

INDIA

COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS

Don Carroll Bliss, Jr.	1924-1926	Assistant Trade Officer, Bombay
John M. Steeves	1927-1942 1948-1950	Office of War Information, New Delhi Office of War Information, New Delhi
John Wesley Jones	1932-1935	Junior Vice Consul, Calcutta
Henry Byroade	1941-1944	U.S. Army Officer, India
G. Eugene Martin	1943-1956	Childhood, India
Louise Armstrong	1944-1947	Consular Officer, Madras
Royal D. Bisbee	1947-1948 1948-1950 1951-1956	Visa & General Services Officer, Bombay General Services Officer, New Delhi Provincial Public Affairs Officer, Lucknow
Howard Imbrey	1948-1950 1950-1951	CIA Officer, Bombay CIA Officer, Kerala
Henri Sokolove	1948-1953	Labor Attaché, New Delhi
Corey Venning	1949-1952	Staff Officer, Bombay
Harry G. Barnes, Jr.	1950-1985	Vice Consul/Rotation Officer, Bombay
Harold G. Josif	1951-1953	Political Officer, Madras
Everett Drumright	1951-1952 1952-1953	Consular Officer, New Delhi Consul General, Bombay
Howard Frank Needham	1951-1952 1952-1955	Information Assistant, USIS, Madras Information Officer, USIS, New Delhi
R. Smith Simpson	1952-1954	Consular Officer, Bombay
William L. Blue	1952-1955	Political Officer, New Delhi

Robert Anderson	1952-1956	Political Officer, New Delhi
Terence A. Todman	1952-1957	Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
	1957-1960	Political Officer, New Delhi
Roger C. Brewin	1953-1956	Consular/Economic Officer, Bombay
Stuart P. Lillico	1953-1955	Information Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Edward Ingraham	1954-1956	Consular Officer, Madras
Christopher Van Hollen	1954-1955	Political Officer, New Delhi
	1955-1958	Political Officer, Calcutta
Emerson M. Brown	1955-1957	Economic Officer, Bombay
David S. Burgess	1955-1960	Labor Attaché, U.S. Department of Labor New Delhi
Edward E. Masters	1955-1958	Political Officer, Madras
Harold M. Jones	1956-1963	Advisor, USAID, Bhopal
Carleton S. Coon, Jr.	1956-1959	Economic Officer, New Delhi
	1965-1968	India Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Eugene Rosenfeld	1956-1960	Information Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Carol Clendening Laise	1956-1961	Political Officer, New Delhi
Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr.	1956-1958	Consular Officer, Bombay
	1959-1963	Political Officer, New Delhi
	1963-1965	Indian Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Vernon C. Johnson	1957-1959	Agricultural Program Assistant, International Cooperation Administration, New Delhi
Milton Leavitt	1958-1960	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Bombay
Stephen H. Rogers	1959	Economic Officer, New Delhi
Eleanore Raven-Hamilton	1959-1962	Wife of USAID Officer, Jacques Raven, New Delhi

Frank E. Schmelzer, Jr.	1959-1962	Political Officer, Madras
Roger Ernst	1959-1962	Development Officer, USAID, New Delhi
Howell S. Teeple	1959-1963	Information and Press Officer, New Delhi
Sidney Sober	1960-1963	Economic Officer, Bombay
George M. Bennsky, Jr.	1960-1964	Economic/Political Officer, Madras
Mary Seymour Olmsted	1960-1965	Economic Officer, New Delhi
Jane Abell Coon	1960 1961-1964 1965-1967	Consular Officer, Bombay Political Officer, Bombay Political Officer, New Delhi
Daniel L. Horowitz	1961-1962	Labor Officer, New Delhi
Joseph F. Donelan, Jr.	1961-1962	Administrative Counselor, New Delhi
Barry Zorthian	1961-1964	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
William Henry Weathersby	1961-1965 1967-1969	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi
Howard B. Schaffer	1961-1967 1967-1969	Economic/Political Officer, New Delhi India Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Terrell E. Arnold	1962-1964	Economic Officer, Calcutta
Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr.	1962-1965	Economic Officer, Calcutta
Bruce H. Millen	1962-1965	Labor Advisor, New Delhi
Kathryn Clark-Bourne	1962-1967	Consular/Political Officer, Bombay
Dennis Kux	1962-1964	Desk Officer for Nepal and India, Washington, DC
Abraham M. Sirkin	1963-1966	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Madras
Ernestine S. Heck	1963-1967	Secretary to the Consul General, Bombay
Frank P. Coward	1963-1968	Education Officer, USIS, Madras

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.	1963-1968	Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi
Chester Bowles	1963-1969	Ambassador, India
Marjorie Ransom	1964-1965	Assistant Information Officer, USIS, Bombay
Robie M.H. "Mark" Palmer	1964-1966	Rotation Officer, New Delhi
Leonard H. Robinson	1964-1966	Peace Corps Volunteer, Paraphour
Lawrence J. Hall	1964-1966	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Melbourne L. Spector	1964-1966	Counselor for Administration, New Delhi
Nicholas A. Veliotis	1964-1966	Political Officer, New Delhi
William K. Hitchcock	1964-1968	Consul General
Harmon E. Kirby	1964-1966 1966-1967 1969-1972	Political Officer, Madras India Desk Officer, Washington, DC Political Officer, New Delhi
David Blakemore	1965-1966	Rotation Officer, Calcutta
Philip Merrill	1965-1966	USAID, New Delhi
Galen L. Stone	1965-1968	Counselor for Political Economic Affairs, New Delhi
Chas W. Freeman, Jr.	1965-1968	Vice Consul, Madras
Lindsey Grant	1965-1968	Political/Economic Officer, New Delhi
John W. Shirley	1965-1969	Press Attaché, USIS, New Delhi
William D. Miller	1965-1970	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Richard N. Viets	1965-1967 1967-1972	Commercial Officer, Madras Science/Political/Economic Officer, New Delhi
Eddie Deerfield	1966-1969	Information Officer, USIS, Madras

Robert J. Kott	1966-1969	Peace Corps Volunteer, Deccan Plateau
Anthony Quainton	1966-1969 1969-1972	External Relations Officer, New Delhi India, Nepal, Ceylon Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Robert Bauer	1967	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Larry Lesser	1967-1969	Consular Officer, New Delhi
Richard Podol	1967-1970	Program Officer, USAID, New Delhi
Herbert G. Hagerty	1967-1970	Political Officer, New Delhi
Leonard H. Robinson, Jr.	1967-1970	Associate Peace Corps Director, Bangalore
Eugene H. Bird	1967-1970 1970-1972	Economic Officer, Bombay Commercial Attaché, New Delhi
Clarence Swift Gulick	1967-1972	Assistant Director for Development Policy, USAID, New Delhi
Richard Davies	1968-1969	Consul General, Calcutta
William Andreas Brown	1968-1970	Political/Economic Officer, New Delhi
Leonardo M. Williams	1969-1970	Junior Officer Trainee, USIS, New Delhi
Slator Clay Blackiston, Jr.	1969-1971	Deputy Principal Officer, Calcutta
Leonard J. Saccio	1969-1972	Director, USAID, New Delhi
George B. Griffin	1969-1972	Political Officer, Calcutta
Walter A. Lundy	1969-1973	Political/Economic Officer, New Delhi
Richard McKee	1969-1974	Staff Aide, New Delhi
Donald M. Anderson	1970-1972	Political Officer, New Delhi
James H. Bahti	1970-1972	Political/Economic Officer, Bombay
Gordon W. Evans	1970-1973	Program Development Officer, USAID, New Delhi

R. Grant Smith	1970-1972 1972-1975	India Desk Officer, Washington, DC Political Officer, New Delhi
Sally Grooms Cowal	1971-1973	Special Assistant, USIS, New Delhi
Stephen E. Palmer, Jr.	1971-1973	Consul General, Madras
Betty Jane Jones	1971-1974	Economic Officer, Calcutta
Herbert E. Weiner	1971-1975	Labor Counselor, New Delhi
Roger Schrader	1971-1975	Labor Officer, New Delhi
Archie M. Bolster	1972-1974	Ambassador's Executive Assistant, New Delhi
Charles W. McCaskill	1972-1976 1976-1979	Economic Commercial Officer, Bombay Consul General, Madras
Albert E. Hemsing	1973-1976	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Robert C. Haney	1973-1974 1974-1977	India Inspection Team, USIS Information Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Dennis Kux	1972-1977	Deputy Country Director for Nepal and India, Washington, DC
Dean Rust	1974-1976	Staff Assistant to Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC
Joseph P. O'Neill	1974-1977	Consular Officer, Calcutta
Virginia Carson-Young	1974-1978	Consular Officer, New Delhi
Arthur Mead	1975	Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, DC
David A. Korn	1975-1977	Consul General, Calcutta
Razvigor Bazala	1975-1978	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Albert A. Thibault, Jr.	1975-1978	Political Officer, New Delhi
Natale H. Bellocchi	1976-1979	Economic Counselor, New Delhi

