the one country that could talk to both sides, to both Israel and the Arab countries, and we were not very inviting, to say the least, to French attempts to exert influence in the Middle East. And yet today there is a commission that takes place to tamp down the violence that takes place between southern Lebanon and northern Israel and the intervening security zone, the Katusha attacks. There is a group that's French, American, Israeli, and I believe Lebanese that meets every two or three weeks. So they have been able to salvage some sort of position, so I think that that desire on the part of the French Government - and it's bipartisan, across the board, something that they want to do - that still exists today; and it is the reason why sometimes we have difficulty.

Q: *Did you find that Africa-*

HOLMES: Africa was a special place for them.

Q: *I was going to say that I've often had the feeling that-*

HOLMES: After the Fifth Republic was set up and the institutions of the Fifth Republic and this hybrid system - you had a president who had executive responsibility and a prime minister - the French presidency, as started by De Gaulle and maintained by subsequent presidents of France, had what they call a *domaine réservé*, their special office that dealt with Africa. So there was an office in the Elysée where African leaders - prime ministers and presidents - could turn and have direct access to the president of France. And they took this very seriously, always have. And my own point of view is that we have not worked with that in a creative way. We had tended to feel that we're in competition somehow with the French in Africa. Different administrations, different secretaries, different assistant secretaries for African affairs have used this relationship in varying ways.

I'll give you an example of a current problem, and that's peacekeeping and the turmoil that's taking place in Africa today. The French have had, up until recently, when they've begun to cut back as well, they've had much more of an establishment - French economic aid, French military - throughout the French-speaking part of Africa, basically a zone of influence, something that is good for all of us. It's good for the west; it's good for our relationship. We haven't used this sufficiently; we haven't recognized it. And we kind of turn to the French at the last minute and say, oh, yes, would you mind joining us, rather than treating them as full-fledged partners from the beginning. And an example of this was the African Crisis Response Initiative, where a couple of years ago the State Department, led by a guy named Marshall McCallie, started a project to train cadres or battalions of Africans to do peacekeeping. And one of the early success stories was the Senegalese battalion. Well, eventually, the French joined us in this, but we bumbled our way along and tried to do it unilaterally, and then we brought the British in, and finally, the French were opposing us because they weren't being invited in. And we finally realized that we're missing something here. This is a typical example of us not listening to and understanding the realities on the ground. The French bring a lot to the table in Africa. They have a lot of influence; they put a lot in there. And so it's an example, I would say, of how to deal with the French intelligently...

Q: *Back to this '70-74 period, you mention at the Quai d'Orsay that the Gaullists were sort of sitting there listening. Who were the Gaullists? Did we have the feeling at that time that there was a Gaullist cadre within the French Government with whom we were dealing that was essentially, this early, anti-American, or not?*

HOLMES: Yes, I think that's safe to say, not all of them viscerally anti-American, but I would say viscerally pro-memory-of-De-Gaulle. I would put it more that way. Yes, there were cadres of people who were absolutely Gaullist, and people knew who they were, and other Frenchmen were wary of them because they felt that it was some sort of a priesthood that and it prevented them from letting French policy evolve, seeking opportunities to do things in different ways that

were in the French national interest and so forth and so forth. So yes, they were there.

Q: Did we sort of try to identify who they were and how to work around them?

HOLMES: Oh, we were dealing with them. We knew who they were. I mean, there were no secrets about it, and we just went about our business trying to make our point of view heard, but we didn't limit ourselves to those people. We talked to a variety of Frenchmen.

Q: During this period Pompidou was the president?

HOLMES: I can't remember the exact dates, but during this period or most of it, Pompidou was president. In fact, I think that shortly after I arrived in Paris, in 1970, De Gaulle died, as I recall, and then Georges Pompidou came in. I'm trying to remember when Giscard d'Estaing was president. He was president before that - or just after. After, I guess.

Q: Afterwards-

HOLMES: That was after I left.

Q: -because De Gaulle resigned in '69, and I think Pompidou succeeded him, didn't he, or more or less. There may have been something in between.

HOLMES: De Gaulle resigned in '69, and then he died in 1970. And Pompidou succeeded him. And then, I guess, after that it was Giscard d'Estaing and then Mitterrand. Anyway, it was Pompidou.

Q: How did we view Pompidou? I mean, was he a little De Gaulle or were we seeing a difference in dealing with him?

HOLMES: No, we were seeing a different man, a man who was much more of the sort of crony politician and very skillful maneuverer, somebody who had a very different kind of experience in World War II, that was frequently pointed out by his detractors, that he had been a high-school teacher and had written sort of critical editions of French classics during the war. His detractors would make a lot of that. Ambassador Watson developed a special relationship with him. Presidents of France, just because we lived practically next door to the Elysée, didn't mean that... Presidents of France did not go to ambassadors' houses for dinner. And Watson kept working on this, and finally he said, "Look, suppose I invite you to come over for dinner as your neighbor, not as the ambassador of the United States? Would you accept?" And he did. And he came for dinner, and it was a very interesting evening with him.

Q: You've mentioned Watson so far as being sort of one-dimensional - the French connection - but obviously there was more to it. How would you say he evolved as an ambassador?

HOLMES: Well, he met a lot of people, and he did have a good command of French, and when necessary he would go and talk to the foreign minister about this subject or that subject. He didn't really evolve that much. He was very active in the business field. He knew a lot of French

business people. IBM was one of the first big American corporations after World War II, when it was developing its overseas operations, not only to hire but to prepare for senior leadership local business people. And I remember Jacques Maisonrouge. It was kind of unheard of that he was elected early on to the board of directors of IBM. I think he was the only non-American when he was elected, and that was considered an unusual move. And Watson had a lot to do with that, so he had easy entrée into the French business community and met with them a lot. That was an advantage, too.

Q: Was Servan-Schreiber and The American Challenge, was that in vogue at the time, or did that come a little later?

HOLMES: Well, Jacques Servan-Schreiber was also a political figure. As I recall he was running the Radical Socialist Party, so he was a well-known figure.

Q: But I was saying, was there concern in French circles about the American challenge? We're talking about business, we're talking about American corporations.

HOLMES: Yes, there was a certain amount of that, certainly. I think there was a concern that American business, through their overseas operations incorporated within France - they were watched very carefully... The French wanted to develop their own industrial and commercial prowess. I mean they didn't want to be dominated by American companies. They worked very hard at that. Kind of - if you will - emblematic of that desire to have their own strategic sense, both in the military and the economic sense, was De Gaulle's decision to develop nuclear power in a big way, to develop nuclear weapons. They went their own way, they did it on their own, although it has come out - I think I can say this now - that there was some American help, mostly on safety, but this was a very deep secret for a long time, but it was going on during that period, as early as the late '60s, early '70s. But this was a decision that De Gaulle made for France, that France should have its own sweep of nuclear weapons. They called it the *force de dissuasion*, the *force de frappe*. And the offshoot of that was that France also made a decision to develop in a major way nuclear power for their national energy grid, and today, if I'm not mistaken, as a percentage of power generated by nuclear energy, I think France is the second country in the world. I think the first is Lithuania. Something like 85 percent. France has just slightly more than 80 percent of their national power generated by nuclear power plants. So this was a major commitment of French resources and, of course, a long-term commitment to go that way. It was De Gaulle who set them on that track, and succeeding French governments pursued that. French technology developed tremendously during the '60s, '70s, and '80s. We've all had this experience traveling in France - just taking computers, for example. Today it's commonplace. If you go downtown to Union Station to take a train to New York, you make your reservation with your credit card and you go and you tap into the system and put your reservation number in and your credit card and out come the tickets. Well, France had that years ago, long before we did, and of course their successful experiment in high-powered fast trains and their transportation system. They've done a lot to develop their own high technology, and they've tried initially to do it in a way that was independent. Of course, that was impossible, and eventually, like all of us... You have multinational corporations that are the only corporations that have the resources to be able to develop the financing and the technology to do a lot of these very expensive projects. But this was a deliberate French policy started by De Gaulle. And if it hadn't been for somebody like

Charles de Gaulle and his will power to do it, probably it couldn't have been done.

Q: No, I think France would have really moved very much into a satellite or not very powerful European power, which today, of course, it is. Just one last question before we move off France. Did you get involved in the movie wars - I mean Hollywood versus the French films and all that?

HOLMES: No, I didn't, but you're speaking about culture. I'll recount one little incident, talking about French pride. My wife and I were friends with a New York lawyer named Lee Eastman (he's now dead), whose law practice was focused on artists and actors and musicians. He had, in the early days, the American abstract expressionists, beginning with Jackson Pollock and that whole school. He helped them, and they frequently couldn't pay their legal fees, so they gave him paintings and drawings. He ended up with the most extraordinary - now worth hundreds of millions of dollars - collection of American abstract expressionist art in private hands. He wanted to establish somewhere in Paris - because he was struck by the fact when he would visit Paris that it was very nationalistic. You go to the Orangerie and see French expressionists and once in a while they'd have a show of some American paintings, but he felt that there ought to be a room, at least, or one gallery in one of the big museums in France that was dedicated to American art, so he offered to gather together a collection, mostly from his own collection, and sort of send it on permanent loan - sort of 99-year loan - if we could negotiate with a French museum to do this. Well, we tried - my wife and I did - and we struck out big-time with the national museums. And then we went to the Municipal Museum of Paris, and there's a very good painting museum there. And we made a lot of headway with underlings, but when we got up to the director, it turned out he was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, and he hated Americans and there was no way that he was going to allow this cultural infiltration from a fly-by-night school. Oh, yes, Jackson Pollock and company, they were pretty good painters, but he wasn't going to allow them. "Once in a while we show one of those paintings." We said, "This is not going to cost you anything. It will be a 99-year permanent lease." No, it never happened. This is sort of an interesting little footnote.

Q: It really is. Well, on that interesting little footnote, why don't we stop for today, and if you think of anything, obviously-

HOLMES: Well, one other thing I might quickly mention because it's just another footnote.

Q: Yes.

HOLMES: The kind of work that a political officer or a political counselor in a place like Paris is called upon to do. I was assigned the responsibility at a certain point to maintain contact with Papandreou, who had been president of Greece.

Q: Yes, it was the time of the colonels, '67 to '74.

HOLMES: The colonels had taken over, and there had been a coup, and he was in exile in France, and we wanted to stay in touch with him.

Q: This is Andreas Papandreou.

HOLMES: Andreas Papandreou. Yes.

Q: George Papandreou was his father.

HOLMES: Well, today the defense minister of Greece is a Papandreou, and he's either the nephew or the son. I think I'm talking about George.

Q: No, George was dead, I think by this time. This had to be Andreas.

HOLMES: I guess it was Andreas. But he was in exile there, and we wanted to stay in touch with him very quietly, so that was one of my jobs. I was just told, go and find him and be in touch with him. So I would go to his hotel, and we'd have tea and we'd talk. I probably did that half a dozen times. But it was just a little vignette of the way a good assistant secretary of European affairs, sort of thinking ahead to the future, was taking advantage of a rather well-staffed embassy in Paris to sort of keep a relationship going there.

Q: One question. Here you are dealing with political affairs in France, and obviously it's a complicated subject. It covers a whole spectrum. We have a large, I assume, intelligence agency there, talking about the CIA and all that. Was there much cooperation, swapping of information, or was it a one-way street. In that particular aspect, how useful was it for you?

HOLMES: Actually, for me personally it was very useful. Others had difficulty, but first of all, the defense attaché, General Dick Walters, was a very, very old friend who actually had known my father in World War II when he was a young lieutenant, and he and I had served together in Italy, and so we had a close personal friendship, and that made a big difference, although, as garrulous a man as Dick Walters was, I never knew that the Kissinger trip to Pakistan and Indochina to set up the Nixon opening to China had all been negotiated by Dick Walters with the Chinese embassy in Paris. That's how close... And I learned that he had done that in about my third meeting with Mr. Tsao, when I said, "I really like these candied apples." He said, "So does General Walters." Bingo. The light went on. I went back to the embassy and said, "Dick, you've been holding out on me." And he said, "You didn't have a need to know." But actually I had good relations with him. We worked very closely. And the station chief and I had a good relationship, primarily because I discovered the CIA officer that was working the Socialist Party was a very intelligent, engaging individual, and we became very good friends, and so we got a lot of cooperation. But institutionally, it didn't always work that way. It was a very difficult relationship.

Q: And in a way it's, you know, both people are working on the same subject, and yet the reports go in and do they come back? Are they useful? And the answer often is-

HOLMES: Institutionally, I got to see what they allowed me to see, because typically the way they operated in those days was to gather the political reporting and they would write it up in ways similar to the way we did, in full paragraphs and organized and as well-written as they could make it, and get it off; but then at Langley it would be edited and sent back to the field as an official report. That's the way it worked. But the raw reporting you would never see - I never

saw. But coming back, occasionally, there would be certain things that were centered on France that a couple of us were allowed to see. It was pretty tight.

Q: Okay, well, why don't we stop at this point, and we'll pick this up: in 1974, you left Paris for where?

HOLMES: For the Senior Seminar.

STEPHEN BOSWORTH
Economic Officer
Paris (1971-1973)

Ambassador Bosworth was born and raised in Michigan and educated at Dartmouth College and George Washington University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1961 he served abroad in Panama, Madrid and Paris before becoming Ambassador to Tunisia, where he served from 1979 to 1981, to the Philippines (1984-1987) and to the Republic of Korea (1997-2000). The Ambassador also was a member of the Department's Policy Planning Staff, and he played a major role in the US-Japan Foundation and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. In 2009 Ambassador Bosworth was named the President's Special Representative for North Korean Policy. He was interviewed by Michael Mahoney in 2003.

Q: In effect you were doing a sort of political reporting as you've explained on the side.

BOSWORTH: Well, I would describe most Foreign Service economic work as political economist. It's not, for the most part, strictly speaking, is not really economic at all, it's some of that, but not very much. In the larger posts of course that's done by the treasury attache, so State Department people are basically doing political economy. I'd met a fellow who was then an economic minister in Paris and I decided I'd like to go to Paris so I applied for a job there.

Q: Who was that?

BOSWORTH: A fellow named Bob Brand who later went on and he was the ambassador to Australia. He's had a long and pretty good career. I wanted to study French. I thought French would be useful to me. I went back to Washington for four months.

Q: In the summer of '71?

BOSWORTH: In the summer of '71. I actually left Madrid in April or May. My family then followed when school was over. I was in Washington for four months studying French and found that speaking Spanish was quite an aid to me because I was able to get it. Actually it was only three months and I got a 3/3 in French after three months. Then we went to Paris where I was again in a sort of internal political unit or economic unit rather, focused on what was happening

domestically, but more focused on what was happening within the European Union and the European Community. That was a good place to be.

Q: How many years were you there?

BOSWORTH: I was only there for two years.

Q: '71 to '73?

BOSWORTH: '71 to '73.

Q: What would you say were the, tell me a little more of the substance of the issues that you worked on there.

BOSWORTH: These were largely issues having to do with U.S. concerns over the EU's or EC's negotiation of the affiliation agreements, association agreements with a large number of countries in North Africa, Central Europe which we felt were trade discriminatory toward the U.S.

Q: Because?

BOSWORTH: Because they created preferences within the trading block and we were not benefiting from those preferences.

Q: Give me an example of one of those, if you can recall.

BOSWORTH: The preferences flowed in both directions. The Europeans would give preferences to North Africans for citrus, which would have the affect of damaging the interest of citrus exporters in the Caribbean or in the U.S. In return they would have preferences for sales of manufactured goods under those countries. We were somewhat conflicted on this because on the one hand we supported as a matter of principle the integration of Europe and there were those who thought that Europe would constitute a point of stability in the world, again in the Cold War world. Our trading interests were somewhat divergent from that point.

Q: Did you advocate for things as an economic officer or just report or both?

BOSWORTH: I was doing more advocating than, it was a lot of reporting, but I was presenting under instruction demarches to the foreign ministry on various subjects having to do with these trading arrangements.

Q: With the French government or multilaterally?

BOSWORTH: We'd go to the French government. We had a mission of course in Brussels, which was dealing with the European community as an entity, but we were in all of the major European capitals also dealing simultaneously with the governments and I think probably to a degree much greater than is now done. My sense is that we now deal with Europe pretty

exclusively on economic and trade issues through Brussels, not through individual national capitals.

Q: How did you find dealing with the French on these matters?

BOSWORTH: Challenging. I decided it was a little bit like Sinatra's song about New York. I mean if you can make it in Paris as a U.S. diplomat, you could probably make it just about anywhere because these were not easy times. It hadn't been that long since the French had pulled out of NATO. De Gaulle had died, but it wasn't going to be a lot easier. It was a difficult time. We were taking over or had taken over from them in Vietnam. We were going through, let's see, we were going through the first stages of disengaging from the gold exchange standard, so we were in confrontation with them over certain aspects of our monetary policy. It was not, not an easy time.

Q: One issue for example was citrus. Are there any others that particularly strike you?

BOSWORTH: Not that I can recall offhand, no.

Q: But it was the general subject of preferences.

BOSWORTH: It was the general subject. That's right. The extent to which we were disadvantaged by these association arrangements which on the whole we favored for political reasons.

Q: For political reasons, the theory being that having a unified European community would ultimately result in more stability than otherwise?

BOSWORTH: Yes.

Q: Now did you get a lot of pressure from interest groups in the United States on various matters?

BOSWORTH: Sure. I was not getting it directly. It was all coming through the State Department, but yes.

Q: People lobby in effect and in the sense that I guess they're entitled to, obviously, make their views known.

BOSWORTH: Sure. Yes. Then in the second year I was there. It would have been the second year, again in this small unit, there were four of us in the unit and the chief of the unit was transferred and there was no assigned replacement immediately. So, I was made acting chief and hoped, actually very much encouraged to hope that I would become permanent in that position. I was under grade for the position and in the end the Department put somebody into the job after I'd been doing it for about eight months. At the same time I had also been given a couple of other temporary assignments prior to the economic minister. I was handling civil aviation among other things. I had a very full portfolio and I was very engaged. I got kind of disenchanted with

the State Department or the Foreign Service at this juncture.

Q: Why?

BOSWORTH: Because they wouldn't leave me in the job that I knew I could do and was doing well. I had to go back to being the number two and of course not, I suppose I might not have dealt with it in the maturest manner possible. I decided that with some encouragement actually, I decided to try to get an assignment for a year outside the State Department. I was encouraged to apply for something called the White House Exchange Program, the Executive Exchange Program.

JACK B. KUBISCH
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1971-1973)

Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch was born in Missouri in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Brazil, France, Mexico, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Greece. Ambassador Kubisch was interviewed by Dr. Henry E. Mattox in 1989.

Q: You received notification then that you were going to be DCM in Paris?

KUBISCH: Yes.

Q: How does such an assignment come about?

KUBISCH: That's a very good question because it doesn't happen very often. It happened as follows. President Nixon appointed a non-career officer to be ambassador to Paris, his name was Arthur K. Watson. He was one of two Watson brothers who were the sons of really the builder of the International Business Machines company. And Arthur Watson, known as Dick, that was his nickname, and his brother Tom Watson, Jr., were these two brothers.

Well, Dick Watson had been appointed ambassador to Paris and was looking for a new DCM in his embassy there. I understand he considered about 20 or 25, interviewing many of them, and rejected them all. And he, for one reason or another heard about me, in Mexico.

In fact, an inspector from the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, had recently inspected the embassy in Mexico and had given our embassy in Mexico very high marks, including some favorable comments about my performance as DCM.

Because I was a French speaker, from my earlier service in Paris with the Marshall Plan, and for reasons of study, my name also was brought to Watson's attention. He sent a personal associate of his, who had worked for him at IBM, to Mexico City to meet and become acquainted with me, and to report back to Ambassador Watson whether or not he thought the two of us would be

compatible. He said yes, and so Ambassador Watson asked Secretary of State Rogers if he would have me come from Mexico to meet Watson when he was visiting in the United States. I did. Watson and I met. And he asked for my assignment to Paris as his DCM. I should add that I didn't really want the assignment, believe it or not. Although it's a highly prized assignment in the Foreign Service and it was, in many ways, a fine opportunity. But I had already been serving at senior levels and had earlier had the rank of a class 4 chief of mission in Brazil. I had been given the impression that if I did a good job in Mexico that my next assignment would be as an ambassador. So I was not keen to go on, having acted as DCM in Brazil for a time and for a full tour in Mexico and had had a senior job in the State Department, in being another DCM. But Secretary Rogers told me personally at the time that he wanted me to go because they wanted to satisfy Ambassador Watson, and he assured me that after a suitable period he would certainly support me to become an ambassador.

Q: Do you recall in the late '50's, I can't think of the name of the person, but our ambassador in Chile was transferred from that position to DCM in Paris?

KUBISCH: Yes, Cecil Lyon.

Q: Cecil Lyon, yes. So, it was not exactly a come down for you?

KUBISCH: Oh, not at all. To be minister, DCM, in Paris, I suppose many in the Foreign Service would say is a much more important assignment than many ambassadorial assignments in many countries of the world. So I went there and served as best I could.

Q: What's the role of a DCM, in Paris, a very large embassy, under a different ambassador, that is to say, a non-career ambassador? Is the role substantially different there from the role that you played in Mexico City?

KUBISCH: It turned out to be somewhat different, through no desire of mine, because I endeavored to perform in Paris as I had in Mexico. But Ambassador Watson, who was very intelligent and very devoted to serving his country, was obviously not as experienced as a man who had spent several decades in the Foreign Service.

I could give you an example, if you wish, of the kind of problem that arose. During the time I was in Paris, 1971 to '73, the Vietnam peace negotiations were going on and there was a special mission to conduct those negotiations. Periodically, the President's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger and others, would come from Washington to participate in those negotiations with the North Vietnamese and others. The head of the U.S. mission to the negotiations in Paris was Ambassador William J. Porter, who later became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Watson had no authority over these negotiations except to the extent they affected our relations with the government of France. He was strictly in charge of bilateral affairs. He was not entirely happy with the negotiations, the way they were going and the way they were being conducted.

One day a few weeks after my arrival, while he was out of the embassy at lunch, a delegation of Americans came to the embassy to present a petition protesting the U.S. role in Vietnam and

other things relating to the negotiations. I was called in my office by the Marine security guard about what he should do with this delegation. I had him hold the phone while I checked to see if a consular officer was present, on the ground floor of the embassy, and there was one. I instructed the Marine guard and the consular officer to receive the American delegation, there were four or five Americans in it, to take their petition, accept it, and tell them it would be forwarded through appropriate channels to Washington.

When Ambassador Watson came back from lunch, he was really incensed that I had done that. He was very angry with me. It was the first real show of anger he had ever demonstrated to me. He was angry because I had allowed an officer in his embassy to receive this group. He felt that he wanted nothing to do with such a delegation or the Vietnam negotiations.

I explained to him that American citizens, whether in the United States or abroad, have the right to petition their government. Abroad their proper place to go to present such a petition was the embassy and to a consular officer. This was quite appropriate and their petition should be forwarded to Washington. Ambassador Watson gave me a very hard time and I got very angry myself and stalked out of his office.

I was wondering, I had only been there about a month, whether I had done the right thing in going to Paris. But not long thereafter, he was basically a very generous and kind man, Watson had calmed down. He came into my office and we made up. We never really had a serious problem after that.

But that's an example of how a politically appointed ambassador might not know something that a career officer would know immediately. There were many other times, on vastly more important things, where I believe I helped Ambassador Watson avoid serious errors or pitfalls, and I think he would agree.

Q: Yes, it's not exactly a nuance, it's just a procedural question.

KUBISCH: Sure.

Q: This was in '71, then I guess?

KUBISCH: It was, about in December of '71 as I recall, or January of '72.

Q: Did he come to realize that what you had done was something you really had no alternative to, that it was something you had to do?

KUBISCH: I believe so. But in any case, I have the impression that his confidence in me as the weeks went by slowly grew as he recognized that I was doing my utmost to serve him well and to serve the embassy well. I think he came to have substantial regard for me, as I did for him, and we became very good friends.

So much so that later, after he had resigned from the embassy and I was back in Washington, he organized a business in the United States, in which he invested some millions of dollars of his

own money. He was very well-to-do. He offered me a partnership in it, with no investment on my part, which I did not accept since I was still committed to the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, that's dedication, all right. Was Ambassador Porter's office in the embassy there?

KUBISCH: It was in an annex of the embassy. Ambassador Porter had words with Ambassador Watson on more than one occasion too, overheard by others, including me.

Q: He was in B building?

KUBISCH: Yes. And Heywood Isham, a career Foreign Service Officer, was his deputy.

Q: What were the words about?

KUBISCH: Well, I remember once when Dr. Kissinger was coming with a delegation from Washington for the talks. Usually when he came, Ambassador Porter went to the airport to meet him, as did Ambassador Watson, and several others of us, depending on who was on the delegation.

In the VIP waiting room, waiting for the plane to come in one night, Ambassador Porter was in an adjacent, smaller waiting room with Ambassador Watson, with the door closed. They had some words about something and all of a sudden there was some, almost shouting going on as Ambassador Porter charged Ambassador Watson with being poorly informed and just a spoiled, rich man who had come to Paris because of his political support of President Nixon.

Q: You don't know what the point of contention was?

KUBISCH: I didn't hear it at the outset, all I heard was the louder words later.

I went in and I requested an appointment to see the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for France, known as "the Quai d'Orsay."

Q: For the record, what do you do to get an appointment with the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay and then how do you get into see him? Treat me as if I'm feeble-minded.

KUBISCH: Well, what I do is call my assistant in, who is a good French speaker, and we sit down and we look at the calendar, and I say, you know, I've got this instruction. Should I go and try and see the President of France? No. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Schuman? No. Should I go and see the Secretary General, the number two man, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Hervé Alphand, who had been the French ambassador in Washington during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations? Probably. Should I drop a level below him to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs? No. Alphand's the man.

So I said, "Call Alphand's office, tell him that Minister Kubisch, the chargé of the American Embassy, has an instruction to see him at his earliest convenience." So my assistant goes and calls and arranges the appointment. He knows my schedule and works out a time and late that

afternoon, I have the appointment with Alphand.

I go in. Now, at that time I spoke fairly good French. I was qualified at the 3-3 level in the Foreign Service, which is the professional level, but Alphand spoke English much better than I spoke French. Even so, although he would speak English with me at parties or at dinners or something like that, in his office and in the Quai d'Orsay we always spoke French. He insisted on it. It was fine with me.

So I went in and made my representation. I had prepared an aide-mémoire, as you know an aide-mémoire is a piece of paper you prepare to aid the memory, that summarized the points of our protest. And I went in and I made my representations to Secretary General Alphand. I told him what our reasoning was, why we disagreed with the French Government in permitting this conference to take place. And as an aide-mémoire, I handed him this document, which is not an official document or of position, but to assist him in recalling exactly what I had said.

Q: Incidentally, I might comment here, bearing in mind now that I'm feeble-minded for the moment. The aide-mémoire is something typed up by your secretary before you leave, from the text of the telegram, right?

KUBISCH: Yes, exactly. I sort of lift from the telegram those paragraphs or sentences, of my instruction that can be conveyed to the representative of the other government. Not the whole instruction, obviously, with all the background and so on.

So, I gave that to Alphand. He looked at it, he read it, he listened to me, and he said, "Thank you very much," very formally. He was very formal, "Mr. Minister, I must say that I don't believe that the French Government will agree to cancel this conference but we will certainly give it careful consideration and thought, and I will discuss it with the Minister and appropriate authorities in the French Government and be back in touch with you as quickly as possible."

I said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary General."

And then he said, "Are we finished now with the formal part of this visit?"

And I said, "As far as I am concerned, we are."

So he said, "Well, let me tell you something. I think you'll find it amusing."

The aide-mémoire contained words to this effect, "Everyone in the world will know that Versailles is on the outskirts of Paris and knows how important Versailles is and knows that such a conference would tend to compromise the neutrality and impartiality of the Vietnam negotiations in Paris."

So Alphand went on personally in saying, "I just want you to know something that you may find amusing because I don't agree that everybody in the United States or elsewhere knows where Versailles is or would attach that much importance to a conference in Versailles." He said, "When I was ambassador in Washington, I got a request from the Mayor of Versailles, who said

that we were going to have in France the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of Versailles, and he wanted to invite mayors of Versailles, towns by that name, all over the world to come and participate in the celebration.”

Alphand went on to say that as ambassador in Washington, he had his associates in the embassy investigate and they found, I believe, eleven towns in the U.S. by the name of Versailles, as they are pronounced in the United States. So Alphand, as the French ambassador, sent an invitation to all the mayors of them to go to Paris and participate in this great celebration in Versailles.

He said he would never forget the letter he got back from one mayor, I think it was the mayor of a town by the name of Versailles in Texas, but I’m not positive. The mayor said, “Dear Ambassador Alphand, thank you for the invitation and please convey my thanks to the Mayor of Versailles in France. I’d love to be able to go but I can’t. But I do appreciate the invitation and I want you to know that I and the people of Versailles, here in my state, are just delighted to know that there is another town by that name in France.”

Q: That’s good. That reminds me of the statistic, I’m not sure exactly what it is, but something like 83% of all Americans think New Mexico is a foreign country.

KUBISCH: Yes, something like that.

Q: Alphand told you this in French?

KUBISCH: He told me this in French.

Q: And so you didn’t get very far on that particular approach?

KUBISCH: No, the conference was held in Versailles, but it was very carefully monitored and to protect the security of the talks, no permission was given for any demonstration or parade or anything into Paris. Typical Gallic solution to a problem like this.

Q: France, not too long before, of course, had had it’s own great difficulties with Indochina. Perhaps it was just as neutral as possible because they had totally withdrawn from the whole scene in 1954. Do we know why Paris was chosen as the site for these negotiations?

KUBISCH: Well, they were chosen long before I went to Paris and I think an effort was made to find a site that was acceptable to all the parties. And Paris offered the facilities.

I had the impression that others were available. Perhaps Geneva or elsewhere, but I am sure there has been lots of published information on that.

Q: Can you talk to us now on a point that you mentioned a little while ago about the resignation of Ambassador Watson?

KUBISCH: Well, yes, I would like to say a word about that because I think he was much maligned in that. As I recall, after President Nixon visited Shanghai and the Shanghai

Communiqué was released, it was decided subsequently between the Governments in Peking, now Beijing, and Washington, that a Paris channel would be opened for contacts between the two Governments. Earlier the contacts had been in Warsaw. And they were not as public or official. This was to be the official opening of an official channel of contact between the two Governments.

Q: In Warsaw, I recall, Walter Stoessel was the person who conducted the negotiations.

KUBISCH: He did. So it was agreed this would take place in Paris, between a very high ranking official of the Chinese government, Ambassador Huang, who was sent to Paris, and Ambassador Watson, the American ambassador, would handle them for the United States. This had not been released publicly yet, that Paris would be the site and channel.

One evening after I had gone home from the embassy, about 7 or 8 o'clock at night, I got a call from Ambassador Watson. He had just had a message from Washington, from Secretary of State Rogers, instructing him, Watson, to come back to Washington as quickly as possible. There was going to be an announcement in the White House about 36 hours later, of the opening of the Paris channel, and they wanted to brief Watson and have him present for that. This was about March or April of 1972, I think.

Ambassador Watson went back to the embassy to try and arrange transportation to go as quickly as possible. As I recall, he told me this subsequently, he went back to the embassy. His executive assistant, John Clark, was there. Watson, by this time it was about dinnertime, had a couple of scotches, I recall him telling me later. He tried to get transportation to get back to Washington as quickly as possible, had difficulty and finally got a military plane to take him a few hours later from Paris to London, where he was able to get on a Pan Am flight and go onto New York and Washington the next morning.

In the meantime, he lay down on the sofa in his office and I think Clark covered him up with a blanket, and he tried to get some rest before beginning his trip.

He got on the military plane later that evening, went to London, got on the plane the next morning to go to New York on a Pan Am flight. Maybe it was then, he hadn't slept much that night, he said, maybe it was then that he had his scotches on the plane. But he had also taken a sleeping pill, he told me, to try and get some rest.

He said the combination of the sleeping pill and the drinks made him woozy and not feeling well. So he loosened his tie and put his seat back and tried to put his feet up, he was in the first class section I think, on the seat in front of him. He said that a stewardess came by and told him that that was not the way for an American ambassador to sit or look and did it in some kind of manner that irritated Ambassador Watson. And he apparently said some words to her about minding her own business or something, that she didn't know what was going on or what he had been through during the evening and the night before.

This led to some kind of intermittent exchange between the stewardess and Ambassador Watson, during the course of the flight. And when she arrived in New York, she filed a written report.

Watson went onto Washington and was at the ceremony with President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, announcing the Paris channel for the opening of the talks. A couple of days later excerpts from the Pan Am report appeared in the Jack Anderson column.

It was circulated all over and was repeated to France. And it proved to be a big embarrassment to Ambassador Watson, and to some extent the White House.

So I just wanted to clarify that story and give, to the best of my recollection, Ambassador Watson's account of what happened. He departed France soon after that but did not resign immediately, as I recall. He came back to Paris for visits and so on but didn't resign until the following September or so.

Q: Did you believe Watson?

KUBISCH: Yes.

Q: You had known Karamanlis?

KUBISCH: I had known Karamanlis in Paris while he was in exile.

Q: In what capacity?

KUBISCH: In a democratic society or country it's very well advised for American officials and ambassadors and 921enefit and diplomats to maintain contacts with key leaders of opposition parties who may someday come back to power. So, for example, I used to meet with President, or at that time the head of the Socialist Party, Mitterrand in France, even though Pompidou was President of the country. And in that context, I was under instructions from time to time from Washington to meet with Constantine Karamanlis who had been Prime Minister of Greece and gone into voluntary exile. So from time to time I would send other officers from the embassy to go and discuss world matters with him and explain U.S. policies and just show him some courtesies. That's how I had come to know him.

Q: Take him to lunch?

KUBISCH: I don't think I ever had lunch with him in Paris.

Q: Is it not also true, that often the chargé, the DCM, if he is there for any substantial period of time, will normally soon have to leave also?

KUBISCH: Yes, that's true. That happened to me in Paris, for example. Our Ambassador in France departed France in late summer or early fall of 1972, and I had been Chargé for a few months, intermittently, before his departure. He traveled outside the country some, was absent. Then I was Chargé for a protracted period of about 7 or 8 months, and got so used to dealing, as I had to, with the President of France, with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others, that when the new Ambassador arrived in April of '73, it had already been pre-

arranged, as I've explained in one of our earlier sessions, that I would leave.

It would have been awkward for the new Ambassador for me to have remained there, because they might have still called me. He wasn't as familiar with our problems or our discussions. The Ambassador really needs to be at the forefront of the U.S. presence in the country. So someone who has been Chargé for any length of time probably should leave, and the Ambassador should have the opportunity to select his own DCM, because that working relationship is so central to the successful management of the mission.

JAMES DOBBINS
Consular Officer
Strasbourg (1971-1973)

Ambassador James Dobbins was born in Brooklyn. After graduating from Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he joined the Navy. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1967, his career has included positions in France, England, Germany and an Ambassadorship to the European Community. Ambassador Dobbins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Jim, let's start in 1971. You're off to Strasbourg. And you were there from when to when?

DOBBINS: Seventy-one to '73.

Q: Okay, can you tell me about what our setup was in Strasbourg at the time?

DOBBINS: Well, it was a two-officer consulate, or consul general, of which I was the junior officer. And it did a certain volume, modest volume, of consular work – no immigration visas, but non-immigrant visas, passport services for a small American community. It did a small volume of commercial work, and its principle reason for being, I think, was the presence of the Council of Europe organization that had been eclipsed by the European Community by that time, but still had some purpose and value. And its headquarters was in Strasbourg. It had a secretariat of 500 or 600 people, and periodic meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly, and we were an observer. We weren't a member of the Council, but we were an observer and had access and could report on their activities.

Q: Well, let's first talk about Strasbourg, per se, and then we'll go into the international, European thing. How French was Strasbourg, and how German was Strasbourg? It's sort of a hybrid.

DOBBINS: Well, it wasn't very German, but it was Alsatian, which is to say that the French, who were very consciously and proudly French, spoke a German dialect in addition to French, at home, often, and could obviously understand German, although Alsatian had deviated somewhat from German with a lot of French words in it. And at that time, the German economy was stronger than the French economy, and so at that time, several thousand – like, maybe 20,000 –

Alsations would cross the border every day to work in Germany.

Q: Well, now, when you arrived, they were three years away from the events of the spring of '68, when the student revolt and all sorts of things were happening in France. How much involved was Strasbourg and the people there we were observing in French politics?

DOBBINS: Well, Strasbourg was involved in French politics. French politics had largely calmed down since then. Pompidou had replaced de Gaulle and there wasn't much residue of '68 in terms of popular unrest. We did a certain volume of political reporting, but there wasn't much going on in French politics. Of note at the time, Gaullists were quite clearly in charge, weren't under threat. The Vietnam War was continuing and there was some anti-Vietnam sentiment and there were occasional very small demonstrations.

One night, we lived in an apartment above the consulate and about 2:00 in the morning, rocks began coming through our bedroom window, and below were four or five, probably by that time, given the time perhaps, alcoholically charged students throwing rocks in a Vietnam protest. Another time, a couple of them burst into the consulate and tried to tear down the flag, and the consul general and I, both of whom were bigger than these students, of whom there were only a couple, went out and tossed them out the gate before they could do any real harm. That was pretty innocent.

There was one, we never did find what the cause was, and it probably wasn't a protest. I was in my dining room, which had French doors overlooking a terrace, and a bullet came through the doors. It was a .22, and it was spent, so it actually went into the wall and then bounced on the floor. It was a spent .22 that had come, probably missed me by a foot or something. If it had hit me in the eye it might have done some serious damage. If it had hit me somewhere else, it might not have, because, as I said, it didn't even penetrate the wood very far. And they never find out whether it was – the police said, "Well, it was probably just someone hunting," but that seemed implausible, but not impossible, I guess. I never did find out what the source of it was.

We had a loud party the night before, and I always wondered if it was someone in the adjoining apartment building was expressing his unhappiness with it. But there were a few rather small incidents of that sort, but otherwise it was a very tranquil, quiet time.

Q: Well, did you feel any constraints, or were you making a point of going to the university there? The campus?

DOBBINS: Well, I don't recall going to the university. I did join some sort of young businessmen's groups – but they were very business oriented. After a couple of meetings, there really wasn't much point. It was very local, the sorts of things that the Shriners or the Elks would be concerned with here. But there wasn't any real hostility to the United States, except in these rather small groups. But, I say, the most they could generate for an anti-Vietnam rally was four or five people, so this was not a mass movement like what we were seeing in the '60s. And in any case, Alsace as a whole was a more socially conservative area than elsewhere in France.

Q: Who was consul general when you were there?

DOBBINS: For the first, I guess, two or three months, I was on my own. I arrived the day the consul general, whom I was supposed to serve under, was leaving. He had just been fired, though it wasn't explained quite in those terms, by the ambassador, who was rather irascible, unpredictable, and ultimately, it turned out, alcoholic.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

DOBBINS: Watson was his name. I think it was Thomas Watson. He was the son of the famous Thomas Watson.

Q: He had another brother who went to the Soviet Union.

DOBBINS: Yes, I think that's right. So he was an ambassador to France, and he finally left the post after the press got a hold of allegations that he had been making indecent proposals to an airline stewardess on some plane. There were a few occasions when he had been quite verbally abusive to Embassy staff – I don't mean sexually harassing – but just verbally abusive to his staff in Paris. He came to visit us in Strasbourg and was very pleasant, and took us out to dinner and was quite a good host.

He did take exception to the Council General, a fellow named George Andrews, who had only been there about six months. I never really got the story. Apparently, it was something as trivial as the ambassador asked Andrews to do something and Andrews turned to his deputy, the vice consul, and asked the vice consul to do it. And the ambassador was apparently unhappy that, having asked the consul general to do it, the consul general didn't do it, rather than turning to his vice consul and asking him to do it. It was a fairly simple task, like go find a copy of X, or something. I don't know whether this was really the source of the difficulty. Whatever it was, the ambassador had come for a visit, been displeased and directed that this individual should be transferred out of his jurisdiction.

So poor Mr. Andrews was abruptly sent off somewhere else. I think he ended up going somewhere where he was happy enough, although he didn't stay much longer in the Foreign Service. But it was too bad, because his father had been a consul general in Strasbourg. He may have even been born in Strasbourg. So this was a sort of a coming home, and he only spent six months. The day I arrived, he informed me, that he was leaving and I would be acting consul general.

Then, for a long time, they didn't name a replacement, and in fact the ambassador's original inclination was to not get a replacement and just allow the post to be run at a more junior level. Eventually, they did assign somebody who was a younger officer, younger than George Andrews, a fellow named Ron Woods. He and I became close friends and worked together several other times over the next couple of decades. So he arrived about three months after I'd been there and took over.

As I said, he was a fairly junior officer himself. In fact, he couldn't technically be a consul general for the first year or two, because he didn't have the rank for consul general. I think at that

time I was an FSO seven and I think he was a five. You couldn't be a consul general until you got to be a four.

Q: Well, let's talk about what was the organization, the European organization, what was its title now, again?

DOBBINS: The Council of Europe.

Q: The Council of Europe. What was the staff of sort of Europe at that time? I'm talking about as a body.

DOBBINS: Well, the European Community was continuing to slowly coalesce. The Council of Europe had been overshadowed, but it was continuing. It had a somewhat broader organization because it included the European neutrals who didn't belong to the European Community. There was still no real effort at political union within the EC, or even common foreign policy, but certainly in the economic and commercial areas, it was continuing to coalesce and do important things. It was, of course, the height of the Cold War and Europe was very divided.

Q: Well, were we monitoring the Council of Europe principals? Were they unhappy or in a snit about what was happening in Brussels?

DOBBINS: The Council of Europe tended to focus on broader, non-commercial, non-economic aspects of the European union. So, for instance, it was the Council of Europe rather than the European Community that would standardize road signs throughout Europe, so they all looked the same. And there were other forms of standardization that the Council of Europe worked on.

It would do studies in social health and, particularly, juridical areas. It would try to set European standards for human rights abuses. It had its own court. I can't remember what it was called, but it was basically a human rights court where people could bring suits if they felt their rights were being abused by their own government. So we would file a report. Some of this was relevant to the United States in a general way.

We sent these reports by air gram, which ensured that virtually nobody read them at the other end. I suspect that these were largely filed and forgotten. I would be surprised if more than one or two people read most of them, and I think it was principally useful for me, just to become adept at the process of going and listening to a full day's debate in the Parliamentary Assembly and then reducing that to a coherent three paragraphs. So as a tradecraft exercise, it was quite valuable, but the actual utility of the work I would think would have been extremely low.

Q: What was your impression of the personnel and spirit of the Council of Europe?

DOBBINS: I thought they were quite professional and approachable. They recognized that they were in something of a backwater in terms of where the real action was, but it was a typical sort of international organization. It had people from 18 countries working together, living a pleasant, quiet life in a small but comfortable European city.

Q: I've seen shots on TV of doings there later on, but it seemed to me, when I see people in full dress kit of tails and all opening doors for the delegates as they go in and all ...

I sort of wondered and said, "Oh my God, I can imagine what almost the overhead would be for an organization like this. A lot of perks and ..."

DOBBINS: The European Parliament, which is the Parliament of the European Community, also met in Strasbourg, and its staff, in a typical European Community arrangement, actually were housed in Luxemburg, where of course all the other institutions were in Brussels. But they used the same facility – that is, the same building, and chambers, and probably therefore used the same ushers and things like that.

Q: How did you deal with our embassy to the European Community?

DOBBINS: We had almost no dealings. The European Parliament, we didn't report on that. If they were sufficiently interested, somebody would come from Brussels and we would obviously facilitate their visit if they wanted us to.

Q: I'm not quite sure of my timing, but were the seeds, or was it more developed, what became known as the Helsinki Accords, because it would fit more into here since this was broader representation than just the ...

DOBBINS: Well, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was begun around that time. And it culminated only in the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in, I guess it was '76.

Q: Ford signed it, so I think ...

DOBBINS: The process had begun. The negotiations were underway. We didn't have anything to do with it there. I wrote a policy paper for the State Department. The European Bureau was inviting policy papers, so I had the temerity, because I guess I came from the Policy Planning Staff, of writing a long paper, which posited rather prematurely the idea that Europe was coming together and that the U.S. had some advantages in a more self-confident and unified Europe. I advised doing things like assisting the French nuclear weapons program, which the department got very nervous about. I only found out later they were nervous about, because it was actually being actively debated, and they felt it was a very sensitive subject. So they liked the paper, but refused to publish it. But it led to somebody in personnel who had something to do with it suggesting me for my next job.

But the CSCE, per se, no, there were really no activities there. Some of the Council of Europe human rights kind of stuff was reflected in the CSCE negotiations, but it wasn't being managed out of there.

Q: Did you find that your consular folks had a certain window on, say, the non-European – well, I mean the European, but the people who were not part of the European Community. I guess we were talking about Sweden and ...

DOBBINS: Well, the Council of Europe, its principal reason for existing separately from the European Community was that it did have a broader membership, which included the neutrals.

Q: Well, did you find that you were tasked, the post was tasked, with looking at the neutrals and how they were observing the European development or not?

DOBBINS: The post really wasn't tasked with anything. We were just doing the reporting to justify our existence. There was no technical interest in any of this, because it had no immediate operational impact on what Washington was doing.

Q: Just capture the spirit of the time, only somebody looking at this from the future or something, what was the spirit, sort of the feeling that you and your colleagues had about European unity? A good thing, or we were concerned they were building up a rival that was going to give us a problem?

DOBBINS: Well, and there's always been a tension. So I think the paper I wrote actually sort of reflected that I tried to argue, already, a more pro-Europeanist approach, as I recall. I wouldn't say – this wasn't a time when the Europeans were particularly challenging us, and if there were any concerns, it was with the Brandt government in Germany, and where they were taking their *ostpolitik* line made Washington nervous. So it was less a concern about European reunification than managing German ...

Q: Were you picking up any reflections from just your acquaintances or your contacts and all about the Soviet Union at that time?

DOBBINS: Well, not in Strasbourg. The politics there were very parochial, and the Council of Europe had no real East-West relations dimension. It was all within Western societies and looking at Western societies. So the Cold War and the East-West competition really weren't part of our professional life at that point, other than the background of what we were doing.

Q: As soon as you have an international organization, one thinks of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security) and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) getting in there and recruiting. One thinks, of course, of particularly Switzerland, where I think every other person was on the payroll of one or the other.

DOBBINS: I don't think either were interested in the Council of Europe. I certainly never detected anything.

Q: Well, then, after this, it sounds like almost an idyllic ...

DOBBINS: It was very pleasant.

Q: And also you were learning the trade.

DOBBINS: Yes, and it was learning how a multilateral organization went. I learned political

reporting. I learned management. Basically, the consul general – or he was the consul, and for a while we were both consuls, but he was the head of the consulate general, the principal officer, basically left the management of the post to me. And the locals were all long-term, highly experienced, so I did nothing but sign documents they put in front of me. I probably spent, at the most doing 25% of my time consular and administrative and commercial work. The rest of the time, I could travel in the district and make calls, see people and report on things that interested me.

Q: Anti-Americanism, was that not an Alsatian trait or something?

DOBBINS: No, not at all. Quite the contrary. They were very, very positive.

RONALD D. FLACK
Trade Promotion Office
Paris (1971-1974)

Ronald D. Flack was born in Minnesota in 1934. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota he served in the US Army from 1957-1960. His career has included positions in Athens, Manila, Abidjan, Paris, Algiers, Geneva, and Copenhagen. Mr. Flack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 7, 1998.

Q: You were there from when to when?

FLACK: From April, 1971 until August, 1974.

Q: ...particular briar patch of Paris.

FLACK: That is right. I was back here on consultation for quite a while because my wife was still not up to traveling. But, eventually we got over there. The trade center, which was part of the commercial operation of the embassy in Paris was in Neuilly out on Avenue Charles de Gaulle and was a very large modern building. It was a wonderful facility: well organized and thought out office space, etc. It was probably one of the nicest places I have ever worked in the Foreign Service. There was quite a large staff. We must have had about fifteen people altogether. There was a director, who was a Department of Commerce political appointee by the name of Scotty Borrowman. Then there was a deputy director, two trade promotion officers, myself and a fellow by the name of George Knowles, who is today the commercial counselor in Brussels, and a staff of secretaries, etc. We put on trade shows about once every two months. Basically my job was to do the promotion in France. I would go out and talk to French industry about an upcoming show on materials testing equipment, for example. I would contact the potential users of this equipment and tell them about the coming trade show, give them brochures, etc. and invite them to come in to see the equipment. They were usually very interested in trade shows. Some of these U.S. companies were looking for agents so we would prepare lists of potential agents and actually visit potential agents so we could set up meetings.

Q: How would a list of agents be picked?

FLACK: Let's say it was materials testing equipment. First of all we would go to the commercial office at the embassy and look at trade lists of companies that import various types of equipment. With the trade list of companies dealing with specialized equipment we could go through making phone calls to make the first list and then by further investigation and visits with brochures showing the equipment in question we would ask if they would be interested in being an agent for the particular American firm. If they said they would like to talk with them, we would set up the appointment so that when the company arrived for the trade show they would have appointments not only with potential buyers of their equipment but with potential agents.

Q: How receptive were the French at that point?

FLACK: Very receptive. I did a lot of what we called blue ribbon calls which was getting to the highest level possible in a French company. I was a first secretary at the time and it was fairly easy to call and say the first secretary of the American embassy would like to call on the executive vice president for marketing, or whatever the title might be, and you get appointments with these people. I would introduce myself and tell them what I wanted and basically they were very receptive. I found very few that simply said they were not interested. If they did say they were not interested, they were always very polite about it. Most of them were interested. Business is a little different than politics.

Q: Was this the period of the American challenge?

FLACK: Yes, Pompidou was president, he died while we were there actually. It was still a pretty Gaullist environment. So, on a political level there were problems as there always are with the French. But, I wasn't really involved in that at all, except just peripherally. I was basically involved in this business element where the relationship was very good.

Q: How were American products looked upon in France?

FLACK: It depended on the area. We were trying to focus on high tech equipment at this trade center because that is where we had the competitive advantage in most cases. Every once and a while we would run into something that wasn't expected. I remember once going to see a laboratory that specialized in a certain type of equipment in France. I went in and said that we were having a show on this particular type of equipment and we think we have the best in the field. This guy was sitting behind a desk with a slight grin on his face. When I was finished he said, "You know, here in our company we consider the United States to be an underdeveloped country in this area." Then he proceeded to show me his laboratories and it was true. They were far more advanced than anything we were doing. That was the exception, it was rare. But, we tended to assume that we were the best in everything and we weren't always.

Q: Were you using things of this nature as a feedback to somebody to say, "Hey, maybe we need to do more in this field?"

FLACK: Well, not really. The decision on what type of shows we would have were made back in the Department of Commerce, partly, I would guess, on the success of shows that we were doing. For the most part these shows were successful. At the end of each show we would talk with each individual exhibitor and ask if they found an agent, made any sales, and what they felt their prospective sales through their new agent might be for the next year. We would add up the actual sales and the prospective sales of the show to get a sales figure that you could use for the show because the Department of Commerce was always trying to quantify these things – how much was made for the U.S. economy in these shows. The figures were always in the millions of dollars at the end of each show. In some cases, sales off the floor, actual orders, and in other cases from the agents who said they would do so much business for you next year. So, these shows were successful and the areas then selected were based on what was selling, so to speak. It was basically all high tech computers, communications equipment, electronics, etc.

Q: Being in Paris, did you find that there was a difference between going out into the country elsewhere and Paris? Were there other worlds out there?

FLACK: Yes, but even today, Paris is still the centralized area of not only the administration but the economy as well. A lot is going on in the rest of France, it is being decentralized. When I was there the economy was highly centralized in Paris. Now, we did do promotion and contacts outside of Paris. That was done through our consulates, Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux and Strasbourg, where we had commercial FSNs. They were the ones that would contact the local companies in their consular district that might be interested in a particular show.

Q: Were you reaching out to Luxembourg, Belgium and other places?

FLACK: Yes through our mailings because we always had a mailing list that the announcement of a show went out to. Very often there would be companies outside of France. However, there was another trade center in Frankfurt. We kind of divvied up Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg and to a certain degree a number of Italian and Spanish firms.

Q: I know that Paris is a place where congress often wants to put proteges. USIA often has a couple of cultural attachés who are there because they either have strong support from congress or for one reason or another. It is a nice place to send people. Did you feel this at all at the trade center?

FLACK: No. Of course, the ambassadors were all political, there were three during the time I was there. The rest of the embassy including the commercial counselors were career people. So, I didn't see that too much there.

Q: How close did you feel to the embassy?

FLACK: Pretty close. As close as you can in an embassy the size of Paris. It is a huge embassy and we were physically detached. I would go occasionally to staff meetings in the embassy, but not all that often. We had lots of friends at the embassy. Also, we lived at this little compound of apartments in Neuilly, two apartment buildings owned by the embassy. American officers and personnel lived there. So, of course, we were very much part of the embassy community because

we knew everybody there. But, in terms of being close on a professional level, a work level, no, not very close.

Q: Were there any political developments during this time that might have intruded on what you were doing?

FLACK: No. It was the Pompidou era and he died towards the end of the time I was there. Then Giscard became president. We had fairly good relations at that time. There was the usual Franco-American friction along the way, but frankly, I had lots of friends in France from my previous days there and my wife being French born we had family there as well. We did a lot of private traveling. I didn't do much professional traveling in France. I found the climate to be one of a pretty good economy, and I can't say I felt any strong anti-Americanism.

Q: On the trade promotion side, what was the feeling between the budding European economic union that was coming along at that time?

FLACK: From our point of view, it was almost non-existent. The economic community was beginning but was not something that was looming large. The French economy was still French planning, not planning from Brussels. Europe was still pretty much a thing of the future that was building. The Treaty of Rome was signed and commitments were being made. The French had previously opposed the British coming into the EC and this was the time that it was beginning to change. I think they came in under Giscard.

Q: Who were our competitors for selling products to the French?

FLACK: I would say basically other European countries, Germany, Switzerland, UK, to some extent Italy. The Japanese were just starting to get into the European market at that point. For example, at that point Japanese cars in France were almost non-existent. The French market was and still is rather highly protected and you just didn't see a lot of Japanese or other non-European things.

Q: You left there in 1974.

JAMES D. PHILLIPS
Political Officer
Paris (1971-1975)

Ambassador Phillips was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his Bachelor's degree from the University of Wichita in 1957 and his Master's in 1958. After serving in the US Army from 1953 to 1955, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Postings throughout his career include Paris, Elizabethville, Luxembourg, The Gambia, Copenhagen and Casablanca. Mr. Phillips then became the ambassador to Burundi and Congo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 5, 1998.

Q: You left the European Bureau in 1971, right?

PHILLIPS: Yes, I came back from the inspection assignment in 1970 and worked in the European Bureau until the summer of 1971. Then I was assigned to Paris. It is interesting how that assignment came about. Allen Holmes followed internal French political affairs at the embassy, which is among the best jobs in the Foreign Service. Ambassador Arthur Watson, a political appointee who was a son of the founder of IBM, operated without any reference to State Department bureaucracy. He would only deal with Nixon and Kissinger and Rogers. He wanted to move Allen Holmes up from the internal job to be overall head of the political section. It violated personnel practice to move a middle-grade officer into a top Embassy position even at an ambassador's behest. But Ambassador Watson wanted Holmes for the job, so he simply moved him into it. Personnel was enraged and refused to fill the position Holmes had vacated. I got a call from Perry Culley, who by now was DCM in Paris, and he asked me to take the job. I spoke French and had just come from the successful Vietnam inspection assignment and Watson wanted me too. I have an iron rule of never saying no to Paris, so I accepted.

Q: When were you in Paris?

PHILLIPS: I arrived in the summer of 1971 and I stayed until the summer of 1975.

Q: You were in internal politics?

PHILLIPS: Yes, I did internal politics for two years. Do you remember the big student uprising in 1968 in France?

Q: In June of 1968.

PHILLIPS: I should begin by saying that the internal political position in Paris traditionally attracted good officers. Allen Holmes turned out to be a Foreign Service star. Other successful officers such as Wells Stabler and Dean Brown had the job. The attraction was the close contact with French politicians, journalists and intellectuals. The events of 1968 made it even more interesting. Washington did not want to be blind-sided by another massive uprising in France so the Department devoted more resources to following the French political scene. This meant more representation funds, which meant I could make extensive contacts within what the French call "la classe politique." As a result I became very knowledgeable about French politics. I was nominated for the Director General's reporting award for my analysis of the 1973 legislative elections, which I predicted the right-of-center parties would win. I called the election results accurately, within a two seats margin of error. A lot of people thought the Socialist would win that election. But I rightly predicted the right would hold on to power in 1973.

Meanwhile the United States was experiencing its own political upheaval because of Watergate.

Q: You are talking about the Watergate period.

PHILLIPS: The Watergate period. Sometime in 1973 Ambassador Watson got involved in some

fracas with an airline stewardess. It got in the papers. I think he had been drinking too much. This was the sort of scandal the Nixon White House didn't need and Watson had to resign. He was replaced by John N. Irwin, who happened to be Watson's brother-in-law. Jack, as he was called, had married one of Watson's sisters. Jack was serving at the time as Undersecretary of State, working with Henry Kissinger who was Secretary. I don't know what the chemistry was between the two men or why exactly Jack left Washington, but he did accept the assignment to Paris. Shortly after he arrived he decided he needed an executive assistant who spoke French and knew his way around Paris and he offered me the job. I accepted with great reluctance because I really did not want to leave internal politics. But I accepted and spent my last two years in Paris as the Ambassador's executive assistant. First I worked in that capacity with Jack Irwin and then with Kenneth Rush, who President Ford named to replace Irwin when he took over from Nixon.

Q: Let's go back to the 1971-1973 period. Relations with France are unique. There is a theme that seems to run through these interviews among those who deal with the French of both admiration and terrible frustration. Here you were inside the monster. How did you find dealing with the French political class?

PHILLIPS: It was very pleasant. No matter how the French appear collectively to the outside world, individually they can be charming. The politicians, the journalists, the academicians were by and large friendly. For example, I had lunch on several occasions with Jacques Chirac and with Francois Mitterrand. Of course they did not hold the positions then that they held later. Mitterrand was the leader of the Socialist opposition at the time and his chances of ever winning the Presidency appeared dim. He was happy enough to be invited to lunch by someone from the embassy. And so were other young socialists who eventually occupied positions of power. Chirac was an assistant to President Pompidou and he hadn't yet made it big on the national scene. The so-called centrist politicians were pro-American and were totally accessible. Only the communists were hard to see, and that was largely the fault of embassy policy.

Q: Was it because you weren't allowed to or you couldn't reach them?

PHILLIPS: You could reach them easily enough. And if you went through a tedious Embassy clearance process you could meet with them. But contact with the communists was mainly handled by the CIA. Everything was so predictable in those days you didn't gain a lot by taking a communist out to lunch. You knew you would get the party line. But the socialists were very open. The Gaullists were difficult on policy issues, but individually there were easy enough to get along with. Those most friendly towards the United States and the ones we worked most closely with were the parties of the center. The Radicals, the Giscardians, the Christian Socialists, and so forth - remember France has a multi-party system. The center parties were pro-European Community, less nationalistic than the Gaullist and more pro-American than the Socialists. They were critical of DeGaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO, for example. Neither the center-left nor the center-right was virulently anti-American, but both were suspicious of United States policies.

Q: Did you find the suspicion was the official policy or when you got to know them was there much interest in what we were doing?

PHILLIPS: No, not really. I could actually write a book on this. The French, since World War II, have had a terrible inferiority complex that often plays out in relations with the United States. France was genuinely opposed to what we were doing in Vietnam. But then no Europeans particularly liked our Vietnam policies. But in addition, the French did not want to see us succeed where they had failed. There was also a French tendency to side with third world countries because they saw them as underdogs. But at the same time most Frenchmen, regardless of party, were defensive about Algeria. Remember the French exit from Algeria in the early 1960s was a traumatic national experience. It caused a deep split in French society that nearly resulted in civil war. French politicians did not like to be reminded of Algeria and they certainly resented any comparison between their Algerian experience and America's Vietnam experience. So there was jealousy and some hypocrisy combined with the very real concern that U.S. dominance in world affairs would undermine French culture and its place in the world. The feeling was summed up by De Gaulle's insistence that the world acknowledge "a certain idea of France," which makes no sense to a non-Frenchman, but which resonates across all ideological lines in France. He was appealing to the French pride in France's history, to its sense of grandeur. But this said, France was part of the west as opposed to the communist east. The average Frenchman loved American movies and jazz, and most French people were sincerely pleased to spend time with an American who spoke some French. So there was ambivalence about America, if not exactly a love/hate relationship, that still exists today.

Q: In regards to the Gaullists on NATO, was it implicate that the French thought that they could have independence from NATO but that if they needed help NATO would be there to protect them?

PHILLIPS: Well, they would not admit it in those words, but that was the case. DeGaulle had a policy he called "tout azimut" which meant that French missiles were aimed both east and west. The policy was meant to show that France believed in a threat from the United States as well as from the Soviet Union. But this policy didn't survive De Gaulle's departure. There was a feeling that the United States was a hegemonious power that poised a threat to French culture and influence. French policy accordingly was to try to weaken United States influence in general, but not to make it so weak that the U.S. could not defend Europe if needed. The official who most personified this approach was the Foreign Minister, Michele Jobert. Jobert, who was married to an American woman and knew America very well, was extremely difficult to deal with. He saw himself in competition with Henry Kissinger for attention on the world stage. He made life difficult for American diplomats. He was very critical of U.S. policy towards Europe and of course Vietnam. His attitude came partly from adherence to Gaullists ideology and partly from political ambition. He knew President Pompidou was ill and he thought that playing the anti-American card would make him popular enough to have a shot at succeeding him. He actually ran for president when Pompidou died but only got about three percent of the vote.

Q: What about on the left side? We had the Kissinger government. They were very suspicious of the Kissinger State Department. He was both NSC and Secretary of State. He was very leery of socialist governments in Europe. How did you find the socialists and what kind of emanations were you getting from the European Bureau about them?

PHILLIPS: Kissinger was fearful of the socialists throughout Europe, but especially in France. In

France they could only win power through an alliance with the communists. Throughout this period the communists averaged about 20 percent of the vote in local and national elections. The socialist averaged less, but even if they were to win as much as thirty 30 percent of the vote they would still need communists votes for a majority. Kissinger was very upset when the Salazar regime fell to a socialist government in Portugal. He was prepared to do anything he could to thwart the left in France, but there was not much he could do. Until Mitterrand took over the socialist party no one seriously gave a socialist-communist alliance much chance of winning power. But Mitterrand was one of the most cunning, Machiavellian political leaders of the late 20th Century. In 1964, the socialist candidate for President got about five percent of the vote, and that's where the Socialists were when Mitterrand became party leader in 1965. He gradually made the Socialist party the largest party in France. He flirted with the communists but never actually let them get too close, and he used his formidable intelligence and debating skills to present a coherent vision of economic reform. He handled the communists deftly, in effect slowly marginalizing them. Of course the communists were marginalizing themselves to a large degree by blindly supporting Soviet policies that were becoming more and more unpopular in France. By the time a left coalition won power the Socialists were dominate and the Communists were very much the junior partner.

Q: What year did the socialists come into power?

PHILLIPS: The socialists came into power for the first time in the early 1980s.

Q: Did you find that the communists being the running dog of Moscow, were not really a power to be reckoned with?

PHILLIPS: They held a unique position in French society for many years. The communist party was both a kind of religion and the main social organization for many working class Frenchmen. It was their support system when they got fired or became ill or needed money. It was very strong in blue collar districts. But nationwide it could never win more than twenty percent of the vote. While it was very unlikely that the communists would come to power in France on their own, they formed a large enough voting bloc in the National Assembly to be a force to be reckoned with, but reckoned with ironically more as a bogeyman than as a political partner. The Gaullists and the Centrists used the communist threat to argue that the left was unfit to govern, and this tactic worked until the economy changed dramatically. Blue collar workers started getting better salaries, working conditions improved, immigrants started doing the lion's share of hard menial labor. This lead to a less militant French work force and workers began to see their interests better served by the socialists than the communists.

Q: Were you reporting and watching the building efforts in the socialist ranks during your time there?

PHILLIPS: Oh, yes. We were following the socialists very carefully. We saw that they were beginning to make progress. We saw that Mitterrand was a consummate politician.

Q: While you were in France did you find yourself under pressure to explain American policy under Nixon and Kissinger? I would think the theme of their policies would be respected because

the French always tried to look for themes.

PHILLIPS: I didn't deal with much the foreign office. I dealt with the politicians and the journalists. My contacts were interested in the game of French politics and they had little time for foreign policy issues. If we sat down to lunch and I said, "I saw Mitterrand on television last night," that would get them going and they would talk non-stop. Their only interest in U.S. policy was how it impacted on French politics.

Q: What about the French press?

PHILLIPS: The French press is quite different from the American press. Le Monde is the journal of record and while it tries to be somewhat neutral it has a pro-left slant. The rest of the papers are party organs. Le Figaro is establishment Gaullist, for example, and Combat is socialist. You knew in advance exactly what line most papers would take on a given subject. The journalists I dealt with, political analysts such as Bernard Lefort, were the James Restons' of France. I had an expense account that allowed me to invite them to nice restaurants for lunch or dinner. They were very sophisticated and well aware of the inconsistencies in French policies. They were also quite cynical about the politicians. The politicians themselves were willing to explain their positions to me. There were never any shouting matches or acrimonious arguments, which might have been expected given the sometimes tense relations between France and the United States. But then I was dealing with party leaders, not rank-and-file hotheads. Speaking of my expense account, there was a family joke that my job description should be "lunch-eater" because I frequently invited people to lunch. When I got a promotion in 1992, someone at school asked my youngest daughter Catherine, who was seven or eight at the time, what I got promoted to and she said in all seriousness, "dinner-eater, I guess."

Q: This brings up another subject. You were dealing with these two groups, the political press and the politicians. Did you get involved with the French intellectuals?

PHILLIPS: I mainly dealt with people from the political class which includes some intellectuals. The political class consists of some several thousand people, mainly living in Paris. It includes the politicians themselves, political junkies that follow them, print, television and radio journalists and a few people from the universities. The ones from the university were really on the fringes. They would write analytical and historical books, but were less involved in day to day politics. I had contact with people like Philip Alexander, a prolific author and radio commentator, who was clearly an intellectual as opposed to a politician. But the kinds of intellectuals you may be thinking of, like Jean Paul Sartre, weren't among my contacts.

Q: Did you find any of this approach that I have found in looking at French movies, this Cartesian way of looking at things. Americans thinking this is the way it happened because it happened. The French think there is always a great plan behind events. Did this enter into the political scene at all?

PHILLIPS: Yes it did. I think without falling into the trap of characterizing a whole people one way or another one can say that some specific French character traits do exist. And such traits were pervasive among people I dealt with. For instance, if Kissinger so much as mentioned

Africa in a speech, my French friends would study it, analysis it and ponder whether it meant America was about to challenge French influence in their former colonies. They would always see minor pieces of the puzzle as part of some master plan. I would explain that Kissinger's speech writer probably just wanted to get in a plug for Africa at the behest of someone in the State Department African bureau. But they would remain unconvinced.

Q: Given the events of June 1968 for internal politics were you looking at the students?

PHILLIPS: Yes, we were. We had contact with student groups. We had a program which I think worked extremely well. It was managed by USIA and was called the leader grant program. Now I believe it is called the international visitors program. An embassy board selected young French leaders for one month travel grants to the United States. I was a member of the board and was able to nominate candidates. Because of my job a disproportionate number of my nominees were selected. Let's say we had 25 grants in a given year. Ten to 12 of those would be my nominees. I would try to pick young men and women who had been active student leaders. We hoped that exposure to the United States would give them a more realistic idea of America.

Q: What was your impression of what the French University was teaching? Was it pretty Marxist? Leftist?

PHILLIPS: The philosophy and history departments had a very left of center bent. The professors were strongly influenced by the intellectuals who emerged after World War II, many of whom were communists, or were deeply influenced by working side by side with communists during the resistance. The universities were a great strength of the left.

Q: You came a couple of years after the 1968 period. Were the student leaders following the same pattern that happens in other countries in that they were much less active after they left the university life?

PHILLIPS: Sure, because you have to make a distinction between the regular universities and the Grandes Ecoles, such as Science Politique and ENA. Acceptance at one of these prestigious graduate schools automatically assures a promising career in government. A lot of the leaders of the 1968 student uprising were very bright and were co-opted into the elite graduate schools. Many of them ended up as high ranking government officials.

Q: What was your impression of how Dick Watson, the ambassador, dealt with the French government?

PHILLIPS: I don't have much insight into that. When he dealt with me, it was mainly about who was going to win the elections. Since I could tell him what he wanted to hear, that the Right would win, I always found him to be very congenial and jovial. I think he was very difficult for some people in the embassy to work with. He had a bit of a Jekyll and Hyde personality. At times he could be charming and he often showed genuine concern for his staff. He never spent a penny of his representation money. It all went to us so we were never out of pocket for our entertainment needs. He would give wonderful parties at the residence and make sure that junior officers were invited. But he could also be very difficult. I think he was frustrated because he

wanted to run the embassy like a business, which really can't be done, and because the French were so often uncooperative. I don't think it was an especially happy time for him.

Q: Wasn't it Watson that told a Marine guard to chop down a tree?

PHILLIPS: That is a true story. Our administration officer was named Pete Skoufis, a wonderful person. He had one lapse in taste though. He bought this artificial tree that he wanted to put in the beautiful entrance hall of the embassy. Of course security wasn't what it is today. People could actually walk into the embassy without going through security, but there was a marine guard on duty around the clock. The tree was made out of rubber or plastic and was supposed to look like a palm tree. Even from a distance though it didn't look real. I don't know why Pete bought the thing. He probably got it out of a catalog and thought it would liven up a dark corner of the entrance hall by the staircase. Well, Ambassador Watson hated the tree. Rumor had it that Watson would stay late sometimes and have a few drinks and maybe get a little tipsy. He hated the tree and came down the staircase one night and saw it standing there and on the spot ordered the Marine guard to take the fire ax and chop it down.

Q: Moving on to when Jack Irwin came and you were his special assistant. What was that like?

PHILLIPS: You have to understand that Jack was an entirely different kind of person than his brother-in-law, Dick Watson. He was a Rhodes scholar, a lawyer and a complete gentleman. He was from Iowa, and I think his family had some money, but nothing like the Watson money. He ended up in New York as a lawyer where he met and married one of the Watson girls. Just before he came to Paris his wife died, so he came as a widower. I guess she had died about a year before he came. He had a son and daughter in college, so he came by himself. He didn't speak French well and was not by nature a very outgoing or loquacious person. But he had great dignity. He was extremely pleasant to work for. I think his life in Paris was probably a bit lonely. He spared no expense to give wonderful dinner parties. He was just the opposite of the French stereotype image of an American. He wasn't brash or loud and he was always beautifully and conservatively dressed. He had the reputation of being one of the best ballroom dancers in New York society and women loved to come to his parties. He had the cache of being part of the IBM family. He was learning French and making real progress. But it was an especially difficult time because of Vietnam and Watergate. Relations with France were not improving. President Pompidou was still alive and Foreign Minister Jobert was Jack's main contact and, as I have noted, Jobert was a difficult man. Jack tried to introduce a more civil tone in U.S.-French relations, but he got little support from Nixon who was on his way out. Kissinger preferred to operate independently of the Embassy. If he had something to say to Jobert he would call him directly. Moreover, Jack didn't drink wine, which can be problematic in France. He did not have an easy time in France, but he made a valiant effort. I believe with time he would have been very successful. He was winning the respect of French leaders and he had a superb grasp of the issues.

Q: What was your role as special assistant?

PHILLIPS: The Ambassador had his DCM and his political and economic counselors so I didn't get involved directly in formulating Embassy policy, but I did try to make sure the Ambassador saw the right people. I would go with him on most of his official calls. I tried to get him to meet

politically attuned people so that he would understand the political dynamics of France. I did that too on the social side. I worked closely with Allan Holmes who was the political counselor, with John Condon who was the Labor Attaché and with Jack Kubisch, and later Galen Stone, both of whom served as DCM. I helped Jack run his office so that he would be free to devote his time to substantive issues. Because we were often together, I was his closest confidant in many ways. But I don't want to exaggerate the position. All of his top people were first rate and he worked closely with them.

PETER J. SKOUFIS
Administrative Counselor
Paris (1971-1975)

Peter J. Skoufis was born and raised in Bangor, Maine. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included assignments in France, Italy, South Africa, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (England). Mr. Skoufis was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1992.

SKOUFIS: When my five years were up, I told the Ambassador that I was not going to ask for an extension. I would have been crazy to do so after my experiences. I got a call from some one in Washington who told me that Ambassador Watson in Paris had requested that I replace Ralph Scarritt. I said that I didn't think that Scarritt had been in Paris long enough to be ready for re-assignment. The answer was: "The Ambassador wants you to replace Scarritt!". I knew Watson; he used to fly over from Paris in his own airplane. He loved to go to the Navy PX. He also shopped elsewhere and went to the theater, with his wife and children. He would also visit the Embassy where we would greet him and he would talk to Ambassador Annenberg. So I got to know him; he was a "hail, well met" fellow. As soon as I hung up from that call from Washington, I immediately called Perry Culley who was the DCM in Paris. I wanted to find out what the score was. Perry started to laugh. It was clear that he had cranked up this plot and had convinced the Ambassador that I was available. Culley of course knew that my five years were expiring and therefore had to be re-assigned. I had previously told him that I was supposed to go to Vietnam. I think he talked to John Burns, who really didn't care because he was leaving.

So Culley assured me that the assignment was mine, if I wanted it. It didn't take me long to agree. Who wouldn't want to go to Paris? I then told Ambassador Annenberg about the Paris assignment. He said he knew all about it because his good friend, Dick Watson, had called him to ask about me. He said: "Of course, I had to tell him the truth!".

We had the packers at our house on Friday night and that weekend we drove to Paris on a direct transfer (that was the only condition: no home leave that year). On Monday morning, the moving van was in front of our apartment house in Paris. Helen and I and our maid, whom we had brought from London, got out of our car and began to unpack. Three days later, I was at work at the Embassy, when I found out what had happened to poor Ralph Scarritt. He had run into a buzz saw with the Ambassador. FBO was refurbishing the Rothschild House on Rue St. Honore, which was the official residence. It had been a long term project moving from an empty building

to an office for USIS to being a residence and then becoming the ambassador's residence after Congress had appropriated something like a million dollars. Wayne Hayes and Rooney were both instrumental in doing this. The idea was to restore the Rothschild House as a new residence for the Ambassador; then we would sell the Avenue D'Iena residential property, which was near the Eiffel Tower. This was property that the U.S. government had acquired in 1924. It was small and had outlived its usefulness; it had needed a lot of work, but it was a very valuable piece of real estate. FBO had surveyed the situation and had concluded that they could fix the Rothschild House for one million dollars and sell the old residence for two and a half million. So it was net gain for the U.S. government.

So the project got underway. Ralph had worked very closely with FBO on it; as a matter of fact, Leo Riordan of FBO was stationed in Paris to supervise the work. There was a personality problem. On a couple of occasions, Ralph had told the ambassador that there were certain things that couldn't be done. If you have to say "No" to an Ambassador, you better do it very diplomatically, particularly if you are dealing with a titan of industry like Mr. Watson. His father had been the head of IBM and he had had a big role in the same company. These guys are not accustomed to hearing that the rules didn't allow for something they wanted. Apparently Watson's position was that if his wife wanted something, she would get it. So sooner rather than later, both Ralph and Leo were transferred. So the problem was left to me. It was a real headache in terms of finishing the job in time for a move that had been scheduled long ago. Of course, both Mr. and Mrs. Watson were changing the work constantly which didn't help the time schedule. They weren't fussy, but there were some changes they insisted on. The money was being consumed rapidly; there were special panels and cornices and art work that had to be restored. It was very expensive work. The Ambassador himself had contributed something like \$400,000 in addition to the appropriation to keep the project going. Most of his money went to buy furniture. It was a funny process. Joe Donelan was back in the Department at the time and was following the project. The Deputy Secretary was John Irvin, who was the Ambassador's brother-in-law. My problem was trying to convince the Ambassador that we had to work within a frame-work, particularly a financial one. When it came time to move, we noticed that several things had fallen between the cracks. Part of it was due that the whole project was financed by a number of allocations and that created problems. We had to pay for something out of one pocket and for others out of another. I could manage that because my mission was to move the Watson's into the new residence on time for a Fourth of July party. That was the target. We had to landscape the gardens.

We finally put together a group that was called "The Friends of 41", because that was the address of the residence on St. Honore. These were public-spirited Americans who lived in Paris; they raised funds to purchase some items for the residence. One of the members was Randy Kidder and his wife; he was a former Foreign Service officer who became the President of the group. It was a very effective device to raise money; their donations became tax deductible. They bought carpets, etc. It was someone else's idea, but I developed and brought into being. Watson's contributions similarly were tax deductible. One time, the FBO supervisor came from Washington and made a "walk through". At the end of it, he declared the FBO role as finished with what ever was left being the Embassy's responsibility. I balked at that. For example, there was a powder room downstairs which did not have toilet paper dispenser in it. The roll of toilet paper sat on top of the tank. He told me that was my problem, not his. I pointed out to him that

small problems like that multiplied by the many bathrooms the residence had (I think there must have been twenty) were a major headache and expense. I learned later that there were even difficulties in obtaining toilet seats not to mention other bathroom fixtures. But FBO insisted that those costs come out of the post's Maintenance and Repair budget and that it would not increase our allocation. I needed another \$200,000 to get the house ready; just to put the finishing touches on it, like bulb for the chandelier, etc. So I finally called Joe who came through with the necessary funds. I told him that unless I was able to complete the job, I too would be thrown out and the Department would have to find another Administrative Counselor; the Department might as well cough up the dough then because otherwise it might cost even more. In the final analysis, the new residence turned out to be a great success and it was finished in time for the Fourth of July party. After getting that job done, I was in pretty good shape with the Ambassador who turned out to be a very nice guy and a remarkable man.

He was the heir to one of the great fortunes of the world; he was extremely wealthy. He had his wife and six children at the post – three boys and three girls. Some were teenagers and in some difficulties from time to time. He wanted to do everything he could to keep his family together; so he converted an upstairs room into a game room. He bought them a juke box, he bought them a pin ball game machine, he built a movie theater for them. He paid all of that from his own pockets. He did have a very difficult personality. A normal human being has a range of emotions from low to high; Watson was on the extreme of that range at both ends. When he was low, he was the meanest son of bitch you have ever seen. And I mean “mean”. He was mean to his wife, his children, everybody. When he was up, there wasn't a more generous guy around. He would take me to lunch to “Tour de Jacques”. We would sit around and chat. I wondered whether he was just lonesome, but it was just his way of trying to be a nice guy. Sometimes, he would call and tell me that I was working too hard; he would then ask me to come to his office and look at the entrance to Chancery wondering who was parked out there. Sometimes it was our representative to the OECD whose chauffeured car was parked outside. He would then tell me that there wasn't any parking allowed there and if the OECD man wanted to park, he should go into the parking garage. He just didn't want anyone parking in front of the entrance which he over-looked. That was the kind of guy he was. He was a man of tremendous contrasts which was his undoing. He was a heavy drinker, although it was controlled during the day. I never saw him drunk in the office. Helen and I would be invited to the residence periodically with other staff members to see movies – he had a tie in with a movie distributor so he and his kids could see American movies before they were shown in Paris. He would then drink a few scotches and before the evening was over, he was asleep. That was not an uncommon event. One time, he came home on an American passenger aircraft and made a pass at one of the stewardesses. That got into the papers after she reported the event. That forced him to resign.

Mrs. Watson was a very lovely and charming lady. She was easy to work with and not very demanding. Very nice. The children were not spoiled brats because she made sure that it wasn't going to happen. Mr. Watson had his own plane in Paris, as I mentioned. There was a crew of, I think, three people, whom he paid out of his own pockets. He was also a pilot so that he would fly the plane himself on occasions. He didn't travel that often, but he did go to England several times and to Vienna to a Chiefs of Mission conference. I don't think he ever flew his plane to the States.

My office was just under his. After I first arrived, he used to come down the steps. There was a IBM copying machine in the corridor outside my office. He wanted to know where we had gotten it. I said I didn't know. He said: "Get it the hell out of here. I don't want to see any IBM equipment in the offices. The next thing you know, there will be stories in the papers". I told him that we were just in the process of re-equipping the Embassy with IBM electric typewriters. He said that was OK, because that was part of a general government contract worked out in Washington. It turned out that the copying machine was there because the IBM Paris office asked us to try it out; if we had found it satisfactory we would have bought some. But after the Ambassador's comments, it went out. In any case, he came downstairs one day with an envelope full of gasoline receipts for his airplane. He wanted to know if he could get reimbursement for the taxes that were paid, as we did in the Embassy whenever we bought gas for our cars. I told him that I would see if that could be done. I sent a note to the Foreign Office. Then I got a call from the Protocol Office which said that it had no precedent for my request – they never had had an Ambassador with his own airplane. But I said that the logic would seem to apply; if gasoline for our cars were tax exempt, then the same rules should apply to the gasoline for the Ambassador's airplane. The Protocol Officer agreed and in due course, the Ambassador got his reimbursement. Of course, the French had to establish a new procedure and that took some time, but I was told to assure the Ambassador that his taxes would be reimbursed. I said that I didn't think the money was an issue, but that the Ambassador saw it as a matter of principle.

One day, he told me that people were making long distance calls on the Embassy' system. He asked me whether all the calls were business related. I said: "They'd better be!". He wanted to know how I could assure him of that. He instructed me to put a pay station in the Embassy. He then told me that in IBM his father had the phone system so rigged that when any IBM official wanted to make a long-distance call to Europe, a red light would flash in his father's office. That was one of IBM's early fetishes' some of which the son brought with him. So we put a telephone pay station in the Chancery. Of course, no one used it. That was the kind of person Ambassador Watson was. He got along with the French quite well. He spoke French; he had been educated in France and had spent a good deal of time there when IBM was starting in France. That is where the headquarters of IBM World Trade was established; there was a big IBM complex just in back of the Embassy where both the European and France offices were located. So he had spent considerable time in France before becoming ambassador. Of course, through him, we met many of the IBM people. He would see them socially, but I not aware that he ever intervened on IBM's behalf. He tried to be very careful about those relationships, as my story about the copier illustrates. Ambassador Watson was also a very generous patron of the American school which was attended by all his children.

In any case, serving with Ambassador Watson was a very interesting experience. He was the Republican member of the family; his brother, Tom, was a Democrat. The family covered both sides. Tom later went to the USSR as Ambassador in the Carter administration. Shortly after Arthur Watson left Paris, his brother-in-law, John Irvin was appointed. The contrast in personalities was amazing. Ambassador Irvin was as fine a gentleman as you would ever want to meet. He was a widower – his wife, a Watson, had passed away some years earlier. He came to Paris with his son and daughter who were young teenagers at the time. It was a lovely family; the Ambassador was very devoted to his two children. They went to school in Paris, although the son eventually returned to the States to complete his education. Irvin had been the Deputy Secretary

and therefore knew the system well. We had no problem in running the Embassy. He spoke French and had a very good relationship with the French. Culley, who had been the DCM, retired when Watson did and became the head of the American Hospital in Paris. The new DCM was Jack Kubisch with whom I worked closely. The Paris Embassy became a very conventional and good operation. There were no major problems.

The major difference between London and Paris was in the Ambassadorial style of the two principals. Annenberg ran his Embassy differently from a traditional style. Paris was much more the norm. Both were big Embassies with their usual problems. A freeze on travel, for example, which occurred from time to time took its toll on morale. Fortunately, it didn't happen very often, but when it did it had a bigger impact because more people were involved. My biggest problem in Paris was a financial one because the rate of exchange between the dollar and the franc kept changing in favor of the franc. It had been 6:1 or 7:1 or 8:1; it slid down to 3.8:1. It was very hard for the Department to obtain more dollars to match these changes in exchange rates. I remember very vividly the time we had to do a local wage survey; we were way behind on our pay scales because we had not been able to keep up with the inflation that was occurring in France. The Department sent a team to make the survey which showed that a sizeable increase was due to our local employees. We were faced with a very touchy situation; there was some discussion of a strike. Nothing fortunately developed. I finally convinced the Department to approve the new wage scale by surrendering a number of local positions; we cut back on motor pool services; we cut positions out of the administrative section and forced other sections to cut back as well. Those reductions, which included American positions as well, enable EUR finally to finance the new wage scale. That was an example of the kind of administrative problems we had to face.

Both London and Paris were qualitatively well staffed. Those posts attracted very good officers; the section chiefs were all good. Hank Cohen was the head of the Political Section; Allen Holmes was there. Many of the staff became ambassadors later and you could tell that would be so even in their junior years. They were sharp.

We had a very good relationship with other agencies. In both London and Paris we went through the periodic reduction of staffs exercises (BALPA, for example). In London we surveyed all U.S. government activities in England. We found several military units that were remnants of World War II – assessing damage from strategic bombings, etc. But we told the Department that these units were the responsibilities of the DoD and that the Embassy would not pass judgment on them, but would look at all civilian activities. We found a guy in North Scotland from the Weather Bureau which was a part of the Department of Commerce. His job was to send balloons up to test the weather over the Arctic or somewhere.

PETER K. MURPHY
Consular Officer
Paris (1971-1975)

Principal Officer

Nice (1975-1977)

Peter K. Murphy was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1936. He received a bachelor's degree from Boston College in 1959 and served in the U.S. Army from 1959-1960. Mr. Murphy joined the Foreign Service in 1962. His career included positions in France, Argentina, Italy, and Germany. He was interviewed on April 4, 1994 by William D. Morgan.

MURPHY: Following Milan we returned once again to Paris - for three and a half more years!

Q: Is this unusual?

MURPHY: I suppose it is. However, I bid on the Visa job which was open at the Paris Embassy - and was assigned to it. I did know the DCM at the time - Perry Culley - but he exerted no influence to bring about my reassignment to France. It was indeed a very interesting period to be in Paris - during the great student uprisings of the early '70s. Many of the public student demonstrations at the time were in protest of our Cuban policy - as well, of course, as our involvement in Vietnam. Many of these large and vocal demonstrations greeted us as we left work in the evening - and attempted to walk home through the *Place de la Concorde*. At the same time, there was also the "Algerian question" which was consuming the French - the national animosity against the *pied noir* living in France as well as the many Algerians themselves - and the resulting *bombs plastique* which continually exploded in the streets of Paris. I remember getting caught in one such demonstration one evening in the Latin Quarter - and being chased by the police through the streets.

Q. What years were you there, Peter?

MURPHY: This was 1972 to 1975.. There was also great "unrest" also in the consular world because of the fact that Vietnam fell during that period. France was heavily involved because of its strong ties to Indochina. As a result, many of the former south Vietnamese government officials came to France.....although their ultimate destination was the United States.

In Paris, I worked with Alice Clement in the Visa Section. Remember Alice Clement?

Q: I do indeed, but the reader perhaps doesn't. She needs a little parentheses.

MURPHY: Alice Clement was a consular officer from the Washington, DC area. A very distinguished woman from a socially-prominent Washington family, Alice was the Chief of the Visa Section at that time.

Q: Things hadn't changed that much when you got back?.

MURPHY: The staff was smaller - but the work was still there. The lines for consular services of all types were never ending. We were cramped in our Visa quarters - which, at the time, were located in the Hotel Talleyrand - a French government building leased to our government. It was located at the corner of the Place de la Concorde - across from the Jardine des Tailors. As you

well know, Bill, the building was not at all designed as an office building - but rather a luxurious town house (or, rather, palace!) for Talleyrand. It was most impractical for the Visa Section - with the USIS offices being located on the upper floors.

Q: Wasn't this the former headquarters of the German SS when the Nazis occupied Paris?

MURPHY: Exactly. That's the place.

Q: With prisons.

MURPHY: I never did go down to the basement to see the reputed Nazi interrogation chambers and cells..

Q: You didn't.

MURPHY: No, I never did visit that area of the building. I heard of it often enough from the Marines but never ventured down there. Alice was the head of the Visa Section and I was the Deputy. I also had a "political hat" and this centered around working closely with our Political Section regarding the "Peace Talks" with the Vietnamese. As you recall, these talks took place in Paris. You'll also remember, perhaps, the months the two delegations spent discussing the shape of the conference table. - and similar important matters!

Q: Was Kissinger there at this conference?

MURPHY: Henry Kissinger did eventually did show up for the final phases of the negotiations. It was a very interesting period for me. It was also around the time we began our secret talks with the People's Republic of China - prior to Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing - via Pakistan.

Q: How were you involved? You mentioned you were assigned to the Visa Section?

MURPHY: The question of visas was a central part of our government's initial talks with the Chinese. You will recall that our first talks with the PRC involved the exchange, first of Ping-Pong players - and subsequently of personnel in the medical field. These exchanges naturally involved the issuance of visas to the Chinese - and this was all arranged at our Embassy in Paris. Not having any US diplomatic offices in the PRC, the Chinese participants were obliged to visit our Embassy in Paris prior to travel to the United States. I visited the Chinese Embassy on several occasions - and the Chinese diplomats, in turn, came to see me at my office in the Hotel Talleyrand - just off the Place de la Concorde. After three or four meetings regarding this subject, I was joined by Ambassador Thomas Watson (our ambassador in Paris - of the IBM Watson family) who would speak with the Chinese Ambassador while I discussed the initial exchanges with my counterpart. Each visit to the Chinese Embassy was very closely controlled by Washington. Watson did manage to get into difficulty the first couple of times - because he drank too much of the Chinese wine - or whatever it was that they insisted on offering to us!

Q: You would go as a representative of the Consular Section?

MURPHY: Yes. These meetings were all held very closely. There wasn't a word in the press at the time that the two countries were speaking. The direct result of the talks was, of course, the eventual secret visit of the then Secretary of State Kissinger to China (via Pakistan, I believe) to prepare the way for the historic visit to the PRC of President Richard M. Nixon..

My talks with the Chinese were very, interesting both to Washington - and I am sure - to Beijing as well. It was the first time they were talking to us 'imperialist dogs.'

Q: But your relationship with your counterpart was normal?

MURPHY: Oh, yes Bill, it was quite a normal relationship. As a matter of fact, it developed into what might in those days be called a 'friendship'. As you can imagine, it was quite difficult to become friendly with a Chinese communist in those days.

Q: The Ping-Pong players were the symbol of that.

MURPHY: That's right. When I left Paris, the Chinese Consul General gave me a gift of a rather inexpensive Chinese screen wall hanging. But I'm sure it was one of the first gifts that was given by the communist government to a United States government official by a PRC representative.

Q: Did you dare tell anybody you got it?

MURPHY: Oh, yes. Everyone in the Embassy knew it. In fact - just the acceptance of this token gift was the subject of telegraphic exchanges with Washington! I was instructed to reciprocate in kind! I don't know where the wall hanging is today. I believe I threw it away - during one of our many moves around the world.

In any event, it was a very exciting period.

Q: Was that through those three years?

MURPHY: Yes, throughout the three years. Well, I think that period was probably about a year and a half.

Another aspect of that job was also interviewing all these ex-officials in the Vietnamese government. All these Ambassadors from all kinds of countries, Ministers of government, etc. Many of them had been directed by our Ambassadors, our Embassies in various parts of the world, "Oh, go to Paris. They'll take care of you."

Q: "Take care of you" in what sense?

MURPHY: Well, take care of you and get you a visa. They'll get you to the States. "You'll feel much more at home in Paris. You can study there. You'll speak French."

Q: "Get out of my territory."

MURPHY: Exactly. "Go to the next consular district."

Q: But a Consul could have functioned in any place in the world with these people. They were refugees, weren't they?

MURPHY: They were, in effect, refugees. One time, I'll never forget, one day my secretary said to me, "You have twenty-nine people waiting to see you. Twenty-six are Ambassadors, and the rest are Ministers." I said, "Well, *qu'est Ce qu'on peut faire?*" "We have to begin. Should I take them in order of seniority?"

It was most difficult to work in those conditions because Kissinger and company were promising the moon to all these people and we would have to say, "No, I'm sorry you don't qualify for immigration. You're going to have roots in your own garden." Or, "You don't qualify for refugee status," whatever it is, and then go away and two days later we would get a direct cable from State saying "Minister Ngynon Vong Dong Meking Yeon (or what ever his name was) has been offered a full professorship at Princeton. Give him a J-2 visa."

Q: But, refresh our memories on this. Refugee status? These people could not be refugees...

MURPHY: No.

Q: ...because they were allowed to live in France, is that right?

MURPHY: They were. They were accepted as refugees by the French government. But many of them came to our Embassy thinking they could claim refugee status in the United States as well. So we would have to convince them that they'd been resettled in France and therefore had no claim for resettlement in our country.

Q: And maybe many of them had French nationality because they'd lived in ...?

MURPHY: Yes - some did, Bill. It was amazing to me to learn how many of these people had very close friends in the highest echelons of our government. They figured that just by mentioning certain names, we would give them visas.

Q: There are those that argue that.

MURPHY: That's right. Hundreds of these people - former Vietnamese government officials - came through our Embassy in Paris - on the way to new lives in the United States. Many more, of course, settled in France and in the Midi there are entire villages which are Vietnamese.

Q: But so many of them, as my barber, under a refugee program. You might clarify for the reader who are those people in that period, particularly.

MURPHY: I think that those people, you mentioned your barber, those people were ordinary Vietnamese that had nothing to do with the government so they could qualify for refugee status. They went to neighboring countries like Laos, Hong Kong.

Q: *And had no title to French nationality?*

MURPHY: No, they had no French nationality. They had no other alternatives.

Q: *No alternatives?*

MURPHY: They had no standing with the former government in Saigon.

Q: *They were technically, and this one part of it, there were people in France who could qualify as refugees, though, I presume? There were Vietnamese who...?*

MURPHY: Yes, there were. There were refugees that managed to get to Vietnam and were brought actually.... Some of them clandestinely came into the country.

Q: *Did you administer that program in Paris?*

MURPHY: No, I didn't administer that. I took care of most of the Vietnamese government officials.

Q: *I see. And refugees who were veritable refugees were taken...*

MURPHY: They were taken care of by our Section.

Q: *By the Section?*

MURPHY: Yes, by our Visa Section and also an INS representative as well.

Q: *The immigration officer for the people who ultimately proved...?*

MURPHY: Granted them Refugee Status, yes.

Q: *That was an interesting period. Sad.*

MURPHY: It was a very interesting period. It was also indeed very sad. I thought constantly of the thousands of our fellow citizens who had lost their lives in Vietnam. Such a useless loss of life! There was a lot of sympathy on the part of the French government for the Vietnamese refugees, of course, because of their history in that part of the world.

Q: *The French accepted many of the people.*

MURPHY: You'd be amazed how many they did accept! There are entire villages in France - even today - which are Vietnamese.

Q: *That sense of obligation, maybe, to these people? As we have a sense of obligation, too.*

MURPHY: Yes, exactly. But I must say that I admire the Vietnamese people greatly. They are a very clever people, extremely family oriented, very intelligent and very hard workers. All you have to do is look around Washington, DC at successful businesses- - or look at the list of Phi Beta Kappa graduates at our universities these days! The campuses of Harvard and MIT are full of Asian faces. I believe they are the hope for the future of our nation and are destined for great things. I would not at all be surprised if there were an Asian-American elected President of the country by 2050!

Oh - I should mention a rather particular visa case I encountered during this period in Paris, Bill. It involved the noted Soviet musician (cellist) Mstislav Rostropovich - his wife Galina Vishnevskaya and their two daughters. One cold winter day towards the close of business at the Embassy - dark, windy and very cold - as only a Paris winter late-afternoon can be - I was about to see my last appointment of the day - Mrs. Arthur Rubenstein. I believe this was in the winter of 1978. I went out to the waiting room and found her engaged in deep and animated conversation with a short, pudgy Russian who was introduced to me as "Slava" Rostropovich. I confess I did not recognize the name but Mrs. Rubenstein told me he was a well known musician in the Soviet Union. She also offered to translate for the gentleman as he spoke no French or English. It turned out that the Soviet government had given Rostropovich, his wife and children permission to come to Paris for a series of concerts - but he was obliged to return to Moscow immediately upon their conclusion - which was in a week or so - from the date of our meeting. Rostropovich had, in the meanwhile, received an invitation (which he showed to me) to perform three concerts at Lincoln Center in New York City. He had been that morning to visit the consular section of the Soviet Embassy in Paris to request that his passport be amended to permit a week's travel for himself and family in New York. The Soviet authorities laughed at him and said that it would take the Foreign Ministry at least two months to reply to such a request - and the answer would surely be NO! Rostropovich was really worked up at this point in the conversation and threw his passport on my desk. "You tell them they can keep it", he said to me. "I want to be stateless. I'll give up my Soviet citizenship if they won't let me go to New York." I calmed him down and told him that I knew my colleague - the Soviet Consul General - and would speak with him in the morning. Rostropovich arranged to return to my office - with Mme. Rubenstein - the following day. In my conversation the next morning with the Soviet Consul General, I explained what I knew of the situation - and told him that his nation would lose one of its greatest musicians if he was unable to obtain permission for the short visit to New York. Needless to say, permission arrived from Moscow in two days - - and off the family went to New York City.....never to return to the Soviet Union! Their flight was denounced in the most vile of terms by the Soviets and the family was stripped of their Soviet citizenship. A couple of years later, Prince Rainier of Monaco granted the family Monegasque Service Passports to enable them to travel at will. We often saw Slava and Galina over the years - and where ever he was performing, my wife and I had gratis front row seats. When he became director of the National Symphony in Washington (Kennedy Center) we often heard him perform. We were invited to both daughters' weddings. Also, at the palace in Monaco, Slava performed for a select group for the 25th Wedding Anniversary of the Prince and Princess. We were guests in the Palace at that time for the weekend of celebrations - having come from Genova where we were posted. Jackie got to hear the concert but, alas!, I was obliged to leave half way through the weekend as that was the time the President Ronald Reagan was shot coming out of the Hilton Hotel in Washington DC.....but that is another story. I would only like to say that Slava and his wife are

among the most delightful people I have ever met. They will be ever grateful to me for my small part in their escape to the West - at a time when travel was extremely difficult for Soviet citizens - -- even world famous Soviet citizens!

To continue - - - From the Embassy in Paris, I went on to my next post as Consul in Nice and U. S. representative in the Principality of Monaco.

Q: Excuse me, one last thing before we leave Paris. You were in the Visa Section all the time in Paris?

MURPHY: The entire time, yes. But as I mentioned, much of my work was political in content in addition to being consular. You'll recall that those years were very "political years" - with Vietnam, public protests against U.S. policy in Asia, etc. I worked very closely with our Vietnamese peace delegation meeting in Paris; with our Embassy Political Section, and with other sections of the Mission.

Q: Did you notice... one last question..... again to compare Paris: had the Embassy improved in terms of the management of the consular section, in terms of the openness?

MURPHY: Yes, actually it was a breath of fresh air to see the changes made in the ten year interim period. As a matter of fact, I thought sometimes the Administration of the Embassy had become a bit too relaxed!! David Betts was the Consul General when I arrived in Paris to begin my second tour there. Ruth McClendon was the Consul head of the Overseas Citizens Unit. And, of course, Alice Clement. We did have officers of great experience in the consular function in Paris at that time. I must confess that I sometimes had a difficult time with some of the junior officers, in that...

Q: Had a generation phase begun?

MURPHY: Yes, it was certainly a generational phase. And also, for the first time in my career, I ran into young officers who were in complete disagreement with our Immigration and Nationality laws. Some of these young officers completely disregarded the laws and regulations - - and had no qualms telling me that they did so! The openness towards superiors was astounding to me. One day a young officer came to my office and said, "I think you should know before I begin to work for you I am listed as a *"some-time marijuana user"* according to the Medical Unit of the Department of State." Of course, I was floored. I'd never heard young FSOs make such statements before. I figured that I had better adjust - - but it was not easy!

Q: What did your leadership and you, aware that this new generation was coming,.....that the generation of the '60s had been brought in..... how did you and your leaders face this?

MURPHY: Looking back on that period..... All the directives coming out of the Department in those days, especially from the Office of Personnel, encouraged us to help younger officers *"develop and grow"* at post. In my own case - I appreciated this guidance. I had been out of the United States for almost ten years - - and tremendous changes had taken place on our university campuses. The Department's guidance, in my opinion, was really appropriate. It may not have

been timely - and certain disasters occurred before the DOS issued such directives and guidance for managers in the field - but the Department came through in the end. I think this was very necessary at the time. Some of my most pleasurable moments, when I look back, are the manner in which I was able to work with and to encourage junior officers to grow in a professional way. Some of these officers were very discouraged working in the enormous visa mill - that was Paris at that particular period. They were usually first-tour offices.

Q: Maybe they didn't know the French language that well....in order to enjoy the local...?

MURPHY: That's right, Bill. The city was new to some, them - the language - the loneliness. I am thinking of one particular officer.... the son of an Ambassador. He would come to me almost in tears at the end of a busy work day....and tell me he couldn't stand it anymore. He told me he didn't join the Foreign Service out of choice; he was pushed into it by his parents. He claimed he didn't know his parents well but was raised and educated by nannies and maids at embassies around the world. His parents, he said, were people who were forever going to cocktails, receptions and dinner parties every evening of the week. There was a lot of resentment built up in this young man.

I simply listened to him and tried to encourage him. I told him that his next post would certainly be much better. I explained how my posting in Cordoba was so different from Paris..... and how you grow at each post; you have different responsibilities.... the work is more interesting in one place than another. Sure, I could understand why he was discouraged in this huge mill in Paris. The lines build up at 5:00 in the morning to get visas....and it was his job to listen to sad tales all day of people attempting to enter the United States. He found it very difficult to refuse a visa application....the sadder and more heart rendering the tale, the more he was inclined to issue the visa!!

Q: To me that is true human management. Were you given help? Were your leaders given help from the establishment, from the Department of State, to advise the junior officers this way?

MURPHY: I can't recall any specific guidance. We were certainly encouraged to advise young officersbut no one told us how to go about it. This was left to our own devices. I would often have long talks with these young men and women. Just listening to them was, I think, most beneficial.

To go back to this particular young man, Bill: when I encouraged him to stay in the service and just accept the next assignment, which I thought for sure was going to be better, he came to me one day and pushed a telegram in front of my face and said, "Now what do you think of that, Murphy?" He was assigned to Lubumbashi!!!.

Q: This is before the invasion?

MURPHY: Yes, before the invasion. So, I had to quickly think of something good about Lubumbashi to encourage him to go there. He did - and he eventually met his wife there. I am really happy to say today this officer is still in the Foreign Service. He is now one of our most distinguished Chinese experts and holds a position of leadership in the Department.

Q: The moral is, the boss in the early phases is very important.

MURPHY: It's true, Bill: the boss IS very, very important. You have to pay attention to people's gripes: and even if you don't agree with them..... they gripe about work, the way it's done, the way an Embassy is managed, the structure, the formality.

Q: And it will be changing. You saw the generational change in the '60s.

MURPHY: We've both seen the change from the '60s. For sure, in the year 2050, the Foreign Service will be quite different.

Q: And the Department of State will continue not to advise us how to do it.

MURPHY: You can be sure of that!

MURPHY: I went to Nice from Paris for my next assignment.

Q: It doesn't sound like a hardship post? Doesn't one normally have to go to..... Lubumbashi?

MURPHY: The assignment from Paris to Nice came about in a most unusual way! I did know Ambassador Watson - via our Chinese talks - fairly well. Normally, as you well know Bill - a consular officer in a large Embassy like Paris would not come to the attention of the ambassador too often !!

Q: Above all,an IBM Watson.... an a political appointee, at that!

MURPHY: No, that's for sure. Above all, not Watson. But I got along well with him. He did have a serious problem in Nice. Eleanor Hicks, a second tour officer, was our Consul on the Cote d'Azur. Eleanor caused all kinds of headaches for the Embassy in Paris. The story goes that this officer was chosen personally by President Richard M. Nixon to be our Consul in Nice. She was a young black girl who was quite bright and was serving at the time at our Embassy in Bangkok. During a Vice Presidential visit to Thailand, "control officer" Eleanor Hicks came to Nixon's attention. She was assigned from Bangkok to Nice. In spite of her obvious high IQ, I believe the assignment was just a bit too much for her. She was in over her head.

Q: She was qualified in the sense that she...?

MURPHY: Very bright young lady.

Q: ...had French?

MURPHY: She spoke beautiful French. However, she was out to enhance her own image, rather than the government's. It was evident in everything she did.

Q: Many people do that!

MURPHY: That's true!! But Eleanor was most successful at it. She appeared in every newspaper and magazine in Europe as well as many in the United States. Henry Kissinger once asked me to describe her abilities and to explain what made her so attractive to the European press. He said that at times Eleanor got more press coverage than he did!! As our meeting was six months after he left his position as Secretary of State, Kissinger immediately thought better of his question. He said, "No, they wouldn't let me speak to her when I was Secretary of State, so I really don't have the right to ask you now." In any event, Eleanor Hicks had her very own Public Relations firm in Nice - and also a contract with a national firm in Paris. She made a movie in Yugoslavia and also she played musical instruments in the Casino bands on the Riviera! Strange behavior for an American diplomat, don't you agree? In short - Eleanor Hicks was the most unconventional consul in the Foreign Service at that time. The final straw for the State Department (and the immediate cause of my assignment to Nice!) was Eleanor's involvement in a hit-and-run accident on the road between Nice and Cannes. Apparently she ran down an elderly man while she was driving to keep an appointment with the Captain of a US Naval vessel in the harbor of Cannes. She was charged with manslaughter by the local Court. For that reason, she had to be pulled out of the post immediately - especially since French Government were starting to express "concern" at her non-diplomatic activity.

As you can well imagine, Bill, Eleanor Hicks did not do much diplomatic work at the office. She had no time!! To get the "real story of Eleanor Hicks" you should interview ex-FSO Bill Tilney - recently Mayor of San Antonio, Texas - who served as Eleanor's Deputy during that rocky period in Nice! His stories would make your hair curl!

Q: Just one small point here. Comparing that tragedy, I mean it is in a sense a tragedy...

MURPHY: I, too, consider the whole episode a tragedy for us as Americans - - especially the damage done to our country's throughout the South of France. There were, at that time, about 16,000 American's residing in the Nice Consular District as well as a huge foreign community. America has considerable influence in that part of France - and many of the third country nationals who lived there were involved with commerce with American partners.

Q: Pressures are tremendous.

MURPHY: What was most difficult for my wife and I was starting to work in the Nice area. This resulted from the fact that Eleanor Hicks never paid her personal bills on time. Her bills were everywhere - - her residence, the gas company, the phone company, dress shops, etc. The consular was constantly being visited by bill collectors.

Q: Oh, of course.

MURPHY: Thousands of dollars worth of telephone bills, water bills, gas bills, that were her personal responsibility, but they reflected on the United States government. My wife, who was looking for a residence at the time, was rebuffed at every turn. Real estate agents said, "No, no,

the American government - - we can not rent to you."

Q: "You don't pay your bills." But in comparison to the tragedy that befell the Cordoba Principal Officer and the so-called..... I won't call it a "cover-up story".... but how did the Department handle this tragedy in Nice? Did they talk about Eleanor Hicks?

MURPHY: No public announcement regarding the officer was ever made by the Department. Eleanor Hicks was pulled back to Washington very quickly. Unbelievably, within six months she was promoted! The Ambassador in Paris at that time, Kenneth Rush (former Ambassador to Germany and former president of Union Carbide) telephoned me in Nice and said, "Peter, I don't understand how this could happen. How could she get promoted?" I told him that I fully understood the reason! Her superiors at the Embassy never commented on her extra-curricular activity in her annual Efficiency Reports sent to Washington. When a Promotion Board has a report in front of it indicating how wonderful an officer is ..."

Q: You promote her.

MURPHY: "You promote her." So, that's the reason!.

From the start of my tour in Nice, I decided that dramatic action had to be taken in order for me to begin to work in that part of France . Eleanor Hicks' outstanding bills just had to be paid before I could begin to do a proper job. I sent a cable directly to the Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Carol Laise - describing the situation and asking that either the Department elicit money from Ms. Hicks for these bills or to give me permission to publish in the local press a statement to the effect that these were private bills of an official American and had nothing to do with the U.S. government. Within three days, I got an answer from Washington saying the check was on its way. It did arrive in Nice - I paid off the debt. The Embassy in Paris was absolutely stunned with this action - especially since I hadn't even sent them a copy of my cable to Washington.

Q: Consular officers know how to solve problems!.

MURPHY: Frankly - I was amazed that it worked!

Q: Peter, you went off to Nice because of an emergency. Certainly, it isn't normal for one to be transferred from Paris to a constituent post like Nice after a number of years already in France; usually they like to send you off to the pits of the world. But, because of this emergency, they did appoint you Principal Officer in Nice and United States diplomatic representative to the Principality of Monaco. When you got there, you had first hand experience with France - after all the years you lived and worked there - but tell us now from your vantage point what you considered the assignment to Nice to be in terms of the uniqueness and the pressures.

MURPHY: Well, I'll admit that the pressures were certainly there! I have already explained to you the circumstances surrounding our arrival in Nice and the difficulties we experienced in lodging ourselves in the beginning. What did I think of the assignment to the South of France? I believe that the city of Nice and the surrounding area, Cannes, Monte Carlo, are today - as they

were then - unique in the world. I considered myself most fortunate to have been assigned to this historic post - which, incidentally, was at the time the oldest functioning American diplomatic mission in the world! We had a very large American community resident in the area. There were many retired Americans living in the consular district: Many Foreign Service Officers, many former ambassadors, top-ranking military, especially Navy people - who had been formerly assigned to with the Sixth Fleet and, who, following retirement from the military, went to work in that part of the world. I am sure you recall that prior to De Gaulle's expulsion of NATO forces from France, the Sixth Fleet Headquarters was the town of Villefranche s/Mer - where eventually we lived during our tour of duty in the South of France. Many of the families in town had American connections - as there was much inter-marriage between the local population and the U. S. Navy personnel stationed in that beautiful town.

There were also many wealthy Americans who maintained secondary homes all along the Riviera - from Menton to Toulon. Of course, the natural beauty of the surrounding area is absolutely breathtaking. In the entire Mediterranean basin, I don't think you can find a more beautiful place to live. Some overbuilding has taken place in recent years, especially in the Principality, but, in general, it is still a choice area of the world. Looking back - I still think it is unbelievable that my family and I were able to live on the Riviera - with its beauty, its history....the Lost Generation, the noted painters, the White Russian aristocracy, the glamour and glitter. In addition to the Americans who resided there, there was also an enormous British communityas well as Swedish, Scandinavian, German, Italian, Belgian.....very international. During my time in Nice, many international meetings were held there....always attended by large Washington delegations. (Who, Bill, in Washington, would want to miss "official business" on the French Riviera!!) We were posted to Nice, for a total of two years..... a little over two years.

Q: The period again beginning...?

MURPHY: The time frame was from - let's see - from 1975 until 1977. You'll realize that period includes our Bicentennial year. The year 1976 proved to be a killer! It was great for the United States and promoted and solidified Franco-American friendship and cooperation in that part of the country! After many years in France, Bill, you yourself know that the usual canard - The French do not like the Americans - is simply not true!! It is my opinion that you could not find a more pro-American area outside of our nation - than the Nice Consular District - - which included the Alpes Maritimes, the Hautes Alpes, Alpes de Haute Provence, Monaco and the island of Corsica. Just as an example of the pro-American feelings of the local people: - when our Bicentennial Fourth of July celebrations of 1976 rolled around, the city of Nice as well as the city of Cannes closed for three full days, shops, etc., in celebration of our Independence Anniversary. Months of preparation went into these events, which included, concerts, religious services, the visits of a US Navy aircraft carrier, the Flagship of the Sixth Fleet, several parades with both US and French military participation; receptions given by the Mayor of Nice, the Mayor of Cannes, the Prince and Princess of Monaco, street dedications in Bar-sur-Loup - the birthplace of Admiral De Grasse - a French hero of our Revolution. The list goes on and on!

Q: Because the French did play an important role in our Independence, didn't they?

MURPHY: That's exactly it..... and many of the heroes of the American Revolution came from

that area of France. Several of Admiral De Grasse's men, for example, who fought in the battles of the Chesapeake Bay and Yorktown came from the Riviera and especially the island of Corsica. The historic connections between the United States of America and Corsica are very strong.

Q: You had some American influence also in the Principality of Monaco, didn't you, Peter?

MURPHY: Yes - of course - with the presence of Princess Grace of Monaco - - the former Grace Kelly of Philadelphia.

Q: But is Monaco an independent country?

MURPHY: The Principality of Monaco is an independent country but dependent on the French for its defense as well asits water!

Q: And foreign policy?

MURPHY: Yes. guess we can call it an independent country - "up to a point"! Monaco has a semi-autonomous foreign policy. The Sovereign Prince, Rainier III, sends his own ambassadors to several European countries; throughout the rest of the world, he appoints Honorary Consuls General in major cities. As a general rule, however, Monaco follows the French in foreign policy matters - including voting in the United Nations, in which the Principality now has full membership.

Q: But how were you accredited to Monaco - - through Paris, through the French connection, or separately?

MURPHY: I was accredited separately - - directly from the Department of State to the Ministry of State in Monaco via our Embassy in Paris and the Monegasque Embassy in Paris. I have kept copies of these diplomatic Notes - as I found them quite unique!

Q: So it's a separate accreditation when you're assigned as Principal Officer in that country?

MURPHY: Yes.entirely separate.

Q: Was Nice an expensive place in which to live?

MURPHY: It was all a bit overwhelming for us at first, Bill.....mainly because of all the expenses involved in the required representation work. We left that post paupers!! We were never able to save a dime during our years there! The Embassy (read "the ambassador") was far from generous with the annual allocation of Representational Funds. I recall that we had a grand total of \$1,200 for the second year we were in Nice - and that was intended to cover all official entertaining! Even in 1975 such a paltry sum did not go very far!

Q: Oh.

MURPHY: To put this into context, Bill..... twelve hundred dollars for the year would actually pay for perhaps (we're talking about 1975-1977) two cocktail parties. That's about what the sum would cover. During our assignment, I received VIP visitors from Washington: Former Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and his wife, Happy, came several times. Henry Kissinger, along with his wife Nancy, came for a week in 1975. Lady Bird Johnson, a delightful lady, came each summer with her friend Mary Lasker from New York City. They rented a very large villa on St. Jean Cap Ferrat which is near Nice and were usually there for a total of six weeks at the height of the summer season. When these people were entertained by the local residents - or by prominent members of the international community visiting the Riviera - - we were usually expected to host return events - - or to arrange for return parties/cocktails at the homes of local residents. My access to important political figures was fantastic - - mainly as a result of the representational responsibilities. During the height of the summer season, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Finance and Foreign Ministers of many of the Arab nations as well as many from western European countries were in residence in the area. Without much difficulty, I had free access to any of these people almost whenever I wished. At times, it was far easier for me to meet with an influential Arab in Nice than for our ambassador to do the same back in the Arab's home country. After all - the Arab was on vacation and after a few drinks, talked freely at dinner parties. As you can imagine, Bill, I sent many interesting reporting cables to Washington following such social gatherings!! But I must admit that the constant representational responsibility got very, very heavy. Throughout the summer season, rare was the night that my wife and I did not have one, two or three engagements of an evening - and almost always in black tie and long dress!

Q: And you had to return such invitations...?

MURPHY: We were obliged to, Bill. For example, when a Lady Bird Johnson or Kissinger were entertained, we had to arrange some sort of repayment of these invitations to such prominent Americans. I can't recall any visitors ever contributing to our representational funds! On the other hand, I do remember vividly one very large reception that we hosted for the Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. He had invited over 300 officials and friends from the area to a large cocktail party at our home. The Admiral's Flagship's mess sent a huge platter of shrimp cocktail for the event. The next morning, as I was leaving the house to go to the office, I met an officer from the mess coming up our walk. He presented me with a bill for the Flagship's contribution! So much for assistance from the U. S. Navy! Life was indeed very expensive for us. Towards the end of my tour, I got a bit wiser....This was at the time of the Bicentennial celebrations. Everyone wanted to come to "American events" because of the love of America - - - and also their love of parties!! Several hundred people wanted to attend our Bicentennial receptions, and we were obliged to host separate ones along the coast. Finally, with the assistance of Prince Rainier of Monaco, I devised a plan which involved the newly opened Loews Hotel in Monte Carlo.

Q: American...?

MURPHY: An American hotel, an American venture....but with German capital (\$49 Million). Shortly after my arrival in Nice, I helped convince Prince Rainier that such a hotel would actually be in the benefit of the Principality...as well as increase tourism in the area. He had been most reluctant.... thinking such an American-type hotel would bring Las Vegas-type gambling

plus hoards of little old ladies with purple hair, tennis shoes...just waiting for the slot machine room to open!!

Q: Pulling down the machine.

MURPHY: Pulling down the machine, right. But, you know, after a while, the Prince began to realize that the era of "luxury tourism" was over. You just couldn't build another Hotel de Paris or Hermitage near Monte Carlo. Besides - the multimillionaires who filled such hotels were few and far between these days. Monaco was full of newly-rich Italians, Germans, Swedes, British - and not a few American long-term residents. After the new Loews Monte Carlo Hotel was completed - and proved to be a smashing success, - the owners (the Tisch brothers of New York and Bob Hausmann - also from New York City) kept asking me what they could do for the Consulate? Well, finally - with the encouragement of Prince Rainier - I thought of something they could do. We decided to have a separate Bicentennial Fourth of July reception in Monaco because the international community was so large there that we couldn't handle it at our home. The hotel arranged a fantastic reception on the hotel's roof overlooking the sea on a perfect evening and it turned out to be absolutely lovely. Not only was there a large representation of the Sixth Fleet (as there was an aircraft carrier in the harbor), but "everyone who was anyone" was present. You know how those things so, Bill!

Now, I should tell you a bit more about the interrelationship between the Consulate and the Sixth Fleet.

Q: That's a good idea - - after all these parties!!

MURPHY: Well, the Sixth Fleet. Since the early days of our Republic, the Mediterranean and the Middle East were considered to be important - because of commerce and also from a political perspective. The United States kept a fleet in the area - even in days of sailing ships. The presence of our warships signaled our interest in the area - - and was used to "send political signals" even in the 18th century. I recall an old photograph hanging in my office in Nice showing the American fleet in Villefranche s/Mer harbor in 1872. This is the same harbor which was host to the Flagship of the Sixth Fleet until the early '60s - - when France left the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (militarily) - and threw all NATO forces out of the country.

To give you an idea, Bill of the frequency of ship visits we handled at the Consulate: in 1977 we had approximately 45 visits of Sixth Fleet ships up and down the coast in ports within the Consular District....Menton, Monte Carlo, Villefranche, Nice, Cannes, Mandelieu. They ranged from tenders and supply ships - - to the largest aircraft carriers of our nation's fleet - some holding 5000 to 6000 men. During that year, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet (Admiral Fred "Fox" Turner) made three official visits within the consular district. And, you know Bill, such visits are almost as bad as a Presidential or ambassadorial visit for a small consulate.

Q: And, also you had the protection of these Americans, even though they had their military police inside, they were running all over the Riviera.

MURPHY: Indeed ! When you have 6,000 men (there were no women aboard in those days!) in

the small port town of Villefranche - things happen!! Well, there's bound to be a few problems. I must say they were much better behaved than the British or the French Navy when ships of those nations visited our port towns. The USO - which was housed in the consulate building - was most helpful in assisting the crew with liberty plans - to travel within the district; visit the local sights or to go skiing in the nearby mountains. On an average, we would have maybe five or six men left behind after the ship took off. The numbers were greater, of course, when an aircraft carrier was involved. The usual reason for "missing the ship" - was oversleeping!

Q: And you would have to take over?

MURPHY: The sailors left behind after the sailing of their ship would either come to the Consulate on their own - or under police escort!! We were obliged to arrange passage - usually by train - to Gaeta (Naples), Italy - the port of the Commander of the Sixth Fleet and the home port for many of the Sixth Fleet ships. It is interesting to note that Naval regulations obliged the servicemen to reimburse the travel from their monthly paychecks! Uncle Sam provides no free rides!

Now, let me tell you a bit of what we did for the many ships which visited the district. Our ports were most popular with the crews for liberty because of the natural beauty of the area as well as the legendary welcome the crews received from the USA and also the local American and French residents of the Riviera. Local residents went out of their way to invite the men (there were no women n Navy ships in those days!) to home cooked meals or to other family-centered events. The most popular ports with the Sixth Fleet were Monte Carlo, Villefranche and Cannes. It is interesting to note that the crews now vote on where they wished to go on liberty - - a big change for the US Navy! The French Riviera always won! Five years later - when I was Consul General in nearby Genoa, Italy - I had only two port calls in the entire five years of my tour!! No one in the Sixth Fleet, it seemed, wanted to rest and recuperate in Italy! I guess its must have been our beaches in Nice and Cannes!

Q: Or chasing certain attractive, local....lovelies!

MURPHY: Exactly, especially on our fabled topless beaches in the area!

Now, we not only took care of the crew and saw to their welfare during the four or five days they usually were with us..... but we also furnished the ship with provisions to continue its journey. The Consulate in Nice arranged for the delivery of tons of perishable goods to the ship in port. This usually involved the provision of thousands of gallons of ice cream and milk, fresh vegetables, breads...anything else not provided by the US Navy supply ships which prowled the Mediterranean. Many items, such as dairy products or fresh meats, came from the Scandinavian countries - and that involved shipments arriving in Nice or Cannes under Custom seals from the point of origin to the ship.

Q: We,.....being the Consulate. There was nobody there to help you?

MURPHY: No - we had no military personnel assigned to the Consulate during my time.

Q: No military assistance?

MURPHY: No, the consulate staff did all of this work for the U. S. Navy...and had done so for many years. The Consulate did a tremendous amount of work in connection with ship visits. Communications and financial involvement were our main preoccupations at the Post.

Q: Did the military help at all financially?

MURPHY: The US Navy, of course, paid for all of the supplies as well as the transport. We, however, at the Consulate were obliged to coordinate everything else. As you know, communication with a ship at sea is not always the easiest thing to arrange, Bill!! The naval attaché's office in Paris helped, and ...once in a while... someone would come down from that office during a ship visit.....a large carrier, for example. But we basically did it all. It was a disaster for us, of course, whenever a ship visit was canceled at the last minute - as frequently happened when a ship received a "Change Order" from the Pentagon.

Q: Melting ice cream.....that sort of thing?

MURPHY: Yes - exactly ! We would receive a call from the ship telling us of the cancellation - and instructing us to donate the ship provisions to local charity. This was a more difficult task than might first appear! Before we could donate fresh vegetables, milk, cream, ice cream, cheese, etc to the local hospitals or orphanages - we had to satisfy French customs! As the merchandise came into France under Custom Seal - it was not actually on French soil - according to the bureaucrats at the Customs. (Our Custom people would interpret the regulations in the same manner, I am convinced!) After the usual couple of days of debate regarding the payment of custom fees, we gave away the U. S. Navy's goods to local charities. I assure you that we never paid a Franc in custom duty!!

On another subject: international meetings and conferences. Several important gatherings took place in southern France in the two years I was posted in Nice. Many took place in Monaco - while Nice and Cannes were also favorite sites. One fascinating conference in which I participated together with a large American delegation was that of the International Hydrographic Organization Conference. The meeting takes place every five years in a different country - in spite of the fact that the international headquarters of the International Hydrographic Organization is located in the port of Monte Carlo. At least twenty hydrographic vessels converged in the harbor at Monaco for this event - Soviet, Chinese as well as our own! As you can imagine, we were very interested in the ships from the Communist nations - given the fact that they were seldom considered solely dedicated to hydrographic research in the world's waters!!

Q: A very famous Frenchman has his sea venture in Monaco, didn't he?

MURPHY: That right, Bill - Jacques Cousteau. Cousteau was at one time the President of the Monegasque Oceanographic Museum - which is one of the wonders of the Principality. It was started by Rainier's grandfather, Prince Louis II - who was a sea-faring man who spent much of his long life collecting the contents of that museum. It's a fascinating place to visit.

So - with all these meetings and conferences on the Riviera - we had a constant coming and going of top American businessmen, U. S. Government officials, Members of the Congress, the Young Presidents Organization, participants in the Cannes Film Festival, and various other organizations from the United States that held meetings on the Riviera.

Q: What was the size of your staff at the Consulate to help you?

MURPHY: I had one Vice Consul who concentrated on consular work - of which there was a lot! Just think of the Social Security work in an area where we had over 8,000 retired American citizens! A Political - Commercial officer was assigned; the Drug Enforcement Agency had an officer there as well. The local staff numbered seven (7) - including the driver/GSO Foreign Service National.

Q: Maybe the reader doesn't fully understand how consuls are involved in Social Security matters.

MURPHY: One is eligible for Social Security in the United States at the age of 62 or 65, depending on individual choice. This eligibility is effective within the United States - or in a foreign nation, if one happens to live outside the country. At the present time, MEDICARE is not available abroad - but full coverage by Social Security is allowable. A potential beneficiary - child, orphan, handicapped, or aged - would come to us at the Consulate for assistance with the various forms for submission to back their claim. In addition at that time, we also distributed the actual checks - either by mail or in person. The work also entailed constant investigation into possible false claims - for example, claiming for someone long dead - - or claiming funeral benefits more than once. Once we did discover that funds had been paid out in error due to fraud - it was no easy task for us to extract the funds owed the U. S. Government from the perpetrators. I recall one 96 year old lady who lived in a two room hut high in the mountains offering to kill and sell one of her chickens each month to repay the Social Security her \$400 debt. I think I recommended the cancellation of that debt - if I recall correctly!!

Q: Other beneficiaries, such as children...?

MURPHY: Actually, should there be a physical disability, a widow or widower can receive Social Security benefits for the partial support of their under-aged children.

Q: You pay them? The consul pays out this money?

MURPHY: The consul and his staff actually does all the work in assisting the American citizen to apply for these benefits. In actual fact - the national employee responsible for Social Security matters provides this assistance. In my Foreign Service career, I never met one single Foreign Service Officer who was intimately familiar with the several Social Security forms necessary for the processing of a claim.

Q: So all of the Americans you dealt with on the Riviera were not all wealthy types?

MURPHY: No, they weren't. As a matter of fact, we also had in the consular district several formerly wealthy people who resided there in very humble lodgings. As an aside, Princess Grace of Monaco was marvelous in ferreting out such people. She would call me at the consulate and tell me of their plight. I didn't have time to visit all of these people but she would take this on - with my wife Jacqueline - and together they would visit - and evaluate the needs of the citizens. Sometimes Grace would bring her two eldest children, Prince Albert and Princess Caroline, to help clean these peoples' apartments. She herself would bring food from the Palace. I think it was a good education for her children. It certainly showed them another side of life. Grace's actions were very touching - all the more so because her charity was done without the least bit of fanfare. No one ever knew what she was doing - or who she helped - either in person or through her own generosity. I have never read anything about this in all that has been written about her untimely death. For this reason I want to record her kindness here - - so that someone will know what a kind and charitable person she was. She may have had a privileged position in the country - but she was ever thoughtful of those less fortunate around her. Through such contacts, my wife and I got to know the Prince and Princess very well.

Q: You certainly couldn't have helped these people out financially without the help from the local community, could you?someone such as Princess Grace.

MURPHY: That's right, Bill, but our Consulate in Nice was very fortunate in having an exceedingly large welfare fund at our disposal. From this fund, we not only repatriated American families without recourse to the Department of State Welfare Funds - - but, from time to time, even paid peoples' rent, heating bills, telephone bills as well as emergency hospitalization - including expensive hospitalizations!.

Q: "We" - being not the United States Government, but acting on behalf of this group?

MURPHY: Yes - acting on behalf of what we called the "American-British Welfare Association of the Riviera". The money in this association was administered by the British Consul General in Marseille and myself. We two would meet once a month to review investment options on the approximately \$300,000 fund total.

Q: And this money was from the local community, the Americans and British?

MURPHY: No, it wasn't. The Fund itself was the result of the sale of the Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital in Villefranche s/Mer. The hospital itself was built at the turn of the century in Villefranche - at a time when the Riviera was full of visiting and resident Englishmen. Shortly after the establishment of NATO and the choice of Villefranche s/Mer as the home port for the United States Sixth Fleet, it was realized that a Fleet Hospital was necessary. During those years, there were many U. S. dependents living in the Nice area. The hospital in question was taken over and operated by the Sixth Fleet. It was a Godsend for the hospital - as the British residents of means were fast deserting the Riviera! The U. S. Navy completely refurbished the hospital - but retained its quaint name! When the Fleet was expelled from France by General De Gaulle, a heavy blow was dealt to the hospital. Eventually it fell on bad times and was closed as it had no major financial support - with the departure of the U. S. Navy presence in the area and the diminishing numbers of British residents. Eventually the hospital was torn down and - because of

the exceptional site overlooking the beautiful bay of Villefranche - it sold very well!! The money realized by this sale was the basis for the American-British Welfare Fund which we administered for the benefit of both communities. The Trust still exists to this day and I believe it is one of the largest (if not *the* largest) "welfare funds" existing at any consular post in the world today.

Q: And people like your wife and Princess Grace and other Americans helped out?

MURPHY: Yes, Bill. There were women and some men as well - usually retired businessmen - who would help with this charitable work. I rarely had time to go personally to investigate the living conditions of these people. Also - we frequently had citizens come to the consulate who had been robbed of their money - and tickets home; or women with children abandoned by the husband and left stranded in France. Then - as in all diplomatic posts - we had several Americans in jail, in hospitals - and not a few in the French Foreign Legion at their headquarters on the island of Corsica!! This was a bit unusual - as such a military unit exists only in France - and we had the training headquarters in our consular district. I recall a few times when we had Americans escape from their basic training units on the island - and show up at our door! I guess they just couldn't take the severe training undergone by Foreign Legionnaires.

Q: You have done a bit of name dropping with our American citizen, Princess Grace. Tell us a little bit more about the relationship that developed with you, how did you get to know her? I know you're the official representative of the government in Monacobut what does this mean practically?

MURPHY: Monaco is a very special place, Bill. Smaller in size than New York City's Central Park - its financial influence throughout the world is considerable. The fact that an American citizen was wed to the Chief of State - and a Sovereign Prince at that - was indeed unique. From the very start of our tour there, Princess Grace could not have been more gracious towards Jacqueline and me. She facilitated my work in the Principality and included us in every major event of international importance - - and there were many during our time there. I recall distinctly our first meeting. A few months after our arrival - and move into our new home in Villefranche - we received an invitation to attend a Sunday afternoon concert with the Princess at Monte Carlo's Garnier Opera House. We arrived 15 minutes early and were escorted to the Royal Box. As you can imagine - for a kid from Boston to be in such a situation was, to say the least, a bit daunting! Before the concert began, the Princess' other guests - her sister-in-law Princess Antoinette and a few others, gathered in a private room for drinks and introduction. Grace made us feel at home at once. It was a very special afternoon - and, as luck would have it, a very close friend was visiting Monaco that afternoon and attended the concert. At dinner following this event, we had a lot to talk about! Grace was as nice and as kind as you have always heard and read about. Well - you know, Bill! You have met her in Paris! She was the driving force for many improvements in the Principality: the revival of the Ballet Russe of Monte Carlo, the founder of the Monte Carlo Garden Club - which she invited Jacqueline to join; and - of course - she attracted the best in the entertainment field to perform at events year round in Monaco. We were indeed fortunate to be included in many of these public manifestations. She and the Prince together planned the American Bicentennial events in the Principality.. Also - never did an American ship call at Monaco without the Princess being interested in the entertainment of the officers and crew. The Sixth Fleet loved to visit Monaco! I believe that we became so close to

the royal couple because of the children.

We were posted there at a time when Prince Albert was contemplating his higher education: his father opted for a College in Switzerland while Grace wanted an American university for her son - and future ruler of the country. I was unofficially enlisted by the Princess to attempt to convince her husband of the value and benefits of Albert's going to the United States to further his education. The young prince had attended schools in the Principality from kindergarten through his high school. In his last year at the Lycee in Monaco, his parents spent much time consulting with and investigating colleges and universities in Europe and also in the United States. One day when I was visiting at the Palace, the Princess pulled me aside and told me that Prince Rainier was insisting that Albert attend a German-speaking university in Switzerland. Grace thought it would be too difficult for him - especially given the fact that Albert's German was almost non-existent! She herself favored an American education for her son as she thought it would give him a bit of independence and also assist in drawing out his personality which, up to that point in his life, was rather over-shadowed by his two sisters - especially by Caroline. Albert was indeed a shy youth - always most obedient to his parents and much like his mother in temperament. His sisters, on the other hand, inherited their father's Mediterranean temperament. In Grace's way of thinking, receiving a university education in English in America would also perhaps assist in correcting the young Prince's speech impediment. Albert had had a problem of stuttering from the time he was a child and, in spite of numerous medical consultations all over Europe, it continues to this day. He has improved greatly in his ability to overcome this affliction. Following my conversation at the Palace with Grace, I wrote away for catalogues on various American colleges. I concentrated on schools in the New England area - as Albert was familiar with northern New England since he had attended summer camp for three or four years together with his sisters. After much discussion, Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts was selected as about the right size school and also the right location. It is, as is well known, a college with an excellent academic reputation. I should point out that Albert was never known for his academic excellence - although he was a diligent and conscientious student who usually managed a "gentleman's C average" in most courses. It took a couple of visits to the Palace for me - together with the Princess - to convince Prince Rainier that Albert would be better off at school in the United States. Rainier was worried about: abduction, the dangers of drugs and drinking - i.e. aside from the possibility of abduction, they were the usual worries of any parent sending his child away to school far from home. In order to reassure the Prince, I enlisted the aid of a good friend, a Jesuit priest I had known from my days in Paris, Rev. William Russell, S.J. - to assist in this effort. Bill Russell located the family of two professors at Amherst who were willing to offer lodging with their family. Their offers were later declined when Albert insisted on living in a dormitory - and then a fraternity house - like the other students. In addition to locating a security company willing to take on Albert's security needs, Bill Russell identified a fellow Jesuit-professor on Amherst's faculty who agreed to provide Albert spiritual guidance - should the need arise. On a visit to Boston and Amherst, the Princess consulted with Father Bill Russell about these matters concerning Albert's schooling at Amherst. After much discussion, it was decided that the young Prince would be better off without constant security in the form of a body-guard - and that he would fit better into college life if he started out living in a student dormitory. During the first three years of Albert's schooling at Amherst College, we were assigned to the Department of State and lived in a modest house in the Dominion Hills area of Arlington, Virginia. During those years, Prince Albert came to Washington to spend long

weekends with us. Our boys loved having Albert in the house: he was like a big brother to them! Prince Rainier and Princess Grace were ever so grateful for our looking-after Albert - especially during his first year at the College. I'll never forget his preparations for his first visit from Amherst - to our home in Washington. (Keep in mind that he had never before actually planned a trip on his ownto say nothing of going to buy an air ticket!) He called me and asked - "How do I get down there?" I had read in the papers that a few weeks previously Albert had gone to New York City with a Monegasque buddy who was a student at nearby William's College. I asked him how he had gone to New York - and Albert replied , "In the private aircraft of one of my Dad's friends". I told him that he had better look up the bus schedule from Amherst to either Springfield or Boston - where he had to catch a plane. I told him we would be at National Airport in Washington to meet his plane. During those weekends he spent with us in Washington, he frequently went out at night with another good friend - Jean Charles van Essche who was from Monaco, grew up with Albert and was a student at Georgetown University. He also spent one of his Thanksgiving Holidays at our home with us in Arlington, Virginia. During Albert's visits, we managed to show him all the tourist sites - visited the White House, the National Gallery of Art and - to his delight - the National Air and Space Museum. On one of his visits to us in Washington during the winter, Albert rented a car in Amherst to drive to the airport in Springfield, Massachusetts too catch his flight. It was a stormy night with the New England roads covered with snow. Somehow Albert managed to bump the car in front of him - and skid off the road. No damage was done and Albert was not injured but on his arrival at National Airport I know that the experience had shaken him. He talked of nothing else all the way home. Shortly after we arrived back home n Arlington, Princess Grace telephoned from London to speak with Albert. He began the conversation by telling her all about the near-accident and, in the telling of the story, he became more and more excited about the incident. I then spoke with the Princess and learned that she was calling from Buckingham Palace where - in 10 minutes time - she was to give a poetry reading before the Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother and her guests for the benefit of one of the organizations of which she is Patron! It was really not the best time for Grace to receive alarming news about her son - and I assured her that he was fine - and that no great damage was done as a result of the accident in Massachusetts. We also visited Albert at Amherst - one time attending a Christmas concert of the College Glee Club of which he was an active member. Since no member of his family could attend, he was very appreciative that we had driven all the way from Washington for the event.

Albert is a very nice fellow and had a heart of gold. He is very much like his mother in temperament and personality. With his father, his relationship is at times a bit strained. I believe that his father would like his son to become tougher - and to learn to say NO to people when it is necessary.

It was Albert who telephoned me in Genoa in September of 1982, the day after his mother's tragic death, to ask if I could possibly come to Monaco to spend time with his father at the Palace prior to his mother's State Funeral. I, of course, drove over to Monaco from Genoa at once and remained with the Prince for the entire day prior to Grace's funeral. Without any doubt, this visit of condolence to the Prince was one of the most difficult I have ever made in my life. We talked all day long - just the two of us - in French, English and at times in Italian. He was often inconsolable and broke into tears. In addition, Rainier didn't want to receive anyone - even including members of the late Princess' family who had arrived from the United States...her

brother, Jack Kelly, and her two sisters plus her cousin, (Secretary of the Navy) John Lehman. With an officer of the Ministry of State, the Prince and I went over the plans for the State Funeral in detail - including the reception of the foreign delegations - The President of Ireland, Nancy Reagan, Princess Diana, Danielle Mitterrand, and many other notables. Before returning to Genoa for the evening, the Prince insisted I stay for a private Mass in the Palace Chapel where Grace's remains were resting prior to the Funeral the next day in the Cathedral of Monaco. As Prince Rainier, Caroline, Albert and I entered the chapel - I remember feeling rather strange at being the only outsider there with them. Already assembled in the small chapel were Grace's relatives who had come from the United States for the funeral and, up to that point, had not seen Prince Rainier. The following day - after the Funeral itself at the Cathedral - the official delegations sent by various governments to Monaco were received at a reception in the Palace garden. Rainier did not feel up to speaking with anyone - and he and the children went to their private apartments in the Palace. He asked Jackie and I to help introduce the guests to one another. This was rather a tall order - introducing the President of Ireland to Princess Diana, for example! I knew, of course that he had not been invited to Charles and Diana's wedding in Westminster!

Grace and Rainier had planned to come to see us in Genoa in October of that year - a month after Grace's fatal accident. They were to have stayed with us for four days - and visit the international Genoa Boat Show - one of the largest in the world. Following the Princess' death, I managed to convince the Prince - with Albert's assistance - that they should both follow through with the original plans. They did come to Genoa and remain in our home as guests for three days. Rainier even purchased a huge sailing boat at the Boat Show - which took a year to build in a small fishing village near Venice. It was their first excursion out of their Palace since Grace's death. As you can imagine, in the glare of the world press, it was most difficult for them - and also for Jackie and me, I might add! In spite of the difficulties with the media during the visit to Genoa, I think that Prince Rainier appreciated our help in easing his sorrow at that period of his life.

During our Washington assignment following our return from Nice in 1977, Princess Grace, too, stayed with us in Arlington, Virginia. During that time, Grace was on a Poetry Reading Tour of the United States together with a British actor from the Royal Shakespearean Company. They performed at Harvard, Princeton and, in Washington at the Hartke Theater at Catholic University. I can assure you, Bill, that our accommodations in the Dominion Hills area of Seven Corners in Arlington were a far cry from the Palace in Monaco - - or Roc Agel - the Grimaldi country home in the mountains above Monaco - or even their town house on Avenue Foch in Paris!! We had a tiny, three bedroom rented home which had a living room capable of holding a party of six! It didn't seem to bother either mother or son one bit, however; both Grace and Albert made themselves right at home. One snowy afternoon during her visit, I remember Grace sledding with our sons Paul and Marc down the hill in back of our home. As Paul and Marc were both too young to come with us to the evening poetry reading at the Catholic University theater, Grace did a shortened version of her poetry reading in our living room just for them in our living room. I'll never forget their big round eyes as she looked and listened to her every word. She had a way of fascinating children and a marvelous way with children. It was not at all difficult for her to communicate with ease at their level.

Q: From what you say, she seemed to be full of American energy.

MURPHY: Yes. Princess Grace was mainly responsible for making the Principality a cultural center in Europe during the years she lived in Monaco. She especially promoted American art - painters, musicians, singers, dancers - all of whom performed or exhibited with their European peers during that period. Grace's American "know-how" always showed through anything she sponsored or was actively engaged in. Grace did not always have an easy time of it! She arrived in the Principality as an American with her film star background. Monaco was a foreign country to her; she was not comfortable with the language. In spite of her convent education and her comfortable background growing up in Philadelphia, nothing could have prepared her for the spotlight in which she found herself upon her arrival in Monaco for her "fairy tale" wedding. In spite of her world acclaim as an actress - she was not of royal blood - but of a mixture of Irish and German ancestry. Many of the "locals" in Monaco never let her forget this fact. In addition, Grace was not a university graduate. She often mentioned to me that in her early years in Monaco, she felt quite lonely - shut up in her gilded palace - with very few real friends in whom she could confide. I think that it was mainly for this reason my wife and I were quickly accepted by the Grimaldis - - and made to feel at home whenever we were with them. Grace, especially, craved close friendships.

Although, as the spouse of the Sovereign Prince of Monaco, Princess Grace was always at center stage wherever she went in Europe or America - I can attest that she did have her family priorities straight. I would like to leave the following striking example with you to illustrate how Grace, as a mother and spouse, ordered her life. You have perhaps heard of The International Variety Club - an organization composed of actors and internationally known political figures - engaged in financing modern hospital facilities for handicapped children. This international organization held an important anniversary meeting in Monaco in 1975. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was invited to speak at the Club's annual gala dinner and to receive their Humanitarian of the Year Award. Naturally, Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger were invited to spend the duration of the meeting (a four day weekend) at the Prince's Palace. Many international figures were also attending the event including the organization's President, Prince Philip of Great Britain and Lord Mountbatten. The Prince of Wales, Prince Charles, also was present as he was being inducted by his father as a member at the closing gala dinner.

Due to the fact that Kissinger was no longer Secretary of State, the Consulate technically had nothing to do with his visit. However, because of the volatile world situation at the time, the former Secretary still had a State Department security detail with him when he traveled abroad. Naturally State kept us advised of Kissinger's travel plans via official cable. Three days prior to the designated day of arrival of the Kissinger party - including his wife Nancy - the Prince called me in the office in Nice to ask if indeed Dr. Kissinger was coming - and if he was going to accept his invitation to stay at the Palace. When I confirmed his arrival, the Prince told me that they had received no communication from Dr. Kissinger. I told Rainier that I had said nothing to him - or to the Chamberlain of the Palace - as Dr. Kissinger was no longer Secretary of State but a "simple private citizen". Rainier then asked if I could join him and the Princess for lunch at the Palace that day so that *"we can figure out what to do with this fellow for four days"!!*

During the luncheon, we made plans to bring Dr. Kissinger to a Monaco soccer game, visit

various interesting sites in the area - in addition to the Variety Club activities. The Prince thought there should be a small reception for him - and I mentioned that, upon driving up to the Palace that morning, I had noticed the huge yacht of Sam Speigle (the movie director) in Monte Carlo harbor. Rainier thought it would be a great idea to ask Mr. Speigle to host a cocktail reception prior to the Club gala at the Sporting Club. He, of course, didn't want to ask him himself to arrange a party - so he handed me the phone - and I called. Mr. Speigle was, of course, delighted to have such an opportunity to entertain both the Kissingers and the Prince and Princess of Monaco. The event was very nice - with about 28 of us present aboard Speigle's huge yacht. Carry Grant, whom my wife had never met before, was also present at the party. He was a very close friend of the Princess and was frequently in Monaco.

To get to my point, Bill - at the end of our "planning luncheon", Princess Grace asked me to do her a favor. She said that when I met the Kissingers at the Nice Airport upon their arrival from New York the next day, she'd appreciate my giving her apologies. She told me that she would not be in Monaco to serve as their hostess - nor to attend the evening's Variety Club celebrations. She said that she would, however, be back the next day. I really couldn't believe my ears!with Princes Philip (President of the Variety Club that year) and Prince Charles in the Palace as house guests - plus the Kissingers! I asked her where she was going and she explained that her youngest daughter, Stephanie, was to receive her First Communion at an 8:00 A.M. Mass at her school in Paris the morning after the Monaco Gala evening. She said, "I can't possibly be up 'till 2 AM at an official dinner and be present in Paris for the Mass". It then struck me that Grace really did have her feet on the ground - and had her family priorities right!

When I explained the situation to Kissinger at the Airport the next day - he looked a bit bewildered - but said not a word. The evening went off very well - and, true to her word, the Princess was back from Paris the next day to play her role as hostess to all of her distinguished house guests.

Q: People didn't treat Kissinger that way.

MURPHY: No, but he really took it well.

Q: Did you tell him the real reason?

MURPHY: Yes - of course. And Kissinger said, "Oh, she's absolutely right. We fully understand."

Q: You talk about name dropping and whatever, and obviously these pressures on both you and Jackie were near to unique - - if not unique. How did you walk through them keeping your balance and not slipping? Because it's so easy to slip into ego. Your predecessor perhaps was part of it?

MURPHY: Bill, I fully realize this! I hope that the reader of these words - at Georgetown University or at the Foreign Service Institute - will not think of me as a simple "name dropper". We can all do that in the Foreign Service - because we have such particular jobs which allow us into unique situations and hence meet unusual people. I am simply trying to tell it like it was - or

, at least, how I viewed the world at that time. Being in such a situation is very “heady” and you have to keep reminding yourself that next week the Department may send you to Lagos or Nouakchott!! It is the old “*Sic transit Gloria mundi*....syndrome!!) but you know, Bill - it is difficult to explain how Jackie and I managed to maintain this friendship with Rainier and Grace over the years. In effect - I guess you could say that they were both rather lonely people - - and appreciated meeting "normal" people - instead of the rather phony multimillionaires who resided almost year-round in Monaco - and on most of the Riviera. We had many fun nights together - and on the occasion of their Twenty Fifth Wedding Anniversary in April of 1981 - when I was posted to Genoa as Consul General - Jackie and I were invited to spend the long weekend at the Palace with them. It was truly memorable since Miroslav (Slava) Rostropovich - who was also a Palace guest together with his wife - gave a private performance in the Throne Room for very few guests after we finished a super anniversary candlelight dinner. I had known “Slava” from my Paris days when I convinced my Soviet counterpart to grant him permission to visit the United States - because without his government’s permission, he intended to go anyway!! This was prior to his having been stripped of his USSR citizenship - - and Rostropovich never forgot my part in his "American adventure". Another evening I recall with the Grimaldi Family was one hot night in late August when Rainier, Grace, their children, us with our boys and about 6 other friends had a midnight picnic on deserted beach near Monaco. We built a bonfire, roasted hot dogs and drank a “*vin tres ordinaire*”! Even when, in later years, we returned to the Riviera for summer visits, we were always invited to spend a day with Grace and Rainier and the children either in Monaco or at their summer home in France overlooking the Principality in Roc Agel. It was pretty relaxed up there in the mountains in their old farmhouse: Grace would cook hamburgers on the grill on the outside terrace overlooking the sea while Rainier and Albert enjoyed showing showed Paul and Marc and me their fantastic antique car collection.

Q: You are still good friends with Prince Rainier?

MURPHY: Yes.....I'd say that we are still quite good friends. We have corresponded for years - and we write to each other about every subject imaginable! I should point out, Bill, that my friendship with the Prince of Monaco is well know by our government. The United States Government has used this friendship to attempt to further our "national interest" on more than one occasion. I guess this is just - - since if it were not for my government position in Nice and Monaco - this unusual friendship never would have developed. That's what diplomatic relations are all about - isn't it, Bill! This has been the name of the game since the days of the Medici - and Lorenzo Il Magnifico!

The first time my relationship with Rainier was "used" by the Department of State was in 1977 during my tour in the Bureau of Consular Affairs in Washington.

Q: This was after you left Nice that this relationship was.....

MURPHY: Yes. The event I am speaking of occurred after I left France was working with Barbara Watson in the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the Department. The Ayatollah Khomeini had returned to his native Iran from Paris and took over the country - - much to the surprise of our government - and Ambassador Sullivan!! I guess our political officers in Paris - as well as those in Tehran - did not feel that the religious element in the political equation at the time

amounted to a hill of beans - and thus their energies were concentrated on continuing our policy of supporting the Shah of Iran.

You'll perhaps recall that after the overthrow of the Iranian government, the Shah of Iran was given refuge in Cairo. He became seriously ill and flew from country to country consulting the best doctors of each. I guess that someone in our government - the White House, CIA or State??? - had moral qualms about the manner in which we had dropped the Shah (rather like a hot potato!!) and announced that we were "actively" seeking a place of refuge for the Iranian royal family "which would be in keeping with the dignity to which they had been accustomed. At that time, as I mentioned, I was working as a Special Assistant in the Department.

Q: In the State Department?

MURPHY: Yes. I was about to leave on an official trip to Eastern Europe (inspection of our posts in Poland) when I received a special request from the Secretariat. I was asked if - while on this particular trip - I minded stopping in either Paris or Monaco to meet with Prince Rainier. The object of the visit would be to attempt to convince the Prince to grant the Shah, the Empress and the family political refuge in the Principality of Monaco.

Q: They were looking for a home for the entire royal family?

MURPHY: Yes - They were looking for a home for them.

Q: Where were they at the time? In Cairo?

MURPHY: I believe they were in Cairo the time. This was prior to their travel to Algeria and then Mexico - - where they later took up residence for a time.

Q: Shopping for a place to live? To die, actually?

MURPHY: Exactly. The Shah was very ill at that point - cancer. Prince Rainier was most receptive to the request and said that they could all reside in Monaco. He did lecture me at length on the errors of Washington in the whole Iranian mess - and thought the U. S. Government had no moral character to have turned its collective back on the Shah in the manner in which we did. The Pahlavi family never did make it to Monaco - but went instead to Mexico - always seeking medical attention. It is ironic in a way that months later - when the Shah was about dead - I personally gave the Consul General in Mexico City (Vern MacInich) verbal authorization to issue Non Immigrant Visas for the Shah and his wife when he had to be rushed to the United States for urgent medical treatment. I recall that it was late in the evening and - as sometimes happened in the Assistant Secretary's office - I was still at my desk! Mac called to say that a private plane was about to depart Mexico for the United States with the royal couple aboard. He asked for permission to issue temporary visas - and I'll tell you that it didn't take me a second before telling him to go right ahead! He hesitated a bit - noting that I had not consulted any political types - but I just assured him that there would be no problem - and if there happened to be some flack - I would take the heat!! I was so ashamed at the way our government had treated this family that I could not but agree to let them into the country. I never did hear any objections

to my action that evening!

After the request that I approach Prince Rainier in the case of the Shah and his family - I was simply amazed to have the same situation repeated once again in 1985 while I was serving at our Embassy to the Holy See - - the Vatican.

Q: At the Vatican, assigned to the...?

MURPHY: Assigned to the Holy See. I was called again by Secretary of State's office and asked if I would once again "ask my friend in Monaco" if he would be willing to take a political family in exile. This time it was a bit more difficult as the dictator in question was none other than "Baby Doc" Duvalier of Haiti, his wife, and children. You'll recall, Bill, that our government forcibly put Duvalier and his family aboard a military aircraft in Port-au-Prince and flew them to France. They were "dumped" at a hotel near Megeve and we gave "our solemn promise" to the French Government that we would have a place of permanent exile" within two weeks - - if only they would accept the family for a short period of time". Well - - as you recall - the weeks went by - and our government had great difficulty finding a place to accept the former Haitian leader. I went once again to see Prince Rainier - - who was most forceful in his negative reply regarding "Baby Doc" himself. He said that the wife and children could live in Monaco until they found a permanent residence in Europe or in Africa - "but under no conditions will I accept that good-for-nothing husband."

Q: The family could stay as refugees, sort of.

MURPHY: Yes - as refugees, but "Baby Doc" Duvalier would never be allowed into the country. Amazingly enough - the story of "Baby " and his family does not stop with Prince Rainier's refusal of refuge for the husband. I returned to Rome and almost immediately received another urgent message asking me to put pressure on the Vatican to pressure the Prince-Bishop of the nearest diocese to the Principality of Andorra to allow the Duvalier family to take up residence in that Principality. As you may know, Bill, Andorra is ruled jointly by the President of the French Republic together with the Prince-Bishop of the nearest Spanish diocese (I forget the name of that diocese). When I went to the Vatican's Secretariat of State (their State Department) with this request from Washington. I was told that the Vatican had already received a negative reply from the Bishop in question.....posed by the French some weeks before! The good Bishop was presently on holiday on Mallorca - and did not want to be disturbed. I suggested someone in Embassy Madrid go to the island and try to persuade him in person. The bishop never did give his permission - although President Francois Mitterrand had already agreed to the request. (*You see - the French REALLY wanted him out of France!*).

Q: But, Peter, again, going back with those kinds of experiences, subsequent and at the time, how did you and your wife maintain an equilibrium if you will? How do you stop it from going to your head?

MURPHY: I suppose you are referring to life in Monaco - and the constant public exposure. I think it's just common sense, Bill . You simply have to realize that you are here today - and gone tomorrow! It is the same for all of us in the Foreign Service. You can't let it go to your

head.....although in the "old days" I do recall Principal Officers who did have a problem in this regard.....their wives as well! One thing negative about our posting to Nice was the effect on the family. Due to the fact that we were constantly on the go - we did not spend as much time as I would have liked with our boys. They were with us the entire tour - and went to school only a five minute walk from our home. However - at times, we were obliged to attend official events several nights in a row. The two great family periods during the year were our ski holidays - and our summers on the beaches of St.. Tropez! There - we lived in bathing suits and blue jeans!! We all have great memories of our days at the beach - and also on the ski slopes in France and in Italy. I often look back on those days with the greatest of pleasure.....and I hope that my family does as well!

About my friendship with Prince Rainier - I want to let you know - and anyone who may in the future read these words, I've never divulged any intimate aspects of our conversations or correspondence because I consider him a true friend. I think that Prince Rainier appreciates this aspect of our relationship. I have, on the other hand, saved all of our correspondence over the years and hope that someday someone will find it of interest. Much of the Prince's writings relate to world politics - and some of it not too flattering either to France or Washington! Also included are long comments on his family - and especially his children. As you know, his daughters have not had the best of marriages - especially Caroline with her marriage in June of 1978 to the French playboy Philippe Junot. Perhaps I should leave these papers to my "alma mater" - Boston College or - why not? - to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service!!

Q: You separate, in other words, the friendship from the official work you had on behalf of the US government.

MURPHY: Most definitely, Bill. I would say that we really became close friends - - as close as a foreigner can get to a Chief of State and his family. I am also fully convinced that because of this friendship I was better able to serve my country and to obtain objectives which were unique.

Q: So for financial reasons, you were glad to leave the French Riviera, but for personal and professional reasons, it was sad?

MURPHY: That's right, Bill, I'd say it was very sad in view of the fact that my wife's family resided in the area. In addition we had all made so many close friends throughout the area. The boys, especially, were very much engaged with their soccer teams and other school activities. This was the first time in their lives that they really made school friends. They were just at that age when friendships begin to count. I do believe we did a lot of good work in that area of France and that our nation's image was enhanced by our presence - - in spite of the subsequent closing of the consulate!

Perhaps I should mention my relationship with Embassy Paris - and the guidance or supervision provided by that large diplomatic post.

Q: Yes, tell us of your relationships with Paris. You were a constituent post.

MURPHY: Yes, that's right. I mentioned earlier, Kenneth Rush, was the ambassador during most

of my tour in Nice. I don't recall if I mentioned his background: he had been President of Union Carbide and also Ambassador to Germany. I've recently read that, at one time, there had been speculation that he would be offered the Cabinet slot as Secretary of State! He really didn't bother us much in Nice; during the two years I served there he visited perhaps four times. On one occasion Ambassador and Mrs. Rush - and Jackie and I - made an official visit to Corsica.....part of my consular district. Talk about a traveling "dog and pony" show!! This is a fine example to demonstrate that all was not fun and games on the Riviera. The job often involved much hard work - coordination, administrative, as well as diplomatic. For the year preceding the ambassadorial visit to Corsica, the island was constantly being blown up by separatist groups who have wanted a " Free Corsica" for years. The genesis of the visit was a conversation Rush had with the French President (Giscard D'Estaing) at the Elysée Palace. Rush mentioned to Giscard that he had never been to Corsica - and asked what it was like. Quite naturally, the French President encouraged him to go see for himself. The French were desperately attempting to find a solution to stem the terrorism and return the tourists to that beautiful island. When Ambassador Rush telephoned me to tell me of his conversation, I strongly urged him to put off the trip due to the precarious situation. Only a week before, three Frenchmen were killed by terrorist bombs on the island. Alas! Nothing I said was heeded - and planning for the expedition began at once. Rush was confounded by the fact that he could not bring his ambassadorial limousine to the island - - and I never thought he believed me when I told him it was too large for the Island ferry!!

Thus - - we planned the trip and we went to Corsica. We were accompanied by our spouses and I believe we stayed there for three or four days. It was an incredibly difficult trip for my wife and me. I, of course, had to plan every moment of our stay - - from the arrival in Ajaccio to the visits to Bastia, Olbi, Corte and the other important areas of the island. It was rather complicated given the fact that neither Ambassador Rush nor his wife spoke a word of French!! (....and Corsica is NOT Paris!) Both the ambassador and his wife were very nice people - but Mrs. Rush had not the slightest interest in France (as far as I could see) and spent her time with her needlepoint!! She rarely made an effort to speak with our hosts and not once expressed an interest in the area or the people. On the other hand - after a few drinks - the ambassador made a great effort to speak with the local officials - none of whom spoke English. He got himself into rather awkward situations because of lack of French. Naturally I attempted to interpret for him - but often, after a formal official dinner - he refused to have me translate - saying that he understood everything. I recall one evening, in conversation with the Communist mayor of Calvi, Ambassador Rush agreed with several of the anti-American ideas the mayor was expounding!! The mayor was amused - and all I could think of was how this conversation would look in the morning's press! Thankfully - it was not reported in the local or national press!

Q: Not knowing what he was agreeing to?

MURPHY: Yes - Bill - It was a ludicrous situation. We did have many happy memories of that trip - the friendliness of the Corsicans, the true pro-American sentiments of the majority of the people on the Island. I especially recall - on a previous visit to the island - being completely overwhelmed when I discovered how much the people of Corsica contributed directly to our Revolution and the fight for independence of the United States of America. It came about in the following manner: the French Consul General in Monaco - Melle. Marcelle Campana - was the

daughter of a distinguished French diplomat. She was born in London at the time he was French Consul General in the British capital. Prior to her posting to Monaco (for health reasons), she had been French Ambassador to Panama - and the very first French female ambassador! Her family was Corse in origin and prior to my first official visit to the island, she gave me the name of various family members to look up during my visit to Corsica. I recall visiting her sister who had resided in center the charming old city of Bastia. She was a widow and her husband, a noted attorney, came from one of the oldest families on the island. I was invited to dinner at this lady's home - which was itself something out of a novel! The entire house spilled down a very steep hill - overlooking the port of Bastia. Thus on the hill side it was two stories in height - - and on the water side 12!!! As my visit took place during our Bicentennial year (1976), my hostess had gathered together various documents relating to the Bicentennial of the U.S.A. which were continued in her husband's family archives. She presented me with letters from family members who had participated in the Battle of Yorktown with the French Admiral Conte de Grasse. In addition, she gave me an official document signed by King Louis XVI ordering her husband's relative - the then Bishop of Bastia - to cause to be celebrated in his Cathedral a *Te Deum* in celebration of "*the victory of my friend the Admiral de Grasse*" in assisting the American nation in its struggle for independence from Great Britain. I found this to be extraordinary - but soon discovered that several Corsican families had ancestors who had participated directly in our Revolution. You will ask: what did I do with these documents!? Well - being a good government bureaucrat and wanting them to be preserved for posterity - I sent them off to the Historical Office of the Department of State. I never received a word of acknowledgment....typical, don't you think? I did take the precaution of having legalized photocopies made for my own use and I still have them somewhere in my papers!! (At least, I hope I still have them somewhere!! When you move around as we do - one never knows!!)

I did enjoy the visits to Corsica during my tour of duty - - they were so different from my daily routine on the Cote d'Azur!!

Q: *But guidance? You were sort of laden to yourself?*

MURPHY: The guidance in the Embassy was minimal - to say the least. In theory - the Consul General was supposed to supervise the work of the Consulates in France. This was a completely different set up than, for example, in Italy, Germany or Mexico - where the Deputy Chief of Mission was responsible for such supervision. As it was my first Principal Officership, I really did need a bit of guidance. After three or four months on the job,.....with no guidance or even much interest forthcoming from the Embassy in Paris - I decided to "wing it" on my own!! There was certainly enough to keep me busy: the monthly visits of the Sixth Fleet ships; the frequent commercial conferences and gatherings attended by some of America's leading business people; the consular work.....and, of course, the political work of the post. There were very important political figures in our area....many of whom had national prominence. I contributed to the political reporting of the Embassy as well as sending political reports directly to the Department. Jacques Medecin, for example, the Mayor of Nice, was most influential both the consular district as well as in Paris. He was Minister of Tourism at the same time he held the position of Mayor of Nice - as well as Deputy. Unfortunately, he subsequently fell on hard times: exile in Latin America due to implications of corruption while in office. I believe that he has now been extradited to France and is awaiting trial on these charges.

Q: In exile, indeed.

MURPHY: Jacques Medecin's father had also been Mayor of Nice as had his grandfather before him. The Medecin family was a regular royal family in that part of France. Towards the end of my tour, there was even an American connection within the Medecin family as Jacques had married a Californian. Jacques Medecin's grandfather was a great friend of Jay Gould, of the Philadelphia railroad family, and of his wife, Florence Gould. Florence was one of the personalities of the Riviera and presided over the cultural/artistic life of the area from her magnificent villa in Juan les Pines - near Cannes. She was a very patriotic American - in spite of having lived in France from the age of 18 - when she went there as a young bride from California. She remained throughout the war years and was even made an honorary French citizen for her charitable works in the country. She once told me that her husband had donated the magnificent fountains (Neptune & company) located in the center of the city of Nice (Place Messina) as a tribute to his friendship with Jacques Medecin's grandfather. Whenever we had a distinguished American visiting the area, Florence could also be counted upon to entertain them royally (Nelson and Happy Rockefeller, Lady Bird Johnson, Congressional delegations, etc.)

Q: Maybe, given the realities of your two years there and the realities of Paris and its complexities and inadequacies, you were better off left alone, where you could be your own boss? You were literally your own boss, weren't you?

MURPHY: Absolutely, Bill. The only time I heard from the Embassy was when an important visitor was to arrive in Nice from Washington or when someone from the Embassy wanted to make a visits to the area. I vividly recall a total of four Inspectors coming to inspect the post. They managed to stay in the area for a total of seven days - including a long weekend. I guess I couldn't blame them; the place was like a paradise on earth. Looking back - I sometimes feel I did not fully appreciate the natural beauty of the Riviera while living there. Of course, having family there, I return often - but it is not quite the same as living in a place. In any event, Bill - No - the Embassy did not show much interest in the Consulate. I was very much on my own - - and fully enjoyed it!!!

Q: Until efficiency reports time!

MURPHY: Exactly, that's about it.

Q: But you had to be equipped to handle such an assignment; have a lot of experience.

MURPHY: You couldn't do it I don't think without having a solid knowledge of consular and political work - - plus a pretty good knowledge of French. Not just the French language but also an understanding of the French mentality and culture - as well as the French political system. And then, again, having a general, overall knowledge of all functions within the area of Foreign Service responsibility.

Q: You were a mini-Embassy in many ways.

MURPHY: Yes - A mini-Embassy.

Q: Because of your accreditation to Monaco, and also the nature of the south of France.

MURPHY: That's correct. I forgot to mention our anti-drug work at the consulate in Nice. With all that money about - there was little wonder that the "beautiful people" (and even those not so "beautiful") were tied up in all sorts of drugs dealings. Because the great center for drug production was just a bit to the east of us, the DEA was very, very active in the area

Q: Now this DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency)....were they there to get people arrested or what?

MURPHY: Yes, Bill. At the Consulate we had one DEA agent (Peter Charette) assigned who worked very closely with the French anti-drug police. He would gather information regarding drug running, consumption, and forward that to Washington. Agents in other European or Middle East nations would pass information to him - and he, in turn, to the French police. He would accompany them on raids although he did not, in fact, arrest people on French soil. A lot of these drug laboratories were located in the area around Marseille - but several of the owners of these labs lived in the Cannes, Nice area.

Q: Because it was a nicer part of the...

MURPHY: It was a nicer part of the world. Exactly!

Q: This is the movie "The Marseille....."

MURPHY: "The French Connection"

Q: "The French Connection", yes. That was in another consular district. That was in Marseille, next to you. Peter, we have to leave Nice, don't we. Where are we going to next?

ANTHONY QUAINTON

Political Officer

Paris (1972-1973)

Ambassador Anthony Quainton was born in Washington state in 1934. He graduated from Princeton University in 1955 and joined the Foreign Service in 1959. He served at overseas posts in Australia, Pakistan, India, France, Nepal and as ambassador to the Central African Republic, Nicaragua, Kuwait and Peru. Ambassador Quainton has also served as the Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and the Director General of the Foreign Service. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: Before we go to Nepal, let's talk about Paris. How did this 15 officer political section in Paris dealing with all these different geographic areas work?

QUAINTON: The mega embassies, London and Paris, were structured similarly with very large sections. It was assumed that the French and the British still retained global interests. Indeed, the French at that period had as many embassies as we did around the world and certainly played a very important role in Francophone Africa, even in the Middle East, where they had historical relationships with Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere. They were important players. We cared about what the French were doing. We also cared about what they were doing in Southeast Asia. We cared what they were doing in political military terms with respect to NATO. A lot of officers were interested in internal politics. There were half a dozen of us doing full time external work. There was nothing going on in the world that we didn't want to know what the French thought. So, the job was essentially one of going back and forth to the Quai d'Orsay inquiring about French policy in Gabon or Lebanon or whatever, in places where we had interests that intersected with the French. Keeping in touch with the French African and Middle East establishments, journalists, academics, etc., I also stayed in touch with the Elysee, because the French presidency had a separate department dealing with Africa under a man called Foccart, who over the previous 20 years had managed intelligence throughout French Africa.

So, it was an exciting job because it brought one in touch not only with professional diplomats in the French foreign ministry but with the Presidency, leading French newspapers, and academics. So, for a mid-level first secretary, it was pretty interesting. There was a lot of reporting to be done. I was quite autonomous. My job was clearly defined. The political counselor, Alan Holmes, was interested in what I did, but he was not a micromanager, so each member of the section had a great deal of latitude in defining his own turf based on instructions from Washington, requests for demarches, need for reports, etc. It was a very traditional Foreign Service job in a very large embassy with lots of other agencies represented. Both the political and economic sections in Paris had an importance which does not always exist in smaller embassies. It was a challenge. The greatest challenge of working in Paris is the French. Like the Indians, they have an extraordinary capacity to patronize the United States.

Q: I was thinking that of any two countries those two would be the most patronizing.

QUAINTON: And, there was always the problem of language. I think there is no doubt that of all the places that I served, the ability to communicate in the local language was the most difficult in Paris. The French did not want to talk to anyone in English, although many of the leading figures could and sometimes would with the ambassador. The ambassador for most of this period was John Irwin, who had been deputy secretary of state, and succeeded Arthur Watson, who had been head of IBM and got caught pinching a stewardess on an airplane and was removed. Watson spoke good French, but Jack Irwin did not speak French and was constantly being put down by senior levels of the French government. I still remember going with the ambassador to discuss some important Middle East question with the secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay, Geffroy de Courcelles. He was an extraordinary French diplomat, having served as ambassador in London. He had been educated in England and spoke perfect English with the fruitiest of Oxford accents. Irwin made the demarche he was supposed to make and de Courcelles looked at him and said in his very British voice, "Mr. Ambassador, I regret to say that I regard the policy of the United States as entirely pusillanimous. I may have the wrong word, you know, but then English isn't my native tongue." I always suspected that Irwin had no idea

what pusillanimous meant, and so the comment sailed over his head.

The first time I went to the Quai d'Orsay, I went to see a rather senior sous-directeur (deputy assistant secretary) to inquire about French policy towards Libya. The officer concerned listened to my demarche, which I had prepared with some care. I had looked up all the appropriate words in the dictionary and got through the demarche without too much difficulty. He smoked Gauloises and kept one lit between his lips throughout his entire response, moving it from one side to the other without opening his mouth and talking at the same time. It was a wonderful technical tour de force and left a young diplomat absolutely spellbound like a rabbit watching a search light. I understood not a word he had said, and I returned to my office knowing I had to write a cable on the French position. I consulted the political counselor, asking him what he supposed the French position was because I had had this extraordinary experience with Mr. Rouillon. He never played that game again, but it was a good lesson to a young diplomat. The tour in Paris turned out to be a prelude to a later stage in my career in Africa. One of the things that I did in Paris was to take the ambassador to call on the President of the Central African Republic in his hotel room in Paris, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, where I was later to be accredited. Bokassa wanted American astronauts to come to Bangui and we faithfully conveyed his request to Washington. I later learned that his request was received positively and that two astronauts went and were received with all the honors of a head of state!

Q: During this brief period was it sort of the general feeling that the French were concerned about keeping the Americans from messing around in their Francophone places, or was that a problem?

QUAINTON: Africa and the Middle East were quite different. They considered Africa as their backyard, and they saw American ambassadors pursuing policies everywhere designed to undercut French influence. They were very concerned about that. In the Middle East, they were less concerned, although French relations with North Africa were clearly equally privileged. I must say I always found the French, among all the diplomats with whom I dealt, the most professional and indeed quite open in describing French policies and interests. I felt I had a good relationship with them in Paris and with French ambassadors with whom I subsequently had to deal as colleagues and friends in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Q: Okay. Let's pick this up next time when you go to Nepal as DCM.

QUAINTON: Fine.

DONALD M. ANDERSON
Political Officer
Paris (1972-1973)

Donald M. Anderson was born in Iowa in 1932. He entered the Foreign Service in 1958. His career included positions in China (Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, and France. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 8 and

September 2, 1992.

Q: We had finished your time in New Delhi. You were in Paris from '72 to '73. What were you doing there?

ANDERSON: I don't know where we finished, but I was in Delhi and got a cable from Washington saying that they wanted me in Paris in two weeks. This was right after the Nixon trip. Actually, the lead-up to the Nixon trip, and the continuing contacts had been conducted in Paris through General Walters...

Q: Vernon Walters.

ANDERSON: ...who was the Military Attaché, and the Chinese ambassador, and after the Nixon trip the contact in Paris sort of went public and the President announced that this would be the point of contact between the Chinese and ourselves, and that Ambassador Arthur K. Watson would represent the U.S. side. It became rather urgent at the time because Ambassador Watson was flying back to the United States on one of his fairly frequent trips and according to the story that appeared in the press, he got rather intoxicated and by way of apologizing to the stewardesses attempted to stuff \$10.00 bills in their blouses which one of the stewardesses duly reported to the press. Of course, the press was all over...the State Department and the White House asking, "Is this the guy that's going to be handling our contacts?" "Yes, he's going to do it, but we'll have somebody there with him who is a China specialist." That is why I was suddenly transferred to Paris.

Q: I assume under strict instructions to keep your hands off the stewardesses.

ANDERSON: We got there in May of '72, and as usual in the State Department after turning my family upside down and disrupting their lives, making everybody miserable, we got to Paris and they basically said, "What are you doing here? And we don't really know what to do with you." Pat Byrne was the Asia officer in the political section and she sort of took me under her wing and took me down to meet the ambassador. I remember that quite vividly because we were walking down the hall and Jack Kubisch, who was the DCM, appeared in the hall on our way down to the ambassador's office, and said in an absolute remarkable way, "Whatever he says, agree." It was sort of a panicky advice that I should be terribly cautious. I went down and met with the ambassador and he was an absolutely charming man. We had a session, just the two of us, and he said he considered the China contacts one of the most important jobs that he had in Paris, that I was his man for those contacts, and I had access to him anytime I wanted to. If anybody in the front office gave me a bad time just to come right into his office, etc. So I left thinking this was going to be great.

And then Allen Holmes, who was the Political Counselor, and was very close to the Ambassador -- the Ambassador trusted him implicitly, and the Ambassador did not trust most Foreign Service people -- spoke to me and said there was a question as to whether I would be Special Assistant to the Ambassador and work directly for him, or whether I would be in the Political Section. And Allen advised me, and I think in many ways saved my hide, that it would be much safer if I were in the Political Section because I would have this buffer between myself and the Ambassador.

Q: Because at certain points efficiency reports are written, and if you're Special Assistant it depends on the Ambassador. Whereas Holmes being in the Foreign Service among other things...

ANDERSON: It was even more serious than that in this case. Anyway, that's the way we worked it out. The job really didn't amount to a great deal. The Ambassador didn't take part in many of the routine things that we did, but I saw the Chinese maybe a couple of times a week, and basically didn't have that much to do otherwise.

Q: What sort of things were you dealing with?

ANDERSON: Largely very routine stuff. At this point there were delegations going back and forth between China and the United States. The Chinese delegations almost all came through Paris. They would usually neglect to get their visas arranged and would come into Paris and would have to have a visa by 8:00 the following morning in order to get to whatever appointment they had in the United States. The first Boeing sale was made, and the Boeing people came through to meet the Chinese who were en route to Seattle and didn't know how to do it, so I took care of that. A lot of that kind of routine stuff.

The big thing that we were waiting for was two packages, one educational exchanges and the overall umbrella arrangement that we were trying to set up to begin educational and cultural exchanges; and a business package to set up a similar kind of relationship and a structure for beginning business relationships, remembering that at that point we had no representatives in Beijing. We had no diplomatic relations so this was the only way we could do these things in a non-official type relationship. This was the point at which the organization I'm now with, as matter of fact, the U.S.-China Business Council which was then called the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, was designated as the umbrella organization for trade. The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China were designated as the educational and cultural umbrella organizations. We were expecting to get these two packages to present to the Chinese, that was probably into around early August and the Ambassador was going home on vacation so I was pushing Washington to get these things. They finally got them out to us, two lengthy cables, and when I came into the embassy that morning the two cables were waiting, and it just happened that the Ambassador was calling on the Chinese Ambassador because he was going on vacation the following day. It was a rather extraordinary meeting because the Ambassador had been out the night before, and was nowhere to be found in the embassy. I spoke to his staff assistant, who was very wise in the ways of the Ambassador, and said, "We've got to wake this guy up, and get him ready. We've got these two things." He said, "Leave it to me, Don. Don't call the residence."

Q: I take it this was a very ticklish situation.

ANDERSON: He was a very volatile individual, he could be absolutely charming at times, but he could fire you on the spot as well. So he went over to the residence, and I got the car and met him over there. He brought the Ambassador down and I handed him the two papers. Each were about, I would say, maybe ten pages long -- one on educational exchanges, and one on the commercial relationship. He glanced at them, and tossed them back in my lap and I believe his

words were, "This is crap. I'm not going to talk about this penny-ante stuff." He said, "I'll leave that to you to take care of with your counterparts." And while we were riding over to the Chinese embassy he said, "What I really want to do today is just talk about global issues, sort of a tour d'horizon," for which we had no instructions whatsoever. In fact I had been specifically told by the NSC that I was not to do that kind of thing, that this was basically a mail delivery program and I was not to engage in other types of conversation.

But we did sit down with Ambassador Huang Chen, who was an interesting individual, and Ambassador Watson did indeed proceed to indulge in a tour d'horizon. The most memorable moment of which I remember -- this was 1972 -- he said, "Mr. Ambassador, the one thing that I think both of our countries have to worry about the most is Germany and Japan." Ambassador Huang, I thought, looked rather surprised at this statement, but we carried it all off, and went back. I wrote a reporting cable which reported mainly what Ambassador Huang said. Ambassador Watson later told me it was the best cable he had seen written in the embassy since he had been there.