Fred Charles Thomas, Jr.	1977-1978	Commercial Attaché, New Delhi
Teresita C. Schaffer	1977-1979	Office of the Science Advisor, New Delhi
Howard B. Schaffer	1977-1979	Political Officer, New Delhi
Ainslie Embree	1977-1980	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Robert F. Goheen	1977-1980	Ambassador, India
Bilha Bryant	1977-1981	Commercial Counselor, New Delhi
Archer K. Blood	1977-1981	Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi
Hugh Burleson	1978-1979	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Madras
	1979-1981	Policy Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Herbert Levin	1979-1981	Political Counselor, New Delhi
Albert A. Thibault, Jr.	1979-1983	Political Officer, New Delhi
J. Michael Springmann	1980-1982	Foreign Commercial Service, New Delhi
Mary Jo Furgal	1980-1983	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Madras
Michael Pistor	1980-1984	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
W. Garth Thorburn	1980-1986	Agricultural Counselor, New Delhi
Stephen Eisenbraun	1981-1983	India Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Barbara J. Good	1981-1984	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Calcutta
Harry G. Barnes, Jr.	1981-1985	Ambassador, India
Gilbert L. Corey	1981-1985	World Bank, New Delhi
R. Grant Smith	1982-1984	Political Counselor, New Delhi
Constance J. Freeman	1983-1985	Economic Officer, New Delhi
Robert Goldberg	1983-1985	Consular Officer/Ambassador's Staff Assistant, New Delhi

Ernestine S. Heck	1983-1986	Political Officer, New Delhi
Harry A. Cahill	1983-1987	Consul General, Bombay
Owen Cylke	1983-1987	Deputy Mission Director, USAID, New Delhi
Prudence Bushnell	1984-1986	Administrative Officer, Bombay
Anthony Kern	1984-1986	Labor Attaché, New Delhi
Bruce F. Duncombe	1985-1987	Economic Officer, New Delhi
Eddie Deerfield	1985-1988	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Calcutta
John D. Stempel	1985-1988	Consul General, Madras
Anne O. Cary	1987-1989	Economic/Commercial Officer, New Delhi
Susan Keogh	1988-1990	Political Officer, New Delhi
Louise Taylor	1988-1990	India Desk Officer, Washington, DC
R. Grant Smith	1988-1991	Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi
Lawrence Cohen	1989-1991	Political/Economic Consul, Madras
William Clark, Jr.	1989-1992	Ambassador, India
Ernestine S. Heck	1990-1993	Consul General, Madras
Charles A. Mast	1990-1994	Consul General, Bombay
Stephen F. Dachi	1991-1994	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi
Frank G. Wisner	1994-1997	Ambassador, India
E. Ashley Wills	1995-1997 1997-2000	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, New Delhi Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi
Wayne Leininger	1996-1999	Consul General, New Delhi
Janey Dea Cole	1996-1999	Branch Public Affairs Officer, Calcutta

	1999	Temporary Duty, Nuclear Disarmament Conference, New Delhi
Alice A. Dress	1997-2000	Economic Counselor, New Delhi
G. Eugene Martin	1999-2000	Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing, China
Dean Rust	1999-2005	Director, Nuclear Proliferation Bureau, Washington, DC
Albert A. Thibault, Jr.	2000-2003	Deputy Chief of Mission, New Delhi

DON CARROLL BLISS, JR
Assistant Trade Officer
Bombay (1924-1926)

Ambassador Bliss was born in Michigan and educated at Dartmouth College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1923, specializing primarily in the Commercial and Economic fields. During his long and distinguished career, the Ambassador served in Tokyo, Bombay, Batavia, Alexandria, Singapore, Prague, Bangkok, Athens, Cairo, Paris, Calcutta, London, Ottawa and Addis Ababa, where he was U.S. Ambassador from 1957 to 1960.

BLISS: When you arrived at a new post fifty years ago, this time in January of 1925, this time in Bombay, you took a room in the best hotel, this time in the Taj Mahal, and then asked everyone you met how and where to settle in for the duration. The hotel wasn't bad if you liked Victorian mahogany, chintz and rattan, pink gins and chota pegs, Mulligatawny soup and lamb curry, but it was rather expensive for a junior officer and I kept on asking.

In due course I put the question to a couple of young Americans who shared a flat on the Cooperage, only ten minutes on foot from the hotel, twenty or so from the office, and very soon they invited me to dinner. It was a matter of mutual inspection as we sat on the verandah in the cool of the evening, and next day John took the plunge. Would I like to join them in a three-man bachelor mess, share and share alike? I would indeed, and promptly checked out of the Taj.

My two mess-mates, I soon learned, were juniors in the Bombay office of American Express, that combination of travel agent and banker which was busily seducing American and other tourists away from Thos. Cook. John was of Irish extraction, quiet-spoken for one of his race but far from humorless. He was not a big man physically but our senior by some years and consequently our leader in most things. (He ended up a Vice President of the company.) His mess-mate was a tall, sallow, rather colorless Virginian christened F. Glasgow Clark. He was so proud of his middle name and his relationship to novelist Ellen Glasgow that we perversely called his "Oscar" for no other reason than that. Oscar kept the books and managed the household, his only weakness being a passion for banana ice-cream produced in the kitchen.

Almost every night, it seemed, we had banana ice-cream for dessert, but when John or I protested, suggesting mango ice-cream for a change, Oscar would instantly put us out of countenance. If anyone didn't like banana ice-cream he could manage the house himself; Oscar would be happy to turn over his stewardship.

In those days every household maintained in India by the master race was awash with servants. Each of us had a "bearer" to tidy his room, shine his shoes, keep his clothes in order, draw his bath, hold his shirt for him, help him into his pants and shoes, accompany him on his travels. My bearer was a sturdy dark-skinned man from Goa, recruited by asking the others to find one for me and hired because his chits (references) were good. He had been trained by British officers who found him invaluable at home and on hunting trips. His name was George, he said.

At least one of the three bearers was always available to wait at table, bring drinks, dump ashtrays, run errands, or do anything else required of him at any time of day or night. They slept somewhere, perhaps on the kitchen floor like the servants who guarded master or mistress in the hotel by sleeping across the door-still on a mat in the corridor. The cook did the marketing in the bazaar, returning home in a loaded rickshaw, a cake of ice slung from the axle. He furnished Oscar with a weirdly spelled account of his expenditures, by immemorial custom withholding is traditional commission of one anna in the rupee. (There are 16 annas in the rupee.) He was assisted by an apprentice who paid him for the privilege and would be a cook himself one day. A sweeper and a *mali* (gardener) were also on the roster, although only Oscar ever saw them. The sweeper scrubbed, swept and polished during the day and the *mali* kept us supplied with fresh flowers, never mind where he got them. Finally the *dhobi* came to take away a mountain of soiled white drill suits, personal linen and household linen, all returned in a day or two clean, bleached in the sun, and carefully ironed.

It was a simply but adequately furnished two-bedroom flat, the dining-room converted into a third bedroom for me, and we ate in the drawing-room. Double doors opened on a deep verandah and that was where we spent most of our time at home. The place was quite airy with fresh breezes off the sea and we didn't suffer too much from the heat. We slept under mosquito-nets, of course, and in the evening a spiral of green Japanese punk burning under one's chair also discouraged mosquitoes, but not completely. In the end we all got malaria, mosquito-born from the street. We never got dysentery, however; Oscar insisted that all raw fruits and vegetables be soaked for fifteen minutes in the "red water" of mercurochrome tablet. If any of us got dysentery the cook would be fired.

Our verandah faced the west, overlooking the dusty park known as the Cooperage. Dotted with coconut palms and clumps of shrubbery, the park boasted a bandstand where crowds of natives gathered for weekly concerts provided by the Municipality, and beyond a line of palms Malabar Hill rose above the waters of the Back Bay. From a distance Malabar was a mass of foliage through which peeped the white facades and red tile roofs of Lord Brabourne's Government House and the spacious villas of native potentates and wealthy merchants. Just perceptible were the Towers of Silence where the Parsees, unwilling to defile earth or water or fire, exposed their dead to the vultures perched on the encircling wall, waiting for the next litter-borne corpse followed to the door by silent white-clad mourners. Inside, priests split skulls and broke arm and

leg bones to facilitate the cleansing process; any bits of bone the vultures left were cast down a deep well.

Malabar Hill was also the scene of a crime which caused a great scandal and provided the Times of India with material for many a column as the story unfolded. To begin with, a Bombay businessman had been waylaid and murdered as he drove along the broad highway slanting up the hill. The attackers sought to escape in a motorcar but were soon apprehended by the police; there were eye-witnesses and the fate of the criminals was sealed. There was more to it than that, however. The murderers were identified as retainers of the Maharajah of Indore and it soon became clear that their lord and master had sent them to mete out princely justice on a man who had abducted a girl from the royal harem and was living with her in Bombay City. Under British law the Maharajah was just as guilty of murder as his henchmen, but the police couldn't touch him, the hereditary ruler of a princely state, completely independent of the British Raj and even entitled to a 19-gun salute from the armed forces. In Indore his power was absolute; he was above any law but his own whim. A crime committed on territory subject to British law and British notions of justice was, however, something else again. Punishment was clearly due, but how to enforce it was the problem, and controversy raged for weeks. The issue was finally resolved when Indore was summoned, before the Council of Princes, tried and found guilty by his peers and required by them to abdicate.

It was unthinkable that a young man living in Bombay didn't belong to at least one club. The stuffy old Bombay Club was out of the question but an American junior officer could belong to the Gymkhana; it welcomed all young white males except "counter-jumpers" employed in retail establishments. The Gymkhana occupied an open space of green turf in the heart of the European section; one leg of the all-India cricket tournament was staged there, as well as an annual "gymkhana" of tent-pegging, jousting at the ring and other equestrian sporting events. Its shady verandah was a good place to meet for *tiffin* (lunch or light meal) or to congregate with friends in the evening before going on to dinner.

The Bombay Yacht Club was more select, a haven for sailors and oarsmen, and its terrace looking out over the waters of the harbor was a delightful place on which to linger with a gimlet, that pleasing concoction of gin and Rose's lime juice. Once upon a time, according to well-established legend, the Viceroy of India, down from New Delhi, repaired to the Yacht Club with a local maharajah to sit on that terrace and was promptly accosted by the club secretary. It was a strict rule, the secretary said, that no person of color could enter the club's premises except in the capacity of servant. As a result Lord Willingdon recruited a group of wealthy Parsees, Hindus and Moslems to organize the Willingdon Club, a dream of a country club on the edge of town, complete with golf course, tennis courts, swimming pool., and what have you, centered on a marble pavilion where the best food and drink in all India were to be had. Completely free of racial prejudice, the Club even admitted white members who could afford it. For us it was a treat to be invited to the Willingdon Club for a dinner-dance.

We were by no means wholly dependent on clubs for our social life, however. As is often the case with foreigners in a large community we tended to clot into a social group, ours being mostly but not exclusively American, and the Cooperage mess was part of it. Twenty-five or thirty of us were constantly in each other's company in a shifting pattern of dinners for eight and

two tables of bridge, picnics at Juhu Beach, tea-dances at the Taj Mahal, Saturday afternoons at the magnificent Bombay race course. We were all in our twenties, bachelors and young married couples, not a single girl in the lot.

Most of the men in our self-centered little social group were the Bombay representatives of American companies, responsible for developing business in western India, and they were often away on trips of some duration. This left footloose young wives, several of them at any given time, ready and willing to be amused. In the course of human events each such abandoned wife was often seen with a particular bachelor at dances or dinner parties and this kind of pairing-off was an understood thing. The husbands seemed reconciled, perhaps out of necessity, and for the most part there was no great harm in it; when her man returned the wife would usually be telling him all.

But not necessarily. There was a story around that young Terry dropped in for a drink with Doris and in the drawing-room was surprised to find her husband unexpectedly back in town; on the table beside him lay the automatic he usually carried with him on his trips upcountry. Terry turned and fled incontinent. Guilty conscience, the tongue-waggers concluded. And there was the time when John and his boss's wife strolled into the dark from a dance at the Willingdon Club. The lady did not return and when John came into the light it was seen that the knees of his white trousers bore fresh green grass stains. This phenomenon was studiously ignored by all, including John, but he sat down rather quickly and soon went home. Nothing was ever said about this, in the mess or anywhere else.

Soon thereafter, perhaps because of this, the Cooperage mess joined the sartorial revolution which was developing. We in Bombay had scorned for some time the long-established Calcutta fashion in evening dress, slavishly copied in other cities, which combined white drill trousers with a black alpaca jacket. We thought it unattractive and impractical, especially because white drill trousers are instantly wrinkled and soon soiled, while alpaca jackets seemed more appropriate for office than evening wear. We therefore reversed the order, topping our black tropical-weight trousers with white sharkskin jackets. This was such an improvement that the new fashion caught on quickly and soon spread even to Calcutta.

The Cooperage cavaliers also developed for themselves what we called the "chit system" to mitigate the shortage of feminine society. We were particularly well equipped for this, I with colleagues at posts along the China Coast and in the Indies, the American Express boys with a far-flung network for trapping tourists. When an attractive young lady entered the system anywhere she would be picked up by one of the lads, suitably entertained, and assured that she would be well looked after at her next port of call. Thus a chit would arrive in Bombay giving the necessary particulars and we would reciprocate with similar chits covering eastbound travelers. It worked like a charm and helped to keep everyone happy.

Then came a bonanza to put all this in the shade. The Denishawn dance company arrived from California for an engagement in Bombay; they ended by touring India for three months. Until then we hadn't realized how starved for theater we were. An Italian opera company toured India annually, a magician in Chinese dress came to put on a one-man show, the Amateur Dramatic Society struggled through an occasional polite comedy, and that was literally all the theater we

had, other than the aptly named “flicks” peddled by Hollywood. Now there was something we Americans could be proud of, and we were all stage-struck in varying degrees.

Ruth St. Denis, we came to understand, was an Irish girl from Hoboken who had become one of the pioneers of modern dance, breaking new ground as dancer and choreographer. Some years before she had teamed up with Ted Shawn – they were now married – to organize a dance group in California. Martha Graham had joined them after her early experience as a Spanish dancer in the “Follies” but soon left to embark on her own dazzling career. There was no lack of talent still in the company, however; Charles Weidman and Doris Humphrey were there and would later become stars in their own right, while Ted would end up with his young men at Jacob’s Pillow after path retired. For us just then the important thing was the arrival in our midst of a dozen lovely, talented, well-mannered young things. One and all they adored “Miss Ruth,” they were dedicated to their art, and they worked very, very hard. Not too much time for play, therefore, and anyway June Rhodes, the little blonde dynamo who functioned as general manager, kept a careful eye on the girls. She fended off prowlers, but for some reason had a soft spot for By Wrigley and me; we were privileged to go backstage at will and we watched many a performance from the wings. It was also acceptable to take a girl to a tea-dance if there were no rehearsals, organize a swim and picnic at Juhu Beach, see her to the hotel after the show without too much loitering on the way. We were assiduous with flowers and even more practical help, as on the occasion in New Delhi when the company arrived late from Madras after a hot and dusty train journey. Only an hour to curtain-time and the show must go on. So By and I dashed to the Cecil Hotel to commandeer two waiters with cold drinks and enormous trays of sandwiches; the girls were near to tears with gratitude.

The Denishawn repertoire was eclectic, including such contrasting numbers as a lively country dance in which the youngsters pranced joyously, or Ruth alone on the stage floating to the melody of the Liebestraum waltz, or Ted displaying his muscles as a living statue or creating the illusion of a gold-crowned, many-armed Siva. For this tour Ruth had devised a number of Indian dances and a knowledgeable Indian woman told us that every movement, every pose, every gesture was an accurate rendition of a fragment borrowed from the sacred dances presented in South Indian temples. The most famous of these for us was the “Dance of the Black and Gold Sari” in which Ruth came on the stage to a tinkling little tune, bearing on her arms a rolled-up black and gold sari; kneeling front center she bowed to the audience in a deep salaam, then rose and with graceful little dance steps unrolled the sari, twisting it around her hips and tucking in the folds with clever fingers, exactly as an Indian woman does when dressing. When she reached the climax and brought the end of the sari over her head the Indian audience burst into spontaneous applause and the galleries shrieked and whistled, demanding an encore. She never did that little dance without being compelled to repeat it three times.

When the company came back to Bombay for its last repeat engagement we gave them all a party, presenting parodies of their program to the extent feasible. Wrigley, in black-face and union suit dyed black, posed on a box as a living statue while Peggy Wills played soulful music on the piano. But when she broke into an Irish jig he hopped down and did a creditable soft-shoe dance as the youngsters giggled and Ted applauded with a strained smile. It was John who brought the house down with the “Dance of the Red and White Sari.” Dressed in his underwear he came on our improvised stage clasping a roll of cheap bazaar cottons stitched end to end and

made a spectacular entrance when, being a little drunk, he tripped and fell flat on his face. He picked himself up, and with Peggy vamping the little tune John proceeded with his dance, winding yards and yards of cloth around himself, getting thoroughly entangled, and finally collapsing in a heap amid shrieks of laughter from the whole company, not least from Ruth herself.