He left very shortly after that and went home, and I am told...I don't know this from my personal experience, that he was met in the United States, and informed that it was time for him to resign. So that was really the last I saw of Ambassador Watson.

Q: Could you explain a bit about who was Ambassador Watson? What was his background?

ANDERSON: He was one of the sons of Arthur Watson, the founder of IBM. He had been president of IBM International, and as you know, his brother became Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the story was at the time that there was a question of who was going to become chairman of the board, and the senior leadership at IBM did not want Arthur K., so they arranged for him to become ambassador. I was told later that he had told someone in the embassy that he had always considered me to be the State Department spy in this China business, and he considered that I was responsible for his demise as ambassador, which was not true at all because I was very careful about that.

Q: Just to get a little feel for somebody looking at this in future times. Maybe you were sort of a mailbox operation there while these other things were happening, but at the same time there still was an official source of communication. Kissinger was head of the NSC at that time. Were you getting instructions, or whatever you want to call them from people in the NSC, "Watch this guy. We don't want him to screw things up," or anything like that? Were people telling you this?

ANDERSON: Not really. I was hearing in the embassy, and I think it was generally understood, that this guy was rather volatile, and sort of an unguided missile. But, as I say, the instructions were really that we were a mailbox, and I can remember one instance when Marshall Green came through, he was the Assistant Secretary at the time, and I told him that I was going to try and use these contacts to broaden the discussion. And he said, "That's fine Don." And the first time I wrote a cable back based on a discussion with my counterpart on his views on Sino-Soviet relations, I got a very fast phone call from Washington saying, "Dr. Kissinger does not want you doing that. Deliver the mail, and that's all." So I did very little of that.

My only other job in Paris during that whole period was to fill in for the Vietnam Liaison; actually I did get involved in the Vietnam peace talks which took place at that time, and which involved the Chinese, of course. In fact, we had a meeting with Secretary Rogers who was with the U.S. delegation, and the Chinese representatives at the Paris Peace Conference during that time. There was a period when Jack Kubisch was involved with the talks, then Jack Irwin who was the next ambassador to come out. By that time Henry Kissinger had gone...this would be November of '72, Henry Kissinger had gone to Beijing again, and they had announced that they were going to open a Liaison Office in Beijing, which I think was a very neat diplomatic stroke. They basically had an embassy, without calling it an embassy, and managed to finesse many of the issues.

Q: Particularly the two Chinas problem which was Formosa and...

ANDERSON: I'm convinced that the Chinese, and I think probably Henry Kissinger, reached agreement on the establishment of the Liaison Office with the understanding that this was the first step toward diplomatic relations and the establishment of a full- fledged embassy. I think probably the Chinese expected it to happen, and they expected it to happen much more quickly. In fact, it took from '73 all the way to December '79 when Carter finally announced establishment of diplomatic relations. I think that was a much longer period, but it was due in large part to, on the one hand the Chinese side which was going through a succession struggle with Mao and the Gang of Four; and on our side we had Watergate.

Q: This was forcing Nixon out of office.

ANDERSON: So what happened was, basically I knew from November of '72 that my job in Paris was going to come to an end because we would be setting up the Liaison Office. Then I was informed by Washington that I would be going from Paris to Beijing. I went on a direct transfer from Paris to Beijing in May of '73, so I was in Paris literally one year.

MARSHALL P. ADAIR
Rotation Officer
Paris (1972-1974)

Mr. Adair, son of a United States Foreign Service Officer, was born in Maryland and raised at Foreign Service posts in the United States and abroad. He was educated at Middlebury College and joined the Foreign Service in 1972. During his career Mr. Adair held a number of senior positions at the State Department in Washington, DC, dealing with a variety of areas, including relations with the US military Commands, Economic and political issues in Europe and Department personnel matters. A Chinese language specialist, his foreign posts include Paris, Lubumbashi, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing, Rangoon, Chengdu (China), and Tuzla (Bosnia). Mr. Adair was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.

Q: So you're off to Paris. What was your job?

ADAIR: I was to be a “rotational” officer. They desperately needed a rotational officer in Paris? That didn’t make any sense. However, the person I was replacing was an economic officer. He had been working in the commercial section and his job had been to organize the Paris Air Show. That’s what they told me I was going to be doing. Well, the Paris Air Show was only every other year and it wasn’t going on the year I arrived. When I arrived they did put me in the commercial section first. I didn’t see why in the world the United States Government needed to be helping American businesses overseas. American businesses were the wealthiest and the most powerful in the world. They had the most resources and they could do their own work. One of the first things I had to do was to call French companies who were behind in their payments. I was supposed to get in touch with them, inform them that they owed money and ask when payment could be expected. I was mortified and thought it was the worst possible assignment I could have. I was also completely unprepared for reaction. I got on the phone, explained who I was, etc and – then they were so nice! They were terribly sorry; they would check into it right away; and some even called me back to report when they paid. They were businesspeople; they wanted contacts in government. I had not understood that.

Then the embassy hosted a trade exhibit for American companies selling equipment for moving things around. The embassy had a whole building in Paris where the Department of Commerce organized trade shows for American companies on a regular basis. One of my jobs was to call up and invite people. Actually, I called to make an appointment and then went and delivered the invitation in person. I went to one company, and the Director looked at me and asked if I would be at the exhibit. I said yes, I’m going to be there. He said okay, he would come. He showed up with his wife and his secretary and they were so much fun. His wife started driving some of these machines around the floor and whooping it up. Then he invited me out to his estate in the country and he said he was going to invite his secretary out as well because he wanted me to get to know her, etc. I thought that sounded great. As turned out I didn’t go because someone else came to Paris who I had to host; so I had to call up and cancel. To this day I regret missing that “opportunity,” though perhaps it was good that I did miss it. But again, I was surprised because I had a lot more contact with people outside of the embassy who were actually doing things and influencing things than did many of my colleagues.

Q: Yes. Well this is just one of the interesting things. You had an economic job, and you had real contact with movers and shakers – rather than the political class.

ADAIR: Right. And I saw that the political class was pretty heavily influenced by these others – they needed each other.

Q: What was going on in France at the time?

ADAIR: Well, I arrived in 1972. Four years had passed since the riots of 1968 that had led to the resignation of President Charles de Gaulle. The French had gone through a period of instability that had really scared a lot of people. By the time I got to Paris they were recouping and the conservative inclination had re-emerged. President Pompidou was just an incredible expression of that. And I remember watching and listening to his speeches on television and being appalled by the patronizing tone. However, France was doing pretty well. Their aerospace industry was

growing rapidly - the Airbus and everything – and Americans were very upset because the industry was getting government subsidies. We were constantly arguing about free market versus state supported companies. We believed they were trying to protect their agricultural sector by restricting imports from the U.S. on health and contamination grounds. The French government was also subsidizing the computer industry – trying to stimulate their computer industry in the face of IBM. When I arrived our ambassador was Arthur (Dick) Watson who had come from IBM. Jacques Chirac was the minister of agriculture and he seemed to be encouraging the big demonstrations where dairy farmers were pouring their milk out onto the streets. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the finance minister. The embassy's economic minister, Chris Petrow, used to Giscard d'Estaing all the time and he really didn't like doing it. Petrow spoke fluent French but he found it every difficult to communicate with Giscard because he was so arrogant and snobbish. Then, of course, the Paris Peace Talks for Vietnam and the secret meetings with the Chinese were taking place at that time as well.

Q: How did you feel about Vietnam from the perspective being in France?

ADAI: I still felt very, very strongly that what we were doing there was wrong. I'd already decided at that time that if they had popped up that list and said you, you and you are going to Vietnam and I was one of the ones that they picked I would just say no and resign.

I didn't see anything in Paris that changed my mind about that. I met refugees, if you want to call them that, from Southeast Asia - wealthy people who had fled to Paris. They were very attractive people, and they were very well educated people; but they were not the kind of people that I would have liked to have running my country.

Halfway through my tour the Department asked for volunteers to go to Vietnam for just six months, to help with the drawdown. One person from the embassy went. He thought it was a fantastic opportunity to go for a limited period of time and see what was going on. He loved his tour. I didn't even consider it.

Q: Did the air show take place while you were there?

ADAI: No, it didn't. I'm pretty sure it took place after I left. At any rate, by that time I was no longer in the commercial section.

Q: Where did you move?

ADAI: I went from the commercial section to the general economic policy section, which dealt with trade policy, which I was just describing. While I was there I was made the acting civil aviation attaché for a period of time. That was an extraordinarily lucky and unusual thing. The position had been filled by a person from the civil aviation board who had to leave due to illness. The job had been empty for six months and they needed somebody desperately. My boss at the time, Steve Bosworth, recommended that I be given the portfolio. I had no clue as to what I was supposed to do. I didn't know how the State Department worked; I didn't know how the embassy worked; I didn't know how anything worked. But it was great experience. I got out of the embassy; I met lots of people and got exposed to things I never would have been exposed to

otherwise.

Q: What was the situation, Airbuses being subsidized both by the British and the French?

ADAI: Yes. Well, the big one then was not Airbus; the big one then was the supersonic airliner – the Concorde.

Q: Oh yes.

ADAI: The French and British had just finished it and they were applying for landing rights in the United States. Those landing rights were facing opposition on the grounds that it was too noisy. The French believed that the U.S. Government was going to prevent the Concorde from landing with a fabricated concern about noise, but that what we were really afraid about was the Concorde would give the Europeans an insurmountable advantage. That was certainly a part of it. There was a genuine concern with noise but I don't think many complained about the noise once it started flying.

Q: Looking at it from your perspective, were we subsidizing Boeing and other companies?

ADAI: Yes, but in more subtle ways, I think: with tax policy, government support for negotiations with other countries, military purchases, etc. It was a whole variety of things. There was no question that those industries got and still get a lot of government support.

Q: Well the Concorde never really threatened us, did it?

ADAI: Well American industry's view was it was not an economically viable option. It was a small niche and it wouldn't make a profit. American industry was concerned, however, that support from the French and British governments could make that calculation very different, so they had an interest in preventing it from being a success. Looking back, it functioned well the whole time that it existed, apart from that one tragedy in Paris. The people that did fly on it thought it was great, though a bit cramped - but only a few could afford to do it. It would be nice to be able to get across the Atlantic in four hours or whatever it was that it took. I don't know what the health implications were.

Q: While you were there, had the "frankenfood" situation become noticeable, the idea of special crops and all that?

ADAI: As I recall, that was just beginning. I believe the French were concerned at the very least about importing things that they didn't understand. It was not on the level that we have now. However, there was a lot of criticism of American grain and other things for how it was treated and what kind of pesticides were used. I can't remember now to what degree there was genetic manipulation of it then. But we had cases then, as I think we had later in China, where whole shipments were stopped because they failed to meet various standards.

Q: Was there a strong element of anti-Americanism in France at the time?

ADAI: Well there was some but not as much as I expected. President Nixon made his first trip to Europe at that time. I believe he was the first one to bring a whole fleet of vehicles to travel around in, bullet-proof car, etc. I was absolutely horrified by the spectacle that he and his entourage made when they came. I thought the French would be too. Some of them were, but many people in France were actually impressed. They were impressed by the flair; they were impressed by the show of power; they were impressed by the organization and didn't seem to begrudge it at all. I was pretty surprised by that.

Q: I would have been too, yes.

ADAI: The other thing that was going on then was the first oil crisis, when OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) embargoed Europe and the United States for their support of Israel. The United States, as you'll recall, had a crisis at the pump and Nixon imposed gasoline rationing. Everybody tightened their belts, turned off their lights and tried to be careful. It was a national movement that was also happening all over Europe - except in France. The French did it completely differently. They said, "We are not going to be blackmailed; we are not going to change our way of life one bit." They left all the lights in Paris on, all the street lights, and the Place de la Concorde, just outside my office window was lit up like a jewel the whole time that we were there. We thought they were crazy. We thought they were absolutely nuts, and that this is just a show of bravado that was going to cost them. Well, it didn't cost them. First of all, they very quickly mended their fences with the oil producers - much faster than we did. Secondly, their nuclear reactor program was within months of coming online. They knew that within six months to a year more than 25 percent of all their energy needs would be supplied by their own reactors. They had that to back them up so they did just fine.

Q: How important were the "intellectuals"? I mean, the chattering class who one always thinks of when you think of the French and the political movements and all that. They were a very powerful group, the commentary. Were they attacking us?

ADAI: Actually it may have been the opposite at that time. Some intellectuals were arguing that the United States model was one they had to take seriously, even though part of their prescription was be more nationalistic. And I'm trying to remember the author, the economist author-

Q: Yes, it was the American challenge; was it "Le Défi Américain" or something like that?

ADAI: That's right. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.

Q: Yes, well somebody else always has "the answer." We've gone through the Japanese having "the answer," now the Chinese have "the answer." You were there when we opened relations with China, weren't you?

ADAI: Well I was in the Foreign Service when we set up the U.S. Interests Office in Beijing, but I was not yet involved with China.

Q: Did you have much contact with the French government officials dealing with the economy?

ADAI: Some, but not much. I made one or two demarches on specific issues but not on economic policy per se. I was a very junior member the embassy and only had oblique contact with officials. I didn't get to know any of them and really get a feel for how they thought.

Q: Well you left there when?

ADAI: I left in June, I think, of 1974.

Q: Did you have much social life there?

ADAI: Yes.

Q: Were you married, by the way?

ADAI: No, I was single. Paris was a wonderful place to be. I had a French girlfriend and a few French friends but most of my friends were ex-patriots, third-country nationals, businesspeople. I intentionally didn't spend much social time with other Americans in the embassy. A lot of the people in the embassy spent most of their time with other people in the embassy.

Q: Well one of the impressions one has in the Foreign Service is that service in Paris is really not much fun for a good number of the people assigned there. It's a big embassy, it's rather rank conscious and you're not treated very well. How did you feel?

ADAI: Well, I think there is some truth to that. I was a junior officer, and at a big post like that junior officers tend to be less integrated into diplomatic work. One of the issues that bothered many of us was that we weren't on the Diplomatic List.

Q: Oh really?

ADAI: The U.S. Embassy at that time had almost 100 Americans on the Diplomatic List. We were told by the embassy's administrative officials that we weren't on the diplomatic list because the French had asked the embassy to keep the size down. The reason given was that was the only way the French could keep the number of Soviets down. We were a little skeptical about that explanation. I was told by at least one French official that he had never heard about that reason. The administrative section also argued that we didn't really need to be on the Diplomatic List. That was specious at best, and incorrect for me. I had a case once where I had to make a demarche to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about landing rights for a very powerful American charter airline company. They had not received an answer to their application and were due to fly in three or four days. For some reason the French seemed to be delaying permission.

The embassy received a cable instructing us to make a demarche. I called up, made the appointment and then went to the Foreign Ministry. It was my first time, so one of the more senior people in the economic section accompanied me. It was Larry Raicht, you probably knew him. We arrived and were ushered into this official's office. It was magnificent, with wonderful high ceilings, huge windows and balconies – the works. He welcomed us very courteously, then

sat down behind his desk and took a book out of his drawer. It was a copy of the Diplomatic List. He opened it and said, "I see Mr. Raicht here, but not Mr. Adair. Why?"

Part of me was mortified - and part of me felt vindicated. Larry leaned in and began to explain. The official listened a bit, then said, OK, he just wanted to make the point - which I assumed was don't stray too far from the rules - and asked me to go ahead and make my presentation. I made the case; he listened and then said he would call and it would be taken care of. The next day, Saturday, I happened to be the embassy duty officer and I received a call from the CEO of the airlines in question, who had not yet received a copy of the report that we sent to the Department. The stress in his voice was fairly high. He was saying he had sent the Deputy Secretary a cable and needed to know right away.... I stopped him, explained we had spoken to the Ministry the day before, and recounted what the official had said. The relief in his voice was palpable - and by the way the flight was approved and landed.

That was done. I recounted the incident to the administrative section and to the embassy leadership - and it had absolutely no effect on their policy. No one was added to the Diplomatic List. It did though strengthen our voice within the embassy a little.

Q: Well it may have given you a little more clout.

ADAIR: Right. Then, I had to spend six months in the consular section. In principle that was required for all of us. I'm glad I did it. It was an interesting experience. After that I knew I didn't want to do that kind of work though. It was a much higher level of personal stress than the work that I had been doing. I was on the visa line for eight to nine hours a day, and many of the people that I interviewed were desperate. We processed thousands of visas a day. Most of the French applicants got them automatically, so we were mostly seeing people that were third country nationals or young French women who wanted to go *be au pairs*. The latter was illegal at the time. Now it's fine but then it was illegal. We were only interviewing the tough cases. We didn't have any of the bulletproof glass and all that stuff then so we were just standing behind the counter and these people would come up and they'd beg and plead, and it just broke your heart. Some of them were very dignified and some of them I thought would have been great people to go to the United States but we had to apply the U.S. immigration law, and more often than not were not allowed to give them that option.

We had one case where 50 Gypsies showed up. They asked for visas to attend an international conference of gypsies in the United States somewhere, and they were going to go with their families and their caravans and essentially everything they owned. The first question we asked was the standard, "How are you going to support yourselves in the United States?" "Easy," they replied, and pulled out bags of gold and plumped them on the counter. We turned them all down because they could not demonstrate that they had an established residence anywhere to which they would return. Months later we got word from the consulate in Montreal, I think it was, that they'd showed up there and tried again. They were turned down there as well - but my guess is they eventually crossed over. The border was not very tight at that time.

Q: Yes. Well then, you left there when?

ADAIR: I left in 1974.

JOHN O. GRIMES
Counselor for Labor Affairs
Paris (1972-1974)

Mr. Grimes was born and raised in Alabama and educated at Notre Dame University. After service in the United States Marine Corp he joined the State Department and served as Diplomatic Courier until being commissioned as a Foreign Service Officer in 1962. A specialist in Labor Affairs, Mr. Grimes served in Glasgow, Valetta, Port of Spain, Kinshasa, Brussels, Tunis and Paris (twice). He had several tours of duty in Washington, DC and a year of Labor Studies at Harvard University Mr. Grimes was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don Kienzle in 1996.

Kienzle: This is in 1972.

Shea: Oh you worked for John Condon.

GRIMES: Yes. That was interesting. That and my last assignment in Paris as labor counselor, those were my only two assignments that were purely labor. The others were a mix of labor and political.

Kienzle: That was in 1972. Do you want to describe the issues you worked on and your working relationship with John Condon?

GRIMES: John Condon didn't want an assistant. I was imposed on him. I found that out after I got there. He was courteous and nice, but he kept me in the back room. I didn't meet any labor leaders to speak of. He didn't want to waste his time trying to inform me or instruct me or coach me in this trade, so it just didn't make too much sense. I recommended that the job be abolished, and they did abolish it. They were having a cutback at the time anyway. I said, "My job is not essential so take it."

Shea: What issues did you deal with there?

GRIMES: Well, I didn't really deal with many issues. I was just a helper to John Condon. He was involved in some things like -- I don't know whether you remember the LIP watch factory. That was a big deal at the time because the CFDT was trying to take it over and make it a worker-owned thing. It never worked out, but that was the major issue that was going on at that time. Honestly, I don't remember much else that was happening. Of course, Condon was interested in keeping close contact with the left there. That brought him into some little friction with Irving Brown. As a matter of fact, Condon sent a group of journalists to the States on one of these leadership grants. Unfortunately, he let the Journalists Association decide who was going to go, and a couple of them turned out to be communists.

Shea: Did he have to get a waiver from...

GRIMES: Honestly I don't know. I don't know if they were card carriers or just sympathizers, I'm not sure.

Shea: Who did your officer efficiency rating?

GRIMES: Condon wrote mine. His, and later mine, too, were written by the political counselor, and then reviewed by the DCM.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe your impressions of the work of Irving Brown and the AFL in Paris?

GRIMES: I thought Irving Brown was one of the most interesting people and famous people I have ever met. I was impressed with that little office in Paris, that little two-man show they ran there and the kinds of things they were involved in. I give Irving Brown as much credit for turning the communist thing around as anybody else. He was instrumental in the help that got to the Polish trade unions. He never said much about it; he never said *anything* about it as a matter of fact, but you could see what was happening there. He was traveling east quite a bit, not into Poland, I guess, but he was seeing to it that the flow of machines did -- printing presses, Xerox machines all of that kind of equipment that was essential to what Solidarity was able to do. I think that is the best example I ever saw of the AFL-CIO encouraging democracy abroad. I forget the name of that program.

Kienzle: NED?

GRIMES: Is that what it is called?

Kienzle: National Endowment for Democracy.

GRIMES: Then they do a lot of other stuff that busts, but there I think he made a difference.

Kienzle: This would have been during your second tour in the early 80's. Did Irving coordinate at all with the Embassy or inform you of what he was doing?

GRIMES: Oh, no. He was very close about what he was doing. He was just sort of mildly interested about what was happening in labor in France. He knew everybody, and of course, everybody knew him. I think they thought of him as a CIA agent. A lot of them did; the people on the left did anyway. The Force Ouvrière, he had been very close with them. I don't know how he felt. He wasn't interested very much in the CFDT or the socialist side of things. He was interested in things he needed from the Embassy. If he needed transportation for Kirkland, or something like that, that is about the only time he would ask anything of me. I used to go around to see him frequently, maybe a couple of times a month, to see what was going on and to exchange information with him. He was very close, and I guess he had to be, with what he was doing.

Shea: Who was working for him at that time?

Kienzle: Is this the first tour or second tour we are talking about?

GRIMES: First tour. Jeepers, I really didn't have any contact with him in the first tour because I was in the back room. In the second tour, I can't remember his name, a Polish man. Anyway, he kept track of the union publications from Eastern Europe, that kind of thing. He had languages.

RICHARD SACKETT THOMPSON
Delegte, Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam)
Paris (1972-1974)

Richard Sackett Thompson was born October 1, 1973 in Washington. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Washington State University in 1955 and studied at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar from 1955-1957. Following his studies at Oxford, Mr. Thompson served in the U.S. military for two years. He later received a master's degree from Georgetown University. Mr. Thompson entered the Foreign Service in January of 1960. His career included positions in Aruba, Niamey, Saigon, and Algiers. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 25, 1994.

Q: Okay. You were in Paris from 1972-74. When you arrived, what was the status?

THOMPSON: Well, they were a kind of ritual that had been going on for at least a couple of years. There had been all that discussion about the shape of the table, but by the time I got there that had been settled. Of course, those sorts of issues are very important because they are symbolic. One side maintained that they were four-sided talks, and the other side maintained they were two-sided talks. So you had all these seemingly trivial issues like the shape of the table and the arrangements, etc., which really were symbolic of who was actually going to prevail and impose his view on the other side. They went to the heart of how the war would come out.

By the time I got there were these talks in the Conference Center in the Avenue Kleber. They were very ritualized with the exchanging of statements around a large table, then you had lunch, and then would come back for some rebuttals. There were four delegations for North Vietnam, the United States, The Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which was the puppet government that Hanoi had set up purporting to represent the South. Of course, the famous Madame Binh was the head of that delegation. You would come into the room and the first few minutes are kind of exciting to be sitting there with the North Vietnamese and Madame Binh. And then the speeches drone on and it becomes less exciting, especially as every speech had to be given in three languages. The procedures were set up that the Vietnamese would speak in Vietnamese, it would be translated into French and then into English. There was simultaneous translating so you could hear all three at the same time, but it still meant that every statement was made three times so everything was really dragged out.

Q: What were you doing?

THOMPSON: I was liaison officer in our delegation. This meant that I was the person authorized to talk to the other delegations to set up meetings, sometimes to exchange documents, and at times visit their headquarters to exchange documents or procedural proposals or something. If you stop and think this makes a lot of sense because you need to have a designated person as a contact point for the delegations. If someone else from the delegation called them they should ignore him or her. You could imagine a delegation with 12 or 15 people if anybody felt he could phone somebody from another delegation and start setting up meetings or passing papers, etc. You needed to have a definite point of contact for that sort of thing.

I did some of the reporting on the meetings and there was always a press conference right afterwards in the same location where the four delegations would take turns speaking to the press. I would do a reporting cable of what was said at the press conference. At the actual meetings, part of the arrangements was a big circular table and a small rectangular table on each side which sort of divided the big table into two sides. That was part of the proceedings. I sat at a small table and opposite me on the other side was the North Vietnamese liaison officer. His English, of course, was much better than my Vietnamese. When somebody started a speech we would exchange the text because they were all written out ahead of time to help your translators know what to say. So, he and I did certain things relating to our duties as liaison officers even during the meetings.

The whole point of these lengthy meetings was to make them last until lunch because the French would give a good lunch. Apparently in the early days, it had been a nice hot lunch, but as the years went on, it started becoming a cold lunch, but it was still very tasty. So, the object was to make sure you could go on long enough to get lunch. And then you would come back for a round of pro forma rebuttals and then go home.

Of course, behind the scenes, as revealed later, Kissinger was carrying on his secret talks. Now and then, in hindsight, there was a faint reflection of those in what went on in these more or less public talks.

Q: Who was leading our delegation?

THOMPSON: When I arrived, it was William Porter, who was a very respected career officer and who thereafter became briefly number three man in the State Department, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and then I forget if he retired or left with the change in administration or what. Anyway he held that job for a relatively short time. A very nice person. Very realistic. One of the relatively few high ranking people I heard that always spoke honestly and made sense. He was in the Phil Habib mold who always spoke directly and frankly and realistically. His assistant was Heyward Isham, another career officer who retired not long thereafter.

The next important development was in October, 1972 when Kissinger revealed the secret talks.

Q: What did that do to what you all were doing?

THOMPSON: It meant the suspension of the talks around the round table at Avenue Kleber and a couple of us were then taken from the regular delegation and brought into the Kissinger talks. I was brought in as a second interpreter. He had a very gifted interpreter, David Engel, who really spoke fluent Vietnamese.

Q: Where did he learn Vietnamese?

THOMPSON: Well, I think in the system. He was at the Foreign Service Institute and just a very gifted person.

I was pulled in to the delegation as sort of an additional flunkey to attend meetings. I don't remember exactly what happened, but basically what happened secretly was that the North had started to pull back from positions it had been taking before and that was when Kissinger revealed the secret talks in October. I attended one or two meetings then at houses in Neuilly, a suburb of Paris where we met with the North and they in effect were confirming that they were pulling back from previously agreed positions. There was one last meeting in early December at which Hey Isham was head of our delegation, all the top people having left already. Hey Isham and I went out to a Communist-sponsored meeting place on the outskirts of Paris and just ran down the list of issues and confirmed that they had pulled back on everything. This set the stage for the famous Christmas bombing of Hanoi, after the election.

Q: You say that they pulled back from previously agreed positions, these are ones that both sides had agreed to?

THOMPSON: Yes, in the secret talks.

Q: And then all of a sudden they just stopped?

THOMPSON: I can't remember. I am talking from memory. I am sure Kissinger has written about this.

Q: Were both sides looking over their shoulders at the battlefield at that time?

THOMPSON: No, they were looking over the shoulders of the American presidential election. And I suppose the reason they pulled back was because they saw that Nixon was going to win and they were not succeeding to influence the election by their maneuverings in the secret talks. The last meeting we held with them was after the election, I recall, in December, and they were still recalcitrant so we had the famous Christmas bombing.

There were two military officers attached to our delegation. During most of the time it was a general and a colonel, but towards the end it was a colonel and a lieutenant colonel. They had the best intelligence coming in from around the world to our delegation. During the Christmas bombing the North started shooting down B52s, the first time any were shot down. I can't remember how many were downed but from our intelligence we also knew they were running out of missiles so they would soon be totally helpless in the face of our bombing. Under the

influence of this bombing, which I think was intended to be close to Hanoi, somehow stray bombs not only strike the French embassy, but killed the ambassador's mistress, which is very unkind indeed. So, in early January they agreed to resume the talks, the secret talks which by then were not very secret because hordes of newsmen would follow Kissinger wherever he went.

Q: Did you attend these meetings?

THOMPSON: Yes. Some meetings were between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, and I would be there. As they started to make progress, they broke into two levels and Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would be working out the general agreement and Ambassador William Sullivan would be meeting with a deputy foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, who later became foreign minister. Bill Sullivan and Thach would be working out the protocols which were the details of application, how you set up inspection teams, etc. in a separate set of meetings. So there were two sets of meetings going on. The principals, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho might be meeting in one place and Sullivan and Thach in another meeting place. So I was the interpreter for the Sullivan/Thach meetings and David Engel would stay with Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Now and then I would be in one of the principal meetings. Maybe they would have to meet and talk to set some guidance for the secondary meetings and then the secondary meetings would resume.

Q: How did Kissinger and Le Duc Tho conduct their meetings?

THOMPSON: When the meetings first resumed in January, they were very frosty. The media, of course, didn't have much to go on but they set up cameras on raised towers 20 feet high so they could focus down inside the walls and see what happened between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Kissinger would arrive and knock on the door and somebody would let him in. Then after some days Le Duc Tho would come out and greet him on the doorstep and guide him in, and then he would shake hands on the doorstep and guide him in. So the newsmen judged by this how warm the talks were getting. As they started to make progress, at first you would have lunch separately. Then they started having lunch together making it a social occasion between the two delegations. And then Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would sit together and chat during the lunches. So the atmosphere gradually grew warmer as we made progress toward an agreement. By the time we got to the point where they were sitting together they were chatting together almost like old friends. You could tell that they were both very intelligent men, very dedicated to the interests of their respective countries and that there obviously was continuing reserve and carefulness even as they were seemingly chatting in a social way.

Q: Before going to a meeting, what would you and the support people on the delegation do? Would you sit around and try to figure out what you were trying to get from that particular meeting?

THOMPSON: I was not a substantive factor in this. Kissinger certainly would sit around and talk with Bill Sullivan; George Aldrich, his legal advisor who had been working on the negotiations for years; Bill Stearman, who I think is now on the faculty here at Georgetown and who was there with the NSC, about what they were going to get out of these meetings. I was not involved in that.

Q: You had been in Vietnam for a long time, did you find yourself being asked how such and such played with the Vietnamese, etc.?

THOMPSON: No, Kissinger and his substantive assistants had been dealing with the Vietnamese in these negotiations for several years and there wasn't anything a political officer from Saigon could add. They had been gaging and judging these people at the level they worked for years.

Q: At this point we essentially bypass the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong?

THOMPSON: That is very true. Of course, the PRG was only a puppet anyway, although Madame Binh tried to pretend she had a more serious role from time to time. We immediately briefed the South Vietnamese after every meeting. Kissinger usually sent Bill Sullivan to do that. Whether he told them everything or not I don't know. You will recall that at one point the issue arose that the negotiators had been working with English language documents and there was also a Vietnamese translation. We gave the South Vietnamese the Vietnamese version of the document and they said, "Well, look, in Vietnamese this says very different things than it says in English." We went back to the North and got some changes in the Vietnamese language to correspond more closely with the English. But they were somewhat shunted aside. I can't remember the exact sequence of the meetings, but I recall at one point when the agreement had been virtually finalized and we were preparing for a very formal international conference because there was sort of a guarantee statement that would be signed by China and the Soviet Union, as well as the four countries involved. There was an international conference with the foreign ministers of all the great powers for the first time in many years after World War II. They all came together in Paris to sign the document guaranteeing and recognizing the agreement on Vietnam. While the preparations were being made for this, suddenly Madame Binh called for a meeting around the old round table again. I remember I was meeting with Ambassador Sullivan and Thach in another room in the conference center to work out some final procedures for the formal signing while she had called this meeting. I can't remember what she was talking about, but anyway, our meeting finished and we came in to the other meeting and Thach was resuming his chair as head of the North Vietnamese delegation. Thach, the deputy foreign minister, walked behind Madame Binh who was talking to the group and stopped and made a choking gesture behind her where she couldn't see him and everybody else in the room laughed and he went on and sat down. This, I think, was pretty symbolic of how the North Vietnamese regarded the Provisional Revolutionary Government. They were nonplused when she called the meeting because this was not following orders.

Q: During this time did you form any relationship with your North Vietnamese counterpart, or were things still chilly at your level?

THOMPSON: Since we met together and chatted during the luncheons, of course, and I had my counterpart close to me at the general talks, so we chatted a bit about our families and other things, I felt there was a certain degree of personal relationship. At the secondary meetings between Sullivan and Thach working out the protocols, again you had the regular meeting at a table, which might be the dining room table in a house in a suburb, but then you would adjourn for tea after a while and Thach spoke pretty good English, although Sullivan and he could talk in French too, and they would sit off to one side and probably work on some of the details. Tea

breaks are very important in diplomacy as you know and that was certainly true of these.

Q: Did you stay until the end of the whole process?

THOMPSON: Well, even beyond in a sense. I am trying to remember when the Paris Agreements on Vietnam were signed. It was in late January, 1973. At any rate, once the agreements were worked out and initialed all the foreign ministers came together and had a big signing and cocktail party in this conference center at which the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam and Madame Binh clinked glasses and toasted peace...I remember at the same party I ran into a Soviet diplomat who had been posted five years in Hanoi and we talked for a half hour in Vietnamese, that was our common language. That was kind of fun.

One of the things that was set up by the Paris Agreements on Vietnam, was a joint economic commission between North Vietnam and the United States because we had undertaken a commitment in the agreement to bind up the wounds of war, which meant to give the whole of Indochina additional help. There was a secret promise, under Johnson, that was originally proposed to North Vietnam that they would get a considerable amount of assistance and this was confirmed in an exchange of correspondence between the prime minister of North Vietnam and Nixon that they would get, as I recall, \$3.25 billion over five years. The Agreements also set up a joint economic commission. So I stayed on in Paris as one of two delegation members who were kept on -- the other one was Bill Marsh, now US Representative to the FAO in Rome -- to staff this new delegation. New people came out from Washington to be substantive members of this delegation headed by Maurice Williams, then deputy administrator of AID, who is a very able man. On our delegation, only Maury Williams and I knew that Nixon had promised \$3.25 billion over a period of five years if the North Vietnamese would be good. This was a secret for several years. It finally became public a few years later.

So these meetings started taking place at two levels. There would be meetings between heads of delegation in which key issues were discussed. Of course, the North wanted us to hand them a check for \$650 million every year and they would know how to spend it. We were saying that they had to have projects and sign agreements for each project and have the full AID detailed treatment of each project. The North was saying that was ridiculous, etc. So, we worked out a set of principles which would guide the US assistance. In our general meetings with everybody from both delegations present we would be discussing our assistance on the basis of specific needs they had, the commodity import program, a statement of principles to guide the US assistance to North Vietnam (their principle would be hand over a check and ours would be all the usual oversight safeguards of an AID program). But after two or three months it was clear that they weren't abiding by the agreement. They were preparing for future war, so we broke off the talks.

In June, 1973, there was something called the June Communiqué. Things were breaking down so seriously that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho came back to Paris and had some additional talks and came out with a communiqué which to some degree modified the Paris Agreements and described how both sides would implement them. This joint economic commission came back and met again briefly, as I recall, in June and July. But the North was not observing various parts of the agreement from our point of view and we adjourned those talks and never met again. I think the world has not really noticed that joint economic commission ever existed, ever met, but

we were, of course, holding out carrots to the North Vietnamese to observe the Paris Agreements, which would have preserved an independent South Vietnam.

Q: When the Paris Accords were signed in 1973, how did you feel? What did you think?

THOMPSON: We felt that the North would probably take over the South in the near future. We were withdrawing our support from the South. Kissinger observed it, and the rest of us, that the South could not stand up and prevail since US support was gone, and Congress had passed a law forbidding any further bombing of Hanoi. These agreements would give us a chance to pull out our troops and make an honorable retreat. There was a lot of talk that Nixon could have had the same agreement four years earlier, but that is not true because the North had been insisting that we set up a coalition government with the current government, neutralists and communists in Saigon even before they would let us withdraw, which was absolutely intolerable. It was only in the negotiations of 1972 that they started to say, "Okay, you don't have to overthrow this government before you leave." So the South Vietnamese government which was our client stayed in place, we withdrew our troops, got our POWs back and were able to withdraw the American forces in some sort of order from Indochina, and that was about the most we could hope for really. We left with the government we supported still in place and with some perhaps small fighting chance to maintain itself, but we weren't very optimistic. So I think we all felt we had gotten what we could out of it and managed to negotiate a more or less honorable US withdrawal from this commitment to Southeast Asia, which obviously was not supported any longer by the American people.

Q: By the time the Peace Accords were signed were you watching Congressional actions as far as support for the war went?

THOMPSON: Yes, that was very clear. Even the hawks were giving up. Of course, then the fighting was resumed, there was the offensive in 1975 and there was a very key vote, and I can't remember how much the money was, perhaps \$300 million, on assistance to the South. By then even the hawks were saying that there was no sense throwing good money after bad, so even the hawks were not willing to vote money for Vietnam by 1975. You could see that trend developing already.

Q: When did you leave Paris after these economic talks had broken down?

THOMPSON: After these talks adjourned in July, Marsh and I were left there in charge of the delegation.

Q: This was in 1973?

THOMPSON: Yes. These talks had adjourned but in theory they could resume. Our delegation's quarters were very splendid because these quarters were a section of the American embassy in Paris which had been organized to house the US ambassador to NATO and his assistant. So they were very nice offices in Building B, as it was called, adjoining our embassy in Paris. It was just Bill and me in two very impressive large offices with large anterooms and a whole series of smaller rooms for other members of the delegation, etc. So we were kept on there I guess almost

indefinitely. Finally after a while I said to the Department of State, "There is nothing happening here, will you reassign me?" But by then my two years were almost up and they said, "Fine, we will do it." Ambassador Graham Martin asked me to come back to Saigon to be head of the external affairs unit in the political section. I left Paris I believe in February, 1974 and I arrived in Saigon in late February or March after some home leave in the States.

WILLIAM H. MARSH
Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks
Paris (1972-1974)

William Harrison March was born in Pennsylvania in 1932. He graduated from Cornell University in 1953 and from Princeton University in 1957 with an MOA after having served in the US Air Force. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 and served overseas in Saigon, Bangkok, Brussels, Paris, Geneva and Jeddah. Mr. March was interviewed by Lambert (Nick) Heyniger and Vladimir Lehovitch in 1997.

Q: Alright. We are now in 1972. You've been in Belgium for four years. You are due for reassignment. What happened?

MARSH: I managed to get myself assigned to the Delegation to the Vietnam Talks in Paris. It had been my dream for many, many years. I had four years of French in high school, taught by Parisians, by the way. I had always wanted to live in Paris and so I got myself that job. It was absolutely fascinating.

Q: Whom were you working for?

MARSH: Well, I was working really for the deputy chief of mission, who was Heyward Isham, of the delegation.

Q: Who was the chief of delegation? Was it Kissinger?

MARSH: The question is really which delegation because we had the public talks, the weekly talks, held at the International Conference Center in Paris and then we had the Kissinger meetings that were Secret, back channel, and held out in the suburbs. So it was a fascinating life.

Q: But you were with the official delegation?

MARSH: I was with both.

Q: You were with both. The deputy was Heyward Isham, the head of the delegation was?

MARSH: Oh, Lord. The last position was Bill...I can't think of his last name. He was ambassador to Canada. This is awful.

Q: Not Robinson?

MARSH: No...no...no.

Q: What were your duties with the delegation?

MARSH: Well, my duties with the public delegation to the public talks, is what I mean, was to write the weekly presentation. And to do such other tasks as were fitting with respect to the work, and to maintain liaison with the delegation of South Vietnam.

Q: About how many officers on the official delegation?

MARSH: On the official delegation we had a half dozen or so, I would say. We also helped one another out so I met with the weekly press conference after the meeting held in Paris in the International Conference Center. When David Lambertson, the press attaché, was away for one reason or another, I would take that. He would do my work, if I were away.

And then on the Kissinger Delegation I was a factotum who would do all the necessary and proper things to make sure that all the information possible reached Dr. Kissinger from all over the place. At first he was the Assistant to the President and later he was that and Secretary of State. Because you see after we signed the agreement in January of 1973 he came back for some follow-up talks a couple of times.

Q: And of course he was only there from time to time.

MARSH: That is correct. He was an extraordinary man...he is an extraordinary man, I shouldn't talk about him in the past tense.

Q: In what way?

MARSH: Well, in the first place, he is the quickest and most supple thinker I have ever encountered in my life. Just amazing. Time and again he would come up with something and all of us would ask ourselves now why in heaven's name didn't I think of that? It was so appropriate, so incisive and so original. But, still, we who had so much more experience on the ground should have thought of that sort of thing. But it was just that we were Salieri and he was Mozart!

Plus he had a sense of humor. I have always appreciated a good sense of humor, particularly when it is based on certain ironies and that is the very nature of the Kissingerian humor. The man used to break me up, quite unintentionally, every once in a while. Now he could be scathing. I have seen senior ambassadors of the United States reduced to jelly by some of his cutting condemnations and admonitions, just all aquiver, I mean really, literally. Again I was relatively young, well in my early forties, but my father always taught me not to take very much from public people unless you happened to be married to them or they were wearing a clerical collar or something of that sort. Neither condition applied to Dr. Kissinger so I would speak right back

to him, and he respected that. So we got along very well.

Q: So these negotiations then I gather were fairly continuous and ongoing, at least on the official side from '72 to '74?

MARSH: Well, you see what happened, after we signed the basic agreement we then held super secret negotiations on a program of economic aid for North Vietnam. Never publicized. I stayed on with a small delegation, very small, just two officers and one secretary...a fellow who worked for me and a secretary who served us both and yours truly... to act as a matrix for these economic negotiations. But at any rate in the Carter Administration, my Top-Secret NODIS cables were all declassified in one day. The amazing thing is they really didn't cause much of an uproar.

Q: I want to take you back to your work for the delegation. What can you tell us about your North Vietnamese and Vietcong counterparts? Who were they, how was their negotiating style different from yours?

MARSH: Well, in the first place, they didn't negotiate in any public forum at all, or even any closed forum. And they would never negotiate in the presence of the South Vietnamese. The interesting thing is they had contempt for the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, that is to say the Vietcong Delegation, and couldn't stand Madame Binh, who was the head of that delegation. So there were times when they refused to talk privately with us when somehow or other the Vietcong Delegation had gotten wind of the meeting and had come to the meeting. They would put it off... the North Vietnamese.

Q: Do you remember any of those meetings?

MARSH: Some of them. But the point is the basic courtesies and pleasantries were always absent. The only thing that they could talk about...very few spoke English incidentally. Some spoke French. The only thing they could talk about was the weather. I remember one time I had my two sons at the Arc de Triomphe, we were looking at the great ceremonial fire there. It was either on Armistice Day or near it, something of that sort, and I had taken the boys there and was telling them about World War I, and all of a sudden the North Vietnamese delegation shows up there! I would say a dozen had come out, all virtually in lockstep marching along. The only thing they could talk about was the weather. It was raining like the devil that day, the weather was absolutely ghastly, and the other topic of conversation was what was the weather like where you come from?

You know you don't get very far.

Q: Doesn't sound too thrilling!

MARSH: No. Now there were very few who were with that delegation, senior political leaders, and one trusted senior fellow from the Foreign Ministry and they could talk substance. But the rest of those forty staff, all aides and that sort of thing, would never engage on anything concerning substance whatsoever. Never.

Q: Did you ever have pizza brought in or chop suey and sort of have lunch together?

MARSH: Oh, yes, and those were chilly affairs and we tended to stay on our respective sides. We had bilateral talks out in the suburbs, quadrilateral talks in Paris, although we said it was two-sided talks, you remember that.

Q: It's sounding a little bit like what I imagine the talks between the two sides in the DMZ at Panmunjom are probably like. Very sort of set piece talks with statements being read but not really much sort of face to face negotiation.

MARSH: Actually there was negotiation but really it was Dr. Kissinger with a Vietnamese counterpart taking a walk and talking of things out of earshot and that kind of thing. There was a great deal of subtlety and the real breakthrough came after the North Vietnamese had surprised us by rejecting the terms we offered and calling off the negotiations in late 1972. They went back to Hanoi and the Christmas bombing resulted. That brought about their acceptance because they were so surprised. As a matter of fact the delegation's plane was landing at Hanoi Airport and the air raid siren went off and they ran into the terminal. A bomb came down and blew their plane to pieces, in front of their eyes. This apparently had a very strong effect.

Q: A very sobering effect. Wow! Anything else that you can think of that an historian would be interested in knowing about this negotiating period, from '72 to '74?

MARSH: The thing that I would emphasize is that it is very difficult to make comparisons between this and other negotiations. You mention Panmunjom, well, of course, there really hadn't been negotiations there. Not until very recently had the North Koreans undertaken the slightest kinds of talks with us about things. For forty odd years they were really messing with negotiations. With the Soviets it took a long time but ultimately, yes, you reached an agreement on strategic arms, something of that sort. But the point is that effort by President Johnson and his successors from '65 on just came to nothing. They were up against an absolutely implacable adversary there. The irony of the situation was that our policy of military restraint against North Vietnam, when finally abandoned, in Christmas of 1972, brought about the desired result. I don't see much revisionist writing to say, well, we should have lambasted them in 1964, '65. I don't see it. But you have to admit the possibility that it might have proven very fruitful.

Q: I want to twist your arm, Bill, a little. The United States has to negotiate with a number of what have appeared over the years as fairly implacable adversaries. I am thinking either of negotiating with the Soviet Union, of negotiating with the Iranians over the release of our hostages from the embassy in Teheran; I'm thinking about the North Koreans. I'm also thinking about negotiating with terrorists and hostage-takers who have this sort of extreme position that there will be no negotiation but just you do what we want or we kill the hostages.

Now you've had experience, you've had direct experience as a State Department negotiator dealing with another side that is very, very difficult to deal with. Have you got any sort of advice or insights or suggestions?

MARSH: First of all, I don't really regard myself as much of a pundit, Nick, when it comes to

these sorts of questions. I don't know what makes Saddam Hussein tick, and how you convert him into a reasonable human being. I'm prepared to believe it is an impossible task, and missions impossible are not exactly my forte. In negotiations, and I've had a lot of experience in negotiations because we have negotiated things in which I have been approached to participate in, such as keeping the PLO out of international organizations. I had lots of experience in that in Geneva and elsewhere. That involved a lot of negotiating and politicking. There is not really an awful lot of difference in my view.

But what's involved in negotiating and politicking, of course, is an exchange of interests in which both sides agree that in return for giving up something they will receive something and there will be an acceptable balance struck. When you are dealing with terrorists, these are be-all and end-all types, it seems to me, and it's our position that we don't negotiate with them. It's not their position. They'd love to negotiate with the United States because they would love the dignity of sitting down with the only super power and despite this Mutt and Jeff disparity in size and, frankly, in virtue, that they could be welcome at the same table with us.

I would want to emphasize, however, the crucial role that experience and prior knowledge play in crisis situations and in negotiations. The great thing that hurt us, it seems to me, in Vietnam more than any other thing, was that we didn't know anything about the place. We attempted to apply our leverage from outside without really understanding whether this would have the desired effect. The tragedy was, of course, the enormous cost for the utterly unacceptable ultimate results. That's the great tragedy of the thing.

Now I'm being a little hard on the Department, here, but let me just say something about the Belgium experience. I asked around, because you know we had travel grants that we could put out. We did have some cooperation from USIA, from USIS. I found the head of the youth movement in West Flanders, the Christian Democratic Youth Movement in West Flanders, simply because I asked some senior Christian Democratic politicians who, in their view, would be good people to send to the United States on leader grants. They directed me to one Wilfred Martens, who became Prime Minister many times over. I left in '72 from Belgium, and when I returned in '84, he was Prime Minister. This had some utility. I'll say no more.

Q: One final question that I just wanted to ask, get your opinion about. Some people feel that there are certain negotiating skills that some people possess and others don't and that there should be sort of a team of professional negotiators who negotiate from the United States no matter whether it is aviation agreements or hostages or ending a trade embargo or whatever. Now you have made the point already that you believe that people who go into negotiations should know as much as they possibly can about the context of the people you are dealing with. What do you think of this idea of sort of a small cadre of sort of permanent U.S. negotiators?

MARSH: Well, frankly, not much. And the reason is that each negotiation advances the current distinct interests of the United States, or is supposed to. Each set of negotiations has a different clientele of interests in the United States. Now State knows more about effective negotiation than anybody else does. I'm utterly convinced of that. Dr. Kissinger certainly knew how to rely on the Foreign Service for his various negotiations. Other Secretaries, I think particularly of Baker, belittled the Foreign Service and did not really make proper avail of it. But I think that was

exceptional. Secretary Shultz certainly knew how to use it and did frequently.

The thing is that the Department does not, frankly, enjoy the trust of an enormous part of the American population and particularly among some of the leaders of some of its most significant interests in the private sector. Thus I don't think that we can say we are double-jointed and will negotiate all these sorts of things. That won't wash. But on the other hand, what we can do is to chair, and usually do, chair negotiations and keep under control the various interests. I will never forget the one international conference, a United Nations conference, in which some members of the United States Delegation took the floor to attack U.S. policy. Stupefaction resulted from that, worldwide stupefaction! No one had ever seen anything like that before. A friend of mine, who was very versed in these things, said the purpose of the Department of State in international delegations is to provide adult supervision. And that is probably very much the case.

It would be very nice.

I would just like to amend what you said, Nick, to say that knowledgeable people from State should be part of each and every delegation. Besides, perhaps, having a State chairman of it there should be someone at the working level who really knows what he is talking about, who the other side is and that sort of thing. That said, we have to be prepared in State, I'm still saying "we" even though I am now retired. We have to be prepared at State to devote far more training and far more time in terms of assignments and so forth to crisis management, terrorists, negotiation, and all of these key things than we have ever shown an inclination to do before this time.

STEPHEN H. ROGERS
Counselor, OECD
Paris (1972-1975)

Ambassador Stephen H. Rogers was born in 1931 and grew up in Long Island, New York. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in India, France, the United Kingdom (England), Mexico, and South Africa, and an ambassadorship to Swaziland. Ambassador Rogers was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing in 1994.

Q: Your tour finished about 1972 and you went back to Paris.

ROGERS: Back to Paris and the OECD mission this time.

Q: Had the mission been there during your previous assignment in Paris?

ROGERS: Yes. I had very little to do with it at that point. I can't say that I was very enthusiastic about going to the OECD mission. Joe Greenwald was there at the time I arrived but left about a month later to become Ambassador to the European Communities. As a matter of fact we didn't have an ambassador for two years and the acting chief of mission was the Treasury

representative, Weir Brown, who had been there for many years and knew the business. I acted as his deputy for that time. At the end of two years the administration finally got around to replacing Joe with a businessman from Arizona, named Bill Turner. He was a very nice fellow, but was new to the business and it wasn't easy for him to get a hold of this very technical organization, so they sent Abe Katz to be his deputy. Weir Brown left at that point. So the third year I was under Bill Turner and Abe Katz.

Q: And then Weir Brown, who had come from the Treasury was replaced by another Treasury man?

ROGERS: Yes, but not at as high a rank within the structure.

Q: That was Ralph Korp wasn't it?

ROGERS: I think it was.

Q: He came from Rome.

ROGERS: Yes. Jim Ammerman was there then too. We had two Treasury people all the time.

Q: While you were acting deputy, what other responsibilities did you have or was it all coordination of the mission?

ROGERS: Well, it was partly that, partly personnel matters and coordination of Mission activities, but with special responsibilities for the trade committee, the energy committees, the manpower and social affairs committees. I did not have responsibility for the financial side of the OECD, the Economic Policy Committee and Working Party III, which were under the Treasury person there. But much of the rest...agriculture for most of the time I was there was part of my responsibility.

Q: I spent part of that period in Bern and I was spending a fair amount of time on something called the Executive Committee in Special Session which was where high level trade economic policy officials come together in fairly quiet ways periodically. Did you work with that?

ROGERS: Yes. That was a limited group. It wasn't all countries. I was there at the time that structure was set up.

Q: The OECD has been there a long time and still does good macro economic research, studies, coordination of AID programs. How would you assess the OECD, particularly looking at the period when you were there, but more generally both before and later?

ROGERS: I had had some background, of course, in my time in RPE, so I knew something about it. I think anyone who has had experience with international organizations knows enough not to jump at the chance of going back to such environments because there is so much talk and so much paper. But I also feel strongly that the OECD is a necessary organization. It serves to deal with some pretty basic problems in international economic and scientific and other relations. It

isn't a very exciting place and that is probably an advantage in dealing with these difficult subjects in a technically competent way. I can think of two or three examples, perhaps.

One is the issue that was brought up in Europe about US technological domination of the world - the technological gap. This had become a major political issue for some people. We were able to put that into the Committee on Science Policy in the OECD and deal with it through a series of specific studies on different areas to see what the situation was and to see whether in fact there was damage to the Europeans of the sort that would require some kind of action which presumably we would not like. I think that somewhat depoliticized the issue and controlled it. That worked quite well.

Q: Another aspect that I think is interesting about the OECD is the inclusion of Japan at a fairly early time. I think the OECD was the first regional grouping that Japan became a member of after the Second World War. The willingness of the Europeans, I think with strong American leadership, to have Japan be a part of the OECD was very much appreciated in Tokyo. I don't know if you had any experience with the Japanese at OECD or any reflections about the expansion of the OECD beyond Europe?

ROGERS: Well, it certainly was an interesting development when the European countries started expanding to Australia and New Zealand and then Japan. It made it the premier organization of developed countries on economic matters. I think the expansion was obviously necessary, to include Japan. Everything since then has shown that it was absolutely right. I don't recall that the Japanese took great leadership at my time there, but they did become active. They had people in the Secretariat and wanted to be active in that fashion.

There was another issue that I should mention that came up then, an issue with which I also had quite a bit to do with in RPE, and that was energy, the oil crisis.

Q: The oil crisis was about 1973.

ROGERS: It was the end of 1973 when OPEC announced that prices would rise. We thought it was a very big rise as of January 1, 1974. I say we thought it was a very big rise, but it went up a good deal more in 1979. The OECD was well placed to do a quick analysis of what the implications were of this great increase in the price of oil. Much of the month of December, 1973 was focused on this. It happened to be a time when Weir Brown was on a well-earned home leave so I was sitting in the Council for the US and was the principal high-level contact on these matters with the Secretariat and all. The Secretariat put out some analyses and policy papers that certainly impressed me at the time and as far as I can recall would still stand up well. They had to do with the implications for capital movements. They foresaw the massive transfer of capital to OPEC countries and the fact that this capital would have to be placed somewhere. Something would have to happen with it. This led through the years to tremendous lending through Western banking institutions during the critical times of the late seventies and eighties in the international balance of payments situation.

Q: Another thing that happened with strong OECD involvement as a result of the OPEC price increases was the establishment of the International Energy Agency.

ROGERS: Yes, that's right.

Q: Were you involved in that?

ROGERS: Yes. That happened in my third year there, or we were in the process of creating it then.

Q: Steve, let's break for today and pick up at this point at our next meeting.

ROGERS: Fine.

Q: Today is Thursday, August 4, 1994 and this is the second session of the interview with Ambassador Stephen H. Rogers which is being conducted on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. Steve, when we finished talking last week, you were talking about your experiences as counselor of the US delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris where you worked in 1972-75. You were talking about how the International Energy Agency got started. I wonder if there is anything else that you particularly wanted to cover from that time in Paris?

ROGERS: The five years that I had in Europe, that is the two years in London and three years at the OECD mission in Paris, occurred at a good time to be there in the sense it was a time of economic change and a certain amount of crisis and many major issues. To go back to the London time, in August, 1971 when President Nixon took major economic steps to protect the US balance of payments including cutting the tie to gold and putting a surcharge on US imports, it caused a good deal of consternation in Europe and in Britain in particular. Then going through the rise in the oil price on the first of January, 1974, that I think we mentioned before. And, in this period also, the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market, which raised issues and heightened issues in our minds, in particular about agriculture, but about other things too. So this was a time of tension, uncertainty and change. In some senses it showed the importance of the OECD, the fact that we had something like that in existence, well supported with a secretariat that was excellent in some fields, including fields of most importance here. I remember that following the announcement, late in 1973, by the OPEC countries of the increase in the oil prices that would shortly go into effect, there was this flurry of activity in the OECD and the Secretariat through the Christmas period and all, to try and analyze what the significance of this would be and the analysis, which I think I mentioned last time, seems to have held up as having been quite valid.

One concern that the Secretariat and the Organization expressed in particular was that countries, especially the developed companies, the oil importing countries that were most impacted by this rise in price of oil, would react in protectionist ways. So, the organization developed a trade pledge, that is a pledge that committed the countries not to take protectionist actions as a reaction to the rise in the price of oil. And that was something we worked on significantly, both in the development of the pledge and then in its renewal later.

Q: Was it initially for one year?

ROGERS: My recollection is that it was for one year. I remember the discussions of renewal while I was there too, so I suppose that means it was one year in each case.

Q: I have been reading a book called "The Cold War, A History," and one of the points it makes is that one of the good results, if you will, of the Cold War was a number of economic measures that served to strengthen and pull together the cohesion of the countries of the West. The OECD, obviously, was one of the important organs or institutions that brought together the industrial countries. Was that a theme or sentiment that you thought much about at the time you were there?

ROGERS: I think it was more something that we took for granted. I don't think it was explicit in our thinking. Rather the focus of our thinking tended to be protecting the continuing movement, the overall trend towards liberalization and opening up markets for goods and capital and all, against the rise in the price of oil. This was a period of adjusting to or toward a new international financial system, devaluation of the dollar in 1973, I guess it was.

Q: I think 1971 perhaps?

ROGERS: Well, there was August 15, 1971, but then in February, 1973 there was another action, and I can't remember just what it was, but it again disturbed people and we had to explain and defend the action. I mention that because looking through my notes I recall that I happened to be sitting in the Council of the OECD at that point and defending the action by the United States to our major trading partners.

Q: I suppose in retrospect one would have wished that when a major action like that were taken that there had been prior consultation, discussion in an organ like the OECD with our major trading partners. But in some cases that wasn't feasible, wasn't possible, wasn't even thought of, and then it became an important task of explaining, justifying, defending what had already been done after the fact.

ROGERS: All that is true and a little embarrassing on occasion, but the United States was and remains a large economy and has perhaps different responsibilities and requirements than other countries because of that reason.

Q: There was also some disadvantage when you telegraphed your intentions by consulting, by discussing because that has an impact, obviously, for certain parties who are involved in the market.

ROGERS: It gives a field day to speculators, among other things.

JOHN N. IRWIN, II
Ambassador
France (1973-1974)

Ambassador John N. Irwin, II was born in Iowa in 1913. He was a partner in a law firm for several years before he began his work with the government. He was the U.S. Representative in negotiations for the new draft of the Panama Canal Treaty from 1965 to 1967, Under Secretary of State in 1970, Secretary of State in 1972, and ambassador to France from 1973-1974. This interview was conducted by Gordon W. Evans on May 30, 1991.

IRWIN: I continued in State until the end of 1974, at that time there was a vacancy in the embassy in France and President Nixon asked if I wanted to go to France. He appointed Kenneth Rush as deputy secretary of state and I accepted to go to the embassy in France.

I had known in moderation France, but never intimately. Paris itself is such a beautiful city that it was a delight to be in. I found the French charming and hospitable. Often I would have Americans come to me and say that "I find the French so irritating" whether they were just passing in the street or what their experience in a shop had been. I would say, "Yes that is true, they can be, were and are, but you must remember that they can find Americans equally irritating from their perspective so we both have to recognize that we can irritate the other, so let's not let the irritation, at least from the American point of view, overcome our good sense and recognition of the vital role that France plays in Europe, and in much of the rest of the world, originally through its former colonial empire and then through its successful continuance of its friendly and sometimes paternalistic relationship with its former colonies. Anyway France has done a better job in keeping its good relations with its former colonies than perhaps the British have." Although I always thought that when they had colonies Britain ran them better than France, but that is one of those uncertain things that one never knows too much about.

Perhaps my first experience in France goes back to my days in the Defense Department. I traveled with President Eisenhower when we went to London, Bonn and Paris. At that time the U-2 had just been shot down over the Soviet Union, Secretary Dulles had died and Secretary Herter was Secretary of State. We were at a meeting of NATO in Turkey and I remember the incident well; we had just left NATO and were flying to Athens and this message came to Secretary Herter that the U-2 had been shot down. It was partially a result of that that we returned more quickly to the United States. There was a debate as to whether or not we should avow the U-2 or whether we should just keep silent on it, or say nothing about it as if it were not basically our aircraft. However the ultimate decision reached by President Eisenhower was that it be accepted as our airplane. As a matter of fact he gave out all the pictures that had been taken to show what it could take in Russia. The plane used to fly from Pakistan to, I think, Norway and then back and forth. It had made many successful flights, it could fly above what was thought to be the range of any then artillery or missile, but on the day that Gary Powers was flying it from Pakistan to Norway, whether the plane was low or the missile was higher than it was thought to be, it was shot down, and the pilot, whose name was Gary Powers, was taken prisoner. Later on he was exchanged for a spy [Colonel Abel] whom we had incarcerated over here.

That U-2 incident of course aggravated the relationship between Russia and the United States; Premier Khrushchev had previously visited the United States and there was beginning to be a softening of relationships, a least a little better relationship.

Q: *I think he went to your home state.*

IRWIN: Yes, he went to D'Estaing, California, several places across the country. A meeting between France, England, Russia and the United States had been set for Paris and that came just after the U-2. President de Gaulle was then still alive and in power. There was the assembly of the four heads of those states, but it was clear that the meeting that could have been profitable under the relationship pre-U-2 could not have continued in the atmosphere because of the attitude and indignation of the Soviet government. At that meeting I would say that although President de Gaulle has never been particularly popular with Americans, he generally was not popular with our military, at that time I thought he was very helpful to President Eisenhower in easing the situation at the meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. There was no question that de Gaulle, while trying to keep the meeting in even temper, was clearly in Eisenhower's corner.

Another incident of de Gaulle I would mention that I did not know about, but only heard about, but in that same line. Was in the Cuban missile crisis when President Kennedy had taken over. Later on our aerial photography showed missiles being moved into Cuba by the Soviet Union and it was at that point that President Kennedy faced up to Premier Khrushchev that they be withdrawn. President Kennedy sent emissaries to the European countries and show them pictures of the missiles and explain the background so that we would have the support of our NATO allies and they would understand what was going on. I have always been told that when the emissary got to President de Gaulle, President de Gaulle said, "You don't have to show me the pictures. Tell President Kennedy he has my support". So while I think that the French are always individualistic, they are always zealous and jealous of their so-called French independence, they are particularly keen to be sure their language remains pure and they can be mischievous when their people with their language are involved, you may remember when General de Gaulle visited Canada. When he left he said, "*Vive Quebec libre!*" which did not please the Canadian government at all, although it did please the French nationalists in Quebec.

My having left the State Department which brings us to our present topic. I might say that my only tie to the government since I left France was that I served on a commission to UNESCO under President Reagan. That was an interesting short term service.

Now in France it is difficult, both because of faulty memory and I have kept no records, I left them in the State Department and I failed to keep a diary. In my next life, if I ever have the opportunity, I will keep a diary. In preparing for this interview I asked two of my former colleagues in Paris, Dan Phillips, who is now ambassador to the Congo, and Hank Cohen, who was political counselor and is now assistant secretary for Near East and Africa, to remind me of principle issues. So what I say is more a measure of their memories than it is of mine.

My ambassadorship came at a time when France was moving into a new internal relationship as well as a relationship, perhaps, with its NATO allies and the United States. The transitional period in French politics was from de Gaulle to whomever was ultimately to follow, but the immediate transition was to President Pompidou. President Pompidou took office immediately following President de Gaulle's resignation and continued to the election of Giscard D'Estaing in

early 1974. It was clear that President Pompidou did not have the charisma and the wide appeal that General de Gaulle had, but he did have a sense of pragmatism, which I felt was very valuable at that time. In fact at the time of his death I felt that France lost at his early death, I think that if he had survived for a couple of more years it would have been better for the transition from de Gaulle to, as it turned out, President Giscard than as it was, his having died that early. But all was not easy with the Pompidou regime. He himself was a much easier man to deal with than General de Gaulle, partially because of his pragmatism and partially because he had been a businessman a considerable part of his life, he was a partner in one of the Rothschild operations. He was just a solid, fine individual, at least in my mind.

While he was in the Elysée Palace his primary assistant for foreign affairs was Michel Jubert and while M. Jubert was in the Elysée I found him always helpful. When I had problems and while we may have disagreed with a problem he was helpful. Then President Pompidou appointed him foreign minister and he moved to the Quai d'Orsay and from then on he was unhelpful. I have never quite understood the change, almost in personality, that occurred from Jubert leaving the Elysée Palace and then going to the Quai. Perhaps it was the issue, perhaps it was because he was in more true foreign policy charge of the issues. Other people have queried whether it was a sense of competition with the then Secretary Kissinger who had been in a comparable position with the Nixon in the White House before he became Secretary of State, whatever it was he did make quite a change. That does get on further than the issues to which I might speak.

During Pompidou's regime, his party, the UDR, the *Union de la République*, was losing strength. The center and center right and just left of center were gaining strength, and that was Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's *Republicains Independants*, along with other centrist parties, Servan Schreiber's Radical Party, called CD. They were moving towards becoming the primary political force, if you joined them all together in France. In the elections in early 1974 or you could say that the early elections in 1973 you could say that while the UDR, the Gaullist party, had the largest party in the Assembly, it no longer had an absolutist majority. It had to work with Giscard D'Estaing's *Republicains Independents* with the Radical Party and with the CD in order to have an absolute majority.

Q: This is a follow on of side one. I have the privilege of turning back to Mr. Irwin.

IRWIN: Thank you Mr. Evans. At the 1973 election in France in which the UDR Party one the largest number of seats but not an absolute majority the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand won a number of seats, I don't remember how many, but it was enough to be recognized as a small section of the parliament. Mitterrand almost immediately began to develop a relationship with the Communist Party, trying to get them to work together on socialist issues. This was displeasing to the United States and Secretary Kissinger was concerned and asked that the embassy make a demarche to M. Mitterrand to see if he would not break off from the Communists. The concern was that the Communists might through the Socialists develop too much influence in the overall two parties and therefor effect the relationship that France had with its allies. We made such a demarche, which M. Mitterrand did not accept and as ultimate political events showed, he was correct. You have to skip a few years until the election in which the Socialist won and President Mitterrand came to power. He brought the Communists into power with him but they steadily lost power in the French electorate and they went down from

something like fifteen to twenty percent or even a little more to down to under ten percent, maybe under five percent. So Mitterrand strategy of bringing them in and then encompassing them and smothering them, you might say, within his own party was successful both for his view and to a large degree for ours - I am getting a little ahead of ourselves for that happened considerably after. The consideration came much later than when he was a small party in the French parliament in 1973.

As mentioned earlier the de Gaulle government was almost fanatical in its desire to be independent, particularly to be seen in Europe and by the Soviet Union as not a dependent of the United States. It had a combined view of the United States, or rather, a schizophrenic view almost, on one hand it had certain resentments against the United States in theory, not in any particular issue, but just the concept of we being too powerful in Europe, on the other hand it recognized the importance of the military strength of the United States in back of the NATO allies. Any one who listens to this tape will know that General de Gaulle withdrew militarily from the NATO alliance, he drew his military forces out from under the military command of the NATO headquarters, however France remained a member of NATO, often that is misunderstood in the United States and people thought that France just withdrew from NATO. They only withdrew from the military arm of NATO. They would not have thought of moving away from the political side of NATO for that would have lessened their political influence in Europe. That is one of the key ambitions of France, to remain powerful politically in Europe and in the Third World.

In 1973 the United States had various objectives. One of them was to try to move the Gaullist government, the UDR government, then under President Pompidou to a more productive relationship with the United States, or at least a more open and less confrontational dialogue. For this purpose the embassy met at all levels with the French government. I would meet with President Pompidou, with Foreign Minister Joubert, with Premier Ministre Jacques Chirac, and later on Premier Ministre Chaban-Delmas and others while the staff of the embassy would be meeting with their opposite numbers in the Quai d'Orsay, or perhaps with the Treasury or with the Interior Ministry or whatever it may be. We tried to cover the whole gamut of relationships so we could find out what the French were thinking and doing throughout its government and report that to our government, and so that we could tell the various arms of the French government our views and thoughts, whether they were acceptable to the French or not. That is what we wanted to achieve, a dialogue, even if we disagreed, rather than the sense we had a difficult time talking to each other, which had existed under de Gaulle.

As well as meeting with the government, of course, we met with the other political parties, particularly with Giscard D'Estaing's party and the other centrist parties and with the Socialists. We would hope that our relationships that developed with the centerist parties would have been one of the reasons when Giscard came to the presidency in May 1974 that the United States was able to have good relationships with him to a much greater degree than it had with de Gaulle and considerably better than with M. Pompidou and M. Joubert.

Carrying on the same tradition with the Socialists we met at all levels with the Socialists. I had then M. Mitterrand, now President Mitterrand, to lunch at least once and to my memory he came twice and some of the younger Socialists were invited to visit the United States as part of the

USIA international visitors' program. This included certain men who became ministers later on under the Mitterrand government. M. Mitterrand did not speak English but was considered a French intellectual among the French intellectuals which was somewhat unique for a French politician just as it would be for an American politician. But you would have to say that M. Mitterrand had been an opportunist. One time he worked closely with de Gaulle in the early days, then he ran for political office under one of the centrist or conservative parties and did not do well. Finally he shifted to the Socialist Party and it was there that he came into his success, first in this modest way in 1973 and then later on as all of us know, as president of France. This is jumping to his presidency. During his first two years as president he put forward many of the Socialist theories as part of his government program. It was only after two years of in effect failure and watching the economy of France deteriorate substantially, that he switched from socialism and became quite pragmatic and went into a different phase which drew criticism over the past few years from some of his theoretical socialists, but some acceptance from the business community. They would now say that he is not as bad as they originally thought him to be or expected him to be. That does not say that most of the businessmen you meet in France would not say they would like to see the Socialists defeated in the next election. But at almost the same breath they would fear that there is no one on the horizon that could defeat them. Speaking today rather than as I should be talking about my embassy, I believe the Socialists could be defeated, and rather easily, but only if M. Giscard D'Estaing, M. Chirac and M. Barre, who are the three principle centrist or rightist who will all independently run for president, but none of them will succeed, if all of them were to get together, and say "We have agreed not to run, but will support so-and-so" they could pick out whomever they wished out of the center parties, then I think France would really have a chance for a new look. A new president who would defeat the Socialists, who would not be far right, but have the support of those three gentlemen who had power in the past politically and still have power, but not sufficient power. Again as many know M. Chirac has been an excellent mayor of Paris, but will not, in my mind, succeed in becoming president of France.

However, that may be wrong, but as we go back to the time of 1974 and de Gaulle and Pompidou, energy was one of our issues, there was disagreement. As you may remember, OPEC had recently been formed and the price of oil was rising because of the policies of OPEC. Secretary Kissinger wanted the United States to lead a bloc of the Western countries and take a tough attitude in the negotiations with OPEC. Pompidou and Jubert preferred to have a French-led dialogue with OPEC on behalf of the Western countries, including the United States. They argued that they had a special relationship with Arabs in contrast with the United States relationship with Israel which they felt would be disadvantageous with the Arabs. The combination would qualify France for the leadership. There was merit in the French position, but it also reflected their deep-seated resistance to U.S. leadership over Europe. They recognized US leadership in military affairs and leadership in other parts of the world, but they always strived to prevent a domination by the United States, at least what they considered a domination, of Europe even through NATO.

Foreign Minister Jubert took a harsh line against the United States also on the issue of the formation of the International Energy Agency. We strongly favored its creation. Kissinger pushed it hard with the rest of Europe and Jubert became more Gaullist than de Gaulle and was abusive both of the United States and its allies over the issue. In fact, he opened one of the EEC

Council of Ministers meetings at that time by saying to his European colleagues, *Bonjour Messieurs les traitres!* As an aside on M. Jubert, even with his anti-U.S. views at the time he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, his wife is an American and his child was at that time attending the American School in Paris. In the end France was isolated in opposing the IEA and as time went on Jubert faded from prominence when Giscard won the presidency. Throughout that period the embassy's mission was to present the U.S. views forcefully but diplomatically in the sense that I mentioned earlier, seeking a dialogue rather than just a confrontation.

In defense there were also disagreements between the United States and France. Some of them were the abstract differences arising from France's so-called desire for independence, but also there were concrete issues, such as the financial one of the replacement of aircraft by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. The issue was the U.S. F-16 pitted against the Mirage M-53. There was great political pressure by France on its neighbors and the U.S. too was trying to sell its airplane, although at that time and I think it is still largely the policy of the United States as the government generally kept out of economic issues of trying to persuade a country to buy a particular American product. We would speak generally to the ambassadors of European countries in Paris or other ambassadors would talk to the countries to which they were assigned, we did not exert the same kind of political pressure on the potential purchasers of an aircraft that France did, directly in support of its industry. That of course is true of most other countries.

The United States is almost isolated in its traditional distancing itself from the business of the United States rather than looking at the examples of the France, Japan, the Soviet Union and even Britain, all of whom support to a much greater degree their economic outreach than the United States has. I hope in more recent times, and in the future, the United States is moving towards more support of its private sector because so much of the world today is international economic competition. If the United States business has no support from the United States government and the other countries have support it makes it a much more difficult competitive environment for an individual American business, particularly a small business in the United States. That, of course, is personal opinion.

Another less publicized issue was the problem that arose from the visit of U.S. naval ships which might have nuclear weapons aboard to French ports. The United States never will state whether or not a particular vessel has or has not nuclear weapons, but it just in effect desires our ships to come ashore. The French did not object to our coming into port, but there was a difference of opinion as to the type of indemnity that would result if there were an accident, particularly a nuclear accident, when a vessel of the United States was in a French port. The French wanted to have any indemnity or fault decided by the French courts. The United States held that it should be subject to bilateral negotiations. It was not decided during my time.

With respect to the broader issues of NATO and *detente* and the EEC, by *detente* I really refer to the Soviet Union, at that time President Pompidou and Minister Jubert questioned what they called our over commitment to *detente* with the USSR. That had a certain irony to it because France over the years has looked to itself as the principle link to the Soviet Union for Europe, and itself would have liked to be the real representative for the Western group with the Soviet Union, and even helping the U.S. with the Soviet Union. Along with that there was disagreement on the *Force de Frappe*, the nuclear force of France which grew at the same time that the nuclear

force of England was growing. The United States never objected to the nuclear force in England and France, and it fact had helped at certain times, but it was not enthusiastic about it. The Soviet Union was, of course, opposed to it. So there was always an element of question in dealing with France about the *Force de Frappe*, any limited test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, who wished to include the French and British forces and the United States said, "We have no control over them." The Soviet Union was looking in effect for us to have the same type of control over the nuclear forces of France and England as they had over the forces they put into Eastern Europe. Of course, Eastern Europe had no nuclear forces of their own. So France was of two minds, as I mentioned earlier. They wanted not to have the U.S. in too great prominence and control in Europe, but they also worried that if the U.S. was pushed too far from Europe, isolationist sentiment might take over in the United States and it might weaken alliance because of the uncertainty of the military power being available from the United States.

So all through this thing you have this dual view. At the same time that these issues were occurring with France, and of course in different degrees on other issues with other countries, Europe was going through what possibly might be called a difficult phase. Revolutionary change was underway in Portugal with the ultimate end of the Salazar regime, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus had heated up, there was unrest in Spain and Italy which threatened the democratic underpinnings. At one time there was real concern about the Communist strength in Italy. Of course there was the civil war earlier in Spain and then there was the domination of Franco, and in Italy there was the Communist potential. One was concerned with the future of Spain. Although no one probably remembers it today, there was often discussion in the press and among the commentators who had to look for something to say in their columns, about the Finlandization of areas of Western Europe or all of Western Europe. That disappeared in time, but there was a period when that was of concern.

As a result of all this France did begin to show a degree of greater flexibility in its role towards NATO. The French attitude toward NATO loosened in the sense that it began to cooperate in small, low visibility steps, such as in planning, logistics, more information sharing, joint exercises of our forces even though they maintained independent control of their forces, and that type of military issue in which they could cooperate without appearing to reduce their political independence or their separation of military force. Still it represented a giant step away from de Gaulle's attitude which was perhaps best stated or symbolized by his contentious statement that France nuclear arms defended France from aggression coming from both the East and the West.

Another side of closer French-U.S. cooperation on Europe resulted from a U.S.- EEC agreement to share information and consult as the community developed common foreign policies. This arrangement was originally opposed by France, they were reluctant to reach an agreement but such an agreement was worked out by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Jubert. The French honored the agreement when it came the time for a Frenchman to be the head of the EEC because it was under each presidency that the president would enter into the discussions with the United States, normally of the embassy in the country which held the presidency of the EEC.

When Giscard took over there was more cooperation. As Pompidou had begun to move away a degree from de Gaulle's firm position, Giscard moved considerably further and was cooperative, and even worked well with the United States. During Giscard's period he initiated a North-South

dialogue. The United States was not particularly enthusiastic about that because it felt that it would result on a greater demand on U.S. resources through aid. But we agreed to it and went along with Giscard with it . Similarly Giscard came up with the idea of an economic summit with the Western countries - that started at the time I was in Paris, but finished thereafter a couple of years later. Not much was done through the embassy. It was largely done by Mr. George Shultz, who was sent as a special, almost a secret, envoy by Dr. Kissinger to work with the countries of Western Europe.

Economics and trade has always been an issue, or potential issue between France and the United States. They support strongly their own agriculture and do not wish to be undersold by any other country, certainly not by the United States shipping large quantities of grain which we have often for sale at a lower price. They were concerned about the floating of the dollar, which - I forget the exact time it went off the gold standard - but it occurred while I was in France. If the dollar seemed to be too high the French criticized the United States for undermining French economic stability; it is was too low they were apt to charge we were dumping cheap goods on the French market and competing unfairly with their industry. That of course remains a perennial issue and still is one of the facts involved in GATT today and will be involved even more so if we succeed with a free trade agreement with Mexico, the United States and Canada.

The Middle East was always an area of contention. Secretary Kissinger at that time was taking a step by step approach to the Middle East. The French preferred an international conference which they felt that they could have more dominance in politically because of their position, not only within Europe, but because of their previous position and relationships with the Arab world. Because of that Jubert gave great support to Arafat and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] supporting, as a modest example, Arafat's request to address the United Nations. All of which was irritating to the United States and we, of course, differed frankly with them. The degree which we succeeded to any leadership in the United States, the difference in feeling can be recalled in a comment that M. Jubert made when he spoke of the United States leadership in the Middle East peace process as a humiliation for France. That seems from our point of view a rather narrow, individual view, but anyway that is what his statement was. The embassy's mission was damage limitation and using diplomacy and dialogue rather than confrontation.

In the negotiations to end the Vietnamese war France was very helpful. Most of the negotiations took place in France, secretly by Secretary Kissinger himself dealing with the Vietnamese representatives in France. The embassy had practically nothing to do with that as it was directly out of Kissinger's office when he was National Security Advisor and later, of course, when he was Secretary of State. Again the duality of the French views came forth, some circles in France were happy to see the United States humiliated in Vietnam, others were concerned because they knew that it was essential for a strong Europe to have strong outward looking America who would be willing to cooperate with Europe and not retreat into isolationism, which Europe remembers as a former strong feeling in the United States, certainly at the beginning of World War II.

I spoke earlier about President Giscard d'Estaing's approach being less ideological, but even there he had certain inhibitions because Jacques Chirac was a strong Gaullist and he was his prime minister. All of that limited to some degree Giscard's ability to move away from the

Gaullist doctrine although he and his foreign minister, became the architects of what could be termed a more benign foreign policy towards the United States and towards the world and accordingly our relations improved.

The embassy in other contexts continued to work with France, criticized French views but presented French views to the United States in a way we could understand the French point of view and not just as a confrontational issue. We tried to oppose voices in Washington that appeared to be confrontational and looked at French views of the French government primarily with pretension and ambition other than trying to get a working agreement together. We tried to point out to both sides that we were in favor of a strong France, economically and militarily, because it would complement the United States' power, not only in NATO and Europe, but throughout the world. That was the approach that Giscard and the U.S. administrations following the time I was in Paris really adopted and worked quite well together with.

There were other important, but less political issues, one of which, for example, dealt with culture. France always was concerned and perhaps upset that after World War II much of the modern painting world, the center of it, shifted to the United States, away from the traditional situation where Paris was the center of all the art world. Now whether that is going on today, there is some question, whether in the 1990s it is shifting partly back to Europe, partly back to here. There was one incident dealing with a painting that the National Gallery was purchasing from a Frenchman. I had Frenchman who had been in what would have been comparable to their supreme court call me as an independent position, he was not calling as an official of France, but calling because he was concerned about the National Gallery purchasing this very fine French painting. He asked me if I could not persuade the National Gallery to take another painting rather than this particular painting. Fortunately I could disavow any part of what the National Gallery was doing, or any influence on it.

But there are elements in France that carry their position not only in the political, military and economic world, but also in the cultural and aspects of business and the media. I think in essence the view in France really remains much the same that it always has, the desire to perpetuate the French language as a beautiful language used throughout the world wherever it has been used and a desire to remain a strong influence in Europe and always looking askance at the United States if we appear to be too dominant in our relationships with NATO or the EEC. It will be interesting to watch the next decade of the 1990's to watch what happens to our relationships in Europe as a result of the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

ROBERT M. BEECROFT
Staff Aide to Ambassador Irwin
Paris (1973-1975)

While Mr. Beecroft served as Political Officer at a number of posts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, his primary focus was on Political/Military Affairs, both in Washington and abroad. Later in his career he served as Special Envoy to the Bosnia Federation and subsequently as Ambassador to the Office of Security

& Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operating in Bosnia & Herzegovina. A native of New Jersey, Mr. Beecroft served in the US Army and studied at the University of Pennsylvania and the Sorbonne in Paris before joining the Foreign Service in 1967. Mr. Beecroft was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

BEECROFT: To the last place I expected: Paris. Amazing story. I had met a guy at a reception in Washington before going out to NATO in 1971, a lawyer named Scott Custer. I did not know that I had made any kind of impression on him, but it turned out that Custer was the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, John N. Irwin II. Well, in 1973, Mr. Irwin was named U.S. ambassador of France. They were looking for a staff aide. Scott Custer remembered me. One day I got a phone call out of the blue: this is the office of the U.S. ambassador in Paris, and we're wondering if you would care to come here to be the Staff Aide to the Ambassador. Gulp. This took about two milliseconds to consider. That summer we were off to Paris.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

BEECROFT: '73 to '75.

Q: What was Ambassador Irwin like?

BEECROFT: He was an exceptionally kind, decent and upstanding individual, as well as subtle and smart on the issues. He had been Deputy Secretary of State during the first Nixon term, and was a major contributor to Nixon's campaigns. In early 1973 he became Ambassador to France. He was born in Keokuk, Iowa, where his family lived for generations. His grandfather was governor of Arizona Territory in the 1890's. They kept a souvenir -- a ranch of about 200,000 acres outside of Prescott, which we later visited. He went to Yale Law School and had become a senior partner in a major firm in New York, to which he returned to afterwards. When he went off to Paris, he naturally assembled a front office team a team, and Scott Custer recommended me. So Mette, Christopher and I moved to Paris in the summer of 1973. It was my first assignment in an embassy. Gulp. The only embassy experience I had had was poking around the embassy in Brussels now and then, and that was of course much smaller and didn't have anything like the cachet or scale that the U.S. Embassy in Paris had. Mr. Irwin was a forgiving man, and in my case he had to be because I was learning as I went along and very much an introvert. He was a quiet, thoughtful person who never, never raised his voice. But he was always on the issue, and he was always asking probing questions. Scott Custer was in many ways what Mr. Irwin was not. He was sharp-tongued, outgoing and aggressive. While working for Mr. Irwin in Washington, Scott commuted to work on a Harley-Davidson. I can't imagine Jack Irwin on a Harley-Davidson. I can imagine him on a horse, though, because he was a superb rider. Working for him was a pleasure. What was interesting though was that this was at the very beginning of the Watergate affair, and here was a man who had been very close to and supportive of Richard Nixon. He was mortified.

Q: Did he get involved, I issued a subpoena to one of the _____ treasurer, Tom Pappas in Athens and I was consul general there. Did Irwin get caught up in this at all?

BEECROFT: Only later and indirectly, but I can share two anecdotes with you. He got a letter one day from Julie Nixon. Mr. Irwin had brought with him a woman with him as his personal assistant. She had worked for him in the Deputy Secretary's office, and you never, ever wanted to cross her. No one trifled with Velma. She had an unsettling way of smiling with everything but her eyes. Nothing got past her. We got along very well, and we relied on each other a lot. That day, I heard her saying, oh my goodness, oh my goodness. The letter from Julie Nixon to Ambassador Irwin said, "I hope you have read the article that I just published in the Reader's Digest, supporting and defending my father the president. I know that as a loyal supporter of the president you will want to support him at this difficult time." I can still see Mr. Irwin shaking his head as he read the letter.

The other one I remember was a letter he got signed, by Walter Annenberg, who at that time was the Ambassador to London. This letter was addressed to Mr. Irwin on Embassy London stationery, and it began with "Dear John." This raised eyebrows, because Annenberg knew very well that he Mr. Irwin always went by Jack. The gist was similar: Now is the time to stand up for the president. I know that you will join me, etc. -- the same kind of message. So Mr. Irwin got in touch with Annenberg and said, "I got your letter." Annenberg replied, "What letter?" It turned out the letter was on bogus Embassy London stationery and had been drafted by Charles Colson. You can imagine how well that went down. Now, here are two very heavyweight political loyalist ambassadors who are basically being used by the White House. So they kept their distance. That was the spring of '74, when Georges Pompidou died.

Q: He was the president of France.

BEECROFT: President of France. The heir apparent to de Gaulle. President Richard Nixon came to the funeral. I do not know whether there was ever a discussion between them, between Nixon and Irwin even had a private discussion on that trip. I do know that I was the control officer to the Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Henry Catto. We were together at the Cathedral of Notre Dame for the funeral, in morning coats. Catto was -- still is -- a big, tall Texan, a really delightful, politically astute man. So we're in Notre Dame and there's Nixon sitting next to Pierre Eliot Trudeau, and Nixon looked awful -- heavily made up. This was a clearly a man under enormous strain. The contrast with Trudeau made it that much more striking. What was really funny about that event was that after the mass, Catto and I went out of Notre Dame at high speed, only to see Nixon's motorcade already pulling out. Here I am, with the State Department Chief of Protocol, in tails on the porch of Notre Dame, and no motorcade. So he looked at me and I looked at him and he said, "Well, what shall we do?" And I said, "Well, let's take the Metro." So we did. We had a great time. We rode the Metro dressed in tails, and both loved it. We got back to the Embassy just as the motorcade did. It was one of those things you never forget. Ambassador Catto is Chairman of the Atlantic Council now, and we still laugh about that adventure.

Q: Let's talk about Embassy Paris.

BEECROFT: Yes.

Q: Here '73 to '75.

BEECROFT: Yes.

Q: What was the embassy like?

BEECROFT: The Embassy was a very heady place to be. It had real clout in Paris. France was as always a difficult partner -- some would say partner -- but it was seen as essential.

Q: You're putting a question mark after partner?

BEECROFT: Yes. Remember 1973 was the "Year of Europe."

Q: This was Kissinger's idea.

BEECROFT: Yes. Henry Kissinger had decided that the beginning of the second Nixon term, which at that time no one thought would be abbreviated, would provide an opportunity to rein the Europeans in and get them back in line. Kissinger started out with the intention of building a strong and effective relationship with Michel Jobert, who was the French Foreign Minister. Of course, at that time there were no e-mails. Cables were the medium of choice for diplomatic communications, and it was still rather unusual for a secretary of state to phone a foreign minister directly. We even still had things called the despatches.

Q: Oh, yes.

BEECROFT: Remember the old forms? Anyway, it was the Year of Europe and the Embassy was the message-bearer and in many ways the interlocutor. Mr. Irwin would go see Jobert, and he would bring messages from Kissinger and convey the responses back to Kissinger. I well remember the curve of the relationship between Kissinger and Jobert, because it was so remarkable. The message salutations started out as Dear Mr. Minister, Dear Mr. Secretary. Then, as the ice began to thaw a little bit -- because Jobert was a very prickly guy -- it became Dear Dr. Kissinger, Dear Mr. Jobert. Then by midyear, it had advanced to Dear Henry, Dear Michel. By the end of the year, it was back to Dear Mr. Secretary, Dear Mr. Minister -- full circle. Jobert was a complex man. He was brilliant, cynical, suspicious of U.S. intentions, and had a withered arm. He had grown up next to the ruins of a Roman city in Morocco. There were a lot of chips on this man's shoulder. He was also a superb novelist. His books are beautifully written in classic French. He was very confident of his own intellectual acumen and he wasn't about to be abashed or awed by Henry Kissinger.

Q: Was this a time I mean I guess there was always a time, but was there a particular thing about in various efforts of the United States to do this or to do that where the French were weighing in on the other side and screwing things up?

BEECROFT: The Year of Europe raised a lot of questions and a lot of eyebrows. For the French, every year is the Year of Europe and they couldn't understand what we had in mind. So I guess the answer is yes, our declaration of the Year of Europe raised their suspicions.

Pompidou may have been mortally ill, which virtually no one knew, but he was no fool. He and

Jobert were very much on the same wavelength when it came to the U.S. Mr. Irwin spent his time trying to reassure two very suspicious people, Pompidou and Jobert, about what the motives were. Where security and defense issues are concerned, the French saw the Year of Europe as an attempt to either isolate them or get them back in the barn. They weren't about to be isolated, because they were leading the charge on the formation of a stronger European Union, and they weren't about to go back into the NATO integrated military structure either. They would always point out, as they still do today, that they are faithful and loyal members of NATO and that they're one of the largest bill payers in the alliance, which is true. What rankled Washington was that they chose to opt out of the integrated military structure. If you raise this, the French will ask you a very simple question: find me one reference to the integrated military structure in the North Atlantic Treaty. There is none. It's a political agreement. The French were not about to be trapped on that. That's what it was like to be at Embassy Paris in 1973-74. The atmosphere was prickly and was suspicious, but Mr. Irwin was a charming man and that made a huge difference. He had brought with him to Paris several hundred of his own paintings, a world-class art collection, Manet, Monet, Pissarro, you name them, all the impressionists, plus a fabulous collection of art from the American West. Mr. Irwin favored an artist named called John Chumley, who painted many rural American vistas. He also had several Remington sculptures. The French appreciated his exquisite taste and his love of the arts. Such things will open doors in France. He gave the most wonderful dinners and receptions. The Ambassador's residence in Paris is an old Rothschild mansion on the rue du Faubourg St.-Honoré. It's a glorious building with French doors – what else? – that open onto a beautiful lawn and garden in the back, so when the weather's good you can have receptions outside. He used the Residence to the hilt.

Q: You mentioned the foreign minister, I want to use the “intellectuals”. Were they a group that were considered important at the time and did Irwin make overtures to them?

BEECROFT: Oh, he did more than make overtures. I mean, he would make it a point to include intellectuals and artists at his various events. He knew what the pressure points were and where the real levers of influence are in France. I remember a reception he gave once in honor of the Alvin Ailey Dance Troupe, which had been performing in Paris. Alvin Ailey himself was there. Literally hundreds of the great lights of Paris were there. You could see people walking around the Residence, looking at the paintings, looking at the sculptures and they would come forth with that cliché you always hear from Europeans when you don't fit their stereotype: “But he is not a typical American.” My response would always be, “What is a typical American?” .

Q: How did you find operating there because sometimes an ambassador's aide is a pain in the ass to most of the other people. You're running around and sort of a low ranking low squirt demanding papers and doing this sort of thing. How did you find this worked?

BEECROFT: I think it was Debussy who once said of the music of Wagner that it had its good moments and its bad half hours. The good part was that you were operating in that quite heady environment. I can remember once getting the Admin Counselor so mad at me that he wouldn't talk to me for a few days. But I was carrying out Mr. Irwin's guidance on a point that clearly mattered to him, or I wouldn't have done it. You had to be persistent. You had to ask uncomfortable questions. You had to do what the Ambassador could not personally do.

By the way, those were the days when the front gate of the Embassy was wide open. I used to drive into the front courtyard every morning, swing around to one side and park my car in the Embassy basement. You didn't have to show any ID; you just drove in and parked. Try that now.

I found that as time went on and I learned the trade, it was important to have one or two allies in each section, whether it was the Political Section or the Economic Section or the Admin Section or Consular or USIA or the Defense Attaché's office, someone you could pick up the phone and call discreetly. That way, you could often avoid raising eyebrows. People tended to what the Ambassador's aide was poking around about this time. Mr. Irwin was a man of many parts. Having worked at a high level in Washington, he knew his way around. He was always asking questions. He wanted people to come in and talk. Allen Holmes was one. Allen was the Political Counselor when I arrived, and we are still friends. Hank Cohen succeeded him. They are both consummate professionals, and Mr. Irwin was asking them questions all the time.

Q: How well, how important was it with the sort of the political world of France, you know, I mean the communists were always hovering. At this time Eurocommunism was considered to be a threat.

BEECROFT: Oh, yes. The one French political party that Mr. Irwin didn't have much to do with was the French communist party. I don't think George Marchais ever came to the Residence, but the Political Section talked with people all over the political spectrum. After a year in the ambassador's office, I joined the Political Section. That was the usual progression for the Ambassador's Staff Assistant: after a year you would go into a line office. At that point, I had never served in a line office in an embassy. I'd been deputy POLAD at SHAPE and Staff Aide in Paris. I wanted to get to do some substance. As Staff Assistant, I felt I was losing the ability to read for content – you skim everything. Because I spoke good French, I went to work in the Internal Political Unit, which consisted of three or four people. Each one took part of the French political spectrum. I did the Right and the Center. At that time, the Far Right was a joke. It isn't anymore.

Q: What about Jean-Marie Le Pen?

BEECROFT: Oh, he was around, but he just wasn't taken seriously. His daughter, who is his de facto successors, was at that time a teenager. We had one officer who did only the left, a colorful guy named John Dobrin, you may remember him. Joe Presel – later Ambassador to Uzbekistan -- and I worked together on the right and center. And there was a fellow named Mike Davis, a wonderful person who not long after, while still a young man, had a stroke that effectively ended his active career. Joe had a crush from afar on Princess Caroline of Monaco and had several photos of her on his office wall.

Yes, internal political affairs in France were seen by Washington as important, which is why we had four people covering them. We were expected to be out and about. I spent that year regularly visiting various party headquarters and attending political conventions. In addition, the French have a tradition of political clubs. These are like less tightly knit political organizations that lean in the direction of one party or another, but are normally independent. Michel Jobert founded one while he was Foreign Minister. I also developed contacts in the various ministries who watched

or were affiliated with the parties. I went to the political conventions of the Gaullists and the Liberals – Giscard’s party. It was a really fun job. Oh, and I also got to know some good restaurants, because you taking a contact to lunch was a regular part of the job. The Internal Unit made book on all the good restaurants.

Q: What was the attitude, it wasn’t your particular sphere, but what was the attitude toward the socialists? I assume Mitterrand was there. How did we feel about the socialists?

BEECROFT: Yes. There was a lot of concern, because at that point the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was still new and still largely untested. There had never been such a thing as cohabitation. There was a lot of uncertainty about whether cohabitation could work.

Q: You better explain what cohabitation means.

BEECROFT: Okay. The French Fifth Republic constitution, as promulgated in 1958 by de Gaulle, allows for the possibility of a president from one side of the political spectrum and a prime minister from the other side. When this happens, it’s called cohabitation. At that point, it had never happened. Now, the first sign of change came when I was there, when Giscard, who was not a Gaullist, became president. So Giscard, being a centrist and not a Gaullist, had to cohabit or cohabitate, I don’t know what the English is, with a Gaullist prime minister – Jacques Chirac, no less.

Q: Well, I mean was there that much difference between the Gaullists and the centrists?

BEECROFT: A centrist like Giscard didn’t necessarily consider being president of France as being the keeper of the flame of French nationalism. He tended to be more in the Jimmy Carter mode. By contrast, the Gaullists, de Gaulle considered it almost unpatriotic to be not a Gaullist. As for the socialists, there was a sense in France, shared to some extent in Washington that if they ever gained power, France would be on the slippery slope to communism. But people didn’t reckon with the cleverness of Mitterrand, and his determination to neutralize the Communists. Mitterrand, in fact, was not really a known quantity. In 1978, three years after I left, the Socialists came very close to taking power, but failed. This produced a lot of unease in Washington. When the Socialists actually did take power four years later, no one was sure what to expect.

Q: What about when you were there covering the right.

BEECROFT: Yes.

Q: Were you looking at sort of the scandals that have come out. I mean there was an awful lot of money sloshing around in this political system unlike except that the American system doesn’t have.

BEECROFT: Perish the thought.

Q: I mean Chirac has got real problems about when he was mayor of Paris.

BEECROFT: But nothing really happened.

Q: You know there was money coming out of the former colonies and all that. Was this something that you were looking at?

BEECROFT: Not really. I think at that point, even more than now, the French establishment has a way of locking these things down tight. There is the inside and there's the rest, and once you are on the inside you're exempt. Chirac, even then, was very much on the inside. He had been Pompidou's executive assistant -- chef de cabinet. Pompidou called him "mon bulldozer." Chirac was the go-to guy. You needed something done, Jacques would get it done. After he fell out with Chirac and left the Prime Ministry, he became mayor of Paris. By the way, being mayor of Paris is the second most powerful job in France after the president. The mayor of Paris is more powerful than the prime minister.

Q: Did you get a look at the French system and the high schools? I always avoid using French pronunciations because I never used it, although I studied it. In a way it's an establishment when you were there, there was an establishment and it was very pronounced.

BEECROFT: Still is. It's a little bit more tolerant and open now. You're referring to what are called the "grandes écoles" -- a half-dozen state-run university-level schools which are separate from the regular university system. That's where the intellectual élite are formed. They are considered (and consider themselves) for the rest of their lives to be something quite special. You have the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, or Sciences Po. You have the Ecole des Mines, literally the school of mines, which is actually the MIT of France. There are a half dozen others, including the Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, or ENA. If you don't go to ENA, you won't get to reach the top of the French bureaucracy; it's that simple. And those are prestige jobs in a bureaucratic state like France.

Now, obviously most French students are not accepted by those schools, so there is a set of inbred expectations, which are there from the outset. We at the Embassy were dealing regularly with products of the grandes écoles, because these people often go into politics, all across the spectrum, from far left to far right. They also enter the world of finance, banking and economics. This is the club.

Q: Did you find when you were there the French were trying to figure out, you know the Americans for the British and the French are hard to figure out because with the British you've got this class system, things are changing, but with the French the school system and all. Did you know who's who and who is coming up and somebody can come up from university and really be very capable and move well up in the system.

BEECROFT: That's right.

Q: This must confuse the hell out of them.

BEECROFT: I think it confuses them a lot more than it confuses us. It's easy to understand a

system that is more structured, like the French, but the kind of social mobility that we take for granted, they don't take for granted. Even now, for example, ENA, or at least part of it, has been moved to Strasbourg. You can't imagine the protests when that decision was taken. There's still a feeling that if you're in Strasbourg you're somehow not as relevant as if you're in Paris. Everything in France is centered on Paris. As a student, when I went to Paris from Strasbourg for weekends occasionally, I would be sort of snickered at because I had acquired a marked Alsatian accent. That was when I realized that the French reputation of being hostile to foreigners is oversimplified. First of all it's not the French, it's the Parisians. Second of all, they're not hostile to foreigners, they're hostile to anybody who isn't a Parisian. If you come from Strasbourg, Bordeaux or Marseilles and speak your brand of French in Paris, you're just as likely to be laughed at as if you come from New York or London.

Q: As you're looking at the rightist parties, was there an anti-immigrant or was there even an immigration problem? I mean today this is probably the major one coming from North Africa and farther south in Africa from particularly Muslim countries. Was this a concern at the time you were there?

BEECROFT: Not to the degree you see today. First of all there were fewer Muslims in France than there are now. Second of all, there was a very strong and vivid memory in France of the Algerian war and the wave of *pieds noirs* -- refugees from Algeria who had left for France. The *pieds noirs* were generally angry and resentful at the Algerians who had overcome them. But the immigrants, Muslim or not, hadn't yet shown up in such numbers in France itself.

Q: You were there at a time when we essentially pulled out not rather ignominiously from Vietnam. How did that play? Was it sort of rejoicing, schadenfreude or the equivalent?

BEECROFT: There was less of that than I would have anticipated, because the United States was in crisis in several different ways, not just Vietnam. The French always assume that it's easy to kick Uncle Sam because he's so big that he won't feel it. Watergate. The oil crisis of 1973. The defeat in Vietnam. These all came at about the same time. The staying power and the future role of the United States were very much in question, so there was less Schadenfreude than I would have expected. I think it's because when all is said and done, the French know they need us more than we need them, and that won't change. The oil crisis never hit Europe as badly as it hit us. Watergate, well, everybody knows how traumatic that was. When Nixon resigned in August of '74, the Parisian elite got busy trying to divine the "real reason" he left office. The French always look for plots. I remember one acquaintance -- highly placed politically, should have known better -- coming up to me and declaring, "You know, we understand the real reason. We know what happened. It was because Nixon was too friendly to the Arabs because of the oil crisis and so the Jewish interests on Wall Street forced him out." This is the kind of cockamamie theory that was going around. The French love this stuff and some always take it very seriously. But overall, there was relatively little Schadenfreude. In the media, there was some crowing that Uncle Sam was getting his comeuppance and looking more like the rest of us, but that's to be expected.

Q: You might explain what Schadenfreude is.

BEECROFT: Schadenfreude is one of these wonderful German words that is almost impossible to translate. It means “joy in the pain of others.”

Q: Anyway, so you, how did your wife find Paris?

BEECROFT: Well, with a Ph.D. in French, she loved being in Paris, but with a young child, that meant she had her hands full. She was not working at the time. We lived in the embassy apartments in Neuilly, a Paris suburb, because as a junior officer I couldn't afford a Paris rental. Then, to complicate things further, our second child came along.

We did some wonderful things. In the summer of '74 we drove south through Burgundy, where good friends from Strasbourg lived -- she was Welsh and had married a French fellow student. We visited them at their farm, then we drove down to Orange, the Pont du Gard, Marseille and Carcassonne, and across the Pyrenees to Catalonia and Mallorca. We had a wonderful trip. That September we also spent a week at Ste. Maxime, near St. Tropez. That was all very nice, but as the Ambassador's aide you were on call 24/7. When I went into the Political Section I got to travel, but on business as I mentioned, going to political conventions and things like that. Then in the fall of '74 Mette became pregnant with our second child. Pamela was born in Paris in April of '75, and we returned to the U.S. that summer.

MARIE THERESE HUHTALA
Consular Officer
Paris (1973-1975)

Ambassador Huhtala was born and raised in California and Graduated from Santa Clara University. Joining the Foreign Service in 1972, she studied Thai and Chinese languages and became a specialist in East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Her overseas postings include Paris, Quebec, Hong Kong and Chiang Mai (Thailand). In Washington, she dealt primarily with East Asia and Pacific Affairs. From 2001 to 2004 she served as US ambassador to Malaysia and, from 2004 to 2005, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Ambassador Huhtala is a graduate of the National War College and the State Department's Senior Seminar. Ambassador Huhtala was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

HUHTALA: I asked for Paris. Paris was the only place in the world I wanted to serve at that time because I already spoke French. Also my husband back in Thunderbird was studying international management with a focus on Western Europe and he was studying French. I presented all of those arguments to the counselors and by golly, I got Paris. I got to go to the only place in the world I thought I wanted to go.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

HUHTALA: April 1973 till June 1975.

Q: What was your job?

HUHTALA: I was in the consular section. What that meant initially was the NIV visa line. Back in those days French citizens had to get visas like everybody else. We had a very crowded waiting room, we stood behind a counter, but there was no glass window. The applicants would be smoking their Gaulois cigarettes and blowing smoke in our faces and it was very trying to interview them under these situations. After about 11 months on the visa line I was really burning out. It was very stressful work. I noticed other young officers were being allowed to transfer into the other section of the consulate, to issue passports and perform American citizens' services. So I made a bit of a stink and asked for a transfer, which I got. I took over the portfolio of the "deaths and estates" officer for a whole year.

Q: Who was the Consul General then?

HUHTALA: Bill Connett, did you know him?

Q: I know the name. Who was the ambassador at the time?

HUHTALA: The ambassador was Mr. Irwin.

Q: You must have found that this was a huge establishment.

HUHTALA: To a certain degree, I felt lost. For one thing the visa section was physically separated from the embassy. It was over in the old Talleyrand building, a few blocks from the main Chancery, so I didn't really feel that I was part of the Mission. If I wanted to read the political reporting being sent out from the Embassy I could walk over to the Chancery on Avenue Gabriel and look at it (which I did a few times), but we visa officers weren't integrated into the main operations. The DCM, Galen Stone, a nice man, tried to mentor the junior officers but I think I met with him maybe twice in my whole tour. There were quite a few junior officers there so every six months my turn would come up to go sit in and observe the Country Team meeting. It was not enough to get a real sense of what U.S. objectives were in France or what was really going on. I felt that nobody outside of my immediate chain of command in the consular section had any real interest in me, knew who I was or what I was doing.

Q: This of course is always the trap of some places like Paris where people think, people at all levels, they get there and it's very easy to get lost because people are busy.

HUHTALA: I think the Service does a much better job now of mentoring our junior officers. Many years later, I was the DCM in a very large embassy and none of our JO's felt like that. When I was a junior officer, though, our leadership didn't put very much emphasis on mentoring us.

Q: What happened, where were you living?

HUHTALA: Oh that was fun. We were living in the Seventh Arrondissement, near the Eiffel

Tower.

Q: You're saying we, now?

HUHTALA: My husband joined me that summer, a few months after I got there. He had just finished grad school. I had found us an apartment on Avenue Bosquet. It was lovely. It was fun to be living in Paris and using French all day long. I enjoyed it. Gradually it dawned on me how hostile most of the Frenchmen were; especially the Parisians were very anti-American at that period. When we went out of the capital and traveled around the countryside people were much nicer. Paris itself was kind of tough. I rode the metro every day.

Q: Kind of like New York?

HUHTALA: Yeah, kind of. I took the metro and I went to see French movies and walked around the city. All of that was a lot of fun.

Q: Did your husband find a job?

HUHTALA: No, poor guy. Britain had just come into the Common Market, as they called it. All of a sudden being a native speaker of English no longer counted as a skill that would get you a work permit. You had to have skills that nobody in the entire Common Market had, so he couldn't get a work permit like we had been hoping that he could. In fact we had a very interesting run-in with the French government. When Eino arrived, the Embassy sent in a diplomatic note requesting a consular ID card for him as a spouse; there came back a diplomatic note from the French saying that they did not issue these ID cards to the "husbands of female agents" unless such husband was either disabled or over the age of 65. The Embassy was great, very supportive of me. They drafted a note in response that said, "The U.S. Government considers Mr. Huhtala a dependent with the same status as all of the other dependents of our officers. We issued him a diplomatic passport and his travel here was paid for by the Department of State. Therefore we think that you should treat him like you treat all of the other staff." There was always a delay of around two months between all of these notes. Eventually we received a note in response that said, "The French government would like to know what Mr. Huhtala plans to do while he is living in France." So we sent back a response that said, "He plans to study the French language." He had in fact started at Alliance Française while waiting for this issue to be resolved. That did the trick; he was granted his Carte de Séjour soon afterward.

Q: Well he can't be all wrong.

HUHTALA: The Embassy had never had a situation like that before. Eino was the first.

Q: As you say they had just allowed married women to come back in the business.

HUHTALA: In fact before that when we were still in Washington he took the Foreign Service Wives' Course at FSI and they had to change the name to the Spouses' Course.

Q: Was there much, in the consular section, was there much collegial of the young officers?

HUHTALA: Yeah there was. We'd all go out to dinner together and entertain each other in our homes. That was nice.

Q: Often this is another aspect of Foreign Service where later you look back on this and you've made some very good friends there because you're all together in this thing and you don't have to worry about the people on the top because they don't know you exist.

HUHTALA: Yes, exactly.

Q: Did you get any feel for what was going on in France at the time? This is about four years, three years after the '68 business.

HUHTALA: Right. I knew that Charles De Gaulle's successor, President Georges Pompidou, passed away about a year after I arrived and Valery Giscard d'Estaing was elected President. I had a vague, general understanding of what was going on politically there. But not in any real depth.

Q: How about the Paris Peace talks, were they going on then?

HUHTALA: No, they were in '72. I got there in April 1973.

Q: Oh yeah. So Vietnam was more or less, by this time, sort of over.

HUHTALA: I was, however, in Paris in April 1975 when Cambodia and then South Vietnam fell to the communists. I'll never forget, I was in the American citizen services office and in came a young Cambodian couple. They were studying in Paris and they had left their baby with Grandma back in Phnom Penh; they were scared to death and beside themselves. Was there anything we could do? – and there was nothing we could do. I thought that was so sad. Then, I remember there was the orphan airlift out of South Vietnam and one plane crashed. I remember all of this terrible news coming in while we were in Paris.

Q: Would you talk a bit about the death and estates job. I'm a consular officer by profession. Can you tell us any experiences?

HUHTALA: It was really interesting. First of all there was a backlog because the previous one or two incumbents hadn't really done all the paperwork so there were still personal effects of deceased Americans waiting to be inventoried. They had a little vault in the basement of the embassy full of dead peoples' underwear and that kind of thing and that all needed to be done. Then the week I moved over from the visa section there was a major air crash, a big DC-10, Turkish Airlines, crashed into the forest north of Paris.

Q: Oh yeah, I remember that, a door came out.

HUHTALA: A cargo door. We lost about 25 Americans there, including several entire families, very sad. In June 1974 they had a memorial service for all the victims, many of whom were in an

unmarked grave. The airlines brought the family members over from the United States so I had to take care of them. I escorted them all -- I think there must have about 10 or 12 of them -- on a drive up to the place in the forest where the plane had crashed. I had not yet seen it so I wasn't yet prepared for it. It still looked really raw. There were still big gashes in the ground and a tree limb sheared off and pieces of clothing still hanging from the trees; no one should have asked relatives to look at that. That was very unnerving. Then I had to take them to a shed where there was a huge table with all of the unclaimed personal effects laid out. (Now we had already returned to the families the effects that we could clearly tell belonged to their family members.) These were piles of watches and jewelry and things like that and we were supposed to ask these families to look through all of these things and see if they could find anything that belonged to their family members. That was very hard for them. I was 25 years old and two months pregnant (but it wasn't showing yet). I said, "Let's go get some coffee." I was just feeling my way through this. We went to a café and we ordered coffee. They pulled out pictures of the family members that they'd lost, and I thought this is going to be hard, but in fact it was really good. It was very healing for them to show me all the pictures of the people who had died and tell me what their names were and what they were like and tell me some stories. I understand now what was going on but at the time this was new to me too. I just sort of instinctively, I think, did the right thing.

Q: Did you have any sort of contact with dead bodies that you had to take care of and all that?

HUHTALA: My two "best friends" were the two French undertakers that serviced Americans. They were hilarious. One of them had been in the business for many, many years. He had a professionally glum face. He always dressed in black three piece suits, and he would tell me all these gory stories, for example, about an American who had been murdered and how they took a chain saw to cut the head off and how hard it is to saw through the head. My God, my cocktail chatter during that tour was really gross. People would move away from me in a cocktail party!

The other undertaker was a former cement manufacturing who got bored in mid-life and sold his company and bought a funeral home. For him this was all an exciting new lark. He took me to his place of business so I could see his caskets. In the window they had the lozenge-shaped ones like in Dracula movies. That's what they were using in Paris in those days. In the basement he had something special to show me. There had been an exchange of some sort and his company had received an American casket, a big bronze rectangular thing with a hydraulic lift so that the head of the deceased could be raised. He just thought that was the funniest thing he had ever seen.

I never had to handle a body myself during that tour. I did later on but not then. What I would have would be the bereaved, the freshly bereaved coming in to see me. One Monday morning I came in to work and there was a lovely middle-aged woman whose teenage son had died over the weekend. He had cancer and was in remission and they were visiting Paris to cheer him up, and just like that, he passed away. What do you say to somebody in that situation? I guess that's what I was learning.

There was another time when a woman in her 50s came in. She had been visiting Paris with her fiancé who was also of that age, and he wanted to impress her, so he climbed up the Eiffel Tower. He didn't take the elevator, he climbed up all the stairs and they enjoyed the Eiffel Tower

and then they went back down, on a summer day, then they went to the hotel and he was taking a shower and his heart just gave out and he died in the shower. Not only was she very, very sad to lose him, they were not yet married so she was not the next of kin. I had to ask her to give me his son's coordinates so I could I contact him. I had to get instructions from his son about what to do with the body and all of that. She took that with a great deal of dignity but I could see that it was distressing. It was very hard for us both.

Q: I have to say as a consular officer I found on these things this is where you might almost accuse me of sexism I guess, but women consular officers are usually better at this than males. Guys really can't handle this very well, myself included.

HUHTALA: Because I was doing that for my primary job for a whole year I got pretty good at it. I learned how. At first it was very difficult for me too. As a culture we Americans avoid death at all costs.

Q: Was there any system covering development of various things within the Foreign Service establishment. Was there anything equivalent to family liaison officers or something, I mean something within the embassy to find a job for your husband?

HUHTALA: No. That came a few years later. That did not exist yet. He was sort of at loose ends. He eventually found a job teaching English on a contract basis to French students. It wasn't ideal but he made some friends through that. There was a lot of stress on us.

Q: What about the contract you had, one year or one tour?

HUHTALA: Well a lot happened before we got to that point. I got pregnant, deliberately. I got pregnant in early '74. We'd been married almost three years, it was time, right? But you would have thought that there had been a tsunami or something when I told my boss. Actually I was chatting with Bill Connett's secretary in French and telling her the news. He came in and he overheard. He said "Tu blagues! (You're kidding!)." No kidding, I was indeed pregnant. It turns out the embassy in Paris had never had a pregnant vice consul except one, some years before, when one of the single women got in trouble with a French guy and had to marry him, and they kept her on despite the ban on married officers. But in general the experience had always been, vice consuls are men and men don't get pregnant. So my condition caused a bit of an uproar. I was surprised, because no one seemed to have thought of the obvious fact that married women would be starting their families on the job.

Q: Well you couldn't get up to the counter as easily.

HUHTALA: Now, now. I worked though most of the pregnancy. I was doing fine. I transferred over from visas to death and estates, and I was fine. Then at about seven months I went on a Thursday night for my check-up and the doctor found that I was starting to dilate and needed immediate bed rest. "Don't get up until I tell you," said the doctor. But I said, "Tomorrow is Friday, can't I go and clean out my desk and arrange for an orderly back-up?" No. Well as fate would have it, my boss at that time, the head of the ACS Section was a woman who had been forced to choose between marriage and the Foreign Service and she chose the Foreign Service.

Although she tried to be understanding, my sudden absence was difficult for her.

Q: That was the generation that never, it was difficult for them to see the next generation.

HUHTALA: It was. I'm sure she thought I was a smarty pants and I thought I had everything. I was in bed for around three weeks until I was allowed to come back to work. I went into labor a week after that. Then I had my six weeks of maternity leave. So I was away for a long time. When it came time for my efficiency report she put something in about how I had done a good job but I did create a burden in the section by being gone for a long period of time. Then she asked me to state in my statement that I had no problem with her saying that. That shows you how confused and uncertain we all were. I decided to be forthright about it and in my statement I said, "Yes, I was away on maternity leave. I had a daughter." That was the end of that.

GALEN L. STONE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1973-1975)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Cyprus. He was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

Q: Galen, according to my notes in 1973 you were reassigned to Paris?

STONE: That's right. I had served on my second tour in India for almost four years, initially with Kenneth Keating, and then with Daniel Patrick Moynihan. During the interim between the departure of Keating and the arrival of Moynihan, I was Chargé d'affaires for almost six months. I was brought back to the Department to meet privately with Ambassador Moynihan and brief him and his family about India. I remained in India for some two months with him, trying to help him into the saddle so to speak.

At that point I learned that Ambassador John Irwin, who had been the Deputy Secretary of the Department, wished me to be assigned as his Deputy in Paris. I served with him throughout his tour there and subsequently served with his successor, Kenneth Rush. So in all I had four different political Ambassadors to whom I was the Deputy. I must say in retrospect that the job of DCM in a major American embassy with a political appointee Ambassador is I think the most challenging and demanding position in the Foreign Service. I was very fortunate in working for Ambassador Irwin, who was a thorough gentleman. He is one of the few men that I would describe as being a gentleman almost to a fault. I say that because in the hurley-burley of the Washington bureaucracy he was a man who was always courteous enough to allow the other person to speak first. The result was that he didn't have sufficient opportunity to voice his own thoughts.

He was extremely perceptive and extremely able; but because of his politeness his talents were not fully appreciated. This was true of the French as well, and was compounded by the fact that his knowledge of the French language was quite limited. It wasn't until the end of his tour that the French realized what an effective and outstanding Ambassador he was. Unfortunately, his tour was all too short, he was there only eighteen months, and during that period he was away from the post for eight of them.

That was the period during which negotiations were going on in Paris with the Vietnamese. Our then Secretary of State Mr. Kissinger thrived on having various separate lines of communication with foreign officials.

I found myself at times carrying personal messages to the French Foreign Minister Jobert very late at night. My tour in Paris was without doubt the most difficult and challenging that I had in my Foreign Service career. The demands on the time of the top people in the embassy in France extensive. There were so many functions that it was really difficult to avoid because one felt the United States had to be represented. This took so much of one's time, combined with the fact that there were twenty-six different U.S. government agencies represented in the Embassy , and as DCM I had to try and keep all of them going in the same direction. It was a real challenge.

Q: How long were you in Paris during this tour?

STONE: I was there for twenty-five months which may not sound like a long time, but I can tell you that none of my three predecessors lasted more than fifteen months. They were Jack Kubisch, Perry Culley, and I think Woody Wallner was the other one.

WILLIAM VEALE
Vice Consul
Strasbourg (1973-1975)

Mr. Veale was born in Washington, D.C. into a US military family and was raised primarily at Army posts in the US and abroad. Entering the military after graduating from Georgetown University, he served with the US Army until joining the Foreign Service in 1971. Throughout his career Mr. Veale dealt primarily with Political/Military and Disarmament affairs, serving both in the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Among his assignments, Mr. Veale was posted to Strasbourg, Berlin and Rangoon. He also taught in the Political Science department at the US Air Force Academy. Mr. Veale was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2000.

Q: In the middle of 1973 your tour was up and you were assigned to Strasbourg as a vice consul. Was this a tour you requested?

VEALE: Again, I got two weeks notice of this assignment. I guess junior officer assignments weren't perceived in those days with much interest. I had been told that there were no overseas

assignments and then a few days later I was told to be in Strasbourg in two weeks. My wife and I bundled ourselves up and we managed to get there in August 1973. It was a two-person post. Ron Woods was the Principle Officer. The post's primary rationale was to be observers at the Council of Europe. At that time the Council of Europe had been promoted by Churchill after World War II as a political alliance to go along with the military alliance that NATO would represent. It would have very strong democratic criteria for membership and it would be aimed at making the legislation permanent and the types of approaches to problem solving of the social problems that existed in the Western European area. It was beginning to be surpassed by the development of the European Parliament and the European Communities at that point. But, there was still a parliamentary assembly which was useful place for gauging the international sentiments of political parties of different countries in Europe. So, the observer function, which had been much larger – with five or seven people in it back in the late '40s and '50s, and maybe into the '60s – had been honed down to just a consul general and a vice consul.

Q: Who was your consul general?

VEALE: Ron Woods. He had been in the Embassy in Paris before. Alan Holmes was the Political Counselor in the Embassy in Paris at that time. Kenneth Rush was the Ambassador, and then there was John Irwin who had been Deputy Secretary.

Q: Did they ever visit Strasbourg?

VEALE: Yes, I believe Rush did and I am trying to remember whether Irwin did. My job was as economic/commercial reporting officer there, although I was assigned as a political cone officer, this post required that I promote business with the U.S. – trade opportunities and things of that sort – so I had dealings with the Chambers of Commerce in the counselor district of eastern France.

Q: Did you have to sample Alsatian wines?

VEALE: Oh, yes. I was forced to drink and eat for my country.

Q: Did we issue visas and passports there?

VEALE: Yes, we did. It had a very normal sort of consular workload there. The Alsatians were not particular problems. There were not really a lot of abusive issues that one had to deal with. I had two American welfare and whereabouts cases that I had to deal with that were very sobering for me. A girl was killed and I had to deal with that and then there was a Picasso art thief that I had to visit in the prison in Metz. To me the most interesting thing was reporting on this process of political amalgamation that was going on at a slow tempo, but fairly deliberate, through the Council of Europe. At this point, the Council of Europe's delegations seemed to have attracted an interesting collection of New World socialists like the Schwartz family from Italy...

Q: Count Schwartz. You don't mean socialist you mean social.

VEALE: I found in my musings through the kinds of thing that are going on there is fascinating

efforts of social engineering that were being thought about. One of the more interesting organizations of the Council of Europe was the European Court of Human Rights. I got to know people there fairly well and did an airgram on it.

Q: The good old airgram!

VEALE: That's right.

Q: Were there any domestic troubles in that part France while you were there or were things quiet?

VEALE: Well, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 weakened the Palestinian-Arab community very much. We had demonstrations. My wife was back in the States at the time. This was shortly after my arrival in the fall of 1973. Our apartment was above the consulate and so, among other duties, I had the job of raising and lowering the American flag from my living room window. I was sitting at my desk writing a letter, looking out this window and noticed this huge crowd that had assembled out there. There were several people chanting about the U.S. being pro-Israeli, etc. It was at this point that Ambassador Irwin called wanting to know how I was doing – besieged as I was. But it wasn't any particular problem. I don't recall, maybe something was thrown but no windows were broken. Nothing really serious.

One of the other interesting things that happened while I was in Strasbourg, is that our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at that point, Jim Akins, who had some connection with France, perhaps a French wife, would come back to France periodically. He was in Strasbourg and he had to send a highly classified message to Henry Kissinger about Middle East issues. We had no communications of a secure nature except for the one-time-pad. So he had this relatively long cable that I had to encrypt using the one-time-pad. After coming out of the military, I just could not understand how the State Department could possibly operate, a few years after we put a man on the moon, using one-time-pad technology.

GORDON S. BROWN

Economic Officer

Paris (1973-1976)

Gordon S. Brown was born in Italy in 1936. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1957 and served in the U.S. Army from 1957-1960. Mr. Brown entered the Foreign Service in 1960. His career included positions in Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, Tunisia, and Mauritania. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 11, 1996.

Q: What was the title of your position?

BROWN: I guess I was just economic officer in the General Economic Policy section. I didn't have a title like energy attaché or anything like that, but in fact that's what I was. And because

that crisis - the '73 war, the Arab oil cut off, the differences we had with the French over how to deal with the Arabs as a result of that, which led to the first of the north-south conferences, etc. - I had interesting work in all of the three years I was there. A super job, and a pleasant embassy to work in.

Q: *When did you arrive in Paris?*

BROWN: It must have been late August 1973.

Q: *The October war of 73.*

BROWN: Well, it was a big surprise to everybody.

Q: *What was your reaction?*

BROWN: I guess my first reaction was that we were not going to sit still too much longer with respect to the Middle East. If you'll recall, in that respect, the war was started by Sadat in an effort to break the log jam in the negotiations and get down to some serious discussion with Israel about the state of their relationship. It succeeded in the end in doing that. A little bit of quick catch-up in policy on our part was very helpful. But the reason was that Sadat did not launch that war in order to defeat Israel. He launched that war in order to change the diplomatic situation. So I felt some vindication in that the Arabs had called an oil embargo - and here I saw what I'd just been working on for the last couple of years coming to reality - a selective oil embargo against certain states. There was going to be an Arab political leverage of the most massive kind, and the Saudis were going to join in it willy-nilly. Everything we'd been arguing about was taking place but we hadn't achieved anything because most of our arguments over the years had been listened to, but not acted on. There was nothing in place to deal with this situation. So the discussion for the next couple of years was obviously going to be: how do we deal with it, what do we do structurally to change the dialogue over oil and energy. That was fascinating. The north-south dialogue, the beginning of the formation of the International Energy Agency, started off being run out of the embassy, and started off being my portfolio. Eventually the north-south dialogue moved over to the US mission to the OECD, but I was still very much a part of the whole process, the delegations which came and went, and the meetings which took place in the first north-south conferences in Paris.

Q: *Can you talk about your perspective of what the French were doing at this time, and what relations between the United States as you were seeing them over this oil embargo?*

BROWN: Well, the French, of course, had always resented the fact that they were the junior members of the oil community. They had their two oil companies in ELF/ERAP and CFP; they held positions in the Iranian consortium, and had minor positions in the Gulf countries. But they had more or less been squeezed out of Saudi Arabia -- and out of resentment over what they considered to be an Anglo-Saxon lock on the major oil resources in the Middle East -- had actively cultivated the Iraqis over the years, and particularly the years leading up to the '73 war, in an effort to get their own assured sources of supply through preferential deals. And that was their approach. Their approach was that they could, by political maneuvering and active pro-

Arab bilateral relations, assure their own security and supply on an individual basis. Our position, the State Department position, and eventually the US government position, was that common measures on the part of the oil consuming countries were necessary to meet the threat of division, and counter the leverage from OPEC -- that we should combine our efforts. And the French, as you know, consistently fought the formation of the International Energy Agency. They joined hands with the Arabs to produce a different kind of a dialogue -- a political dialogue over the terms of trade over natural resources and money -- which became the North-South Dialogue. So their approach was totally different, which, I suppose, was facilitated by the fact that the then French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, and Henry Kissinger had a very instinctive dislike of each other on a personal level, as well as on the political level. So the relationships between the two governments got fairly icy at times during this debate over oil and energy policy, and response to the Arabs.

Q: Was the attitude from the embassy, I mean from what you were getting, was it that the French were doing this as a matter of survival, but was this also a matter of sticking it to the Americans.

BROWN: Well, there's that element in anything that the French do. I mean, there's the Gaullist desire to be independent of the Americans just because they don't like to be led around by the Anglo-Saxons, and particularly the transatlantic Anglo-Saxons. They also have a more positive philosophy behind it, and that is that they would go their own way, so as to avoid being identified with a strong Israeli lobby -- that is, that they can cut their own deals in the Middle East much better if they go an independent way than if they tried to cooperate with us.

Q: Did you have any dealings with the French Foreign Ministry at all?

BROWN: Oh, yes. I was over across the river, the Quai d'Orsay, twice a week at least, with the French oil companies once a week, with the Ministry of Industry twice a week. The French ministries have a close relationship with their commercial sector, and the French Ministry of Industry was the ministry supervising the petroleum and gas industry -- in fact they set policy for the French energy industry, so they were the key for administering price and import policy, purchasing, etc. I had to keep in touch with them as well as the Quai d'Orsay, the Presidency, and the oil companies quite regularly.

Q: What was your impression of the French that you dealt with at both the Foreign Ministry and elsewhere?

BROWN: Well, they're very professional. These people are all trained in professional schools, the upper level bureaucrats, and the ones I was dealing with were quite often infinitely better versed on their portfolio than I was. I was learning, as I was there, about how they administered their companies, how they administered their foreign policy, how they manipulated oil contracts, how they achieved preferential deals in the Middle East. These are all things which they did within their bureaucracy, with a non-prying press, and with a great deal of old buddy relationships between themselves in the various ministries, and the senior members of the companies. So that they were able to do things in a closed circle which I kept trying to butt in on. I found them to be exceptionally good, exceptionally difficult to get information out of, and they defended their interests extremely well. It was very frustrating because they were doing things

that we were clearly not in favor of, but they weren't exactly telling us what they were doing, and the French press does not search very hard to find information which is embarrassing to the French government.

Q: Was the Libyan connection relationship, was that important at this period?

BROWN: You know, I don't have much recollection of whether or not the Libyans were a significant factor. The Libyans were a minor supplier relative to the Middle East. So the French were really playing footsie with the Iraqis and other people in the Middle East, the Iranians and others, in an effort to ensure their supplies. Libyan oil was going at that point mainly to Italy if I'm not mistaken, and the Italians were the people who were playing footsie with the Libyans more than the French. Probably some of it was going to Marseille as well.

Q: Did you see much cooperation between Germany, the UK, maybe Benelux countries, and the United States of policy.

BROWN: The Germans, of course -- when Kissinger and the United States proposed consumer solidarity against the oil producers -- were much more inclined to come along with us, because they didn't have any significant oil companies of their own to protect their interests, and (unlike the French), they saw that they were likely to be victims of a world market shortage, so they were inclined to go along. The British were inclined to go along because, yes, their companies -- whether or not they saw things commercially the same as our companies -- saw things geopolitically pretty much the same way we did. So it probably heightened the French -- with Dutch Shell in the same boat -- French suspicions about the cabal of northern Europeans were heightened. Frankly, their determination to go it alone was heightened by virtue of the fact they saw these other people not necessary colluding with each other, but acting in parallel out of their own interests.

Q: Did Soviet oil finally roll at this time?

BROWN: The Soviets didn't have much oil to put on the world market. They were selling largely to Eastern Europe and they were trying to get more oil to put on the world market. They had, I think, at that point gas to put on the world market. There was hope, I think, that the Soviets would increase supply to meet shortfalls in Western Europe, but I don't recall that was a major factor in what was discussed in Paris, nor did we ever get much from them as I recall.

Q: Who was your ambassador at the time?

BROWN: The first one was John Irwin, of the IBM family, and the second one was from Dow Chemicals, Kenneth Rush -- two political ambassadors, anyway.

Q: Did they engage much in this?

BROWN: They both did to a certain degree, but they left it as largely a professional thing. They wanted to be informed; they obviously had to deal with French dissatisfaction about our policies at the level of the Presidency, so they had to be informed. And they had to know the line; they

had to go in periodically and argue with the French. They were not really driving this very hard. It became fairly rapidly a dialogue which was carried out at the staff level by people like me, and at the professional level by Assistant Secretaries talking with each other on the transatlantic phone. My boss at that point, the Economic Counselor Chris Petrow, wound up leaving the Foreign Service after he left Paris because he had been undercut so many times by Washington's direct contacts with ministries in Paris; he felt embassies in Western Europe were beginning to lose their role when they could be cut out of significant communications between Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Assistant Secretaries in Washington, and their counterparts in capitals. Those people were seeing each other at international meetings; they developed personal relationships with each other; they had each other's telephone numbers, and the time difference wasn't so substantial that they couldn't phone each other every day, or once a week or something like that. It happened at my level sometimes, but at Petrow's level more often. He would go into a ministry with some instruction from Washington and he'd say, "Please help us do this, or let's do that," and they would say, "But Chris, you don't understand; I was talking to your boss last night on the phone and the instructions have changed." The French were quite good in playing this against us. They quite often knew more what was going on in Washington than we did.

Q: This is an addendum to an interview that was done with Ambassador Gordon Brown. There were some parts of it that did not come through, in particular the part 1979 to 1984, which covers your end in Paris. Today is the 14th of December, 1999. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Gordon, did you have a chance to look at the part that didn't come through?

BROWN: No. I had nothing to look at. I should make a comment, I think, about the rest of my assignment in Paris because - to make it quick - we were talking last time about the U.S.-French bilateral situation. The end of my assignment really wound up much more in a multilateral framework because (if you'll recall) as a result of the oil embargo of 1973, the big and burning issue between the U.S. and France, and the rest of the world in fact, became: How do you deal with the OPEC group? Do you deal with them as a group? Do you set up a countercartel, or do you cooperate with them? The French were very far over towards the cooperation side. Our policy under Secretary Kissinger was pretty far over towards the confrontational side. As a result, we had a bilateral fight with the French which ultimately, I would say, tactically the French won and strategically, we won. Tactically, that is, the French got they wanted which was a consumer-producer dialogue between energy or resource producing countries and resource consuming countries, whereas we got a standfast position - even though the dialogue finally did take place - but we ultimately did confront the OPEC cartel by one means or another. The setting up of this international economic dialogue between producer and consumer countries moved the action closer to the OECD realm. In fact, after I left the embassy, the entire function was moved over to the U.S. mission to the OECD because they felt that was the proper place to do it - as a multilateral negotiation at that point, rather than bilateral.

Q: Did you find that the British and the Germans for example were sort of consulting with you at the beginning? Their oil people trying to figure out... Were they sort of watching this battle between the French and the Americans and waiting to see where the dust fell or...?

BROWN: I think that is about the best way to characterize it. I don't recall their positions very strongly, to be perfectly honest. After this period of time has passed, it would imply that they didn't have very strong positions. It was in many ways a little trilateral struggle between us and the Saudis talking on one track, and the French and the Saudis talking on another track, and us and the French talking on a third track. It was played out in the multilateral...what was it called...the dialogue...I don't even remember. It had a name. The endless meetings were held over at Avenue Clébert in Paris and dignitaries came from all over the world, and it was a great talkfest and nothing ever was achieved. Ultimately, it was a way, I guess, for the developing countries or the resource producing countries to feel that they were being heard in the other capitals, and it did have that advantage. It defused a pretty aggravating situation at the time.

Q: Well, did Kissinger have a Mr. Oil who would appear from time to time from Washington?

BROWN: That was Tom Enders who I'm sure you know from others...

Q: Unfortunately, I never had the chance to interview him - a very strong personality. What was your impression of how he operated in this situation?

BROWN: Well, he was a very strong and independent person as you point out. The under secretary for Economic Affairs, whose name escapes me, was a little more soft line than Tom at that point. Tom was playing Kissinger's game to the full - and that was to be as hard-nosed as he possibly could towards the energy producing countries. It got actually comical at times because there was one point, for example, in which Tom obviously was unhappy with the U.S. line for an upcoming meeting. He came into Paris the night before the meeting started. I picked him up at the airport, took him to the hotel. He then had an interview with some journalists which I hadn't known about, in which he told the journalists this conference was going to go to Hell and that everything was...He gave them a very tough line. The next morning I went out to the airport to meet the under secretary. He was furious because he'd read the interview which was entirely opposite to his instructions. There was that kind of thing going on all the time. Various agencies were feuding. There was even a feud within the Department as I just mentioned. In the end, Kissinger saw that there was a need to compromise and let Mr. Enders drift away. He undercut him in short. He used him and then undercut him.

Q: Which seems to be part of the modus operandi. Did you find yourself when these things were going on...You were sort of playing clean up, sweeping behind the elephants in the parade?

BROWN: To a certain extent. I was pretty junior. I was the factotum really rather than the policy maker.

Q: I was wondering, would you sort of sit down with your French colleagues and you'd both kind of wonder what the Hell was going on or did you try to figure it out?

BROWN: No. No. Relations with the French were such that I wasn't really free to do open heart kind of exploration. I really had to follow the line pretty closely, if I knew what the line was in any given week.

Q: Well then, just after, when you left... You left France when?

BROWN: It was summer of '76. Is that right? Yes. Must have been. Yes right. I went directly to Saudi Arabia if I'm not mistaken.

Q: *What was your impression of France overall as being part of the West? Talking to Foreign Service people, I have some who think that the French are a real pain in the ass frankly, and others who say well yes, they may be a pain in the ass but they are with us when times are tough and all this. Where would you put yourself?*

BROWN: I'd be in the second school. They are definitely our ally. They just don't like being pulled around by the nose. We have a tendency to ignore them or to treat them with scorn and they react.

MARK S. PRATT
Member US Delegation to International Conference on Vietnam
Paris (1973-1978)

Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: *Well, now, you left this Indochina Working Group in 1973, and you went where?*

PRATT: Well, I was still part of that group when I went to Paris for the International Conference on Vietnam. And this was where we brought in all the people who had been previously at the Geneva conferences, one and two, and had a conference there where everybody signed it and the Chinese came and the Soviets came and so on. And that was supposed to be reaffirming what it was. Then it finally was signed between the U.S. and the Vietnamese. Prior to that time we had several last-minute meetings that instead of Kissinger you had Le Duc Tho. It was Bill Sullivan and Minh Co Tac, who was then the foreign minister.

Q: *Of North Vietnam.*

PRATT: Of North Vietnam. And we had those little talks to iron out the various aspects of holding the conference. So I went over for three or four meetings of that sort and then finally went over for the conference itself, came back to close up house and finish up my job and was over in Paris in April of 1973.

Q: *First, before we move to that, what did you think, what was the mood at this international*

conference? What did you think? This was the one that essentially set up the so-called peace, wasn't it?

PRATT: That's right.

Q: In the first place, was there within your group a feeling of annoyance that in this whole damn thing you were working on a sideshow while Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were putting it together.

PRATT: Well, at that point we were merely implementing, under Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, what it was that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had come to. And then the Vietnamese sort of stuck at a couple of issues, and we had the Christmas bombing, and then that was broken away and we went back to the board there. We felt that this was a kind of Soviet-Chinese persuasive action which had taken place. The bombs helped, but the real influence on Hanoi was what the Soviets and the Chinese said, which was, "Listen, you've got all you need. The Americans want out. You're going to give them a chance to get out, and so stop trying to hold out for the last little bit of America's humiliation and holding up for the last little bit of what you hope is going to be a lot of money." Now, as you know, the agreements did include a provision for the U.S. providing assistance for reconstruction to North Vietnam after the war. That was one organization which was set up there in Paris. Of course, they went on negotiating for months and came up with something which, of course, the American Congress said forget about it. But the major reaction was come on, let's get it over with. This is not where the real battle is going to be. None of us think the Vietnamese are going to be able to do anything very effective, so our view was that we've lost this, and therefore just let's go through with it and get rid of the last bits of this because we are admitting that we are going to let them take over South Vietnam. We're basically going to stand by and let Cambodia crumble and Laos go to the Communists. And therefore, let's do it in as gentlemanly a fashion as we can. So our view certainly was that this was countdown to the end. We did not believe, as Kissinger professed to believe, that this was a peace with honor in the sense that the South Vietnamese would be able to hold their own more than, shall we say, a decent interval.

Q: Was there concern on the Asian hands, which you were, about the aftermath of this thing, of an aggressive Vietnam, say toward Thailand? Was this a concern?

PRATT: Yes, very much so. And of course that, as you know, was why we had SEATO to begin with, originally China, but of course also covering Vietnam. And this is of course why ASEAN finally sort of kicked off after the end of the Vietnam War. It's because they themselves could not agree as to whom the greater enemy was. For some, Thailand, it was Vietnam. For Indonesia it was China. For Malaysia probably it was China. And so our view was that we didn't believe necessarily in the "domino" system because we believed that Indochinese nationalism would go just so far, and it was basically French Indochinese nationalism and it would not necessarily extend to Thailand and Burma, which is what originally, let's say, Ho Chi Minh had perhaps been dreaming of. So we did think that this was going to be a problem and, in other words, that struggles were not over, but they would take a different form. And this, from our point of view, one of the few good things about it was that we had worked out a relationship with China where we could perhaps expect to be on the same side as China in many of the ensuing struggles, and therefore, of course, none of us were terribly surprised when eventually Deng Xiaoping attacked

Vietnam. It was the sort of thing which we would have felt was quite possible because, as I said, even the 1970 Indochinese People's Summit Conference seemed to be a way for China to lay down the rules to Hanoi, giving the limits of what they expected Hanoi to be able to do. So already we had a better situation because of a China which was being concerned about its own national interests, and one of those was not to support Hanoi in its ambitions.

Q: So with this in mind, when you went to Paris in 1973 to settle, this was what, April of 1973? You were there, by the way, from when to when, approximately?

PRATT: April 1973 to I guess it was basically April of 1978, so five years.

Q: What was your initial job?

PRATT: My job was the one that remained the same throughout my entire career there. It was to be a first secretary in the embassy handling liaison with whatever kind of negotiation group we had there, which was the post-peace-settlement negotiation about aid for Hanoi and also to handle turnover with Peking, because although we had established our working groups in Peking and the Chinese one in Washington, nonetheless communications were such that a certain amount of our communications back and forth were still done through our embassy in Paris. And also I was supposed to deal with both the North Vietnamese, because we had no other place where we could have contacts with the exception of occasionally in Saigon. But the major turnover point was in Paris, and I was charged with that. And then also, of course, working on liaison with the Lao and the Cambodians for the fallout of the peace agreement, and then dealing with the French Government.

Q: Well, it would seem that in a way your connection to our embassy outside of for administrative support was rather thin.

PRATT: Well, it was, and basically I was expected to be working primarily for Washington. For example, we worked out later on when we started new talks with the Vietnamese, it was the DCM in Paris who had these talks with Hanoi's DCM, and he, of course, provided a certain amount of supervision, as did the American ambassador because they were both interested in this.

Q: Who were they?

PRATT: Well, there were three ambassadors there. Watson was just departing, so he was out. He, I think, formally left a little later. Then they had Kenneth Rush, and then we had Art Hartman [Ed: see Hartman's ADST interview]. Oh, I'm sorry, we had Jack Irwin first. Jack Irwin, Kenneth Rush, and Art Hartman. So there are four ambassadors inside my period there, but three that I dealt with.

Q: Well, let's talk about the money first. This was essentially a non-starter.

PRATT: Well, we thought it would be a non-starter - that is, the unofficial sort of people who discuss things in the Department of State - because we felt that the major interest of the

Vietnamese was not in getting money. They had never been good capitalists. Their interest was in getting, for their own people primarily, admission of guilt for the U.S. in fighting an aggressive war, and we sort of figured that would not be easy to get out, certainly, of Nixon, and maybe Congress wouldn't like it. So that was one of the things which you may remember, because I was there when Nixon and Ford and Carter were President. There were three Presidents. And so at no point was the Congress ever prepared to do what would have to be labeled "reparations" or pass for reparations, and even when Carter wanted to give them and Holbrooke had sort of worked them out, the Congress blocked it. And of course it was quite a bit later. But from the early period, and I've forgotten who was the head of this, it was a political appointee who was sent out there to renegotiate it, and he tried to keep me out of things as much as possible, but of course I would generally find out what they were doing anyway. There was, of course, need to know, and I had to know the general atmosphere because I had to discuss this with others. But again, it was going to be sent directly back to Henry Kissinger, and there's no question but that the terms that Hanoi wanted were not terms that Henry would be prepared to give, so those talks resulted in a kind of document which was the best they could do, and then we never went anywhere with it.

Q: Were you talking to your North Vietnamese counterparts at this point?

PRATT: Yes.

Q: Did they seem to be other than messengers, or how did you see them?

PRATT: Well, they sent special people out from Hanoi to negotiate with . . . Williams I guess his name was. And so this was a separate kind of channel. I would deal with the embassy personnel on arranging for messages to be sent back and forth. For example, if we had Sunny Montgomery coming out to talk about trying to get more information about POWs and MIAs and so on, then I would be the one to arrange this and accompany them to see the North Vietnamese and so on. So I would handle all of the stuff except for the actual negotiation on the so-called "reparations agreement." And my contacts would tell me, because they would be told more by their negotiating team what was going on than I would be able to get easily out of Williams and his crew - although I say Williams and his crew were very competent and they were good people.

But it was, I think, fairly clear that the Vietnamese, as we would have predicted, were continuing to be not so much interested in the money, which they felt they were going to be able to get out of the Soviets in ways which they thought would be less destructive to their society than getting reparations from the U.S., so that they were primarily interested in something which would look like an admission of war guilt.

Q: That wasn't in the cards at all, was it, from our side?

PRATT: We thought it wouldn't be in the card. We thought that regardless . . . But we weren't so sure when Carter came in because when Carter came in, of course, he sent his emissary, Don White, who basically beat his breast and said that, basically, Carter wanted to let bygones be bygones and have mutual forgiveness and let's go to church together and sing the same hymn.

Q: So there was concern about the Carter crew, that they seemed to be full of Christian forgiveness and all, that they might come up and say something that might, in a way, let our side down. Was that a concern?

PRATT: Well, we felt he had the full authority as President to make such a policy shift; however, we did not think it would get by the Congress, and in the end it didn't. And I'm sure that under our current President, after all, we did reestablish relations with Hanoi. It was a few years after Carter, perhaps.

Q: We're talking about the Clinton Administration.

PRATT: The Clinton Administration, of course. And so we get another sort of anti-war crew in, coming with hat in hand. And of course times have changed in Hanoi as well. The same old people, some of them are still there, but some of them have gone, and they're not holding out for the same reparations. However, they will get recognition, and they will get trade, and of course we would all say that, well, times have changed, water has gone under the bridge, and so on. But we did not feel that in the immediate aftermath of a very bitter war - because it had been not perhaps quite so bitter on the ground there as it was inside the United States, but it was not one which left a political climate which would be congenial for somebody like Carter himself and his views. But even before that, the reaction of the Congress had been very clear, and I think both Nixon and Ford read the Congress well enough to know. And that, of course, was another aspect of my little struggle in Paris, and that was the POW-MIA question.

Q: Yes, I wanted to ask about that. Before we move to that, though, just to finish up on the money side, there has been sort of rather grandiose talk about a big Mekong Delta plan and all this. Was there sort of a plan in your hip pocket or the negotiators hip pocket that if this thing did open up this is what we'd do?

PRATT: Well, there has long been a Mekong project under the United Nations, and one of the key things which we had been working on even while the war was going on was the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. And therefore, even farther down from the Mekong it was considered that there was work to be done. I'm sure, given the importance of the Mekong to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, that it would have been one of the things which would have been what we would have prepared to provide greater support for. So indeed, there was supposed to be quite a bit in the way of rebuilding, and of course rebuilding also in North Vietnam - port facilities and things of that sort. So yes, there were some very good projects which had been identified even before the war reached its peak as good projects and which would have obviously been ones which resurfaced if you could ever pacify the area. So, sensible projects were in abundance, and we were prepared to give quite a bit, and even Henry Kissinger talked about 13 billion. They were figures which were bandied about and all denied, but nonetheless some of them seemed to make some sense. It was indeed what appeared to be a fair amount of money that we were prepared to provide. However, know under the terms that it would be considered reparations, and never tied directly to the sort of thing which would permit it to be called reparation. So the Vietnamese deprived themselves of this. I think it would have perhaps collapsed anyway when they moved into the Parrot's Beak and certainly when they occupied all of South Vietnam as well.

Q: Just to continue on this particular side before we move to the other, was the situation on the ground, were we coming back and saying, "No, we're not going to talk about money" - you've done this or that, which is a violation of the truce agreement and all that?

PRATT: No, it didn't look as though we were going to get out from under. I think they took the proposals back and said we would study it, there are things we still don't like in there. And this, of course, by that time, we were getting very close to the North Vietnamese decision to move full-force against the South. Remember that was, after all, 1975 by that time. So we went through a year or more of these negotiations, and that, I think, got them fairly close to their preparations for moving against the South because after all we'd made it very clear that we were going to continue to remove our forces. And of course the Congress refusing to permit money to be voted for military equipment for the South was giving a very clear indication that the North Vietnamese had won their war in the United States.

Q: But it also meant that if it wasn't going to give it to the South, it sure as hell wasn't going to give it to the North.

PRATT: That's right. And that was, I think, why they decided. They may have held back in their invasion of the South to see if they could get some of this money first, but then I think that they saw that the chances of their getting the money were not very good, and if they did start getting it, it would be cut off the minute they invaded the South. So I think they decided this was good as to see what the U.S. might be prepared to do, and when it wasn't going to do what they needed, then to hell with it.

Q: Well, when they invaded in full force in the first part of 1975, did that stop all the talks?

PRATT: They had stopped before then.

Q: Why?

PRATT: On the economic side? Well, our turnover had never stopped, and we had a hiatus at that point, in fact, slightly before that. But the money talks had just been dropped, I think, sometime in 1974.

Q: Well, then, let's talk about a problem that still remains with us, sort of an artificial problem, the missing in action, the prisoners of war thing. What were we doing when you got to Paris? What were your marching orders on this issue?

PRATT: Well, the only marching orders we in Paris had were to research the French experience, which had already to a great extent been done by a special contract to the Rand Corporation, so that one would be able to have an accounting and be able to address, for example, to find out where persons were buried, if they had died in captivity, and registration of this sort of thing. And then, of course, we were going to work on the recovery of remains. And so we would be doing all of our discussions there. We, for example, whenever we were going to have . . . this would be later, of course, after 1975, that we would actually be sending planes in, but we would arrange that sort of thing through Paris. It was, as I say, our turnover point. So we were basically

waiting to find out how many came out, whether they all came out, dealing with the French Government to find out if the French, who had, after all, an ambassador in Hanoi, could provide us any indication as to whether the "Hanoi Hilton" is now emptied or do they still have some people there. And of course, we always are dealing with the French, trying to find out if they had gotten through any of their contacts any information about places where they might be held or whether they indeed had all come out.

Now in Paris, we were basically sharing the views of the people we were depending on later on as well that they were not holding any people. Now, we had to take what they said and parse it, because they said that "we are not continuing to hold any prisoners." Now we tried to tell Washington what that means, that is the terminology they used also with the French, but it did not apply to Senegalese troops who had deserted from the French Army and had asked to remain in Vietnam, married Vietnamese wives and so forth. So we were not surprised when - I've forgotten the name of the chap now who finally was released years afterwards - and we wouldn't be have been surprised particularly if some African-American had done what the Senegalese had done - perhaps they had met some of the Senegalese and the Senegalese persuaded them to stay on, life isn't half bad here - because they were very good at driving wedges between various aspects of the American military. So some people may have rallied to, to put it militarily, rallied to the North Vietnamese side and they therefore were not considered still to be POWs.

Q: Now it's still an issue today - I think it's basically a fake issue - that somehow or other the Vietnamese are holding prisoners of war somewhere. Did the French - I mean obviously we were looking at the mass capture of troops at Dien Bien Phu and other places - did the French have the feeling that there were any prisoners of war - not deserters, but prisoners of war - who remained in North Vietnam afterwards?

PRATT: Well, there they believed, as we did, that maybe it's going to take a month or so to make sure that they have gotten the word around everywhere that if you've got anybody, for God's sake send them in, because anyone who disappeared in the last weeks of the conflict might possibly be in a remote area and they hadn't gotten the word yet. I mean they don't know the war's over. So we thought that perhaps there could be some short delay, but we did not think that they were lying about this question - not that they didn't lie about almost everything else, but the point is that one question where it was put in such a way that the only way that others said they were lying was that they would not answer the question which we put: Do you hold any Americans? They would not answer that question, so we knew that, yes, they did have some who were there, but they were not considered by them to be prisoners. So we did not consider that then, of course, this whole question about all these prisoners supposed to be held in Laos - we felt that was a red herring, that for the most part it was people who had gone down in areas where the control was in the hands of the Vietnamese, not even, shall we say, indirectly through the Lao Communists, but directly to their own Communists, and that they were being sent back to Vietnam. They may have died en route, and of course a number of people may have been killed when they first came down because sometimes the troops weren't that disciplined. But the thing is, we did not feel that this was . . . I mean, I had to deal with the league of families quite frequently, and I think that they were - even though we thought they were somewhat misguided - nonetheless, we thought that they were honest in their concerns to make sure that everybody got out and we didn't believe that they were correct in saying that they thought all these people were

still there.

Q: During the Vietnam conflict, several of our people, like Philip Manhart and others, had been picked up and basically held out in the hills somewhere by the Viet Cong and all that. Did we feel that this was just a matter of some months, of making sure that the word had gotten through?

PRATT: Yes, we did. As you know, Phil Manhart finally got the word.

Q: Had the cottage industry which is still going on today, particularly in Thailand and all, of entrepreneurs who were picking up pictures of so-called prisoners of war being held - had this started yet?

PRATT: It started.

Q: I mean the creating of artifacts to show that there was a cadre out there.

PRATT: Yes, this, of course, was after 1975.

Q: Yes.

PRATT: And even, for example, Phoumi Nosavan got his son cranked up to get involved in this in the hopes of getting U.S. support moved back into Laos. At that time Laos had a Communist government, and what did a good anti-Communist do except to offer his services and find out some things that the Americans might possibly want, such as dog tags and reports of American prisoners in the mainline area. We found that most of this was fabrication of various sorts. Even as late as when I was in Guangdong we had people coming up in to China purporting to have reports of some people still being held somewhere in Vietnam. So indeed yes, when people can't make money without working too hard, they generally find a way of doing it. We were concerned about the way in which the U.S. military handled it, but we knew how difficult it was for them. They had established a big office in Washington and, of course, had undertaken a number of studies, and they sent a lot of people out, so they did not want to call the National League of POW/MIA Families [Ed: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director] or groups of the press. They knew that they were mostly well meaning and so on, while many of these persons, of course, in the military realized they were trying to get maximum pay benefits, which if they had a husband who was missing in action pay, including combat pay et cetera and automatic promotions, would continue until they could establish probable death. Therefore, the family had no incentive to try to have that straightened out until the wife decided she wanted to be married. And so there were all kinds of stories about just what this really meant for a lot of people. But nonetheless, for the most part, I think the Defense Department leaned over backwards to try to follow up on any story. They didn't believe there was any prison camp or even two straggling prisoners around there by that time, but the thing is they weren't going to turn it off. So I think all the attacks saying that we abandoned our POWs in that whole area of Laos and Cambodia I think is misguided, and all the films that they turn out - you know "Rambo" this and that - are certainly keeping alive something which deserved a much speedier death.

Q: Well, had it turned into a real political issue? Today it represents - God, we're talking about

25 years later - had it turned into a right-wing conservative political issue at that time, or was it mainly groups, during this time you were dealing with it, around the families and all, as opposed to sort of a political movement in the United States?

PRATT: Well, I think that it has a little bit of each. The families were there to be exploited by other people. They had their other political agenda, and that often included people who were anti-war people, who wanted to consider that we shouldn't have done the war at all and when the war was over we should have fought a war to get our MIA back.

Q: How did you find the North Vietnamese in dealing with this issue? Were they understanding and businesslike, or what was their attitude?

PRATT: Well, I was dealing for the most part with a very, I thought, professional man who was fairly young. He had been involved in the war against the French, I believe, but had then gone into the Foreign Ministry. His French was pretty good, and this was always in a very professional manner because, of course, he would basically report back what I said to him and then give me the report in from Hanoi. He was not embroidering too much, and very clearly they had been somewhat prepared for this by the way in which the French had handled their prisoner and death issue following the war. And the French have perhaps an even stronger motivation than our government had in that there was a provision in French law which requires anyone who is *mort pour la patrie* to either have his remains brought back and put into a military cemetery or elsewhere, if the family itself is not in France, with perpetual care for the grave, or being in a foreign graveyard which is basically supervised, at least, if not run by the French. And so whenever . . . for example, on one occasion Hanoi wanted to take over one of the cemeteries inside Hanoi for some building project and wanted to move these bodies from that to another, they had to go through a whole rigmarole of trying to find out from each family whether they wanted the body to be reburied in this other cemetery or whether on this occasion they wanted the remains sent back to France. So they had been accustomed to dealing with the French on these matters, which from their point of view were a bit extraneous because, they, after all, never really made much of an effort to recover their own dead.

Q: Of course, the project was a mess, but what was the Vietnamese culture regarding the remains of dead?

PRATT: Well, of course, in their circumstances of peace, they have to a certain extent a cult of the dead. They have their cemeteries. They don't exactly worship their ancestors, but nonetheless, the tombs of their ancestors are very important. So that part they understand. But during wartime, when it's difficult to do this, then of course you have to abandon some of your usual rules. So they were not making a great to-do about getting back from South Vietnam the bodies of the North Vietnamese who were killed there. In the first place, most of them, they said, were not there. Anyway, it was nothing but the South Vietnamese doing all this. But what I think amazed them more than anything else - and this, of course, was later on when we began to send out our forensic boys - the fact that they were able, from a bone here and there, to sort out the remains, because sometimes bones were put together, and sometimes they would include bones of a Vietnamese in with the bones of an American. And the fact that they were able to determine all this and that we would go to the point of doing it sending in all these big forensic teams and

all this aircraft and all this equipment and so on and then shipping them off to Honolulu and sending a report back saying, Well, you gave us four bodies, you thought, but it's really three plus parts of two others. So this, I think, the technical aspect, was something which they were amazed that we could do as much as we could do.

Q: Well, let's talk about the French side of this whole equation, not just about the bodies missing in action but on your work with the French on this whole liaison and being point man dealing with the Vietnamese and reports from the embassy. What was your impression of how the French supported or worked with us?

PRATT: Well, obviously two very diverging trends in France - it's no more united, I guess, than the U.S. is. But as you were aware, I'm sure, at the time, there was a whole group within the French Government, and that included the Foreign Ministry, included political figures, included the military, who were still smarting from their defeat in Indochina and were quite determined to enjoy the U.S. defeat and to gloat over every aspect of it. One of Dolores's friends back in this country was married to somebody, a French woman, who used to rub her hands with glee every time casualty figures came in on the American side. So indeed, there was that whole trend within France. But you know, the French have always had a love-hate relationship with the U.S. anyway, and on the other side there were persons who, of course, wished us well and hoped that we would not have such a feckless government as they had had fighting against Hanoi and therefore would be able to succeed where they had not. And we found those persons as much in Saigon and in Vientiane as in Paris. And in addition to that, you had, of course, the real professionals, and these professionals, like Challier, who had been ambassador in Hanoi and then ambassador in Peking and when I was there was working within the French Foreign Ministry on the problems of resettlement of the Vietnamese, because when Saigon fell there were just as many boat people who wanted to go join their family members in France as wanted to come to the United States, maybe more. France took certainly, on a per capita basis, far more refugees than we did, and of course we had people coming over and lecturing them about how they ought to do their share. And Challier was very gentle in explaining how they were doing already a good deal more of their share than we were doing of ours. And I think that we really had a lot of good friends who went out of their way, for example, over the whole grave question and repatriation of remains and so on. They had an organization there which spent hours with... Some people came out and wrote a full report, and then other people came out and didn't even know that the Defense Department already had in its library a report which they had already laboriously provided for them. Whenever I wanted to see them, I could get to see them. They were really leaning over backwards. So yes, we had that side, the very admirable side of the French.

At the same time, we had the bloody-minded people who just wanted to stick their finger in the U.S. eye, and they had a good chance to gloat and to cause us problems. This was something which had existed from the time of the Paris Talks on. Even at the end of the French involvement in 1954 they were pretty nasty, and then they were nasty again in the Geneva agreements of 1962. And you have this whole trend. And I'm sure they didn't think they were being nasty to the Americans. It's just that they obviously so much understood Hanoi and the whole Asia so much better than the Americans did, and therefore they wouldn't have made any of the mistakes that the U.S. had made. The fact that they already had made them, and made them under circumstances where they had less of an excuse - because loads of people knew that area very

well . . . So this included people like, shall we say, the chap who was then there during the '70s and handled the Asian bureau and then was ambassador to Peking - Manach, a very strange French name [inaudible], I think. And these were the old socialists, and that strain of anti-Americanism was very much alive in much of the Foreign Ministry.

Q: Well, were we using our connections there? I mean were you involved in trying to figure out what was happening in Hanoi, because this goes with the time, how the truce implementation went and then the takeover? The French were sitting there. Did we use that, and were you involved in that aspect?

PRATT: Well, of course, I would have regular meetings with the people in the French Foreign Ministry and others who would talk about what their perception was of what was going on in both North and South Vietnam. And yes, I would send in their estimates. Of course, it's a fairly closed society, and therefore it's not easy to get too much hard information, but the impressions and what information they did have, they were often prepared to provide to us. Not all of them - as I say, there was that very nationalistic, anti-American side of some French which meant that they wanted to make sure that we were led astray so we would do ourselves the maximum harm. But that was not what I found among many of the more professional people who realized that they had had their chance in Indochina, and De Gaulle himself said let's forget about it, it's past, and so let's not try to just wish ill on the Americans just because we failed ourselves. And as I say, the people who were most important to us, namely those who could be of assistance in trying to get out persons for whom we felt a responsibility - they were very helpful, and they understood this and they themselves were trying very hard to deal with Hanoi to get out the persons from South Vietnam who were important to them. As you know, some of the people who had been involved with us, in talks in Paris or something of the sort, were taken prisoner there and sent to education camps. Some of them had French connections, and the French tried very hard to help get them out, and we, of course, would go to the French and say we know that you are aware of such-and-such; what we have heard is the following; I'm sure you have more information; we also have an interest in seeing if this person can be gotten out of the education camps from which he might not emerge alive.

So in general it was the usual mixed bag of dealing with the French, which is that some of them are marvelous, but difficult, and some of them are difficult, but marvelous.

Q: What about after the fall of South Vietnam, were you continuing to talk to the North Vietnamese?

PRATT: Yes, well, we resumed our talks very shortly after that because we had to find out about including some Americans who were still there. There are always a few stragglers, and on the American side, people go out to do some ethnographic music in the Highlands and, you know, what's happened to them? So yes, we started to have our talks again. These were not designed to do anything about the previous negotiations. They were considered by that time a dead letter, although it was occasionally still mentioned by people in Hanoi, the reparation, as one of the unfinished business between us. Nevertheless, they knew that that was just for the benefit of their own people, not out of any hope to get anything going. Of course, as I mentioned, when Carter came in they picked up considerably.

Q: Talking about the cleaning up after the fall of South Vietnam, were we getting people out? For example, Saigon must have had still a considerable number of deserters. There was a whole deserter colony in Saigon of GIs who had gone AWOL. They were deserters by this time and living in the black market. Were we trying to get these people out?

PRATT: Well, we were trying to make sure that . . . When families came to us we would ask what information they could provide on some of these people. However, things were sufficiently chaotic, so we didn't expect really to get much in the way of answers down there. And of course very quickly the boat people started arriving. That, by the way, is another whole and rather shameful chapter. I think the United States behaved rather badly in that.

Q: Before we move to the boat people, were you taking any information the families would have and passing it on to the North Vietnamese and saying where was so and so and do you have any information?

PRATT: Yes.

Q: How would they accept that?

PRATT: Well, they'd accept whatever we gave them. They wouldn't necessarily ever respond. I think for the most part we never got a response.

Q: Where all of a sudden an agricultural researcher in the Highlands who sort of disappeared, would he or she surface?

PRATT: Did surface, did get out.

Q: I mean this is not a matter of putting and holding. In a way it was pretty much they were trying to clean up and not leave these people.

PRATT: That's right. They were trying to get rid of these people. They didn't want them around.

Q: What about people, for example, we would have Vietnamese that we'd say, Look, can you let so-and-so - we're talking about a South Vietnamese national who's got a sick mother in the United States or something - and can you just . . . if you let him go, we'll take care of him or something like that? Were we trying any of that?

PRATT: Not at that point. Later on we were prepared, by transmission or to tell the family in the United States how to address their own communication. And so we'd say we think it would be better if you were to raise this personally, and you send it to the Vietnamese Embassy in Paris, Mr. So-and-so, and say that this is a family unification matter, and you would like to be able to promise that you will support this person and please let him leave and so on. The French were doing the same thing. The French were trying then to get out people, and of course the last thing they wanted to do was to have everybody get off by boat.

Q: Did you get involved in the boat people business.

PRATT: Yes, well, we were handling much of it there and trying very hard to get all the people concerned - that means countries as well as private organizations - to provide what assistance they could and also trying to make sure that ships implemented the law of the sea. Because under maritime law, if a ship comes across a vessel in distress, they are required to stop, pick up the people, and they may offload them at the nearest port. Well, unfortunately, out in that neck of the woods, the nearest port is not very close. Secondly, it may not be the port to which they are heading. In the third place, none of these ports may be willing to offload these Vietnamese. And in the fourth place, no matter what happens, it delays you and costs you money. So they were constantly passing by . . . Some countries did not do that. Some countries gave instructions to all their flag carriers to follow strictly the maritime law, and I believe that American carriers got those instructions, and I think for the most part they lived up to them. But of course you had the Lebanon and Panama and Liberia registries, and of course God knows, it was probably a Greek who owned the ship, and these were not really living up to these requirements. And we had, of course, an office in the Department of State which was trying to handle this refugee migration matter and so forth - Frank Sieverts. And we were trying to see whether we could get maybe even a tougher U.S. law which could penalize foreign carriers if they failed to implement the maritime law, and deny them U.S. ports or something or other. And I guess they looked into it and decided it was much too cumbersome, too difficult, and so we did not follow through. We did not try anything more than just try to make sure that our own flag carriers did not violate the maritime laws. But a lot of people died because these ships passed them by.

Q: How about the French? Do they-

PRATT: They tried. I think the French flag was probably pretty good. Well, of course, you know, they have felt a sense of continuing responsibility for almost all of their colonies anyway, and therefore, they were taking, as I said, far more Vietnamese into France, per capita, than we were. And I think that at all points they were sort of among the most active. And I'm sure some French ships probably didn't stop, but the French Government made every effort to make sure that any ship which was under their discipline would do something even though it would cost them time and money.

Q: Did you, in your capacity as this liaison person, tap the Vietnamese community in Paris at all?

PRATT: Yes, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao. And obviously my time was limited in doing this, but I had best contacts with the Lao, but also good contacts that I gradually built up to some of the Cambodians because they were interested in having their views conveyed at a time when we were still important there in Phnom Penh. And then after the Khmer Rouge took over, they of course were interested in seeing what we could manage to do to help, particularly some of their relatives, because there was not much we could do but, of course, we had contacts with more people perhaps in Thailand than they had, and of course they were able to escape out to Thailand.

One of my contacts, for example, at the Cambodian Embassy was called back to Phnom Penh

and was there when Phnom Penh fell, and he was, I believe, part Vietnamese origin, and he know that if he tried to go toward Thailand the Khmer Rouge would get him and, of course, kill him because he was educated. And he went back through the highlands in Vietnam and into southern Laos and from there was able to get out through the UNHCR. And of course when he was able to get out and back to his family in Paris, he gave me quite a report on his trek. He eventually went down to Abidjan for a while. So that's the kind of person whom I would talk to to get what information he could provide.

Q: Talking about the time you were in Paris, 1978, were we aware of the enormity of what happened in Cambodia at the time?

PRATT: Yes.

Q: How were the French reacting?

PRATT: Well, the French felt particularly - I can't say "responsible," but particularly concerned - because they blamed us for the polarization by our behavior over Sihanouk. However, they also knew that the Khmer Rouge movement-

Q: It has a French name even.

PRATT: That's right. Pol Pot - or Saloth Sar, as he was originally known - and Ieng Sary and Thio Som Po and so forth - all of these person imbibed their Communist in France. They were not part of the Vietnamese Communist movement as Kun Sen is, but instead were the French intellectual side of Communist, and so of course they saw this as a direct implementation of the most anarchistic and chaotic and extremist type of political movement and having very good roots in France. Not in Marxism - well, in Marxism, perhaps, but not Leninism. In any case, the French were very concerned about what was happening in Cambodia, and they, of course, were in the forefront of trying to protect some of the people and trying to get them out, particularly as Phnom Penh was falling. The French ambassador had in his compound a large number of persons who would have been, in fact, Sirik Matak was there first and then decided he should not take refuge in a foreign embassy and went out to his death. So the French were very, very concerned about this, and of course they continued to have information on what was going on and to of course see that we got it. So we were not unaware of the killing fields.

Q: Speaking of the French intellectuals, they always occupy an important place within the French social and political life. Were they of interest to you in your job, or socially? I was wondering how they were reacting? Here they had been sort of anti-American and things were falling apart in Indochina and it wasn't a nice scene. It wasn't the nice clean, tidy parlor Communism that many of them had ascribed to.

PRATT: Well, of course, there again, the French intellectuals are even more divided, I think, than they would ever be in the United States. I of course had a great deal of respect for and enjoyed talking with people like Raymond Aron, who of course I think, as a good Jewish intellectual, was pretty solid, and a number of other journalists and writers. But one of the problems I had with many of them, of course, was that they would have their opinions first and

then seeing what facts would fit. That, of course, is not something which is unique to the French by any means.

Q: No.

PRATT: But it did mean that even some of the persons whom I would deal with fairly frequently because they were scholars on China and so forth were ones whom I would deal with as best I could, but still often I would find that their positions were, you know . . . it was very difficult to argue with them because they had already had their conclusions, and any facts I gave them would be of interest only if they happened to fit in. But that was not true of many of the others. For example, on the China side there was General [Jacques] Guillerma, who had been one of the famous line of French military officers who did some of the best reporting out of China in the late 1940's and early '50s. And he was sent by De Gaulle to Taiwan, for example, to break the news to Chiang Kai-shek that De Gaulle would be recognizing Peking. And he was head of a Chinese institute there. They did very, very good work. They were very conscientious. Others, however, were just, well, particularly of course the Communists - they had real problems after the Sino-Soviet split because, of course, the French Communist Party was basically dominated by the Stalinist Russian side, and so of course it was bound to be somewhat against Mao, but then of course you had another crew that just loved Mao because he was more of a French-type intellectual. And of course even the intellectuals who were not Communists Peyrefitte [Ed: ?], for example, who recently died, and others of that sort - were often very pro-Mao and pro-China. Of course, they saw a very different China from just a purely political one; they saw it as a great empire on the cultural side and philosophical side and all the rest. There was Mao, the great philosopher king. Well, I saw quite a few of them, but I didn't have time to cover the full range, and it was not my principal focal point because I needed to be kept up on what the facts were and what the French Government's position was and how they intended to implement it. These influences on the French Government, which you get from the writers, both scholars and journalists, were, of course, something I would follow in order to be able better to predict what might be a governmental decision.

Q: Did the intellectuals have an influence on the Foreign Ministry and the people you were dealing with, on the government?

PRATT: Yes, somewhat. But what they wrote would have an impact based upon the political level, not the working level. The working level had to be concerned about it, to know what it is that their minister might have read in the morning *Express*, and therefore what he might be telling them they ought to do and what they ought to look into. The French politician, of course, found that China was always something from which you could get benefit. In other words, China was good news, good copy, and anybody . . . It was Giscard who went there representing the National Association of Manufacturers, of the *patronat*, and other people going there representing aspects of the government and the establishment - they all would have very nice things to say about China because China was well regarded in France. And it doesn't make any difference whether it's under the Cultural Revolution or the anti-cultural revolution and so on. They probably preferred the news they could get out of Mao and the Cultural Revolution to what they could get out of Deng Xiaoping, who is much more pragmatic and therefore not so French. But as I say, the other side of the intellectuals, of course . . . I don't know whether you are aware

of Pierre Ryckmans (writer, sinologist) (born 28 September 1935, in Brussels, Belgium), who also uses the pen-name Simon Leys,, a Belgian really, but someone whose works, in French, had been most highly critical of the Chinese Government. He's somebody who has a great admiration for the Chinese and their culture but does not consider that their politics is something for which they are most gifted, unlike art and poetry and literature and philosophy and so forth. Politics is not their forte. In any case, you would find that as well in France, but regardless of that, China always is something that the French are interested in.

Q: Well, maybe this would be a good place to stop, I think. Was there any other aspect of your time there we should talk about up to 1978?

PRATT: Well, let's see. I think that the interesting thing, of course, was the fading of Kissinger from the scene. We found, of course, that Brzezinski came in and apparently -

Q: As national security adviser to Carter.

PRATT: He seemed to be picking up - we might have said - the bad habits, but he I'm sure would say the intelligent approach to his role that Kissinger had adopted. And of course it was later on that we saw the sharpest dispute between Brzezinski and Vance, but already this was part of the framework that we noted for matters which were of import to me, anyway. The Indochinese and Chinese areas were ones which were also of importance to Brzezinski, and therefore one found the same problem of secrecy, of obfuscation, and of conflict. And of course this put many of these problems which I faced into the basket of the difficult things. Do I aim this for one or for the other? What can I expect to have happen when I do some of these things? And this, of course, when we began our new discussions with the Vietnamese after Carter eventually came in on the problem with the trip to Hanoi and also Woodcock, and then the efforts in Paris to get things going, which I think I should discuss the next time because the framework of that was also difficult in dealing with our own government because our own government does not want to deal with its own people.

Q: Today is the 12th of January, 2000. Mark, when you heard what we said the last time, do you want to pick it up from there for a while?

PRATT: Well, I think that the key aspect of the entry of Carter was of course the personality of Carter himself. I'm sure many others have commented on much of his approach to foreign policy and the importance to him of his religion. And of course it made it very uncomfortable for people who have their own religions views but do not necessarily believe that religion is the best direct guide for handling politics and particularly foreign affairs.

Q: Could you explain as you say it what was his religion and what thrust did this give to his approach to foreign policy?

PRATT: Well, I think the key thing mentioned impacted on me, but I think we can see it in, say, his approach to Africa and other countries - the desire for peace and his trip to Korea and so forth

- but as it affected Vietnam, it was the Christian view, which I can respect but don't agree with, that we had fought a bad war, morally, in Vietnam and therefore he should be having the U.S. atone for this. And he, of course, wished to be able to establish relations with Hanoi. He wished to, in effect, apologize for the war and try to if not get political reparations, nonetheless from his point of view moral reparations for what he considered to have been an unjust or immoral war in Vietnam.

Q: Was this palpable when he came in? You were still in Paris dealing with Vietnam.

PRATT: I was the only turnover point at that time. After the fall of Saigon, we basically had all of our contacts, such as there were, in Paris. Of course, we did have things we had to talk about. Not all of them were ones that you were willing to raise in any meaningful way, but nonetheless, whatever you were prepared to do, and often we were acting on behalf of the Congress because, as you well know, the Foreign Service is the Foreign Service of the United States, it's not the Foreign Service of the President. So when Congress wished to be very active about missing-in-action or something of that sort, then we were expected to be of assistance. And indeed, we were. So it forced us occasionally to get involved with the North Vietnamese when, probably, the President and Secretary of State would not have been so happy to have done so. But when Carter came in, he of course was most anxious to do so. Of course, one of the early acts was to send Leonard Woodcock to Hanoi [Ed: March 1977], in effect to try to move things toward recognition. Obviously it was very early in that process, but that was the flavor of that trip. In addition, in order to emphasize this approach, Woodcock got all of the State Department people whom he was forced to take along because they were the experts and knew the languages and all that stuff, forced them out of any meeting which he considered important. This, of course, was again an aspect of the Carter view that the *Realpolitik* of the State Department was something he had to get around, and to do that he had to get his own people and to be as much against the State Department as any Republican had been who was suspicious of these liberals in the State Department.

Q: Well, this is interesting. We'll talk about the Woodcock thing, but when Carter came in, since you were the point man for the Vietnamese-American contacts, did you sense a change in attitude, the fact that they'd read Carter and figured that they could, in a way, get more out of us than previously? Were you aware of anything like that at your level?

PRATT: Well, somewhat, because, of course, the signals were coming, indeed, from the White House about the desire on the part of the President to overturn what he considered then to be a Republican policy, you know, a Nixon policy, which was, from his point of view, I guess, immoral. But more important, one could see that the forces in Hanoi were what drove them more than anything else. In other words, we may think that only the United States had domestic politics, but Hanoi had a lot of them, and of course the top leadership, their whole framework had changed with the collapse of Saigon, and the relative strengths of various groups and what they ought to be doing with each other, who was up and who was down, which one was pro-Chinese and which one was not, which one was really totally concerned with the concerns of Moscow and nationalism and so forth. There were various trends there, which meant that they had to treat the United States in a particular way for their own internal needs.

Q: Were we getting any feedback - I mean particularly you - about what was going on in Hanoi and any feel for the various currents that were going on there?

PRATT: We were not getting too much. Of course, we had nobody of our own in Hanoi. I was also not getting much of the intelligence information coming out from Hong Kong and persons whom we were using as agents there, but I would get a bit from the French themselves, but the French had their own national interest and their own way of chivvying things to serve their interest. And as I mentioned the last time, we had a series of heads of the Asian department in the Quai d'Orsay who were basically very, well, they're not anti-American in the sense that they were opposed to what the U.S. was doing in the U.S., but the point is they were very much suspicious of and against what they considered U.S. policy in Asia to be. So we were not getting at the political level the kind of insights which would have been much more helpful, but we were getting a great deal of direct information from the lower level of the Quai, which was concerned about facts, as we tried to be in the State Department, and less concerned about the great political games.

So, yes, we were getting certain information about what was going on in Hanoi, and yet we had to extrapolate because, of course, that society was perhaps even more closed than was Peking society. And Ho Chi Minh, particularly during his lifetime and for a short time thereafter, was a unifying force which one did not have in China because after all in China from the early 1950s on there had been fights within the top leadership and purges and all the rest of it. One did not see much of that, and to this day, you know, we still have not seen much in the way of open fights going on in Hanoi, with one exception. But we nonetheless knew that there were various strains because the war had been such a unifying force. Once it was over, then, of course you would quarrel about how you managed the next stage, what you'd do *vis-à-vis* Cambodia, your next-door neighbor, what you'd do about the agreement you'd previously arrived at in 1970 with the Chinese about giving greater independence to the Lao and Cambodian Communist movements, and then of course how you would handle the border area with China. So there were a number of issues which would be viewed differently and of which strains would have to be handled without the moderating and overall influence of a Ho Chi Minh because they, of course, lost their great leader.

Q: He died in, what, September 1969?

PRATT: I'm sorry, you're right - 1969. So this had occurred before. But as I said, they were able to carry on as though he were still sitting there.

Q: And the war was still keeping them together.

PRATT: That's what I mean, and it was basically his framework that was behind it.

Q: Well, it's January 21, 1977. The Carter Administration comes in. What were you doing and how did you proceed at this point? Was there the usual hiatus while they were sort of putting their administration in place?

PRATT: Somewhat, although of course very quickly on, as you know, he did get some staffers in

to the White House and into the State Department for handling foreign affairs. And of course Dick Holbrooke came in as assistant secretary for East Asia, and he apparently had established a kind of relationship - less so than perhaps some others, because he wasn't, after all, from Georgia - so he was in and, of course, had his own history with Vietnam, and also, working in the White House, he had his own personal desire, I think, to move things along in East Asia, in particular with Vietnam.

Q: What were you doing? The Carter Administration is in. You're kind of a point person in Paris. What were you doing?

PRATT: Well, whenever there was a message to be passed, that was where it was passed, and this would be, for example, if we were going to have Sonny Montgomery [Ed: Mississippi Democratic congressman] come to talk about MIA issues, we would have to make all of the arrangements for the aircraft and so on. So we also had information which we would sometimes want to get about certain Vietnamese in the South, some of whom had worked very closely with us. And we were often asking whether they could find us any information about this. A lot of them were the same persons the French were asking about, and occasionally we'd get the information via the French, generally a more thorough report. But whatever it was, and of course, any meetings, anything we wanted - for example, the Woodcock visit - we had to set all that up in Paris. He was taking his own aircraft in, and one had to say what aircraft it would be, where it would take from, where it would be landing, and so forth. We had to get the information and say what facilities they had, what airfield to land at, what were the means of getting the airplane started through ground equipment or whether they had to bring in their own ground equipment.

Q: Did you have a feeling that, yes, there was activity there but at the same time that sort of this whole apparatus of the Department of State and the military, the Pentagon, and everyone else, had been so focused on Vietnam that all of a sudden it was sort of, "Well, we lost that one," and getting on with it and in away, except for these efforts, which are based a lot on missing-in-action but also the Woodcock visit, that it almost passed off the radar of the foreign policy apparatus?

PRATT: Well, we thought it had basically gone off the screen when Ford and Kissinger were calling the tune, because then, of course, Vietnam was something where we couldn't go ahead with any of the economic stuff because of the demands of Hanoi that it be cast as reparations and the unwillingness of the Congress to budge on that. And therefore, of course, China had to shift to be the more important relationship. And of course, as I said, we had a kind of role in that as well, in addition to being one of the turnover places when the communications were swamped for our newly established liaison offices in China. We would take the slack there, but in addition to that, of course, we had our own head of the liaison office, David Bruce, coming to Paris quite frequently, and we were interested in getting the French view on what was going on in China because this was, after all, a very significant time in China, with the demise of first Zhou Enlai and then Mao Zedong and the ups and downs of Deng Xiaoping. This meant that we, of course, had China far more on our screen and Paris was one of the places where we thought we could get information which would supplement and deepen some of our understanding of what was happening in China. So indeed, for that particular moment, China was far more important. When

we had Nixon visit Paris for the Pompidou ceremonies, one of the key things he wanted to do while there was to see Deng Xiaoping when he was on his way through Paris to New York for the United Nations, and that didn't happen because he decided, I think very intelligently, that he did not want to give the French the impression that any stopover in Paris was to be able to see the American President. So he didn't show up, although I was taken to the ceremony for Pompidou.

Q: Are we talking about the funeral?

PRATT: Well, it was after the funeral. The funeral had taken place, and then they had a big reception, a memorial service sort of thing. And I was taken along with the Nixon crew to be the interpreter for Deng Xiaoping, should he arrive. In the end, since he didn't arrive, we did talk to the person from the Chinese Embassy because this was being organized by Nixon to give himself maximum international coverage as a way of defusing, or at least trying to make himself a little bit more popular in the United States, and to show also to anyone else that he at least was very popular abroad - as indeed he was. And he managed a very spectacular session at the Pompidou ceremonies, four or five people sort of moving him around and turning from one group to the next, and everybody was anxious to come up and talk to him. Of course, we had the general, Vernon Walters, as his major interpreter, because of course he could talk with the Russians and the French and the Italians and the Germans and so forth, but he didn't know Chinese, so I was there to take care of that.

So that sort of set the framework from, shall we say, the end of the Nixon Administration, and then through the Ford Administration China was increasingly important to them and also much more activity. But when Carter came in, then the activity shifted to Vietnam.

Q: What was Carter after, did you feel, at the beginning?

PRATT: Well, I think that he wished very much to erase this long war, probably as much for the United States domestic political scene as for anything to do with foreign affairs. But nonetheless they had the attitude of that more than apologies, one needed to try to reestablish friendliness and show Christian forgiveness et cetera, and this would mean that there would be a resumption, perhaps, of trying to give aid to Vietnam for reconstruction and then moving toward what he would call "normal political relations." And that's I think what the Leonard Woodcock mission was all about. It was very hard for us to know because, I guess on the President's instructions, persons who were not in the political appointee - and therefore politically reliable - group were not privy to what his real thoughts and real intentions were. I have seen very little that has come out from Freedom of Information Act queries which would clarify much of this, and we knew that there were a number of things which we were very much excluded from.

Q: Well, from your perspective, you were told Leonard Woodcock would be coming out. What were you doing? I mean was it airplane arrangements and that sort of thing?

PRATT: Yes. We were not told very much because, I think, they had only the most general descriptions which they were prepared to make available to lower-level people. They wanted to get directly through to persons whom they considered would be politically reliable in Hanoi and avoid very much of, shall we say, persons who would not be considered to be loyal by the top

government figures in Hanoi. So we weren't told very much about the substance, as I say. Woodcock excluded the State Department people from most of his important conversations while he was in Hanoi. We would see what it was the State Department people drafted coming out of Hanoi, and it was fairly revealing, but nonetheless we knew that in many of the key meetings had people excluded, and Woodcock would not himself tell them what it was he had discussed, and he would say he would report back directly to the President upon his return. So this was very much something which had the flavor of a presidential operation.

Q: Well, in a way, was there sort of the feeling that Henry Kissinger and Nixon or Nixon and Henry Kissinger had sort of set the pattern for this type of thing, and so this was Brzezinski and Carter picking up, and this was considered this is really the way to get things done?

PRATT: Yes, I think that's quite true, and of course I think also the usual view, which of course being Republicans, would say the reason they couldn't trust the State Department is that it was composed of a lot of persons who had voted Democratic and were really not even closeted liberals. And the Democrats coming in would say these are persons who, if they could work for Nixon, you can't trust them. And therefore, also, of course, there they were coming up from Georgia, and here were persons who had worked in the Washington, DC, area for so long, and of course that meant that they were automatically not so trustworthy. Brzezinski, I think, also . . . of course, he had known Henry Kissinger. They were to a certain extent colleagues and ran across each other for quite a number of times over a number of years. And so I think he felt that this is a model to follow.

Now the fact that also you had a President whose initial interests were not that much in foreign affairs, was again also of significance. I think, Vance, who was an honorable man, was considered, however, not be within, shall we say, the closed sphere of Carter's friends. He was, after all, drawn from the New York lawyer establishment and he was not a Georgia, shall we say, political figure around Carter. And so the paranoia... and of course it's interesting that you see the paranoia at the same time you see considerable, shall we say, emphasis from a form of rather fundamentalist Christianity.

Q: As this went on - I'm trying to capture the spirit of the times - was there concern on your part personally that this Woodcock mission might try to give away the store, in other words, to make an abject apology, to promise reparations, and all that?

PRATT: Well, on the one hand, I personally did not feel - although I thought that this was the kind of action which would undermine much of what we might try to do elsewhere in Asia, because it would show us, I think, not really understanding what had really happened, because after all we had engaged in that kind of war for a relatively high-minded reason. There was nothing in it for us. We were not trying to establish or maintain an empire, like the French. We were just trying to basically get out gracefully at the end, and in the beginning we were trying to defend a kind of people. Maybe you'd call them Chechens against the Russians, but nonetheless they were a people in the southern part of Vietnam. Vietnam had never been one, even during the times of the empire it was handled in rather separate ways. But high-minded intentions were those, certainly, of both Kennedy and Johnson, but nonetheless, as I say, I don't think it would have hurt us terribly if that had been successful. On the other hand, we didn't really believe he

could pull it off, because the Congress was very much of a different mind, and that included members of Carter's own party.

In addition to that, Congress had the wherewithal to block it because a major thing which the Vietnamese wanted was the kind of money which would indicate that we were really saying that we caused the war and therefore we have a responsibility to reconstruct all of Vietnam, and the billions of dollars are given for that purpose. Well, the Congress was jolly well not either going to give or to be committed to be given that kind of etiquette. So we could feel that it was a rather misguided intention that the President had, but in any case that he couldn't follow through it. And of course, this is in the end what actually happened because they started conversations in Paris, and we had to arrange them, and Holbrooke came over and Phan Hien came from Hanoi, deputy foreign minister, and we talked and talked. And we don't know all that was discussed. We were there for the more formal set pieces, you know, 12 people around a table. But every time Holbrooke would go off in a corner with Phan Hien, and we would not know what had been discussed. They did not really get too far because Congress actually passed a resolution which was designed to make sure that whatever Holbrooke thought he was doing in Paris, whatever Carter wanted to do in Paris, the Congress would be on record as making sure that it was not including any money.

Q: Was money, from your perspective, foremost on the part of the Vietnamese?

PRATT: That was their foremost interest, and a symbolic gesture more important than the money itself. In other words, they were getting still a certain amount of subsidies from the Soviet Union, and they knew how they could use these subsidies and how they could run this, but if American aid were to be provided, then of course they had seen how American aid was provided elsewhere, and they knew that they wouldn't stand for that. And therefore, I think that the actual getting the money and the practical things it would do was something which was not high on the list of priorities of the Ho Chi Minh-oriented leadership. But getting it as a symbolic admission of the justness of the North's war and the aggressive nature of the U.S. intervention was key. It was the last thing which would show how they had been Marxist-Leninist correct all along. And this, of course, would be one which would be the best memorial to Ho Chi Minh and the best brownie points and gold stars for their performance as loyal inheritors of the Ho Chi Minh mission.

Q: How long were you there? When did you leave?

PRATT: I left in April of 1978. I was there about five years.

Q: Did you see any change in attitude in the various meetings and all that you were having with the Vietnamese? I'm talking particularly towards the -

PRATT: Not really, because, as I say, my contacts had been with mostly the working level, the person at a level comparable to mine, who was the intermediary, and he was always very businesslike. We did not engage in any kind of recrimination one way or the other. We always tried to be of assistance. We tried to make sure that both sides understood that we were available at any time night or day that a message came in because it was a horrendous problem at that

particular point because you can imagine that in Washington you couldn't get anything cleared through probably until five o'clock or six o'clock on a Friday evening, which meant that your Saturday and Sunday were days when you had to be delivering messages to the Vietnamese, and they, on the other hand, were of course 12 hours out, and they'd come in with a message in the early afternoon, which would make the handing it over, and I had to get it in, of course, by noon Washington time. And then, of course, Washington would sometimes want to go back almost immediately with something or other. So it was late at night that we were often working and then also on weekends. So at that point it was not a very relaxing situation, and basically I was sort of told, at least from Washington, that they were going to be having some message coming through and therefore I shouldn't plan to go off for the weekend, but I couldn't call my friend O Tan and say, "You're going to have something coming in and therefore I've got to stay in town, or can I go off now to visit friends in the country?" So it was very difficult because we did have one occasion, I guess, when we did not mesh, and by telephone I couldn't be there in time for the transfer, and so we had to deputize somebody else to go and take the message. But that was only once.

But from their point of view, the top leadership, indeed, seemed more ingratiating, but they had been very ingratiating when we were having the talks in 1973 after the Christmas bombing. They knew full well that when they were getting what they wanted the best thing to do is smile and be jovial about it. Even the foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach - subsequently he was purged apparently - was very gracious, sort of taking Churchill's view, when you're getting what you want you shouldn't bother about being impolite.

Q: Were you involved in the China connection, or was that pretty much . . . We had our office in China, so that was not . . .

PRATT: Well, when I first arrived in Paris in 1973, we didn't have the liaison office. It was being set up. And therefore I went along with Don Anderson.

PRATT: Don was the one who was handling the turnover, but he was being taken out because he knew this was being reduced in frequency and importance as the liaison office went into effect, and also he was asked to go to Chuokei to work there. And so this was something which went on for a few months, and then I took over that aspect, which within a matter of, oh, I'd say, six months was almost totally gone. However, we still had certain things which we were expected to do back and forth, and the Chinese became much, much more ingratiating once they had a formal permission from Peking to be more forthcoming.

Q: Did the Vietnamese-Chinese border war happen during the time you were in Paris?

PRATT: No, that was when I was in Taiwan. Dick Holbrooke did not particularly like having the conversations take place in Paris because it made it more difficult for him to handle the rest of his job as assistant secretary for East Asia. So he wanted to have them close at home, but they were established in Paris because both we and the Vietnamese had good communications from Paris. One of the key things was that the Vietnamese wanted to be able to have these talks without their being intercepted by Moscow. They could do that because they had their own dedicated communications from Paris to Hanoi. They were not, however, able to do so in many

places in the world, and one of them, of course, was New York at that time. They had, of course, gotten their mission to the United Nations, and yet that, I believe, was piggy-backing on the Soviets. This was a subject which they themselves did not wish to, shall we say, have the Soviets peering over their shoulders. So it was a while, I guess they did establish decent communications from New York which they could consider secure. So this is where Holbrooke wanted to shift the conversation.

However, we were still making these arrangements in Paris, and much of the communication was done there. Whenever we had full-fledged meetings, they went there. However, one of the activities of the Vietnamese representative in New York, apparently, was involvement in a certain amount of espionage in the United States, including somebody who had recruited a member of the USIA, and we knew about this USIA problem in that the USIA chap had been trying to get a Vietnamese woman, with whom he had had an affair, out of Vietnam. And apparently this was considered to be a way of getting the girl out, to serve as an agent for Hanoi. And I don't believe he had - he certainly, I don't think, intended or wished to pass information of great value, but nonetheless, apparently there was enough of it so that they did have a court case over it, and the Vietnamese representative at the United Nations was named an unindicted co-conspirator, and we requested his withdrawal from the United Nations. That took place. This is when we decided, in April of 1978, that there was not much chance of anything important going on for a while with the Vietnamese. This was when I was told, go on to your next assignment, whatever that may be.

JOAN M. PLAISTED
Commercial Officer
Paris (1973-1980)

Ambassador Joan M. Plaisted was born in 1958 in Minnesota. She attended America University and received both her Bachelor's and Master's Degree. Her postings abroad include Paris, Hong Kong, Geneva, Rabat and Marshall Island as Ambassador. Ambassador Plaisted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 30, 2001.

Q: You were in Paris from '73 until when?

PLAISTED: From '73 until 1980 which was highly unusual and highly illegal.

Q: Well, let's start, when you went there in '73 who was the ambassador?

PLAISTED: It was John Irwin when I was first there. I just remembered Ambassador Irwin as being very generous. Occasionally I would be invited over to the residence when he was entertaining some of the top business people for luncheons. He, of course, was known for his very fine vineyard. He had an interest in Chateau Haut Brion, and he helped introduce me to the finer wines of France. Once I caught on that they were going to serve Chateau Haut Brion at the luncheon table, I would clear my calendar for the rest of the afternoon, and tell my staff that if

they wanted me to do anything that day it would best be signed in the morning because I had a lovely lunch. I was going for lunch at the ambassador's residence and I was going to try and get as much Haut Brion as I possibly could, because if I finished my glass, the wine stewards would quickly fill it up again. So that was one of my more memorable experiences with the ambassador. This was the first ambassador I really knew.

Q: What was the situation in France, particularly as seen from the American Embassy in '73?

PLAISTED: It was a time of still close relations with the French. I was there during the election campaign between Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on the right and François Mitterrand on the left the first time around. It was something we were watching very closely at the American embassy, who was going to win. We were a little concerned about the possibility of the socialists, and in those days the communists were getting about 10% of the vote in France, as to who was going to win the elections. It was Giscard who was victorious at that point. We were following political events in France very closely, especially the presidential elections.

Q: Did you get involved with all the officers in the embassy being sort of sent out to look at the political scene?

PLAISTED: I was friends with a number of people in the political section. I would team up with them. I wasn't professionally sent out as a commercial officer to go and observe political developments, but I was very interested in it personally, and would go with friends of mine to see the debates. I remember going to see Mitterrand in a television interview that he was giving. He was just absolutely perfectly charming, ran overtime, was as gracious as he could be publicly, and then once it was time to leave, I was sitting in the back, he started yelling at his staff for allowing him to be late. Sort of a Jekyll and Hyde personality coming out that one can only see behind the scenes. What I was sent out to do was to be a control officer for VIP visits. For Jimmy Carter's presidential state visit to Paris when Giscard was president, I was the control officer for the segment, it was a dinner at the Grand Trianon, and also a big reception at the Palace of Versailles. I was the control officer for that event and had to write up all these elaborate scenarios. I got to go through the palace several times, to make decisions with security, where were we going to place the nuclear football in case the President had to declare a nuclear war during this reception at Versailles, and decided on Madame de Maintenon's bedroom. If she only knew what was happening so many years later that that's where the nuclear football was, in her bedroom. Also we set up johnny's-on-the-spot at the Versailles palace because Louis Quatorze never designed it that way in the first place. The French polished the floors so highly; they were cleaning every chandelier, waxing the floors. I had to get word to the President's party it would be best to wear rubber soled shoes because you are going to slip all over these highly waxed floors at Versailles. Then to my absolute panic at the end of the Versailles event we lined up all the cars to pick up the President and the congressional participants. There was the chauffeur for a congressman, but we couldn't find the congressman. It was about two or three o'clock in the morning after the events at Versailles. I was running through the palace trying to find a lost congressman who must have shown up in Paris, because I never heard about him again.

Q: In the commercial office at that time, did you find it a challenge to try to get American products through the French system? Was it a feeling that the French were through various

bureaucratic methods trying to inhibit our selling things in France?

PLAISTED: It was very much a competitive environment, and there was always the philosophy of buy French if the French product is available. I was the coordinator for the Paris Air Show. Where we had some of the greatest competition with the French was in selling aircraft and avionics equipment. So that was a very competitive environment. But we were able in those days to have record sales at the Paris Air Show, I think in part because of the quality of the U.S. equipment. Of course at the Paris Air Show, there are international buyers, too. These aren't just French buyers for some of the avionics, but this is an international show where the U.S. was very competitive in those days.

Q: Did you run across, let's say the proclivity of the French to sort of sweeten deals for selling things and competition? I mean it has been mentioned many times they sweeten the deal by making some under the table agreements or something like that. Was this apparent?

PLAISTED: It obviously wasn't anything I saw firsthand. It was something that was talked about in those days. Later when I was at the OECD, one of the issues at the OECD was to come up with a code of conduct for this type of investment and just what are legitimate business practices.

Q: By the time you were there, the book, "The American Challenge" had come out...

PLAISTED: Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber wrote that. In fact that was one of the questions I was asked on the foreign service oral exam. Are you familiar with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber, and they said it in such a way, and I had been a student in France, that I didn't quite understand until a few moments had elapsed who they were talking about. But yes, the book had come out earlier, I believe, and was debated quite a bit at the time when it came out. I think America was certainly seen as an economic competitor, an economic giant as it is today.

Q: Who were you dealing with in the French bureaucracy?

PLAISTED: In the French bureaucracy the ones I was really closest to were the air show organizers, because my main job was to coordinate the U.S. participation. I was working for the Minister of Economic and Social Affairs, Chris Petrow at that point and later Robert Harlan for the second show. I would be coordinating very closely with the organizers of the Salon Aéronautique, the Paris Air Show, trying to get additional VIP passes, additional tickets, good space for the U.S. exhibitors, negotiating with the officials at the Paris Air Show. I was also in contact with some of the people in the aviation firms. Also I was a U.S. delegate to a Bureau of International Exhibitions that approves world fairs. There was a French head of the Bureau of International Exhibitions who had been in their diplomatic service, and had been a consul general in the U.S. at one point. I had very close relations with him.

Q: How did you find these international exhibitions? There is a tremendous amount of politicking isn't there on that?

PLAISTED: Yes, absolutely, and the Russians were members. In fact my first day in Paris there was a luncheon at the George V hotel. My new boss wanted me to arrive in time to attend a

meeting of this bureau. He insisted I move up my arrival date. I was seated at lunch next to a Russian delegate, but thank goodness somebody had tipped me off that he was really KGB. I had to watch out because he was asking me rather embarrassing questions. I knew exactly why he was trying to do so. My first day in Paris and the KGB is trying to convert me! It was quite exciting, but it was in a very international context and it could be quite controversial.

Q: What were some of the dynamics that went on there? Were you more at the technical level or...

PLAISTED: It was really my boss, the commercial counselor, he was our main representative. I was the junior representative. Yes, at times it would get very technical.

Q: In dealing with the French did you get involved, I mean the system in France. I have never served in France, but I understand some of the intellectuals represent a very strong important group, chattering class, whatever you want to call them. Then there would be the commercial people who were pretty hard nosed and practical. I mean did you find any cleavage between these two? Did you get involved in any of this?

PLAISTED: I would sometimes be at dinner parties with people from the staff of Le Canard Enchaîné who were absolutely delightful.

Q: This was the satiric...

PLAISTED: Yes, a very satirical newspaper. I dined with some of their French journalists. In Paris we had delightful, magnificent political conversations around the dinner table. We were used to quite a lively discussion, but I never saw the break between the commercial people and the intellectuals.

Q: You had seen the beginning of the computer generation coming though in France?

PLAISTED: Yes, in fact it was one of the industry products that I was responsible for, trying to promote U.S. exports of computers to France. We were somewhat successful in breaking into the French market. Of course you have the American firms that were established in France, manufacturing computer equipment in France. But even today, the use of computers, the use of the Internet in France, is a lot less than it is elsewhere in the developed world.

Q: In the commercial world, did you feel the relatively heavy hand of the government in controlling things, I mean compared to much looser control in the United States?

PLAISTED: I think there was more planning, certainly more, I don't think there was central planning per se, but there was more government direction, yes, than there would be in the U.S. I think the relationship between government and industry was closer in France than it was in the U.S. It wasn't as close as you would find it to be in Japan. There was a close relationship between government and industry. You would have industrialists sometimes serving in the French government.

Q: Was there much interest on the behalf of commercial people in what America had to sell and all?

PLAISTED: Yes, I think French businessmen were always interested in what was in their industry sector. We had a very active Paris Trade Center. We would be mounting exhibitions on computer equipment, machine tools. We were quite big, the U.S., in the environmental protection field. There were areas where we were quite competitive. Of course those were the areas where we would try and have the trade shows. We could draw a large crowd and get some very good sales results. One of our objectives was always to introduce new-to-market exporters, the little guy. The big guys could take care of themselves and didn't need my help. I was to introduce the little guy, new to exporting to the French market, with his pollution control equipment and help him find an appropriate French agent through the trade center shows. In the mid-'70s it was quite doable.

HOWARD R. SIMPSON
Consul General
Marseille (1974)

Howard R. Simpson was born in 1925 and raised in Alameda, California. In 1943, he was drafted into the U.S. Army and served in the European Theater. He returned to the United States in 1945 and continued his education in California and Paris, France. Mr. Simpson joined the Foreign Service in 1951, where he served in Vietnam, Nigeria, France, and Algeria. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 10, 1994.

Q: Well then you left there in 1974. Was that right? And you went back to Paris. You were there from..., well maybe you were back in Washington for a bit. But I've got you from '75 to '79 in Paris.

SIMPSON: Well, I tell you, there was a big gap, wait a minute, we're missing something here. Because, no, I went from Algiers to Marseille as Consul-General.

Q: Oh, I see.

SIMPSON: After 2 years in Algiers, they appointed me Consul General in Marseille. Which was sort of a surprise because you know, USIA types don't normally go into that kind of thing. But I had heard that the thing was coming open and I made a few soundings and some people had been favorable of the time I had spent in Marseille and all that. So that worked out and it was very nice. There's a nice residence there and I was back in my element and coming back as a Consul General was good because I had all the press contacts, the cultural people, and I knew the politicians, the mayor and all that sort of thing. So it was a natural assignment and lasted a little over two years. Once again, it was one of those administrative hiccups. It was suppose to be a 2-2 (years) or something like that or at least 3 years. And State, I didn't know it, I didn't realize it, was going into this economic mode. In other words, saying this Consulate General is now going

to be Economic not Political. Well, unfortunately for me, they decided that Marseille was going to be an Economic post so I was replaced by somebody who specialized in Economics. And that was the time when I didn't know where I was going from there. But fortunately, I heard about this Paris possibility coming up. And in the interim, I went to the University of South Carolina as a so-called Diplomat-in-Residence. But this wasn't the State Department program. This was a deal through USIA. And it only lasted for about 3-4 months.

ELIZABETH RASPOLIC

Vice Consul

Lyon (1974-1976)

Elizabeth Raspolic worked for the Peace Corps in Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. She served mainly as a consular officer in France, Korea, Ethiopia, and China. Ms. Raspolic was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

RASPOLIC: To Lyon, France. It would have been one thing had I been going to a larger post, where if you had a procedural question, you could always turn to a colleague and ask, "How is this done?" But when there's only one other person in the post, and that person has never served as a consular officer, then you really do have to rely on the FAM and your own wits, and also how well the long-distance telephone system works in the country, so that you can call a nearby post and ask for advice.

Q: What were your responsibilities in Lyon?

RASPOLIC: Basically, I was sent to be the vice consul in charge of consular operations, and to oversee the administrative side of the office. I ended up doing that, plus doing some USIS work and also working with the commercial section. Admin, USIS and Commercial were all parts of the office that were run by French staff members. The American CG did his own thing and wrapped himself in the flag and showed up on various official occasions, and sometimes took an active role in commercial affairs, but mostly left the rest of it to me. It worked out well for me, because I was very interested in doing as much as I could, learning as much as I could.

Q: Was there much consular business there?

RASPOLIC: There was, but it was rather limited in scope. We did not handle immigrant visas at all; those were handled only by the Embassy in Paris. We had the second largest NIV issuance in the country, outside of Paris. We had an enormous number of businessmen in eastern France, who had a lot of business with the United States. We also had a lot of ACS [American Citizen Services] work, because the Alps were in our district, the ski resorts were in our district. We had a lot of cardiacs, a lot of deaths, a lot of tragedy, frankly, that had to do with the ski season. So that kept us rather busy.

Q: Can you give me an idea of how a ski case might work?

RASPOLIC: I remember one case very clearly, a death case where a charter group came over from Philadelphia. I believe it was the telephone company charter. They arrived in Grenoble and immediately went to the slopes. It was a nice, bright, sunny day, and it was misleading, obviously, because some of these people went skiing inadequately prepared for the weather. One fellow, in particular, was wearing jeans and a tee shirt and went skiing, because the sun was shining and he felt apparently that he could get by with this kind of clothing. Halfway up the mountains, the weather changed dramatically, he got lost in a sudden snowstorm, he completely lost his sense of direction, and he was found the next day frozen to death.

The French were simply appalled. Aside from the tragedy of the whole thing, they simply couldn't believe that anyone would be so lacking in judgment or so ill prepared to enjoy a sport. The man had appropriate ski clothing in his luggage, as it turned out. It was totally unnecessary for him to have died that way.

So my first indication of all of this was a call from the Grenoble police, telling me that they had a missing American, presumed dead. That was the night before. Then I went over to Grenoble the next morning. There was no point in going at night for a search and rescue operation on a mountainside. So I went over at 7:00 the next morning, about a two-hour drive from Lyon, and they found the body maybe three hours later, brought it down the mountain, and I had to do the usual notification of next of kin and make arrangements for the shipment of the body home.

Q: In notification of next of kin, how did it work at that time? Did you talk to them directly?

RASPOLIC: No. I'm trying to think. We've had so many changes in the procedure. It must have been a telegram at the time, then a follow-up offering the family the option of getting in touch with us by phone, which most people did, considering we were in western Europe and it was quite an easy operation. I don't recall initiating a phone call, no, so they must have called me.

Q: Was the non-immigrant side of visas a problem? These were businessmen, also French. The French seemed to return more than almost any other group.

RASPOLIC: They do. They don't use their maximum immigrant visa numbers at all. They never have, as far as I'm aware, at least not since I've been in the Foreign Service. There were some problems, not all that many. Certainly the problems were nothing compared to problems that I faced in other countries later on in my career.

France is the only country I've ever served in where we had mail-in visa applications. That really was just a mechanical problem for us, because we had one full-time French visa assistant, who was wonderful. She had been with the consulate since the late forties, and she knew more about visas than probably I'll ever know. We worked together very, very closely on processing mail-in applications. We also had a couple of summer hires during the peak season that would come in and help. So business visas were quite routine. Most student visas were quite routine. Once in a while we had some questions. They had to be interviewed in person, anyway.

Our biggest problem, I suppose, with visas were two categories of cases. One was third-country

nationals, non-French citizens, who would either be passing through or would be in France for some unspecified reason and suddenly decide that it was imperative that they go to the United States. The other problem was just the usual French au pair who claimed to be going for six weeks to visit Disneyland, but actually more often than not, had a contract from an American family offering them an au pair job. At that time, it was illegal to have an au pair.

Q: How would you sort these out?

RASPOLIC: Through personal interview. You'd listen to what they were saying, and also weigh that against, in your mind, what they weren't saying, and see whether you could come up with a reasonable solution.

Q: Were these difficult? After you had refused, would you then get all sorts of pressure to issue a visa?

RASPOLIC: Not very often, frankly. Not in France. I did have one very funny case. A girl who I had refused, I had suspected she was a possible au pair, and I had refused her. Then she'd come back in and applied again. We had a very interesting conversation, and I thought perhaps I'd really misjudged her. I went ahead and issued the tourist visa.

Lo and behold, about four or five days later, she walks back into my office with her mother, and her mother was absolutely livid. I said, "What on earth is wrong? Why don't you come into my office and we'll sit down and discuss this." So we sat down. It turned out that the girl had gone off to the United States with a B-2, arrived in JFK, and had her luggage searched, because INS at JFK did not believe her. Lo and behold, she had an au pair contract in her suitcase. So they put her on the next plane back.

Her mother was furious with the American government because the mother had wasted the money on the plane ticket, and she wanted to know what we were going to do about it and what the family needed to do to get the girl back into the United States. I just threw up my hands at that point and said, "Listen, the girl has already lied to me. Now you're asking me to counsel you on how to break our laws again? Get out of here!" (Laughs) It was just outrageous, absolutely outrageous. But it was also very French.

Q: Did you serve in consular work the whole time you were in France?

RASPOLIC: Yes.

Q: How were your relations there with Paris, as far as from a consular support point of view?

RASPOLIC: All of the consulates were under the jurisdiction of the consul general in Paris. It didn't matter what the subsidiary function was of the consulate. Both my boss and I reported to the consul general in Paris. He would come through on sweeping inspections maybe once or twice a year, and that was sort of it, and we would never hear from him again.

On the other hand, when I had tricky visa cases and I really wanted to check on procedures, or

even an ACS case that I really wasn't sure of, because I hadn't handled a case like that in the past, I could very easily call Paris and ask for guidance. I must say the person who handled the waivers in the visa section, Peter Murphy, who later was DCM in the Vatican for several years, was extremely helpful, very, very helpful. And Ruth McClendon at that time was head of the American Citizen Services section in Paris, and she also was very wise in telling me when to follow the FAM exactly, and when I could forget about the FAM. (Laughs)

I remember one case in particular, I had an American drifter who was panhandling. The French were trying to get him out, and I was trying to get him out. I was trying to have a repatriation loan authorized by the Department. At that time, the FAM said, "Send the memorandum in and we'll let you know as soon as the decision is made." So I called Ruth and said, "Ruth, I sent this thing in by memorandum. It's going to take ten days for them to get it. In the meantime, this guy is here running up a hotel bill. It's just a holy mess. Can't we do this any faster?"

She said, "Oh, my God, send it in by telegram. Forget the FAM!" (Laughs) I had not had a repatriation case, so that's why I simply didn't know that the Department was that flexible.

Q: There are certain things which are built-in delays which are almost on purpose.

RASPOLIC: Probably so. I'm sure there are other cases, certainly renunciation of citizenship. My God, there's simply no point in hurrying that along. If you give the person enough time, perhaps whatever decision they come up with is a considered decision. That's fine. I can see the value in that. Repatriation, usually by the time the case has walked into your office, the situation is rather desperate. Time really sometimes is of the essence. This fellow, not only was he a drifter, but he had three kids with him. His wife had walked out on him -- with cause, I think. (Laughs) But what we had, basically, this man was 35 years old and was perfectly capable of caring for himself, but he was ignoring the health and well being of his three little kids, who were all under the age of seven or eight.

Q: Of course, he was running up a bill, which did not work to the benefit of the American government.

RASPOLIC: Not at all. Besides, the case was becoming more and more of a thorn in the side of the French authorities, too, so it behooved us all, I think, every player, to get this family out as soon as we would and could.

Q: Did you get him out?

RASPOLIC: Well, sorry you asked that. What happened was I did get the authorization for the repatriation loan, I did set up the return reservations, I did offer the guy and his family a ride to the airport, and he said, no, no, no, he thought he could get them out there himself. He was very, very thankful, this and that. The next thing I knew, he did not catch the plane. The reason I knew that was I had a call from Ruth McClendon in Paris, who said that the man had been picked up for panhandling in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Paris 24 hours later. So I succeeded in getting him out of my consular district. (Laughs) Paris ultimately had to plop him onto a plane and get him back to the States. In fact, I think what Paris ended up doing was getting authorization from

him to send the children back to the United States, and if he wanted to mess around in France, that was up to him. But it simply reached the point where it was much more a concern for the welfare of the children. It was a memorable case, I must say.

JOHN H. WILLETT
Consul
Bordeaux (1974)

Political Officer
Paris (1975-1977)

John H. Willett was born in Massachusetts in 1941 and received his BA from Kenyon College in 1941. His career has included assignments in Gaborone, Tunis, Bordeaux, Paris, Rome, Strasbourg and Rabat. Richard Jackson interviewed Mr. Willett on December 21, 1998.

Q: So you're working your way north. You started in Botswana. You got to Tunis. You're on your way by Ferry to Bordeaux, and a short time it looks like there, a year or so, and then on to Paris. So let's talk about Bordeaux first.

WILLETT: Well, that was planned, Dick. They had a system then whereby incoming young officers -- I was no longer a junior officer because I'd been promoted -- but young officers were encouraged to do something else first in France, a year in ENA or a consulate, before entering the Political Section in Paris for another 18 months or so. Something like that.

Q: That makes great sense.

WILLETT: It does make sense, because Paris is not France, despite the fact that Greater Paris has nearly 20 per cent of the French population. In Bordeaux I learned a lot about the way French politics works in the grassroots.

When I arrived in Bordeaux, William Dixon Boggs was Consul General and I was to serve as Consul. This was in January 1974, and it seemed to me that the eyes of all France were riveted on Bordeaux. Just sheer coincidence, but the reasons were threefold. In the first place, Chaban-Delmas was running for President of France against Giscard d'Estaing, so the papers were filled with news of Bordeaux, not only the local papers, but also the national papers.

Secondly, for the first time in recent memory, there was a scandal involving Bordeaux wines. Now we can laugh at this and call it "very French" or whatever, but it was no laughing matter in Bordeaux. One of the great Bordeaux vintner and trading families, a member of the Cruse family and of that closed society they call the *Quai des Chartrons* -- going back to the 18th century, when Bordeaux was part of the "triangular trade" with the United States, the Caribbean and Africa -- was found doctoring the wine. Tanker trucks of cheap wine from outside the Bordeaux appellation were trucked in at night and unloaded into vats. They were *chaptalizing*, they call it -

- I don't know the English for it -- adding illegal sugars to the wine vats to raise the alcohol content. Things got so bad that the patriarch of the Cruse family committed suicide by jumping off a bridge into the Garonne. The scandal cost Bordeaux millions of dollars in good name, and exports to the United States plummeted. Americans stopped buying Bordeaux.

The third issue, a national one, involved the implantation of a nuclear power plant on the Garonne River. There were huge manifestations against this project. It was believed the plant would pollute the river, that it could even have an effect on ground water going into the vineyards; there were jokes about luminescent grapes the size of a grapefruit, etc. So for that one year, there I was in the second oldest consulate in U.S. diplomatic history...

Q: The oldest being Tangier.

WILLETT: Exactly, but Tangier was closed, so this was the oldest active consulate we had -- and in a minute we can talk about what's happened in Bordeaux -- but at any rate, I had my hands full.

In addition there was a mess in the consular section. The Consul General's secretary was a clearly deranged woman who'd been working there for years. No one had dared fire her.

Q: American.

WILLETT: No, she was French, but she had, I think, an LOU clearance, as locals sometimes do.

Q: Sure.

WILLETT: There was an ages-old backlog of cases, unresolved consular cases, safe drawers filled with them, and the Consul General had said to me when I arrived, "If you could do something about this situation, it would be a feather in your cap. As long as people can remember, nobody's ever surmounted this problem." You can see I'm heading towards braggadocio. I did get them all cleaned up, just taking file after file and determining what do we had to do with it. I drove the staff there -- there were 11 locals in the consulate -- I drove them crazy.

Q: And how many Americans?

WILLETT: Just me and the Consul General, that was it.

Q: So the workload was for both of you largely consular, or you were entirely consular and he was economic and political.

WILLETT: No. I did political reporting and economic reporting as well. Hell, with a two man post like that, everybody does everything -- sort of like Botswana, except that, unlike Botswana, Dixon Boggs -- may he rest in peace -- did write reports. He worked.

Q: He was a working Consul General.

WILLETT: He was a working Consul General, yes. His feet weren't just up on his desk. But he went away once, on home leave, and there I was alone for six weeks. He allotted his secretary to me; she used to drift in at 10 o'clock in the morning and drift out at 4 in the afternoon. One day I closed the door and took her to task, as a result of which she fainted. I wrote a report. I contacted Boggs on home leave and said, "Look, this can't go on. I have invited your secretary not to return to the consulate until you're back." Eventually she was fired. Overnight, the atmosphere in the consulate changed. You could sense a window had opened, letting in the spring.

Q: He wasn't the strongest manager not to have taken that step before.

WILLETT: I think he should have, though she performed, I guess, competently enough for him. But she had so poisoned her relations with everyone else that she'd become a detriment to the ability of the consulate to carry out its work. I think, in fact, that part of that backlog was due, indirectly, to her presence. Anyway, we got her out of there; a delightful woman replaced her.

The ten months passed. I lived pretty much on my own. There was a surprising amount of work, however. When I say to people that I had a year in Bordeaux, they kind snicker, but there was a lot of work, a lot of late nights. It wasn't as if you had crisis situations, but with the mayor of Bordeaux running for the presidency of France, there was a lot of reporting to do. I went out, just like a political officer□□ which I'd never really been, invited people to lunch and exchanged views with them on the political situation in Bordeaux. I remember going to see the *conseiller général*, a kind of -- what would you call him? -- regional official. I remember seeing the *préfet* a couple of times in the Consul General's absence. It was the first time I really felt a sense of responsibility, that I had been given real responsibilities, and was important to me that I acquit myself well in the job.

By the time summer came around and Giscard won the election, I was packing my bags to move on to Paris. Bordeaux had sunk back into the kind of invisibility it had before I arrived. It seemed as if there was one little magic period of ten months when every eye had been riveted on Bordeaux, then it ended. The wine scandal ended, unhappily, but it ended. As regards the nuclear power plant, the French said, Dammit, you can protest all you want, but we're going to build it. So the year ended. My personal life there was very quiet and pleasant; I did a lot of horseback riding and swimming at the nearby beaches. I could drive out to the Atlantic coast, and it was sort of like Long Island, with endless expanses of broad, mostly empty beach good for running my dog. I led a quiet but rich life those ten months in Bordeaux. There again, I recall my stay there with great fondness.

Q: They say that for the past few decades power in Europe and France has been devolving to the subregional level, and it's trendy these days to talk about bananas that stretch up from Barcelona and pick up Bordeaux and go to Milan as being the power centers industrially of Europe, and central governments have less and less power. From the perspective of what you said on Bordeaux, how about that?

WILLETT: I don't believe France has decentralized very much. I didn't see much evidence of it then, nor do I now. A *préfet* is still a *préfet*, and he's got a lot of power. In France, of course, you

can have more than one mandate. You can be mayor. You can be a member of the National Assembly. I think you're allowed to hold three different posts at once. Right now, Alain Juppé is mayor of Bordeaux, having taken over the job after Chaban's 30 year stint, both of them having been Prime Minister of France at one point.

Q: Well, from the perspective of your stay there, if you in later years had been responsible for the Department management, would you have closed that post?

WILLETT: Yes.

Q: That is to say, there were no real U.S. interests that you could perceive?

WILLETT: No. In part we were driven, very understandably, by nostalgia. I mean, it was a historic post. At one point, when we first talked about closing it, Chaban-Delmas dealt directly with U.S. senators whom he knew. He'd call them up on the phone and say, "Look, don't close this post." Of course, we not only closed Bordeaux, but Nice and Lyon to boot. Of those three, I think the most logical closing was Bordeaux. A number of American retirees lived there, and the Ford Motor Company had a plant outside town making automatic-shift gearboxes that were transported all over Europe; but our interests there were, and remain, limited.

Q: You don't feel, on the one hand, as you close all the consulates and you give quickie two week courses in leadership, that the Foreign Service officers rise up to DCM and ambassador with not the slightest managerial training, so one, it's training, and two, it is as you found before going to Paris, quite a different perspective than inside the beltway in whatever the capital city is.

WILLETT: Yes. It really is.

Q: In those respects it has some value.

WILLETT: Yes. Oh, I'm not saying we should close all our consulates. It's just that if we're driven by budget concerns, if we're constrained to take a hard look at which consulates to keep open and which to close, and if inevitably we're going to close some, then Bordeaux rightly figured on that list. I'm sorry to say this. I know it's traitorous to my friends in Bordeaux, a couple of whom I've kept up with, but there's no way around it. The State Department did right to close the post.

Q: So you were happy then to get to the big city, Paris, which you reached in December of '74.

WILLETT: Right.

Q: And then you went into the political reporting side.

WILLETT: I went into the Political Section as a reporter on the majority conservative parties. The Political Section in Paris was huge. It's smaller now.

Q: A dozen people then.

WILLETT: More.

Q: *That's counting everybody.*

WILLETT: Oh, if you counted the secretaries, I think there were 21 people in the Political Section.

Q: *Goodness.*

WILLETT: There was the political counselor, the deputy political counselor, the Middle East officer, the Latin America officer, the Asia officer. There was the internal unit, which in and of itself had four officers who did nothing but report on internal affairs. There was the social affairs office, run by John Condon, who later became Ambassador to Fiji. There was the political-military office, with two officers and a secretary. By the time you added all of those up, biographic officers and people like that, you had a solid 21 or 22 people. There are far fewer now; that I know. But somehow or other -- what is it, the Peter Principle? -- "Work expands to fill the occupation of the number of people available to do it." Well, POL Paris was the living proof of this. We kept busy, reporting all the time on everything, too much reporting, much too much.

Q: *Giscard had just been elected for another term. The conservatives were fairly entrenched. There was not a lot of uncertainty. Was there a concerned readership in Washington for your product? Were they saying, "Give us more, report on this, report on that"?*

WILLETT: I don't think they were saying so much "Give us more" as "Tell us what this all means." You know, it's easy to crank out telegrams every day on every burp and fart the political parties engage in. What's harder is to take the tendencies, the trends in the parties themselves, take the intraparty and interparty rivalries and try to make sense out of them, to extrapolate a prognosis for the future of the country. For example, do these fights on the right mean the conservatives will become so weakened that the left will win the next election? I remember well -- this was the time Giscard was caught with the Bokassa diamonds.

Q: *I guess that's true, the Central African caper.*

WILLETT: Right, the Central African caper. I'd become a close friend with the editor-in-chief of the *Canard enchaîné*, the paper that broke the story. So I had a tremendous source to all the ins and outs and skullduggery of that scandal. But France is unlike the United States, where such a scandal might, I think, have occasioned another forced resignation in the White House□□□□□mean, here's the head of state taking graft.

Q: *So he really did have it. It was an open and shut case.*

WILLETT: Yes, but the French didn't care.

Q: *They didn't care. But how could he have been so stupid?*

WILLETT: Well, perhaps he just took it as a prerogative of office or something. He also had a

crash in his private car, in which the French actress Mireille Darc was riding; he rammed a milk truck, and there was milk and broken glass all over Avenue Gabriel, right where the Embassy is, for heaven's sake. Giscard's people came along and had that cleaned up before you could say "Jack Robinson." Then, of course, there was the Mitterrand affaire, the phony assassination attempt up by the Observatoire. Mitterrand for years had let it be known that not only was he a valiant resistance fighter, but such an extraordinary man and such a threat to the right that they -- whoever "they" are -- tried to kill him. As the story goes, he was in a car, he jumped out, somebody fired a machine gun at him, or something like that. Nobody believed it for a second. They think he engineered this whole thing so he could appear a hero. The French are more philosophical about this kind of cynical manipulation than we are in America. Although people snickered and it made the *Canard enchaîné*, it didn't, as you can see, have any long-term deleterious effect on Mitterrand's career, because he was President of this country for 14 years.

Q: So you were essentially a journalist in a big environment, a political reporter ferreting out the latest scandal within the conservative ranks and getting the inside story, trying to get it to Washington before the press.

WILLETT: Well I made friends way back in the lower ranks of the conservative parties. Alain Juppé was a regular contact. In fact, when I returned to Paris on assignment in 1987 and found Juppé clearly destined for the highest ranks of elected political officialdom, I could still see him. There were a couple of ministers I could still see. In the Foreign Service you have to be careful about this. If you're a little twerp in the Political Section and you're frequenting people who should rightly be seen by the counselor or the Ambassador, then you have to be careful. You make a mistake -- I won't even qualify it -- by thinking, Oh, I'm going to rush out and see Alain Juppé and do a reporting cable that'll knock their socks off; because when the political counselor or the Ambassador sees that cable, he may not like it at all. He may feel constrained to send it, but he'll be suspicious of you from that point on. He might think you're trying to upstage them or something.

Q: You mean to go forward in the Service, it's go along to get along, keep your head down, that sort of thing?

WILLETT: No. I don't at all mean keep your head down. I mean that in certain situations you should go to the political counselor if you're a younger officer and say, "Look, by dint of my connections formed years ago, I'm a friend of So-and-So. I'd like to have lunch with him. What do you think? Do you want to come along? How should we do this? Should I invite him in to call on the Ambassador first?" You've got to use your noggin, because if you don't things could backfire. People resent a mean and hungry look. I too might feel a little threatened, you know, if I were in the reverse position. So I handled those fortuitous acquaintances of mine carefully.

Q: That's such a big embassy, I guess one of the biggest we have. Who were some of the people at the top of it, the Ambassador and so on, at that time?

WILLETT: Let's see. One of the men, when I first arrived in Paris, was Ambassador Rush.

Q: Kenneth Rush?

WILLETT: Yes, Kenneth Rush. I thought he was a blowhard who didn't understand anything about France

Q: *He had been Deputy Secretary.*

WILLETT: Yes. He was IBM before that, no? I had no respect for him at all. I'm sorry, but I have to say it. Nor for the DCM in place when I got there. I didn't have much respect for him either. The whole Embassy called him "The White Mouse." But the political counselor Hank Cohen was a brilliant analyst and drafter, and a great boss. I recall him as one of the three or four superlative bosses of my career. I still see Hank when he comes through Paris.

Q: *But they sound like fairly remote figures. That is to say, the people we were talking about in Tunis, they jumped right out. These were people whom, as a reporter in the Political Section, you didn't see every day. The Ambassador wasn't pulling you out to work with his visitors or that kind of thing all the time.*

WILLETT: Well, we were active in the Internal Political Unit in proposing lunches. We would say, "You should host a lunch at the residence for the head of such-and-such a party and his four key deputies. We'll be good reporting officers, listen carefully and write you a crackerjack cable on that lunch." The Ambassador would be receptive to that.

Q: *John Irvin, were you there under his tenure?*

WILLETT: Briefly. John Irvin was approachable, decent□

Q: *Serious sort.*

WILLETT: Yes, Ambassador Irvin was a pleasant person to work for, kind and professional, but not distant. We could approach him. We could write him a short action memo to suggest an activity, and he would do everything he could to fit it in his schedule. We were invited to most of the receptions he held at the Residence, to lunches and dinners when it was appropriate. And of course there were the visits, by the Secretary or the President or a CODEL or political figures. Then the whole Embassy would be mobilized. It didn't matter whether you were third secretary or DCM, you were up to your neck in work and hands on tasking in preparation for, and during the execution of, whatever visit was taking place.

Q: *This is a fairly frequent occurrence in Paris: Presidents and Secretaries, they're in and out. We're talking the Jimmy Carter years.*

WILLETT: Yes.

Q: *We're talking before the Iran hostage year.*

WILLETT: That's right. It was before the Iran hostage year.

Q: *The Secretary would be Cy Vance, no?*

WILLETT: Right. Cy Vance. He came through on a couple of occasions. That was the time, too, Dick, when one of the big problems between France and the United States was resolved, a residual debt from the time France kicked U.S. NATO forces out of France and they moved to Belgium. We were claiming \$125 million, if I remember correctly, and the French gave us \$25 million, what, 20 cents on the dollar? That accord was finally signed in a major ceremony at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what they call the *Quai d'Orsay*, and I was present for that. Quite moving. We were a little bitter because we felt we were getting rooked, but I suppose we believed it was the best deal we could get. The whole gamut of Franco-American relations is a highly complex one, charged with emotion on both sides, charged with resentment. It goes on today. We can see it in virtually every major foreign policy issue. The French will want to distance themselves from the United States, to show their singularity. They have an expression for it, "*l'exception française*." Even when France agrees with the United States, this *exception française* sometimes emerges. De Gaulle's decision to have NATO moved out of France is an example.

Q: *In the scheme of things, those particular years, Giscard, Jimmy Carter or Cy Vance, wasn't Alain Juppé the foreign minister?*

WILLETT: No. He was still a young whippersnapper.

Q: *Was the chemistry particularly good, bad? It wasn't the period of the more strident misunderstandings between the two countries in those years, was it?*

WILLETT: Well, let's see. Vietnam was over, the secret talks having been conducted here in Paris. I came just after that. Of course, the French had no lessons to give us on Vietnam. There were foreign ministers in place who were as close to being outright anti-American as one could meet in this country. Take, for example, a man who served as foreign minister of France for barely a year, Michel Jobert (with an American wife, by the way). Jobert would be damned if he'd say yes to any American. He and Kissinger mixed it up, and in Jobert's memoirs he writes about showing up Henry 'the K' letting him know he couldn't push France around, etc. Much later I had a public dispute with Jobert, after he'd left the Foreign Ministry. He was giving occasional public talks, and still had a coterie of people who'd show up. He could draw a couple of hundred people into a room when he gave a talk, and I'd decided to attend one of them. This was during my second incarnation in Paris. I'll come to this later on. We had a most uncomfortable public exchange, in which I stood at a serious disadvantage because I was a first secretary on active duty and he was a retired foreign minister of the host country in which I was serving. He could treat me to *tous les noms de la terre* and I had more or less to take it on the chin; otherwise, I'd have been PNG'd.

Q: *He, if I remember, was a Frenchman from Meknes in Morocco, who frequently wrote very favorable articles about Morocco and the King and maybe was on some sort of a retainer from the Moroccans.*

WILLETT: While I was in Morocco on my last assignment, he would periodically blow in and

out of the country. I believe he's a member of the Moroccan Academy.

Q: Yes, he is, along with Henry Kissinger, whom you mentioned.

WILLETT: Along with Vernon Walters, and the former head of the French espionage service, Maranches, who died last year.

Q: You certainly came to Paris from two small, relatively, posts -- Tunis and Botswana. How was the atmosphere, the morale, in this giant embassy? I get from what you're saying a feeling of some distance. The names don't jump out. Everybody was doing their own thing in their own subsection. Did you get a picture that there was some kind of a conductor bringing that orchestra together, something like 48, 49 different agencies of government housed in the embassy? Was it a real symphony or not?

WILLETT: From my perspective as a second secretary in the Political Section, I was ill placed to evaluate the overall management of the Embassy. If I'd been the DCM, or even the political counselor, I could answer that question better. But I did sense there was overall coordination. Mind you, my job, and those of my colleagues in the Internal Political Unit, was to be out meeting Frenchmen, and I did it with enthusiasm. My French was good. At the time I had a French girlfriend who later became my wife, Chantal, and I almost never saw Americans. I spent my life with the French, either on a professional or friendly basis. I was in the Embassy but in curious way not of it. I didn't like going to intraembassy dinner parties on Saturday night, seeing the same people I'd worked with all week. I didn't like taking Embassy-organized trips. I would come into the Embassy and do my job, but even then I was out a lot.

If you're not lunching with contacts two or three times a week, you're not doing your job. We were encouraged to produce at least a couple memcons a week. (Those were the days when people wrote memcons.) One of mine contributed to my getting a meritorious Honor Award. I went and saw René Andrieu, editor-in-chief of *L'Humanité*, the French Communist daily. I had to get permission to do so, because we had no official contact with the Communist Party. I managed to do a couple of reporting cables on that. As I later learned, Andrieu also had to get permission, from his Central Committee, to see somebody in the American Embassy. It was a lesson to me that you had to be careful how you handle these things. Do it by the book. Talk to people. Tell them what you're planning. I'd gone to a lecture he was giving, then I went up to him afterwards, handed him my card and said, "If I were to call you, do you think we could have lunch?" "Well," he replied, "I'd have to think about it." So I cleared it all through the Embassy, and once I had the Embassy's accord, I could get in touch with him.

I had a lot of journalist contacts, French journalist contacts. Paris is filled with discussion groups. I joined a few of them and even gave an occasional talk.

Q: In French, of course.

WILLETT: Yes. You remember I met Chantal because we were both members of the youth wing of *L'Alliance atlantique*, the Atlantic Alliance. The Embassy sent me down - this was Watergate time...

Q: *Ah yes, of course.*

WILLETT: □□□they sent me to give a talk to this youth group about what Watergate meant, to a rather incredulous audience of young, sophisticated French people. I told them Richard Nixon had been forced to resign because if he hadn't he probably would have been impeached. He had violated U.S. law. It wasn't just a question of whether you liked him or not. And it was at this talk, on an island off Toulon -- you can see how "rough" some of these assignments were -- that I met Chantal. So I can say my marriage is a direct consequence of Watergate!

Q: *But in trying to explain Watergate, you met relative incomprehension from the French.*

WILLETT: Yes, total incomprehension.

Q: *And was that incomprehension any more or less unique than today in discussing the question of President Clinton?*

WILLETT: Same thing.

Q: *Same incomprehension.*

WILLETT: Yes.

Q: *No more, no less.*

WILLETT: No, same. To them, the Americans are still "big kids." *Les américains sont des grands enfants*. It's a cliché. I used to be offended by it. Now I have all sorts of replies. I've become a little more cynical, like the French, but I turn it back on them now. What they couldn't understand is how something they considered a peccadillo -- eavesdropping on your political opponent -- could get blown up into something that caused a President's downfall. They just didn't get it. And they don't understand today why the fact that a President is doing things with a young woman and then acting discreetly to, as they see it, protect her honor should bring such a *merdier* down on his head. I suspect they may believe U.S. politics are somehow cleaner than theirs. Many French fail to grasp how nasty it can get Stateside. I see little evolution on this between 1974 and now.

Q: *Well, John, before we leave your first tour in Paris, anything we've missed, any particular things that stand out, accomplishments you're particularly proud of from that period, any particular things you would have done differently that somebody who hears this coming into the Service might benefit from?*

WILLETT: I would say two things. One is that hard work, imagination and energy are rewarded. The other is that it's as important to be diplomatic with your colleagues as with your host country officials. Maybe more important, because you're going to be with your colleagues for the long haul, whereas with host country people, you've got your assignment there, but you may never be back. You have a little run-in, well, okay. This does *not* mean you should roll over and play

dead, because, for me, that's the unfortunate tendency of many people in the diplomatic service. It always backfires.

I remember a political counselor once coming into my office on my first assignment in Embassy Paris. I'd arrived early in the morning, as I often did. I had a ton of work, and the only person there besides me was the POLCOUNS (political counselor) secretary; I asked her if she could type a short action memo for me quickly, something that had to be on the Ambassador's desk at opening of business. She said, "Sure, be happy to." She was a good-natured lady, and the political counselor wasn't in yet. Later I was conducting a meeting of the Internal Political Unit□□□I think the guy who normally headed it was away, so there were only three of us. We were talking about the day's work when the door burst open and the political counselor stormed in. He tears into me for daring to have used his secretary without his accord. I just blew up right back at him; I said he had hell of a nerve humiliating me in front of my colleagues, that I wouldn't stand for it, that I was trying to do my job, and if this was the reward one gets for coming in early, the hell with him. He walked out, but later came back and apologized.

Q: Good for you.

WILLETT: I said to myself right then and there, That's it, that is the clearest lesson. And I think foreign entities, foreign governments sometimes have to be treated the same way. This doesn't work all the time, because when you're wrong, you're wrong. If you make a mistake and somebody comes in and chews you out, okay. But never humiliate someone out in front of other people. To me that's an automatic dictum. You can say, "May I see you afterwards?" Maybe everybody's going to realize that the person you've asked to see is in for it. Nonetheless, never do it in front of that person's colleagues. It's too damaging.

The behavior of CODELs, in Paris and elsewhere, also made a lasting impression on me, because frankly I was appalled by what I saw. One very powerful senator came here and the only thing that man wanted to do was go to nightclubs. He took eight or nine people, including me, to the Tour d'Argent and spent I don't know how many 1975 taxpayers' dollars on a dinner there. I found this disgusting, and I saw it time and time again. It seemed to me there should be some better oversight of the way elected officials spend money when they're abroad. Nobody dares do anything, and I didn't either. I deserve no credit for standing up to a senator and saying "Aren't you ashamed!" But I found it ultimately saddening to think there was such abuse of the people's trust, to use an appropriate cliché.

Q: They all come through Paris.

WILLETT: They all come through Paris. There were something in the neighborhood of 20/30 CODELs a year in town, and even if they had no business here, they'd orchestrate the trip so as to arrive on a Friday with one meeting, make sure there was a holiday on Monday and have their second and last meeting on Tuesday afternoon. So they could be here from Thursday evening to Wednesday morning and have two meetings. Of course the Ambassador, doing his job, would always feel constrained to have dinners for them and shepherd them around, and they would *devour* the time of two or three officers. Anyway, just thought I'd get that off my chest.

One of the most distasteful aspects of our Foreign Service careers is taking care of these visiting firemen, though every now and then, very rarely, there'd be a crackerjack CODEL. One of these involved arms control. Claiborne Pell and the then head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Rhodes Scholar, the names don't come to me. There were five of them in all, and they were good. I was proud to be with them. A couple of them spoke good French. On the other hand, one of our most respected senators came through and was inebriated half the time he spent here. He bullied the marines and blustered his way around with the French. It was embarrassing to be seen with him.

Q: But, John, I'm thinking more about the diplomacy with colleagues. I've never been myself in a political section and I can't imagine it of a total of 20. I can't imagine ambitious young middle grade officers trying to get ahead. There must have been some sharp elbows and competing for scraps. How did that work out, and when you were the acting head of the internal section, how did you keep the boys apart and preserve the, kind of, good working relations?

WILLETT: There it was pretty easy because the jobs were defined in a way that made it difficult to transgress. Admittedly, I said previously I was doing the majority conservative parties, then all of a sudden I'm dealing with the editor-in-chief of *Humanité*? Why is it me that brings him into the Embassy? That was a target of opportunity; I'd attended his talk simply to hear the man, and wasn't intending to identify myself. I made that decision on the spur of the moment. Having gone that far, though, I carefully shepherded the deal through the Embassy, as I mentioned, including, first and foremost, the young man responsible for the opposition parties. He did resent it a bit, as I might have in his place. But the categories of work were clearly defined. If you're doing Asia, you probably won't get involved in domestic politics. If you're doing the Middle East, you probably won't get involved in Latin America. Spillover did occur, Dick -- and your question is well placed in that respect -- on the political-military side of things. The very definition of the job, political-military, means that it's both military and political. We were stepping on one another's toes all the time. And not only was political-military stepping on political's toes, or vice versa, but on the military's toes as well. John Kelly was political-military officer in Paris when I was there, and before him there was a very strange man who later murdered his wife and committed suicide.

Q: In Paris.

WILLETT: No, back in the States. It was a famous case. We don't have many FSO's who do that.

Q: I remember that, I remember.

WILLETT: In fact, this event occurred not too distant from the time when the former French ambassador to the Vatican killed his wife and four children and then committed suicide. Marital problems and alcoholism run high in diplomacy. Too much easy alcohol lying around.

Q: How were relations as a reporting officer between the reporting officers and the Station?

WILLETT: Tense at times, but I, for one, always remained convinced, and did so through the time I was acting DCM and briefly chargé d'affaires in Morocco, that the only people who stand

to gain when tensions arise between pol and the station are the people who don't have U.S. interests at heart. I would go out of my way to work with the Station, when appropriate, even on a couple of rare occasions sharing contacts with them. I wouldn't let them *take* my contacts unless they needed to get at someone else through one of mine. Then I'd ask: "Is this what you're planning to do; let's see if this is workable," or whatever.

Q: You mentioned the DCM. That wasn't Chris Chapman and the celebrated incident he thought was an attempt on his life?

WILLETT: No. I arrived after that.

Q: Okay. So you weren't particularly constrained at that time by terrorist threats, menaces and so on, security.

WILLETT: I never felt it. I lived on Ile Saint Louis. I didn't have car, but I did have a dog, which I took to the Embassy. I walked him the two miles from Ile Saint Louis to the Embassy every day, and no matter what time I got out of work, I walked home at night. This kept me in good shape. The ambassadors were understanding about the dog, which slept on a chair in my office. The political counselor was less thrilled, but I pointed out to him that Giscard kept his two retrievers in his office. "Yes, but he's the president of France," he answered, "and you're a second secretary," which was a pretty good response. Anyway, it all worked out.

Q: John, before we leave France, the whole aspect of the impact of U.S. culture and embassies as a platform for cultural projection and understanding -- have you any thoughts on that?

WILLETT: I've always believed that the cultural section of a post is as important as any other section. Every time one steps out of the embassy, one is, in effect, acting as a cultural ambassador for one's country. I enjoyed going to the cultural events. I readily agreed to speak a few times. I traveled to universities in France and spoke on American topics. I did have a slight advantage over some of my colleagues, because I'd majored in French literature at Kenyon and was therefore able to talk to the French perhaps a bit more on their own terms. But this said, the Political Section in Paris, where I worked, had a number of excellent French speakers. It is incorrect to say that Americans are monoglots; they're not. There were proficient French speakers working in the section with me. One of them was Chuck Redman, who followed the left. We stayed friends until he left the Foreign Service after completing a tour as ambassador to the FRG. In fact, my family and I went up to visit him and his wife Eileen when he was ambassador to Sweden. We stayed there ten days, hiking with him and his family. But back to your question; staying involved in the culture of the country one's serving in, speaking the language of the country, incrementally increases one's ability to do his or her job well.

Q: But in a country as culturally aware as France, whether it's James Baldwin or Michael Jackson or Ernest Hemingway or Gertrude Stein, the U.S. influence is flowing in all around an embassy. Can an embassy really play a role in that? It seems to me the influence is so much more pervasive than anything the embassy can purvey.

WILLETT: You're absolutely right. The influence of American popular culture is all embracing

and has, in fact, reached a point in this country where the authorities are now limiting the number of American films on TV. The GOF has also imposed tariffs on the importation of American movies, which doesn't stop people from paying \$10 a ticket to go see, you know, totally idiotic things like *Lost in Space*.

Still, there's another side to American culture, less popular, which the Cultural Section has a role in bringing into France, Spain, Germany, Italy -- whatever. Poets, artists, writers who are not so well known by foreign publics are sponsored by USIS. It's true that William Styron is a well known abroad, so when he came to France there was a ready-made audience for him. But there are others. William Gass, for example, is less well known. I shepherded him about when he came to Strasbourg. I learned a lot; the French learned a lot. It was stimulating to watch him entrance a French audience even though he didn't speak French. I would end this by repeating that it's a mistake for Foreign Service officers to ignore the cultural side of their job, a real mistake. First of all, foreigners are understandably flattered when you evince knowledge of, and appreciation for, their culture. As a result, they're more inclined to learn about the better aspects of your culture. You're right; American popular culture is omnipresent. But there's another side to things in America that deserve knowing, and that's where USIS plays an important role.

Q: Feeling as strongly as you do about cultural outreach, are you reassured or concerned by the recent complete merger of USIA and the State Department?

WILLETT: I would say it's not a bad thing. Why not amalgamate them? Each one can influence the other in beneficial ways. What I certainly hope is that this doesn't make USIS a less powerful presence in embassies; that would be a mistake.

HERMAN J. COHEN
Political Counselor
Paris (1974-1977)

Ambassador Herman J. Cohen was born in New York City. After graduating from The City College of New York, he joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His career has included positions in France, Uganda, Zambia, Zaire, Senegal and Rhodesia. Ambassador Cohen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 15, 1996.

Q: Well you left there in '74, where to?

COHEN: I was appointed political counselor to the U.S. embassy in Paris. This was a result of Kissinger's so-called "GLOP" policy. I think you may have heard of it.

Q: Oh, very much so.

COHEN: He decreed within six months before I was due for a transfer that you couldn't be assigned to an area in which you were a specialist.

Q: This was I understand from a meeting he had with ambassadors from Mexico and Latin American who weren't as interested in his policies as they were trying to tell him about Interamerican problems and he wasn't very interested.

COHEN: The story goes that he came back and said, "Those guys don't even know what NATO is." So anyway I went to personnel and I had just completed 13 straight years in African affairs. I said, "Where in Africa are you going to send me?" They said, "Didn't you hear of the "GLOP" policy; you are forbidden to go to Africa." I said, "Well, what can you offer me" They said, "We were thinking about political counselor in Paris." I said, "I accept!" So, it was a great happy surprise for me.

Q: You were political counselor in Paris from when to when?

COHEN: From June of '74 to September of '77.

Q: What was the political situation in France at this time?

COHEN: President Pompidou had just died. They had an election and Valerie Giscard D'Estaing had replaced him. I was coming in just at the beginning. The election was in May of '74, and I arrived in June. There was a spanking new French administration. Gaullism, in effect, had left the scene, and a new modernizing conservative regime was taking over.

Q: I would have thought this would have been a very congenial type of regime to the U.S. or not.

COHEN: It theoretically should have been, but it turned out not to be. One thing, in France, the legacy of Gaullism was still pretty fresh, was that one does not show that you accept American leadership. It was really politically incorrect in France to say that the Americans were the leader in the NATO alliance. French politicians had to show their independence constantly, and Giscard d'Estaing was no different. So, he was constantly flirting with the Soviets and Eastern European countries while we were treating them as adversaries.

Q: You had worked in our embassy in Kinshasa. Did you find here was sort of the mega embassy with always a somewhat distant difficult country to deal with. We were never completely comfortable with the French or the French with us. What was sort of the operating atmosphere in France?

COHEN: Well, I found that people, political party leaders, intellectuals, and press people, were always very friendly in the sense that they always wanted to be close to us and talk to us and influence us. They never refused dialog with us; they were always available, always approachable. Now, their public rhetoric was frequently anti-American, but they were always accepting lunch invitations, and always doing so recognizing the U.S. was the superpower, and they wanted to remain close to us.

Q: Did you find that working as a political officer, your method of operation was different than in other places you have been?

COHEN: Not particularly. I think diplomatic discourse and getting to know people is all pretty much the same. Having worked in Francophone Africa, I found a lot of similarity intellectually in the approaches of people, but in France one must know the language.

Q: A question I have put to a number of people that have served there, what about dealing with the intellectuals? I don't think there is any other country who can use that term and really mean a rather specific group. Could you talk about this?

COHEN: The French had what we called the “classe politique”. They were a whole bunch of people who spent their whole waking hours dealing with political issues. One thing I found about serving in Paris is that we had a very deep interest in internal politics. Normally we deal with state to state relations. For example, how are you going to vote in the UN; what are you doing about Iran, and a host of international issues. We had a sub section in the political section to deal only with internal politics. It was fascinating how French people were willing to talk to us about their internal politics instead of saying it is none of your business. Every Frenchman is politically intellectual. They are always looking for people to talk to about it, so we got loads of information. This went from the far left to the far right; everybody wanted to talk.

Q: In the long run, what difference did it make in our operating policy?

COHEN: Well, there was a great deal of interest in internal politics there because the socialist party that was in opposition was reforming itself, reinvigorating itself. Francois Mitterand, who had taken it over, was sort of a Johnny come lately socialist anyway. It was coming back and it was starting to get popular. Gaullism was on the decline, and his method was to make an alliance with the communist party, so that the left would be unified in defeating the right. Now this blew Kissinger's mind. These guys were saying, “when we come to power, we will have communist ministers.” Kissinger was saying that was unacceptable”. It is not acceptable for a NATO country to have communist ministers in the government listening to all those secrets. So, we had to watch this very closely; it was very important. It also meant that we had to combat these people who were constantly anti-American, the right who were in power had to constantly show that they were not anti-American but independent. So this worried Kissinger since it threatened his whole European policy. Internal politics had an impact on European policy.

Q: You were there from '74 to '77. Was there one ambassador or several?

COHEN: When I arrived, our ambassador was John Irwin. He left after maybe about six months and was replaced by Kenneth Rush who stayed there until the Carter administration came in. Then he stayed a couple of months and then left. Mainly I served with Rush.

Q: How did Rush operate there? What was your impression of his work?

COHEN: Rush lacked enthusiasm. First, he didn't speak French at all. He was getting a bit tired. He once confided in me that he was in the semi-retirement mode.

Q: He had been an under secretary?

COHEN: Deputy secretary. Before being deputy he had been ambassador to Germany where he did a very good job on the Berlin treaty. He sort of saw that as his crowning moment. In Paris, he was not that energetic; however, on the question of communists in a future French government allied with the socialists, he defended the embassy's analysis that it might not necessarily be against U.S. interests. In fact, it might be pro-U.S. in that it would result in a reduction of communist influence. It was hard to understand why communists in government would lose power rather than gain power, but we had it all analyzed by experts. We had communist affairs officers. Of course sending this analysis to Washington was sort of taking your life in your hands, but he defended us. I give him a lot of credit. He was a conservative American businessman who understood the real world of French politics.

Q: What was the basis for this analysis that it would actually diminish the power of the communists?

COHEN: The power of the communists was to be constantly in opposition and to denounce the bourgeois establishment. By being coopted in a regime dominated by socialists, they would in effect have to defend everything the government was doing. When they stopped attacking government, the people who normally vote for them would just lose interest you see. So the communists would lose their image as a protest party, and it worked out that way later. When they finally did come to share power, that is exactly what happened. Their vote went down from something like 16% to 8% in a couple of years.

Q: Did we have any contact with communist leaders?

COHEN: That was a policy question. It was a great debate. Should we actually legitimize them by treating them like a normal political party as we did every other political party. The answer that came from Washington was that we should keep contact but only at a low level. We had a Foreign Service officer in the political section named John Dobrin who followed the left. He reported on socialists and communists. He was allowed to meet with communist officials, but nobody else saw them. The political counselor was forbidden and of course, the ambassador was absolutely forbidden.

Q: How about with the socialists? Did you see Mitterand in those days or not?

COHEN: The socialists were totally legitimate. The ambassador invited Mitterand to lunch usually once every couple of months. I had the honor of sitting next to Mitterand because I was usually the translator for the ambassador, so I got to know him well.

Q: What was our approach to the French? I mean on major issues, did we kind of know what battles to fight and what not to fight in those days? We knew the French were always trying to look like they were not our tools and it seemed they were always the burr under our saddle every time you turned around. Were we trying to explain this and say let's don't worry about that; let them go ahead. Let's concentrate on this.

COHEN: Basically we tried to ignore the irritations usually from some public statements. We

tried to work on issues in a substantive way and make headway. We usually did. For example, you remember when Jeruzelski in Poland had a coup, the army took over to consolidate communist rule and to eliminate democratization tendencies. We saw this as a Soviet move against Walesa and that sort of thing. We denounced it and were calling Jeruzelski all sorts of horrible names. So what does Giscard D'Estaing do; he goes to Poland and makes an official visit. He does just the opposite of what the U.S. is doing. But, we decided to ignore these irritations and work on issues. Usually we had a meeting of the minds on issues.

Q: What was the political section's analysis of Giscard D'Estaing at this time? Where was he coming from particularly as far as American interests were concerned?

COHEN: We found him to be pretty good for U.S. interests. He had his own agenda, but we really didn't find any major problems with him, nor did we find any with Mitterand. Both of them were being very cooperative generally. Both were quite anticommunist and were fully aware of the need for NATO solidarity in moments of crisis.

Q: What about the role of the media in France?

COHEN: The media is very powerful, and we paid a lot of attention to them. We didn't leave it to USIS only and we spent a lot of time with the media political analysts. First of all, they were a great source of information for us. They had a lot of channels that we didn't have. Secondly, we liked to influence them. I had a policy to bring in one of the leading political journalists to the embassy once a month for a little seminar. This was mainly for the political section but we invited everyone else. We found this was very useful.

Q: Did you find that the press could reflect where America stood, not necessarily support it, but reflect our position. I'm talking about different presses although they might have a different attitude or not.

COHEN: Generally they were pretty fair in reporting our point of view. We gave them ample interviews. We brought them in to see the ambassador and the ambassador would serve drinks. We got a pretty fair shake. Of course, it depended. If you are talking about Le Figaro, which was pro-American and conservative, versus L'Humanité, which was communist.

Q: Or Le Monde where was that?

COHEN: Le Monde blew hot and cold depending on the journalist.

Q: Again back to the French intellectuals, How did you sort of work with them? Did you find, from what I've seen although I have never served in France, they always seem to have wonderful constructs of how event come about where I think most Americans there isn't a plot behind everything or there is not a manipulation. Did you find that you were out to cultivate this group?

COHEN: Yes, we did. For example there was always this feeling about the Israelis having too much power in Washington, and we tried to put that into perspective. There were all sorts of special interest groups they were worried about.

Q: How about the officers you were getting? Did you feel you had a pretty strong crew?

COHEN: We had very bright officers. You know you are talking about a mega embassy, there was a mega political section; we had about 15 people including two CIA undercover officers who did regular work. We had one doing international organizations and another doing Asia. They were all very bright, especially the younger ones. They all spoke good French. I did find a very high percentage of prima donnas that I never saw in Africa. I get the feeling this was the Europeanist. "You know, we are Europeanists; we are better than anyone else." Coming in from Africa, I sort of had an inferiority complex.

Q: You were sort of the country cousin of the European bureau?

COHEN: That's right. I remember a secretary who worked for me in Africa. A secretary whom I considered to be very smart and competent, and she was working there, and I said, "Brenda, what do you think of these guys who call themselves Europeanists?" She said, "They certainly think a lot of themselves." So, there were prima donnas and people with turf problems. For example, I had one officer who covered French relations with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. He felt he should supervise the political section's work on communist party and socialists. He was trying to grab John Dobrin's turf away. I also found the political military guy who was brilliant, a NATO expert, was constantly fighting with the Army Brigadier General who was the military attaché. I was always mediating. I spent so much of my time with this sort of thing instead of doing my substantive work.

Q: Well, in a place like France in Paris as well as in London, you really have people who are reporting on things like French relations with Africa, French relations with the Far East and all this, so in many ways you were much more as political counselor, dealing with the whole panoply of American foreign policy.

COHEN: That is one of the reasons why I valued this assignment so much because it gave me a totally different perspective. For example, the Vietnamese negotiations were going on. We had a guy there who spent all his time on that. I got to know a lot about the Vietnam negotiations.

Q: You were there during the fall of Vietnam.

COHEN: That's right, and I remember one last effort to save things and Giscard D'Estaing offered to mediate between the United States and the North Vietnamese. It lasted a few weeks, and we got involved with that.

Q: Did you find the French were just sort of being politely nice and saying well you didn't do any better than we did? Was this something?

COHEN: I felt they were kind of sincerely hoping to bring that to a soft landing to avoid humiliation. I thought they were good on that.

Q: France at that time was in but not in NATO. Not on the military side, but really was. I realize

there was another embassy that dealt with NATO affairs, but from your perspective, how did this NATO thing work out?

COHEN: They were in on the political side of NATO. They had an ambassador to NATO who sat on the Atlantic Council that includes all of the ambassadors. However they were not under the unified military command. Their forces in Germany, for example, did not report to SAC Europe, NATO command. They reported to Paris, totally separate. They did not sit in the military council and its regular committees. They did not sit in the nuclear committee and all that. However, they constantly protested they were part of NATO. I remember once when General Alexander Haig was SAC Europe. He constantly made the rounds of all the capitals, and he came to Paris once, so Ambassador Rush invited him to lunch with the defense minister. As usual, I got into a lot of these things by virtue of my being able to translate which is always very helpful. I was there for the lunch. Our political-military officer was also there, as well as Haig and the minister of defense and the ambassador. After lunch the conversation became free flowing, and the minister of defense, who was relatively new, said to Haig, "General, I want you to know one thing. If the balloon goes up; if there is a Soviet attack, we will be under your command in under three hours." Haig sort of took it for granted like well I knew that all the time. I, after listening to all this rhetoric, we don't come under American command, all that sort of thing, it sort of blew my mind. After that point I never worried about this separatism from NATO. I knew that was really just rhetoric.

Q: Were we watching Germany, because in many ways almost every, as I look about American foreign policy we had three things: one to keep the Soviets from taking over, two, to keep the Japanese from reviving, and three to keep the French and Germans from going at each other. We had already gone into two wars because of this. Were we watching the French-German connection from your perspective for any glitches or anything else like that?

COHEN: We watched it in terms of our interest in Europe, but we never felt there were any problems. In fact, the Germans and French had always made a point of having a special relationship, very friendly, many meetings between heads of state. We never saw it as something to worry about.

Q: Were there any major developments during the time you were there that particularly absorbed you or problems?

COHEN: As I said, I spent most of my time on the internal French politics. I had a policy. I said the government, the establishment, let the ambassador and the DCM and the minister counselor for economic affairs, let them spend most of their time stroking those people. We in the political section will spend most of our time on the opposition, knowing they will come to power eventually. Let's get to know them and work with them, so I spent most of my time with the left, and I found that this officer who did the left, John Dobrin, was very good, very well connected, and had tremendous contacts. He'd say, look can you make a lunch for the shadow defense minister, and I'd make a lunch. He was really terrific. But, even better than him was the labor attaché. The labor attaché, John Condon, was one of the legendary labor attaches of the Foreign Service. Mitterand was his personal friend. Jacques Attali, who later became the chief of staff of President Mitterrand, was his personal friend. He wouldn't even tell me who was coming to

lunch. He would just tell me come to lunch tomorrow, and all these big socialists were there. It was fabulous. The trouble with Condon though was that he didn't like to spend time doing any reporting. He had fabulous contacts, but he couldn't turn it into useful reports, so he would invite me and other colleagues, and we would do all the reports. That was my main concern, making sure that the left didn't turn bad. We knew they were going to come to power. The other things that were of interest to me, I remember the Turkish Greek problem over Cyprus.

Q: Yes, July, '74.

COHEN: That was my first crisis. I remember the western European director in Paris, a great diplomat named DeMargerie, who later became ambassador in Washington. We became very friendly. Through the summer months we were working on a day to day basis on the Cyprus crisis. We also had the famous Entebbe raid by the Israelis.

Q: Air France was hijacked and went to Uganda.

COHEN: This was Air France. Then we had an American plane hijacked to Paris. It was a TWA flight, New York to Chicago to Paris. It was Croatian nationalists. I was the embassy's anchor man for that. Usually the Americans say we don't negotiate for hostages, we don't negotiate with terrorists, but here was the administration ordering us to negotiate. Get the ambassador out to the airport, because it was all Americans on board. But it was the French who said, "No. Either they give up or we kill them." So, we had a tough time on that one. Luckily, the people who took over the plane eventually gave up.

Q: So what happened? How did it work out?

COHEN: The Croatians demanded that certain things be published, some of their manifestos be published, so we got the Associated Press office in Paris whom we were very close to, and they agreed to put it out on the news wire. Then when we showed them that here it is, it is in the newspapers, and they surrendered. That worked out. They were immediately put on a plane and returned to the States; there was no extradition procedure there. We had a number of these very interesting short-term problems. Kissinger was very worried about the communist-socialist alliance because it looked like in the next election they might win. He was really getting panicky, so he sends an instruction to the embassy to go and see the socialists and tell them that this alliance with the communists is unacceptable. It will kill NATO. You, know, such a real interference in their internal politics which was something the French really didn't like, even if you did it confidentially. So, the ambassador said, "I'm not touching this," and the DCM said, "I'm not touching this," so they both looked at me and said, "You do it." So, I said, "How am I going to handle this?" I was planning a trip to Marseilles anyway because I liked to travel around France, and the head of the socialist party foreign relations committee was the Mayor of Marseilles. His name was Gaston Defferre, who was one of the old socialist barons. He had already given me an appointment, so I came in and I saw him. I decided to make the approach with him since he was the head of the Socialist Party foreign relations committee. So we talked about Marseilles and internal politics, very friendly. He was a right wing socialist. So then I made the pitch and he got very upset. "This is unacceptable of the American government to try to tell us what to do in our internal politics. Who are you to tell us about the danger of communism?"

After the Second World War when I came back to the city we found communists installed in all of the city offices trying to run the city. We didn't fool with them. We just got our taxi drivers out with their wrenches, and within five hours these guys were all out. We know how to handle communists and we really resent this attempt to tell us what to do " So, that meeting kind of ended in an angry tone, but I made the pitch and carried out my job. So nothing came of it until about six months later when there were local, municipal elections, and this was seen as a sign of what would happen in the national elections. Defferre was out campaigning, and he was in Bordeaux, and he was in a very nationalistic mood. He said, "Let me tell you a story. This American diplomat who came to see me and try to tell us what to do, and tell us that our alliance with the communists is dangerous to NATO, and I told him off." This got tremendous press play. My phone was ringing off the hook. There is a satirical weekly in Paris called Le Canard Enchaîné. (the shackled duck). They had a picture of me in a cowboy hat that said the sheriff goes south. But, then, of course, I became the darling of the right wing. So, anyway, we had a few of those types of adventures.

Q: Did you have any problem with the French Deuxième Bureau or what ever their equivalent is to the CIA, and our CIA as well, everyone seemed to get into collisions over things. Were there ever any embarrassments over things of this kind or problems?

COHEN: When I was political counselor, there weren't any. We were kept informed. We had pretty good relations. Actually there was a big problem later when I was Assistant Secretary; we were really going off on a tangent with each other in Africa and some African countries, but not while I was there.

Q: One last question on France. It seems like relations with Germany, France and the UK often are secretaries of various departments have their direct contacts; the President has his direct contact and all this. Did you ever feel like the big boys were flying over you and that you weren't quite sure what was happening?

COHEN: This was a problem. Kissinger especially was adept at this. Shortly after I became political counselor, I was at the foreign ministry talking about a specific problem. I can't even remember now what it was. Anyway, they talked to me about it and said in any event Kissinger will be here next week and we know he is interested in this. He and the foreign ministry will settle this. I was new and I hadn't heard that was coming, maybe it was arranged before I came. So I went back and the ambassador said what happened at the foreign ministry? Well they said Kissinger was coming next week. "Kissinger is coming next week? I didn't know that!" This was John Irwin, a sweet man. He was a very nice person, but he got very upset about it. He wrote one of those NODIS cables that are eyes only for the Secretary of state. He said, "I don't see why you need an ambassador here if you are going to come over here and not even tell me you are coming so that we can help prepare the way and all that. This is really unacceptable" It was a very angry cable, and he showed it to me. I asked, "do you really want to send this?" He said, "No, I really feel strongly about it." So, he sent the cable out. About four days later an answer came in eyes only saying, "I'm terribly sorry I didn't inform you about my visit. It was totally due to the incompetence of my staff."

Q: Kissinger is renowned for doing this. If caught with his hand in the cookie jar, it was always

somebody else.

COHEN: So he visited a few times; it was usually like that. I remember the ambassadors tended to be kept on the periphery of his visits. He visited quite a bit actually. There was a lot of preparation for it, so we got involved in that. We had one big event that was the first G7 summit ever held, and that was in France in 1975. Giscard d'Estaing thought up the idea to have a summit. They met in a suburb of Paris called Rambouillet. President Ford was in office, so we all had an assignment to deal with tremendous advance parties. I was assigned to getting the U.S. delegation the best possible quarters to stay in. One of my big diplomatic victories was to beat out the Japanese in commandeering a small hotel. The Japanese were very upset about it. I also was in charge of Ford's bedroom. Does he want logs in the fire? Also there was another issue. Did Ford want to go to church on Sunday? There was going to be a weekend involved before he went back to Washington. He is a Protestant, there is a chapel, because he would be staying on the grounds of the palace. There was an old feudal palace there. There is a chapel. we can bring out the American Episcopalian Bishop of Paris. Word comes back from Washington no, he wants to go to a local church even if it is Catholic, it is okay. He wants to go mix and mingle with other people. You can think of the security. We find a local church. The French say look we can't have him mingle with local people. We don't know who they are. I'm sure they are all nice people. So the French say to us, get as many people as possible from the American embassy to fill up the church. So, we put the word out more or less, you must go to this church. We all went to the church. It had Giscard d'Estaing and the Prime Minister of Italy, and I think one of the other heads of government was there, so it was a mini summit in church, but there were no French people there.

WOODWARD ROMINE
Consul General
Strasbourg (1974-1977)

Woodward Romine was born and raised in Indiana. He graduated from Wabash College and later pursued studies at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His primary assignments in the State Department were as Political Officer in Washington and abroad. His foreign assignments, all European, include Warsaw, Paris, Strasbourg, Vienna and four posts in Germany. In Washington, Mr. Romine dealt with French relations as well as Refugee and Management matters. He is a graduate of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Mr. Romine was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1998.

Q: 1974 takes you back to Europe, to one of its more delightful cities, as Consul General in Strasbourg, with all the excitement of France and the Consular Bureau associated functions.

ROMINE: Those were three lovely years. One, you're far enough away from the capital so that generally speaking you can do the things that you want to do or that you feel are important. This was an absolutely fascinating part of France, especially in Alsace. When you cross the Vosges Mountains and come down into Alsace, you find that there's another language spoken there. It's a

language very much like German. It is a German dialect. This gives people a slightly different viewpoint of things. Also, they have always felt that they had been very much protected and taken care of by the people of what they call the interior, the people of the interior. That was meant as a highly complimentary thing to the French-speaking people, but sometimes it wasn't taken that way and the French people thought that this was aimed at them as a condescending sort of thing, but it wasn't. I was very interested to see how this affected people's attitudes in that part of the world. While there were many people of the left there, what the French would call the left, the Socialist party, still with these people in Alsace there was a great feeling of being very, very French and therefore very much attached to the memory of de Gaulle, who was, of course, out of the picture by that time, and an even nicer thing, a feeling of deep affection for the Americans, because the American 7th Army who came down and been highly instrumental in freeing that area from the German occupation at the end of the war. This you found always reflected in the attitudes of the people towards anyone there who was American, and it made your work interesting. Also, it was an interesting place from what was going on. There was a rapidly developing area that had a lot of industry in it that was interested in getting into the American market and in buying things. One of the things that I remember the most was a textile industry which was most interested in getting American cotton and which, for reasons that were sometimes obscure, always seemed to have difficulty in doing this. The consular district itself covered not just Alsace but also Lorraine and parts of France bordering on Switzerland, very beautiful country. It gave you a different view of how people would view problems than you would get from being in Paris. Then there was the Council of Europe and later on the European Parliament. The Council of Europe was sort of a discussion- (end of tape)

-members who were not members of the Communities at that time like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, and they could meet and discuss all of these European questions. As I recall, also the Council had the Court of Human Rights attached to it. Now, maybe that's with the European Communities. I don't think so. I think it was with the Council. And that was a very interesting thing. We followed its work a great deal. During the time I was there, there was a dispute between the Irish and the English on the holding of prisoners in Northern Ireland, Irish Republican prisoners, of course. This was debated at the Council. It was a splendid thing to see these perfectly trained English barristers from both sides, English or Irish but all obviously out of good English universities, debating this with the most exquisite courtesy to each other and some of the most sad and tragic matters that you could talk about, that they all recognized themselves as they made these debates. That was a part of my stay there that I found very rewarding, mainly because the representatives there certainly wanted to reach some sort of understanding. They knew how to talk to each other, and they were all very pessimistic, to say the least, that any solution could be found. The court did find, however, in favor of the Irish complaint this time, and the Brits acknowledged this and, I think, the prisoners were released or something was done. Then the assembly of the European Parliament came there, and they built a new great building for them. That was an interesting thing to follow, but, of course, the mission in Brussels liked to cover this very carefully itself, and its representatives were nearly always there, but still you could watch carefully what was going on, and the residence where I had the great fortune to live could be used to receive prominent guests and people from Brussels that I could talk to.

GEORGE Q. LUMSDEN
Economic Officer
Paris (1974-1979)

George Quincy Lumsden was born in New Jersey in 1930. He graduated from Princeton University in 1952 and served overseas in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant from 1952-1955. His postings abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1957 include Izmir, Bonn, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait and Paris, with an ambassadorship to The United Arab Emirates.

Q: It's a dirty job, but somebody's got to do it. You were in Paris from when to when?

LUMSDEN: I got to Paris in late summer 1974 and was there through the first Iranian takeover in the latter part of 1979. I was back home by the time the main hostage crisis started.

Q: 1974-1979.

LUMSDEN: It was a tour that turned out to be very good for me. With my petroleum economic reporting background, the 1973 oil crisis had just hit and the International Energy Agency was being formed and France was objecting to this formation of this cartel of rich countries. They were grandstanding to the non-rich countries of the world by saying that the IEA is, as Jobert said, "a machine de guerre contre l'épais en droit de développement." We had famous arguments in the paper every day between Kissinger and Jobert about the efficacy of establishment of the IEA and I got the assignment in that the French were not joining to do the French energy policy. At that time, it's amazing. Western industrialized countries including the United States simply did not have overall energy balances. They didn't really know what segments of the energy input was going into what segments of the energy output. It was incredible. Even countries like Germany that you would have expected to have one didn't.

Q: Did we have something like that?

LUMSDEN: No, we did not. We had basically Jim Akins playing Cassandra doing his Wolf is Here article and President Nixon getting on television showing people how to turn down the thermostat in their living room. We did not have the Energy Information Agency, any of that stuff. We did not have a coordinated plan at all. It was amazing, after having controlled the world of oil and energy for the better part of a century through our multinational corporations which we were very happy to have incorporated in our territory, suddenly losing the handle through the Tripoli and Tehran agreements. The posted price situation busted and then, of course, we had the 1973 war, which you can read about in Daniel Yergin's, The Prize, how the airlift to Israel arrived during the middle of the day when it was supposed to arrive late at night because the winds in Lajes Field and the Azores kept these huge, goliath planes down. The friendly Arabs knew that we were going to do this, but then when it all got publicized, they met and the Arab oil boycott resulted. Before they met, OPEC in general busted the price and it skyrocketed up to \$5.60 or \$5.70 a barrel, but the important thing was that OPEC was calling the shots all of a sudden, not us.

Q: What was your position in the embassy?

LUMSDEN: In the embassy, I was the general economic policy officer. I worked for a gentleman named Jack Myerson and Art Hartman, who was the ambassador then. I guess I flatter myself in saying that I did an awful lot of work in French energy policy at that time and came up as close as we could get with a French energy balance and what the French oil companies were doing. We fed that back to Washington.

Q: Did the French know what they were doing?

LUMSDEN: To start, not all that much. They knew what they wanted to do, how to grandstand to the Arabs as much as possible. They felt that would assure a continued friendly relationship and that they wouldn't be cut off. However, shortages hit them just as well. As we all know by now, the oil market is totally fungible. You can't say, "You don't get any and you don't get any." It's just a great world.

Q: The word "fungible" came out during the crisis. Before that it was an esoteric term. After that, everybody was saying, "We all know that oil is fungible."

LUMSDEN: Of course, another thing that happened to me there was, as fate would have it, the Iranian Revolution came on. I got extensive TDYs back down to the Gulf to interview people down there and talk about the situation as a result of the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini was in Paris at this time. The French flew him back, thinking that they would get a special deal out of that, which they did not.

Q: I'm sure it's from my chauvinistic American point of view, but it seems like the French always end up by being, in the British phrase, "too clever by half."

LUMSDEN: Oh, I think you're right. The problem heretofore with French policy has been that the various insiders, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration-types and others, are able to make policy decisions with very little reference to what public opinion might think in France. When it doesn't work, they just brush off their desks and say, "Well, we'll do something differently." There has not been really in my view in France a really good public accountability quotient for many of the policy actions that they've taken in the past. Now, they're faced with the new globalized economy and we'll see whether they can break out of that pattern or not. But I would agree completely that they are too clever by half.

Q: When you got there in 1974, what about dealing with the French? How did you go about it? What were your impressions? Did they change over this period of time?

LUMSDEN: Well, I don't think my impressions of the French have changed as much as they have developed and become more, I think, penetrating. The French actually are a very nice people who have an inferiority complex that shows itself in superiority. There is anxiety there. You can't blame many of them because of the constant pressure on the great French culture and what was "la grande nation" for them acting sometimes the way that they do. When you got your back up against the wall, they'll usually come out on the right side and support you. But they are

terribly sensitive to the fact now that a bipolar world in which they were not one of the two poles, but in which they thought they could play an interesting swing role, has now, to all intents and purposes, become a unipolar world where they don't feel they have the leeway to play one side against the other and inject themselves as crucial.

Q: We want to swing to 1974-1979. Could you go down to the Minister of Energy or the equivalent thereof and get information or go to the oil companies?

LUMSDEN: Oh, yes, I got lots and lots of information and lots and lots of lectures on the state of the world and how if only America's strength could be combined with France's intelligence. But I took this all in good stead. I'm a rather cynical, humorous person. I think that people enjoyed having me around. I had a pretty good time while I was there. Anybody who can't have a good time living a few years in Paris ought to have their head examined. But this was their wont to try to get us to understand the true nature and complications of the world that only a very, very mature society such as France could impart and they wanted to help us out.

We had, of course, while we were there, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the CIEC, at the Kleber Palace. I think that was 1975 or 1976. It ran on for three years and ended not with a bang, but a whimper. This was a time when generally economic policy in the U.S. as well as elsewhere was in the model of John Maynard Keynes. Nixon said, "I'm a Keynesian." We were willing to take the whole menu of commodities that are crucial to the industrialized world and the third world and to put ceiling and floor fixed prices on these if the oil producing states were willing to put ceiling prices on their commodity. Guess what? They sort of liked the free market at that particular time. It simply wouldn't work out. I think since that time there has been a steady decline in the resultant vector of international economic policy makers that governments can fix things. Currency markets have gotten out of the control of finance ministries and departments. They're just too enormous. Oil, on the other hand, can no longer really be fixed by governments anymore, not even OPEC. At that time, it was felt that you could. Of course, you couldn't. The price went up, way up in the first Arab oil embargo. Then at the end of the decade with the Iranian Revolution, where there was no exact embargo, but the market had a strong perception in 1978 and 1979 that supply was going to be inadequate, the price spiked again. I went to the Gulf in 1978 and again in 1979. I found my former contacts there riding a crest of egomania. They thought that this was it, they had it made. As the Shah said, "This is a noble resource. The price is right and that's the way it will stay and it will probably go to \$50 or more a barrel." Kuwait was showing the door to Gulf Oil and people like that. Of course, we had been trying to impress the Department with the fact. Jim Akins at least certainly got the message and knew that with the nationalization moves underway and the reliance of the West upon this commodity, we were headed for big trouble. Indeed, we were - so much so that after I got back from a TDY in the Gulf in 1979, I suddenly found that my assignment in Paris was, in effect, over and I was to report back to the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs forthwith as deputy director in charge of all the Gulf states except Saudi Arabia. That came in 1979 just about four or five weeks before the big hostage takeover in Iran.

Q: To whom were you reporting on oil matters back in Washington?

LUMSDEN: On oil matters then, we were reporting to the Office of Fuels and Energy, which I

think has been transmogrified into something else by now, and to the Bureau of Near Eastern/South Asian Affairs. I remember seeing the then-assistant secretary having written on a memo (I wasn't there then. I was still in Paris.) when the threatened embargo was made, "What are they going to do, drink their oil?" Nobody really believed that it could happen. It did. It caused a great recession in this country. I'm trying to think of what I can usefully add to something that has been written about so thoroughly.

1973 before I went to Paris... I'm sorry I jump around, but these things pop into my head not in a perfect chronological order. I, being an eager desk officer for Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen, of course, went to the office on Saturday. The word came in that the OPEC meeting in Kuwait had busted the posted price system, that they were taking control and were going to price it themselves.

After OPEC broke the posted price, the OPEC countries who met in Kuwait, after the Iranians and the Venezuelans and other non-Arabs left, broke up in disaccord over the question of whether or not to embargo, with Saudi Arabia stonewalling in trying to keep this thing from happening. This was all the same day. The Secretary of State, who had flown off to Eastern Europe somewhere, had received the news that the airlift to Israel had been delayed and that when it arrived, the Arab ministers who had just left Kuwait and gotten back that very day to their own countries, heard about it and said they were going to embargo anyway and that our airlift had to go forward because it was a question of U.S. arms perhaps being defeated by Soviet arms. This was when the Egyptian army had pressed the Israelis on the other side of the Canal. This was all one day. We had gone to DEFCON two. That is like full nuclear alert.

Finally, that was the day of the Saturday night massacre! my wife said, "What is going on down there?" I said, "Wait until I come home!" It was an incredible day. You can see how with the Watergate scandal breaking something like that would affect the decision making ability of the government. Luckily, we backed down from DEFCON two. The Israelis held. As a result, Sadat got just what he wanted: everybody to pay attention to him so that he could sign some kind of peace agreement with the Israelis having some sort of negotiating position. Anyway, that was the famous October 20, 1973.

Shifting back to Paris, it was agony all the time on energy while we were there. We basically had lost our negotiating leverage with OPEC and they just ran the show. The International Energy Agency was formed. Tom Enders negotiated that agreement. Actually, that was November 18, 1974. I was invited back to the 25th anniversary on November 18, 1999. The agency sans la France (French: without France) went into effect and started to try to get the industrialized consuming countries to have some sort of cooperation. Out of that comes our strategic petroleum reserve, a whole lot of work on other energy sources, and comes the producer-consumer dialogue which I skip ahead to because that is something that at that time was absolutely anathema to us because the dialogue meant that the producers were going to levy terms on us that we didn't want that were not market terms. So, this was in the late '70s and early '80s. I jump ahead a bit.

Q: Who was calling the shots in the French government? Was this a matter of the foreign ministry?

LUMSDEN: No. The foreign ministry pretty much followed the ministries of finance and economy on this. Their job was to keep relations with the Arabs good. Well, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the president of France at that time. I think by and large most of the decisions on energy policy - for example, going to 70% nuclear for electricity - were made at the presidential level. I am trying to remember the names of the various economic ministers we had at that time. Darned if I can recall all their names right now. A very important person was Raymond Barre, who was Minister of Economy then. The fellow who is now the head of Total. The French move people out of government. Thierry des Males or someone like that was very important in that. But I think that the basic decisions on energy policy at the time I was there were made by Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre, not by the foreign minister.

Q: When you were watching this, you had both, the oil portfolio and you were an Arab specialist. The French are still even today trying to show that they're greater friends with the Arabs than anyone else. Did you see a short-term, long-term effectiveness of this policy at all or did the Arabs...

LUMSDEN: To be very honest, no. The Arab oil producing countries are mostly desert Arab Bedouin stock people. They know what they call "killam fadhi" (free words) when they hear it. They also know where the real power is and that was with us. I did not see a tremendous benefit for France except possibly in contracts to negotiate for arms sales. I admit, they did preserve their concession rights in places like the United Arab Emirates, but so did we. They never nationalized. The French would say, "Look, we weren't taken over." But where else other than in Iraq were the French that strong? I do not see that it gave them that much of an advantage over everyone else.

Q: Did you see a certain amount of almost delight in feeling that "We're the big boy and we're playing this carefully balancing game and sticking it to the United States" when actually nobody else was playing the game and it was almost an internal French one?

LUMSDEN: You see, yes, there was, but it was done for local political clout. It was constantly "France-Amerique." It didn't make any difference whether it was positive or negative, but it had to be "France-Amerique," "Paris-New York" to put the political discussion on this phony level that France and the United States basically were equal partners in the world. The policy was one of delighting in American difficulties to pronounce these in front of the French public. It still goes on. Jacques Lang visits death row in Texas and thereby certainly condemns to death anybody that he visits. If you think the state of Texas is going to buckle under if some froggy goes down there and tells them, "Oh, don't kill that fellow." He's dead meat as soon as Lang arrives. Excuse my cynicism, but I'm getting old. But it is true. Plus the fact the French themselves had the death penalty through 1981. We had done away with it before.

Q: While you were doing this and were watching the French but you were dealing with oil - this was sort of a place where people met from other countries - were there really other players that were around in the oil thing? I'm thinking of Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, maybe Italy?

LUMSDEN: Oh, very definitely, but at this period of which we speak, I was assigned to the

embassy in France with a brief to cover France. I was not in any international thing. I from time to time would meet a German diplomat or something like that. But it was not my bag to get into what the Japanese, Germans, and others were doing. So, the answer is, yes, of course. They played very prominent roles, particularly in the founding of the International Energy Agency, right under the French nose. The French wanted the headquarters to be in France. Although they didn't necessarily want to join it themselves, they wanted it under the OECD umbrella. So, it came out as a dotted line out to the side administrated by but autonomous from the OECD. France, by the way, is now a member of the IEA and is participating fully in all the discussions there. Times change.

Q: Were you reporting on other elements of the economy?

LUMSDEN: Energy took up a lot of my time, but other mineral resources and commodities got a little bit of their share. The Law of the Sea took up quite a bit of time. Reports generally on non-energy related mining, some on technological developments in agriculture, but we had an agricultural attaché there who did most of the gut work on that. And hustling bags for Bob Strauss, the WTR. I did an awful lot of note taking and carrying on whenever the World Trade representative was there. I followed him around and took care of him. Which was terribly interesting, by the way.

Q: What was your impression of Strauss in this environment?

LUMSDEN: I think he did pretty well, all things considered. The problem, of course, was the U.S. economy was pretty weak at the time he was trying to operate. We had an enormous inflation rate. We were constantly getting into these trade flaps with the Europeans that ended up like kindergarten sandbox fights. But I don't fault him at all for his personal tactics. It's just that it was a time when, totally unlike today when our economy is so obviously muscular that what we say and what we do counts. Back then, we were scrambling around under some pretty bad economic indicators and trying to get a move toward (Was it the Uruguay Round???) was awfully painful. We really didn't progress that much during the Carter administration on these economic matters.

Q: How did you find dealing with these graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, L'Ecole Polytechnique? One always hears about these people who were off to one side in rather austere offices smoking heavily and making these decisions. How did you find dealing with them? This was not just a normal relationship. Everybody was, if not scared to death, really concerned about a present day situation of an energy crisis.

LUMSDEN: Yes. Well, first of all, there is a social cache of complete snobbism there that is totally out of it as far as this country is concerned. I guess we can edit this later. I found that my entrée such as it was with these types, who were quite smart to start with, came around quite a bit when they knew that my great, great, great grandfather was the first treasurer of the United States, before Alexander Hamilton, that I went to Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts and Princeton University and had been an officer in the U.S. Navy and blah, blah, blah. That is what they were looking for. They were looking for what they imagined eastern establishment elitist Foreign Service officers to be. So, I tried to make them happy. It tended to break the ice. They

don't go on to first name basis very easily. They don't cotton that much to the hail fellow, well met American. The Arabs, on the other hand, do. It's snobbism and it's snobbism that is a cover for what is basically inadequacy. What more can I say?

Q: I watch French TV every night and no matter what happens, they're comparing what is happening there to the United States.

LUMSDEN: Mais naturellement (French: But of course.).

Q: You won't find much comparing of France in the United States.

LUMSDEN: We don't even think about what they're... They're trying desperately to retain this grande nation image, which clearly even the other Europeans sort of smile wryly about.

Q: This was a worldwide crisis. You were in one of the key places. How much did the ambassador, Arthur Hartman, and others look at what was happening? Or was it sort of out of their hands?

LUMSDEN: I would say that Ambassador Hartman was extremely interested in what I was doing in energy. I would get called down to his office once or twice a week just to report, "What's going on? What are they up to now?" I would try to explain the best I could. Sometimes I knew. Sometimes I didn't know. I don't think the other branches of the government had the assets there to discuss sections of nuclear power going into electricity, what the world scale tanker rates were doing, whether they were meeting or lagging behind oil prices, how oil prices were even set. These other agencies were more interested in the Cold War aspect and what was going on in the big picture. I think I was about the only guy there doing this little bit. Suddenly, I got my day in the sun. Interest, yes, heavy interest. But it was such a new, awful field. We had gotten ourselves into a terrible bind. We were searching wildly for ways to get out of this. The way to get out of it ended when they started to produce so much oil that the price went down.

Q: Were there concerns, interests, or what have you in the fact that France was turning to 70% nuclear? These are small countries with big nuclear plants.

LUMSDEN: No, it was not of concern. It was sort of "Gee whiz. I wonder if they can do this. I don't think we can do it in the States." We were building nuclear plants at this time, but we all know the difficulties of nuclear power, which aren't as difficult as some people paint them to be. I personally believe it's still something that should be looked at in the future. I will give the French full marks for just plunging... This is what you can do in France regardless of public opinion. We are the French. We know better, right? So, nobody says anything. The Loire River level drops as all the dams are put in and all the heating units and everything go. Everyone says, "Ah, we're better than the Americans. Look what we can do." The degree of nuclearization in France, I think, has really topped out. I think they're going to actually have to back off a bit from this now. But it was an outstanding example of what you can do if you don't have too much public opinion to worry about.

Q: There was a lot of publicity at the time about the French putting research into solar energy,

wind energy, etc. When Carter came in, he was saying, "We're in the equivalent to a state of war. We have to do something about our energy." There was a lot of effort made... Was there collaboration? Solar energy, for example, was considered to be perhaps one of the keys to cutting our dependency on oil.

LUMSDEN: Yes. Solar energy, wind power, fusion... More power to anybody who can get those things into a commercial state.

Q: Were you seeing a collaboration?

LUMSDEN: There were incessant people coming from the United State to France and French scientists going to the States to talk about fuel cells, about fusion, about hot dry rock, about all these processes, gasohol. The point is that there is lots of talk and there are lots of things you can do in the laboratory aside from nuclear and hydroelectric under certain conditions. Virtually none of these have yet advanced the point where they can make a significant contribution to the energy balance. The more they're examined, the more the negative aspects - wind power and the amount of space required to get enough windmills up, the amount of damage done to birdlife, the degradation of the landscape as a result of that - not good.

Gasohol. Someone figured out that if you took all of the corn every year raised in Iowa and didn't sell it to anybody except the energy industry and they turned it into gasohol, we could have perhaps 1.5-2 percent of our gasoline requirement. Plus the fact that these things kick in at high prices just as some hydrocarbons do (shale, Orinoco sands, shale oil, tar sands, all of these). The thing that saves us - here's my cynicism again - is that all this created a colossal damned recession. The bottom fell out of demand. OPEC went on thinking they were kings of the world until about 1983. At that point, one day, the finance minister of Saudi Arabia came into Fahd and said, "Here is the government's balance sheet." The figure for foreign exchange holdings was \$99.5 billion. It went under \$100 billion. The king said, "What's this?" He said, "Your Majesty, we're OPEC's swing producer. We have to keep lowering our production in order to maintain the price because the demand is dropping. The others have the right to go ahead. We, having so much oil, have agreed to swing down." "How much oil are we producing?" "Well, only about two million barrels a day, Your Majesty." "Get Yamani on the line." Yamani was told, "This doesn't work anymore. Open up the taps. We're getting back into this." So, of course, they opened up the taps and by 1985, the price was in a downward trend and the largest economic recovery in American experience started soon thereafter, not to say, please, that oil is as important today as it was then. We've got the whole new economy. That is an entirely different discussion. But that was a hinge point in the late '70s and '80s. They created their own demise by throwing everybody else into recession.

Q: Did we have an Arabist specialist - not you; somebody else - at the embassy in Paris?

LUMSDEN: They did have a position for a third world either African or Arab specialist in the Political Section and apparently rotated. While I was there, it was an African specialist.

Q: My question is, were you in much contact with the Arab embassies or missions in Paris?

LUMSDEN: Yes, I was socially. I knew people. It was not specifically other than discuss energy with them - and, of course, the Saudi embassy doesn't have a clue as to what Riyadh is doing on energy policy.

Q: It was more just a social embassy?

LUMSDEN: Yes. We've been in the Middle East a long time. Of course, there were a whole lot of Lebanese refugees there. As the French called them, "Refugees des luxes." There were a lot of Lebanese businessmen. We had a number of Gulf Arabs who took apartments and things in Paris that we knew; by and large the Gulf Arabs couldn't function because of the language problem. But we did not have an Arabist as such other than myself at the embassy when I was there. They do from time to time have one in the Political Section. I think we had a couple of officers who had served in the Arab world. In the station, there was somebody who had really served in the Arab world who is a friend of mine. If he were allowed to give stories on... He was really in.

Q: What was your impression of... There was always this grand policy, but were the Arab embassies having much effect in France at all?

LUMSDEN: The embassies themselves?

Q: I'm just wondering about was there an Arab clout?

LUMSDEN: The Arabs let themselves be flattered by the French knowing full well that it was flattery. That is basically what it was. The Arab embassies as such could always be received and fawned over just like the former colonial governments in Africa. They were given satin treatment. I don't think that the French for a moment had any illusions about having truly substantive discussions with the embassies in Paris. France worked that through the French embassy out in the field - just as unfortunately, depending upon who our ambassador is in France, so did they do with us. Pamela Harriman was a very interesting person to the French. She was received at all levels. I can guarantee you though that they were not discussing force levels in Bosnia with Pamela. That was done through Reservoir Road here in Washington, DC. They've seen these ambassadors come and go. Hartman was an exception. He was a professional. They liked that. But we keep putting people who are not professional diplomats in. Some of them are very good, but some of them aren't.

Q: They tend to often get at the social level.

LUMSDEN: Yes. I don't know, the current ambassador apparently does quite well. I just have no knowledge of that.

Q: How about Kuwait? One hears reports about the Kuwaitis being disliked by just about everybody in the Arab world as well as elsewhere. Did the Kuwaitis raise any... or were they pretty much just an English phenomenon?

LUMSDEN: The Kuwaitis can be the most insufferable people ever seen. They are a tiny little place. If the Arabs have chutzpah, the Kuwaitis have it. It's just unbelievable. The Kuwaitis are

smart. They were millionaires before oil was ever found there. They are a trading, bargaining type of people. It's in their blood just like the people in Dubai. There are a couple of colonies in the Gulf that do this.

A great example recently. Here we are, Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy, is going out. We've got to convince these countries to increase their oil production. Would you believe that the Kuwaitis are hardliners against increasing oil production? By god, we fought to defend their country and what the hell is going on out there? Well, you see what happens. Let the man come. Then you get in with the emir and after he sees the emir, he says, "You know, there are some good points there. I think maybe we ought to agree to increase production. We'll talk with the other members." In other words, don't give away your card before you can really make something of it.

Q: What about events in Iran? While you were in Paris, was there concern about the fall of the Shah? Were we concerned about what was going to happen there?

LUMSDEN: Some of us were concerned, but the some of us who were concerned were so unimportant that it didn't make... Here you've got to hand it to the French and their ability to collect information and have a fingertip feeling for what's going on. They were extremely cognizant of which way things were going in Iran. They had Khomeini there. He had asylum and did whatever he wanted. We on the other hand had so attached ourselves to the Shah even when in 1972 he shafted us with constant oil price increases because of the Tripoli-Tehran business that when Irwin got out there he called him up on the carpet and told him this was too noble a resource and we should pay. But he was our man. To tell a succession of American presidents both republican and democratic that the Shah was a weak reed and could fall would be like trying to tell the Pope that the Immaculate Conception is a fraud. It just didn't sell at political levels here and wasn't going to happen. Quite to the contrary, all of the biggies in Washington would go to the Middle East and come back. When I came back from Kuwait, the conversation at every Georgetown cocktail party was the longevity of the House of Saud. "It's really going to collapse and then we'll be..." "How do you know?" "Oh, well, I've just been with this group with Secretary So and So to Tehran and the Shah told us." Well, the House of Saud, like it or not, is still there and the Shah is long gone. We couldn't see the forest for the trees.

Q: Do you think sometimes we oversell ourselves? If somebody becomes our friend, we seem to be unable to qualify it.

LUMSDEN: Yes, I agree.

Q: This happened in Vietnam and other places, Chiang Kai-shek.

LUMSDEN: I agree. But I also would ask you to entertain that when we finally decide that somebody is really our enemy, we're also unable to qualify it. Everything in the Balkans is Milosevic. I know he's a bastard, but he's not everything. You saw today that now they're starting to have to move against the KLA. But it's always just incessantly "Milosevic, Milosevic, Milosevic." Everything is Milosevic.

Q: Either a devil or an angel.

LUMSDEN: Everything is Saddam Hussein, Saddam Hussein, Saddam Hussein, Khomeini, Khomeini, Khomeini, Castro, Castro, Castro. We're not winning these rhetorical battles.

SAMUEL R. GAMMON, III
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1975-1978)

Ambassador Samuel R. Gammon, III was born in 1924 in Texas. He received a bachelor's degree in 1946, a master's degree in 1948, and a doctorate in 1953 from Princeton University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946 and joined the Foreign Service in 1954. His career included positions in Italy, Ethiopia, and France, and an ambassadorship to Mauritius. Ambassador Gammon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: I'd like to go on to what must have been a fascinating assignment as a Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris. Is this considered a particularly good job or not?

GAMMON: In the good old days it was one of the best, and all DCM's Paris went on to embassies. I think I was the last one for whom that was an absolute rule because Chris Chapman, my successor, did not. I'm not sure about the later successors. But indeed previously an ambassador might come back to be a DCM in Paris like Cecil Lyon, been somewhere as ambassador in Latin America then went to Paris as DCM and then went to Ceylon as ambassador again. His wife, who was Joseph Grew's daughter, once told us on a visit to Paris, she said, "When we arrived in Ceylon and we were on our way into town from the airport I looked at Cecil and said, 'Cecil, let's go back to Paris.'"

Paris was a major break because I was not fluent in French, though I crammed the hell out of it for the six or seven weeks I had to get up to speed. I read French fluently, but I never before served in a French-speaking post.

Q: Your ambassador to begin with was Kenneth Rush?

GAMMON: Ken Rush, who picked me for the job, and was a previous Deputy Secretary of State and who had dealt with me in S/S and picked me for the job following Galen Stone, who then went as ambassador to IAEA and then to Cyprus from Paris.

Q: How did Rush use you as a DCM?

GAMMON: I like Ken, he knows the great game, knows it very well, but he was not hyperactive, he was in a sense "energy efficient," shall we say. He would say basically, "I will deal with the prime minister and the President of the Republic."

Giscard d'Estaing, was President in those days, the Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, the Mayor of Paris, a fascinating man. And usually Ken would see the foreign minister, and say to me you do everything else. Which meant all the rest of the cabinet with their business to be done. The Director General of the Quai d'Orsay, the whole schmeer. And then, of course, he would be gone at least four months out of the year, out of the country, so I did an awful lot of chargé time. Whenever anything went wrong or something hit the fan I was chargé, that's a paranoid's rule of thumb. It became very different under his career successor, Hartman, for my last year.

Q: So at the time under Rush, you were really much more an operator as Deputy Ambassador rather than sitting down and being the manager as often a DCM is.

GAMMON: Which is exactly what I was for Hartman, who is, of course, a crackerjack pro and an old friend.

Q: This is Arthur Hartman.

GAMMON: Yes, I switched to being the floor manager and particularly looking after the huge mission. We had something like thirty agencies in Paris, including the Veterans Administration and Social Security!

Q: That was obviously done for efficiency sake rather than putting them someplace cheaper like Tangier or something like that.

GAMMON: Yes, and interestingly enough when Kingman Brewster came in as Ambassador to London in the early Carter period and fairly late in the day for me in Paris, I had this funny message from London shortly after he arrived, that he was going to be in Paris and needed an hour's time with me. I said, "What was all this?"

When he duly came he said in effect that he was thinking about how he should organize his embassy in London and somebody in Washington said come and talk to Sam Gammon across the channel. So I told him in effect it's like, where does the 800 pound gorilla sleep? You organize the embassy in the way which will be most effective for your operation. Then I talked a little bit about Rush's role and how the embassy functioned. And about Hartman's role, he had been there three or four months and how obviously he was starting to function. Brewster had already picked his DCM, who was coming over from U.S. NATO, and said, "Talk to him, and you do it any way you want."

In fact I think he experimented, somebody told me, with merging the political and economic sections or some adventurous innovation of that sort. I said, "Whatever works for you is fine, there ain't no you got to do it this way or you got to do it that way."

Q: Who managed the store, the operations of the embassy when you were acting as really the deputy ambassador?

GAMMON: To a very considerable extent the section heads. I tried to get to all of the constituent

posts and I think I got to all of them at least twice during my three and a quarter years in Paris. For some reason I seemed to have made it to Nice more often than to Lyon, I can't think why! And similarly staying in touch with the other agency operations, the Secret Service, the Treasury, the Social Security and the Battle Monuments Commission, all of the rest of them. But I relied very heavily on the counselors.

In fact, when I visited Moscow a couple of years after I left the service, Warren Zimmermann, who came to Paris with Hartman as political counselor, said to me -- I was ravished with pleasure, very decent of Warren because he was then DCM Moscow -- "I'm trying to operate this job the way you did in Paris. I was very impressed that you never peered over my shoulder or joggled my elbow as political counselor and I'm trying to do the same here."

Q: In the 1975 to '78 period in France, what were our major issues with France?

GAMMON: Concorde landing rights.

Q: Concorde being a jet aircraft?

GAMMON: The supersonic transport which was only allowed to land in Washington for a year and a quarter because the Federal government used to control the landing field. New York wouldn't let it in. The French people were furious with this, because this was their macho symbol. The Brits thought it would be nice and yes, it would happen, but they didn't work themselves into a rage.

It had all the sensitivity for the French people, that French "trimming" vis a vis terrorists did it for us. They sprung a couple of nasties, Abdul Aboud was nailed and arrested and they let him go very quickly. When Jean François Poncet, who was later Foreign Minister, nailed me at a reception at the Embassy, "You've got to do something about Concorde."

I said, "Yes we do, we're working on it very hard and I realize that this is every bit as neuralgic to your people, to the entire French people as Abul Aboud is to the American people."

Q: So very often you save up things and then sit down and work them out?

GAMMON: Yes, an embassy is a funny bird. As you know, its partly on the side of the country and people to which it is accredited. Because it sees them close up, it understands their problem, but it can never lose sight of the basic U.S. interests. When you've been too long in the country or you're suffering from what's called localitis, then you become more nearly the representative of the host country to your own, which is dreadful. That's terrible and it's a perpetual danger because you work like smoke to understand and get close to and to empathize with the people and the government of the country to which you are accredited. Particularly if it's a friendly or allied country etcetera. But at the same time, you can't give away the store in anyway whatsoever, so there you are balanced in-between.

I did an awful lot of work on African problems. Partly because France had more clout in Francophone Africa by the mid to late seventies than Britain did in what somebody once referred

to as anglo-saxophone Africa. That by the way, was an African diplomat, who referred to anglo-saxophone Africa.

Q: The French maintained troops in many of those places?

GAMMON: Sure, and a willingness to send them back in. U.S. relations with France, the water was muddied by Gaullism an awful lot. Though we talked, and we talked intimately on some things, there was always this desire on the part of the successors of the General to cock a shock at the U.S. because they could get away with it.

One thing I found most helpful in dealing with U.S. congressional visitors who come in believing that the French are not our allies and garbage like that. I always said, "Well, the French are following exactly the policy of General Pershing and President Wilson in World War I. They're an associated power, but they're not part of the unified command structure."

But particularly on African matters, there were things that France could do in Africa that were highly desirable from the western point of view that we could not. They could send troops into Zaire which they did a couple of times or into Chad.

Q: Because they sort of were acting in a way, maybe it's not the right term, but sort of a cat's paw for the whole western position.

GAMMON: Sure. As I once commented to François Poncet, "we have to be careful on these things because we don't want people to say you're our Cubans." The bottom line was that France was a hell of a lot more effective and a hell of a lot more authoritative middle power that could do things in our interests, as well as its own, that we could not.

For instance, the French Air Force was short of long range airlift, they could do short range, they could airlift to northern Chad, but as you get them beyond that if they're going to tidy things up in Zaire, if the Belgians didn't, then they had to borrow our airlift. So they could have a lot of sensitive things needing crash action and very fast turnaround time.

Q: Really you could say the nervous system is all there, but it wasn't talked about and it was sort of almost understood when the chips are down as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis? That France often is in a much more stalwart position than Britain or some other countries?

GAMMON: And usually also the career people. The French diplomatic pros and the French military are much closer to us than the French political scene. So a politician like Chirac would want to swagger a little bit and have a couple of cock crows from the French rooster where the pros would forget all that stuff.

We're never really comfortable with France, the American people, because our establishment is northern European and we come from a beer drinking Anglo-Saxon pattern and we do not understand and we have very little respect for wine drinkers! So the French are rated in the American unconscious -- at surprising high levels -- very often get treated as though they were Italians or Greeks or Mediterranean types. Which they ain't. They have that part of their culture

too, but no more than we. For instance because of the powerful influence of our very large afro-American minority through the years, jazz and slang and cultural what all, but we aren't an African or a Caribbean country. So that's part of the misconnection between the two countries.

Q: You and the Embassy, at the time, were aware of these currents and you dealt with them realizing there is a sort of a cross misunderstanding, but at the same time a cross affinity.

GAMMON: Yes, you worked to reinforce the basic tie perpetually, to be sympathetic on Concorde problems, to send as strong a message as you can back to the U.S. The French used to say, "Why didn't the U.S. government just tell New York the plane can land?" I would say, "That's all the fault of a Frenchman." Montesquieu and separation of powers influenced our Framers of the Constitution! We don't have a unitary government like France does where the préfet in Bordeaux is not going to say that an American jet can't land there.

Q: You were there in '77 when the Carter Administration took over from the Ford Administration. How was this reflected in our relations as you saw it?

GAMMON: It was basically my last year plus. The Carter crowd took longer to shake down. In other words, there was a certain amount of naïveté at various levels. Not so much in State, where Secretary Vance and the pros were in good shape, but as far as the White House was concerned, a certain amount of awkwardness, such as the barely visible shudder on the Carter visit to France when the White House decreed to its advance people that they were not willing to wear black tie. So the French dinner party at Le Trianon for 130 or 140 people were long dresses for women and tenue de ville for men. And was at the very last minute, about ten days before the event, long after the invitations had gone out, Sally Quinn and the Washington Post had a snide article about these clowns from Plains, Georgia who don't even know what a black tie is. So we got a hasty telegram W.H. saying "we've reconsidered and we're willing to do black tie for the banquet" and the advance man for the White House in residence came into me in a swivet. I said, "Not to worry, I'll take it around, we'll kill this off." So I went around to see the chief of protocol in the Quai d'Orsay, and said, "Jean-Paul sit down. Jean-Paul, I have to ask you a question and just reply honestly and we'll take care of it all, but I have to go through the motions." Then I delivered the message.

He sprang up, "No, no"-The invitations have already gone out. "Just say no and I'll take care of it." The U.S. chief of protocol who advanced that trip, whose name happily escapes me, but who's previous experience of power had been mayor of a central Massachusetts town, had just been to London, which was an earlier stop on the Carter trip. Then he came on to Paris, this was his first trip outside of the U.S., and he was saying, "Gee, that London is a great place; you ought to go there some time."

Q: This does show how even trivial things can get played up.

GAMMON: They capture the atmosphere.

Q: They capture the atmosphere and a new administration coming in with people who don't know, but exercising power for the first time.

GAMMON: It takes time, the good ones learn very quickly and the lucky ones don't have a Bay of Pigs.

Q: How about France in the Middle East? We've talked about Africa.

GAMMON: In general the Middle East, the French instinct was to outflank us and anybody can do with the Islamic world. French public opinion was Pro-Israeli. But the difference between France and the United States, still existing, is that foreign affairs is a prerogative of the throne or in this case the Elysée and public opinion doesn't count for much.

I have enormous respect for the Quai d'Orsay and the French Dip Corps, but when they blow one, and they do occasionally, it's always an issue in which public opinion is so outraged over some issue or policy some step that the Elysée and the Quai d'Orsay have done, as they would do on anything, and then they're caught by surprise by a public opinion blast and have to walk the kitty back.

We, in our government, spend all our time agonizing with the funny papers and public opinion and "will it play in Peoria and what does congress think." So we're probably too unwilling to do anything risky.

I would say, in general, the French were always nudging us to be less captive of the Israeli lobby. During our time, there no major flaps. Maybe minor flaps like the Abdul Aboud business. And to my great pleasure, the French were pretty tough on internal terrorism. The French and the Israelis between them took care of about three terrorists at Orly, who tried to shoot up an AIEI flight on the ground and in the airport terminal. To my distinct and great pleasure, and I always wanted to go around and shake the hand of the actual police type who had done it, one of the murderers that was killed was the guy who had killed Ambassador Frank Meloy in Beirut. Frank was a good friend. I was gratified by that one. A routine precautionary episode and a couple of Israeli security guards and the French guards on the scene that responded instantly and did away with the three terrorists.

DAVID M. ADAMSON
Deputy Principal Officer
Strasbourg (1975-1976)

Executive Secretary, Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC)
Paris (1976-1977)

David Adamson was born in Connecticut and raised in Virginia. He graduated from Swarthmore College and the Fletcher School of Tufts University. Since entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Adamson has held positions in France, Panama, Portugal and Honduras. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: So, you went to Strasbourg, France? You were there from when to when?

ADAMSON: I arrived, I think, around the 1st of August 1975. I stayed only until the following May or so, because I was pulled into Paris, which was good, professionally, but not so good, personally, because Strasbourg was a wonderful place to serve on a personal basis.

Q: Where did Strasbourg fit in those days? What was its importance?

ADAMSON: At that point, the Department was in a process of reducing personnel and presence, a process that went on during most of my career, and particularly reducing it in the outlying area, outside of Paris. The reason why Strasbourg continued to exist as a post, although albeit a two officer post, and now I think a one officer post, unless things have changed very recently, was because of the international institutions there. Notably, the Council of Europe. Also, there was a Commission of the Rhine, and also the European Parliament would meet in Strasbourg, periodically, although the Consulate didn't cover that. That was the rationale for having Strasbourg.

Q: How was the Consulate General set up?

ADAMSON: It was set up with just two American officers, the Consul General, and then the so-called deputy principal officer, who was really a junior officer, a Vice Consul. The Consul General handled what little political reporting and political contacts we did. He handled that primarily, although the deputy also did some of that. The deputy's primary charge was to handle the economic, commercial and consular work in the district. For each of those functions, I had one or more French national employees, who worked for me.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

ADAMSON: At that time it was Woodward Romine.

Q: What job did you have?

ADAMSON: I was the deputy principal officer and vice consul, who as I say, handled primarily economic-commercial and consular work.

Q: How did you find France at that time - your corner of France? How were Americans perceived?

ADAMSON: I found it to be a wonderful place to serve because Strasbourg and its surrounding province of Alsace were a fairly conservative part of France, very pro-American, because they still had vivid memories of being liberated by American soldiers in 1944-1945. We were very well received there. We had a very good relationship with the local French authorities.

Q: It's an awful event that this long, long, troubled or mixed relationship with France exists. That was more Paris centered, would you say?

ADAMSON: I would say it's Paris and political elite centered. Alsace was basically, as I say, favorably oriented toward the U.S. Of course, by that time, de Gaulle had left power, indeed he was deceased. I guess Pompidou would have just left the presidency of France and Giscard d'Estaing was coming into the presidency. Giscard had a somewhat more pro-American, more modernist, orientation. At the same time, there was no question of France going back into the military side of NATO at that juncture. Still, France was a favorable environment for the U.S. in general terms in those days.

Q: Was the German heritage sort of shunned, or was this a factor?

ADAMSON: The German heritage was certainly very much alive in a number of respects. You could see it in the culture, in the architecture, in the food, in the wines, in the patois, the dialect that people spoke. Many Alsations at that time spoke what was called Alsatian, which is, as I understand it, a German dialect. I never learned to speak it, but I did speak French. The local newspaper was printed both in French and Alsatian. I think at that time they published more copies in Alsatian than in French, although I could be mistaken about that.

Right across the Rhine was Germany. Germany was very accessible, although the European Community, at that stage, had not gotten to the point where you could cross the bridge into Kehl, Germany, without showing your passport. Generally, it was a very hassle free border crossing. So, I did get into Germany with some frequency. Relations had greatly improved over the course of the post-war period between Germany and France. They were then essentially allies, even if at a personal and social level the Germans still did not have the best reputation in France, at that time.

Q: Did you have any contact with the French university students at all?

ADAMSON: I did not have very much. I had some contact. I was still young, 25 at that point. I had some contact with some higher level, medical and other students, who were basically in my age bracket. But, in my official functions, as far as I can recall, I never went to speak to the university, or taught a course, or anything like that. I interacted with them strictly on a personal level. There, the interaction was good.

Q: Any problems with American tourists, consular problems?

ADAMSON: No, it was a very amenable, attractive, welcoming environment for American tourists. The only security problems we had, as I recall, in 1975, 1976, were when Franco was on his deathbed. Franco was perceived as an American friend and ally. He was seen as very close to the United States, and the United States as very close to him. I recall that he was going through his death throes. Somehow this ignited threats against U.S. consular personnel in Strasbourg. We had death threats against us, which we didn't take too seriously. The French stepped up their patrolling outside the Consulate. Actually, some years later, there was an apparent attempt against the life of the American Consul General. Things didn't get that bad when I was there. Even then, I think the later assassination attempt was an isolated act. It did not reflect popular sentiment.

Q: Did you ever find out where this sentiment was coming from? Strasbourg is very far from Spain.

ADAMSON: Yes, it is far from Spain. I suppose it was “student radicals,” whoever that might be. Also, whether it was any kind of offshoot of the ETA Basque movement, or other such terrorist organizations, I really don’t know. I can remember seeing graffiti and so on, but I just don’t have any sense from where that emanated.

Q: Obviously Strasbourg is in the heart of the embryonic European Union. Was it called the European Community at that time?

ADAMSON: Yes, I believe it was called the European Community. It was not called the European Union, in any case, as the Union did not come into being until the early 1990s.

Q: Was this seen as something that was bound to develop? What were you getting?

ADAMSON: It was seen as a good thing that was developing, and that would no doubt develop further. I’m not sure that in 1975 people anticipated that it would go as far as it has gone by now, 2002. Yet certainly there was a perception that it was developing, that it was a positive thing, and that it would be developing further.

Q: Was there much of a European Community in Strasbourg?

ADAMSON: Since the Council of Europe was there, which is a European intergovernmental institution separate from the European Community, Strasbourg was a very “European” city. There were a lot of international civil servants, European civil servants, and a lot of consciousness of the evolving nature of European integration. But, the primary presence was of the Council of Europe, not of the European Community. There was this sort of peripatetic European Parliament, which would meet in the Council of Europe’s headquarters building from time to time. Still, basically the “European” presence that was there was the Council of Europe, which was a very pronounced presence. There was certainly a sense of European integration. There was also a sense by then that the European community was becoming the place where the action was, and that the Council of Europe was being marginalized except perhaps in its central area of effort, the protection of human rights.

Q: Today is the 26th of June 2002. David, you went to Paris in 1976?

ADAMSON: That is correct.

Q: You were there from when to when?

ADAMSON: I was there from April 1976 to roughly July 1977.

Q: What was your job?

ADAMSON: My job was to serve as executive secretary for the U.S. delegation to the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), also known as the North-South Conference. This was a conference that emerged from the international economic turbulence associated with the 1973 Arab/Israeli war and the oil embargo that ensued. There was intensive diplomacy thereafter, trying to get the oil embargo, such as it was, removed. The Arab countries used that as leverage to try to develop a negotiating framework in which concessions would be made to them and to others in the "Third World." Of course, there was pressure on the oil exporters for solidarity from others in the Third World. These were poor countries who did not have oil resources to use as the so-called "oil weapon," which proved to be less than that, to get concessions from the developed countries that would assist in the development of the less developed countries. So, I was the executive secretary of this delegation, which was headed, on a day-to-day basis, by a deputy assistant secretary from the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at State, by the name of Steve Bosworth, who by the way, is currently the Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, where I went to graduate school.

Q: We're talking about the end of the administration, when you went out there.

ADAMSON: Yes, we're talking about the end of the Ford administration. Kissinger was Secretary of State.

Q: Kissinger was Secretary. One thing, Kissinger - this not being a prime concern of his, as he was interested in east-west, not north-south relations - how dedicated were we to doing something about North-South issues?

ADAMSON: Kissinger was actually quite interested in this, because this tied into the Arab-Israeli dispute as well as the developed world's so important oil imports. As you will recall, he engaged in all kinds of shuttle diplomacy, in the 1974 to 1976 period, to try to make progress. He also participated in various meetings and negotiations that really gave birth to CIEC, also known as the north-south dialogue. He was actually more interested in this, than he had been in the past in what were seen as economic matters. This really was a political-economic conference. He was not, and the U.S. was not interested in making deep concessions. We were interested in getting a process going that would help to manage these issues, but we were not interested in making enormous concessions. I don't think we believed that this kind of a negotiating forum could really bear fruit. We agreed to this kind of a forum, because it would help to mollify the Third World, and hopefully stabilize the oil markets and lead to a more stable economic climate.

Q: What was our sounding of the European delegations, I mean the major ones?

ADAMSON: The European delegations and the Japanese were probably more interested in this kind of process than we were because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil. The Japanese, of course, were very nervous, because they were totally dependent on oil imports. The Europeans were more dependent than the United States, and they were very interested. Plus, the Europeans and Japanese generally have a more accommodative foreign policy, because they are less self-sufficient in various areas of power than the United States.

Q: Did you find the Europeans and the Japanese a bloc, or were they all sort of doing their own thing?

ADAMSON: The Europeans, at least the European Community nations, were a bloc. In fact, the EC countries were represented in the conference collectively, by the European Community. There were no doubt differences among them, but they did try to negotiate as a block. The Japanese were entirely separate. I would say, they certainly were as close to us as they were to the Europeans, if not closer to us.

Q: Now the representation from the south, where were they coming from?

ADAMSON: There was one other actor from the north. That was Canada. Canada was actually co-chair of the conference, along with Venezuela.

Q: What was Canada's position?

ADAMSON: They saw a leadership role in CIEC as consistent with their foreign policy. They saw themselves, and still do, as being a moderating force in international affairs. They were, however, at that point, and may still be, essentially self-sufficient in energy. They didn't feel directly the pressure from the third world. The Arab countries had limited leverage over them. Nevertheless, their foreign policy was attuned to the third world. They saw themselves and see themselves today as more responsive to the third world than the United States. The third world was represented by various groupings. First, the OPEC countries were very influential. Venezuela was co-chairman of the conference. Saudi Arabia was co-chairman of one of the four commissions - on energy - perhaps the most important one. They co-chaired that with the United States. There were various and sundry third world countries. These represented a pretty wide gamut of both resource rich and resource poor countries.

Q: How did our delegation work? Was it a strong delegation?

ADAMSON: It was a strong delegation. Bosworth was a savvy leader. When we had more senior meetings, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, first William Rogers, under Kissinger, then Richard Cooper under Cyrus Vance, led the U.S. delegation. They were a knowledgeable group. There was a deputy assistant secretary from the Treasury, John Niehuss, who was there. At the higher level meetings, the Undersecretary of the Treasury, Tony Solomon, was present. So, we had a very capable delegation. Underneath those leaders, we had office directors from State, Treasury, Commerce, and the Energy Administration that existed at that time. The Energy Department didn't yet exist.

Q: What was your impression of the delegations from the oil producing countries? Were they sort of "one," or were they varied?

ADAMSON: They were varied in their outlook. The Saudis were certainly very cooperative with us. The Venezuelans, who co-chaired the conference, had a ministerial level guy, by the name of Manuel Perez Guerrero, leading their delegation. He could be a bit fiery and oratorical, but I

think beneath that, he was a practical guy. Some countries like Algeria were more radical in orientation. Others were not so radical. They were more heterogeneous than the developed countries' delegations. The South generally was a heterogeneous group with deep cleavages in it, including between those who had resources such as oil and those who were resource-poor. Of course, they came from many different continents, many different political systems. They were a group that I think had some difficulty coalescing and really exerting significant and coherent leverage.

Q: It sounds like a three-sided school here. You have the major consumers, but they were industrial consumers. You have the oil producers. Then, you have the poor folk, who are out there for an awfully long time, who don't have much to work with, except moral suasion.

ADAMSON: Yes, moral suasion and their link to the OPEC countries. That link was a one-way street. They were really dependent upon the oil producers to pressure the developed countries on their behalf. There was only so far that the producers were willing to go in that direction.

Q: So, how did it work? In the first place, what were you doing? What was your role?

ADAMSON: My role was basically the junior man on the U.S. delegation. So, I did some reporting. I did some note taking. I made sure that reporting went out, that various managerial tasks were taken care of. I was not, by any means, a decision maker or leader, quite the contrary. I was a 25-year old junior officer, basically doing the dirty work.

Q: Of course, from an oral history point of view, this is interesting, because you are the "fly on the wall." This view is as important as somebody who is the decision maker. How did the conference go?

ADAMSON: I would say that in the end, the conference wasn't a hugely productive conference. When these conferences take place, even if they don't produce much, there is always one point of view that says it's better that these people were talking, and letting off steam that way, than being out there acting unilaterally without a larger cooperative framework. That is probably the most you could say about the utility of this conference. I actually studied this conference quite closely and later wrote my doctoral dissertation on it. I came to the conclusion that these kinds of conferences are not generally very effective venues for negotiation because there are too many players with too many disparate interests, to really be able to negotiate effectively. You get into situations with the lowest common denominator results. Generally, from a point of view of achieving concrete results, it tends to not be very useful. In terms of improving the international atmosphere and managing international problems, in a negotiating framework, these kinds of exercises could have some utility. I think this conference did in that respect. It did peter out without achieving the aims of the developing countries. On the other hand, there weren't any great repercussions from that.

Q: Was there any difference with the election of 1976 and the Carter administration? The conference obviously continued. Was there any change, other than the people?

ADAMSON: Yes, there was a change. When the Carter people came in, they were marginally

more prepared to accommodate the third world, than the Republican administration had been. So, you had the United States, the Europeans, and the Japanese a little more willing, at the margins, to give at least on paper, what the third world seemed to want, or indicated it wanted. But, I would say, these were marginal changes. They were not really a quantum leap up. Maybe they were sufficient to allow the conference to conclude, even though the conference concluded on a whimper, rather than a very positive bang. Without those marginal changes in U.S. policy, it would have been more difficult to reach a final conclusion.

Q: Was there also a time factor and that by doing this, we could avoid being hit by this oil crunch? How far up was the oil weapon? By doing this, it was occupying time when everybody had to see what the fallout was going to be, and help dissipate the effect.

ADAMSON: This conference was part of a larger diplomatic process that had begun really in late 1973, or early 1974. It helped contain the broader problem. So, I think from the U.S. point of view, it was useful in that respect. Of course, you never know what would have happened had you not taken the road that you took, had this conference not taken place. It's difficult to say. But, I think from our point of view, it was a useful way to manage North-South relations

VICTOR D. COMRAS
Deputy Delegate to COCOM
Paris (1975-1978)

Victor D. Comras was born in New York State in 1943. Comras graduated from Georgetown University in 1964, the University of Florida Law School in 1966, and promptly joined the Foreign Service. While in the Foreign Service, Comras served overseas in Zaire, Nigeria, South Africa, France, Canada and Macedonia. He also worked on the Law of the Sea negotiations. Comras was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: You went to Paris in '75?

COMRAS: Yes.

Q: And you were there until when?

COMRAS: Until 1978. Yes. But, the assignment also disappeared before I got there. Just at the last minute, I received a call from my personnel counselor. He told me that he was going to change my assignment to Beirut. "Vic, we've got a great new opportunity for you in Beirut," he said, "This is a great job. It's above your grade, but you'd be good for it. We want to send you as economic counselor to Beirut." At first I liked the idea. But my wife told me. "You go to Beirut on your own."

Q: Was that before Beirut exploded?

COMRAS: Yes, Beirut appeared to be a great place at that time. Fortunately, I was able to get my personal counselor to hold on to the Paris Assignment for me. Beirut blew up just after we arrived in Paris.

Q: So you were working with COCOM. Could you explain what COCOM was and how you fit in?

COMRAS: COCOM was established in 1948 right around the same time as NATO. After the war there was a burst in creating new post war institutions to reflect the new situation resulting from the aftermath of World War II. The creation of the UN, the post war recovery organizations, the administration of Germany and Japan, and the rise of the communist security threat gave new imperatives for new international institutional frameworks. One such resulting organization - or better arrangement, that resulted was a very secretive Consultative Group that had the objective of depriving the Soviet Union of strategic materials that the Soviet Union could use to expand its military industrial support base and the strength of its armed forces. It was directed at reducing the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the post war period. It sought to develop a limited, but highly coordinated, strategic embargo against the Soviet Union. This would include military equipment, but also critical raw materials, commodities, technology and equipment that might strengthen its military industrial capacity.

The Consultative Group was to serve as a mechanism to coordinate and hold the line among different countries that were in a position to trade with the Soviet Union. Its consultations were very secret. Its controls were very secret and very little information was made public at the time. But this is now all history in the public domain.

The Consultative Committee was initially composed of ministerial level representatives from its member countries. It met in Paris (NATO was located in France at the time) and it fell to the French Government to chair the group. The Group laid down policies to be followed. The work was actually carried out by different coordinating committees. They drew up a list of strategic technology, commodities, and equipment that would not be provided to the Soviet Union or its newly communist dominated satellite states unless all the members of the Consultative Group agreed. The targeted countries included the Soviet Union, the Warsaw pact countries, China and North Korea.

While the embargo agreement was a voluntary one, it reflected the great leverage the United States had over its NATO partners, including the French, at that time. The arrangement literally gave the United States a veto over the export of any of the listed commodities or items. Of course, each country was free to disregard the decisions of the Consultative Group if it felt inclined. But, there was considerable political and economic pressure on them not to do so. This was particularly the case as the United States was providing critical economic and military support to Western Europe at that time. And one must also recall that there was universal concern in Western Europe with the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

The initial members of the Consultative group were the same members as NATO. Its membership grew to include West Germany and Japan. During the period I served in COCOM it had 15 members - all the NATO countries, minus Iceland, plus Japan. It grew subsequently to

include South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

When De Gaulle took over in France and expelled NATO, it also refused to name a new chairman for the Consultative Group. However, it did not go so far as to expel COCOM, which, after all, was an informal arrangement which continued to be critical to France for both strategic and economic reasons. Since a Chairman was required to call for meetings of the Consultative Group, the work devolved to the various Coordinating Committees. Since they operated so similarly, in time they were merged into one coordinating committee that became known as COCOM for short.

COCOM had its headquarters in Paris on le Rue de Boite “between a hairdresser and a bank”. At least that is how it was subsequently described in an article in Time Magazine. It had a small permanent secretariat. Delegates from the member countries were posted with their bilateral embassies in Paris (or with their missions to the OECD as was the case for the United States). The delegates met twice a week to review matters pertaining to the list and to review requests for export exceptions to the list.

The embargo lists evolved over time. Most raw commodities were removed, and in time, the COCOM lists focused principally on arms, military equipment, nuclear items, and dual use equipment and technology deemed strategic. In the beginning, there were very few requests for exceptions but as time grew there were more and more exceptions.

One of the main ideas behind COCOM, was to create a relatively free trade between the countries of the Western alliance including trade in certain military and nuclear items, and dual use equipment and technology. The United States, for example, would have been reticent to provide western Europe and Japan with access to much of our advanced technology if we could not have been assured that the technology would not slip through such countries to the Soviet Union. COCOM permitted us to draw a strategic trade fence around the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact, rather than on our own borders. Other non-NATO countries could join this open area if they agreed to provide the same controls that COCOM countries provided.

By the 1970s, COCOM had become a specialized group charged with maintaining and reviewing the control lists, keeping the lists up-to-date as technology evolved, and as a clearing house to air and decide on exceptions to the list. The number of exceptions grew to the thousands per year. Each of these was reviewed on a case by case basis. The delegations would present the information in the case exceptions or against the exceptions sought by others in regular discussions. That was the role of our COCOM delegation.

Q: How would you treat Sweden, for example, which later became a problem? They want a fancy milling thing that's good for making submarine propellers but they could use it for... Could you look at what a country was ordering...

COMRAS: While COCOM itself did not limit sales to non designated countries (i.e., the communist countries) the COCOM member countries understood that they would have to closely review and restrict trade in sensitive commodities to third countries, where there was a risk that the item or technology would be reexported to a COCOM designated country. Each COCOM

member had its own export control regulations that addressed these issues. COCOM held discussions from time to time on the need to harmonize these regulations and assure they were adequate to prevent leakage of strategic items to the Soviet Union and its allies. This did encumber trade with a number of third countries and led to special arrangements being made with such third countries to safeguard transferred equipment and technology. Countries like Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland found that they had to negotiate bilateral arrangements that gave full effect to the same COCOM restrictions as COCOM countries. Subsequently, in the early 1980s, under the Reagan Administration a special effort was made to reenforce these bilateral arrangements. That became known as the COCOM Third Country Initiative. I played a major role in designing and implementing this strategy.

If Sweden, wanted to sell anything that involved U.S. technology or any NATO country technology to the Soviet Union, it was obliged itself in the contract of sales to first clear the reexport with COCOM.

I recall one incident that demonstrated both the vulnerabilities and the seriousness of these issues. It involved a request by Sweden to reexport to the Soviet Union a sophisticated Air Traffic Control system for use at the Moscow Airport. The export was to be handled by the Swedish company Datasaab. It was a very controversial request as the equipment was quite sensitive to air defense. But, international air traffic safety also had to be taken into account. Much of the equipment and technology involved was of U.S. origin. COCOM debated that request for almost a year. Finally, a compromise was reached and the sale was approved subject to a number of conditions which were insisted upon by the United States. This involved reconfiguring the air traffic control system to eliminate a number of features which had particular application in Air Defense. Special responsibilities were also placed on Datasaab to carry out close verification and inspection procedures to insure the civilian use of the equipment. There was also a limitation on source software and other spare parts. Sweden agreed to the conditions and the export went ahead.

Subsequently we learned that Datasaab had failed to abide by the conditions that were imposed by the United States and COCOM. They provided the Soviet Union with an air traffic control system that retained the capabilities we had required DataSaab to eliminate from the system. This transaction turned out to be a something of a national security disaster for us.

This information only came to light after DataSaab had gone bankrupt and had been acquired by the much larger Swedish company, Eriksson. The Datasaab case developed into a major scandal in Sweden and a major issue in Swedish American relations.

We eventually got full cooperation from the company officials and the Swedish government to piece together what happened, and what features were actually passed to the Soviet Union. This enabled us to better assess the actual damage done and to take the necessary counter-measures.

Q: When you arrived there, where did this thing fit? Were you a world unto yourselves?

COMRAS: The U.S. COCOM delegation was located in an embassy annex building. But, our office was officially part of the U.S. mission to the OECD. I guess it meant that we really

independent from both missions. Our small 5 person office was a world apart. We did our work separately from the embassy and the OECD mission. Much of our work dealt with the reproduction and forwarding of materials related to COCOM. We were responsible for the preparation and submission of U.S. exception requests, and for forwarding the exception requests of other countries to Washington for expert consideration. The two officers were charged with dealing with the substantive issues in the organization.

COCOM was located in an embassy annex building which, as I mentioned before, was located between a bank and a hairdresser. Some of the delegates were full-time just handling COCOM. Some of the delegations had other functions in their embassies besides COCOM. But for the U.S. it was a full-time assignment.

Q: Was there a COCOM building?

COMRAS: No, COCOM had a suite of offices in a U.S. embassy annex - it had almost a whole floor in the Annex Building.

Q: And that was it for the whole organization?

COMRAS: Yes.

Q: Which was multinational.

COMRAS: That's right. It had a multinational secretariat staff. But each person on the secretariat staff was on loan, or was otherwise paid out of funds coming from the various missions participating in COCOM. A formula had been worked out to share these expenses. For example, Italy provided the chairman of the COCOM and the Italian government paid his, and his secretary's salary. They also paid the cost of maintaining them in Paris.

Q: How did this group work together?

COMRAS: Very good. We all became very close friends and colleagues. Our sessions were very gentle and very friendly, although we could have our barbs. It was a good working environment and a good team. There were two kinds of meetings. Most of the regular meetings were at the delegation level. These were held on a regular basis and handle the day to day issues. But, special meetings were also held with higher level officials and/or experts from capitals to discuss policy or technical issues.

Q: I would think that, here you're trying to figure out how to stop the Soviets from gaining technical advantages, but what the hell would you know about this?

COMRAS: Most of our work was based on either general or specific instructions from Washington. But, the delegations themselves were quite adept at filling in the gaps in these instructions. We also dealt with the nuances, the advocacy, and the general diplomatic side of how to insure our instructions were well presented, respected and accepted or rejected. We also provided a very important channel back to Washington regarding the attitudes expressed by

others. Of course, our work was also supplemented by direct approaches in Capitals on critical or controversial issues. We often generated such activities when we felt such interventions were necessary. We were the experts at working the system.

Q: I would think you would find yourself playing the traditional role where the Department of Defense doesn't want to let anything get out at all. The Department of Commerce says, "Hey, these are sales" and is pushing for that. The State Department is kind of in between.

COMRAS: That was just about the way it was.

Q: Then for Germany, I imagine that their salespeople were stronger than their defense people. And the French the same way.

COMRAS: With strategic trade controls there is a built in tension between commercial and national security interests. This tension is compounded by the factor of multiple sources and international competition. The Soviet Union and its allies were very adept at playing off one source with another. And not all the COCOM countries evaluated the national security costs or risks the same way that we did. After all, the United States footed the largest bill for the common defense. So there was always a lot of tension, and some intrigue, associated with each exception request. And this game was not always played just in COCOM. Not everything would happen in COCOM itself. A lot was happening around us, through bilateral channels government to government, embassy to embassy. A French company that wanted to sell something used its own representatives and employed its own lobbyists to get the necessary approvals through the Commerce Department and the Defense Department. The French government used its own bilateral channels to push the USG to approve their exception in COCOM. Still, since we at COCOM knew the system best, and how it worked, we were often very valuable players for everybody in this process.

Some of our colleagues in COCOM limited their role to only delivering their instructions and reporting back on the outcome. Others, like the U.S. Delegation were very active players. I was very much engaged in the COCOM process. I developed very valuable knowledge and experience concerning the COCOM process, and I was able to bring that skill back with me to Washington. It served me particularly well in subsequent years when I took over the responsibilities for Strategic Trade issues and COCOM in the Office of East West Trade.

Q: We'll stop at this point.

Today is April 23, 2002. '75-'78. We've talked about COCOM in general. Let's get specific. What were some of the issues that stick in your mind?

COMRAS: I arrived at COCOM in 1975, at the height of the U.S.-Soviet Union period of détente. I recall that many of my colleagues in State were beginning to believe that COCOM should be dropped or at least modified. In fact, some thought that COCOM had already been dropped altogether. Some of my colleagues were surprised when I told them that I was going to

COCOM, and that it still played a major role in East-West Trade. Trade relations with the Soviet Union had increased significantly through the 1970s. More and more exceptions were being granted in COCOM. Refusals were becoming increasingly rare. There was also increasing pressure to liberalize the COCOM lists themselves. The list had been amended several times since the adoption of an almost total embargo of the early 1950s. Since the United States was by far the most advanced in high technology and since the way COCOM worked, we had a veto on any changes to the list, any shortening of the list - removal of technology and equipment from the list - was subject to our veto. We also had a veto on any exceptions from the list. We held a very powerful seat in COCOM.

We had technology that other countries wanted and we had the ability to stop them from selling items and technology to the East at least openly. Every COCOM member government was always free to do what it wanted. Some violated COCOM openly, some covertly. But those occasions were relatively rare. There were times when countries completely disregarded COCOM. This included the United States. Some of our first trade with China was conducted without reference to COCOM. But, for the most part, COCOM played a major role in coordinating strategic trade and strategic trade policies within the Atlantic Alliance. It played a major role in permitting the West to preserve and increase its technological lead over the Soviet Union, and to win the arms race. It made it significantly more difficult and expensive for the Soviet Union to compete with the West economically and militarily. COCOM certainly played its part in helping us win the arms race. It also played an important role in the downfall of the communist system in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact.

Q: Were there sometimes issues that would come up and we would say, "Let's not even raise that because it doesn't make sense. If we raise it, then we have to take action?"

COMRAS: Right. There was an understanding that certain things would be talked about bilaterally among the countries that were most interested. Not everything was vetted in COCOM. But that was still the exception rather than the rule. Many believed that the U.S. used its leverage in COCOM to apply its own strategic export controls extra-territorially. The other countries generally looked to the U.S. to lead in policy. If the U.S. had no problem with an export, they shouldn't have a problem. However, there was a suspicion that the U.S. might also be using COCOM to gain trade advantage. For example, the U.S. might be the first to approve a large strategic export to a Communist Country. The Warsaw pact countries also might have believed that if the export was to be made by an American firm, the U.S. government would be under greater pressure to approve the export they would be if the export was to be made by a company in another COCOM adhering country. On the other hand, applying for an export from another country might also serve to place greater pressure on the U.S. to grant the license.

Q: And also we were the schoolteacher, making people stick by the rules more or less. If we weren't doing it, nobody else would do it.

COMRAS: That's right. But that was kind of a snapshot of the situation. The pressure for liberalization was always there from our business community, from our détente impulses, and from our new openings to China. So, while I was in COCOM I witnessed a growing more liberal, favorable attitude towards exceptions to the COCOM lists.

However, I should tell you that back home in Washington there were many conservatives and others that were beginning to believe that we were giving away the store. This was certainly the case in the Pentagon. There was growing criticism and concern that perhaps we were liberalizing our strategic trade restrictions too quickly. And there was increasing intelligence and other information that the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly adept at circumventing the COCOM controls in place - that they were getting their hands on some very advanced western technology. I began to see growing pressure from the Defense Department to hold back this liberalizing trend. As I said the number of exceptions began to grow exponentially. This gave rise to increased calls from the other COCOM countries for a reduction in the Lists and the establishment of new mechanisms to streamline the exception approval process. The more exceptions that were requested, the longer the backlog of exception cases grew, and the longer it seemed to take to get any exception request through the national and COCOM review process. Companies, and subsequently countries, began to complain loudly in Washington that the COCOM process was inhibiting their legitimate business and trade interests. This in turn gave rise to increased rivalry and jockeying for position vis a vis potential Warsaw pact clients. There were also suspicions that the U.S. would delay other country cases while pushing ahead on its own.

Q: What do you mean by "delay?"

COMRAS: When an exception request was presented, it was referred back to capitals for full analysis. Although COCOM rules provided a specific timetable, it was easy to get extensions of time to review cases. If the U.S. felt overly pressed for a response, it would simply object to the export, pending further review. When exception requests were sent back to Washington, they would be circulated around the various interested agencies. This usually included the Commerce Department, the Defense Department, CIA and State. Some cases would also involve the Department of Energy, the NRC and perhaps even NASA. All the agencies had to agree. Often, they disagreed, and that entailed further delay to work out their differences. Sometimes this took 10 to 12 months or more. Some cases had to go to the White House for final resolution. In the early stages of COCOM, cases could generally be disposed of quickly. The agencies would quickly say "No" and the export was stopped unless the Defense Department really wasn't worried about it. But, during détente, a Defense Department "no" was often challenged by the Commerce or State Department. So the delay factor became a growing problem within COCOM during my tenure there. Delay also became a growing irritant in our relations with other countries. The result was increasing pressure to liberalize and shorten the COCOM lists.

Q: I would imagine that another factor would be that if this was a European outfit that wanted to do something, it would have a lower priority back in Washington.

COMRAS: That often was the case, but sometimes it appeared that way more than the actual fact. The first step in processing an export license request was to have it viewed domestically. Before the U.S. submitted an exception request to COCOM it had already vetted the case at home and decided on approval. So the case would stay in COCOM for a relatively short time before being approved. However, other countries would often just send the case directly to COCOM for review, and then await the U.S. position in COCOM. The case would only get

reviewed when in COCOM. They took the view that if the export was ok'ed by the U.S., they should have no objection to it. So, when a U.S. case was going to go to COCOM, it had already been vetted in Washington. COCOM review, could be handled rapidly for the most part. This made it appear that there was little COCOM delay in handling U.S. cases. However, other countries cases in COCOM got held up for months while the case was being reviewed in Washington. This made it look like the U.S. was holding up other cases, while its own were being processed quickly. In fact, both U.S. and non-U.S. exports were subjected to the same, often time consuming review - U.S. cases before they got to COCOM and other cases after they got to COCOM.

There was another factor also at play during my tenure in COCOM. Other countries were beginning to close the technology gap with the United States. They began to compete directly in many areas of high technology. The percentage of U.S. components, or U.S. source technology began to diminish. This weakened U.S. leverage with regard to the exports of such items. This also gave rise to increased pressures to reform the COCOM lists.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact countries began to play on this growing intra Western competition. They looked increasingly to other countries for their purchases, and they favored equipment that did not contain U.S. origin components. This became a costly business for U.S. OEMs. This gave rise to increasing pressure in the U.S. business community, also, for export control and COCOM list reform.

Q: Who were the operative people who would say, "Okay, we've got to do something about this" and do something about it?

COMRAS: Our instructions came from the State Department's Office of East West Trade. But the major players in Washington were the Commerce Office of Export Administration and two offices in the Defense Department - the Office of the Secretary of Defense which dealt with export control policy and another office known to me as DDR&E which looked closely at the technology and its military implications. All of these offices, agreed, for their own purposes with the need to begin to undertake some reform of our Export Control system including the operations of COCOM.

But, along comes 1978 and 1979 and the Soviet invasions of Poland and Afghanistan. Détente is put on hold. The U.S. begins to reconsider its relations with the Soviet Union and to review the advances that the Soviet Union has made in its own military technology. Much of this, it happens was either purchased or stolen from the West. The Carter Administration orders a full review of our export control system, including COCOM. Not with the intent of liberalizing, but, rather, to reassess what we should do to preserve our technology advantage and slow down the advance of Soviet armaments.

Q: Yes. Was that comparable to the '68 invasion of Czechoslovakia?

COMRAS: No, I don't think it was quite as dramatic. But, I do think it had major consequences. It changed our whole attitude towards the Soviet Union. It led to the imposition of new sanctions - the grain embargo - it led to a tightening of our export regulations and administration, it

suspended further liberalization in COCOM and it helped elect Ronald Reagan. It ushered in a new period of concern with the nuclear and military threat posed by the Soviet Union.

As I mentioned previously, a number of stories began to appear about how the Soviet Union had acquired sensitive high technology from the West. They reported that the Soviet Union had succeeded in circumventing many of the COCOM controls and had gained technology and equipment in areas that we would never have let them have. More and more of these stories came out about the failure of COCOM to adequately control high technology. Blame was placed on a common failure by our allies to provide sufficient monitoring and enforcement over their export controls. There was a significant mood change. Rather than liberalize, there was now pressure to reinvigorate COCOM. The Europeans shared this attitude to a point, but those concerns faded rapidly when the initial shocks wore off. The election of Ronald Reagan reenforced our own desires for a more stringent set of export controls.

One has to also consider that during this period - early '78 through the early '80s, Europe was in an economic recession. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact countries were very tempting markets for European high tech companies that risked going out of business. There was a great loss of jobs in those industries throughout Europe. If they could sell to this new and growing and exciting market to the east, they might be able to stave off closing. So, there was enormous pressure within Europe to liberalize and to sell to the Warsaw Pact countries.

Q: I've noticed this even today dealing with Iraq and other places, that there seems to be almost a game that goes on that the Europeans almost depend on the U.S. to be their conscience and to be the tough guy making them do things where they can almost feel free to try to see what they can get away with and pursue trying to sell things because it means good business and almost depending on the United States to make them be a bit careful about over arming potential enemies.

COMRAS: That's been true for a while. European countries, particularly the smaller ones have either been unable, or unwilling, to devote the same level of resources and expert review to vet each dual use export. It is simply easier to rely on the U.S. However, when it comes to challenging a negative U.S. position, these countries sometimes decided to devote a greater expert effort to respond to U.S. concerns. Their attitude was, "Why should we do this if the Americans are going to do it? Let's just take the piece of paper, we'll look at it, we'll be good guys to our business, we'll grant it, and we don't have to take the political heat for any denials. In any event, we don't have the resources or the personnel to figure out whether this should go or not. We'll ship it over to the Americans and then they're going to study this thing to death anyway. If they've got real problems with it, they're going to kill it. What the hell, let them..."

Q: "And then we can scream and yell and point to our business and say, 'We want to do it, but those damned Americans.'"

COMRAS: Yes. Hiding behind the American skirts became a regular tactic. However, sometimes they wanted to show their independence from the U.S. This was often the case for the French, who often challenged our rationale for denying a French export. They could apply considerable pressure, and sometimes used linkage as a tactic to push their cases through. The

Germans, the British and the Italians also took to increasingly challenge U.S. negative positions as time went on. And later on even the Japanese began to express their own independent considerations, political considerations in their own trade relationships, with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Each of these countries increasingly felt - and the Soviet Union played well into this - that this kind of trade had enormous political and foreign policy overtones and that there were many reasons that the Europeans wanted to be able to deal on their own with their own foreign policy interests towards the East. Their relations with Poland were a good example. And the Europeans perhaps quicker than the Americans envisaged a day where Europe might be as the Europeans even began to talk in the mid-'80s, this European home. They wanted to be the first out of the block. If they perceived that eventually the United States was going to liberalize, then they wanted to be at the forefront of such liberalization. They were resentful that we would change our policy and be the first out and then we would be holding them back. Our companies, they feared, would know if we were willing to change or become more liberal before foreign companies knew. This would give our companies, they felt, a commercial advantage. To prevent this they would regularly test the envelope so they could be out in front and as soon as we would change our policy, they'd be in the market before us. This was a period of great computer technological advances. New technology companies were right at the cusp of profitability in a number of countries. These countries were pushing for further technology investments. But they also remained heavily reliant on new U.S. technology. They needed to keep us on board and willing to allow technology transfers to their shores. You add to that several other factors that play into this very complex picture.

At that time COCOM consisted of the NATO countries, minus Iceland plus Japan. But, a number of other countries were beginning to experience new technological advances, and wanted to be able to share in the same relatively open market for technology transfers that the NATO countries were enjoying. They wanted to be in the same circle. This included Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea. Many other countries were also beginning to create and replicate the same technological capabilities that the COCOM countries had.

To some degree, the United States retained through this period a degree of control because it was the source of much of the base technology and equipment needed by these countries. By the early 1980s when I am back in Washington, these factors are all prominent forces that are influencing our strategic export policies.

Q: During this '75-'78 period, Israel was the beneficiary of a lot of our technology. It also was adding its own embellishments. They were also playing a game with the Soviets of getting the Soviets to let Jews out and were offering goodies for the Soviets mainly to get Soviet Jews out. Were we looking at Israel as being a leak?

COMRAS: No. During this period Israel was only a marginal player in the high tech area. They became more important later on. Many of the items that were in Israel were subject to the U.S. reexport licensing requirements. In fact, during that period of time, relations were not that favorable with the Soviets. When detente came to a halt in late 1970s, there was no significant trade moving between Israel and the Soviet Union. The aftermath of the '72-'73 Middle East war had cooled relations between Israel and the Soviet Union even further. So, Israel was not viewed as a source of leakage of western technology to the Soviet Union.

However, there was a growing concern during this period with leakage from the emerging high tech markets in Southeast Asia, and in Sweden and Finland. They were all active in the Soviet market at that time.

Still the Soviet Union was most interested in gaining access to the most advanced new technologies available only in the United States.

Q: Were we concerned about Americans who were going after the fast buck?

COMRAS: Yes. There were a couple of transactions that stand out during that time.. The most serious issue was a case of the sale of an air traffic control system to the Soviet Union from Sweden.. We had put very significant and severe conditions on what they could sell before we had agreed to it. They accepted those conditions and then ignored them and sold a system that created enormous problems for us later. There were other problems that arose. In the late '70s, there was a major anti-trust lawsuit against IBM which dealt with the issue of the software and the interfaces with what were the mainframe computers where IBM had a near monopoly, if not a monopoly. As part of the settlement of that case, it was agreed that IBM would have to publish its whole series of technology related to its interfaces so that others could make equipment that could be components and peripherals to IBM mainframes and open up the market to other countries. All of a sudden, all this control technology was beginning to appear in textbooks and in other non-classified sources. The Russians move in very quickly to take advantage of this. They used this new publicly available information to design their own interfaces and systems and began to replicate IBM technology. They also did a lot of work on reverse engineering stolen equipment and components. The Soviet Union tried to copy as much Western technology as they could. In fact, there new generation computers were based largely on the published data and interface material and other replicated and reverse engineered components. This is the technology that they were targeting during this whole period of time. The machine tool area and the chip area and the computer technology area were the real big areas of concern. Israel and some other states weren't into that kind of stuff.

Q: How about Taiwan and South Korea? Was there any talk about bringing them into the COCOM circle.

COMRAS: Not in the 1970s. But later in the 1980s. In 1982 when I came back into export control - I was doing Law of the Sea from 1978-1980 - Taiwan and South Korea, along with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were getting into high tech. This gave rise to a new policy debate in the United States. It also led to the adoption of a new U.S. strategy to broaden out the COCOM cooperating countries circle to include these countries. This became known as the Third Country Initiative, which basically brought these countries into COCOM without their actually sitting at the COCOM table. They agreed to abide by the same strictures as COCOM. This, in turn, led to a new round of COCOM and export control reforms.

GEORGE JAEGER

**Political Officer/Deputy Counselor
Paris (1975-1978)**

Mr. Jaeger was born in Austria and raised in Austria, England and the US. Evacuated from Austria to Holland and England, he immigrated to the US. After serving in the US Army he was educated at St. Vincent College and Harvard University. He joined the State Department in 1951 and the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1953. Primarily a Political Officer, Mr. Jaeger served in Washington several times as well as in Monrovia, Zagreb, Berlin, Bonn, Geneva, Paris, Quebec (Consul General), Ottawa (Political Counselor) and Brussels (Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs. His final assignment was Diplomat in Residence at Middlebury College. Mr. Jaeger was interviewed by Robert Daniels in 2000.

JAEGER: To my delight and surprise I was next assigned as First Secretary for Political Affairs in the American Embassy in Paris: Delight because this was obviously a challenging assignment, surprise because I didn't have more than a smattering of high school French and so had never expected to be sent to this very sought-after post.

Personnel explained that they wanted me there to help strengthen the Political section which apparently had some problems, and packed me off to FSI for three months of intensive French from which I 'graduated' just before Christmas of 1974.

Q: And then you were off.

JAEGER: Yes. Pat, our infant daughter Christina and I arrived to a warm welcome from my new boss, Political Counselor Hank Cohen - later Assistant Secretary for African Affairs - who met us at the airport and took us to our temporary quarters. As it turned out, I had hardly time to settle into my new office when word came from Washington that they wanted me to go to Geneva on a temporary assignment to help Ambassador Sherer and his delegation negotiate the Helsinki Final Act!

For Pat this was particularly hard, since, after 58 false starts, she had finally found a wonderful large apartment for us overlooking Place d'Auteuil in the 16th Arrondissement. What's more, our shipment of effects had just been delivered and stood around in large not yet unpacked cases, when I had to explain that, for an as yet unspecified number of months, she would be on her own in Paris!

Q: When the Geneva conference ended in July 1975 you went back to the Embassy in Paris?

JAEGER: Yes, still another beginning in, what in retrospect, was one of the most challenging assignments of my career. As second ranking officer in the Embassy's large Political Section I now had broad reporting and policy responsibilities for France's east-west relations; a charge later expanded to include France's Western-European and Mediterranean relations, including

special issues like Cyprus and Portugal's struggle to become a democratic country. Still later, I was made Deputy Political Counselor, a new position which was created for me, with management responsibility for the work of the section.

Q: That sounds like quite a challenge!

JAEGER: The trick was keeping all these balls in the air, while making and maintaining effective contacts at the Quai d'Orsay, the Elysee, among Paris's intellectual and journalist elite and with its many Embassies, including the Soviet and the swath of Iron Curtain Missions.

Personally it was a wonderful, if often stressful, time. Pat, Christina and I gradually settled into our lovely top-floor apartment overlooking the Place d'Auteuil, with its bustling, colorful biweekly market, the Auteuil subway station and an oyster merchant virtually at our door. Our kitchen was cramped and separated from our elegant dining room, with its French windows, by a too long corridor which made serving hot food a daily challenge. But these shortcomings were made up for by the large and airy formal rooms which were ideal both for our family life and for entertaining. Christina, now five, was enrolled at Notre Dame des Oiseaux on Rue Michel Ange, virtually around the corner, came to speak French like a native and, I think, rather liked playing Madeleine in this strange new world.

In due course, we even shared a weekend get-away from the pressures of Paris with our colleagues Bob and Mette Beecroft - a damp gatehouse on an estate owned by dour and impecunious Lionel Armand Delisle, near Dampierre in the Beauce - whose chimney smoked uncontrollably whenever a fire was lit to overcome the cold.

Getting there, or anywhere beyond the city confines, involved hours of fighting Paris weekend traffic. But the rewards were long walks on the paths crisscrossing the wooded estate, picnics and games, and the special fun of surreptitiously liberating a few of Delisle's thousands of pheasants which he kept penned up, to be released from time to time for his commercial 'hunts', when rich Germans popped away at them and were then rewarded with an 'authentic' hunters' banquet at the chateau - decked out and candle-lit for the occasion. Although Armand Delisle suspected that I was the culprit, I redeemed myself when I found and returned his beloved riding horse, one day, which had gone astray.

When, after some months, the smoke and damp of our gatehouse had lost their charm we rented a more comfortable weekend retreat from Jacques Leprette, then French Ambassador to the UN - an ancient farm house near Toucy in northern Burgundy, which, with its ancient windmill, overlooked the wheat field where Charlemagne's nephews had divided France at the Battle of Fontenoy in 841 AD. That battle, according to recent research, was a huge affair which left tens of thousands dead. Ironically, the short inscription on the nineteenth century obelisk commemorating the carnage does not lament this first failure to maintain a united Europe, but remarks with unabashed nationalism, that "it was here that the victory of Charles the Bald, separated France from the Western Empire and established the independence of the French nation".

Q: Hardly surprising for the time, although not quite the text they would choose if the monument were to be replaced.

JAEGER: History aside, our weekend perch in Burgundy was a marvelous place from which to explore Burgundy's ancient towns and villages, including Autun, Cluny and other medieval treasures, the area's fabulous vineyards, and, last but not least, the region's many restaurants, among the best in France. I also discovered that French officialdom in Paris was one thing, but that 'la France profonde' lived in the Provinces, where people were warm and outgoing, Americans were welcomed for their roles in two World Wars, and where all French politicians ultimately had their roots.

I am digressing.

Q: Right, but still relevant and interesting. Let's go back now to the challenges you faced in getting started in the Political Section and with your work at the Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere. Tell us first a bit about the Political Section and the Embassy.

JAEGER: We were a section of 19 political officers - somewhat an overstatement since almost half were from the Station and kind of floated in and out.

Q: Are we supposed to infer from that what was going on?

JAEGER: Well, if you like. Particularly after I was made Deputy Counselor, I was supposed to know them all but didn't. So it was sometimes disconcerting when somebody I had never seen before would come gushing up to us at a cocktail party and say, "Oh, my husband is enjoying so much working in your section." I would, of course, smile brightly and then say to Pat, "Who the hell was that?"

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: To get back to the point, the regular members of the Political Section were a brilliant bunch. The Counselor, Hank Cohen, an outstanding Africanist, French expert and gifted analyst, focused mainly on the French left and was adept at running productive staff discussions. He would introduce some major question and deftly weave everyone's contributions into a coherent whole, which would then form the basis of a major, often very perceptive telegram. Hank was much less gifted as a manager. In his Oral History of the period he describes the very capable but strong-willed officers in this Political Section as typically 'superior' 'Europeanists', a description clearly not meant as a compliment which said more about Hank's own insecurities than the generally very high caliber of his staff. From my perspective the main problem was his cautious, self-protective management style - he would simply disappear into his office and type away on telegrams - which left the obvious conflicts in the section unresolved and me often in the middle.

The key problems, when I arrived, were between John Dobrin, a brilliantly verbal, undisciplined youngish officer and so-so drafter, who would come in when he pleased and do what he wanted - but who knew France better than any of us and had developed extraordinary contacts with the

French left, including Francois Mitterrand and other key people in the Socialist and Communist parties.

On the other end of the spectrum was Marvin Humphries, the Embassy's high-strung, intensely turf-conscious tall and handsome Political/Military Officer, who was in constant combat with Dobrin, whom he despised, and who also had major difficulties with the Brigadier General who was the Embassy's Military Attaché and others. Marvin prepared for my arrival by letting it be known at the Quai d'Orsay that I was a junior officer who worked for him, and that he should always be consulted if anything I said produced questions or doubts. Needless to say, it took some effort and time to set the record straight.

Things improved markedly when Humphries was replaced by competent and relaxed John Kelly - who later became Ambassador to Lebanon and Finland and Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs; although Marvin gave us one last, horrendous shock when we learned from news reports that, some months after he had returned to Washington, he had shot his two young sons and his lovely wife, whom we all knew and liked, and then committed suicide! He was a deeply troubled personality whose illness should have been diagnosed and dealt with long before.

Q: How horrible. No wonder there were problems! What were the rest like?

JAEGER: Varied and uniformly able. In no particular order, there was Mark Pratt, our experienced Far East and Vietnam expert, who helped Henry Kissinger on his frequent meetings with the Vietnamese in Paris, and was famous for the mounds of classified and other papers which always graced his desk and produced endless security violations and for the superb Chinese dinners which he prepared for the favored, which sometimes included Pat and myself, in his bachelor digs. There was 'Frecky' (Fredrick) Vreeland, the urbane son of Diana Vreeland, our UN expert, who may also have had other less visible duties, perhaps having to do with his long relationship with the king of Morocco and others at the top levels of the social world. I will never forget the day the phone rang and a deep feminine voice said hoarsely: "Is Frecky there? This is the Duchess of Windsor!" There was also Chuck Redman, a bright, gifted young officer, joined the French internal politics reporting unit, did excellent work and enhanced amity. He later became Department spokesman. I should also mention Phil Rizik, the scion of a Washington clothing store, who headed the internal unit and did a fairly competent job, although managing Dobrin was beyond him.

Q: Was Hank Cohen there throughout your tour?

JAEGER: No, he was replaced for a few months in '77 by Jack Myerson, a delightful, experienced Europeanist who had just finished a gig as Ambassador to the UN Economic and Social Council and was in a holding pattern before becoming the Embassy's highly respected Economic Counselor: A voluntary step down which enabled him to live in Paris. Jack and I had met and become friends years earlier through Pat, who had known him in Brussels and were both delighted at this chance to work together. He was soon replaced by Warren Zimmerman, who was to become famous as our 'last Ambassador to Yugoslavia'. Warren ran the place like the serious pro he was, did a brilliant job at developing high-level contacts and raised the work of the Section to a new level. As his then Deputy I much liked and greatly admired him.

Q: Before we get back to your work, tell us briefly about the Ambassadors during your time.