Life for bachelors in Bombay was not all fun and games, of course. Most of our days we labored in offices to earn our modest salaries in a manner no better and no worse than anywhere else. For many of us, however, this was not all and from time to time we had to go on the road to the cities of western India regarded as Bombay territory, to great cities like Cawnpore, Lucknow, Lahore, Delhi and Agra, or to smaller centers in between. For a young man this was often exciting; after his business was done he could visit all the wonderful places described in tourist guides. There was a price to pay, however. Distances were vast, travel was necessarily by rail, and that meant acute discomfort.

The British were justifiably proud of the extensive railway network they had constructed in the nineteenth century, and indeed it had contributed greatly to the economic development of India, but in 1925 its rolling-stock, apparently designed in the days of a young Queen Victoria, was not only obsolescent, it was worn out. Locomotives belched soft-coal smoke and cinders, the third-class carriages jam-packed with natives were still much as described by Kipling, while the sleeping-cars for the elite were divided into compartments accessible only from a station platform. To get a meal passengers had to climb out during a stop at a way-station, push through the milling crowd on the platform, and climb aboard the dining-car, returning at the next stop by the same route in reverse. Fortunately the stops were long, twenty minutes or so, and there was no need to hurry.

Arrayed for travel in khaki shirt and shorts topped by the khaki pith helmet characteristic of Bombay (in Calcutta they were white) I would arrive at Central Station with George shepherding the baggage coolies to a four-berth compartment. The baggage included a bedding-roll hired from American Express containing a thin mattress, a blanket, dingy sheets and a limp pillow, a cotton towel or two. George would make up my bed on one of the berths and then withdraw with his own little bundle to a cramped cubicle for servants at one end of the car, whence he would emerge whenever the train stopped, to loiter within call on the station platform. He was there to fetch from the dining-car cold drinks or hot water for my ablutions, to pack and unpack the bedding-roll, to guard my possessions when I was away in the dining-car. No one travelled without a bearer.

The so-called berths were really hard benches upholstered in a kind of black imitation leather, one above another on each side of the compartment, and the uppers could be hauled up out of the way. A small tap yielded tepid drinking water next to a door leading to a minuscule wash-room and toilet. Open windows were screened, shades could be pulled down on the sunny side, and electric fans in the corners of the ceiling could be turned on to stir the air. They also stirred the dust and cinders that leaked through rattling doors and windows and swirled across the linoleum floor. In hot weather, it was said, one could close the windows, place a cake of ice in a tin tub on the floor and direct the fans on it. That was the theory anyway; something to think about.

If a man had a compartment to himself he was lucky, or perhaps he had bribed, the guard to ticket it as full. Otherwise the discomfort increased in geometric ratio as additional passengers intruded with their baggage and sleep might be disturbed in the middle of the night when a passenger sought to board the train at an upcountry station and the guard and he raced along the cars, banging on doors and demanding entrance. A generous man would open up; a selfish one would keep quiet behind his locked door and wait for them to go away.

With all this in mind I was not looking forward to my next trip to Delhi when an exciting alternative presented itself. Sitting at table in the Gymkhana we were listening to Larry Kent's exuberant account of his plans for a publicity stunt to put his Graham-Paige automobiles on the map in India. He was going to stage a non-stop run from Bombay to Delhi, a thousand miles away, something no one had ever done before. The roads would be primitive, of course, but passable in dry weather and the rains were months away; most of the rivers to be crossed were unbridged but there were ferries; he knew where he could get petrol and oil; he had mapped the most practicable route. To make the trip non-stop, he said, would require three drivers to take it in turns, say in two-hour shifts, since the going might be rough, and two men would be functioning while the third could sleep. How about it? Would any of us like to make the trip with him? The big redhead's enthusiasm was contagious and two of us volunteered forthwith. Pres Wills was manager of Dupont's office in Bombay and could do as he liked. As an American official I was in a more vulnerable position. What would Washington say? What would the local firms representing Ford or General Motors have to say about any activity on my part for the benefit of a competitor? It was agreed, therefore, that my participation would be strictly anonymous and above all that my name would not be used in any publicity.

The sun was setting in a cloudless sky beyond Malabar Hill as we assembled on the Cooperage for this venture into the unknown. We were all in khaki traveling kit and everything else was in the baggage sent ahead by rail with George and the other bearers to wait for us in the Cecil Hotel. We had grease to protect our faces from windburn and goggles to protect our eyes from the glare of the sun. There was food and drink, for we would not be stopping for meals; if the car came to a standstill for any reason the motor would still be ticking over and we could claim that this run was non-stop. Larry was at the wheel for take-off, with Pres beside him to operate the spotlight. He noted the time, raced the engine, and we were off!

Memories of the next day and a half are blurred. Pres and I never knew where we were, since Larry did the navigating, and for us, whether driving or operating the spotlight or trying to sleep in the back seat, our every faculty was concentrated on the road, and only the road, as we hurtled through a pitch-black night or under a blazing sun. We swept through towns and were scarcely aware of them; although we were in open country most of the time we have recollection of the fields, the trees, the hills that must have been there. What we do remember is the road, narrow, twisting, pot-holed, sometimes rocky, surfaced only by a layer of fine white dust. Glancing back we could mark our trail by the continuous band of white thrown up by flying wheels, a cloud of dust so fine that it hung in the air for minutes before drifting away. Fortunately there was almost no motor traffic – it would have been impossible to overtake another vehicle and tunnel past in an atmosphere more impenetrable than the densest fog. Twice we met motorcars coming the other way; then it was necessary to slow down, guess at the way ahead, and plunge blindly into a blank whiteness.

There were breaks when the road ended abruptly on the bank of a river and we had to stop while the motor idled. A steep earthen ramp would lead down to the water's edge and to the ferry, hastily assembled for this exceptional burden by laying planks across two boats. With the Graham-Paige precariously aboard, this contraption would be poled and paddled to the farther bank and another earthen ramp. Here we also could refuel and roar away with a loss of no more than half an hour in running time.

Concentration on the road of course encompassed everything on it. During the first night there was little traffic other than an occasional bullock-cart plodding through the darkness, its driver asleep on a pile of grain sacks or bales of cotton. The spotlight picked it up in good season and then it was up to the driver to slip by as quickly as possible before a panic-stricken bullock could veer across the road. Come dawn the traffic between villages came to life and the driver had to be constantly alert to avoid disaster as the car wove its way in a plume of dust between bullock-carts, handcarts, loose cattle and groups of pedestrians, or waded through an occasional flock of sheep. Special care was needed when passing a string of camels because camels can kick sideways. And so all day under the blazing sun we followed the relentless road.

During our second night we were traversing wild country through one or another of the native states in the Central Provinces. The way was particularly rough and tortuous and the spotlight was picking up the glowing eyes of wild animals on or beside the road. Most of them – jackals, antelopes, rabbits, civet cats – skipped nimbly out of the way, but at one moment I was confronted by the bulk of an enormous boar planted in the road, his white tusks gleaming, his little red eyes glaring. To hit him would have been catastrophe for us, even if he paid with his life; fortunately he lumbered just enough to one side as the car swerved past and we all gasped in relief.

Well into the small hours of that second night my eyes suddenly gave out. At one moment I was peering ahead along a beam of light, at the next there was complete blackness. Blindly I stopped the car in the middle of the road. "Sorry," I said, "I can't see. Somebody else will have to drive for a while." Larry took me by the arm. "Into the back with you," he ordered, "and stay quiet until you have had a rest." He took the wheel and we started off again while I lay there in a semi-stupor. (The trouble was that I had been unable to accommodate the glasses I normally wore behind the goggles that were so essential during the day and the result was severe eye-strain.) When I came to I could see again and the morning light revealed the trees and fields of the tidy countryside surrounding Delhi. Larry was driving; he insisted on being the man at the wheel for the triumphant climax to our adventure.

As we climbed wearily up the steps into the Cecil Hotel our servants were there to greet us, all broad grins, but the Anglo-Indian clerk at the desk was not impressed. "Sorry, sir," he said to Larry while Pres and I drooped against the wall, "all space in the hotel has been booked and we can't give you rooms. We have pitched some tents on the grounds, however, and we can take care of you there." Larry expostulated; we had made reservations from Bombay, we had motored all the way and just arrived, we desperately needed food and baths and sleep. The clerk was adamant; tents or nothing.