JAEGER: The first was the same Kenneth Rush for whom I had worked in Bonn. He had, in the meantime, been Nixon's Deputy Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of State and, after Nixon's resignation, had been asked by President Ford to take on Paris. He was a thoroughly nice man, consistently kind and appreciative of our work, but didn't speak a word of French and, in spite of his years in Bonn, didn't have a deep understanding of European affairs. The residence at rue Saint Honoré reflected his mid-western background and tastes, mostly American cowboy pictures and wild west stuff. French officialdom, predictably, did not relate to him or appreciate his mild but frequent English-language admonitions through which he thought he was advancing American positions. Rush and his wife did not seem to notice, and, instead of getting to know the real France, spent a good deal of time visiting and hobnobbing with France's now largely impotent aristocracy in their various great chateaus.

Q: Sounds like a typical political appointee.

JAEGER: Well, maybe a shade above, since he really was a kind and good-hearted man. He became a burden only when he went on official trips to various parts of France, because he required major, grotesquely detailed briefing books for every stop he made, even if it was only at a 'mairie' in some minor town.

There were also some major gaffes which made the rounds of Paris, such as the one about Mr. and Mrs. Rush's visit to Chartres cathedral, whose dignitaries, as you would expect, had put on a big show. After the presiding bishop had shown them the stained glass windows and discoursed on the cathedral's history, he invited them to join him in going up the tower to enjoy the famous view of the town and its surrounding countryside. At which, and I can vouch for this since I was there, Mrs. Rush famously blurted out, "Kenny, do we really have to? My feet hurt!" "Well, honey," Rush replied, "in that case, maybe we better cut this short, and let's just go straight to lunch." The French, of course, were appalled. I recount this not to ridicule but to explain why he probably was not our most distinguished Ambassador to France.

Q: Did he launch any worthwhile new projects?

JAEGER: Yes. He thought all of us should find out first hand what people were thinking across France during the run-up to the important municipal elections, in which Francois Mitterrand's Socialist-Communist alliance threatened, to Washington's chagrin, to carry the day. Some grumbled that in a country as centralized as France one can follow the regional press and opinion polls from one's office and so get elections right without making long time-consuming trips. The counter-argument was that many of the politicians with their fingers on the pulse were local mayors or had other hometown roles and were more available in the provinces than they were in Paris. I for one strongly agreed that we could all benefit from the chance to spend over a week out of the office interviewing journalists, mayors and ordinary people in the provinces.

I, for my trip, had drawn the south-west, starting my explorations in Limoges and Périgueux and then drove on through small towns and villages to Cahors and Albi. At each stop I was overcome

by the unexpected warmth of people, who might or might not have given me much time in Paris, who were clearly delighted that I had come to see them in their home towns. As a result there were many long and informative discussions over splendid meals in cozy local restaurants. My only trouble was that I was invariably asked if I would try the specialty of the region, which, just as invariably, was delicious, but very rich cassoulet de confit d'oie, washed down with great local wines and finished with desserts and vintage armagnacs.

So I came back to Paris noticeably heavier than I had left, but a good deal more aware what France was thinking and, for that matter, what it was all about. The trip was also an opportunity to see things I might otherwise have missed, such as the vineyards of Cahors, the fortress church in Albi with its frightening murals which mother church erected to remind future generations what it could do to heretics, and the almost mystic beauty of the French countryside in the cold mists of early March.

All in all Rush was right to send us out of town, although our basic prediction, that Mitterrand's Socialist/Communist coalition would sweep the municipal election remained unchanged. As it turned out the left won 155 of 221 cities and towns with populations over 30,000.

Q: Well, Rush did make a contribution after all. Who followed him?

JAEGER: Arthur Hartman arrived later in 1977 and could not have been more different: A superb career Foreign Service officer, who had just been Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Hartman had the stature and breadth of experience the job called for and, with the help of his gifted wife Donna, immediately took Paris by storm.

For starters, out went the cowboy pictures, to be replaced by an eye-popping collection of French art, including Monet's, Manet's and other famous French impressionists and post-impressionists. It seems that before their arrival, Mrs. Hartman had persuaded American museums to loan them to the Embassy for display in the residence. When the French Foreign Minister arrived for their first glittering reception on rue St. Honoré he was clearly blown away: "My goodness, Mrs. Hartman," I heard him say, "you have a Monet!" Mrs. Hartman replied with little smile, "Ah, but you see, Mr. Minister, that's only the first! The rest are coming later."

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: In short the Hartman's, both fluent in French, made a terrific impression and from the outset greatly improved the quality of our relationship.

Q: Hartman, I believe, went to Moscow after Carter sent him to Paris and was very well thought of there too.

JAEGER: That's right. From our perspective in the Political Section, life also became less stressful. Out went the immensely time-consuming briefing books, because Art Hartman was a pro who knew what to do. Instead Art welcomed new thinking, appreciated good reporting and creative recommendations. I always thought of this tall, aquiline, fast-moving but graceful man as our Jewish Prince.

Q: You yourself had to learn French to manage this assignment. How did you make out?

JAEGER: That recalls a funny story. One of my very first calls at the Quai d'Orsay was on Ives Omnes, the Director of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs, who was to be one of my main contacts for my work on Soviet and satellite issues.

Needless to say, my French was still pretty wobbly and I was, understandably, somewhat nervous. Omnes greeted me warmly in French and, after I sat down at his desk, explained that he had been concerned that Washington may not completely understand all the nuances of the then French policy toward the satellites and the USSR and proposed a series of five meetings, in which he would set out and explain French East-West policy.

When he saw that I was ready to take notes, he began his first disquisition, talked for almost an hour and then sent me off. Together these five initial meetings produced a really remarkable series of telegrams, because the French had never before, to my knowledge, so systematically laid out their Soviet and east-west thinking for us. Even so, writing them was a nightmare, since, with my still rather limited French, I was continually worried that Omnes might have said something that I had misunderstood or that I had missed something important, and so sent Washington off in the wrong direction.

The surprise came when we met for the last of this series and Omnes looked at me with a kindly smile and said in perfect Oxford English: "Well, George, I think you've now worked hard enough, and you've made some progress. Why don't we do this one in English!"

Q: Laughter.

JAEGER: I had evidently passed the test, and, as it turned out, the telegrams all this produced were all right as well! In time my French got pretty good and became a major asset.

Q: I was going to ask you earlier, how you managed the language issue in the Geneva negotiations.

JAEGER: We had simultaneous translation into all the key languages, linguists in little booths which were set up in each conference room, with wires running all over the place. We could both listen to others and speak in English...

Q: ...with radio headsets.

JAEGER: Yes. It really worked very efficiently. But living and working in France was quite another matter. The French are often ridiculed for their insistence on the use of French. Its partly a matter of survival, since they don't want to be submerged linguistically, and partly a matter of cultural self respect. I suspect we would do the same thing if the tables were reversed.

Q: So your initial job was to cover France's east-west relations?

JAEGER: Yes. Reporting on and analyzing French east-west relations was the core job. This had all sorts of ramifications beyond Paris' bilateral relations with Moscow, including the evolving SALT and other arms control developments, CSCE issues, Berlin, GDR and FRG policy, as well as France's often rather special relations with Poland and the other Soviet satellites.

Given France's tendency to play at the margins of Western policy toward Moscow and its satellites as a way of enhancing its own role, some of this was fairly tricky, since Paris sometimes went to some lengths to keep us in the dark. Given Moscow's involvement in the French Communist party, which was then still quite influential, my work also involved some aspects of French domestic issues.

Later, as I think I mentioned, I was also asked to take on French Mediterranean policy, including Portugal's precarious transition to a left-leaning democracy under Mario Soares and Cyprus. In 1977 I was made Deputy Political Counselor, a new position created for me, with responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Political Section and was asked to add French Western European relations to my portfolio. To round things out we had intensely energy and time consuming visits by Jimmy Carter, French elections, a visit by Brezhnev, not to mention the world's highest rate of Congressional visits.

Q: Maybe we could get a sense how you managed all this if you were to describe an average working day.

JAEGER: Well, it was nothing like the popular idea people have of the relaxed life of striped-pants diplomats. Virtually every evening there was either a national day reception or some other social function followed by a dinner offered by another Embassy, French friends or someone on our staff. Frequently we ourselves would entertain, a big job for Pat, since we didn't have help and she put on the whole show by herself. Her peak performance was a sit-down Thanksgiving dinner for twenty-two, a memorable occasion at which the distinguished French lady at my right skeptically held up something on her fork for my inspection and asked me "exactly what it was?" It, I explained, is a "sweet potato" - which she then made plain was clearly not part of Paris' culinary repertoire! But then cultural relations are never easy!

Q: So all this socializing was important?

JAEGER: Of course. It was one way of meeting all sorts of people, across the spectrum of government and the diplomatic corps, in French intellectual circles, journalism and other key professions. To understand a country and its policies you have to get inside its skin, and that means knowing, and being on warm terms with, lots of different, well-positioned people. When an unexpected situation arises and you have to scratch around at the last minute to see who can provide background and perspective it's usually too late.

Q: Who were your closest friends in Paris?

JAEGER: My warmest and most interesting recollections were of the lovely evenings offered by Dominique and John Riggs, he a leading American lawyer at the Paris office of White and Case, she the daughter of legendary French Ambassador, Francis Lacoste, former Governor General of

Djibouti and Morocco, Minister in Peking, Ambassador in Ottawa and Brussels: A classic diplomat of the old school, who had the special distinction of having been fired by de Gaulle for being too pro-American! It was one of the joys of this period that he became my friend and mentor, and remained so until he died, long after we had left Paris,. Together, the Riggs knew everybody in Paris and an evening there was invariably an introduction to new sets of fascinating, often important people in diplomacy, politics and the arts. We have all remained good friends, although they are, alas, no longer married.

So, to get back to the main point, evenings usually meant brilliant food and drink, but were often more work than entertainment.

Q: Bit hard on the constitution as a regular routine?

JAEGER: Especially when you had to get up at six or six-thirty the next morning, get on the subway or fight your way through heavy traffic to the office by car. There, waiting for you, would be a good two and one-half inch stack of telegrams which had come in overnight from all over the world. The thing about a place like Paris is that you can't really say, "Indonesia doesn't interest me, so I won't read that." Countries like France have relationships in all parts of the world, with special interests in Africa and parts of the second and third world. So any of these reports might be or might become important, and at least had to be scanned.

Q: Were these telegrams between another Embassy and the Department that were copied to you, or messages sent especially to you?

JAEGER: Mostly the former, since telegrams were routinely repeated for information; but also the latter, when someone wanted to comment or supplement one of our reports. Or they might involve a new issue another Embassy wanted to bring to our attention.

Having hurriedly digested all those messages, as well as in-house memos, announcements and what-have-you, it was off to the nine-thirty staff meeting to discuss the issues of the day and agree on next steps as to who would do what, when and why.

Then there would be a bit of time to draft telegrams, review and sign out memos and messages others had prepared, or go to meetings called by the Ambassador, the DCM or elsewhere in the Embassy. By eleven or so, I would again be off to see someone, perhaps at the Quai, the Elysee, or at another Embassy; or I would meet a key journalist like Michel Tatu, the famous Soviet expert at Le Monde, or even a major intellectual like Raymond Aron (a shrewd realist who was passionately interested in the evolution of the Cold War). Particularly after first contacts had been made, these meetings, more often than not, took place a bit later over lunch.

Q: Why always lunch?

JAEGER: Its what's expected. Just calling on people usually produced little of value. Real relationships in France are established over a good meal and a bottle of wine.

Q: Isn't there a cultural difference between Americans and French in this respect?

JAEGER: Very much so. It was invariably instructive to watch American government or business people fly in from the States and expect to get their job done in a brisk, efficient meeting. In France it didn't work that way, or at least not well. If you wanted to get to the heart of issues, you had to make real human contact over bread and wine.

Q: So this happened almost every day?

JAEGER: Yes. What's more, the whole point was not to be hurried. As a result, I usually I didn't get back to the office until two-thirty or three, full of good Burgundy...

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: ... and information that should be promptly reported. The trouble was that my secretary, who had had a less splendid lunch in the cafeteria, had been impatiently waiting for me all this time and would make clear that she was leaving at five-thirty no matter what, and warn that if I had something to write, I had better do it quickly!"

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: So afternoon drafting was usually stressful. Things progressively got worse toward the evening as new piles of telegrams arrived, other colleagues brought their work for clearance or review, and there were unexpected calls to front-office meetings, flaps or visitors.

By five-thirty or six you are pretty drained. You have had no exercise all day, you have eaten too well and are still processing that half bottle of Burgundy. Then its back home for a bit of time with Christina and Pat, before being off again to the evening's social event. And so the week would go by, until we could escape two or three times a month for weekends in our fresh-air retreats in Normandy or Burgundy

Q: It sounds like a pretty demanding life.

JAEGER: It was demanding, but also exhilarating and rewarding. Demanding, because that's what it took to produce the high volume of first-class reporting and analysis required to keep Washington abreast of France's complex interactions and to offer sound recommendations. And rewarding because our collective work often did succeed in pulling important rabbits out of the hat.

Q: Let's now turn to the work you did on French Soviet and Soviet Bloc relations.

JAEGER: When I arrived in Paris in '75, detente had probably peaked with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, since - for reasons which are still debated - Moscow's line hardened after that. The 'Brezhnev Doctrine', which had emerged after the Soviet military suppression of the 'Prague spring', hung ominously over the eastern European satellites, which, led by Romania, were increasingly restless and chafing at Moscow's control. At the same time, Moscow's renewed heavy-handedness further disillusioned the Western Communist parties, including the

still powerful French CP, who increasingly trended toward 'Euro-Communism' - a new, less rigidly Moscow-controlled, ideological position.

The ideological and political Cold War also continued and in some areas sharpened in the second and third worlds. Moscow's renewed offensive posture was reflected in their military aid to Angola's 'Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola', and the astonishing appearance there of Cuban troops; in their parallel efforts in Mozambique and the Horn of Africa; as well as in Moscow's push for increased influence in Afghanistan, which culminated in its ill-fated Soviet invasion in 1978. The contest also went on in the Middle East, where Moscow continued to support Syria and the Palestinians. All together, the US and its allies were frustrated by their seeming inability to stem these renewed pressures.

The picture was further complicated by contradictory developments in the strategic arms race. On the one hand the late seventies saw the deployments in the USSR of the first of what would eventually become over 400 SS-20s, a new MIRVed triple warhead mobile intermediate range ballistic missile aimed at Western Europe. The purpose of this huge new investment, turned out to be Moscow's last, desperate try to 'decouple' Western Europe from the US by raising doubts about the reliability of the American deterrent. The question it meant to raise in Western European minds was, whether we would really launch our ICBM's if Europe were attacked, and so risk Chicago for some European city? And whether they, particularly the Germans, would not be wiser to go neutral.

By 1977 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was concerned enough to raise this issue privately in Washington and in major speeches, an effort which eventually led to NATO's 'dual track' response: First, the counter-deployment of US IRBMs in Western Europe which - after huge public debates in Europe - was begun in '83, and, secondly, the beginning of negotiations to limit medium-range systems. Interestingly, negotiations toward a second SALT agreement continued during the same period, suggesting a certain ambivalence in Moscow's posture.

Q: That's a fair summary. But how about the French part?

JAEGER: France, unlike Germany, was clearly a player but its frustration as usual was that, in spite of its major roles in the French-German relationship, in the European framework and on the political side of NATO, it was not in the driver seat. I think its fair to say that the French were dependable allies, although, then as later, there was a consistent tendency to try to be a bit ahead of the US through their efforts to have 'special' relations in Moscow, Warsaw and elsewhere, to enhance their importance in the east-west game.

Q: So your job was to follow all these issues and developments and analyze things as seen from Paris?

JAEGER: Yes. One part of the job was sharing and coordinating analyses of all these ongoing east-west developments and making sure the French government correctly understood and, hopefully, supported what we were thinking. Obviously, things that are now pretty clear in retrospect were much less so as these developments occurred, and all of us were groping to make

sense of them. The second part was finding out what the French were up to in Moscow and elsewhere behind the Curtain and, when possible, getting the story from both sides.

Q: So your task was not only to find out what the French were thinking and doing, but what the Soviets and Eastern Europeans were thinking as well?

JAEGER: That's right. An example might be a visit by the French Foreign Minister to Moscow. To find out what really happened, I would of course call at the Quai and report what they told me. But to get the whole story, it was usually useful to check further with German and British colleagues, with well-informed journalists who followed Soviet and French policy, like Michel Tatu at Le Monde, and to talk to the Soviets and some of the satellite Embassies. As often as not they would, inadvertently or intentionally, drop a small nugget which could be measured against other information. The result would be a much more nuanced account, with useful clues as to what the French were thinking and trying to accomplish. Over time, I developed and sustained a fairly wide set of relationships with people in the Soviet and Satellite Embassies, which occasionally produced very interesting and sometimes very useful information.

Things were sometimes more difficult, for example when French President Giscard d'Estaing made one of his periodic trips to Poland to go hunting - he had a special affinity for Poland - and would sometimes remain incommunicado for several days at the Polish Prime Minister's hunting lodge without informing the Quai what was being discussed or what he was doing. People were sometimes seriously worried by this, because he would be literally out of touch and unreachable behind the Iron Curtain.

Q: Well, the Poles have always had a traditional affinity for the French since the time of Napoleon.

JAEGER: Giscard clearly tried to build on this, partly to gain leverage in Eastern Europe and soften Polish positions, partly because he enjoyed the adventure of escaping from his Presidential cocoon in Paris. What's more, he would commit quite a bit of money to Polish projects on these trips, expenditures the Quai complained were frivolous and produced few results.

Q: Did your contact work with the Soviet bloc people in Paris upset the Embassy or the station?

JAEGER: On the contrary. In contrast to my experience in Bonn, where relations with the Station were sometimes fractious, the Paris Station Chief came to my office shortly after my arrival to stress that he wanted ours to be a cooperative effort and promised never to undercut me or use me in any way I did not fully understand.

Q: All right.

JAEGER: And he kept his word. The problem in dealing with Soviet and Eastern European personnel in a cosmopolitan setting like Paris is that all sides are afraid of each other. Nobody is quite sure whom they're dealing with or what their motives are. So the business of making useful contacts was delicate and took patience. I tried to call on and often lunched with many of many counterparts in the Soviet and satellite Embassies. Most of these contacts proved useless or

worse. It was sometimes only after six months or a year, after one got to know someone fairly well, that they might begin to talk more seriously about actual issues rather than repeating party propaganda.

I remember a Polish colleague, a pleasant, highly educated man with whom I had many meetings during this period. One day over a particularly pleasant lunch, he said, "Well, George, I think I know you well enough now so we can stop talking poetry!" I said, "We are going to talk about the real world?" He said, "Yes! You're not from the CIA, and I like and trust you. So let's talk reality." From then on, we had a highly productive relationship, which almost led to his defection, although he decided not to in the end.

Q: Did any of your contacts actually defect?

JAEGER: Yes. A senior East German diplomat, very bright, informed and disciplined. After months of meeting him occasionally, he said out of the blue one day over lunch: "You know, you're pretty dense. Haven't you figured out that I've invested all this time in you because I want to get out? I have got to a point where I can't wait any longer." When I got over my surprise I explained that I was the wrong person to talk to. He said, "Yes, I know, but they're a bunch of klutzes, and I don't trust them." So I said, "I'm going to talk to some people about this, but, in the end, you are still going to have to bite the bullet and deal with them, because I am a diplomat and I can't do this."

Q: So what happened?

JAEGER: Well, he told me to do what I had to and promised to comply. After I had gone over all this with the Station, it was arranged that he and I would have dinner at a famous hotel in Paris, at the end of which I would accompany him for a couple of blocks. He would then have to cross the street on his own and meet someone at a café. That was the end of the story.

Q: That was the defection?

JAEGER: That was the defection. It worked, but not without some cliffhangers, since, all during dinner he was extremely nervous and twice said he couldn't go through with it, and twice changed his mind. Needless to say, the hotel and the neighborhood through which we walked was swarming with our people to make sure he wasn't kidnapped by his service at the last minute. As it turned out nothing happened, and he presumably made it to a new life in the United States.

Q: How did they know he wasn't a mole or a double agent?

JAEGER: That, of course, was the big question. But that was their and certainly not my business. I should add that I never found out what happened to him and what, in the end, he turned out to be.

Q: Did you have any useful contacts at the Soviet Embassy in Paris?

JAEGER: Yes. We knew a number of people there, but I came to have a special friend whom I saw often over the years. After we had gone through the usual feeling-out process, he would welcome going for long walks (no listening devices) during which he discussed the petrified state the USSR under its current gerontocracy and his passionate hope as a Russian patriot that a renewal could be brought about. He made it quite clear that he wasn't interested in defecting or of compromising me with his people, but simply wanted a serious US interlocutor, so that people in Washington would know how things really were and understand that there were many who wanted change. I often asked him if he was not likely to get in trouble. He thought not, because he submitted, I assume, sanitized reports of our conversations to his security people, and had permission to continue to see me.

Q: Weren't our security types worried that you might get in trouble?

JAEGER: Actually, both my superiors and the Station warmly encouraged me to continue what gradually turned into a real friendship. He and his wife and child came to one of our Thanksgiving dinners and had an absolutely marvelous time. He even invited Pat and myself to visit them once at the Soviet Embassy compound where they all lived and worked, which, as far as was known, no one from our side had ever entered before. We were warmly welcomed in their tiny apartment where a dozen or so of his friends and neighbors in the compound brought cakes and served us tea, and made it clear how pleased they were that we had come! It was all as if a 'Moscow Spring' had just broken out!

Q: But did he give you real, valuable information?

JAEGER: Washington and the Agency certainly thought so. The relationship developed to the point that we began to get very clear readings on problems in Moscow, its views on the French Communist party, evolving relations with Paris etc.. Of course, all this raised questions whether he was a KGB guy assigned to work on me, or a legitimate diplomat and "Russian patriot" as he claimed.

Q: Do you think this was really a back channel way to communicate what someone in their government wanted our government to know, without taking responsibility for it? Or was he also passing disinformation?

JAEGER: Perhaps it was the former. All I can say is that none of the many telegrams our talks produced were ever challenged by anyone in Washington. On the contrary they again and again received high commendations. That would not have been the case, if some of it had sounded dubious.

Q: Can you cite an example?

JAEGER: One might be Brezhnev's three day visit to Paris in June 1977 which the French hoped would be a significant success and Washington was keenly interested in. As usual we had all sorts of official briefings from the Quai, talked to various direct and indirect participants and studied Le Monde's and other accounts of what turned out to be a rather unproductive but turbulent visit. To set the tone, Brezhnev broke protocol and summoned some French Ministers

to Rambouillet before meeting with President Giscard, didn't like a car the French gave him and met with Paris Mayor Chirac, even though the latter had pointedly been excluded from the schedule.

Conversely he did not meet with French CP chief George Marchais, who publicly wanted to deemphasize his Moscow ties, being now committed to the "Programme Commun" with Francois Mitterrand's Socialists, through which the French left had just decisively won the municipal elections.

In the end Brezhnev made some meandering public statements saying, inter alia, that US-Soviet relations were in a 'difficult phase' and signed two documents: One on non-proliferation and another on detente, in which Brezhnev accepted, what he had already committed himself to in the Helsinki Final Act, that respect for human rights should be one of the bases for improving French-Soviet relations.

What I learned from my Soviet friend on an almost real-time basis during the visit was how very poor Brezhnev's health actually was; that he was much more feeble and sick than had generally been realized in the West; was not able to concentrate, drank too much, had to be primed and propped up for every event and helped in and out of buildings, cars and airplanes. We even learned what he had for lunch.

Q: We've seen that pattern again in more recent times with the Russian leadership in Yeltsin's time..

JAEGER: We have, except in Brezhnev's case people knew he was not well, but I think they were not certain how debilitated he really was. We received warm commendations for these reports which the Department said had changed Washington's appreciation of Brezhnev's health and therefore had significant implications for US policy.

Q: Which leaves open the question why your friend was so helpful.

JAEGER: It is possible that he helped us because, as he said again and again, he was a Russian patriot and wanted us to see clearly what was happening in the Soviet Union. Conversely, it is also conceivable that some faction in Moscow wanted us to know, which would help explain why he seemed to be able to operate with relative impunity. In the end we will probably never know.

Q: Who, by the way, was the Soviet Ambassador in Paris at the time? Did you ever meet him?

JAEGER: Stepan Chervonenko, the hard liner who had presided over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, whom I met once. It happened when Art Hartman phoned me one afternoon to ask if Pat and I would join him and Donna at a dinner at the Soviet Ambassador's where they had been invited. The last time the Hartmans had been there, he said, the ratio was a dozen Soviets to two Americans. That was heavy lifting. Art thought if four of us went we should be able to handle them. He was prescient.

Although obviously interesting, it turned out to be the gloomiest evening we had spent in Paris, beginning with the Soviet hatcheck girl, who made it clear that she was being watched and that even a word of small talk was unwelcome; to the cavernous reception room where a solemn Chervonenko dourly welcomed us and promptly engaged Ambassador Hartman in earnest conversation - with the predicted dozen Soviet staffers clustering around to hear what was being said; and finally to truly ghastly sturgeon dinner, served in solemn Victorian fashion - so bad, that Pat said afterwards that the sturgeon must have walked all the way from Vladivostok. As for substance, we went through the catalogue of standard exchanges before and during dinner, toasted each other several times with the obligatory vodka, and finally went home having survived but learned little.

Q: You earlier mentioned George Marchais. What about the French Communist Party in those years?

JAEGER: The whole question of the French Left, both the massive Communist party and, to a lesser extent, the Socialists, had been at the center of American concern since World War II. In my time in Paris the French Communist Party was still an extremely disciplined, centrally managed, quite powerful force in French politics, able to attract over 20% of the popular vote.

Q: And slavishly pro-Soviet?

JAEGER: That was less clear since the formation of the 'Programme Commun' with the Socialists in 1972 and the growing influence of 'Euro-Communism'. Successive shocks and revelations, from Khrushchev's secret speech, the Czech invasion and particularly the publication of Solzhenitsyn's sensational 'Gulag Archipelago' in '73, had had a huge impact and shaken the European Communist parties - especially the Italians. Although the French CP had rejected 'Euro-communism' for longer than anyone, even they had to bend to the wind at their party Congress in '76, at which they dropped the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and moved somewhat closer to Euro-communist positions. Even so, this was a qualified shift motivated by fear of losing voter appeal rather than changing convictions, since, only three years later, the French CP loyally approved the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - as they had supported the invasion of Czechoslovakia some years earlier.

That said, understanding the French Communist Party, and its relationships with Moscow remained one of the most difficult and important issues for us. While not a vital threat, as they had been after World War II, they could still turn out massive numbers of people to demonstrate in Paris and across France and were obviously a crucial factor in France's electoral equation. The frustrating thing was that we were able to get only fragmentary insights into what was going on inside the party or about its Moscow relationship.

Q: Can you try to sum it up for us?

JAEGER: On the one hand, it was clear that the French party chafed under Moscow's control and tried to conceal the directives it received dictating their behavior. What's more it did show some independence, as when Marchais avoided meeting Brezhnev during his visit when their lines increasingly diverged.

Even so, I remember being at the Soviet Embassy on their National Day around this time and seeing a totally relaxed and jovial George Marchais being received as a most honored guest, clearly enjoying himself and looking very much 'at home'. Indeed the leading French CP people were continually seen at the Soviet Embassy which had a full-time officer assigned to liaise with them. It is more than likely that the Soviets themselves may have pragmatically accepted the necessity of a little public disloyalty for electoral and political reasons, while trying to preserve the essential relationship behind the scenes, which remained one of their major assets on the French and European scenes.

Q: Were you able to follow any of this in detail?

JAEGER: Let's say, we managed to get a certain degree of insight for a period of time. Part of this came from John Dobrin's high-level contacts with the Socialists, part from mine and part from other sources. Since Washington was intensely concerned that a possible 'Programme Commun' government would necessarily include French Communist ministers, it was important to understand to what degree Moscow would gain influence and so obtain a window into the Western alliance.

Q: What was the CP pushing at the time?

JAEGER: One of their projects was for a Soviet-French friendship treaty, a theme which also had a certain limited appeal to extreme Gaullists opposed to NATO and some others frightened by the continuing 'balance of terror'. Even so, it was clearly a non-starter.

Q: But that would have been consistent with de Gaulle's signing of a war-time Friendship treaty with the Soviets in 1944?

JAEGER: Yes, but in Giscard d'Estaing's world in the late seventies it was out of the question. I also learned early on that the Soviets were unsuccessfully pressing for separate and far reaching French-Soviet disarmament agreements. While Giscard wanted a prominent French role in the Western alliance, breaking ranks altogether in any of these ways was not in the cards.

France under Giscard, was in the vanguard of detente, with annual summits with the USSR, but he sought detente in the context of a strengthening French role in the European context and improvements in French-US relations.

Q: Why don't we turn for a moment to Mitterrand and the 'Programme Commun'. Could you set the stage?

JAEGER: The 'Programme Commun', roughly translatable as the 'Common Program', was signed by the Socialists, the French PC and the Left Radicals in 1972 to regain momentum in view of the continued predominance of the Gaullists after the political crisis of 1958. That this sharp turn to the left was a winning strategy became evident in the presidential elections of '74 when Mitterrand's 'Union of the Left' lost only narrowly to Giscard; and even more so when it

won the mid-term municipal elections in 1977, mentioned earlier, which were seen as the run-up for legislative elections to be held in '78.

Given this increasing success, there was growing concern in Washington that the 'Union of the Left' might then gain control of the French National Assembly and form a government - raising the specter of Communist Ministers in power in a Mitterrand cabinet able to influence French foreign and security policy and get access to sensitive military and intelligence information. How to deal with this and the possibility that the 'Union of the Left' might, worse still, gain the Presidency in 1981, became a major Washington concern.

Q: How did the Embassy deal with this?

JAEGER: One obvious first step, was to get to know Mitterrand a little better. John Dobrin, the Political Section's gifted 'enfant terrible' had come to know him informally as leader of the Socialist Party, and he and Hank Cohen conveyed some of these concerns, of which Mitterrand was, of course, aware. His response was an informal commitment that Communist Ministers in any future government of the left would not be given access to this kind of sensitive information. So far so good.

Q: That's nice, but...

JAEGER: Right. We then evolved the notion that maybe we should invite Mitterrand to lunch with Ambassador Rush to emphasize our concerns more formally and create a closer relationship; Mitterrand and others on the left having long been in the Embassy's and Washington's official deep freeze, with official contact largely limited to Dobrin's Second Secretary level.

Q: Did Mitterrand accept?

JAEGER: With alacrity, but one, on the face of it, quite reasonable condition. "If", Mitterrand replied, "I am going to be head of a government or President of France, I need to be read into the real strategic situation." In short, his price for coming to lunch was a comprehensive, highly classified briefing on the state of the nuclear and strategic east-west situation. That, of course created an immediate problem.

Q: How much you are going to tell Mitterrand ...

JAEGER: Precisely. At the same time, Mitterrand, and his people reiterated that a government of the 'Union of the Left' would share power and information with the Communists only on French domestic issues, and that the Communists would be hermetically sealed off from foreign and security affairs. We had his word that he would protect Allied interests and clearly understood the problems posed for America and France's NATO and European allies by the French Communists' relationship with Moscow.

Q: So how was this resolved?

JAEGER: The issue precipitated telegraphic exchanges with Washington over nine months, an endless back and forth which only underscored Washington's distrust Mitterrand. At the same time, everyone was aware of the other horn of dilemma, that the US might soon be dealing with him as head of government or even President of France, and that rebuffing him would be a bad start for this relationship.

In the end Washington waffled. An elegant little outdoor lunch was arranged on the terrace of the Ambassador's residence with beautiful food and great French wines. Mitterrand came, said little and was very polite. After lunch a lowly Lieutenant Colonel (!) gave a 'secret' half hour briefing on the strategic situation, with the usual maps and paraphernalia, which was in fact just a standard, unclassified rundown. Mitterrand might as well have read the New York Times!

Although he left with the unfortunate impression that he was still not trusted, the lunch was not a total loss. For it was Mitterrand's first-ever visit to the Embassy and so symbolically important in itself. Moreover, it gave him the opportunity to tell Ambassador Rush on the record how, if elected, he would conduct his government and to stress again that America had nothing to fear.

My own feeling, then and later, was that by delaying this meeting for nine months, and then serving him lukewarm gruel, we failed to seize an opportunity. As it turned out, when Mitterrand was finally elected President in 1981, albeit without Communist participation, he turned out to be a pillar of continuity in foreign affairs and was rather tough on Moscow, even though his domestic policies of nationalization of industries roiled French and other waters.

Q: Another piece of the Paris puzzle is the Elysee. How were the Embassy's relations with the Presidency during your time in Paris?

JAEGER: I am glad you asked. I began to realize early in my assignment that our relations with the Élysée were very, very thin. Ambassador Rush had virtually no substantive contact with Giscard. Hank Cohen did occasionally see the head of Giscard's tiny, but very influential foreign affairs staff of six or seven - a pleasant man, given to sport coats and country house manners, who invariably gave him a polite half hour but, as Hank kept saying, produced little that was worth reporting. This was a real problem, since the Elysee often kept the Quai in the dark as well, leaving us only partially informed and with little influence at highest level.

Q: So what did you do?

JAEGER: Well, time went by and eventually Hank Cohen and I decided that I should have a go at the 'working level' of that staff. After thinking about this for some time, I settled on the youngest member of the Elysee staff, Jean-David Levitt. At thirty he was a rising star among France's junior diplomats and, although very junior, reportedly had Giscard's confidence.

The next problem was how to make effective contact. I found out that one of his minor duties was to follow Andorra issues...

Q: [Laughter]

JAEGER: .. because the President France, together with the Catalan Bishop of Urgell, is one of the 'two co-princes' of Andorra - an odd arrangement which goes back to the 13th century.

Q: That's right.

JAEGER: So, on September 8, 1977, Pat and I decided to help celebrate Andorra National Day and, as expected, found Jean-David Levitt in attendance, standing in for Co-Prince Giscard. We met, hit it off, and agreed to an early lunch, at which I deplored the rather spotty relationship between the Embassy and the Elysee. Levitt fully agreed, but then said, "If we work together, can you deliver?"

I knew exactly what he meant. If we established an informal channel to Giscard, would Washington respond with equal seriousness at the highest levels? I took an enormous chance and said "Yes, I can." Levitt said, "Fine. Now what would you like to know?" Well, I said, "I have five questions," and asked for the Elysee's view on five top-flight issues of the day.

He said, "I'll be in touch."

By 3:30PM that afternoon my phone rang, and there was Levitt: "The answers to your questions are" and rattled off succinct replies to my five questions. When he had finished he proposed that we have lunch again next week "when I will ask you several questions."

Q: So you had your channel?

JAEGER: Yes. Levitt had evidently seen Giscard after our lunch, and phoned me his answers to my questions! So far so good!

The next problem was, of course, to get Washington to respond appropriately. Well, I prepared a highly classified and very restricted message 'for the Secretary and the White House only', explaining that we had succeeded in establishing a backchannel to Giscard; reporting his responses to our initial questions, some of which had far-reaching implications, and making clear that this arrangement would work only as long as we were able to respond to their questions promptly and with equally authoritative highest-level answers.

Q: Big time stuff!

JAEGER: Well, yes. I took my draft telegram to Sam Gammon, the able Deputy Chief of Mission who was then Chargé, who had not heard of any of this before and was clearly taken aback: "You know, if this isn't for real, its not just your job but also mine! You really want me to sign this? How do we know this guy is responsible?" I said, "Sam, you don't know, but, I think, it's the best source you're ever going to get. My recommendation is that you sign it, and let's see what happens." To his great credit he did. After some high level back and forth with Washington, our new channel worked effectively until I left Paris and resolved some important misunderstandings between Washington and Paris.

Q: That must have quite a coup!

JAEGER: Well, it undoubtedly helped with my promotion to FSO-2 and the Senior Foreign Service after I got back to Washington. But I recount this, not in self-praise, but because it's an important case study of how, finding the right person at the right level, making real human contact and then playing it absolutely straight, can overcome major systemic roadblocks and open the way to genuine communication - the critical prerequisite to effective diplomacy.

Too often people think you have to rely on cloak and dagger stuff, when its all there to be had with a little imagination, drive and that indefinable quality necessary to make genuine human contacts - even between adversaries.

Q: As it did with some of your Russian contacts. In this case the highest level in France realized that they had a channel they could use to get some points across without the rigidity of formal highest-level meetings.

JAEGER: Precisely. It was an official unofficial channel. The footnote to this story is of course that Jean-David Levitt had a legendary career, was France's Ambassador to the US during George W. Bush's Presidency, then served as French Ambassador to the UN and, as I edit this account, has returned to his old haunts in the Elysee - this time as the Foreign Policy Advisor to President Sarkozy.

Q: Paris being a major diplomatic hub, there must have been many other issues you became involved in. What were some of the main ones?

JAEGER: My bit-part in the Portuguese drama of the seventies began one day in 1976, when I received a call from the Portuguese Ambassador to France, Antonio Coimbra Martins, asking if he could come to see me. I demurred and suggested he might want to see Ambassador Rush. Martins said he had, and repeated that he wanted to meet with me. It was the beginning of a wonderful personal and political relationship.

Martins - a brilliant Romance literature scholar and close friend of Prime Minister Mario Soares whose Socialist party had just prevailed in the April elections of that year - came promptly, sat on the hard chair next to my scuffed desk and explained that he needed a friend in the Embassy who would help support Soares' and Ambassador Frank Carlucci's struggle to stabilize his country by persuading the French government to be more supportive. He had tried to explain this to our Ambassador, who had not seemed deeply interested and had suggested he meet with me!

Q: Amazing! Sketch in the background of what was happening in Portugal to set the stage, OK?

JAEGER: The background was dramatic. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonies and the fall of Portugal's authoritarian regime a left-leaning military coup failed to contain the deepening crisis and the Moscow-guided Portuguese Communist Party remained a powerful destabilizing influence and threatened to make Portugal the first Communist country in Western Europe. By '76, Mario Soares and his moderate-left Socialists had managed to win legislative elections and form a weak government but were endangered by Portugal's profound poverty and discontent. To

visualize the situation you have to keep in mind that the average Portuguese standard of living in those days was at the level of an African country!

Kissinger had at first written Soares off as the 'Kerensky' of Portugal, the guy who would just be the front-runner for the Moscow-controlled Communists when he failed. Carlucci eventually persuaded Henry to be supportive, enabling him to undergird Soares' government with aid, loans, new military programs and strong public support. Carlucci's compelling point, which was the main theme of the gusher of telegrams from Lisbon, was that there was no alternative to Soares. So he worked like a tiger to assure Soares' survival and success.

Q: But what did the Portuguese Ambassador want you to do?

JAEGER: In brief, to help persuade the French to be more generous and to untie French assistance from the usual conditions that any resulting business had to go to French firms. Moreover, France, then as now, had a special relationship with Spain and Portugal, both being Mediterranean countries and neighbors. It was specially important, therefore, that effective support for Soares come, and be seen as coming, not only from the US but also from Portugal's European neighbors, particularly France. Soares saw this as Martins' principal task.

Q: Actually, if I remember correctly, the Germans were more supportive of the Portuguese socialists than the French.

JAEGER: That's right. In France, the Giscard government, indeed the whole right wing of the French political spectrum, was not at all happy about the socialist direction of events in Portugal, and were therefore holding back. For Soares and Martins it was critical to reassure the French and show them how much worse things could get if they didn't help.

Q: Were you able to help?

JAEGER: In the end yes. The Portuguese desk officer at the Quai was an austere, rather difficult woman who seemed like an impenetrable wall. I took up the cause and made many trips to the Quai, cajoling and pleading Soares' cause at various levels, making it clear that this was a major American priority. In the end, after months of effort, we made headway and were able to report to Carlucci and the Department that the French had untied and increased some of their aid and were being generally more helpful. Even so it remained hard for the French government to help ideological opponents in Lisbon who were friends of Mitterrand. It was a tough, uphill fight.

Q: That's fascinating. I don't think I told you about my own acquaintance with Portugal in those days. Because of my interest in the comparative history of revolution, we went there in June of '75. By that time, as you have described, the revolution was going through the characteristic phase of being radicalized, with radical officers in the military, who had come out of Africa, becoming the dominant political force. They were backed, at a certain distance by the Russians and the Communist Party. Thanks to the Embassy we got passes to the opening session of the newly elected constituent assembly.

I was, of course, comparing this with the constituent assembly that met in Russia in January 1918 and was dispersed by Lenin. Well, in this case, it was not. Following the session, when the delegates left the building, which was surrounded by armored cars for security purposes, I saw Soares talking with a group of people and went up and introduced myself and explained that I was an American historian interested in revolutions, and could we meet? He said, "Tomorrow." So my wife and I went to his office in the Parliament building. At the time he was a minister without portfolio in the military government. And, of course, it was touch and go as to whether he would be thrown out or become prime minister. In our meeting he also recounted his meeting with Kissinger at which Kissinger told him, as you said, that, "maybe you're going to be the Kerensky of the Portuguese revolution. "Well", Soares said he replied. "Kerensky didn't do so badly. He became a college professor in the United States!" I thought he was a very honorable man, who was desperately trying to steer between the forces of right and left that were threatening Portugal at the time.

JAEGER: That's right. And it was Carlucci's great merit that he clearly understood the importance of this and mobilized all possible resources to help, of which my efforts in Paris were a minor part.

Q: Yes. We happened to encounter Soares again the following year. By that time the psychological atmosphere had changed completely. There was a distinct thermidorian reaction. Exactly the same thing George Orwell described in his book on 'Catalonia' after the anarchists were crushed in Barcelona. Well, in Portugal there had been this ultra-left uprising in Lisbon in November of '75, the collapse. The Communists distanced themselves from it. Soares then made his tremendous comeback and won the parliamentary election in '76! Glad you were able to help a bit after that!

Q: What other issues came up in Paris?

JAEGER: The Political Section, when in my last year or so I was Deputy Counselor and floor manager, had to deal with an almost endless list of issues in Europe and across the globe: Arms control and Helsinki follow-up, French-German relations and European community developments. There was the endless fuss between Greece and Turkey, various problems in the Middle East, Morocco and Algeria as well as former French Africa which the French were very neuralgic about. My colleague Mark Pratt presided over the Far Eastern issues, Japan, Taiwan, China and Indonesia, but particularly Cambodia and Vietnam. There was no end of work.

Q: So Paris really had some of the most complex tasks of any of our embassies?

JAEGER: Well, much like all the great embassies, London, Paris, Tokyo, Moscow, now Berlin, where all the hubs come together.

Q: Let's talk a bit more of some of the off beat problems which you worked on personally.

JAEGER: I remember spending considerable time on problems involving Svalbard, the island archipelago north of Norway, governed by Norway under the terms of the 1920 Svalbard treaty,

where suspicious Soviet activities near their mining town were raising red flags in Washington, Oslo and NATO.

There was Cyprus, and the never-ceasing Greek-Turkish problems, which became a particularly persistent theme in the aftermath of the '74 invasion. I worked closely with the British Embassy on peace initiatives then underway and often shared reports and analyses. One of the things which struck me at the time was that, although their political staff was a third the size of ours, they managed somehow to handle the same range of issues as our much larger staff.

Q: Isn't that rather characteristic of American efforts compared with some Europeans who often do almost as well with a lot fewer people?

JAEGER: Yes, although there are distinctions. The Brits tend to produce people who write concisely and do things with an economy of means, perhaps as a result of their tutorial system in Universities. I saw this again when I was heading the Political Department at NATO, where my British colleague was as productive as most of the rest of the staff put together.

Q: Don't the French do this too?

JAEGER: The French view things through a logical prism, the Cartesian method taught in the 'Grands Ecoles'. The Brits tend to begin with concise perceptions of reality and then think their way through to policy conclusions, as we do, except we tend to need more paper and more words.

Q: Was Berlin still on the front burner when you were in Paris?

JAEGER: Berlin too continued to take much time, since France was one of the four occupying powers. My interlocutor at the Quai was Francois Plaisant, the Director of Berlin affairs, a smallish man whose bangs stretched across his forehead concealed a very bright and somewhat stubborn mind.

I remember frequent meetings with Plaisant in which we tried to coordinate Allied positions, which could be difficult. One rather technical Berlin issue comes to mind, on which Plaisant had taken a hard position which our people in Berlin and the Department badly wanted to change. I met with Plaisant at least four times and presented our arguments as persuasively as I could. When I gave it one more try and had again gone over the whole thing, he smiled a little and said, Ok, if it's that important I'll meet you half way, not because you have persuaded us but because you are a friend and you really want this - which again illustrates the importance of genuine human contact.

Q: Was he able to make decisions for the French Government?

JAEGER: On most of these issues yes. Plaisant was Mr. Berlin at the Quai. The Director for Europe, Jacques Andréani was no doubt kept informed and consulted.

Q: One thinks of the French as so bureaucratic and centralized that what you say surprises me.

JAEGER: Yes, but Office Directors at the Quai, at least in my time, were powerful people who almost always became ambassadors on their next foreign assignment, like my friend Yves Omnes, the Director for Soviet and Eastern European Affairs, who became French Ambassador in Egypt. They no doubt cleared their decisions, but were very influential.

Q: Now I am sure you had one or more visits by Henry Kissinger, who was Secretary until Carter came in in January '77.

JAEGER: He came to Paris frequently, sometimes on Vietnam matters, sometimes to see Giscard d'Estaing and whoever was Foreign Minister at the time.

Q: Did you see him on these visits? I remember you had known him at Harvard.

JAEGER: Only once - since he never came to the Chancery - although that proved to be rather memorable. I was the senior Embassy duty officer, which meant being available at the Ambassador's residence at rue Saint Honoré where Henry always stayed to help with whatever issues might come up, i.e. late-night contact with someone in the French government etc..

The scene was the residence's vast lobby, where duplicate arrays of copying machines, multiple typewriters and desks had been set up in somewhat surrealistic readiness for the arrival of "the aircraft", expected about ten PM, but then delayed. At nearly midnight the doors burst open with a crack, and Henry, followed by a phalanx of assistants and staffers, burst in. Ambassador Rush stood in the middle of the hall to welcome Henry and offered him a drink. Henry, didn't even break his stride, perfunctorily shook Rush's hand and was off to his and Nancy's rooms. Poor Rush mumbled something like, "Well, welcome to Paris," and disappeared as well, while Henry's platoon of assistants, who had all brought along whatever they had been working on on the aircraft, set to typing away furiously on important papers.

I was at my little desk awaiting developments, when the very bright-looking young woman with blonde bangs and sharp blue eyes who was Henry's secretary, picked up her phone, took a message, looked at me, and said, "He wants the paper."

I said, "Today is Sunday, and there isn't a paper. There's just a weekend edition of the Herald Tribune, which was published early yesterday morning." Goldilocks, as I nicknamed her in retrospect, was unamused: "Don't be stupid! He wants the paper! Get the paper!"

So I called the Chief Housekeeper, a wonderfully kind and competent lady, and asked if there was a copy of the weekend Herald Tribune. She called back a moment later in some considerable distress and said, "The Ambassador has gone to bed, and is, I think, doing the crossword puzzle."

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: I said, "Mr. Kissinger's Assistant here says that he wants the paper." She said, "Well, if its really necessary, I'll try to talk to the Ambassador." After a few minutes the Chief

Housekeeper appeared in person, looking very distressed, and said, “The Ambassador hasn’t finished with the crossword puzzle yet,

Q: (Laughter)

JAEGER: and wonders if Mr. Kissinger could wait for 20 minutes?”

Q: I can’t believe it!

JAEGER: I turned to ‘Goldilocks’ and explained the situation. She looked at me while continuing to type at an alarming rate, and said, “When Henry wants a paper, Henry gets a paper. GET IT!”

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: So a few minutes later, out comes this crumpled Herald Tribune with a half-done crossword puzzle that had been taken away from the American Ambassador in Paris so that Henry could read the paper.

Things turned out quite differently on another occasion when I was asked to help with Brzezinski’s arrival at Orly airport. On the way into Paris, there was a loud pop emanating from Zbig’s newly armored car followed by several others, at which point his limousine seemed to sink into the ground as it came to a stop. It seems our admin people had forgotten to put heavier tires on the car to compensate for its additional weight! Zbig was, of course, quickly and safely transferred to one of the other cars and sped into town.

Stories like these about high-level visitors and the endless Congressional delegations who turned up in Paris, and required much time and effort, could fill volumes.

Q: What about President Carter? Did he visit France during your time?

JAEGER: Yes, in January 1978, part of a swing which began in Poland, and then took the President through Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I was asked to help our Minister, Sam Gammon, to coordinate the visit.

Q: Were the preparations as intense and time consuming as one hears?

JAEGER: If anything more so. There were, of course, endless planning meetings in the Embassy and with the French, as well as major challenges - such as arranging housing for the 200-some official support staff and all the journalists traveling with the President in one place. I remember startling the General Manager of the Meridian Hotel when I told him that I needed to rent his whole 500 room hotel for Carter’s visit, and succeeded only after the Elysee kindly supported my request.

Weeks before the visit a Secret Service detail had, of course, appeared, followed by a huge Advance Group from the White House which virtually took over the Embassy. Between them

they looked at every aspect of the visit in painstaking detail, including the routes Carter would travel, the prevailing security situation and, of course, the apartment the Carters would occupy at Giscard's official country retreat, the Chateau of Fontainebleau.

It was this apartment which gave rise to the first major incident. Our counterpart at the Elysee phoned me a few days before Carter's arrival in great agitation to say that the Americans were stealing President Giscard's rugs and adamantly refused to return them! He had not yet told President Giscard but very much hoped I could promptly get this straightened out!

Q: Incredible!

JAEGER: I sent a rocket to our White House liaison officer who established that the Secret Service team casing Fontainebleau thought the rugs in the apartment the Carters would be staying in were not as nice as others they seen in a nearby suite, and claimed not to have understood the loud complaints emanating from Giscard's staff - since they were speaking French! I made it clear that the rugs were to be returned instantly, and asked our Minister to convey the US Government's profound apologies. The French were kind enough to make sure that the story did not get to the press, which would have destroyed the visit.

Q: You said this was the first major incident. What else happened?

JAEGER: Well, a few days before Carter's arrival the operator rang me to say there was someone on the line who wanted to report a death threat to the President. When I picked up, a man speaking French explained that he knew of an assassination plot and wanted to warn us, but then refused to explain anything further on the phone.

Q: You had a major problem.

JAEGER: I told him it was terribly important that we meet either at the Embassy or elsewhere, that he could trust me and that we would do everything in our power to protect the President. The caller would only agree to think about it before he hung up without providing contact information. He then called back two or three times, which was reassuring, and after more conversation, finally agreed to come to the Embassy the following day. He insisted, however, that he only wanted to meet me since he said he didn't trust anybody else.

I reported all this to the Secret Service, who thought that I was in no way qualified to deal with the situation and informed me that they would now take it over. I said, "Well, this guy said he will only deal with me. What's more, none of you speak French. If we switch signals on him and he refuses to talk, it will be your responsibility if things go wrong."

They thought about this and said. "Okay, we'll put a listening device in your desk because we do want to know word for word what he says, and want a recording." So they installed an expensive looking tape recorder in my desk drawer and attached a red button under the edge of my desk. My instructions were that as soon as he started to talk I was to press the red button which would start the recording.

Sure enough, the man came, a small rather innocuous-looking person, and was shown to my office. When he was about to sit down and start talking, I pressed the red button - and guess what happened?

Q: What?

JAEGER: There was a big BANG and a cloud of smoke shot up over my desk!

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: They had installed a US specs recorder not realizing that in France the voltage is 220!

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: While I was still trying to collect my wits, my little friend was out the door like a shot, down the stairs and out of the building before anybody could get hold of him! As a result, we never found out whether there was a threat or not, which left everyone rather nervous and then greatly relieved when the visit unfolded without incident!

Q: Wow! Clearly a nut-case, but you couldn't have known that at the time. Tell us now about the actual visit.

JAEGER: Giscard d'Estaing wanted Carter's visit to be a special occasion and had decided to use the just restored Palais de Versailles for the official reception, a first since the Revolution! Because he thought of Carter as a populist he had invited 500 people drawn from all social classes and professions from all over France, besides the usual government ministers, the diplomatic corps and other notables.

When the guests arrived at the great courtyard of Versailles, illuminated only by flickering torches, they were ushered through a dramatic defile of 'Garde Republicaines', sitting their horses with sabers drawn in salute, the torchlight glittering on breastplates and helmets. The only quixotic touch in this tableau was the lone guardsman urgently running around behind the ranks of horses with a pooper- scooper ...

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: ... to make sure that the occasion would not be marred by an equestrian mishap!

Once inside, we saw Versailles at its historic best - the Hall of Mirrors and all the subsequent reception rooms sparkling in candle light, were decorated with vast flower arrangements skillfully matching the mood and colors of each room. There were small clusters of musicians here and there in period costumes softly playing flutes, harps or violins. And there were 'oyster trees' and other opulent and ingenious displays of food and drink for the eventual delectation of France's guests.

To provide structure, the 500 public representatives Giscard had invited were all gathered in the hall of Mirrors. The rest of us were variously led to other reception rooms, the ambassadors to one, the ministers to another, those of us of less exalted rank to a third, and less easily definable invitees were ushered to a fourth. It was all like a great fairy tale, extravagant, shimmering, and, for Pat and myself, somewhat overwhelming.

After some time had passed, more and more people commented on the fact that the two Presidents had not yet arrived, and were clearly late. What's more protocol demanded that no one could eat or drink until the two Presidents had walked through the reception rooms and greeted everybody, at which point the party could officially begin.

Alas, more time went by, everyone was increasingly hungry, feet began to hurt because no seating was provided and the question became more urgent: Where were the two Presidents? Had anything happened?

Finally, well after eleven PM, Carter and Giscard arrived, jovially passed through the salons shaking hands, stopping here and there for a word or two, clearly enjoying each other's company and savoring the event. We later found out what had happened. President Carter had arrived on schedule, but, as he was being taken for a quick drive around the gardens and illuminated fountains of Versailles, the two Presidents became totally engrossed in a long private conversation - we never found out what it was about - while their limousine just continued to drive around the gardens - for almost two hours!

The evening was nevertheless a great success, even though none of us had a drink or even a tiny canapé until it was almost time to return home, again passing through the ranks of glittering horsemen who were still solemnly on guard in the courtyard when we left.

Q: Any other events which should be recorded?

JAEGER: Yes, I do want to say a word about my father's rather remarkable good-bye to Vienna. Since my mother's death he had been living alone in Kansas City, was increasingly frail but surrounded by a circle of friends who admired him and his paintings, appreciated his willingness to give art lessons to their youngsters, and helped him in all kinds of ways. One day, I think it was in my second year in Paris, I received a letter from him saying that he wanted to make one last visit to Vienna to "forgive these people"! Would I therefore take a ten day leave and come with him, since he was too weak to go alone.

So we did. We flew to Vienna and had a wonderful time together visiting all his old haunts, going to concerts, the theater and even to Grinzing, the famous village in the hilly vineyards above the city where we spent a typical Viennese evening over a happy dinner and a few glasses of white wine. He returned to America at peace, having made this remarkable gesture of reconciling himself with a people who had so enthusiastically welcomed Hitler, cheered, or at least remained silent over the expulsion and death of many thousands of their Jewish fellow citizens, and who had so disrupted his own life. As he said in the end, it was the Christian thing to do. He lived on in Kansas City, cared for largely by his many friends, until he too died on January 11, 1980.

There was a personal revelation during this trip for me as well. Among the places we visited was my old grade school, the 'Volkschule' where I had learned to read and write. When we explained that I had been a student there for four years, until 1936, the teacher who had admitted us went white as a sheet. "That's impossible", he said, "they are all dead. That whole class died at Stalingrad! They were all drafted and thrown into that battle when they were 16 and 17. "

He was amazed and glad to learn that I was the only exception, having been saved by my two Jewish grand parents and my emigration to England and America from the disaster which awaited my Aryan schoolmates in the Hitler youth.

Life is sometimes very strange, and I was again and again very very lucky!

Q: What a story! And what a tour in Paris. Were you sorry to leave?

JAEGER: In a way yes, since it had been the richest and most rewarding assignment so far. We had worked hard, had made many friends and felt that we had succeeded, both in providing high-quality political reporting and in leaving the Political Section in much better shape than it was when I arrived. The icing on the cake was that Art Hartman had warmly recommended me for a 'Superior Honor Award' for my service in France, a distinction which in those days was still something special.

The evening before we left, the two Lyonnais owners of our favorite small restaurant, the 'Bellecour' on the rue Surcouf, where I had had so many of my business lunches and Pat and I had often gone to mark family events, offered us a truly magnificent good-bye dinner - a splendid, happy seven course affair with all sorts of wonderful Burgundies to match. On our way back to our pre-departure quarters at the Intercontinental Pat and I danced across the footbridge over the Seine, with moonlit Paris shimmering romantically in the waves. It was the perfect ending of a richly rewarding adventure in our lives.

RAYMOND MALLEY
Minister Counselor and U.S. Representative to OECD
Paris (1975-1978)

Mr. Malley was born and raised in Massachusetts and was educated at Boston University, the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. After serving in the U.S. Air Force and engaging in private business, Mr. Malley joined the Treasury Department. He later joined AID, where he worked in senior level positions at home and abroad until he retired. During his career Mr. Malley was posted to Karachi, Rawalpindi, Kinshasa, and Paris, as well as in Washington, where he worked on economic development projects of AID and with international organizations concerned with foreign assistance and development. Mr. Malley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: What were you doing in Paris?

The OECD is where the rich countries of the world discuss international economic problems. The “rich men’s club” it is often called. There were about 25 member countries when I was there – the U.S. and Canada, the countries of western Europe, and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Today there are several more members, including Korea, which progressed from being terribly poor to relatively rich in not much more than a generation. OECD might be compared to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is a military alliance of the rich democracies; OECD is where the same countries coordinate economic matters. Of course the comparison is far from perfect, but it is illustrative.

OECD has a secretariat of 100 people or so headed by a secretary general. It has offices dealing with specific international economic topics – foreign aid (the DAC), finance, trade, agriculture, science, energy, education, labor, and so on. The secretariat organizes and manages meetings of the members on these topics, including the preparation of discussion papers describing problems and possible approaches and solutions. It also does research on international economic problems.

Each member country has a delegation accredited to OECD headed by an ambassador. In my time the U.S. delegation consisted of 25 to 30 people. Our ambassadors were Turner and then Salzman, but the key man was the number two, Abe Katz. He was State’s OECD expert for many years, and eventually became ambassador himself. About half of our delegation consisted of State people; other departments of government such as Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor provided attaches. Our USAID office consisted of Smalley, myself, two or three analysts (including Bob Asselin), and a couple of secretaries. We were a close knit and high morale delegation.

In our area of foreign aid and north-south relations we were discussing and dealing with policies, not with individual programs or projects. Such policies were very widespread – they ran the gamut. Let me give you some examples. Having received development loans for some time, many developing countries now had considerable debts and were making large repayments to donors even as they received more aid. Should some of their debt burden be reduced or eliminated? And would such reductions count as foreign aid? These questions were discussed at the DAC over many years, before, during and especially after I was there. The members decided that the answers to both were yes. This is an illustration that, although the basic question of what is foreign aid had long since been agreed, it had to be periodically reviewed and updated to respond to new developments, such as debt relief and the creation of new financial instruments.

What is foreign aid may seem like a simple question. It is not. International financial flows are constant and in the trillions of dollars, but almost none meet the definition of aid. Most move under normal commercial terms. To be counted as aid, the flow must be on concessional terms – that is, non-market terms. But only a slight concession from normal commercial terms, say five or 10 percent, is not enough. The DAC decided to define foreign aid as financial assistance provided to developing countries with a minimum 25 percent grant element – a technical term that is complex, but means partly that there must be at least a one-quarter reduction from the prevailing commercial rates. Of course the consideration of grant element is applicable only to loans. When aid is provided as grants, there is 100 percent concessionality.

Here are some other examples of what we discussed. Tied aid – requirement that the funds be spent for goods and services from the donor country – was a frequent topic. Obviously it is better for the recipient if it can buy from the lowest responsive bidders, regardless of nationality. But in donor countries, the tying of aid often is important to gain support from businesses and the public for significant aid budgets. This problem usually was compromised by donors – by tying some of their aid, untying the rest. Often it was decided to untie aid for the poorest developing countries, but not for others. In meetings, those in favor of more untying usually did not want to get too much in front of the doubters. All would have to march along more or less together to get consensus.

Most donor countries have export credit agencies that assist their exporters. Ours is the Export Import Bank. A frequent topic of discussion was the relationship between export credits and aid. To what extent should they be mingled for the same project? When is the aid portion so diluted that it is no longer aid?

The United Nations prepared a list of the least developed countries, and argued that they should receive more aid under more favorable terms than the better off. DAC generally agreed, but discussed the details and ramifications at length. We also discussed aid to individual sectors of economies, such as agriculture, education, and health. Experts often would come from Washington to assist us in such meetings. All DAC members shared their experiences with others, and all profited. We described USAID's pioneer work in such matters as evaluation and women in development, to the gratitude of other members who introduced such considerations into their own programs.

Another area of activity was the review of each member's foreign aid program by the other members, which normally took place every other year for each member. Criticisms and suggestions for improvements inevitably came out of such meetings. The U.S. program was criticized as being divided between too many agencies (USAID, OPIC, Peace Corps, and the Trade and Development Agency, which we will discuss later), and for being too small relative to our economic size. We were invariably near the bottom in the amount of aid provided as a percentage of our gross national product (GNP). The DAC had established a figure of 0.7 percent of GNP as a target for each donor country. We were usually around 0.2 percent, along with Italy and Austria. France and Britain were higher, but only the Nordic countries and the Dutch normally came near to or exceeded the target. We had a difficult time defending the U.S. record in these meetings. We stressed that because of our economic size the quantity of our aid was very great, often at the top of DAC, even if our percentage was low. Another argument was to note our preponderant role in military defense and NATO, where our expenditures well exceeded those of others – but our colleagues usually refused to see the relationship between the two. I must say though, that the discussions were civil and diplomatic. There was no rancor.

Maybe that is enough to illustrate our work at DAC.

Q: It is quite a lot.

MALLEY: But I should mention one other very important undertaking that was not envisaged when I went to OECD. That is the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC)

between the DAC countries and the so-called Group of 77 developing countries (actually more than 77). It was also called the North-South conference. It was hosted by the French government in Paris during 1976 and 1977, and was a major event at the time. The Group of 77 was pressing the rich countries for all kinds of concessions – more foreign aid, reduction of trade barriers to their exports, more technology transfer, more influence in the IFIs and UN bodies, and the like.

The large U.S. delegation to CIEC was headed by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard Cooper. It was divided into four or five segments, one of which was development assistance. Joe Winder headed that segment, and myself and Bob Asselin were appointed part of his team. Other sections of our delegation to OECD provided support in other areas. There were, as I recall, three long CIEC sessions lasting two to four weeks each. A vast amount of time and expenditure went into the meetings. Position papers on all manner of topics were prepared by both sides. We had to reach agreements on topics with our OECD colleagues before facing the other side. Night discussions and negotiating sessions were normal, all night on a few occasions. Diplomatic notes regarding results were negotiated to the last word and comma. There were daily meetings with the press. Finally it all ended in June 1977. I suppose it made some contribution to north-south relations. At least we understood each other better. Secretary Cooper sent me and Asselin commendation letters for our roles.

Q: During this time, how did you get along with that political appointee who was your boss?

MALLEY: Mr. Smalley turned out to be a good and reasonable fellow. He let me and the analysts do the work and represent the U.S. at almost all DAC meetings. He limited his role to attending the highest level meetings only, and representing us at formal functions. And he did not participate in CIEC. Later under the Reagan administration, he became the State Department's number two and then number one press spokesman. He and his wife then retired in France. They were real Francophiles.

I had a fair amount of dealings with political appointees during my career. Unlike Smalley, many arrive with the attitude that they are going to change things – to “run things right,” or “in a businesslike manner.” They imply that you have not been doing so. You have to tell them truths. Foreign aid is not a business – it is a foreign policy and economic development tool. You have to say, “What you want to do is illegal – you have to get the law changed.” Or, “We can cancel these activities if you want, but they are joint with the World Bank and the Dutch, so you will have to explain to them.” The newcomers are often irked by such responses. You have to be very diplomatic.

Q: How was life in Paris?

MALLEY: Well Stu, it was very nice. My work was high level, intense at times, but there was also considerable time off. That is the European way. Let me tell you about my involvement in baseball in France.

Q: Did you say baseball?

Yes. Baseball is a minor and amateur sport in France, say like rugby in the U.S. There is a

baseball league, well organized with rules and regulations, in the French manner. The top team each year wins the French baseball cup.

Well, the U.S. marine detachment in Paris had several excellent baseball players, and wanted to form a team and enter the league. They needed a leader and manager. Somehow they discovered that I had a baseball background, and asked me to assume that role. I was glad to. We found other players in the American community, applied and were accepted into the league, and practiced regularly in the Bois de Boulogne. We had a great 1977 season, ending up as one of the top four teams in the country. We lost in the semi-finals to a team from Nice, which in turn lost to a Parisian team in the finals. The next year we were not so successful – some of our best players had been reassigned. Eventually the team disbanded and left the league. But I continued to attend meetings of the French baseball association. And I became an umpire, earning francs in the process.

At their annual ball in 1977 or 1978, the marine detachment presented me a nice award and plaque for my services, to my complete surprise.

Q: Let me ask a question about the French. So often we are at odds with them. At DAC, were you pretty much singing out of the same hymnbook, or not?

MALLEY: In the foreign aid field, yes. The French had, and still have, a very significant aid program. It is much higher than ours on a per capita and GNP basis. We are one of the stingiest countries, although as I said before, our quantity of aid is still very high because of the massive size of our economy.

Q: Okay. That is probably a good place to stop. You left OECD when?

MALLEY: American politics again intervened in my life. Carter won the presidency in 1976, so Smalley had to leave. It was assumed by everyone involved that I would succeed him – after all, I had been doing most of the work all along. I was highly recommended to the Carter foreign affairs transition team by our mission and our backstops in Washington. And members of that team visiting Paris virtually promised me the job – it is “only a matter of paperwork”, Ted Van Dyke said.

But in truth, they had other ideas. They decided to replace Smalley with their own political appointee. And more egregious, this favorite was a veteran USAID officer – Lloyd Jonnes -- who had retired some years before. Stuart, you may remember that the late 1970s and early 1980s were a period when senior Foreign Service officers were in surplus – some were even “walking the halls” in Washington without assignments. For me to have been promised and then not get the DAC job, and then have a retiree be brought back to take it during a period of employee surplus, was disgraceful. Myself and the mission voiced our displeasure at the highest levels. Of course it did no good. Efficiency and cost did not matter to the newcomers. I assume that Jonnes had some great influence among the Democrats, and he and his wife wanted to live in Paris for awhile.

Actually I knew him from the past – he had been in PPC. He had been a perfectly competent

senior professional, and we got along fine. But I could not stay in Paris under these circumstances. I requested transfer.

Q: And then where did you go?

MALLEY: To Washington. But I almost stayed in Europe. You are familiar with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna. The number two position became vacant, and our OECD mission recommended me to Washington and Vienna to fill it. I did not get it.

ROY STACEY
Program Officer, USAID
Paris (1975-1978)

Mr. Stacey was raised in Hawaii and educated at the University of California and George Washington University. Joining USAID in 1963, he served first on the Somali desk in Washington and was subsequently assigned to Mogadishu as Assistant Program Officer. Continuing as an Africa specialist, Mr. Stacey served with USAID in Nairobi, Mbabane, Abidjan, Paris and Harare. From 1986 to 1988, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Following retirement Mr. Stacey worked with the World Bank, also on Southern African Affairs. Mr. Stacey was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1999.

STACEY: After the REDSO experience, I went back to Washington for a short period of time, about three months. I was going to go into a senior position in Africa DP as I recall. Then I was asked to go to Paris to work with the DAC Chairman, Maurice Williams at the time (He had been a former deputy administrator of AID) to work on an idea of what to do in the post-drought period on the Sahel. There had been some earlier conversations that I certainly wasn't a part of, between the French and the Americans. There had been great concern about: if the Sahara had returned to its pre-drought AID levels, which were very, very small, that this region would be condemned; that there were going to be recurring droughts and recurring emergencies. How could we drought proof this region? How could we insulate it from these weather-induced emergencies?

Q: Do you know who was the instigator in this?

STACEY: Yes. The two people that were the primary instigators were Sam Adams, who was the Assistant Administrator for Africa, and Jean Audibert, the Director of Development in the French Ministry of Cooperation. Jean Audibert later went on to be their ambassador in Algeria

And he's retired now living in Paris. We see so many instances where the French and the Americans can't agree on something, but the Club du Sahel really was a French-American initiative.

Q: Why were the French interested in having us around? That wasn't always the case.

STACEY: I suspect they decided, which was a rational decision in their eyes, they couldn't bear the burden of this very poor and rather vulnerable region all alone, and it would be in their best interest...

Q: Were they active in the relief operation?

STACEY: Oh, yes. They were active in the relief operation.

Q: But not on the scale of the U.S.?

STACEY: Not on the scale of the U.S., but that's because so much of their food aid goes through the European Community, so the EC was certainly active on the scale of the U.S., but...we estimated that the drought, even though by some estimates a hundred thousand lives were lost and millions of head of livestock, the overall relief effort in '73-'74 cost about two billion dollars for the entire world community. The thought that this might happen every few years, especially in '73 seemed catastrophic, not just for loss of life but catastrophic in terms of budgetary impact. The idea that maybe we could do something to head this off became...certain people began talking about that. The idea to explore what could be done, and if the Sahelians would be interested in doing something on a regional basis, Maury Williams, the DAC Chairman was also President Nixon's Drought Relief Coordinator, and so the green light was given to Maury (this was unusual for the DAC Chairman who really is an international civil servant although he works for the U.S.) to explore whether the Sahelian countries were interested in some kind of initiative, and would they take the lead on this, or what were they interested in. So Maury said he needed a staff person from the French and one from the Americans to work on this to do the legwork, the staff-work, to do the traveling and so I was asked too do that which was a very lucky opportunity for me.

Q: Building on the fact that you had this REDSO experience.

STACEY: Yes, I think it was because I had the REDSO experience and by that time had pretty decent French. It was difficult to work with the French unless you could speak their language, they didn't like that at all. What I particularly remember about this period in which the Sahel Development Program was created as a line item in the U.S. budget - and as I mentioned it was no year money, unheard of - was that those bureaucrats like ourselves that worked on this, people in the AID office here in Washington, people in the AID missions in the field, we never succeeded in creating a strong executive branch interest in this initiative. We somehow created more of a Congressional interest in the initiative.

It was while I was in Paris at the Club du Sahel, that perhaps one of my more memorable experiences occurred as an AID officer, in that the Senate held hearings on the Sahel Development Program. In those days the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had an Africa subcommittee, which was chaired by Hubert Humphrey. I still considered myself a young and relatively inexperienced AID officer, and was asked to come in from Paris and testify before Hubert Humphrey on the Sahel Development Program. Which I did, and we laid out what we

meant to accomplish. I recall that the Congressional interest in this was positive and later in my various dealings with the Hill and working with the Congress, I never saw this kind of positive interest in anything else. Hubert Humphrey was really interested. I do remember him really grilling me on who was going to be in charge, because as far as he was concerned, if we were going to have a Sahel Development Program, somebody had to be in charge, and it couldn't be an American. He wanted to know who out there was in charge.

Q: What did you say?

STACEY: I said it was the Minister Coordinator, because the organization we were working with, which had been created by the Sahelians at the time of the drought, was the CILSS, which stands for the Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought and Desertification. That's a French acronym. The CILSS was governed by a Council of Ministers, and there was a lead minister who was called the Minister Coordinator. The Minister Coordinator in those days was a man called Buli Mamunga, who happened to be a colonel in the Niger army, but he was also Niger's Minister of Rural Development and Agriculture. So I told Senator Humphrey that the man in charge would be Buli Mamunga. He had a tough time pronouncing that name, but we finally got it on the record. It's interesting that Buli Mamunga was really quite a competent military person. Shortly after those hearings, he was imprisoned by the president of Niger, who as we know, was a bit of a dictator and quite an authoritarian person. Buli Mamunga spent seven years in solitary confinement in a very tiny prison cell. I met him recently. He's now the head of the Energy Agency in Niger, an oil company that does all of the importing of oil. He said the way he kept his sanity in prison was a combination of exercise and prayer, but with exercising every day for hours at a time, he got to the point where he could do hundreds of push-ups. Interesting man, and he's somebody that I did remember.

Q: What was the concept of the program you were presenting to Congress and Humphrey?

STACEY: The concept of the program was first of all to mobilize a great deal of international support. There were many countries, which were not providing any kind of assistance and were not engaged in this region of Africa. This had largely been French domain in the Sahel. So the first element was to develop some conceptual framework that could be of use to other donors. There was a major study that was requested of MIT on the Sahel. I think Congress appropriated a million dollars for MIT to do that study.

HOWARD R. SIMPSON
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1975-1979)

Howard R. Simpson was born in 1925 and raised in Alameda, California. In 1943, he was drafted into the U.S. Army and served in the European Theater. He returned to the United States in 1945 and continued his education in California and Paris, France. Mr. Simpson joined the Foreign Service in 1951, where he served in Vietnam, Nigeria, France, and Algeria. He was interviewed by Charles

Stuart Kennedy on January 10, 1994.

Q: Well then you left there in 1974. Was that right? And you went back to Paris. You were there from..., well maybe you were back in Washington for a bit. But I've got you from '75 to '79 in Paris.

SIMPSON: Well, I tell you, there was a big gap, wait a minute, we're missing something here. Because, no, I went from Algiers to Marseille as Consul-General.

Q: Oh, I see.

SIMPSON: After 2 years in Algiers, they appointed me Consul General in Marseille. Which was sort of a surprise because you know, USIA types don't normally go into that kind of thing. But I had heard that the thing was coming open and I made a few soundings and some people had been favorable of the time I had spent in Marseille and all that. So that worked out and it was very nice. There's a nice residence there and I was back in my element and coming back as a Consul General was good because I had all the press contacts, the cultural people, and I knew the politicians, the mayor and all that sort of thing. So it was a natural assignment and lasted a little over two years. Once again, it was one of those administrative hiccups. It was suppose to be a 2-2 (years) or something like that or at least 3 years. And State, I didn't know it, I didn't realize it, was going into this economic mode. In other words, saying this Consulate General is now going to be Economic not Political. Well, unfortunately for me, they decided that Marseille was going to be an Economic post so I was replaced by somebody who specialized in Economics. And that was the time when I didn't know where I was going from there. But fortunately, I heard about this Paris possibility coming up. And in the interim, I went to the University of South Carolina as a so-called Diplomat-in-Residence. But this wasn't the State Department program. This was a deal through USIA. And it only lasted for about 3-4 months.

Q: Then you went to Paris about...

SIMPSON: I went back to Paris as the DPAO and I must say I didn't really enjoy it that much. Because everything had become so set.

Q: Well, I must say, it sounds like a huge Embassy.

SIMPSON: That's right, and not much flexibility. And all these problems. I'll tell you why I left in '79. I was suppose to do 2 years there at least, maybe 3, and I wasn't too happy with the job. And then the Director of USIA came through and we had a luncheon for him at the house, at the apartment. And at one point, he said, and how long have you been in France? And I started to tout up the number of times I'd been in Paris, Marseille or vice versa. And he looked quite shocked. And so the next thing you know, about a month later a telegram came through giving me a few weeks to get ready to go to Zaire as Counselor for Public Affairs. I had 2 teenage daughters at the time and 2 young ones and Zaire was sort of tottering, as it always is, and I'd led an inspection team to Zaire at one point and I thought: Is this really worth it? So after an evening's discussion with my wife I had the pleasure of sending a telegram saying, rather than appearing in Kinshasa on such and such a date, I'd like my retirement to begin on such and such

a date and etc., etc. So that was when I bowed out.

Q: How did you find, in Paris, actually you were there 2 times, one time we haven't covered. How did you find dealing with what you'd call the intellectuals there? They seem to be a major force in France, they identify themselves as such and people know who they are. And I assume they were one of our target groups.

SIMPSON: That's right.

Q: How did you find them and how did you deal with them?

SIMPSON: Well, this was a problem because all Embassies develop their own lists, their own favorites over a period of time. And every new officer, every newly assigned officer comes in and after a while he adds his. But unfortunately there's not much shedding of these people. And so you build up a crustacean; an endless list of regulars at the Embassy. And this is particularly true of the Paris Embassy where reception after reception you find the same people. So there was a sort of limited, a difficulty of breaking into the real world outside the Embassy circle. And often when you would try to do that, things didn't work out. Now the French intellectual, whether he be on the right or the left, usually considers himself vastly superior to anybody else. You know, thinking things out and his education and all that. And so there was more a meeting of the minds in things like music and theater and cinema than you'd get in philosophical discussions or literature or whatever. And I myself wasn't too involved in the cultural side. But on the side of the journalists, information and the media, TV and all that, I found it fairly easy to operate in Paris. Because this was a worldly crew of sophisticates. And they knew what you could do for them. There's no doubt about that. And what you couldn't do for them. And they knew, you know, what we might be interested in as far as programs and things they were involved in. And we tried to help them where we thought it would work out as far as covering American events and developments. But myself, I'm probably wrong, but I think the time has come for the Agency, USIA, to stop worrying about the cultural side so much. Culture takes care of itself.

Q: It spreads like wild fire.

SIMPSON: You don't need government to fiddle in it. The very fact, this whole idea that you send some cultural leader to the States on some sort of leader grant and you're gaining great ground from this. It's not necessarily true. Some people go to the States and they hate it. We never seem to recognize that.

Q: Yes, might as well, particularly it's not as though we're talking about--if you're working out of the Ukrainian culture, you've got to work with people to come and learn about yourself.

SIMPSON: That's right.

Q: The American culture is all pervasive and people are going to make up their minds one way or other about it. I mean sometimes we're trying to prove ourselves to be more couth than we think other people perceive us. And we actually do have ballet or something like that. Well, I'm not sure it makes a hell of a lot of difference. It's a little bit pretentious. Somewhat nouveau

riche. Just before we quit on this, you had 2 Ambassadors while you were there this last time, Kenneth Rush and Arthur Hartman. Can you just give me, how you felt they operated?

SIMPSON: Well they were completely different of course. Kenneth Rush was a political appointee, a businessman, a very personable fellow. And with a certain founding in foreign affairs and he knew his way around. I can't remember what his job was before that but he traveled a lot, been on international...

Q: I think he'd been Under Secretary of State or something like that.

SIMPSON: That's right, he'd been in the business before, but always on the political side. Then of course Arthur Hartman was a professional, a long time Foreign Service officer. Rush delegated a lot, you know. And I remember he came down to Marseille when I was there as Consul General. And I introduced him to Gaston Defferre who was a socialist mayor, and a Chamber Deputy, and a former resistance leader. He was very outspoken and often accused of being anti-American. But he was just an independent cuss, that's what he was. And I'd always, not defended him, but I always tried to explain this to people in Paris. And so there was a little, well they weren't afraid, but there was a little worry about his meeting with this new Ambassador who wasn't a professional. And so as it always happens, as it often happens, here are these two outspoken men, self-made men, meeting in the Mayor's office and they hit it off just perfectly. Now whether that would have been the same with Art Hartman, I wasn't Consul General when Hartman was there, I'd moved up to Paris. Hartman was, as I say, a true blue professional. Presided over all the staff meetings, scanned all the telegrams, was involved in a lot of the negotiations with the French, but talking about culture--he had great hopes for the cultural side of USIA in Paris. To a certain extent I think he was disappointed that we didn't get more into that because you know he'd have cultural soirées at the residence and all this sort of thing. In fact we finally had to bring in somebody to handle this, to be a Cultural Attaché. But they were altogether different people. To sum it up, I wasn't sorry to leave that big post.

Q: Well then why don't we stop at this point and I'm leaving room for you to fill in later. Thank you.

JAMES DOBBINS
Officer in Charge of French Affairs, European Bureau
Washington, DC (1976-1978)

Ambassador James Dobbins was born in Brooklyn. After graduating from Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he joined the Navy. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1967, his career has included positions in France, England, Germany and an Ambassadorship to the European Community. Ambassador Dobbins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Well, today is the 17th of September 2003. We have now reached 1976, where you were in charge of French affairs in the European Bureau until '78.

Now, in the first place, let's look at the wiring diagram. Who was the head of European Affairs at that time?

DOBBINS: Art Hartman.

Q: He had not been ambassador to France at this point.

DOBBINS: No.

Q: Who did you report to?

DOBBINS: In the European Bureau? The office director was Robert Barber, and the deputy office director was Ed Roll.

Q: Well, now, what was the status in 1976 of American-French relations?

DOBBINS: Well, as usual, we were periodically irritated by some French assertion of independence. I think at the time the major issues tended to be nuclear proliferation, and I think there were some monetary issues, but nuclear proliferation was the one I recall being an irritant.

Q: Well, looking at it, was it a discussion among Office of the European Bureau, others? Had you become almost a focal point? Were people trying to puzzle out this French-American relationship? I mean, why was it always such a testy one?

DOBBINS: It was an interesting job, because there always were issues with the French, unlike most other countries of a bilateral nature, and thus there was a market for somebody who could explain how to effectively manage the relationship to get whatever it was that we were looking for at the time. So it did give somebody who could pretend to have the key to getting the French to do what one wanted entrée at a more senior level than might otherwise be the case.

Q: Well, what did you feel you brought to this?

DOBBINS: Based on two assignments in France, but also, the year I had been working with Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger, an understanding of how European politics and European diplomacy worked.

Q: Well, '76, who was the president of France at that time?

DOBBINS: There was an election, and there was a serious threat that the Socialists, allied with the Communists, would win, which made everybody very nervous, because this was a period in which Euro-Communism was the State Department's main European preoccupation. So we spent a lot of time considering how we should deal with Mitterrand, who was then running on this coalition ticket with the Communists, and deciding whether we should receive him in Washington, for instance, or not.

A lot of the European Bureau was strongly opposed to receiving him, some on the seventh floor, including probably the secretary of state, but certainly his main adviser there, Peter Tarnoff, who was executive secretary of the department, were pushing in the other direction. So there was a good deal of tussling back and forth, which we ultimately prevailed in.

Q: The issue was that Mitterrand was a candidate for, but not the ...

DOBBINS: He was a candidate for president.

Q: So the idea would be that if we received him, we would ...

DOBBINS: We would effectively be endorsing the idea that Communists could enter the French government, which of course they did, five or six years later. But by then, the concerns were a lot lower. The nature of Communism had changed, of Western European Communism.

Q: How did we view this Euro-Communism?

DOBBINS: We were very suspicious of it.

Q: In what way?

DOBBINS: We thought it would threaten the basic willingness of the countries concerned to cooperate within NATO, to adopt common positions on East-West issues, to confront the Soviet Union.

Q: Well, we had just gone through sort of the trauma of Portugal. From your perspective, did you look upon Portugal as being a positive omen? In other words, sort of the Socialists could eventually chew up the Communists, or not?

DOBBINS: I think some of us did. Henry Kissinger tended to take a cataclysmic view of it, and it was only with difficulty that Sonnenfeldt, and Carlucci, who was the ambassador there, persuaded him that if we gave the Socialists some room to maneuver that they would in fact ultimately prevail, as they did.

Q: Well, was this used as an argument on your part when you were running the French desk?

DOBBINS: At that stage, I was of the view that Mitterrand was by no means certain to win, that our receiving him could modestly improve his chances, that we could do without having a Socialist-Communist government, that one would be damaging to our interests and that we shouldn't therefore receive him or legitimize the process, but that if he did come to power, we would have to learn to live with it and work with, at least, the Socialist elements of the government. And we did some contingency planning on that basis. We had a meeting in the White House, and I did some papers on the subject.

Q: Who in the National Security Council was handling the French affairs, European Affairs?

DOBBINS: Bob Hunter was the senior director.

Q: He later went to NATO, didn't he?

DOBBINS: In the Clinton administration.

Q: What were your relations with the French Embassy?

DOBBINS: They were pretty good. I knew the ambassador, which was unusual for a desk officer. I had handled the quadripartite talks, which were very informal, confidential discussions among the main three European powers. And the French ambassador had been the French political director, so we had known each other, and I continued to perform that function for Hartman, who succeeded Sonnenfeldt as the American principal in these talks. I continued to be the note taker, which was unusual because I was on the French desk officer, but because I had done it from the seventh floor, I continued in it.

So I worked on those issues directly for the assistant secretary, and I was known to have access directly to the assistant secretary. I didn't see a lot of the French ambassador, but I did see him occasionally and I saw other members of the French Embassy.

Q: Well, I was wondering, the French government at the highest level and the American government at the highest level, have a tendency to get into kind of spitting contests over things. We're going through a big one right now. But this has been going on going back forever. Did you find that you, at the desk, and with the French Embassy, were trying to work to do what diplomats do and smooth things out and trying to keep things from getting out of hand?

DOBBINS: Yes. I think this wasn't a period of great tension in the U.S.-French relationship, and after Giscard took over from Pompidou, the relationship became a good deal warmer. There were some difficulties, but by and large, it wasn't one of the more difficult periods of the relationship.

Q: Speaking of relationships, you were there during the election of '76. Did that cause any tensions within European Bureau? Were there concerns that the Carter administration might be going in the wrong direction?

DOBBINS: There were some tensions. Euro-Communism, how seriously we should take it. Not a major problem.

Q: You were mentioning nuclear proliferation as an issue.

DOBBINS: Yes, the French were selling nuclear technology to Brazil, as I recall, and we were concerned about the Brazilians having nuclear weapons, as they appeared to be flirting with.

Q: Did we get anywhere with that?

DOBBINS: Eventually.

Q: How does someone get somewhere with this?

DOBBINS: I don't remember any particular denouement, and I don't know to what extent we were successful with the French, as opposed to the Brazilians, but eventually the Brazilians did fairly definitively give up their ambitions.

Q: Yes, I think the Argentineans were on the other side of the equation. It was a major concern to us, to have two nuclear powers down there with no particular reason to use them or anything else, but you've got unstable governments. Did the French have a different view of the Soviet Union than we did, say, under Kissinger?

DOBBINS: Not markedly. The Germans had taken a softer line.

Q: This is during the time of ostpolitik. When Carter came in, at your level, did you see any change?

DOBBINS: They had a much less experienced team and there were strong tensions between the NSC and State, which became more evident over time. And Carter brought in a young, inexperienced team of people. I remember going to a meeting at the White House to prepare for some trip he was going on, and I was by far the oldest person in the room, and I considered myself a young man at that point.

Then I went to another meeting to meet with two assistants to the president, again, to prepare for Carter's first trip, and I was explaining to them how – he was going to an economic summit – and how these things worked, because I helped set them up under Sonnenfeldt, and had assisted George Shultz, who was the sherpa for the first of them. So I was explaining to them, and these two young, very senior people in the White House, all they wanted to talk to was what time on the tennis court that the president had personally awarded them.

He had been in office a couple of weeks, and he had finally made a major decision as to how to allocate time on the White House tennis court among his chief lieutenants, a task that most chief executives would have delegated considerably down the chain.

Q: Way down the line.

DOBBINS: But which the president had made personally, and there was a definite status involved in whether you got a prime time or were delegated to something more – so that was both alarming and amusing. The NSC made an effort to get more heavily into European affairs. For instance, they insisted on sending somebody to participate in these quadripartite discussions, which made the State Department unhappy, to share this channel with the NSC, so we had to work with them. But, we weren't at the eye of the storm as it affected the Vance-Brzezinski relationship.

Q: Whom did Carter name as our ambassador?

DOBBINS: To France, he named Arthur Hartman.

Q: So, in a way, this continued a strong relationship between the bureau and France?

DOBBINS: Right, and I knew Hartman, saw him when I went to Paris, which, again, was somewhat unusual for the desk officer. And then Vest became assistant secretary.

Q: So it was quite a strong team, then?

DOBBINS: Yes, it was a good team. I saw a lot of Vest and traveled with him frequently.

Q: What sort of travel were you doing?

DOBBINS: Well, we did these quadripartite talks, which occurred ...

Q: The quadripartite talks were on what issue?

DOBBINS: On everything. They were the inner steering group for the alliance, so mostly East-West issues, but they basically discussed anything that was of common interest to the four.

Q: Well, Carter came in with the idea that one can almost literally do business with the Soviet Union. He put in Arthur Watson I think in there as a businessman. The idea was a new look. In the quadripartite group, did you sense disquiet about sort of the Carter approach?

DOBBINS: Well, there were issues on which the Europeans were unhappy. They didn't like his proposal for a consortium to control conventional arms transfers, for instance. That initiative consequently never really got off the ground. There was unease about aspects of his arms control agenda, which became more prominent as that agenda advanced, ultimately focused on the whole issue of shorter-range missiles. It led to, ultimately, the two-track decision to deploy a new generation of missiles, which the Carter administration really didn't want to do, but felt compelled to do to make the Europeans feel secure.

That sort of what I was doing when I got to London, which was my next assignment. There were lots of issues that needed to be worked out, and by and large they were worked out. It was not a time of tremendous tension. The real European concerns with the Carter administration were the idea that followed defeat in Vietnam; there were elements of the Carter administration, like Andy Young at the UN, who were saying that the United States would never engage itself again in that kind of commitment. So there was anxiety as to the durability of the American commitment to Europe and its robustness and willingness to be tough when it had to be. And this became a source of anxiety in Europe, particularly among more conservative circles.

Q: Well, the French, do you recall sort of what the French intellectuals, that class of people, were saying about Carter? Because he must have been a rather exotic bird for them to deal with.

DOBBINS: They were rather dismissive of him, the same way they later became with, say, Reagan, or the latest Bush. Later the French intellectuals in the '90s became much more conservative. There was a shift and the United States became popular with at least some

conservatives. There was a reaction to the more traditional French left wing, and you were beginning to see little signs of that in the late '70s.

They were the beginning of times that you might have the wider range of views on issues, which became more prominent over the next 10 or 15 years, as a more conservative strain of French intellectual thought emerged.

Q: I realize you were at the desk level, but did you see, was there a group within Congress or the congressional staff that sort of reacted against the French, or not?

DOBBINS: A little bit. As I said, this was not a period in which U.S.-French relationships were particularly bad. Giscard made an effort to get along with the United States – not on every issue. He was not a Gaullist and didn't feel bound by certain Gaullist attitudes.

Q: Were there any problems with conflicts over African policy? The French have their spheres of influence.

DOBBINS: I think by and large we were quite content with the French to manage their part of Africa. There wasn't as much cooperation as there might be in areas where our interests coincided because of sort of mutual suspicion, but I don't recall any real tension.

Q: Well, was there in a way a sense of relief within, say, the State Department, particularly in European Affairs, that Vietnam, having been kicked out of there and all, was kind of behind us, and then we didn't have to deal with that all the time?

DOBBINS: I can't speak for everyone. I think there was a concern about American credibility and weight as the result of what was clearly a sharp defeat.

Q: Yes, I was in Korea at the time, and obviously the Koreans had a great deal of interest in how much we would stick to our commitments. There was a lot of nervousness there at the time.

DOBBINS: Right, so I think our main preoccupation was reassuring people that this wasn't going to portend ...

Q: What was your view, your collective view from the European Bureau, of Brzezinski?

DOBBINS: I didn't know him well at the time. I still don't know him well, but I know him better now. He became the opponent in the sort of interagency battles, although, again, this tended to become more prominent after I moved to London. I guess I was about a year during the Carter administration in Washington. That was the first year, and tension develops more progressively over time.

JOHN H. KELLY
Political/Military Officer

Paris (1976-1980)

John H. Kelly was born in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin in 1939. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Emory University. Mr. Kelly entered the Foreign Service in 1964. His career included positions in Adana, Ankara, Bangkok, and Songkhla. This interview was conducted by Thomas Stern on December 12, 1994.

Q: In 1976, you were assigned to our Embassy in Paris as the politico-military officer. How did that assignment come about?

KELLY: I don't think that I requested an assignment to France. In early 1976, as the Presidential election campaign was beginning to move into high gear, Hal Sonnenfeldt told me that he would be leaving government regardless of the outcome by the end of 1976. He volunteered to be of help to me if I wanted another assignment before the end of his government service. He suggested that I look around for another assignment. He did at the same time admit that his support might damage my chances of getting a good assignment and that therefore I should weigh his offer of assistance very carefully. So I went to see my friendly Personnel officer and reviewed possible assignments. He was pushing me to accept the job as permanent Chargé d'Affaires in the Seychelles Island. That was a two-officer post. Our Ambassador in Kenya was the accredited ambassador, but the permanent US representative was the resident Charge. We had a NASA tracking station and some other facilities on the islands which was one of the reasons for a diplomatic presence. So my friendly assignments counselor wanted me to go there. I was not interested; I had my tour on a tropical beach -- Songkhla; furthermore the Seychelles was far remote and isolated -- not a good post for a family, even if being Chargé had some attractions.

Anne Armstrong, then our Ambassador in London, heard about me from someone, and asked that I spend sometime with her, which I did. She offered me the job as her executive assistant in London, but that didn't work out because she wanted someone immediately and I was not available that soon. Then someone mentioned to me that the politico-military position in Paris was going to be vacated. I was only an FSO-5 at the time and my personnel counselor didn't think that I had a chance to be selected because I was just too junior. Many more senior officers had applied for it, including one senior officer who was willing to take a job rated below his rank. Somehow, Art Hartman, then the Assistant Secretary for EUR, learned of my interest and he called me. As I mentioned earlier, he and I had been involved in a number of issues so that he knew my work first-hand. He thought I would be the right person for the job; I said that I would love to get that assignment. A week or so passed by and I got a call from my Personnel officer, who told me that the assignment was mine. I am sure it was all Art's doing; as far as I know, Hal never got involved.

During the last two months in the Counselor's Office, I went to FSI to refresh my French. That was a full day's tutorial. I would go back to my office at 4 p.m. and worked usually until 10 p.m. I also started the day at 6 a.m. until it was time to take the bus to FSI. It was crazy, and I don't recommend it, but I did it. It was probably my period of peak efficiency because I had no time for anything extraneous, but again, my family life suffered.

In any case, in the summer of 1976, we went off to Paris. We arrived at the beginning of August when the Parisians flee their city. Hank Cohen was the Political Counselor and my boss. Sam Gammon was the DCM and the Ambassador was Kenneth Rush, formerly the Union Carbide CEO, Ambassador to Germany, Deputy Secretary of Defense and briefly Deputy Secretary and Secretary of State. I was the only politico-military officer in the Embassy, although a number of my colleagues were involved in P/M issues.

My main responsibilities were to deal with the Foreign Ministry on arms control -- which the French viewed with some skepticism and with the Defense Ministry on NATO programs that still involved the French. When the French, under De Gaulle, decided to withdraw from NATO's integrated command structure, General Lemnitzer, then the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO troops, and French General Ayaray, initialed an agreement which preserved French participation in a number of NATO activities, such as the European air defense system, the integrated communication system and some other systems. So we had some NATO business that had to transacted with the French.

I also dealt with the Defense Ministry on the sale of American defense articles to France. By mid-1976, these items were almost entirely high tech systems, such as the AWAC aircraft, which the French ultimately built with Boeing. I spent a lot of time selling the French on that acquisition. I also reported on French defense policy, its independent nuclear deterrent, the defense budget, etc. I was also reported on some French domestic issues -- how French political parties or politicians viewed defense or arms control issues.

Even though NATO had moved to Brussels, there were still vestiges of a US military presence in the Embassy. For example, we had personnel, both military and civilian, who worried about the NATO petroleum pipelines which carried products through France to Germany and Belgium. We had some uniformed personnel who worried about the European air defense system. There was also a large Defense Attaché Office, an Office of Defense Cooperation, which handled military sales and American Monuments Commission office. I worked with all of these groups. Our relationships were very good, which was a major change from previous eras when relationships had deteriorated seriously. My predecessor, who regrettably committed suicide some months after leaving Paris, had an extremely difficult time both within and outside the Embassy. He had feuded with the DCM, with the Political Counselor, with the American military. So I inherited a situation which could only improve, and I think everyone was looking forward to a more normal relationship. Unfortunately, my predecessor had destroyed all the files before he left, including the index cards and listing of his contacts. So I had in many ways to start from scratch. I tried to talk to him before I left Washington, but he kept referring me to Cohen; it was not until I had gotten to post that I understood how bad the situation had been and how troubled my predecessor had been. I had been told that there was a difficult situation by both Hartman and Lowenstein, the DAS, because they told me that one of my first tasks was to rebuild relationships both within the Embassy and with the French. But I was certainly surprised by the depth of the problem that I encountered.

My contacts with the French military started as being "correct"; i.e., not warm but on speaking relationships. Over the four years I was in Paris, I am glad to say that they grew to be quite close.

I was even invited to be a lecturer at the *Ecole Superior de Guerre* -the French War College. I became involved with a lot of activities with the French military. These things developed even though my French in 1976 was lousy; that is 3-3, but that was not good enough to transact business. I remember the trepidation I had the first time I went to the *Quai d'Orsay* which is right on the other side of the Seine from the Embassy. I didn't know how I could really communicate the *demarche* I was supposed to deliver. I went through it in my best school-learned French. My interlocutor, a former ambassador, listen to me and took some notes. At the end of my presentation, he told me that he was a little hard of hearing and asked me to go through my presentation again; that was a very kind way of commenting on my language skills. I had been told to expect the French to be very rude; in fact, I found them to be very accommodating and forgiving to someone who was butchering their language and they tried to help me overcome my deficiencies without hurting my feelings. I studied French every day and after four years, I was very comfortable with the language. I had decided during my first year that I wanted to do some public speaking which forced me to improve my French. But I must admit that I found public speaking and the "question and answer" sessions that would follow my presentation exceedingly difficult at the beginning, but by the end of my tour, that was not a problem any longer. The Embassy did not object to my public appearances; I was under no restrictions. Gammon and Cohen, in fact, encouraged me to make these appearances; they never put any limitations on me either on public appearances or contact with the French that I considered necessary, regardless of their rank or position. I had a free hand and I took advantage of that liberty. I talked to a lot of French both in the public and private sectors. They were delighted that I was interested in public appearances because I may have been one of the few people in the Embassy who actually enjoyed it and sought it out. Hank Cohen did a lot of it, but most officers were very reluctant. Hartman, when he replaced Rush, appeared regularly on radio and television, although I know that he agonized over some of his utterances because they may not have been grammatically correct; he was very effective. It was hard enough to speak publicly in English; to do it in a foreign language as the official representative of one's own government makes it exceedingly difficult. I had done it in Thailand, but that was an entirely different environment. I found that despite French not being my "mother" language, I could communicate with people effectively as long as I didn't completely butcher the language and thereby hurt people's sensibilities. I would appear before military groups, as I mentioned, student groups, etc. I made a point of telling people as I met them that I would be delighted to appear at universities around the country. There are many student clubs in France; there are many political science clubs; France had an active network of "think-tanks" -- smaller than what we have here in the US, but nevertheless very active. Pretty soon, invitations began to come in -- more, in fact, than I could handle; after some initial appearances, the "grapevine" took over and people learned that I would be available. The French loved meetings and were happy to discuss NATO strategy or US foreign policy or many other subjects with which I had some familiarity.

In my public appearances, I met the traditional French skepticism about US government policies and actions. Jimmy Carter was not terribly popular in Western Europe. The most controversial subject that I addressed was arms control because I usually met either with a student audience that wanted to ban all nuclear weapons or disarm unilaterally if not international agreement could be reached or a more *bourgeois* audience that felt that any efforts to limit arms were bound to fail and therefore the Western countries had no alternative but to continue the development of its weapon capacities; that audience was also often critical of the lack of US assistance to the French

nuclear deterrent. So I was vigorously challenged by almost every audience that I addressed, I can't remember any unpleasant confrontation. It is, of course, not easy for an officer, particularly one of my rank, to be current on arms control strategy being discussed in Washington, but I did my best to remain current by reading French newspapers and a daily DOD publication called the "Yellow Bird," which included clippings from The New York Times, the Washington Post and other leading American papers. I used to copy selected articles from that source and give them to my French contacts in the defense community. I also used the phone frequently to Washington; I am sure that I ran up a sizeable long-distance phone bill, talking to people in the State Department, DOD, ACDA and the NSC staff. The contacts I had made during my tour with Sonnenfeldt certainly came in handy then! Finally, I was very fortunate that about twice each year, I used to return to Washington for consultations; that was highly unusual for a mid-career officer. I have Leslie Gelb and Reg Bartholomew to thank for that process. They, as Directors of PM, thought that it was important that their people in the field -- London, Paris, and Bonn -- should be brought back to Washington for a few days of discussions and briefings about twice each year. These were very useful sessions because we could, in a face-to-face situation, bring our Washington counterparts up to date on European thinking and at the same time have the opportunity to hear about Washington's thoughts.

I had good contacts with our delegation to NATO, particularly Bob Brown, the POLAD to General Al Haig, the SACEUR. Haig knew and was very conscious of the approach that the French were taking towards NATO, which was different from that of all other European countries and needed special handling. Haig would come to Paris every three months on a private trip. He would spend a full day talking to the French General Staff about defense issues. There was minimal publicity about these trips, and I think it was a very useful technique. Brown might come a week or two earlier to set things up; he would read my files and talk to various Frenchmen. He would then prepare a lengthy briefing memo; but when Haig came, he came without the POLAD and only one military aide. These were very low key visits -- no motorcade, no fanfare, no Embassy escort. But Haig would always see Hartman at the end of the visit for a debriefing of his meetings. If Hartman was not available, he would send his aide -- usually Colonel Tony Smith -- to debrief me and then I would brief the Ambassador. We didn't report to Washington about the Haig visits; there was nothing in Haig's conversations that contradicted US policy, but the fact of his visits was not widely known in Washington -- the Secretaries of Defense and State and the NSC Advisor knew -- which was as it should have been; wider knowledge might well have jeopardized further visits -- by leaks to the media -- or at least seriously hampered them. I know for a fact that Harold Brown, the DOD Secretary knew what Haig was doing and that he very likely received a briefing after each visit in a highly restricted channel. I think that the P/M Directors knew that Haig did make these forays, but they showed little interest. I think the Haig visits were invaluable. In the first place, it made NATO-France cooperation very easy. While I was in Paris, there were two operations in the Shaba region of Zaire which required participation of US airlift capability because in both cases, Westerners were in jeopardy. American aircraft carried French and Belgian troops into the area who restored order. Our participation was obviously useful for the French and the Belgians, but it was also useful to us. After the policy were set at governmental levels, the actual technical decisions were worked out by Haig and General Marit of the French General staff. The French sent three officers to Stuttgart, where our European command was located, to work out all the details. It was a very smooth operation. The same kind of operation took place when Westerners had to be

evacuated from the Chad. The Haig-French connection was very useful to reach decisions on the practical details. The French used our aircraft for some of their African operations. That cooperative effort worked very smoothly.

I should note that just because France did not belong to the NATO integrated command did not make them irrelevant to the defense of Europe, if conflict should ever had broken out. So Haig was able to discuss with the French about possible scenarios and NATO and French reactions to various threats. Of course, no action could have been taken by either NATO or French military units without political approval, but at least the technical military details had already been a subject for discussion. This was not a re-integration of France into the NATO military command, but it lay out a framework for what NATO and France might do in case of confrontation. I think I should make it clear that the talks had the blessings of France's highest political authorities, like the President, and the Defense Minister, but I think that the French military were ahead of the many political leaders in understanding that if a European military crisis should ever arise, it was absolutely essential for the French and NATO to work together very closely. I think that France then and still today is only one of five countries in the world that sees itself as a global power. The US could talk to the Soviets -- and the Russians now -- the Chinese, and the French about problems in any part of the world. They will all have a view. The Germans are still very Eurocentric; they have very little concern for events in the Pacific or Africa. The British have lost their empire and although they may be interested in affairs far away from their homeland islands, they have lost much influence east of Suez. The French aspirations are probably larger than their capacities, but they maintain a global view and still tries to remain a player in all corners of the world. Given that perception and since the Cold War was still on in the late 1970s, it made life in France for an American diplomat very interesting and sometimes very irritating since the French would try to be players in areas where they had absolutely no possibility of making a difference. They French never had any doubts that they could be influential; they might use different means than we might have, but they always thought that they could make a difference everywhere in the world.

The students were divided to some extent on the question of France's role in the world. Particularly among some leftists students, whom I got to know, there was a view that France was a very corrupt society and that France's policies in the Third World was primarily a commercial effort intended to line the pockets of French manufacturers, especially the arms producers, or French politicians. The word "corruption" included bribery of foreign and French officials which seemed to appear in the media periodically. The President of France, Giscard d'Estaing and his wife had accepted fifty large diamonds from Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa, which, after the story appeared, the d'Estaings said they intended to sell and give the proceeds to some charity. So there were a number of Frenchmen, young and old, who believed that corruption was rife. There was considerable support to what the French called *La Mission Civilatrice* -- "the civilizing role of France" -- the cultural leader and the developer of ideas. There was a significant French minority in France that viewed the "merchants of death" with great skepticism.

While on the subject of arms sales, I might say a couple of words about my role in the sale of US weapon systems. As I said, AWACs was our major possibility. I used to talk to members of the French General Staff and Air Force and parliamentarians, especially those who were members of the Defense Committees about that plane. The French were faced essentially with four choices of

planes that would be able to survey large expanses. Since they saw themselves as a major force especially in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the French did not seriously consider relying on any other nation to conduct the surveillance. They wanted "eyes and ears" to look out for long distances. One choice was to build one themselves, but the more they examined that option, the more problematical it became. They did have a domestically-produced limited capability, but its long range use was out of the question. If they wanted to buy into a long range surveillance capability, the French had three choices: the British-built Nimrod system, which was cheaper but inferior to the AWAC, an American system built by Grumman -- the E-2 system -- a naval system which had a longer range than the Nimrod, or the Boeing E3A-AWAC (Air warning and control command), which had the longest range of all and one that became the keystone of our own surveillance system. It played a major role in the Gulf and every major military operation in which the US was involved; it allows a commander to have information about what was happening on the ground and in the air 300-400 miles in the distance. I was not a high pressure salesman; I focused on the French desire to have a system and if they had reached that conclusion, then to suggest they might as well procure the best. I worked closely with Boeing's resident representative in Paris, who was a retired American Air Force General. We held a continuous dialogue with the French decision-makers and staffs. I did not get any urging from Washington; neither State or DOD seemed to be indifferent to the sale; certainly not as interested as Boeing or the US Air Force was, but on the other hand, Washington did not put any restraints on us. The sale would have encompassed four or five aircraft, which was not a major sale. In any case, in those days, the US government was not as involved in foreign military sales as it subsequently became and is now. In fact, during the Carter administration, there was considerable discussion and in fact some actions designed to reduce US sales.

I attended two Paris air shows. They are monumental; I would guess that a Paris air show is the biggest one in the world. It took place at Le Bourget airport outside of Paris; that was not an operational passenger airport; it was used primarily for cargo, although it had been the field that Lindbergh had used in his first transatlantic flight in 1927. But the airport was large enough to accommodate the 400-600 aircraft that out on exhibit at the air show. Then there were thousands of exhibitors who set up displays; ever aerospace company in the world would show its latest wares. Some just had small areas consisting primarily of desks and perhaps photographs of their products; others had "chalets" which were substantial structures -- looking something like town houses -- one next to another stretching along runways. Each chalet would have a big room with lots of comfortable chairs, with a well stocked bar. Some had a first class restaurant which served excellent meals. All these features were intended, of course, to attract potential buyers; they would be served food and drink and given sales pitches with videos or in some cases by giving them a first hand look at the product which might well be parked right outside the house. Each chalet had a huge observation deck -- usually in the roof -- which enabled people to see the actual aircraft perform periodically, as it did throughout the day. You could watch fighter aircraft performing stunts, or the *Concorde* or a Soviet TU-144. Every company was trying to show the maximum capability of its aircraft, which unfortunately led to a number of serious accidents. In my first show, in 1977, Fairchild introduced the A-10 plane -- called the "Warhog" -- which was a very powerful anti-tank platform. The first A-10 took off and the pilot attempted to make a loop. He got up perhaps as high as 600 feet, made a loop, but as he was approaching land, ran out of room and crashed, nose first, into the runway. The pilot was killed and the plane destroyed. The Soviets had a crash when their TU-144 -- their supersonic transport -- stalled when it went

into a climb and fell to earth. The French continued to tighten the rules with every show to minimize the chances for crashes by prohibiting the pilots from exceeding the minimum safety standards for their aircraft. But the test pilots were paid large bonuses by the manufacturers to push their planes to the limit in order to try to impress potential buyers. A transport aircraft, like the TU-144, should never go into a vertical climb; it is not needed in regular operations and the plane is not built for that purpose. Vertical climbs are reserved for fighter aircraft. Similarly, an A-10 should not do a loop-the-loop on take off; so many of the crashes were caused by pilots who abused their aircraft. In any case, there were lots of aircraft on display at the Paris Air Show. The "Harrier" was always a big hit with its capacity to take off straight up, flying backwards, flying forwards, flying sideways. It was a great show with lots of new innovations put on display and lots of souvenirs. It was a great bazaar.

Both times I attended the Paris Air show, it was as an escorted officer for an American Congressional delegation. The show itself lasted about ten days; I would guess that for 80% of that time we would have in Paris a Congressional delegation performing the taxpayers' business which was to observe how the world's aircraft industry was doing. Since I was the Pol-Mil officer, I was always the designated escort officer for the Armed Services Committees of both the House and the Senate. I got to know a number of Members of Congress that way. We would go out to the Air show, visit the various American exhibitors and the visit foreigner producers such as the Israelis. One time, Mel Price, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, decided that he wanted to see what the Soviets were showing. So we went to their chalet and I explained to the greeter that I had the American Armed Services Committee in tow. That created a major uproar in the chalet; the Soviets finally decided to deny the Congressmen access to their chalet. It was a stupid reaction on their part; obviously they were not displaying any secret weapons, but in the heat of the "Cold War" their bureaucratic minds could not think of word but "Nyet". In the evening, I would escort the Congressmen and their spouses and their staffs to restaurants or receptions given by each of the major exhibitors. Those receptions had food and drink of all sorts available in copious portions.

The uniformed American military were not at the show pushing American wares; the Carter administration frowned on such activities; in fact they were barred from participating in any way. There were many American military civilian clothes, most from the intelligence services taking notes and pictures of the competition. They were invited to the receptions and enjoyed the bounties available there. But the military services refrained from becoming part of the sales efforts. Other military services were much more active; the French, for example, had a huge military presence, in part because this was their home turf. The French drew no distinction between government and private sector efforts; to them, every Frenchman should be involved in sales efforts. Of course, in the case of most other countries, each only had one major defense producer in each sector; we on the other hand had multiple producers of fighter aircraft; so we couldn't endorse just one American manufacturer. The Germans were very active in supporting the sales of their products as were the British, the Soviets, the Chinese, the Italians and most of the other Europeans as well. If you were a buyer from a country that was in the market seriously, you would be wined and dined for days on end. Many of the buyers were Europeans; during my first Air show, the raging question was which new generation of fighter aircraft would meet the needs of five European countries -- the F-16 from General Dynamics or the Mirage F-1 from Dessault or the F-15 from McDonald Douglas. So in this case, Europeans were both potential

buyers and potential suppliers. Then, of course, there were a number of Third World countries in the arms market as well as Asian ones. Not all were looking for major new weapons systems; some were just interested in parts or avionics or commercial products.

I might say a word about my involvement in arms control issues. As I said earlier, I was on the phone with my Washington contacts frequently. The French felt that there was a chance that we would enter into an arms control agreement with the Soviets which would reduce our ability to defend Europe. Of course, it was somewhat paradoxical for the French to exhibit this concern because they were the major proponents of an independent nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, they also wanted us to be strong enough to defend Europe if necessary. Sophisticated French military analysts and politicians realized that a realistic defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact attack without the US was impossible. So they wanted us to be involved and they were apprehensive that we would lose that capacity somehow in the negotiations with the Soviets. That fear was never realized, but the French, with their time honored skepticism, were always concerned. They were also concerned that we might sign an agreement that would directly impact on their military capability, conventional or nuclear.

The arms control field was my major substantive concern. I was one of the channels to the French Foreign Office on arms control matters. The French were every active in Washington and had developed a good network there. Furthermore, I doubt that a month went by without a visit to Paris by a delegation from the American government -- ACDA or Paul Warnke, our chief SALT negotiator in Geneva or Ralph Earle. And the French would visit Washington often. This constant interchange enabled me to really stay up to date on all the discussion, both intra- and inter-governmental and in Geneva -- in the arms control field. A lot of my colleagues complained by the heavy traffic of people -- too much time had to be devoted to the visitors -- but I found it very useful. I attempted to accompany as many of the visitors as I could when they met with their French counterparts. I interpreted for Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, when he came to Paris. These meetings and visit enabled me to stay current on all developments. Just meeting and delivering people at the airport was useful because that is when I picked up a lot of "background" information -- useful tidbits of gossip; that also happened at other informal moments -- lunch or after-dinner drinks. So I was really up-to-date on what was going in the arms control field. The visitors were a valuable resources. Once the French developed some confidence in my knowledge and my ability to accurately describe an American position or actions, that gave me credibility and much greater access to the French policy makers in the arms control field. The ability to have this constant flow of information from a variety of American sources was invaluable to me.

In 1978, the UN had a special session on disarmament, which, like most UN special sessions, didn't have much impact. But Giscard d'Estaing, the President of France, went to New York to give a speech. Like all Presidents he felt he had to something new. So he called for a "Conference on Disarmament in Europe" -- an idea that the Soviets had been pushing for years and we had rejected many times. I had heard about six hours before the speech that d'Estaing would be including his suggestion in his speech. He made a number of other proposals, including one that would have internationalized photo reconnaissance -- at the time, only we and the Soviets had that capability; the idea was that the pictures would be given to a UN agency. Of course, the availability of these photos would have saved the French billion of dollars because

they would not have needed to set up their own surveillance system. That proposal was very attractive to the Third World who would have dearly loved to have access to the information that the satellites found. In any case, I was able to give Washington a few hours' lead on d' Estaing's speech; that gave the administration's spokespeople time to prepare responses particularly to some of d' Estaing's more provocative ideas. I think that is a useful role that a Foreign Service officer can play; i.e. give some warning to Washington of upcoming events so that the government will not be caught flatfooted and give some spur-of-the-moment reply, which too often just creates more problems. In this case, the brief period of notice suggested to me that the Foreign Office had probably sent over a very bland draft and that the major initiatives that were included in the final speech probably came from the President and his staff -- as happens in most countries. So there was probably only a small group of four or five people close to d' Estaing who knew what was going to be in the final text. In retrospect, I take some pride that these officials knew me well enough and have sufficient confidence in me to give me as much advance notice as they did. In fact, the final text was not approved by the President until his flight on a Concorde plane across the Atlantic the day before; the information I passed to Washington was red off the presses. In France, the President plays a major role in defining his country's role on defense issues. De Gaulle, when he set up the Fifth Republic, saw to it that the President would have a very strong role in defense and foreign policy. The French bureaucracy may not stray very far from well established positions, but French Presidents may and have.

D'Estaing's speech confronted us with a new dilemma. The Soviets supported the French, we opposed them and the Europeans split. Eventually, the Conference did meet and, after fifteen years, adopted a treaty on limiting conventional forces in Europe. In any case, the French President's speech opened up old and new areas for debate.

Another event that comes to mind was Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow in March 1977. This was his first trip to the Soviet Union. During his visit, he introduced some arms proposals which were quite different from what we had been saying to that time. On his way back, Vance stopped in Paris, Bonn and London to brief those governments. Vance and his party were in Paris for approximately twenty-four hours. I went to the meetings with the party at the Foreign Office and heard our views, some of which had been seriously criticized by the American press for not having been sufficiently vetted. By and large, I didn't have any serious reservations about the new proposals, although I felt that they needed to be fleshed out further. I believed then and do now that arms control, if seriously negotiated, can produce a more stable world. There are a number of ways of achieving worthwhile goals, but I did view some of the efforts of the Carter administration as feckless. I was particularly concerned by the Conventional Arms Transfer talks which were started in 1978. In fact, those talks never resolved any of the issues; some people described them as being too ambitious. The goal of setting limits on the flow of conventional weapons around the world is in principle a worthwhile one, but achieving it is a monumental task. Even with the Carter administration, there were opposing views giving rise to the undercutting of our negotiator, Les Gelb, by Zbig Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor. We did not put a very good showing in those talks. I attended those meetings that took place in Paris as the note-taker.

Carter came to Paris in January, 1978 for about three days. His visit raised another hot issue between us and the French -- the control of nuclear exports. I have already mentioned the issue;

it was very key question for the French because while I was still in Paris, they were having talks with the Pakistanis, the Iraqis and to some extent even with South Korea and the Argentine on possible sales of parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Occasionally, we and the French disagreed on the wisdom of certain sales which led to some fairly harsh exchanges. Carter had lectured Giscard d'Estaing as well as Helmut Schmidt about nuclear exports. Neither found that tact very appealing and certainly did not enhance their willingness to cooperate with the US. I must say, however, that the French got over the Carter lecture and cooperated with us pretty effectively. Of course, many of the disagreements we had with the French stemmed from their much more cynical view of the world; that made a dialogue particularly with Carter especially difficult.

Finally, I should mention the tremendous difference in the interest in pol-mil issues exhibited by Ambassadors Rush and Hartman. Rush was very superficial; I don't know whether that was due to the aging process or because he didn't seem to have great interest in the subject, although as former CEO of a major company, Secretary of Defense, etc. would suggest that he certainly had the necessary background to understand the issues and show some interest in them. But during the eight months during which we overlapped, he was very cordial to me, but took very little interest in pol-mil issues -- or I might say, any issues. The DCM did almost all of the substantive work; Rush was socially engaged which generated a huge amount of work for the Embassy staff. We used to have to prepare huge briefing books for his trips around the country, regardless of the size of the cities he would visit; we also had to provide a biographic paragraph on each guest who might be invited to a reception, some of which were humongous. So the Embassy was saddled with a lot of work for very little useful purpose. I think Rush was just very superficial. Hartman, on the other hand, was a professional -- a very smart man comfortable discussing the issues. He was very interested in pol-mil matters. He had been instrumental, as I mentioned, in my assignment to Paris. So I saw him very frequently; in fact, I was surprised that he was as patient with me as he was. The change in DCMs -- from Gammon to Chris Chapman -- and in Political Ministers -- from Cohen to Warren Zimmermann -- also made a tremendous difference. Chris was very interested in pol-mil issues, having just come from the Pol-Mil Bureau. I had been given permission to authorize my own telegrams, which I did in the main except for exchanges of a controversial or potentially controversial nature. Those I would discuss with Hank and Sam. I had started this practice soon after my arrival, not as a matter of principle, but because I had enough confidence that I knew the subject matter well enough that I could be expected to represent the Embassy's views accurately. But it was an unusual arrangement for someone below section chief to sign out his or her own telegrams on his behalf. But I was lucky that I worked for good people who gave me lot of room to do my job, just as Sonnenfeldt had done.

But Chris found this practice hard to accept; so very morning he would call me into his office to discuss the previous day's traffic that I had signed out. He would examine my messages minutely and ask a lot of questions; that was in the nature of a tutorial for me. Ultimately, he was satisfied that I knew my business and that I could be relied upon to send good messages, but it took him a while to accept that. Zimmermann had no problem with that arrangement even though he didn't know me very well when he arrived at post. I must say that I was somewhat suspicious when he arrived, but I learned that he was a very able and intelligent officer and I think he found me to be a good officer.

Among many other actions, the Carter administration decided to save money by requiring the lowering of all thermostats in government buildings. In Paris, we were all freezing in our offices. But Hartman had in his office a large fireplace, stocked amply with firewood. He would have a fire going during the cheerless, murky Paris winter days. I knew him well enough so that one day I took my in-box from my office and without asking anyone's permission, I went into the Ambassador's office. Hartman was at his desk, working away. I went to the easy chair in front of the fire and sat down. Art said: "Good afternoon, John. What can I do for you". I replied: "Good afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. I hope you don't mind if I do my work here in your office in front of the fireplace until we get some more heat in our offices. The secretaries are trying to type with their gloves on, the officers have their coats on and everybody is miserable, except perhaps you". That prompted immediate action; Hartman called the Administrative Counselor to talk about the working conditions in the Embassy. He did not scream at me or throw me out of the office, as he might well have. But the temperature was raised. I must say that in retrospect that was not a very judicious action on my part; I probably should have been immediately transferred to sub-Saharan Africa. I am now a little ashamed for my behavior. Fortunately, no one else found out about my behavior; I realized that evening how brazen I had been and refrained from telling any one else about it. My action perhaps can be partly justified because during my first year in Paris, my marriage broke up and I went through a prolonged period of depression, during which I did some zany things. For example, at one point, I decided that the world was filled with false appearances and duplicity and that I was going to help change that by always being truthful. That led me to many social *faux pas*; if some lady asked me how I liked her hair do, I might have told her that it was awful. That "honesty" not only did not change the world, but led me to several unpleasant encounters. I also refused to wear a tuxedo to some formal engagements; Hartman was very tolerable and allowed me to attend in a suit, after I had told him that I had given up "black tie" for life as a matter of principle. I must say that in retrospect, I am amazed by the patience and forgiveness shown by my seniors; they were also much more charitable about my work than I thought I deserved. Hartman, Gammon and Cohen were very supportive in these very trying days; fortunately, after a period, I began to recover and returned to a more normal behavior, including the wearing of tuxedos. Perhaps the most amazing part of the story was that despite this very personally emotional period for me, my efficiency ratings were good enough to warrant a promotion in 1979. I was very fortunate to work for such able and understanding professionals.

Overall, I think I did a good job in Paris after the first year or so. In the first place, as I suggested, I had some very good bosses. Secondly, I got out of the Embassy often; I made a lot of friends among journalists, defense analysts and French uniformed personnel. None of that would have been possible if I had stayed in my office in the Embassy. That is a lesson that I believe all young officers need to learn: get out of your office, particularly those, who like myself, might be responsible for a single substantive area; I handled pol-mil work by myself and therefore seldom had to clear messages laterally with colleagues in the Embassy. My Paris experience was entirely different from the one I had experienced in Ankara, where I was a member of a pol-mil section and where my boss did in fact discourage me from having contacts with Turkish authorities and people.

I should mention another aspect of the Paris assignment which had some relationship to counter-terrorism. This was an activity which started by chance. In September, 1976 -- a month after my arrival -- a TWA plane was hijacked as it flew from New York to Paris, via Montreal, Gander

and Reykjavik. It was hijacked by a gang of Ustashis -- the old fascist Croatian gang which had become infamous during WW II. They were American citizens of Croat descent; they were making supporting an independent Croatia. After the plane had been hijacked -- and that happened essentially before the plane really took off -- the gang told New York authorities that they had left a note in a Grand Central station locker. When a policeman opened the locker, a bomb which had been planted inside, exploded and killed him. So the everyone was on notice that this was a deadly group that had to be dealt with -- as I learned later, there is a difference between hijackers that have killed and those who have only made threats. In any case, I happened to be the duty officer at the Embassy the weekend of this hijacking. After it had refueled in Iceland, it became clear that the plane was heading for Paris. As you can well imagine, the eighteen hours of this episode was one of great tension; the hijackers finally surrendered after prolonged negotiations. I have described my role that weekend in some detail in a Georgetown University publication entitled "Diplomats and Terrorists: What Works and What Doesn't". What I did, after receiving the first call from Washington, is described in that book.

I mention this episode because during this weekend it became clear to me that no one in the Embassy -- and that included the CIA, FBI and FAA components -- knew much about French counter-terrorist capabilities and how they went about handling terrorist incidents. A few days after the hijackers surrendered in Paris, I decided that we had not been able to answer with any great specificity the questions that Washington kept posing to us during that weekend when we had an open telephone line with the Department, which kept asking about French capabilities, intentions and operational methods. At one stage, a psychiatrist got one the phone from Washington urging me to tell the French to treat the hijackers gently so that they would not get upset and potentially take it out on the passengers. So I took upon myself to find out more about French anti-terrorist doctrine, capacities and approaches. Through a French friend, who was a writer on defense issues, I was put in touch with the *Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN)*, which was an organization comparable to our DELTA Force. I asked whether I could visit their base and they were delighted to host me. They told me that over the preceding years, they had tried to contact the American government to exchange information and to try to acquire American weapons so that they could train their men on as many weapons as they could; this would help them to know the kind of capability that any adversary might have. For example, this French force had no M-16s, which are the basic weapon of an American infantry unit. They said that no one in the Embassy or in the US government had shown the slightest bit of interest in their approaches. This special unit was run by a young French Captain who later became famous and infamous. In light of their evident interest, I arranged another visit for one of Colonels from the Defense Attaché Office and a representative of one of our intelligence agencies. Over the course of the following years, this relationship grew; I and others visited this French force frequently and did members of our Delta force. Once having built this bridge, I sort of eased out of it since other members of the US government, much more involved in anti-terrorism, maintained the contact with the French. I did help them get 5 M-16s and some other American weapons, through the US government's licensing process.

There were two results from that purely coincidental connection. One was that a relationship between US and French anti-terrorist forces developed. secondly, because of my efforts, the word seemed to get around in the Embassy that I was a terrorist expert. So I got invited to

meetings on the subject, although there were very few people at the time that were real experts. I learned a few things which stood me in good stead later on.

JON G. EDENSWORD
Consul
Nice (1977-1979)

Jon Edensword entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Since joining the Foreign Service, his career has included positions in Martinique, Liberia, Haiti, Jordan, France and Mexico. Mr. Edensword was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1995.

EDENSWORD: So I went to Nice in 1977.

Q: *And you were a consul general?*

EDENSWORD: It was a consulate, so I was consul.

Q: *Tell me about that post - that sounds like a very nice post.*

EDENSWORD: It was a nice post. There was a very nice residence in Villefranche-sur-Mer which used to be the home of the Sixth Fleet until 1966 when the French pulled out of the military side of NATO. So there were many good and strong feelings about Americans.

Q: *Positive feelings?*

EDENSWORD: Positive feelings - very positive. I was accredited to Monaco: I was the official representative to Rainier and Princess Grace. Corsica was also a part of my territory, and of the places I had responsibility for, Corsica was maybe the most interesting.

Q: *How big a staff did you have?*

EDENSWORD: I had one vice-consul and five or six FSNs. It was an old villa in downtown Nice near the old British Anglican church, about three blocks from the water. With a lot of grass around it, it was a lovely old building. The top floor, the floor that we didn't really use, had been the communications center for the Sixth Fleet back in the old days. There were still some wires hanging out of the walls up there. There was a branch of the American Legion there, and I let them use one of those upstairs offices.

Q: *It was a building just devoted to the American Consulate?*

EDENSWORD: It was very nice. I had a vice-consul and I also had the USO representative, a French woman, who I also gave office space too. She would have to look after, you know, they would have problems: sailors would have to go back to the States. She sort of moved up and down all over the southern coast of France, looking after these special problems. We had ship visits

regularly: they liked Villefranche because the mayor was very pro-Sixth Fleet as was the mayor of Cannes. While I was there, I convinced Prince Rainier to invite the Sixth Fleet commander and his flagship to the Monaco Grand Prix and that turned out to be very nice. You can't anchor in Monaco. You have to anchor offshore. I remember that Lawrence Tisch had opened up a new hotel there just before I got there and introduced Las Vegas style gambling. He had me over for dinner when he found out about this and the flagship was there. He said that he wanted to do something for the admiral and so I said fine. He said, "Well, this is really terrific," as he sat looking out the window, seeing this American Navy cruiser anchored off Monaco. One of the things Admiral James Watkins (who was the 6th Fleet commander and later became the Chief of Naval Operations and eventually became the Secretary of Energy) offered to give Rainier and Prince Albert a briefing on Mediterranean sea power including Soviet sea power, U.S., stuff like that. He said, "It would be an unclassified briefing, but I'll answer pretty much any questions that he had." When the briefing started, there was another guy there and Watkins took me aside and said, "Who the hell is this?" I said, "I don't know." Watkins was clearly irritated. It was a cousin of Princess Grace named John Lehman, who it turned out had worked in the NSC [National Security Council].

Q: *An American?*

EDENSWORD: An American. I'm trying to think of this guy's name. Watkins was clearly annoyed and made his annoyance show to this American. This American later became Secretary of the Navy when Watkins was the Vice-CNO under Reagan.

Q: *That's a good story.*

EDENSWORD: Yes, it's a great story. Anyway, we did all these wonderful things. I went into Monaco and Watkins sent in a helicopter for my wife and me and Princess Grace and Albert and Caroline (I don't think Stephanie was there) and Prince Rainier. They flew us out and we stood on the deck and they flew planes off and on. Then we steamed into Monaco - you know, he brought his fleet in and one of his aircraft carriers in, and we steamed into Monaco and he had a lunch for us. It was really, really nicely done. Then we all went up to watch the Grand Prix and then there, of course, is...it's a big affair and they have a dinner later on and a dance. There is always a number of movie stars there: Cary Grant was almost always there and Paul Newman was another one because he likes to race. I remember my wife coming up and saying, "You've got to do something. Paul Newman is in a big argument with Admiral Watkins." So I went over there and Paul Newman is not very tall and Watkins is tall and was really, really mad. Princess Grace was also moving onto the scene at this point. Watkins later on told me what they were arguing about. He said, "It's the stupidest thing, Newman doesn't know a damn thing. Newman was accusing the Pentagon of managing news. He has no idea of how the Pentagon works. If we could manage news, we would do it. We can't possibly manage news!"

Q: *They couldn't do it if they wanted.*

EDENSWORD: We couldn't possibly do that. Anyway, Princess Grace grabbed Admiral Watkins and made him dance with her. I was left with Newman and I must say that I found myself tongue tied. I thought to myself, "Now, how do I deal with this guy: is this Hud or is this

Harper or is this Minnesota Fats?" So, it didn't turn out so well. I found myself confused and I probably should have explained that to him. I am sure he would have laughed: he looked like he had a good sense of humor, but anyway we said a few sort of polite things and then he went off, muttering about the Pentagon and managing news.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN
Political Counselor
Paris (1977-1980)

Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was born in Pennsylvania in 1934. He graduated from Yale University, received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cambridge and served in the U.S. Army in 1959. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1961, his postings abroad included Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Geneva, with an ambassadorship to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Zimmerman was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is October 7, 1997. Warren, we are off to Paris. You were in Paris from when to when?

ZIMMERMANN: I was in Paris from '77 to '80. It was a bit of a surprise assignment for me. I was working for Arthur Hartman in the European Bureau. He was the assistant secretary for Europe. I had not spent a good deal of my career, much of my career in Western Europe. He became ambassador to Paris, and he asked me to come out as political counselor. So, I had an enormous learning curve to deal with. France is a complicated country. We were there at a fairly complicated time. Giscard d'Estaing was president. While he wasn't the most anti American president France had had, he certainly was very strong on French prestige which he felt, as many of his predecessors had, was being undermined to some degree by American power in the world.

Q: We will get into the policy and the relations with them, but first, what sort of a political section did you have? It seems that often a country like France gets a very large political section and you covered in exquisite detail.

ZIMMERMANN: It is an interesting question. We had a big political section. As foreign service posts go, Paris is one of the largest foreign service posts, of course. There were those who looked at foreign policy issues. Of course France is one of the few countries in the world with a global approach to foreign policy. Then there was a group that looked into internal politics which of course, were very confused and difficult and murky for a foreigner to understand. There were if I recall right, there were about nine people in the section, foreign service officers. But when I got there, I was told that the political section was going to provide cover for the CIA in Paris. The CIA in Paris, I discovered in 1977, was enormous. The reason it was enormous was because the Vietnam war had ended two years before. You had a lot of CIA people they had to place. Given the iron law of good posts, Paris and Rome, posts like that were considered good posts. Of course, there was a serious problem of communism in France as there was in Italy. So, a large number of CIA people, many more I think that were required, gravitated toward Paris.

Something like 20 of them ended up nominally in my section, so I was nominally the boss of an enormous political section of some 30 people, 29 or 30 people, 20 of whom I never knew at all. I did insist to the station chief that we have at least one staff meeting to which all these people turned up so I would at least recognize them by face since they were going around the city saying they worked for me. It was a very peculiar arrangement. I was not particularly comfortable about it because occasionally French contacts would come up and say oh we met so and so. He is such a charming person. I would be scrambling around trying to figure out if this was one of the CIA people that I was supposed to know, and try not to look blank at this person who was telling me about his meeting with somebody who was supposed to work for me.

Q: Well, I can't remember the terminology, but there is covered and uncovered, I mean announced or something like that. When you are in a friendly country you say so and so actually you tell at least somebody that they are part of the CIA apparatus. Do you know how that works?

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, I think that these people were declared to the French secret service which was called the SDEC. That is an acronym. I don't know what it stands for. I think they were declared to the SDEC, but they did operate under what I think was called light cover as political officers in the embassy. Of course the outside world everybody who wasn't in the SDEC including many people in the French government didn't know that they were CIA agents. There was another ground rule also, which was that they assured the French government that they were not targeting French officials, that their targets were third country nationals in France. Of course there were Vietnamese in France, there were Chinese, there were Russians and so forth, so they had plenty of targets.

Q: Well while we are on the subject of CIA, during the time you were there, was there much information that was coming in from them that was of use to you?

ZIMMERMANN: Very little. In fact we often wouldn't know of the information we saw, we wouldn't know what was generated from the Paris station because we would see it in digest, a national intelligence digest that had been prepared in Washington based on sourcing from all around the world. Given the nature of the intelligence game, the sources were never revealed so we would have no way of knowing whether a particular piece of information was generated in Paris or Moscow or wherever. So, I at least, didn't have a keen idea at all of how much of this stuff was coming from the Paris station.

Q: Well this is a theme that runs throughout a good number of the interviews we do. As a practical matter the people often most concerned with a country are those diplomats stationed in the country, and yet the connect between the CIA and the overt political economic officer is very slight.

ZIMMERMANN: It was very slight in the '70s and the '80s. This is jumping head a bit when I was ambassador in Yugoslavia in the early '90s, the station chief came to me one day and told me that they were getting real time intercepts involving Serbian politicians, Yugoslav army, people that we had a tremendous amount of interest in. They hadn't been sharing those intercepts with us, so we didn't know a lot. We didn't have a lot of information that would have been extremely useful to us in our dealings then. At that point they started giving it to us. That was

how we knew it existed. We didn't know it existed before. When they gave it to us, of course, it was very useful. I understood that from my colleagues in Bucharest in 1989 which was the year of the coup when Ceausescu was overthrown, that the CIA station started giving the ambassador intercepts which were of course, tremendously valuable to letting him make up his mind about how the coup was going and the direction it was going in and what would happen to Ceausescu and so forth. But the CIA behaved in a rather arrogant way before that, keeping embassy and ambassadors in the dark about information which could have been very useful to them.

Q: In the embassy, how did Art Hartman operate?

ZIMMERMANN: I served three times with him, once in the European bureau, and twice in embassies, in Paris and in Moscow. He was one of the great ambassadors of the post war period to my mind because he had a tremendous fund of historical and economic and political knowledge which he wore very lightly. He had a remarkable way of dealing with people, not threatening, very relaxed but extremely geared to understanding what was going on. He was very well liked by virtually everybody who worked for him. He gave his officers a lot of scope. He expected them to set high standards for themselves. He expected them to get the job done. He gave good direction about the kinds of things that he wanted. The two embassies I served with him in were both very happy embassies. Neither Paris nor Moscow had long time reputations for being happy embassies for different reasons. Paris, because people get frustrated dealing with the French, and Moscow because you were dealing with an adversary all the time. So much of what would be considered normal life was out of bounds or restricted. But Hartman scored very high on morale in both of those places. I think it was because of his own professionalism and his confidence in his staff that they would exercise a similar kind of professionalism.

Q: What about Hartman in dealing with the French in your observation?

ZIMMERMANN: Hartman had a very good way of dealing with the French. He understood that the U.S. French relationship is traditionally a conflicted relationship, and to some degree has to be because to a degree French policy in the world is formulated on the assumption that the United States is an adversary and has to be treated as an adversary. At the same time France was one of our most important allies in Europe. It had a nuclear capability which was certainly an asset on the NATO side against the Soviet nuclear capability. So, it was very important to find areas of cooperation with the French, and it was equally important to take the French along when our feeling was that they were going too far in their willingness to overlook American interests. So, it was a balancing act all the time. I think Hartman did it very well. Others in the post war period have done it well, as well. I think the only other professional ambassador we had in the post war period, Charles Bohlen did it extremely well. It involves not making an enemy of the French. It also involves not falling for their nationalistic line too heavily. We discovered that Washington was uniformly anti French. That you could never make a mistake in Washington if you took an anti French position, so we and Hartman had a lot of problems in convincing Washington that the French weren't all bad. There were some assets that the French had which were of great interest to the United States. I mentioned the nuclear capability. Also the French had tremendous influence in Africa, and in those days we had as great an interest as they did in keeping in power African leaders who were prepared to deal cooperatively with the west on the economic plane, with Africa's minerals for example. Mobutu in Zaire was kept afloat partly by

the French. There was a tremendous American sigh of relief at that because we didn't have to do it. We wanted to; we didn't have to do it because the French did it for us. They did that in other places in west Africa as well, basically taking the responsibility for supporting some fairly unsavory characters at the head of African states for economic reasons. That meant that we didn't have to take the brunt of that. So the French did some objectively valuable things from Washington's point of view. Washington never seemed to either recognize it or be grateful for it.

Q: Apropos that, an interview I did recently with Jack Mendelsohn who is teaching at the Naval Academy for two years. During about this period saying the word in the navy was in case there was a real crisis with the Soviet Union, the first thing to do is to sink the French nuclear submarines because, not that they had anything against the French navy but they didn't trust French politicians, and they didn't know what they would do.

ZIMMERMANN: And you know, there is an interesting corollary to that. In the 1970s we had a very secret program between the French navy and our own navy in which we provided the French the technology to make their submarines quiet so they couldn't be as easily detected by the Soviets. It was such in those days such a clandestine program that very few people in the U.S. government knew about it. I found out about it only later myself. But what we were doing was giving the French very sensitive technology. That was based on the assumption that they were on our side and not on the other side. I think it was the right thing to do. It was the smart thing to do. The French in a pinch were going to be on our side. There is no doubt at all about that. But I think what Jack Mendelsohn is describing is kind of jokey sniping that was very prevalent.

Q: Well it is again a theme that runs through our interviews. I always have fun talking about relations with the French because it is not a really cordial relationship most of the time.

ZIMMERMANN: That's right. It's a love hate relationship. The French, don't forget, they are our oldest allies. They sent us Lafayette and helped George Washington. We have never fought a war with the French ever.

Q: A quasi naval war.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. But the British, whom we feel much closer to, we have tangled with several times, and nearly again during the Civil War period. They were hoping the South would win.

Q: Well back to Arthur Hartman, how did he connect on the social side, because I take it society plays a larger role in France than it does in the United States. I think social cultural is what I am really talking about.

ZIMMERMANN: Hartman was tremendously successful on the social side because he shared a lot of interests with the French. He is an enormously cultured man himself with a really deep love of music and art. It wasn't faked and the French understood that, so they cottoned to that very quickly. I mean they understood that this American ambassador was someone who really did have a deep understanding of some of the cultural things that they cared about as well. I

might add that Hartman's wife Donna, was equally this way. She was genuinely interested in music and art, and liked going to openings of art exhibits and liked going to concerts. They were seen around a lot doing that, and I think that made them very well liked.

Q: You had never served in France had you?

ZIMMERMANN: No, never had.

Q: As political counselor so often you get somebody, my experience was in Italy where you had people coming back for the third or fourth time usually as each time a little higher up in rank so by the time one is say equivalent to political or economic counselor, they are really well versed in French, I mean Italian politics. France is a complicated place. How did you bring yourself up to speed?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I read everything I could get my hands on when I heard I was going. I always did that. I would read as much history as I could, contemporary analysis of the political scene and so forth. Talked to professors who dealt with France. When I got out there, of course, the political section consisted of many people who knew France extremely well. Their brains were there to be picked. That was very useful indeed. Phil Rizik who was the head of the internal section, had a long association with France. He had attended the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the elite French management school. He had relatives who were French. A couple of times a week, he would take a French politician and me out to lunch. We would go out to lunch together and talk about politics. After a couple of months of that, I was pretty well steeped in at least the political gossip that is the basis for getting more deeply into what is happening in France. I had also read European history at Cambridge, and had taught European history so I had some grounding in France's role in Europe and in the world. If you don't know a country first hand, I think there is no substitute for talking with as many people as you can. I am a great believer in getting out of the embassy and talking to people, seeing as many people as you can, getting into as many political conversations as you can. I discovered that, here again it is an interesting paradox with U.S. French relationship, I could pick up the phone and call virtually anybody in France short of the President or the prime minister and invite them for lunch, and they'd come. As the political counselor, I was not the top person in the embassy. But the job was interesting enough for French journalists or French politicians or French officials so that you could get them for lunch virtually any time you wanted them. That was fascinating to be able to talk to people who were in the power structure in one way or another. They were very glad to come.

Q: I am trying to weave a little trade craft in here. When you have a lunch like this in France, how would you use it and how would they use it, the person you had over use it?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I had a very nice apartment. So, I would typically invite a guest to the apartment for lunch. It would be just the two of us again typically. I would, normally consult well in advance with other people in the political section: who should we have, who would be interesting to have. They would give me names and reasons why these were interesting people. So, by the time I invited them I had a pretty fair idea of what I wanted to get out of them. It might be the man in the socialist party--they were out of power in those days, who was in charge

of their foreign policies. I would want to know where they differed with Giscard and the conservatives on foreign policy. If there was a major issue brewing, as for example there was during my time with the Camp David Accords, to get their take on that and how they saw that. So, there was a set of I wanted to get at that my staff would help me work out. But sometimes the conversation would go off on all kinds of different things, and I felt particularly that if this was somebody I really wanted to get to know, that the last thing I wanted to do was just bore in with one question after another. I would try to find out a little bit about them, what they were really interested in, how they spent their vacations, that kind of thing, in hopes they would come back or they would invite me, and we could establish a closer relationship based not just on trading secrets.

Q: Were they interested in how the United States operated particularly since you were there during the Carter administration which is a somewhat off beat one from previous administrations?

ZIMMERMANN: They didn't understand Carter. They found his zeal for human rights very strange and his Christian fundamentalist background, they couldn't understand at all. They certainly understood Kissinger. They hated him, but they understood him much more easily than they did Carter. They had tremendous interest in the United States, the French did. There was a growing amount of French tourism in the United States, not only the people we would see who gravitated toward the American embassy but middle class French people in general. They would love to go to the United States. They would always do three things. One is they would go to New York. The second is they would go to New Orleans for obvious reasons. The third is they would go to the west. What the French liked about America is the American west because there is nothing like it. They were just fascinated with that. There are a lot of kind of French novels that are about the west, cowboy stories by Frenchmen in French.

Q: Sort of like the Carl May type in German.

ZIMMERMANN: A lot like that. The French were interested in our technology. They were interested in our business schools. They were interested in how American finance and business worked. There were really a lot of points of contact. I recall Servan-Schreiber who was one of the major French journalists wrote a book called the "The American Challenge." That was in the '60s I think.

Q: It was quite popular here in the United States.

ZIMMERMANN: Tremendous book. Basically it said the Americans are destroying us. They are just too powerful economically. They are just going to turn us all into a bunch of satellites. Well I think that kind of approach generated a tremendous interest in France and what was going on in the United States. Of course we didn't destroy them; we didn't bury them that way at all. But they did see that we were ahead in all kinds of ways, particularly economic and business and finance, and they wanted to know firsthand what was going on. So, I think the French American relationship has grown a lot more positive and a lot deeper. There will always be the squabbles at the top because of the way France defines its national values, but I think it is a fundamentally sound relationship, and I think Art Hartman certainly contributed to that by his very close

understanding of the French. He had spent many years in France before he became ambassador. He had been there during the Marshall Plan year when we were helping put France on its feet after all. There were a lot of people who remember that as well.

Q: How important did you find the French intellectual class? Because unlike almost anywhere else except perhaps the Soviet Union, I can't think of anywhere where there is sort of a defined intellectual class.

ZIMMERMANN: It is tremendously important, and it dominates the press, even what we would call the tabloid press, the popular press. There are always intellectuals writing columns in it. There are interminable television programs, talking heads type of programs where the intellectuals watter on all kinds of subjects. So, the intellectual is really a very important figure. You have, the French Academy which elects intellectuals. Intellectuals are taken very seriously in France. There is a lot of arrogance that they have because of this. I had some trepidation going to France because I worried a little bit about my French. It wasn't perfect, and I worried about these French intellectuals. A friend of mine in Washington, Simon Serfaty, who was French, he is a Pied noir from Algeria actually or Morocco. He is a professor at Johns Hopkins school of advanced international studies. He said, "Let me give you some advice about French intellectuals which will help you enormously when you are dealing with them." He said this. "Bear in mind at all times that they are clowns. They are clowns in the sense that they are always trying to make an effect. They are always trying to cause a stir. It may have nothing to do with what they really believe or what is really true." He said, "If you keep that in mind as they talk at you and try to impress you, you won't go wrong." I thought about that a lot, and indeed to a large degree he was right because a lot of this was just for show. They were putting things on. If you saw through it and could deal with it, then you could get on a much more serious basis with them and there would be much less pretense and everything would be fine.

Q: Did you find in dealing with the French intellectual class, because you say they are important so this is obviously a group you want to win their respect and to insert sort of the American viewpoint hoping that this will at least make some difference. Did you find this was possible or were they too busy making posture?

ZIMMERMANN: Most of the time they were available. As I said you could call up anybody and there was a chance they would come. This was true of the intellectuals as well. They enjoyed showing off for the Americans. They liked it a lot, so they would come around for a one-on-one lunch, or they would come to a reception that the ambassador would give. There was no problem there. But, the very left wing ones were sometimes harder to attract, but you could do it. Usually, sometimes at least with a French intermediary saying, Well I know this person, let's go together you know, to some bistro and we'll talk. That worked as well.

Q: Did you find the French train of thought which is, I may be wrong as a Cartesian? Is that the correct term. Anyway, there is always a plan behind everything, and things just don't happen. I recall almost a conspiracy theory or something of this nature. Is this something you had to deal with?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, you said a couple of different things there. Certainly the French manner

of argument appears very logical, and I think that is why it is called Cartesian. You build up from a basis and you draw one conclusion and that leads to another conclusion. This is all fine if the basis from which you build is correct. If the basis from which you build is wrong, all the logic in the world is not going to make it right. It actually can take it even a wronger and wronger. That often happens with the French. So, they have no monopoly on logical thought although it is quite beautiful to watch a Frenchman develop an argument. By the way, French politicians are the most brilliant speakers I have ever heard anywhere in my life, almost never speaking with notes. They can talk half an hour, an hour, two hours brilliantly developing one point after another in perfectly logical progression. I never heard anything like it. They all can do it. Mitterrand was one of the best. He was the head of the socialist party which was in opposition. He hadn't become president yet. He was brilliant. Couve de Murville, who had been De Gaulle's foreign minister, a wonderful old man, was at a lunch given by a group of diplomats. I heard him give an hour and a half speech without notes on the current foreign policy situation in France, while he was boning and eating a trout. It was an extraordinary performance. They all have this talent. Now, I think this is the Cartesian side. You talked about conspiracies and so forth. The French are Latins after all, and there is a kind of a tendency I think, in Latin countries, to believe that there is an answer for everything. Nothing is by chance and if something happens, it is because somebody willed it to happen. If nobody comes forward to say they willed it to happen, then it is a plot. That kind of thing was very prevalent. A lot of what we had to do in the embassy was to beat down these conspiracy theories about the Carter administration doing one thing or another because it was anti-French or it was thinking about ways it could score points off the French. Most countries big as well as little tend to think that people in Washington think about nothing except their country, and that therefore everything that is done has some reference to their country whereas, most of the time, of course, it doesn't at all.

Q: About the issues, let's start sort of with the progression of the major Carter initiatives. How about the neutron bomb, I am thinking about the so called neutron bomb, did this raise any hackles?

ZIMMERMANN: The neutron bomb fiasco, I think caused the French to write off Carter. They just decided they were dealing with a second rate amateur who didn't understand anything. I think after that they didn't take him seriously. Then when he got on his human rights kick they dropped him down still another notch.

Q: Could you explain how the neutron bomb thing, because this is for sort of the historical part.

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I don't remember all the details very well anymore, but Carter as I recall, was trying to get the Germans to take the neutron bomb which was advertised as something that didn't kill people but it just...

Q: Well, it killed people but not property. It had more radiation.

ZIMMERMANN: Is that what it was? Okay, kill people but not property.

Q: Sort of the ultimate capitalist weapon.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, and the Germans as I recall, were totally resistant. It was the Schmidt government, and Carter really didn't know when to stop and just kept going. The French were very close to the Germans in those days as they have been lots in recent days as well. I am sure Giscard was getting all this from Schmidt. The two were very close; spoke to each other in English, by the way. I think the conclusion the French drew was not, whether the neutron bomb was a mistake or not a mistake, but they just felt that Carter and Brzezinski his National Security advisor just loved to lecture the Europeans on what they should do. The neutron bomb was an example of that. They weren't understanding the signals back from the Europeans that they really didn't want to get into this. So., I think it was a question of style more than substance. That the French saw Carter and Brzezinski and company as insensitive to Europe, as arrogant, as fixated on the Russian threat too much, and basically not competent to deal with the problems of the time.

Q: Human rights, could you talk about how you were trying to explain the human rights policy, and also what was the attitude of our embassy because when the human rights policy first came, I mean real emphasis. It has always been kind of there. There was a certain amount of resistance within the foreign service. You know, human rights it is all fine, we are all for it, but gee we have other fish to fry in our foreign relations. Could you explain how it hit you all?

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, well in one sense human rights has always been an element of American foreign policy right back to the Declaration of Independence which of course, was based on rather fundamental human rights. But it had never been an official part of the policy. When Carter came in he started a bureau for human rights. The Congress was very exercised about this. Everyone forgets the Congress provided a great deal of initiative.

Q: That's right, even prior to the Carter administration.

ZIMMERMANN: And the French who are pretty cynical anyway and who believe that diplomacy is designed to advance one's state interests and not one's values, took a pretty dim view of it. Partly because they felt it would damage the western relationships with the Russians because we were beginning to turn our attention to human rights violations in Russia. The Helsinki Final Act had already been signed in 1975 which provided a license for that. Partly, I think, the French felt that human rights was going to undermine the stability of important parts of the world like Iran where the Shah was beginning to come under some criticism. The French saw it as a kind of a childish approach to the adult game of diplomacy which had to do with things like the balance of power and realpolitik and Machiavelli and God save us not Thomas Jefferson and people, fuzzy thinkers like that.

Q: How about the embassy to begin with because you arrived early in the Carter administration was taking hold. Did you have problems with the bureau of Human rights or anything. I mean was it hard in a way to turn the ship of the embassy around to really focus on this?

ZIMMERMANN: Well I don't think we really did focus on it too much. In the first place France was not a big human rights violator except by extension in places like Africa where I mentioned before, they were helping us out to some degree as well. So it didn't hit us very hard there. I think Hartman's view was that human rights had a place but shouldn't be allowed to dominate

relationships which we probably much more important in other areas. So, I can't say that it was a major issue in our bilateral relations with the French, except that the French looking at Carter's approach to human rights felt that it was hopelessly naive and possibly dangerous in areas like Iran where they felt very strongly that the Shah was the final protection between all that oil and chaos.

Q: What about focusing on before we move to Iran, focusing on the Israel Arab connection. This is the period of Camp David and all. The French have always maintained they have an interest in that area. How did this work? Were there tensions?

ZIMMERMANN: There were tensions. The French were very critical of Camp David. I think both the government and the opposition thought that it was not a comprehensive agreement, that it didn't deal with the whole issue. Well, you know, there is merit in that. I have heard some American Arabists say the same thing. On the other hand, it was a major partial agreement that took Egypt totally out of the war.

Q: It ended the war potential in that area.

ZIMMERMANN: It really did. I will say that Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was probably watched on television by everybody in France. It was an enormous evocative and emotional experience for the French when Sadat did that. But, in the middle east, we have always been, we have always had problems with the French because the French have always wanted to be major players in the middle east, and to some degree they have been, particularly in Lebanon where they have been the traditional protectors of the Christians. They have always been very nervous about American policy because of that. They have also tended to pick up Arab countries that they think can be useful to them and give them a kind of an entrance into the area and Saddam Hussein's Iraq was one of those countries in the late '70s. The French gave him if you recall, a nuclear reactor which the Israelis took out. The French were very critical of us for not understanding how useful countries like Iraq could be. I put it down mainly to a genuine rivalry they felt they had with us in the middle east. We had more cards to play than they did, but they wanted to be players. They had been traditional players in the middle east going back centuries, and they wanted to get in anywhere they could, and they saw us as a kind of an obstacle to it, so I think geopolitically that was more or less the way it was.

Q: How did this translate itself?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I don't think any damage was really done. The French unlike the Soviets, the French did not actively try to undermine the initiatives that the Carter administration was taking as far as I can remember. They groused a lot; they complained a lot. They poked holes in the obviously imperfect agreement that had been reached at Camp David, but I don't think they did any real damage.

Q: In dealing with this, say with the Quai d'Orsay, did you find that the professional French diplomat and their apparatus in the foreign ministry and it had a different view than the government in a way? Was this on a more professional level or was it all in sync?

ZIMMERMANN: It was in pretty good sync then partly because you had the same party in the presidency as you had in the Parliament. The majority party, Giscard had in the parliament and he was the President. Of course, it has been very different in more recent years when you had a divided presidency and government. The prime minister was Giscard's man, Raymond Barre. Things worked pretty smoothly I'd say, but Giscard had a tiny national security staff when compared with the United States it was ludicrous, it was about five people. But some of them were on loan from French diplomacy, French diplomatic service, so I would guess it worked pretty closely. I would say we had good relations with the Quai d'Orsay. They weren't enormously warm, and on some issues there was a serious problem. I recall that, when the presidency country of the European Community as it was then called changed and the French took it over, EUR sent us a cable saying they were going to send somebody out from the European bureau who had been traditionally consulting with the incoming president of the European Community about arrangements for future consultation. We got this cable. They didn't ask us; they just said he was coming and gave us arrival information and so forth. One of the officers in the political section, Jack Maresca, knew France very well, married to a French woman, said, "The French won't receive him." I said, "What do you mean they won't receive him?" He said, "They won't receive him because their view is they have no obligation to consult with the United States on matters involving the European Community." I said, "C'mon [Come on] Jack, I just don't believe that." Well the guy arrived and we sent over, first of all we called, and then I guess we sent a note over to the foreign ministry saying what he was doing. It came back we won't receive him, and they didn't. He sat for three days in Paris cooling his heels trying to get an appointment in the foreign ministry, they would not see him. The French were furious at Kissinger for his approach to the U.S. right to know not only what the Europeans are doing but to get into their decision making process. They just stonewalled on that, and that was one of those issues on which they were not going to move. Another issue on which they were not going to move and on which they were very Gaullist was cooperation in NATO in a military sense. Anything beyond their presence on the political side of NATO was simply not going to do. Any efforts we made to lure them into something larger than that were very strongly rebuffed.

Q: Well, you know, during part of this time I was Consul General in Naples, and NATO South was located there, and Admiral Crow was commander. I remember asking him about French cooperation in the Mediterranean. He said, "It's our main other force other than the Americans." It is very close; we work very well together, but they just don't talk about it very much."

ZIMMERMANN: If you had left it to the French military without the politicians interfering, they would have been back in NATO for decades. I mean they loved cooperating with NATO and particularly with the Americans. That was certainly true while I was there. There was a wonderful French chief of staff named General Neri who was extremely friendly to the American military and to NATO. He went about as far as he could go within the Gaullist straitjacket, and I think that has been very typical of the French military. But, you know, for political reasons, because of De Gaulle and because French politicians have felt very nationalistic about this, the military has not been allowed to cooperate.

Q: Did you find during this time a difference between the approach towards the United States between the Gaullists and the Socialists?

ZIMMERMANN: Really only a very small difference. The socialists being out of power, had nothing but time. We spent a lot of time with them. They were always available for, meals or whatever you wanted, even for exchange visits. I think by the time we were finished with sending socialists to the United States on exchange visits, we had taken care of the entire hierarchy of the socialist party. When they came into power, virtually every member of the cabinet had been at least six weeks in the United States in the last five or ten years. It was fantastic. But, you know, they were Gaullists too. A little bit softer maybe about it, but they had very strong Gaullist tendencies. Mitterrand moved it a little bit toward some cooperation with NATO and Chirac has moved it a little bit more, but I don't think there has been a tremendous difference. between the socialists and the conservatives on these bedrock French nationalistic issues. I think there is still a tremendous degree of Gaullism that's there on all sides, even with the communists.

Q: What about, talking about the communists, what was you, do we have contacts with the communists, and what was your impression of the communists at that particular time?

ZIMMERMANN: I think this was done in Rome too, you would remember this. We had one relatively junior officer in the political section who was authorized to have contacts with the communists and who would see them. The communists had an appointed person to talk to the American embassy. It was a fellow who was responsible for their foreign policy brief, and our guy in the political section happened to be Chuck Redman who went on to be ambassador to Germany, would meet this fellow a couple of times a month probably. Once or twice, and I think we had to get Washington's permission for this. Once or twice Chuck would take me with him and so raise the level a little bit of how we met them. It was totally unproductive really, because they would give you their line on everything. It was absolutely standard stuff. French communists, of course, were much worse than Italian communists, less sophisticated and harder line and more pro Soviet.

Q: Did you have the feeling, I mean, that this was really Soviet controlled group or?

ZIMMERMANN: I wouldn't have said Soviet controlled, just like minded. They had very a hard, and we thought at that point irreducible, baie among French workers. They always got about 15% in elections, not much less I think. They could always count on that. They were always quite important, and of course, Mitterrand used them and abused them brilliantly. He used them to get to power because the socialists couldn't make it on their own, so he needed the coalition of the communists. When he got to power he dumped them. He always said he would. Our policy was strongly to dissuade Mitterrand from his coalition with the communists. In fact we couldn't have been wronger because it was the best way of all to destroy the communist party in France, and Mitterrand marginalized them in a way that would never have been possible if he hadn't aligned with them to begin with.

Q: Within the political section, were we thinking in those terms, or did we sort of have the mindset that any communist in any cabinet is going to be a mole who is going to divulge all the secrets and all that?

ZIMMERMANN: No, I think our approach and Hartman's approach in the political section was

may I say less rigid than that. I mean if you made a communist defense minister, you would be in trouble. But no, no French government was going to do that. I think this rather frenzied campaign against French and Italian communism, particularly Italian communism which had much deeper roots than the French did, was ill advised. I don't think they were the threat that we thought they were, and I don't think we made it better by taking on this crusader like stance against them. It antagonized the French government when we were doing this, and certainly it antagonized Mitterrand and the French socialists that we took this position. I expect the same was true in Italy. I actually had done quite a lot of work on eurocommunism as it was then called when I was back in the department doing policy stuff in the mid-'70s. I reached the conclusion they were simply not as important as the whole scholarly community and the whole governmental community thought they were. I think that proved to be right.

Q: Did you have much contact with Mitterrand during this period?

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. I didn't personally, but Hartman did. It was always very formal. Mitterrand was a very formal person, and Hartman would invite him to his residence, which was a wonderful old Rothschild palace for lunch. It maybe happened three or four times during the time we were there. It was always a very rigid thing. Mitterrand would bring his chief aides, many of whom later became prime minister, like Fabius and Jospin. They were all very young; they were all in their 30s in those days. He would bring them, and Hartman would bring us political people. The conversation was always a bit stilted and wooden and never flowed freely at all. When you would get to know the socialists who worked for Mitterrand, you could see them one on one or in small groups, they were very easy to talk to, and they were fine. But, with him, they were all intimidated by him for one thing, and for another, he was just a very formal person. I don't think he was a great fan of the United States or of Carter or of American policy or of America's role in the world. I don't think he had a lot to say for any of that.

Q: What about the nationalists, Le Pen and that group at that point?

ZIMMERMANN: I don't recall they were a major organization. I think that was a bit later, although Le Pen was certainly on the scene, but we didn't take him too seriously in those days.

Q: What about the press?

ZIMMERMANN: French press, the ones who did foreign policy were very interested in seeing us and were quite often very good sources for things that were going on. You have different gradations of French press. In a way the top gradation consisted of one person, Raymond Aron, who was still alive in those days and writing columns for I think it was Figaro. I mean this was a man with the stature of Walter Lippmann or maybe even higher. He was an extraordinary man. A really deep thinker, a brilliant conversationalist, funny, profound, just a delight to be around. He was not well, but he would come quite often to the embassy. His journalism was at a level that nobody else attained. Then you had kind of the people who were genuine foreign policy experts like Andre Fontaine who wrote a column for Le Monde and others. They were the barons of French foreign policy journalism. Again they came around. We saw a lot of them.

Q: Did they pick your brains did you find?

ZIMMERMANN: No, never. No, they never needed to talk to us. These people did not beat the bushes to get stories from the American embassy. Now, others did. You drop another level down and you got working journalists who would be interested in genuine exchange. You have lunch with them; they ask you questions, you ask them questions, sort of the way it normally works with journalists, but these were the ones below the barons.

Q: Well how did you find the press, particularly the barons and all? Were they particularly with the Carter administration dubious or what?

ZIMMERMANN: Oh, yes, virtually unanimously anti for one reason or another. I don't think Carter had any journalistic support that I can remember in France either from the left or the right.

JOSEPH CHEEVERS
Consular Officer
Paris (1977-1981)

Joseph Cheevers was born in 1933. Most of his career in the Foreign Service was spent as a consular officer. He held positions in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Morocco, Spain, and France. Mr. Cheevers was interviewed by William Morgan in 1988.

CHEEVERS: . . .allow me to jump to my Paris assignment and tell you that at one particular time, we had a Haitian case, an official of his government, seemed to be the worst and most unqualified individual I'd ever come across. I said "that's a pretty bad case. If I were doing that adjudicating, I wouldn't have issue." And then we would go down the line on citing various scenarios, what the regulations said, what the attorney concerned was trying to do. It was an educational process for a new officer, and very time consuming.

Q: So what you're saying is, you really try and walk through the particular elements of a case, and hopefully as a learning process, the vice consul will come to the same decision.

CHEEVERS: It took time and patience. Unfortunately, in Paris we didn't have an awful lot of time, as you very well know. There wasn't a lot of time for the explanations, but I don't recall having to go through such exercises in visa cases more than once with the some officer, except one, but that's another story.

Q: Let's jump to Paris, where you and I worked together. I don't know where to start with that. What new lessons did you pick up in Paris?

CHEEVERS: How to work among the French. (Smiling)

Q: Were they any different from the Spanish?

CHEEVERS: Oh, yes, of course.

Q: What was the principal difference?

CHEEVERS: Well, they were easily irritated and individualistic. You had to spend a lot of time separating them, I found, in the very beginning. I had a lot of -- I shouldn't say problem, per se, but a lot of concerns with the management of the FSNs, because they were uneven.

Q: So you didn't have the same type of qualified FSNs?

CHEEVERS: I had some very good ones, but I didn't have the same across the board quality as in Madrid.

Q: How big was the visa section?

CHEEVERS: Let me see now. I think we had five offices all told, and about 13 to 17 FSNs.

Q: Did you restrict yourself completely to the visa function, then?

CHEEVERS: Yes, that was the Office of Visa Services, which was in a separate building when I got there. Paris was not yet considered a Visa Mill.

Q: Did you feel separated?

CHEEVERS: Very much so. There is no splendor in isolation.

Q: You were in a different annex, the famous Talleyrand.

CHEEVERS: Yes. We were two and half blocks or so away from the embassy, and it definitely did foster the feeling of isolation.

Q: We were in the midst of talking about the consular section in Paris, and specifically the visa section, which you headed, which was separate from the embassy, in a separate building called the Talleyrand. How did that separation affect your role with both the section and the rest of the embassy?

CHEEVERS: Very profoundly, I think. You were two and a half blocks away. You didn't eat in the embassy cafeteria where everybody else did, because you didn't have time, away from this. It was very difficult for your officers to run over and take a look at classified material or meet other Embassy colleagues casually. If you had to get something done at the Embassy, you had to walk across Place de la Concorde. The physical distance translated into other kinds of distances. You felt separate and apart.

Q: You felt separate. You were physically separate. But what was done to make you feel part of the mission?

CHEEVERS: In the beginning, not an awful lot. But subsequently, as you very well know, we did pull the whole consular section together in one place in the embassy auditorium, and that, for a while, cured that. The consular section is all in one place again, but they are again on the other side of the Place de la Concorde, separate from the Embassy.

Q: So what you're saying is that you were not only what some consular sections suffer from, being separate from the regular mission, but you were even separate from your own section.

CHEEVERS: That's right. I will tell you that I am a consistent believer in keeping the consular section where it should be, and that is as part of the chancery.

Q: As you know, you and I feel 100% together on that, but there are arguments against it which are security questions.

CHEEVERS: I am aware of the arguments which have come up since. There's no doubt that security is a problem. But I think it is also very curable, and I've seen places where it is. I've inspected for two years, and I've seen places who have the security situation taken care of very well, thank you, and it did not impede the functions or endanger the chancery. There are ways to manage the flow of people so that the chancery did its function and personnel are secure.

Q: I know it wouldn't be fair for me to ask you to speak for me, but since you and I have discussed this so many times in Paris, what are the arguments that you think are most important that you can give to your bosses of why it is important to have the mission together?

CHEEVERS: You have some problems with young consular officers, who feel that just by being consular officers, they're not like other embassy officers. Separating them or moving them away physically from the embassy underscores that feeling, that kind of uncertainty, of the value of the mission. One of the problems of separation was that many of the officers did not have opportunities, to have lunch with their opposite numbers in the political section or other embassy sections. It underscored their isolation and their feeling that they were different.

Q: What did you do about it, as their supervisor?

CHEEVERS: There really wasn't very much I could do, because there's no way you can roll up two and a half blocks as was the case in Paris, but you could hammer away at working toward integrating the consular section into the embassy and make your officers aware of your efforts. I think you recall your battle to take over the auditorium for the visa function.

Q: The auditorium, I should stop to say, is part of the main chancery, and that's where we ended up moving. Which put us right in the chancery. It did not make the ambassador happy at all, because the ambassador had a lofty and elite view of the consular function. I'll maintain that to this day. But we were there, and I think that the morale was better because we were there. They could exit out the back door of the visa section and be downstairs in the same cafeteria as their colleagues. They were part of the embassy. You are, of course, preaching the Holy Gospel to me.

CHEEVERS: Does it sound this way?

Q: What we're trying to do is really get from you your views on how you go about convincing ambassadors that have problems with the consular section.

CHEEVERS: I would allow that there are some ambassadors who are uneducateable. There is nothing one can do to convince them that a chancery should house the key functions of a mission or that separate deleterious effects upon young consular officers. But there are others who are dying to be educated, who never given the consular function any thought, because consul generals have ignored the opportunities to educate.

Q: But your experience in Paris was that you, me, and others did try?

CHEEVERS: Yes, there's no doubt about it.

Q: And maybe, in part, succeeded.

CHEEVERS: Oh, yes, I would have to concede that that was true, indeed.

Q: Going back to the officers, you had quite a good ones tough.

CHEEVERS: I also had some of the lame and the halt.

Q: I was going to say we have heard the cliché about Europe and Canada, that they sometimes are assigned officers they can't place anywhere else. What was your impression of some of your junior officers and other officers?

CHEEVERS: Some were junior officers in name only. They were veterans, and had gone from post to post performing poorly. It was extremely difficult to coax a performance out of them. As much as you might like to believe that there's some good in everybody and that you can get something out of an officer, I found that in one particular case, without naming names, I got so very little that the rewards were not worth the effort. There are cases of that, uncurables! In other cases, I was successful, however.

Q: What do you do with an officer that, as you say, you've tried everything out on, and it just doesn't seem to work? What do you do?

CHEEVERS: Well, there are a number of classic ways you can handle that, as you very well know. You can pick up a telephone to the Dept and say, "You've got to help me get rid of Mr. X. He's destroying the morale of my section." There are officers who do not pull their weight, and the other officers look at you and think, "What kind of a manager are you if you can't help us to get rid of somebody who's not doing his work?"

Q: So number one, talk back to the boss.

CHEEVERS: Talk back to the boss and say, "You can't let this happen. We've got to do something." You can use the system, with its flaws and often slow response, when an officer like

that wants to extend, and say, "No, I can't support your extension." More serious are the cases where there is genuine incompetence, and the system does not respond. You are often forced to make adjustments, and work does suffer for it.

Q: How did you work this problem out with others beyond your own supervisor?

CHEEVERS: As you very well know, I did have your ear and your sympathy in one situation. I think you understood that. In that particular case, we were saved, because the officer concerned retired. Other cases were tougher to handle. In Spain, I had an officer who was a classic troublemaker who threatened a grievance at every perceived opportunity. Personnel management can be a minefield.

Q: Mr. Spiers, as Under Secretary for Management -- how do you stop this problem? It seems to have been going on for years and seems to still be out there, of the officer that just is really incompetent and you can't get to leave and the system won't get rid of?

CHEEVERS: I think BEX has a problem.

Q: Board of Examiners. BEX is the acronym.

CHEEVERS: They have to take a look at things and say, "What is the successful past work record of this individual?" Not "We ought to have this individual for a variety of reasons." Not related to competence and experience.

Q: Maybe take a person who's unsuccessful and read back into the BEX files and see where maybe a mistake was made?

CHEEVERS: Sure. That is one way.

Q: Or maybe the person changed.

CHEEVERS: Some people do. I would give them the benefit of the doubt. I did come across in my inspection experience an officer who did so poorly in the beginning, it was pathetic, but it turned out the officer was in the wrong environment with the wrong supervision. Subsequent assignments provided the right mix and this officer later demonstrated great competence.

Q: Am I concluding, then, no matter what, the supervisor is still responsible for doing the most?

CHEEVERS: Yes. And I believe that problems arise in the fear of the supervisor to document things or to bite the bullet.

Q: Do you have any examples of that?

CHEEVERS: Yes, I can tell you that the officers would -- and I reviewed many such examples when assigned to the grievance staff. Officers who had been problem officers for years had sterling performance records. Finally somebody would say, "This simply can't go on. This officer

is not functioning." When post Eleks were reviewed you were astonished because there was no record of performance flaws. The record and the verbal performance assessment were poles apart. Poor performance were not documented because the supervisors are afraid to take on the problems of the system -- grievances, EER [Employee Efficiency Report] complaints, disgruntled employees, intimidation, all of those kinds of things. It is very difficult. I would not say that there is no simple answer to this serious flaw in the system.

Q: So it sounds like that Paris added some management skills and experiences.

CHEEVERS: Oh, no doubt about it. What I inherited in Paris was an individual who had been everybody's problem for years and nobody had dealt with it appropriately.

Q: Including me as an inspector.

CHEEVERS: I didn't know this bit of history. But it is nice to have someone to blame.

Q: I inspected him, yes. (Laughs)

CHEEVERS: Okay, fine. But I found myself at the tail end of this officer's career, documenting everything. Drafting memos to this officer that said: "On such and such a date, I asked you to do the following and I have not yet received your response. Would you promptly advise me the status of the report I asked you for?" In normal circumstances, you collegially asked your officers: "Hey, what about that thing I asked you about?" I couldn't do that in the case mentioned. Management became labor intensive. One individual took up most of your time for the management of the section.

Q: So what you added to your career in Paris is more of an individual oriented management of those individuals and so on.

CHEEVERS: Oh, sure. I would say you can't shirk these things. You have to look ahead and say, "You know something, my friend, if you don't deal with this right now, you may inherit this problem again later on down the pike." And you're not helping this officer. You are adding to the deterioration. There are people in the system who not only don't want to bite the bullet, but don't know how to evaluate a performance. From the standpoint of a grievance officer, I can tell you that 60% of all the grievances are generated by the performance evaluation report.

Q: I want to make sure, because we're really working now under the Washington area, where we should be in your two jobs there before you retired. But before we leave Paris, anything else you want to tell us?

CHEEVERS: No. You're talking about incidents, very interesting things that happened, and we talked about this once before. This was during the Iranian crisis and all the different things that were going on. We had an enormous increase in the number of third country nationals, i.e., Iranians. Then we had the controversy over what country would accept the Shah.

Q: Again, this period is 1977 to 1981, so this is '79.

CHEEVERS: As you will recall, the Shah was adrift. Wandering around the world because no one would offer him asylum. I think that when Embassy Paris got involved in the matter, the Shah was either in Mexico or Morocco, I'm not altogether certain.

Q: I don't think we were.

CHEEVERS: And we may not even have known.

Q: I don't think even Mr. Kissinger knew.

CHEEVERS: Probably not.

Q: As we understand it, Mr. Kissinger felt we had an obligation to the Shah.

CHEEVERS: Very definitely. I believe that's true. In any event, we received a Department cable very, very early in the morning -- or very, very late at night, depending on how you look at it -- and I think I called you.

Q: You called me in Brest.

CHEEVERS: You were somewhere, and I said, "Hey, wait 'til you see this. There is a cable that says the passports of Reza Pahlavi Shah and the Shahbanou and the children along with family retainers, are on their way to Paris. The passports, are being forwarded separately, with a request for visitor visas.

Q: Is there a rule against issuing a passport to somebody when he's not in the same country?

CHEEVERS: There certainly was.

Q: And we discussed that, didn't we? (Laughs)

CHEEVERS: You took the matter up with the ambassador. The ambassador said, "It's very clear. The Department wants you to issue the visas." That was what he said.

Q: So the ambassador was instructing you to issue the visa?

CHEEVERS: The ambassador, in effect, was saying, "The handwriting is on the wall. If you tell them you can't do it, you better have some darn good reasons."

Q: You were intimidated by the DCM in Rabat. How did you do with this one?

CHEEVERS: He was quite correct. We had been told, in effect, "They're on their way. Now let's wait and see what happens." Luckily for us, waiting to see what happened, did not take long. A very short time thereafter the Department advised Paris that the shah had found asylum elsewhere. The issue evaporated; we did not have to do something that would have created

serious problems personally and politically.

Q: This instruction came from the highest levels of the Department?

CHEEVERS: No, not that high, but I'm not really sure of this.

Q: Did Barbara Watson, do you think, know about it?

CHEEVERS: That's hard to say. It would not surprise me that she didn't.

Q: My recollection is that she didn't know about it, which raises the question of who can give the ultimate order in visa issuance.

CHEEVERS: The Secretary. If you are talking of the last analysis.

Q: I didn't think so. Technically you are correct, but I am not aware of any case in which a consular officer has successfully challenged the Department when it had been determined that the issuance of a visa was in the U.S. interests.

CHEEVERS: Yes, the Secretary.

Q: You and I didn't always agree on everything.

CHEEVERS: No, we didn't agree on that, and as I say, we are a little better educated about things right now, I think. It didn't enter my mind at that time that the Dept could have shifted responsibility to the Attorney General with the waiver authority.

Mr. Kennedy: Is there an ultimate order?

Q: There's an ultimate decision. There's the ultimate decision of whether the visa is issued or not, and the consular officer issues the visa.

CHEEVERS: That's quite true. You can be persuaded. The ultimate comes from the Secretary. If the Secretary says, "Do it," which he probably wouldn't if he had L's advice, you would have a hard time defying it.

Q: When you walked out of the ambassador's office, were you operating under marching orders that you were to do it?

CHEEVERS: Yes and no.

Q: God, that sounds like a wishy-washy consular officer! (Laughs)

CHEEVERS: I probably said, "Okay, fine. You can't make a decision on a visa until an application and travel documents are presented. . ."

Q: Then you went and said a novena.

CHEEVERS: No. No, but I should have.

Q: You didn't call me, because I was on the plane coming home.

CHEEVERS: I'm not sure whether I even checked my memory against regulations looked to see whether or not presence of an applicant in the consul district was still a requirement.

Q: You did indeed.

CHEEVERS: ...before or after I saw the ambassador. I wasn't sure when I did that.

Q: I think also we had agreed that it would be proper to inform Barbara Watson of the action we were about to take.

CHEEVERS: Yes. Your memory is better than mine on that.

Q: What we're talking about here, obviously, is an example of the consular officers being under pressure and being told for political or whatever reasons that a decision had to go a certain way in which the officer did not feel that was the right decision, not ethically or even practically, but in this case, legally.

CHEEVERS: Legally, yes. However, if you took a look at that, the way that cable was written, I don't have any recollection that it ordered us to issue that visa, but it was implicit that passports were going to be presented. Some subtly.

Q: My real question is, do you think there are times when the U.S. national interests causes us to do things that would be in violation of the law?

CHEEVERS: Probably. Yes, sure.

Q: Do you think the consular officer should have to figure out when those are or do you think he should pass the buck?

CHEEVERS: Well, I'll tell you something. A consular officer needs guidance in such cases. I don't think any consular officer is going to make that kind of decision all by himself. As I think about this incident now, the scenario surrounding receipt of that cable, I would have picked up the telephone saying, "Okay, fine. We're waiting. But has anybody back there thought about this, this, and this?" The fallout of a controversial decision.

Q: Has everyone done their homework.

CHEEVERS: Exactly. Because if I make such a decision, I want to have all information available to me. Barbara Watson, for example, I don't know if we asked anybody, but apparently you knew or subsequently learned that Barbara Watson was not in on it.

Q: She was not in on it.

CHEEVERS: Okay. That says something about our system, and it isn't the best, in my opinion.

Q: The press was too sensitive. Some things are so sensitive.

CHEEVERS: What we've been saying here is what we all know, that there are some things which are taken out of the realm of the consular function and decisions are not made by consular officers in such cases.

Q: Or if you put them into the realm of the consular function, the consular officer will screw it up and say no!

CHEEVERS: Well, it could happen. For political reasons, they don't want that to happen.

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
Ambassador
France (1977-1981)

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman was born in New York in 1926. He entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included assignments in Vietnam, the United Kingdom (England), Belgium, and ambassadorships to France and the Soviet Union. He was interviewed by William Miller in 1987.

Q: How did the assignment to Paris take place?

HARTMAN: Well, I went with Cy Vance to Moscow in March 1977. I was not enthusiastic about the position he was taking there. Les Geld was on that team along with a number of other people. I felt at the time, and we were not told much about the position until we got on the plane. This was one of the interesting things at the time because they were anxious to prevent leaks and so there was a little meeting at the White House and then we were all on a plane, and it was only at that point that I along with Les Geld and the others who were working even more directly on the policy were informed. I had the feeling that it was such a change from the previous position and that the Soviets were unprepared, and that we were going to run into heavy seas. Therefore it might have been better to continue with the old just to try and get that nailed down before going onto something else. Well we got blasted out of the water by Gromyko and I had a feeling that Cy was not totally behind what he was doing. I mean he was kind of ordered to do that out of a meeting that took place with Sprague and others. It was not a good show, but I am fond of pointing out to my Soviet friends that they shot out of the water the position that they took them almost ten years to come around to again, and now accuse us of not giving enough support to: namely deep cuts in strategic forces. So, the objective I had no difficulty with. I think deep cuts was a hell of a lot better than just trying to put caps on the programs that both sides had planned to do in any case. It took us along time to get back to that. With the Soviets it seems to me that

you have to have a certain amount of continuity, at least you used to, maybe now you don't. We didn't have it at that point. In any case shortly after that time Cy called me in. I don't know if he was still uncomfortable with me being in EUR and sort of reminding him of old positions or what, anyway he said "How would you like to go to France?" I said "Gee I'd be delighted!" So that was my first Ambassadorial post, Go to France, Why not!

Q: That was his theory, that the best of the Foreign Service should be rewarded?

HARTMAN: I think so and I must say they had an idea of quality. I mean that there were some appointments that were made for political reasons that were not too hot, but as we looked around Europe you had people like Kingman Brewster in London, and for awhile Walt Stoessel was in Bonn as a professional, I was in Paris, Dick Gardner was in Rome as a non-professional. At the EEC you had Dean Hinton, at NATO we had another professional and it varied during that period between professionals and non-professionals but I think always I've had a respect for the quality of the outsiders who were brought in.

Q: How did you find the role of Ambassador? When you were there you were at one of the great posts in the world, at least in Western Europe; beautiful embassy, fascinating country and at the height of your career. Was being an Ambassador as much fun as you had thought?

HARTMAN: Well it was a lot of fun, but very frustrating from an intellectual point of view and from a policy point of view. This was because as prepared as you are from having worked in Washington for the fact that ambassadors are really not brought in to the high policy councils, nor indeed know fully what is going on, and a lot of people try to get around you; you are not prepared for that actuality of it. I can remember the tussles I would have with people like Spate who wanted to have his own sort of direct relationship with somebody in the Elysée and without informing me sometimes, I would get messages back and forth.

Q: Well does this raise the question of the whole nature of foreign policy? In the post-war period you were a part of the new Foreign Service as you described. Then with electronic communication and the ability to fly anywhere in the world faster and faster as we get new airplanes, the nature of embassies change. You have this anomaly in the distant parts of the world where the issues are not formal diplomacy but rather what you do in the bush, or sort of hand-to-hand combat in some places. There is such a range of what an embassy should be. Can you comment on that?

HARTMAN: It depends on the situation and different people react differently to those situations. You can end up as Dean Hinton did in San Salvador where he was trying to get and encourage a kind of democratic process to begin and prepare for an election. Actually they did and they had a successful election and someone with good Democratic credentials got it. Well he was an activist and is, and is a man who understands these things and gets a great kick out of that sort of interplay. I am sure that it was the center of American policy-making with respect to that country. Then you have your more traditional embassies, say in Europe, where you may have particular problems. Occasionally a man, the Ambassador in Bonn for example, has got a very serious problem with the negotiating issues around something that the Germans are concerned about like deployments where both parties have very heavy involvement and are issue oriented.

So you've got public aspects of dealing with the German public, as well as the government, as well as the opposition on a particular issue. While I was in France, in that four years there was not much of that. There was a lot of sort of basic hand holding, of keeping Giscard particularly, from not exercising his royal independence for just the hell of it; but making sure that he understood what the policies were before he made statements and before he took decisions. There were a lot of cooperative things we did with the French around the world. One of the real oddities was to watch Jimmy Carter who didn't have that many instincts to begin with about involvement in other parts of the world, working closely with, or his people working closely with, Giscard and his services and real involvement in some of these countries and helping opposition movements or helping governments to stay in power. I said earlier, the way that administrations shift back to a kind of centerline position is interesting to watch. Jimmy Carter came in saying he wasn't going to pay any attention to the Soviets because that had been too long the preoccupation with our policy, and boom he was back to being preoccupied by them. I think that the French experience for me was fascinating, first of all to have more time with my family and to be able to really enjoy life a little bit. Also, the way to influence a country like France, particularly France and I think also the Soviet Union, is to get into their intellectual debates and into their intellectual life. So we spent a lot of time cultivating the intelligentsia in Paris. I think it paid off. I think they had tended over the years, I won't say I did this – but I certainly encouraged the movement, to be sort of pathologically left and anti-U.S. By showing an interest in their arts and even their avant-garde type things, by getting together with the youth more, by bringing in different kinds of people; I think we made a kind of place for a more favorable setting for the acceptance of American policies at a time when it was sort of difficult to do. This was because there was a lot of feeling about the softness at home and this was before the advent of Mitterrand. Then the other thing of course is the, it was always the potential, of the Socialists coming to power and you had to kind of keep a hand out there and I knew many of them from my earlier days and you could see it coming. You always have the problem, I had a Foreign Service Officer who was working for me, of people wanting to anticipate this, and getting the regime that's in power; and also wanting to have alternates just for the sake of alternates and not saying but there is an American policy interest in the French having the right views on certain subjects, as there is for example with the British. I mean the Labor Party now has a view about defense in Europe which is to say the least is antagonistic to most of the things that we stand for. So while you continue to maintain contact with them, you also have to let them know the facts of life and tell them why you are opposed to what they are discussing.

Q: How did you work with the desk back here in Washington? Did you have anything to do with the appointment of who was working on the desk?

HARTMAN: Not really, but I certainly. George Vest was Assistant Secretary for awhile and I think there was another Assistant Secretary while I was over there. You know we would talk about it, work very closely with the desk, work very closely with the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I knew Washington, so I would go back there often enough to kind of keep my hand in on the policies that I thought counted. I knew the Cabinet Officers quite well, I remember Jim Slezinger coming over quite often to discuss energy matters; that was one of the big issues in that period. Defense cooperation, we did a lot to encourage it, Al Haig was up in the NATO job and we worked very closely without a lot of publicity to bring the French into a much

closer defense relationship. Then of course you always have the financial problems and I worked on that. When it comes to financial cooperation, the French are always varying in their view of whether the dollar is too high or too low. And that was all fun!

Q: How did you handle Congressional visits?

HARTMAN: There were a lot of visits in addition to the air show when they would all come over, there were a lot of visits back and forth. The Vice-President came, Jimmy Carter came; and then you've got all these other meetings that go on like the meeting of the five or seven summit countries. So there is a lot of contact back and forth and I would go to those meetings. For example, when we met in Martinique with Giscard and Ford, I would be present at those meetings. So it's a little bit more of a traditional role, and with a country like France there not top of our mind unless there is a very specific problem.

Q: So you have a little more free run?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, you have a more free run and you can do a lot of things, make speeches. I've made a very critical speech of the position that Giscard had taken after Afghanistan. It's the one time that I kind of intervened in a French political matter, but it was so important to us and he seemed to be taking such a kind of midpoint decision as if France was not part of an alliance, that surprised me. Even in de Gaulle's time they were part of the alliance, they just weren't part of the structure. So I spoke out and a lot of Giscard's friends thanked me at the time, we got a lot of publicity in France; but that wasn't my purpose. I felt at that point that's one of the few times that I felt speaking out in a country like France was important. He didn't like it for awhile but we still stayed friends. Then of course Mitterrand was elected at the end of that period and I knew quite of the few people around him, I had a friend who introduced me to some of his colleagues, I met Rocard, I had Mitterrand to my house before he came in. So we kept in contact with him and indeed when they got in power, at least on foreign policy issues, they were stronger than Giscard in some respects. This was true certainly on their desire to have a close connection with NATO and their desire to buttress the situation in Germany, toughness on negotiation on nuclear matters because they really believed in the independent deterrent, but a hash of the situation economically at home.

Q: Was it Regis Debray who was the spokesman?

HARTMAN: Regis Debray I would never even talk to, I think he was a very sad character. He finally disappeared from the scene I think, he still remains a friend of Mitterrand but he is one of these intellectual gadflies who may be all right when your out of power to get some ideas from, but if you have him around anywhere close to you when you're in power, I real problem. I knew his Mother very well who was not at all of his persuasion.

Q: How did the appointment to Moscow take place? What were the circumstances of that?

HARTMAN: Well again, it was I was just there for the Carter administration really in Paris and the Reagan administration came in and I of course knew Al Haig very well and he said, "I think you better stay on in France. We've got a transition period now with Mitterrand coming in, but

eventually we'll have to think about a successor." I don't know what all the considerations were but I'm sure there were many. The President had a lot of friends I think that he was thinking of sending to Paris and Al finally called me back and said, "How would you like to go to Moscow?" I was torn because I was not a Soviet specialist, I did not have the language, but I was very much given to understand that if it didn't go to me, it would probably go to a non-professional.

SAMUEL S. REA
USAID Liaison Officer
Paris (1978-1980)

Samuel Rea was born in New York City in 1938. He graduated from Princeton University in 1961. Since joining USAID in 1966, his career has included positions in Tanzania, Botswana, France, Senegal and Madagascar. Mr. Rea was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

REA: Marvelously, without my lobbying for the job at all, I was assigned to the one single post which AID held at the time at our Embassy in Paris. The post was located in the General Economic Policy section and was established there in 1974 to assure a measure of coordination with the French on our assistance programs to Sub-Saharan Africa. My predecessor was Howard Helman, who, as I mentioned, had been conducting our business very vigorously with the Club/CILSS livestock team. When I got to the Embassy in September, 1978, my State Department supervisor, Bob Duncan, took me aside and made clear that the Ambassador, Arthur Hartman, had agreed to continue the AID position I was about to fill on the express condition that the next incumbent, namely me, should not serve as a livestock specialist!

Rather, as the Embassy's "overseas development coordinator," my job, Duncan emphasized, was to analyze and report on the full gamut of issues connected with French economic assistance. Duncan introduced me to the individual down the hall who represented the U.S. Treasury in the Embassy – Bob Gelbard, who is today serving as the President Clinton's Representative to Bosnia – and encouraged us to work towards a comprehensive understanding of the structure of French assistance. Although Gelbard had many other things to do, that became my mission, and I'm pleased that I have something to show for it after the 16 months I was there.

Although I was the sole AID officer in the Embassy, we did have other officers in Paris – one at UNESCO and several at the OECD, which now sheltered the Club du Sahel. At the same time as I arrived in town, Art Fell came to replace Roy Stacy as Deputy to Anne de Lattre. In the first few months Art (who was bilingual in French) and I teamed up to make a series of day-long visits to several of the most important component agencies of the French assistance program. Later, I made many more visits on my own. After the end of my tour in Paris, I put together all I had learned about the French aid program to Tropical Africa in a 33 page airgram. It was a labor of love which I finally completed in Dakar in July 1980. Bob Duncan in the Paris Embassy cleared my airgram and sent it out to a wide number of posts, including all our Africa Missions. Embassy/Paris also distributed my message to our embassies in the four other capitals (London,

Bonn, Brussels, and Ottawa) which along with Washington had agreed to join in the “Giscard Initiative.” This was an idea of the French president to encourage joint project funding in Africa.

The airgram represented, I think, and Bob Duncan would agree, the most complete report we had up to that time on French assistance overall. I had had to start from scratch because we knew so little. This report was the main thing I had to show as evidence of my 16 months in Paris, since the representational nature of the job didn’t encourage visible results. Norm Schoonover, our Director in Dakar, came up to replace me and I left Paris to become the Program Officer in USAID/Senegal.

Q: What can you recall about what you wrote about how French cooperation worked?

REA: The first thing that struck me was the size and complexity of the French program. In volume of assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, France was the Number One bilateral donor -- \$1.5 billion of ODA in the year I was writing, 1980. I wrote the airgram as a guide for development people like myself who had been asked to work with the French more closely, but who found they knew next to nothing about the purpose and instruments, with all the acronyms, of the French aid program: who did what, and why, and how much -- that sort of thing.

There were two other interesting characteristics of the program. First, its centerpiece was technical assistance. France had 11,600 “cooperants” in Tropical Africa at the time. About three-quarters of them were teachers. According to OECD, France was, not surprisingly, the leading bilateral donor in aid to education, accounting for over half of all education aid by the DAC countries combined. Most of these “cooperant” teachers were posted in secondary schools or secondary-level institutions. Along with the cooperant program went a very large French investment in training, on the level of well over 5,000 scholarships and training grants each year, for courses both in France and Africa, of both long and short term duration.

The second characteristic which interested me about French aid was its emphasis on research. About two-thirds of all the research assistance given by the EEC in these years was French. And the agencies which carried out this research were quite specialized and were state-supported. My airgram went into the broad lines of policy, but in it I also catalogued the various institutions which made up the French program, perhaps in more detail than many busy AID officers in the field wanted to read. I intended the airgram to be a reference document. I imagine it may still have some currency today as it describes the basic agencies and institutions of French aid, although I’m sure the program has gone through many changes over the past 15 years.

Q: Maybe we can even use the airgram as an attachment if it is not too much.

REA: That will be fine, if the scanner will work on the copy I have, which is a bit faded.

Q: That is very important history.

REA: Yes, given the sheer size of the French program, if for no other reason. Of course, French aid was concentrated pretty much on the former French colonies, and most particularly on five countries: Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, and Madagascar. Also, the nature of the

program was quite different from ours. In the way it was organized, under the watchful eye of the Presidency (the Elysée), France's aid program was a model of close articulation between foreign policy, trade policy, economic assistance, and internal economic policy, all set within the workings of the franc zone. Still, French assistance had a very human face and this was the cooperant, mostly teachers, as I've said.

Q: Were the cooperants also just people, staffing?

REA: Yes, the other quarter of the 11,600 cooperants then serving in Sub-Saharan Africa were the so-called "technicians." About 1500 of these were in health services, and the balance, some 2000, were in miscellaneous fields like administration, utilities, agriculture, and industry.

Q: In positions in government?

REA: Yes, very often. Perhaps the ones we most think of in this regard were those in administration. They were often very influential – legal, economic, and cultural counselors in presidential and ministerial offices, magistrates, internal security and military advisors, and communications people. No wonder it was said that the French technical assistance program represented the "transmission belt" of French policy in Africa. But that's a bit of an overstatement, since they were concentrated in the five countries I've mentioned. Also, compared with 1960, the proportions were reversed. Twenty years before, at the time of Independence, the "technicians" were three-quarters of the total number of cooperants and held positions in the government, and only one quarter in 1960 were teachers. So the French program had changed with the times.

Q: Well, it would be interesting to see what you wrote at that time. So, you didn't stay working in Paris very long. How did you find working in Paris compared to the SDP in Washington?

REA: My four years helping the Sahel Program to get up and running had been very intense. Sadly, my wife and I separated towards the end of that period. The Paris assignment was just what I needed to regain a larger perspective and take a few deep breaths. Our Paris Embassy was second to Bonn at that time as the largest U.S. embassy anywhere in the world. All the U.S. agencies were represented, and we were proud to be led by a distinguished career diplomat, Arthur Hartman, who went from Paris to become our ambassador to the Soviet Union. I found a ground floor apartment on the Seine across from the Eiffel Tower and I could walk to work every morning. Life was so good in that sort of way that within only a few months I realized I would be lost to development if I did not get out at the first good opportunity. I did not have long to wait.

Q: Did you have any other functions other than doing this study, so to speak?

REA: You bet! In fact, the study took the least official time -- it was the product of late nights and weekends -- even though reporting was supposed to be the main result of all I did. As the AID man in the Embassy, I spent a great deal of time, as you can imagine, supporting visitors, briefing them, setting up meetings and accompanying them. Fortunately, I had a crackerjack secretary, Jacque L'Huillier, who had worked for years in the Embassy and performed the

routine jobs with great zest. She was known to all our regular visitors. I also got involved in several projects, such as a remote sensing center in Ouagadougou, and in various activities, like supplying Rwanda during a war with Uganda. But I did not have any responsibility for these activities other than “coordinating,” and I soon discovered that that kind of work, without any responsibility for programs, is profoundly unsatisfying in the long run. The good thing was that by means of all these meetings I got to see the French system in action, and this provided much of the insight I needed to write my final report, the airgram.

Q: Were you working on Club du Sahel matters?

REA: No, Art Fell was managing all of our interests at the Club. I always needed to know what the Club was doing to factor that into the larger picture of Franco-American coordination. Both France and the U.S. were members of the Club. But from my position I was interested in what the French themselves were doing, not only in the Sahel but in other places in Africa, as well, in order to orient others to the total French program. Still, the Sahel region was where the U.S. and France were doing the most together. I came to believe that in an age of shrinking budgets for personnel, if I were running AID, the position I occupied in the Embassy would be hard to justify. It made me feel uneasy to be in that kind of slot.

Q: Right. Were there any particular cooperative programs with the U.S. that you were working on?

REA: Yes, the “Giscard Initiative” which I’ve mentioned was the most important. It had a formal title, something like CADA, Concerted Action for Development in Africa. I was involved in the first two rounds of talks which involved senior people from AID/W and the other capitals. The meetings took place, as I recall, in the building which had served as the secret meeting place for U.S. negotiations with the North Vietnamese five or six years before. It was a grand old building on a tree-lined avenue in the area of the Arc de Triomphe. But I don’t know what became of the CADA initiative, since I left Paris just at the time it began to gather some steam. The fact that Norm Schoonover, our most experienced French-speaking Mission Director, replaced me at the Embassy was taken by the French as a sign, I think, that the U.S. was taking Giscard’s idea seriously. You were involved in one or both of these initial meetings. Whatever became of CADA?

Q: It petered out, but it got some things started. It is another story.

REA: It had the potential of being the most significant thing I was involved with in Paris.

Q: But you don't know much about it.

REA: No. I helped to get the six partners in the same room and they looked at possibilities for joint funding some projects, but after a couple of meetings Norm Schoonover took over. He arrived and I departed in January 1980.

GREGORY T. FROST
Vice Consul
Lyon (1978-1981)

Gregory Frost was born in Washington, DC in 1951. He graduated from the University of Kansas and then joined the Foreign Service in 1975. His overseas assignments include Liverpool, Lagos, Lyon, Maseru, Tijuana, Conakry, Hermosillo, Tegucigalpa, Brasilia, and Buenos Aires. Mr. Frost was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2012.

Q: And then you went then in '78?

FROST: Yep.

Q: Where did you go?

FROST: I went to Lyon, France as Vice Consul.

Q: Ah.

FROST: Which I truly deserved, from the hardship tour in from Nigeria, plus I had four plus, four plus French.

Q: Yeah.

FROST: You know? And I was sort of an expert on the country, I'd lived there, so to speak. So, so that was, that was a dream. That was --

Q: How long were you in Lyon?

FROST: Two years also, little over two -- two and two and -- two and a bit.

Q: What was the role of Lyon consular wise in France?

FROST: Well, they had five consulates in France back then: Marseilles, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, Lyon, and Nice. We were one of five. And they were -- as in the words of an Irish colleague that I got to know later at another post, it was a -- they were all "man-boy" operations, you know, and older, experienced Consul and a younger, junior Vice Consul -- and I was the "boy." We did, you know, a fair amount -- not -- many fewer visas that we did in Liverpool, because the French didn't travel to the States like the Brits did. But it was, you know, American Citizen Services, representation, you know, a lot, a lot -- just showing the flag and attending stuff and --

Q: What were the politics of Lyon?

FROST: Well, they had kind of a strange city. They were -- it was a very bourgeois, but very much of a growing concern than, than Bordeaux had been, you know, when I was there as a

student-- progressive, prosperous, growing. But they'd had these whole series of -- there was a guy named Édouard Herriot who was, who was Mayor of Lyon, if you can believe it, from like 1914 to 1958.

Q: President of France, wasn't he?

FROST: Yes, he was, he was Prime Minister before that too, I think Yeah, during the like inter-war years, yeah. He was a very -- he was a national politician. And you know, in France, even to this day you can be a mayor and a senator at the same time and --

Q: Yeah.

FROST: -- and, and a minister all at the same time. And so he was. After him they had Louis Pradel for years, but he was really a purely local guy, whereas at least Herriot had national standing. And when I was there the had a guy named Francis Collomb So they had like three mayors between 1914 and the time I was there. And we were on the third one while I was there, so it was kind of insular. And then they had Raymond Barre, who was Prime Minister for a while back then when Giscard was President and who was an MP from Lyon, they call a "parachutist" --not local but put there to occupy a safe seat in Parliament. And he was just stuck in there, you know, by the party, whatever. So, so it's kind of interesting to have the Prime Minister be from there, you know, sort of from there. The city was very business oriented, conservative in that sense.

Q: What sort of business was going on there? Was there any particularly big business?

FROST: Well, they had kind of like chemical industries and pharmaceuticals and kind of, kind of -- you know, I'm thinking more high tech cutting edge now than it was historically, when they had the silk and textiles, before you had all the information stuff, you know. So very much -- they saw themselves as kind of a rival to Milan and Turin and places like that, kind of -- not the heavy-industry rust-belt type city.. There was Saint Etienne to the west, where they used to have a lot of coal and steel and that kind of industry. But they didn't really have that in Lyon. It was more light industry sort of things I guess you could say.

Q: Well, were there many French students going to the United States in those days?

FROST: No, not very many.

Q: Mm-hmm. It's not the time of the American challenge?

FROST: Yeah, there was that. Because -- well, Lyon was a little bit ingrown, a little bit, as we found when we got involved with the community there because of our French, you know. But they were still very open and welcoming to us, you know. But there was a group called "Rhone Accueil," which was kind of what "welcome wagon" is in the U.S. for new people that were transferred or moved there from other parts of France, you know, and didn't have a -- because France is very family, group oriented society. And so people kind of go to a new place and don't feel like they have, you know, it's their job maybe to be there, but they don't fit in, you know,

their family's somewhere else in the country, whatever, you know. So we joined this group and we were there for two plus years and none of us were new anymore by the time two years had gone by. But we still hung out together. We had a bridge club that played every week or so at different people's houses. And we had one guy that was -- loved the Romanesque churches and Auvergne, and he would take us out on these little hikes and excursions and stuff like that. It was fun, you know. So that's our group of friends really, just a bunch of French people that were like, you know, young professionals I guess I would say mainly.

Q: Did the hand of the embassy rest heavily or lightly on you all?

FROST: It was pretty light. The Consul General, guy named Bill Morgan --

Q: Bill and I wrote a book together.

FROST: Oh, you did? Bill, yeah, Bill was kind of a larger than life character.

Q: Oh yeah.

FROST: In certain ways. And he was the, he was in charge of all the consulates, you know, as the Consul General in Paris. And he was a good guy and we got along, you know, we liked him, he liked us, and my boss and I got along, got along well. And but so he, you know, we were basically, you know, he was interested in -- it's about right, I would say. We sort of felt like, for example, the CG for some reason -- and it wasn't anything personal, you know, but, but the locals there just kind of like -- we, we were just a mere consulate and it was *the embassy*. So if, if it came time, if they wanted somebody to come down and do a representational kind of thing, you know, the -- the French people would always want somebody from the embassy. And it would always piss off my boss because he'd sort of say, "Well," guy named Carol Floyd was his name, from Arkansas, great guy, Econ Officer. But he would, he would, he would just get livid, say, "I'm a Consul General, you know, you know, I'm, I'm, you know, I'm a Colonel, whatever, you know. You know, why aren't I good enough? Why does it always -- they really have some Junior Political Officer from Paris because he's from, just because he's from the embassy than they would me who's the consul General in this district, you know?" (*laughs*). It was kind of weird about them in a way that the embassy was for them this huge powerful thing and we were just this little consulate.

Q: Well, there is this, this feeling, you know, I mean the title and all. Was there much anti-Americanism at the time or?

FROST: Not really, no. Didn't seem to be -- it was -- I didn't feel it really, hardly. And of course I was, I was so assimilated in terms of my, you know, French background, and my wife too, that we, we were, we were sort of honorary French in certain respects I guess you'd say. I was there when Giscard lost to Mitterrand. All the bourgeois people there, people I knew in context, they were all panicking about that and, "God, we're going to have a Socialist President and it's going to be terrible," you know.

"No, your three-star restaurants will still be there. You'll just -- they'll just be a bit more

expensive, but nothing'll really change."

Q: What was your wife doing?

FROST: Well, she, she got -- she was able to work as a PIT doing visas some of the time, you know, even though it didn't seem to be a problem for summer, summer hire kind of stuff, you know. But she just really enjoyed living in France. We both joined an amateur choir there and our, our group would combine with a couple other choirs and sing with the Lyon Symphony, you know, concerts that people actually paid to attend, you know, major choral works with symphony backing us up and professional soloists brought in, and some from the U.S., you know. And that was our, that was our main hobby there, you know, so we had -- so when they had a group, a group of friends from that group, from the choir as well. And that was lots of fun. We did a lot of traveling too, because my boss liked to travel and I like -- we like to travel. So basically I don't know how we did it, but during the two years that we were there each year, I don't know how I had enough leave to do this, let alone the money, but we did two three-week vacations each year, a spring one and a fall one generally.

Q: Good heavens.

FROST: We drove all the way through -- we drove down through Spain, toured parts of Spain, ended up in Morocco, and went all the way to Marrakesh and back in our car. And we did another trip to, where we just got visas for -- got it cleared and everything and got our -- got visas for -- we had one friend in Krakow from A-100 and another friend in East Berlin, and we drove from France over there, over, over to Vienna and then transmitted up through Czechoslovakia to Krakow and went to Auschwitz and went to Krakow and stuff. And then we drove over from there to East Berlin back to France. Those were two of our vacations, three weeks each.

Q: Well, was there any significant immigration from Lyon to the States?

FROST: No, not really. They had a -- the closest thing was the Clermont-Ferrand, which was kind of the headquarters of Michelin. They had a Michelin plant in I think North Carolina, which is still there.

Q: Yeah.

FROST: And -- but no, there was, there was very little.

Q: Well, then you left there when?

FROST: It January of '81.

Q: Must have been quite a wrench.

FROST: Yeah, it, it was, especially coming back to Washington.

WILLIAM D. MORGAN
Consul General
Paris (1978-1981)

William D. Morgan was born in New York in 1925. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester in 1949 and a master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1953. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. Mr. Morgan's Foreign Service career included positions in Lebanon, Paris, and Montreal. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: Moving off this subject to being consul general in Paris, what was different there as a consul general than in Lebanon?

MORGAN: Of course, the dangers of being blown up, for example, are reduced. You were looking at a more civilized setting, so your living was easier, although living in Paris isn't always the easiest thing in the world. But let me tick off the similarities. First, getting to know your colleagues and working with them well is identical to the Beirut, S/IG and VO situations. There was no difference whatsoever in how you work with your colleagues, gain their confidence and relate to the consular function. Secondly, we also had a physical relocation problem in Paris that was basic and involved the entire embassy. On the other hand, the visa function involved much less intercession; as a matter of fact, next to nothing. So, visa pressures were less but the volume was far worse. We were in Paris during the Iranian hostage crisis when our embassy was held imprisoned. We had a tremendous influx of Iranians at that time.

Q: You were there in Paris between 1978 and '81.

MORGAN: Right. Exactly. The visa responsibilities were largely a function of volume and people movement logistics. The basis of our visa business was the legitimate French and European applicants weighed against the third-country nationals who were the problem cases, particularly Iranians. And the physical layout lessons I learned from Beirut became applicable in Paris. We had to relocate the section, and that was a battle far more difficult than in Beirut.

The similarities with the American community were there. The Americans weren't as concerned about security issues, but they were very sensitive that the American Embassy understood their concerns. I was on the board of the American Chamber of Commerce and the American Hospital of Paris. I was vice-president of the American Club of Paris, an organization that were very, very closely tied to Embassy objectives. The Consul General was role-playing but that role was clearly in U.S. interests in France and with the American community.

The thing that's different -- and I want to emphasize that most issues really were the same as in Lebanon -- was my role as supervising consul general over five constituent posts. I would say that took up about a third of my time. These constituent posts were constantly being closed or threatened to be closed. We also had, in some cases, prima donnas as Principal Officers. In other cases, we had not too qualified people. They were almost all two-officer posts. The small- post-

syndrome versus the big embassy, was endemic: "no one ever listens to me and no one ever cares what I'm doing," versus "they don't know what they're doing out there in the consulates." The role, as supervising consul general, as well as guiding the consular function, was a ball-juggling but very fascinating responsibility.

Q: What were the posts?

MORGAN: Lyon, Bordeaux, Nice, Marseille, and Strasbourg. We closed Nice while I was there, and then we reopened it. I think we closed it again. I can't remember. But the issue: Can a consular cone officer supervise principal officers who are economic or political cone? Yes, if he ranks them and writes their efficiency reports. It's amazing what he can do. And second, if he gains their confidence and says, "Look, I'm with you." Traveling out to the constituent posts repeatedly, sitting down with the admin and other FSNs, commiserating with the principal officer and understanding where they feel they're being misused or misunderstood. Security. I traveled repeatedly with the Embassy security officer to these posts, because security in France was becoming ever more important. Remember, we lost an assistant military attaché and almost a DCM and Commercial Counselor.

ROBERT B. DUNCAN
Economic Counselor
Paris (1978-1982)

Robert B. Duncan was born in New Jersey in 1934. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1957 he served in the US Army from 1958-1960. His career has included positions in Rabat, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Paris, and Bangkok. Mr. Duncan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 9, 1995.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

DUNCAN: 1978-1982.

Q: What was your job in Paris?

DUNCAN: Now, the title of it is the economic counselor, but at that time it was called the chief of the Economic Division. We had an economic minister who was in charge of it. Because Embassy Paris was such a large embassy, the Treasury representative there handled the financial questions. We had a commercial counselor who handled the commercial issues. And we had an agricultural attaché. So, I used to think of my own division as being sort of the Department of Miscellaneous Affairs. In other words, if it wasn't something that was assigned to the commercial counselor and it wasn't anybody else's, then it was mine.

Q: Who was the economic minister?

DUNCAN: It was Jack Myers first and then Mike Ewing. I had two.

Q: I imagine you had several ambassadors while you were there.

DUNCAN: Art Hartman was ambassador for most of the time that I was there. I had Galbraith first and then Hartman.

Q: Where did he come from before that and can you tell me how he operated?

DUNCAN: He was a political appointee. He had made his money in oil tankers. We are under President Carter. Then Reagan was elected in 1980.

Q: I'm having a little trouble because I don't have my references of who was who. We think it was Hartman and then Hartman moved into part of the Reagan administration and then Galbraith followed when Hartman went off to Moscow. We can sort that out and manipulate this in the final transcript. Could you describe your impression of how Hartman operated with the embassy and his effectiveness in dealing with the French from your perspective?

DUNCAN: He had a total command of the language. He had served in Paris before. He knew lots of people in Paris who had risen. But the thing that amazed me about the man is that he took a great interest in making sure that he had good people. In other words, he spent a great deal of effort in selecting the people who worked for him. Once he had selected them, he let them do their thing. This is the most incredible thing about him: Even though your contact with him would be limited because it was a very large embassy and I was two tiers down if you don't count the DCM as a separate tier (I had a minister between me and him.) that we would let everybody know what his desires were. It wasn't that you were constantly talking to him. It was the question that he had an ability to both delegate authority but to give very clear guidelines of what he wanted. I remember a particular case where we had a problem out at the American School. A communicator went to complain. He asked me to come up because he knew that I had children in the school. He asked some very pertinent questions. We discussed the problem. He wanted to know who was the person that was on the board of trustees out there. He picked up the phone and took care of the problem himself. In other words, this was a thing that could have become a serious problem. He was made aware of the problem and immediately moved to take care of the problem. He figured out the problem and the power dynamic and took care of it. It's a minor thing.

Q: But it signified a method of operation.

DUNCAN: It signified a person who is truly an effective manager. He recognizes that a subtle problem like this can become a very serious problem.

Q: We'll talk about ambassadors, although that will probably be a little later. What about Galbraith? There was a famous economist named John Kenneth Galbraith, but this was not this person. You probably didn't have too much time with him.

DUNCAN: No. It was like day and night. In other words, we had an individual who came into

the job, really did not have background, did not have the command for the language, had money, but was a bit of a bull in a china closet.

Q: If I recall, he wrote a book afterwards

DUNCAN: Now that I am absolutely sure, I know that it was Hartman and then Galbraith. We're talking about people who are still around. When Galbraith wrote the scathing attack on the Foreign Service, I had left Paris. I was away for quite some time. I'm trying to remember whether he said it to me or somebody else said it to me. He had been told that you don't want to take any experienced person who has background or their own power base and what not. You want to bring somebody in there who is totally dependent on you so that they will have total loyalty to you because they won't be there unless you are there. The DCM had been picked in that category. There were a lot of raised eyebrows. I'm not going to mention his name. There had been a lot of raised eyebrows about the fact that this individual had been picked because there were a lot of people who were much more likely to get the job, but had been picked because it was a person who would be loyal because of he'd be utterly dependent on him. He behaved that way. The DCM, in effect, basically acted like a doormat for him. So, when he came out and attacked the Foreign Service, he was basically attacking primarily this guy who had done everything for him. I remember that.

Q: Did his attitude permeate the embassy?

DUNCAN: Oh, yes. Hartman was so phenomenal. Hartman is generally considered to be probably one of the handful of the very best career Foreign Service officers, who now we know got a real raw deal in Moscow because the Russians set him up to try to divert attention away from Ames. But the point of it was that here was a guy who was running a very effective ship with very effective delegative power, but everybody operating in tandem. Then we went to a completely different agenda. My perspective was somewhat limited. I had the impression that the French were not impressed.

Q: If I recall, Galbraith got on TV to publicly espouse the American cause and to attack the French government or something like that? Does that ring a bell?

DUNCAN: That's after my time.

Q: I may be wrong on that. When you say you had the economic job of the bits and pieces, what were some of those?

DUNCAN: If it didn't fall under the jurisdiction of the agricultural attaché, the Treasury representative, or the commercial counselor, I got it.

Q: What were some of the things that you got?

DUNCAN: I spent a great deal of time was dealing with commodity issues and energy. I guess one of my major operations there was that the issue was coming up of building a huge new natural gas pipeline from Russia into Europe. At the same time, the Europeans were looking at

this as an alternative to Algeria because, particularly from the French perspective, there were risks involved in being dependent on natural gas from Algeria, even though they had a big interest there. It was a matter of national policy. We were trying to work with the Europeans to not let this natural gas pipeline, in effect, become a type of Achilles heel, where the Western Europeans would become dependent on natural gas that could be turned off. It was a major strategic issue. I was involved in that.

Q: Can you talk about what at that time the French stand was on this and how did you deal and work with this?

DUNCAN: They were as conscious as we were of the risks. They were probably more sympathetic to what we were trying to achieve. They were trying to approach it from a balanced point of view and trying to work out some kind of system whereby the Algerians could participate in the exercise, but in a way that was not going to pose a threat. In other words, try to develop a relationship where Algerian gas could become like an offset. It was very interesting because the bottom line in the whole exercise at the very end when the crunch came, the Belgians undermined the united position vis a vis the Algerians. I remember at the time, this French official said to me, "Bob, it's Zaire." In other words, the question was, "Why are they doing this?" There was this FrenchBelgian competition for influence in Zaire and this was a way for the Belgians to get back at the French.

Q: This is a question I particularly like to ask about France. It's been our oldest ally and all, but the relationship has always been rocky. We're talking about this 1978/1981 period. How did you find dealing with the French bureaucracy, your estimation of the people you dealt with in the French government, how they reacted, how one deals with them as an American?

DUNCAN: I had one advantage. My French was pretty good and I made the decision that in all my dealings with the French, I was going to use French. So, as a consequence, it not only increased my fluency in it, but I had the feeling that by sitting and always talking with them in French, I would get them to be more open and forthcoming and frank, rather than forcing them to try to express their views in a foreign language. But they wanted to demonstrate their own English ability. Most French diplomats and the people I dealt with in ministries all had excellent English. So, they could work in English. If we had a problem, sometimes we could switch. Generally speaking, I think that that's absolutely essential. My own feeling is, as they used to say, you can't work in Embassy Paris unless you have really good French. I agree with that. If all you do is English and they have to deal with you, they will deal with you. But if you are, as frequently you are, really in the demander position, saying, "Would you support us on this," to have to say, "We're going to support you on this" and then force them to, in effect, do it in English... My own feeling is that I think that that creates a problem. So, that's the first key thing. I would say that I found that because I could work with them in their language, I always found courtesy and access. Then comes the problem of how are you able to condition their thinking. I think that the critical thing to understand here is, the French approach things, based on my experience and other commentators, in a very Cartesian way. That is, all the interested parties sit down and they analyze the problem in terms of "les interets de la France (the interests of France)." When they finally come to a conclusion on what is the best way to go in terms of protecting "les interets de la France..." Their policy is very oriented toward national interests. If

you make an appeal to them where "This would be good for mankind" or "This is the right thing to do," maybe... But they think of what is in the French interests in this issue. Maybe the humanitarian concern might be a French interest. Americans tend to say, "Look, this is very important to us and this is very important to you. How about you go along with us on this and we'll go along with you on that?" They don't function that way. "What is the interest of France on this issue and what is the interest of France on that issue?" That's the way it is. The other thing is that when they make this determination of what is the interest of France, they must have a very effective interministerial coordination system. I guess there must be very rigid rules held that you do not engage (We're talking about civil servants.) in interministerial warfare by going outside and dragging the foreigner in. There may be ministerial differences of opinion, but you don't try to manipulate the foreigner and use the foreigner as a wedge to condition like in the American form of government. They don't have that. So, as a consequence, once they came up with a decision, it was like a parrot. You could ask this person "What is the view of the French government" and he would use almost the same language as if you asked somebody over here. I'm just saying that, in retrospect, it seemed to be always well thought out in advance. A conclusion was come to and then it was applied. The positive side of that is that they tended not to do anything rash. In other words, they wouldn't take a leap until they had thought the thing out. The trouble of it is that if they ever thought the thing out and came up with an erroneous conclusion or a poor solution, it was impossible to change their view until the realities crashed through and caused them to rethink.

Q: I have never dealt with the French in a political sense. But from watching their movies and all, they seem to see patterns where the Americans don't see patterns. Sometimes these patterns, at least to my eyes, seem to be erroneous. There are some things that happen like plots or some idiot will shoot somebody or something like that and they try to see a pattern to maybe what we're requesting, where it may be just because we're doing it because a senator in a key state wants something to be done. They think there is a pattern behind our request.

DUNCAN: I think there is an element of truth in what you say. They tend to project their own way of doing things on other people. It's hard for them to understand that you could have a totally disorganized, totally uncoordinated situation coming out that they would never permit themselves to have happen. They wouldn't permit a type of chaos that we sort of view as our way of life. There is an element of that. Another thing is that they make a decision (This is the way I look at it.). The French never condition their thinking by what you say. They condition their thinking by what they believe that you're prepared to do. So, therefore, if they don't think that you are prepared to do something, they won't do it. It doesn't matter if you tell them. They may not believe that you really mean what you say.

Q: Particularly in many international affairs where we tend to preach and bluster and say, "We should do something," when they will look at us and say, "This is all fine, but the reality is that the United States isn't prepared to insert force there or do this."

DUNCAN: Right.

Q: Did you ever find them coming to you in your position and find that they were working our system to their advantage? In other words, they would go to you and maybe to the Treasury or

something like this and be trying to get something?

DUNCAN: It may have happened. Play one of us off against the other.

Q: It might have been done more in Washington than in the embassy anyway, if it was done.

DUNCAN: I guess on some trade issues if the Germans took a position that they did not like, they would try to mobilize us as an ally for them against the Germans. Or the British. Yes, that would happen. But you're talking about trying to internally play one side against the other. It may have happened, but I'm not aware of it.

Q: I'm speaking as a gross outsider in this whole relationship. Did you ever sort of have the idea that the French were sort of odd men out and doing it with a certain perverse pleasure of showing that they were different and weren't part of anybody's team or not?

DUNCAN: I think that where there was the difference is that they were not prepared for what we would characterize as a larger greater good to sacrifice what they viewed as being a French interest. In other words, I guess there was more of a Machiavellianism in theirs than in ours. There would be cases of where the American government would, in effect, not support, if you want to call it, a very narrow commercial interest if they felt that this was going to pose a serious instability or security problem. That didn't seem to bother them a bit. Do business with Iraq... The idea would be, we put an embargo on a country because of terrorism problems and they would go for the business.

Q: You mentioned commodities besides power. Were there any particular issues during the time you were dealing with this?

DUNCAN: There, the issue had to do with do you believe in trying to have commodity agreements? The French were more inclined toward commodity agreements than the American government was. So, I was more in a defensive position. In other words, the thing that they would be advocating, we would not. They were in favor of more regulation than we were.

Q: Do any particular commodities come to mind?

DUNCAN: Cocoa, coffee. They were very oriented toward quota agreements and things like that. My problem was, our administration was opposed to that sort of thing.

Q: Did you get at all involved in the development of the European Community in your position?

DUNCAN: If they were trade issues, they would normally be handled in Brussels. The negotiations between the United States and Europeans on trade issues were with the Commission. We had a number of investment issues.

Q: To rephrase the question, were there any specific problems with commodities between the French and the United States?

DUNCAN: The problem was that we and, to a degree the Germans, and to a degree the British, were more oriented toward letting the market handle itself. The French, on the other hand, were responding like an advocate for themselves and for developing countries that wanted to regulate commodities. In some areas we were prepared to consider it. But I think the French would be prepared to use a commodity agreement as a means to, in effect, raise the price of the commodity above what we'll call the normal market price and we were not.

Q: I realize that we had an agricultural consulate. Did you get involved in any farm disputes?

DUNCAN: No.

Q: That was a handy thing to have someone else for.

DUNCAN: That was his problem.

Q: You say that with a certain relief. You were there during the transition with the arrival of Ronald Reagan as President. I can imagine that the French were really kind of bewildered about, all of a sudden, here is this person is known as not a top rate movie star, despite the fact that he had become Governor of California, become President of the United States, and seemed to be coming from the strong right wing of the Republican Party. Did you find in your dealings with the French either at the social level or professional level trying to explain or answer questions about Ronald Reagan?

DUNCAN: I remember one particular meeting which was just before the election in which they wanted to know who I thought was going to win, trying to discuss American politics and the electoral system and what not. But my general impression is that they were happy with Reagan's victory.

Q: Jimmy Carter had not come across as a very strong President.

DUNCAN: That was the problem. They viewed him as a weak President. They like strength.

When they ask about all my assignments, they say, "Which one did you like the best?" I always say, "You like different assignments for different reasons. But the most dangerous assignment I've ever had was in Paris because that's when we had the terrorist attack. Our Army attaché was gunned down on the sidewalk. A Libyan attacked our DCM, Chris Chapman. They said that we were being targeted, so they set up all sorts of special operations for us. At one point, they said they were going to have us accompanied. Then we had the famous case of Rod Grant, the commercial counselor, saw the bomb under his car. This was the miracle of why American Embassy Paris continues to stand. We were having these terrorist attacks against American personnel. Rod Grant had a son who was going to UCLA. He and his father were having an argument. He was going to take him back to the airport to send him back to college. They came down the stairs. They were on the Avenue de la Bourdonnet in the seventh arrondissement. They came out of their apartment house and went over to the car. The 18 year old son, who was an athletic type, was so aggravated at his father that when he got the trunk open, he threw his duffel into the trunk and slammed the trunk so hard that a magnetic bomb that had been put under the

car dropped off into the street and they drove away to the airport. Our assistant Air attaché, who lived nearby, was walking down the street, saw this thing and knew from his own experience what it was. So, they called the Parisian bomb disposal people. They came out. According to one of the security people, the reason that what happened happened was because they violated the first rule of bomb disposal. That is, you don't move the bomb until you diffuse it. They moved it and it exploded and took out windows on two sides of the avenue to the whole block of the Avenue de la Bourdonet. The thing of it was that the terrorists probably knew that Rod Grant parked his car in the basement garage of the embassy. So, the feeling was that what they had wanted was for him to drive his car into the basement and then have the thing blow up there. So, we would have lost our building on the Place de la Concorde. The fact that it took out all the windows on a whole block in the air, you could imagine what it would have done to the embassy.

Q: How about your personal life there? Did you feel particularly under attack or not?

DUNCAN: No. We went through this period where they said we were being targeted. Therefore, they were figuring out who was most involved. So, there was quite a bit of stress and strain. Other than common sense sort of things where you don't go the same way the same hour every day, I felt that... They originally wanted everybody to drive and they would have policy escorts to take you in. I remember the first time they said this. I said, "Look, I always take the Metro. I don't want to drive my car." So, here they had a motorcycle cop come along. As I'm walking from my apartment to the Metro station, he is driving along. It was like, "Here is one." This is counterproductive.

Q: Who were the terrorists that we saw at that time?

DUNCAN: Arabs, Muslims. The ones that shot Chapman were Libyan. The one that killed the assistant Air attaché was also Libyan. Afterwards, there were some bomb explosions against the French.

PAUL K. STAHNKE
Counselor of Mission, OECD
Paris (1978-1982)

Paul K. Stahnke was born in Illinois in 1923. He served in the U.S. military from 1943-1946 and received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree, both in international relations, from the University of Chicago in 1950. Mr. Stahnke's career included positions in Germany, Italy, Japan, Somalia, Denmark, France, and Thailand. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on June 1, 1994.

Q: Now, as you mentioned, in 1978 you moved from that assignment to Paris where you were with our mission to the OECD. What was your exact position there?

STAHNKE: My title was Counselor of Mission and I was number three or four, depending on how you counted it, in the Mission. To provide direction to our complex activities, the Mission

had an Executive Committee composed of the Ambassador, DCM, the Treasury Attaché, myself, and the AID representative. I headed a section that dealt with the energy issue (the International Energy Agency, which was semi-autonomous), trade, steel, social affairs and a few others things of lesser importance. Perhaps one of my most important assignments was that of US representative on the OECD Budget Committee. That was the committee that annually determined the budget for the OECD Secretariat. This was important because we contributed directly to the OECD, all of the 24 member countries, and through this budgetary process at the end of each calendar year we directly influenced the activities of the Secretariat, indeed sometimes forcing them to change direction. For example, over the strenuous objections of those working in social and labor affairs, we took money from them (thus forcing a reduction in their activities) and transferred it to trade which had become a more important current issue. Using the budgetary process as a program setting device worked very effectively. We thus kept the activities of the Secretariat and member country priorities in harmony.

Q: It sounds as though you had a very full platter there. I note you mentioned energy and as I recall it was during those years that we had the great rise in energy prices in 1979.

STAHNKE: That was the second oil shock. The International Energy Agency was a semi-independent agency. We were then collectively trying, among other things, to develop a set of procedures in the event that we should have another oil crisis which would result in a cutoff of oil from the Middle East in particular. This involved programs such as stockpiling. Nobody was forced to do this, although there was a lot of talk about it and recommendations about how we best could do this and indeed the United States began about that point to store larger amounts of oil. We perhaps over did it because the concern about oil was not just whether it might be in short supply, or cutoff for various reasons, but that the price might rise. There was considerable concern at that point that it might rise to \$100 a barrel; instead, it did nothing but go down, dropping to something like \$12 a barrel about four or five years later. So, as a result of these changes in the years I was there, the International Energy Agency, dropped from being a very important focal point, particularly for our Department of Energy, to becoming almost irrelevant. Little purpose was served in coordinating energy policies in an environment of satisfactory supplies and falling prices. It also seemed clear that a shock similar to the two we had in the 1970s would be repeated again in the foreseeable future.

Q: My only experience with the OECD was to note that they usually issue gloomy reports as to how bad the situation is. But the period you were there it was a serious problem because inflation was rising in the United States and probably in other countries too. Were there differences between the OECD organization and the US administration's views, and you dealt with two administrations, Carter and Reagan?

STAHNKE: I suppose you are right in that these reports tended to focus on problem areas but not always. Coordination for these reports was excellent. In preparation for the report on the US economy, either the Chairman or his deputy of the Council of Economic Advisors came to Paris for discussions in depth, plus representatives of the Treasury Department. Discussions were usually heated and the outcome not necessarily satisfactory to US representatives. Still, on the whole, these reports were widely respected as they continue to be.

I think you are right that the OECD staff responsible for these reports felt, besides a certain amount of glee in criticizing various governments, that they did have a responsibility in being the sober, external, objective organization looking at the economy and providing recommendations as to where the focus should be. This was also the time when the Japanese began to feel their oats. They were always ready, whether in the economic committees or in the Executive Committee or in other organizations to provide advice to the other OECD members countries as to how they should run their economies. They were never reluctant to tell the Americans that they were spending too much and saving too little.

Q: The Dutch uncle treatment.

STAHNKE: Yes, the Dutch uncle treatment, which was kind of amusing because they were the ones who were soliciting advice ten years earlier on how they should run their economy.

Q: Did you enjoy your tour at the OECD?

STAHNKE: Yes. It was eventful and intellectually satisfying. Aside from the other activities I mentioned, I was Chairman of the Trade Committee Working Group which met weekly much of the time. The Group consisted of representatives from the various missions resident in Paris who prepared the material for consideration by the Trade Committee at its periodic meetings of representative from capitals.

The major issue with which I was involved at the time was trade and services, which I've already cited. We were trying very hard to develop a coordinated position among the OECD industrialized countries which we could then use for presentation to the GATT in Geneva for further debate and for consideration at the next GATT round, which indeed it was.

Q: It became a sticky point there for a while.

STAHNKE: It was a very strong sticky point for quite some time. That and agriculture issues. We didn't get as much as we wanted but we got a fair amount and the issue is now subject to both international agreement and international dialogue.

Yes, on the whole, besides just being in Paris, it was an interesting, exciting and very different assignment. It was different from normal embassy operations because it involved a consultative organization among 24 countries, both in the General Council as well as the various committees, with generally no decisions being reached, but a lot of discussion. So it was interesting in terms of the subject matter under discussion and a little frustrating because there was so much talk, so many papers and very little accomplished. But it was fun doing it nevertheless.

CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1978-1982)

Christian A. Chapman was born in France to American parents on September 19, 1921. He served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1945 and received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1948. Mr. Chapman entered the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Morocco, Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam, Luxembourg, France, and Laos. Mr. Chapman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then your next assignment was one that must have been sort of interesting. That was as Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris.

CHAPMAN: That was totally pleasant.

Q: How did you get that assignment from 1978-82?

CHAPMAN: Because Arthur Hartman called me and asked me if I would take the assignment. Arthur Hartman is a friend from Saigon days. I'm very fond of him and his wife, Donna, and have great admiration for both of them.

It was a totally pleasant three years with an ambassador who was thoroughly professional and very highly regarded. Arthur Hartman is one of the most politically sensitive persons I have ever known. He has antennas, that pick the essence of situations out of the air. Very good judgement. Very broad views. A strategic thinker. Highly respected in Paris and Washington.

Q: How did he operate that embassy. That is almost always a political appointment, someone with money.

CHAPMAN: He and Donna are very culturally inclined. They genuinely love the arts, particularly music. They put a lot of effort into it and received a lot of American artists and went out virtually every night to concerts or something. So they established a climate around the embassy of being receptive to the arts and to the world of the artists. Which in France, plays big. As far as running the embassy, he left it largely to me.

I ran the embassy, but Arthur always kept an eye on what he considered problems that had to be dealt with. He was also very sensitive on personnel matters. Professionally as a foreign service officer it was a fascinating job. On one side you run the embassy and at the same time, you have to maintain a presence in town so that when the ambassador leaves, the embassy doesn't become faceless. In effect, you are doing two jobs. It means thirteen to fourteen hour days every day. But it was professionally very satisfying.

We had 27 different agencies represented in the embassy. One great advantage of being the Paris Embassy was that the agencies sent, by and large, very good people. There was never a dearth of volunteers. As a result, we dealt with first class professionals in all agencies, which makes all the difference in the world, as you know.

Q: How did you find dealing with the French bureaucracy?

CHAPMAN: I let my colleagues do that. I tried to have as few operational questions to deal with as possible. Otherwise operations and contacts become layered and confused. If I were to deal with the Quai d'Orsay extensively, that would mean the political counselor would be squeezed out. It was much better to give him full rein. I had a State Department house with four servants, and I tried to provide support for my colleagues in every field, as they considered it useful and necessary. For instance, I had luncheons for senior people at the Quai to let the more junior political officers get to know them. Or when American businessmen came through, the economic and commercial officers would organize an event for their counterparts in the French government. I found this kind support for our colleagues a very good use of our rather elegant appointments.

Q: How did you find the consular operation. You had consulates all over.

CHAPMAN: It was a real problem because we were under pressure to reduce the number of consulates. The case had to be made that they served an important purpose. Very frankly, it was a stretched argument in that, although it is a very good thing to have consulates, to have an American presence around a country like France. that keeps tabs on what is going on around the countryside, the reality is that French political power remains very largely centered in Paris. However, the power of politicians remains anchored in local communities in the provinces. Typically, a French deputy spends each weekend in his department nurturing his constituencies.

It is also good to have consular affairs officers and commercial officers closer to people throughout the country. But consular posts cannot be a top priority; yet powers that be in Washington remain very attached to some of these posts, all for different reasons. The most amusing was the case of Nice. We went through a painful exercise of justifying this post, pointing out among other things that closing it would save really very little. Nevertheless, the decision was made to close it. Then, Grace Kelly wrote a Dear Ron note to President Reagan, and presto it was reopened- on a more modest scale. We lost a magnificent property in the heart of the city, and the Consulate General was reopened in a more modest setting.

Q: This happened when they tried to close Turin. Fiat wrote and you just don't close these things because there are constituencies.

CHAPMAN: Yes, and from the point of view of the local people, the Mayor of Strasbourg for instance, felt quite genuinely that closing a US consulate is a reflection on their city. (Strasbourg by the way hired a public relations firm in Washington, and for whatever reason, the Consulate General was saved.)

Q: There is the problem too, that sometimes we overload a capital. There is a world outside the capital. I speak as one consul general in Naples at one time and Rome seemed to be a world unto itself. If you want to know about Italy it wasn't enough.

CHAPMAN: The same was true in France, although perhaps not to the same degree as in Italy. France is simply one of the most centralized systems in the world.

Q: Any major issues at the time?

CHAPMAN: There was the transition of the Presidency from Giscard d'Estaing to Francois Mitterrand, as a result of the elections of 1981, which we called wrong by a hair. It was a very interesting transition, with a hard right government in Washington and a dreamy left wing government coming to power in Paris.

The great question was what sort of relationship would we have. I confess the recommendations we sent in from the embassy were to stand aloof and tough with this government to see how it would evolve. To let it define its position before we defined ours. And for once I gave the Reagan White House credit of writing, contrary to our recommendation, a very warm letter to Mitterrand, congratulating him on his election. It also came as a surprise to the L'Eysee. I don't know how it happened, but Bush, who was Vice President, came for a get-acquainted visit. The election was held over two weekends in May-June, and Bush came on the 25th of June and made a twenty-four hour stop to call on Mitterrand. It came off very well.

The issue that had rattled Washington immediately, was the incorporation of communists in the government. But Bush managed to put this in context, and I guess was reassured by Mitterrand's firmness on the subject and the impression that Mitterrand always gives of knowing what he is doing.

I had personally one experience which illustrated the gap between the Reagan Washington and the Mitterrand Paris. Early after the legislative elections, I called on Pierre Beregovoy (who by the way is of Ukrainian background) who was responsible for the transition and who is now minister of finance, and probably the most influential Minister in the government. He received me in a small office at the headquarters of the Socialist Party, where the transition team was located. He greeted me at the door and said, "*Alors, M. Chapman, vous vous mettez dans la gueule du loup!*" ("Well, Mr. Chapman, you are putting yourself in the maw of the wolf!") He was persuaded that Washington viewed the Socialists as a dangerous threat, almost on par with the communists. I reassured him on that count, and we got on very well from the beginning.

Q: Were you in France at the time of the new ambassador, Van Galbraith.

CHAPMAN: Yes.

Q: Could you talk about him, he was after all, a fairly controversial man.

HAPMAN: Van Galbraith is something of a mystery to me because he spent five years in Paris, four years in London and one in New York, at senior levels of banking, a very sophisticated world. But he is an ideologue. He considers the Soviet Union, not only an enemy, but as the power that manipulates everything in the world. Everything in the world can be explained by Soviet activity and action. There has to be therefore an uncompromising confrontation with the Soviet Union everywhere. He spent four years as ambassador in Paris and I don't think that to this day he understands why anyone could possibly have voted Socialist much less communist in a country where half of the vote was to the left. So I never felt that he had a good grasp of the reality of France, of Europe, or indeed of the world. Otherwise, he was a perfectly nice fellow.

One aspect of Galbraith was interesting and challenging. He considered that, in the communication world of today, the role of an embassy was limited and its principal function should be to engage in public diplomacy. He really carried out this view of modern diplomacy. He was always available to all the media for interviews, participation in panels and reactions to events. This delighted the media, greatly irritated the government (at one point they considered asking for his recall), and left his staff with their eyes lifted to the skies. Finally, I do not think it was an effective approach: the French being a formal people did not appreciate this perceived intrusion into their internal affairs. And this was a reaction of both left and right, both socialists and conservatives..

Q: Was this a little bit like a hostile confrontation when he arrived?

CHAPMAN: No, he had chosen Jack Maresca who was Director of Western European Affairs to be his DCM, and I was delighted. I spent two months with Galbraith and then left.

RICHARD FENTON ROSS
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1979-1984)

Mr. Ross was born in Virginia and educated at the University of Florida and Vanderbilt University. Joining the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1964, he served several tours of duty at its Headquarters in Washington, DC as well as at a number of US Embassies abroad. Dealing primarily with Information and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Ross served in Beirut, Amman, Jerusalem, Calcutta, Colombo, Kabul, Rabat and Paris. Following his retirement in 1992, he accompanied his wife on her Foreign Service assignments in Sana'a and Damascus. Mr. Ross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: You were there from '79 to '84, yes?

ROSS: Yes. But I went over to UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) after three years there.

Q: Okay. Well, okay, '79 to early '80s.

ROSS: Yes. Anyway, it finally settled down that I would be university contacts and American Political Process; and I would do some editing and writing for a magazine, which we published, and handle all kinds of sociology professors and the political process, to a certain extent, because the elections were big. The French paid a great deal of attention to the American elections right from the get-go, as they would be right now, watching the Democratic party with its nine candidates or however many there are. There's a lot of French press, and they seem to know a lot, so I had my hands full. I'd operate a system of contacts, send them things, and then have two or three big, expensive seminars. We'd get French authorities from, say, "Sciences Po Institut d'Etudes Politiques" (that's the Institute of Political Science), and get them to talk, and get

American scholars or people who were professors or people who did polling to come over and do presentations. Then we would have panel discussions to explain the American political process to the French, but also to let them kind of feel that they had a place to go and that they could take part in it.

Every Frenchman who's literate thinks that he has a vote in the presidential election of the United States, much more than we would imagine here sitting in America, and they follow it. They'll tell you what the strengths and weaknesses are of Ronald Reagan or something like that. I'd get caught off guard—they'd talk to me about Lyndon LaRouche or something, and I wouldn't know that much about it. They're a very thorough kind of people. I also had to do a lot of different political things, which opened my eyes up in my late 30s to things that I didn't know about, like international economics, or the Mont Pelerin Society, or Leo Strauss and the Chicago conservative school.

There were a lot of funny connections between France and America, and they all popped up because France was going conservative at the same time America was in the sense of their politics. I would take, [it seemed (to me)], kind of obscure Americans around, but the French would seem to know more about them than I did. This would mean having people go to outlying conferences at universities, say Grenoble or Lyon. But at the same time, I got to know a lot of people, and I got involved, again, in the arts world, which I seem to gravitate toward, as I mentioned. I had known people in different places and they popped back up.

I became very thick with a black American poet named Ted Joans, who's just passed away; and I got to know Charles Henri Ford, who's also just passed away at 94 [1913 – 2002, 89] years old, who I first met in Sri Lanka, a very important figure in American poetry who started a poetry magazine in the 1920s [*Blues: a magazine of new rhythms*], was involved in the surrealist movement in France in the '20s and '30s, then started *View*, which was important in New York in the '40s, and had always published, and had a place in Paris part time. I got friendly with him and other people like that. Paris has a whole cast of characters, thousands of Americans who more or less know each other. So life was very full.

We lived downtown. One Sunday night I went off to a famous Sunday night, you wouldn't call it a salon, it was in an at-home that a guy named Jim Haynes had in Paris.

He's an American who was teaching at University of Paris VIII (Vincennes), who had sponsored all kinds of artists and had written a book or two and knew everybody; and everybody showed up at his house, and he cooked spaghetti—one of these things. He lived in, literally, an artist's studio with glass lights facing north.

I was coming back around 11:30 at night; and Mom—that is, to say Jane and the boys—we were downtown then in “Saint Germain des Pres,” a block from the church. I came up out of the Métro, and this is right where the “Deux Magots” [Café des Deux Magots] is.

“Brasserie Lipp” is across the street, “Cazes Lipp” as they say. There was this tremendous KA-BOOM! I thought, “That is not a car back firing. That is an explosion!” So people ran out into the street—it was summerish I think—and looked down the street, and some people started

running down the street. I started running too, and I then turned down “rue des Saints-Pères” and then ran along a little street toward our house, and I saw smoke coming out from the building! (It was a five-story building from about 1890) I thought, “Oh, God! They got us!” because by this time we’d been in the revolution, I’d been in a couple of dustups, I’d actually been in a dustup in Cambodia—but that’s another story, where I was shot at from both sides of the bridge and everything. So I ran around and ran into the front door, and there was broken glass everywhere, and there was this car that was on fire. Our car was parked up the street on the curb.

By this time things had gotten so bad in Paris that a friend of ours who’s a military attaché got shot; the DCM had gotten shot at with the same gun they found out later; Israelis from their embassy had been killed; and there had been different kinds of threats; and somebody from the police had their feet and legs blown off trying to disarm a package that fell off a car that was at the economic officer’s house, Rod’s house—a package fell off when they drove away to the airport, and then the police went to disarm it, and it blew up and actually killed one guy; he died in the hospital later; it made him what they call a basket case kind of thing. So I ran, and I thought, “Oh, my God!” I felt my hair standing on end. I’ve never felt that before. The electricity worked, and I did the code and got in the door and ran up the steps and banged on the door, and Jane opened it. I said, “You’re alive! Oh, my God! How are the boys?” She said, “You’re alive!” I said, “I thought it was our apartment!” She said, “I thought it was our car!” because our car was all messed up.

There were people running up and down the street and below us was the “commissariat de police” (local police station), which they only open during weekday hours; it was like a little branch police office, “su commissariat.” Somebody had put a bomb in the door and blown in the police station and blown up the car, and it cracked the building, and it blew all the glass out of all the windows. We closed the metal grates which they have in Paris, to kind of make it darker in the kids’ room (they slept in the same room). Glass blew all across the floor, but it didn’t cut them because of the way the blast came. Jane had just gotten into bed, and she said she was halfway asleep and saw a white thing in front of her eyes. You know it’s funny how you can. The whole room lit up. We stayed up all night; we stayed there, and nothing much happened. It just caused a tremendous hassle to get everything all organized; then you had to do more security.

We didn’t have CD (diplomatic corps) plates after that; we had regular Paris plates they called “banalisé” (unmarked), which was wonderful because we could get any amount of tickets [laughter]! When you had CD plates, they didn’t give you tickets; Paris is famous for the parking ticket problem. So you didn’t get parking tickets if you had CD plates. You could get your car towed away if it was in the wrong place, but they wouldn’t give you a ticket; the French were pretty good about that. But as soon as we got civilian plates again, regular plates, everybody got tickets again, which nobody paid, of course.

Q: Who set off the bomb?

ROSS: It was supposedly Corsicans, a Radundi Cassio, to get back at the police for accidentally killing a 16-year-old girl in a dope bust. This was the story, that it was not against the American embassy or against us, but we didn’t know it at the time. That was the conventional wisdom on

it.

Q: Dick, a question I'd like to ask you—from your perspective, during the time when you were there, '79 to '82ish or something like that, how did you find the intellectual community at the university level, which was a different level than the commentators?

ROSS: Yes.

Q: How did they view the United States? I mean was there sort of a—

ROSS: The students themselves?

Q: No, well, I'm thinking about the professors—

ROSS: Right.

Q: ...and then the students.

ROSS: Actually, both those different elements really found the United States absorbent, particularly the culture of New York City, the culture of the West, you know written big what they call “cou-for-boy” (cowboy) and the culture of films. I didn't run across too many people who disparaged or just dismissed out of hand the United States. They would, of course, tell you how you made your mistakes in Vietnam and what you should have done, and they would tell you what you were doing wrong, but they didn't do it with any animus. Almost everybody, the French that I met, liked the United States. They perceived it as having flaws, which they understood being French. That's partly I think, the French attitude toward things. “Oh, but of course we know, you see, the problem here is this. Now once that is done, then it'll be this way.”

Q: Yes.

ROSS: But there was not any on the streets or Marxist Leftist rage against the United States. That kind of '60s revolution of social mores and ideas, which may or may not have stuck in the United States, had gone over to Europe and to France later. If there was one kind of young influence which people did do, it was a newspaper period called Le Bien [Public] or Liberation which was wonderful in the sense it was full of ideas. It wasn't dumbed down, but it was different than Le Monde, which is very dreadfully serious, kind of the way the Financial Times is serious. The Liberation was sprightly, and Le Figaro was sprightly. The body politic in France was going to the Right.

These people accepted the United States. France had enough of its own problems with Africa that they didn't see too much of us to attack whatever we were doing. They kind of raised their eyes and moaned when Reagan was elected, but then they accepted it in the sense of, well now, this is something...we're realists, real “politique” (politics).

If there was one problem that I think had affected the French, it was this kind of a nuclear...what is it...that nuclear bomb that radiates everybody?

Q: Oh yes...a neutron bomb.

ROSS: Right. In Jimmy Carter's time we had tried to sell that and get it positioned in Europe, I believe.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: They were very much against the neutron bomb, and they were very much for "rapprochement" (connecting or bringing together) with the Russians.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: They weren't prepared to take on communism the way we had announced, sounded the alarm for all that, earlier. Polls showed that if the Russians rolled their tanks across the Fulda Gap and into Europe along through the north and so forth, that the French would accept it. I mean if there was some kind of a big World War II ½ or something, they didn't believe in going out and dying for all this because I guess they saw that Soviet socialism was on the way down.

Now what was also starting to come up was the Right of Jean-Marie Le Pen. I went by accident. I took a pouch run, which you could do—you went and signed up and took the pouch run. They gave you a first class pass on the French Railway, and you ran the pouches down to Marseilles, places like that. That was a wonderful deal that no longer exists, I'm sure. Anyway, I was in Nice, and I walked into this great, big, circus-tent thing where people are saying, "Come on in! Come on in!" and handing out flyers for it. I didn't know what it was. It was like 5,000 or 7,000 people, and they were very well dressed. It was one of the first of the bigger rallies because the movement of Le Pen came to a certain extent out of the south of France because of the North African immigration.

Q: Yes, it's still his center of power.

ROSS: Yes, and I went back...this is a good one...I wrote up a little, like two- or three-paragraph report and took it to John Garner and said, "I could make this bigger, because I saw a lot of this, what was going on down there. He said, "Don't get involved in all that!" [Laughter] So I knew the guy over at the embassy who was the French-watcher.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: The deputy political officer for internal affairs is what he was called, and I went and told him. So I said, "Can I talk to you?" I went over and called a meeting with him, and he said, "Oh, we know all about that. That's not important. There's no point in that. I know about that, and I'm not even gonna write a report on it." And I thought, "Oh, okay. Well, maybe he's right!" [Laughter]

When I was first started in Paris, they said, "You'll be in charge of American Political Processes. That'll be good for you." So American elections were coming up. So what do you do? Well,

conceive up all these programs and figure out how much it'll cost, and we'll figure out what the budget can be, and find out what's been done, and what are you gonna publish, and who are you gonna get in contact with, and so on. It's like being a producer; I had to learn a lot of these things as I went along.

So I found out that [for] the previous election somebody had gotten hold of an elephant, and somebody had gotten hold of a donkey, and they'd had a big party. But meanwhile I was being approached by French promoters, who were saying, "We can put ze very large telescreen in de middle of the Champs Elysees, and we can do zis, and you rent the big ballroom at the 5,000-room hotel, and you do this, and do that;" and then the political Right and Left of France wanted to attach themselves. So there was this burgeoning interest. It seemed like it was getting bigger every day that I was there because there'd be more kinds of things than it'd be possible to do or conceivable.

So I was telling Lois, and she said, "Now, next thing, Dick, go over to the embassy and have a meeting with people over there to explain what you...and draw down on their ideas." Warren Zimmermann was political officer. So I went over there.

In those days the embassy had very fine, little paneled offices. They had little fireplaces with grates in them, and you could get wood, and have a wood-burning fireplace in your office in the American embassy in Paris—not everybody, to be sure, had this prerequisite. I went in, and First Secretary Zimmermann had his fire going, and he had his feet up on the grate or something like this, and he said, "Well, what do you intend to do? Why did you come see me?" So I [said], "I'm new here, and in fact, I don't speak French very well, and I don't know anybody, and you're here, and I understand that you may have been here before, and well, I need your advice." "Of course. I'd be glad to help you." So I said, "Well, it's been suggested that I organize certain events that have to do with the American election." [With a sudden interested tone of voice] "Events with the American election? Well, why here?" I said, "Well, the French are interested in this, and I'm the American Political Processes person. That's one of the three or four things we have in the country plan, and I've been assigned it, sir." "Well, why do you want to do it here? What do you want to do?" Of course I didn't know what, so I sort of fished around and said, "Well, I understand the last time they had a big event the night of the election, and they had an elephant and a donkey, you know, were brought in from the circus or something like that, and..." "What! What else would you do? An elephant and a donkey?" And I said, "Well, yes. People say—of course I'm new here—that the French have a lively interest, and I thought I'd have a couple of big conferences, one at the conference hall." That was the same hall that they had uptown in the 16th [arrondissement], where they had the Vietnam peace talks—

Q: Yes.

ROSS: ... in International Center (International Conference Center, "Centre De Conferences Internationales"), if you will. And so he's, "There? What? What would you do?" I said, "I'd rent it, and we'd have lots of people from the universities. Paris has sixteen universities and from, you know, important regional universities, and we'll have a luncheon, and we'll do...we'll bring in people from the United States." "Well, why do you want to do that?" I said, "Well, you know, this is..." I said, "The ambassador would like to know about these things too." "Oh! No! The

ambassador? I don't think any of this is a good idea, Mr. Ross." He was about like five years older than me. He said, "No, the ambassador's not interested in this! This, this, this would be all wrong. You know, we're the embassy! We're neutral in these things! Don't you understand that?"

So I went off and went back to Lois Roth and didn't know what to tell her. I said, "You know, this is...I must have made a terrible bad impression or something!" Well, of course, I found out later that Ambassador Hartman had had one appointment to the Soviet Union by a Democratic president and another appointment to Paris by...or the other way around.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: So he had one foot in the Democratic sphere and one foot in the Republican sphere. It's unusual to get big posts from different presidents of different political parties, and he was also very close to Kissinger and people like that, and that was the walking on marble chips business—that's a mixing of metaphor.

Anyway, I did have quite a good thing with the political process, and I did do a lot of writing. I wrote nearly a whole pamphlet, which I don't even have a copy of, which explained the whole thing, and I was explaining down to the county levels and the municipal judges and all this stuff and trying to make it all clear, and of course, draft in French. Some people would say, "Well, why do you...you mean they do that in the United States?" I mean it was useful.

I also wrote on art and other stuff; we did layout and did photographs, did editing too.

Q: Did you ever run across or deal or observe sort of the French intellectual establishment, which is sort of the commentators, the chattering class, but they're extremely important in France? I mean they would be different than the university level, wouldn't they?

ROSS: Oh, yes! I did get to know some of them. I became friends with a guy named Jean Marie Benoit, who was kind of a guardian of the principals of the Right, of the conservative, in France. He lived near me, and I found him extremely good in English, and actually, I felt more at home trying to speak to him in French than I did other people because he was an attractive personality. He'd written books on the necessity of defending the conservative position.

Once Reagan was elected, a certain number of people got on the A-list to come over to France. Among them were [Norman] Podhoretz and Midge Decter. Podhoretz, he's a forceful personality, and she is too, and they seemed to know about Benoit. Anyway, they came over, and it was my job to take them around because I was in American Political Process. Of course everybody else in USIS was a little bit liberal. [laughter] They said, "Nobody wanted to really have drinks for Podhoretz," or something like that. Well, I went and did these kinds of things and took them to a restaurant with a conservative group of people—not the Jean-Marie Le Pen crowd, but a different crowd—and they were nice.

I had Tony Dolan [Anthony Dolan], who was Reagan's principal speechwriter, come over and then took him all around. A lot of Americans who were conservative, bankers too—that is to say,

economic bankers' speakers—really can't speak much French, so they'd kind of rely on you, they'd kind of hang on you to help them along.

Benoit very good. I got to know Dominique d'Ambra quite well. He wrote in the *Herald Trib* [*Herald Tribune*]. Then I got to know his boss who had started the Institute for International Affairs in France, and I also got to know commentators, Americans who had ideas about France who would come there.

NYU (New York University) has a particularly good relationship with Paris—it's as if it felt like it owned the intellectual establishment there. Anyway, I knew Serge Hurtig, who was the director of Sciences Po, very well because we did a bunch of programs together with him; and I knew people at the institute which was down the street from us, the College de France [Institut de France], and some of them were very senior guys who'd written a whole bunch of books. I knew people at [Université] Paris VI [now IV], the Sorbonne, who had studied America and were the lecturers on it. I got to know a lot of people who perceived that they needed me because I could get them information or stuff like that, but also at the same time I found very interesting because they knew so much about the United States. When I left, George Shedan gave me a beautiful book with a very special binding up of the poems of Rimbaud.

So I did that kind of stuff, and I did some film shows, and I got to know enough people that when the time came down...you see, when I first went there, it was supposed to be a full-year assignment. Then they had a hotshot, young, career supervisor come through Paris, and he had to talk to everybody, and he said, "Well now, how long are you here for?" I said, "Well, I'm gonna stay all four years." "Oh, it's not a four-year assignment!" I said, "It isn't? They told me it was!" He said, "No! No! This is a three-year assignment. All European assignments are now three years. Didn't you know that?" I said, "Well, no, I didn't." He said, "I'm gonna check on that," like, "Be prepared not to stay."

ANNE O. CARY
Trade Policy Officer
Paris (1980-1983)

Anne O. Cary was born in September 1952 in Washington, DC. She received a bachelor's degree in international economics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1973 and entered the Foreign Service in 1974. Ms. Cary's career included positions in Belgium, Haiti, Ethiopia, India, and Morocco. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 30, 1995.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

CARY: From 1980-83.

Q: And what was your job?

CARY: I was trade policy officer in the econ section, it was called general economic policy. My portfolios were strategic trade (keep electronic and computer communications equipment away from the Soviets and the other proscribed destinations). This was a problem because the French did not take the same approach even though they were members of COCOM and should not be shipping things, but the French shipped things. So we had an awful lot of back and forth with them on that. I also did French relations with Eastern Europe. Again, this was an area where the French had a lot of trade with Eastern Europe and we didn't. We just wanted to keep tabs on what they were doing and what types of agreements they were signing because we felt some aspects of the exchanges were not in our best interests. On technical assistance the French were providing information that was not kosher.

Q: During this 1980-83 period, who were your ambassadors?

CARY: Art Hartman was ambassador when I arrived. He was a delightful person to work with. And then Evan Galbraith.

Q: You might talk a little bit about Hartman and then about Galbraith.

CARY: Hartman was just as professional as you could be. He was a delight to work for. It was a huge mission but you felt that he knew who you were and cared. I didn't have very many opportunities to work with him directly.

Once or twice I would go down and fill in the front office for a staff assistant. He had a very, very busy schedule with lots of meetings. The residence was just gorgeous. Everybody was sad to see him leave, but he went on to Moscow.

He was replaced by Evan Galbraith who was an investment banker and a very different sort of a person. He was very pleasant but gave the impression he saw it as an we vs them situation, and he meant the Foreign Service not the French as the them, the Foreign Service were not necessarily his friends. There were a couple of issues such as the Soviet gas pipeline with the embargo imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q: This was very early in the Reagan Administration which came from the right wing of the Republican Party and the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and was a very confrontational time with the Soviet Union.

CARY: One of the major policy decisions by the US was to deny all equipment that would go to the Soviet natural gas pipeline that was being built, a huge 2 meter pipeline. A certain amount of the equipment was US or US licensed. Some US companies took big hits on that. The French would not honor the US requirement not to sell US licensed equipment. We had some GE turbines that were manufactured in France under US license. It became a big issue with the French. I can remember Bob Gelbard was in the Treasury office at the Embassy. He was sent to the port because as soon as the GE turbines were loaded they were informed that would break the embargo because the French were going to ship them on to the Soviets. There was an awful lot of back and forth about how to deal with the French on this issue. Galbraith was very critical publicly about the French actions, which in most people's opinion is rarely the way to get results

from the French, to criticize them publicly. He, against advice, did it on French television. There was a feeling that his manner of dealing with the French was very, now you would say “in your face.” Well, he wasn’t quite that aggressive but there was no question that he was publicly criticizing his hosts and the French got all indigent and woofy about it. There was a feeling in the embassy that he did not listen to advisers very much, and had he the situation would have turned out better.

Q: Who was the economic minister at the time?

CARY: Mike Ely at the time and he was just great to work with.

Q: Yes, I interviewed him. Did you have much dealing with French officialdom?

CARY: Yes. They were not very warm. In fact, I remember one lunch I was dealing with a counterpart, a one on one lunch, and it was one of my days when French was just not coming at all and was struggling and finally at the end of the meal, he lets me know he spent eight years in India as a child growing up. I said, “You let me struggle with my French. You could have at least switched to English once or twice.” He said, “Oh, but I speak with an Indian accent.” So, it was better for me to struggle with my French than for him to switch into English because he didn’t like his accent in English.

They were very bright people. At that time one of my friends was going to ENA, the Ecole Nationale d’Administration, {every year one Foreign Service officer spends a year at ENA and then works at the embassy} . In 1980-81 it was Dean Curran and I got to know a lot of French who were going to ENA. They were just bright, bright people, and yet just not very personable.

Jean Claude Paye was the director of the economic bureau at the Quai d’Orsay. I would go with Mike Ely for most of his calls, particularly on this tech transfer problems that we had. Paye was just a brilliant person but he would lie through his teeth. He had no problem at all. He must have known that we knew he was lying. But he was just as cool as he could be. I found that there was a big difference between French diplomats in Paris and French diplomats outside of Paris. I found they tended to be a lot easier to deal with outside of Paris. It was very compartmentalized. You did your business and left, there was very little chit chat.

Q: But, this is also the atmosphere of the office too? So, it was not directed towards you as much as this is the way its done?

CARY: Well, at that point my husband, we got married in France, was working for a French company and it is exactly like that. Nobody knew anybody’s first name. We were invited to a couple of people’s houses but most people in the office had never been to anybody else’s house. It is a much more formal and distant way of doing things. I always think of their kids -- they put them in play clothes that have to be dried cleaned! You just have to wonder about it.

Q: Was the pipeline thing resolved at all?

CARY: Well, the French went ahead and broke the law. Dresser and GE were fined and lost

contracts. Afterwards, one of the things I spent a lot of time on was the fact that the French wanted to sell telecom switching technology to the Soviets and we said absolutely no way. I learned a lot about switching, more than I thought I ever would about technology and digital switches and how much information could be sent. Again this was one of those instances where the French would say one thing and do another.

Q: Was it business at any cost or in your face?

CARY: Business at any cost. This was French technology, it was good and they disagreed with our...this was also the time when Richard Perle was involved in a lot of these negotiations as well. Richard Perle was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology. This was the sonabouy story where DOD took the little chips out of a Speak and Spell, a kid's toy, and said the Soviet's could use these for sophisticated military applications.

Q: Richard Perle was the par excellence, called the dark prince because he came out of the very extreme anti-Soviet side. He was an assistant to Scoop Jackson who had been a senator from Washington and there was no accommodation, he took no prisoners.

CARY: Right. He really was "don't sell them the shoelaces." The French felt very much that we had gone overboard with the technology issue. I can remember making a demarche requesting the French not to sell spare parts for C-130s to Libya. In a very unkind way, my contact at the Directory for External Economic Relations said, "If you let the Libyans get the plane how do you expect us to keep them from getting spare parts?" We had a lot of differences with the French about what they could sell and to whom. They thought we were ridiculous about this. But, they also, in my opinion, went ahead and sold things deliberately that they knew really were of strategic use and they didn't care. Money was more important, the deal was more important.

Q: Iran and Iraq were at war part of this time, did selling to them come up?

CARY: Yes, but I didn't get too much involved in that one because it was munitions and we had the military side on that. But, yes, we had definite differences. The relationship between the French government and US government was one of very hard feelings. We were more interested in what French intelligence was up to than we were in Soviet intelligence in terms of what was going on at the time.

Q: We were concerned about French intelligence trying to get at the equivalence of trade secrets?

CARY: Yes. There was no question about it, it was going on. That was an issue. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the question in the US came up as to whether the CIA should be doing more economic espionage. I kept thinking back at how negatively we reacted to the French using their intelligence purely for commercial reasons.

Q: Well this sort of long term alliance with the French has not been an easy one has it? It seems to be a special relationship with the accent on the negative side.

CARY: Yes, very much so. The French, I always feel, have a complex. They really do believe they are superior to virtually anybody else but they just can't find the proof and it drives them nuts because they really do believe that everything has to fall into A, B, and C.

Q: I have always thought about these magnificent schools that you are talking about, the ENA and others, which were mostly set up during the Napoleonic time, and France has been diminished in power ever since Napoleon. I am not sure if there is a one, two, three relationship or not.

CARY: It was also interesting, the role of the private persona and the public persona. When we were there Giscard had lost the election, which the embassy did not call at all and everybody said, "We didn't call it because everybody spent all their time in Paris. Anybody who had gotten outside of Paris would have known that the country was ready for a change." There was mud on everybody's face on that one.

But there was never a word in the newspaper or in the media about how many of the female ministers Mitterrand had appointed were supposed to be former mistresses. That was all just understood and had nothing to do with anything else. People's personal lives were people's personal lives and had no role any place else.

France hosted the G-7 economic summit in 1982. President Reagan came. This was at Versailles. As a control officer I got to know my way around Versailles and the back rooms of Versailles. It was really pretty amazing. I was just astonished about Reagan and the way his staff protected him. He was late for a meeting with Mitterrand, he was sleeping and nobody would wake him up. I thought, "How could you do that?" But they did. And, nobody was going to apologize, he needed his sleep. He came two days early so he wouldn't have jet lag.

Q: Mitterrand was the longest term serving president, and just recently died. We didn't call the election of Mitterrand, but was this going to make things worse for the embassy?

CARY: It was not what we wanted. Mitterrand's stance on a number of political issues was directly opposed to where the US wanted to go. In the months after Mitterrand was elected, people just fled with money, baskets full of money and gold left the country. Among the upper class of France there was this feeling that under Mitterrand things were just not going to work out and they had to get their money out. And politically, he was not interested in making any accommodation whatsoever to the US point of view.

Q: In dealing with the French was there much informal mingling afterwards?

CARY: No. You got to know friends other ways. The people we saw socially were generally formed through non work contacts. Friends who we knew living there, some old Peace Corps people who had married French people and now were living in Paris. There was a group like that that we got to know. Or French diplomats that we had known in other posts and were then posted back to Paris, you would see them socially. A friend of my father readily included me into the family gatherings things like a traditional epiphany dinner, where the person who finds the almond in the cake is crowned. It was very nice to be included in such things and it gave an idea

how people live at home which many people at the embassy didn't see, I think.

Q: Looking at the French social structure, one always hears of the importance of the intellectual class, the intellectuals. In no other country can I think of where somebody calls himself an intellectual and gets away with it, certainly not in the American sense. Did you find that the intellectual class, or whatever you want to call it, was important?

CARY: Ah! Amazingly so. We got to know some people from a couple of the think tanks...this was when a couple of the French graduate schools were starting to get into management.

Q: Like the Harvard Business School.

CARY: Right.

Q: Well this was the American challenge wasn't it?

CARY: Yes, "Le Défi Americaine" by Jean-Jacques Servan-Shriver. At dinner parties you were always talking about ideas and concepts and there was real debate, it was give and take, with people thinking, which is an exciting thing to do. People weren't just economist, only being able to talk about the economy. They could talk about the opera, some kind of butterfly, or whatever. The intellectual was a much more rounded individual. People were clearly identified as intellectuals and comfortable being called that.

I would say there was more excitement about intellectual activity and food. I have never seen people feel so strongly about food. I mean, the Belgians care about food, but they care about quantity. It has to be good but there has to be lots of it. The French didn't care so much about quantity but it had to be exquisite and just right. You would spend time talking about ideas but always spent time about the food, this meal and the next meal and the last meal.

Q: Was there intermingling between the industrial or business class and the intellectual class?

CARY: No, not much. We made a couple of trips with congressional people when we were trying to see the GE jet engine, a quieter engine. We went out to SNECMA, which a French government company. In all major industry at that point there was significant government control. So at the top levels you might have engineers, economists and administrators a mixture from the grandes écoles and other universities. Further down the line class lines were pretty rigid. If you didn't go to college you were limited. At the work site you just did your job. Husband John was sent out to Syria to work for a French construction company that was building an oil pipeline. He described very little mixing on the site between "management" and workers. They ate meals together, but that was it.

Q: This intellectual give and take and sort of making your points in a way is somewhat alien to us. At least our skills aren't as honed as the French who have been doing this all of the time. Did you find that this was a problem?

CARY: The problem I found was that you could not be an individual. I could not turn around

and say, "Yes, I think US policy on this, that and the other thing, was wrong" in the course of the conversation and then go back and say, "But this is US policy." People didn't buy that. You weren't allowed to concede one thing and then go back to the original statement. We can generally draw a line between this is my job and I am presenting the US point of view. And we did have some dumb things to present.

Q: And early Reagan was a very difficult time a lot of us. He was going through a long learning curve, let's say.

CARY: Right. I can remember presenting demarches where you just sort of put them down and then talked about something else, obviously totally undercutting the demarche, but you had to deliver it. There were difficult times when you were trying to develop relationships with people, and yet you were sort of stuck because you couldn't cross the line. To cross the line from being a bureaucrat and a diplomat you crossed the line of friendship. After using the familiar form "tu" you can't go back to *vousvoyer*. And, yet, we do it all of the time. It doesn't work with the French and I had a hard time with that. So, I ended up not talking to people I worked with other than the official line.

Q: Was Galbraith still there when you left?

CARY: Yes.

Q: Because he left and had been asked to leave the embassy.

CARY: Yes. We also at that time had some terrorist incidents. One of the military attachés was murdered. There was a bomb put under the commercial counselor's car and two French bomb experts were killed trying to detonate it. The *Chargé*, Chris Chapman, was shot at at about 30 feet but missed. This was all within less than 6 months. So we were down on hands and knees looking under the car for bombs every morning, and we got...this was so typical...the French would let us get regular plates but wouldn't give us the regular macaron, the little sticker that said you paid your tax, so you got stopped all the time. It finally took action at the highest levels to get the French Treasury to agree to issue to us the little stickers so we could have regular plates and not be stopped all the time.

Q: The idea of having regular plates being so you wouldn't have conspicuous diplomat plates.

CARY: Yes, and the diplomatic plates all started with a specific number for each embassy - I think the US was 6 CD, so there was no question who were the Americans.

Q: Who was bombing and who was shooting?

CARY: Arabs. They never found anybody. But the person who shot at Chris Chapman was dark and appeared to be of Arab extraction. At the time there was a lot going on. There was a Jewish delicatessen that was machine gunned one Sunday morning. There was a lot of anti-Israel and anti-US activity. One poor guy, an American who lived in the Netherlands, inadvertently parked his car near the Israeli embassy and the French police blew it up. The degree of terrorism, that

was one of the issues that we had a lot of problems with the French on. There was a strong belief at the time that the French had cut a deal with a number of terrorist groups... basically you leave the French alone and we will leave you alone. Not only were the Iranians living there but everybody from all over. It was felt that a lot of people's lives were at risk because France let the terrorists live there. That did change later, but there was a lot of bitterness.

Q: Well, you had really two governments. You had the Reagan administration and you Mitterrand government, both of which moved up and eventually came to coincide but again one was coming from the right and one was coming from the left and as always happens the early times of the administration and the later times of the administration, really they both come towards the center.

CARY: Right. It was funny, had it been any place but Paris, they would have sent the dependents out. But you couldn't do that. You couldn't say you were sending people out of Paris because of the high level of danger, that just doesn't work.

Yes, it was an interesting time.

MICHAEL E. C. ELY
Economic Minister
Paris (1980-1984)

Michael E. C. Ely was born in Washington, DC on August 26, 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in international affairs from Princeton University in 1952 and a master's degree in public affairs from Harvard University. Following his studies at Princeton, Mr. Ely served in the U.S. military for nearly two years. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included positions in Kuala Lumpur, Algiers, Mogadishu, Rome, Tokyo and Brussels. Mr. Ely was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: So you went to Paris, where you served as an economic minister from 1980 to '84. Arthur Hartman was the ambassador most of the time?

ELY: He was, for the first year, and then left. Ambassador Hartman was a superb ambassador. He loved the work. An authentic intellectual, with very broad interests. Good humored, approachable, quite effective with the French. He stayed there less than a year, in fact; I got there, there was the election, the change of administration, and Hartman left.

And then we got Evan Galbraith, a banker who had served in Paris before and was a friend of Bill Buckley. He had run the Goldwater campaign in Europe in 1964. He was a member of the right wing of the Republican Party. I'm a Democrat, and my instincts are entirely in that direction. And there was some question about whether Galbraith was going to be able to work with the embassy team. Actually, it worked out fine. I found Evan Galbraith to be an excellent ambassador in many respects. He was good humored, energetic, spoke pretty good French (not

as good as he thought or other people thought), nice wife (strange but nice), good about receiving people.

He had, however, an aspect to him that was very difficult; and that is, he would occasionally kick in as a kind of Buckleyite, hard-right, second kitchen Cabinet. He had ambitions for moving to at least Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, or maybe deputy secretary of the treasury, and he was trying to show off his conservative credentials in Paris.

One day I was out of town for the day and came back and found that he'd called a press conference to essentially talk about the virtues of Reaganomics and the evils of Socialism. I would have opposed any such press conference in Paris.

He enjoyed teasing the Socialists. This was after Mitterrand came in '81.

Q: Mitterrand, who was a Socialist; it was a Socialist government.

ELY: They were very edgy, and Galbraith loved tweaking and teasing them. They didn't like that at all; they did not have a sense of humor about being Socialists. He also made right-wing speeches, which pleased the opposition very much, and people would come up to him on the street and say what a great job he was doing.

He thought that was wonderful, but I thought it was terrible, because the Socialists basically cut him out of the loop and would have nothing to do with him. The Quai d'Orsay twice called him in for making speeches about the Communists. The reproof was mild, but nonetheless, the Quai called him in and reproved him. It went over him like water off a duck; he never realized that what was happening to him was a formal rebuff. He took it in a William Buckley, happy Boy Scout way, which I found quite attractive in some respects. They weren't getting through to him. He was thinking of running for governor of New York, which goes to show you what he really had in mind.

Q: When you're at an embassy and, obviously, you have to deal with the French bureaucracy, and you have an ambassador who has, you might say, a different agenda that is cutting him out of the loop, what does this do to you all?

ELY: Well, it put me under pressure. I had three difficult issues that I was handling.

One was technology transfer, where the previous Giscard regime had been very aggressive in selling advanced French technology around the circuit. The Department of Defense was very worried, and Richard Cooper was trying to do something about this. Eventually, the Socialists came around because they discovered a very large Soviet spy ring stealing technology from France. They recognized, yes, we Americans had had some points. And they cleaned those guys out and worked with us more closely. That happened just as I left.

The second item was the miserable business of embargoing the compressors for the Soviet gas pipeline. Where Galbraith thought that was great, we were really on very poor ground. There was no agreement that France should not buy Soviet gas. There was no agreement that the Soviets

would use gas supplies as a tool to extract concessions when they maneuvered the West into a position of dependence. Gas compressor technology of the '50s was not classified. The only reason that we had any control over it was the fact that General Electric had to report sales of this stuff under the Export Control Act. Once a week, I'd go in and bang heads with Jean-Claude Paye, the Director of Economic and Financial Affairs, who's now the secretary general of the OECD. He handled it extremely well; he could have been destructive. He put enough pressure on so his message got through to Washington, through me, very clearly, without exciting the hard-liners by belittling them or seizing the moral high ground too consistently.

Q: Well, also, on something like this, here you have a policy issue which was, at the time, at a very high level in the Reagan administration: "We're going to stop the Soviets in this perfidious exploitation, going into selling gas to the West. We can put a stop to this." And the French never take kindly to this type of thing anyway. And you were the principal messenger back and forth.

ELY: You better believe it.

Q: Did you find yourself consciously toning things down?

ELY: No, no. This, of course, is always the dilemma. When you see the situation rather differently than Washington, and you receive instructions that tell you to go in and punch 'em in the snoot, you go in and punch 'em in the snoot, because you're not conveying your views, you're conveying Washington's views. And then if you want to, sometime later, over a drink, talk the thing over, that's different. But you follow your instructions. You're not doing your counterparts a favor if you, by winks and nods, dilute the content of the hard line that you're instructed to convey.

Q: Okay. Well, look, we'll stop at this point, and then we'll come back again.

ELY: I've got one more issue to cover, the nationalization of American companies, which was also difficult.

Q: Today is March 10, 1993, a continuing interview with Mike Ely. Mike, we were just finishing up your time in France. You mentioned at the very tag end that you wanted to talk about nationalization. What issue was that?

ELY: Yes, well, the Socialists came in in 1981. They had an extensive program of, as one of them put it quaintly, "storming the commanding heights of the economy," which included a series of nationalizations. The companies on their list included several American subsidiaries. One, a subsidiary of ITT, was an electronics firm that worked entirely for the government. Another was a subsidiary of Honeywell.

Q: Honeywell being a computer electronics firm.

ELY: That's right. It was the Honeywell-Bull joint venture.

Q: Bull being their major computer-type firm.

ELY: Yes, it was quite interesting. Honeywell had gone into the joint venture with Bull not many years before, and had suggested that while the joint venture was being put together by the lawyers, they put in something about what might happen should the French government ever decide to nationalize the venture.

The French said, "Oh, we'd never do that."

Honeywell said, "Of course, we understand you never would, but just to give the lawyers something to do..."

So they had an ironclad nationalization agreement, where the book value of the proceeds was automatically put into Treasury bills (which meant more interest for Honeywell) as soon as nationalization happened. Then they negotiated a settlement. And, indeed, that worked out well. Honeywell continued to represent Bull in the United States and sold computers, through Bull, in France. Honeywell was being treated better than IBM had ever been treated under the Giscard government, because it was playing the game.

ITT was quite another case. It had a sick French company. It had it on government contract. Rand Araskog and his people came in. They had a valuation, made by Merrill Lynch, I believe, that said the company was worth something like \$30 million. The French had another valuation, that the company was worth virtually nothing. The Socialists appointed a representative, kind of a mediator. He turned out to be a very flaky guy, who never showed up and didn't wear neckties, quite unpredictable. The ITT people were clearly concerned. They were holding out for their \$27 million. They asked for embassy intervention. We declined to intervene into the substance of the issue, but said that we would stress to the French authorities the need for prompt, effective settlement, in accordance with our instructions on nationalizations. The Socialists didn't like being told by us that they were supposed to give prompt and effective settlement. They listened but with gritted teeth. Meanwhile, the negotiations went on and on. Finally (I won't string it out), the Socialists made an offer, which ITT accepted. Later, I found the ITT negotiators were chortling up their sleeves, that they thought they weren't going to get anything and that the company wasn't worth anything. This led me to some inner soul-searching about the ethics of the whole situation. It left me with a bad taste in my mouth, and I admired neither side. But, anyhow, we got over that particular hurdle.

The worst one (and I think I covered it in our last discussion) was the gas pipeline episode.

Q: Yes, you did talk about the gas pipeline.

ELY: That was difficult. And also the technology transfer talks. Then the persistent disputes over agriculture, which were a running theme.

Q: Including today, 1993, in today's paper, they're still talking about it.

ELY: That's right. The Community reformed the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1984, to make it less expensive, produce smaller amounts of unwanted surplus commodities that have to

be disposed of by subsidies of destruction.

I was talking to the then-director of foreign economic policy at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. He is now the French executive director at the IMF, incidentally, an inspecteur des finances, an intelligent, well-informed young man, who spoke excellent English, although we did business in French. He was saying that this package was so good, that the Community had done so much for its trading partners, that they owed... the Community a debt. The EC should get trade concessions in response to this reform. This was the one serious dispute that he and I had. We were good friends and tried to resolve things in a friendly way, but I told him that our technicians, who I thought were very good, said that that reform wasn't worth anything. It was the third in a row. About every five years the CAP would threaten to collapse under its own weight, so the EC would try to fix it. And they didn't. I said, you know, we think there's going to be another one down the road in about five years. It was six; we were off by one year. Which the French, of course, resisted seriously.

The French have allowed their farmers, in part because of sympathy, in part because of political considerations, in part because of, I think, the lack of forward thinking, to have an inordinate political influence, which the farmers proceed to exercise selfishly on their own behalf. I mean, the French seem prepared to throw out the Uruguay round because the farmers, in some inchoate way, say, "Well, gee, you know, we can't accept a lot of this stuff that's going on, including the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, the soybean judgments against the Community in the GATT."

Who are the French farmers to say that they can't go along? The Common Agricultural Policy has enriched them. It is now enriching them less. And this is in response to world market forces (the way that the CAP was set up to begin with, anyhow). Their answer is, "Well, don't bother us with the facts. We just want money."

Q: Were the French farmers a force at that time as much as they are now?

ELY: Yes.

Q: Did we make any effort to try to look at the French farmer and figure out what can be done about them? Was this something that was high on your agenda as far as a concern?

ELY: We tried to understand the French farm movement. And we did, and do, well. There's nothing particularly opaque or mysterious. The French farm movement has two poles.

One is the poor farmers south of the Loire, who are marginal. The land's not very good, the farms too small, and they try to survive with a couple of cows, some vegetables and some cereals, which they feed to the cows, and grow some fruit. These people have always been on the margin and their numbers have been dropping for hundreds of years.

Against them you have north of the Loire very modern, efficient producers of wheat and soybeans, and a few other things, like rape seed, that are substitutable. These farmers typically have holdings of 250 to 400 acres, worth millions of dollars. Indeed, the high prices of cereals

have been capitalized in pushing up the value of the land, and these people are all extremely wealthy, at least on paper. Their investments in terms of farm equipment and storage facilities are very considerable. They use large quantities of modern fertilizers and pesticides. And, indeed, they can compete on world markets. The French will acknowledge this; in fact, they sometimes say that they may be somewhat better than their American equivalents. [Can one be better than one's equivalent?] I don't know whether this is the case but they're certainly competitive.

Here is the irony. These well-organized, modern farmers (who give money to all the parties, incidentally) have actually lost their market in Germany, because the Germans want high prices, and the French want no limits on production, so you get the German prices and the French production scheme; lots of production. The German output is enough to feed Germany, so the French output has to be exported with subsidies. This is one reason that the French talk about their exporting vocation. Well, if they're going to run this unholy alliance with the Germans on which the Germans are now trying to blow the whistle they've got to have export subsidies. That's what makes the mechanism work. And the export subsidies are expensive and bitterly resented by other grain exporters -- the United States, but also Australia, Canada, and others.

We've made Common Agricultural Policy the centerpiece of our objectives in the Uruguay round.

Q: The Uruguay round is the one going on now.

ELY: The round that will not die. It's been going on for six and a half years; it should have been over in three. And taking the Carns Group, 14 agricultural exporters, and making very substantial reforms of the CAP a prerequisite for progress in all of the other areas -- in intellectual property, coverage of services -- we put the Uruguay round hostage essentially to the Community, and to some extent hostage to the French.

I'm a severe critic of the CAP. It works badly. It doesn't benefit the people it's supposed to benefit. It's very disruptive. It is intrusive. It is highly regulated. It is protectionist. It is all these things, but I do doubt the wisdom of putting it on the top of our negotiating list, because of the difficulty of making progress on agricultural subjects.

The Community agricultural system is at the stage of demographic evolution that ours was a generation ago. They've got six-plus percent of their people on the land (it varies by country, of course). We are down to three. When farmers are three percent, even with a disproportionate political influence, their ability to run things is circumscribed. American farmers, as a result, have been taking cuts in their support programs and in the agricultural budget. The Community is not yet to that point.

The problem is solving itself over time. The number of farmers is going down; farmers are getting older, they're moving off the land; holdings are being consolidated; some land is being turned back. This process will, in some way, solve or contribute to an eventual solution of the problem in X years.

Mounting extensive external pressure to force the Community, that is to say the French, to reform the CAP has never worked. The latest rounds of EC reforms have taken place independent of the Uruguay round, forced upon the Community by, once again, a pattern of rising expenditure, increasing production of unwanted commodities that have to be destroyed or sold on world markets at subsidized prizes, provoking outcries from the other producers of the same farm products.

However, that's neither here nor there. The round is still underway. It has all kinds of good things in it for the participants. The experts that I've talked to say that the current administration should accept it even though it's not perfect. The intellectual property and trade and services provisions are too weak for certain sectors of American industry. They would like to see it reopened and renegotiated. Very dangerous to the package. The fact that you can't get the best doesn't mean you should give up the good.

Q: Well, Mike, going back to that period of time. Here you were, in a major capital, the chief economic officer of the United States. Were you getting any reflections about the Soviet economy at that time, between '80 and '84? Because, within five years of the time you left, the Soviet system collapsed, basically because of the economics.

ELY: Well, yes. I would say you got a rather different view from the French -- always have gotten. We tended to think it was self-serving: the French wanted to sell them factories and technology. And when we complained about this, they would say, "Well, you know, the factories are never going to get unpacked. The technology is never going to be put to work." (It turned out they were correct; the Soviet Union is littered from one end to the other with unfinished factories that foreigners have sold under export...) "So don't you worry."

But our people, particularly on the analytical side, in the Central Intelligence Agency insisted on viewing the Russians as ten feet tall, with daggers clenched between their teeth, and (particularly under the Reagan administration) that anything you did that helped the Soviets in any way was contributing to the strength of your adversary, who was armed to the teeth.

A picture of the Soviet Union as a collapsing economy: the French sniffed this. They didn't actually say it, but they would continually pull back from our apocalyptic analysis of Soviet military and economic power.

A team came over from the Central Intelligence Agency to show the French the results of a very extensive survey they had done of Soviet petroleum resources and the probable evolution of the petroleum output. I knew about this, because it went back to when I was in INR in 1977 and '78, when the same team had said that the Russians by 1980 will be net importers of oil. This meant they'll be looking south to Iran and Iraq. We have a new threat in the Gulf. We should get ready for it.

My one analyst of the USSR said, "You know, even if the figures are true, the Soviets will never let themselves become that vulnerable. They'll switch resources. They'll do everything to keep up their production."

This turned out to be correct. The Russians did that, and a lot of bad things; they wrecked oil fields in the process. Only now, ten years later, are they paying the price. The Agency was off by a full decade. Very important.

The CIA came and made a presentation to the French that, on paper, was ironclad. They had the figures for all the fields, they had all the historical data, and they projected these, and they showed that by 1982 or '83 or '84, the Russians would become net importers. The French listened politely, thumbed their noses, and said, "No, it's not going to be that way."

And, of course, it wasn't. So, once again, the French, with much less in the way of analytical resources and intelligence [as in information, not mental aptitude], rolled back U.S. estimates.

We thought that their estimates were self-serving. They thought that our estimates were self-serving, to tell the allies that they had to do what we told them to do, because Russians would come and murder us all in our beds with their vast economic and military might that we have contributed to.

Q: That's interesting, because these are, as you say, both self-serving. But at the same time, we sometimes get caught up in figures without looking at, you might almost say, the personality side. And we're talking about the personality side of the Soviet economy, which basically stunk. I mean, they were unable to put things together. We added figures up, but we weren't talking about actuality.

ELY: Well, the tendency on the part of analysts is always to cover themselves, and by exaggerating the strength of the enemy, you protect your estimates.

Q: You never are off if you make them stronger rather than weaker.

ELY: That's right. If you make them weak and you're mistaken, they'll hang you by the thumbs or the neck, while the other way around, they'll give you a medal. If you're correct, they will just quietly retire you.

Q: One last question about your time in Paris. You've talked about Ambassador Galbraith and his way of looking at things, but what was your impression (you'd been there before and all) of how the embassy operated? I mean, here was a huge embassy and all, how was it being run?

ELY: Well, the embassy was huge and getting bigger. The Central Intelligence Agency had an enormous contingent there. Everybody did. And meanwhile the line Foreign Service officers, as usual, were few in number and increasingly outnumbered by their miscellaneous other-agency counterparts.

Ambassador Galbraith, in one respect, was a very good ambassador. He took an interest in what people did. His door was always open. He was personally courteous and helpful, when he didn't go through one of his hyperconservative seizures, which he did from time to time. But normally he was a fine man, a good chief of mission.

He did drive the Commercial Section crazy by positing, in a good Reaganite way, that we didn't really need any export promotion, that export promotion was best left to the private sector, and that you should close the Commercial Section. This caused anguish, and the Commercial people felt that they were being undermined, that this free-enterprise approach to export promotion didn't work. They thought that they could find evidence to support their viewpoint.

I jumped in to support them, but on an economic standpoint, saying that there are economies of scale in providing information for small- and medium-sized businesses that cannot each master the information universe, and so small amounts of money, which is what we were spending, would probably have a very good payoff in terms of increased export activity. We should logically be doing the same for foreign exporters to increase trade, but for conventional reasons it's been worked out that countries promote their own exports, not imports into their own country. This seemed to be working okay; the Commercial Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service had management programs with specific goals and objectives. I thought we could be reasonably confident that this money was being sensibly spent. The Commercial Counselor was a friend of mine and appreciated the support.

As usual, when you were talking something ideological to Ambassador Galbraith, it was "Don't bother me with the facts, my mind is made up." But he had actually dropped that particular bomb.

He also had another idea; the United States was basically, on a corrected cash flow basis, doing a much better job on investments than the statistics would indicate. A lot of people were saying then, as they have been saying for some time, that the United States was underinvesting and either had to cut its investment levels down below the optimum, or borrow a lot of money from abroad -- which we ended up doing. Ambassador Galbraith had some figures that indicated to him that on some sort of a recalculated statistical basis we were out-investing almost everybody. He asked me what I thought about the figures, and I tactfully said that, yes, you could make the case, but I think you could make the opposite case better. He didn't lose his temper, but he didn't like it a lot. He made speeches on this subject to uncomprehending audiences. He would say, "Basically, the United States is doing a lot better than anybody. And here are the numbers to prove it."

And they would say, "Yes, that sounds fine. But why is the U.S. borrowing all this money? Why is the dollar so high?"

"Well, a high dollar was a sign of strength, not of weakness."

Well, as the financial guy, I walked him through this. I said, "If you run big budget deficits, and you have a solid currency, it means it's going to lead to capital inflows, it's going to run your currency up, and it may pull your exchange rate out of line; there are dangers in doing this because this has inadvertent effects on costs in the economy, and price-sensitive industries are likely to get hurt."

He looked at me, a hard look, and he said, "What kind of argument is that?"

And I said, "Well, it's analytical. It's not an argument, it's an identity. It happens."

And he said, riled as hell, "Well, for some people it happened, but for other people it didn't," as if there were something ideological in my argument, which was not the case.

One last anecdote before leaving Paris. I couldn't help hearing a telephone call that he got from Judge Clark, who was then President Reagan's chief of staff.

Q: He was national security advisor.

ELY: That's right, he was national security advisor. Judge Clark had seen in the papers that exports of French wheat to the Soviet Union were being subsidized; here was another case of the Europeans subsidizing the Russians. He was furious. And Ambassador Galbraith, very patiently, calmed him down and said, "Well, no, in this case, although there is a subsidy attached, it doesn't go to the Russians. It goes to the French producer, who gets the difference between the support price and the world price." He explained this three or four times.

Q: Judge Clark was a good friend of Ronald Reagan's. In many ways he was a very effective expediter. But at the same time, he was not renowned for his...

ELY: Swiftiness.

Q: Swiftiness or intellectual depth, particularly in foreign affairs.

ELY: Well, the ambassador understood this perfectly well, and he explained it deftly and patiently. And he eventually got Judge Clark calmed down, so we didn't get a broadside telling the French and, indeed, the Europeans to stop passing subsidies to the bear to the east, subsidies that it would use to put on muscle and rockets to threaten us and break down our defenses and our democratic system.

Q: Well, then, you left Paris in 1984. . .

LYNNE LAMBERT
Investment Advisor, OECD
Paris (1981-1985)

Lynne Lambert was born in Ohio in 1943. After receiving her bachelor's degree from Smith College in 1965, she received her master's degree from Johns Hopkins in 1967. Her career has included positions in Athens, Teheran, Paris, London, and Budapest. Ms. Lambert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 2002.

You went to Paris and were there from '81 to when?

LAMBERT: '85. I was not at the bilateral embassy. I was at the U.S. mission to the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], which is primarily an economic organization of the wealthiest countries in the world, namely Japan, Australia, New Zealand, North America, and Europe. It was a policy organization. In some ways, it was a place where policy was debated before it was debated in a large international context. A specific example would be preparation for the Uruguay trade round.

Q: Let's get the nuts and bolts first. Who was the ambassador while you were there?

LAMBERT: Abe Katz was the first ambassador that I had. Ed Streeter was the second. I was there for four years. The mission at that time had about 30 permanent employees.

Q: Was there any relation to the European Community or to the embassy in Paris or any of these other organizations or were you sort of on your own?

LAMBERT: Serving in a multilateral organization in a foreign country, I think we sacrificed a lot of knowledge of the foreign country. Of course, you lived there. You listened to the news. You knew some people. You deal with buying your groceries, having your car repaired, and this is all in French. But you don't follow the political or cultural life of the country as much as you would in a bilateral embassy. Of course, I knew everybody in the embassy. Socially, we saw quite a lot of them. There were a lot of embassy-wide activities. We shopped at the commissary. But the kind of substantive... Culturally, we were not part of the French experience so much as the embassy was. As far as the European Community goes, they had a representation, they had a mission, at the OECD just like a country would. They attended every meeting. In some cases, where the members of the community had ceded their sovereignty, the EC represented the member states. In others, the member states represented themselves, but the EC chose to speak quite often. They always caucused. So, there was very definitely a large European Community presence. On some occasions, the member states would take pleasure in shooting down the Commission where they had the sovereignty and the Community didn't. But I think by and large, the caucus was always effective and became more so. Once the EC members had agreed among themselves, and it often was a least-common denominator position, it was hard to accomplish anything other than the EC position. I think there were 12 members of the Community at that point. Maybe they should have had one vote, but like in the UN and elsewhere today, they had 12. So they would give 12 speeches on their position, and we would get only one shot. Voting doesn't matter, really, except on officers and the budget, because the OECD works by consensus. Even so, it is hard to work with a block of countries that constitute about half of the membership. At the time, we were roughly the same size as the whole Community.

Q: What was your slice of the pie?

LAMBERT: I had an unusual and interesting slice. My title was the investment advisor. Every job at OECD relates to different committees. My primary committee was the Committee on Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which supervised three non-binding voluntary agreements, which were major at that point because there had been no international discipline in investment. Still, the OECD instruments are the gold standard. The investment instruments were quite newsworthy and interesting to U.S. corporations. One dealt with national treatment, which is the idea that we treat a foreign investor equally to a national investor. They're eligible for the

same government contracts, the same tax treatment, the same treatment in licensing, etc. The committee did review exceptions and complaints. Another instrument had to do with trade-related investment measures, which is the weakest instrument. This is basically an attempt to try to stop incentives and disincentives to foreign investment and let the market regulate it. An example would be tax holidays, which in our case would usually happen at the state level, not the national level, but the U.S. government was a signatory.

The third instrument was the most controversial by far. It was a code of conduct for multinational enterprises. This was the most difficult to negotiate and certainly the most politicized, the one that business had the most interest in, even though they had the most to gain from the other two. But this was the one that would put them on stage and often criticize them. Those were the three primary instruments in the investment committee.

Delegates to the Investment Committee came from Washington. We had large delegations with a number of agencies represented – State led, with USTR as co-chair of the US delegation. Then we had reps from Commerce and Treasury, and sometimes other agencies. My job was to prepare the delegation, work the Secretariat between meetings so our positions would be reflected in committee documents, and to work with other delegations to try to resolve issues prior to the start of the formal meeting.

In addition, I was one of two U.S. reps on the Committee on Capital Movements Invisible Transactions. This committee dealt with two binding codes - in this case, obligations of the codes were mandatory – dealing with the movement across borders of services and capital. There were old codes that had been signed shortly after World War II, and probably would not have been achievable in the early '80s or today, because they were more liberal than the situation in the '80s. The Treasury representative basically dealt with capital movements and financial services. I dealt with non-financial services and investment, and I took the microphone on those issues. We managed in the time I was there to negotiate an important agreement on the right of establishment, which meant that any company of any member state had the right to establish in any of the other member states. This was a binding agreement, which took the form of an amendment to the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, subject to some reservations usually related to national security. This was pretty much a three-year negotiation. The negotiations were acrimonious, in part because the amendment would provide really a new investment instrument, and it would be binding. It was quite a major step forward in the mind of U.S. business. Actually, it was my initiative.

Q: Give me an example.

LAMBERT: Most American companies were having trouble establishing in France. They had to have a presence to get any business in France, and it was difficult to get a presence. The requirements were such that the bureaucracy might take four or five years, by which time the firm would lose its opportunity or its market. Some of our companies for this reason or that would never succeed in establishing a presence. This instrument made a lot of difference and set up some standards. The French government was required to be transparent on what their restrictions were. If they hadn't entered a reservation, the problem could not exist for an American company. If they had entered a reservation, the Code required gradual elimination, and

it forbade new restrictions. Countries were examined annually, and with each examination were required – maybe pressured is a better word – to get rid of several specific reservations. This was a major initiative, and, although imperfect, is probably state of the art even today.

The two committees, we also made an outreach to third countries. The idea here was that developing countries needed investment to get their economies going. They needed also to understand some of the things that the investors from the developed world were looking for. In addition, a number of countries were particularly promising candidates for investment like Korea and Mexico. That was the beginning of the move to get these countries into the OECD, which did happen.

Q: What was in it for a country like France that had very strong exclusionary impulses to get involved in something like this?

LAMBERT: The French were not in the forefront of wanting the instrument. They had a number of reasons why they opposed the instrument and a number of negotiating ploys. But the OECD is a strong organization that moves forward. The Codes themselves were intrinsically liberalizing, business was pressuring, and the French eventually went along – I’m sure because they decided it would be in their interest, or against their interest to keep stonewalling. The more comprehensive investment instrument that the US wanted in the late 1990s, called the MIA, would have combined all of the OECD instruments and made them binding. Unfortunately, the effort failed. But normally in the OECD, if you have a critical mass of particularly the larger countries that want something and it makes sense and the Secretariat supports it, it’s discussed at ministerial level and the ministers give a go-ahead. In the case of the right of establishment amendment, ministers gave a fairly strong endorsement. The ball gets rolling. It’s difficult to stop. I think the French initially opposed the idea. Certainly Canada did. At that point, Canada had a very restrictive investment environment. Some of the Scandinavians opposed it. But the critical mass kept getting larger. These countries’ ability to argue down, particularly with a ministerial endorsement, failed and they changed their efforts to try and protect some of the things that they were most interested in protecting, which they succeeded in doing. It is interesting that this effort succeeded, because at one point the negative countries made an issue of sub-national units, or states in the United States, which can be a vulnerability for a US negotiator. We sign agreements with foreign countries only at the national level, but the federal government doesn’t speak for states and can’t control what states do unless the agreement is a ratified treaty. Most of our establishment regulations are actually determined at the state level. While our states for the most part promote investment, they do have regulations and laws that sometimes discriminate against foreigners. In a negotiating situation, the fact that we are not negotiating for the parties that actually control the issue, even though it’s a largely hypothetical problem, it’s one that is used against the U.S. continually in many negotiations.

Q: Were there natural allies in your particular field and natural opponents?

LAMBERT: Yes. Again, quite often, it mirrored the U.S. relationship with the European Community, because a majority of the countries in the OECD were members in the European Community. The more liberal countries on investment and trade were the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Basically that was the liberal nucleus of the Community. Canada was

more restrictive at that point. Japan was more restrictive. It depended on the issue. Sometimes these could countries could be allies. Occasionally, you could find other allies, but your hardcore allies were those four.

Q: It sounds like particularly France was often on the other side.

LAMBERT: Yes, usually. And then France had a little alliance of its own, which were basically the Latin countries in the Community. Turkey was a possible ally for us. It had very liberal economic policies.

PHILIP C.BROWN
Assistant Information Officer, USIS
Paris (1981-1986)

Mr. Brown was born in Massachusetts and raised primarily in Pennsylvania. He was educated at College of Wooster (Ohio) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. After serving with the Voice of America, in 1965 he joined the United States Information Agency Foreign Service (USIS), where he served several assignments at its headquarters in Washington DC. His foreign posts include Dakar, Douala, Yaoundé, Paris, Vienna and Moscow, where he served twice. At these posts his assignments ranged from Assistant Branch Public Affairs Officer to Counselor for Information, Press and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2012.

Q: Where had you been and where were you going?

BROWN: 1981 was a transition year. We had just finished this amazingly interesting three years in Cold War Moscow preceded by a year in Garmisch, Germany so we had been overseas for four.

Toward the end of that assignment in Moscow, I thought a lot about where I would like to go next. I was intent on staying overseas. My wife and I had given serious talk about staying for a fourth year in Moscow, this rather surprisingly from a woman who practically kicked me out of the house when she knew we were going to be going there for three rather than two years. My wife, Bobbi, thrived in Moscow. We could talk about the possibility of staying for a fourth year. Ultimately we decided not to.

I still have a little piece of paper on which I prepared a chart of various possible assignments. I listed the advantages and disadvantages, professional, personal and otherwise. Paris was on that list but I thought Paris wouldn't be good for my career because the position was assistant information officer. In Moscow, I am information officer, press attaché. Do I want to go to Paris and be assistant information officer?

Fortunately that was just a paper exercise because without me having to do much to do with it, I

was reassigned as assistant information officer, AIO/Paris. One day I picked up one of those bland cables that came out from Washington with personnel assignments and there was my name assigned to Paris as assistant information officer.

My job was going to be press attaché. In some ways it would seem to be a step down. I was going from being information officer to assistant information officer. But there is at least one thing I did right in my Foreign Service experience. I don't usually hand out advice but if somebody asked me for advice, I would say "if you see an interesting assignment, take it. Don't turn down an interesting assignment because it wouldn't seem to be a good stepping stone to something else." The reverse of that is: Don't take a lousy assignment just because you think it is going to help you out in the long run.

I was being assigned really, forget the AIO title, as press attaché to a key West European embassy and to what would turn out to be an amazingly interesting time and place in the Foreign Service. It was a wonderful five years. I really picked the right five, actually six years to be away from Moscow because it was the period of all the funerals in the Soviet Union and I was in Paris during a time of very active American-French relations.

Late in my assignment in Paris, I got back on the Soviet circuit. I was still in Paris but I will talk more about this later. I went to the Geneva summit in 1985. I was in Reykjavik in 1986 when Gorbachev and Reagan met there. Before the Geneva summit, I spent ten weeks in the Old Executive Office building on the staff of the National Security Council under Jack Matlock, doing public diplomacy preparations for Geneva. So I got back into things in time to go back to Moscow for my second tour in the late '80s but none of that was in my mind when I arrived in Paris in 1981.

Our first four years in Paris, 1981-1985, were a very unchanging period in the Soviet Union. Yes, we were well beyond Stalinism but there didn't seem to be any flexibility. Arrests were continuing. Our good friends were regularly denied permission to emigrate. The Reagan administration seemed to be on a head-on collision course with the Soviet Union and as we all know now, some awful things were going to happen. Remember when the Korean airliner was shot down? That kind of thing. These were not good times and there was no indication of any movement.

As I prepared for today, I decided rather than going through all my detailed journals and folders and for various other reasons, I would try to recall the five years we spent in Paris from memory and see what jumped out at me; later on, I can go back and fill in some of the details.

Q: Let's describe as you went, 1981 Paris but France in '81. How stood things there? What was the situation there?

BROWN: First, to describe my office physically. The American Embassy in Paris occupies a wonderful spot right on the Place de la Concorde, a classic center city location. Two blocks away is the Hotel Talleyrand where USIS, consular and various other sections of the embassy were located. For at least my first year in Paris, the Hotel Talleyrand was undergoing a major restoration and the normal occupants, including USIS, were in temporary offices around Paris.

But my office, the press office, was in the embassy proper. Look out the window of my mezzanine-level office and you could see the obelisk on the Place de la Concorde. What a heady location. My office was one floor down from the ambassador and the DCM. In effect, I was part of the embassy proper staff. The public affairs officer, my nominal boss the IO and the cultural section were all several metro stops away doing wonderfully important work but it was the USIS work. I was the press attaché. I was the first line of contact with the journalists.

The other thing that made it interesting was the fact that both countries had just elected new presidents. Ronald Reagan had just been elected president of the United States. He was in his first year, recovering from the assassination attempt, but he hadn't even finished his first year in office. François Mitterrand had been elected president of France that year.

Q: As a socialist, this was a real change.

BROWN: So you had not only a conservative Republican in the White House and a socialist in the Elysée Palace but you also had two very different personalities. Mitterrand probably read more books in a month than Ronald Reagan would read in his life. Mitterrand was a scholar. He was out of that leftist, socialist tradition in France. It was potentially a very uncomfortable relationship.

In fact, if you look back with historical perspective, the two men got along pretty well. They never became personal friends but politically, the United States enjoyed a good relationship with France during those five years.

The key issue, at the time these words were on your tongue all the time, was missile modernization and the desire of NATO -- political people are going to tell me I don't have all my details correct, but I know what I am talking about -- the desire of NATO to modernize the Pershing missiles in Western Europe, to counter the SS-20s that the Soviets had directed at Western Europe.

A lot of West European countries didn't like this idea but Mitterrand, in a very famous speech in Germany, basically said we must modernize the Pershing missiles or the Soviets will have no motivation to limit their SS-20s. That single speech did more to bring the United States and France together politically than any other event during the five years I was there.

There were plenty of other things the United States and France disagreed on but missile modernization was not one of them.

Q: This SS-20-Pershing issue, do you have any thoughts on the conflict that must have gone on within the French government to this? This is quite a threat to the NATO and Western alliance. It was designed that way to try to split; this is all on the part of the Soviet strategy. Through the press or something, was this a raging debate?

BROWN: There was probably opposition to it within the Mitterrand government. I think that the French acted in their national interest. They were not, technically I have to be careful here, part

of the military structure of NATO but they were part of NATO, the political structure. So their voice was heard. If they had resisted on this, then countries that were wavering, such as the Netherlands and even Germany, would not have gone along.

Q: Well, the Netherlands were always a problem. Actually, Germany was a problem.

BROWN: Then the decision to modernize the Pershings would not have gone forward. As I say I think the French were simply acting out of their national interest. They certainly were not acting as some favor to the United States because we know on other issues they would resist.

Quite a number of years later, when President Reagan decided to bomb Libya and requested overflight rights for American planes coming out of England, the French said no and those planes had to take a long circuitous route to carry out their mission; on that and other issues, the French had no problem saying no to the United States.

Q: I was interviewing a man who was our ambassador to NATO at the time. He was he publisher of the Washingtonian, among other things. During this crisis he was invited to a dinner at the French Embassy and people were giving toasts and all that. So he got up and said, "I would like to toast our magnificent British allies who helped us launch this attack and I'd also like to toast our French allies who are giving us this magnificent dinner."

He was also the one who said that one of his daughters said, "When are you going to see the God damned French?"

He said, "What makes you say that?"

"Well, Dad every time you come back you slap your briefcase on the table, those God damned French." She thought that is what they were.

BROWN: I think, in some ways, that what made Mitterrand's support on this issue all the more credible was the fact that the French did not line up behind the United States on every single issue. If they were a puppy dog led around by the nose ally, then they wouldn't have had much credibility but because they could be so obstinate, we knew they were acting in their own national interest.

Q: Let's talk a little about the atmospherics. Who was the ambassador when you arrived?

BROWN: Let me answer that question a little more broadly. When you walk into the embassy in Paris, into the lobby -- and it is too bad the general public can't do it now -- there is a wall listing everyone who had ever been American ambassador or envoy to France. Right at the top of the list were names like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.

Q: Benjamin Franklin.

BROWN: Benjamin Franklin and on through many names that didn't mean very much. You reminded yourself that whoever your ambassador was, he was heir to quite a tradition. Out in the

courtyard was a wonderful seated statue of Benjamin Franklin. He got moved one time because they put in a guard gate and had to relocate the statue and he was not quite so visible. I once came back from a July 4th party at the residence where they had given out hot air balloons and I thought too bad that Ben Franklin had not been able to attend the party so I tied the hot air balloons to Franklin's hands. A lot of people came by and took pictures and expressed their approval. Then some cold water person thought that this wasn't appropriate and took the hot air balloons off. There's always somebody.

But back to your question. When I arrived, the ambassador was Arthur Hartman. At that point, he was concluding his assignment to Paris; he was the ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union. So there was a little joke from his end that he and I were changing places. I never bought into that. I was very modest. Ambassador Hartman was going to Moscow as ambassador and I was coming to Paris as the press attaché but he and his wife Donna were very interested in talking to me about what they were going to find in Moscow. I think he was conscious of the fact that he was not a Soviet expert. He was not a Russian speaker and he was going into a pretty nasty climate there but he was the ambassador.

If you were at a party and you asked someone who didn't know to identify the ambassador, I am sure they would have pointed at Ambassador Hartman; tall, distinguished looking. He was right out of central casting.

Ambassador Hartman had a rather arms length relationship with journalists. He was not inclined to give interviews or talk freely with the press. He took more of the State Department approach that there wasn't a whole lot to be gained. I arrived in September and he hosted a reception on October 6 to say farewell to the press. Right during that mid-day reception, we got word of the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt. Ambassador Hartman didn't have anything to say on the record about that but it was a news making event on a day he was saying goodbye to the press.

Q: The Hartmans certainly both in France and in Moscow were very much avant-garde culturally, weren't they?

BROWN: I will tell you an anecdote. He provided at Spaso House in Moscow a venue for a pianist to play, a pianist who wanted to emigrate. His name is Vladimir Feltsman. The first opportunity he had to perform publicly was thanks to Arthur Hartman at Spaso House in Moscow.

In 1985, I was called back to Washington for ten weeks to work on the public diplomacy arrangements for the Geneva Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. Then I got to go to Geneva. Ambassador Hartman came out from Moscow. He called me aside. He said, "Here, I have some thing I want to entrust to you." It was a violin. A Russian violinist, Sasha Brussilovsky, had emigrated but was not allowed to take his violin with him. Ambassador Hartman gave this violin to me and asked me to deliver it to Sasha in Paris, which I did.

I thought at the time here we've got this very high-level east west meeting, this summit. The future of the world was at stake here and what did Arthur Hartman risk by bringing out a violin for some unknown violinist? It wasn't going to be Gary Powers and U-2 but he could have

provoked an incident. But he did it and he did it I think because he just wanted to help out this guy and he could.

So yes, he did a lot for the intellectuals and artists and dissidents in Moscow during those years.

He was replaced by Evan Galbraith and I will say what I have said a thousand times and something Evan Galbraith said ten thousand times; he was no relation politically or otherwise to John Kenneth Galbraith. Evan Galbraith was a protégée of Bill Buckley. It was Bill Buckley, National Review who recommended him to the Reagan administration.

Q: Sort of the extremely articulate spokesperson of the intellectual right wing.

BROWN: Yes and also vulnerable to putting his foot in his mouth too. A French speaking, investment banker who had spent time in Paris as a banker, a very young fellow with his wife, Bootsie. He was fond of recalling the various bistros that he and Bootsie had visited when they lived there in the investment banking world.

He arrived in the fall of 1981 and he made my life extremely interesting for four years and I mean that in a very positive sense. We got along well together.

In 1985, he resigned in a flurry of rhetoric and invectives and everything else we will talk about later. He was replaced by Joe M. Rodgers, a Republican from Tennessee who had been a Reagan fund raiser there. He was my ambassador for my last year in Paris. Did not speak a word of French, a very courtly man from Tennessee who nevertheless, managed to cultivate some pretty good relations with the French during his time there simply because he went to bat for them on issues. But the fact that he didn't speak French was a handicap and made it a little bit awkward for him.

Anyway, I had three ambassadors.

I shouldn't mention the three ambassadors without saying that I had three DCMs as well. The first was a man named Christian Chapman who was probably 5/5 in French. He had been educated in France and he certainly was a native speaker of French, very distinguished; the name just fit.

Q: I think he flew a Spitfire during World War II.

BROWN: It could well be. Replaced by a man named John Maresca. Jack also had very good French. Jack was not the easiest guy to work for. Reminded me a little bit of Jack Matlock in that respect. Not the easiest guy to work for, neither one was, but I had great respect for Jack Maresca. He was smart, articulate, bought into Evan Galbraith's approach to the press which was instead of holding them at arms length, we need to try to use them to get out our message.

If I did things right, and I was right most of the time, Jack was very complimentary. If I screwed up and didn't keep him informed on something, boy, he could come down on me like a ton of bricks. His office was only one floor above me.

Then there was a third DCM whose name was Bill Barrowclough.

As long as we are going down the line, I also had three PAOs. The PAO when I arrived was Jack Hedges. Jack was already into his third or fourth year in Paris. Jack really gave me great liberty to operate as press attaché. He had been press attaché Paris (my job), he enjoyed his job and he gave me liberty to operate as long as I kept him informed.

He was replaced by one of USIA's legendary figures, Terry Catherman. I have to be a bit careful how I say this but Terry was going through a terribly difficult period in his life. He didn't speak French very well and he was hung up about that. I think he had other personal issues. For a while, he wanted to keep really close tabs on what I was doing but then he realized that wasn't going to make his life or my life any easier and I kept him informed and that was enough.

The third PAO was Sam Courtney who again was one of the high profile figures of USIA. So I had three prominent ambassadors, three DCMs and three PAOs.

Q: Let's talk about sort of the administrative wiring diagram. Charlie Wick was the head of USIA. I have had people talk about both a difficult guy but also the guy that brought in money so a great deal of respect for him for keeping USIA high profile but not an easy person to work for.

BROWN: Everything you say is true.

Charlie Wick was the director of USIA. I would have to go back and count but I bet he made at least an annual trip to Paris while I was there. After my Paris assignment, I went back to Moscow and Charlie Wick was out there a couple of times as well.

In Paris, the burden of a Charlie Wick visit fell on the PAO and I can remember Terry Catherman saying he was losing sleep and sweating and everything else worrying about the Charlie Wick visit. I didn't have that problem myself. He added to our workload, certainly. Even when he wasn't visiting, he initiated this project called WorldNet or EuroNet. I think in fairness it has to be said that Charles Wick was ahead of his time and a lot of Foreign Service officers were behind the times, dragging our feet, thinking "what is this crazy system of using a satellite to put a newsmaker in Washington in touch with a journalist somewhere out in the field?"

Admittedly, there were technical problems the first few times or you might get someone who was supposed to be a newsmaker and wouldn't say anything. But the technology is so taken for granted these days as a means of communicating that our resistance to it early on leaves the Foreign Service people who resisted open to criticism.

Q: Could you explain what it was at that time?

BROWN: It involved identifying putting a newsmaker in Washington into a studio and inviting journalists into, let's say, a USIA office in Paris and thanks to the satellite, the journalists could interview the newsmaker. One of the first persons we had was George Shultz. We had a pretty good turnout for that.

There were technical problems. It wasn't done with the ease that you do a satellite connection these days. You had a language issue and you also had . . . I can talk a lot about George Shultz and my high respect for him, but he wasn't always the most scintillating newsmaker. He gave sometimes pretty bland answers to questions. But he was the secretary of state. The second time around you wouldn't get the secretary of state. You'd get somebody else further down on the food chain and it became awkward every time to round up an audience. Charles Wick wanted to make sure we were not only getting an audience but getting placement out of this.

So it was a challenge to produce the results that he wanted. WorldNet was the global name given to it. Euro Net was the name given to it when you had a European audience.

It wasn't always bilateral. It wasn't always just journalists in France interviewing someone in Washington. You might have three or four or half a dozen posts involved so you'd go around from one post to another. Again, that added to the logistical, mechanical difficulty. But that was Charles Wick's major contribution in those early years.

The other major contribution of course, was his personal relationship through his wife to Nancy Reagan.

I have said many times, as a registered Democrat, that I always felt we got better support from Republican administrations and from Republican directors of USIA than we did from Democratic administrations and Democratic directors of USIA. Various theories as to why that might be the case, even if you accept my premise.

My basic theory is that Republicans liked the idea of going out there and telling the rest of the world our story. They had no embarrassment at using federal government funds to go to the rest of the world to say "hey, we are a good country and our policies are correct and our point of view is to be listened to. If we need money to get that message across, let's do it."

Mr. Wick came to Paris many times. Usually my job was to put him in touch with journalists and I can remember arranging a couple of luncheons with very prominent, English speaking French journalist contacts. You would hold your breath and hope that Charles Wick wouldn't say something offensive, stupid or outlandish because he did shoot from the hip. There were plenty of occasions when I had to make that kind of arrangements.

One of his other projects goes to the period when martial law was declared in Poland and we were very concerned about the situation there. He put together a program called "Let Poland Be Poland." We were to try to place it on television. The French were not at all open to the idea of taking a packaged American program and putting it on TV but one channel did. They ran "Let Poland Be Poland" on a given Sunday night and, of course, we were obligated to report the reaction to it.

Q: How did it play?

BROWN: I don't recall. I don't think it had a whole lot of impact. At least we could say it went

on French TV.

I guess I could take off from that a little bit, however, and say that the whole trend of French thinking during the five years I was there was increasingly dubious, skeptical or whatever about the communist model. There was of course a communist party in France and tangentially, Ambassador Galbraith got himself in trouble early on by making negative aspersions about the French Minister of Transport, Charles Fiterman. Mitterrand's government included communist ministers and Galbraith made critical comments that got him in hot water with the French.

I recall an occasion when the French Communist Party wanted to deliver a petition to the American Embassy. I had only been there for a few months and a fellow in the political section, Ted Van Gilder, and I were assigned to the front door to receive this petition from members of the French Communist Party. My picture appeared in L'Humanité, the French communist newspaper, along with an article about this petition.

But overall, events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the five years that I was in France conspired to make that model increasingly unattractive to the French left. I was so fortunate I was in Paris for five extremely interesting years in our bilateral and multilateral relationship. During those same five years in the Soviet Union, you had the death of Brezhnev, the death of Andropov and the death of Chernenko. As one person said to somebody else in Moscow at the Chernenko funeral, "didn't I see you at the Andropov funeral?" and the second guy replied, "Yeah, I bought the subscription."

Not much was going on. This was also a period when they exiled Alexander Solzhenitsyn. It is one thing for the Soviet Union to be an unattractive political model but when they exiled their leading intellectual, cultural thinkers, then the Soviet Union in general had no attraction for the French left. This was a period in which the French left was increasingly disillusioned with Soviet-style communism.

Q: Maybe this would be the time to talk a bit about the French intellectuals. I can't think of any country where the sort of intellectual class, whatever that is, has the importance or presumed importance or at least the high profile than in France. How did you approach it and what was your impression of it?

BROWN: I am going to be modest in answering that question. I think my colleagues in the cultural section and elsewhere had more direct contact with the intellectuals per se. You always were aware that intellectuals played an important role when you went to the Pantheon and saw where they were buried or you saw those long, thumb-sucking pieces in the newspaper which I never read, actually. You knew the intellectuals played an important role.

Let me address the subject indirectly. There were a more than a few French journalists who were truly intellectuals. Especially in my early years in Paris, I was frequently invited out to lunch by French journalists. These were long, two hour, two and a half hour affairs, full course meals, bottle of wine kind of get-togethers. A few of the journalists or commentators who invited me out were way above me in terms of intellectual ability. I was doing this in French and my French was good but with a few of these people, I can remember thinking "he isn't going to want to see

me again because I am not really on his intellectual level.”

I didn’t worry too much about it because there were a lot of others who were just plain old practical journalists, interested in a story, interested in the good backgrounder, interested in being invited to some event with an American newsmaker. I felt comfortable with these people, able to exchange ideas, able to operate on a practical business level. For me, the French intellectuals were out there but they weren’t really a direct part of my day to day work.

Q: Did you have the feeling that they were, their chromosomes put them in the left or were they distinctively left or did you have a feeling that this was sort of an immovable group?

BROWN: Without thinking about it, you say emotionally in the left but a couple of the people I am thinking about who were just so far above me in terms of their thought processes were working for Figaro and L’Express, the journals on the right. The French journalists were thinkers. Many of them were deep thinkers and I suppose more of them were on the left than on the right but not exclusively so.

Again I come back to the point more often than not, I’d call them and say, we have somebody in town who is available for a background briefing on economic or political or issues or we can send you to the United States on an IV grant, that kind of thing. That was more the relationship I had with the French press.

Q: How about the right and the Le Pen phenomenon?

BROWN: We didn’t have anything to do with Le Pen and we didn’t have anything to do with the far left, L’Humanité. We were, I think, absolutely restricted from contact with the communists. With the far right, we were not absolutely restricted but we didn’t have anything to do with Le Pen and company. Figaro and the Express and those legitimate right-of-center publications, yes. We had a lot of contact with them. The ambassador would be invited to a big luncheon hosted by the L’Express and Figaro enterprise.

My job brought me in contact with the whole gamut of the French press – Le Matin and Liberation on the left. L’Express, Figaro on the right and Le Monde, wherever you would place it.

Q: You mentioned you were forbidden contact with the communists. It is fairly simple to be that way in the United States where the communists aren’t really much of anything. Since the communists are part of the web and wolf of the French politics

BROWN: I think it was an absolute restriction. I could not invite journalists from L’Humanité to a press event. Within the political section, there were contacts with the whole spectrum of French politics but not with the French Communist Party. There were no formal relationships. They were communists and they were in some ways farther left than any other West European communist party.

Q: As often is the case the step children of the regime. I would think that if you wanted to get at

least maybe you couldn't do anything press wise, but certainly for politicians you should know what they are thinking and all because the maneuvers going on, you know. This is like in Iran, one of our terrible mistakes was we allowed ourselves to be cut out from a contact with the anti-Shah forces.

BROWN: I didn't make the policy.

Q: Did you find yourself chafing under this?

BROWN: No, I didn't. I had plenty to do. I recognized, not that I ever even thought about resisting it, that this was the Ronald Reagan, Evan Galbraith administration and this was perfectly consistent with their thinking, that we would want nothing to do with French communists. You didn't want to do anything to legitimize them.

Did people in the political section have some informal contacts? Perhaps, I don't know. But I don't think they would have wanted to have been seen in a restaurant dining with someone from the French Communist Party. We did not have relations with the French Communist Party.

Q: This was the period of time where there was the phenomenon called Euro communism. It was considered to be ___ in Italy. They were seen as more, you might say, more respectable.

BROWN: That may be true but overall, I would argue that the early '80s in France marked the decline of influence of the French Communist Party. More importantly, just a general disillusionment among the French left with communism and the eastern bloc.

Q: The invasion of Czechoslovakia in '68 I think really hit the communist Western European communism.

BROWN: On the other hand, despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, people were still talking in the 1980's, as you said, about Eurocommunism. I think that part of what happened in the '80s was the inability of the Soviet Union to produce anybody who could articulate, who could speak. It was a sclerotic society. In addition, you had the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn. You talk about intellectuals in France. Well, here was the leading Russian intellectual, an esteemed Russian writer and the Soviet leadership couldn't tolerate him; they booted him out of the country.

Let me turn to a couple of things I have notes on, some personal observations

First about arriving in France. My wife and I both passed through Paris en route from Moscow back to the United States on home leave but we did it in a clumsy fashion. She went with our younger daughter Christine to try to decide where we were going to be living and she found an apartment somewhere in the suburbs. A few weeks later, I went through Paris, decided I didn't want to live in her apartment and picked out one that I thought was better. I put down \$1,000, which seemed like a lot of money to me at that time, to reserve it and went on home leave.

I came back to Paris ahead of my wife and checked into a hotel around the corner from the embassy where I was going to be staying for a while because nothing was ready. Ironically, we felt hard pressed to find anything in Paris as wonderful as the apartment we had in Moscow. Moscow living conditions, you would think, would be awful but remember that in Moscow, we had this spacious apartment on the 12th floor of a building with a view on three sides. Something like that in Paris proper would have cost multiple times my housing allowance.

There was another factor at work and that was our daughter was to be enrolled in the Lycée International several miles west of Paris, in the direction of Versailles. We decided, contrary to the advice of a lot of people, not to look for an apartment on the Left Bank or in the 16th arrondissement but out in St. Germaine-en-Laye.

Well, I got back to Paris and went out on the weekend to look at the apartment that I had put down \$1,000 on and I became almost nauseated. I could not live out there where I have to take a bus and then a train to get to work. I felt confined. I tossed and turned for several nights, talked to my wife on the phone and decided to forfeit the \$1,000 and start all over again. I was going to wait until she came and do it the correct way.

But I didn't. A couple of days later I went out to St. Germaine-en-Laye with a note that I picked up in the embassy's housing office and accompanied by the Reuters bureau chief, Bob Evans, and his wife whom we had known in Moscow. I found this big old airy house with a huge garden a short distance from the RER, the train line, and I was blown away by the place. This was totally different. It wasn't available for a month but I said to myself "this is where we want to live." The owner, Madame Legras, wisely suggested I wait until my wife came. I did wait until my wife came before I confirmed.

We lived in that house a 3, rue des Bucherons, and it was a huge part of the France experience. We were in a community where we had a lot of friends and acquaintances. Contrary to what the security people said I should do, I would walk every morning from my front door five minutes to the RER, pick up my Herald Tribune and find a spot on the platform where I knew the doors on the RER car would open. It was the end of the line. In 20 minutes, I would be at l'Opera and two metro stops later, I would be at the embassy. Living in the suburbs didn't inhibit my style.

At the end of the day, I would gather up newspapers and other unclassified documents and read them on the return trip home. Yes, we did not live in the Left Bank but we had a really wonderful French experience. Not only did we have a lot of friends out there, we had a chateau and a huge park, a great place for our dog, a different lifestyle, a different experience during our five years in Paris. So that is a very strong memory.

The second thought involves where my office was in the embassy, looking out on the Place de la Concorde. I replaced a fellow named Chris Henze. Chris had done a fine job. The first week I was there, Jack Hedges hosted a farewell reception for Chris. It was very well attended, a tribute to Chris and the job he had done. Journalist after journalist came up to me and we exchanged cards and said we will have to get together for lunch. I did not really know what this meant at the time but especially over the first year, I had innumerable lunches with French journalists. I got a lot of kidding about it as I came back into the embassy after a couple of hours away.

But when somebody mentioned the name of a particular journalist or wanted to have access to somebody in the French daily press, the weekly magazines or the audiovisual media, I had those contacts. My office and I had those contacts.

In my office, I was blessed with five extremely dedicated, long serving French employees -- Lucette, Monique, Nicole, Michelle and Jacques. Those five were like the starting five on a basketball team. I will never forget them. They were such an important part of doing the job there and I remain in contact with a couple of them.

Lucette Beal, in particular; I wrote a piece about her for the USIA magazine. If I do say so, it was a really good piece that captured who she was and what she did. Lucette prepared a daily press briefing for the ambassador. She had come to work for the American embassy I think circa 1948 and her office was actually in what became the ambassador's residence. She went to work for the Marshall Plan and occupied a cubicle; not far from where she sat was a young Foreign Service officer named Arthur Hartman. That was 1948 and I am going out there 30 plus years later. By 1981, Lucette is the chief FSN in the press office and Arthur Hartman is the ambassador.

Just to illustrate how things worked, it was my first week and I think back to my first day on the job in Moscow in 1978 when I had three newsmakers. I got a call from the DCM, Christian Chapman, who said Richard Allen, the NSC adviser, was in town and would like to do a background briefing with French journalists. This is my first week on the new job.

I turned to the PAO, Jack Hedges, who suggested two or three names. I turned next to Lucette who at that point, more easily than I, could contact those journalists, all of whom were delighted to come to the ambassador's residence for a background briefing with the NSC adviser. I attended and I did what I do well and what I was experienced in doing from my Moscow days. I took notes. I took good notes and I showed them to the ambassador and DCM. They were put into a telegram and they got me off to a good start. I got a lot of commendations right away for making effective use of this press opportunity. It is always nice to get off to a good start.

I won't attribute all of my success in Paris to those five French employees but they were part of it.

Meanwhile, remember that I had the title of AIO. That didn't last very long. Things were restructured. I became the information officer with a lot of other responsibilities.

As I said, Lucette did this daily press briefing. She would come in early. With her scissors, she'd cut up all the French newspapers and at about 10, we'd go up to the ambassador's office and do a briefing for the ambassador on what was in the French press. The ambassador, DCM and PAO and anyone else who was interested would attend. Not that many other people attended because they I think they found it a little bit tedious. For Ambassador Galbraith, it was a five day a week operation unless there was something extraordinary that called him away. We did it in French. He preferred to have it done in French.

Michelle Carteron was a generation younger than Lucette. She aspired to do what Lucette did and there was a lot of tension between the two of them and Michelle brought in her contacts in the French press. Things became very competitive.

Monique Barra was flamboyant type whose contact was in the audiovisual world. She would come running into my office and tell me I absolutely had to meet some particular journalist she had encountered or absolutely had to go to some event, attend a live taping of a show. A very effervescent, ebullient character.

Nicole Mazon prepared the daily summary of the French press that every West European embassy was required to do. Nicole went through and summarized particularly the French print press, the editorial comments, press round up. She would bring this to me in draft. I would correct it.

I always remember the day around 1982 when Nicole brought her report to me in draft and said “we have a new system here. Put a circle around something you want changed and we will take it back out and change it on the machine.” Literally, when I arrived, it was all being done on a typewriter. Lo and behold, a couple of years later and they had come up with this thing called the word processor produced by Wang. You may recall that Wang was the supplier early on to the State Department.

I can remember the novelty when we had the first Wang computer. It was in my office and when I wasn’t using it, other people were able to come in and use this fancy device where we could actually change words without retyping the whole page.

Then there was even a stage where once you did that, you took the report to the technology center, pushed a couple of buttons and this whole thing was transmitted electronically to Washington. Wow.

Q: This whole communications thing, you were right on the cusp of it at that point.

BROWN: Cusp but we were still on the slow side.

The fifth employee was Jacques Jacquinet. He was a midget. He was less than five feet tall, probably four feet and so well known. Everybody knew Jacques. He tended the AP and AFP tickers. All day long, he would tear news items off the tickers, photocopy them and like a mailman, in the afternoon, he’d go around and plop 20 or 25 pages on people’s desks. He did that early in the morning and again late in the afternoon.

When we say we were on the cusp of advanced communications, this is the way we kept informed. There were no other ways, except a telephone call, that brought the news any faster than the AP and the AFP ticker. I can remember any number of times when there was a news event and I would go dashing in to the embassy to get the latest news on the event so we could keep the ambassador and other people posted.

I said that I keep in touch with those people. I am still in touch with Lucette and Monique. There

was a spring Saturday in 1982 and I received a phone call saying Jacques had died of a heart attack. I immediately went to his home on the other side of Paris and tried to console his widow. It was clear that the Embassy was Jacques's life.

We set up a condolence book at his desk and the outpouring among both the FSNs and the Americans was overwhelming. The ambassador went to his funeral. Partly because he was a midget, people would never forget him physically but that aside, he was a beloved character. He would come into my office late in the afternoon and although, he didn't speak much English, he'd use this little phrase like he was going to take the rest of the day off. It reflected his pride in his work. He was married to a French woman of normal stature. I don't know if he ever had any children. Bless his soul, we missed Jacques. In the condolence book, I wrote that somebody else would take his job. He could never be replaced.

And there was the practical question of who was going to monitor the AP and AFP tickers that were going to keep spewing out paper forever. I interviewed several candidates and eventually hired an Algerian-born fellow whose last name was Choutri. He was still in the job when I last visited the embassy a few years ago.

Q: Did you find your employees, the French national employees were, were they sensitive pointing out saying look this is correspondent or this event in the United States or something is taking a peculiar turn, a wrong turn or anti Americanism? Was this left sort of to the officers or were you getting from the people who had been around the press for a long, long time where things are going?

BROWN: Lucette was completely objective in her clipping of the French press. If there was something critical of the United States, that was probably the first thing she called to the ambassador's attention. There was no effort to feed the ambassador and the embassy just the good news. Critical information out of the French press was served up.

As far as the journalists we dealt with sure, we were aware of those who might provide a sympathetic hearing. Particularly between Lucette and Michelle, there was a competitive relationship enhanced by the generational gap to try to introduce me to some journalists we didn't know and they might advise that this particular person was fairly critical or not necessarily as inclined as someone else to give us a good hearing.

Q: You have five years, from early Reagan to mid Reagan. Did you sense a greater understanding of Reagan? When Reagan first came in here was a Hollywood actor from the far right and Europe was extremely dubious about this character and they learned to live with him. It was a learning experience. Did you sense this change?

BROWN: It is hard for me thirty years later to recall precisely what was in the French press. You could go back and see he was described as a movie actor and all this kind of thing.

Was there an evolution on Reagan during that time? Yes, there was. First of all, he's President of the United States. He has to be taken seriously and he didn't bomb the Soviet Union or whatever. He was conducting reasonable policies. Some policies they would agree with; some they would

disagree with.

Overall, the understanding and appreciation of Reagan improved during those five years partly because we were starting from a fairly low understanding and a low appreciation. You'd have to go back and look in detail at editorials and that kind of thing to give an in-depth answer to that question.

But I was dealing more with the day-to-day kind of stuff. Very early on, a couple of months into my presence there, the word came to the press office that shots had been fired at the DCM, Christian Chapman. He was the chargé. He came out of his house in the morning to get into his car -- I think he was being driven -- and realized that someone was firing shots at him. Christian Chapman was as close to a French intellectual as you could find in the American Embassy, educated in the French or in the French tradition. But like a good American, he ducked behind his car; shots were fired but missed him, miraculously missed him.

He came to the embassy where I asked him for guidance; our phones were ringing off the hook. What had happened, etcetera? I asked him if he would be willing to speak to the French press and despite concerns from the security people, he was. I will never forget the scene as we allowed French journalists into the embassy and Christian Chapman occupying a position there on the second floor of the embassy where the ambassador's office was, a very elegant position. He answered questions in both English and perfect French and basically the word that went out was that the American embassy chargé d'affaires had ducked behind his car, the bullets had glanced off and he was safe. That was about all there was to it at that time. No clear cut information on who the assailant was or whatever.

Little did we realize this was thrusting us into a new age. In 1982, anyone who wanted just walked in the front door of the embassy. We didn't have ID cards, badges. If there was any sort of control on who walked in the embassy, it was minimal. Somewhere, not too long after that, we got ID cards. The French resisted this, particularly the more senior employees. Lucette, for example, was accustomed to French journalists coming in and having a chat with someone in the embassy, perhaps the way it used to happen in the State Department. It wasn't just the attempted shooting of Christian Chapman that caused the change but it was part of the whole evolution at that time.

The Christian Chapman incident was November 12, 1981. It was two months later, January 18, that one of our military attachés, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ray walked out of his house and was not so fortunate. Someone walked up and shot him once in the head. He was assassinated, murdered right there in the streets. He was married with two children, roughly the same age as my children

By that time, Evan Galbraith was there as ambassador. We all assembled in his office and I can remember to this day, Ambassador Galbraith was very quick except at this point, he seemed to be a little bit paralyzed. What should we do? We lowered the flag to half staff. I drafted a statement. He didn't like the statement. He thought it was the bland kind of thing you say every time something like this happened so he came up with his own version. He not only issued it in writing but verbally as well. He said he was "revolted" by the cold blooded murder. And he went

ahead with a previously scheduled lunch with President Mitterrand.

The next day there was a funeral service at Notre Dame where Charles Ray was a regular parishioner. My job was to control and advise the French and other press on what they could and could not do in the service. So that was a big news making event.

It was not the only terrorism related incident we would have but it was the only time an American official would be killed while I was in Paris.

Q: Did it become clear later who was doing this?

BROWN: They did arrest somebody, a Lebanese. He was tried and sentenced to jail.

There was another incident a couple years later on a Saturday where somebody from the embassy was coming out of his house and was suspicious about a package under his car. He called the police. The French police came to check it out. It exploded and killed one of the French police and wounded the other.

And in March, 1984, there was a shooting at our consulate in Strasbourg. The Consul, Bob Homme, was struck twice but was not seriously wounded. It was a miracle. If I recall correctly, the shooter turned out to be the same guy that shot and killed Colonel Ray.

The point is that along side having a great time going out to lunches with French journalists, there was this nasty backdrop that always involved questions from the media. It was a wakeup call to everybody and it was part of a pattern.

I mentioned all these lunches I had with the French journalists. At some point, I decided I would make a list of the restaurants I had gone to. I still have the list. It became an embassy directory of the French restaurant world. I probably should have made more of it than I did. I could have made some money off it or gone into the restaurant review business.

New subject: During my first year, I got a call from the Elysée press person -- basically the President's press person -- inviting my counterparts from five other embassies and me for a planning session for the G-7. You recall that the first G-7 meeting took place in Rambouillet, France, in 1975, hosted by Giscard d'Estaing and then it went to every other member of the G-7 which meant that by 1982, France was due to host it again. So with my counterparts from five other embassies, we went out to Versailles. The French were going to use Versailles for the 1982 G-7 meeting.

At a subsequent meeting, we were asked what the needs were for the respective press corps in covering the G-7. The Germans, Italians, Canadians gave rough estimates of what they might need. The Japanese said they would need something like 22 typewriters, 18 telex machines. They just had it down precisely, very Japanese like.

As for me, I had to say "well, we have asked the White House but they really haven't responded." As we all know, the White House just didn't march with the other countries on these

things. The White House press office and the whole White House on any presidential visit had their own way of operating.

Over the course of the next several months leading up to June, 1982, I hosted any number of White House press advance teams and people from the White House transportation office for innumerable visits to the sites, discussions about photo ops and everything else leading up to the President Reagan's visit in 1982 which was the biggest presidential visit that I had ever been involved in and probably ever would be involved in. Talk about President Reagan's image in France.

I describe this as three visits. There was President Reagan's bilateral visit to France. This was his first visit as President of the United States to France and so it was a state visit with reciprocal dinners at the Elysée and at the ambassador's residence. It was rare to have two official dinners and President Mitterrand came to the residence as a guest. Mitterrand would never have gone to any other ambassador's residence for a dinner but an exception was made for the President of the United States.

There was also Nancy Reagan in France and a whole team with vast resources went into that visit. And finally, there was President Reagan's attendance at the G-7 summit meeting. I worked my tail off in the preparations. I worked very intimately with people in the White House press advance office, including especially with a very good guy named John Dreylinger. Unfortunately, his name came up often during the Clinton years in connection with the so-called Travelgate issue. I knew every one of the probably 25 photo ops at Versailles. I was intimately prepared for that meeting.

It was also a lesson to me on how the White House big foots everybody else. Yes, I got to stand at certain points along the way but the White House would never entrust anything solely to embassy people. The White House staff, many or most of whom were political appointees, would ultimately have responsibility for everything.

I did make a good impression on Larry Speakes, who was the White House spokesman. He had replaced Jim Brady, wounded in the assassination attempt. Larry Speakes liked me and I liked Larry Speakes. I got high praise for whatever it was that I did, even though it seemed to me at the time I was mostly standing at some place waiting for a photo op to take place.

A couple things characterized that G-7 meeting. I think it was the only time that Alexander Haig came to Paris as secretary of state. He was something of a show of his own which the White House didn't particularly like.

It was also extremely hot and the press operation was in the Orangerie at Versailles; the Orangerie was a hot house designed to allow fruits to grow year round. The working conditions were absolutely atrocious. If the French had hoped to call attention to the magnificence of Versailles, that failed because it coincided with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra Shatila massacres. All news attention was focused on that event and very little on the G-7 meeting at Versailles.

But I do have vivid memories of it, of lost sleep and long days.

Q: How about Nancy Reagan? She was quite a power unto herself. I was wondering how you found

BROWN: I really wasn't too involved in it. Somebody else did all of that.

Jumping ahead several years, when Reagan came to Moscow and I was the PAO, we had all the various advance teams and specific site assignments. Everybody on the staff was assigned to some particular group or location such as the university, the writer's club, Red Square or wherever. There was a woman on my staff, an assistant cultural affairs officer, and we assigned her to the Nancy Reagan team. She came to me one day in high dudgeon and said that she didn't like this at all. It was sexism. As a woman, she was being assigned to Mrs. Reagan while everybody else was being assigned to President Reagan. I said, "Susan, first of all, a lot of women on the staff are being assigned to President Reagan but somebody also has to be assigned to Mrs. Reagan. Secondly, you're in the cultural section and most of her program will be culturally related. And thirdly, I can tell you that at the end of this event, you will have had the most interesting experiences."

She came to me later, perhaps still offended that she had been assigned to Mrs. Reagan but she acknowledged that she had had very interesting experiences while the rest of us again stood around and waited for things to happen or listened to speeches. She got to see icons and attend cultural events that nobody else got to see.

I don't specifically recall much about Nancy Reagan's program in Paris but there were probably some similarities.

Q: On that trip to Moscow I have talked to Nick Burns and others. They said the whole party ended up three days in Helsinki before they came to Moscow. I think that was the trip because her private astrologer had said that if they arrived at a different time or something it would be dangerous or something. Maybe it was that trip.

How did this G-7 thing work out from your perspective?

BROWN: The visit ended on a Monday and we went to Orly Airport, waved goodbye to Air Force One and to President Reagan. I so wished that it had ended on a Thursday or Friday so that I would have a few days to recover. Instead I went right back to the office.

From a practical point of view, some of my USIS colleagues or people back in Washington seemingly forgot that I had just been spent five or six days nonstop on President of the United States-related activities and they would ask me some mundane question about a work related project. I was physically exhausted by the end of this visit. I didn't have this great uplifting sense of satisfaction. I had put a lot of time into working with the White House advance people only to realize, come the time of the visit, that my role was pretty minimal. I didn't expect it to be maximal, certainly not involved in substance, but you were never entrusted with any responsibility because the White House wanted to hold all that responsibility to itself.

Was I the only person to feel this way? I mentioned our DCM, Jack Maresca. Jack was a very controlling kind of guy. President Reagan came to France three times while I was there. First was 1982, Versailles. The second was 1984; I'll talk more about that later, the 40th anniversary of D-Day. And the third was a quick visit to Strasbourg and the European Community. Jack Maresca was as involved as I was with the White House advance teams for each of the first two visits. By the time of the third visit, he said "I don't need to be here" and he went on leave. He realized that the White House comes in and they just take over everything.

At the end of the Versailles visit, Ambassador Galbraith felt somewhat the same way many of us did about the behavior of the White House staff. We had a wheels-up party that did not involve the White House party. Ambassador Galbraith was as offended as everyone else by how we were treated and made some pointed remarks about manners that gave all of us a good reason to laugh and to relax a little bit. He did not include President and Mrs. Reagan in his criticism.

For me personally, I had become well and favorably known to the White House press office. A year later, when it was the turn of the United States to host the G-7, the Reagan administration chose Williamsburg, Virginia, as the site. I was invited back to the United States and I attended the G-7 meeting in Williamsburg. My job was to work with the French press, attend their briefings, report back to Larry Speakes on what the French were saying, try to encourage their coverage of something other than just the G-7, the Williamsburg scene, that kind of thing.

I also went to the G-7 meeting a year later in Bonn and in 1986, I went for the only time in my life to Japan. I went again at the invitation of Larry Speakes and company to the G-7 meeting in Tokyo, to cover the French press, report back on what their take was, how they were dealing with the issues. That was heady, that was fun, a good ego trip.

Let me mention some of the other newsmaker things that kept me busy.

On September 15, 1982, right at the end of a visit from Mr. Wick, we learned that Princess Grace of Monaco had died in an automobile accident. Soon after, we got the word that Nancy Reagan would lead the American delegation to the funeral so I and others, including Lucette Beal, were sent down to Monaco to work particularly with the American press who came along with Nancy Reagan. Her press person was Sheila Tate and I met with her.

On the day of the funeral, September 18, I had the experience of being right across from the cathedral as the whole funeral party led by Prince Rainier walked down the street. I was really very moved. I didn't have much of an impression of Monaco prior to that time except I knew it was a gambling mecca. Clearly, the whole community led by Prince Rainier was grieving for the loss of their princess, Princess Grace of Monaco, and I had a firsthand seat, not a seat, but I was standing right across from the doors to the cathedral as everyone came by.

November 11, 1982 was a holiday and I got the word that Brezhnev had died. I called the Ambassador. He was having breakfast with Henry Kissinger but he called me back a few minutes later. I went in to the embassy. Kissinger was staying at the ambassador's residence. A lot of French knew about the visit and there were a lot of requests to interview Kissinger so I

went over to the residence and was asked to coordinate.

I tiptoed in to the room where he was meeting with a French visitor. I had never met the great man before and I asked him if he would like me to try to coordinate media requests. To my surprise, he was very cordial and very appreciative. He explained that he had a contract, I think, with ABC and had to do ABC first but after that, he would do any number of interviews.

We used two rooms at the residence. He did the interview with ABC and then we moved him next door to do a follow on interview with a pool of French TV networks and then we moved him back to CBS and NBC. I think he did four interviews quite willingly on his memories of Leonid Brezhnev.

It was the only time in my career I encountered Henry Kissinger first hand. Fortunately in contrast to other people's experiences I found him quite easy and cordial to work with.

In October, 1983, I had one of my busiest weeks. It was on a Sunday that we woke up and heard about the bombings in Beirut, the Marine headquarters there. 250 American marines killed there. The second largest number of deaths was among French so there was an American-French link and the ambassador did not hesitate. He went on French television that same day, didn't check with anybody. I can't tell you at this point what he said but I thought it was very courageous of him to do that. His words must have been along the lines of loss of life, our common loss and that sort of thing.

With him doing that on French TV on a Sunday night, the DCM, Jack Maresca felt confident to accept a radio interview the next day. I went along. I had great admiration for Jack Maresca; he was not an easy guy to work for but very, very professional. His French was far better than the ambassador's. In some ways, his reasoning and thought processes might have been less emotional and more analytical and he did a really good interview. I couldn't tell you today what he said but I do remember those two interviews; the ambassador on Sunday night on TV and the DCM the next day on the radio. We really got our message out.

That was Sunday and Monday and on Tuesday, the United States invaded Grenada. Again, we were up in the ambassador's office, the DCM, somebody from the political section and me. Ambassador Galbraith was chomping at the bit. He wanted to go out and make a statement. The problem was nobody really knew what was going on. We didn't have guidance. We didn't know what the whole story was except the ambassador was sure he did. Everyone else was advising him to be cautious about this because we didn't fully understand but he went ahead

Q: The real concern was Americans on the island, students.

BROWN: And we were going to go in and rescue the Americans at the hospital and elsewhere. Whatever the case, the ambassador looked at us who were around him hesitating and didn't have a very charitable view. He went on television and debated Serge July who was the editor of Liberation, one of the left of center newspapers and he didn't come out too well. I think he lost the debate. He didn't come out too well on TV and he came out even worse in the eyes of Secretary of State Shultz who was in Paris on Thursday of that week.

I think the ambassador made some statement suggesting that the Grenada invasion had been planned two weeks earlier. He was really off the reservation. When Secretary Shultz arrived on Thursday, I linked up with John Hughes, his press spokesman and it was clear to me with all the body language that the ambassador was going to be disciplined by Shultz for going beyond what he should have.

That was an up week for the ambassador and a downer. I am sure in his view you won a few, you lost a few.

Q: Did the ambassador later acknowledge that maybe he'd gone too far?

BROWN: He did, maybe not publicly, but I am sure when he looked in the mirror, he said I should not have been quite so outspoken. Regarding his statement that the invasion had been planned two weeks ahead, he did say something about being misquoted.

Amidst all this, the Beirut bombings, the Grenada issue and the Shultz visit, we had a visit from Director Wick and that was always a full load. He made a speech that week; we had to record that and the Q & A session. I set up a lunch for him with two leading, English-speaking French journalists; a woman named Christine Ockrent and a man named Leon Zitrone. At the time, they were as well known on the French scene as any two network nightly network people are today.

Wick liked me personally but he was wondering during that period if we should have in our Western European capitals a super press attaché, not a career Foreign Service officer but someone from the outside who would really know how to get out there and get home the message. I have always felt good that Christine Ockrent and Leon Zitrone both rejected the idea. "You don't need a super press attaché. We deal quite well with the press office at the embassy, thank you."

That was October, 1983. It was almost two years later that Galbraith gave an interview to John Vinocur of The New York Times just as he was leaving and in that interview he criticized Foreign Service officers for not having guts. I won't take the time now to describe the repercussions but the State Department issued a formal statement disavowing Galbraith's remarks. George Shultz issued a less formal statement in which he said the ambassador's tongue ought to be tied. Galbraith found himself backpedaling and apologizing and saying he didn't mean individually that Foreign Service officers lack guts. They don't have the guts to stand up to their superiors and challenge. I think what he may have had in the back of his mind was this whole Grenada thing when he wanted to make a statement and people were advising him to be cautious.

Q: Did you sense that he during the time you worked with him sense that he was looking at you all and judging you all none too favorably?

BROWN: He may have been. I don't want to single myself out but he liked me because I, in my own interest, kept enabling him to do press contact work.

Let's talk a little bit more about what motivated Galbraith. He went to Paris and in so many words, he said I am a businessman but I don't want to be a super commercial attaché. I don't want to be a super political officer, spending all my time delivering notes to the foreign ministry. I want to go out and espouse Reaganism, Reaganomics and any opportunity speaking or otherwise to do that I will do it. I don't have to check first, I don't have to ask permission. I know what the policy is.

Very early on, we were doing one of the morning press briefings. He had given an interview to French TV in Washington before he came out and the embargo was that the interview was not to air until he presented his letters of credentials. Well, it ran before he was in France but he hadn't presented his letters; they jumped the gun.

I was told to call and make a little protest. I did. I called, I knew the guy at which ever French TV network it was. He apologized. I went back to the ambassador's office and said I had called and talked to him and he apologizes. What more can we do? Everybody nodded.

At the end of that meeting, the ambassador asked me to stay behind along with PAO and he basically said what I just said. I want to do press work and I don't have to check with people. I want to be pro active. I want to get out there and give interviews and talk about Pershing missiles and Reagan economics and he did and it really made my life interesting.

I could say to journalists, "You want an interview with the ambassador? Yes. You want to talk to the ambassador about this subject? Yes."

Along the way, there were some bumps and there were some things he may have regretted. I didn't appreciate him saying Foreign Service officers don't have guts but I have to be honest and say he really made my life interesting. I think overall he did what he set out to accomplish. Probably he advanced the U.S. national interest by espousing what he saw as U.S. government policies.

We had innumerable high-level official visits. We had three by the president; I don't know how many by the vice president, even more by the secretary of state and just as many by the secretary of defense, to say nothing of many other newsmakers farther down on the food chain. We had the one Haig visit and that was Versailles. About a month later, he resigned to be replaced by George Shultz.

Shultz and Weinberger talked to the press every time they came to Paris. Shultz was bland; Weinberger was outspoken and imminently quotable. But in the long run, I was much happier we had George Shultz where he was and we survived Cap Weinberger.

In December, 1982, Shultz came out for a meeting with his counterpart, Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister. I think there was a gas pipeline issue, something we were not seeing eye to eye on. Cheysson reminded me of Christian Chapman; he was a French version of Christian Chapman, totally bilingual. There wasn't even a hint of the Gallic accent in his English.

Shultz had a press conference (in my diary, I wrote that it was "technically successful but

substantively very bland”) and the traveling press filed their reports. There were always 8, 10, 12 journalists who came along with the secretary of state. Parenthetically, these were really serious journalists. Some of them had been covering the State Department for so many years that they had a longer mental record of foreign policy than the incumbent secretary of state. They were very unlike the White House press corps with a lot of big egos and people looking for a headline; the State Department press corps was a very serious group of people.

So Shultz had his press conference and I fed back to John Hughes, the press spokesman for the State Department, some of the early reaction and that went to Shultz and he said, “What? This isn’t what I said at all. You are totally misinterpreting.”

Shultz was trying to calm down, put to rest the idea that the U.S. and the French were not seeing eye to eye and that’s not at all the message that went out that day. John Hughes, I think, was probably the best press spokesman at the State Department that I worked with, a former Christian Scientist Monitor journalist, a very solid individual, in it for the professionalism of it, not for the ego trip and that kind of thing.

I got the word that Shultz and Cheysson were having a black tie dinner at the Foreign Ministry but at the end of that dinner, they would again meet with the press to clarify things, at 10:30 at night. The American journalists covering Shultz had gone off for a night in Paris, nice dinners and whatever. We certainly didn’t have text messages or e-mail or anything like that but somehow we rounded up as many as we could and went to the Quai d’Orsay. At the end of the dinner, Cheysson and Shultz sat down again with the press and talked in English for about an hour. I had my little cassette tape recorder. I kept praying that the red light would keep glowing, that my batteries would not die.

I recorded this press conference and went back to the embassy. It is now past midnight. The phone rings, Jack Maresca who says, “Phil, we have to have that transcript.”

I protested, “It’s midnight. It can wait until tomorrow. I can go home and get a good night’s sleep.”

Jack says, “No, we have to have it tonight.”

In my heart of hearts, I said to myself let’s get it out of the way tonight. I don’t want to go home, sleep come back and face it tomorrow.

We got hold of an OECD secretary to type. She sat down in front of the Wang computer and I am playing this tape recorder, pushing a button. Half a sentence, half a sentence would be typed. We worked all night long. We worked until 6 or 7 in the morning and came up with a 25-page transcript cable.

Well, that probably did more to advance my Foreign Service career and increase my promotion rate than anything I had done to that time. John Hughes at the end of the visit sent out the perfunctory note praising the work of the PAOs in the various posts. But he tacked onto it, I will immodestly quote, “A special word about Phil Brown who worked straight through the night

doing a transcript and who was a superior fellow all around.” That was widely circulated to my betters, Charlie Wick and whomever.

It was donkey work. It was nothing but pure drudgery. It was not creative policy making but it increased my profile and probably my promotion rate. I will never forget the reaction to it.

Q: Is there anything we should be covering in the next session in France before we move on?

BROWN: I could talk about any number of things ranging from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games to some plane hijackings. We will talk about those next time.

Q: Okay, great.

Q: Today is the 8th of May, 2012 with Phil Brown.

BROWN: Let’s continue with my five years in France. I’ll preface it by saying I have a lot of resources to look at -- journals and files -- and once again, I am struck by how fortunate we, I always say we, were to have had this stretch of time overseas. From 1977 through 1990, we were overseas: three very interesting years in Moscow during the Cold War and then, when very little was happening in Moscow, this five year period in France. In future sessions, I’ll talk about our return to the Soviet Union and three more very memorable years there. I turn the pages of my journal and day after day, I am struck by what an interesting time we lived in. We took full advantage of it, both personally and professionally.

So what I thought I would do today is to go through and touch on some of these experiences from our years in France, maybe not go into them in too much in depth. Some may seem trivial; others were more substantive and most of them in chronological order. I have touched on a number already.

I talked about working as the press attaché at the embassy, the wonderful French staff that I had and Ambassador Evan Galbraith who was very happy to encounter the press. He wanted to be active both with the print press and the audio visual world. He felt very confident. He didn’t feel he had to check with headquarters to know what he should say. Most of the time he did quite well and a few times he really got himself in trouble doing it. For better or worse, it made my life very interesting.

I talked about the Versailles G-7 summit of 1982, my first intense experience working with the White Office Press Office, how I got myself on the G-7 circuit and became known to Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman. He liked me, got me involved in subsequent G-7 meetings.

My ambassador in the Soviet Union had been Tom Watson, former head of IBM. We continued our relationship after he left Moscow and after we moved to Paris. It wasn’t unusual for him to take his own plane and fly to Paris. We would see him there from time to time. On one particular occasion, he called and said he wanted us to attend a dinner with the board of IBM which was meeting in Paris. At the last minute, he and his wife could not attend but he arranged for us to go

to the dinner nevertheless.

We were there with some pretty high rollers. I was reminded recently when I saw the obituary for Maersk McKinney Moeller, the Danish man whose family created Maersk, the big shipping firm. When I saw his obituary, I remembered we sat with him and his wife at that dinner at a restaurant in Paris called Le Faugeron. That wasn't a typical night out in Paris but it was the kind of thing that made it fun.

A frequent visitor to Paris was Vernon Walters, General Walters, who wore so many hats it was hard to keep up with all of them; he was multilingual and bilingual in French and any time he came to Paris, he was good for an interview. We could usually line him up with TV because they loved his outspokenness and his fluency in French.

Another note about people like General Walters or any number of senior officials. I have frequently mentioned Lucette Beal, the senior French employee in my office who had been with the U.S. government since 1948. It was typical of these people like General Walters that when they came to the embassy, they'd stop first to see Lucette and then they'd call on the ambassador or political counselor. It was partly a courtesy, it was partly friendship but I also think they got a reading on what was going on in France from Lucette. I shouldn't say just Lucette because we also had Monique and Monique and General Walters were twinned.

Q: I think there was a time when De Gaulle was speaking and he used Walters and I think it was a public occasion. And Walters translated. And De Gaulle said 'tres bien' about Walters.

BROWN: His ability in the language but also his willingness to speak to the press. And as I said, he wore many hats, military, civilian and otherwise.

I had a lot of professional contacts at the International Herald Tribune but also friends we knew there in other ways. We knew Charles and Laurana Mitchelmore both through the IHT and the American Church of Paris.