Then my old friend Miss Anna arrived on the scene like an angel from Heaven. She was manager of the family-owned Cecil Hotel, that comfortable old-fashioned hostelry which had ministered to travelers since the turn of the century. She was also a warm-hearted and perceptive woman; she took one look at me leaning against the wall, did a double-take, and issued brisk orders. We were to have rooms immediately, no matter who had to be bumped into a tent; this was an emergency and it had to be dealt with.

George promptly disappeared with the baggage and I was led upstairs to a comfortable room. In a mirror I caught sight of my face and realized what had prompted Miss Anna's reaction. Layers of dust and grease formed a mask pierced by two bright scarlet holes, a truly horrendous sight. Now George arrived through the back door, herding a gaggle of hotel servants with a tin tub and pails of hot water, and I was in his hands again. Bathed and fed, I was dropping off to sleep almost before I could reach the bed. George woke me at noon and I went down for lunch, only to fall into bed again and sleep until dinner-time.

Drinking their pink gins in the bar the three adventurers glowed with self-satisfaction. Larry was ebullient; he had been busy with reporters and photographers and was getting all the publicity he could want. The Graham-Paige, according to the press, had travelled non-stop from Bombay, its engine ticking over as sweetly in Delhi as when it had started; the air in its tires was sea-air; that marvelous American vehicle had covered a thousand miles cross-country in a day and a half! In all India there had never been anything like it. (Not for long, of course; records are made to be broken.)

Back home the Cooperage mess was soon in trouble as one after another we came down with malaria. In retrospect we know that it came from the massed listeners around the bandstand, a short hop away for a mosquito when the wind was in the west. In such a crowd there was bound to be a sizeable number of natives carrying the malaria parasite in their blood; they had no protection at all from insect bites and even our defenses were sketchy at best. We had given no thought to this and boasted that we could ward off malaria with the help of enough Scotch and soda when we sat on the verandah before and after dinner.

As it happened I was the first victim. Every Thursday at exactly four o'clock in the afternoon I would suffer a violent chill, shivering uncontrollably and obviously through with the office for the rest of the day. By the time I got home to a quinine tablet the fever was running high and when it broke I was pouring sweat, my bed so soaked that the sheets had to be changed. In the morning I was back to normal but drained of energy and barely able to stagger back to work.

This went on for some weeks until Kitty Bossi heard about it and insisted that I see a doctor, an Italian specialist on malaria. Doctor Vicente came, listened to my story, and, fingered my belly. Sure enough my spleen was enlarged and I had malaria, he said, but I wasn't really coping with it. When an attack was checked by quinine, he explained, the organisms feeding on the blood simply turned into spores which lodged in the spleen. Hence the enlargement of that organ, a sure sign of malaria. (And that was why British soldiers and policemen were warned not to hit natives in the belly, since the result was often a fatally ruptured spleen.) In due course the spores would erupt into another generation of parasites in an endless cycle. To get rid of my malaria, he insisted, I would have to eliminate every last spore, including those that remained in hiding, and

that meant fifteen grains of quinine every day for sixty days. For the next two months, therefore, I went about with ringing ears, partly deaf and a bit fuzzy in the head, but it worked. In the end I was grateful to the good doctor, who later died of malaria himself.

Oscar was next, but he couldn't face the music and fled the country. Then John began to complain of stubborn constipation and turned to me for help. In view of my experience with malaria I was now regarded in the mess as a medical authority and for some time I had been dispensing home remedies with some success and only one near-catastrophe. That was the time Harry Russell said he couldn't sleep and I got some veronal tablets from the chemist. Uninformed as to veronal's potency I was nevertheless cautious enough to give him only half a tablet; when he fell sound asleep in the middle of dinner and had to be carried to bed. I was really scared and flushed the rest of those tablets down the drain. In John's case he responded to none of our treatments, not even to a glycerin enema, and he finally went to the company doctor, who thought to take a blood test. And there it was! Malaria. There are several types of malaria, we were told, including my weekly bouts, the "quartan agues" of medieval Europe (an attack every four days), and John's mysterious paralysis. So American Express transferred him to Ceylon and a convalescence at Nuwara Eliya, where he enjoyed cool mountain air and boasted of fresh strawberries for breakfast.

The departure of our leader was the end of the line for the Cooperage mess, and as we went our several ways I moved in with a young American couple as star boarder, complete with the wardrobe trunk and George. At the same time my way of life changed completely; reversing biological processes the butterfly became a grub immured in its cocoon. Instead of flitting about town I spent my evenings and my weekends hard at work on a project which absorbed my energies and commanded all my attention seven days a week for months on end.

It all started over lunch with George Shantz, who had been trading in gold and silver on the Bombay bullion market on behalf of Irvine Trust. The bank had finally tired of this, George said, and he was going home, but he thought I might be interested in one of his activities. For some time he had been inconspicuously helping one of the leading firms in the market to prepare its weekly published reports and by doing so he had gained invaluable insights into the operations of the native traders whose activities created an important, complex and highly speculative market. He knew that one of my duties was to prepare reports for Washington on financial activities in Bombay (he was one of my sources) and he felt that if I took on this job it would pay off handsomely for me.

In due course, therefore, George took me to meet Maneklal Premchand, senior partner in Premchand, Roychand & Sons, in his solidly paneled office in Apollo Street, not far from the new building of the Bombay Bullion Exchange. From the beginning Maneklal impressed me favorably. Medium in height and weight he had no outstanding physical characteristics, but his Indian dress or London suitings were equally impeccable, his eyes intelligently alert under a brush of graying hair, his facial expression assured but calm and amiable, his speech educated, direct and always to the point. We became friends on the spot and eventually he would even eat his lunch in my presence, although as a Jain, the strictest of Hindu sects, he should have turned his back lest my shadow pollute his food. That food, incidentally, consisted of a saucer of parched grain.

After not too much palaver we came to a clear understanding. What Maneklal wanted was someone to prepare every week the text of the printed market reports he distributed, the statistical work to be done by his clerks, the text to be written in lucid English by someone with a background in economics. He soon recognized that this new young man would do just as well as Shantz had done. He also recognized that such an arrangement presented problems for me as an American official and that the Washington bureaucracy might take a dim view of it, whether or not it became public knowledge.

My collaboration would therefore have to remain a dead secret. The question of compensation was not even mentioned, it being understood that the advantage for me, as it had been for George, would be the information I acquired about what went on behind the scenes in the financial markets in Bombay: the bullion market, the stock exchange, the money market, banking operations, and anything else relevant for my purposes. Every Friday just before noon I would therefore repair to Maneklal's office and for an hour or so we would discuss the happenings of the past week, deciding what should go into the published market report, the text of which was delivered on Monday morning in shape for the printer. (Some developments would be discreetly ignored, as when His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad dipped into his fabulous treasure and broke an imminent corner on the silver market by sending a freight car floored with silver bars over his Guaranteed State Railway for spot deliveries in Bombay.)

The financial reporting from Bombay soon displayed an unprecedented sophistication which readers in Washington, unaware of what lay behind it, either took for granted or, if they happened to notice it, doubtless attributed to the competence of the reporting officer. As for him, he soon became fascinated with the lore of the bullion market and went on to undertake extensive research into the whole subject, poring over official publications and bombarding Maneklal with questions. Bombay was then the center of Indian trade in precious metals and one of the great bullion markets of the world, a highly developed complex involving banks, brokers, importers, wholesalers and retailers, organized around the Bombay Bullion Exchange, an association of the principal native dealers.

India, this research soon revealed, was a country which traditionally enjoyed a favorable balance of merchandise trade as a heavy exporter of cotton, jute, rice, wheat, oilseeds, shellac, mica and other natural products, while it was unique among nations in settling that balance mostly by imports of silver ingots, gold ingots, sovereigns or eagles, as it had done for generations. In the immediate post-war years after 1918 India was absorbing annually some 6,000,000 ounces of gold and 90,000,000 ounces of silver, 40 percent of the world's gold production and 30 percent of its silver. Unhappily for India, however, wealth in this form produced little of real value. The whole history and tradition of the people, the economic and social organization of the country and its primitive financial system induced a pervasive habit of hoarding gold and silver, whether as bullion stored unproductively in the strong rooms of princes or wealthy merchants or as ornaments adorning the wives and daughters of farmers after crops had been harvested, later to be sold at a loss when it came time to buy seed for the next crop.

All of this had many ramifications, and it took six months of hard labor to sort it all out and complete a massive report on "The Bombay Bullion Market" which was eventually published in

Washington, but that is another story and here we are dealing only with matters which never reached the files.