Our first Thanksgiving in Paris, they invited us to their home for dinner and I learned that one of the guests was a singer but I didn't know who other than she had some association with the opera. Everyone simply called her Flicka. After the dinner was over, I learned her name was Frederica von Stade, a personal friend of our hostess for that night. Frederica Von Stade is one of the leading sopranos in the opera world.

There was something called the Anglo American Press Association, English speaking journalists, and they had a luncheon that the ambassador attended. He came back very, very pleased with the whole experience. That was good for me and good for my relationship with him.

It loosened him up all the more and so one night early 1982, soon after the assassination of our military attaché and the beginning of terrorist type activities in Paris, Ambassador Galbraith agreed to do an interview for Nightline with Ted Koppel. Pierre Salinger, who was by then resident in Paris and working for ABC, came by at the ambassador's residence. I was there to coach the ambassador on what it would be like doing an interview with Ted Koppel. It was an

awkward situation because we could see an image of Ted Koppel but only the ambassador could hear his voice. The ambassador had an ear piece that allowed only him to hear the question. So there would be silence in the room and then the ambassador would speak because only he was hearing the voice. It created the image of this daft man sitting in the corner of the room occasionally talking to the wall but it worked out and it was just part of the ambassador's increasing level of confidence in doing interviews.

Q: As a press attaché in an extremely important country, how important was the ambassador's connection to the press both French and foreign, did you feel he advanced the cause?

BROWN: I think he felt it was very important. As I said last time, he did not want to be a super commercial attaché. He made that point. He was a businessman. He didn't want to be carrying diplomatic notes to the foreign ministry so he was looking around to see what he could best do that would keep him busy? He had a lot of energy and so he felt that public diplomacy, I think we must have used the term though I don't think he ever thought of it in those terms, public diplomacy was where he could do the most good.

So he certainly felt he was advancing the cause even though as I say, on occasion he got himself in hot water. It made him certainly a higher profile individual because people would read his name in the paper. They'd see him on TV. After almost four year there, he sort of wore out his welcome and he was not that much of a newsmaker.

But did it really have a major impact on U.S.-French relations? I doubt it. Relations were going to go where relations were going to go because countries like the U.S. and France act in their own best interests.

Q: How did he relate to the fairly extreme leftists?

BROWN: He didn't and I think we discussed this last time. We did not have contact with the far left press, with L'Humanité, the French communist newspapers. He would not have agreed to give them an interview.

He got himself in trouble by very critical remarks about communist ministers in the Mitterrand government. He did not relate to the far left, the communists.

I will say there were a couple of times when we had encounters, I can't recall now specifically with whom, I wouldn't say the far right but with the right and Galbraith would sometimes say, "Gosh, that guy goes a little bit further than I go."

To answer your specific question, there wasn't contact with the left.

I was working intensely. During my first year, I thought I would never get a break. It was thanks to contacts with a couple of French journalists, Jean Leclerc du Sablon and Marie-Claude Descamps from Le Matin, that we went off on our first ski trip in France in winter of '82. It was memorable.

Q: We used to listen to the French news here in Washington. When the ski weekends come the traffic

BROWN: That was the thing I learned. These school vacations or long weekends, there was no way around them. Vacations were not staggered. We left in the wee hours of the morning to try to beat it but to no avail.

But it makes a difference when you go skiing with somebody and the next week you invite him to a breakfast with a visiting newsmaker at the ambassador's residence. Or if you are calling to discuss something you didn't like in their reporting.

Q: You mentioned G-7 meetings. From the public affairs side of things, how did these meetings usually come out?

BROWN: That's a big question and I am not prepared to add much to what I said last time..

What I do recall about the Versailles summit was that with all the effort that the French had put in to this -- closing Versailles to the public and transforming it into the venue for the meetings, the press and everything else -- two things could not have been anticipated. One was the intense heat, especially in the Orangerie; this greenhouse for tropical plants became an impossible place for the press to operate in.

The other was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at that same time; whatever news that was coming out of the G-7 was overtaken by the events in Lebanon.

The next year when the U.S. hosted the G-7 in Williamsburg, my job was to deal with the French press. That was specifically what I was assigned to do. I could go to their press briefings, unless they were closed and they generally were not closed, hear what they were saying and feed that back to the White House in case there was anything that we wanted to address.

What worked quite successfully was that after a couple of days of reporting economic news and politics, a lot of French journalists looked around and wondered "what is this place, Williamsburg?" They were looking for a new story, a new angle. A year earlier, there had been the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Yorktown, just down the peninsula. At least geographically some of them were familiar with that area. There were some good stories about Williamsburg, about William and Mary College (which is where the press center was) and about Thomas Jefferson and I was able to answer a lot of questions and point people in the right direction for interviews and information.

By the way, the White House paid to air condition the building on the William and Mary campus that was used as a press center. I think they had the Versailles Orangerie experience in mind.

Q: In the Battle of Yorktown they had troops there and the French fleet had kept the British from relieving

BROWN: That's why there was also much emphasis on the bicentennial in France because it

was a glorious moment in U.S./French relations.

I had a call from Jock Shirley, a mentor of mine in late 1982, asking me if I was interested in bidding on the job of PAO, Moscow for the summer of 1983. That took me aback. I was barely in my second year in Paris. I had given some thought to returning to Moscow but not that soon so I turned him down. I said “no” to Jock. I really didn’t want to do it then. They found someone else, Ray Benson

Q: I know Ray because Ray and I served in Belgrade together.

BROWN: I eventually did replaced Ray in Moscow at a much more appropriate time for me in my career and a more interesting time in Soviet history but I didn’t like to say no to Jock. He said something at the time to the effect of: “Well, I will accept your no answer this time but it may not be as easy the next time.”

It wasn’t too much later that he called and said he wanted me to bid on PAO Brussels for 1983 or 1984. I was not the least bit interested. My quick analysis said Paris has three missions, three ambassadors. Maybe by that time we only had two because UNESCO may have been cut. We had OECD and we had the bilateral and of the two or three, the bilateral was by far the most important. I was press attaché in a big West European embassy.

Brussels had three missions, NATO, USEC and the bilateral, and the bilateral was the least important of the three. The fact that I was going to be PAO didn’t mean anything to me. One thing I did very well in my Foreign Service career was not to take a job just because it might be a stepping stone to something else. Take a job because it was interesting. So again I said no to Jock and he accepted my no and I got to stay.

About that same time, I was pushing to stay in Paris not just four years per the assignment but for five years because my daughter went there in eighth grade and I wanted her to be able to graduate after five years. I was making that case to Washington and I got a call one day saying “send us a letter saying you want to stay in Paris for five years because there is going to be a change of ambassadors and a change of PAOs and issues and other things and oh, by the way, I d like to stay because my daughter is going to be, for her schooling.” So I rephrased it and I did get my fifth year although to be honest, the real reason was the schooling.

Q: You earlier mentioned Pierre Salinger. He was one of the figures, a hold over from the Kennedy administration who was a name and continued to be a name. Was that a problem for you?

BROWN: No, it wasn’t a problem. In fact it was a big advantage. He was working for ABC then and he would quite happily receive Mr. Wick for breakfast or drinks and I’d go along. He said nice things about me and about the embassy and about how we were getting the U.S. message out. He never undercut us.

It is rather interesting that Wick thought he was going the extra mile because here he was representing a Republican administration but he was willing to speak to this former press man,

under Kennedy, just an example of how open minded he could be. What I think he liked was associating with a famous name.

Pierre Salinger was a good guy, a friend. I remember going out to dinner with him one night. He lit up one of his cigars and I recall that I enjoyed it; ever since my youth, I have enjoyed the smell of a cigar because I had a friend who used to smoke them when we went to baseball games in Pittsburgh.

Pierre Salinger was also working with someone else at that time for one of these big coffee table books called Over Paris, Views of the City. I don't recall exactly how but I consulted with the man who was working with him on that book. So we liked Pierre Salinger.

Q: WorldNet; How did that work in France? The French seem to like to talk to people.

BROWN: I think Mr. Wick was ahead of the curve and I would say a lot of Foreign Service officers were behind the curve; some people dug in their heels and didn't think it was going to work. This was Mr. Wick was taking us out of our comfort zone.

It did not work real well initially because we were going through the trial and error stage, technologically. What is today taken for granted back then was a risk; you were never quite sure it was going to work.

The first couple of times we had newsmakers like Shultz or at least high profile people like Shultz. When you got down to the lower levels, it was hard to attract French journalists especially when these lower level people personally would likely as not come through Paris; General Walters or Fred Ikle. These people were available in person almost weekly so why trundle over the to the USIS office for a WorldNet?

Then they tried to get into different types of audiences; have an intellectual in with an author or something like that. We struggled with it initially, both for technical reasons and our unwillingness to get fully behind it and also because Washington wanted inflated reports on placement and audiences reached.

This was a period of martial law in Poland and we also had the "Let Poland be Poland" project of Mr. Wick's. It was different from WorldNet because he wanted us to place this specially created documentary on French TV and we managed to do that by calling in some chips. The French weren't comfortable about carrying a piece of American produced material on the Cold War.

Let me jump ahead to May 20, 1984, for one of the most amazing days I ever had in Paris. To retaliate for our boycotting the Moscow Olympics of 1980, the Soviets decided they would boycott the Los Angeles Olympics of 1984. Late on a Friday afternoon, a couple of months before the games were to begin, I got a call from French TV, TF1, saying they were going to discuss the boycott as part of their regular Sunday night sports programs called Sports Sunday, Sports Dimanche.

They wanted to have a debate about the Olympic boycott and they had invited the Soviet press

attaché and now they would like to have a representative from the American Embassy. Literally this call came about 3 o'clock so I ran upstairs and explained to the DCM, Jack Maresca. I admitted that I would be nervous but when he suggested they recruit someone from the political section, that got my juices flowing. Jack talked to the ambassador and after very little deliberation, I was assigned to be the American Embassy representative on this program. Since it was the press attaché from the Soviet embassy, I would carry the ball for our side.

And so I did. Maybe it is a good thing I didn't have a whole lot of time to prepare. I spent Saturday and part of Sunday preparing for the debate but it wasn't the only thing I had on my platter that day. By that time, I was also singing in the choir of the American Church of Paris and we had scheduled a special concert that night plus my daughter was in a fashion show. So on Sunday, I sang the Schubert "Mass in C major" with the American church choir. What a wonderful experience that was. We did it by memory, this rather short mass, but we sang it well and then I went to Christine's fashion show.

And from there, I went to the headquarters of TF1, just around the corner from the American church, and debated the Soviet press attaché, Mr. Avdeyev on the Olympic boycott. They threw the ball to him first and he was well prepared. I probably should have interrupted him. He went on for several minutes but then I had my chance and my theme was basically that Americans believe you can have both freedom and security. For the Soviets it is a choice of either freedom or security. We could absolutely guarantee that their athletes would be secure while at the same time, people would have freedom of speech.

I made reference to my years in Moscow and even some reference to the KGB which is the Committee on State Security and how they interpret security and how we interpret security and obviously, if security is part of the name KGB, then it has a very different meaning in their context than in ours.

I went home and didn't sleep a wink that night. I tossed and turned wondering what the reaction would be. Jack Maresca, the DCM was the first person to greet me and he was indignant, not with me, but he felt that TF-1 had favored the Soviet, let him have more speech time than I had. But the ambassador was 100% on my side, congratulated me not only for what I did but for being willing to go do it. He felt he had set an example for people on his staff; not only he but the DCM and now the press attaché would be willing to go out and do this sort of thing.

I am not sure I ever want to do it again looking back. It was live TV and I could easily have stumbled. When we got to the station, my wife and daughter went along. The Soviet was by himself but he could not have been more courteous. Spoke English with us. But when he got on the set, he was a well-trained debater.

I remember that TV offered an interpreter. Of course, he didn't want an interpreter and I remember thinking to myself "I am so glad I don't have to say, yes, I want an interpreter." I did it in French and did very well. That was a day I will never forget. Ironically, no one taped it at the embassy. It had all come together late on a Friday afternoon so there is no record of it.

Less than a month later, I had another day I will never forget. After weeks and weeks of

preparation and on-site visits, President Reagan came to Normandy on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. He came specifically to the Pointe du Hoc where he addressed still some living members of the units that scaled the cliffs of the Pointe du Hoc on June 6, 1944.

I had worked closely with the people in the White House press office on all aspects of the visit. I will be the first to point out when the big day comes, they don't pay any attention to you; they take over everything but I made many trips out there for the planning stages, to Normandy and specifically to the Pointe du Hoc.

On that morning, I was fortunate enough to be aboard a helicopter and to ride over the area to Cherbourg where the press planes came and where the press boarded buses back to wherever they were going. The roads are so narrow and the photo ops were so limited that journalists went to one particular spot and that's as far as each one could go that day.

For the visit, I was at Pointe du Hoc on a bunker that was the CBS base and with me there were Walter Cronkite and Mrs. Cronkite. While Walter Cronkite was off interviewing a couple of veterans from 1944, Generals J. Lawton Collins and James Gavin, I struck up a conversation with Mrs. Cronkite, reminding her we had seen her in Moscow when we were there. She said she remembered. She had a recollection of my wife and our dog. So when Walter came back over, she very kindly introduced me to him and we had a brief chat. Then off he went to interview President Reagan at the conclusion of his remarks. So it was a moving day from the helicopter ride in the morning to ending up at the press center in the afternoon.

I think it is still true to this day. There is no part of France where the American flag flew more prominently than it does in Normandy on June 6th. In 1984, there were still people who could remember the liberation, D-Day and the rest. Today almost 30 years later, there are not many people who can remember it as participants but the memory is still there and nowhere is the warmth of feeling towards the United States stronger than in Normandy.

This trip to Normandy was President Reagan's second visit to France. The first was Versailles, the second was Normandy. The third, in May, 1985, was a one day, no overnight, symbolic visit to Strasburg to address the European parliament, the first American president to do so. As always, the White House would send out advance teams. There would be opportunities to go look at the sites and everything else connected with a presidential visit.

I was in Strasburg in February, 1985 when an advance team came in headed by Mike Deaver, the president's image maker. A big group of Europeans came down from Brussels to Strasburg to meet with the White House officials and to talk about the arrangements for the visit. Mr. Deaver was too busy even to meet with them. Mr. Deaver did a lot of good things but I don't think that was one of his finest moments.

They had been to Munich -- this was the trip that would include the controversial stop in Bitburg -- and one of the White House press advance people was gloating about that stop. The highlight of the stop in Munich was that nine of them had used their diplomatic passports to buy BMWs at a big discount. Somehow that got under my Anglo-Saxon, Calvinist sense of what is right and wrong and I will now go on record for the first time that it was I who passed that information to

the Newsweek correspondent in Paris, Scott Sullivan.

Q: I remember reading about this.

BROWN: It appeared in the Newsweek Periscope section and it led to a White House examination of the issue. The White House concluded that there was “nothing per se illegal or unethical” about this but nevertheless, they rewrote the rules. One or two of the people who bought cars using this method were Secret Service people. It bothered me.

To keep things chronological, let me recall another unusual experience that dates to December, 1984. At some level in Washington, I don’t know whether it was the White House or not, there was concern that we were not getting our message about Central America across to European audiences. This was the period when the U.S. was concerned about the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and their influence on the rest of the region. So along with PAOs from several West European countries, I traveled to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala over a period of ten days for a first-hand look at the situation there. The idea was that we would be better able to make the case for U.S. policies if we could say that we had actually been there.

One problem arose right away. Along with our concern about Nicaragua, we were holding up El Salvador as a model. But the people at the American Embassy there advised against our travel because of the security situation so we did not go there. It seemed rather ironic that we could safely go to Nicaragua but not to El Salvador.

I’m not sure how much I was able to draw on my experiences in my subsequent conversations and work in Paris but it was a learning experience for me – my first trip to the region, to an area that really was foreign to me and my foreign service experience.

On February 13, 1985, John Vinocur interviewed Ambassador Galbraith. The ambassador had now been in Paris for almost four years. I did not sit in on the interview. It was one of the very few times that either he didn’t invite me or I decided not to sit in.

Out of that came the article in The New York Times in which the ambassador, as Vinocur put it, talked of his “scorn” for the Foreign Service; we did not have a backbone, we weren’t courageous. That led to Secretary Shultz saying someone ought to tie his tongue, to the ambassador receiving protests from the local chapter of AFSA, a lot of hand wringing and soul-searching for the first time. His DCM did not know which way to go; whether to side with the masses in saying this was uncalled for or continue to hang on with the ambassador.

The Vinocur article provoked columns by Flora Lewis, the late esteemed op-ed columnist who lived in Paris. She took him to task.

I would never have imagined but individually Evan Galbraith, DCM Jack Maresca and Flora Lewis, none of whom was a shy character, none of whom ever had any lack of self confidence, all three separately asked me my point of view, my impression, my advice. What do you think I should say or do? After the local chapter of AFSA rose up, Galbraith said to me in so many words, did I make a mistake? He felt that he wasn’t talking about physical courage as much as

the willingness to challenge and that kind of thing.

Jack Maresca, who was offended by what he had said but was still the loyal DCM, was very uncertain and even Flora Lewis at some point asked me about her column. Maybe it was a tempest in a teapot. I thought some of it had to do with that earlier time with Grenada when we didn't fully support the ambassador going on TV to talk about that event

Q: It wasn't that much of a tempest in a teapot within Foreign Service ranks.

BROWN: No, not at all.

Q: The Galbraith name in Foreign Service folklore is linked to that.

BROWN: And not unfairly. He backtracked and said he didn't mean physical courage. He said he was misunderstood and I don't think he would have looked some of us in the eyes right there in the embassy and said you don't have courage. But it was in the back of his mind. It was a thought that he had, there's no question.

For some of us close to him whose lives he had made professionally interesting, it was a hard to turn our backs on him. It was only a few months later that he left his position but I don't think it was necessarily linked to that.

From this same period, March, 1985, here's an example of the type of activity we had all the time. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger came to Paris regularly and on this particular visit, we arranged for him to meet at the hotel where he was staying with Michael Tatu, one of the best known writers for Le Monde. I was very pleased the next day when there was a front page interview, Michael Tatu interviewing Weinberger and Weinberger putting his views on record.

You could say that anybody could do this. No French journalist is going to turn down an interview with the secretary of defense. Nevertheless, I was very pleased and it redounded to my credit that I was the go-between.

Weinberger had also agreed to do an interview with French TV. I don't remember the subject but it probably had to do with military hardware and during the interview, Weinberger was saying, whether he meant it or not, that the French had a great deal of technical prowess. Something like: "The French are very, very good in the field of technology, wonderful technical prowess. We don't always think of the French in that context but the French have a great deal of technical competence."

It was about at that point that the interviewer got a signal that a camera or the recording device wasn't working and we had to say to Mr. Weinberger, "I am sorry. We didn't get that. Would you mind?"

He said, "No problem." They rolled things again.

And off Weinberger went: "As I was saying, the French have enormous technical prowess and in

the field of technology the French are leaders. The technical prowess of the French is unmatched.” He didn’t miss a beat. We were all smiling but I was a little tense for a moment. I thought he might stomp out of the room but he didn’t. He knew it was in his interest to get his views on the record. I was always rather glad that on matters of policy, he was counterbalanced by Secretary Shultz but for an interview, Weinberger was much more interesting.

I mentioned singing in the church choir in Paris. Our rehearsals were on Wednesday night and I would walk from the embassy across the river to the American Church on the Left Bank. The timing was perfect for me. I regularly worked six days. Wednesday was a halfway point of the week. It was a true break from what I was doing. There were always a bunch of Americans in town studying music so you never knew who was going to be there on a given night. There were always enough people for the tenor section that I didn’t have to worry about being alone.

In addition to singing on Sunday morning, we did special concerts. In May of 1985, the Sacré Coeur church on Montmartre dedicated a new organ and our choir was invited to be part of the celebration. We did some wonderful choral music including works by a French composer named Louis Vierne. That opportunity brought balance and spiritual pleasure into my life.

Q: You’d been fortunate because of your obvious interest in cultural life and cultural values both in France and in Russia too.

BROWN: The difference was that in Moscow, it seemed more accessible. Tickets were virtually given to us. It was maybe physically a little closer to us. We lived outside town in Paris so I always had to remember that when the concert ended at 10:30 or 11 o’clock, I’d have a long train ride to where we lived but nevertheless, you are right. The cultural, musical opportunities in both cities were considerable and there was overlap too. Some of the same people you had seen in Moscow, you would see in Paris for one reason or another; either they emigrated or they were on the circuit. In both cities, music provided me a balance to the intense press work that I was doing.

Two and a half weeks after that Sacré Coeur concert, we got word that a TWA airplane had been hijacked out of Greece and had been forced to land in Beirut. Jewish passengers on board were singled out. I think that was about a Friday of that week. The plane ended up in Algiers where women and children were released before the plane went back to Beirut. Those freed hostages were then brought to Paris and put in a hotel and the call went out that someone needed to be there with them.

I went in on Sunday. Part of the reason they needed to have someone with them was there was a lot of press interest. I spent an entire Sunday with those people. I was more than a press attaché. We wished we could follow the details minute by minute but we couldn’t. The French didn’t have much news on TV on Sunday. There was a midday program we watched but it had just had a little bit of information; then later in the day, we watched a TV program and I remember one of the ladies saying “oh, that’s my husband.” Whether or not that was the case, it was an emotional experience to be with those families that entire day while they waited for information. I did arrange for one or two of them who were willing to talk to the press.

Eventually the hostages were freed. Vice President Bush came out; he passed through Paris on his way to Germany to welcome the freed hostages and later, there was a reception at the ambassador's residence for the freed hostages who had come to Paris. I had the satisfaction of a lot of them thanking me for having spent that day with them. They didn't speak French and they appreciated me trying to keep them as well-informed as I could.

You think of a particular news event and you don't think Paris but somehow no matter what it was or where it was, it often spilled over to Paris.

Q: You mentioned, obviously the hostages, if any, usually up at least in that era, at our military hospitals in Germany. What about German French relations? Did you get any feel for that maybe in the field of interest in the press or anything like that?

BROWN: I can't give you a quick answer about French-German relations. I guess they were pretty good during those years. The process of post-war reconciliation was still underway.

Those were the times when the Germans were buying a lot of property in eastern France, particularly in Alsace, and you'd hear the French say if they'd only realized they could have bought that land in the 1910's and in the 1940s, they might have avoided two wars.

We talked before about the speech that Mitterrand gave on the SS-20 and Pershing modernization and the fact that he gave that speech in Germany was very important and of course, it endeared him to the U.S.

I remember talking to John Vinocur, whom I referred to regarding his interview with Ambassador Galbraith. He spent much of his career in Germany and then he was reassigned to Paris. I said to him, "How are you enjoying being here in France after all the time you spent in Germany?"

He said, "Oh, I would rather be back in Germany. It is much more interesting news environment there. They are going through a crisis." I don't know what crisis he was referring to in the mid '80s.

I said, "But John, France has crises of all sorts. They've got economic crises, governmental crises, and the liver crisis to which they attribute to all their ailments."

He said, "That's the point. The French always have a crisis so it is not news. When Germany has a crisis, then it is news." And that's why he wanted to be back there analyzing what was putting the self-confident Germans into a crisis mode at that time.

I went to the Bonn G-7 meeting in 1985. I can't remember it being much of a newsmaker. This was still Cold War time and the capital was in Bonn.

In July of 1985, Ambassador Galbraith left. He had been there for four years and despite bumps along the way, he and his wife had a large number of friends and were sent off with sincere best wishes. Within two days, there was a full page interview with him in Figaro in which he made

some blatant comments about French internal affairs. Our chargé , Jack Maresca, found himself being called in to receive a protest about inadmissible statements about French internal affairs.

I remember thinking Jack is going to come back wringing his hands and wondering what am I going to do now? He came back basically laughing saying, “Look, we went through the ritual of their delivering the protest and me receiving it and that’s it. That is the end of Galbraith’s presence.”

Q: What sort of things? Were these things that Galbraith had been stewing in private conversations or something?

BROWN: He ran into the same trap early on and that had to do with the communist minister of transportation, Fiterman. In the Figaro interview on the 17th of July, 1985, he said the French Communist Party should be outlawed and he said he was convinced the right would win upcoming parliamentary elections. He wasn’t disagreeing with them on major foreign policy issues.

The irony was he spoke pretty good French and he was always uncomfortable calling himself a ‘liberal’ in French which meant more of a conservative to them. He could never tolerate anything that looked like socialist or public welfare programs so it might have been one of those issues.

Within days, we had Ambassador Joe M. Rodgers who didn’t speak a word of French but had raised a lot of money for President Reagan’s reelection in his home state of Tennessee. He and his wife Honey came out; very, very nice people.

I was very flattered when Jack Maresca, still the DCM, brought him down to the press office to look around. Jack described the press office as “the nerve center of the embassy” and said that we often knew about a news event before anyone else in the embassy. That was just the nature of how news traveled at that time. We had the AFP and the AP tickers. Journalists would call our office before they would call anywhere else. I felt pride in him telling the ambassador we were the nerve center of the embassy.

Ambassador Rodgers did not want any give and take with the press. He was not going into that. If he knew some event would be image creation, that was fine, but he did not want to do what Ambassador Galbraith did, understandably.

About that same time, we had another newsmaker. Rock Hudson was suffering from AIDS and he came to Paris to seek care at the Pasteur Institute. There was a report that someone had a cure for AIDS that he could benefit from only by coming to Paris. It became a news event over the question of whether Mrs. Reagan had been involved and whether she had intervened to ask that he be given special attention. She had and eventually, I was allowed to say that although not quite that baldly but to say to the press that Mrs. Reagan was very concerned about the health of Rock Hudson and hoped that he would be able to get the best of treatment in France. It was just a one or two day story and Rock Hudson then got on his 747 and went back to California where he died. Mrs. Reagan’s interest in the issue brought it a lot of attention.

By 1985, I had an additional number of people working with me in the press office. They had expanded the responsibilities and given me additional staff. Some were Foreign Service officers, others were political appointees who were rather interesting characters. One was a guy named Danny Wattenberg. His father was Ben Wattenberg, the rather well known conservative writer. I don't remember much about Danny.

Then we had a young woman named Sandy Sidey. She had been working right out of college in the 1980 Reagan campaign and ended up with Larry Speakes in the White House press office. She was a good young Republican. Her dad was Hugh Sidey, well-known columnist for Time magazine. Sandy was a delightful person. She didn't ask for any special favors because her dad was Hugh Sidey or because she had worked with Larry Speakes at the White House. She was quite willing to do all the grunt work of going through the AP or the AFP tickers or running upstairs to get the cables or working on transcripts. She was a real gem. And the French liked her very much.

\ I mentioned that Joe Rodgers didn't speak any French but one day in September of 1985, I went up to the ambassador's office and was told the he would soon be leaving to go back to the United States on an issue on an issue that was described as RITA Ptarmigan. This had to do with competition for a DOD contract on some battlefield communications technology and the French program was called RITA and the British had a competing program called Ptarmigan.

For some reason, the ambassador got it into his head that the French were not getting a fair shake back in Washington in the Defense Department and so he flew back to argue their case. This was a case where you could have had an ambassador who spoke perfect French and who knew Voltaire and all the great heroes of the Pantheon or you could have an ambassador who didn't speak any French at all but who was willing to go back and argue their case in Washington, to in effect to be the French representative in the DOD. They would obviously choose the latter.

I am not sure how the issue resolved itself but it was rather interesting that he decided this was an issue where . . .

Q: What was the issue?

BROWN: The Defense Department was going to contract for a highly sophisticated battlefield communications technology and the French program was called RITA which was an acronym for something. The British had a competing technology called Ptarmigan and the ambassador just thought somehow the French were not getting a fair shake and so he was going to go back to the Defense Department and at least make sure their case was being heard.

We are now to the summer of 1985. I had been in Paris four years, one year to go, and I went on home leave. That was the summer I shaved off my beard. I had had a beard for ten years. I came back feeling very self-conscious and people would say you've lost weight or nothing at all or you were better with a beard. I remember that very self-conscious period but I was back a very short time when I got a call saying Larry Speakes and company would like me to come back on a temporary assignment to work in the NSC in the Old Executive Office Building on the public diplomacy task force prior to the Geneva summit of 1985.

Recall the situation: Gorbachev has taken over in Moscow and is being touted as such a change from his predecessor. He is on the cover of Time magazine. He's a man who not only talks but he talks endlessly. He is now the great communicator. Ronald Reagan is running second. We have to do everything to make sure we get our message out especially with this summit meeting in Geneva scheduled for November of 1985.

I did go back for ten weeks as did a fellow named Bud Korengold who was with USIS in London. I lived in a hotel for that entire period and endured awkward, strenuous working conditions. We had very little information technology. Word processors were hard to come by. I recall researching an issue and I went to the library in the Old Executive Office Building. It had a clanging, wrought-iron door and endless shelves and the librarian, a woman, helped me locate a particular book. She pulled it off the shelf but before she handed it to me, she blew the dust off the top and I had to step aside to avoid the cloud of dust.

But the clumsiest aspect of it was just maneuvering in that NSC bureaucracy and trying to move anything forward. One of the few people who could help us move a document forward was the president's NSC advisor for Soviet affairs, Jack Matlock, with whom I had worked with on several previous occasions. I didn't know it at that point but he was soon going to be my ambassador for three years in Moscow so all in all, it was a good experience.

Q: Were you getting any feeling, obviously Gorbachev had gone through this period of gerontocracy in the Soviet Union. You can't exactly call Brezhnev or somebody like that a bright and interesting person but you had been a Soviet hand sort of qualifications or seen some of the things? Do we trust Gorbachev or what was happening?

BROWN: It wasn't a matter of trust. No and no one at that time was talking about the end of the Soviet Union or the end of Communism or anything of that sort but what had people frightened -- maybe that isn't the right word but what people couldn't cope with -- was that he was a communicator and because he was a communicator everyone was falling over him to get the interviews.

There is a parallel I draw here and it is probably not a good one but I can't help but do it. On the one hand, you've got these Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko stumble bums, unable to communicate, sickly men and on the other side, you have Reagan who was virile and communicative. We had such an enormous advantage. Victory is ours.

The parallel I draw is the current presidential campaign. Here is Mr. Romney being raked over the coals by Santorum, Gingrich. His staff says the wrong thing. Obama has an enormous margin on him and suddenly, Santorum and Gingrich are gone and they have effectively endorsed Romney and Romney is just about dead even with Obama in the polls. How quickly things can turn around, that's all I am saying. I think that is what had people scratching their heads.

People were saying that Reagan had met his match and that the more effective communicator was in Moscow. Forget for a moment that Gorbachev didn't have any better story to tell. Their economy was still in shambles and everything else was going wrong but people were very

concerned that by the Geneva summit, we would be out argued by Gorbachev. That is why they created this special staff in the NSC to focus on nothing but interviews that Reagan would give, the timing, what messages we wanted to get out. I was just a little part of this.

Q: I have never heard of one of these before, such an effort, but something of this nature.

BROWN: I think we were created by the White House press office but Larry Speakes was the one who was instrumental in Bud Korengold and me coming back and put in a huge, high ceilinged room in the Old Executive Office Building along with a couple other people, my Foreign Service friend Gil Callaway among them.

The problem was we had responsibility but we didn't have any real authority. We couldn't make any final decisions. We could only pass papers forward and make recommendations. USIA people thought it was just great because they had all these ideas on how to get Reagan's message out. Now, they had three people in the NSC they could turn to. We were inundated by USIA people saying "hey, can you pass on our ideas? Can you pass on our suggestions?" We'd say "yeah, sure. We'll try but we don't have any magic way of getting these things over to the White House" which was still focused on the domestic press. In their hearts, they may have been thinking about getting their message out to the world but on a day-to-day basis, they were still going to focus on the domestic press.

In the end, I went to Geneva on the White House press charter plane and worked out of the press center. Even on arrival, Mr. Wick was being told "oh, the Soviets have their press center up and operating. They are getting their message out. You guys are so far behind the curve. You are not getting it out." That could be fairly easily dealt with by putting out a few American newsmakers. Bud McFarland was one of those who were doing a lot of the speaking for the White House at the press center in Geneva and in the end, it looked like unnecessary worries.

This was the summit meeting where Ambassador Hartman came out from Moscow. I got a message one day that he'd like me to come by his hotel room and he handed me this package which was a violin to be delivered to a violinist named Alexander Brussilovsky in Paris. I thought about the trouble he could have created and the deflection from the major news he could have caused by bringing that violin out but I passed it on.

On the way back, we stopped in Brussels. Reagan did a quick NATO briefing there and on the tarmac there was the first time I actually saw him as part of that assignment. We got to Washington and I said to someone in the White House press office that I actually saw the president in Brussels. I had been back there this whole time and I had never really seen him, which wasn't completely true. One day, I was in the White House because I did have access to the press office and was taking some piece of paper over and I realized there was a flurry coming in the other direction and I stood in one of these little stairwells with my back against the wall as a secret service man came by followed quickly by the President, the Vice President and James Baker. When I caught my breath, I realized that I had been that close to power.

But I told the guy at the White House I had hardly seen the president. He says, "Oh, really? We see him every day."

Not long after, after the summit, we have returned to Washington. This was the occasion when Reagan returned from Andrews and his helicopter landed on Capitol Hill and he went right before a joint session of congress to talk about his meetings with Gorbachev. Talk about stagecraft and drama. That was midweek.

The word to me was that I should come to the White House on Saturday and I would be able to attend the President's Saturday radio address. Along with Bud Korengold, we were pre-positioned in the Oval Office in late morning when Reagan came in.

There is a myth that Reagan so revered the Oval Office that he never appeared in there in anything other than a business suit. That is not true. At least on this particular day, November 23, 1985, he came in casual clothes he would wear around the ranch. He sat down at the desk. A woman there gave him some advice. This was live. Reagan delivered his remarks. He had his watch on and his wrist turned so he didn't have to turn his arm to see exactly the timing and he concluded his remarks, made a comment about how he had gone two seconds over but it was that perfect showmanship.

Then somebody said we have a couple of guests here today. So he came over and shook our hands and we got our pictures taken. He did make some jocular remark about "I don't usually come to the Oval Office dressed like this." I responded "well, I don't usually wear a dark suit on Saturday but this is a special occasion." Anyway, I got my picture taken in the Oval Office with President Reagan. I have two photos – one formal pose and one laughing.

After that, I went back to Paris. People there thought I had flown the coop forever. I had been gone for ten weeks but I still had an interesting six months in my service there.

On January 28, 1986, I was getting ready to go home when Monique came running into my office. They were showing on TV the explosion of the Challenger liftoff from Cape Kennedy. We all know that image. You might ask, "Well, what did that have to do with an assignment in Paris?" NASA had two overseas offices, one in Tokyo and one in Paris. So NASA had a full time representative at the embassy in Paris. The fellow there did not speak French but he was willing to go on TV so the next day I accompanied him to AN-2 for an interview about the Challenger and about the shuttle program. He didn't have any special information but the fact that he was a NASA representative gave him a certain cache. I remember saying to him that I bet the shuttle doesn't fly again for several years. He was dubious. I think I was closer to being accurate in that case.

A couple of days later, there was one of those moving services at the American Cathedral on Avenue George V in Paris, a service of remembrance honoring those who lost their lives in the Challenger explosion.

In mid-February of that year, 1986, there was a big flurry because Baby Doc had fled Haiti; he ended up on Lake Annecy in exile in France. I can't tell you the details but there was a question about whether the French were going to ship him out, send him to the United States. For a couple of days, we handled a lot of press questions on that subject with very little guidance from

Washington. In any case, they did not send him out. He stayed on.

One thing I was able to do quite often was to invite French journalists to travel to the United States on IV programs, to be involved in newsmaker events at the embassy or to participate in NATO or U.S. military related activities. The aircraft carrier Eisenhower came into Monaco in June, 1982, right after the G-7 summit. We got to invite and accompany journalists on board.

In March, 1986, there was a plan to take a handful of journalists way up to the north of Norway where Norway has a common border with the Soviet Union. There would be NATO exercises up there. So I had a half dozen fellows rounded up to go when I got word that there had been a late season avalanche; 16 Norwegian soldiers on cross country skis had lost their lives in this avalanche in a place called Vassdalen.

If you extrapolate, 16 young men in Norway would be like 1,000 in the United States and to lose their lives on cross country skis where most Norwegians are as comfortable as anywhere was a major news event in Norway, a major confidence shaker. Despite this, we went. I went with these half dozen journalists all the way up to a place called Bardufoss, not far from where the accident had taken place. We had briefings on the NATO exercises and how NATO would be ready if there were any attack from the Soviet Union but it was all overlaid by the nation in shock and in mourning at the loss of so many young lives in an accident.

Not long after that we had another visit from Secretary Shultz. The most notable memory I have is that the press spokesman was no longer John Hughes, who I found to be the steadiest and the easiest to work with. Now it was a man named Bernard Kalb, brother of Marvin Kalb, both of them well known journalists from network news. Bernie Kalb didn't have his mind very much on news or on Secretary Shultz. The first thing we did was to head out to one of his favorite art dealers on the Faubourg St. Honoré, someone he knew well and did business with. We spent the morning with that person. It was a different approach to the job than what I found with John Hughes.

On April 15 of that year, 1986, the U.S. bombed Libya, retaliation for the nightclub bombing in Berlin. Tensions had been ratcheting up. There was all sorts of talk about how we might retaliate against Libya but when the news came through, I got a call in the early hours of the morning that the U.S. had bombed Libya. We were in for a lot of press questions, the biggest one being whether the French granted over flight rights? No. Did that affect the mission? Yes, it meant the U.S. had to fly much longer but of course, you went from there to "did the United States request over flight?" What was the nature of the request? What was the nature of the response? And we were not able to go into any detail on that because we didn't have the information. This was a low point during my time in France in U.S./French relations.

There were ramifications on a personal level. Our daughter was flying back to the United States two days later on TWA to look at colleges and my wife was very, very nervous. She went to the airport to put her on the airplane and came back saying she had never seen so much security. That reassured her.

By now, everyone who worked at the embassy had ID badges. When I arrived there, we you just

walked in but now we had badges. It was about that time, the bombing of Libya, that the word went down to the Marines at the entrance to the embassy that even if the Marine knew you, even if he'd seen you every day for the last six months, he couldn't take that for granted. He had to look at your badge, eyeball you and make sure you really were the person on that badge.

The result of that was there was quickly a nice long line of Americans and French out in front of the embassy and we remarked that if the Libyans ever wanted to retaliate, we had lined up very nicely for them. They could come by and pick us off one by one. That policy got turned around fairly quickly.

It was also during that time that in Le Monde, there was an article headlined "*l'Inquietude des Américains à Paris*," worries and concerns among the Americans in Paris. I had been authorized to talk to a correspondent at Le Monde and to say that yes, we were concerned about security but that we were going about business as usual, that we were not being deterred. We had taken certain measures that we wouldn't go into detail on. I didn't know what those were except we were always told to vary your route to work. Don't come to work via the same route or at the same time every day, a policy I violated everyday because I came in from outside of town. That article in Le Monde caught the attention of a lot of people at the time, in part of this whole context of Libya and terrorism.

Q: Was there a bit of hard feeling about the British allowed us to use their territory?

BROWN: I think the bombers actually used came out of bases in Britain.

Q: And the French didn't allow.

BROWN: Sure. This was not looked upon kindly at all. Not only did it make the mission much more difficult but you had to fly much farther, refueling, a question of the accuracy of your raid and everything else and it just seemed to be saying we are not in this together. I think the French were calculating then whether they risked more by angering the United States or by angering some of the radical countries.

Q: Were you picking up discomfort with Islam coming out of Africa?

BROWN: It wasn't a major issue then, no. Of course, I referred to the hijacked plane between Athens and Beirut but nobody was talking al-Qaeda. Nobody was talking about radicalized Muslim youth in urban settings in Europe, that kind of thing. That wasn't a preoccupation. I think it was more focused on the PLO in that part of the world or on people like Gaddafi. No one could even tell you where Yemen was on a map. Iran was of course under the same leadership it is today.

Q: Was there any discussion about the absorption of Algerian and Moroccan youth coming in? Later it became a huge problem.

BROWN: Right. Of course, though those are two totally different situations for the French; the Algerians and the Moroccans. People were aware you had these increasingly large numbers of

Arab youth in the suburbs of Paris and in other cities and that it was a potential problem but it wasn't yet associated in my mind with terrorism.

There had been a bombing on the rue Marbeuf in the Jewish quarter early in the 1980's but that was not necessarily linked to a group like al-Qaeda or to radicalized Muslim youth. I am not even sure who they eventually determined was behind that.

So there was concern and the embassy was tightening up and there was talk about putting bombproof devices on the wall that was very close to the road there but still it wasn't the conversation we have these days about radicalized Islam. It seemed to be more a case of isolated incidents and a lot more associated with Lebanon than with Algeria or Morocco.

Q: Did you get any information or feedback from our attachés concerning relations between the American military and the French military?

BROWN: They were good.

Q: That was my understanding.

BROWN: Very professional.

Q: I was a little earlier on consul general in Naples and admiral Crowe I remember saying that really, the French navy excellent cooperation even under Mitterrand, the socialists and all.

BROWN: I think they were and I think Weinberger in his many visits there had always had very professional relations with the French minister of defense.

If there were policy disagreements, they were at a different level but on a pure military to military level I think they were very good and very professional.

Q: Did you get any feel for the French political class? I used to watch these people on TV. For one thing, you didn't see a single dark face in that group and not many women.

BROWN: That's true and also true in terms of the people doing their television news coverage. The term French political class is appropriate. Most of the French political leaders came out of the same schooling, the same elite and they loved debates. As vigorous as the debates could be, I would image they knew each other very well. This class was a rather small inbred group of people. These televised debates would draw large audiences that I think in America would draw very small audiences. They had frequent elections. The presidential elections were every seven years. Mitterrand had been elected in '81 and wasn't going to be up for reelection until 1988 after we left. But there were frequent parliamentary elections and elections for local offices. And for most of it, you had divided government.

Q: Did you find yourself sitting around the table or something with the French and all start getting into highly intellectual discussions which were sort of not the sort of thing we would have in an American?

BROWN: Yeas, but for me, this did not involve sitting around the dinner table. It was lunches with French journalists. I said last time and I still say that most of the French journalists I dealt with were pragmatic. They were looking for a good story. They were looking for a good interview. They were hoping this lunch would pay off in being invited to something we were putting on.

There were a few where the conversations were not so much that, where the French person would do most of the talking. All I would have to do was throw out a little question and the guy would go on at great length and it was usually a guy. I can remember some of the names: Paul-Marie de la Gorce of Figaro or Henri de Kergorlay for example. The names sounded as august as their ideas. These were primarily idea people. They weren't interested in the next interview or getting a short answer to a short story. In fact, they seemed more interested in conveying information to me. I didn't find them all that interesting. I sometimes found myself out of their league and I'd look at my watch and think I need to get back to those phone calls in the office.

Let me mention another couple of other quick memories of my Paris years.

In spring of 1986, my last G-7, I got to go to Tokyo, flew halfway around the world, and attend the G-7 meeting again at the request of Larry Speakes, following the French briefings there. I used that as the opportunity to get out to Kyoto. It was the only time in my life I have ever been to Japan.

Ambassador Rodgers was not interested in hard news interviews but 1986 happened to be the bicentennial of the French gift of the Statue of Liberty so he wanted to do anything that was Statue of Liberty related. In fact, he put out some mandate that he wanted a Statue of Liberty event every day. Anybody could come up with a Statue of Liberty event.

I was involved in proposing the mother of all Statue of Liberty events. It led to a three-day trip the ambassador made to Alsace Lorraine which is where Bartholdi, the Statue of Liberty sculptor came from. It went way beyond what I had initially thought of. We flew out in the Minister of Defense's plane. For three days, we traveled along the wine road through Epinal, Luneville, Baccarat, Colmar and Mittleberghein with the ambassador being feted with parades and lunches and dinners and gifts in each town.

I had never eaten so much quality food -- six major meals in three days -- with each town vying to outdo the last one. I went along, among other reasons, to interpret for Mrs. Rodgers. Somebody else did the interpreting for the ambassador. It was what he liked, flying the flag, saluting the French, looking back at our long historical ties. He came back very, very satisfied with that.

On my return to Paris, I found a Superior Honor Award awaiting me for my pre-Geneva work. A few days later, with complimentary tickets from NBC, I went to Roland Garros to watch some of the French tennis open. I still have the seat cushions that I bought. It all brings back wonderful memories.

One of our last trips was a visit to Annecy to visit our older daughter Sarah, a Tufts University student, who was studying at a Tufts' summer program at Talloires on Lake Annecy. She was staying with a wonderful French family who lived in Veyrier-du-Lac. I recall visiting them, looking down at the lake and eating more wonderful French food.

Soon after, on the 11th of July, 1986, I ended my five years in Paris.

AURELIUS FERNANDEZ
Economic Officer, OECD
Paris (1982-1986)

Aurelius Fernandez was born in New York in 1931. He graduated from Bowling Green University, received an M.I.A. from Columbia University and served in the U.S. Army from 1953 to 1956. His postings abroad have included Bucharest, Vienna, London and Paris. Mr. Fernandez was interviewed in 1997 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well, that's all right, but you can add. Then in '82 you went to the OECD. What is the OECD?

FERNANDEZ: The OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. Which grew out of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, the Marshall Plan after World War II. Something that Kingman Brewster had worked on, it was always fun to talk to him about those years, too. But at any rate, this organization they had, I guess, at the time 23 or 24 members, they were really all the west European, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and it was a marvelous...I always like to say, as I wrote down here "the greenhouse of ideas." There was always a lot of activity there and they were high-level visitors. Secretary [George] Shultz came through, [Ronald] Reagan was Treasury Secretary, [William] Brock used to come through all the time as USTR, [Secretary] Malcolm Baldrige, as Commerce, Mark Feldstein was the Counselor of Economic Advisors, and Beryl Sprinkle. Well, I could drop more and more names to engage in what my dearly beloved Kingman Brewster used to say, "Sorry, Joe, the Queen hates name droppers."

Q: The first place you were there from '82 to when?

FERNANDEZ: '82 to '86, four years.

Q: What was the role of the OECD as opposed to the Common Market, the European Union, whatever you want?

FERNANDEZ: It was in a sense, freestanding. It was not a policy-making body. It was more of a...where policies surely were debated because statements were made about them. But it was, as I say, freestanding. One of the institutions that came out of the Marshall Plan where studies were about all the subjects and they were sort of forerunning for what became the G-7 summits out of

that. There would be a direct relationship between what would come out of the G-7 summit, of the ministerials, and then what would go into these summits. There was just terribly exciting work going on in the field of trade in terms of commercial policy, in terms of communications.

There was once a long, long negotiation about transborder data flows. There was an economic policy committee. That Committee Three or Committee One that used to meet two or three times a year. And the Feldsteins and all the leaders, Sprinkles, and all the leaders of... thinkers of a number of countries would come together and they would sit there for two days and they would then debate policy. Well, these things didn't always make fast years. That is to say the myriad of ministerial meetings that were happening, for example, the ministries of transportation. Those things really didn't resound in the press the way the annual surveys that were done internally would just buzz through the whole press the world over. Or the ministerial readings where the Secretary of State and the President would come.

During the period I was there [Secretary] Shultz came once. He was the only Secretary of State who came to the meeting. But these were meetings where there was always negotiation beforehand about issues but where they would sit and talk about issues. One of the issues during those years was, for example, that as far the United States had information issues in foreign relations was the matter of our deficit, budget deficit. Well, they used to beat up on the United States for having this great budget deficit and drawing in foreign capital and such and just not contributing to world growth. This was something that the whole time I was there was pretty active because we did have a big budget deficit at the time. We always argued that as a percentage of our GNP we weren't as bad as a lot of other countries, depending on how you cut it. Our position was that our budget deficit was not as disruptively destabilizing as it was often charged.

We then came back in about '84, was it or so, with a proposal in the OECD again, focusing on the international information relations problem. It was focusing on the problem of structural adjustments that what our theme then became was that what we really needed in Eastern Europe was to free the capital in labor and merchandise markets and this was a theme that we pushed very, very hard in which we put an enormous amount of energy because this was in many respects a response to the charge that we had too big a budget deficit.

Q: Well, I'm still unclear, other than having meetings and debating things, sounds like almost an academic exercise as opposed to coming down with policy or something like that. What did you think?

FERNANDEZ: It tended more toward that. You know, it was more of this greenhouse of ideas than a policy-making... You know, out of which would come let's say, factual treaty type of commitments. You didn't get that. These really were policy statements. They were talked about as issues. We're talking about another fora. The trade issues we're talking about the GATT, and the size of the GATTs. There is where the contractual obligations would come in.

Q: Could you talk a bit about maybe, from your perspective national differences as they went into this. Take the French for example.. I mean, what role did they play?

FERNANDEZ: They played a very big role. Of course they were right in town so they could always send big people to the meetings. No prime minister was in. I don't know that the foreign minister was in, too. The minister of agriculture, the minister trade and people like this would be at the meeting. What was their role? It probably wasn't a great difference than it was in any other forum in which the ministers between the United States and France, whatever you wished. When I left the organization was headed by a Frenchman. But as I say, I don't think there was anything terribly unique about U.S.- French relations in that forum from any other place, believe me, just no differences of what the priority should be. I remember during this period Mitterrand had come to power.

Q: *As a socialist.*

FERNANDEZ: A socialist and a series of nationalizations if you will of the banks and such. These policies were not particularly beloved by the United States. He did in time have to make a U-turn. But when he came in, was it in 1980, '81, he began a policy, a regime of directing the economy which is a strong French tradition in trade which the United States is not very much in favor of.

Other issues that we would, trying to think of another one that came up. For example, there was the matter of subsidies to industries by the government in order to compete internationally. There was the matter of giving countries foreign assistance as a sweetener to get certain deals. One, let's see, the devolution of the telephone system, or whatever. These could be very flagrant instances of the French using ODA, Official Development Assistance, to sweeten the package that French industry would be negotiating with the country in order to enable them to get the contract because U.S. and other companies couldn't make these kinds of arrangements, which would run contrary to whether or not it should be done. The fora in which that was debated was called an export credit [arrangement]. According to that arrangement, [there were] two categories. For each of these categories a government could provide a certain percentage of ODA [Official Development Assistance]. Now there is where we really separated with the French. The United States and France were really fighting that out in the export credits arrangement because then that would become policy that the country would be committed to, in a sense codified their behavior or what was legal to do in our international relations with each other.

Now, what are the French things? Well, I think on the trade matters we were always tuning and throwing during this period. I could remember Bill Brock, he was our USTR, a splendid man with an outstanding staff of people. I just want to talk about USTR as far as the Foreign Service and the State Department and foreign relations. There is no question that the USTR was a lean and mean agency that had great influence, and still has, over our foreign trade relations. Greater, in many instances than the Department of Commerce and the Department of State. At State, the old economic officers will always [be critical] or complain about [USTR being] the stepchild of the whole thing. Well, STR was very much involved in trade policy. There was a trade committee and it was a trade committee involved in trying to adjudicate differences and interests and reconciling [differences].

I remember during this period that there was a GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] meeting in Geneva where the issues were taken. What struck me was I went down there to assist

with the information activity and I was not feeling well at all, I had a terrible cold, and I said, "Well, I think I'll go home." Well, it was Sunday afternoon, so I got in the plane and went back to Paris. In the meantime the negotiators stopped the clock. They had these negotiations to go on until midnight of another day. So they stopped the clock and they kept negotiating. Lo and behold, that Sunday morning I left Paris and I woke up the next morning in Paris and the talks were still going on.

Q: Did you find within the American delegation a growing questioning of what the development of the European Community meant to the United States? This had been a cornerstone of our policy, particularly keeping the French and the Germans from fighting each other, and the more you can tie them together... The main thing was to keep the French and Germans... So we were sponsoring all this. This has been a cornerstone since 1945. But I was wondering whether you were finding people beginning to say, "Hey, wait a minute, is this a good thing as far as the U.S. is concerned? Will this become a closed market for us?"

FERNANDEZ: Well, those issues, you know, for market access and competition policy for example, those are really handled in Brussels. The major ring for the negotiations was in Brussels.

Q: I was just wondering, when you're discussing these things, one of the things, obviously, the French keep French interests foremost and I was wondering whether the United States was in discussing wondering where are all these joint cooperative like Common Market and other things going?

FERNANDEZ: See, they actually had a representative on the executive committee, seated. Let me just try to answer this from another different point of view in terms of what U.S. priorities were and what is going on in OECD. There was one issue that we didn't want to expand too much. That was environment. ...let's do more for the environment, so there was a constant struggle within OECD to keep a reign on that, so an issue like that wouldn't come to dominate...

Q: This is reflecting the Reagan administration early on, acid rain, and everything like that.

FERNANDEZ: That is correct, there would always be... There was a bureaucracy there that was very clever. [The people] trying to fill up their briefs and their sections were very, very active indeed in that sort of thing. Now, in terms to go the other side of the issue that were of interest to us in that forum, [there] were as any others, was the matter of East-West relations. Well, there, I think any officer of our mission at the time you would interview would remember that getting the East-West issues out on the table for a good debate was always a problem. It was always a compromise on the part of the others. You would say, "Well, you know, we really don't need, you know..." Then the other country would say, "We don't..." you know, went into it holding their noses to debate East-West issues. But this was the Cold War and we were very interested in having that [included] as an agenda issue for the executive committee, XESS, the Standard Executive Committee meeting which were always very interesting. You had two or three kinds. You always had big fish that would come from all the countries to this.

TERRENCE CATHERMAN
USIS Director
Paris (1983-1985)

Terrence Catherman was born in Michigan and attended the University of Michigan for undergraduate and graduate school. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1949, his career has included positions in the Soviet Union, Austria, Germany, France, Israel, Yugoslavia and Poland. Mr. Catherman was interviewed by Lewis Schmidt in 1991.

CATHERMAN: Well, I was surprised at the pro-Americanism that I found among the French. I had been led to believe that the French were cynical about the Americans.

Q: I think they were.

CATHERMAN: And I came there ill prepared. Next to Israel France was the country I was least prepared to cope with on arrival. I was sent to Paris because the deputy to Charlie Wick, Gil Robinson, wanted me out of the Voice. I was creating trouble for him down here.

Q: He was soon out of the Agency.

CATHERMAN: He was soon out of the Agency but he wasn't out of the Agency then. He wanted to get me out of there but he knew he had to handle it in a way that I would not create great trouble. He gave me a major PAO-ship, which I had trouble refusing and I went, but I was not prepared. I spent several months learning French, but by that time my hearing was going and I really had some problems with the language, although I had a conversational ability and I used French. I was not prepared for the enthusiastic reception on the part of the French and that started from the day I arrived and was still going on when I left France to go to Bonn.

I never felt as confident in my French as I did in Russian, Serbo-Croatian or German so that tempered the way I went about handling my affairs there. But the response from the French to me and to Americans was overwhelmingly positive. It was an overwhelmingly positive era in French-American relations. I arrived just in time for some celebrations of the 200 anniversary of the conclusion of our Revolutionary War. The town was full of Americans in colonial clothing and the French loved that sort of pageantry. We had some wonderful ceremonies and dinners at Versailles. They went on all night. I was overwhelmed with all of this. I had a good time with the French and I think, again, my best contribution was in bringing some better order into the academic exchanges program. Continuing the very fruitful university relationships that were in effect all over the country. And dealing with political affairs, mostly again centering around nuclear weaponry. But I will admit, that from my professional point of view, those two years in France were the least satisfying because I had never dealt with a romance language. My languages had been Germanic with the exception of Hebrew or Slavic. It just took too much of my time trying to cope with the language. That is a lesson I hope USIA has learned, not to send senior officers who are not qualified in a language to major posts. It happened with me and it caused a great deal of stress for me, more than I want to talk about.

Q: As you undoubtedly know there was a lot of feeling over many years that the Western European program had been inbred and that officers had tended to make a career out of it and resisted being anywhere else except Western Europe. No where was this more evident than the case of the French program. I think some of it was justified. The people who were in USIS almost invariably tended to look down upon anyone who came out there to participate in the USIS program if they were not Francophiles and if they were not French language specialists. An attempt was made to clear out that kind of ingrained French immersion. By the time you got there had that been fairly well adjusted or was there still a good deal of that attitude on the part of the American staff?

CATHERMAN: I don't remember that there was any of that. Most of the Americans, if not all of them, had come from African posts where they had learned that version of French and with one or two exceptions they were all having their own little problems. They were better off in the language than I was, but they were by no means perfect. There were one or two people who spoke perfect, bilingual French. But out of 20 Americans their linguistic abilities were not top class, although they did a good job, we had a good staff.

WILLIAM V.P. NEWLIN
Consul General
Nice, France (1983-1986)

Mr. Newlin was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He obtained degrees from Harvard University and the Fletcher School and, after serving a tour with the US Army, joined the Foreign Service in 1960. A generalist, Mr. Newlin's service took him to France, Guatemala and Belgium, where he dealt primarily with European Organizations and NATO. In Washington his assignments concerned Trade, Law of the Sea and other economic matters. Mr. Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: In your last assignment, you went off from '83-'86 as consul general. How did you get that job? It sounds like a very nice job?

NEWLIN: I've always been very grateful for that. I had this rather undistinguished career and then this nice job came along. First, I was told I was going to be consul general in Bordeaux. Then that went to the person who was working in assignments in Personnel. But Nice came up and they gave me Nice, which I thought was very nice of them. It was a funny job. It's a one person post. This was the first time it had been made a consulate general. In the past, it was just a consulate in Nice. It was nice. It was a consulate general. It was nice for me. It was nicer being a consul general down there. They treated the American consul general as "une personnalité." It was treated as a big job even though, in fact, it was a little job. We have since closed it. Although I, of course, opposed closing it at the time... I opened it. There was no consulate there at the time. I went out and opened it and they wanted me to close it.

Q: Once you close something... What happened to make them want to open again?

NEWLIN: I think that there was some political pressure to open it in the U.S. Senate. I'm not quite sure why people wanted to open it, but they did. It had a limited role. It didn't issue visas. It was lovely not issuing visas. That's kind of a messy job. We took care of American interests. We issued passports. We showed the flag. There is a lot of American industry down there. We had a commercial Foreign Service national. When the place was closed, it was never completely closed. It was a Foreign Service agency. We had a consular agent. After I left, there was a consular agent. There is still a consular agent. Much of the stuff that was done when I was there is still done. Somebody comes up from Marseille to sign passports.

Q: We have a consul general in Marseille.

NEWLIN: That's right.

Q: Did Nice cover Monaco?

NEWLIN: Yes.

Q: Was that a major reason for... Particularly since Princess Grace... What was your impression of Monaco? It had gone through a period where it was putting itself out as a tax haven and the French got a little annoyed at this.

NEWLIN: Yes. Monaco is a company. The prince runs a company. Its assets are its tax laws and its ability to decide who is going to do business there and the conditions under which they're going to do business. He ran that company very well. He is very pleased to point out that the gambling for which Monaco is, of course, known really more than for anything else is a relatively small amount of Monaco's industry. Its real industry is banking... They do have some lead manufacturing and that sort of thing. But tourism and banking are their main industries. They run their little municipality very well. It says of itself that it's the only place where a woman in a long dress and an emerald necklace can walk down the street at 6:00 pm and feel both safe and not ridiculous.

Q: Did you get involved in any consular cases? Were any Americans in trouble in your area while you were there?

NEWLIN: There were always Americans in some kind of trouble. That was the thing that the consulate general did the most of and the best. We were a very good place for an American in trouble to come largely because of our Foreign Service nationals and largely because of one who had been there for a number of years, Jeanette Reese. She had a wonderful can-do attitude that she wanted to send people away satisfied. It was my attitude that I wanted very much to send people away with the feeling that they had come to the consulate with a problem and the consulate had solved their problem. I always thought that was very much not the attitude in Marseille, which had the bureaucratic feeling – and their nationals had the bureaucratic feeling – that they had something to give and, by God, one of the things they could therefore do was to withhold it. What we did the best was deal with Americans and their problems.

Q: Do you recall any of the consular cases that you dealt with?

NEWLIN: They were mostly people with passport problems and money problems. The money problems were on two sides. One, rich people will have lost all their money and expect to get money to continue their trip. The other were people who were more or less destitute who lived down in the area who needed ongoing help. With the rich people, the biggest trick was to get them to realize that their biggest asset was their friendships at home. I'm talking about people who had a liquidity problem, not a money problem. If you have a liquidity problem, you call a friend at home who you figure hasn't got a liquidity problem and you say, "Can you send me \$5,000 and as soon as I get back, I'll make you whole?" You try to get them to realize that, in fact, you would be flattered if the same person called you in such a situation. You wouldn't feel put on. You'd feel pleased that you were the person to whom they had turned. Then you had the people who were destitute and a little bit deranged, mostly had some kind of pension income coming in but they had run out of it before they got to the end of it. We would help tide them over. That was Jeanette Reese who knew them all and often would do things, in fact, that probably the regulations would have said that wasn't the way to handle a particular problem. We had a slush fund that local American organizations would give us to which we would just add money if it needed it. We would use that to tide people over when it seemed the best to do.

Q: Did you have fleet visits?

NEWLIN: We had a lot of fleet visits. We had two heads of the Sixth Fleet while I was there. One was Ed Martin and one was Frank Kelso. They were outstanding men. We worked very closely with the USO (United Services Organization). They were good people in the USO who coordinated lots of the stuff in terms of helping take care of soldiers ashore. The government of Nice was very helpful. It at the time was being run by Jacques Médecin, who was a crook. But he was Nice's crook, so he was hugely popular. His father had been mayor for a very long time. He was mayor and could have been mayor for life if he had not... When he was out of the country once... He was very right-wing. The country at that time was socialist. He was out of the country and his guys got a hold of him and said, "Jacques, this time you can't come back. This time if you come back, they're going to put you in jail." He didn't come back. He went down to Uruguay. The scuttlebutt was that he was selling tee shirts on the beach. You have to have known that Jacques Médecin knew that he had salted plenty of money away offshore and that he wasn't selling tee shirts on the beach. He had an American wife with a slightly... It's a name associated with the American cosmetics industry. People kept saying that she was an heir of that family, which was not the case. She didn't even claim that was the case. She was quite glamorous. But when he went to Uruguay, she did not follow him there. They got divorced.

The fleet... Therefore, Médecin was very pro-U.S. and very right-wing. So, he loved having the U.S. fleet come in and show the flag. The fleet put its band to good use. The local economy would put the band to good use. The band would play at things for the public. It was good flag waving for the U.S. We would entertain the officers and local dignitaries at our house, which was a good thing. Local dignitaries liked to be invited to meet the fleet. Then the fleet would invite them out to receptions on board ships, which was a nice way of making U.S. friends.

Q: Did you find that the writ of Paris ran strong in Nice or did Nice sort of run on its own?

NEWLIN: Nice ran on its own. You're talking about the government. No, Nice was always its own fiefdom. Nice was Italian until 100 years ago. Nice was operated by the Médecin family for a long time. You have lots of roles in... Médecin was not only a deputy and a mayor, but he was head of the conseil generale, which ran the... The region is run by two people, the head of the conseil generale and the préfet. The préfet takes care of the central government's part. The conseil generale is the elected part. Médecin ran that and ran the city. He didn't need Paris much at all. It was a little bit of a fiefdom. But they did get him. Then they extradited him. He did serve some time. Then he died.

Q: You left there in 1986.

NEWLIN: That was my last post.

RICHARD FENTON ROSS
Public Affairs Advisor, UNESCO
Paris (1984-1988)

Mr. Ross was born in Virginia and educated at the University of Florida and Vanderbilt University. Joining the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1964, he served several tours of duty at its Headquarters in Washington, DC as well as at a number of US Embassies abroad. Dealing primarily with Information and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Ross served in Beirut, Amman, Jerusalem, Calcutta, Colombo, Kabul, Rabat and Paris. Following his retirement in 1992, he accompanied his wife on her Foreign Service assignments in Sana'a and Damascus. Mr. Ross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

ROSS: So okay, what do you do? After I was there for awhile I got involved with a bunch of people who worked at UNESCO. There had been a good ambassador there...a woman ambassador [Barbara Newell?], and she had had connections with the American groups of Indians and so forth. Who was that guy that ran for president of the United States [in 1976] from Oklahoma? [Fred Roy Harris] He's a very famous, old congressman, Fred Harris. We had programmed Fred Harris. We programmed a lot of people! He sat up in a chair and said, "Well, I'm gonna tell ya what is the story with America's political situation now in five or ten or fifteen thousand well chosen words!" and by George, he was not underestimating what he did, you know [laughter]. I mean it took him fifteen thousand words, but he told us!

At UNESCO a new ambassador got nominated by President Reagan, named Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard. She was our famous last ambassador to UNESCO. She decided she didn't like the public affairs fellow there who worked for her, who had been in Paris off and on for a long while, and knew everybody, and had a French wife, and so forth, and so she said he had to go. Somebody (the corridor gossip) said he doesn't even know that the red velvet tomahawk's in his

back yet.

So I thought, “Well, am I gonna stay here three years or not?” I had already applied to try to go, and they said, “No, you have to stay.” They changed it then, because I said, “I’ll go be branch PAO in Peshawar, [Pakistan],” because I was getting long in the tooth not to have been a PAO. “Oh! You haven’t been a PAO yet? Well, you know, that’s too bad for your career!” So I said, “No, I always wanted to be a CAO,” which, of course, is not necessarily a good maneuver. So I went over and told her [Gerard], “Well, I’d like to have the job of public affairs advisor in the American mission to UNESCO.” So she talked to me for a long while and asked me all kinds of questions, but the subtext of the questions was, “Are you reliable—that is, for me, for the way I am personally, and for what I believe?” I must have been opaque enough or dissembled or something like that, so she called up Charlie Wick [Charles Wick], who was then the director of USIA, and said, “I want Ross to come work for me.” This astounded a whole lot of people because I guess they didn’t think Ross could pull it off, but it meant I would have another tour in Paris on top of the first one.

Barry Fulton, who was head of USIA personnel [chief of Foreign Service personnel] or USIA something or other, apparently had a meeting (he was back in Washington) where he said, “I’m gonna make it absolutely impossible for Ross to stay there any more than five years in Paris.” Everybody always wants to go to Paris, and everybody who’s there always wants to stay, and you’ve got all those poor, benighted souls in Sub-Sahara Africa who all think that they if they bid on it they’ll get it. I’ve actually been to a meeting in Paris where people sat and laughed at the fact of all the people bidding on jobs that they’re never gonna get. “They’re not gonna get up here. We’ve got it locked up!” Literally.

So the upshot of it is that I went over to UNESCO, and took Judson Gooding’s place. He was in a tremendous rage at the system, at the ambassador, and anybody who got in his way, which included me because I was moving into his office as he was moving out. But later we became good friends, and he’s quite a sensitive fella, and I had him even come down and give some talks in Morocco.

Anyway, I worked for Ambassador Gerard, who I’m told now has passed away. The first people I met were her political friends who came hustling into her office. She ran an eccentric kind of ambassadorship. There was kind of a funny attitude of the American delegation: it was, that while we’re here UNESCO’s a sick monster and should collapse, but it’s okay with me if it collapses just as soon as my tour is finished. Then people who were in the Secretariat who were Americans, there were a percentage of them, who’d lived in Paris for 20 years, who all just viewed us with kind of a baleful glance and said, “Oh, well, it’s too late for you all to do anything! It’s such a mess!”

Q: Yes.

ROSS: “And I’ll tell you, it’s not like it was 20 years ago, but I’m staying until I retire, of course,” because nobody wants to leave Paris, or very few people do!

So Ambassador Gerard came and went, and she tended to take long lunches with her friend,

Mike Curb's sister. He started a very famous record company in California, and they made tons of money in the pop music industry and moved to Paris and bought himself a Rolls Royce Phantom II convertible and drove around town. Why not? If you have a quarter of a million a year, my advice is move to Paris.

So Gerard's husband was a retired, I guess, some kind of financier from New York, owned land in New Jersey, and had been a general in the 69th Infantry Regiment—or the Seventh, the Seventh Infantry Regiment on Park Avenue.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: It was the society regiment.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: So he was concerned with that.

She wore her big \$100,000 or whatever it was, eagle pin, for his contributions to the Republican party. The people who came to visit her that I saw were all people who had just pots of money. There were a certain amount of very conservative people; some of them were interesting; some of them weren't. The ambassador would go off to England to the Ditchley Conference or something like that, would be very right wing kind of thing, and she was exceedingly right wing.

It became apparent to me after I'd been there for awhile that really she was hired to stick as many pins and knives into [Amadou-Mahtar] M'Bow [director-general of UNESCO] as possible. After I got there, within about two or three months, she had a speech cobbled up for her, which I didn't have a hand in, saying that the United States was now going to give UNESCO one year to clean up its act, and they had the every-two-year annual conference coming up at the end of that one year, and the United States would see how that was. We stayed there for a year, all the while making more speeches about this threat to leave UNESCO, and had the every-two-year conference with M'Bow and everybody, and delegations coming in. The delegation that came from the United States was really strange. Some people didn't have passports when they were told they were on the delegation; some people had only traveled, say, to the West Indies or something like that and had no intention of going overseas. It was a political thing. There were other people, the attorney general's wife came, Mrs. Meese, and she was a delegate, and she was a heavy hitter.

Q: Ursula Meese.

ROSS: Yes, Ursula Meese, quite a nice lady.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: Ed Hennessey was then chief of delegation. He was a New York lawyer—had been one of the, I don't know, inspector generals or counsels for the CIA in Langley and seemed to know something about American interagency workings, but had a practice in New York. He

immediately fell into a tremendous struggle with Ambassador Gerard about who would be the point person, and who would lead the delegation, and who would give talks, or who would give backgrounders and briefings and everything. This was all kind of very confusing because at that point, I think, Judson Gooding was allowed to stay on to cover some meetings. Then he got involved with stuff a little bit, and there was a lot of confusion about who said what to whom and who was supposed to speak about this or that. These people were class A personalities, I tell you! I didn't have the strength to do it, besides they were way above me in rank.

Anyway, we went through that biennial conference. It was something else. People would not appear when they were supposed to. I was a delegate too, and I found myself in meetings where big decisions about important kinds of issues were being taken by people who were brought into the convention. I'd be representing the American position, and I wouldn't have been briefed into it at all. If there was anything I was supposed to know, it was to be the New World Information Order, which was kind of a...something that was always lashed out at by the Americans. But there'd be all kinds of other things, say, like a revision of the history of Africa texts, where you'd have 20 people and they're mostly African representatives; you'd have to vote or speak or something like that, and I'd have to say, "I can't cast my vote now," this all being with simultaneous interpreters, and serious stuff, everything being taken down, you know, subplenary session. "I don't have instructions on this at this time. Can I now leave the room, run, try to find somebody?" "What are we gonna do on...or what should we do? Should I just go with it?" you know, these kinds of things. It was a great learning experience.

Actually, there was a guy named Jan de Wilde, an American, who I'm told has gone over to the international organizations, who is now in Geneva, and he was very irreverent. Big, tall, blonde guy.

Q: He was a brand new vice consul under me in Saigon.

ROSS: That's right, he was there. He has a lovely wife, and his father was a World Bank figure or something like that.

Q: Yes, yes.

ROSS: And very, very slick, and puts on that sophistication thing.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: Always wrote with the Montblanc pen and all this.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: He could skewer people very funny, as if he was Oscar Wilde. Some of the stuff we saw there, I couldn't believe it! Somebody would come steaming in totally drunk and sit down and grab the mike.

Q: This is for the American delegation?

ROSS: Yes! Actually, the AEP, shall we put it that way? The Cuban would try to interrupt and just go at it, both of them talking into the mike, and M'Bow would say, "Now, now, this is enough, you know." It just—

Q: Well, you know, you're mentioning the problems with UNESCO and the United States. I mean you are the new boy on the block. What were your observations about UNESCO at the time when you got there around '82 or '83. I mean what its work was and what the organization was like in Paris?

ROSS: The one word that springs to mind is "fromage" (cheese)—that is to say, it was just a big slice of cheesecake for anybody who wanted to get there and get themselves into a position. People jockeyed all the time to get jobs there because then they got the international salary. There was a lot of kind of make work—people seemed like their offices would be full of projects and stuff, but I don't think they did very much compared to the old days. They went into a tremendous amount of hairsplitting argument about what was the New World Information Order (NWIO), and then they got into big struggles, say, with the Algerians and the Cubans and everybody, and who had a right to say what. They were arguing about the cultural position of the world.

Q: Well, if I recall, the New World Information Order, as we saw it, was basically that the press should be under the control of governments, wasn't it?

ROSS: Right, on all the new governments, that would be nonaligned governments, if you will; all said no; said that, "Of course they don't understand these cultures. We applaud the fact that you think that you have a free press and that you can do anything you want, but you just don't realize you have what they call self-censorship there. Since the press barons own everything, whether it's William Randolph Hearst or somebody, you people are manipulating your press against us, so the only way we can defend ourselves is to explain ourselves from the prime minister down, and he will control what goes in the newspaper."

Then you get into things like what correspondents will be allowed into which countries, and what correspondents will be allowed to file, and this accreditation and all that. America through Freedom House and through other heavy hitting organizations had NGOs there watching this stuff. There were different people with different axes to grind, and that always seemed to get into the argument.

Q: But to put it, in a way we had a right wing administration under Reagan, particularly early Reagan, but at the same time to be perfectly fair, UNESCO hit the wrong buttons across our political spectrum. I mean correct me if I'm wrong, but 1) it was, as you say, a bunch of fromage. I mean it had nothing, it was a place full of nepotism and good living with a lot of American dollars involved.

ROSS: Absolutely!

Q: The other one was it was a control mechanism over the press.

ROSS: That was just even one of them; it was control mechanism on all kinds of cultural ideas, on the theory of culture.

Q: Yes, yes.

ROSS: I mean East Culture, Afro Centrist, and on a lot of colonial resentment, which seemed to have wound up into UNESCO. It was a forum for all these things. The people who were really the logicians of it tended to be like Cubans who could really do that Marxist analysis of all this stuff, and a lot of Sub-Sahara people just went along and voted whichever way they were told to.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: M'Bow had come up a long way. His first language from Senegal wasn't the major language; it was a tribal language; and he'd been a sergeant in the French army, an automobile mechanic or telephone mechanic, and he derived to the distinction of being the director general; and he'd brought other people along.

There was one chap who came, God bless him, up from Sub-Sahara Africa, and his country was so poor it didn't have enough money to send him. So when they didn't have enough money to send him, M'Bow could cut money loose from whatever big pile of money he had, central funds, and give people travel and per diem for this conference. At the end of the conference this wonderful, simple guy who was obviously a farmer—they had new clothes on that they didn't take off the labels on the outside, it still had the labels on the outside because they thought that you wore the label, the little stitched on. They asked him what he would suggest to improve the conference, and he said, well, he wasn't staying in a very great hotel, but it was nice, but it was a little far from UNESCO in the Seventh, and what he would suggest is if they could move the subway stop closer to UNESCO—

Q: Yes.

ROSS: So that people could get out across the street from UNESCO instead of having to walk in the rain or something like that. That was one of the few times that I saw M'Bow cut in and say, "Well, thank you." You know, "au France", [laughter] thank you for your intervention.

Q: Well, were there any things that UNESCO was doing that you felt were worthwhile?

ROSS: Some of the science stuff seemed to be very interesting. Now I didn't have any hand in that. Some education and some science—and that is to say, coordinating either country things like water catchment flows or whatever they're called, like the Rhine River's a giant mess, and they keep trying to clean it up—well, UNESCO helps with some of that; and some of the scientific kind of thing, just like mapping in the Third World where it's very hard to do, where you can bring people together; and then some education stuff. But for the most part it was all wordage; that's my feeling after I got there.

The Americans who worked there would say, "Oh, this place is a mess!" While we were there,

people were playing jokes on M'Bow, tricks like letting the air out of his tires on his cars because he had three or four Mercedes. Somebody would sneak around and let the air out of his tires, and then it would get around, or put too much salt in the food in the cafeteria or something, kind of strange stuff. Who did this? Nobody knew.

Q: Well, what were you...I mean, you know, you're the public affairs officer—

ROSS: Right.

Q: ...and normally you would be contacting delegations and getting the word out and all this.

ROSS: Right, yes, yes.

Q: I mean but how did this work in this particular case for you?

ROSS: In retrospect, I see myself a little bit as a handler for Ambassador Gerard to get her to do this or to do that or to get her to agree that these remarks that she was gonna make are all right, which you could never tell whether she was going to do it or not.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: One time it was arranged that Chirac, who was mayor of Paris, wanted to give her a distinction of some sort, the medal of the city of Paris, because of her conservative connections. Notice I never say right wing; I always say conservative. Anyway, she went off to Castille with some friends. They had the thing set up at the Mairie de Paris (town hall of Paris), and Chirac was there, and it was supposed to be at 1:30. They couldn't find her and couldn't find her and couldn't find her. It was four o'clock, and they found her just in one of these (these are very, very chichi) restaurant things. She said, "To hell with it!" like it's not important. So there was a certain amount of making sure that the guest list was right for her.

I found out I was in Tibet—that mode, you know. The people have to be good, and they have to be available because she's gonna have somebody big from New York, an old member of Congress, but she's not gonna have the party yet. So we had to call people up and ask them if they'd be free that night if there is a party. So I had Danny Wattenberg come work as my assistant. (You know the guy on television, Ben Wattenberg. He's written a bunch of books, he's a big commentator.) His son [Danny] came; Ben Wattenberg pulled a wire and got his son a job in USIA and then an overseas excursion tour. Danny had been with the *New York Times*, even, as he admitted, as a copy boy. He came over and he did a lot of stuff. He was considered a theoretician of the junior wing of the conservative element because Jeane Kirkpatrick had spotted him one time at a dinner party and said, "My goodness, that guy's very well informed. You're the best spoken young man I've ever heard." So you know, one thing led to another. So he was working for me, and he finally blew up and said, "Well, I'm not supposed to be doing this. I'm not supposed to be doing guest lists for parties!" as if junior officers all over the world didn't actually do that. He said, "I'm supposed to be doing think pieces." So he quit after we left UNESCO and went back and did hatchet jobs on Clinton, I think.

We didn't have a principle position except that we really were going to get out, and to say that we were waiting for a year to give them a chance for M'Bow to clean up his act. It was already decided.

Q: Well, did anybody give a _____ in the regular apparatus of UNESCO about how the United States was positioned? I'm talking about the non-American staff.

ROSS: Everybody said, "It's a shame! You shouldn't leave." That was 1) because of the money, but 2) because in the old days there was kind of a principle of operation at UNESCO, going back to Huxley, I think. Wasn't he with it? Not Julian Huxley, but another one [Aldous Huxley]. In the '50s there were some triple thinkers and stuff like that.

Q: Yes.

ROSS: Of the staff that I knew, the guy I replaced, he was in a rage, and he didn't care whether we stayed in or not. There was a guy who was an ex-Jesuit priest, who was in Education, Ray [Warner]; he's just retired recently from the State Department; he was in IO (Bureau of International Organization Affairs); he did care, but he also cared about being assigned to Paris. There was Jan DeWilde, the Wild, who saw this merely as moving on.

Q: But I was thinking about the non-American professional staff of UNESCO. Was there any attempt to sort of do something, or were they just couldn't care less whether the United States was in or not?

ROSS: The American professional staff in the Secretariat were scared that if we pulled out, that their jobs would be cut down, although we had less percentage than what we were entitled to. The British actually, believe it or not, had the most of anybody, if you just counted everybody, and then the French.

People tended to bemoan the fact that UNESCO didn't have the kind of intellectual clarity that it used to. It had devolved into a lot of sniping; and M'Bow hadn't really done anything to cut it out, in fact, may have encouraged it in a way to divide and conquer, but then got into kind of a manager of a mess; and no matter what he did, it was attacked!

So he towards the end he was trying very hard to build/mend fences. During the conference Charlie Wick came over as a delegate. He'd gotten himself named a delegate, and he was going to attend some part of it, and I went to the airport and met him. I was his handler or his escort, and that was very interesting indeed.

Q: How did that work out?

ROSS: He had come to be mistrusted by the career Foreign Service officers' staff, but they wouldn't give him a break! So immediately, since I was going around with him, they said, "Are you holding his lead raincoat for him?" "Oh, you're, yeah, Ross, you're the, you know, like _____ person," like "What's he up to now?" Well, these are the guys who were above me who worked for him. They were laughing behind his back; they were over in the

corner sniggering.

I tried to get them to do this and that and the other thing, but they wanted him to come to a special UNESCO evening where everybody's delegation had cooked all the food of their various countries. M'Bow got me and said, "You must get Director Wick to come. I'm looking forward to it."

Director Wick had called me up after the explosion, the bomb, which busted up our apartment. He called me directly, which I didn't expect and said, "Richard Ross, how are you?" That was before I went to UNESCO. Then when Ambassador Gerard said she wanted me to work, he remembered me again because he just told his personnel, you know how they do it at the top, just get that person there.

So I said, "You've got to go to UNESCO right now, tonight." "I don't wanna. I don't want to go. You go instead of me." I said, "Well, you know Director M'Bow wants you to go." "No, I'm tired, I didn't sleep on the plane. I don't feel well..." this or that and the other thing. What he actually wanted to do was go over to see Evan Galbraith, the ambassador in Paris—we had different ambassadors; I'm talking about the ambassador to the French—and I don't know, discuss politics, which is what a lot of people wanted to do when they came to Paris. It doesn't happen in a lot of other countries that I've ever been in, but it must happen a lot in England too, like they want to buy ties or they want to do this, but they want to talk politics, ya da da da.

So he didn't come, and I had to go over to UNESCO and see the terrible tragic look in M'Bow's eyes. He said, "He didn't come." It was like he cut M'Bow, and also the subtext there, if I can use that fancy word, was that this is the handwriting on the wall. We don't care about you, and it's gonna be gone for a six as soon as possible. So even M'Bow couldn't do anything, even if he knew how to do it.

GLENN SLOCUM
Club du Sahel Officer, OECD
Paris (1984-1988)

Glenn Slocum was born in 1940. After finishing graduate school at the University of Maryland in 1969 he joined AID. His career includes positions in Cameroon, Senegal, Paris, Washington D.C., and Burundi. Mr. Slocum was interviewed by W. Haven North in November 1998.

SLOCUM: I continued working on the same region, succeeding Art Fell at the Club du Sahel position at the OECD in Paris. The Club was a donor group organized under OECD auspices in 1974 to help coordinate donor policies and strategies in the eight countries of the Sahel region of West Africa. In August 1984 I transferred from Washington to Paris. It was unusual for an AID officer to be assigned to a European post, but I was fortunate to be assigned to one of them. I had quite a bit of Sahel experience, having been posted to Senegal for three years in the late

seventies, plus the five years I had spent working on projects in the Sahel region from the Washington side, which left me fairly familiar with the issues of the region.

Q: What was the setup that you had at the Club?

SLOCUM: Before getting to that maybe a little bit of background on how the office was established. I recall an evening dinner, when you were coming through Dakar and Gene Chiavaroli had you over for dinner while you were waiting for a connecting flight on PanAm for New York. I have a vague recollection of sitting in Gene's living room, out there by the beach, and talking about some of these issues.

As the drought had taken on some fairly devastating dimensions in the early seventies, by about 1974, AID was, I think, the main agency pushing other donors to have a more coordinated approach to the effects of environmental devastation and desertification and drought in the region. The Sahel region of West Africa goes from Mauritania to Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau moving east across a belt south of the Sahara through Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. (The same ecological conditions pertain to Sudan, southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, but the Sahel region with which the Club du Sahel deals ended with Chad.) The Sahel also includes the islands constituting the country of Cape Verde off the coast of Senegal. Roy Stacy was the first AID officer stationed at the Club du Sahel. He went there in, I believe, 1974 and served there for about four years. Art Fell then was there for six years. So, by the time I got there in 1984, the Club du Sahel was a mature institution. It was headed by a renowned Frenchwoman, Anne de Lattre, who after 10 years was the driving force and, some would even say, the personification of the Club. Although AID was the main donor pushing the Club's establishment, the French were key to its success because six of the eight countries were former French colonies and French was widely spoken, and the official language of, these countries. In 1974, Madame de Lattre was named the first director of the Club, and served in that position for 14 years, maintaining an association with the Club until recently. She had already been an international civil servant, having worked for the OECD for a number of years in the Development Assistance Directorate. Though she had no experience living in Africa in the way AID Foreign Service officers did, she was a very dynamic and respected force behind the Club. The AID person functioned informally as the deputy in the Club. The Club staff has varied over the years. When I was there, there were four donors who seconded people to the Club. In addition to the American, Canada and the Netherlands posted officials there. France had a de facto representative in the fact that Mme. de Lattre was French, but also by virtue of the Club's location in Paris, with close access to the French Government and the widespread expertise of French citizens. Italian participation was informally supported by an OECD documentalist who was Italian. Later a knowledgeable German aid person served at the Club.

The Club had been founded in tandem with a counterpart organization in the Sahel, which was known as the CILSS, the Interstate Committee for Development and Drought Relief in the Sahel, a regional organization of Sahel countries set up to combat the effects of the drought. In the first 10 years, the CILSS and Club collaborated to complete a number of sector assessments in the main areas affecting environmental degradation and food security policy in the Sahel. By the end of the '70s, there were AID Missions in all the Sahel countries, and they collaborated in varying degrees with the Club to help do these national sector assessments.

By the time I arrived, the sector assessments had been completed for each country, and the member states had approved them. These formed the basis for the next step, forging common regional approaches to make the national programs effective and working in sync with each other. National programs of food security, environmental control and related areas had regional implications, as, for example, in pricing policy. One country's pricing policy could stimulate or discourage trade with its neighbors. If the latter, then farmers would be disadvantaged or consumer prices would be higher than they had to be. By the time I arrived at the Club, the basic analytical work had been completed, and the time had come to begin looking at national programs from both the governments' and donors' perspectives. Art had handled the anti-desertification and environmental portfolios, so I spent a fair amount of time working with the donor community in the Sahel countries helping them develop national environmental action and desertification control plans that would meet the approval of most of the donors so they could have coordinated approaches to these areas.

Q: The sector studies were for the whole region rather than individual countries?

SLOCUM: Initially the studies centered on individual countries, followed later by some "synthesis" studies bringing together some general analysis and principles, tying together the country assessments and drawing some regional conclusions. Most of the national studies were prepared in French, and they had the French-language title that became our jargon: Bilan Programmes. "Sector assessments" is a loose translation of that, but we don't have quite an equivalent.

Q: What did they focus on?

SLOCUM: The initial push was on food production. The agricultural bilan programmes looked at what they called overall cereals policy questions because they were the basis of the agricultural economies of all those countries. The others were in the areas of drought control and environment, with a focus on reforestation.

Q: They were projects?

SLOCUM: That is a good question. From the donor and Club du Sahel point of view they were not projects, they were sector assessments with policy indicators. But here is where we get into a theme that I think became a problem for the Club's network and philosophy. I touched a little bit on this earlier. From the donor/Club viewpoint, the assessments were necessary to develop consensus approaches to overcoming the effects of the drought and getting the countries back on a self-sustaining ground. A key operating, and philosophical, principle from the beginning was that the Club had to work in collaboration with the CILSS secretariat. The key founding donors of the Club, notably the French and the U.S., in effect, "created" the CILSS to institutionalize Sahelian involvement and ownership of long-term sustainable development programs. However, the Sahel states through the CILSS had a different, if unwritten, mandate, which was not in concert totally with the donors. The donor interest was to develop better policies and programs. I think the Sahelians saw the CILSS more as a mechanism to get more funding into their programs. This fundamental institutional difference was unspoken but important to recognize. It

probably still persists today.

In the ten years since I left the Club the work program has branched out to include new areas, such as the linkage of coastal countries' to the Sahel countries' economies. The Club and the CILSS also began looking more to the private sector as the indispensable underpinning to growth and development. And the impact of population growth became part of the mandate. These changes have taken place since I departed in 1988. It is a sign of the Club/CILSS model's staying power that it is still a dynamic network, despite the cuts in AID's budget and personnel staffing over the years and the closure of bilateral USAID Missions in all but two of the Sahel countries. It shows that despite the divergent interests of the two institutions, their contribution has been important enough to merit continuing support.

Q: Was policy reform a major emphasis?

SLOCUM: Yes, mainly in the selected sector areas. But the implicit result was to expose the Sahelians to the regional nature of the issues with which they were working so that the countries would cooperate more closely on issues critical to their economic futures.

Q: But, it wasn't a formal program.

SLOCUM: Not as such. The idea was to spur debate among the Sahel countries to develop better policies, but to do so based on their gained experience and the added knowledge provided by their debates on the bilans programmes.

Q: How did you find this work of trying to translate a general sector analysis into a national program?

SLOCUM: It was a challenge to translate the sector assessments into national applications that had a change impact on the donors or the Sahelians. Again, the divergence I enunciated earlier, divergent interests between donors and the Sahelians — in which donors were looking for better projects and Sahelians for more money — played out here too. An additional element was that donors' national programs were unlikely to be changed based on a Club/CILSS-sponsored meeting held in country X. Holding national "concertation" meetings to see how countries might better approach agriculture or environment had only a temporarily stimulating effect. What was needed was some sort of local incentive to take the results of those discussions and put them into a framework which would effect real changes in approaches within the national programs. But it never quite came to that. I suppose that for this to happen it would have been necessary for a Club/CILSS entity to take root institutionally within that Sahel country. But that was not the purpose of the Club/CILSS, to replicate itself country after country.

In fact, I learned that USAID Missions in the Sahel were the strongest objectors to a strong Club/CILSS network in the Sahel. They saw us as laying a competing claim to scarce resources for their bilateral programs. They rarely saw us as value-added to their own programs. In meeting after meeting of Sahel Mission Directors, complaints were lodged that USAID funds going to their regional programs detracted from their own programs. I should note here that, in addition to the Club/CILSS study program, AID funded a number of regional projects, in

AGRHYMET, INSAH, Population, Agricultural Research, and Pest Control (IPM). It was a battle, and despite strong support from Washington leadership, both the Administrator's office and the Africa Bureau, the field directors never fully bought into the regional program. The field directors were part of an institutional culture that rewarded the Missions' bilateral programs. Officers rarely got rewarded for building regional programs, because they were seen as not really contributing much to their own national development objectives. This was a constant tension which I don't think any of us were ever able to abate. The debate was over how much investment should be made into regional approaches vis-a-vis national ones. It was something we talked about at every annual Mission Directors meeting.

Q: What was the receptiveness of the governments to this sector strategy for the Sahel ?

SLOCUM: At the technical and policy levels, there was tremendous receptivity. For one thing, for the first time, the CILSS/Club network provided a regular forum for exchanging ideas, for learning from country to country, and this was very enriching and empowering (Anne used to refer to it as a "privileged forum.") I did feel that at a political level, there was this divergence in interests between the donors, who were aiming at better policies and programs, and the Sahelian governments, who saw CILSS as a fund-raising mechanism. However, to be honest, I should ask the question: if the interests were as divergent as I assert between the donor community and the Sahel governments, then why in 1998 does the Club/CILSS mechanism still exist? I think it is because the CILSS provided a needed forum for dialogue, even if the countries' economic indicators have not improved that much in 25 years, regional cooperation has been in their collective national interests, and the CILSS has fostered that and is now, a generation later, identified as an important contributor to that process. I should add also that the operational budgets of the Club and the CILSS as institutions were not large. In fact, donor pressure has seen the CILSS budget and staff cut back and their work program rationalized.

After my departure from the Club, the CILSS secretary general, Nigerien Brah Mahamane, was hired to set up a regional office in the Ivory Coast to look at the role of the coastal states' economies on the Sahel countries. I remember hearing that there wasn't much product from that effort, but I can't be specific as to what the problems were. It was inevitable and, I think, appropriate, that the burgeoning movement to spur market-led growth in developing countries would be reflected in the Club/CILSS work program.

Q: You talked about the coastal regions?

SLOCUM: Yes, these were a critical element of economic opportunities for the Sahelians, and I don't think the Club/CILSS strategy gave them adequate attention at the outset, though it came to recognize their importance. For over 10 years the Club/CILSS looked to restoration of the Sahel's ecological capital, but it could also have taken its coastal neighbors into account. For years, citizens from the Sahel have made their way to the coastal countries for jobs and other economic opportunities. So, for example, throughout the coastal countries of West Africa you have many citizens of the Sahel countries working in the service industries. There was an attempt to look only at the Sahel countries as a unit and exclude the economic impact of their economically stronger neighbors. There were a lot of efforts in that area after I left. The point of all this is that there were constant attempts to take a fresh look and enhance the wisdom and

rationale for the CILSS and Club's agendas.

Q: To raise the question of why did it survive?

SLOCUM: Well, there was a mechanism to have the "board of directors" —the donors and the Sahel countries — conduct a formal review every two years of the Club/CILSS work programs. Later, there were efforts to re-engineer, to look at what made sense in the Sahel. What is curious is that, in response to the Sahel drought, not only was this regional mechanism set up between the CILSS and the Club, but AID also established Missions in the mid-seventies in virtually every country in the Sahel, which was, I think, a sign of the strong interest and support the Agency intended to give to development in those areas.

Q: You were able to view the work of the Club du Sahel and all resources it provided after it had been in business for about ten years, what sense did you have that it was making a difference or would make a difference? What was the result of ten years of effort? In the beginning there was an assumption that in ten years we would have finished the job or close to it.

SLOCUM: I recall seeing a review of the 1960s' antipoverty program on PBS recently, and a clip showed Sergeant Shriver, the program's first head under LBJ, reply "yes" to a question "Do you think poverty can be eliminated in America in 25 years?" I think that the 10-year time frame envisaged at the outset was totally unrealistic and not based on any firm analysis of the real problems that had to be overcome: desertification, poor human resources capacity, mismanagement, donor dependency (which was probably exacerbated during this period), inadequate macroeconomic environment, etc. We've learned that sustainability requires long-term investments. The Club has now gone on for over twenty years. Roy Stacy went back after his retirement, and became the Club du Sahel Director. He has now left, and Club donors have agreed on a replacement candidate — another American, by the way. So, despite all, the slow rate of progress in the Sahel, the closing of many USAID bilateral missions, and the historic lack of support to the operation by USAID Missions in the field, the Club/CILSS institution lives on. I think it continues for a number of reasons. One I suspect is the fact that the level of poverty in those countries, because of the low resource base and the effects of continued environmental degradation and desertification, are such that they simply cannot survive without donor support. So, collectively among the donors there is a recognition that, even if not every donor can be present in every Sahel country, as AID is no longer able to be, the Sahel needs special attention. (In fact, it could be argued that closing so many of the AID Missions was facilitated by the existence of regional sources of continued assistance to those countries.) That is one rationale that keeps it going. I think the other reason is that there probably never will be very strong results in the near term. One has learned to be very modest in the expectations as to how long it will take for these investments to bring lasting results, and that probably the best we can expect in the short term is to create a kind of standing action to keep the desert from encroaching further, to enable the nationals, both public officials as well as private citizens, to better equip themselves to manage their own development.

But, there has been another factor, and this is kind of getting us away from this assignment, but I think it is useful to put it in context because we are going to come back to it in my experience in subsequent assignments. That is, the increased propensity in many African countries towards

chaos and conflict, which unsettle the already fragile conditions, have become more manifest and therefore have worsened the human condition. That means a stronger need to give some kind of attention to this. One manifestation of this is the increasing amount of funds going to relief and humanitarian aid as opposed to development aid. That is a reality. I don't have the figures on every country, but in the East Africa region four years ago, for every dollar of U.S. government money going to development, two dollars were allocated for relief and humanitarian assistance.

Q: How much would you say roughly was the aid to the Sahel over this ten year period that you can look back on?

SLOCUM: Speaking for AID, the annual Sahel development appropriation was on the order of \$80 million. It varied from year to year and eventually this special appropriation got melded back into the Africa appropriation. Early on, this level of interest was manifested by some fairly big projects. I remember one for Burkina Faso that was a fairly large integrated development project. I think it was \$80 million over ten years, or something like that. Wherever we went we saw the same tendency because of the availability of funding to come up with some fairly ambitious activities. In the countries in which I have more knowledge, for instance, Mauritania, where I was later assigned after leaving Paris in 1988, the impact of those initial large projects was unclear. For example, in the Rural Assessment and Manpower Survey (RAMS) in Mauritania, a great deal of money went for a wide swath of technical assistance which produced a long series of studies that, regrettably, seemed more useful as shelf stabilizers than for the application of their substantive contents, and I saw little evidence of their use by Mauritians, or anybody, when I got to Mauritania several years later. I would hope that other donors coming through wanting to work in a given area where some of these overall assessments and satellite mapping and natural resources had been completed would use them. But, to what extent it enabled the Mauritians to better understand their areas of potential that they could develop, I am less able to answer that. I just don't know.

I had a colleague who worked on a huge livestock project in Tahoua, in northern Niger. He is a personal friend of mine and I see him socially. He spent two years as a financial analyst on the project, a huge technical assistance team in this remote area of Niger and the idea was to assist Nigerians to improve herd practices, animal health, management and accounting, etc. He told me that he is not sure any beneficial result was left behind based on his own knowledge and the contacts in the years following he had with his working colleagues from there. This person is still working in development and is able to place the activity in a wider context.

At the same time, I know that Mission Directors were very keen on making these projects appropriate and making them run properly and structuring them in a way that enhanced capacity locally. Similar issues were raised, I recall, with respect to the regional integrated pest management project (IPM). This concern led to a major scaling back because it became apparent that the expected results were not being achieved, mainly because of the very weak indigenous capacity to learn and apply the assistance.

Now talking historically, of course, and lessons learned ten, fifteen years ago, I think we did learn a lot of lessons which helped us improve our approaches. The focus on managing for results and developing indicators that give you a sense of how you measure progress has all

come in the last ten years. But, if I go back to your question, what results do we have in the countries in which these projects were implemented, I think probably the biggest result over time is how many trained people understand the issues, understand management, understand financial controls. I think that probably it is the most important thing. Gradually building a critical mass of trained managers and technicians who can design and run these activities themselves on the ground.

Unfortunately, what has countered that tendency has been problems of governance, power oligarchies and corruption, not to mention tribal and ethnic violence. Those things were not as apparent in the Sahel in the '80s. There was one border war between Mali and Burkina Faso, but it only flared up for a few days and quickly subsided. There was a greater tendency to maintain control, but these also were essentially nondemocratic governments. So, I think the effort to focus on the Sahel made sense, because it was recognized that over time, more and more humanitarian relief would be required if we didn't try to get a basis for development established in that region.

Q: But you don't see any results on the ground?

SLOCUM: Oh, yes, once we understood better the multiple causes of the constraints, we began to design better activities. Certainly we see results in terms of enhanced capacity, both of civil servants and in the private sector. The Club/CILSS epoch coincided with the World Bank structural adjustment programs. These SAPs, plus sector investment programs, have resulted in such innovations as modern and widespread health clinics and reforestation activities that involve community participation. While the mega-projects were probably inappropriate for their time, progress has occurred in decentralization, civil society and other examples wherein nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) serve as counterpoints to governmental dominance in economic development. The Structural Adjustment Programs became very important mechanisms for economic adjustments so that the state got itself out of some very inefficient roles in the economy and allowed the private sector to take over. All these things were germinating in the 80s and later even burgeoned in the 90s. For example, were the investments in the health sector from the donor community sustainable for the host country? Probably not. It is unlikely for the national economies to get to the point that they can maintain a national primary health service delivery system without some kind of donor assistance. Whether it was for vaccinations or for drug supplies, birth control, whatever those systems were, I suspect that it was going to take a lot more than just these projects to make these activities sustainable. But something had to be done to get the basics to the people. My point is that we are learning as we go and adjusting our programs accordingly to get at the basic constraints.

Q: Do you think these countries are viable?

SLOCUM: It just occurred to me: You came through Paris and you and I sat in Anne de Lattre's office and we were talking about some of these same issues. I remember you said to Anne, "What can we do?" Anne said, "We should just build roads and maintain them forever." I don't know if you remember this discussion, it just came back into my consciousness. We were all three searching for what would really work. I think Anne's point was that they are not going to be really viable in the national sense, and, therefore, the donors have to pick out certain sectors

and provide the wherewithal to make them work for the foreseeable future, relieving the pressure from the local government by a major contribution to that one sector, and freeing resources and people to work on other important sectors. That was probably a nonscientific response Anne gave you based on her years of experience and may not have been totally thought through. If one went further with that question I think one would say that even if the economy is not viable, what are the areas that these economies can sustain? There are other complications in this discussion. For example, how much of an AID budget should go to the social sectors, how much to the economic and productive sectors? Well, there you have national parliaments and our own congress saying that you will devote so much of the budget to health and family planning. Even we, as analysts, who try to determine where the best donor investments can go, have our hands tied by the fact that some of the allocation decisions are made through the appropriations process and not on the basis of a needs analysis. So, it is a very complicated game we were and are playing here.

Q: Did you get a sense after ten years that anybody was better off?

SLOCUM: I think there was the beginning of the effort to see how local initiatives could pay off. For example, I told you a lot of my time was spent in the first three years of my four years there on working with donors in countries to come together with the national services and develop a national environmental action plan. (Actually they were called “National Desertification Plan.”) In my last year, with help from my Dutch colleague, we began to realize there had to be much more emphasis on local initiatives, what we now call civil society and NGOs. So, a big conference was held shortly after I left, and my Dutch colleague took responsibility for organizing this. It was called the Segou Conference, held in Mali. That was the first effort to bring not just government officials but also NGOs interested in reforestation and similar environmental projects throughout the Sahel to come together and talk. To my knowledge this was the first effort of the Club to get involved in participatory issues. I think donors had been talking participation for some time, this was not new, but it was the Club’s recognition that we had done the sector assessments, done the regional issues, done a lot of the national sensitization programs on cereals policy and environmental issues, and now where do we take it from here? About the time I left they were just beginning to recognize there had to be much more involvement — what we now call “stakeholder” involvement — and this was the logical direction for the Club to go, a new area for them, to get broader participation in the decision making, the actual problem identification and the whole process.

Q: In the sectors you were handling, environment, etc., what were the elements of the strategy or policy that you were promoting and trying to get governments to adopt and donors to join in on? What were some of the substantive features?

SLOCUM: In a resource-poor environment aggravated by drought, rationalizing the agricultural sector on a regional basis was the first priority. Thus the bilans programmes on cereals pricing policies. The reforestation bilans were meant to help countries and donors develop coherent strategies for stopping the advance of the desert, where feasible. Later, as I just said, the Club began looking at how these strategies could be best promoted, and we realized that there were gaps at the local level. We also began sharing technical lessons among the countries. A research activity in one country might develop a special plant species that had roots that could go down

low and find the aquifer, a perfect drought-resistant species for the Sahel. One of the things we were trying to do was take lessons learned and propagate them. There were things that were drawn up by the consultants who did the sector assessments and then the idea of doing these at the national level was to see what the donors and the Sahelian officials coming to the meetings thought would make sense. The result of that meeting would be a document which would provide a list of activities that would move the process forward. Was it a shopping list that the Sahelians always like to see? Well, to some extent it was. On the other hand it did get people sitting in the same room thinking about these things.

Q: What were some of the activities?

SLOCUM: Sand dune stabilization was a controversial area and applied mainly to Mauritania and the northern regions of countries like Mali. I saw such schemes in Mauritania. Even the capital city of Nouakchott was threatened. Once those dunes start moving, they are virtually impossible to stop. The Mauriticians had constructed a good road running east from Nouakchott, which is on the Atlantic. Within five years parts of it had to be regularly plowed from sand on the northern side. Eventually the dune would be so massive that no amount of plowing could handle it. They would simply have to abandon the road at some point and relocate it further south. So, technically, stabilizing sand dunes was a lost cause. As far as I know, the idea was abandoned as unfeasible. The more successful activities over time were community-based reforestation, small-scale irrigated perimeters near water areas, natural crop and plant protection.

Q: The big part was reforestation?

SLOCUM: Yes.

Q: Would that include the community tree-planting scheme?

SLOCUM: The result of Segou was to encourage countries to give farmers more autonomy and authority over such planting sites. Prudent use of water sources was another area for development, including irrigation schemes. Other lessons learned and applied included the evolving role of the state, from one of intrusion to support for private-sector and community-based initiatives. The idea also was that these local reforestation projects were more successful if land ownership issues were resolved and if the people living in the area had a sense of personal responsibility for making these projects work. There were land tenure issues involved. We did quite a bit of work in that area.

Q: Were you involved in the cereal policy exercise?

SLOCUM: Most of that work was done before my time, although I had some involvement.

Q: Have a chance to see any results of that policy exercise?

SLOCUM: Prior to my arrival, national cereals policy analyses had been completed. The effort shifted to regional coordination of those policies. A series of regional conferences were held, the last in my era was in Cape Verde. At this point discussions were shifting away from official

policies, which were becoming increasingly harmonious among member countries, to private sector incentives to increase production, and more extensive agricultural practices.

Q: Did you go to the Club du Sahel conferences where the donors got together?

SLOCUM: The formal convocation of Ministers and aid agency heads occurred every other year. I went to the one in Milan in 1986 or 87, I believe it was.

Q: Who attended them?

SLOCUM: It was very high level. Donors sent the equivalent of the Administrator or the head of their Africa sections. These were major events. Usually a president of one of the Sahel countries would come to open the session. In the case of the one I attended in Milan, the Italian Prime Minister and the President of Niger presided at the opening. The agenda was twofold: to present the results of the joint work program of the past two years, and to propose for review and discussion the work plan for the next two. A number of thematic presentations were made by Sahelians or donor representatives.

These were not just sector-level presentations. For example, two years earlier, the Canadians had proposed, and the plenary approved, an assessment of the future of the Sahel over 25 years: a “Futures Study.” The Canadians funded it and contracted with a Canadian firm to conduct the study. It was a fairly extensive effort, but my recollection is that they carried it out rather in isolation. They came to the Club and met with Anne, then traveled to the Sahel organizations: certainly to the CILSS headquarters, and probably to the INSAH. As far as I know, no other donors, including USAID, were consulted until the first draft was produced. It was a Canadian effort from start to finish, from proposal to report submission. The brief was to present a picture of sliding scenarios of what the Sahel was going to be like 25 years from now, with an analysis of what donors could do to affect these scenarios. Their draft report was quite disappointing: it concluded that the Sahel was bound to fail unless donors provided what they called a “big push,” an infusion of massive donor investments that would somehow make the Sahel viable. This was an instance where Anne’s considerable diplomatic skills brought success out of failure. (Anne wasn’t always so diplomatic, but someday maybe you can get her story!) The consultants were sent back to their drawing boards, gently, and tasked with doing more focused analyses and making recommendations for ways in which both Sahelians and donors could make a difference.

Q: Back to the biannual Club meetings. What were these meetings supposed to accomplish?

SLOCUM: Taking stock of the work accomplished and getting endorsement of the work program for the following two years.

Q: The work program was a program that each government agreed to and was willing to take on?

SLOCUM: Yes, in principle. But frankly, I don’t think the Sahel national governments were as motivated by the Club/CILSS work program and its impact on their national sector development plans as they were about attracting donor attention, meaning more funds, to invest in their own

plans.

They weren't meant to be pledging sessions, but in the eyes of some attending the meeting, there was an expectation that those discussions would end in endorsements which would result in more aid. But, from donors', and certainly the Club's perspective, it was important to show what had been done and get some guidance on future activities.

Let me mention one other comment on the Paris assignment. In addition to the Club professional staff of five, three of whom were seconded from donor agencies (the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands), Club funds employed a number of consultants. There was a decided bias toward French consultants, but not entirely. One of the two full-time consultants working in the Club was French, and the preponderance of the short-term consultants we used were French. As you know, six of the eight Sahel countries are French-speaking. As an American Foreign Service officer, I found this an enormously enriching experience, too, working with development experts from other donor countries, often interacting in French. Most of the work in the Club was done in French. This opened up a world which was in many ways very different: conceptually, analytically, and culturally.

As the only native Anglophone in the Club, I was the one to do the final review of professional English translations of French studies and reports. It could be tedious but always necessary to make sure the final English version flowed smoothly. I did find, in fact, that professionally translated English-language versions of the original French often were very weak and required some work. So, I began taking on that as well, just because I was under pressure all the time to demonstrate to USAID and to the Mission Directors in the Sahel the "value-added" of the Club. So these reports in English had to look fully professional and be readable. Sometimes if you took a perfectly good sentence in French, and just translated it literally into English, it wouldn't make sense, or would come across as very stilted. I remember I would sometimes look at a sentence and wonder what it meant and would take it to my French-speaking colleagues for help. They would scratch their heads, hem and haw, and eventually we would understand each other, and I could then put it into idiomatic English. There were instances in which the sentence had to be totally restructured for it to make sense.

Q: How did you find your counterparts from other countries to work with?

SLOCUM: The ambiance was quite good. My colleagues were all development professionals and we shared a commitment to Africa. We were two groups: what I would call development managers, people like me who had "grown up" in a bilateral overseas development environment. Others were a step removed, from countries in which their aid agencies were part of their diplomatic service. The Canadians were in this category. Madame de Lattre, Anne, was the most different. She had never lived in a developing country, unlike all the rest of us, but she had a career as an international civil servant at the OECD in the Development Assistance Secretariat. So she knew the development business and the issues. She was fully bilingual, traveled well in the worlds of USAID and the ODA (British aid at the time). I would like to say a word about Anne. She was both a positive and negative influence on the Club. She was its matron. In many ways the Club and Anne de Lattre were synonymous. She put her all into it and deserved this identification with the Club's success. For the 10 years prior to my arrival, she and Roy Stacy,

followed by Art Fell, were the principal drivers of the organization. She in particular gave it its stamp. But after 10 years, she had begun to realize she wanted to reduce her personal involvement and hand over the Club to someone else. But she was having difficulty letting go. In fact, even though she has not been the Club director since 1988, I believe she is still very influential and playing a role behind the scenes. At least that was the case until very recently. She was the driving intellectual force behind the Club, but she was not what one would call a “modern” manager. In the four years I was there, as she was slowly withdrawing, she would choose moments for intense involvement, alternating with periods of virtual absence. For example, each year she spent the spring semester teaching at Davidson College in North Carolina.

I must say she interacted very well with Sahelians at all levels. She was an aristocrat of the old school, yet loved traveling to the remote corners of the Sahel. She was on a first-name basis with many Sahelian presidents. She really was a very strong presence. This is the positive side. But I think her strength did have one negative impact: it did not allow the natural growth on the Sahelian side of strong counterpart leadership in the Club/CILSS network. But let’s give her credit: the Club and CILSS system is still a strong presence in the Sahel, even though many bilateral donor missions no longer are present.

I cannot talk of the Club without reflecting on the French more generally. As I said earlier, the Sahel region was in many ways still in the French “domain” (I realize this term could raise eyebrows.). The period of the strong donor buildup in the Sahel, roughly the first 10 years of the Club’s existence (1974-1984) saw growing collaboration between the French and other donor countries. The French were happy to have other donors share the load. The French had a burden after their colonies’ independence to keep investments and the economies afloat, and they welcomed assistance from other donors. I think that is one of the reasons the initial effort by the Americans to set up this regional system of the Club and the CILSS met strong French support, and also the fact that Anne de Lattre was such an excellent bridge builder. So this was a period of strong collaboration.

Occasionally there would be little scraps which gave an indication of French underlying attitudes towards their “domain.” I will give you an example. The French had financed a lot of big irrigation schemes in the Sahel. I remember there was an irrigation group that had a meeting in Paris and I don’t remember exactly who was attending, but one of the things I circulated was a comment from USAID/Mali that included a sentence saying the classic big French irrigation projects have been a failure in Mali. One of the French engineers at that meeting caught that and reacted strongly. He was a very nice, reasonable guy, but he saw that as America attacking the French. He came back with a very vitriolic letter, which was totally untypical of the man whom I had met at the meeting. I showed it to Anne, who said not to engage in polemics, just leave it alone and don’t worry about it. She had good political instincts, including which battles to pick (i.e., the ones you have a chance of winning!)

What has happened subsequently and especially in recent years is that the French budgets have gone down, just as the U.S. budgets have declined. But major conflicts in Africa have required the French to send their troops, and this always has a high cost. The French have started to become concerned that they are losing their hold in Africa, and fear we are trying to replace

them. Of course, the last thing we want is to see the French leave, because their influence is still needed. So, it is a complicated subject.

The last comment I will make on the French in my experience at the Club du Sahel is that the French philosophy of development is intimately allied with their own cultural values. Their cooperation missions abroad are called not just development missions but development and cultural missions. This means propagating the French language, which is the main vehicle for propagating the French culture. One cannot understand the French attitude towards its former colonies without understanding that we, as Anglophones, do not share that sense of feeling threatened. We don't feel threatened by the potential loss of English as an international language, but the French feel constantly beleaguered by the "dominance" of the English-speaking world. They feel that that is an important part of their international role, and it is in their national interest to propagate their language as a vehicle of their culture. This is the key to understanding much of France's behavior in Africa in recent years, such as in Rwanda.

Probably the best example I can make, and this jumps ahead a little bit, was in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The French sent troops into what was called Operation Turquoise, which was to try to stop the civil war. I happened to be in Paris on my way through and was in a friend's apartment watching the news that night on TV. The French prime minister was being interviewed by the newsman, who said, "Mr. Prime Minister, why is France sending its soldiers to Rwanda." Here is how he responded. In French it comes out much better, but what he said in English was, "Well, of course, you understand Rwanda is our friend and it is a French-speaking country." In French that makes perfect sense. But, can you imagine if you try to apply this to the American context, with our president announcing that he has decided to send troops to Nigeria to restore democracy and we are doing it because they are our friends, *and* they speak English? He would be impeached! So, there is a fundamental cultural difference in the approach and the world view the French have.

Q: A very good illustration. What about the technical orientation of the counterparts that you worked with, the French, the Dutch, etc.? Did you find them still in the old technological perspectives or were you all on the same wave length when you are talking about desertification and environmental issues and things of that sort, for example ?

SLOCUM: The French irrigation expert aside, I found that donor representatives were moving forward in technical innovations and concepts pretty much in sync. In fact, one of the Club's major contributions was its serving as a forum for bringing different points of view together and hammering out a consensus. In addition to the meetings, there was almost continuous consultation on the range of technical issues to reverse the process of environmental degradation in the Sahel. Technically, I think there was excellent interaction. In fact, as I think back on it, what the Club really represented was what USAID would call re-engineering ten years later. The principles of "customer focus" (e.g., African ownership) represented by the CILSS, "doing business differently" (hammering out regional and national consensus on approaches to development) typified the Club's philosophy and operations. The Segou Conference was a breakthrough as it applied a broader consultative approach with the populations on the types of participatory programs which could combat desertification at the local level.

Q: How did you find the Germans?

SLOCUM: Like the Swiss and the Dutch, the Germans employ what I would call a disciplined and “pure” approach to development. None of them has colonial “baggage” in Africa. (The Germans did, but that ended in 1919.) I found the Germans at the cutting edge in technical areas, and they trained well and seemed motivated by making sure Africans were able to pick up the activities at the end. Only in later years did the Germans post someone to the Club. But I worked closely with their man in Ouagadougou, an environmental expert who headed the German Cooperation Technical Assistance office there (GTZ). Part of his work was to support the Sahel regional program through the CILSS. His name was Gunter Winckler. I liked him immensely. When the Germans later decided to place a person in the Club, it was Gunter, where he served for a number of years. He and his wife were strong supporters of the Club/CILSS process, and I worked very closely with them on a number of related issues. He had great skills for the work he did, technically, interpersonally, and so on. The Germans were very cooperative during the period I was there. The GTZ in Frankfurt at one point hosted a donor meeting on environmental programs in the Sahel, to which all the major donors and the Club were invited to participate.

If you asked me to rank the donors in terms of their interest and support — and I realize you haven’t asked — I would say in the top rank, after the U.S. and France, of course, I would put Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the same countries I cited above for the soundness of their programming, so this is not a coincidence that I rank them equally high in terms of their policy commitment. Canada was very interested, and collaborated closely with us, and, of course, they too had someone in the Club. Japan began getting more involved, and at one point was considering joining the Club and perhaps even placing someone, but that did not occur. Italy was hot and cold, and eventually Italy withdrew as a Club member, I understand.

Q: Were the meetings always with the Sahelians and not just among the donors?

SLOCUM: There were both. There were donor-only meetings, usually when CILSS performance issues were on the agenda or, for that matter, Sahelian countries’ performance in a given area needed airing in a frank atmosphere. There was another meeting I remember I generated with the World Bank here in Washington. I was concerned that after the national meetings on the draft national environmental action plan, there wasn’t any follow up or even an action agenda. The idea was to get the major donors interested in national environmental action plans to agree on approaches, then work out a plan of action for implementation. It was hard for us to know what practical effects these meetings had. So these meetings didn’t really push the action agenda forward on the ground. Normally the CILSS would and should have been responsible for the follow-up with their member countries, but I don’t think this was done, at least systematically.

By the way, in terms of donor interest, though the World Bank was not formally a member of the Club, it and the European Commission were interested in the process and routinely attended both donor and mixed donor-CILSS meetings. One reason for the Bank’s interest was probably that it didn’t have many resident missions in the field they way it does today.

Q: They didn’t participate in the Club did they?

SLOCUM: As I said, the Bank never formally joined the Club as a member, but Bank staff, both technical and managerial, were very active in the policy and sector issues. The Club ethos was, I would say, very “Bank-friendly”: deeply analytical, prescriptive, pointing the way to reforms. Now that I think about it, we (the Club and the Bank) were soul mates. And the Bank staff were very cooperative. This was another problem. The Club and the Sahelians generated reflection at the regional level, but the challenge became to translate that energy into national-level change. But then who was going to take responsibility at the national level to follow up? As you can see, this issue keeps popping up.

Q: The Sahelians weren't there?

SLOCUM: We had a mix of meetings. Some, especially the more formal, definitely involved national services, and Sahelian officials were active participants. But, as I showed above, we sometimes had donor-only discussions as well. But, you are touching upon another thing which is: how effective can donor-only meetings be when we are essentially trying to get the Sahelians themselves to get more involved and engaged in these areas. Once in a while someone would raise the question: why is the Club in Europe? Shouldn't it be a support organization to the CILSS in Ouaga? Well, nobody ever said so, but I think it probably was because a lot of the people who energized the Club at the OECD would not move to Ouagadougou, including Anne, herself, I suspect, if you asked her. A related proposal was to transfer people between the two organizations, to take somebody from the Club and put that person at the CILSS and put somebody from the CILSS in Paris. Implementing the proposal broke down over the practicalities: who in the Club would move to Ouagadougou? And who would the CILSS put in Paris? The problem became who they would be and how effective would they be. That never quite got to the operational stage. In fact, it didn't really come up, to my knowledge, while I was in Paris, but it had been discussed earlier.

Q: Also the question of how effective the CILSS was because you still weren't at the national level at the CILSS. How effective did you find the CILSS?

SLOCUM: Generally speaking, the CILSS had difficulty finding its proper role vis-a-vis its member countries. Though some might disagree with me, I have the impression that the CILSS's creation was more an initiative of the donors than of the Sahel member states. The Club needed a Sahelian counterpart institution with which to work. As I said before, I think there was always a different perspective between the two institutions. Donors felt the CILSS would harmonize the policy and strategic dialogue among its member states, while I suspect that the CILSS countries saw the CILSS as opening up a wider source of donor resources for their national programs. So, CILSS's effectiveness was, in my view, constrained by this reality. But I am not saying that the CILSS served no useful purpose. Its secretariat had some outstanding people. The Secretary General during my tenure was quite good, a Nigerien former Minister of Rural Development who understood the issues and possessed excellent interpersonal skills, probably one of the most self-effacing people I've ever known. These skills helped give the CILSS a certain amount of credibility, but there was always the question of what CILSS's value-added was. People with a longer history might say that the CILSS's reputation fared better under the first Secretary General, but keep in mind that he served when the CILSS was starting from scratch developing those bilans programmes in the major sector areas concerned with agriculture and environment.

He laid the foundation of the organization. Another element affecting the CILSS's effectiveness was, I think it needs to be said, the image many had that the Club drove the CILSS agenda. Was this true? Well, Anne was a very strong personality and, as I said earlier, her personification of the Club surely impacted on the CILSS. If some felt the CILSS was drifting, then the Club would pull it back. Again, I think one has to keep in mind that each institution had, by its own members' reckoning, different objectives. The Club wanted to improve the quality of development assistance going to the Sahel; the CILSS wanted to show its members that it was getting more money for them. These are not identical objectives.

About the time I came to Paris, Art Fell's counterpart for environment and forestry was a Malian who was quite good, a fairly senior man with earned credibility and respect, and an acknowledged expert in his field. Unfortunately for me, he returned to Mali (and became a senior adviser to the prime minister), and was replaced by another Malian who was just the opposite: lazy, unproductive, and lacking respect and credibility among his own peers. So, the effectiveness of CILSS varied according to the quality of its staff.

Q: How did you go about it since your primary job was to convert national plans into operating programs? What did you do and how did you get them involved at the country level?

SLOCUM: We employed experts to move from the bilan programme stage into the preparation of national anti-desertification action plans. During my time at the Club, we oversaw the preparation of these plans for about six of the eight countries. The process involved outside experts, always including Sahelians, working with national experts. Once the host government approved the plan, we would sponsor a national-level meeting among relevant services and donor representatives within the country to review the plan, revise it based on that dialogue, and finalize it for donor funding. I think it was follow-up at this final stage that wasn't very successful. Even though CILSS staff participated fully in the planning and execution of these national meetings, and even though each Sahelian government had what was called a CILSS National Coordinator responsible for managing all CILSS-sponsored activities within the country, there weren't enough personnel to shepherd this process of operationalizing the plan. Now maybe this wasn't so bad. Ultimately, the impact had to happen within the country, and whatever initiatives generated by the CILSS national meeting took root, fine. Perhaps the seeding analogy helps: when you broadcast seed you expect some seeds to take root and germinate; others to dissipate. What I cannot tell you is which seeds among the ideas discussed at the national meetings took root. It was impossible for Club and CILSS personnel to keep track of each national program, nor should we have been expected to. I would be fascinated to see evaluations of these efforts in the subsequent years.

Q: They were national workshops about environment with specific programs?

SLOCUM: That's right. They were called "National Desertification Control Action Plans." There was a dichotomy there between our perception that these plans had to have high-quality program content based on rigorous analysis and research, and the CILSS/Sahelian perception that the plan should offer a shopping list of projects for donor funding. We always had a struggle in trying to get them to reduce the "shopping-list" mentality in the preparation of the documents and focus on quality of analysis and program development as the basis for project identification.

The “first-things-first” concept. The joint Club/CILSS expert team would conduct the analysis, and when the document floated through the national services, projects for funding would be added in an annex, with little relevance to the analytical section. I think this was true in every country plan once it went through the national services.

Q: Did you find the regional meetings somewhat productive?

SLOCUM: They were useful in sharing ideas among member states and learning lessons that could be applied from one country to others. The participants, either policy-makers or technical experts, would get to know each other and to exchange ideas and experiences. I remember one technical-level meeting on agricultural statistics, which was held in Dakar. The Burkina Faso representative later became the minister of agriculture. Such meetings and discussions must have enriched his ability to direct agricultural policy in his own country.

Africa development is not constrained by the lack of good professional, analytical and technical people. I think the idea is to build a critical mass. I hope that these regional efforts by the Club and CILSS over time are helping to build this critical mass.

Q: Critical mass of...?

SLOCUM: Professionals, trained managers and technicians who form the nucleus of the institutions needed to manage the development process. Over time I think that has been developing. Institution-building has been enhanced in recent years by the revolution in information technology, which is helping to create this mass of trained people.

Q: Any other dimensions of the Club du Sahel experience?

SLOCUM: As an AID officer assigned to Paris, I was privileged to be exposed to a very different working environment in support of development objectives in Africa. I would estimate that I spent about 30 percent of my time in the Sahel region of Africa working on the areas I have described, networking, promoting national programs and representing the Club at a number of regional meetings.

However, I would like to point out one additional area related to this assignment: it is that I don't think the agency places a great deal of value on what are called excursion assignments. These are assignments in such areas as long-term training, or an assignment to an international organization or bank. The AID promotion system does not honor such assignments because the AID “culture” regards them as outside “the mainstream.” I think it is unfortunate because some of the most rewarding and broadening assignments have been these such which have served to substantially broaden one's professional perspectives. For me, the Club posting enabled me to look at development from a very different perspective in a multi-donor environment. That was very useful. Later on I went to the War College, which was also extremely enriching, but within AID, officers' chances for promotion are not enhanced by serving in such assignments.

I can tell you a story. At one point your successor as one of the Deputy Assistant Administrators for Africa, Lois Richards, pulled me aside at a meeting in Washington. She had been on one of

the promotion panels and said, “I think you ought to know that when we looked over your file, someone on the panel felt if you want to get promoted you have to get back to the mainstream.” She was graciously sending me an important message: to get promoted in AID, don’t stay out of the “mainstream” very long. It was very good of her to pull me aside and give me that advice, because that was important for me to know.

Q: Your assignment in Paris was not appreciated by the system as contributing to your promotion?

SLOCUM: Again, I think AID’s value system does not include these kinds of assignments. It would be interesting to see what the progressive downsizing of the Agency has done to this concept. If anything, it has probably hardened.

Q: I think you are right.

SLOCUM: Since we are talking about the general impressions of the Paris assignment and leading on to the next assignment, I can relate an amusing set of events. I got a cable sometime in the fall or early winter of 1987, sometime before I was due to leave in the summer of 1988, informing me that my next post would be Fiji. I thought this wasn’t consistent with the discussions I had been having about my future goals, so on my next trip back I checked with people in the Asia Bureau and talked to them about the Fiji program. I was to be the number two in Fiji, not the director. People whom I knew and respected said that this was not a prominent program, and they expressed surprised I was being assigned there. I was advised by some senior people that I thought had my interests in mind to appeal it and hold out for a more senior assignment. So, I did that.

The response was that they had considered my appeal and overruled me, so the Fiji assignment was upheld. Shortly thereafter, back in Paris, I got a phone call from the head of senior placement in Personnel, who had been a senior officer in the Africa bureau, saying not to tell anybody but I would shortly be getting a call from the Assistant Administrator for Africa asking if I would like to go to Mauritania as director. This was an unexpected and immediate vacancy. I had been hoping for a senior-level appointment, and realized this was a big opportunity even though Mauritania had not been at the top of my list of preferences, so I accepted. In the same week that I got reconfirmed to go to Fiji, I got an offer to go to a senior assignment in Mauritania.

TIMOTHY DEAL
Deputy Representative to OECD
Paris (1985-1988)

Timothy Deal was born in St. Louis, Missouri and graduated from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965. His career has included positions in Honduras, Poland, England and France. Mr. Deal was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2004.

Q: So then you went as Deputy U.S. representative to the OECD in Paris in the summer of '85.

DEAL: Correct.

Q: And Ed Streator was the U.S. representative, the Ambassador.

DEAL: Yes.

Q: Now there have traditionally been two deputies in that mission.

DEAL: There was such an arrangement in the past, but by the time I arrived there was only one Deputy. There was a senior Treasury officer in the mission, and at times past, the Treasury person had been the DCM.

Q: Now Ed Streator had already been there a year when you arrived?

DEAL: Right. In 1984 and 1985, my first year at post, we tried to put in place the reforms recommended in the roadmap.

Q: So, some of those things had already gotten started?

DEAL: Ed had brought an official from the Labor Department on a detail to deal with the structural reforms including budget and program priorities. So, yes, much had already been done by the time of my arrival. I spent the vast majority of my time there on management issues, running the mission, and dealing with my counterparts in the other G-7 countries. We had an informal consultative network among the G-7 countries at the OECD. Probably the most difficult job I had was overseeing our relationship with COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], which was also located in Paris. That was the organization that dealt with Western export controls to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Relations with the Secretary General, who was an Italian, were especially prickly because of the hard-line stance the U.S. had adopted on the export control issue at the behest of the Defense Department. While I could not do much about the policy, I did try to make our working relations with the Secretary General and other COCOM countries as smooth as possible given the high priority the Administration had attached to the export control question.

Q: How did COCOM come to be the responsibility of the U.S. Mission to the OECD?

DEAL: I don't the origin of this setup. Certainly, COCOM could have been the responsibility of the Embassy Paris, but, in fact, it fell to the U.S. Ambassador to the OECD. American officers at COCOM were listed as members of the U.S. Mission to the OECD, even though they didn't work there.

Q: How about the Paris club? Did that come under the OECD?

DEAL: No, I certainly saw a lot of people from State and other agencies dealing with the Paris

Cub debt issues, but we had no responsibility for them.

Q: And that's true of UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] too?

DEAL: Yes. It was an entirely separate mission, which closed its doors in 1985 because of the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

Q: How about relations between the OECD mission and the Embassy Paris; did you have to spend much time on that?

DEAL: I did because the Embassy provided all our administrative support. So on matters of housing, assignments of personnel, finance, etc. we had to work very closely with the Administrative Section of the Embassy and the DCM there as well. We had a very good, cordial relationship. It would be easy in certain situations to end up as a second-class citizen, but that was never the case with Embassy Paris. We got all the support we needed.

Q: One of the other traditional functions of the OECD is related to the coordination of developed country positions in trade negotiations and other international economic issues. You mentioned you were part of a group of G-7 country representatives that would work together. Did you get into trade negotiations during much of that period?

DEAL: Well, the OECD is one of those international organizations where the real players come from capitals, not the mission to the organization. Much of the coordination and consultation that we had with other country representatives, including the G-7, primarily involved approaches being developed in capitals.

Q: Who was the Secretary General of the OECD when you were there?

DEAL: Jean-Claude Paye. He was a very senior French economic diplomat. He was distinguished, impressive, and intelligent. Among other things, he had been Chairman of the Paris Club and the equivalent of our Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry.

Q: And was there a senior American on the OECD secretariat as well?

DEAL: Yes, Jack Myerson. Traditionally there has been an American Deputy Secretary General at the OECD. We kept in contact and he was supportive of our reform initiatives. He was also helpful with the perennial budget problems that the U.S. has with international organizations.

Q: From 1973 to 1975, I was Economic Counselor in Switzerland in Bern, and at that time, there was something called the ECSS [the Executive Committee in Special Session] of the OECD, and it happened to be chaired at the time by a Swiss official. I remember meeting with him fairly often on issues related to that body; I don't know if that continued during your time there.

DEAL: It continued, and it had a fairly high profile at one time. But by the time I had arrived at

the OECD, it had lost much of its importance. I believe that as the Economic Summit process became more formalized with numerous preparatory meetings, G-7 Summit teams took up the work previously carried out by the ECSS.

Q: You mentioned before that much of what happens at the OECD involved people from capitals that come to the meetings and served on the committee. Did you feel at times that you were basically running a travel agency or hotel service for visitors, or could you and the Mission be involved in substance?

DEAL: It was difficult to take part in any meaningful substantive work. In general, I believe it is difficult to be a diplomatic mission to a think-tank or to have much of a role in the policy debates at home. To the extent you have good relations with the agencies in Washington, you can play a useful supporting role, and I think we did. We had good working relations in Paris with our counterparts in other missions at all levels. However, the real players came from capitals, and it was our primary responsibility to help them prepare for those meetings and support them while in Paris.

Q: Ok, anything else you want to say about your time there from '85 to '88? Was Ed Streater the Ambassador throughout that period?

DEAL: No, he was there for the first two years, and then Denis Lamb replaced him in my final year.

Q: Denis Lamb had similar background to you, right?

DEAL: Yes, he was an Economic Officer with extensive experience at the OECD.

Q: He certainly had been involved with it in Washington.

DEAL: Not only in Washington, he had also served on the staff of the U.S. Mission to the OECD.

Q: Ok, anything else you want to say about that time in Paris?

DEAL: Well, I should mention that we lived in a beautiful apartment overlooking the Bois de Boulogne. After leaving London, Jill took a position with Rogers and Wells, a law firm with which she was associated until 1992. Chris went off to the University of California at San Diego. Bart attended the American School in Paris. We had some good times in France, especially one summer vacation in *Provence*, but after three years I was ready to leave.

KENTON W. KEITH
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Paris (1985-1988)

Ambassador Keith was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. After

graduating from the University of Kansas he served with the US Navy before entering the Foreign Service in 1965. An Arabic speaking Officer, Ambassador Keith served as Public Affairs Officer and/ or Cultural Affairs in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria, France and Brazil before his appointment as US Ambassador to Qatar. His Washington service included several tours in senior positions with USIA. Ambassador Keith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Today is February 21, 2000. You're going to Paris as CAO.

KEITH: The position of Senior CAO was established in the '70s to do two things: first, allow for prestigious academics to enter USIA for a limited time in the largest posts such as Paris, Rome, New Delhi and the like. Second, it was seen as a capstone position for career USIA cultural affairs specialists who were not interested in the press and information role a PAO had to play. An example of the former was the Senior CAO position in Rome where the first incumbent with that title was an eminent professor of Italian politics.. These were senior positions that enabled a handful of career CAO professionals to get to Senior Foreign Service levels usually achieved only through successful service as PAOs. In some ways, my assignment as SCAO Paris broke that mold. I had been very active in cultural affairs, but I had also been a PAO with the traditional range of responsibilities.

Q: It seems a little bit like taking coals from Newcastle to be pushing American culture in France.

KEITH: That is unfortunately the prevailing view of the Congress. The sense is that the West Europeans are allies who know American society very well. So Congress questions why we spend so much money on public diplomacy in Western Europe. But the truth is we have very legitimate interests in establishing exchange links between our institutions and French institutions, in trying to counteract some of the negative popular images of the U.S. that are seen on French television. The amount of anti-Americanism that exists in Western Europe, particularly in France but also in Britain, especially among intellectuals and media figures, is surprising and it has its influence. I believe we are cutting our programs there at some peril.

When I went to Paris, the Fulbright commission was in limbo. The reason was that the French had their interests and what they wanted to do with their own money for scholarships in the U.S. They wanted to support French students coming to the U.S. in selected fields that would take the edge off American competitive advantages in certain areas. They certainly were not interested in going in with American government educational programs and sending people back and forth to study film writing, American history, and so on. So, that was a real challenge. The thing that helped save the Fulbright program was the name itself and the prestige that has always attached to a Fulbright scholarship. So, I thought that it was my task as the senior cultural affairs officer to get on the board as the vice or co-chairman with the French Ministry of Education official assigned to the position by the French government. I wanted to try steer this the program out of the backwaters of French educational interests, and to find ways to encourage them to devote more positive energy to the commission. There was no likelihood of getting more U.S. government funding, so I set out to show how we might could involve the private sector in not

just scholarships but in new institutional relationships between academia and the private sector. It was a totally new concept for the French and they took to it like ducks to water. I went to a major French bank and persuaded them to create fellowships in the U.S. in the field of public finance and monetary policy. Fellowship recipients would have what amounted to internships in the bank's Paris headquarters. The bank's name was associated with the prestigious title of "Fulbright." The French loved it, and they began to pay much more attention to the Fulbright Commission.

Q: You were in Paris from '85 to when?

KEITH: From '85-'88.

Q: In a way, what you were describing about what the French wanted to do with the Fulbright program sounds very much like the Soviets wanting to send all their students to go take nuclear physics and not being very interested in American...

KEITH: Or any Third World country, whether it's Turkey, Egypt, or Burundi. They feel generally that they need doctors, civil engineers, petroleum engineers, or increasingly computer engineers, and they're not concerned with Hawthorne scholars or even linguists. That is why American influence on Fulbright boards has to exist to ensure some kind of balance. You can't deny the legitimate desires of a board to help bolster a faculty of engineering, but allowing that to systematically exclude of people who are in arts and letters would not be in our interest. We have this challenge in virtually every country where there is a Fulbright Commission.

Q: Was there in France when you got there in '85 a place within the university system of solid American studies? We have European, French studies. Americans learn about other countries in their universities. But there seems to be a certain lack of solid American studies.

KEITH: There were institutes of North American studies in a couple of universities, including the University of Paris. But the French academic system generally is so broad and is so penetrating in its level of inquiry. In history or English language studies a student may be required to have a remarkably deep knowledge of certain aspects of our society.

We developed a lot of cooperation with the French in their annual examination process. This was a wonderful opportunity for us. We were asked one year for some help with one of the subject areas that was to be a part of the national examination for English language students at an advanced level. It struck us that not only could we supply some information, but we could start supplying lecturers and specialists. One of the first questions was about slavery in the antebellum South. We arranged for the eminent scholar on that question, John Hope Franklin, to have a sort of telephone hookup with the people who were writing the exam questions. That worked so well we took matters a step further. We said, "For your examinations, if you're going to have American topics let us know what areas we can help you with. Give us enough time and we'll bring people over to have seminars with your test writers." That worked extremely well, and helped us develop much stronger relations at the Ministry of Education.

You never knew where the French would aim their academic inquiry. I sat on a jury on one of

the French universities where a student was defending a doctoral thesis on the Harlem Renaissance. He did not come out of a department of American studies such as you might find in other countries, but that obviously didn't mean you could not study American subjects in great depth.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

KEITH: Joe M. Rogers, a political appointee, a businessman from Tennessee, very warm, a very easy man to work for. He was perhaps not the most qualified ambassador of the U.S. and was the butt of a certain amount of joking on the part of the French, but in his quiet way, I think he advanced the relationship for one reason, he was the personal representative of Ronald Reagan, the most popular American president since John Kennedy.

Q: I would have thought the French would have been ill-disposed toward Reagan's politics.

KEITH: Yes. You might think that Ronald Reagan would be the incarnation of all the negative stereotypes the French have about the U.S. A cowboy, a political conservative, a confrontational figure in the Cold War. But you would be wrong. I was always bemused by the outpouring of admiration and even affection for Ronald Reagan among the French. I saw kids standing on street corners selling Reagan tee shirts. I believe he gave many French citizens feeling of confidence in American leadership. Of course this was not a unanimous view. I believe there are always competing intellectual strain in France. Those who believed in an Atlantic alliance were buoyed by Reagan's confidence in the U.S. and his forthright support for increased freedoms in the East.

Q: How about dealing with the intellectuals there? It's such an important group in France. Did you find that this was a difficult group to crack?

KEITH: Well, it was a very interesting time in French intellectual life, and the relationship with the U.S. was always a kind of reference point for competing points of view. Certainly the trendiest philosophical trend in France in those days was that of Les Nouveaux Philosophes, The New Philosophers, represented by the very media-conscious Bernard-Henri Levy. They represented a break with the existentialism of the post-war generations. Their critics described their thinking as a Reaganite right-wing philosophy dressed up in French rhetoric. In self-defense they would occasionally indulge in anti-American rhetoric, although Levy once told me that his only argument with the United States was that his books didn't sell here.

There was also a movement that was seeking a "Third Way." They were seeking a philosophical basis to support the idea of state intervention in a market economy. They wanted to make sure that those entitlements the French were used to, would never be challenged, but at the same time that the bankruptcy of socialism was certainly indicative that another way had to be found. Their slogan might be "neither the American model nor the Socialist." Italian, American, and German philosophers associated with this quest were being discussed in the coffee houses – and French philosophers, too.

The traditional Left, the Socialists and Communists, were in retreat. The Socialist president,

François Mitterrand, who virtually destroyed the Communist Party in France and who was the deciding factor in the force modernization effort that was so important to American policy, was leading a Left in disarray. The Socialist party lost the legislative elections massively, bringing in Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. As for the Communist Party, the faithful were defecting from the party in droves. They regarded their leader, Georges Marchais, as authoritarian and backward, and blamed him for not allowing the reforms that were taking place in communist parties in the rest of Europe.

Our relations with the Socialist government of Michel Rocard were somewhat schizophrenic, you're right. On the one hand, Mitterrand had been indispensable in the force modernization effort, and seemed to be a committed supporter of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other, there was a strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism among the socialist ministers. Jack Lang, the minister of culture, was one of the most vociferous in criticizing the pervasive presence of American popular culture. On a trip to Mexico he publicly decried the "Coca-cola Culture" that aspect of American culture. I was dispatched to complain about some of his more strident anti-American gestures – and not just the Coca-cola Culture incident. He had also made a very public show of not going to the American Film Festival in Deauville. He told me, "I can understand why your people would be a little bit upset, but you should advise them to look at what I do as much as listen to what I say." He started ticking off the things that he had done to help promote American culture in France. He said, "What other minister of culture you know of would give a subsidy to a nightclub so they could continue to bring American jazz groups? What other minister of culture do you know where an American writer who just needs a few months and a place to sit and some food on his table while he's finishing a book, or a photographer, can simply go to a foreign government and say, 'Can you help?' I do this all the time. We put them up with a studio and a typewriter and a stipend not because they're writing about France and even though they are not French citizens, but they're producing something we think may be valuable to humanity. He reminded me that his ministry supported the American section of the Cité Universitaire, where American students could come and be supported by the French government outside the government to government exchange relationship. "You go back and tell them that we have our problems with the popular culture but that we are very supportive of what's best in American cultural." He gave a Legion of Honor to Ray Charles while I was there, as well as to Leonard Bernstein, James Baldwin, and I.M. Pei. He was showing respect for American culture. The most popular films were still American films. Interestingly, a number of American authors who were translated into French – Paul Auster, for example, somehow captured the imagination of the French much more than American readers.

Q: He didn't go to the film festival. Was this making a public bow to the left-wing intellectuals?

KEITH: Yes, I think so. It was a very public gesture and he made it clear in public statements that he saw no reason for an American film festival in France. It was a wonderful festival. The city of Deauville, located not far from the Normandy D Day landings, was administered by Anne D'Ornano, a woman from one of the rightist parties and was quite pro-American, so there might have been an element of French politics involved as well.

Then came the legislative elections that swept the Socialist government out and brought in the Center-Right government of Jacques Chirac, creating an uneasy co-habitation between Socialist

president and Gaullist prime minister. On the surface there seemed to be friendlier attitude toward the U.S. among the new crop of ministers. François Léotard, the new minister of culture, announced publicly that he would be attending the Deauville Film Festival. But by and large, I would not say the Chirac government was fundamentally closer to the U.S. than it's Socialist predecessors. There was always an element of the kind of Gaullist chauvinism we sometimes found maddening.

Q: How about the universities? One always thinks of the professors there being bastions of Marxism.

KEITH: Universities were a reflection of what was happening in the rest of France. There is always an element of chauvinism in France and it does not have to be on the left. It can be right in the center and it can certainly be on the right. There is great respect in France for French literature, French culture, and French language, even from people who are not particularly well educated. The fact that French presence on the international stage is in decline culturally is regarded as unfair and regrettable, and the villain in the play is the United States. We are seen to have an unfair advantage because of our wealth and our power. Even on the Japanese stereos the French buy, the controls buttons are in English.

Having said that, however, our relations with French universities were generally very good, and often took place outside the realm of government-to-government programs. On a visit to Lyons once, my French host invited me to a luncheon to celebrate the 10th anniversary of a bilateral exchange program between the engineering faculty at Lyons University and an American university. We had known nothing about it. And as I was leaving Paris, it was Hélène Ahrweiler, Rector of Paris University, who pinned on my medal as *Chevalier des Arts et des Lettres*.

Q: Did you see changes in the French intellectual establishment coming about? During this period, you had the Gorbachev period in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's warts were beginning to show at that time.

KEITH: Yes, Gorbachev himself was regarded very positively, but the Soviet Union was bankrupt in intellectual terms as far as the French were concerned. What was more interesting among the French of the left and especially of the far left was the renaissance in national communist parties around Europe and elsewhere, particularly in Italy, where they saw an emerging communism free of the totalitarian trappings of Brezhnev and the Soviet Communist Party. Unfortunately for the communists, the French Communist Party itself was run by a man who was basically a Stalinist and who did not go with the reformist current that was sweeping the rest of Europe. As a result, there were a lot of disaffected cadres in the Communist Party and people just fell away. Actually, some of them turned in disgust to the extreme right.

Q: Were we concerned about Le Pen?

KEITH: Increasingly.

Q: As far as hoping that he wouldn't make too much contact with the Senator Helms side of our political spectrum?

KEITH: That was never a concern. The man is so chauvinistic there is very little concern that there would be any effective coordination between him and right wing groups in the United States. But there was real worry about the possibility of violence along racial lines in France because of the immigration question. Immigration spilled over into the kind of racial politics that people like Le Pen were able to exploit. There were highly visible icons in France representing opposite sides. You had the whole moderate-liberal-left-relativist side represented by Mitterrand and people like activist Harlem Desire who were trying to promote a France more welcoming and hospitable to the diversities that came with immigration. On the other hand, you had the Le Pens with the Skinhead support, who were disaffected because of high levels of unemployment, who felt they were disenfranchised at least partially because so many people of color had been brought into the country to do work that they should be doing. So, you really had at times a sense that this could erupt into organized violence – not like the Skinheads, who every now and then would pummel or even kill somebody they didn't like -- but a more generalized movement that would be very dangerous to French democracy.

Well, it didn't happen. There is still a Skinhead problem in France. There is still racism and there are still acts of violence. But this is definitely a minority and a lunatic fringe phenomenon. That isn't to say that the immigration problem and the other racial problems have been completely solved; they haven't. Ordinary people, people you've known for years, will sometimes say pretty outrageous things about what ought to be done about immigration. They're scared. They're scared that the French way of life and what is France could be so altered that you would not be able to recognize it. In many places around France you can see that the character has been changed over the last couple of generations because of the immigrants who are walking the streets and populating the bars and sending their kids to the schools. It's not hard to understand where resentments can arise and be politically exploited.

Q: How about visits of opera or other music?

KEITH: Our officially-sponsored cultural presentations program was practically non-existent. The reason was, it was totally unnecessary. Paris had, as far as American cultural expression was concerned from jazz to symphony, orchestras, classical music, ballet, modern dance, writers, more than any city in the United States except New York, Los Angeles, and possibly Washington. I think it would compete even with Washington. In the three years that I was there, we had every major orchestra including the NSO, New York, Philadelphia and Cleveland, all on commercial tours. Our major conductors came to lead the Orchestre National de Paris and other French symphonies. You could count on seeing Isaac Stern, Andre Watts and equally famous performers on Paris stages every year. Paul Taylor, the Dance Theater of Harlem, Alvin Ailey...well, you get the picture. And as for jazz, Miles Davis and the other great stars were regulars during my years in France. Of all the major performing jazz musician at the time, the one who didn't come was Sonny Rollins, and French promoters kept calling me to ask if I couldn't intervene just to get him to think about coming. You want to complete picture of what is happening in American jazz? Go to the south of France in the summer. That's where everybody is. There is a concert cycle that starts in Montreux in Switzerland and then goes to Nice, Antibes, Salon de Provence, Nîmes and Marciac with smaller stops in between. American jazz is alive and well and it's living in the south of France in the summer.

Q: Do radio stations play a lot of jazz?

KEITH: Jazz is certainly played on French radio, but I don't know of any stations devoted solely to jazz. In a way, what exists may be even better. Where you hear jazz is on *France Musique*, the FM station that features serious music. So, jazz, being a serious music, is played on *France Musique*, as is symphony music, as is other classical music. You know you will hear good jazz periodically every day on *France Musique* because it is considered in France a major cultural art form.

Q: Where there any things that would fall within your purview on the cultural side that took explaining or that the French didn't quite understand or were not happy about?

KEITH: A persistent issue was French concern about the impact of American popular culture on the society, particularly on youth. The French didn't believe they were competing on equal terms because they didn't have the resources for producing and marketing French cultural products. They were especially concerned with the dominance of American cinema. They believed that the German and Italian cinema had already been crushed by the waves of American movies, and they were determined that the French cinema would be protected. What developed was a major debate over the limits of French cultural protectionism in a worldwide free trade environment. American movies are, after all, an exported commodity, and if you take steps to close the market in some way you are in theory violating GATT or WTO rules against barriers to trade. So, this was a debate that began in earnest in those days and continues to this day. Government in the eyes of the French has a right to protect its cultural heritage. In the analogy of American NFL free agency, your culture is your franchise player. There must be an exception to completely free exchange. That is what it came to be known as: "*l'exception française*," which would exclude certain cultural products from free trade protections. On the face of it, some saw this as an almost fascist impulse, but there was a simple pragmatism at the core. The French film industry was under threat because most of the screens in France were showing American films, often American films of poor or indifferent quality. They were looking at the fate of the German film industry. In the '70s the German film industry was thriving, with well known and innovative directors like Fassbinder, Wenders and Herzog. But by the end of the '80s, the German film industry was virtually dead. The British film industry was essentially being absorbed by American studios and television. And the French film industry was under heavy pressure from across the Atlantic. You could go to any town in France with a movie house and you would see a succession of American films that most educated Americans would not pay to see. This, in a country like France, was bound to lead to some kind of protective action.

They started by putting a surcharge on the importation of American films, the proceeds from which would go to the French cinema industry. Of course, the Motion Picture Export Association in the United States was pounding on the door of the Special Trade Representative, saying, "Look what they're doing to us. They're making us support our competition." Well, yes, but the market for U.S. films was very solid. By the 1980s, income from foreign sales of American films could virtually assure that a picture that bombed in the U.S. could still break even.

Q: I think this is the general calculation. There were an awful lot of shoot 'em up adventure

movies.

KEITH: Exactly. The smart thing for MPEAA to do would have been to find ways to protect the market its market share but show some creative self-interest in cooperating with French cinema. They were perfectly ready to receive that kind of initiative. U.S. film industry people came to the Cannes Film Festival and made public statements about their great respect for the French cinema, but no real cooperation was accomplished during my tenure. Spielberg told the French media how much he had been influenced by the great French filmmakers and promised financial support to keep the industry healthy. As far as I've heard, he hasn't done much. He's made some noises, but he hasn't really done anything. It may not be his fault because the French are sometimes very hard to help.

Q: Did you get caught in this?

KEITH: Well, I certainly got involved in the whole issue of intellectual property. When Congress was debating accession to the Bern Convention on copyright protection, they held hearings in Paris, and I was given the responsibility to organize them. The hearings were designed to help Congress write implementing legislation for our long-delayed accession to the Bern Convention. There broadly two competing groups seeking to influence the committee: On one side were the creative people (film writers, director and actors) – French and American united in common cause. On the other were the money people (producers, marketers and distributors), also both French and Americans making a common front. It was a most interesting exercise.

WILLIAM P. POPE
Political Officer
Paris (1985-1988)

Mr. Pope was born and raised in Virginia and educated at the University of Virginia. After serving in both the US Army and the US Navy, he joined the Foreign Service in 1974. Mr. Pope served several tours in the State Department in Washington, dealing, notably, with Counterterrorism. His overseas posts include Gaborone, Zagreb, Belgrade, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, and the Hague, serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in the latter two embassies. Mr. Pope was interviewed in 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well then, you were in Paris from when to when?

POPE: '85 to '88. In the Political Section; it was absolutely great.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

POPE: The Ambassador was a gentleman from Tennessee, he was a political appointee, had been the finance chairman for Reagan, a gentleman named Joe Rodgers.

Q: Did he play much of a role in your business or were you pretty far down the line?

POPE: I was, first of all, pretty far down the line and second, he was a businessman, a very successful one, and he was much more focused on, as I recall, on trade and business.

Q: Who was the president? Was Mitterrand the president?

POPE: Yes. And he had his folks at the Elysee, including his son, Jean-Christophe.

Q: I was going to say, his son was-

POPE: Jean-Christophe was one of the advisors. The main one was a gentleman named Guy Penne in the Elysee. And it was interesting because it was the first “cohabitation” government, the President and Prime Ministers from different parties. Chirac was the Mayor of Paris for a while and then Prime Minister, and it was very interesting to watch all of that, how that all came down, even though that wasn’t my primary beat. My beat was Africa, but I still was living there and watching it.

Q: Well, let’s talk about this, the French government in Africa at that time, I mean, the relationship was, as you say very close. In many cases it was almost cozy from the way of oh, money and other relationships. Were we observing this and commenting on this back to Washington?

POPE: Sure. Of course.

Q: You know, one thinks of diamonds going to the Seine or to Mitterrand himself. Was this?

POPE: I don’t remember that particular business.

Q: This has been sort of the accusations. But how did you feel, I mean, how about Mitterrand’s son? I mean, was he the person you would see?

POPE: He was one. He wasn’t the only one.

Q: How did you find the French? Were they taking and not giving or giving and not taking or how did it work?

POPE: No. I guess I was fortunate or did my job right but I had good relations across the board. Not just at the Foreign Ministry with people you would expect to be able to relate to but at the Matignon, at the Elysee and elsewhere. It seemed like the entire French government had people in various places who were Africa specialists. I got to know most of those people and was able to have interesting conversations. And it was not one-way at all. In fact, it was certainly more coming from them than went back.

Q: Well, did you find at a certain period, I think we probably were by this time in the ‘80s were

past it but still, the French, when we first went in Africa sort of became independent thing; the French are extremely wary of the United States-

POPE: Yes.

Q: -thinking that we wanted to take over.

POPE: Yes.

Q: Which of course is the last thing in the world that we wanted to do and particularly Francophone and the Anglophone too.

POPE: You could not convince them of that, though. When I was there, they still believed that or at least they were still concerned about it. It was still a worry to them, that we somehow wanted to take over and take a lead role. I can't imagine what could make them think, that but they did.

Q: I mean, you know, the idea of the United States wanting to push the French aside in Chad or something like that, I mean, it's ludicrous when you think about it.

POPE: It was, but they were worried, they were concerned about it. And I suppose if you look at the broader world picture you can understand why. Being a member of the Security Council and their dominant position in at least parts of Africa, that was much of what was left of what had been great glory at one point. And so I guess that was something that needed to be rather fiercely protected. It just didn't need to be protected. But they didn't accept that. They were still worried about it when I was there.

Q: Yes, well, I think it's as an empire shrinks, I mean, this is true of Spain at the turn of the century on Cuba. I mean, they lost everything else and whereas normally the problems they had in Cuba could probably be- things could have been settled by accommodation. They just couldn't do it.

POPE: Right.

Q: But did you find yourself getting into long discussions about what in hell's in it for the United States?

POPE: Sometimes. Those questions were asked sometimes and others. I could just tell that they wanted us to continue to stay in the background; they didn't want us to challenge them. But yes, sometimes there were such discussions.

Q: How did they view our policy towards particularly southern Africa at this time? I mean, I would imagine that the French, being probably the most skeptical of all nations, and here was Crocker tilting at this windmill, which he eventually succeeded in overcoming or knocking down, whatever you want to call it. But as you say yourself, we're dubious about how it would come about. How were the French looking at what we were trying to do?

POPE: Like most other European countries; they had formal diplomatic relations with the Marxist government in Luanda, the MPLA. And so from that point of view, my recollection is that they felt that we were too ideological and not practical enough, that the Cubans and Marxists together had won. They had taken the capital and that's what counted and had shot their way into power and had forced the others out into the countryside. And that was just the way it is and that we ought to accept it and go forward. Of course they would want us to succeed over the long term in getting South Africa out of Namibia, if possible, and overturning apartheid in South Africa, should that ever become possible. But in terms of the most sensitive piece of it right at the time, Angola and the Cuban presence, I don't know, I just don't recall that they felt that the fact that the Cubans had come in there and upset the balance at the request of one of the three original parties so, not a big deal. That's my recollection of it.

Q: How were the French viewing, I mean, while you were there, did we get involved with the French on Libya and particularly with them messing around in Chad?

POPE: Oh yes.

Q: What were we doing and the French were doing?

POPE: We had very close cooperation on that issue. I don't recall how much of that remains classified, probably not very much of it anymore it was so long ago, 20 years ago. But there was very close cooperation in helping the Chadians drive, I mean, we didn't have troops there, I don't think the French had any troops there to my recollection.

Q: Well, the _____ had troops.

POPE: Well, but small, I mean advisors, they didn't send in armies and we didn't send in armies; the Chadians did it. But we worked closely, had very close cooperation with them on that particular issue because we both felt that the Libyans had no business with military units there.

Q: There seems to be this relationship, particularly with the French and correct me if I'm wrong, but in Africa always having coups or problems and there seems to be this thing where we've got the airlift and they've got, you know, a few spare brigades of paratroopers or something. Were you involved in any of these sort of movements of getting our Air Force to take to the French troops from point A to point B to quiet things and all that?

POPE: I don't remember about the transporting of the French troops but in the broad level of cooperation that you are talking about, their having troops available for short-term kind of putting things down in a capital to make sure that the foreigners were all gotten out, I'm sure we had some evidences of that, some situations like that, I'm sure we must have. I don't remember that we flew any French troops while I was actually in Paris and working on those issues. We might have but I don't think so. They had their own airlift.

Q: Yes. They had their own airlift and at a certain level we can put more in.

POPE: Yes. But they had enough to move their own folks around and it didn't take so many.

They would bring in a Foreign Legion unit and it would quickly dominate a situation.

Q: Did you run into, I mean, looking at the French Foreign Ministry and other places you were dealing with, did you have any feel about the French both political but also the civil service system there? How'd you feel about this?

POPE: Well, some of the people I dealt with were delightful, people you'd want as friends of any nationality and some others were really, really arrogant. And I think their situation, their system, produces or at least elevates and rewards a certain amount of arrogance. That's the truth of it. I'm not French-bashing because we loved our tour there and there are some absolutely lovely, delightful people but there were some people who were very arrogant and very condescending toward the United States. They were very dismissive of us as a "very young country with no real history" and sort of semi-noble savages from the western forest and 1,000 years down the line we might begin to understand some of the deeper mysteries of the universe. But right now we're much too young and too naïve to really understand anything. That was very frustrating, as you can imagine.

Q: Did you get any reverberations or this just wasn't your bag, about the changes that were beginning to happen in the Soviet Union? You know, you had the death of several Soviet leaders and the rise of Gorbachev and all that and I was wondering whether that affected the thinking of people in the political section.

POPE: A little but it wasn't quite defined enough yet that it came through to me in Paris. There were issues in Africa that had only marginal relationship to things Soviet and Cold War. There were some that had very direct, like Angola for example, but in terms of the Soviet Union itself or the Warsaw Pact, it was just a little after. Because I left in the summer of '88, and it was really as I was leaving that that was beginning. I'm sure my colleagues were beginning to already have conversations with the French.

Q: Well, were we still thinking in terms of the quote, "Soviet menace," unquote, in Africa while you were doing this?

POPE: Yes.

Q: This was something we were really concerned with for a long time.

POPE: Yes. It was peripheral. It was one of these the game being played around the edges, because the center was still Europe, the Fulda Gap, deterring the Soviets from launching this huge conventional army across Germany, etc. But there was this game being played on the margins. Vietnam was long over, but still there was Angola and Mozambique and other places we were worried-

Q: Ethiopia too.

POPE: Ethiopia too. One of the problems, one of the things that Crocker was trying to do with the apartheid government in South Africa was to rebut the "Soviet menace." Every time he'd

say, "You cannot go on like this," they would answer along the lines of "Our African citizens aren't really so discontented, it's really all a plot out of Moscow to destabilize us. You're so far away you don't understand it, you Americans." And so even there they were either using it as an excuse or had real belief that some kind of a bogeyman was coming out of Moscow and that otherwise they wouldn't be having all of this trouble.

Q: Well now then did the French have a different view of the quote, "Soviet menace," unquote in Africa?

POPE: Oh sure.

Q: How were they looking at it?

POPE: They just didn't see it as... They were well aware, they weren't stupid. They have very smart people and very fine intelligence services. They thought that we looked at it with too much of an ideological prism as opposed to a practical prism. I had the impression that they didn't think that a temporary Soviet gain was as much of a huge zero sum as we felt it was. That's the difference. Not that they weren't aware of it.

Q: Well did you find yourself, you know, after dealing with this, beginning to look at Africa with a more, I won't say French attitude or at least have a different understanding of Africa now the game was being played there before you went?

POPE: Well, I think I had more understanding of it. I think I was a little bit probably less sympathetic to the French when I came out of. I realize this is going to be made public, and as I say, they are lovely people, but I was probably less sympathetic when I came out, even though Paris is absolutely glorious. It was frustrating to be an American official there, in some ways.

Q: Was the Mitterrand government sort of playing the, I won't say anti-American but opposition to American card more than, or was this a Gaullist prerogative?

POPE: Yes, I'm not sure that they were playing it more but it was, I think, the basic direction in which they would try to maintain what they did have, which by comparison to what they'd had at one point wasn't so much, but to try to be the counter-American and try to line up others to slow us down at least. Sure. But there was also a huge amount of cooperation including later when we talk about my last assignment, which was counterterrorism. That is much more recent than the period we're talking about right now, but the French are very professional and they were not too ideological and they got it.

Q: Well, this is one of the things that I've found interesting. We've had this overt sort of public dispute with France now for, you know, maybe 225 years or what have you, but at the same time sort of in the military and intelligence side and lots of other places very much closer cooperation than with many other countries.

POPE: Yes, that's exactly correct.

Q: You know, it's, at the professional level, up to a point, and I suppose the Foreign Ministry can be a place where you can't be overly arrogant and be in the military. I mean, it doesn't work. Or in the intelligence business.

POPE: Right.

Q: But you can in foreign policy.

POPE: Exactly. And that's why I say I definitely ran into it there among some. And some were absolutely terrific colleagues. It was a mixed bag there.

Q: Well then, you left there in '88?

POPE: I did.

DAVID M. WINN
Political Officer
Paris (1985-1989)

David M. Winn was born in Texas in 1942. He graduated from Swarthmore College in 1964, received an MA from the University of Texas in 1966 and an MPA from Syracuse University in 1969. He served in the Peace Corps and then joined the Foreign Service in 1969. He has served overseas in Vietnam, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, France and Senegal. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Okay, today is March 27, 2002. David, you were off to Paris. You were there from '85 to '89. Could you explain what the job was and how the embassy was set up to use these what other area watchers were there?

WINN: My brief was, the countries and their representatives in the Middle East. All of NEA. We used to say it was from Marrakech to Bangladesh. So, the answer is the Arabs, the Israelis and the Iranians. So, I had the Arabs, the Israelis and the Iranians. Now as to your question, we had someone else who dealt with East and South Asia, and we had someone who dealt with Africa, and, incredibly in those days we had someone who dealt with Latin America. We had four regional representatives in the political section. Your point is well taken - how did the political section deal with us? All of whom were regarded as odd birds to say the least, but the political section was divided into an internal and an external part, and that's how they dealt with it. They had of course the political counselor, the deputy political counselor and then all of us gnomes running around this large internal political section and this four person external political section.

Q: Was there somebody who kind of had the French external brief, too?

WINN: Yes, and that would have been the deputy political counselor. He supervised us.

Although, he shared that with the political counselor. The joy of my job was that all of our areas were so arcane that as the area watchers, often we would deal with almost the highest levels of the Quai d'Orsay because our subjects were so obscure, whereas a comparable level officer in the internal section would have been relegated to lower dealings with the French government.

Q: Who was the, well, in the first place the ambassadors while you were there and then the political counselor and the deputy political counselor?

WINN: Sure, I'm embarrassed to say I cannot remember the name of the ambassador, who was a political appointee, a Tennessee real estate developer who was a very nice guy.

Q: But they kind of come and go.

WINN: They come and go and he was there indeed the same ambassador the entire time. For the life of me I cannot remember his name, the nicest guy in the world. The political counselor was Adrian Besora, whose long career in the Foreign Service ended up as ambassador to Slovakia I think. Then he was replaced by a guy named Phil Semler, S-E-M-L-E-R, who also had a long career. He went on I think finally as consul general in Milan. The deputy political, do you want these names literally?

Q: Sure.

WINN: The deputy was a fellow named David Engel and he was replaced by John Willett. John Willett to this day lives in Paris where he owns an apartment. David, whose wife is also an FSO, lives in Florence. Both retired.

Q: Well, in the first place I mean, when we move on, but before we go I would think that the Latin American watcher could spend most of his time sitting on a beach in Martinique or something like that?

WINN: Well, they may have reordered these priorities. I don't think there is a Latin American watcher there anymore. I also had another brief, which was the IO watcher. To put it another way, I handled everything to do with the UN, which actually was a pretty heavy.

Q: I would think that would be quite a heavy job?

WINN: Anything to do with the UN fell to me and I always kind of wondered why. So, it kept me busy and a brief I might add that always was overlooked both in the Department and in the embassy. Although I did get very good EERs out of the job, it was always on the NEA side, but imagine any cable or any demarche to the French and any visitor dealing with the UN. That's a huge burden. Imagine how many UN visitors came through? That's incredible, not to say that, so I mean it was a busy time.

Q: Well, before we move on to the NEA portion,

WINN: Which is the most interesting.

Q: The most interesting, but lets talk a little about the UN brief. Im interested in this '85 to '89, our perception of the French role in the UN because so often in my interviews I find a certain amount of frustration with the French. Always feeling the French are trying to screw us in some way or another, just for, maliciously or something.

WINN: For the heck of it.

Q: I mean sticking it to the United States seems to be you know, seems to be the diplomatic sport in France. What was our attitude towards in this period the French role in the United Nations?

WINN: I confess I do not recall that it was particularly negative. We had a lot of cordial meetings. My job would be to trot over various small demarches and they were usually well received. I don't recall that there were any great problems. I can recall the IO assistant secretary, Vernon Walters, was always entertaining and he would come through and had rather cordial meetings. Because Vernon Walters was the assistant secretary for IO and because he was raised in France and spoke perfect French he always got what he wanted whenever he came through Paris. He was by this fellow who is on TV "making sense," Al Spheres, whatever his name is, a politician. I don't recall.

Q: Allen Keyes?

WINN: Allen Keyes, sorry. Allen Keyes. I just don't remember a particularly contentious time. The Middle East was different with the French, I always sum up the French this way. They somehow have the reputation for and publicly display the characteristics of being obstreperous, however, privately they always seem to come through. Im not saying they weren't also spying on us. I mean, we were aware, they were the oddest combination, but I have a warm spot for them because particularly in the Middle East, they generally always pretty much were helpful. That's just generally what I recall about the UN.

Q: All right, let's go to the Middle East. Let's focus particularly on Lebanon. What was going on?

WINN: Lebanon. Well, it was A) I'd just come from Lebanon and B) the big issue were the hostages and the fate of Lebanon. There was a presidential election. The Middle East per se was pretty quiet. I had the occasional peace process thing, but only toward the end of '88 and even in '89 did the Intifada in Jerusalem break out. So, the Arab Israeli problem was just a minor, only occasionally did I have to deal with that. The big topic was Lebanon and the fate of the hostages and whither Lebanon, so that was a constant topic and Iran of course. The Iranian role in Lebanon and what were the Shia up to. Now, all of these countries, the Lebanese practically occupied Paris, as they do to this day. Between the Lebanese journalists and the Lebanese politicians who all assumed that I had in the palm of my hand the fate of the next president of Lebanon, I mean Amin Gemayel was up for reelection. As I recall, he was reelected. So, I dealt intimately with all the candidates who would come through Paris and all take me to lunch. I also dealt with every crazy that came to the embassy, usually these crazies were walk-ins claiming to have information about the hostages. The Agency was happy to use me in that regard. I can even

say this on tape they would love to trot me down and have me interview walk-ins, often in Arabic. So, that was fun. Actually it was fun, but it was so time consuming and I would meet guys under bridges and it was constant dealings with nuts, almost invariably nut cases. One of whom was Ollie North, I might add, who as often dispatched to Paris throwing his weight around and the embassy of course supine, I was instructed to do whatever Ollie wanted because it "came from the White House," as that situation persists today. It turned out he was completely nuts and was arranging this guns for hostages thing with Iran. It was all full of derring do and a lot of fun, but I was in the middle of it simply because I was the NEA type. And I knew all the players in Paris. But of course to the French while that was always important, they had issues in North Africa as well, Algeria and to some extent Tunisia and Morocco, and the Western Sahara and it was never every day was different. The Iranians, these Iranian exiles, one whom for God sake had been my boss in the Peace Corps in Tehran. So, you have these guys all over Iran claiming to control armies that would "go back and we'd take Iran." I tended to take them perhaps more seriously than I should have, but I was trying to show a conscientiousness in dealing with Iran as well. I cannot imagine a more feckless and obscure group of people and I think my successor Josiah Rosenblack cut most of them off, rightly so. I had a fond spot in my heart for Iran also because of my Peace Corps years, so.

Q: What did the French have hostages in the Lebanon?

WINN: Im trying to recall. They may have had one or two. The French take a rather harder line on this though. Its funny I didn't deal with the French per se on the hostages very much. Had they asked I would give the status of things, but so much of my time was spent just talking to everyone who came in and relaying that back to Washington. In that sense it was not a bilateral issue with the French. They had of course a great interest in Lebanon historically. Again, to some extent the peace process. We had a flood of visitors also. Can you imagine it? Everyone who had anything to do with the Middle East, Iran came through Paris and would go over to the Quai and that was fine with me. It always meant a reporting cable. I also dealt with the broader issue, just Islam and France. I wrote a massive cable on that toward the end of my stay and I remember much of the cable deals with what was then the obscure topic of Pakistani Islamic fundamentalism and the mosque they were setting up in Paris of course. It later emerged the 15 years, 10 years, 12 years later the crazies that blew up the Trade Center. At the time I thought, who are these people? Pakistani fundamentalists. So, I dealt with that and the journalists, of course, my bread and butter were the Arab journalists and the French journalists. Now not every FSO gets along with journalists. I always have. The French with many of them to this day. They really knew what they were doing.

Q: When you say they?

WINN: The journalists. They all had a line to spin, but they were smart guys. I'll tell you, the best Arabists of all the diplomats in Paris, not surprisingly, were the Israelis. I remember an Israeli diplomat. I dealt very intimately with an Arab journalist with whom Im in touch today, who had such a line into the French foreign ministry it was quite astonishing. He would tell me things. He regularly took me to lunch and would tell me things that were scooping the Agency. I was pretty open with him in return. I was always pretty careful. I would feed him this party line, but I was pretty open with the guy. I remember an Israeli diplomat (and of course, this Arab

published only in Arabic) who said, I detect your hand in this guys articles. He was right. Now, here's an Israeli reading Arabic. Now most of us could barely parse out the text, but I was really struck by this Israeli guy, his capacity in correctly detecting my hand in this Arab journalists reporting. The stuff the Arab gave me was a good example of how the French got along with the Arab journalists.

Q: Well, did you feel from that perspective at that particular time that the French were...

WINN: They were trying to play catch up. They were just running around, following us trying to see what in the hell we were up to everywhere. They were trying to and they always have been trying to carve out their own role. So, they couldn't have been more responsive to every request for an appointment. I could literally see at a moments notice the equivalent of the deputy secretary. I didn't abuse that privilege and I never saw him alone. I guess the highest guy I saw on my own would have been the equivalent for the undersecretary for political affairs. They were so interested in what we were up to.

Q: Did you feel that you could, I mean, was what we were up to pretty straight forward?

WINN: Yes, I was very open. I tried to be open because we were such at, we were floundering in Lebanon. We never had anything going on behind the scenes, not as much as the French thought we did and certainly not as much as the Lebanese thought we did. All the presidential candidates would take me to lavish lunches assuming that somehow I would dictate to the Lebanese parliament. I think the French always gave us more credit than we deserved. They didn't buy the line that we were running things in Lebanon quite to the extent the Lebanese did. They were correct though in assuming that when we would launch this or that Israeli Palestinian plan, they wanted to know whatever detail was. Richard Murphy the then Assistant Secretary, often came through Paris. They were very cordial to him. We had a separate guy that did terrorism, Steve Kashkett, now of all things our consul general in Newfoundland.

Q: The Centers of Terrorism?

WINN: At the time he was in the Agency, a fact that is well known. He said, Im tired of this. I want to take the Foreign Service test. Sat down and took it and became a Foreign Service officer and he was one of the best officers I've ever worked with. He had the terrorism brief, but Steve and I worked hand in glove on this terrorist thing for obvious reasons. We altered the trial of a French, actually Lebanese, a French Lebanese guy who had shot our defense attache in Strasbourg some years before. His name escapes me at the moment. It was a big trial and Steve and I were the embassy watchers at the trial of this guy. I remember the political counselor saying, We need people to go down there and be witnesses at this trial. I remember one of my colleagues saying, Im not going to do it. Im a married man. As if Steve and I weren't, but anyway, it was logical that Steve and I would do it anyway. But, then we had French body guards after that. Immediately after the trial, the Department said, "Your lives are in danger because the guy was found guilty and we will send you to anywhere in the world that you want to go for a couple of week as long as it's London or Brussels." So, we chose London and spent two weeks in London hanging out and then came back to find to the dismay of my landlady French plain clothes detectives shadowing us for a few weeks until we all decided this is

ridiculous. End of story.

Q: Well now, how did you feel on the Arab-Israeli thing at the time you were there? Did the French come down more on the sort of Arab side or were they having the same?

WINN: They pretty much took our lead - knew we were in the drivers seat. The Intifada didn't break out until about '88 or '89 so at the time it was sort of a placid holding pattern. We were worried about the extent these settlements expanding, but things were quiet, so it wasn't as if there was any great sense of urgency there. The urgency came later. As I recall, that was quite a minor part of my brief. Its hard to realize that, but only occasionally did I deal with the French on the peace process. I think the French were willing to go along with whatever the Palestinians would buy. At the time we had various plans worked out and it was mainly pressure on the settlements issue and of course by the time the Bush administration got in there he really did lean hard. You know, we didn't have any great contentious issues with the French on it. They were just trying to get the ins and outs of what we were really up to there.

Q: Did we have any, were we still under the instructions not to have contact with the PLO?

WINN: Yes, we sure were and that's quite amusing. We would dance around town and I would go to various and endless seminars held by French think tanks. A PLO representative would be there and you know, we would sort of nod to each other, but I never, I never exchanged a word with him, nor did he embarrass me. So, I had no, I had contact with very few Palestinians in Paris, certainly not with the PLO representative and the French did. But, I don't know, that shows you again what an unreal air about the whole situation.

Q: Well, would you find yourself talking to the French saying okay you're talking to the Palestinians, what are they saying so I can go back home?

WINN: Not that often because of the Consulate General in Jerusalem. They had so many ties with the Palestinians one way or another, as did the Embassy in Tunis.

Q: It was about that time I think.

WINN: Was permitted to talk to them. So, it wasn't a great hindrance. We knew well enough what their position was. Particularly, Bob Pelletreau was there talking to them in Tunis. The last thing I wanted to do is get in his way.

Q: But you're saying at that time this?

WINN: It was a minor part of my brief.

Q: The French didn't have any major policy differences with us or something, they were kind of watching?

WINN: That's right. No major policy differences, no. It was such a rush. Each day would be incredibly busy. I remember going over to talk to an Iranian exile, whose name escapes me, at

his home in a Paris suburb heavily guarded by French police. Soon after I, it was a household word at the time, soon after I left Paris. Someone else posing as a diplomat or journalist got in there and cut his throat. I've forgotten his name, but there were no great contentious issues with the French in my view. Again, behind the scenes they were always quite cooperative.

Q: How about with Lebanon, I mean the French of course, had been the colonial power in Lebanon and Syria. How did they view the Syrian connection in Lebanon?

WINN: They of course like us wish the Syrians would leave, but realize that they were there for the long haul. We had a grim acceptance of the Syrian role there and until the domestic situation between the Lebanese parties and the Palestinians resolved itself. I don't recall us differing greatly particularly with this hostage situation. In many ways we were happy to have the Syrians lurking around, trying to figure out where these people were. So, the Syrians in some ways were helpful, on the other of course, they were the conduit through which Hezbollah received arms through Damascus. So, I don't recall us differing greatly. We realized there wasn't a lot we could do about it, let's put it that way.

Q: How about the Maronites? The Lebanese Maronites? They certainly worked hard to tie up American representatives. We talked about before socially, politically and everything.

WINN: I had one in my living room 48 hours ago who still remembers me from '89, or whenever it was, '85 was the last time I saw the guy. Well, of course, they had the president of the republic Amin Gemayel, who was a Maronite and they always are the figures what stand out the most strongly when I recall our dealings with Lebanon and they were certainly active all over Paris, where most of them lived for God sake.

Q: In many ways they were more attuned to the French, weren't they?

WINN: Yes, they were and they all spoke French. Gemayel spoke only broken English for example, but perfect French. Always were more attuned to the French, but they knew where the power lay and they certainly were on our case all the time. I was taken to lunch by more Maronites than any other group of people in Paris and particularly during the tempest in a tea pot over the presidential election. I can't even remember who the candidates were at the time although I'd just received greetings from him two days ago from this guy who was just here. He said, so and so says hello. I could barely place these people. They were candidates for the presidency of Lebanon. It was always great fun. The Maronites though were still running the show then. Their day was over and it was only long after I left that a conference in Saudi Arabia rearranged the representation. We had as I say tempest in a teapots. Prime Minister Karami was assassinated. The helicopter blew up. All of these names long forgotten by us, but it was a big deal at the time.

Q: How about with Iran? What?