Such a one is the story of Premchand Roychand's annual report for 1925. Maneklal and I wanted it to be more than the usual routine summary and he agreed enthusiastically to include a discussion of what we called "the fundamental problem of India's wasted resources." That problem we identified as being "in spite of the fact that the wealth of the world for many decades has been poured into India's lap in the form of gold and silver, the standard of living of the great mass of the population is distressingly low, the industrial development of the country is obviously backward, and a large proportion of its vast natural resources is as yet practically untouched. The root cause of these conditions," we argued, "lies in the rudimentary character of the country's credit system. The life-blood of Western civilization is credit and its genesis is the accumulation of capital. Without these India can never develop to the extent of which she is capable. With a pitifully inadequate banking system, with savings jealously hoarded in the form of unproductive metals, with no funds available for the development of industrial enterprise, India will always be a backward nation unless her people can be educated to see the folly of their present practices." For obvious reasons the twin evils of cow worship and over-population were not mentioned in the report, which went on to say: "If India's gold and silver holdings were invested we would be receiving from the rest of the world, not gold and silver, which experience has proved provide little in the way of comfort or improved standard of living to the Indian people, but rather the manufactured goods, the foodstuffs, the services of the other nations – in other words, real wealth."

This line of thought provoked admiring editorials from Bombay's Times of India and Calcutta's financial journal Capital. It also attracted attention in the Bombay financial community and British bankers, convinced that a "native" could never produce anything like that, besieged Maneklal with queries as to the authorship of the report. He could not honestly maintain that it was all his own work, but he kept faith with me and gave inquirers no satisfaction. One of the local bankers finally pronounced judgment: "Only an Englishman could have written such an economically sound résumé."

JOHN M. STEEVES
Office of War Information
New Delhi (1927-1942)

Office of War Information
New Delhi (1948-1950)

Ambassador John M. Steeves served in the China/Burma/India theater during World War II in the Office of War Information. His Foreign Service career included positions in New Delhi, Tokyo, Djakarta, Naha, Kabul, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Thomas Stern on March 27, 1991

Q: While you were in India -- I have you there from 1927 to 1942 -- did you have any contact with the Foreign Service, either the embassy or our consulates?

STEEVES: Yes, I did. Like any citizen that is interested in his country I knew the people of the time in the consulate general in Bombay, but only slightly. During the war when the special representative of the President was established in Delhi, I had more of an acquaintance with him. The name of that representative has just slipped my mind. But since India at that time was still part of the British Empire, he could not be given diplomatic accreditation. The President's Personal Representative was a designation used where such a situation existed. So that was what he was called during the Roosevelt administration. Hazleton, was one of his deputies.

Q: Here you were knowledgeable in the politics and social movements in India during the war; did the United States seem to be following a reasonable course in our military dealing with India or was it just pursuing the war and didn't there seem to be much sense to it?

STEEVES: You mean when our armed services began to come into the theater? Yes, I had a very good impression of that and they made a very fine impression. The army in general, which was the branch of the service that came to India on there way up to the Combat Headquarters in Assam on the Burma border. General Sultan was the C.O. in New Delhi. They were very well thought of in that GHQ area in New Delhi. I think they conducted themselves extremely well. The same thing was true when we got up to the front. The facts of the case are that our magnanimity and reputation for generosity kind of made us suckers at times. But the Americans got along extremely well. At times we were the objects of a little jealousy because, quite naturally, the British were not very popular with their colonial subjects. It was rather humiliating at times when the British personnel used to trade things (like their good Scotch whiskey) to us in order to get some of the goodies unknown to them from American stores.

Q: You came into the predecessor of what is now the United States Information Service.

STEEVES: That's right.

Q: In what year was that, 1945?

STEEVES: Yes, late 1945. The transfer from the Wartime Agency was accomplished piecemeal. It was right out of the middle of the Office of War Information. This logically took the place of the office in the Department that had handled News and Information.

Q: Office of War Information at one time?.

STEEVES: Yes, Office of War Information from which the News Agency was first lifted. Then they asked us to interest ourselves in the office of cultural affairs. This Office of Cultural Affairs was housed in a little, beat- up building across from the old State in an old house (since torn down) on eighteenth street. It was a flea- bitten place. But those were the little roots that we were attached to before we became a full blown US Information and Cultural Service. Some of us therefore were in at the creation of the new agency when it was first organized under the very colorful Bill Benton of the well-known business of Benton and Bowles.

Q: Benton and Bowles was an advertising firm. The largest advertising firm in the United States.

STEEVES: The new Office of Information and Culture (USIS) blossomed rapidly to a pretty fulsome operation. Not altogether to the glee of the old Foreign Service in those days. But a group of us had the task of sitting down and drawing up the original charters and the organization that became the first full blown organization for the USIS. and we sure had our original fun. We had to adjust old rules, regulations, make exceptions to old time-honored procedure as we went. I hired the first 350 people for the Near East and Africa operation. That's the way it was in my division, it was the old AND. I was the chief. The first person I hired was a guy by the name of Ernie Fisk. He was a newspaper fellow who had been with OWI in Lyon France, during the war. A wonderful person who lives out in Ohio in Oberlin, now in retirement.

Q: When you were drawing this up I find it very interesting that you were working in Africa and the Near East, both areas colonial preserves of our allies. In the Near East there was an exception such as Saudi Arabia. But the rest had French, British or our troops dominating the area. What did you see as our goals at that time in those areas?

STEEVES: The goals were pretty clear. To help give the people of those emerging states, working for their independence and self expression, some concept of American institutions and values. We could see what was going to happen, although I don't think we had any concept of it happening quite as fast in Africa, for instance, as it did. We saw it happening in India and then in the Southeast Asian states. That area at that time was under a different division. But India, Burma and Ceylon were in my division, although it was called Near East and Africa -- NEA. I guess it was because we were attached for geographic reasons to the old NEA division that Loy Henderson was the head of for a while. Ray Hare, I think, was the head of the Near Eastern Bureau either after or before Loy Henderson. But anyway, that was where we found our attachment.

Q: Did you find yourself, after all, pushing democracy in all these places that were ready to explode, yet the European powers, particularly France and Britain, were not pushing for independence for these colonial areas?

Did you find that the geographic bureaus, particularly European Affairs, were saying, "Hey fellows, cool it, or be careful don't push this Democratic doctrine too fast?"

STEEVES: Yes, they did. They had a conservative view towards the world. The element from which the Foreign Service was taken those days had kind of ready ears for that kind of attitude.

Q: Are we talking about the Eastern establishment the ivy league, etc., from whence many of the Foreign Service establishment had been taken?

STEEVES: That's right. People from the wealthy homes of the United States. There was an inevitable movement towards Independence and Freedom, the Older Order didn't accept very happily. The old stable powers and forces found it very difficult to accept what was going to inevitably happen. I mention in my book that if you wanted to look at it from the standpoint of what was better economically for these countries, one would have to admit that most of them

were far better off in their colonial status. Their plea had been "we want to be free to make our own mistakes" and they sure made them. Burma, for instance, had been the shining light of the British Empire, became the tail end of everything. As a nation it lies in ruin. Rangoon, the capital, is a horrible hole. It had been a real shining light of what British administration could do. I think I make the observation somewhere that it will take them a hundred years to get back anywhere near what they were when they gained their independence and even then they will have to do it with our help.

Q: Didn't you feel that you were sort of "young Turks" sitting down in your areas promoting plans for the spread of democracy and that you almost looked upon the European Bureau as the adversary or not?

STEEVES: I didn't feel it so much. But we did feel a lack of appreciation of the problems of the post-colonial world outside of Europe that we had to deal with. In my area when talking about the Near East especially there was an expression used that was quite apt, "those European fellows are always putting their European foot into our Near Eastern mouth." It always irked us a little bit that all the instructions we were sending to Lebanon and Syria had to be cleared by the French desk before they went out. We thought it was none of their darned business! But of course we were wrong for it did impinge on their vital interests. We had a little bit of the same problem that lasted for years with the British. There were those on both sides of the Atlantic that were still very strong for the "British Empire" view..

Q: When you were discussing the British you referred to the "spats", mentality .You are referring to the type of foot gear worn by the more au fait British as characteristic of the British generation of that mind set, were you not?

STEEVES: Yes, and they couldn't quite cotton to this new idea. Thereby hangs a little anecdote. The columnist, Pearson came out with a report in his column one day in The Washington Post.

Q: This was Drew Pearson who was sort of a muckraking columnist?

STEEVES: The story stemmed from an episode in my office one day. Where he ever got a hold of it I don't know. But we were packing the kits for all the posts in our area. I was there helping the staff get these things together and as we were putting in copies of the Declaration of Independence, I said just as a kind of a joking passing remark while picking up one of the copies, and looking at it, "Boy you know this is pretty heady stuff to be sending out to these people, I wonder if this is more than they can digest." Drew Pearson got a hold of that from somebody and said that,- he named me by description pretty well-our basic doctrines on freedom were a little too strong to be spread around the world and we ought to be careful how we put them out. That is the way he interpreted it. I got called on the carpet for that.