WINN: Well, again, sort of a holding pattern with the various exile groups. General this and former General that, assuring me that they had armies in waiting, but never really even asking for support, just wanting to maintain contact, let me put it that way. They were always calling me up

and saying, "Let's just get together to chat," but never asking for any specific support and never saying they were going to make a specific move. They wanted to keep their names in the American hat in case we ever decided to approach them for some proposal. Maybe the Agency was up to something, I don't think so. So, that was an odd sort of dance I conducted.

Q: You didn't get involved in the what was it the Iran gate business?

WINN: Well, I did only to the extent that Ollie North every once in a while or one of his employees would say meet me in such and such a restaurant or I would be instructed, more specifically to meet some obscure Iranian in an obscure restaurant. The Iranian would simply give me a message to transmit back to Washington, a message which meant nothing to me. I was simply the conduit for these scum bags both North and the Iranians. So, no I never knew what was going on. I remember the first guy who told me what was going on was an American journalist in Paris named Ken Timmerman, who, I just saw on TV, published a book on Jesse Jackson. At the time he wrote a little two-page out of news letter his apartment on the Middle East. He called me up one day and told me all about this guns for hostages thing going on in Iran. I don't know how he found out, but I have to give him credit to this day he was the first one to find out. Then I put two and two together. I remember our then NEA watcher in London, Robin Rafael, later went on to be Assistant Secretary for South Asia and ambassador to Tunisia. She also called me up. She said, David, I think were dealing with the Iranians over these hostages. Yes, I found out everything about Iran Contra from journalists and Robin. I never knew what was going on when I was delivering and receiving messages. So, it was only much later that it came out in the wash. I was called to London at one point, but that had to do with the release of a hostage, Charles Glass, that was a separate issue. God, they all meld together in my mind.

Q: Well, now did the a good part of the time you were there, the Iran Iraq War was going on?

WINN: Yes, oh thanks for reminding me.

Q: A little minor matter.

WINN: Yes, a little minor matter and I would try to pick up what reporting I could on that, which is very little. Baghdad had a singularly amiable Iraqi ambassador there who had spent so much time in Cincinnati, Ohio, he spoke unaccented American English and a very nice guy and I remember we had representation in Iraq at the time, Bill Peck and Bob Eagleton.

Q: Well, we were sort of on the Iraqi side?

WINN: We were on the Iraqi side, so I had cordial relations with the Iraqi embassy. I picked up a little reporting. Half the time those guys the Iraqi diplomats in Paris didn't really know what was going on.

Q: How were the French? Did the French have any dog in the Iran Iraqi fight?

WINN: I don't recall that they did. I guess they sort of would come down on, like on our side, they kind of hoped the Iraqis would, I mean be a little more friendly to the Iraqis. I just don't

recall that it occupied a lot of my time.

Q: How about Iraq at that time? The war was going on, but also Saddam Hussein was beginning to pick up weapons and this sort of thing, including an embryonic nuclear program and all? How did the French often are more commercially minded on this. Did you find we were at odds?

WINN: That's true, that's true. I have to give you credit for nudging my memory and knowing your brief. I did do the occasional demarche objecting to various commercial transactions between the French and the Iraqis that probably persists to this day. I do dimly recall going in to sternly lecture them. I remember the Iraqi desk officer looking up and said, Oh, you're here again to spank froggy's bottom. A line I put in a cable, which I was later told, made it all the way to the Secretary, that's true, absolutely right. I remember going over there from time to time, but the most information I got on the Iran War and French dealings with them, came again from this journalist, Ken Timmerman who taught me a lesson. No matter how weird and off the wall and how much of a one-man operation seems to be, this guy had a line into something, be it Iraqis, the French and everyone. I learned a lot from his newsletter and I also learned from his newsletter a lot of the stuff he printed was completely off the wall. So, you had to be able to pick and choose. Its funny, I point this out only to say its too bad so many FSOs are afraid of journalists, because you can learn so much from them depending on where you are, and certainly in Paris you can. Its true, maybe at another post, where after all we are the center of attention, you cant learn as much, they can learn more from you.

Q: But, I mean, were we seeing Iraq, particularly Saddam Hussein as being a potential problem?

WINN: I don't, it doesn't seem to have loomed large on the horizon. If it did, it went by me. I think as I fling my mind back, as I say this, the whole thing was overshadowed by the Iran Iraq War and I don't recall warnings coming from anywhere I have to confess. Who was out there, Bill Eagleton and Ed Peck?

Q: I cant remember, maybe you remember when the Israelis found the Iraqi nuclear?

WINN: I was in Washington at the time, so that would have been way back during the period I was in Washington, which was '77 to '81. By the way, Barbara Bodine who was then the number two in Baghdad at that time, is now out in California. I noticed she is speaking to the University of Delaware tomorrow if you ever want to, I mean the World Affairs Council in Wilmington, Delaware.

Q: She's not retired yet?

WINN: No, she's a Diplomat in Residence out at the University of California, Santa Barbara. You really should get her and sit her down.

Q: I'd like to, I'll sort of wait till she is retired.

WINN: Hard to catch. Exactly, of course.

Q: Did?

WINN: Well, let's see, where were we? Oh, well the hostages as I say one of whom was released then, Charles Glass, a journalist who later was accused of fabricating his escape. He claims that he had been kidnaped and held and then fashioned a key and undid the rusted lock of his room. I know a lot of people to this day insist that he made the whole thing up for the brief publicity it afforded him. But when he did escape, I was sent to London to be part of the team that debriefed him, mainly Agency people. In fact I was the only State Department person there. He certainly convinced me and he convinced the team that it was a legitimate escape. Charlie is still an active journalist for CNN and some other outfits. It was an exciting job, literally each day ranging from counter terrorism and their trials.

Q: Did you get any, you say you did something on Islam at that time in France. I watch the French news fairly frequently because we can get it in Fairfax County and obviously there is a very large Islamic community there. Its getting bigger all the time, both Islamic and American, and African community. How did you see the Islamic community in France? I mean what were we looking at?

WINN: I looked at them through the eyes of the French. We regarded them as to some extent an alien and mildly hostile entity that needed to be closely monitored by the security services. The French have always looked on them that way. The French have always been pretty tough, you know, Muslim women are not allowed to wear scarves in French schools. They don't kowtow to political correctness. I kind of admire the French for that. They can assimilate with a foreign culture and allow another culture to live in France, but they always sort of lay down the rules. Whereas we get so confused with our political correctness and falling all over backwards to tolerate for example, Muslims schools here in Virginia that are just teaching hate. The French were very clear that they monitored what was going on in the mosques. The Muslims, the French Muslims, didn't really want to talk to me either. They regard me with justifiable suspicion. I say justifiable, since they put me in the same group with the French. So, it was kind of hard to get a line on them. I mainly rely on a lot of French journalists who had been following the Muslim community for years. So, they started to use a horrible phrase from my youth, you keep them in their place because they're such an enormous community. But the French don't fool around.

Q: How about particularly Algeria and Morocco?

WINN: There were some terrorists incidents in France when I was there that if they happened here, the entire country would close down. The French of course absorb these bomb attacks. You will recall the bomb attacks in Paris and Europe that were so horrific that Americans wouldn't travel to Europe for a couple of years. The French, however, absorb these and go on. To us it's a national catastrophe and I'm not talking about the Trade Center. It's just that they're more used to bomb attacks, which was a national catastrophe, but the Europeans seem to take these in stride more than Americans. The enormous Algerian community, there was something they really kept a close eye on.

Q: Did you feel that they were moving towards assimilation?

WINN: In many ways, they have assimilated. The North Africans all speak perfect French. They all go to French schools. They all, however, live in suburban, industrial suburbs. So assimilated, no I mean yes and no. They all became part of the French community and pick up French ways and language in many ways more than foreigners do here because the French insist on it more than we do here. They still harbor these resentments, but I don't think a lot of them want to go back to Algeria. They could if they wanted to. Its an odd love-hate relationship the French have, but since they do lay down the law, they lay down the rules, you can assimilate, but you can be French, but in a way you're always going to be foreign and we're going to keep an eye on you and you will play by the rules. Particularly this business of no headscarves. I don't know what the rules are in American schools here.

Q: They allow them.

WINN: They allow them, so. Assimilate, yes, they assimilate under the rules. They're going to be second class citizens, lets put it that way. The French say, you can take it or leave it.

VICTOR D. COMRAS
Consul General
Strasbourg (1985-1989)

Victor D. Comras was born in New York State in 1943. Comras graduated from Georgetown University in 1964, the University of Florida Law School in 1966, and promptly joined the Foreign Service. While in the Foreign Service, Comras served overseas in Zaire, Nigeria, South Africa, France, Canada and Macedonia. He also worked on the Law of the Sea negotiations. Comras was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Today is July 26, 2002. You're going out as consul general to Strasbourg. You were there from when to when?

COMRAS: I was in Strasbourg from the summer of 1985 until the summer of 1989.

Q: Why did we have something in Strasbourg? What was our focus there?

COMRAS: The Strasbourg consulate was one of several U.S. consulates in France. At that time we also had consulates in Nice, Marseilles, Lyon, Bordeaux. There was also a Consulate General Section in our embassy in Paris.

The Consulate General in Strasbourg had a consular district that included the eastern regions of France - Alsace, Lorraine, Franche -Compte, and Belfort. This was an historically very important part of France. This part of France was also unique in French history. These regions had passed back and forth between Germany and France for centuries.

The Strasbourg Consulate General was also unique in many respects, and had a function quite

different from the other U.S. Consulates. In fact, it operated as a diplomatic mission to the Council of Europe, which was also based in Strasbourg.

Strasbourg was in many respects an international city. It had a very large diplomatic community that centered around the Council of Europe as well as the European Parliament and the other European institutions based in Strasbourg, including the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Strasbourg considered itself one of the capitals of the European Community. The EU's European Parliament met in Strasbourg for a week once a month.

These institutions were the main focus of our Consulate in Strasbourg. The consulate also looked after the defined consular region, but provided only limited consular services in that regard.

There was a lot of confusion about the role of the Strasbourg Consulate. When the Department began looking to cut posts overseas for budget reasons, Strasbourg found itself on the list to cut, largely because of the limited consular services it provided. Even the embassy in Paris was willing to cut Strasbourg rather than any of the other consulates in France because it viewed the Strasbourg consular activities as marginal.

But, in fact, the Strasbourg Consulate played a key role as a U.S. diplomatic mission separate from these consular activities. This fact finally prevailed, but it took a great effort on my part to hold back the administrative and budget gurus who were determined to get rid of the post.

The Strasbourg Consulate had a very long history. We had a post there well into the last century. Strasbourg was French until 1871, when it was lost to Germany. France took Strasbourg back in 1918. Germany reincorporated Strasbourg during the Second World War. French Forces under General LeClerc, supported by U.S. forces under General Patch, liberated Strasbourg in 1944 and brought it back into France. Our consulate closed during the war periods, but reopened shortly after the liberation.

Q: Before we turn to the European EU side, what about your consular district? How did you find it at the time politically and economically?

COMRAS: The Strasbourg consular district was very exciting, politically, economically and historically in part because of its uniqueness and its unique history. Alsace and Lorraine are major heavy industry areas - Lorraine for the steel industry, Alsace for railroad construction. Both regions were heavy in technology. Franche Comte, was more rural, but enjoyed a famous university center in Besancon. The regions were also known for their great food, beer and wine industries. While economically vibrant, there were serious restructuring problems, particularly in the Lorraine Steel industry. This was also a major gateway for trade with the rest of Europe. Strasbourg was an important road and rail hub, and one of the most important river ports along the Rhine.

Politically, the eastern regions were going through significant changes. The area had generally, been center-right. However, the area was beginning to polarize between the Socialist Party on one side and the extreme right National Front on the other. The character of the area was also changing with the influx of a number of immigrants from North Africa. This was particularly the

case in Strasbourg and the larger cities in Alsace and Lorraine. Because of vulnerabilities stemming from Strasbourg's position on the Franco-German border, the incidence of crime had increased during this same period. Much of this was attributed, rightly or wrongly to the increase in the immigrant population. There was a growing feeling among many native Alsatians and Vosgians, that their communities were being significantly altered. Some xenophobia resulted.

Also, this was a time when France was under great trauma from terrorism. Although it was very exciting to be going to Strasbourg in 1985, there were some downsides to be considered. One of the most significant downsides related to terrorism concerns for me and my family. Our predecessor, Bob Homme, had been shot by terrorists. He was shot by a member of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction as he left his house (the residence). This happened one morning just as he was leaving the residence to go to the Consulate. He survived, but was very badly wounded. He was shot while backing out his car. There was a person repairing a motorcycle out in front of the house. As he pulled out the person got up and shot him through the window. Luckily for Homme, just a week before the Consulate had installed a gate opener so that he could remain in his car while exiting. If he had gotten out of his car to open or close the gate, he probably would not have survived. As it turned out, the terrorist had to shoot him through the car window. He was hit several times. The bullets came within millimeters of hitting vital organs. One bullet grazed his head. Fortunately, he had turned at that precise second or the bullet would have entered his brain. Fortunately for him and his family and for us all, he survived and the wounds ended up being neat and repairable.

The person who fired the shots was never caught. The ringleader of the group was caught several years later.

But, at the time we were in Strasbourg, both the Consulate and the Residence were under threat and the French government provided us special 24 hour protection. This included assigning two special GPN guards to accompany me whenever I left the residence or the Consulate.

During this same period we lost our military attaché in Paris to assassination by terrorists. There had also been an attempt against our DCM. A car bomb set under his car didn't go off. However, and very sadly, a French policeman was killed when the bomb was being removed.

Q: What was behind this?

COMRAS: There were so many factors going on in that period of time. The situation in Lebanon was very unsettled with western interventions. There were a number of different homegrown terrorist groups also operating in the area including - the Red Army factions, the Red Brigade, as well as other terrorist groups in Germany and Italy. There were also a number of groups associated with one or another cause or faction or another in Algeria. Of course there were also issues related to the Palestinians, and to French interventions in Chad. Terrorism became a daily occurrence in France during this whole period with bombs going off in trash cans, car bombs, and various other things. It was a very difficult period from 1985 through 1989.

Q: This having happened to your predecessor, what did they do for you?

COMRAS: U.S. and French authorities took the issue of our security very seriously following the attack on Homme. They took a number of steps to tighten the security of the consulate and the residence. We were also given an armored car and a chauffeur. The French police set up a police box in front of the residence. They also gave us constant 24 hour close-on protection. They accompanied us everywhere I and my family went. This was particularly the case during the first 2 years. It tapered off a little after that. We also had security guards at the consulate and residence hired by the U.S. government.

Q: That must have been a real downer, wasn't it, as far as getting around?

COMRAS: It was something to which we had to adapt. The French had a team of specially trained policemen that were specially assigned to us. Over time we got to know them all well. They got to know us well. I don't know if it was the best from the security perspective, but we decided that the only way we could do this and be comfortable was by making them family. So, over time they became part of our family. So they got to know us and we them well enough that we were comfortable with them and they were comfortable with us. It worked well in that sense.

Q: You had children?

COMRAS: Yes, I had 2 sons.

Q: How old were they?

COMRAS: Both were young. Our son David was 8 and our son Manny was 13 when we came to Strasbourg. Manny was 17 and David was 12 when we left.

Q: How did they find this?

COMRAS: Constraining. It meant that they could not function in the same way as many of their friends. Their movements were restricted. It was difficult for them initially, but they adapted to it. The notion that we were all family helped them as well in this process.

Q: How about your wife?

COMRAS: She also went through a process of adaptation. Although the police protection was centered on me, they also had to cope with a number of constraints and restrictions. My wife recognized that there was a risk for her as well as for the children and so she assured that we all were cognizant of the risks and dealt with them accordingly. But there were times when we all had to escape from this. For us the way of getting out from this pressure would be to leave Strasbourg and go across the border into Germany.

Q: You were talking about the political spectrum in that area. You didn't mention the communists. At one point the communists were a third of the voting part. What had happened?

COMRAS: The Communist Party was still an important force in Eastern France. More so in Lorraine than in Alsace. Also the Communists were not very strong in Franche-Compte. The

Communists were well organized among steel workers. There was not support for the Communists in Alsace and non steel parts of Lorraine. There are a number of reasons for this. One of them is that both Alsace and Lorraine were brought into Germany during the Nazi period from 1940 through 1944. All of Alsace was made part of Germany, and parts of Lorraine also were incorporated into Germany. As the men were considered by the Nazis to be German citizens, they were subject to the war drafts. A very large proportion of those drafted were sent to fight on the Eastern Front. Many were captured by the Russians and held as prisoners of war. Russia did not differentiate between the Alsacian prisoners and the German prisoners. And did not release the Alsacians until the early 1950s. This colored the attitudes of a great number of Alsatians toward the Soviet Union and the communists. It left them with a very bitter taste about Russia in the years following the war. So the Communist Party was not able to make much headway in Alsace.

The situation was very different in the Steel industry areas of Lorraine. The steel industry was going through some very difficult times. Many steel mills were closed and there was large unemployment. Slow progress was being made to restructure the steel industry and bring production standards and methods up to point. There was also a transformation into specialty steel. Also new programs were underway to restructure the local economies and to diversify. This was a difficult time for the Lorraine worker. The Communist party did well in playing to their concerns and gained significant support. This meant elected legislative deputies and majors and heads of local regional councils.

However, the center-right remained the largest political grouping in both Alsace and Lorraine. It was under increasing challenge from both the left and the right. That's pretty much the situation as I understand it still today in that part of France.

Q: Was there any feeling in Alsace towards Germany? Was this mixed identity a problem or had the European Union and developments in the past 40-odd years meant that you didn't have people sitting around drinking beer and talking about the good old days?

COMRAS: The pressures of history on Alsace had the effect of creating an "Alsacien" identity. This identity was not in conflict with their being French. It was in addition to their being French. They were proud of both heritages. While Alsacians had always felt a lot in common with their German brethren, their incorporation in Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1944 convinced most of them that they did not want to be German. There were perhaps periods of great ambivalence on the part of Alsace with respect to France and Germany, particularly when they were incorporated in Germany from 1871 to 1917/1918. Alsace had enjoyed great prosperity in that period before the beginning of World War I. This goodwill toward Germany lapsed completely during the second world war. However, even during the 1871-1918 period, many in Alsace resented Germany. They had preferred the French and saw the Germans as occupiers. I cite, for example, Bartholdi, the sculptor of the Statue of Liberty. He viewed the German period as a period of occupation. For him, Alsace had lost its freedom. This was a principal motivation for his work in creating the Statue of Liberty, which later became a gift of France to the United States.

Alsatians are a very proud people. They view themselves as a distinct part of France, but

nevertheless French. In addition to French, Alsacians speak Alsatian which is a Germanic language.

I should tell you also that Alsace has closer ties with the United States than, perhaps any other region in France. Almost every Alsatian family has one or more immediate relatives who immigrated to the United States. The Alsatians and to a certain extent Lorraine also probably sent more immigrants to the U.S. than all the rest of France combined.

Q: France was never a major immigration source.

COMRAS: That's right. But every time Alsace or Lorraine moved back and forth between Germany and France, it sent a wave of immigrants to the United States. There are a number of Alsatian communities in the United States. Let me tell you one story about one community of Alsatians in the United States. The story starts back in the 1850s and 1860s. A Portuguese Jew by the name of Castro was given a land grant in Texas if he could attract an agreed number of people to settle there. This was a troubling period in Europe. So, he set off to Alsace and talked about this great place in the United States. He convinced a certain numbers of Alsatians to sign up. They formed the nodule of settlers in the new town of Castroville, Texas. When Alsace passed to Germany in 1871 a wave of Alsatians left for the United States as immigrants. They went directly to Castroville, to join the small Alsatian community already there. The same thing happened during the First World War, and again during or just after the Second World War. Castroville is one of a few towns in the United States where a good part of the population speak Alsatian.

The east of France suffered enormously during the First and Second World Wars. From the staggering death toll of the battle of Verdun in the First World War to the Liberation of the Colmar pocket in February 1945 - the region witnessed some of the costliest battles in France. Americans were deeply engaged in a number of critical battles in this area, in both World War I and World War II. The largest American military cemeteries from World War I and World War II are located in Lorraine.

You may recall that Strasbourg took on great symbolic importance for the Free French during the Second World War. Those joining the Free French Forces pledged not to lay down their arms till Strasbourg was in French hands. The Strasbourg Cathedral was the symbol worn on their soldiers shoulder patch.

Q: Did you find yourself attending a lot of ceremonies dealing with the world wars?

COMRAS: I certainly did. During my stay in Strasbourg I participated in a great number of ceremonies to mark the battles and the sacrifices of American, French, British and Canadian soldiers in the region. This included the Memorial Day, Armistice Day and other commemorative occasions. It also included the ceremonies associated with the 70th anniversary of the U.S. entry into World War I.

Let me tell you about the latter event. The American Ambassador at the time was Joe Rogers from Tennessee. He had a great interest in World War I. His father had come to France and

fought in the first world war in eastern France. He was an officer in an engineering battalion that built or repaired many bridges and other structures in the region. He had written a letter to his wife dated November 24, 1918, less than 2 weeks after the Armistice, detailing to his wife all that he had done, the places that he had gone from village to village to village. So, Ambassador Rogers had the idea that to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the U.S. entry into World War I, he would retrace the steps of his father - from village to village through the whole area. He asked me to arrange this with the local authorities.

The French thought this was a great idea and we worked closely to put the appropriate events in place. We planned an itinerary that would challenge anyone - from village to village. We would start in the town of St. Mihiel and end at Chatel-Chehery, where Sergeant York became famous. In fact, the Tennessee Historical Society joined the events by dedicating a new plaque to Sergeant York in the Town Square of Chatel-Chehery.

The Ambassador reserved for us one great surprise until the last moment. He had invited his mother, in her early 90s, to accompany us on the trip. She was the one that had received and preserved the letter we used to plan the trip. Sara, my wife also joined us, as did Mrs. Honey Rogers, the wife of the Ambassador. Sara volunteered to accompany the two Mrs. Rogers and make sure that their own special needs were met. They all hit it off wonderfully, and thanks to Sara's efforts had a great time on a very grueling trip. The temperature was in the 90s and there were few of the facilities to accommodate the heat or nature's other requirements. I have to say that Sara did a marvelous job looking after the two Mrs. Rogers. In fact, they fell in love with her. Mrs. Rogers Sr. parting words as we saw them off on their plane back to Paris was "Joe, can't we take Sara with us?"

It was a wonderful trip. A wonderful occasion for Franco-American relations. Every town and village we visited welcomed us with flags and bands. The children of the town participated in the ceremonies. Each town set up photo and other exhibits demonstrating their own local history during World War One. It was just a wonderful occasion.

I'll tell you another little anecdote. The trip almost had a disastrous beginning, at least in a diplomatic sense. The first ceremonial stop was St. Mihiel. Ambassador Rogers had valiantly tried to learn French but never succeeded. However, he liked to read prepared statements in French. He did so whenever he could.

He asked the Military Attaches office to prepare a statement for the events in St. Mihiel. Through their own sources, they received information that the Mayor of St. Mihiel was going to present a plaque to the Ambassador to commemorate the occasion. They prepared a thank you statement in French for the Ambassador to accept the plaque. Turned out that they got it all wrong. The Mayor was not going to give the Ambassador a plaque. He was going to ask the Ambassador to unveil a plaque on the Hotel de Ville wall commemorating the Battle of St. Mihiel.

The Ambassador had memorized the French statement that had been prepared for him. Now, just at the last minute he needed a new statement - A statement that he could read without too many mistakes. Well, it was Sara to the rescue. My wife speaks native French. She sat down and wrote out phonetically a short appropriate statement the Ambassador could make, in simply French to

unveil the plaque. He was forever greatly for the way she got him out of this fix.

Q: How did the mother do?

COMRAS: The mother did absolutely great, perhaps better than Joe in holding up to a very rigorous program. The trip was a great success. It underscored the enormous amount of affection that resides in that part of France for the United States. There are a lot of reasons for this affection.

There were two great battle areas in France where U.S. forces took very high casualties. One is Normandy and the landing, The second is the eastern part of France. Once the allies broke out of Normandy they advanced fairly quickly through the plains of France. However, they ran into increased opposition as they approached the Vosges and eastern France. These were areas that had been incorporated into Germany, or which had been specially fortified by Germany. The Vosges mountains were a natural defensive line. The French had used these mountains as part of their Maginot Line. They joined up with the Ardennes. That's where the Battle of the Bulge broke out. But, that battle had major ramifications for the areas further south also in Lorraine and northern Alsace, and for Strasbourg itself.

It proved very difficult for our troops to get over the Vosges. There were some great battles and we took enormous casualties. In fact, the last part of France to be liberated was Colmar, an area which became known as the Colmar pocket, which wasn't until February of 1945.

Q: That's where French armies ended up, too. American and French armies fought together.

COMRAS: Yes, especially when it came to taking Strasbourg. The American Fifth Army under General Patch was ordered by Eisenhower to allow General LeClerc to come across first to liberate Strasbourg. This was a great gesture made by Eisenhower, and was always greatly appreciated by General LeClerc, if not by General De Gaulle.

The Battle of the Bulge came shortly after the liberation of Strasbourg. The initial German advance posed grave risks for Strasbourg. The best military advice was that Strasbourg was extremely vulnerable and would likely fall back into German hands, creating an entrapment situation for American and French soldiers. So, General Eisenhower was advised by his people that Strasbourg should be evacuated. De Gaulle fought this tooth and nail and made a very strong plea to Eisenhower not to evacuate Strasbourg. He wanted to hold Strasbourg at all costs. Eisenhower wrote later in his memoirs that only one time did he deviate from his policy of not allowing political factors to influence his judgment on military issues, and that was with respect to Strasbourg. Military reasoning would have led to an evacuation of Strasbourg. But, he allowed himself to be swayed by De Gaulle. He decided to hold in Strasbourg. And, in the end, thank God, Strasbourg held.

There is another little story about that came to our attention. One day it ought to be the subject of a movie. While the Battle of the Bulge was raging further north and west, one of the largest tank confrontations during the war took place just north of the city of Strasbourg. At the same time as the Battle of the Bulge was raging, the Germans, sought to encircle Strasbourg. There were a

number of villages in the mountains just north of Strasbourg where we had troops bivouacked for rest and relaxation. A segregated black American anti-tank brigade was stationed in two of these villages. The brigade was one of a few that had not yet been integrated. The Brigade had a poor reputation and was not noted as showing any valor. It had not distinguished itself in the war. They took the brunt of this German tank attack. Against considerable odds they held these villages and halted the German tank advance. They took enormous casualties. They were all heroes. They probably more than anyone or anything else they saved Strasbourg. They held until adequate reinforcements could be provided. The story is written up in a few little journals. It was told to me by a several elderly residents in the area. It's a story that I always said I wanted to do something more with. It's a story that should be told.

I later found out that Senator Ernest Hollings fought in this same area. He told me that he had helped liberate Strasbourg. I met him at the time the State Department had targeted the Strasbourg Consulate for closing. He was opposed to that. He was on a visit to Strasbourg and told me of his own experiences in the War. I remember that as we were walking to the Strasbourg cathedral, he turned to me and said, "Vic, they'll close Strasbourg over my dead body. I helped defend this place and keep it free."

The French have a very strong attachment to Alsace and Lorraine. The Americans who fought in this area also are tied by strong emotions to the region. As Consul General it was one of my duties to preside over the Memorial Day ceremonies at the various American Military Cemeteries in the consular district. Each year I would attend ceremonies at, at least two of the five 5 American military cemeteries in the district.

A huge crowd of French men women and children would turn out at each of these occasions. These ceremonies served to underscore just how close we were attached to each other in this war. This relationship cast in blood still colors their favorable feelings towards the United States today.

Q: On the political side, how well did that area feel it was being represented and dealt with by the central government in Paris?

COMRAS: There were times when they felt they were very different than the rest of France. They had their complaints. But they were a political stronghold of the central right. During most of the time I was there, there was a central right government in Paris.

Still, there were a number of complaints concerning immigration policy, rising crime rates, competition from Germany, and desire for improved infrastructure. There were also strong complaints concerning the downturn in the Lorraine Steel industry.

Q: One of the things you mentioned was that the steel mills had to close. One of the things... The French even with a right-wing or center-right government, maybe it was worse later than it was then, but did you see that the French economy, it was difficult for French business to operate because it was hard to shut down people, let people go, once they were hired, you couldn't eliminate workers who weren't needed? Was that a problem?

COMRAS: Pretty much the whole region of Lorraine felt the effect of the depressed steel industry. There was high unemployment through most of the northern part of Lorraine. This is the area where the Communist Party began to get increased support. It was a very difficult period for that region. Nevertheless, new programs were begun to transform the steel industry and to diversify the industrial economy of the region. This included the introduction of new high tech industries. These reforms were moving ahead only slowly and this gave rise to strong complaints.

Pittsburgh Pennsylvania provided a good example of the type of reforms that we necessary. There was great interest in what was going on in Pittsburgh during this same timeframe.

It's interesting that you had this growth of this communist party. You had the steel industry. You had great concerns about competition issues and import issues and restrictions. The United States was going through the same thing. There were complaints and counter-complaints between the United States and France about unfair trade practices, particularly in the steel sector. Yet the sympathy for the United States in the region held strong. This was so even in areas where the Communist Party had the support of a majority of the electorate. I believe these positive feelings toward the United States were tied in to the historical relationships and the relationships forged during the Second World War.

I was invited to participate in a great number of popular events in the area. Without exception I was received with great friendship and courtesy. I remember one event that involved the departure of a number of American High School Students that had spent a semester in the French Schools in the region. The whole town turned out to say goodbye.

The 5 American military cemeteries in the region were a reminder to all of the sacrifices made during the two world wars. These cemeteries were managed extremely well by the American Battleground Commission. But, just after the war, there were many, many, more cemeteries in the region where American and other allied soldiers were buried. A decision was made in the late 1940s to repatriate many of these American dead and to consolidate the others in the established American Military Cemeteries. This process took several years. Yet, today, the previous burial grounds remain hallowed ground for the villages where they were located. Many of the villages and towns put up special monuments or markers to identify and honor these hallowed areas. I attended a great many of the ceremonies that were held to honor these sites.

There was also another major event that marked the strong links between Alsace and the United States during my tenure there. That was the centennial of the Statue of Liberty. Most Americans don't know that the Statue of Liberty is Alsatian. The sculpture of the Statue of Liberty was Frederic Bartholdi, an Alsatian. The face on the statue is the face of his mother. They were from the town of Colmar, just south of Strasbourg.

Bartholdi set out to sculpt a major statue dedicated to Liberty. He wanted it to represent his sadness at the loss of freedom, as he saw it, that derived from the German occupation of his homeland, and home town of Colmar after the War of 1871. He looked for a commission to build such a statue and to find the right setting for it. He looked many places, including in Egypt. But eventually he found the perfect spot for it during a trip to the United States - New York Harbor.

Then he had to convince the French government to commission his project. The French decided to support the project and turn it into a gift to the American People for the Centennial of the United States in 1876. For a number of reasons, including the fact that the United States was unable to provide come up with the funds necessary to build a foundation of base for the statue, it remained in storage for a decade. It was not until 1886, 10 years after the American centennial that the statue was finally erected in New York harbor. Bartholdi was French-Alsatian. Louis Eiffel, who built the support structure for the Statue was also French, and the Statue of Liberty.

So, the celebrations that marked this occasion were also very big celebrations throughout Alsace. I got to play a major role in these celebrations as American Consul General in Alsace. I think my role became even more important because I could speak French, which the Ambassador couldn't. That meant that I was invited to all the TV Talk Shows to represent and talk about the U.S. perspective on these events.

Q: Did you get Alsatian dignitaries to the ceremonies?

COMRAS: Yes. In fact, the mayor of Strasbourg was invited to join the foreign dignitaries hosted on board special ships in New York Harbor the July 4, 1986 celebration of the statue. We were in the town of Colmar at our own very beautiful celebration on the same day.

Q: Was there much in the way of trade promotion there or links to American firms?

COMRAS: Business activity and investment had slowed in the mid-1980s due to a general recession in Europe. The pace of activity began to accelerate in 1988-89. The business community in eastern France had a high degree of familiarity with the United States and the American market. Also there were a number of major American companies that had offices and factories in eastern France. Some of the largest companies in Alsace were American companies. General Motors had a major plant in Alsace not far from Strasbourg. Timkin, had a large ball bearing factory in Colmar. Eli Lili had a large facility just outside of Strasbourg. There were also a growing number of American high companies in the area. All and all it amounted to a sizeable U.S. business presence in the region.

Eastern France was an area targeted by American companies for further investment. A number of American companies were looking to establish themselves in Europe and this appeared to be an attractive area given its location in the heart of Europe right along the French-German border and along the best of the north-south-east-west access routes in the region.

Trade and investment is a two-way street, and there were a number of American states that were also doing their best to attract investment from eastern France. This was particularly the case for North and South Carolina and many of the sunbelt states. Several states had established business, trade and investment offices in Strasbourg. There was significant business activity in both directions.

Q: Were there consular problems, people getting arrested, kids in trouble, split families?

COMRAS: The Consulate provided only very limited consular services. These included welfare

and whereabouts. We did not provide passport or visa services except to take applications and forward them to Paris for processing. We also handled other consular services related to American services.

But let me tell you another story about one of our consular cases:

Back in 1962, during the time when Americans had military bases in France, an American soldier stationed at a base near Metz, in Lorraine, met and married a French girl. They had a son born to them in France. Shortly afterward, in late 1963 the soldier was transferred back to the United States and released from military service. His French wife and child accompanied him to the United States. They moved to Iowa. The family became a typical American family and raised a typical American son. In 1988 the son gets married to an American girl and they decide to go to Europe for their honeymoon. First they visit Germany and Switzerland. The mother suggest that they also go to France to visit with family members they had never met. So the young couple decides to take the train from Switzerland to Metz, France where the French family members live. The train crosses the border at the city of St. Louis, near Mulhouse, France. That is where customs procedures are handled and visas are checked. The train arrived at the St. Louis Station late Friday afternoon. The young man presented his American passport. He was surprised at how long it took for the authorities to process it and return it to him. While he was waiting, two French Gendarmes appear and arrest him. He is charged with evasion of French military service.

Of course, he's horrified. His wife is horrified. They're on their honeymoon and he's being pulled away by the French police. Neither of them speaks a word of French. They have absolutely no idea what's going on. He is brought by the Gendarmes to a holding cell in the station and eventually from the border into a French military detention center near the town of Mulhouse. The wife doesn't know quite what to do. She calls the U.S. embassy in Paris and they tell her to call the consulate in Strasbourg. Luckily I was working late and took the call. She was very distraught. After calming her down I was able to ascertain what had happened. I got her to go to the station masters office and arranged with the Station Master to allow her to stay by the phone so that I could call her back, which I promised to do quickly once I had reviewed the matter with the appropriate French authorities.

Fortunately, I had very good contacts with the prefet and the military governor in Mulhouse. I think it is so important for our Consulate Officers to have close contact with the local officials. That's what they are there for. Consular officers have a better opportunity to meet and know local officials than those in the embassy. Handled right, a consulate can be very effective eyes, ears and mouth for an embassy when it comes to dealing with events on the ground.

So, anyway, I called the prefet in Mulhouse and was able, because I knew him well, to get him on the line directly and quickly. We both realized that what had happened was an embarrassing anomaly. The young man had been outside of France since his infancy. He was an American citizen. He probably no longer had French citizenship. The problem was that his birth was recorded in France and his parents had never notified the French authorities or the French embassy in the United States concerning his departure from France and probable change of citizenship status.

The French authorities had a record of his birth in Metz. These records are reported to the French Bureau of National Service (their Draft Board). When he failed to show up to register for the French Draft, they sent a letter of notification and warning to his last known address in France. When he still didn't respond, they put him in their look-out book as a possible draft dodger. That list was triggered when he handed over his passport at the Mulhouse border. From that point, they treated him according to established procedures for those seeking to evade French Military Service. They hand him over to the French Military Authorities.

The Prefet suggested I call the Military Governor and see what we could do to resolve the problem. However, it was already late Friday afternoon, and there did not appear to be a solution at hand, at least until Monday morning when the Office of National Service would reopen and the mess could be straightened out.

I knew the Military Governor in Mulhouse to be a real French gentleman. I was sure that he would understand the situation and work with me to find a solution. After all, the couple were on their honeymoon. And that should appeal to the romantic side of any French gentleman. I explained the situation, and appealed to sense of the romantic. What French General wanted to be responsible for destroying this young couple's honeymoon. Especially since the problem here was more technical than real. He promised to consider what I said and see if he could find some solution. He promised to call me back shortly. A short while later, he did call me back. We were pretty much on a first name basis, so he said, "I'll tell you what I'll do. We've got him under military jurisdiction. Since we've got him under military jurisdiction, I can give him a 3 day pass. I'll do that on one condition, that you come up and get him, that you assure to me that you will keep him in your control, and make sure that he shows up at the Office of National Service in Strasbourg when it opens on Monday morning to straighten all this out." We agreed.

I called his wife to explain the situation, and tell her about the conditions imposed. I offered to pick her up and then get her husband from the French Military Garrison. I offered to put them up in our guest house until Monday when a member of my staff would accompany them to the Office of National Service. She agreed and was so very relieved.

We put them in the guesthouse over the weekend. They toured around Strasbourg a little bit. They were a very nice couple. We took them down on Monday morning to the Office of National Service and got everything straightened out. He thanked us very much for that at the end and then he said, "This has been a terrible weekend in many ways, but a great weekend in some. But I'll tell you one thing, this is a very unique story that I'll have to tell my kids and my grandkids, that I was part of the French army for 3 days and I have a pass to prove it!"

Q: I had an American major in Greece who was born in Greece and they tried to... What the hell is this? It's a real problem sometimes.

COMRAS: Unfortunately, many of the other stories were not as happy. Because of the very large number of American tourists that come through Europe, there are bound to be some difficult, unfortunate, and sometimes even tragic, happenings. I still feel sad to think about the tragic accidents and deaths I had to deal with. But, I like to tell the happy-ending stories.

Q: Did you have drug problems, kids getting arrested for possession of drugs?

COMRAS: Fortunately, we did not have very many cases involving Americans arrested for drugs. However, Strasbourg and Alsace were major transit points for the movement of illegal drugs across France. This was prior to the Schengen Agreements which opened the internal borders between the EU members. During the 1985-89 timeframe, border controls remained in effect. The French applied a major effort to cutting off the flow of illicit drugs into France. Local drug use was not so much of a problem in Alsace at that time. We did have a few Americans in jail on drug related charges. We provided them the appropriate consular services, including periodic visits.

Let me tell you another story. We did have another major incident with the local police that turned out to be quite humorous. I think the story reflects some the tensions and precautions that were in place due to the wave of terrorism that was going through France at that time.

As I said earlier there were a lot of student groups that visited Strasbourg. Many of them attended French Universities for semester or summer programs. One student group from a women's college in the United States was studying that summer in Strasbourg. The American students were invited to visit the local newspaper to see how the newspaper was put together. The visit, which took place over several hours, began in the early evening and went on until late that night when the newspaper was put in print. Since the paper was printed at a fairly late hour in the evening, they took them around first to show them and showed them the newsroom and then they took the group to a dinner at a restaurant several blocks away. After dinner the students were to return to the Newspaper for the last part of the tour. The students had a wonderful time eating and drinking and perhaps drinking in many cases more than they should. This was particularly the case for one young lady.

After dinner the group left the restaurant to return to the Newspaper. During the several block walk back, this young lady felt an enormous urge to go to the bathroom. There were no places in site, so decided to break away from the group and to go up a quiet back alley where she could find some privacy. She found herself a small area hidden by some walls, and decided to relieve herself. What she didn't know was that this was the side of the main police station and that everything she was doing was being monitored on camera.

I'm not sure the French Officer monitoring the camera quite understood what was going on. In any event it looked suspicious enough for him to send out two plainclothed policemen to check it out. When they see the lady squatting there, they move quickly to intercept her. She's in an particularly awkward position and she sees these 2 guys running towards her, so she quickly gets up and takes off. She left so fast, that she left her handbag and a package back along the wall. Could be a bomb! The police don't know what to think of this, so they take off after her. They tackle her and they grab her and they bring her back into the station. They realized quickly what she was up to and decided to let her go. Well, the next day I, I get a call from both the school and from the police captain. The calls come in one right after the other. The one from the police station came in first and it says, "Listen, we want to apologize. I know we created a little bit of an incident here, but we wanted you to know what happened, that we didn't know how to take

it.” They were afraid that somehow there was going to be a complaint from the University about the incident and the tackling of the young women. They didn’t mean to rough her up or anything of this sort, they said.

Then we get a call from the school which went something like this: “We’re sorry. We didn’t know we were causing an incident. We didn’t want to create a problem with the French government or the French police, but this young lady had had too much to drink and it was all a very innocent thing. Please make sure that you can get the police to overlook this and not hold it against her.”

It was great to be able to Subsequently tell both groups, “Yes, I’ve solved your problem!”

One more story because this reflects another part of the role of a Diplomat and of a Consulate.

After arriving in Strasbourg in July 1985, one of the first issues I faced, was the local reaction to planned visit by President Ronald Reagan that summer to France. President Reagan decided to attend ceremonies in Europe to mark the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. He wanted also to reflect the rapprochement in European relations and U.S.- European relations. He decided that he should visit a German military cemetery, and American veteran groups also decided it would be appropriate to invite German veterans to attend special ceremonies at the American Cemetery in St. Avold. The German Cemetery was at Bitburg, and included a large number of SS soldiers. The Unit invited to St. Avold also included SS veterans. Well, this idea did not go down well with the French, or with French veterans, or Jewish groups in the area. There was a general outcry against the idea and threats of local boycotts of the ceremony, and even a human shield blockade of the cemetery. The American Consulate was the first place to which the French brought their protest.

Even in the United States there were a number of people who questioned the wisdom of the President’s visit to the Bitburg Cemetery and the emotions that it would raise. Within France, it raised considerable emotion that President Reagan was going to do this. But, what happened in Germany was one matter. What would happen in France was another. There was an enormous outcry on the part of the French community against the St Avold invitation. We were asked as a U.S. Consulate to convey these feelings to the United States authorities, and to the American veteran groups sponsoring the St. Avold ceremonies. These veteran groups were free to do what they wanted. And it was the policy of the American Battle Monument Commission to allow any U.S. veteran group to sponsor a commemorative ceremony. They could invite whoever they wanted, so long as the decorum of the cemetery was respected.

So, I had to contact the American sponsors and explain to them the local reaction. Fortunately, when we were in discussions with the American veterans groups - of course all decisions were theirs - they recognized that it probably was not in their best interest and it would not be conducive to what they were trying to do to have this kind of local reaction. They did not want to cause this kind of bad feelings. So, I think wisely, they decided that it would be better for them to hold the ceremony at St. Avold with only the U.S. veterans present and to meet with their former German adversaries in Germany at a German cemetery. The American veterans agreed to hold their own private ceremony at St. Avold. And that is what happened.

I can only wonder what the feelings would be today and how things might have changed since then. But, in 1985 the war years were still fresh memories. Now we're perhaps in a somewhat different situation in Europe with the European Union and with the experience that France and Germany have had in working together with a common political ideology, with a common currency right now, and the rapprochement between France and Germany. Another 20 years have passed.

Q: Speaking of emotions, did you run across in your part of France, one of the subjects I always open up with somebody who served in France, usually in Paris, is the intellectuals, who are by their chromosomes sort of as a class left-wing, kind of anti-American or quite anti-American. It seems to be a Parisian clique, their chattering class, but it has some clout within the French political world. Did you find any equivalent to or reflection of that in your area?

COMRAS: Yes and no. I would apply the "No" to Lorraine and Alsace. Their intellectual ties with the United States, their basic feelings towards the United States, are very strong. They have not adopted the Gaullist philosophy, and particularly reject that part of Gaullist philosophy that related to distancing France from the United States. The intellectual community has been very close to the United States and cross-fertilized.

The "Yes" would apply more to Belfort and Franche-Compte. These areas had a different history than Alsace and Lorraine. Neither were incorporated in Germany after the 1871 war or during the world wars. Besancon, the capital of the Franche Compte region is a French University Town. I think the atmosphere there would be similar to that at the Sorbonne. One could sense a resentment toward the There has at the Sorbonne and other places with a lot of those who resented America during the Vietnam War which was somewhat past then but resented American culture in many ways. I think this attitude vis a vis the United States was reflected best by Jean Pierre Chevenement, who was the most notable of the French political leaders from Belfort. He was a strong critic of the United States, although he held a grudging respect for America.

Q: Who is still a political figure today?

COMRAS: Yes. Chevenement is still active, although he was quite ill a couple of years ago. They call him the socialist De Gaulle. His "France First" attitude is very Gaullist. During the period I knew him he was concerned about what he viewed as the growing hegemony of the Soviet Union and the United States - "Europe against the two empires," as he phrased it. We got to know him quite well, and he was always very friendly to my wife and me. We had a number of political discussions with him.

Q: Was there a lot of reporting and excessive reporting on horrible events that the United States has done in the treatment of crimes or what have you both in the U.S.-

COMRAS: Not so much from the regions that I was in, but there's a whole other side of Strasbourg. Remember, the Strasbourg Consulate dealt mostly with the European institutions in Strasbourg. That accounted for about 80 percent of our work. Only about 20 percent of our time was related to the regional issues and our work related to the embassy in Paris. It was our role as

a stand-alone mission to the European institutions in Strasbourg - The Council of Europe, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, that made our role in France unique among the Consulates. We also played a support role for our Mission in Brussels to the EU since the European Parliament met in Strasbourg for one week each month.

U.S. economic, political, social, and cultural happenings and attitudes were often an issue up for discussion or debate in one or another of these European Institutions. This was particularly so with the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Our work dealt mostly with the latter. The European Union was covered mostly out of our mission in Brussels. They would send someone down to Strasbourg to spend the week if the European Parliament was in session. So they were responsible out of Brussels to do most of the issues related to the European Parliament. Our role was logistical supportive but there were many times when we would have to help and cover for them or handle specific matters. Ours was a secondary relationship with the European Parliament. But we had primary responsibility vis a vis the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Court and Commission of Human Rights. These institutions represented the broader Europe. At that time it was the Europe of 21 as opposed to the EU which was the Europe of 12.

Q: What was the relationship of the Council of Europe to what is now the European Union? Was this an appendix or an earlier manifestation?

COMRAS: The Council of Europe was the first attempt at European unification. It traces back to 1947 when Winston Churchill proposed the establishment of a Council of Europe to build a peaceful, more stable Europe. The concept behind the Council of Europe was the establishment of a unified Europe achieved through a process of harmonization of its laws and structures and on increased cooperation. The Council of Europe was created with that ideal of bringing together those countries that could form and work and begin to heal the wounds of War in the post-World War II. And to prevent such wars from happening again. Germany was brought into the organization at an early stage. But because of the occupation of Germany, a decision was made to keep the Council of Europe out of issues related to security and defense. Such issues were to be relegated to NATO. The Council of Europe was an European structure for dealing with political, social, cultural, and other kinds of issues, not defense and security.

Subsequently, with the Treaty of Rome, several European countries decided to move further and faster on European Unification. They established a coal and steel community, and went on to form a customs union. Slowly the idea emerged to create a unified Europe based on integration rather than just harmonization of laws and institutions. This was going to be Europe on the fast track. As the European Community grew in importance the Council of Europe appeared to some to decrease in importance. But, this was really not the case. Europe needed both types of organizations, and still needs them today. Although the European Union has grown considerably, the Council of Europe still has many more members, and provides an essential institution for unification and harmonization within the Broader Europe. This was particularly the case in the 1980s.

In the beginning the European Community was principally a customs and economic institution and a customs union. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, the Council of Europe had a

broadened mandate. But, over this time, the European Community took on greater form and responsibility and grew into the European Union with political as well as economic and social responsibilities. The train on the fast track quickly passed the train on the slow track. The European Community also grew from its initial 6 to 7 and more. It was already 12 by 1985.

The European Union began to act as a single bloc within the Council of Europe. They became the dominant political force within the Council of Europe, and began to define the role of the Council of Europe in more limited terms. In fact, by 1985 they had decided that the role of the Council of Europe needed to be redefined in light of the development of the European Community.

The initial impetus was to redefine the Council of Europe, and its subsidiary organs as an institution devoted to social and cultural issues, and as a bridge between the European Community to the broader Europe of 21. It was also to serve as a bastion for democracies. However, its role was clearly secondary to the role of the European Communities institutions. The debate over a new mandate for the Council of Europe took a dramatic turn, however, with the dramatic events underway in Eastern Europe.

The members of the European Community recognized that the Council of Europe served an important function in holding the Broader Europe together. One of the unintended consequences of the EC was that it risked dividing Europe rather than unifying Europe. A division was already developing between EC members and EC nonmembers. The Council of Europe was an essential element for keeping and building European commonality and European unity in the broader sense. At the same time, it was a good holding place to put countries that needed to feel that they were part of Europe and not being pushed aside by the European Union even if they were not yet ready to come into the European Union. It was a good holding place for European countries, EC members and Non EC members to continue their work towards harmonizing laws and institutions and maintaining close consultation and cooperation.

Then when the Berlin wall came tumbling down! What a dramatic change for the World, for Europe, and for the Council of Europe.

With the changes taking place in Europe the need for a broader European Home grew in importance. The European Union was obviously not ready to expand to encompass more of greater Europe. The Council of Europe became the essential European organization with this purpose. It took on greater importance in setting the European standard for respect of democracy and civil rights, and human rights. The Convention of the Council of Europe set a high bar for membership with regard to democracy and human rights. Countries that aspired to COE membership had to meet those standards. This was the first precondition to participating in European harmonization or integration. Some wanted to dilute the COE requirements in this regard, but the majority insisted that these standards hold.

The Council of Europe also played a role in preparing and strengthening good governance in the emerging European democracies. They helped the aspiring new members to establish or improve their systems of governance to meet European Council standards. These activities were very important to us as well. However, it took us some time to recognize that we should also join with

the Council of Europe in assisting this process.

We also were slow to recognize that the Council of Europe could provide us an effective channel also for improving cooperation with Europe. It provided a useful backdoor into the EU itself in getting ideas and concepts across to the EU leadership. The Council of Europe offered great potential for U.S.-European Cooperation on equal terms.

In the beginning we had a stand-offish attitude toward the Council of Europe. For reasons I do not understand we concentrated all of our diplomatic resources in dealing directly with the EU Commission and Council. We allowed the process to develop into an “Us and Them” relationship, rather than into a cooperative relationship. Europe and the United States were more and more defining themselves as separate entities. The concept of an Atlantic community had become secondary to the notion of European integration. We were faced with a EU bloc. We had to deal with a bloc, not with a group of allies. This made reaching agreements very difficult. The EU had to first work out its own common decisions. It would take considerable negotiations, discussions and concessions among them to come to an agreed EU position. Often this reflected a lowest common denominator between them. When we got into the discussions or negotiations were faced with a EU position that had little or no flexibility. This produced a lot of tension in these discussions. Sometimes we tried to use surrogates within the EU to reflect our views. But this was not always useful or possible.

The Council of Europe, working within the process of harmonization and cooperation, offered a forum that might have been easier to work with. Several European non EU countries welcomed our participation in that forum. They saw potential benefits in getting an alignment of views with the United States that could help strengthen their own hand in dealing with the EU. After all, they were outsiders too. The Council of Europe was also a place where we could contribute to the form and development of new laws, procedures and regulations to cover new developments and new technologies. If we worked together in designing these laws, we could eliminate unnecessary differences and head off potential future problems. This was important, for example in the new computer technology, information technology and pharmacology and bio-engineering technology areas. This was also true in areas of social reform and cultural cooperation.

I believe that the Council of Europe should have been used by the United States as a potential forum where we could influence our European friends and allies on these broader issues, gauge their attitudes and fashion new approaches. We also could have used the Council of Europe better to work toward good governance in the newly emerging European democracies.

Q: '89 was when the heavens fell and you ended up with a whole Eastern Europe which was clamoring to get in.

COMRAS: I have to tell you a story about that, too. July 1989 was the final month of my assignment to Strasbourg. It was also the month that Gorbachev came to town. He had visited Paris and was scheduled to make a major address to a combined session of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Before getting into this story let me step back and explain to you the difference between the

parliaments.

The European Parliament is the legislative branch of the European Union. Members of the European parliament are elected directly by an electorate in each of the member countries.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe predates the European Parliament. It was established as a consultative organ within the Council of Europe. It is composed of national parliamentarians who are selected by their peers to represent their national parliaments in the Council of Europe. Each member of the Parliamentary Assembly is also a member of his national parliament. The delegations from those national parliaments must represent all the significant political factions that sit in the national parliament according to a complex formula established by the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly has no real legislative power, but can only make recommendations to the Council of Europe's Council of Ministers, or to the national government. However, as they are sitting members of their own national parliaments, and representative of those institutions, their recommendations can carry a lot of weight.

Anyway Gorbachev decided that rather than pick and choose between these two important European Parliamentary institutions, it would be best to speak to both of them together. At the time both parliaments met in the same building, the Palais de l'Europe in Strasbourg, but on different dates. So a joint session had to be specially arranged. This was to be the first joint session ever. But Gorbachev was a big enough draw to get both parliaments to agree to such an arrangement.

Gorbachev's visit to Strasbourg turned into a major event for the Europeans and for our small Consulate General. The speech he gave had great historic significance. He used it to announce the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. I remember well the moment that he got to that part of the speech. He stopped reading his text. He hesitated for a moment and then he said "These are words, but I can assure you that you will see the deeds in the reflection of these words." I was very excited about his speech and these words. I had Senator Alphonse D'Amato with me in the Gallery at the time. He had come to Strasbourg with a small congressional delegation to represent the United States.

When the speech ended I ran back to the Consulate and called Washington immediately. They were just opening in the morning for business. I went over the text of the speech and told the Office that I report to in the State Department that "Gorbachev just announced the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine." I couldn't get anyone back in Washington to take me seriously. They dismissed my analysis and asked only about what he had to say in the speech about arms control. At the time there was a small crisis with the placement of long range missiles in Europe. They asked me to read them the part of the text dealing with arms control. I did. The only response I got was - "We don't see anything new in the speech, Why don't you just send it in?" I told them I thought they were crazy. Man, this is the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine." They said, "Well, send it in and we'll look at it." I got the speech off to them right away and I wrote my own reporting telegram laying out my interpretations. I told them that the speech represented the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It's in that reporting cable. Nobody took it seriously. Ten days later I left Strasbourg on reassignment. In November, we saw the events that Gorbachev said would reflect the words in his speech. I had it right. The Department had it wrong. We now attribute to

that speech by Gorbachev the announcement of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Q: It does point out that nobody was really ready for the earth shaking change that happened at the end of 1989. Here was a precursor of that and nobody was thinking in those terms.

COMRAS: Yes. It did catch everybody by surprise. I remember the thrill of the surprise of watching the Berlin Wall come tumbling down. It was a really...

Q: We'll cut it off here. I'd like to talk next about what your impression was of the composition of this, the clout that each had, both the European Parliament and the Council of Europe and the rivalry or how that harmonized, how you operated in this...

Today is December 6, 2002. You were in Strasbourg from when to when?

COMRAS: From July 1985 to August of 1989.

Q: Let's talk about how you saw the various elements of Europeanization that were in Strasbourg fitting together or not fitting together.

COMRAS: Strasbourg provided a very interesting vantage point to see what was happening in Europe. The city is right on the Franco-German border and right in the heart of Western Europe. It had a vocation as a European Capital dating back to the end of the War and the establishment of the first organizations for European unity. Strasbourg's history reflected the history of Europe and the historic tensions between Germany and France. Both countries felt strong emotional ties to Strasbourg.

The town reflects characteristics of both France and Germany. It was logical that it be considered the first capital devoted to post war European unification. In 1947, with Winston Churchill there, the Council of Europe was established in Strasbourg with the task of working toward the peaceful unification of Europe. The organization grew from an initial membership of nine countries to 23 countries by the time I left in 1989. It is considerably bigger now.

Q: We're talking about '85 to '89. From your vantage point, how did the elements of trying to put Europe together work?

COMRAS: The unification of Europe was proceeding on two separate tracks. A fast track represented by the European Community and a slow track represented by the Council of Europe. There was growing tension between these two tracks as the Council of Europe tried to define a role that was both consistent with, but different from the role of the European Community.

The European Community was the main economic and political force in Europe. It was growing rapidly in importance. Even the countries that originally opted out of the European Community began to reconsider their position. EC expansion was a foregone conclusion.

The Council of Europe seemed to be receding in importance. Its actions were already dominated by the EC bloc of countries. It looked to some that the Council of Europe would be bypassed or shunted aside by the EC. Some argued that the Council of Europe had become redundant.

But, on the other hand, there were also a number of European leaders that recognized that further expansion of the European Community was not imminent and that special consideration had to be given to maintaining the cohesion of the broader Europe. In their view the Council of Europe's mandate should be redefined and the organization reinvigorated.

The Council of Europe was given a new mandate in the late 1980s to maintain social and cultural cohesion among European Countries, to foster new openings toward democracy and human rights throughout Europe, and to provide a place for consultation that could serve the broader European Populace. If the European Community was economic Europe and political Europe, the Council of Europe was going to be value Europe. The notion of social policy, human rights became its calling card. This included also greater stress on legal cooperation, particularly in new areas, such as computer privacy.

The Council of Europe was directed to play an important role in pursuing European Unity and acting as an eventual gateway for the rest of Europe into the European Community.

Q: What sort of role were you playing?

COMRAS: The Strasbourg Consulate General's main responsibility was to deal with the European institutions in Strasbourg. This was one of our diplomatic windows on Europe. The State Department had kept it as a small window - probably smaller than it should have been. But, nevertheless, it (We) provided a valuable perspective on what was going on in Europe. The Consulate was, in fact, the U.S. link with the organization of the Broader Europe.

Of course, the U.S.' major emphasis was with the European Community. That's where we put most of our diplomatic chips. We had left only one small chip - our small consulate in Strasbourg - to deal with the Council of Europe.

I'm not sure I ever understood the State Department's reluctance to develop stronger relations with the Council of Europe. We were always so standoffish, even when the Council of Europe made overtures to us. These included invitations for us to send high level U.S. government officials to Council of Europe working groups and sessions. They even offered us the opportunity to have an observer ambassador in their midst. We (the Department of States) weren't interested. I guess we were just too EU-centric.

We didn't foresee the important role the Council of Europe would play vis a vis Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We thought that the CSCE, which subsequently became the OSCE would be the more important forum for bringing Eastern Europe and the Newly emerging states into mainstream Europe and to closer relations with the West. I didn't think the OSCE could play that role. First of all the CSCE/OSCE was formed to allow dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It was not created as a forum for strengthening or fostering democracy, human rights or open market economies.

The Council of Europe was dedicated to these principles.

The CSCE/OSCE represented a mélange of varying standards when it came to democracy and human rights. It represented the lowest common denominator among its member countries. The Council of Europe had set a much higher standard, and we wanted to get these countries in the East to reflect this higher standard.

Despite considerable disinterest in Washington, I remained very active in establishing and fostering relationships between the United States and the Council of Europe. I was particularly successful in creating new relationships between the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the U.S. Congress. This included putting together a joint Worldwide democracy building project that became known as the Strasbourg Conference on Democracy. I also was very active in assuring U.S. attitudes and positions were known and reflected in discussions within the Committee of Ministers and the Parliament. I represented the United States at a number of COE sponsored gatherings dealing with legal, social and cultural issues. I am very proud of the record I established there. My work there was recognized by a Superior Honor Award from the State Department. I was also honored by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe when they formally presented me with their President' medal for my contributions to U.S.-European Relations.

I should tell you also that a good part of the period between 1985 and 1987 was taken up with another distraction. This was the decision taken by the State Department in 1987 to close the U.S. Consulate General in Strasbourg for budgetary reasons. Strasbourg was among 15 Consulates designated for closing as a cost cutting measure.

This planned move was a clear indication that many in the State Department did not understand the unique and important non consular role that the mission in Strasbourg played. It also showed the same amount of ignorance at the Embassy in Paris. The embassy was willing to sacrifice Strasbourg in order to keep all of the other consulates - in Lyon, Bordeaux and Marseilles. They rationalized that our work in Strasbourg could be handled via the EU Mission in Brussels.

The planned closing of the Strasbourg consulate became something of a *cause celebre* on both sides of the Atlantic.

In early 1987 we got word that the State Department had decided to close up to 15 additional consulates in the second phase of its cost cutting program. These cuts were being made to reflect continuing shortfalls in the State Departments budget. The State department had originally intended to close Lyon in this phase, rather than Strasbourg. But, under pressure from Ambassador Rodgers in Paris, had put that move on hold. But, there was still a need to cut at least one consulate in France. An agreement was finally worked out between the embassy in Paris, the U.S. Mission to the European Community in Brussels, and the European Bureau in the State Department that the Strasbourg Consulate would be closed, the functions of the consulate vis a vis the Council of Europe would be transferred to the Mission in Brussels, and the embassy in Paris would allow three of its positions to be transferred to Brussels to cover the additional work. Of course, nobody consulted me about any of this.

Well, I thought this was a bid mistake and I made by feelings known in a dissent channel message to Washington. I was surprised by how many other posts and personages in the European Bureau agreed with me. But having their support apparently was not enough to turn this train around.

When word leaked out from Washington about the Post closing plans, the city of Strasbourg became very upset. They immediately undertook an important public relations campaign in Washington and hired some high powered lobbyists to support their position. Strasbourg was already in a major international battle to keep their designation as the seat of the European Parliament, which wanted to move permanently to Brussels. They weren't going to allow this happen, and they certainly didn't want to see the United States also pulling the rug from under them on the importance of Strasbourg as a European capital, or of the Council of Europe as a European Institution.

Strasbourg found many important allies in the U.S. Congress. The Congress, which already knew Strasbourg well because of its historical importance and because of their relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, began to question the wisdom of the State Department's decision to include the Strasbourg Consulate in the list to be closed. It was in this context that Senator Fritz Hollings from North Carolina, during a visit to Strasbourg that summer made the point to tell me personally, "Vic, They will close the Strasbourg Consulate over my dead body. I helped to liberate Strasbourg. I know how important it is." This same strong reaction was shared by a number of Senators. In fact, one article in the Washington Post ran an article on the issue entitled "Senators Helms and Pell Finally Agree!" They both agreed that the Congress should act to keep the Strasbourg Consulate open. Amendments were placed in the State Department Appropriations which made this reaction clear. The amendments provided that if Strasbourg was closed, no new diplomatic posts could be established until Strasbourg was reopened. In the end, the State Department backed down and Strasbourg was never closed. But, this issue took about a year to resolve. Let me add a postscript. Our consulates in Lyon and Bordeaux were eventually closed, and then reopened several years later at great additional expense to the U.S. taxpayers.

There were many in Washington and Paris who blamed me for the Congressional reactions. I also was criticized heavily for my dissent message which, I might say was leaked by others, not me. This all led to need for me to file a grievance concerning my subsequent treatment by the Department regarding this issue. I won that grievance. But it certainly cost me several years in my own career. It became a serious handicap I had to overcome.

Q: How did you find the embassy in Paris? In a way you were technically under them but your job was really quite different. How did they relate to you?

COMRAS: It took some working together to figure out the right relationship between the Consulate and Paris and between the Consulate and Brussels. In the beginning, Ambassador Joe Rogers did not understand the role the consulate played in terms of the European institutions. He was focused on his own assets in France. He understood the role of the consulates in Lyon, Bordeaux and Marseilles. They were outposts of the Embassy and provided some limited

traditional consular and trade services. The post in Strasbourg was different. It didn't seem to do as much in these areas as the other consulates did. So, for him, the Strasbourg consulate was less important.

It was hard to change his attitude in this regard. But, he did come around eventually to seeing the importance of Strasbourg to U.S. interests.

I don't want to underplay the role our Consulate did play vis a vis our bilateral relations with France. Our consular district represented an important part of France, including Alsace, Lorraine, Franche-Compte, and Belfort. The consulate covered the political and economic happenings in this region and reported on them regularly. You know, all the consulates in France were important outposts. They served a very important function in following, and influencing, what was happening in France.

Jacobinism in France had centralized authority over all of France in Paris. But, France was still ruled largely from the interior. The French political system allows for politicians to carry several political mandates simultaneously. Every French politician was also, first and most, a local politician. He was also a mayor, Local counselor, leader of the provincial regional assembly. That was his political base. Almost all of these political features were only part time residents in Paris. Their homes were in the regions and provinces. They spent only a few days a week in Paris. And when they were in Paris they were very very busy. It was very difficult for the embassy to establish any close relationship with them. Rather, the embassy had to deal mostly with the senior bureaucracy which ran the country under the guidance of the political leadership.

Ironically, the Consulates had closer relations with many of these political figures than the embassy. The embassy never wanted to admit this, but it was pretty much so. They might meet the politicians in their offices for short meetings, or, at most over Lunch. The ambassador might also get them to a reception or a formal dinner. But in the provinces we got to know them at home, and with their families, and mostly in informal setting. These were settings when they were "local politicians," catering to their local constituency and political base. I got to know many of them well, and on a first name basis. Over time, Joe Rogers began to understand this, perhaps more even than some of his predecessors.

Q: How were your contacts at the Council of Europe? Did you have to be careful you weren't getting crosswise from our embassy in Brussels dealing in European affairs?

COMRAS: Strasbourg was a unique situation. It was a small post with a big agenda little understood in Washington or Brussels. That gave me quite a bit of independence. I reported what I thought important. I gave Washington, Brussels and Paris my best shot in interpreting events. I contributed to our dialogue with Europe and our understanding of Europe. I made friends and influenced people - more on the European side than in Washington. I was an activist.

I took a very active stance vis a vis the Council of Europe and integrated our post into the activities conducted by the 21 other European Missions to the Council of Europe (all of which were headed by an Ambassador). I became the ex-officio representative of the United States to the Council of Europe even though we weren't members.

I had a great number of frustrations in getting my points across to Washington, and I sometimes had considerable difficulties in getting Washington to follow through on its commitments, or on activities related to the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, I was able to keep my credibility with the COE, with Washington, Brussels and Paris. Some of the people in all of these quarters didn't always appreciate me. I made my own bunch of critics, but that went with the territory. But I guess I must have done a good job as I received a nomination and favorable mention in the Director General's Best reporting competition, I received a Superior Honor Award from the Department, and I received the President's Medal from the Council of Europe.

While I was in Strasbourg we got involved in a large number of intergovernmental activities under the auspices of the Council of Europe. I took great pride in the role of the Consulate in setting up the Strasbourg Conference on Parliamentary Democracy. I also met regularly with the members of the Committee of Ministers that ran the Council of Europe. I used these occasions to make sure they were aware of, and considered U.S. views on relevant issues. These included issues related to Yugoslavia, for example, or to Turkey. I was very much involved in advocating the reintegration of Turkey into the Council of Europe after it returned to civilian rule. This was pursuant to U.S. government policy. I also reflected U.S. positions vis a vis the situation in Romania at the time of the Ceausescu and his destruction of the center of historic Bucharest. I handled numerous issues related to computer technology and computer privacy law, attempts to limit the importation of American film and TV programming, and many other related trade issues. I was deeply involved in numerous human rights questions, and proceedings at the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. This included one case where the United States was seeking the extradition of a person to Virginia to stand trial for murder. The case before the European Court of Human Rights dealt with the death penalty, and whether it violated that person's human rights to extradite him to a country which could execute him, or hold him for long periods under the threat of execution (the so-called Death Row Syndrome) There were a whole range of issues.

There were also the normal grist of political comings and goings, including visits by numerous U.S. government officials and a great many congressmen and senators.

I did a lot on the parliamentary side. This included the Strasbourg Parliamentary Conference on Democracy, which was a common effort between the U.S. Congress and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This work included discussions and plans to foster democracy in Eastern European countries that were beginning to show some liberalization in the Gorbachev period.

Strasbourg also was a place for exercising a multiplier effect regarding getting U.S. points across. A large number of European parliamentarians and European Government officials were in Strasbourg at any particular time. We had a number of good opportunities to meet with these officials and to get our points across. I wanted the Consulate to play as large a role as we could on public diplomacy. I think the State Department should have given us more resources for this effort.

I want to tell you that my Wife Sara played a very very important role in this public relations

effort. And she did so without the resources and support she should have gotten for the work. She was truly an unpaid volunteer employee of the U.S. government every day we were in Strasbourg. She provided the settings for so many successful occasions when we could entertain and get to know French leaders and European leaders. She was also always by my side at the very numerous occasions we attended special events and functions. She was an additional translator and interpreter. She was a scheduler and a planner. She provided an enormous service to U.S. interests and the U.S. government. She was busy working alongside me, or on the home front every day.

One cannot understate the important role that principal officer's wives or spouses play. This is particularly the case in small posts. My wife was among the best of these. She established a glowing reputation as a hostess and guest, and as one who gave a volunteer hand whenever and wherever needed. I do believe that she made a greater impact in Strasbourg than I did.

I can understand completely the efforts made by Mrs. Eagleburger to obtain some official recognition and compensation for spouses that work so hard for the United States with little or no recognition or compensation.

Q: I would think that the parliamentarians would be quite approachable because it wasn't as though they were sitting in the middle of their constituency and all that. In other words, they were somewhat fish out of water, too, weren't they, being in Strasbourg?

COMRAS: Absolutely. Strasbourg provided a very good setting in which to establish such relationships, to get to know the parliamentarians. I do believe that some of the conversations I had with members of parliament found their way back into their national parliament discussions. I believe I helped, in some cases, in broadening their understanding of certain issues, and U.S. views on them. You know these parliamentarians also produced a large amount of material during their participation in European Parliament and Parliamentary Assembly sessions that provide some useful and interesting insights into European popular thinking and attitudes toward current affairs issues. I tried to keep abreast of these discussions and, when appropriate to use them to report back to Washington on relevant issues. I think I got some very good insights on European attitudes towards various economic, political, social problems that were also of interest to us.

You know, the Council of Europe was the first international forum to put together a legal convention on the suppression of terrorism. We took great interest in those discussions. They laid down the principle that terrorism crimes should not benefit from the so-called political crimes exception to extradition.

Q: I was talking to someone else who was saying that the Europeans had played this dangerous game of allowing terrorists, if they were working on their home country's soil but doing their nasty stuff to somebody else, they weren't taking them very seriously. In other words, as long as you're not blowing up my people, we'll arrest you but we're not going hard after you. Things came to change after a while.

COMRAS: Well, I know that just about all the Western European countries took terrorism

seriously during the last half of the 1980s. Terrorists were very active in Europe during that period. There was a terrible wave of terrorism throughout Western Europe. It cost the life of our Military Attache in Paris, Colonel Ray. It almost killed our DCM. Bob Homme, my predecessor,, was shot. Our military attaché in Athens was killed. We saw active terrorism throughout Europe - street bombings, train bombings, shootings. These occurred all over the place, Italy, Greece, Germany, France, Spain, Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium. No country seemed able to escape this terrorism. I think the Europeans learned during this period to take terrorism very seriously. I hope they have not forgotten the lessons they learned in that period.

W. ROBERT WARNE
Economic Counselor
Paris (1986-1988)

W. Robert Warne was born in Washington, DC in 1937. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1962 and then served in the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Buenos Aires, Brussels, Kingston, and Paris. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 1, 1995.

Q: Was this Caribbean Initiative a real program?

WARNE: It had a substantial program. The main thing was the preferential trade arrangement. And I think it made a big impact. But it was a long-term program, and it wasn't going to turn things around right away. It certainly helped solidify our effort in the region, and we had congressional support for it. It didn't make as big a difference as we hoped, because, frankly, it depended on those countries' ability to organize their trade to take advantage of it, and a lot of them were slow in responding, such as Jamaica.

And then, finally, my last tour, I went to Paris. Actually, I did it as a last choice. I wanted to leave the Bureau. I felt that I had had enough of working on economic affairs, and I wanted to go overseas as a DCM or ambassador. At that time, I was a minister-counselor, and had been a minister-counselor for three or four years. I ran in competition for about six or seven DCM jobs, and I didn't get one of them. And it finally came down to Caracas. They had a new ambassador, not a career guy, and he chose a different candidate. So I decided to throw the towel in.

I took the job of economic counselor in Paris, as sort of a final assignment. I was in Paris for two years as the man in charge of trade and agriculture and energy and social affairs and labor affairs. I had a wonderful two years. My family and I enjoyed it immensely.

I was elected, among the 24 countries, as the chairman of the trade committee working party and ran the preparations for the Uruguay Round, which was very exciting. We developed some new guidelines for services and for investment and intellectual property protection. It made a substantial contribution to the Round. Got some new guidelines, which developed into the final agreement on agriculture. So we did a lot during those two years.

But I had decided to get out of the Foreign Service. I decided that, since I wasn't going to be an ambassador and I couldn't even get a good DCM job, I ought to go do something else.

Q: When you were in Paris, what was your attitude towards the French and how they viewed us and how we dealt with it? It always seems to be a stormy relationship. Very interesting letter from the French ambassador in the paper today.

WARNE: I saw it. I thought it was well written. I enjoyed it. I had no resentment against the French. I enjoy the French. They're wonderful people. I had a lot of good French friends.

In fact, I had an interesting experience in France. Suzy was here in Washington to take care of our daughter's wedding preparations. This was during the time when there were a lot of French terrorist bombing activities. They identified our apartment as a place where an American diplomat was living. And they just one day called me up and said I couldn't go home, that this was a threat. I said, "What do you want me to do?"

He said, "Get out of town and go stay in a hotel."

So I called a French friend and asked if I could go stay with him in Nice. He had an apartment. So I spent ten days with him down there, and I had a wonderful time.

We still have three or four French friends that stop by. No, I didn't find any problem with the French at all.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you were there?

WARNE: Ed Streator was our ambassador to the OECD.

Q: You were with the OECD.

WARNE: I was at the OECD, yes. And then the last year was Dennis Lamb. Two entirely different personalities.

The OECD was a fascinating place, and it's been very useful. In fact, I just got back from a week at the OECD, where I looked up a lot of the old people I worked with. I did an audit of the Korean effort to get into the OECD, and found that it's even a more vital organization for U.S. interests today than when I was there. It's a sleeper. A lot of people don't know much about it.

Q: Could you explain, what is the OECD?

WARNE: The OECD is a group of 25 countries that have structured themselves to look at international economic issues and collaborate together in dealing with these issues. It's an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan, in which, just after the war, as you know, the U.S. helped with the reconstruction of Europe. And coming out of that was the OECD. It was originally a community which the U.S. planned to coordinate the aid effort, the purpose of which was that we

agreed that we would provide substantial financial aid if the Europeans would, in turn, structure their economies to revitalize their industry and reconstruct the war-torn countries. And the OECD was the framework for the aid program.

Well, it evolved from a major bilateral aid effort to a collaborative effort to manage the world economy, mainly focused in Europe, but throughout the world. And it now has about 16 major directors, handling everything from trade to environment to finance to education to social affairs, labor, industry, and all of the major areas of economic activity, globally. Its purpose is to try to identify emerging problems and to develop, first, an analytical basis for the ways to deal with the problems, and then, secondly, to come up with recommendations and then proposals for governments to take in the way of policy actions. For example, there are five issues that I was dealing with when I was in Paris this last week.

I can give you examples of the things. One is what to do about the stagnant and large unemployment in Europe and, somewhat, in the United States, what policy measures to be taken in the way of training, revitalizing the economies to generate more employment.

Another issue that they're dealing with is the aging population in a number of the member countries. The population of Belgium is projected to decline by ten percent over the next decade. What are the economic consequences of these demographic changes, and how do you cope with them?

A third area that I was dealing with was a new initiative to open up investment worldwide. We're negotiating a new investment instrument that would have a much higher discipline for countries in handling foreign direct investment.

A fourth area was how to restructure the International Energy Agency to better cope with the changing oil situation, particularly on how to help develop oil in the Caspian Sea and in Russia.

A fifth area was concerning new guidelines for environmental issues. How should trade negotiators take environmental concerns into account, and the impact on the environment of expanding trade and new trade opportunities. We're working out some new guidelines.

These are the types of issues. They're very nitty gritty things that a lot of people don't pay a lot of attention to, but are important.

Q: I think this is the sort of thing that I'm trying to bring out in these oral histories. Foreign relations aren't just coups and elections and things like this, but underlying it is a tremendous economic web, where the United States plays a leading role in trying to meet crises. And this is what we're getting.

WARNE: Well, for example, during the time I was at the OECD, my main interest was trying to get a consensus among the major trading countries of the world of what we wanted to do in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations to restructure our trade relations. We were, for the first time, advocating that we should have discipline on investment that all of us could agree to: national treatment, right of establishment, of transparency, of rules.

Another area was on intellectual property protection. What should be the copyright rules, and how could they be standardized worldwide to protect U.S. companies and others from invasion of their copyrights.

And then a third area, for the first time, we were taking up services -- accounting, business services, financial services worldwide -- and what disciplines could be established in this new area that is now the most important part of our trade. It's the most important part of our economy, and we don't have any international disciplines in these areas.

We were able to adopt, in the working group that I was chairing, a consensus. And we worked at it very hard. I had a mandate. Every week I would be putting forward a new paper and a new proposal, and we would dialogue about it, and we would get countries to react to it, and then we'd draw up some guidelines. I had a steady stream of people from Washington that would participate in this. We had people from USTR, primarily, that would come out and help me in the preparation of this. And we got a very good working framework out of the 24 countries, which we submitted to the Geneva negotiations, which were the basis for these agreements. So the OECD played a very good catalytic role in getting this Round.

We did the same on agriculture. We analyzed the cost of subsidies on all the major commodities, and we compared the amount of subsidies among each country, and then began to create a framework for how these subsidies could be reduced. We got a very substantial first step, not a final step, in an agricultural agreement out of the Rounds.

So, yes, we made quite an impact on it. And, as a result, trade will expand substantially in Western Europe.

DENIS LAMB
Ambassador to OECD
Paris (1987-1990)

Ambassador Denis Lamb was born in Ohio 1937. He received his BS from Columbia University and MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1964, he was posted in Fort de France, Paris and Brussels. He was interviewed by Ray Ewing on September 19, 2005.

Q: Okay, where did you go from there and how did that come to happen?

LAMB: I become the permanent representative to the OECD, which carries ambassadorial rank. The route back to OECD was circuitous. With the support of Doug McMinn, Secretary Shultz put my name up to be the U.S. representative to what is now the European Union, an assignment I welcomed, although, to be honest, the day-to-day workings of trade policy can be pretty tedious. I wasn't thrilled with the prospect of returning to Brussels, but the assignment was a good fit. (And let's face it, the chances of a career officer being named ambassador to an

important post in Europe were and are slim.)

At that time, having switched jobs with Jim Baker, former treasury secretary Don Regan was President Reagan's chief of staff. His assistant, whose title was secretary of the cabinet, was Alfred Kingon. Al, who had been publisher of Institutional Investor, came to work for Regan in the Treasury Department. Although he was mainly concerned with public affairs, Al would occasionally represent the Treasury on the Trade Policy Review Group, where I represented State. (Al was the White House official I contacted to try to get "fair trade" out of the text of the Reagan speech we discussed earlier). When my nomination papers crossed Al's desk, he decided he was going to go to Brussels. He actually called me and told me that he was going to claim the assignment. Thanks, Al. The timing was good for him because Don Regan eventually left his post as chief of staff (pushed out by Nancy Reagan), which would have left Kingon in a difficult situation. My consolation prize was that my name would go over as the candidate to be the permanent representative to the OECD. (I did not deal directly with Secretary Shultz on any of this but, as relayed to me by Doug McMinn, the secretary said that he could not do anything about the Brussels assignment, but that if I wanted to go to Paris he would see to it that the nomination went through.)

Q: This was '87, the year before the election.

LAMB: Right. It raised the question of what would happen after the election. If a Democrat won, I would probably be sent packing. If a Republican won, my chances of staying were better. But I put those concerns aside.

I did have another option. At Frank Carlucci's initiative, I was interviewed -- at arm's length so to speak -- for the top economic job on the National Security Council staff that Carlucci then headed. The interview by Ken Adelman, then head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, had a pro forma quality; my sense was that I was being offered the job. I turned it down, probably due to the lure of acquiring an ambassadorial flag. Who knows, if I had accepted, you might be talking to one of the principals of the Carlyle Group (Carlucci is chairman emeritus of Carlyle). On my yacht.

Terry Sanford chaired my Senate hearing. I was a member of a panel of three or four, so the attention of the senators was shifting back and forth; none of us received especially close scrutiny. Senator Lugar's questions to me focused on soybeans, which I knew something about. Everything was going well until Senator Sanford was about to close the proceedings. "Oh, by the way, Mr. Lamb," he said, "Senator Helms will have some written questions for you." As you know, the prospect of having to answer written questions is never welcome; questions from Jesse Helms could involve serious jeopardy. I had no idea what might have caught his interest or the interest of his staff.

Q: You waited by the mailbox?

LAMB: In trepidation. But no questions were forthcoming and the nomination proceeded quickly to the floor and passed. I was able to start preparing to move to Paris.

Q: And you did the ambassadorial seminar?

LAMB: Yes, I did. The seminar was very good. Two former ambassadors, Tony Motley and Shirley Temple Black, conducted it. We had a good mix of political and career people. The Foreign Service participants were part of the teaching process. We were helping our political appointee colleagues to acquire background that would help them do their jobs. Some were rather full of themselves, but most took good notes. I thought that having Tony and Shirley as co-chairs helped the political appointees to absorb the lessons on offer.

Q: Shirley Temple Black did the ambassadorial seminar, coming from San Francisco, pretty much throughout the Reagan Administration. She had been chief of mission to Ghana during the Nixon Administration; during the first Bush Administration she went to Prague. I've always thought it a little odd that this California movie industry president that we had (Reagan) never offered her anything other than the ambassadorial seminar, which I think she did well. I also went through it with her as a leader, respected her and felt like when I did go to Ghana later, that having known her was helpful to me.

LAMB: When she was in Prague we renewed our acquaintance at a chiefs of mission meeting in Oslo. She is a gracious lady.

Q: Well, why don't you talk a little bit about what the job as U.S. permanent representative to the OECD entails, both within the mission and as far as dealing with Washington and, I suppose, dealing with the other ambassadors. You knew what you were getting into in many ways, but how different was it this time?

LAMB: What do ambassadors do when policy makers have access to CNN, Fox News, the telephone, and email? One of my notions, which we have already touched upon, is that ambassadors help Washington coordinate itself. The agencies have overlapping interests that they have difficulty in reconciling. Ambassadors are well placed to identify conflicts, whether actual or potential, and to take steps get them resolved. That can mean simply asking people to work out their differences. It can mean injecting a proposal of one's own that the bureaucracy in Washington is forced to address and in the process sort out its differences. It can involve informal contacts, telephone calls, personal relationships, putting up visitors at the residence and talking to them informally about emerging problems.

Similarly, within an embassy or mission, conflicts can appear in local variants. The ambassador has to be alert to those and to try to reconcile divergent views.

An ambassador assigned to an international organization continuously interacts with the permanent staff. The OECD has about 2,000 people on its payroll. While the secretariat is pledged to support the committee structure and serve the member governments, the not so surprising reality is that it can have an agenda of its own. It needs to be motivated, guided, and occasionally curbed, reprimanded, and otherwise brought under control. I found in looking back over how the U.S. has been represented at the OECD that ambassadors tended either to seek to intimidate the secretariat or to seduce it. In either case, the objective is to bend the institution to your will. Well, temperamentally, I'm a conciliator and a motivator. That meant that I preferred

seduction to intimidation. I wanted to work with the Secretariat. This entailed a minor course correction. My immediate predecessor leaned in the other direction. Ambassador Edward Streator arrived at the OECD in a way analogous to my own. He should have gone to NATO, but that assignment did not materialize.

Q: He'd been for many years the number two in London.

LAMB: Yes, and he headed the military-political office (RPM) in the European bureau before that. He was expert in security matters and intimately familiar with NATO. At OECD he thought the best way forward for the U.S. under his leadership was to promote change by aggressively seeking to hive off activities we did not like and moving resources to those we thought should be beefed up. Surveying the scene when I arrived, I thought that the results achieved to date had been modest, but had caused a certain amount of turmoil. I decided to turn the whole thing around 180 degrees and try a different approach. Ed's and my goals weren't all that different. It was a matter of style.

Q: And were you encouraged in that direction by the powers that be in Washington or was this pretty much something you could do on your own?

LAMB: I had the latitude to make the adjustment. The key, as I saw it, was to bring the mission staff along and to have them back me in my approach.

Q: And who was the secretary general at the time?

LAMB: As I mentioned earlier, the secretary general was Jean-Claude Paye. Prior to being elected secretary general, he had been the senior permanent official at the French foreign ministry, the Quai d'Orsay. One of my predecessors, Abe Katz, had almost single-handedly engineered Paye's election by convincing U.S. officials that it would be advantageous to have a French figure, to put it crudely, inside the tent p----- out, than outside the tent p----- in. Although Jean-Claude was an experienced, adroit French diplomat, he shared the conceit of many French officials that their role in life was to speak truth to power, i.e., to get under the skin of the United States. I had encountered him at the Quai on CoCom issues when I was in the Department. I found him difficult to deal with at the time because French interests were best served by opposing us rather than seeking accommodation. Still, I thought that Abe Katz was right to back Paye. I thought that he would strive to be evenhanded as secretary general. Paye and Ed Streator did not get along. Perhaps there was too much history there, although I can't be sure. It having been said that "you can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar," I decided to go on a charm offensive. Ultimately, it worked, but Jean-Claude and I got off to a rocky start.

Here's what happened. One of my tasks was to host a regular dinner for the senior members of the of the economic policy committee, chaired by the chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. In addition to the members, Jean-Claude and the head of OECD's economics department attended the dinner. Well, we got the seating wrong -- I went along with the seating plan prepared by the social secretary that I had inherited. Paye was not seated to my right, where he belonged. I blundered and Jean-Claude was frosted. It took a couple of weeks to overcome that, beginning with an abject apology on my part, but eventually we got beyond the incident.

Q: You had nowhere to go but up, presumably.

LAMB: But we did progress from that low point, thankfully. One of the things I did for Jean-Claude was to help him conduct meetings of the Council more efficiently by refraining from speaking unless I had something important to say, a discipline not always exercised by my colleagues. It is not necessary that the United States representative speak to every point and, *mirabile dictu*, it turns out that if you only speak when you have something to say, you are more likely to be listened to. So that worked out. There were other ways that I could be helpful and, in that way, foster the relationship.

Q: I assume there were a number of American nationals in the Secretariat. Was there a senior American of influence?

LAMB: At the time, the OECD had three deputy secretaries general. Today there are four. From the creation of the organization, the senior deputy was always an American national. In the early days that post was held by a serving Foreign Service officer. When I arrived, the American deputy was Jack Myerson. Jack had taken the job on the stipulation that he be allowed to retire from the Service; that had financial advantages for him, but it loosened State's control. When it came time to consider renewing Jack's term I told him that I wanted to bring in a new deputy, someone with recent international economic policy experience in State. It was handled well and Jack, although he was willing to extend, was quite happy. But I made a serious tactical mistake. As part of my "charm offensive," and because it appealed to me as good personnel policy, I asked the Department to put up three candidates and let Jean-Claude choose one of them. This prolonged the process. To boot, the matter was in the hands of Under Secretary Allen Wallis. Lacking a bureaucratic sensibility, he did not bring the matter to closure on a timely basis. As a result, when Secretary of the Treasury Baker was in Paris for some OECD event, he took Jean-Claude aside and put forward his own candidate, Robert Cornell, a deputy assistant secretary in his department. Paye selected Bob. Although Bob turned out to be a perfectly fine deputy secretary general, I regretted our inability to fill the post with a deserving FSO. When Bob retired after six years, the job returned to State Department control.

As to the presence of Americans in senior secretariat positions, the U.S. is under-represented in relation to its contribution to the budget (if that is a useful gauge). We staffed about seven percent of the top posts. The reason is that, whereas an OECD posting adds luster to the resumes of economists from most OECD countries, in the U.S. an OECD assignment is often viewed as a detour on the path to advancement. But we did our best, with the help of the Department, to publicize job openings and find U.S. candidates to fill them.

Q: Well, I was going to ask you a little bit about the structure of the mission itself at the time you were the permanent representative, perhaps compared with what it was earlier and who was your deputy and how all that worked. Was he from Treasury Department?

LAMB: No. By the time I arrived, the deputy chief of mission was an FSO. The Treasury official in charge of the economic and finance section, John Lange, was designated deputy chief for economics and finance, but he did not have a role in the overall management of the mission. Tim

Deal was the DCM I inherited from Ambassador Streater. He served with me for a year and helped me with the transition from the Streater approach to the Lamb approach, while avoiding obvious signs of discontinuity. He did a wonderful job for me.

Tim was succeeded by Dick Hecklinger, whom I recruited, and who was with me for the remainder of my tour. (Later Dick served as U.S. ambassador in Bangkok. Following that, he succeeded Sally Shelton as the U.S. deputy secretary general at the OECD.) I relied on Dick to keep in touch with thinking in Washington on matters the mission was dealing with, as well as on broader geopolitical considerations as the cold war was winding down. When Washington opened for business at about 3 pm Paris time, Dick would get on the phone and gather the intelligence that was so helpful to the mission in charting its course in a changing environment.

Q: The United States Mission to the OECD was still located in the OECD building?

LAMB: Yes.

Q: And you would have Marines on your floor or security procedures?

LAMB: We had secure access to the mission and Marines provided security. It was an honor to return their salutes. But the troops were later removed on the advice of a team of State inspectors. The inspectors told me that the purpose of Marines is not to protect people but to protect classified information, and that the mission did not have enough classified documents in its files to warrant a Marine presence. So the Marines were withdrawn and replaced by local hire guards. Although I protested the decision at the time, the new arrangements were perfectly satisfactory.

Q: Was the work of the Council the main area that you spent time on, whereas the economic policy committee, the development advisory committee, some of the other activities, were largely staffed, led if you will, by people from Washington?

LAMB: I did work with delegates to committees, but this did not ordinarily involve heavy lifting. There was one exception. The president's science adviser, Bill Graham, led the U.S. delegation to the Committee on Science and Technology Policy. Bill wanted to negotiate a framework agreement that would encourage and establish ground rules for intergovernmental cooperation on large science projects. To help him accomplish this goal, I got into the trenches, sat with him in committee, and helped him reach agreement on a document that met his needs.

In the Council, I handled the routine matters such as approving budgets and negotiating communiqué language, but I also advanced several initiatives. I went to Paris with three goals in mind. I was following the advice of Warren Christopher who, you will recall, had advised one of my predecessors, Herb Salzman, to limit his reach in the job.

One of these goals was to bring South Korea in as an OECD member. There were a number of reasons for this. One of them was that the organization needed better geographic balance. Despite the presence of the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, it remained too heavily weighted towards Europe. Second, we believed that membership would help consolidate

democracy in Korea. (In 1987 President Chun left office in the face of student unrest and international pressure in the build up to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. A sixth constitution was passed on October 12, 1987 and Roh Tae-Woo succeeded Chun in the first direct presidential elections held since 1971. Once in office, Roh instituted further political reforms and launched a bold anti-corruption campaign.) Also, we felt that OECD membership would contribute to the liberalization of the Korean economy. At the time, Korea maintained controls on inward direct investment. If it adopted the OECD Convention, Korea would have to abide by OECD's obligatory Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, which would require it to lift controls. Finally, although this was only a distant cloud on the horizon, the idea of establishing an "Asian-OECD" was in the air. We wanted to foreclose this possibility.

Contacts between OECD and South Korea increased after my late-80s initiative, but formal accession negotiations did not begin until 1995. Korea was somewhat wary of the liberalization it would have to undertake to become a member (even though it was understood that liberalization could be phased in), and it was reluctant to give up its status as a developing country. (Some OECD members, including the U.S., were adamant that Korea abandon its membership in the G-77, a pressure group active in the UN system.) Korea joined the OECD in late 1996.

A second goal was to secure an agreement among OECD countries to promote and protect foreign direct investment. In addition to the capital movements code that I mentioned a moment ago, OECD countries adhered to a voluntary "national treatment" instrument that committed them to treat foreign-owned enterprises no less favorably than domestic enterprises in like situations. With Washington's backing, I proposed in Council that we transform this voluntary undertaking into a binding agreement. (I should note that my objective was both to make the world safer for U.S. investors and to counter, admittedly in a modest way, pressures for investment protectionism in our own country. Although the purchases by Japanese investors of iconic U.S. real estate -- Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach -- did not take place until 1989 and 1992 respectively, concern over Japanese investment was already building.

Although the Council said "no" to the initiative, it didn't die. Discussions ensued in the relevant OECD committee. By 1995 (yes, as we observe yet again, the wheels do grind slowly), agreement was reached to begin negotiations on a "free-standing" treaty, i.e., an undertaking not embedded in the OECD, governing foreign investment. Within the U.S. government, this involved settling a dispute between Treasury, which championed its approach of negotiating bilateral investment treaties ("bits"), and other agencies that preferred a more comprehensive approach.

The prospective treaty was dubbed the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or MAI. The approach followed the traditional OECD model of working out the details of a policy issue within the OECD before opening the process to other countries in the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, the effort came to naught in 1997. The MAI encountered opposition from the EC Commission, which favored negotiating in the WTO; from developing countries opposed to relinquishing control over inward investment; and from opponents of globalization. France -- where anti-globalization forces, united under the banner of the organization ATTAC -- held sway, administered the death knell. In October 1997, France withdrew from the negotiations,

insuring their collapse. In the wake of the debacle, one had to wonder whether the effort had been necessary. Developing countries continued to seek foreign investors and in the vast majority of cases treated them well. Doing so, after all, was necessary to attract additional investment.

The third thing I set out to do was to promote economic reform in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact countries were slipping out from under the control of the Soviet Union and it was important to demonstrate that the West was going to assist them. It was also important, frankly, that the OECD demonstrate its relevance in a changing political landscape. The idea I came up with, aided by Dick Hecklinger and others in the mission, was that OECD should establish an East-West Center to advise on how best to make the transition from centrally-planned to market economies. I came back to Washington, talked to people in the Department, including Bob Zoellick, and on the NSC staff, including Bob Blackwill, and secured their support. I didn't think we needed much money -- a million dollars would do. We would leverage the million into four million by raising a proportionate amount from the other OECD members. As to the source of the funds, there was a bill moving in the Senate, sponsored by Joe Lieberman, which appropriated money for Eastern Europe that I thought we could tap.

To make a long story short, I got it done. Jean-Claude took some convincing. For some reason, he thought a "center" might drift out of his control. He welcomed the money, but wanted to disperse it throughout the organization. I wanted the visibility that a center offered. I prevailed, although the center remained a small entity and the programs conducted on the behalf of Eastern Europe were decentralized, as Paye (and I, for that matter) wished. The center, now renamed the Center for Cooperation with Non-Members, still exists. It conducts "outreach" to countries such as Brazil, China, as well as many others.

Q: And the million dollars, was that a one time only payment?

LAMB: Well, it was purposefully left a little vague. It was understood it wasn't one time only, but it was also understood that it wasn't part of our regular assessed contribution. Other countries dealt with their share of the cost based on their administrative structures. Most of them simply added it to their regular bill. I knew that our (annual) million would have to be worked into our regular contribution eventually and that doing so would be an enormous headache for Washington. I went ahead anyway, and I am glad that I did.

Q: 'Cause while you were there from '87 to '90 the Soviet Union would end, the Berlin Wall came down, Europe changed dramatically. Were there other aspects of all of that that affected, that impacted on the OECD or the OECD was able to influence?

LAMB: I've mentioned Secretary of State Baker's strategic vision, which centered on U.S. participation in important regional groupings. Taking that as a starting point, I tried to figure out a way to insert the OECD into his concept. Dick Hecklinger and I spent hours pondering how to fit the OECD -- a global organization with a limited membership -- into Baker's construct. To get a better sense of their thinking, I went to Washington and visited with Counselor Bob Zoellick, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bob Kimmitt, and Jim Dobbins, who was then the principal deputy in EUR. I am sorry to say that the effort failed. There was no mention of the

OECD in the series of speeches that scoped out the institutional scheme for post-cold war diplomacy.

Q: But I assume that some of the other permanent missions were not terribly active, maybe understaffed. You want to talk about some that were really good and effective?

LAMB: We've touched on the question earlier. Let me say here that the Japanese had the largest mission and they were very active. Many of the smaller missions made the most of limited resources and were quite effective. The French didn't have a permanent delegation of any size because they drew on their ministries to do the OECD work.

Q: Must be a little bit like the Organization of American States in Washington, where we do have a mission but there are lots of other people. Want to talk a little bit about, I want to go on to the political aspect, but maybe a little bit more about sort of attitudes towards this international economic coordinating body on the part of the two Secretaries of State that you were especially involved with. George Shultz, an economist by background, probably enjoyed coming to Paris for OECD meetings. Jim Baker, who probably didn't have quite the same background.

LAMB: You know, it was just the opposite. Let me step back and say that I had a rare opportunity to watch Shultz and Baker interact in Washington. Baker hosted a regular breakfast meeting, once a week I believe, when both he and Shultz were in Washington. Their deputies (Darman and Wallis) sat in, as did National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci. Shultz usually brought along Doug McMinn. When McMinn was unavailable, I attended.

The meeting was very relaxed, with no agenda and no record made. It covered whatever happened to be on their minds. In his approach to international economic policy, Baker differed radically from Shultz. Baker was not passive. For example, take intervention (buying or selling dollars) in foreign currency markets. Shultz was philosophically and temperamentally opposed to intervention. Baker thought being seen to be managing things was an important part of his job. Remember the Plaza Accord of September 1985, in which the G-5 countries agreed to intervene to devalue the dollar. That's something that I can't imagine Shultz having anything to do with.

Baker supported the OECD because he liked to use international economic institutions and to be seen using them. He wanted to foster the notion that these institutions were monitoring and guiding the system under the tutelage of political leaders and acting to benefit citizens. (Baker attended several OECD meetings, both before and during my tour as ambassador.)

I have mentioned that Shultz came to the OECD in 1982 to nail down the resolution of the Soviet-European pipeline dispute. Abe Katz, our ambassador at the time, did a fantastic job of preparing the necessary decisions in negotiations in the Council. He worked out the parameters of the IEA study, which dealt with dependence on Soviet gas exports and the OECD study, which addressed the export credit angle. The end game, at the meeting Shultz attended, featured Ambassador Katz moving around the room showing language to other ministers of foreign affairs and nailing down the final agreement. It was an example of what a skilled player in that position can accomplish under pressure.

Q: Usually, though, the communiqués were worked out in advance.

LAMB: Yes, although there were always a few contentious points to be decided by ministers. Nowadays, the organization has replaced the communiqué with a brief chairman's statement. This is an improvement in some ways, although the lengthy communiqués provided guidance for the secretariat on what it should be doing in the interval between meetings. The organization may be relinquishing an important management tool.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit about the International Energy Agency at the time that you were there as permanent representative. Were you responsible for U.S. participation, U.S. relationship with it?

LAMB: I did not have a formal role with respect to the IEA. Although many of my fellow ambassadors represented their countries on the IEA Governing Board, the U.S. was represented by a delegate from Washington

Q: From the Department of State?

LAMB: From the Department of State, yes.

Q: So on, you wouldn't go to meetings, would your mission, you, perhaps others on your staff, meet with the Secretariat, other delegations before meetings, Governing Board meetings?

LAMB: An energy officer on my staff dealt with the IEA secretariat. The deputy executive director of the IEA has always been an American from the State Department. During my tenure John Ferriter, who had served with me in mission in the 60s, held the position. If I needed to know anything about IEA matters, it was easy to pick up the phone and talk to John.

Q: Is the secretariat of the IEA co-located with that of the OECD?

LAMB: It occupies separate quarters in a building on the Left Bank and has its own meeting rooms there.

Q: But the, to the extent anybody was involved between meetings it would be the OECD mission, as opposed to the embassy?

LAMB: Correct. The embassy had no role.

Q: You want to say anything about the relationship with the embassy?

I was fortunate in my relations with the U.S. ambassadors to France who served with me: Joe Rogers, who was in place when I arrived, and Walter Curley, who succeeded Joe. We met once a month, informally over drinks, in our respective residences, just to chat. Ambassadors can't be "one of the boys," so, aside from your deputy and your spouse, to whom you might confide your occasional doubts and misgivings, you are alone. Joe and Walter lived in the same bubble and we welcomed the chance to talk candidly about our problems and frustrations, both major and

minor. Joe came to my rescue early on: the Arts in Embassies program that borrows American art for display in embassy residences had run into budget problems and could not ship paintings to hang on my walls. When I mentioned this to Joe, he offered to lend me a painting by Milton Avery that he had put in storage. It turned out to be a superb canvas, bordering on the abstract, in tones of grey. (As for the rest of the paintings we needed to cover the walls, Lee Huebner, publisher of the International Herald Tribune, came to the rescue. He introduced us to a French artist, René Théobald, who loaned us a number of her semi-abstract oil paintings. When Helen and I left Paris, René gave us a reproduction of a watercolor depicting Notre Dame, which she inscribed “Hoping that Paris will always be in your heart.” Well, it is and so is René.)

My regular meetings with Joe and Walter were probably helpful in sending a signal to our administrative support that the mission should be well treated, which it was. As to what I could do for them, although they were well-served by the embassy economic section, I had more direct contact with the economic movers and shakers from Washington and other capitals and could pass along useful insights as well as good gossip. Both of my colleagues included me in high-level visits. To cite an example, when Vice President Bush came to Paris on one occasion, there were a couple of meals at the embassy to which I was invited. One was a small, informal lunch with three (including the VP) on the U.S. side, and three French ministers. I occupied very valuable real estate on that occasion and I was grateful to my host. The other meal, a larger dinner, was less important but I welcomed the invitation as a gesture of comity and support. This was the dinner where I had my conversation, recounted earlier, with the wife of the CEO of Airbus; General de Gaulle’s son, a retired admiral, was at the same table. He resembled his father.

Many congressional delegations visit Paris, but few seek out OECD. So I counted on the embassy and the ambassador, when necessary, to alert me to upcoming congressional visits. More often than not, I would go to the hotel where the delegation was staying and meet informally with whomever was interested in chatting. I remember one occasion when Newt Gingrich and a number of others had just returned from Eastern Europe. We had a good conversation on the evolving situation and I had an opportunity to make a pitch for OECD’s new east-west center. One other angle involving Congress. There is a NATO parliamentary group independent of NATO itself. It has an economic committee that meets annually in Brussels and then pays a visit to the OECD. There would be a meeting with the secretary general and some of the directors. That evening I would host the American participants -- a senator or two and several congressmen -- plus ambassadorial colleagues and members of the secretariat. The reception was always appreciated and produced some useful interchanges.

I should mention that the embassy’s regional security officer also serviced the mission. This was important because Paris was under siege by North African terrorists who had exploded a number of bombs. It was important that the mission receive the same protection that was afforded to embassy staff. As for myself, if I was not at home, where guards were posted, or at the office, I traveled with a plain-clothes police escort laid on by the French authorities. This was reassuring but confining. I led a scripted life; the police had to know in advance when I would leave the house or the office, where I was going, and for how long. Although onerous in many respects, traveling with the cops had its up side. For example, the family never waited in line for movie or museum tickets. One of my escorts would go to the box office, pick up the tickets and escort us

in. If we went to the countryside, we paid for our protectors' meals, unless the restaurant proprietor picked up the check, and many did. If we made a trip out of town by train, we would be met by a local police escort.

Now, you would think that the security threat would call for a discreet mode of transport. For a while we motored around Paris in an armored BMW that did not call attention to itself. Later, though, the BMW was replaced by a Cadillac that drew stares.

Q: Did you come back to Washington pretty regularly during the time you were there, about three years?

LAMB: Fairly regularly, yes. The secretary general visited Washington at least twice a year and I would accompany him. After joining him in his meetings with administration officials, the Fed chairman, and others, I would tack on a few days and make the rounds of my contacts. Since Washington is something of a revolving door, it was important to me to "put a face to the name" of those I was dealing with, and to let them get to know me. As I mentioned, I also visited Washington on at least two occasions to promote my OECD agenda.

Q: In those days there wasn't a third mission in Paris as there is now with UNESCO.

LAMB: There was not, no.

Q: I'd like to talk a little bit more about the political dimension of the OECD. I find very interesting the role you played with regard to Korea's membership, participation. I've often thought and I may be influenced by my assignment to Tokyo from '59 to '61, that in many ways after the recovery of Europe and the takeoff of the European Community, which really was an indication that the OEEC and the Marshall Plan had been a success, that one of its main political dimensions of the OECD was linking Japan to the rest of the industrial world and then later Australia, New Zealand, and Finland became members. You want to talk at all about that, as you saw it, when you were there as ambassador or by that time it was so accepted.

LAMB: Those countries were well integrated into the organization by the time I served as ambassador. Although the OECD did not find a place in the front rank of post-cold war international organizations, it acquired another political role, as symbolized by Korean entry, the subsequent entry of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and expanded outreach to non-members. In a nutshell, its role became (and was becoming while I was there) one of integrating like-minded, democratic countries into the fold. There are two constraints. One is the number of countries ready to embrace free markets and open political systems. The other is the OECD's method of work, which is based on bringing national officials together around the table. The table can only get so big before the "magic of the OECD" ceases to appeal or to work. The OECD has yet to solve the problem of how to expand while retaining its distinctive character.

One indication of how Japan values OECD membership was its decision to host a meeting of the Council in Tokyo to mark the 25th anniversary of its accession. The ambassadors and their wives, the secretary general and his wife, and members of the secretariat were treated to a trip to Tokyo (and Kyoto and the island of Kyushu, which was the birthplace of the then Japanese ambassador)

at Japanese government expense. Perhaps the most revealing moment of the trip came when our group attended a reception at the home of a provincial governor in the city of Fukuoka on Kyushu. The governor was a dynamic young man -- with whom we had conferred in his office -- touted as a rising figure in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. As we strolled up the long driveway to his house, lined with the tombs of his ancestors, the Japanese ambassador explained that the governor came from a long line of hereditary rulers of the island.

Q: Turkey?

LAMB: Turkey is in the OECD which, along with its membership in NATO, links it to the West. Will it become a member of the EU? Regrettably, although negotiations have begun, the omens are not good. Turkey would be a difficult fit under any circumstances, but the problems faced by many EU countries in integrating large Muslim minorities are going to make them especially wary of bringing in a very large Muslim country.

I've left the Middle East out of our discussion so far, but a very good tool for reaching out to countries in the region that embrace political and economic reform would be a reformed, modernized, rationalized OECD.

Q: Well, let's see, you were there for the election of George H.W. Bush and as you said the new secretary of state was Jim Baker, coming from the Treasury Department. Was there a question about your staying on at that transition or did you get your normal three years?

LAMB: After the election some of the new president's supporters, major contributors among them, were agitating to replace me. The information came from friends in the Department as well as press reports. I made some calls to people I knew in the Baker State Department in which I expressed my interest in serving out my full term and mentioned some of the initiatives underway that I thought could be brought to fruition if I remained in place. I also traveled to Washington in early 1989 to brief the incoming secretaries of the treasury (Nicholas Brady) and commerce (Robert Mosbacher), the USTR (Carla Hills), and the head of the council of economic advisers (Michael Boskin) on what the OECD could do for them.

Time passed, but I eventually received word from Under Secretary for Political Affairs Kimmitt (with whom I had tangled on Libya sanctions when he was at Treasury) that I would be kept in place.

Q: Okay, anything else you want to say about your time there? I think we've pretty well covered it.

LAMB: Ambassadors receive letters from the president telling them what their duties and responsibilities are as the president's representative in a country or to an international organization.

Q: And what their authority is.

LAMB: And what their authority is and where it doesn't run, i.e., to active military commands.

At the time, I had a navy captain working for me. He was the Pentagon's man in Paris on the CoCom delegation. He was getting back channel instructions from Defense that were at odds with the formal instructions we received in cables signed by the secretary of state. So I called the captain to my office, told him that he was acting contrary to my wishes, and asked him to read the presidential letter in my presence. Now military officers are, as they must be, very sensitive to the chain of command. When he absorbed the fact that the chain ran from the president to me to him, it brought tears of remorse to his eyes. He corrected his conduct immediately. I always wondered what one did with that letter and was pleased to have found a use for it.

Q: Yes, I don't think I ever pulled mine out, used chapter and verse although it was helpful sometimes, at least to remind people of the authority. You also noted that the OECD has become less political; we talked about that but now OECD ambassadors are political appointees. Should countries have ambassadors to the OECD at all anymore? You've talked I think a little bit about that. There had not been a political appointee as OECD representative before your time or had there been?

LAMB: There had been two. Bill Turner was ambassador when I was the desk officer. Herb Salzman succeeded Bill in the late Seventies.

Q: But with strong economic policy credentials, perhaps.

LAMB: Bill was a management consultant and Herb was a turnaround artist in the business world. His wife was a Broadway producer. Both were talented and both did a good job. There's no reason why political appointees cannot do well. However, the added value that political appointees can sometimes bring to the job -- proximity to the White House -- does not count for much at OECD.

Q: Who was your successor?

LAMB: My successor was Alan Larson.

Q: Career officer?

LAMB: Yes, Alan was a career officer. David Aaron, who had been a Foreign Service officer in his youth, succeeded him. He later went to work for Fritz Mondale and, as noted earlier, became Brzezinski's deputy on the national security council staff in the Carter administration. David was succeeded by Amy Bondurant, a lawyer with a congressional staff background. George W. Bush appointed Jeanne Philips, a leading political fundraiser from Texas. The current ambassador, Connie Morella, a former congresswoman from Maryland's DC suburbs, replaced her.

Q: Anything else you want to say about your time in Paris at the OECD?

LAMB: Perhaps a brief word on official entertaining would be in order. At the posts where I served as a senior officer, Brussels and Paris, my workday and workweek were shorter than they had been in Washington, but many evenings were taken up with social obligations. A certain discipline was observed, however. Social events were scheduled Monday through Thursday;

Friday nights and weekends were your own. In addition, no entertaining was done during the Christmas, Easter, and spring school holidays. In Paris, as in Brussels, Helen and I lived above the store in a quite comfortable suite of rooms. (Herb Salzman and his wife, Rita, had used their own money to install kitchenettes on the second and third floors of the residence. They had to quarter in a hotel while the work was done. The kitchenettes made the house much more livable for both our guests and us. Herb also funded a \$5,000 annual award for “excellence in international economic performance” by a mid-grade FSO.)

We had two guest rooms and one or both were usually occupied by official visitors (except during the holidays and in August, when the OECD curtailed its meeting schedule). With help of Irene Corron, the social secretary she and I recruited, Helen managed the staff of five and planned and oversaw the execution of the events we hosted. All I had to do was show up and be ready to deliver a toast. I much preferred to do working lunches, but a certain number of dinners and cocktail parties had to be laid on. Because the OECD “circle” of ambassadors and senior members of the secretariat was limited, we reached out to the wider Paris community to liven up official functions.

Occasionally we ventured out into the wider world. I remember receiving an invitation from the mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, to attend a ceremony at which he would give the key to the city to Frank Sinatra. (Sinatra, Liza Minnelli, and Sammy Davis were in town for a concert.) When the “Caddie” pulled up under the portico of the Hotel de Ville, a flustered protocol officer, who addressed me as “Monsieur le chargé,” greeted Helen and me. I told him that I was not the embassy chargé, but he persisted. (I was told later that the real chargé had boycotted the event because he was not offered free tickets to the concert. I have no idea whether this was true.) We were escorted into a small reception room. I was presented to the mayor as “Le chargé d’affaires de l’ambassade des Etats-Unis.” Chirac introduced us to Frank, Liza, and Sammy. As it happened, I had been in Tokyo a week or two before and had seen the three of them perform in concert on television in my hotel room. So we had something to talk about. The brief encounter went smoothly. Then it was time to move to a larger room where the keys would be handed over. As we were trudging down a long hallway, I felt a hand on my shoulder. I looked around and heard a voice say, “Hi, I’m Greg Peck.” Made my day. My new friend “Greg” and I chatted amiably as Chirac droned on during the ceremony.

MARK C. LISSFELT
Deputy Chief of Mission
Paris (1987-1991)

Mark C. Lissfelt was born in Pennsylvania in 1932. He received his BA from Haverford College and his MALD from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1959. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1956. His foreign posts included London, Tel Aviv, Bamako, Brussels, Bonn, Berlin and Paris. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 22, 1998

Q: So such a short time in such a great challenging job only means something bigger afterwards,

and you got a call to go as DCM in Paris, or engineered that yourself, or how did that play out?

LISSFELT: Well, I don't think it related at all to the experience being responsible for Southern Europe. It just so happened that one day, for whatever reason, the DCM in Paris, Bill Barraclough, resigned from the Foreign Service. He had a non-career ambassador named Joe Rodgers, from Nashville, a big Republican fund-raising leader, very energetic, able guy, but not really very interested in foreign affairs. But he desperately wanted to replace Barraclough in five minutes, and he chased down Roz Ridgway somewhere at a meeting and said he needed 20 minutes on the phone with her and laid it out. First I knew of this was a phone call from the director general, George Vest, who'd known me over the years from my NATO connection and so forth, and with that wonderful question: Would you be willing to be among those considered for DCM in Paris? Well, I almost fell out of my chair. This came right out of the blue in the spring of 1987. I hadn't been seven months in the job and back home, just settling in, and I probably would have said no, except, "Paris," I said, "Let me check with my wife, but I'm favorably inclined." And Cindy was, too, as soon as she heard it was Paris, and though we had to pack up in less than a year home and get on our way, we did - we were about a year home - and took our youngest daughter with us for her senior year in high school at the American School in Paris.

I was one of two finalists for the job, and met with Joe Rodgers for an interview, when he did all the talking, a typical interview, you know. I hardly got a word in edgewise. One of the most interesting moments, though, was I knew he was a "born-again" Christian. He was one of several born-again Christians in the administration, and I wondered how he was going to deal with that question. And he started to get a little nervous and he danced around, and I thought to myself, Here it comes. Then he asked me bluntly, "Do you go to church?" It came out that abruptly, and I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, the truth is not very often." And he said, "Well, never mind. It's not important." He says, "You may know of my own..." And then he explained his own religious interests. I already knew of his own conversion, which really related to a near-fatal heart attack on the Athens tarmac when he was 40-some years old, which brought him face-to-face with his life, and he became a born-again Christian. Anyway, for whatever reason, I think my old friend Bill Bodde helped this decision. The other candidate Bodde described as having his own agenda, being a hard charger, and suggested to Joe Rodgers that since Joe Rodgers was a hard charger he didn't really want another hard charger down the hall from him. Rodgers saw the logic of that and in a week moment-

Q: That's the Tiger-Patsy-Tiger-Patsy school of management.

LISSFELT: I guess so. I never quite thought of it that way. I got the nod, to my great delight, and we prepared and off we went in the summer of 1987. After just a year home, we pulled up stakes from our house, which we dearly loved, in Falls Church, took our daughter from what would have been her senior year in high school and took her along with us - the other three siblings were by then in college or out of college - and off we went. Joe Rodgers charged me with two thoughts in the course of that interview. "If you come," he said, "I want you to prepare or lead the preparation of a good work annual scheme for work and responsibilities, goals and objectives, that's your sort of mission for the embassy. It will have to be a good one. And second to help me reduce the size of the staff." Well, I think we achieved the former, but we didn't do

much to improve the latter.

But off we went, very excited after about a month or so of French review at FSI, which was useful, and moved into a wonderful official residence, which is still the official residence, on the Champ de Mars, the Eiffel Tower to one side and the Ecole Militaire on the other, complete with staff and a chauffeur and a driver, which was a great luxury - in Paris it's worth a million dollars - and settled in with a terrific embassy staff. You can imagine, the kind of people who get to Paris, by and large, are the *crème de la crème* from whatever agency, 48 U.S. government agencies, it turned out, we had there. That became my major preoccupation, really, sort of listening to them and presiding over their differences.

Q: Did you feel prepared by previous experience training to suddenly preside over that complex and far-flung-

LISSFELT: Well, I must say, I was perfectly relaxed at the prospect, although I knew that the people I supervised, the section chiefs, all outranked me, by the way. This disparity helped me get promoted after my first year on the job to minister-counselor, fortunately. At least I was on a par with them. But no, I wasn't intimidated by it. On reflection, I'm not sure why. I knew two people there very well. One was the third man in the embassy, the economic minister-counselor named Bill Edgar, who was a friend from Bonn and a wonderful guy and very supportive, full of good advice, very practical and sound, and the other one happened to be the defense attaché, this Colonel, now General, LaJoie, who knew me from Berlin. As a matter of fact, when Rodgers was making his decision, he asked me if I knew anybody at the embassy, and I said, "Well, I know these two guys. They know me from other incarnations." And I know that he called them, and I'm sure they said nice things. So that helped, plus a very experienced head of the political section named Peter Semler. I liked the administrative guy and we became very good friends in my time there, Bruce Clark. And the Consular Section was run by a good guy and replaced by even better people. So the whole thing was very congenial. Paris also had four constituent posts (Bordeaux, Lyons, Strasbourg, and Marseilles) which I didn't know much about, but I just decided to take it day by day with no preconceptions and to try and be reasonable and supportive of Joe Rodgers, who was there only two years of my four and succeeded by Walter Curley.

Q: Probably a rather different style...

LISSFELT: A very different style, a guy who'd been ambassador to Ireland under Jimmy Carter-

Q: And a New York financier with J. H. Whitney.

LISSFELT: -and very close to the Bush family. He'd been a roommate of Prescott Bush at Philips Andover Academy. He knew the family very well. He knew more about the family than they cared, but he was close to President Bush. Bush wanted a man in Paris who would work and be friendly with President Mitterrand.

It was a mutual relationship between Mitterrand and Bush ever since Bush got the job, as Vice President, to go to Paris and explain to Mitterrand why the U.S. government was so upset when Mitterrand formed his first government with four communists in it. Mitterrand told Bush in no

uncertain terms that his long-term plan was to destroy the Communist Party, and he laid it out, what he intended to do, and convinced Bush. Bush went back a believer. And of course, Mitterrand did it, and they had a close relationship ever since.

By the way, Mitterrand and Rodgers had a very good - though they couldn't understand each other, couldn't speak one word - but Mitterrand respected what he'd heard of Rodgers, this self-made millionaire, a man who'd started with nothing and built his own business, Rodgers also made the U.S. government live up to commitments to France in series of phone calls across the Atlantic relating to a thing called the RITA system, a military communications system worth a billion dollars to the French manufacturers, which Ronald Reagan's administration pledged to buy till Margaret Thatcher got a hold of Ronnie and began to twist him and urge him, "Nah [No], don't do that. Take a British system which we're still developing." Rodgers heard about this and apparently went ballistic, over the international open phone lines. Obviously he was heard by the French government arguing for the United States to live up to its commitment - it endeared Rodgers to the French government! He was given the *Légion d'honneur* when he left, at the highest level that they can give to a foreigner, at the insistence of Mitterrand. Funny, these two men couldn't have been more different. But Curley came along-

Q: *With a background in France and French.*

LISSFELT: Who?

Q: *Curley.*

LISSFELT: Not so much, but he knew the French in funny ways, from China days, when he was out there in the Second World War an aide de camp for a while to Chiang Kai-Shek, in the Second Marine Division, and he knew all the French ambassador's family, the De Margerys. Robert De Margery was the ambassador in Washington, the son in the family Curley knew in China. Curley knew all the daughters, I think, rather intimately, judging by his winks. But Curley, it turned out, was a Pittsburgher, as am I. We raced, as soon as we heard of Curley's nomination, to the *International Who's Who*, looked him up, saw he was a Pittsburgher, and I waited and didn't say a thing. I was a chargé for seven months from December 1988 to June 1989, by the way, which was pretty exciting stuff at that embassy, with Chirac as the mayor of Paris and Rocard the Socialist prime minister. It was very interesting times, and when the phone rang I never knew whether - and Chirac called me sometimes from the United States, usually in high dudgeon ordering me to do something as if I were a French bureaucrat. Rocard was nicer and very cordial. So that was a great experience, the seven months' interlude. And then Curley was nominated and I waited until he passed the Senate and was named as U.S. ambassador to phone him and introduce myself. I'll never forget the conversation. I was in Paris and he was in New York. I called him to congratulate him. And his first question was, "Where are you from?" And I said, "Well, it so happens I'm from Pittsburgh." And he said after a long pause, "But that's where I'm from." And we really had a lot of chuckles over that. I think that helped me, but to make a long story short, he'd been advised by his predecessor not to accept, necessarily, the DCM in place, but to consider him along with other candidates whom the Department might put forward, and be free to choose his own man, in effect.

Q: Advised by his predecessor-

LISSFELT: Joe Rodgers, yes. Which was kind of a slap in the face to me, but never mind. Fortunately, the Office of Western Europe Affairs was run by Ed Casey, a wonderful guy and good friend, who said to Curley, "Okay, if you want to do that, we'll get a list together," and they started doing it. "But why don't you start with the guy in place, who is a kind of a benchmark, if you like." And I went back, went to Washington, went up to New York for an interview, went to Curley's office at Rockefeller Plaza. This doesn't have much to do with French relations, but it's very-

Q: It's very interesting.

LISSFELT: -to Rockefeller Plaza, and we went to lunch at the Racquet Club over on Park Avenue - I think it's Park Avenue - with him. He liked me because I liked oysters. We had oysters on the way in and we sat down and we talked, and we must have had a half an hour together, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Lissfelt, and chitchat about Pittsburgh friends and cousins and "What about Pittsburgh?" and "What do you know?" and the Department and so forth. Half an hour into that conversation he reached out his hand across the table, "Let's do it. You be my DCM." The chemistry was immediately right and I believe remained so during our two years together.

Q: Ha, ha, ha. Great. That's great!

LISSFELT: That was during the first luncheon course. You don't know how I enjoyed that lunch.

Q: Oh, I'll bet.

LISSFELT: One of the first questions he had after lunch was the whole connection of the prayer breakfasts which his predecessor had organized as a born-again Christian. Apparently, every day, people (staff and others) would go to the ambassador's residence for prayer breakfasts, which he fostered and paid for. Joe Rodgers and his wife, Honey, very sweet people, both of them born-again Christians. And Curley had a letter from Mr. Rodgers recommending that he continue this practice. He handed me this letter, and he said, "What's your reaction to that?" I replied, "Oh, Mr. Ambassador, that's an entirely personal thing. That's entirely up to you. It certainly has nothing to do with your official responsibilities as American ambassador to Paris. He said, "Thank you." It was a great relief. He practically did everything but wipe his brow. The result: no more prayer breakfasts.

Anyway, that was the start of a wonderful relationship that doesn't usually exist between a political ambassador and a career deputy. And the Curleys Cindy and I count among our friends, and we established a relationship that we'd go off once a month. One would choose a restaurant and just the four of us would go off and chitchat about staff, about the Department, about life, about everything. And the Curleys became very open and good friends. I had mixed feelings about leaving at the end of his being there only two years, but I'd been there four, and you know what things are like. They're cyclical, and after a while you say, "Who needs another goals and objectives exercise for the Department?"

Q: But thinking back on it, you count yourself lucky to have two political ambassadors. That gave you, as the FSO DCM, more - you were more indispensable. Had you had career types it would have been less of a challenge, right?

LISSFELT: Perhaps. I saw all the advantages of having them. First of all, Rodgers could call the White House and *would* call the White House and go back and grab somebody by the throat on the White House staff until he could see the President if he got his dander up about something. And people did not mess around with Rodgers in his territory, you know. We used to have visits by Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, who didn't consider he was beholden, an American general, in any way to an American ambassador in Paris, but he came regularly to talk to the French military about their role, and he was very careful there. He always paid a call on Rodgers, very deferential, because Rodgers was a tiger on questions of turf. His rights and responsibilities. The closest thing to a reprimand I ever got from him was signing off on a cable to Jerry Bremer, who headed the terrorism office, saying we hoped that he found the ideas in this cable of interest and we of course would be interested to hear his in return, which we would give due consideration - something like that, something innocuous. But Rodgers thought I was entirely too deferential, since *we* knew best what would go in France, and told me not to forget it.

Walter Curley was very close to President Bush and wrote him notes all the time. He had a secret way of getting access to him. He put Bush's middle name at the bottom left corner of the envelope, "Walker," and it would be shown in to the President. These guys were note-writers. I think that New England prep school training must have had something to do with it. And he could call, and would call Brent Scowcroft or whomever - never bothered the President, that I'm aware of, rarely. But the possibility was there, and Mitterrand knew it. Curley was introduced to Mitterrand up at Kennebunkport, when Mitterrand came on a state visit, and Bush had him up there for a few days, and he had Curley come up, before he went to Paris, I think it was, and put his arm around him and said, "This is my old friend Walter, and I'm sending him to you, François, and he's got my ear." So Curley came so highly recommended. As it turned out, he didn't get very involved in policy, and seldom went near the foreign ministry. I seldom went near the foreign ministry - but more than he did - but the guys who were the counselors liked to work their contacts, and I would go occasionally to the political director, one of whom was totally inept, but the second one is now the second man in their foreign ministry - Bertrand Duforque is his name, very able guy.

Anyway, it was a great experience, but working with the French is never dull. But they agreed with us on more things than most people ever knew. For instance, in the terrorism field, we worked together splendidly. And when in 1991 it came time for the dust-up in the Middle East about Desert Storm and the preparations therefor, what very few people know is that when the U.S. requested the basing in France of air tankers to facilitate flying and refueling of planes, the French agreed right away to base them down near Toulouse in Southwest France, and they soon had an airfield loaded with great, big American tankers there. Now, most people don't know. They only know about their turndown on the request to overfly and to go hit Qadhafi in 1986, but we constantly made this pitch to people when they came through, everybody from Colin Powell to cabinet level people - Dick Thornburg, whom I'd known from Pittsburgh days - who was the Attorney General. There were more areas of agreements. We had our problems with the

French, and you have to be careful with the French. You have to show them the courtesy of asking their opinion on things. Because they like to think they have good ideas and they often have. Some of them often said, "We're not always wrong, you know." I heard that first from the second man in the Foreign Ministry, to Newt Gingrich in a CODEL, who told him, "You know, Mr. Gingrich, the French are not always wrong." And everybody chuckled, but you know, there is a message. But they could be difficult. One of the best contacts, by the way, was Peter Semler's, at the Elysée is the current foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine. His father had been a one-time colleague of Mitterrand. Mitterrand was devoted to Vedrine the young boy, who was the spokesman at the Elysée Palace and now, as a socialist, has been brought back to be the foreign minister, about a year ago, a very able, very nice guy. He spoke rather good English.

Q: Well, Mark, I'm having trouble picturing your day. There you're sitting at the top of this giant edifice, the embassy in Paris, you're trying to supervise, you said, 48 U.S. agencies that are producing a mound of daily reports in all channels. You are receiving probably more visitors to Paris of a high level that need care and feeding than most other posts, maybe any other posts? How can you manage that and feel on top of it?

LISSFELT: Well, the day you feel on top of it is the day you're out of touch. But first of all, you get to know, I got to know, right away the subordinates, and knew whom I had to watch and whom I could trust without a question. I had complete faith in Bill Edgar and his successor, and a key part of the whole economic side of things, complete faith in the commercial attaché, a very good guy out of the commerce department, same thing in the consular area. Peter Semler had a very good bunch of people in the Political Section. Sometimes they'd write some goofy cables that you had to watch out for, every once in a while, but not often. By and large, we had this team that was very reliable and very solid. My biggest problems probably came with the successor defense attaché, an admiral in the navy who had come right from working for the Secretary of the Navy and had been promised an aircraft carrier group when he left Paris (which he went on to get). He was a super-activist guy. He was the son of a Foreign Service officer who spoke very good French because he'd gone to French [schools] as a kid, in France with his family, and he quickly established close relations with Mitterrand's military advisor, who happened to be a navy admiral too, and there was stuff going back and forth there that I don't know the half of, I'm sure. Some of it shouldn't have been passed at all. Some of it was State Department traffic. We know that for a fact, because they blew up over a few of them and wiped them in our faces, but I did save him on one occasion around the time of the Gulf War. We were sharing with the French, Mitterrand, at the highest level, satellite and overhead photography. It was being sent to the embassy, and this guy was putting it together in satchels and taking it over to the military attaché and going in to brief the President and showing him these targets and so forth. And I asked him, I said, "Phil, let me see what you're taking?" And sure, fine, he came down with the valise and opened it up (I had the right security clearances and could look at it.). It turned out to be something totally unrelated. It was the wrong set of photographs, and I looked at it, and I said, "Wait a minute, Phil. This has nothing to do with what they're interested in." I don't know what it was, but it's absolutely irrelevant. "You can't go in and show it to the President of the Republic." And he was just aghast, and I'd saved him from a huge gaffe. And he raced upstairs and got the right stuff, and off he went. But I'll never forget that, so I always felt that I'd done him a favor on that score. But he was very active and considered himself a political-military officer and, really, I think, certain days thought he had my job. These were the days of

classified faxes entering the scene too, so written communications were going back and forth in a classified channel between Washington and the embassy which I had no knowledge of, between all agencies and their home offices.

Q: Were your days foreseeable? You must have been jerked about by visitors, filling in for the ambassador here and there, entertaining, all these things..

LISSFELT: They were foreseeable, barring a crisis. The first thing I did was look at the overnight cable traffic and see whether certain instructions were out there, most of which the Political Section had long since read, or the economic, section and were on top of, but I just had to be sure of that. My major concern was the staff meeting with the ambassador which we had almost every day and being sure people knew what he wanted and watching out that nobody was getting at cross-purposes with him. But I went home for lunch most days and, when there were visitors in town or whatever, did a certain amount of entertaining at home (we had a wonderful chef) and most usefully on behalf of other embassy officers who wanted to impress their contacts and get their contacts out for some nice event and not in a restaurant. So there was a certain amount of that.

The evening stuff I picked and chose among myriad possibilities. I did not slavishly accept every diplomatic invitation that came along. I decided right when I first arrived, the calls that I made were limited to allies, the NATO Alliance, and I also called on the Egyptian because he called on me and one or two others, but I picked and chose there. I just wasn't going to go off - I wasn't interested in it, and it was too fatiguing and often a big waste of time. I did go to many of their national day receptions, if for no other reason, to see the facilities in which they worked. It was fascinating to see some of the old palaces and so forth in Paris.

There were a lot of things that came my way that the ambassador didn't want to do. Relations with the whole Cincinnati Society headquartered in Paris, which meant a couple of annual dinners and things like that. That's okay. And a lot to do with the American community and the American Chamber of Commerce whose president was one of my good friends, John Crawford, who lived right across the street from me. He's a wonderful guy. And a lawyer in Paris, so there's a certain involvement there, but generally you got a schedule of events, and you went in each day and asked "We're still here?" "Yes, we're still here" was the constant reply.

But we had certain real concerns about security in Paris, by the way. People can't grasp that, but there is a huge Mediterranean and Northern African population in and around Paris. People were very worried about Palestinian terrorists, about Qadhafi, because of the proximity, not so far away, across the Mediterranean. And there were scares, and we had to spend time briefing embassy staff. Spouses and families were brought in. There were a whole series of world events when things would heat up, and you had to try and maintain a modicum of reasonableness about protecting the embassy.

One thing I instituted there was the first fire drill they had in the embassy in the time anybody could remember. We learned in that fire drill that because of the security measures and the placing of steel plates across windows and barring the windows, there was only one door out which people were going to go. Six hundred people in that building were going to go out the

front door of that building, which was as wide as this table. And that was rather scary. The weirdest thing on the security front was when somebody went up a building adjacent to us, right up to the top floor, went across the gutters on the top, climbed over onto our roof. First thing I knew, I was sitting in my office and there were papers fluttering down the front of the embassy. It turned out that this guy, who was a publicity hound, had arranged to have television out front filming all this, came and sat on the balustrade above the ambassador's office, one floor up, throwing these copies of his poetry off the roof. He had done the same thing in Marseilles and was known. But it was obvious to us: somebody could have come up there, come across that roof and shot us or thrown a bomb right in. So we had to build a special little memorial fence up on the roof for that.

Q: It's such a big embassy, Paris isn't necessarily an easy place for the junior officer. Were you able to have a watching, mothering brief with that whole pack?

LISSFELT: Well, I did, and there were, oh, I don't know, if you added up the CIA contingent and some of the other agencies, we had at least 30 people whom you could call junior officers. I tried to get them to organize themselves (and they did better with some people than others) and had them out to the house for at least an evening occasion. It started with a bull session, which turned out to be pretty stale, and then we had them out for a spaghetti dinner when they could bring their young French contacts. That was okay. Some of them had French contacts. I was always available to them, and I took interest in the embassy's language program, too. One junior officer came in and complained to me that it was dead, and I hadn't paid attention to it, and he helped me revive it. But they knew I was supportive in onward assignments questions and reviewing statements for any of their work, and I really paid a lot of attention to how they were supervised.

I had huge numbers of efficiency reports to write, as well as ratings on many of the people from other agencies. And ones that the ambassador should have written himself but he had me write and that he would sign, for instance, on that same defense attaché, who was quite a handful. But I gave him high marks. I did it one year and the next year I said to the ambassador, that's one I can't do. And Curley said, "Come on, just do it." So I did it - but grudgingly. That's a big occupant of your time, too.

There was a lot of stuff that had to do with internal organization and working with other agencies, and when all the time their visitors came and you had to see their official visitors from Washington and you had to keep an eye on them you had to try and bring them along with the rest of embassy policy. You had to know when to ignore them and leave them to their own devices. We had a whole building full of what we called "the cops," you know. We had the FBI; we had the Secret Service; we had DEA - all in one building separate from the embassy compound.

Q: You probably managed by "cluster," by justice cluster, intelligence cluster-

LISSFELT: I didn't manage them as much as maybe I should have, but--I know--more than they wanted. I got to know their chiefs, and my door was always open to them. I paid a call on them in their offices to see where they were located. It was outside the building. And I kept touch with the important ones. The DEA chief was a very responsible guy who helped us with our drug

problem at the American school there, which is another entity outside Paris that we were kind of responsible for, although we contributed very little to it, in terms of money. And the CIA. I haven't mentioned the CIA, which was a huge presence, is a huge presence, not only official in the embassy, but in France. I got on well with the two station chiefs that were there. One of them is still a very good friend here in the Boston area, Chuck Cogan, who came back and did his Ph.D. under Stanley Hoffmann at Harvard University and wrote his thesis on DeGaulle in French. He was a very able guy. But I never kidded myself that they told me everything that was going on.

The most difficult chores I had to do in my memory related to personnel matters in Paris. Two of them related to French employees, one an assistant protocol officer, a woman, who, it turned out, had been dumped on the embassy by USIA, where she had given very bad service (USIS I guess it's called overseas), and was rude to me and to my wife. She was supposed to support me and my wife. It took us a year, counseling her, and lining up written complaints against her service before, under French law, we could fire her without having a lawsuit on our hands.

The other one was much more serious and was the assistant to the legendary Johnny Berg, the head of the travel office in Paris, who, it turned out, this rather flamboyant woman, was working for us and for French intelligence. Now she didn't have access to classified information, but she certainly saw every visitor or knew of every visitor and CODEL and submitted regularly the visitors list to French authorities, which gave them, we know, targets for the operations which they were famous for carrying out in hotel rooms, rifling people's baggage, and attaché cases. So it came to the point where we had to issue warnings, anybody coming to France, not to leave any classified, important, information unguarded in their hotel rooms or wherever. But it was a hairy experience to get this woman, whom we, to make a long story short, confronted at the same time investigators who came from Washington to do this confronted her daughter, who worked for the OECD - I think it was OECD, maybe it was for COCOM - as an auditor, financial person. And when they confronted the daughter, she broke down and confessed that finally she had the chance to unburden herself of something she'd known for years, the perfidy of her mother. The interrogator called me over to the one who was talking to her mother and told him, so they could play these two off, and in fact got the woman to resign and leave. Fortunately, it turned out very well. It could have been a sticky thing, because she was very good friends with a lot of people on Capitol Hill whom she had helped on hundreds of CODEL visits to Paris. She had a lot of friends, and letters from Strom Thurmond and many other distinguished American congressmen and senators. We got her to go away, and never made a stink until, later, she did go public and the French government later gave her a job working for the French national industry Renault automobile. But this was a person right in our midst for years, and we were glad to see the back of her head leaving the embassy.

Q: Mark, I've watched the voice power meter as you've been speaking about France and it's been much higher than in the earlier sections of your career. I assume this was probably the post that excited you most, the one that you felt your greatest challenge and contribution.

LISSFELT: Yes, when anyone asks me what was my favorite post in the Foreign Service - same thing with my wife - we always say we had two favorites: one of them early in our career was Tel Aviv, for a lot of different reasons related to the age of our children, the climate and so forth,

after being in London, but certainly Paris was the high point, in what I consider to be the best job the Foreign Service has to offer, almost barring any, to a career person. We enjoyed it, worked hard, Cindy established good relations with many French people, and certainly enjoyed the professionalism of our staff and the work aspect which certainly was, day in and day out, considered to be important. Again, I keep coming back to that, but that's what makes all the difference in the world, when you're pushing the papers and doing the work, to have some feeling that it relates to something important.

Q: It's a job, certainly, that's its own reward. In years past it was also a platform to ambassadorships. Going through it you probably felt it was its own reward.

LISSFELT: Well, I did, and I still do. It's alumni have a very uneven record, what happens to people after a job like that or the DCM in Bonn, for that matter, or other places. Back in Washington and in the bowels of Personnel, certainly, you are considered to have had your reward in this life, and if you come back thinking that, like many of our European friends, you step right from that DCM job to a good embassy job somewhere around the world - my colleagues, the British and the Canadian, particularly close colleagues, did just that - forget it. Very seldom happened. Jack Maresca did get the title of ambassador, but he didn't go on to be ambassador. The current ambassador in Bulgaria, Avis Bohlen, succeeded me, and with all her talents had, I think it's frank to say, certain other advantages working on her behalf as well, although I always told Walter Curley, when he asked me who should succeed me (I didn't want to get involved in that), that of all the candidates that I knew of, she was far and away the most qualified, and she did a great job. But that was the exception to the rule, I think. Chris Chapman retired. Sam Gammon, I think, went as ambassador to Mauritius, but more and more it's "You'd better be satisfied with that as your reward," although I did leave it, coming back and while there, doing a certain amount of lobbying and inquiring to find what was coming up. And I was called by personnel to be put on as filler, later, on new lists for various jobs, for example, the ambassador to Romania, for whom I knew they already had a candidate, whom I'd met before. He went there, in fact, and four years later died of cancer, in the saddle, as a matter of fact, as I recall.

So I decided that four years would be enough. My wife agreed entirely, although I think if we'd gone to Curley and asked to stay on, he would have said, "Yes, stay as long as I'm here." That's a presumption on my part, but I think it's well founded. We decided that four years, the cycle, as I said earlier, even in Paris, is repetitive in a certain way, and it's time to do something else. And we wanted to come back home. Again I began to hope that the phone would ring, maybe, with an offer back in Washington, when it was known that that was my desire. When I had been on home leave, I went in to meet the new director general and his deputy, whom I didn't know at all, succeeded George Vest and Bill Swing, Ed Perkins and Larry Williamson, respectively.

I had a very startling experience with Perkins. He was new to the job, and I got talking to him about my future, and he told me, first of all, he said, "You know, Mr. Lissfelt, your extension there in Paris was very controversial" (to stay on an additional two years), and I said, "No, I never heard that at all. I thought, in fact, I helped the Department solve a problem with a new political ambassador." And he shook his finger in my face. He said, "Mr. Lissfelt" - and I'll never forget this - he says, "Don't you get greedy. We try to turn those jobs over." Then he perhaps felt

bad about what he'd said - I was so shocked, I was mad - and he said, "Now we do try to give people who come out of these responsible jobs and do well another responsible job, to be sure... " blah, blah, blah. But nothing ever came of that, and I found myself, as the fourth year was winding down, with no specific prospect, except to leave in the summer of 1991, it would be, and come back as just another supernumerary senior officer in the Department, walking the halls with, then, 30 or 40 others like that, and I could not face that prospect, so I began to look for something specific, which is when I heard that at FSI - which kind of attracted me, because I knew they were going to move from the old incarnation to the new campus, where they are now, at this wonderful location out there in Arlington, it could be interesting to be part of that. The deanship for the biggest part of the school, the language school, came open when Mary Ryan, who was to go to that job, suddenly was asked to be a deputy assistant secretary of the European Bureau, opening the job. I called Brandon Grove, the director of the Institute, whom I'd known from my first job in the Foreign Service. He said, "You're my candidate." It happened almost that fast. And back I came and started in August. I had this great big organization teaching sixty-some languages, \$9 million budget, and helping them prepare for the move two years later to the new campus, where we all lived happily ever after.

JOHN HURD WILLETT
Deputy Political Counselor
Paris (1987-1991)

Consul General
Strasbourg (1991-1992)

John H. Willett was born in Massachusetts in 1941 and received his BA from Kenyon College in 1941. His career has included assignments in Gaborone, Tunis, Bordeaux, Paris, Rome, Strasbourg and Rabat. Richard Jackson interviewed Mr. Willett on December 21, 1998.

Q: So on that note, in early '88 you headed back to Paris.

WILLETT: Yes, that was a real battle. I and a friend of mine, Dean Curran, then working for Armacost up on the Seventh Floor, were both vying for the job. I'd been promoted to FSO1. I was eligible. The deputy political counselor job was opening up in the Paris Political Section; it's an important, challenging job, and I really wanted it. Though there may have been many other officers more deserving than I (because my posts added up to quite something when you look down the list at them), I felt nobody was more qualified. So Dean and I got into a figurative slugfest on this. He had Armacost on his side; I had Hank Cohen on mine. Hank was in the Director General's office.

Q: Perhaps he was the head of Personnel?

WILLETT: I really wanted that job! I arrived in Paris in January 1987 and moved into the flat we're still in. Chantal followed shortly thereafter with our firstborn son, and I felt everything was

in front of me. I'd been recently promoted. I'd secured the job I wanted in a city I knew well. I felt certain I'd do a crackerjack job. Chantal found work in a bank and we plunged in. I didn't give a second's thought to the morrow. I didn't want to focus on what would happen. I said to myself, "If you start thinking about what you'll be doing in the summer of 1991 when this job runs out, you're going to go crazy."

For the first time, I had real executive authority over a number of American diplomats; I could motivate a team and get them doing things. In addition I had the confidence of the front office and the political counselor. Who was the political counselor at the time? Kim Pendleton, no, before Kim it was Peter Semler. I was given a lot of leeway to mold things, craft them as I saw fit. I thought the Political Section had good *esprit de corps* and I flattered myself with being in part responsible for it. There I was in at a fairly high policymaking level, brought into a number of the Ambassador's meetings, etc.

Q: The Ambassador being Joe Rodgers, a political appointee from Tennessee, and the DCM Mark Lissfelt?

WILLETT: Then Rodgers was replaced by...

Q: By Walter Curley from New York, who had been Ambassador in Dublin, I believe.

WILLETT: Right. I was not so close to Rodgers, who incarnated what many French think of as "American."

Q: So they were reassured by a Tennessee appointee, without French, I understand.

WILLETT: Right, no French, which, of course, turned people like me into interpreters, a job we sometimes resented, but -- what the heck -- that goes with the work.

One of the highlights of this time for me in the Political Section was the CSCE Paris summit in, what, 1988, 1989? I volunteered for, and was appointed, control officer for that event. And control officer in a Class I embassy for a Presidential visit is really something! You hold meetings with a 120 people, you have a "third baggage handler," a *this* and a *that*.

Q: It was by then President Bush.

WILLETT: Exactly. "Preadvance teams" and "preadvance teams" blow into town, and you're running all over the place. There isn't a great deal of substance, except when you get down to writing the briefing papers, those little one page jobs, wherein the creation of the world is summed up in 30 lines. It's a good exercise in brevity.

We all really worked for those three days with George Bush. I rode in the car with him to a dinner Mitterrand hosted at Versailles. As he was leaving for Washington Bush said to me, "Good job, John," which became a joke in POL. If ever something went wrong, someone would say, "Bad job, John."

Q: George Bush had cultivated Mitterrand, had had him informally for a week at Kennebunkport. Surprisingly, the chemistry between those two was good. Was that your observations?

WILLETT: Well, I'm not sure the personal chemistry was that good, but Bush went out of his way to ensure a close relationship. On his side Mitterrand, a pretty conniving guy, also walked the extra mile. I remember two things about Kennebunkport visit. One, I knew that President Mitterrand liked wearing cardigan sweaters, and when the White House said, "What would be an appropriate gift?" I suggested giving him an L.L. Bean Kennebunkport sweater, which they did. It was placed on Mitterrand's bed in Kennebunkport. During the consultations with the Elysée to set up the Maine meeting, I had called to ask Madame Mitterrand's chief of staff, very frankly □□ whether she and the President shared a double bed or whatever. Rather a personal question, but the Bush place in Kennebunkport is not all that big. The woman at the palace frigidly responded that President and Mrs. Mitterrand *never* shared a bed. I said, well, okay, we'll keep that in mind. And it was dutifully done: twin beds were installed in Kennebunkport.

I found it interesting to observe how the highest level works and thinks. I met Brent Scowcroft and that terrible man Sununu. I met again Joe Verner Reed, whom I knew from my days at USUN. He'd become head of protocol.

Q: This was the CSCE summit, or Kennebunkport?

WILLETT: CSCE. I beg your pardon. This was all here in Paris. I didn't go to Kennebunkport.

Q: Walter Curley had not yet come to Paris, but George Bush introduced him there to Mitterrand as an old friend and a future ambassador designate with whom he, Mitterrand, could deal. Walter Curley viewed that as the best precedent he could have starting out here.

WILLETT: You're right. Joe Rodgers was still on board then. But there was also a visit to someplace in Florida. Mitterrand had gone to Mexico, I believe, and then stopped off for a day or two in Florida. After that visit an article appeared in *Time*, on the page they used to entitle "People." There were 20 lines speculating that the French President had cancer. This was around 1990.

Q: Yes, definitely.

WILLETT: Something like that.

Q: At that time, Walter Curley -- already here and charged with ascertaining the facts of Mitterrand's health before that Florida visit -- called on Mitterrand and considered him to be in fine health. But when he arrived in Florida he was not doing so well.

WILLETT: He was not doing so well. He had the kind of puffiness that people on cortisone often acquire. And along comes this article speculating that he had cancer, which, of course, he did.

Shortly thereafter I went to one of these political think tank meetings that abound in Paris, at the

Sorbonne. Former Foreign Minister Michel Jobert was talking to a room of 200 people, a small room, filled with his coterie. He said, in essence, "This is typical of the CIA at work, planting a rumor that our president has cancer expressly to weaken the French presidency and thereby undermine France as a European power." He extrapolated from this article. When I raised my hand to respond, identifying myself as the deputy political counselor of the U.S. Embassy...

Q: Identifying yourself as that?

WILLETT: Absolutely, and as first secretary, whatever. I said to Jobert that American journalists were obsessed with the health of public figures, *obsessed*, and that the American public adored reading about the ill health of its leaders. They considered this part and parcel of their "right to know," and consequently this little *Time* piece should not be considered some sort of nefarious plot on the part of the CIA. I did add, rather undiplomatically, that I felt Jobert's comments were unfortunate, because his anti- Americanism, or the rumors about his anti-Americanism, would be more given more currency by this kind of speculation.

He went bananas, treating me to a vitriolic *ad hominem* attack. "How is it possible for the Americans to send such naïve people abroad to represent their country? How can you sit there, young man, and tell me the CIA was not behind this? Don't you know what your own government is doing? Haven't you any idea?" I had to take it because I was a first secretary on assignment in the country for which Jobert had been foreign minister. Had I responded in kind, I would have found myself in real trouble. When, after this attack, I tried simply to reiterate my point that American journalists closely followed and reported on the health of political leaders, the chairman of the meeting refused me the floor. An embarrassing moment for me, that much I remember. Michel Jobert lives nearby. I sometimes see him on the street.

Q: Well, were there other issues that were particular highlights? This was a time of many issues between the U.S. and France, and as deputy section chief you had quite a large field.

WILLETT: Yes, but I had a good team, good officers in the section. Some were young, some not so young, but they all knew they had important work to do. It was a specialized section, as I mentioned yesterday. One officer doing the Middle East. One doing Latin American. One doing Asia. Four people doing internal politics, etc., etc. This is before the big personnel slashes of the last few years.

Q: How did you and Kim Pendleton, the political counselor, divide, and how was that as a working relationship?

WILLETT: I had my own bailiwicks that I carved out for myself with Kim's accord, and Kim was content to leave the day-to-day management of the section in my hands. Of course, he wanted, and rightly, to chop on any policy cables, to decide what should go to the front office. He counted on my using good judgment as to whose name went on the *approval* line: his, mine, the DCM's or the Ambassador's. After working in the section for a few months, I had a pretty good idea how high up a cable needed to go. Kim or I could approve routine reporting on Middle East issues, but if we got into U.S. policy at a higher level, it might have to go to the DCM. Or if the Ambassador had been involved in the issue in any way, if it tied into a demarche previously

been made by him, then of course, he was the one who chopped off.

Ambassador Curley, was an activist, and most competent in carrying out demarches. Once he went over and made *nine* demarches to the acting Foreign Minister, one after another, all of them perfectly. I accompanied him on that meeting and wrote up the subsequent reporting. He said everything exactly as instructed. And he was generous with his table. The Internal Political Unit would propose a lunch with a political leader, and he'd say, "Sure, let's do it." He opened the residence up to families, kids, Christmas parties -- whatever. In that sense he was exceptional. Furthermore, his office was accessible. You could go in to see one of his staffers and say, "Look, something bothers me about what's happening in this section or that section of the Embassy, and I want to talk to the Ambassador." You could do it.

Q: Mark Lissfelt was an encouraging, laid-back kind of a manager. They had good relations, the Embassy seemed to click over pretty well?

WILLETT: Yes, it did. Mark left all the running around to other people. He would go through his cubic foot of cables each morning. He would make sure the paper was moving, and he would jog people now and then with a handwritten note or a phone call "Where's this? Where's that?" One knew somebody was up front keeping an eye on things. He was not the sort of DCM who never gets over being a political officer. He left the job of political reporting up to the Political Section, and economic reporting up to the Economic Section. He didn't do much reporting on his own or go out and seek contacts. He ran the Embassy, the principal task of a DCM.

Q: It's a full-time job.

WILLETT: It's a full-time job in an embassy of -- what, 900 people? A thousand? I don't know. Walter Curley counted on him to run the Embassy.

Q: You had a look or perspective on the Embassy separated by about a decade. Notice any changes? Morale better, worse, the same? Always difficult in such a big place? Or what do you think?

WILLETT: Morale *is* always difficult in these big embassies. As regards Paris, I don't think the American compound out at Neuilly is a good idea. Americans are clumped together in apartment buildings, seeing no French, living a transported American life, doing all their shopping at the commissary. The "wild life" is going out together once a week to dinner in the Latin Quarter; that's the extent of their insertion into Parisian life. If I had any recommendation to make to the Embassy in Paris or to the Department, I'd say to FBO, "Get rid of Neuilly. Let people who come to Paris pick out their own housing if they can, or give them an option." Since I knew a lot of the secretaries and officers had to live out in Neuilly, on my second tour I arranged things beforehand. I said, "I refuse to live in Neuilly. I can't do my political job out there. I can't invite contacts to a Neuilly apartment building. They're not going to come. It's got to be an accessible apartment, where they can arrive at 8:30 at night and not be exhausted." They let me do it. You know, they give you the maximum housing allowance, and you rent an apartment in that range. Things worked out fine.

Q: But between '77, when you first left Paris, and '91, when you next left Paris, had the world of the Embassy changed -- in the sense that you now had 24 hour CNN, you had Internet, you had information all around you? Was the political reporting function as important as it was before? Had it changed?

WILLETT: I did not notice a change in the political reporting, although my focus was on a broader spectrum. I had to pay attention to more issues. When I was in the internal unit, by definition, I was focused on French domestic affairs. When I was deputy political counselor, I had not only to include domestic political affairs in my area of focus, but the whole *shmeat*. Even some of the political-military cables were cleared with the deputy political counselor. I didn't notice that CNN made any particular difference in our work, though I might be misleading myself on that. For example, the Iraq mess. Everybody was away on holiday when Baghdad invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1991, so a large share of the reporting burden from Paris fell on my shoulders. There were only a couple of us left in the Political Section to do a tremendous amount of work.

Six months later, during Desert Storm, I became - principally by dint of speaking good French and with Ambassador's Curley consent - a kind of "talking head" for the Embassy on French TV and French radio, explaining U.S. policy. I appeared on Patrick Poivre d'Arvor's television program, and on the radio. I was interviewed. Old friends I hadn't seen in 25 years called up saying they'd seen me on the tube. Of course we won, which made the task easy. Everybody loves a winner. In one debate former president Gemayel of Lebanon, a man from the PLO, an Israeli and I debated the situation.

People were impressed by the technology of U.S. destructive power, you know, films of laser guided smart bombs zipping through a particular pre-selected window. So to get back to your question, I'd say those CNN tapes did bestow a certain aura on U.S. military technology, and in fact tempered reactions, in France at least, to the U.S.-led assault. A far different cry from what's happened today, where most people in France, including the French Government, are dead set against the December strike on Baghdad that President Clinton ordered.

Q: But, John, the French had been very reluctant in the mid '80's to allow landing or refueling for the raid on Tripoli, and the U.S. coming into the Gulf War coalition, one couldn't take the French for granted. It was a lot of coalition building. France came into it, of course, but the French forces were somewhat separate from the British and American. You must have been in the thick of that diplomacy, which had very high stakes indeed.

WILLETT: Yes, high stakes, and the U.S. was glad just to get the French participating in some way.

Q: President Bush was undoubtedly on the horn directly to Mitterrand to make it possible.

WILLETT: We reminded the French at the time of what you just raised: the GOF refusal to let the warplanes attacking Tripoli overfly French territory, forcing them to make a lengthy roundabout through the Straits of Gibraltar. We reminded them of that and said, "Look, this

should not happen again." It was in part handled via discreet contacts with the French minister of defense.

Q: Did he not resign, Chevènement, because France joined Desert Storm? I recall a contretemps and the defense minister was replaced as a result of that.

WILLETT: Right. Today Chevènement is back in the French government. He had a serious stroke, and it wasn't certain whether he'd be able to reassume his job. The problem with Chevènement from the American point of view is that the man is pro-Iraqi, a former President of the French-Iraqi Friendship Group in the Chamber of Deputies, which makes it difficult for us to deal with him on the Iraqi question. I don't believe he's particularly well disposed towards the United States, the case of many officials in this country.

Perhaps I'll just take a second here to say that Gaullism in France today is not a reflection of General de Gaulle's attitude. Rather de Gaulle's attitude incarnated the sentiments, then and now, of many ranking French bureaucrats and a certain segment of the population. He simply personified a point of view that already existed, that still exists: namely, that the United States constitutes a threat, that it's taking over the world, not with arms but through economic might, "cultural imperialism," etc. The GOF can't abide that. On the other hand, it's convinced the United States is biting its nails to the quick over the Euro or the advent of the Community, the future and power of the EC, that we're anxious over waxing EC power.

Q: John, before we get too far into Morocco, you might deal a little bit with Strasbourg, with being Consul General. That's the seat of the European Parliament. A previous consul general - was it Robert Hormats - had been target of an assassination attempt in Strasbourg, was it not? In brief, how was your nine months there? What were the highlights? What was it like to be Monsieur le Consul Général?

WILLETT: I had a reporting job to do there, a straightforward reporting job, and that was the Council of Europe. Catherine Lalumière, then secretary general of the Council of Europe, came to have confidence in me. The U.S. is not a member of the COE, but we had observer status. We could hang around certain meetings. In addition I dealt with the mayor of Strasbourg, a high-profile woman named Catherine Trautmann, now minister of information in the current Jospin government. I greatly enjoyed talking with this cultivated lady, and I've kept the medal she gave me when I left town.. She has a degree in Protestant theology, and she told me she 'd written her thesis on Mary Magdalen. I said, "Oh, Mary Magdalen," and she said, "Yes, but not the one you think." Apparently somewhere in the Bible there's another Mary Magdalen.

I might mention that reporting out of Strasbourg was a bit cumbersome, because you had to be your own communicator.

Q: You had some staff in the consulate?

WILLETT: Oh, yes, there was a staff of eleven locals.

Q: So you were the only American.

WILLETT: The only one.

Q: Strictly reporting, not carrying out demarches or trying to influence, or did you do some of that?

WILLETT: Yes. I'd go see the Secretary General of the Council of Europe or her senior staff. In their crazy system, the European Parliament trucks all its files over from Brussels every two weeks and holds meetings in Strasbourg. When the two weeks end, they truck everything back. This is because the French refuse to concede that Strasbourg not be a seat of the European Parliament. It has nothing to do with the Council of Europe. The EC Parliament still sits two weeks of every month in Strasbourg. A nutty situation, but I can't imagine the French would alter their position.

For communications I'd have to go in a little safe-room with a computer I barely understood and send classified cables over the phone line, kind of classified e-mail. I never really got it right, and my year there was frustrating in one sense because of the communications problems. A couple of times professional communicators came over from Germany to help me with the machinery. Despite these problems, I still managed to draft some worthwhile messages.

Besides, there were interesting outside events. Dick Walters, whom I'd worked with at various times, came up once, and we had a good weekend.

Q: What would bring him there?

WILLETT: I can't remember exactly. A meeting with European politicians and diplomats...?

Q: Target of opportunity? The people were there that he needed to see about something?

WILLETT: Something like that. He gave a talk while there, but not in his capacity as ex-CIA or perm rep to the UN or anything. And since there are a lot of American companies in Strasbourg, I made sure to become active in the Strasbourg chapter of the American Chamber of Commerce, once arranging a lunch with mayor Trautmann as guest speaker.

The city itself is unimaginably beautiful, a pleasant place to live. The CG's official residence is a historic place, very grandiose, lovely grounds, statues and walks, but I thought it would be too much to live there. Since the assignment was so brief, I chose to live in the apartment over the Consulate. It would have been ridiculously expensive to keep that huge residence up and running with a full staff for one person who lived in it only five days a week. I did my entertaining in the Consulate proper or in restaurants.

The most dramatic event of my short assignment was the farmers' demonstration against U.S. agricultural policy. I got permission from Paris (who checked with the Department) to allow riot police into the Consulate. We had to close down for the day, lower the shutters, whatever. The outside walls were splattered with eggs and tomatoes, but otherwise there wasn't much damage. At one point the demonstrators wanted me to come out and accept a petition. I said to the head

policeman on duty, "Let me go out and take their petition. I think I ought to do it." He advised against it, and I felt that since they were on hand to protect me, I ought to follow the advice. But I kind of regretted it; I should have gone out and accepted that petition. It turned up in the mail next day.

I remember, too, the trade fair in Nancy, with its American theme. U.S. products were on display, and all these American cowboys showed up. I was invited as a guest speaker, and Chantal came with our two boys.

My duties also included speaking at American cemeteries, before those endless rows of white crosses. The people in the Alsace and Lorraine *départements* are generally pro- American, which is unusual in France. There was even a parade of American World War II army vehicles, jeeps and halftracks and things, passing by with American flags waving in the breeze.

INTS M. SILINS
Consul General
Strasbourg (1989-1990)

Ambassador Silins was born in Latvia and raised in Latvia and Maryland. He was educated at Princeton and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1969 and served abroad in Saigon, Duc Thanh (Vietnam), Bucharest, Stockholm, Port au Prince, Leningrad and Strasbourg. In 1990 he was appointed United States Representative to the Baltic States, resident in Riga, Latvia, and from 1992 to 1995, he served as United States Ambassador to Latvia. He also had several tours of duty at the Department of State in Washington, D.C. Ambassador Silins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Well then, in Strasbourg... It was the European Union when you went there, or was it still the European Community?

SILINS: First of all, the organization that I was to work with was not the European Community, as it was called then, but the Council of Europe. And the parliamentary body I would be in touch with was not the European Parliament, which was the legislative side of the European Community, but the similar-sounding Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. But the similarities and seeming overlap of the two organizations and their sub-units quickly lead to eye-watering confusion!

Only a handful of specialists had any idea what the Council of Europe was. It was not the European Community; it's a separate organization. And it had a larger membership – more countries – than what is now called the European Union. It's more inclusive but it doesn't assert, as the European Union does, supranational rights over its members. It operates on the basis of conventions, treaties and agreements covering important areas. Some of these are technical, such as standards for pharmaceutical products, but they include the fight against terrorism and human rights. It is the overseer of the European Convention on Human Rights and it hosts the European

Human Rights Court. As the former Warsaw Pact countries and eventually Russia joined the Council of Europe and accepted its requirements, the Human Rights Court and the Convention exerted positive, even decisive influence on the reform of their legal systems. So the Council of Europe does critically important things, but even in the State Department maybe only three or four people had any idea of what it was and how it was different from the European Community.

Q: Well, in its inclusivity, did it include Turkey?

SILINS: Yes, it did.

Q: What was the background of the formation of this organization?

SILINS: It goes back to the dream of a united states of Europe that Churchill called for in 1946. Unlike the organization that eventually became the European Union, the Council of Europe proceeded on the fast track without taking on the economic portfolio. It developed in breadth rather than depth, shall we say, and focused on things like harmonizing legislation and providing a political forum in which to debate issues, with a focus on rule of law and human rights. On the other track was the European Coal and Steel Community, which really got down to the nitty-gritty, that is, how some of the economic assets of the continent were going to be managed. And that's the one that led to the European Union, which acquired the clout and the money and is the one we mostly talk about today.

Q: Did the delegates run for office, or how are they selected?

SILINS: The delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are chosen from their own parliaments. In other words, they're already elected to the parliaments of their own countries and are sent periodically to represent that country in Strasbourg.

Q: You were in Strasbourg from when to when?

SILINS: Well, I was there from '89 to, let's see, '91. The reason I hesitate is that I didn't complete my assignment to Strasbourg. I was asked in the fall of '91 to set up a new embassy in Riga.

Even before that, and I forget the exact date, in Strasbourg I got a phone call from the State Department asking if I would be interested in going to a Baltic capital, presumably Riga, although the location was still a little up in the air, to set up something that would be like a consulate general but that would represent the U.S. to all three Baltic States. Already back in Washington people were thinking the Baltic States might change their status. At the time we were represented to them only through Leningrad, a city in the USSR. Wouldn't it be nice to have representation in one of their capitals, separate from the consulate general in Leningrad? That would reinforce our policy of not recognizing their incorporation into the USSR. I said, yes, I would be interested, but how are you going to do this? The answer was, we plan to ask for Soviet permission to set up such a mission. I knew right away that the idea wasn't likely to fly. I mention it only because it does show that the thinking about the transformation of the USSR was beginning to evolve. The Swedes did set up such a consular mission in Riga and got a jump on

the rest of the diplomatic community.

Q: Well, let's go back to the Council of Europe and all. What sort of a player was this in European unity?

SILINS: I think it was an important player in the early stages of grooming the former Soviet satellites for reintegration into Western Europe. They also reached out to Gorbachev, as I said. The East European countries that had been part of the Soviet bloc were invited to send guest delegations to Strasbourg and launch the process of becoming full fledged members of the Council of Europe. In doing so, the Council of Europe imposed requirements on them, including human rights and rule of law requirements that had an impact on how these countries evolved internally, because they could see now that they had to jump through certain hoops in order to be accepted back into Western Europe, which is where they wanted to be. So I would rate it as being quite important on the European stage, particularly with respect to harmonizing legislation and with the highlight on human rights issues, but as having almost no discernible impact in Washington.

Q: Did you find that there was an EU mafia that tended to be dismissive of it?

SILINS: Well, to some extent. They simply couldn't hold that many things in their minds at the same time. The European Community did exist, we knew it was important—God knows I would never deny that—and the Council of Europe looked like excess baggage that no one had much use for. So they gave me pretty much free rein to do what I wanted there. Considering how little the State Department cared, I was treated with amazing respect and consideration by the various officials in Strasbourg, as the equivalent of an ambassador from a member country. But the U.S. at that time was not only not a member country, we did not even have “official” observer status. We were simply represented by our consul general in Strasbourg.

Q: Where was the, well later it was the European Union but I guess your European Council, where was its parliament located?

SILINS: Well, here's just one of the many sources of confusion. The parliament of the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg. But so did the parliament of the European Community – part of the time. That's what we call the European Parliament. It would move back and forth. Half the time, it met in Strasbourg in the same building as the parliament of the Council of Europe until it eventually acquired its own building nearby.

SILINS: I apologize, but this is just the beginning. The European Parliament would commute back and forth, at great expense, between Brussels and Strasbourg. For good measure, it also had administrative offices in Luxembourg. The commuting was largely at the insistence of France, which demanded equal time for Strasbourg. For further eye-blurring confusion, we could talk about why the similar-sounding Council of Europe, the European Council, and the Council of the European Union are really three different institutions. But perhaps we should go on to something else.

Q: Well, did you find Strasbourg important as a listening post?

SILINS: Very much so. You know, that's what really made it for me. I mentioned that the former Soviet satellite countries were sending delegations to Strasbourg and preparing for full membership. So it was a good place to meet parliamentary and government officials from all over Europe and keep tabs on the dawning of the post-Soviet era. Among the delegations with which I met was one that included the soon-to-be foreign minister of independent Latvia.

Now, I was slightly schizophrenic officially because part of my job was to represent U.S. interests in east-central France. In fact, it was a particularly pleasant part of my job. That part of France, Alsace-Lorraine, that whole corner of France, happens to be unusually pro-American. They just love the United States. That's where the design for the Statue of Liberty came from. They thought Americans were wonderful, the Americans came over to save them from the Germans, and they will go out of their way to be nice to us. And in fact they, that is, those French citizens living there, prevented the State Department from closing the Strasbourg consulate as part of its many and frequent attempts to trim its budget. The State Department had put Strasbourg on the hit list, but a delegation headed, I believe, by the mayor of Strasbourg went to Washington and lobbied – not the State Department, they're not that dumb, they went straight to the Congress. They told the Congress that this was a really bad idea, it would give the U.S. a black eye in France and don't do it. So Congress removed Strasbourg from the hit list.

MILES S. PENDLETON, JR.
Political Counselor
Paris (1989-1993)

Miles S. Pendleton, Jr. was born in New Jersey in 1939. He graduated from Yale University in 1961 and received his MPA from Harvard University in 1967. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1967, his postings included Burundi, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Paris. Mr. Pendleton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: *So you were in Paris from when to when?*

PENDLETON: I was in Paris from '89 to '93.

Q: *Who was our ambassador? This would be near the beginning of the Bush Administration.*

PENDLETON: Yes, not long after the transition, and our ambassador was Walter Curley, who had been a school and college-roommate of George Bush's older brother Prescott. He had known the Bush family for most of his life and they were good friends. Curley was a combination of investment banker and business man, had been involved with *The New Yorker* and had served as ambassador to Ireland. He also was an expert on European royalty and had written a number of books on the subject. His was a long-standing fascination with the subject. And he had been, I believe, chief fund-raiser for the Bush campaign in the New York and New England area and had gotten his reward. His was an old-school charm counterposed with an ability to put his foot

down.

Q: Well, now, in '89, what was the situation both domestically and in our relations with France?

PENDLETON: Well, France was still led by François Mitterrand, who had been president for a considerable period of time and remained president for a considerable period of time. He died in 1996. Mitterrand was a Socialist, a man about whom we had many apprehensions when he became president because, in part, he undertook to put in the French cabinet a couple of communists and others whom the United States found to be anathema. At that point, Vice-President Bush went to Paris to meet with Mitterrand to express to him some of our apprehensions about these choices for ministers. Now Mitterrand was a man of considerable hauteur, and it must have been one of the more delicate jobs that any Vice-President or President or anybody could have, to walk into his office and say, "We don't like your domestic appointments." Bush, by all accounts, did so with considerable sophistication and got the message across without alienating Mitterrand. He and Mitterrand developed a relationship which really strengthened throughout the time of the Bush Presidency, once Bush became President, and to which we owe a great deal, particularly in terms of the Gulf War, when it came along. At that point Bush, to a degree, became at the highest level the Desk officer for France. He invested, even before the Gulf War, a certain amount of time and energy that other presidents would not have, probably, in communicating directly by phone with Mitterrand and taking into account what Mitterrand had to say and adjusting, at least tweaking, US approaches and policies to reflect concerns expressed by the French president. And this just strengthened Mitterrand's sense that this was a relationship which was two-way and which it would really benefit France to pursue.

Below Mitterrand, a tremendous number of both bureaucrats and elected officials continued to have the traditional distaste for many things American and had to be, on occasion, dragged along to listen to our side, particularly as France became more and more a part of Europe in a way that it hadn't been before. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, French apprehensions about the role of Germany, particularly as it unified, and the close ties between the United States and Germany were always near the surface. So I cannot say that our relationship with our oldest ally was easy. It had to be worked on the whole time that I was there and has always had to be worked on, ever since we were allies during our Revolution. But the Bush-Mitterrand relationship allowed a kind of joint decision-making on occasion that was quite unusual in an historical sense.

Q: Well, before we move into some of the events, which were the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union and all, what was your impression of the French Communist Party at that particular time? Was it still a tool of the Kremlin?

PENDLETON: The French Communist Party, by the time I arrived in 1989, was really very weak and getting weaker. The trade unions in France were weak and getting weaker. Marchais had been head of the French Communist Party for many years and remained head for much of the time that I was in France, but he had remained faithful to a form of Communism which was rapidly being discredited with the impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. The result was that the rest of the France was really moving on in a way that one wouldn't have expected a decade earlier. And the French Communist Party was

being left in the wake, both in terms of supporters, voters and influence. So it was not a terribly important force at that point. The Green parties were coming up a bit, and France basically remained split between Socialists and more conservative members such as the "Rally for the Republic", which led to (before I arrived) "cohabitation" between a Socialist president and a prime minister who was from the right. France returned later to cohabitation in 1994, which reflected basically the split of sentiment within the country. But France is so disciplined and has such a forceful bureaucracy, many of whom are "Enarchs," the graduates of the National School of Administration, who tend to go on one way or the other and have a hard time being influenced by elected officials, many of whom attended ENA as well. When you have cohabitation, for the United States, it means another address you have to go to when you're trying to convince France to do what we would prefer. You have to go to the Elysée Palace, where the presidency is; you have to go to the Foreign Ministry, the Quai d'Orsay; and then you would have to go, under cohabitation, to the prime minister's office. All these centers of power involved themselves in issues that France deemed to be important such as Africa, which has never been at the center of our own thinking. Nevertheless, they tend to, in France, be absolutely convinced that we wish to replace them in Africa, and they tend to be everything from jittery to frantic, depending upon whether it's morning or afternoon, about this. The whole time I was there, it was no longer Chet Crocker, there was Hank Cohen as Assistant Secretary. His wife was French. Instead of going to Africa via London, as Chet Crocker had done, he went to Africa via Paris, and he briefed the French in detail so regularly that it was destroying my limited representation budget. But his efforts only seemed, in a funny way, to heighten suspicions on the part of the long-time Africa watchers in Paris.

Q: What was the role of the (I don't know if you'd call it new, but the entrepreneur class, technicians, the people who were "The computer age is upon us," and the service industry (things like this. Were they playing, did you see, a different role than sort of the old power structure, or did you see any difference?

PENDLETON: One of the things which surprised me was that in terms of our political relationship there seemed to be less of a role than I would have expected, unless it had changed, in terms of new elements hoping to inform political decisions. This seemed to remain pretty much in the hands of traditional and bureaucratic apparatchiks who were very confident about their own abilities to make decisions and very anxious to make the best decisions possible for France. On the economic side, of course, all of Europe was going gangbusters at one level but not so fast at another level. And here France was very, very worried about its own technological expertise and its ability to convert expertise into exports. France faced, throughout the time that I was there, growing unemployment, and that became a major preoccupation. Indeed, if there hadn't been conscription (the draft) (the unemployment rate would have been for adult males up above 20 percent, with particularly high unemployment in the 18-30-year-old age cohort.

France has a remarkable capability to balance the old and the new, and France also has a level of statism that we're not quite used to. For instance, in order to keep employment high, Air France, which was owned by the government and which at that point was in line to be privatized, kept on a great many people at all levels and all jobs who in the United States would have been downsized or let go. For instance, in 1993, for every employee working for American Airlines - which is about the size of Air France - Air France had five employees. So you're not going to

make a profit on that. Instead, you are going to have to satisfy a lot of customers who like the personal attention that you can give them with five employees to every one that a major American airline might have. And you had tensions within the government between the Socialists, with a very strong commitment to social welfare and a safety net for all citizens. Of course, among the conservatives there were more business elements with a less traditional viewpoint about social welfare.

You also have in France something I might mention. You had the very interesting role in the very small group who are Protestants. And I didn't realize before I went to France that being a Protestant in France is a special role. There's a lot of respect for the Protestants, and my wife and I were very well received by Protestants, who, more than many Frenchmen, had traveled abroad, had parents and grandparents and great-grandparents who had fled and lived abroad and come back. They were more open, too, and in the process were more entrepreneurial than a lot of other Frenchmen. Their families, like Peugeot, who make the cars, Schlumberger, who do oil(

Q: My brother worked for them, yes.

PENDLETON: Et cetera, quite a very interesting role in the process. And I was surprised to find that, for instance, if you have a new person joining an office, that person might be identified as a Protestant, the way in the United States one might mention, if you had a largely white office that the new arrival was black, a very discreet sense of Protestants being separate and sometimes more than equal.

Q: What about the intelligentsia? How did you deal with it? One almost has the feeling there's a visceral anti-Americanism within this group, that it has more impact in France than it does in almost any other country. Is this true, or not?

PENDLETON: Well, it was very definitely true when I spent a little bit of time in the early '60s, but I found that there was a slow and quite remarkable evolution and that people who had considered themselves to be of the intelligentsia, by the time I was there, were much more open to American notions and ideas they recognized, at least, the need to know and understand what motivates us and the need to understand what can be uncorked in the United States in the way of political and economic energy and that frequently doesn't seem to be as possible in Europe. I found a lot more respect for American culture, particularly if it had a capital C rather than a small c, than I would have expected. Now when you have something like the establishment of something like EuroDisney 20 miles outside of Paris, that brings to the fore all the latent tensions that are not always creative between those who see the debasing of French civilization by the invasion of an American fantasy land against all of those who would like to take their children to see Mickey Mouse. And within society there is a fair bit of tension in that regard. But the French intelligentsia, and these were not the people who necessarily would welcome me immediately, in part because my French was not at the 5+ level. I did sense from many conversations, that they had come a long way in being more open to the impact we have in the world.

Q: What about the bureaucracy? Did that have a thrust as far as America was concern or did it have its own foreign policy, or not?

PENDLETON: Well, I suspect that Mitterrand or any of his prime ministers might claim that the Quai d'Orsay, the foreign ministry, had its own approach to life, and they were always trying to tame it. One of the most fascinating things about French society, really, is the influence that the graduates of the National School of Administration, mentioned above, have on our patterns of thinking and French decision-making. They come out class after class and provide not just the bureaucrats but the entire political class, really, including prime minister after prime minister (the impact that that way of thinking has on French decision-making. And the way of thinking involves a kind of philosophical approach to challenges and issues, a Cartesian division of issues into three parts. Whatever you went to make a *démarche* on, you knew you were going to get a three-part answer, no matter how seemingly unnecessary that might be. And the three-part answer would always be informed by a staunch belief that France has a special role in the world and that the United States doesn't understand this and that the United States doesn't adequately take France into account and that France thinks harder about issues than the United States does. Indeed, their approach to issues frequently was more nuanced than our own. The watering-down process that goes into creating a *démarche* in Washington could also be the worst enemy of those overseas trying to convince the French to do something because you would be passing along really what often seemed to me, as well as to the French, to be half-baked suggestions that were too easily dismissed. That came out of our inter-agency jockeying process. I found many of my interlocutors to be absolutely brilliant, in their own eyes at least.

I found that the best of them wanted to be creative, and these included people like Hubert Vedrine, with whom I met at regular intervals to discuss the future of NATO. He was Mitterrand's strategic counselor at that point. He later became Mitterrand's, basically, chief of staff, and now he's foreign minister of France. Or Ambassador Jean-David Leavitte, who was charged at the Quai d'Orsay with coming up with the world's approach to Cambodia, at the time that France was leading the efforts to have elections and have the UN appropriately involved. These people were absolutely world-class individuals who, in their professionalism, could run rings around most of us. I have to say that, as I said, my French wasn't 5+/5+, ("fluid but not fluent" I used to say) and Mitterrand said he would fire any of his underlings who ever spoke with diplomats in Paris in anything but French. It was sometimes funny that you'd work on and off with somebody for a couple of years, and then you'd have a visitor from Washington who would call on them, and you would find for the first time that the person spoke colloquial English English or American English. They are quite a remarkable breed, and sometimes they serve France brilliantly, and sometimes the baggage they bring with them leaves them a bit in the wake as world events go on.