Q: You have to watch what you are saying even in the packaging process! Now, there were two major developments happening in your area of concern: Indian Independence and the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel. We will come to the Indian one later, but, to turn to the next page, you went to India in 1948. 1948 was a big year for partitions. You said you went with Loy Henderson.

STEEVES: Yes, that is right. I went out via one of the most beautiful sea voyages I have ever had in my life. I got on the maiden voyage of the "Silver Plane" down in Brooklyn Basin and 42 days later landed in Bombay.

Q: Did you have the feeling at the time that Loy Henderson was sent to India because he was so sympathetic with the Arab world and the idea was to get him out of the picture?

STEEVES: Every move, of a senior officer you know, takes that into consideration. Sometimes sympathetically. When we are talking about sending people into senior positions we often say, "For heavens sake don't torture the guy by making him go there and carry out a policy that he really isn't very happy about." There could have been an element of that. Henderson was not well accepted by the Zionists. They had him targeted and as you know when they have their ways of influencing action. If that was there it was out of my sight . I didn't see it.

Q: You arrived in India and what was the situation at the time?

STEEVES: When we got to India, independence had been declared the year before. They had gone through the blood bath of the first few months of it. The awful scenes of the massacres and slaughter of innocent people by the train load when they were exchanging people, Muslims allegedly going north and Hindus coming south. There was a train load of Muslims passing through the native state of Patiala that were stopped at a station and the Sikhs systematically went through that train and murdered every single individual on it. Of course, coming the other direction, the same thing was likely to happen to Hindus going south.

Q: You were in charge of public affairs. What were your major objectives in your particular field and how did you find dealing with that?

STEEVES: We still tried to do everything we possibly could to give a realistic exposure of the American scene to the people of India, whether we did it through motion pictures, or through the release of information or cultural events or the running of a library. We had three very good libraries in India: one in Bombay, one in Delhi and another in Calcutta.

Q: How did you find dealing with the new Indian government?

STEEVES: We had excellent relations.

Q: Relations were good in that period?

STEEVES: Oh yes. For instance there came the event very soon after our arrival when we went to present our credentials to the New President of India. Ambassador Henderson was the first full blown American Ambassador there in the new India-and the Indians had no other understanding of pomp and ceremony, but to carry the ceremony out about like the British had done. Having been in India before and remembering some of the same affairs with the British; there were those same Sikh guards, with their long lances , high turbans, etc-so statuesque you could have stuck a lighted cigarette in their eye and they would not have blinked.

We got up to the Durbar Hall where after all of the dramatic ceremony before the great oaken doors would be swung open, to match the scene nothing less than seeing a armored knight on a white charger come out to announce the President would have been appropriate. But instead a little man leaning on a cane came out wearing a turban, a dhoti, and dark glasses. I couldn't help but remember the story that I had heard the day before ,which I shall tell you in a bit.

Q: This was Mahatma Gandhi?

STEEVES: No, this was Rajagopalachari -- the first President of India .He was a wonderful scholar, a truly great man, but still of the old- fashioned Orthodox Brahmin ways. He was very, strict in the observance of his Brahmin cast rules. I had heard this story the day before and knowing a good deal about India I believed it. In order to purify the food that came out of the great fancy kitchen downstairs he had to have the walls smeared with cow dung in order to purify it. When he came to Loy Henderson's house for a meal, which he finally agreed to do, he had to bring his own bearers along with his own utensils to stand behind his chair and serve it to him. He couldn't touch anything in the place.

Q: Could you explain how Loy Henderson operated in the embassy and how he dealt with the Indians, because he is one of the great figures of the Foreign Service and I would like your impression of his style?

STEEVES: As you know, Loy Henderson had no peers in his knowledge of protocol and procedure and policy and things of that nature. He was a wonderful gentleman and a good teacher to learn from and take instructions from. I can see him just sitting there going over your draft and saying, "Take this or that out, save superlative words of that nature for some really demanding moment." He was a good preceptor and disciplinarian when it came to that type of form. He was the same way when dealing with people in a very correct and proper way.

Now, having said that, his usefulness with all of that ability in dealing with leaders like Pandit Nehru was diminished a little bit by the fact that secretly he disliked and mistrusted Nehru. He disliked Nehru with a passion and didn't appreciate him but dealt with him very correctly. The day that Truman ordered American troops into Korea...

Q: June 1950?

STEEVES: Yes, President Truman sent instructions out to the Ambassador to go to the prime minister, P.M. Nehru, and see if you can get his permission to send an Indian contingent in the United Nations force into Korea. Loy Henderson, with all the experience he had had in Russia and elsewhere, made a remark I found a bit strange. What he said to me in the car going up there that day,(he had asked me to go up with him to see Nehru) was "Today is one of the proudest moments of my career." He would have rocked me back on my heels if he had said that when I was standing up. I figured out in thinking about it years later that he was so glad to be the messenger of that kind of a tough message to this Nehru, and to tell him what the great United States expected of him if he wanted to be a decent member of the world community. The Ambassador couldn't forget that after all that China had done when the Communists took over

the country, Nehru, in the early days of the independence of India-had been the first to recognize the brutal Communist regime. He had stabbed the poor Chinese in the back by throwing out the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador and was one of the first to invite in the Communist Chinese Ambassador.

Q: When Henderson was going up to ask Nehru to supply troops do you think he had any feeling that they would? .

STEEVES: No, and of course they really didn't. But I will tell you what they did do as a symbolic act. They sent over a very efficient military field medical unit, you know. They performed very well in Korea. So they were at least numbered among the nations that supported the United Nations effort in Korea.

Q: What do you think was behind Henderson's antipathy towards Nehru?

STEEVES: Well, Henderson was kind of a purest in the way he lived and thought of other people. He didn't want you to profess to be one thing and then turn out to be something else. Nehru to him was in a way a British country gentleman and then turned around and tried to be an Indian peasant in politics and the two didn't fit at all. One personality was always jarring against the other. For him to be almost kissing Gandhi's feet was next to ridiculous, almost comic opera to see him in this sycophantish way act around Gandhi.

You could see that where he really felt at home was in his tweeds with a shooting stick standing on the downs of England watching the foxes. That really was where he felt more at home. He was the fellow who had the reputation of writing a book that was looked upon by Lord Macaulay as one of the finest collection of British prose in the English literature. He was nobody's fool. Nehru was a very bright fellow.

Later we took Nehru to the United States. He acted as though he wasn't interested at all in going. He didn't look upon it as any great favor. His daughter, Indira, who we had to deal with later after Nehru was gone, carried on the same haughty attitude towards the United States.

The attitude was reciprocated. When Nehru invited us up to the Presidential Lodge -- it used to be called the Viceroy's House and is a real crown jewel of the British Empire in terms of the beautiful interior, a palatial place. The State Dining Room can seat between 100 and 150 people at one long table with a beautifully bedecked waiter standing behind every chair waiting to respond to your every wish. It was in that type of atmosphere when we went up for the State dinner welcoming the first American Ambassador to India that Mrs. Henderson picked up the silverware and wiped off the knife and said, "You can never tell what you get in these places." Here she was sitting along side of Nehru. Nehru, the perfectly trained country gentleman that he was, if he could have turned over and swatted her he would have. If looks could have killed her she would have been dead. Anyway he was too self-controlled to allow that to bother him. But that is another reason why the Indians and everybody else, including our staff, of course, too, disliked Mrs. Henderson. She was a real 'pain in the neck'.

Q: Well she is one of the great dragons in the Foreign Service wasn't she?

STEEVES: Oh, yes. She was terrible. I could fill rest of the tape with stories of Mrs. Henderson. She was awful.

Q: Was there anything else we should cover in New Delhi? We covered the Korean War and the arrival there. Was there any resistance on the part of the Indians to your efforts to talk about the United States?

STEEVES: No. We were welcomed everywhere. I had the best of reception for our libraries, our music, our efforts at promoting things American. When we were putting on our trade fair or any displays of that nature it went over very big in India.

JOHN WESLEY JONES
Junior Vice Consul
Calcutta (1932-1935)

Ambassador John Wesley Jones was born in Sioux City, Iowa in 1911. After graduating from George Washington University in 1930, he entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Mexico, India, Italy, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Libya and Peru. Ambassador Jones was interviewed by Horace Torbert in 1988.

Q: Now we were about to go to Calcutta, you said you were assigned to Calcutta.