Q: A theme that goes throughout almost all of these oral histories, anybody who deals with the French, is (frustrations not the word, but not really anti-French because there are many things about the French that everybody likes (but the French policy to really grate; and often, at least in the eyes of the Americans whom I interview, they see French policy as being out to make a buck for France or to throw, as the British would say, a spanner into the works just to show that they have the ability to stop things in the international world. Did you get any of this?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes, I got it all the time. And the question of making money for France was very much involved in the interrelationship between large French corporations and the government. The government would choose who would head many large French corporations.

And France, knowing that it is a relatively small country, has mobilized to try to increase exports, increase productivity, and it has done so against the backdrop of high unemployment that we discussed earlier. In terms of the grandeur of France, it was something that would pop up like a jack-in-the-box time and time again, it wasn't simply the misplaced notion that the U.S. is trying to compete with them in Africa or get them out of Africa or whatever because we want that role. In every negotiation, there would be a demand that (a) any new international body must have French as a language even though that might be terribly inconvenient for all other players; (b) there inevitably would be a demand at a certain point in major international negotiations that whatever was going to be signed would be signed in Paris and that it would be yet another "Treaty of the Elysées" ending the cold war or it would be the "Treaty of" this or that, ending the conflicts in Cambodia, this happened over and over again. President Bush was very gracious about seeing this need and subscribing to it. Repeatedly we had to bow to this intense internal French need in order to increase cooperation in terms of the substantive issues at hand. It's a small price to pay, but it's maddening. you see it coming like a steamroller; they almost can't help themselves with these demands. France is an extraordinary country but it has a capacity to make its leaders seem petty, and leaders do seem petty when they insist on France's central role over and over again. I'm not at all surprised that this is a constant theme. I fortunately, and perhaps because of the Gulf War and because of President Bush, was there at a time when, yes, we paid more attention than I think many in Washington would ever have wanted us to. That came from the very top on down. A great many people in Washington were not pleased because the French can be varsity-level irritating. But I think we got some pretty good trade-offs in the process, so that my view is a little bit more positive, in terms of how the trade-offs can work for us.

Q: Did you find yourself in any relationship with Washington or anywhere else or with our embassies in Bonn or London or something trying to explain the French position on things --in a way sort of gritting your teeth while you were doing it because you didn't quite support the French position?

PENDLETON: One of the great dangers of serving in Paris is the whole question of "clientitis" and how you are perceived by those who are more skeptical of the French than perhaps I was or became (and I was more skeptical of the French than some in our embassy who had a lifetime of commitment to strengthening French-US relations, either because they had French spouses or because they'd grown up in France or had studied in France, et cetera. But what I was extremely anxious to do in both London and Paris was to try to assure that our reporting reflected US interests from top to bottom, even if we had to put it in a summary and then repeat it: why is this of interest to the United States? And if you package the French argument in an American context, then you're probably all right in terms of critics. And we did not get into the kind of slanging match with other embassies that I used to see, for instance, between Tel Aviv and Cairo when I served in Tel Aviv in the late '60s. No, everybody was trying to understand a rapidly evolving Europe, and then, in terms of Washington, as I mentioned, the tone President Bush set couldn't help but affect the approach that subordinates took, even if they had to grit their teeth in the process. And every time you were ready to strangle the French, they would do something that was positive enough to let you breathe for another day.

Q: Well, let's take the two big events that are at least apparent here, one the fall of the Berlin wall and all that. I would have thought we would have been looking very closely at France

because it meant, you know, this thing was great, I mean, we'd all been all for this, but all of a sudden you had a greater Germany and all that. How did France feel about it? How did this affect what you were doing and your observations of the French-American relationship as these things were happening?

PENDLETON: France almost went into mourning about the unification of Germany. On the surface, they were very pleased about the course of events in Europe, but if you scratched them the slightest bit you would discover that there was a tremendous amount of apprehension about what was going to happen. Was this a new German tiger next door, now so much larger than it was, which had already wreaked havoc in Europe twice in a century (was it going to become an impossible neighbor to deal with? What would happen about the relationship that had always been so strong between the United States and Germany? Would it become even stronger? Would the United States try to influence France through Germany? What would happen about Germany's economic might, and would Germany be able to really dominate commercial ties with all of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in a way that France would like to have been able to stretch its own wings? Once you scratched the surface in Paris you found an almost funereal degree of apprehension about what all this would mean.

Nevertheless, the French had to put the best face on it because of trying to be good Europeans at that point, and French apprehensions contradicted the impulse toward a united Europe, which Mitterrand supported without reservation and which caused a great deal of concern on the part of many other Frenchmen. This led to Mitterrand calling the Maastricht referendum after the Treaty of Maastricht's propulsion toward a united defense and security foreign affairs policy for the EU. At the same time, the treaty that many Frenchmen resisted, created a common European currency to go into effect in 1999. Many worried that somehow the mark would become the currency of Europe and that the French franc would play a third or fourth or fifth role in the process, well behind the dollar and the mark.

I think we should say a few words about the Maastricht referendum, because it was a preoccupation of ours in terms of where France came out and in terms of the impact on the future of a united Europe and the impact on the future of Mitterrand, who I thought, from the moment I heard he was going to have a referendum, had made a major mistake. I didn't see any sense in it. I didn't see what he could gain because all the polls suggested almost immediately that it was going to be very close. Indeed, it was very close. We didn't know, up to the end, whether it was going to be decided by voters in the DOM-TOMs, the overseas departments. Were the people of Martinique, Guadeloupe and the French citizens of the Pacific going to decide this issue related to Europe? One could only guess. And uncharacteristically, I had our political section gin up two different cables, one if the referendum succeeded and one if it failed and focusing on the implications for the United States. On the night of the vote count, we stayed up most of the night and then sent the correct cable (Mitterrand succeeded. As would so typically be the case when you give a lot to something the cable got lost in the central computer in the State Department and was not read by anybody at Main State, which may be an argument for "you don't need embassies." Actually, it was fortunately relayed and was read by Eagleburger up in New York, where he was at the UN, and a few others, but by the time we realized that it had never been received by anybody, it was kind of untimely. I was tired and unhappy.

Q: What were the issues on the referendum?

PENDLETON: Well, the basic issue was whether France would go along with the Maastricht Treaty, which would give away to the EU an element of French sovereignty, particularly over foreign and security matters. This was not anything which many Frenchmen had been historically able to bring themselves to do, although France had been drifting and sometimes paddling vigorously in that direction for years. Maastricht basically was a sovereignty issue which divided, I would say, Europe, in a great many ways. It divided France in the same sorts of ways, with those who are afraid about change taking a rather conservative point of view and voting against the referendum and those who felt the change would be acceptable -- if not even good -- voting for it. Then you had the overlay of whether you were supporting Mitterrand or not. But it was a close call for Mitterrand.

Q: I would have thought, the French, in this period and really for a long time, were moving in two different directions. One, they were always concerned about a resurgent Germany, not necessarily a Hitlerian Germany, but just the sheer weight of a big, quite efficient country and all which could overwhelm them; and at the desire to sort of keep the United States out. I would have thought that there would have been an underlying spirit of "let's keep the United States in as a control over Germany," but the French always seemed to be going for this European solution, which would mean that they would, in a way, be overwhelmed by Germany. I mean, was that at all a thing?

PENDLETON: I think what they hoped to do was to be able to influence Germany and have us influence Germany a little less on issues where we disagreed with France but have us influence Germany about French concerns on issues where we agreed a little more. And you had a funny triangle involved, with no easy answer. France was very anxious to try to educate the Germans, and the Germans very anxious to keep French concerns and angst in mind. And there are structural relationships between France and Germany that aren't very widely known but have helped to support ties that are important. For instance, on a fairly minor level, there are Frenchmen and Germans who work in each other's foreign ministries. Now occasionally we've had somebody who has worked at the Quai, but they're asked to work on aid matters related to places in the world that France doesn't care much about. France had a German diplomat working in the European office on questions related to the integration of Europe, which is fairly extraordinary. French and German diplomats have joint meetings, not unlike our chiefs-of-mission meetings. They have chiefs-of-mission meetings involving both French and German chiefs of missions. There are a fair number of structural approaches which allow each country to try to influence the other and to build confidence between the two. But in the back of their mind always was, the United States had 330,000 troops in Europe. The majority were in Germany. We had a remarkable impact on German thinking in the post-World War II era, and the French did fear very much that in a way we would, through the Germans, throw a spanner in the French works. And I think that we were more sophisticated than the French frequently give us credit for, but it's something that bothered them.

Q: Did you find the NATO relationship within Europe bothersome to the French? I mean, were they talking one way and performing another way?

PENDLETON: Well, sure, and this goes back over the years. France's approach to NATO has evolved over the last decade in important ways, and yet what most people in France did not realize was that even on the military side France had quite a close relationship to NATO even in the decades following France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure. France found it very much in its interest to keep us involved in as quite a way with NATO military thinking. And then of course they remained in NATO - pushed by France, NATO decamped from France to Evère, outside of Brussels, and yet France remained very much a player on the political side. Because of its coherent view about a variety of subjects France frequently was able to play a role way out of line with its military commitment to the Alliance, which in theory was none. Next to us and next to the Brits, they played probably the major role, the Germans being relatively cautious in NATO because of their own military history. The Brits had no army in the '70s to speak of, but they had a lot of candlepower in the people who represented them at NATO and put it to good use. The French in the latish '80s began to give a lot more thought to the question of rejoining the integrated military structure, and this led to a need on their part to understand better what they were missing and what was involved(although they had a pretty good understanding(and they were testing the political waters at home increasingly. This went on into the early '90s, with the notion of reentering, and my talks with Hubert Védrine were very much focused on NATO and the French role and the French potential role in NATO. He was giving away nothing in terms of what they might do, but there was a certain amount of probing back and forth. And this I found encouraging over time, but you'd go in fits and starts as to whether France would rejoin the integrated military structure and do so with gusto. In parallel, of course, they were considering a stronger defense role for the EU.

What they did do, vis a vis the U.S., and we saw it during the Gulf War, was increasingly to cooperate with us on a variety of issues which would not have been possible even a few years before. If you think, for instance, how much unhappiness there was in the United States about France's role in the Libya bombing at the end of the '80s. France forced our planes flying out of the UK to go around France to get to Libya. That left a very bad taste in a lot of Americans' mouths, and rightly so. In the end of the day, with the Gulf War, they allowed our planes to land at French bases(two of them, as I recall, in the south of France(and this was a very big request which we made to them and one which in the end they agreed to approve. We also, in the early '90s, provided France on increasingly frequent occasions with what people in Washington like to call "lift." France had a military which was very deficient in terms of long-haul air capability, and it had aircraft carriers with no planes. When it sent an aircraft carrier to the Gulf, during the build-up for instance, the deck was covered with trucks. And the pictures taken from the air of the aircraft carrier put out to sea(instead of being called a porte-avions it was called a porte-camions(it was very embarrassing for France. Now why didn't it have planes? Because the French wanted to build their own advanced fighter and they were way behind in doing so. They wanted to build their own long-haul aircraft and they were way behind in doing so, so when they wanted to send troops to Chad or Somalia or whatever, we quietly had to provide them with the lift. But there was really a very large degree, in the early '90s, between the French military and the United States, even though the French minister of defense, Chevènement, was quite a good friend of Iraq. He was not one whom we ideally would have chosen to be the French defense minister at that point.

Q: Let's follow through on the Gulf War. This is the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. How did that sit

with the public and then with the French Government when it initially happened, before there was any response from anybody?

PENDLETON: Well, I think there was a tremendous amount of unhappiness about it in France, and for a variety of different reasons, some of which wouldn't have been necessarily our first reasons. I mentioned the French defense minister, Chevènement. He had been very anxious to build up French military sales to the Gulf, and people of his persuasion could see immediately that the invasion was going to be highly incompatible with that aim. It was going to be highly incompatible with France's desire to build up commercial relations in the entire region, and much of French foreign policy is commercially motivated. It would mean that (if the United States took this seriously, as it was pretty clear we were going to from the outset (we were going to have a situation in which France might wish to accept, possibly, what had happened, but that would not fit into its international construct. It might wish to see some kind of diplomatic compromise, and it certainly would not like to see at the outset any kind of war in the Gulf. It took a great deal of communication back and forth from August to January, right up to the end (the invasion being in August and the Gulf War in January-February) to convince the French through each step of the way that we were on track and that we knew what we were doing and that they should be with us. And as I've said repeatedly now, Bush played a very major role in communicating with Mitterrand. Secretary of State Baker also played a very major role by coming through Paris repeatedly and keeping the French fully apprized of where we were going. So did Secretary of Defense Cheney. And in the end, they came with us to a degree that I never would have expected.

Now the French were not using conscripts so that, in a way, the French public could accept the risk because those who were involved were all volunteers and Foreign Legion types and others this would not mean death in every little village around France if things went wrong. The French were also very concerned about the potential for terrorism in France; that was another constricting element. But they were extremely vigorous about coping with terrorism. They not only, for instance, took every waste basket out of every Métro station, which soon turned the Métro stations into mammoth garbage bins, but they worked through the leaders of the Muslim communities in France and basically told them that "you spread the word that if there is one terrorist incident, you people will not be welcome here." This message was terrifying for those who had come across the Mediterranean from North Africa or had come from the Middle East and who wished to stay in France, frequently for economic reasons. The upshot was that nothing happened during the whole process. As we built towards war, the French were with us, and I never personally would have guessed that they would have allowed our planes to land and refuel and stay overnight, but they did, and it was fairly remarkable.

Now at the same time as the day on which battle was to be launched by us approached, France, on the diplomatic side, felt it had to show that it would go the extra mile, and Mitterrand made some suggestions which were not welcome in Washington, about diplomacy with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. We felt that we had to go an extra mile, too, and Baker had met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva and gotten nowhere.

Then, really very much at the end of the run-up to the war, Peres-de-Cuellar, UN secretary-general at that point, decided he would go out and meet with Saddam Hussein. That led me to

involvement which was interesting in a sense, because he was going to come back from Baghdad and stop in Paris. We needed desperately to know what his view of the situation was after talking with Saddam Hussein. He had said he would not say until he got back to either Paris or New York(I can't remember which)(but I was asked by the folks in Washington, on I believe it was a Sunday, to find him. But at that point he was on his private plane coming from Baghdad, and I literally made more than 200 phone calls looking for him, through New York, through UN types in Paris, through everybody I could think of, from hotel bellhops to anybody and keeping the ambassador and Washington up to speed. And in the end he turned out to be in the Crillon Hotel, which was 20 feet from my office across Boissy d'Anglais Street on the Place de la Concorde in Paris.

Ambassador Walter Curley, Mark Lissfelt (the deputy chief of mission) and I went over to call on him in the hotel, at the first meeting I could arrange in the morning. It was pretty hairy. I kept getting calls the night before and that morning from the executive secretary of the Department, who was on Baker's plane, which at that point was flying from Europe to Canada. And the Secretary of State wanted to know immediately when we saw Peres, of course, what the upshot was. I told Ambassador Curley that I'd been getting these calls and that we would have to let them know straightaway on the Secretary's plane. We went over to the hotel and were shunted into a side bedroom, rather than into Peres-de-Cuellar's suite where he was receiving people. He had the Luxembourg foreign minister with him (Luxembourg at that point had the presidency of the EU), so we had to wait. Then to my horror, just as we were about to be received, the Russian ambassador came along. He had been the Soviet ambassador at the UN and knew Peres-de-Cuellar very well. Peres-de-Cuellar came out and saw the Russian ambassador and embraced him in a big bear hug. In the meantime, it thought, Oh, my God, my ambassador is going to be upstaged by the Russian ambassador and time is going by. So I threw my body in between them and said, "the American ambassador has been waiting there, and you've got to see him next," which fortunately is what happened. And basically Peres-de-Cuellar told us there wasn't any alternative to war, that Saddam Hussein had given him nothing, and that the moment had come to go ahead, which was very important news because it kind of uncorked the bottle.

We went back to the embassy, and I called the Secretary's plane, which was on the ground in Ottawa; and then I had a memorable disconnect with Ambassador Curley because he had forgotten that the Secretary's plane people had been demanding on his behalf to know right away. He had wanted to send a personal cable, which could be received on the plane, and I was to write the cable. When I told him that the Secretary had already been informed, he was not best pleased and made clear that my future lay perhaps better in Washington than in Paris. However, the deputy chief of mission kindly reminded him that we had discussed the need to make a phone call, and I was able to stay on in Paris. But that was one snippet of the last days before the fighting started.

Q: How did the French react to the victory over Saddam Hussein?

PENDLETON: Oh, I think it was interesting. First of all, during the war, I think they were absolutely flabbergasted by some of the films they were shown of smart bombs and that sort of thing. The American military might and ability to put together a coalition was something that even the French found themselves in awe of, and initially after the victory there was a

tremendous outpouring of respect for what the United States had done. It was quite unusual to have French people telling me that "God, the U.S. have done something just unbelievable."

But like so many of us, they quickly sobered up, and before very long they became quite French. I must say, when I heard that we'd stopped the war on the hundredth hour, I thought that was a very bad thing to do, that it was artificial, and that it probably would have meant that we hadn't thought about some elements that were involved. And the French, a lot of my French compatriots, thought that there was something artificial there, that we did not know adequately what we wanted to do after the war, and we were being very heavily blamed for not caring about what was going to happen to those who were against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, including in northern Iraq. And we had this situation in which Bush was shown on TV down playing golf in Florida. The French, who have a strong humanitarian impulse, for a lot of reasons, were beginning to beat the drum in terms of humanitarian aid for those who were still in Iraq and who were hostile to Saddam Hussein. They were under his gun and his chemical weapons. So it was interesting how quickly we got back to business as usual in which the French had some very strong concerns about how we were comporting ourselves, which they were not shy about registering and which started almost as soon as the war was over.

Q: I think (and this is from my interviews with people like our ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas Freeman, and Gordon Brown, who was the political advisor to our general, General Schwarzkopf, there (we didn't have an end game, and the hundred hours thing sounded very much like the boys sitting and Colin Powell and George Bush and all saying, "Wouldn't it sound nice to end the war and get the hell out of there?" It was not our finest hour.

PENDLETON: Well, I would agree with you. I've lamented that, and you wonder how it happened that when we had such a long time to build up an advance. But it's always harder to think about the unthinkable. I think we probably assumed that Saddam Hussein would not survive, that he would either be killed during the conflict or that he would be put aside by his own people very quickly. And that was just wrong.

I think the French are better than we are at trying to push through the thought process and look at the consequences and the peripheral by-play that comes from any action. And whether it's there Cartesian way of thinking (most of us are good at thinking about one thing, and we pat ourselves on the back when we think about two things. The French, because of their education, have to think about three things, and it sometime takes them a step further than we find convenient. In this case, some of their concerns were mine. But that is not to say that their interests were ours.

All this said, the French basically were incredibly generous about what we did in terms of the execution of the war itself. When Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defense, came to pay his final respects to France as he was getting ready to retire, the French treated him with the kind of honor and esteem that only the French can muster. For instance, I went to the airport to meet him, which I thought was a mistake because I thought the Ambassador (I was acting deputy chief of mission) should do so at that point. But at any rate I was dispatched. Cheney arrived at the airport at Orly, about 15 miles south of Paris on the notoriously busy autoroute that goes from the Mediterranean to Paris. You can spend hours getting from Orly into town. Some people spent many hours that day reaching Paris, and the reason was that the French closed the autoroute and

allowed only Secretary Cheney's motorcade to be on it. And partway into Paris I pointed out to him that if he looked behind him and ahead of him he would see something he would never see on that road again in his life, which was that there wasn't another car but the ones that were with him. And even Dick Cheney, who is very down-to-earth Wyoming guy with a couple of years at Yale at a patina of some sort, was quite amused by that. That's the kind of great gestures the French can make.

I fear I amused him less. I made him talk about my vision of the new post-Cold War military, dealing with hurricanes and forest fires on top of its classic duties. I also pressed peacekeeping on him. He appeared tolerant of these notions and others but did not hesitate to make clear that he disagreed. A day later when I went to take him back to the airport, I saw he had a lot of morning reading to do and said I assessed he would like peace and quiet to focus on it. "You are damn right, Pendleton," he said.

Q: I'd hear things about the French troops that were there, including air, realizing that they really weren't that integrated into NATO and that they had to be almost assisted to find out where they were. I mean, they realized how much farther ahead NATO was than they were. Did that come through?

PENDLETON: Oh, yes, after the war there was a lot of talk on the part of the French about what lessons were learned, and part of it was the whole question of how does France deal with NATO? But here were other questions which they saw as more strictly French in nature. One was that they clearly didn't have any overhead capability, and they had to rely on us to brief them on what the French forces would be facing in the places where they were assigned. France, incidentally(I mentioned that they allowed the use of air bases(also, in an absolutely extraordinary way, allowed their troops to be placed under the command of foreigners. That had not happened since World War II and was an extraordinary gesture. Particularly since they had left the Integrated Military Command of NATO many years before.

France put the Gulf War behind them with a determination to beef up their intelligence capabilities dramatically if they could, and I think without a real sense of how expensive this would be. They, I think, became more realistic about what it meant to buy foreign planes if you have an aircraft carrier rather than to wait till you can have exactly what you want, which has "France" written on every possible component. They became quite obsessed with the whole question of lift and the ability to get to foreign points of conflict without having to rely on another air force, i.e., the United States Air Force. And there were a variety of lessons there, but underlying it all, as you suggest, was the whole question of working in the best integrated fashion with NATO and what it means to be involved. This came up almost immediately again and in terms of ex-Yugoslavia and how to manage that, because France supplies a large number of troops to the UN. The role of the UN and the role of NATO(what can you decide without having a UN resolution versus a NATO resolution, have become ongoing issues.

Q: Well, we'll move to Yugoslavia in a minute, but in Iraq, I was told somewhere, that Madame Mitterrand had taken the cause of the Kurds very much under her wing and that she, in a way, was the prime force for everything that developed with the Kurds, safe haven and support and all that. Was there anything to this, or not?

PENDLETON: Yes, she played a major role. Now her relationship with her husband wasn't very good, and yet she participated with him in all necessary functions. She had her own human rights organization which she spearheaded, and she indeed was very active in terms of supporting the Kurds. The French were very much prepared to involve themselves in it. They see themselves as people of a great humanitarian impulse, and this sometimes is a cynical approach, and it sometimes is a well-meaning approach, but the humanitarian side of it, --whether it's Doctors without Borders or the French Government involving itself in the guise of humanitarianism in, say, Rwanda,-- at some point can be an important impulse. I wouldn't give Madame Mitterrand too much credit, but I would very definitely give her substantial credit against the backdrop of what the public was perceiving as a result of watching TV.

Q: You were there up to '93. What was happening in Yugoslavia? Were we working with the French to try to do something about it, or were the French sort of saying, "We'll take care of it," or how did it go?

PENDLETON: We were working with the French, but we weren't sure what we wanted to do; and they weren't totally sure, either, and it was messy(it was really quite messy because, of course, the situation on the ground was confused, and it didn't lead to clear-cut policy options on the part of anybody involved. We had, for instance, Reg Bartholomew, who for a while was our point man on the former Yugoslavia. He came to have a day-long series of meetings with the French about options. And he kept getting up and going to the telephone every 20 minutes or so, to the annoyance of the French, but Reg kept getting new instructions all day long. And it was very clear that what we had in mind was a work-in-progress, and all we could do in terms of billing it to the French was to say, "You see, we're consulting with you. You always say we face you with a *fait accompli*. We're consulting with you as we work out our own approach to the issues involved, of which there are many, many layers. So you keep factoring it in." And this, in a way, brought out the traditional French apprehension of that cliché that we mentioned earlier about NATO, where the only time when the allies in NATO are more apprehensive than when the United States knows what it wants to do is when the United States doesn't know what it wants to do. I'm not phrasing it very elegantly, but that sentiment was running through. It was a bit of a shock, I think, to the French to see they were dealing with us at a moment when they really could influence our policies from the outset, and yet they seemed to me to want a better sense of direction on our part.

Q: Did you have any feeling in this early period of a certain thirst on the part of some in France who were saying, "Ah, at last, here is a European problem"(i.e., the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This was even before Bosnia got into it, but it was obviously out there), and say, "This is a European problem, and we will give a European answer and butt out"? I mean, was there that?

PENDLETON: Not really. There was a strong sentiment that it would be very nice if Europe could solve this problem by itself and for once be Europe and not the transatlantic relationship, but I think anybody who had to deal with it recognized that the capability lay with NATO and that the United States still dominated NATO. How would you create an alternative mechanism? Now this brought up the whole question of what the EU might be able to do and what the US might be able to do in conjunction with the WEU, the Western European Union, by removing

some forces from NATO, deploying them under the flag of the WEU and trying to handle it that way. But this was all ground which had never been tilled before in a meaningful way. It led to a great deal of concern on both sides about whether anything could be done in timely fashion. I think most Frenchmen who were going to deal with the issue recognized, on occasion with relief, that the United States had to be a player. Presidential indecision became even more noticeable when President Clinton replaced Bush. Clinton decided to step in vigorously, only rather late on, including his useful involvement before the Dayton Accords (but it had taken months and months to sort out in his own mind what to do).

Q: What about the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Did this happen gradually enough, or did this make any difference in our relations with France or your dealing with the French?

PENDLETON: Initially, I don't think it made as much of a difference as I would have expected. I think the French were as surprised as we were and are, with the speed that it all came about, and it led to many discussions, but it led more to a sharing of views that were useful on both sides. It seemed to me, looking back, that the unification of Germany is part of a process that was much more of a blockbuster for the French for historical reasons than the breakup of the Soviet Union per se. We were all feeling our way, but Jim Baker, in particular, I think, played an important role in trying to sort out our approach to the future with his Berlin speech, to the future. The French, I think, were encouraged to hear what our thoughts were and didn't have any necessarily great apprehensions about where we might lead them in the process. As time went on, however, there was growing French apprehensions about the only remaining superpower and US "hegemony".

Q: Did you have any feel that the French were looking at Eastern Europe, which was now becoming unstuck from the Communist Bloc and saying, "Well, we'd better get in there and start turning this into a market," because obviously the Germans would be a major factor?

PENDLETON: This was a major French preoccupation from the outset. The French feared that the Germans would dominate all of Eastern Europe from the point of view of markets; and were extremely anxious to beef up their commercial approach to Eastern Europe. They saw this as a real opportunity, but one that they would have to hustle to make a dent in. While they were determined to do so, the trade statistics, I believe, suggested within a few years that they hadn't been particularly successful. The markets proved, in a way, to be a bit smaller than they had thought. The Germans were indeed very active, and the French also have a strong cultural commitment to making sure that French language and that French culture is extended as far as it possibly can (to wit, their interest in Romania, for instance, their interests in ties with the Czech Republic. In terms of contacts among peoples, it is astonishing how Europe changed during the time I was in Paris. For instance, I had some old Czech friends from my days in Ghana who lived in Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia. We have kept in touch over the years, but it was not easy without endangering them, with me being an American diplomat. We had to be in touch on those occasions when they could leave the country. Well, after the wall came down and after the Soviet Union collapsed, we invited them to come and visit us in Paris. I had noticed that every weekend there were literally hundreds of buses from Czechoslovakia that came to France, to Paris, to see the City of Light, which was practically like the capital of Czechoslovakia in the minds of many Czechs. They weren't very warmly welcomed by the French because they brought their own

food(they couldn't afford to spend a dime(and slept on the bus and went home again.

We invited our friends, and they were supposed to arrive at our house midmorning on a given day, and they appeared at 6:30 in the morning. I said, "Jeez, how did you get here so fast?" They said, well, the bus picked them up in Pilsen(this was just a regular intercity busy("picked us up in Pilsen at five in the afternoon, and we stopped at the border with Germany for about a minute and a half, and then we came on through" And for those of us who thought of Europe with these boundaries and barbed wire, just listening to them saying, "and we came on through"(it was a real reminder of how things had changed.

For their part, the French saw that you could go the other way. Out in the Place de la Concorde, for instance, this isn't commerce, but there were trucks there, and if you wanted to send a package to a city in Poland, you'd go throw your package in the Poland truck, and it would be delivered the next morning. If you wanted to do Hungary, you threw it in the Hungary truck. And off they would go, overnight, and the package would be delivered. Europe was changing vastly at the human level, of people traveling, and at the same time the French wanted to get a hold of all these changes.

I mentioned Romania. One of the things that reminded me that the United States optic and the French optic are rather different on international affairs was the revolution in Romania and the killing of Ceausescu in December of 1989. It happened about the same week that we invaded Panama. And I, of course, was under orders to get French support for the invasion of Panama. When you went to French officials, all they wanted to talk about was Romania. And all you'd see on French TV was Romania, endless shots of the Romanian revolution and then a trailer of a few seconds of what was happening in Panama. And it was a reminder that the US and France are different countries with a different view of the world, and that we're in the Western Hemisphere. Even when Colin Powell came over a bit later to help brief on what we'd done(and he was by no means the legend that he became later(the French were slightly bemused that we would send a four-star around to brief them on Panama.

And then a Romanian speaker who'd been educated in Toulouse and who spoke fluent French, Peter Romano, became the president of Romania, and that excited the French tremendously. Anne Sinclair, who was the kind of Barbara Walters of France had him on, and couldn't stop complimenting him on his French. While watching, I was reminded that nobody seemed to know all that much about him in the United States Government, and it occurred to me that if he'd been educated in Toulouse there might still be professors there who remembered him. So our able consul general, Judith Heimann, went up from Bordeaux, at our request, and found a professor who still put Romano up every summer for his holidays. We got some insight into him as a person and as a potential leader from that we otherwise wouldn't have had. And we wouldn't have had that insight if we hadn't had the consulate in Bordeaux, which has since been closed, because the consul general had already met the professor. This little episode was a reminder of the price we pay when we have to close consulates.

Q: Just how did you see the role of the Ambassador during these turbulent times, Walter Curley, because he was not a professional, and I would think it a difficult time?

PENDLETON: It was a difficult time, and I don't know quite how to say it, but Walter Curley had a great fondness for France and a great interest in things financial and commercial and cultural and less of an interest in some of the political issues which preoccupied us. I think it's fair to say that in the time I worked for him, only once did he ask to see the foreign minister, and only once did he see the foreign minister, Roland Dumas, in something other than an informal way, such as at a dinner or a cocktail party or reception or something of that nature. During the Gulf War, everything got ratcheted up and there were instructions in no uncertain terms that ambassadors should deal with particular issues. It was a little bit more difficult to gain the entrée than you would think, even though the stakes were extremely high. Whether the ambassador would respond was an issue that obviously, for those of us working in the embassy, was of concern because, while the Ambassador's willingness to plunge into some of the most complex economic and commercial and cultural issues was manifest, we felt a little bit limited by his lack of enthusiasm for political démarches. And the French are so hierarchical that if you top off(I was the number three person in the embassy(at the number three, they take note of that, and the access you have is much more limited. And the deputy chief of mission had a great many challenges to face just running an embassy that included 1100 people(everything from the Battle Monuments Commission to the consulates were under the embassy(

Q: *Who was the DCM?*

PENDLETON: Mark Lissfelt. For him it was a challenge to get spun up on some of the issues. The embassies issues were global. The world was our oyster. I'm not talking about just the war; I learned more about, say, timber and mineral smuggling along the Thai-Cambodian border while serving in France than I ever thought I would want to know, much less need to know. You had to study extremely hard to keep on top of these substantive issues, which a political counselor could do, but a deputy chief of mission who has the FBI representative banging on his door and the DEA representative banging on his back door and at the same time the INS representative trying to waylay him in the cafeteria couldn't easily involve himself in every substantive issue that came along.

So for us it was a challenge, and certain things got done in Washington that I wish had been done in Paris. Now when Avis Bohlen came as a deputy chief of mission, involvement on the political side of the top two in the embassy changed. Avis had a very strong history of living in France, speaking impeccable French, knowing the French, being sympathetic to French concerns and understanding how to interpret them to Americans who might be more skeptical than she. She also had a kind of intellectual and personal drive that was fairly remarkable. Moreover, the arrival of Ambassador Pamela Harriman made a difference. She was determined to make her mark. She was uncertain about the issues, but she arrived with a kind of energy and commitment which was(with respect to mastering some of the tough concerns, at least when I saw her during the initial part of her tenure -- really quite remarkable. And she got involved, at that point, anyway, in issues that previously did not get attention at the ambassadorial level. She also paid attention to French officials who had never had attention paid, and of course they responded.

Q: *What sort of issues would these be?*

PENDLETON: Well, they ranged from some very complex arms control issues to concerns of

the Treasury Attache. She not only went to make démarches, but when we had the undersecretary for security affairs visiting, she did what she did so well, which was to throw a working dinner. There wasn't much work done at the dinner but it brought into the residence level after level of French officials involved in the issues, from the top down to the working level. They were just astonished to be invited and caught in that net and were flattered and honored. Of course, she had quite a remarkable ability to make people feel at home and important. And this helped to open more doors in the future.

With the help of numerous briefings, she took on some terribly complex issues related to finance that were fraught with potential downsides and even went public to a degree on top of her private démarches. But she just waded in and saw people, at least initially, and called on people who were not used to having the embassy come knocking on their door. It was, to me, quite impressive.

Q: On the personal side, was your wife able to operate as a lawyer and an investment banker in France?

PENDLETON: Yes, fortunately, and that was due (a) in part to her capabilities and training and (b) in part to the fact that her father had been a British diplomat and she'd been registered as a British subject at birth. So Elisabeth had a British passport and could work in London and then later in Paris. In London, she worked for a French bank, Paribas, as a lawyer out on the trading floor, doing largely swaps and options. When I moved to Paris, she stayed in London and continued working there until she could organize a move to the French headquarters of Paribas, which she did, and she found that was really quite difficult working environment. In London it had been an international environment; her boss was an Australian, for instance. In Paris, the headquarters was almost all French, and she was the only American in the French headquarters -- and without 5+/5+ French---. Along the way she was head hunted by an American insurance company called AIG, American International Group, which is our biggest overseas insurance company. They were making so much money they set up a bank to invest and reinvest it. Not only were they doing swaps and options, but all sorts of complex derivatives. So Elisabeth moved to join them at their Paris operation, a twelve-minute walk from our grand representational apartment on Avenue Kleber, again out on the trading floor and had quite an experience. When I left France after four years, she stayed on for a year and a half. She continued to work for them as she undertook to line up a job at the World Bank here. But fundamentally my wife was the principal breadwinner in our family for the time that we were at our last two posts, which is unusual, to say the least, and I include in that even the value of the housing and schooling and things that we were provided by the US Government. I am terribly proud of her and proud to be her husband. So to me that was a relief on a variety of fronts, particularly in view of the leukemia which by that point I was being treated for at the Hotel Dieu Hospital near the cathedral.

WALTER J.P. CURLEY
Ambassador
France (1989-1993)

Ambassador Walter Curley grew up in the Pittsburgh area. After graduating from Yale in 1943, he fought in World War II as a Marine. Throughout his life, Ambassador Curley has been an author, a New York City Official and a partner at J.H. Whitney and Company. Throughout his Foreign Service career, he has served as ambassador to Ireland and to France. Ambassador Curley was interviewed by Richard Jackson in 1998.

CURLEY: We were down in Nassau, at the Lyford Key Club, being really frivolous, and the telephone rang. It was Jim Baker on the phone. He chided me, saying, "We're up here working." Made me feel terrible, but he said, "The President and I would love to have you get back in the diplomatic service here, and the President says you can go anyplace you like." Boy, that was pretty nice. I said, "Jim, that is so nice, but honest to God, anyplace..." He said, "Okay, look. Say something, otherwise it's going to be..." And I said, "Well, we both speak Italian, like those Italians, and know their character. We'd love that." But I said, "That's not necessary." I said also, "We know India. We don't speak it - I have a little Tamil, but not much. Well, we'd go to India and we'd love that."

Baker said, "Okay, I'll call you back in two days." And in two days, the President called me back - while we were still down there; I felt doubly embarrassed. And the President said, "How good is your Italian?" And I said, "My Italian's pretty good." And he said, "Is it as good as your French, because that's where you're going? You're going to France. How good is your French?" He and I had the same French teacher at Andover. I said, "Well, it's about as good as yours, if you had that French teacher." And he said, "Oh, no, it has to be better than that." (Well, it was. I took it at Yale and I had used it. Funnily enough, I'd used my French a lot in China. There was a French community there. So my French wasn't bad.) Well, he said, "That's where you're going." When I told Mary, or Taitsie, she was thrilled and excited and surprised.

I'm jumping a bit to the language part of it. I really worked on it before I left here. I worked with a man. I didn't write anything; we just spoke. So I got my French up to a pretty good level. It wasn't bad, but I got it up to a better level. And then when I got over there I insisted at dinner parties that we preferred to speak French at the endless formal dinner parties. They'd always start out saying, "Shall we speak French or English?" Or they'd always start out in English. And I was dying to speak English, but I said to them, "No," and Taitsie did, too, "No, we prefer to speak French." It was agonizing at first, particularly for Taitsie, but it was very good for us both. That way I became totally at ease with that part of it as we started our four years in France. We were there '89, '90, '91, '92, and I came home in mid-'93.

Q: *You followed Joe Rodgers, then.*

CURLEY: I followed Joe Rodgers. Right. Let me tell you a rather interesting incident. George Bush did an extraordinarily thoughtful and useful and nice thing. I had been approved by the Senate, and I had no problems there at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing except with Senator Joe Biden. Joe Biden was asking me if I spoke French, and then I spoke French to him at the hearing, and asked him if he spoke French. I said it nicely. Senator Claiborne Pell was there and does speak excellent French. So Claiborne Pell asked him the same thing, and Biden

was put off. I think he just wanted to bait me a bit because I was a Republican nominee. Anyway, I cleared it through with no problem. Now we were preparing to go, and Bush called me up on the phone. We were here in New York, and I had just finished that ambassadorial charm school with a lot of other ambassadors. It was very worthwhile, incidentally. "What are you doing next weekend," George Bush asked. When the President calls, where does the big gorilla sit? Anyplace he wants. I said, "What do you have in mind, Mr. President?" And he said, "Why don't you and Taitsie come up for the weekend to Kennebunkport?" He said, "I think it would be very useful because I have President Mitterrand and Madame Mitterrand coming over with a bunch of his senior people." I think it might be useful if you met Mitterrand before you got to France." I said, "If the protocol is okay, not having presented my credentials. If you think the niceties of that wouldn't be uneasy-making for the French, I can't think of anything I'd rather do." So he said, "Well, don't worry about the protocol. I'll handle that part. Why don't you come up a day early." George Bush loves to play golf, and so do I. All the Bushes are very competitive. Bush said, "Come up a day early and we'll play a little golf with Baker and Brent Scowcroft." So, we went up a day early and had a bit of that, and then arrived Mitterrand, Madame Mitterrand, Admiral Langsade - remember him? - and of course, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Ambassador de Margerie, and a whole phalanx of French government types. And it was a time of very serious discussion but also some fun. I could never have perceived Mitterrand without a tie, or without a coat, for that matter. Well, in the Bush way of life, particularly at Kennebunkport, it is militantly casual. Sweaters were kind of foisted on and ties were snatched off President Mitterrand, and we had a hell of a good time. Mitterrand is - we can talk about him later, if you like, but we had a most interesting time there that weekend, and I can tell you, if you ever want to hit the ground running and have a leg up in France, be introduced to the President of France by the President of the United States in his house with his arm around you. It sets your social and professional scale pretty well by the time you get there. Baker was there, and Susan, his wife, and Taitsie, and one of Bush's sisters, Nancy Bush Ellis, was there, and of course, Brent Scowcroft. It was a very, very cozy time at Kennebunkport. The payoff because Mitterrand knew from that and from other subsequent things that I had real access to the Oval Office and to Jim Baker. That was most helpful. Well, Mitterrand plus his senior people. Dumas saw the relationship between George Bush and me. So that was very helpful. Also, Bush and Mitterrand were genuinely good friends. Now that was an odd couple - I mean, it really was a funny couple - so different - but they were seriously firm friends; they genuinely liked, admired, and respected each other. That had built up during the time that Bush was Vice President. He and Mitterrand had solidified this friendship. And the reason, probably the main reason, that Bush chose me, outside of the fact that he wanted a loyalist around, was that he wanted a friendly gesture to indicate to Mitterrand that he was sending one of his close friends who'd been ambassador before and for whom he had great personal rapport. He wanted Mitterrand to know that. Mitterrand would be flattered. It works that way. So that was the basic reason I was sent to France. I was very grateful to Bush for arranging it that way.

Q: What a great start!

CURLEY: It was a good start. Yes, indeed.

Q: So you arrived, then, at that big embassy, 50 government agencies, or whatever you have there-

CURLEY: Yes. 1200 employees, a change from Ireland - at least in size or scope.

Q: You kept your DCM, Mark Lissfelt, who had stayed on.

CURLEY: As I mentioned to you before we started, I thought I'd save a little money for the State Department regarding travel expenses interviewing prospective DCMs, so I said, "Let's start with the incumbent." So Mark Lissfelt came to New York for me to interview. I thought he was a really good person. We got on. The chemistry was just great, and I liked everything about him from the start, and as time went on, I liked him more and more. That holds true today. Both he and his wife, Cindy, are extraordinarily able, capable, nice, funny, interesting, curious, and attractive people. I enjoy them. We made a good team. And I hasten to add that when he finally had to leave, after renewing his assignment to the point of near irregularity, I was again deluged by people who wanted to replace Mark. I got a call from Larry Eagleburger, who said, "I'd like you to take very seriously Avis Bohlen as a candidate. Think of her very seriously." And I said, "Well, Larry, I know Avis. I like her very much. But," I said, "we are already gender-imbalanced here at the moment. The head of our commercial section is a woman. All of our senior consular people - consuls general and consuls - are all women." I said, "If we have another here, it's, I think, a little *de trop* [French: overboard]. Nothing to do with ability or anything." And Eagleburger said, "Well, no, I just repeat this: take it seriously." I thought very seriously, and said, "Well, that's not a big problem, gender imbalance. I mean, think of the years we went along when there were just too many men around. It wasn't so bad. So it's not going to be so bad if we have too many women." Well, Avis came, and Avis and I became really good friends. And she is without peer, peerless; she did a wonderful job, and we again were a very good team. I liked Avis and admired her enormously. And that holds true today. So I was lucky three times: with Jack Rendall, Mark Lissfelt, and Avis Bohlen. I couldn't have been luckier.

Q: You had some security worries in that big embassy. Did somebody sneak in at one point?

CURLEY: Starting in '89 - as I said, we got there in May or June '89, just in time for the Embassy Fourth of July party, an instant way to make 5,000 new friends - it was really a remarkable period in history, the events in that '90 to '92 period. The reunification of Germany; the implosion of communism in Eastern Europe; the disappearance of the Soviet Union; the Gulf War; Maastricht. We had all these things just go bang-bang-bang, one right after another. I mean it was just incredible, let alone the Tiananmen Square massacre and all that, but just in Europe itself and especially in France - not London as much. London's certainly very important - always has been, always will be - but a lot of that activity, a lot of the repercussions and reactions and responses and intrigue, if you will, was happening in Paris. So it was a cascade of events and occurrences. Of course, the Gulf War was the epitome of that whole thing.

And that was a difficult period with the French. That was not easy. The French took to that coalition effort - putting together the coalition - very reluctantly, very. They saw themselves in that posture they always have of being outside the military structure of NATO, and there was no way they were going to get into the coalition other than as an observer. I had a lot of instructions from the Secretary of State and from the President himself: get in there and do a little shin kicking, they said. I tried, but the French were wearing shin guards. But when I was given a little

“ammunition” by Secretary Baker. I went in and had a chat with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. He and Jim Baker did not have the best of chemistry. They were both very effective people, but chemically they had a hard time. I went in to see Dumas about getting France to agree to the refueling of some of our big aircraft - bombers - that were leaving the UK en route to the Gulf. We wanted to have them refueled in southern France and then onward. That was finally agreed to, and then, kicking and screaming, the French were finally brought into the coalition. And then, as always, they did a hell of a good job. The French were on that left flank in Desert Storm; they worked with our Marine Corps, so I was particularly interested as a former Marine Corps officer. They worked well with the Marines. The French did a good job.

Q: Did the defense minister resign at that point?

CURLEY: Chevènement.

Q: Chevènement, yes.

CURLEY: He did.

Q: So it was a moment of high feelings?

CURLEY: A lot, a lot. And I - well, I suppose this is supposed to be all candid, and no public secrets here - but I was pleased when Chevènement resigned. He was virulently anti-American, and he was very communist. That sounds like an epithet, but I don't mean it to be - he was very much that way, very left socialist in his political orientation, and with that came along this very undisguised anti-Americanism. I found that very hard to deal with, because he became kind of petulant and, I thought, a little arrogant - never so much to me, but I could see it in the reactions. I was pleased when he moved on. But the French, as always, have a little problem with our way of getting at the problem, but once aboard, as historically they've done before, they've always been good partners, militarily and...

Q: Your job was somehow explaining that to Washington, which didn't always see it that way.

CURLEY: Well, on that subject, if I can divert a bit here, there was a period of high sensitivity about them. There were always those, in fact. Well, right after the victory in the Desert Storm Operation, I got a call from the White House, from President Bush himself, and he said, "I want to talk to you about the French reaction right after this Gulf War thing because there are some things we'd like to do with the French and I'd like to talk to you about them. Could you please come back to Washington?" And I said, "Wonderful, I'd love to." I hadn't been to the U.S. all during the Gulf War. So I said, "Sure, I will do that, Sir." So Taitise and I went back. She hadn't been back to see the kids or anything. We went right to Washington and had dinner with the President and Barbara Bush - at a dinner party in the White House, not for us but including us. There were a lot of heavy hitters there, the Bakers, the Cheneys, the Websters, the Colin Powells, and about six others. The next morning, I met alone with the President in the Oval Office. It was expected to be a half an hour, which is a long time with the President. It ended up being over an hour. And what he wanted to ask me was, What was the French national mood and the governmental mood - the man on the street mood - post-Desert Storm? I said, "Damn near

euphoric." And it was true. People were stopping me on the street and saying, "*Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Américain* [French: Mr. American Ambassador]," and giving me a kiss, men and women, on both cheeks. I told that to Bush. And actually, it happened to me on the street and in a restaurant. I said, "The mood is euphoric. Even in the Travelers' Club, that men's club, that bastion of propriety, I got kissed by a man." The President said, "I hope it wasn't in the men's room." But it was like that. It was euphoric.

He said the reason for his keen interest in the French mood was that they wanted to get the French into the muddle about the Arabs and the Israelis. Baker was very keen, as you know, about getting on with the Middle East peace process. And he first wanted to make the French a major partner in that. They'd been out there for so many years. They were very sophisticated on the subject. But recently - or in our recent history - they'd been kind of left out of the discussion or invited only as observers. So Bush wanted to make that change, bring in the French as major colleagues. Was the time right? That's what he wanted to talk to me about. Was the time right for that? And I said, "It will never be better." Well, that ball took a lot of different bounces before...

But back to the French-U.S. friction. Right after that euphoria, not unnaturally, I guess, a period of irritation started, a subliminal erosion of good will. It was almost palpable, and it was not pleasant at all. There was friction and abrasion between the U.S. and French interlocutors. It was there. And in Foggy Bottom, in the State Department, there was again - to use that word - palpable anti-French feeling. I didn't go native there in France, but I could feel in Washington this feeling that they felt the French were anti-American, and there was a knee-jerk reaction against the French in some very important quarters in Washington, in the State Department. And I could see this manifested in the negotiations that were happening, or trying to happen, in France between American teams and their French counterparts. It was really pretty bad. I could see that the American style, the instant familiarity, the back-slapping, the cold-water candor, the rush to the finish, the do-it-now approach, came eyeball to eyeball with the French *Il faut réfléchir* attitude, the Cartesian logic, the let's-take-a-little-relaxation-over-this-thing. It was a clash - nothing too fundamental, I figured - but it was a triumph of style over substance. I could see these guys - you know them all, Dick, because they were all prominent State people - some of them have left, but some of them are still there - prominent experts, State Department personages - who had this thing, not to be outdone by the French, who had the same kind of stylistic problem.

The French ambassador in Washington was a man called Jacques Andreani. And Jacques Andreani had a few stylistic problems of his own - to many, he seemed arrogant, abrasive. But I said this to him, I said, "Look, Jacques, we've got a style problem here between our top negotiating teams, our policy people. If we can get over that, we can smooth this road and get talking decently." He said, "You talk to your people." I said, "Okay," and went to the President and to Baker. Baker first. This was in Washington. I went to Washington for this purpose. I said, "I perceive problems with certain State Department people," and I named them, "at a certain level. These people are able and good and they're looking out for our best interests, but it's very abrasive, and I think we ought to try to change their style or much of our joint efforts in harmonizing policy will go down the drain." And I said, "You've got to get them to change it." Secretary Baker said, "No, you tell them to change, but you tell them I said so." I said, "Okay, and I'd like to mention this problem to the President, if you don't mind." And I did. I mentioned

the guys' names and everything, but in a way that - I hope - didn't impugn their careers or anything, or their intelligence. The President said, "You tell those clowns, but you tell them, and if they have a question they can tell me or Baker." So I'm with this instruction - I'll put it like that - and I went to three or four of them and spelled out the problem and just said, "Look, let's change the act a little bit." Well, I put myself in this and said, "Let's change our act and our style a little bit to get over this problem." And they all said, "Those French bastards are hard to deal with. You know that?" And I said, "That's exactly the way they feel, too." So I went to Andreani, and he did the same. We got it changed. And it got better. There was one day [when] we started to talk about it in Paris with everybody present, the two sides. And, for a little example, the French would say, "Well, sometimes we don't like the way you arrive in Paris on your plane from Washington. At seven o'clock in the morning, we all sit down to a business breakfast. We don't like to meet until 10. We hate the U.S. 'working breakfasts.' You want to meet at 7:00." Well, there were a lot of little things, but we got the stylistic things out of the way so we could deal properly with the bigger matters. It became amiable, at least, again - for awhile. I basically like the French, a lot.

Q: Did you think somehow that France was in a delayed transition in those years and all of the shocks you mentioned of the world changing around them, and particularly German reunification, had changed their role, and they were beginning to worry about millions of North Africans and how they were fitting into the society?

CURLEY: Absolutely. No question about it.

Q: Lots of their industry, particularly in the computer area, was way behind ours, and they felt threatened.

CURLEY: They did, but in the industrial part first, they caught up fast, particularly on the high-tech side. They caught up very fast on the nuclear energy side. They certainly did, and surpassed us in some ways. Their main nervousness was the German problem. The immigration problem with North Africa and all of that racial, if you will, problem - very important and very nervous-making to them - but of priority importance was this fear of the German problem. I had many discussions - many; I'd say I had three - serious discussions on Germany with Mitterrand, and Mitterrand told me one time at breakfast, just the two of us at the Elysée, that he was very afraid of the Germans. He said, "I admire the Germans. I really admire them, but I fear them." He said - I'll never forget this - he said - and he was very interesting on the subject, very knowledgeable, very intellectual, and learned - he said that he always considered the Germans as a *Volk* [German: people], not a nation but a *Volk*; he said they have a feeling of their own destiny, you know, that their destiny lies to the east, I would say, and there's always *Lebensraum* [German for "room for expansion"]. There's always that. Our American efforts at the time had a lot of emphasis on Gorbachev, if you recall, and on Kohl and Bush, the three of them were always talking. They were the ones in a huddle. And that made Mitterrand nervous. It made the British very nervous, too. Margaret Thatcher was a little nervous. But you're dead right. France was in a transition then, in many ways.

Q: Well, now, Mitterrand - you got off to such a wonderful start, from the intro and he's often called, I think, "the Sphinx." You got to know him quite well in those years. Perhaps towards the

end, he also knew that he was sick.

CURLEY: Yes, we did become friends. Mitterrand was never the type that relished the backslapping, let-me-tell-you-the-latest-joke type relationship. He had a very wry sense of humor, kind of an ironic view of life, and he could tweak you - he liked to do that in an enigmatic, intellectual way. I liked his sense of irony. He was highly intelligent, so whatever you were going to do, you had better be prepared to tap dance pretty fast, because he knew what he was talking about. He was always most gracious to my wife and to me and always interesting to listen to. And happily for my relationship, from my standpoint, if I needed to see him, I could call up and be received. I would try to keep that to a minimum, which is why, I guess, I was received - because I didn't hound him. We got along well, and I enjoyed it.

You asked me another question here. I'm trying to remember what it was.

Q: We talked about his health.

CURLEY: Big point. I was asked a number of times by Washington if I could find out what was really wrong with Mitterrand, because you'd see him sometime, he'd look terrible, absolutely terrible - I mean, kind of yellow, parchment skin, frighteningly bad-looking, unhealthy looking - and then other times he'd be ruddy and vibrant. His demeanor was always the same. His actions and his intellectual qualities were always there, but the physical look would vary wildly. So I was asked by Washington what did I think. And of course, they had everybody on the case; they had the CIA. What I was told was they figured it was kidney failure. I said, "Well, let me see what I can find out through all kinds of sneaky sources, French sources, see what I can find out and then you can see what you can find out." It was more than curiosity. I had a certain compassion about it. I wasn't just gleefully trying to find out what was wrong with the Sphinx. And it was an important bit of knowledge strategically for us, we Americans.

I made no headway. I mean, I tried everything and heard all the different things. And do you recall when there was a meeting of Bush and Mitterrand in Saint Martin, down in the Caribbean? Baker called me. I was flying over from Paris to Washington and then getting on Air Force One to fly down to Saint Martin with Baker and Bush, which I did. But before I left Paris, Baker called and asked me, "Can you find out about Mitterrand's health? President Bush is definitely going to ask me, what *is* wrong with Mitterrand and how will he be or how is he when he gets to Saint Martin?" And I said, "Okay. I will make a point of seeing him before I leave Paris, which is tomorrow." I didn't have to make a point because there was a reception at the Elysée that evening. So I went to it and there was Mitterrand - big as life. I had a minute with him and talked, and he said he was looking forward to seeing me in Saint Martin. He looked perfectly wonderful. He looked terrific. So I cabled that back to Baker, and then later I told him on Air Force One going down to the Caribbean. I said, "He looked just terrific, and all that worry about his health you can put aside." Bush then goes over to a rendez-vous area to wait for Mitterrand. Baker and I went out to the Saint Martin airfield to greet the Concorde that came in with Mitterrand. Baker and I are standing there at the foot of the ramp. The door opens and Mitterrand stands at the top of the stairs looking like Hell, like *Hell*. And Baker, out of the side of his mouth, as we're walking up the stairs and Mitterrand's walking down the stairs, says, "Ambassador, you're information is [expletive]. That man coming down the stairs isn't sick; he's dead!" And by

God, he looked it. He really looked bad. We never learned what it was. Of course, it ended up being prostate cancer, but I still think (The doctors in France were never forthcoming.) he also did have a serious kidney condition. I think he had - what do you call it? - dialysis, on somewhat of a regular basis, which took him from deathly pale to ruddy, and fooled us all..

Q: He came in as a real socialist, I guess, with communists in his government, and then evolved to a liberal or a very moderate position. You watched much of that process. Was that expediency or change in his, kind of, outlook?

CURLEY: Expediency. Oh, yes, he was a most expedient fellow. Well, I suppose the change in outlook became expedience. Mitterrand - before I got there, but I certainly watched it before I got there - single-handedly defused and eliminated, for all intents and purposes, the Communist Party, on his own. That wasn't due to any pressure from the conservatives. No, he did that with some very adroit plays with the socialists.

On the subject of Mitterrand, as long as this is a historical document to a certain extent, or to the fullest extent, Mitterrand's personal life was something that was always an enigma to Americans, not so much to the French. But Madame Mitterrand never featured much in his official life. That doesn't mean that she was a shrinking violet. She was anything but that. She had her own agenda. She had her own passions, and I mean both physical and philosophical, and she was an interesting person, but certainly not, as far as I was concerned, a fetching person. She had minimal charm. I'm told that in previous years, way back, she'd been very good-looking. There were some vestiges of that. They also said that she'd been charming. As far as I was concerned there were no apparent vestiges of that. They also said she was very intelligent, and I would say that was in fuller bloom.

But François Mitterrand had a private life. He was a romantic figure in many ways, to put it mildly. He had many snuggles - I don't think promiscuously, not all at once - but he had a litany of liaisons with various ladies, none of whom, as far as I could discover, thought badly of him afterwards, which is about as neat a trick as you can pull - to have a former romance speaking well of you. But I think he did, so that says something for him. While I was there, France elected its first woman prime minister, Edith Cresson. Edith Cresson had style - not much class, but a lot of style. She was smart and she knew where she was going, and it was rumored - France is always big on this - that the prime minister, Edith Cresson, had been one of former President Mitterrand's "friends" - as *Time Magazine* used to call it, "a great and good friend." I rather liked Edith Cresson. But she was very naughty. They were great and good friends. Well, old François was a most interesting character. That friendship with Bush that I alluded to was everywhere - in the dark days and in the bright days. That was always there. I give Bush - and Baker, of course - I give them full credit for getting France into the coalition in the Desert Storm Operation. Absolutely. I don't think enough time has been spent by historians or analysts or reporters on the matter of Bush's personal diplomacy. It's been alluded to, but I don't think it was ever properly understood, or at least the breadth of it or the depth of it understood. It was a most important ingredient in Bush's foreign policy operations and a most serious ingredient in the man himself. His effective relationship with Mitterrand is a prime example.

Q: Were they putting pressure on you to slim down the size of that big embassy in those years,

the budget cuts? That came somewhat later, I guess.

CURLEY: Well, yes, it did. It started in my time with the cutting down of consuls, of consular staffs. I got instructions, orders, if you will. Ivan Selin - do you remember Ivan Selin, the State Department cost-cutting czar? Bizarre - I liked Ivan, but boy, he had some very spartan, draconian ideas. Instructions came - you don't instruct an ambassador if you're at that level - I got *strong recommendations*, to be followed by instructions if needed, from Ivan Selin: get rid of three consulates: Bordeaux, Lyons, and perhaps Strasbourg. I knew I couldn't fight all three battles at once, so I chose Lyons, a very important center, as you know. It is sort of the equivalent of Chicago or Pittsburgh. So I said, "No." And that raised a little Hell. Selin responded, "What do you mean, 'No'?" I said "I mean just that. You give me your rationale. Start out with numbers, because if we're talking numbers, let's play a numbers game; I'll give you some and we'll see who wins." And I went to Washington and fought with Ivan. He's a good competitor. He likes that. He relishes the battle. I won that battle, at least while I remained in Paris. I think that after I left, the closures happened quickly.

Dick, maybe an interesting - at least to me - parenthetical comment here might relate to my friendship with Giscard d'Estaing, the former president of France and, as you know, an arch-adversary of Mitterrand, a totally different type. He was from the conservative right and a very interesting man, seen by many to be Mr. Arrogance, Mr. Elegance, Mr. Supreme personified, but a most engaging man. During my time there, he approached me initially and asked if he, as representative of an important French party, could be briefed. And I said, "Yes, of course." At times when I felt I was too busy or didn't want to do it, for some reason, I always did it anyway. I'd go over to his office - he would offer to come to my office; I never did; he was the former president, and so I always went to his office. We became friends, and particularly during the Gulf War, he was always interested in some of the rationale that was being employed. I was as forthcoming with him as I possibly could be without revealing anything compromising. He really appreciated that, and in turn - many times rather than just hearing one party line or if I had some dilemmas in my own mind about how certain things might work - I would go to see Giscard d'Estaing about French and European matters. And we became great friends, and are to this day. Well, that was just a little postscript to my time there, but it added to my repertoire, so to speak. I never talked about it much - I didn't hide it - but I just appreciated that friendship.

Q: Thinking of you sitting atop that big embassy and all those streams of information coming in to you every day, the French papers, the international press, the embassy reports, the CIA reports-

CURLEY: All the above and more.

Q: -all the above and a lot more, were there any you particularly valued? Did you develop a confidence in what the Agency, for example, was reporting? You found it useful?

CURLEY: I'm going to say something that history may think you rehearsed me for, and I can assure historians that you did not, nor did anybody. One of my abiding impressions of my years in working in that foreign service area was the quality of the intelligence of the men and women I worked with, in the Foreign Service. I'm not saying that gratuitously. I experienced it; I utilized

it; I exploited it. It was extraordinarily wonderful. There were exceptions always, but the average of excellence and the quality of work that I got from almost all sources was of a very high level and an enduringly high level. I was impressed by most of the agencies very much. I had no complaints. I had some irritation, some complaints about a few internecine conflicts, like between the defense attaché and the political officer and this and that. There were a lot of those - nothing to do with the intelligence level of these men, or women, but it had to do with whatever bad chemistry or just bad viewpoints or conflicting viewpoints existed between the parties, and I would have to wade in every now and then and do some scolding that an ambassador is supposed to do from time to time. Overall, the reporting was wonderful, whether it was the CIA, whether it was the DEA. I mention those two off the start because a lot of people don't know about the DEA, for example. They know about, or think they know about, the CIA - excellent. I found the little things about the CIA better than some of the big ones. I was always sort of abashed by the fact that they misread the Soviet Union's strength so badly. So I think on macro work they may need a little checking up. On some of the less macro and more micro work they were first class.

The budget cutting you asked about was going on. We always had to pay attention to that, and it got no better as time went on. That budget really shrank, and for understandable reasons, I guess. But it got worse in subsequent times. I know Ambassador Harriman faced it and now Rohatyn faces it. The State Department was and is lousy, inept at courting and lobbying Congress for the money it needs. Lousy.

Q: And then finally came the election, and the administration changed yet again, and that would have put an end probably to that term of yours in Paris.

CURLEY: I stayed through March. New York was always our home base. We never gave up our apartment; we just, sort of, left the apartment. And my wife said that, after four years or four and a half years away, the culture shock of coming back from Paris - *bang* - to Park Avenue and 74th Street was a little much, so she suggested that it would be a very good idea for the ambassador and his wife to take a little "decompressing" detour to Morocco, where we had never been - to your old stamping ground, Dick. So we spent 10 days there and decompressed. We traveled all over, *partout* [French: everywhere], thanks in great measure to the loan of the ambassadorial van by Freck Vreeland, who was chief of mission there a very short period of time, but he gave me his personal Land Rover. And then we got a driver who knew what was going on, a driver who had driven for Ambassador Joseph Reed, and was on his own by then. So we moved about in some style and had a wonderful time.

My time in France and in Ireland - and I say this absolutely subjectively, not objectively in any way - were very lucky posts for me. They were both interesting; they were both areas that I remain fascinated with.

Q: Even in France, were there any things that you regretted not getting to or accomplishing? One always leaves with a sense of unfinished business, but any particular objective that you had?

CURLEY: Yes, it remains an objective. There were some small objectives, and then there were some bigger ones. The bigger objective which still is there is this. It was there when I got there

and was there when I left and will be there a long time unless something is done about it. The United States and France are ancient historical allies. The old cliché that France is America's oldest friend is historically true. We've been allies in a number of wars; we've been firm friends. But the average American on the street doesn't know beans about France or about the French. The man walking along the street in downtown Cleveland - ask him about a Frenchman or a French woman or France, what do they know? They think of a beret or they think of a song or wine or *couture* or something. They just don't understand what the hell the French are about. Strangely enough, that is relatively true - not as much, but relatively true - in France about the Americans, although we have a lot of Americans that have been over there as soldiers and a lot of our movies and our television shows and tourism have given some knowledge of Americans over there. I'm not saying it's the right image, but some knowledge. That doesn't exist here. There are a fair amount of French tourists that come here, but not even close to the millions of Americans that go there. Also, it was explained to me by the French - obviously, I would have cottoned on to it anyway - there are no real French immigrants here. I mean, in Quebec a little or maybe a tiny bit in New Orleans, but hardly anybody has a French grandmother. Everybody has an Irish grandmother or an English grandfather or German or Jewish or whatever, but there is no French residue here. There's no "race memory," no heritage. There was no French immigration to the U.S. You see, we don't know enough about the French, and I don't think that's good. I guess there are ways. We tried. The USIS, which is an echo now, tried through cultural exchanges, and they never worked very much or very well. So that's a major project left undone: more mutual knowledge of each other in the French-American relationship. But, after all, maybe a little mystery isn't all bad. Maybe it's better that way in the long run.

Q: *Right.*

CURLEY: Among the short things that I wish I'd done and didn't do was to spend more time in eastern France. It's relatively unknown to the average American. There's a lot of power there with a lot of industry, a different kind of mentality. I know a fair amount about it, but not enough. That's something I wish I'd done more of.

Q: *There's been a lot of writing about what they call "bananas" these days, that the regions of Europe are assuming more powers than the states, and that there are industrial regions that stretch, say, from Barcelona up through southern France and to Milan and then in Germany.*

CURLEY: Yes.

Q: *Does that correspond to what you see?*

CURLEY: Absolutely. That was one of the reasons that I objected most vociferously to closing the Lyons consulate, because Lyons is right in the heart of one of those big belts you're talking about. So I thought that would be just madness to close a consulate in an area like that. No, I think that's very true, and increasingly so, don't you?

Q: *Very much, very much.*

CURLEY: I did not mention - and should have - President Chirac. Now Chirac was mayor of

Paris while I was there and had been prime minister, as you know. He and I became good friends, too. I always liked him, Chirac and his wife, Bernadette. She's charming and gracious and fun, and I liked *him* very much. He's very different from Mitterrand in the sense of *homme d'état* [French: head of state]. I'd say Mitterrand was definitely an *homme d'état*. I'm not too sure that that same expression applies to President Chirac. He's certainly literally an *homme d'état*. He's President of France! But Jacques Chirac does not have that certain imperial gravitas. He has other fine and crucial qualities. I mean, I can see Mitterrand's face on a coin - and I'll tell you who also could see his face on a coin or a stamp very readily was Mitterrand himself. Sometimes when you looked at him he'd turn his face in profile. He had a feeling, I felt, that he was the emperor, and he had that imperial kind of view of life. François Le Quatre [French: François the Fourth]. I don't think Jacques Chirac thinks of himself as a head on a coin. He's a little more relaxed in that sense, but a very nice man, a first-class mayor, having his problems as president in that "cohabitation," but a thoroughly nice man, a great admirer of America, and very understanding about the frivolous things of America. He's very tolerant, unlike Minister of Culture Jack Lang, or his ilk, who take great exception to the so-called American culture invading France. Chirac's much more relaxed about that; he likes Big Macs and chocolate sodas and things like that, junk food. A good man, and I think an effective politician. I with him well. We shall see whether the "style factor" raises its ugly little head between our two governments.

Q: Well, Mr. Ambassador, I know you've got a one o'clock appointment. This has been a very interesting interview, and unless you have anything further you'd like to add, we thank you.

CURLEY: Well, you are very welcome, and I'm flattered that you took the time to come up and see me. I hope we meet again.

Q: Thanks very much.

FRANKLIN E. HUFFMAN
Director of Programs, USIS
Paris (1990-1993)

Franklin E. Huffman was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia in 1934. In 1955 he graduated from Bridgewater College and immediately joined IVS. From 1967 to 1985 he was a Professor of Southeast Asian languages and linguistics at Yale and Cornell. His second career was as a Foreign Service Officer with USIA where he was posted to London, Rangoon, Marrakech, Paris, Washington, Phnom Penh, and Wellington, with subsequent WAE tours to N'Djamena (Chad) and Phnom Penh. Mr. Huffman was interviewed in January 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: So after Marrakech you were assigned to Paris, right? When were you there?

HUFFMAN: Three years, from the summer of 1990 to the summer of 1993. But Paris, as a non-hardship post, was a four-year assignment for USIS officers. I stayed three. I curtailed out of Paris. I curtailed three times in the course of my career. My mentor at USIA said, "Huffman,

never extend because they'll forget about you, move often, and every time you move, you move up."

Q: Okay, Frank, what were you doing in Paris and how did you get there?

HUFFMAN: Well, I had served in London for Bud Korngold, who's one of the legendary super PAOs of USIA – former Newsweek bureau chief in Moscow, that sort of thing --and by the time I was leaving Morocco he was PAO Paris. So I contacted him and of course he knew me and knew my work and was eager to have me come to Paris and he managed to pull a few strings and get me there.

My job in Paris was Director of Programs. Now, Paris was unusual in that it had a tripartite organization of the USIS post. Most USIS posts, have a press section headed by an IO and a cultural section headed by the CAO (Cultural Affairs Officer), both supervised by the PAO. In Paris they had press, cultural and programs. I was head of programs, which meant primarily speakers and seminars. The U.S. Speaker Program used to be called the AMPART Program, or American Participant Program. I programmed about 50 speakers a year in Paris. These speakers came from three different sources. Primarily they came from our office back at USIA that recruited U.S. experts in various fields -- academics, government officials, professionals -- and supplied them to posts in response to posts' demands for particular kinds of speakers to meet the public diplomacy challenges of that particular country. Only about one third of my speakers came from this office. A second one-third came from what we call TOOs, Target of Opportunity speakers. And being Paris, of course, this was a rich source of expertise because you have a lot of prominent people going through Paris, and we would prevail on them to come and give a couple of talks for the U.S. Embassy. And the third source, not quite as prominent as the other two, was embassy officers themselves. Whenever I got a request from a university or a think-tank for somebody to discuss trade issues or security issues or the Chinese-American relationship or arms control in the post-Cold War world, I would go to the political section or the economic section and I'd say "Look, could you go out on Thursday night and talk to such and such an academic group?" Those Foreign Service Officers who could lecture in French were particularly useful. Finally, I myself would go on occasion; I think I gave maybe half a dozen lectures in French while I was there. Having been trained as an anthropologist, my topic was usually a comparison of U.S. and French culture and cross cultural communication, or as is so often the case, miscommunication.

So I was able to field about 50 speakers a year. Some of the speakers we programmed were Ambassador Vernon Walters, Librarian of Congress James Billington, Barry Bosworth and William Chace of the Brookings Institution, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (USIS of course played a subsidiary role in her visit), Ambassadors John Maresca, Joseph Greenwald, Maynard Glitman, and John Kornblum. Several of the embassy officers I programmed later became ambassadors, such as Alexander Vershbow and Neils Marquardt. And of course I had a very professional staff. I had three French Foreign Service Nationals working for me, each of whom was a specialist in her particular field. One was a PhD in political and military security affairs and was a member of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, the French Institute of International Relations, and she was a professional in her own right. Another one was a PhD in economics and she was a member of the various economic organizations, well-known

to her academic and governmental colleagues. The third one was a specialist in American studies. Whenever we recruited a particular speaker from Washington, one of them would go to their counterparts in the French government or in academia, at the Sorbonne, or the Ecole Polytechnique or Science Po and say, "Would you like to have such and such a speaker?" The French are extremely knowledgeable about who are the prominent people in their fields and there was great demand for Ambassador Walters as a speaker because in addition to a half a dozen other languages he spoke fluent French.

Q: Translated for Eisenhower. As a matter of fact I think it was General de Gaulle at the time when they were both making speeches and Walters translated, de Gaulle looked at him and said, "Tres bien, Walters."

HUFFMAN: I had an interesting contretemps with Ambassador Walters. I was his handler, and he was going to be available over several days. He had an apartment of his own on the Champs-Élysées; he was in Paris often enough that he had his own pied-a-terre there. And when he had finished his program at the French Institute of International Relations and the various venues where he was speaking, he was to catch a flight out of town the next day so I sent one of the USIS drivers to pick him up at his apartment and deliver him to Charles de Gaulle airport. Well, about a half hour later I had a call from General Walters, saying "Where's that driver?" I said, "Well, I sent him a half hour ago; I don't know what happened." "Well you better get somebody here pretty soon or I'm going to miss my plane." I said, "Yes sir, I'll certainly locate him or if I can't find him I'll send another car." So I got another car and went up to General Walter's apartment where he was supposed to meet my driver and my driver had apparently misunderstood exactly where he was supposed to meet the General, but to make a long story short they hadn't gotten together. And General Walters was fuming. I got them together and apologized profusely, and as he was getting in the car the driver decided he would put the window up on the passenger side. But General Walters had his hand on the window so the window went up and mashed his fingers. By that time General Walters, who does not suffer fools gladly, was turning the air blue. "Huffman, who do you work for? I'm going to give him an earful!" I was devastated, but I learned an important lesson. When I discussed this with my colleagues, they said, "Huffman, you know, a man like General Walters, you don't send a driver to take him to the airport, you accompany him to the airport." And I realized, "Yes, well, okay, that was a mistake."

Q: Oh boy. Well, with all these lectures, what worked, what didn't work from your impression? How did they go over with the French?

HUFFMAN: Well, you know, I don't think a lot of French were persuaded against their will. They tended to have a lively question and answer period but the French were very polite and very civil and you'd have an academic discussion. I think they served an important purpose in sort of reassuring certain audiences that we were not totally crazy and in modifying some of the more virulent anti-Americanism that we encountered there. Paris of course is a highly desirable post and everybody wants to go there, but from the standpoint of my function, which was to "tell America's story to the world," this was one of the most difficult of all my assignments in the Foreign Service because the French didn't want to hear America's story. In fact they felt that America could use a "mission civilisatrice" from the French.

I'll give you an example. As I said, my staff was highly professional, but we had just had a speaker from the U.S. Trade Representative's Office discussing the Uruguay round of trade negotiations of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and we were discussing agricultural supports and so on, which of course are still being debated 20 years later. But I overheard my program assistant, the economist, sort of agreeing with one of her French colleagues that the reductions of tariffs on agricultural was not a good thing for France. And I took her aside afterwards and I said "Sylvie, how are we going to be effective if even my own staff doesn't support American foreign policy objectives with our French public?" And so we argued and I said "Look, don't you think that the French would be happy if they could pay less for their groceries at the supermarket?" She said, "Listen, I've lived in the United States and I've tasted your supermarket tomatoes and we French don't want any of them." She had a pretty good point as a matter of fact. For the French, eating, I think, plays a far more important role in their daily life than it does in the United States. You might say we eat to live, they live to eat. But cuisine is one of the very important aspects of French culture, and they would rather pay more for a good tomato than to pay less for a tasteless tomato.

Q: What about the Gulf War? Did that involve you at all?

HUFFMAN: Yes, the press section was heavily involved in responding to the local and international media concerning the war. And there were increased numbers of terrorist incidents around the world at the time of the Gulf War, so the embassy was on high alert and we had to take all kinds of precautions. The French, after a period of fence-sitting, turned out to be pretty hard-nosed in the Gulf, and the French military wanted to go on into Baghdad at the end. Who knows, maybe they were right.

Q: Did you find any particular subjects particularly contentious?

HUFFMAN: Well yes, I would say the trade issues were the most contentious really. Political issues not so much. We were pretty much in sync on security issues. Whenever we had a specialist in military affairs who came and talked to the French military, they were in remarkable agreement on our position. And while France was not in NATO nevertheless they were supportive of NATO.

Q: They weren't in the military but they were in the political side.

HUFFMAN: Yes, exactly. They withdrew from the military side in 1966. The NATO headquarters at that time were in the building now occupied by one of the branches of the University of Paris, University of Paris Nine, also called Dauphine. One of the most interesting things I did while in Paris was to lead a delegation of French mid-level politicians on a NATO tour where we visited NATO and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe) in Brussels, various arms control negotiation groups in Geneva, and a joint NATO military base in Oslo. I had led a similar tour for British academics while posted to London. These tours were co-sponsored by USIA and the U.S. Mission to NATO, in the interest of building support among young politicians, academics and journalists for NATO and U.S. defense policies.

But I'd say the most contentious issues were in the field of trade and economics and negotiating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We were always sort of in contention with them on that and as a result we brought over many speakers and specialists in trade from academia and from the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, most of whom were quite rational and credible people who didn't advocate extreme positions or anything like that and we were able to have civilized discussions with the French over these trade issues.

Q: Did you get any feel for the university system there? As you'd been a professor in the American system, how would you compare the two systems?

HUFFMAN: Well, the French system is much more elitist than ours. Entrance to university is much more competitive, as a result of which only about 30 percent of secondary school graduates go on to higher education, vs. about 60 percent in the U.S. The French like to believe that they have the best schools in the world, but that can be said only of their Grandes Ecoles – the Ecole Polytechnique, Sciences Politiques, Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Ecole Nationale d'Administration, etc. – which are highly competitive and are typically attended only by the elite of France. That's one of the things that came to a head in the recent ethnic riots in France; the students were saying that only French, white, elite can get into these schools and as a result the country is run by this revolving elite at the top regardless of which party is in power. I used to compare the two systems in my talks on cross-cultural communication. I would point out that Americans believe that everybody should have access to higher education, but that some educators go too far in claiming that everybody *should* have a higher education. The problem with this is that if everybody gets a higher education, then it is no longer higher. But in spite of our problems, foreign students still flock to our universities. We must be doing something right, since 30 percent of all Nobel prizes since the founding of the prizes have been awarded to American scholars.

In my speeches I would talk about cultural differences between the Americans and the French in a humorous vein. The French usually describe Americans as open and friendly and practical and so on but they also see us as loud and aggressive and naïve. Conversely, Americans tend to think the French as artistic and stylish and sophisticated, but at the same time think of them as rude, chauvinistic and cynical. And I would point out that there's always some truth to stereotypes. Charles de Gaulle is famously known for having said that the Germans are all talent but no genius, while the French, alas, are all genius but no talent. As examples of cultural differences I would talk about the fact that the French shake hands a lot. If a Frenchman meets a friend in the morning he shakes hands. If he meets him again in the afternoon he shakes hands again. If he meets him that night he shakes hands again. I said that in the United States we don't feel the need to shake hands with each other more than about once every week and that's usually when you see somebody at church. Also the French custom of kissing a lady on both cheeks, twice, sometimes three times, sometimes four -- four is becoming more and more popular now. I pointed out that most Americans are uncomfortable with that. To me it seems insincere, but if we had a French couple to my home for dinner and he kissed my wife on both cheeks I have to sort of do as the Romans do, because if I don't he'll think I don't find his wife attractive. These are all trivial little differences that don't really affect the essentially common background of the two countries.

Q: Well then, as an anthropologist, how did you see the French political system? You know, from my perspective and not a close one, there seems to be a sort of divide but they call themselves right and left. I mean, did you see French society changing to meet the demands of the future?

HUFFMAN: Yes, there tend to be two distinct camps in French society, but perhaps less radical at the extremes than in Great Britain. But in France, yes, there were definitely changes going on every day. For example I think they have had to adapt to some American business practices to try to help improve French competitiveness, which is hampered by very strong labor unions. Of course, the French are a rather volatile people. If the government does something they don't like they go out in the streets. If you reduce farm subsidies they're going to dump rotten tomatoes at the door of the prime minister. I think it was de Gaulle that said "How do you rule a country that makes 328 kinds of cheese?" But of course the divide that is opening up is between the traditional French people and the immigrants, mostly from North Africa.

Q: And they hadn't really arrived in the great numbers when you were there.

HUFFMAN: No but they had become a significant minority even by the early '90s.

There's another difference that I used to talk about in my contrast of the United States and France and that is ethnicity. There's something unique about the United States in that we all came from somewhere else, and to say you're an American doesn't mean anything ethnically or racially. To give a personal anecdote, when my wife defected from the communist regime in Romania in 1970, she headed straight for Paris, because the Romanians are great Francophiles -- educated people in Romania typically speak French. She got a job at UNESCO, but after six months she realized that she would never be French; she would forever be a Romanian living in France, whereas in the United States she could be an American. She could be one of the 30 million people in this country who were born abroad. So the designation "American" does not have the same ethnic significance as do the words "French" or "German" or "English." Those words have a clear ethnic connotation whereas American does not. I have always thought that's one of the most interesting differences between the U.S. and France, and most other countries, for that matter.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

HUFFMAN: Ambassador Walter Curley.

Q: How was he as ambassador?

HUFFMAN: He was quite good. As you know, traditionally the big posts like Paris and London and Rome are patronage posts, they're usually given to wealthy supporters of the administration, and Walter Curley was no exception -- he was an investment banker who had supported the Bush administration. But he was quite likeable and he had an uncanny ability to remember people's names and who they were. He had maybe 1,000 employees in the embassy but he'd meet one of them on the steps and call them by their first name. He'd meet me on the steps, and say, "Good morning, professor, how are you?" He knew the story. He was also quite a joker. When I was first introduced to him by the PAO, he said, "Huffman, you gave up a job as a full professor at an

Ivy League university to do this? I don't think you're smart enough to serve in my embassy." I hope he was joking. But I think he did not have a great deal of access to or impact on the host government. He fulfilled all his duties as ambassador and represented the country perfectly well but he did not have the profile that I think the French would have liked. By contrast, his successor, Pamela Harriman, was extremely well known and had known socially the major players in French politics and called them by their first names. She spoke quite good French and was, I think, a very effective ambassador. But she arrived just shortly before I left post.

RONALD D. FLACK
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls
Paris (1990-1995)

Ronald D. Flack was born in Minnesota in 1934. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota he served in the US Army from 1957-1960. His career has included positions in Athens, Manila, Abidjan, Paris, Algiers, Geneva, and Copenhagen. Mr. Flack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 7, 1998.

FLACK: In 1990 I left for Paris for the COCOM job, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls.

Q: How did you get this job?

FLACK: As I was finishing up in Copenhagen I was basically at a point in my career where as an OC I was probably backed up against the idea of having to retire in a couple of years. Frankly, I wanted to go back to Paris again. The only job that was available at that point was the head of the U.S. delegation to COCOM which was an OC job and I thought it would be interesting. I contacted a couple of people in the Department and I was assigned to it rather easily because not many people wanted that job. The COCOM job was traditionally felt to be not very important and one that was not terribly career enhancing. Well, at this point in my career I thought I may have to retire a couple of years anyway and that is okay.

Q: OC being what?

FLACK: The first level of the senior service.

Q: Sort of like a brigadier general.

FLACK: Exactly. That is the counselor level, then you go to minister-counselor and so on. As it turned out I got the promotion through that job to minister-counselor, which was surprising and unexpected in the sense that this was not a job that normally would be career enhancing in that respect.

Q: You were there from 1990 to when?

FLACK: From 1990 to 1995 and there were a number of reasons for staying on so long. First of all after I got there I realized this job was not the low level uninteresting job that it had the reputation of being. During the Reagan administration the whole concept of strategic controls and using strategic controls against the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union, in particular, had been renewed and invigorated and enhanced. It was at that point that they raised the level of the job there to OC from an O-1 job. The reason being they wanted to emphasize the importance of the program, use it more vigorously and increase the size of the delegations, which was actually going on by the time I got there.

Let me go back a little bit and talk about COCOM in the historic perspective.

Q: And what was it designed to do?

FLACK: First of all as I mentioned it is the coordinating committee for multilateral strategic export controls, or COCOM. The French never called it that. It was a bilingual language committee in French and English and the French called it something entirely different. The French translation doesn't have the same meaning. They called it the Coordinating Committee for East-West Exchange, which is entirely different.

Q: In our language it would mean promoting people going from one to the other.

FLACK: The French were so sensitive originally about doing anything that might upset anybody they wanted something very innocuous.

Following World War II in the late 1940s, there was a dispute between the United States and the UK over the shipment of copper wire to the Soviet Union to the point where John Foster Dulles and Winston Churchill were actually exchanging communications on this. It highlighted the problem that was emerging at that point about what do we do when you have the sale of a strategic item to one of the Communist countries that we had some concerns about. How do we handle this? I guess there was a very informal gathering of certain NATO countries to discuss this problem and how it might be faced. Well, it turned into an informal grouping of the NATO countries that would get together on a periodic basis and simply discuss the problem. Eventually this informal get together was called the coordinating committee for multilateral strategic export controls.

So, it started very informally and it was never formalized. COCOM was never a formal organization. It never had a charter, a signed agreement of anything. It was a handshake among its members that we would get together and talk about exports to the Soviet bloc. As time went on into the fifties this idea of talking about it grew more institutionalized in the sense that there were rules and regulations and formalities that were established informally through meetings. They would say, "Can one country simply veto the sales of another?" Well, it turned out through discussions to be "yes." The procedures and submission of cases were developed this way. There developed a list of goods that would be concerned and eventually there turned out to be three lists. There was the military list, which was rarely used because nobody was going to export guns and arms to these countries in the first place. There was the nuclear list which was of concern

and then the most interesting one and most active one which was called the dual use industrial list which were those items that might be sold that could be used in a civilian function but could also be used in a military way.

For example, a powerful computer that was ordered by some university or public institution of some sort. That could also be diverted and used by the Soviet military. An item like this, if it were then put on the list of excluded items that were not to be sent to the Communist Bloc and if one of the countries in the organization decided that they wanted to do that being convinced it was a benign sale and not of military use, they would bring it to the committee and say, "We have an exception from the list request. We think this is a good sale and want the committee to approve it and here is why." They would make the argument why this item should be approved as an exception to the embargo list. The information would all be taken down and sent back to the various capitals to be looked at. In the United States it would be the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, CIA and possibly Department of energy if it were a nuclear matter. They would give their opinion in an intergovernmental process and come up with the position of the country. In the case of the U.S. we would come back to that meeting and say "yes, we agree it is okay to sell" or "no, we don't agree." Any country had a veto. If the French didn't like the proposal for an American sale that we thought was okay, they could veto it and then we would not sell it. So, it was this rather extraordinary informal arrangement where members could lookover proposed sales of strategic materials to these countries and decide on the basis of the information they were given, the information they had and on their own policies whether or not they would allow it.

Today, only a couple of years after its demise, one wonders at the possibility of doing such a thing these days. It is almost unheard of that countries would actually give up a little bit of their sovereignty like they did to each other to agree on a multilateral basis to submit themselves to this type of scrutiny and control on the basis of multilateral action. So, it was an extraordinary arrangement. One, as I said, that was informal, a gentlemen's agreement and probably the reason it worked so well. At any given point the country knew that this was nothing that they were entirely tied to. If the French really wanted to make a sale and the German's were saying "no." in the back of their minds the French knew they did not have to go by this and if they really wanted to do it they could go ahead and do it. That did happen on occasion but not very often. The Brits did it once. Margaret Thatcher disagreed with something and went ahead and made a sale, much to the consternation of the other members. So, I think the fact this system did work was partially due to the fact that it was not a signed agreement.

Q: I would like to talk about some of the issues you dealt with because this is an extremely interesting time. The Soviet Union ceased to be the Soviet Union during this period and things were changing so rapidly that suddenly our concern was more about collapse rather than threat. But also the dynamics between the countries that you saw when you first arrived and did this change. And did commercial rivalries get involved.

FLACK: It did, of course. Before I get into those, let me say in terms of membership originally it was NATO members that were members. It was expanded in the sixties and seventies to include Australia and Japan because of their capabilities in the strategic field. By the way it was NATO minus Iceland. Iceland never participated, I guess, because simply they weren't an exporting

country. So, we had these countries sitting around a table every Tuesday in Paris. Now the headquarters was located in Paris in an annex of the embassy called the D Building. The secretariat was about 35 people headed by a chairman or president that was usually not an American. For many, many years the Italians had the presidency simply because of almost tradition. But, after I arrived in 1990 the Italian chairman had been sent off as ambassador to The Hague, I think, and a Dutch chairman took over who was there until the organization was ended. The fact that COCOM had been originally established because of U.S. initiatives and the fact that we were always the most active in it and the fact that it was located in the U.S. embassy, which probably was a mistake, it probably should not have been, made the other members feel that they were participating in a U.S.-controlled organization or one where there certainly was high U.S. influence, which really wasn't true. The secretary was pretty independent and so were the chairmen.

All of the members had at their embassies in Paris people on their staff that were delegated to represent them at COCOM. Except for the U.S., French, British, Germans, and Japanese, these delegates were mid-grade officers in their embassies. But the countries I mentioned did have full blown delegations. I had eight or ten people on my delegation. The Japanese had five or six. Of course, the French delegation was located at the foreign ministry and they had many people working on it. So, the major players did have larger delegations. There were not only the meetings of the regular committee, but there were other meetings called on occasion where delegations would be brought in from capitals to discuss updating the lists, what should be put on and what should be taken off. Given the changing nature of technology, it was very important that we do that on a regular basis.

I arrived in 1990 at the time that things were starting to really change. Strangely enough there was a delay in the impact of all this on COCOM of several years. Even after the regime in Russia changed...

Q: When you arrived it was the Soviet regime and when did it become Russian?

FLACK: That was in 1992, I think. But during all that period of the change in Russia, nothing was changing in COCOM and for good reason. None of the governments involved, including the United States felt that it was time to give the Russians a vote of confidence in this way. They all had great concerns about the former Soviet Union republics that were now independent in terms of strategic affairs and were unwilling at that point to say we can now lighten up in this area. So, basically the whole process continued. Anything that was being exported to Russia, even when Yeltsin was president went through the same process and the members were being just as careful and giving just as much scrutiny as they did before. In the case of telecommunications there was even more scrutiny, because of the uncertainties in Russia, because of the caution that the member governments of COCOM felt they needed to use in dealing with Russia.

There was as time went on and we got into 1993, especially, there was a feeling that this was going to have to change. Yeltsin was meeting on a regular basis with our leaders and leaders of the West and the political climate was changing. We were now talking about being friends. Yeltsin personally got involved in the campaign to do away with COCOM. The first idea, during the Bush administration, of how to handle this issue of what do we do with COCOM was a good

one. I think they were right on. I think it was Secretary Baker and Regie Bartholomew who had the idea of trying to very gradually bring the Russians, and others like the Ukraine, into the COCOM fold. Don't do away with the organization, create a COCOM forum as they called it. We would have meetings of the COCOM forum that would include representatives of these other countries to start talking to them about export controls. The idea being that we would eventually invite them to join this organization and change it. But, in order to do that, in order to have the confidence of the COCOM members, Russia would have to have export controls. They would have to have the confidence that if the French were going to sell something to the Russians that was of strategic value, that the Russians would be able to control where it went and it wouldn't end up in Iraq.

Q: Of course, the allied fight against Iraq was going on and we were concerned about strategic weapons going into Iran so the emphasis had begun to shift hadn't it?

FLACK: Not in COCOM. COCOM never had the mandate to control exports to anything but the list of prescribed destinations that was agreed to by the organization which was basically the Communist Bloc and after the fall of the Soviet Union it was basically China and North Korea. The other countries of concern were not of concern officially in anyway with COCOM. These countries were not under this control whatsoever. The United States tried to get the organization to include, for example, Iran, as a proscribed destination in COCOM, but most of the countries and particularly France, were vehemently opposed saying that this was not the way we should handle countries such as Iran. So, with the list of prescribed destinations dwindling and other countries of concern not being brought in, the organization, itself, was losing its meaning. But, as I said the Bush administration had the idea of creating a COCOM forum that would bring these other countries into the fold, so to speak, gradually and using their membership, which they wanted, as a lever to get them to establish good export controls. We even had monies made available from the Congress to help them do this. Then the Clinton administration came in.

Q: January, 1993.

FLACK: That's right. At that point everything changed. As was often the case, and I have seen this time and time again in my career, when a new administration comes in, particularly one of another party, anything the previous administration was doing, even if it was eminently right, the White House people mistrust it and don't feel it is a good idea. The COCOM forum approach was immediately dropped. We didn't even mention it again. When people came up and asked what was going on with the COCOM forum meetings, all I could say was that the new administration does not believe this is the way to go forward so we are basically dropping it. This was not something we were going to do anymore.

In Yeltsin's first meeting with Clinton he brought up COCOM. He said that it was a thorn in the side of our relationship and you have to do away with it. Clinton said something like, "That's interesting, I will look into it." I don't think he had been briefed on it at all. Yeltsin brought it up again at the second summit. This time Clinton said he was still looking into it. At the third meeting Clinton gave in. He had looked into it and his group basically said that we could give in on COCOM to them; it was no problem if it helped our relationship with Russia.

This in my view was an enormous mistake. COCOM was an organization that could have been used as a lever with the Russians to get them to establish better and efficient export controls. We did not do that. We simply threw away this lever as a negotiating tool and told the Russians we were going to close it down. We should of done it by first having a meeting with the other members and say that we would like to close COCOM down. Instead, Clinton announced it after the third Yeltsin summit. The meetings that we had after that were simply towards closing down the organization. It was eventually formally closed, I think, in April, 1994, but it wasn't until about two years later that the whole organization was finally disbanded in the sense of closing out the books and making sure everybody was off the roles that the place was actually physically closed down as it is now.

What the Clinton administration's view was, was to close down COCOM and at the same time negotiate a replacement regime. This in my view was a mistake because you can't give away your lever and then try to negotiate something. We should have kept COCOM going and saying we are going to change it but it is still going and use it as a negotiating tool. But, we didn't, we simply said that is gone and now we can start from a clean sheet.

We negotiated for about a year in various places around the world to try to establish a replacement regime for COCOM that would have hopefully some sort of reasonable authority in terms of controlling exports to other countries of concern. Here we are talking about Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. But, nobody could ever agree to put that into writing. No one could ever agree to a list of countries of concern, especially the French. So we were just spinning our wheels around and around at meetings all over the world. We finally established what is called the Wassenaar arrangement because it was finally agreed in this small town of Wassenaar outside The Hague. We couldn't even call it an organization, a regime or anything else because the French would not put up with it. Anything that had the idea of some sort of a structure they would not agree to so it was called finally "arrangement." It is located in Vienna. We have a delegate there now who was my former deputy in Paris. But, it is an arrangement without any meaning. The members, including countries like Russia meet to discuss on a periodic basis after the fact exports of certain materials to certain countries. But since they don't meet until after the sale has been made and there is no list of countries of concern, it is all so vague that it doesn't really mean much. The Clinton administration finally agreed to it simply in terms of this would be the beginning of an ongoing negotiation to make this arrangement into something and as far as I know that has not ever happened.

Q: Did you at all feel the hand of Strobe Talbert on this because he was sort Clinton's Russia man?

FLACK: I don't know how directly he was involved, but it was clear that the White House and, for that matter, the senior people in the Department, were unwilling to use COCOM in a strategic way in dealing with Russia. When Yeltsin said he didn't like COCOM, get rid of it, we did it. What we should have said was that we needed something from him before we do that and then work with them on it.

Q: Going back to 1990, what were the major concerns?

FLACK: There were several major concerns in terms of the types of equipment we were talking about. First of all, as I mentioned, military equipment was not something we dealt with. On the nuclear side there was also the nuclear suppliers agreement that was handling that. So, most of it was in the dual use category. Within this area the things that were of prime importance were telecommunications, computers and machine tools.

One would wonder what is so special about machine tools. Well, machine tools in the West are capable of working to extreme precision. The Soviets were never able to build machine tools capable of working to the level of precision of the Western machine tools. We are talking here about laths and all sorts of things that basically work metals. An example would be manufacturing propellers for submarines, or the manufacturing the parts for jet engines. Jet engines made by the Soviets had to be overhauled about five times as often as engines made in the West simply because they didn't have the machine tools to make things to a precision enough so they would work more efficiently. So, machine tools were a great interest to the Soviets and they wanted that technology. They would have bought it and used it in the civilian sector but also mainly in the military sector.

Powerful computers were also of interest to the Soviets. As time went on, towards the end of COCOM, computers became an difficult problem simply because of the technology changing so fast and computers becoming more powerful and smaller. In the end you could hook up a series of small powerful PCs and have a super computer. So, it became almost impossible to control this. There were also countries outside the membership of COCOM that were starting to produce these things and we couldn't control this anyway. So, this was becoming a problem.

And finally, and most important of all, telecommunications. Here we get into the question of telecommunications to be produced in the West, particularly fiber optics, that could be used by the Russian military to use for military communications which would be a problem for the United States and for the West simply because it would be impossible for us to eavesdrop on those communications. So, we were trying desperately to keep this type of telecommunications from the Russians and for very, very important strategic reasons. This was one of the main and most important and seriously strategic issue and product that we were concerned about as COCOM was going into its final stages. It was one of the items that they tried to hold over into the Wassenaar arrangement, which it was, but it doesn't mean anything because there is basically no control now on these things.

Q: Did Sweden play a role? One tends to think of Sweden with rather advanced equipment, particularly machine tools.

FLACK: Well, there were a number of countries that worked closely with COCOM over the years, Austria, Sweden, and South Korea. They followed COCOM very closely and we had an informal interface with them. They very often simply followed the COCOM rules and did not go out of bounds in that sense. South Korea in particular was very careful about meeting with us regularly asking for information. They wanted to join COCOM but we wouldn't let them, although in the end they were doing just what everybody in COCOM was doing. Sweden was very much impressed with the influence of COCOM and it would have been very unwise of them, and they knew it, to overtly do things that COCOM would be upset with.

Q: What was the threat? If Sweden got out of bounds what was the implicit threat?

FLACK: There wasn't any. I can't think of a threat. I would think that Sweden and its diplomats would simply be influenced by the disapproval and perhaps public outcry in the media. They were just not willing to not play ball in that sense.

Q: And, of course, they were concerned about the Soviet threat too.

FLACK: Yes.

Q: What about the commercial rivalries particularly between France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States? I would think there would either be horse trading or blocking.

FLACK: It was amazingly coherent. There were rivalries and commerce did interfere and make itself known in these times, however, the main thing was in the business community in all these countries even though they do not like export controls, they know that they exist and realize that if their own national authority has an export control they like it when they know there is a multilateral control that puts them on a level playing field. If an American company because of American laws knows that they can't sell something to Russia, but are upset because French law does not have the same effect and therefore the French company can sell that product to Russia, that is not a good situation and the American company is upset. However, when there is a multilateral organization that everybody agrees to controlling this and the American companies knows they still can't sell it to Russia they have at least the comfort of knowing that neither can the French or the Germans or the Brits, etc. This was the leveling effect of COCOM and even though the private sector didn't like in many ways these controls, when they thought about it seriously they realized that it was better than no multilateral control because they then had real trouble with their own national control enforcing an embargo.

So, there was rivalry and when you talked to a French businessman saying you were the U.S. representative to COCOM, he would get a kind of smirk on his face and say, "Oh, yes, COCOM. That is that American organization that keeps my company and French firms from selling abroad so that the Americans can get the market." And, if you talked to an American businessman, as I have, and introduce myself as the representative to COCOM, they will say, "Oh, COCOM. That is the organization that let's the French and other countries get away with all the sales when we can't." And every country you talk to have the feeling that they are being slighted in the process and that other countries are making the sales, which wasn't the case at all.

One of my jobs, and I did this on many speaking occasions, was to try to explain to the American business community that COCOM was actually good for them in the sense of this level playing field. If you have to have export controls, don't do it unilaterally, they don't work and you are simply hurting yourself because another foreign company will get the business.

By the way, another footnote here. I mentioned that I talked to business groups and so on, when COCOM first started it was an ultra secret organization. The meetings were secret to the point where men coming to the meetings would not even tell their wives where they were going. Over

the years, especially in the Reagan years, it became much more transparent and open, although the meetings were secret and everything was classified, it was much more transparent and we talked about it more openly and everybody was aware of it. But, at one point its existence was not even known.

Q: As diplomats did you find that you had to call in your experts to follow the conversation about various products?

FLACK: Absolutely, the meetings were filled with experts. If I was sitting at the head table, behind me would be people from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA or whatever agency was interested in that particular meeting. The technical experts were always there in these meeting discussing these things and they were very, very important. For example, when we talked about telecommunications the NSA people were there all the time. We were discussing highly technical issues and we needed the expertise of these people. And all of the delegations were the same. Now, there were some of the delegations of the NATO countries that were kind of out of it. They were present but almost like observers, rarely participating on a technical level. Greece and Portugal for example.

Q: They weren't producing the technology.

FLACK: They weren't producing but were interested and were there to observe and were part of the process. But there were the key players who were there in force and for which this is really serious business.

Q: I have always heard of the classic situation in the State Department which I am sure is true in other countries, that basically the Pentagon says "no" to anything, the Commerce Department says "yes" to anything and then the State Department is sort of caught between and tries to come out with something. Was this played out again, again and again?

FLACK: It was again and again. I always said that dealing with the 17 members of COCOM was not nearly as difficult as dealing with the U.S. interagency process. Getting agreement in COCOM was relatively easy, but getting a position on an issue through the interagency process was sometimes impossible. So, it was very, very difficult. You have the Department of Defense with a very strong position on an issue, the Department of Commerce with a very strong position exactly the opposite, representing the interests of the business community, and the National Security Council was often involved in these discussions. The interagency process was difficult and painful at times.

Q: Were you just carrying the word or did you get involved back in the Washington process?

FLACK: I didn't get involved personally in the Washington process except observing it from a distance, but nevertheless with communications the way they are these days between the secure phone, fax and all the other things we were doing, we were really a part of the process from Paris. On my delegation in Paris we had a Department of Defense representative, a Department of Commerce representative, and several people from the State Department and they were in daily contact with their people back in Washington, so we knew on a daily basis what was going

on on each issue. So, we were deeply involved but not physically present.

Q: Were you getting relatively good intelligence about what was happening in the Soviet Union and understanding how these things could be used?

FLACK: Yes. For example, Italy decided it wanted to sell a particular machine tool to North Korea.. They said it was a benign sale and were asking for an exception from the committee. We would get all the information and they would give a considerable amount of documentation about the product and about the end use and the end user. Each country then would send this to their capital. We would get back from Washington several weeks later, after it had gone through the U.S. intelligence community and some investigation had been done we would get reports back saying for example, we don't believe that this is a benign sale if this company that it is going to be sold to is a state-owned company and it is clear that they want to use it for usage that we would object to in this military installation, and they would give us classified information on why we thought this was a bad deal. We, of course, would give this information to the Italians and other members of COCOM so that they would have this. Or, other people would be doing this. We did it more than anybody else. We had the capability of getting intelligence on these sales much more often and more thoroughly than did other delegations. But, often the Brits, French, or Japanese would have information about a specific sale that would be put forward. Then we would all take it under consideration and it had a great influence. So, intelligence did play a role, yes.

Q: I would have thought in any multilateral organizations that the French usually turn out to be the burr under the saddle. How did it work in COCOM?

FLACK: Pretty much that way. The French had a reputation in this way and it was clearly earned in COCOM. The French were basically disliked on a substantive basis by almost all of the other delegations, even though we were in Paris. Whenever we were having discussions and particularly in these discussions trying to establish the new arrangement, the French were impossible. They would never agree to anything, falling back on national sovereignty, which was actually kind of amusing because when we were trying to negotiate an agreement that had some sort of teeth in it, so you could actually do something in terms of controlling these exports, the French inevitably would say, "No we can't agree to it because it will impinge upon national sovereignty to make these decisions by ourselves." Inevitably I would say, "For forty years you have been doing this in a much more specific way with this veto, and now you say you won't do this anymore." The French were difficult. Whenever we came up to an negotiating point that had any substance to it, the French inevitably would say, "No, we can't agree to it," simply because they didn't believe it was in their national interest, they wanted to make decisions on their own and didn't want anybody else looking over their shoulder, any other judgments, any other advice. They were willing to hear things like that after the sale had been made, but not before.

Q: Was there any feeling that maybe the French could be excluded?

FLACK: There were times when we could have simply said we would go ahead without the French, but you can't really. The French are one of the major exporters of high technology and dual use equipment in the world and you couldn't have an effective organization without them,

basically. But, there were times when our own people were saying that maybe we should simply go ahead and do something without them. But it wasn't a very realistic approach.

Q: You mentioned that Iran and Iraq were not included in this, but when you arrived we had just finished the Gulf War against Iraq and the concern then and the concern now has been the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. We are thinking about biological, nuclear and chemical weapons and that technology rest pretty heavily within the West. Did this come up at all?

FLACK: In an indirect way. The COCOM was specifically targeted towards the Communist Bloc and no other countries. We tried in the early 1990s to include Iran and some other countries on the proscribed list unsuccessfully basically again because the French did not agree to this. There was concern but we were not able to bring that concern into COCOM. There was an impact in COCOM as a result of the Gulf War, however, in that we learned things in the Gulf War about the importance of certain strategic items to the Iraqis, for example, but we also recognized in a general way their importance in another sense. For example, in the Gulf War you may remember how important night vision equipment was. It became extraordinarily evident that the Iraqis did not have this equipment and we did and it was a major, major advantage. Because of that we went back to COCOM and looked at our list of equipment and realized that we had been selling night vision equipment where we probably shouldn't have been selling it in the Communist Bloc. So we tightened up a lot of night vision equipment.

When North Korea, for example, would say that they wanted to buy night vision equipment from the Dutch, who are a big producer of night vision equipment, for rescue efforts, it is hard to say no because it is very useful for rescue efforts, it is also extraordinarily useful for their military. So, COCOM usually in those cases would say no even though the stated purpose is innocuous, it was just too dangerous.

Q: Was there any re-evaluation after the unification of Germany and the breaking up of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc?

FLACK: Yes. As these countries became, in some cases independent, or simply democratic, they were brought into this COCOM forum and we were starting to deal with them. Unfortunately, that has stopped. As the international political system changed and as the threat disappeared, we started getting a lot more information from these countries about how things operated in the past. As a matter of fact, the president of COCOM took a trip to Moscow and to some of the East Bloc countries. He was received there and shown around. He came back and made a report to the members which was rather extraordinary. He visited factories in East Germany that were desperately trying to get a hold of the materials that COCOM was keeping from them. In some cases he saw controlled equipment there. There was diversion. In one factory there were some machine tools made in the West just sitting there. The president asked how they had gone about getting the tools. They said, "Well, there are ways. We can go through third parties and get a hold of these things, but it's almost not worth it." The reasons were first it was very expensive costing them three or four times the normal cost of the machine tools. Secondly, there were no spare parts. Thirdly, when they received the machine, all of the serial numbers, all of the markings where it was made, were gone so they had no idea in some cases where it was made or

what number it was. Usually the machine would operate for a few months and then something would happen and they couldn't fix it and they didn't know who to call. It almost became not worth it, they said, because they could use them for a few months at very high cost and they would be useless. So, they were able to go around our rules at great expense but it was hardly worth it and the president of COCOM was told by most of these people that the system basically worked very, very effectively, even though there were these occasional diversions.

GEORGE KENNEY
Visa Officer
Marseille (1991-1992)

George Kenney received a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of Chicago. Mr. Kenney's government service began with the State Department's Bureau for Economic Affairs. In 1991, he joined the Foreign Service. In addition to serving in Marseille, Mr. Kenney has also held positions in Kinshasa and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Michael Springmann on September 10, 1993.

Q: Let me start by asking for a brief description of your Foreign Service career.

KENNEY: When I started in the Foreign Service, I was recruited as an economic officer. Sometime later, in 1990 or 1991, the Department began recruiting officers without categorizing them first; i.e. "un-coned." I went through basic training here in Washington, then was assigned to the obligatory first tour as a consular officer in Marseille, France. There I was in charge of the non-immigrant visa section of the Consulate General. We issued about 36,000 visas. I did a little work on American services and a fair amount of representational work. The post was very active in hosting visits of the Seventh Fleet. We also represented the United States at different commemorations and festivals in the towns on the coast. The Consul General had so many of these invitations that she would pass them down to the staff, and, although I was the lowest ranking officer, I still got a good share of these invitations. I would guess that at least half of my weekends were taken up by traveling to somewhere in the south of France to participate in one event or another.

My tour in Marseille lasted fifteen months. It should have been eighteen months, but it was curtailed so that I could get a better job in Washington. I had a selection of possibilities and decided to take a job doing energy economics because I thought it would be interesting, a middle-pace kind of a job -- I really didn't want to go into the fast lane in my first tour in Washington, but I also didn't want a back-water. I talked to the people for whom I would work, and was given the task of worrying about oil and energy security. I found the work quite interesting. The people in the office were quite friendly, and I enjoyed my assignment.

LUKE KAY

**State Department Intern
Paris (1992)**

Luke Kay was born in Greece in 1969. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan in 1991 and attended the School of International Studies, Bologna. After joining the Foreign Service in 1998 he has held positions in Brazil, Ethiopia, and Uruguay. Mr. Kay was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in June 2004.

KAY: To backtrack one moment, I also had an internship with the State Department at Embassy Paris in the summer of '92.

Q: What were you doing there?

KAY: Half the time in the consular section, the other half of the time in the political section.

Q: What sort of work were you doing first in the consular section?

KAY: First, in the consular section, the summer of '92 was the time where the US Congress had passed laws basically updating our opposition to communism. The time was right after the demise of the Soviet Union. It was no longer considered a crime to be a communist in the sense that you could not officially preclude someone from entering the United States, or refusing someone a visa, based on past communist leanings or tendencies. So there would be some things, luminaries, like Charlie Chaplin, and several others, famous luminaries, basically French intellectuals who for one reason or another had dabbled in leftist politics. We basically had to go through every single file, thousands of names, to excise the ones who were just benign communists vs. veritable mala fide terrorists, real revolutionaries or "terrorists" in today's parlance.

Q: What about in the political section?

KAY: In the political section I covered French politics on the left, so we would follow the leftist paper, Liberation. I would go to symposia at the French Senate among other places, of course, writing about ramifications for the US, if any, sending appropriate cables back to Washington.

Q: What sort of a taste did that give you?

KAY: Oh, I loved it, it was fascinating and fabulous. Of course, I attended the Fourth of July ceremony at the US Embassy and got to meet the French President, Francois Mitterrand.

**SHIRLEY ELIZABETH BARNES
Consul General
Strasbourg (1992-1995)**

Ambassador Barnes was born in Florida and raised in Florida and New York City. She was educated at City College of New York and at Columbia and Boston Universities. Before entering the Foreign Service in 1984, Ambassador Barnes worked with the Ford Foundation in Africa and was active in African American women's organizations and in the advertising business. In the Foreign Service she served in Strasbourg, Dakar, East Berlin and in the State Department in Washington. In 1998 she was appointed Ambassador to Madagascar, where she served until 2001. Ambassador Barnes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Could you describe a little about Strasbourg? Why do we have a consulate up there and what were you all doing?

BARNES: When I went to Strasbourg we still had posts in Marseille, Bordeaux, Strasbourg and the embassy in Paris. I represented the ambassador for the northeastern part of France. Consul General, especially in Strasbourg, most people in the United States don't even know what it is. The city has the Council of Europe, important to the Europeans, though the United States could care two cents about the Council of Europe. It is the gathering of Europeans who are at the local, the state level in their country. They are usually elected officials and they are at the Council of Europe. They come every four months and they have an ambassador to the Council of Europe that treats intra-European affairs and world affairs. They have beautiful, beautiful building in Strasbourg which considers itself the crossroads of Europe although in Brussels they say they are too.

I had both multi-lateral and bi-lateral duties. I would explain our point of view to those people who were senior officials in that part of France, what we were doing bi-laterally; our policy. And especially things in the economic area, that was very important, agriculture and those things. But, also what we would do politically. All these European countries, which were then I think about 44 members, because the East European countries were just up and coming. They wanted to petition; they were petitioning to be members of the Council of Europe. So I met, very often, with all of those ambassadors to the Council of Europe. Which turned out to be—if you knew the story—that most of these ambassadors were senior officials within their foreign affairs ministries and this would probably be their last post. I mean it was cushy, Strasbourg; you couldn't get a better post. And then there were outside people, members or that were observers like the United States. The Japanese opened an embassy there. So, besides all the European countries that were members of the Council of Europe there were some outside members. We just had a grand old time, having and drinking great Alsace wine and diddle-fiddling around about policy and it was just fabulous. Great folks.

Q: Did our embassy in Brussels to the European Union send out people during...

BARNES: Only once in a while. You were—I hate to use this—we were a back order for them. I mean it was like an afterthought. So once in a while they'd come down to some meetings or something that were going on. But the United States didn't give a fig about the Council of Europe so in general our embassies didn't care about it.

Pamela Harriman—she was my ambassador in Paris. Someone else had started out and he was finished when Clinton got in.

Q: It must have been early '93.

BARNES: I don't know. I thought...

Q: He was elected in '92.

BARNES: Okay, '92. Then she became the Ambassador.

Q: How did you find Ambassador Harriman?

BARNES: Absolutely fantastic ambassador. She knew what she was doing and she did it well and people liked her in France and so it made life easy. She was very good at her job.

Q: Was the Council of Europe doing much?

BARNES: They were very good on human rights issues. For example, Turkey was petitioning to be a member of the Council of Europe. They have a very, very bad human rights record. Turkey always wants to be a part of Europe and so this would be held over their head. You've got to change your human rights record. And the Council of Europe was known throughout the world for their extraordinary position in human rights. The European Court of Human Rights comes under the Council of Europe. They have a lot of cases that come up from across Europe on human rights issues involving people who feel that their human rights have been violated. Those countries listen to what the Council of Europe comes out with and it does a lot of that kind of legal, extra judiciary work. In the area of some political affairs, if a nation seems to get getting out of line on some things, the edicts that come down from the Council of Europe make the rest of those countries or the country that *they* have their eye on back off on some issues: whether it's France and they way they treated some minorities, Spain or whatever. Council of Europe is a nice arbitrator in this sense and people have said, "Count me in I want to be a part of it." There are certain guidelines that you have to follow as a nation. If not, the Greeks and then they had their coup in 1967 and so the generals took over...

Q: It was '67, April 21st in 1967.

BARNES: They were kicked out! They were told, "You're out until you get your act together." And that had a tremendous effect on Greek politics to know that they were soundly and roundly told by the Council of Europe, "Get out until you get your act together."

Q: Did Yugoslavia it was beginning to split up at this time...

BARNES: That's right.

Q: Was this something that you were concerned with?

BARNES: We got demarche cables in and do this and go to the Secretary General over the Council of Europe and say, “this is what we think about the issue.” So we had a nice little basket of what to do on Yugoslavia that was breaking up.

Q: Tell me about your relationship with—I mean here you are essentially the Consul General in a place—but yet, you’ve got this almost foreign operation going on, the Council of Europe, were you having any problems dealing with the Secretary General or any of these people?

BARNES: Absolutely not. They were so delighted that America was paying the Council of Europe some attention. So it was almost, “why didn’t we see you, Shirley at this, that or the other?” I mean they were so delighted with the presence of the United States at their meetings, as an observer and they were so delighted when I finally pushed through with the State Department that we would be an “observer” because before that we weren’t even that. We were just there once in a while; we would go to Council of Europe things and all of that but we had no real official status. As I said, I had a lot of other work too. I had two hats because I had all of these things that come in on a bi-lateral business, debts and Americans in jail and I did a lot of traveling around the country. For North-Eastern France I represented the United States for Alsace, Lorraine and other French areas.

This was around the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII [World War Two]. So the French are very patriotic and they do not forget the Americans and what the Americans did in two world wars. And everything you could ever imagine was going on in every village, every little county, every town. The American Consul General was expected to be there and the events were usually on weekends. So my Sundays became driving from one part of my territory to the next. And that was when the State Department was on this rampage to cut costs. They wanted you to drive your own car. I said, I am not driving on these roads. We would use these drivers, of course. I said, “I get overtime on Sundays” and it became, really, a kind of shuffling of papers because they would say from Paris, you should go to this. Because, I said, I’ve got to stop going to these things plus I said I had no free time on the weekends. Most of these people who were celebrating the 50th anniversary of WWII in Europe, they were doing everything on Sundays and I got to see a lot of North-Eastern France, all those villages. I got to really understand them, the French in that area and the outlying provinces.

They had more American flags than I ever saw. They brought out of moth balls every tank, every jeep; you wonder “where are they storing these things?” And they would have their parades down these beautiful little towns all in North-Eastern France. And the Consul General of the United States was the most important person there so I really got an appreciation of the French and for North-Eastern France.

I got Mrs. Harriman to come there twice to events; one was in Colmar and something else. These were areas that had a real significant history. One thing seared in my memory was a group of Japanese Americans came through. They had served up there in the Vosges Mountains in WWII. They came into town and there must have been about two or three hundred of these veterans, maybe even more. They had made the trail all the way from Italy; this memory trail, through Normandy and on into that eastern part of France. They’d done this during the war, and they had been saving up for this for the last several years. Some of them came back every year. They

know those people and those villages in North-Eastern France, “hey buddy!” You see these guys some of them with their grandchildren and great-grand children. They know the whole village, they know the whole region. When I had been told, “Consul General, there’s this group that’s coming in and they want you to go to all these things in Colmar and I forgot the other village up in the Vosges Mountains. I said, “I can’t do another trip.” Well, I got an earful from all these people calling me, I said, “okay I’ll be there, I’ll be there.” I drove up in the Vosges Mountains. I didn’t know that this was a Japanese American group. It was just a group of veterans, you’ve got to come. It must have been about 400 Japanese Americans and their families. Some of them had brought daughters and sons, three or four daughters and their grandchildren! And it was the most fantastic thing I had seen, to see these guys and they’d sit around and talk about ... that cold winter. That was the coldest winter that had ever been reported in European history.

Q: You’re talking about the winter of ‘44 or ‘45?

BARNES: ‘44. You’d sit down and they’d start talking to me and say, “well you know, I was in the internment camp, I was 16, 17, I had nothing to do with it and when they say, ‘you want to join the military?’ Sure! Get me out of here.” These were people who had been in internment camps in the U.S. and to see that they had been in 1944, 16 and 17 year old kids out there fighting for the United States of America it was the most moving thing I have ever seen. One of them was a very well known Japanese sculptor that lives, I think, in the Netherlands now. But pretty well known. He had a sculpted piece that was dedicated that was up there in the Vosges Mountains—I’m sure it’s still there—but that had been commissioned and he brought it there.

It was something that I’ll never forget, and the way they treated me it was like I walked on water.

Absolutely amazing people. Man oh man, you’d sit down and talk with them. “I was head of the health services at so and so hospital,” and all these professional people during their lifetimes and they’re not retired and they had their kids with them and their kids’ kids.

Q: When coming to this part of France, where did it fall in the political spectrum? Socialist, Christendom?

BARNES: Northeast France is very conservative and they always voted for Le Pen. [Laugh]

Q: Did you ever run across Jean Marie Le Pen?

BARNES: No, no, no. I never ran across him. He came in here now and then in a campaign. I mean he knew it was in his pocket, that’s why France is so conservative. They like me, but they didn’t like, if when one Arab landed in a village somewhere was like a bit scourge was coming. The most conservative people, no way.

Q: Was there?

BARNES: I think Colmar was communist. Oh I know in French county there was a communist there. Who was in on of the government’s of Mitterrand.

Q: Was there any immigrant worker groups there?

BARNES: There are lots of people of Middle-East origin; Moroccans, there were lots of them in Strasbourg, a great big community. In Colmar, too, there were a lot of North African immigrants; I'd say that about France. Proportionately speaking, outside of Marseille or Paris I think they had a large community up there in North-Eastern France. They say that the Alsatian income level is the highest in France. Those people are the kind that you see these novels and things written about ... that put their money under the bed or whatever, but they have had generations of great excellent wine and agriculture and they're very rich. The Alsations are very rich.

Q: Good subsidies too.

BARNES: Pardon me?

Q: Good subsidies too.

BARNES: Oh yes, the subsidies and they are extremely well off.

Q: How did the immigrant community fit within this, did they...?

BARNES: Not very well. They don't fit that well. They are the people that are welfare people ... I mean, most of France is welfareed anyway when you think about it, what with the subsidies but they're the ones who purportedly commit more crimes and they're the ones that have trouble with their kids in school. They're going to be there and the French are going to have to deal with them.

Q: Yeah the French are having a little problem with this.

BARNES: Yup.

Q: This is what I gather, you know, basically a political job wasn't it?

BARNES: Absolutely. People don't know that when they go into that job. They just say, "Wow, Strasbourg!" It's a real political job and it was a lot of reporting and of course by the time I got there they had narrowed it down to one American as the pope; *un numero uno* [the number one] and I had a consular assistant that took care of passports and deeds and all of that and a very, very good secretary who was really the administrative assistant who could get out there and she knew a lot about what was going on politically so she was really, she was a little like my political assistant.

Q: When you left there, how did you find those of Ambassador Harriman, how did your direction or contact with the embassy?

BARNES: Very little. I have to knock on the door and say, "hello, remember we're here?" But that was the same thing with Bordeaux except that there they had great wine and everybody wants to go there. Marseille got a little bit more play but in general if you didn't keep knocking

on the door they would pretend you didn't exist. Once a year, the Consul General in Paris would have a meeting with all three of us where the ambassador would see us, a two or three day meeting. Which was nice because it'd just made you feel, oh you didn't forget us and you'd come up to Paris and sit around and have a series of meetings on what's going on with the embassy and what our policies are and what are we doing with the French and it would be a series of very well structured meetings from, say, eight in the morning on. And the ambassador would have me over for dinner and/or a lunch and so it was really nice. They did recognize that those guys are out in the field doing something. The only thing that came up in the first part of my being there in that job was there was a big protest on the agricultural policy and at least 200,000 farmers from all over France and all over the rest of Europe marched on Strasbourg. And they marched on the Consul General's residence.

They knew where I was living, but I wasn't scared for some reason. But they did some damage to our consulate. They burned something and all of that and pulled down the gate. The mayor who was then a woman, when I heard about it, someone called and I marched out there to the consulate to see what was going on physically and they really damaged it. It was on international television, CNN. Of course, my friends didn't even know where Strasbourg was. They said why is it that whenever you go to some place there is always things that blow up? We didn't even notice Strasbourg!

Other than that, nothing too much happened in Strasbourg which was nice. I like being under the radar. It was great. It took a lot of effort, of course, they were always petitioning me, Madam Consul General, you've got to have the ambassador come here. "Okay I'll ask her." So as it were she came to the 50th anniversary of WWII in Europe. I think she got inundated enough she came for something then and that was more difficult than anything else. At one point, the administration—Clinton—was going to come but then they scratched that. And I said, "Oh God, I'm so happy that he didn't get here." But she came twice and it was a lot of preparation but it turned out great. But other than that, as I said, I think our highest ranking person was maybe a lieutenant ... or what do you call it ... Lieutenant General or something like that. Nobody came. Once they came they wanted to get back though, oh god, this is great!

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Minister for Economic Affairs, OECD
Paris (1992-1996)

Mr. Weingarten was born in New York in 1936. He received his BA from Colgate University and his MSFS from Georgetown University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas from 1958-1961. His postings after entering the Foreign Service in 1962 included Paris, My Tho, Belgrade, Brussels, Canberra and Ottawa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1999.

Q: Well, then, in '92, whither?

WEINGARTEN: Paris.

Q: *And you were in Paris from when to when?*

WEINGARTEN: '92 to '96.

Q: *What were you up to?*

WEINGARTEN: I was the minister counselor for economic affairs at the OECD mission. I had selected that post or for some years, kept an eye on it, because I had promised my wife back in 1968 and told her that I'd take her back to Paris some day to live, and I hadn't been able to do that, and this was the time to do it.

Q: *What was the OECD at that time? I mean, what was its coverage? I mean, what was it?*

WEINGARTEN: Well, at the time, it was an organization that includes all of the major Western industrial democracies plus Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, and it was pretty much a sleepy organization until about '91-92, and it was kind of a terminal place to go. Nobody ever gets promoted out of the OECD. It's kind of a pre-retirement tour for a lot of people. But then, it was also the place in the '70s and '80s, where if you had a really intractable international problem that you couldn't make progress on politically, you'd shunt it off to the OECD, have it looked at, have it staffed, and have it studied and talk about it there. That takes it out of the spotlight.

Q: *OECD stands for what?*

WEINGARTEN: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It's the outgrowth of the old OEEC, which was the operating system for the Marshall Plan. And so over the years, for example, the International Energy Agency was created within the OECD structure to address the energy problem in the 1970s. And then in '92, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all of these Eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and so on, all wanted links with the West. For example, the preferred one was NATO. They wanted NATO, but NATO had a clause that commits every member to defend every other member, which was not something we were anxious to do with respect, say, to Poland. The other organization they angled to get into was the European Union, but the European Union has very high barriers to entry, and economically these countries weren't ready for that. But they wanted some form of link with the West that would keep them happy and would fend off the day when we would have to consider them for NATO or the European Union, so the OECD came into the fore. So we wound up bringing in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and then we added Korea during the time I was there. And we had to, in effect, interview each of these countries very, very carefully because the OECD is not an organization without entry barriers of its own. You have to have convertible currencies; you have to have free capital movements - so on and so forth. So we did a lot of work in examining these countries.

Q: *I take it when you say "we" you're talking about the other members, too.*

WEINGARTEN: Yes, the other members. The other thing that's interesting about the OECD is that all of the ideas, all of the motivations for the organization all come from the United States.

It's really quite extraordinary. The U.S. is basically the only country that proposes new things for the OECD to consider. Nobody else does.

Q: I would have thought that would have sort of a stultifying effect on the rest of the group.

WEINGARTEN: It does, and we never intended it that way, but they did not use the OECD or did not see the OECD as an instrument that could further their national policies, and we did. And so we used it. And then finally, I think it got to be a habit. They just sort of sat back and let the Americans take the lead.

Q: I would have though the French would have... you know, it's in Paris, and the French don't like the United States leading anything. I would have thought they would have been a -

WEINGARTEN: Well, sometimes they would be the ones that would say, "No, no, you can't do this" or "you shouldn't do that" or "you should do it this way." But they never had ideas of their own, nor did the Europeans as a group were 16 of the 27 members. But the French were very critical of some of the U.S. proposals, and could get them modified if they made a convincing persuasive case, but they never really projected... One time they sort of floated the idea that maybe the OECD should extend its reach into North Africa, but they never pushed it very strongly. It never seemed to be more than just an idea thrown up but not pushed very hard.

Q: What was the OECD doing? I mean, what was its operation?

WEINGARTEN: Oh, they had a vast variety of things. It ranged all the way from setting standards for fruits and vegetables to international aviation standards. We did aviation. AID standards, untying aid, reporting aid transactions. It was an international energy agency; it was a forum for trade debates, sometimes very technical, sometimes policy level. And then one of the things that was done while I was there was to extend a hand to these newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and give them assistance in the form of advice on how to set up a central bank, how to set up statistical systems that enabled you to measure how your economy was doing.

Q: It sounds like there are a lot of other organizations. The European Union is setting up fruits and vegetable standards - whether cucumbers can be curved or not - and you have the ICAO dealing with aviation - you know, I mean, each country is going out and doing its own aid program and all - it sounds like you were doing things, but any other countries were just doing what they or other organizations were doing their thing.

WEINGARTEN: Well, in a sense yes, but the OECD had this coordination function. All of the members would keep each other in the picture on what they were doing in these various fields, and one of the important things that the OECD had was kind of a peer- pressure aspect. As you review somebody's economy - and another part of their activity was to do an annual review of each economy, and they'd provide advice or guidance - and we, for example, in the U.S. economy, we would always try to send over somebody very senior from the Treasury Department who would get a lot of questions about U.S. deficit or about other aspects that weren't so hot in our economy. Sometimes they'd get very angry at being questioned like this.

Q: From what you're saying, though, you're saying it's sort of a sleepy thing, but it sounds like a rather key organization within the industrial world.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, it is, and it's probably not recognized as such by all that many people. It is a key economic organization, and you're right, it could be a very sleepy place at times.

Q: But it sounds like a... The types of decisions and all that would be coming out of here all sound controversial as all hell, that would set standards or how to distribute aid and all that would all seem to be very political.

WEINGARTEN: Oh, yes. It was all politicized, but to the extent possible, it had some of the political sting that these issues could have if debated openly, pitting one country against the other. In the OECD, you could debate these things, set standards, and inform each other of what you were doing and do it sort of out of the limelight.

Q: Well, what would happen when you'd set these standards? Would countries go along with them?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, basically, it's a financial organization. It sets financial standards for capital movements and so on, so that's a big part of the operation.

Q: Who was the ambassador there?

WEINGARTEN: The first ambassador was Alan Larson, who was a Foreign Service officer and is now assistant secretary for economic affairs and may become the undersecretary for economic affairs in the Department. He was there the first year, and he was the one who hired me. I knew him pretty well. I'd worked for him before, and so I went and saw him and asked to be considered for this job. And I had a lot of push from Washington because I had done this thankless food policy job and enjoyed it. So I got that job. That was Al's third year, and then he was replaced by David Aaron, who's now the undersecretary for international affairs at Commerce. And so he was there the three years, the last three years I was there. I did a four-year tour there.

Q: What were the major issues that you were in?

WEINGARTEN: The major issue that I was involved in was the opening of Central and Eastern Europe, and I did pretty much anything that anybody wanted done or the ambassador wanted done. I became a speechwriter, wrote a lot of speeches for him. And it was kind of funny because he's a professional writer. He writes potboiler mysteries. And I wrote speeches for him. Basically, it was a nice assignment. It was not a particularly testing one. I didn't really work flat-out. But I sure lived flat-out in Paris. It's really a nice place.

Q: Well, what about the new countries coming out of the former Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc? The criteria to get in, you must have had to cut a lot of corners in order to get them in because they were - I mean they were coming out of this authoritarian system.

WEINGARTEN: Yes, well, you did have to bend the rules. There were some rules, though, that were critical to the organization, and one of those was the convertibility of the currency, the free capital movements. You had to have that; pretty much everything else could be negotiated. And what those countries got out of it, was they would undergo the same kind of reviews that the others did and point out to them some of the policy mistakes or any shortfalls they were making and problems they were causing for themselves. I benefited them. It does sort of knit you into the Western world. And it's still very sought after.

Q: Did you find that your delegation and other Western delegations were acting as sort of tutors?

WEINGARTEN: Yes, basically, that's it. They basically asked to be tutored, and we were happy to do it.

Q: What about dealing with the Europeans?

WEINGARTEN: We dealt with them... one of the things that made it easy to work in the OECD was that all of the representatives to it were either located in the same building or in the immediate vicinity, so it was really easy to stay in touch with these folks. So we had good relations with everyone.

JOYCE E. LEADER
Consul General
Marseilles (1997-1999)

Ambassador Leader was born in Pennsylvania and raised in Ohio. He was educated at Dennison University, the University of Chicago, and the Columbia University School of Journalism. After work in the private sector and with the US Department of Education, he joined the Peace Corps, serving in Kinshasa and at headquarters in Washington. Joining the State Department in 1982 he began his career in which he was to deal primarily with African concerns, both in Washington and abroad. His foreign postings include Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Lagos and Marseilles. In 1999 he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, where he served until 2000. Ambassador Leader was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003

Q: You left in 1997. Where did you go?

LEADER: I got a little bit of a reprieve. I was assigned consul general in Marseilles. That was very nice.

Q: How long were you there?

LEADER: I was there for two years, not the normal three year tour because I got an ambassadorship immediately after being promoted to OC. I did not stay the whole three years, unfortunately, because it was gorgeous.

Q: You were there from 1997 to 1999?

LEADER: Yes.

Q: What were the main things that you found yourself doing in Marseilles?

LEADER: Marseilles had a lot of representation activity. It is on the southern coast of France where the United States had had such an impact during World War II in terms of saving the people from the axis powers when we invaded and liberated the coast. There is just ceremony after ceremony after ceremony commemorating this. The mayors of Nice and Cannes were very strong in terms of having these kinds of ceremonies and inviting the U.S. consul general, making sure that you're there at this or that flag ceremony. On the Fourth of July, there were about 10 stops to make for little ceremonies. That was a big time, but there were other times that these ceremonies would take place. Frequently, they were in connection with ship visits. The Sixth Fleet had its headquarters in Naples, Italy, but the fleet would circulate in the Mediterranean and stop at the French ports. These were always big events. The town would usually host a big something or another. In Cannes, they did lovely luncheons for the officers and some of the crew. We would often hold receptions and invite not only the American community but also the French community onto the ship and so I'd have to be on hand for that. Then there would be return receptions. There was a lot of activity. This did dwindle a little bit because the ships were being called more frequently to go through the Suez Canal to support the Sixth Fleet in activities off Iraq. That did slow down our ship visits just a little bit. Thanksgiving was another busy time.

Also, there were American communities. There were a lot of Americans who stayed in France after the war, married French women, raised their families there, and were getting on in years. There were clubs of Americans who would get together. One big one drew from most of Nice, Cannes, some from Monaco (to which I was also accredited as the U.S. representative). So we would have events that they would host as well. On the Fourth of July, there was always the problem of how many of the dances could I get to, how many of these soirees. And at Thanksgiving time, it was how many Thanksgiving dinners could I get to. There were two clubs in Monaco. One time, I actually went to both dinners there. Then you'd move down to Nice and Cannes. Then in Marseilles there were two or three clubs that did dinners. It was incredible. Everybody at the consulate got involved in representing us at these various dinners. Let me tell you, there are more ways to serve pumpkin than I ever imagined. Nobody knew how to make a pumpkin pie, but they knew how to make everything else out of pumpkin from pumpkin soup to some other kind of dessert that was pumpkin. They all tried to be very American and follow the ritual, but they all missed a little bit. But nevertheless, we had to eat, to do our duty. That took up a lot of time, especially traveling back and forth. There used to be a consulate in Nice as well as in Marseilles. It was Nice that handled Monaco. But that had been closed and all of those responsibilities shifted to Marseilles. When Bordeaux closed, we also got half of that territory. So, our territory extended from the Italian border and the principality of Monaco all the way to Toulouse. It was four hours from Marseilles to Toulouse and it was three hours from Marseilles

to the principality of Monaco. So we were on the road quite a bit. We also went up to Grenoble. That was part of the territory as well. I only got there a couple of times. Then in addition, I dealt with American businesses in the area. We were always looking at what they were doing. But it was interesting that they didn't want a chamber of commerce. They had disbanded their chapter of the French-American Chamber of Commerce and did not want to restart it. They didn't see any value added. They all seemed to be getting along quite well without very much support from us, though they tolerated our visits and our imposition on them. A few times I traveled with the commercial officer from the embassy who came down to see what was going on. There were some high tech industries down there. There were some technological parks where there were a fair representation of American businesses. So, that was another aspect. Airbus was in our territory. So we had a lot to do with Airbus in Toulouse. Then there were some other airplane plants near Marseilles that we went to from time to time. We were trying to promote American business, but they didn't need too much promotion. There were frequently American delegations that came to look at business prospects. Sometimes we would hear about them and sometimes we wouldn't. I might hear after the fact, "Oh, we had a delegation of Americans in Marseilles." I would hear it from somebody at the mayor's office. Well, they hadn't bothered to tell us about it and we didn't really get involved. So it was kind of catch as catch can. That was another aspect. I also tried to promote the dissemination of information about American policy through collaboration with our local USIS officer. We would do this by organizing speeches at some of the universities in the area or with chambers of commerce or with other kinds of clubs in the area. One of the ones that I liked to work with quite a lot was the military. There was a military training school in the area. I organized a couple of speeches there. Usually I tried to bring down people from our Paris embassy who were more on top of the policies that we were promoting than we were in the consulate. I only had three Americans at the consulate and one person who did the navy criminal investigations. So that was another very important activity that we were doing in the area to promote dissemination of policy.

Q: Did you run across endemic anti-Americanism in some parts of the community?

LEADER: Quite honestly, they loved us. I don't know what's going to happen when these people who remember the war are all dead. I'm sure it will change and I'm sure that it has changed more recently. There was a little bit more ambivalence about the U.S. in Marseilles itself because we bombed Marseilles and they remembered that. We bombed it in the process of liberating it and they weren't very happy about that approach. So, we weren't as warmly welcomed in Marseilles at all these commemorations as we were farther up the coast on the Riviera.

Q: What about the increasing number of North Africans into France, many Muslim? Was this changing the character?

LEADER: Some people often refer to Marseilles as one of the largest Muslim cities outside of Africa. In fact, in many parts of the world, they don't have as many North Africans and Muslims. It had an impact in Marseilles particularly because there was such a large North African community and there were a lot of people... There were several different groups that had connections with Algeria and there were the Pied Noir, the French who had lived and farmed and had their businesses in Algeria who left when that revolution took place around 1960. A lot of

them settled in Aix-en-Provence, but also in other parts of southern France. Then there were the Arabs who had worked for them who had fled when they did. And there was just a lot of immigration from North Africa as well. There were parts of the city that were really just Arab. In fact, it was quite fun right near the consulate, right near the old port. There was a market that made you think you were in North Africa because they had all the dates and the fruits and vegetables that came from the orchards and the farms in that part of the world. You really felt like you were in another place rather than France. Certainly a lot of French people did not like coming to Marseilles. At the time I was there, it was considered off bounds. People didn't think it was safe. It still had the aura of being connected to the mafia and drug mafias. Then to have all of these Arabs there. It's kind of like here in the metropolitan Washington area, some people don't want to come into downtown Washington because they are not comfortable there. Fortunately, it's my understanding that this has changed a lot in Marseilles. It has really changed since I was there and become a much more open city. Part of it is because of some commercial developments for which I have to give the mayor and his people credit. They worked hard and they succeeded where I didn't think they were going to. They have cruise ships going into Marseilles regularly now. So part of it was their efforts to get the cruise ships there, but it was also the fact that the fast train from Paris, the TGV, now goes all the way to Marseilles. That has also made it easier for French people to get there. It's helped it to become a tourist destination and to open the city up more to everybody.

Q: Were you looking at drugs in Marseilles?

LEADER: We did meet on occasion with some of the French investigators, but as far as U.S. interest was concerned, we had closed our DEA offices in Provence and the Riviera. The explanation for it that I was given was that drugs were still coming into Marseilles but they were not going to the U.S. from there, they were destined for other parts of Europe. So, our drug investigators were not so consumed anymore with that trafficking.

Q: That was the old French Connection.

LEADER: Right. So our drug people were not so interested in that anymore.

Q: Did you ever run across or deal with Le Pen?

LEADER: We watched very closely what was going on with that political party, the Front National, the FN. But it was U.S. policy that we not deal with them. This became a big issue when a Front National party member was elected mayor of the town which was a big port for some of our ships, Toulon. This became a big issue when we would bring our ships into that port. It was a headquarters for the French navy and so we would sometimes want to do exercises with them and maybe bring in a ship. There was a Sixth Fleet liaison officer based in Toulon. He was superb and is now the military attaché in the embassy in Madrid. He knew all the people and all the players and all the characters. He was able to give us good advice. They managed one time to bring the admiral who was the head of the Sixth Fleet onto a ship there without having him make the traditional courtesy call on the mayor. Some of the lower down officers did that. But we had to treat it not as a party issue but as a protocol issue. So we did have lower officers from the military meet them. But it made it very awkward for us. The whole idea that we were

supposed to report on these people without ever being able to talk to them or any of their followers made it a little difficult.

I would like to add one more thing that did become a very important issue for us and that was security. One of the walls of our consulate was right down on the street and so we weren't in a good situation. Security was becoming a big issue after the explosions in East Africa. We worked with the mayor to get some barriers put up behind our embassy so that people couldn't park there. It was a very narrow street but cars had a tendency to pull up on the sidewalk and sort of park temporarily. So we got that so they couldn't do that. We started to look at our evacuation plan and how we would get out of our building. Our evacuation plan was outdated because the building next to us which was supposed to be our evacuation route had changed its roof and you couldn't get from one building to the other anymore. We worked with police in Nice and Cannes and Toulouse about security. So that was a big, important issue for us. We were always told that we probably didn't need to worry about any links between the Islam in Marseilles and the Islam of the Middle East, that these were very separate... Or the Al-Qaeda. That these were very separate groups, very separate issues. The rationale we were given was that nothing would happen in Marseilles because there were some Algerian activists who used it as a planning base and they didn't want to foul their own nest or to be chased out, or to bring the police down on them. I always was a little skeptical of these assurances. As we've seen more recently, there have been threats to the consulate in Marseilles that were made public. That was another big issue that we were trying to deal with. There were often big demonstrations in Marseilles. One time a consulate was occupied by some demonstrators. This was always a concern, whether the demonstrations would remain peaceful.

Q: What were they demonstrating about?

LEADER: Well, there would be political demonstrations. I'm trying to remember what that particular one was about. Turkish Kurds often demonstrated. I think it was the Turkish consulate that got occupied. Usually they were very calm and they were very peaceful in their marches. They were usually allowed to march. It was the Turkish Kurds who were protesting the treatment of a Turkish Kurd who had been arrested by the government of Turkey and imprisoned and was going on trial. That was one of the big ones.

LARRY COLBERT
Consul General
Paris, France (1997-2001)

Mr. Colbert was born in Ohio in 1940. He attended the Universities of Ohio and Missouri. After a tour in Turkey with the Peace Corps and a year as an assistant on Capital Hill, he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to Viet Nam as Regional Advisor. His subsequent postings, where he served as Consular Officer include: Ankara, Turkey, Oran, Algeria, Dublin, Ireland and Manila, Philippines. At Tijuana, Mexico, Madrid, Spain, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and Paris, France Mr. Colbert served as Consul General. Mr. Colbert was interviewed by Charles

Stuart Kennedy in November, 2006

Q: I think these are interesting things to put in and pass on. OK you are in Paris. You went to Paris from when to when?

COLBERT: From '97 to 2001. I think let's talk about how I got to Paris.

Q: Yeah.

COLBERT: I think that's important to understand how the system works in reality in terms of assignments. The more senior the officer, the more the assignments are decided outside the system but by the system. That's to say that you have to request a position or you have to...it is rare that you're called blindly and said, "Take this job." Maybe if you are Negroponte and they want you to go to Iraq or something but for the most part when you are in the system you look around to see what's available at your grade and then when you are leaving, when the job will become open and so on.

In the case of Paris I had had my eye on Paris as a possible final assignment because of timing issues. I knew when I would be leaving Juarez, and I knew when Paris would be opening because I knew the person who was there, Jim Ward would be leaving after four years and our timing would be probably matched. But another officer had been promised the job I found out even before Jim Ward arrived to take on the job, that's really unusual that a job should be promised to somebody three or four years ahead of it becoming open. So I knew that Paris wasn't going to be a possibility for me. I had French and I had been I think a fairly well regarded professional in my field so I thought well, it's possible but if this other person had the job locked then why...you can't really fight the Bureau of Consular Affairs front office.

Q: Who was this?

COLBERT: Maura Harty.

Q: Uh huh.

COLBERT: Whom at that point I think was deputy assistant secretary. She wasn't an assistant secretary, maybe at that point she was not at that point deputy assistant secretary but she was certainly...I was reliably informed had been promised the job by Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary. I'm minding my own business and the phone rings and Jim Ward calls me from Paris and said, "Are you still interested in coming here as consul general?" I said, "Is the Pope Polish?" He said, "Well, the job is now in play because Maura is going to be ambassador to, it turned out, Paraguay, somewhere. So would you like me to have a word with Ambassador Harriman and recommend you?" I said, "Ah yes, please do that." He said, "Well, I'll be happy to do that. Ambassador Harriman and I are on very good terms, but you are going to have to sell me yourself. What can you do?" I said, "Well, I'll call down to Ambassador Jones and..."

Q: Jimmy Jones in Mexico City.

COLBERT: He was the ambassador in Mexico City, he was a former Congressman, former president of the American stock exchange and probably one of the sharpest ambassadors I have ever worked for.

Q: I interviewed him. He was at a very early age; he was a sort of the gatekeeper for Lyndon Johnson.

COLBERT: He was in Georgetown University when Kennedy was assassinated and I think it was either in law school or in his senior year, I think maybe law school. Johnson just sort of just sucked him out of Georgetown and brought him over. Whether he finished his law degree at that point or not I don't know. He became a wonder kid in the White House, but certainly a really, really sharp guy. So I called up Ambassador Jones and said, "Would you mind contacting Ambassador Pamela Harriman and putting a good word in for me?" He said, "Well Larry, you know the consul generalship down here in Mexico City is coming open, why don't you come down here and be consul general in Mexico City. You could be supervisory consul general for all the constituent posts, it's a good job, we would love to have you, etc., etc., etc." I said, "Well Ambassador Jones I'm very flattered but I've already done two tours in Mexico and also if my wife found out that I agreed to go to Mexico City at the expense of possibly going to Paris she would probably kill me and then maybe come after you." I said that only jokingly, I don't think my wife would do that but I said, "Seriously, I really would like to go to Paris." So he said, "Well, I'll call Pamela." That was all I ever heard.

Maybe a month later the ambassador called me up on the phone and he said, "Why didn't you return my phone call?" I said, "Your phone call?" I mean I would have returned the ambassadors phone call. He apparently had called me back to tell me that he had spoken with Pamela but my secretary neglected to tell me that he had called. I didn't kill her but I thought evil thoughts at least for one day because he really thought I was very rude and he had gone out of his way for me and I hadn't been polite enough to call him. In point of fact, those things happen and he accepted my apology but it made a difference. Ambassador Harriman wrote a letter to the assistant secretary for the European bureau and wrote a letter to Mary Ryan saying that I was her personal choice. I was Pamela Harriman's personal choice. Pamela Harriman didn't know me from Adam but Jim Ward had said nice things about me and obviously Ambassador Jones had...it turned out Ambassador Jones and Pamela Harriman went way back to Democratic politics so they knew each other.

Anyway I don't know that I was the Bureau of Consular affairs Candidate for the job. I have a feeling that it was probably somebody else, but I was Pamela Harriman's candidate so in that case what the bureau of consular affairs wanted I don't think mattered as much. You can't stand in front of a powerful politically appointed ambassador who really wants something and she was very well connected, as you know. Unfortunately, I never got to work for the lady. She had a heart attack swimming in the pool at the Ritz Hotel and died. She was in her early 70s at the time. One of her regular regimes was to go to the Ritz for exercise in the pool. I mean if you are going to swim in a pool swimming in the Hotel Ritz in Paris is probably the best place to go. It is a lovely pool. I've never been allowed to swim in it myself but I've seen it.

So when I arrived she was already departed and she was replaced by Felix Rohatyn who was a

New York financier. He is probably now in his late 70s I would think, a multimillionaire, fundraiser and a very, very competent person. He had fled from Austria I think as a child, because he was Jewish, either just before or just after Hitler occupied the country. He went through I think maybe high school, junior high school, he spent a substantial period of his adolescent life in France, fled again from Marseilles 1940 and the collapse and obviously came to the United States as a very relatively young man and did very well. So I worked for him, obviously not directly because there was a DCM between the ambassador and me.

Q: How would you describe French-American relations at the time you got there?

COLBERT: Well this was under the Clinton administration and the French loved Bill Clinton. They really, really thought that he was a very good president. In terms of day-to-day stuff, if you sit in on the country team meetings, there was always an awful lot of grouching about the French not agreeing with us on that, the French being sticky about this or the French dragging their feet on that. Often I found myself quietly agreeing with the French but of course, you couldn't really do that out loud. On such issues as they had a ban on hormone, beef that had hormones added, you couldn't export to the EU.

Q: Frankenstein Food.

COLBERT: The French are fanatic about their food. They take food issues very, very seriously. I mean it's strange when you think about it, they don't pasteurize their cheese. If you've eaten French cheese in France you know it's quite good but ours is probably healthier because it is pasteurized and is really safer. But they're quite fanatical about their food and we wanted to sell wheat that had been altered or perhaps not altered and they weren't having it. So there was a struggle between the EU and U.S. agriculture as to what could or couldn't be imported into Europe. The French, who are sort of in the forefront of those countries and trying to keep out things that they didn't want in. Part of it was protectionism, I mean they wanted to save their own market, part of it was just their being French and part of it was sincere hysteria. I meant that as it came out, sincere hysteria. But often you had to be sympathetic. They had their own way of doing things.

When I was in France the 35-hour workweek came in.

Q: This was under was it Mitterrand?

COLBERT: Jospin. Chirac was still president but he was advised by his advisors that they should have a snap election and the conservatives would retain control of the national assembly. In fact, the Socialists, the main opposition party at that time, really didn't think they were going to win and they put up a very sort of, how would you describe Jospin, sort of a professorial in the pejorative sense candidate, no charisma, no "je ne sais quoi" (I don't know what). But, whatever it was he didn't have it. But Jospin won and so the Socialists were in charge. One of their campaign promises was that the country would go from 40 to 35 hours. Well I don't think that they thought that they were going to win. But then they won and suddenly France went from 38 hours or 39 hours, down to 35. It was somewhat less than 40, maybe 38 but they went to 35, which was a real challenge for everybody. The idea of the Socialists was that if you reduced the

number of hours that people work then businesses would have to employ more people and their unemployment rate, which is always scandalously higher than ours, at that point it was particularly high, would be reduced because people would be working fewer hours so you'd have to employ more people. It doesn't really work out that way.

What happened was the larger companies bought more equipment, people did imaginative scheduling things, but employment did not increase. For me, as a consular manager it was a real challenge as it was for many other people in the embassy because the employees decided that the way they would go from 40 to 35 is they wouldn't work on Friday afternoons. So the embassy FSNs except for those who were being paid premium overtime pay all went home at 1:00 on Friday, or noon on Friday, whichever it was, I don't remember. So you'd go from having your entire staff to puff nobody, except for the Americans who, of course, had to stay. The Americans, as you are well aware, did not do all the grunt work, they didn't answer the phones, they didn't do the clerical stuff, they didn't do the vouchers and they certainly didn't do all the mechanical things that are involved in doing consular work. So you would find at say 1:00 everybody is gone except for all of you. What do you do to keep busy? Well I'm sure that Washington would say there are lots of things you can do but over time those lots of things become more and more problematical, so it was a real challenge. That was one of the challenges I dealt with and we managed to work it out.

Q: Did you also find that your employees, the French, have these very long vacation periods?

COLBERT: One of the reasons that it is difficult for young people to get employment in France is that if you hire a person after six months they are considered a permanent employee. To terminate them you have to go labor court; witch or bitch depending on what. She was then met by police authorities who attempt to take her into custody and she ends up rolling on the ground with one of them. She resists arrest physically so she is arrested and taken to jail. Of course, we know nothing about this.

Q: how did you find living in France at that time?

COLBERT: Very pleasant. I had only one unpleasant experience with one French person. I think once we had an unpleasant experience in a restaurant in some little town in Provence but no I think people were generally nice, friendly, my French accent is decidedly American and they never made fun of my French. They certainly were very polite, very helpful and either they have changed from their reputation of being unpleasant and surly toward Americans or that was a bad rap that they did not deserve. Certainly I had no bad experiences with any of them.

Q: I must say we've made several trips to France and I speak very little French but I found it very pleasant. This is I think it's a generational thing.

COLBERT: There's a deep, deep connection between the French and the Americans. I think that that relationship goes way back obviously to our revolution but its been enriched, not just by the First World War and the Second World War and all that but by the number of French people who study here, the number of Americans who study there, the mixture in commerce and certainly the mixture in marriage. So many, many prominent French people are married to American women

and vice versa. The connections are just so, so intense and one forgets. There are so many organizations like the Daughters of the American Revolution; the Sons of the American Revolution have French branches. There is the so-called Cincinnati Society...

Q: Oh yeah?

COLBERT: Which is composed with first sons of Americans whose...

Q: Officers.

COLBERT: Officers, sons of officers, who served under George Washington. There are thirteen chapters to represent the thirteen states, there is a fourteenth chapter and that's composed of officers who served in French regiments in the American Revolution of which there were...

Q: Rochambeau and all.

COLBERT: Rochambeau and all. These organizations and many, many, many others are intertwined to the two societies. One of the most I think emotionally touching things that I experienced similar to visiting the cemetery in Normandy or the many other military cemeteries particularly the one in Normandy. But my last year I was invited to a triennial, every three years the Cincinnati Society has a meeting either in French or in the United States. This is a meeting in France where they inaugurate their new president general for a three year term. It was held in Versailles Palace, which was loaned to this Society by the French government for this occasion. It was a black tie dinner, cocktails in Louis XIV private chapel followed by a ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors in which one French soldier dressed in each regiments colors, representing each regiment that served in France or in the United States during the revolution in their own traditional 18th century uniform. They played the two national anthems and then at a particular point each soldier took three steps forward, presented arms with a musket and they read off the name of the regiment and how many people died, how many people were wounded in that regiment and stepped back. The ceremony lasted a good 20 minutes because there were that many regiments and one has to be impressed with the number of dead and wounded, these are French soldiers serving with Rochambeau and it was very, very moving. Then we had a black tie dinner with representatives from the French government.

I was the only American official there but I was there as a guest of the Society not representing the embassy. But I was very impressed with the ceremony. Once a year there is a ceremony in the town of Grasse, where Admiral de Grasse is from. I was privileged to go there, there is always a representative from the consulate in Marseilles because it is in the Marseilles consulate but I was there after I had retired and the official U.S. guest was the General Jones, the head of NATO who came down and made a speech. Admiral de Grasse commanded the fleet, which compelled the surrender of Cornwallis. The ties between the countries are just so, so tremendous.

Then you get these small-minded idiots in this country, like there are small-minded idiots in that country, who for example wanted to rename French fries to freedom fries because the French wouldn't send troops to Iraq too. That same Congressman now is one of the Congressmen who were saying that we made a mistake in going in the first place. This petty name calling on both

sides by morons is just disgraceful.

Q: I think Colin Powell summed it up by talking about someone saying to the secretary of state about French-American relations. He said, "Well you know France and the United States have been in marriage counseling for about 200 years now."

COLBERT: Absolutely true but the marriage continues to work. The first leader who called Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis was Charles de Gaul.

Q: Yeah.

COLBERT: We have stood together through thick and thin and we've continued to do so.

Q: Well again in my interviewing one of the strong themes that goes through these interviews is that the French-American connection, the annoyance. One man who was in NATO and an American in Brussels said his kids when young thought there was a nationality known as Those God Damn French because he would come home almost every night and slam his briefcase on the table and say, "Those God damn French." But at the same time you have intelligence in the military side, very close cooperation always.

COLBERT: On the intelligence side the cooperation is total, the mutual respect is very, very high. I knew both station chiefs that served when I was there and they had very, very close relationships with their counterparts. The military cooperate in so many ways and at so many levels and so well. People should be able to say, "Have you considered this or do you think about the circumstances of that." I think the French sometimes represent an anchor to our battleship and I'm talking categorically, slowing us down sometimes even stopping us. The trouble with being the super power and the economic colossus is that we can go charging forward. On occasion perhaps somebody saying no or stop and think about it it is a good thing. I think that recent events would indicate that perhaps more of that would be a good thing.

Q: We are talking about involvement in Iraq.

COLBERT: You understood that did you. I was being so elliptical. The French really believed that what we were about would have consequences about which we wouldn't like, we in the west. I don't have any doubt that with hindsight we would have done things differently or perhaps not at all. So I think the French are good for us.

Q: Did you have any problems with Bill Clinton and his impeachment and his affair with Monica Lewinsky and all that sort of thing?

COLBERT: The French found that whole thing to be totally incomprehensible. I have never met a French person who had any sympathy for the impeachment. Number one, why were we investigating the private life of a president? Consensual sex between adults and even adults who aren't married is not unknown in any country and certainly not unknown in France. They would have pointed out to me had the time been current that the illegitimate child of Mitterrand attended his funeral. They just couldn't understand why people would be asked to testify about

their private life, why it was a concern of anybody other than the principals within the immediate circle, that is to say the spouse, mistress, husband, and why you would spend all this money to investigate something. They thought that Ken Stark was a monster.

Q: Ken Starr, S-T-A-R-R.

COLBERT: The special prosecutor was as far as they were concerned on a children's crusade and they would probably have hoped that he ended up just like the children on the children's crusade ended up. They had no truck with any of it. Basically they liked Clinton, I mean they didn't always agree with our policies but they found him to be a competent, personable leader that they could get along with. I think Chirac and Clinton from my perspective and our perspective that is obviously consul general not political counselor got along very well, communicated very well. To them the whole thing was a joke.

I was not, let's see I left in 2001 so Bush was already president, they did not care for the Bush administration when I was there. The Kyoto issue was part of it, a feeling of not being listened to was part of it. I don't know what more I want to say; maybe you can ask me a question.

**LISA PIASCIK
Consul General
Paris (2011-2014)**

Lisa Piascik was born in Delaware in 1957. She graduated from George Washington University before entering the Foreign Service in 1980. Her overseas posts include Beirut, Lebanon; Sana'a, Lebanon; Cebu, Philippines; Baku, Azerbaijan; Warsaw, Poland; Abuja, Nigeria; Baqubah, Diyala Province, Iraq; and Paris, France. Ms. Piascik was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2016.

Q: In 2010 what?

PIASCIK: In 2010 I left. Before I went to Iraq, I had gotten a handshake on the consul general position in Paris as my onward assignment. At some point, we all realized that the position was language designated for French, and my French language scores were decades old, so I went to FSI for six months. I probably could have met the requirements after three months but I elected to stay the entire six months. I'm very glad that I did because it really helped solidify my language skills.

So I went out to Paris in May of 2011 and served there for three years.

Q: Did you take your cat?

PIASCIK: I took two cats with me. They both passed away in Paris and I came back with a French cat.

Q: All right, let's talk about Paris. What was sort of the situation when you arrived there in 2011.

PIASCIK: By 2011, we had pretty much gotten over the bad patch that came about as a result of the Iraq war. France was seen one of our best partners and we shared common interests and values. We didn't always share the same views on how to achieve our goals, but we had a really good working relationship with the French on almost every level.

Q: Let's talk about the consular work there? How did you find the consular section when you arrived and then what were you up to?

PIASCIK: Paris was a full-service consular section with non-immigrant, immigrant and American citizen services. The consulate general in Marseille performed American citizen services and had a dedicated consular staff, although the consular officer was also the management officer for the post. The consulate general in Strasbourg offered limited American citizen services; it accepted passport and report of birth applications and carried out notarial services and emergency consular services. We also had four American presence posts (APPs), in Rennes, Toulouse, Lyon, and Bordeaux. These were tiny posts with one officer and two to three local employees. They offered the same types of consular services that Strasbourg did. These APPs were the first anywhere and had been grandfathered to officer those routine consular services. Finally, there was a consular agency in Nice that reported to Marseille.

As far as the workload was concerned, Paris was a medium-sized non-immigrant visa post, which processed some 60,000 non-immigrant visas per year. France was in the Visa Waiver Program, so French nationals who wanted to visit the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less did not need a visa. So those who needed visas were going to stay longer than 90 days or needed visas to work, study or invest. We had a very large pool of applicants from North and West Africans who were living in France. We also saw a lot of Chinese applicants, mainly students who wanted to go to the United States during summer vacation. The visa work was pretty straightforward, but there were a cases that needed special handling of one sort or another. This ranged from French performing artists whose applications got stuck in the clearance procedure to Syrian opposition figures who needed to travel to the U.S. Our embassy in the Central African Republic didn't process visas, so we used to see a fair number of applicants wanting or needing diplomatic visas.

We had a small immigrant visa (IV) workload. We only processed 1200-1500 applicants a year. When I was there we took over IV processing for Portugal. CA decided to cease offering immigrant visas in Lisbon because the workload was so small it just wasn't efficient to do them there. The original plan was to move IV processing in Portugal to Spain, but I understand the Portuguese objected to this for political reasons rooted in history. I never really understood why. Anyway, CA saw that we had the capacity to take on the workload.

Q: You mean that a person from Portugal had to go all the way up to Paris?

PIASCIK: Yes, yes.

Q: Oh my God.

PIASCIK: Not very convenient for them. We did send our IV officer and a local employee to Lisbon once a year to interview anyone who couldn't come to Paris.

Now, our real bread and butter was American citizens services. France is a very popular tourist destination, and Paris is one of the most visited cities in the world, with more than 1.5 million American visitors each year. Most people had perfectly lovely experiences and left. But there were also those who encountered problems: they were pickpocketed, ran out of money, they fell ill or went off their medications or died, some had run-ins with law enforcement. There was also a large resident American community and again, while most of them lived their lives with no problems, there were others who had problems, For instance, child custody or child abduction, runaways, abuse, deaths, estate issues, trials and court cases. Something happened every single day.

Q: Do you remember any stories from while you were there?

PIASCIK: Well, we had family living in Brittany – they had been there for quite some time and were out of status. In other words, they were living there illegally. There was the mother, her husband, who was quite a bit older than the mother and in poor health, and their two children. The older was 16 or 17 and the younger about 10, I think. The mother's father was also there as well. The mother had a history of mental illness, and at one point, the children had been removed from her care and put in foster care. Her father claimed that he was being held against his will by her. And at some point several years earlier, the woman's husband had applied for and received a passport in the woman's husband's name. I don't remember how it was discovered, but we referred it to the regional security officer for investigation and follow-up. However, the husband died, and then the father also passed away after he returned to the U.S. We kept trying to convince the woman to return to the U.S., but she didn't want to. She managed to subsist on French social welfare subsidies, which is pretty crazy considering she was there illegally. She started acting erratically again, and the kids were placed in foster care. The older child, a girl, ran away and reunited with her mother. The mother also tried to remove the younger child, a boy, from foster care. It was a real mess. The boy was very unhappy and just wanted to be with his mom and sister. He received very good care from the foster family and French child welfare services, but we had to send an officer out to check on him. The mother and sister did return to the U.S. We eventually got the French to agree to return the boy and we worked with CA and the child welfare services in Vermont, I think it was. And the fun and games did not end there; we heard that the mother tried to abduct the boy back in the U.S. This was just a very complex case requiring a lot of time.

We also had a case in which a teenage girl who was attending boarding school. Her parents were assigned to a military base in Germany. She attended the school during the week and went home on the weekends. Well, one Friday she did not show up at home. It turned out that she ran away with some guy she met on the internet. It wasn't so much a consular case and the primary actors were the management section and our FBI representatives, but we worked very closely with them. The girl was eventually found and we worked out an agreement that she would be returned

to her parents in Germany rather than enter the French social services system as a runaway.

There was also another complicated case in which an American citizen killed his doctor in a very brutal manner. This happened in the U.S. He had fled the U.S. and gone to Guadeloupe, which is a French overseas territory, and claimed he was also a French citizen. This turned out to be true. France wouldn't extradite him, but he was tried and convicted and sentenced to prison. He was able to cite some provision in French law for a retrial, so he was brought to Paris for that and this is where we got involved. The family of the doctor was really concerned that he would be let off the hook, and they were in constant contact with us. There was also congressional interest in the case. It put us in a delicate position since the perpetrator was also a U.S. citizen. We reached out to him but he didn't want anything to do with us. We did work with the French prosecutor to get them to cover the family's expenses to come for the trial, and we sent an officer and local staff member to attend the trial itself. He was found guilty once more and received an even long sentence.

We would had contact with celebrities. The actress Hilary Swank a came in because she'd been robbed in a limo on her way in from the airport. Her bag and her passport were stolen and she needed a new passport. She was perfectly charming, called us herself, came in by herself.

Q: My wife was pickpocketed in Paris.

PIASCIK: Not a day went by when we didn't have people come in or call us because they'd been pickpocketed.

We had one really unfortunate case. CA had sent us instructions to have a hearing for an American woman on the grounds that she was not entitled to American citizenship. She had come to the United States as a child with her mother. She had been naturalized as a teenager at the same time as her mother. She had lived her life and moved to Paris to study law. So the point of the hearing would be basically to remove her passport on the grounds that she was not an American citizen. What had happened was that someone had made an administrative mistake when processing her naturalization. She was a few months older than 18, and shouldn't have been naturalized through her mother in the first place. She should have qualified on her own rather than via her mother. No one really noticed this mistake until years later when she applied for a certificate of naturalization from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Department of Homeland Security. They had noticed the mistake and referred it back to CA.

It wasn't the fault of the woman at all. We were very concerned because if her passport was removed, she would be stateless. She had lost whatever her original nationality was when she naturalized as a U.S. citizen. We talked to the consular people at that embassy and they just couldn't get their minds around the circumstances, so it would have put her in a bad situation. We all felt very strongly that this was wrong on so many levels, not to mention the optics. We went back to CA and asked if there was any way to delay or to have her go back to the U.S. to deal with this. CA wasn't very helpful. So we reached out to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services office in Rome, and the agent in charge there was not only sympathetic but helpful. We agreed that we could arrange for her to re-enter the U.S. as a returning resident, not as a citizen but as a permanent resident, and that she could make an application for expeditious

naturalization. This is what happened. Unfortunately, she had been out of the U.S. long enough that she couldn't meet the physical presence in the U.S. requirement. I mean, she had enough time in the U.S. but it wasn't in the period immediately before her application. In effect she would have to have five years in the U.S. to meet those requirements. She was not very happy, and I understand that. To live so many years as a U.S. citizen, and then be told you are not? We really did the very best we could for her.

Q: Yeah. We get into these things. Did you have much problems with North African people in France?

PIASCIK: Not really. There were many North Africans who were resident in France. Those who had long term residency, those whose had the right to a ten year period of residency, we didn't worry about too much. We looked more closely at those who only had one year residency visas.

Q: What about terrorism? Association of screening people for terrorism?

PIASCIK: Well, visa applicants went through namechecks as part of the application process. We had people who came up as terrorism or security hits or near hits. Most people were cleared and we could issue. There were others which we denied and yet others just got hung up somewhere in the system. We never really got the background on these cases and had little visibility on them.

We did have one interesting case. He was a French national of Lebanese origin and had an American car dealership in France. He'd been to the United States before and then his name came up as a terrorism hit. One of the consular officers took an interest in this case and learned that the original hit had been entered by the FBI. He worked with our FBI guys and our regional affairs people and both offices indicated that there was nothing on the guy. It just looked like some case that someone forgot to remove from the namecheck database. This officer worked for over a year and a half with CA to get a one entry visa for this man to consult with the American car company. The guy went to the U.S. and returned, and then about a year later wanted to go back. So we had to go through the same process once again because his name was still showing up in the database.

As interesting as these case were, I did not spend a lot of time on individual cases. Much of my time was spent on getting France to meet requirements of the Visa Waiver Program that had been drawn up well after the program began. These additional requirements applied to all current and prospective members. One was to certify via a diplomatic note that all lost and stolen passports were be reported within a certain time period to Interpol, which would make sure they were in these widely-available databases. The second was to conclude an agreement to share information on people who committed serious crimes. We called it the preventing and combatting serious crime (PCSC) agreement. The third was to conclude an agreement to share information on known and suspected terrorists. We referred to it as an HSPD-6 agreement, for the homeland security presidential directive which defined what it would be.

Talks had dragged on for years with the French and other Visa Waiver Program countries. The Paris consul general had generally been responsible for overseeing embassy efforts to coax the

French to meet these requirements, and I took this on when I arrived. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security took the lead on negotiating the texts of the PCSC and the HSPD-6 with the French Ministry of Interior, and I worked closely with all these parties, as well as the Department of State and the Department of Justice attaché who was in Paris. A lawyer with the French presidency or prime ministry also became involved in those talks as well. I worked directly with the French interior ministry on the Interpol diplomatic note.

The French eventually were compliant on all three requirements, but it took a lot of pushing and pulling. The diplomatic note for reporting lost and stolen passports to Interpol was the easiest. This had languished for quite some time. In France, as in many European countries, passports are not issued centrally or in a couple of places but by the prefectures in the different provinces, all under the guidance of the Ministry of Interior. They really had a lot of work to do to institute accountability procedures and programs for ensuring that lost/stolen passports could be timely reported, and they were unwilling to give us a diplomatic note saying that they would do so until they actually could. They eventually did so and gave us the diplomatic note. CA periodically checked to make sure they were reporting, and everything checked out.

The PCSC negotiations began in 2009 pattered along over the next couple of years. By the time I arrived, there were essentially only a couple of issues that were unresolved. One was how our countries defined “serious crime”. For the U.S., it was basically any crime for which the penalty was one year in prison. For France, it was anything over three years in prison. Bridging that gap took a long time.

Another sticking point was that if the French shared information on someone who had committed a serious crime with us, we wanted to be able to use that information in a variety of ways whereas the French were quite adamant that we could only use that information for the purpose for which France turned it over to us for. For example, if they shared information on someone who had robbed bank, then we couldn’t use that information in a murder investigation on the same person without first getting permission from the French. Both sides really stuck to their guns on this point. The U.S. side was convinced the French were not serious about concluding an agreement and talked about walking away. The Justice attaché and I just didn’t think this was the case and that the French were only reflecting what was in their law. With this two, everyone calmed down and found a solution which was so technical I couldn’t really explain what it was.

France held elections in the spring of 2012, and in the run up to those elections, it became clear that the Socialist candidate, François Hollande, was likely to win the presidency. This really motivated our French interlocutors as they did not want to contemplate that the Socialists might not like what was in the PCSC and we’d have to start all over again. We came to a final agreement on the text, in both French and English, a couple of days before the elections.

Then we had to figure out who would sign it. The French Minister of Interior wanted to sign it with our Ambassador. We were reluctant to do this so close to the elections as we did not want to be seen as doing something that might affect the outcome of the elections. In addition, the minister was a pretty polarizing figure. We eventually agreed that the minister would initial in Paris, and we would have Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano initial in Washington. The French minister signed, and the interior ministry sent it to their embassy in

Washington and --- it never showed up. DHL lost it. So another set was draw up and the French gave it to us to transmit, which we did and it was signed in good time.

After that, the French Constitutional Court had to ok the agreement, which was not supposed to be a problem since the interior ministry had run it by them, and then Parliament had to approve the agreement, and we knew it would take a long time and we'd have some work to do with the Socialists, who had won the election. However, the Snowden revelations really put the PCSC on the backburner for the rest of my time in France.

The last agreement, the HSPD-6, was the most problematic. It was a very structured format that had some infrastructure connected to it and revolved around exchanges of information on known and suspected terrorists. The French were just not interested and we were never sure why. They felt we already had robust exchanges going on and didn't feel the need to formalize it. After many, many talks, the French finally indicated that their reluctance stemmed from the fact that any agreement would have be cleared with the Parliament, and they were concerned that Parliament not only would never agree because of potential conflicts with French privacy laws, which were very tough, and because it might affect our on-going cooperation.

The French clearly understood that the Visa Waiver Program agreements were a priority for us, and I really didn't believe that they were being obstinate just for the sake of being obstinate. On the U.S. side, the National Security Council was pushing the need for all Visa Waiver Program members to sign off on all the agreements. We just needed to find a way to accommodate French concerns, so I went to the DCM, with the Justice attaché, and said we believe the best chance of success was to modify the format of the agreement, and look for a more flexible arrangement that met our requirements and French concerns at the same time. He and the Ambassador agreed.

So I wrote a cable to the Department, and to the counterterrorism bureau, specifically, to this effect. The counterterrorism bureau did the necessary footwork with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and with the National Security Council, and they suggested an exchange of letters. The French agreed, and we went back and forth over the specific language, and came to an agreement. And the exchange of letters basically brought France into compliance with the Visa Waiver Program requirements. I do understand that after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, the French finally did sign on to the original HSPD-6 agreement.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

PIASCIK: Charles Rivkin. He was a political appointee but his father had been an ambassador twice. The American Foreign Service Association award for constructive dissent is funded by the Rivkin family. I have the highest respect for Charles Rivkin, who is now Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs. I thought he was a first rate ambassador and one of the best I have worked with. He was wonderful to work for and cared about his staff and was interested in all of our issues. I was acting DCM several times so I was able to see him from the front office perspective but we also dealt with each other on a number of consular issues. People would ask him about visas or consular issues and he was very careful to do the right thing.

He was very focused on disaffected youth in France. France is facing a challenge on how to

integrate not only its immigrant population, which is largely Muslim, but also the children of those immigrants, who are French citizens. Many of them live in very depressed areas and face discrimination and limited opportunities. He had close ties to a number of well-known people in the entertainment industry, so looked for opportunities to involve them. For example, will.i.am of the Black Eyed Peas, agreed to do a number of programs aimed at disadvantaged youth which were very popular and well received.

Ambassador Rivkin didn't manage by walking around, but I invited him to the consular section several times for hail and farewells, or consular leadership days, or special events. He always attended, always spoke to us, and always, always spent way more time in our section than he was scheduled to. He took the time to talk to everyone, and the consular staff loved him.

Q: How did you find the special consular posts?

PIASCIK: The American presence posts?

Q: Yeah.

PIASCIK: Well, the American presence posts, or APPs, in France were a little unusual in that they were doing routine American citizen services (ACS). Other APPs in the world do not. APPs are supposed to concentrate on public diplomacy and commercial work. The France APPs were the first one established and were grandfathered to do some ACS work. They didn't receive any funding from CA to do so and the neither the American or French staff were paid for by CA funds. In terms of consular work, they accepted passport and consular reports of birth abroad, and sent them to Paris for approval. They also did notarial services and non-routine services, such as responding to Americans in distress. I didn't have any supervisory authority over them but visited them once a year. Except for one officer, who left shortly after I arrived, I was impressed by all the Americans and all of the local staff. They were all very good and diligent about assisting American citizens, and they were by and large receptive to guidance we provided.

But as I visited the APPs, I was pretty shocked at the lack of security accorded to the APPs. Most had no "hard lines" separating the customers from staff, no bulletproof glass. Most had to bring their customers into their office space to either provide the service or process the fee. The APPs were proud that they could provide an old-fashioned, personalized service, but it was just not in accordance with regulations. Volume 3 of the Foreign Affairs Manual clearly said that APPs were not to do routine ACS services because they did not have the security infrastructure. I brought it up with the economic chief in Paris, who oversaw the APPs; the regional security officer, the management chief, and the DCM, but none were really concerned.

We were inspected by the Office of the Inspector General in the spring of 2012, and right before that occurred, the regional security officer suddenly told me he was very concerned by the lack of security features at the APPs. Naturally, I raised my concerns with the security inspectors. The inspectors wrote in their report that if the APPs were going to continue to do American services they need to have security infrastructure to do so. This was really a non-starter as we were in the midst of budget cutbacks, the fallout from the Benghazi attacks, and the fact that there was no way to make changes to most of the APPs because of structural issues. So eventually, we just

stopped the APPs from offering routine consular services. We agreed to send consular officers to the APPs periodically to offer services, and did a lot of public relations work in the run-up to that to make it more palatable. I think the people who were most affected were those with children. Adults could renew passports by mail, but parents needed to bring kids in for the application, so this could entail a train trip to Paris or Marseille plus most like a night in a hotel. On the other hand, with a little planning, these folks could just wait until a consular visit. From the point of view of efficiency, Paris and Marseille were able to leverage economies of scale that the APPs never could.

Q: Were many Americans getting arrested? I'm thinking of kids getting drunk and that sort of thing?

PIASCIK: Not really. If it happened, people were released pretty quickly for drunkenness or disturbing the peace. We only had about seven Americans who were in jail throughout France during the time that I was there. They were in jail mostly on murder or drug charges.

Q: How about students?

PIASCIK: There are thousands of U.S. students in France. Most seemed to be on semester abroad programs. We worked closely with the universities to brief them on safety and security as well as the consular services we offered. We had a very sad incident when an American student was killed in a fire in a dormitory, so we wanted to make sure they knew what to do in the event of a fire. We also used these talks as opportunities to encourage people to take the foreign service exam and work for the State Department.

Q: Well, during my time France had the reputation, the French of being very rude to Americans. But I'm told it's been changing a lot. I've been there a number of times; I've had no problem but was this a problem?

PIASCIK: No. You know, Paris is a big, international city, and people can be impersonal. The French, like many Europeans, don't smile a lot, which Americans find off-putting. Parisians appreciate that millions of tourists benefit the economy but I understand how tiresome it can be to deal with this tide of foreigners all the time clogging up sites like Versailles or Notre Dame. The French government did make an effort to make sure Parisians were nice to visitors. Once you are outside of Paris, people are generally very friendly and nice to foreigners. Most French people are very well-disposed towards Americans and those in areas where Americans were a factor in World Wars I and II are particularly well-disposed. I have to say I never ran across any French who were unfriendly to me, either on a professional or personal basis, or even just from very brief contacts in stores or on the street. Nobody made fun of my bad French accent or my grammatical mistakes so I found them really very easy to deal with and certainly outside of Paris they were just delightful people. People really went out of their way to help.

We had an American woman write that she and her twin sister had been born in France. Their father was a soldier. Her twin sister had died as a baby and had been buried in France. She was trying to find out where exactly the sister was buried. We normally would not have the resources to help her out, but my American office management specialist, a really capable person who had

previously been a French teacher, asked if she could take this on as a project.

She was able to find the cemetery where this baby was buried and she established a good relationship with the woman in charge of the cemetery. This woman was able to locate the gravesite and she and her husband took it on themselves to clean up the site and take photos, which we were able to send back to the American lady.

The embassy always received requests from small towns which would hold memorial ceremonies to commemorate a pilot who had been shot down or a soldier killed during one of the world wars. We always tried to send someone to say a few words, and the towns were always so grateful. President Nicolas Sarkozy came to the embassy for a September 11 commemoration, which was a big deal, and he gave a very moving speech in which he talked how Americans had come to the aid of France twice and died so that France could be free.

Q: Well, is there anything else you should cover?

PIASCIK: I don't think so. I think that about covers it.

Q: And then what?

PIASCIK: I came back to Washington in May 2014.

End of Reader