JONES: Yes. I arrived in September at the Foreign Service School and, after 3 months went to Sioux City for Christmas, knowing that I had already been assigned to Calcutta. In early January 1932, I proceeded to New York, where I got one of the American Export Line ships to Alexandria, Egypt. In Alexandria the Consul there had received instructions to purchase a ticket for me to proceed on to Calcutta. He confessed to me later that he had misunderstood "the first available vessel" and had bought me a ticket on a German freighter rather than waiting for the Peninsular and Oriental steamship line which most passengers took from Alexandria to Bombay. So I had a very interesting trip as the only passenger on a German freighter through the Suez Canal. We stopped at Aden; our next stop was in Ceylon, at Columbo. Tommy Thompson -- Llewellyn Thompson, was the U.S. Vice Consul in Columbo then. And since the ship was in port there for three days he kindly showed me around Columbo and I had a very pleasant and agreeable stay.

And then the ship went on, the freighter went on, to Madras and there I met the Consular Officer in Madras and had two days there and finally arrived in Calcutta on the 22nd of February 1932. I think that I expended probably the maximum allowed by the Department in those days sailing to a new post, which was 45 days.

In Calcutta the Principal Officer was Arthur G. Frost and Gerald Keith was the Principal Vice Consul. Dorsey Fisher was there as a Vice Consul. And I think I was the Junior Vice Consul,

well I obviously was, when I arrived on the 22nd of February 1932. In Calcutta my job was double, number one, to issue visas to Indians wishing to visit or migrate to the United States. And, number two, the growing American colony in Calcutta required passport services. I stayed first at the Grand Hotel on Chowringhee and then eventually moved into a house with Fritz Jandrey and Russ Engdahl when they appeared as Vice Consuls in Calcutta.

Q: Fritz Jandrey and who else did you say?

JONES: Russ Engdahl, E-n-g-d-a-h-l.

We adopted the British custom of calling the house a chummary because there were many bachelors, principally English, in Calcutta in those days and they couldn't afford apartments by themselves, so they took houses. Our house was quite an elegant place, but it was still called a chummary. There were four of us by that time, including Wilson Flake, then an Assistant Trade Commissioner.

I spent three years in Calcutta and at the end of my three-year tour I either had to pay my own way home or wait until the Department decided to transfer me to another post. So on my salary I had saved up enough money to buy a ticket on a freighter from Calcutta to Manila. I bought a ticket on a Dutch freighter this time which took me around Southeast Asia en route to the Philippines. We stopped in Singapore where I first met Harrison Lewis, colleague of mine, same class; and then on to Hong Kong where Donald Dunham was the Vice Consul; and finally to the Philippines, where Bart Richards, former Assistant Trade Commissioners in Calcutta, was then stationed. After four or five days in the Philippines, I took an American passenger boat to San Francisco and then finally arrived in Sioux City, Iowa by train four days later.

It was while I was in Sioux City that I learned that the Department needed a Vice Consul in Rome, Italy. And since I was still on my own, I had to pay my way to Washington to pick up my official orders. Only from Washington was my travel paid to New York to board an American Export Line ship to Naples.

I arrived in Rome 1935, June. And I remember taking a taxi from the railroad station up the Via Veneto to the Consulate in the building next to the Palazzo Margherita. I couldn't believe the beauty of the city. After three years in Calcutta, to arrive in a place like Rome was like going from Hades to Paradise. In Rome the Principal Officer was Graham Kemper and his assistant was Gilson Blake. I was the Vice Consul in charge of immigration for Italians going to the United States, passports for Americans, and registration of the large American colony living in Rome.

HENRY BYROADE
U.S. Army Officer
India (1941-1944)

Ambassador Henry Byroade was born in Indiana in 1913. He graduated from West Point in 1937. He served in the Hawaiian Islands from 1937-1939. While still in the service, he received a master's degree from Cornell in 1940. His Foreign Service posts included Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, Burma, the Philippines, and Pakistan. He was interviewed by Niel M. Johnson on September 19, 1988.

Q: *You mean they were lost over the ocean, over the jungle, or...*

BYROADE: Over the ocean.

Now, we went on through Africa and arrived in Karachi [India]. There was chaos and confusion; we were going to hit Tokyo from just south of Shanghai, but it took us about three months in Florida to get organized, and underway, and by the time we got to Karachi, the Japanese had that area. The second plan was to use the Northern Philippines, but that was gone too. I was left in Karachi. General Brereton came in from Java, and he outranked our General. He took all the bombers away from us. We were left with the DC-3s and they said, "Go start a Hump run to China."

So I was on the first DC-3 that went up to Assam, India.

Q: *Where were you stationed at this time?*

BYROADE: Well, I was around Karachi, trying to decide now to get in the war. My orders were to report to the senior aviation engineer in the China-Burma-India theater. The people that wrote the order knew that I was it, that I was the only one. I was picked up by General Wheeler.

Q: *What was his first name?*

BYROADE: Raymond A. Wheeler; he was head of the Service of Supply Command in CBI; it then consisted of General Wheeler, an aide, and a secretary.

Q: *What was your rank at this time?*

BYROADE: Either a captain or a major, I'm not sure. I guess I had been promoted to major. We got up to Assam, India; Dinjan had half of one runway. The job was to build however many airfields it took to transport lend-lease supplies to China. There were lots of river boats there, full of lend-lease for China that had been in Rangoon. They thought that was going to fall, so they sent it all to Calcutta, and they thought that was going to fall, so they just sent it up the Brahmaputra River, as far as they could go, up towards Assam, waiting for us to get airfields, and airplanes to fly it across the Hump [Himalaya Mountains].

Am I going into too much detail?

Q: *No, that's fine.*

BYROADE: Well, we had to work through the British, of course. I was the American in charge of not only supplying our own forces, but building airfields and handling the air freight. We used a lot of labor, Indian coolies, breaking rocks by hand. We were to build, I think, seven freight fields, and three or four fighter fields for protection. Well, when I got there, there were two Pan-Am planes running the Hump, and two pilots; one was in bed with malaria and the other one was in the hospital. They had had a fight over some girls. At that time that was the Hump run to China. So we started from absolutely nothing, and none of us had any idea that that would build up to a couple hundred thousand tons a month.

Q: Do you recall about when that started, that operation?

BYROADE: Well, we left Florida, I think, in March. I was around Karachi a couple months. It would be the middle of the summer in '42, July or August.

Q: Where were you stationed, mainly, in India?

BYROADE: I moved up to Chabua in Assam. I built a little headquarters at Chabua and we started with elephants pulling out trees and built our first field at Chabua.

Q: So you're in Assam. When did you get into China? I mean you didn't fly yourself.

BYROADE: Well, not legally, but our Air Force friends let me get in lots of flying hours. I guess I could have got my service wings if I'd stayed one more week, but I couldn't do that.

I was in the India end of the Hump, I've forgotten, but I guess for maybe a year and a half. Then I was transferred to the Advance Section No. 4 of the Services of Supply, which was the eastern half of China, in support of the forward echelon of Chennault's 14th Air Force, and old AVG. It was a prewar outfit...

G. EUGENE MARTIN
Childhood
India (1943-1956)

A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is September 21, 1999. This is an interview with G. Eugene Martin. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Well Gene, we'll start at sort of the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?

MARTIN: I was born in Indianapolis, actually Speedway, Indiana, which is right next to the racetrack outside of Indianapolis, during the war, in 1943. My parents were missionaries in India, and they had returned in 1941, just at the beginning of the war, for furlough back in the States. Caught in the States and not able to go back to India during the war, my father took a church in Indianapolis. We were living there when I was born.

Q: What denomination was your father?

MARTIN: He was American Baptist.

Q: Yes. Where had they been working in India?

MARTIN: They were in what is now Andhra Pradesh, then it was called Hyderabad. It was about 180 miles north of Madras (now Chennai), on the east coast of India. My parents were third generation missionaries in the same area of India so that essentially was "home." My great grandfather had started the work in that town. I guess this is how I became interested in foreign affairs.

Q: So, well, I mean, you were pretty young. By the time you started being at the age where you remembered things, where were you?

MARTIN: We went out to India when I was two on an empty troop ship going out to pick up the troops from the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater. The troop ship docked in Bombay, father met us there, and we took the train home.

Q: Yes. Where was home?

MARTIN: Home was, at that time, a small town in India called Kanigiri, where we lived for a few years. That was where I have my first memories.

Q: Yes. What do you recall first memories? Sort of family life or?

MARTIN: I guess the most vivid one is when I found some red chilies out on the back porch one day. Not knowing what they were, I popped several in my mouth. I instantly found out what red chilies were all about. I probably ate a whole stalk of bananas to moderate the heat.

Q: Well, that's down in the chili belt, isn't it?

MARTIN: Well, the hot Madrasi curry is famous in that area.

Q: Where did you start going to school by the time you were put into kindergarten or whatever?

MARTIN: My mother taught my elder brother and me initially, using the Calvert course, the famous correspondence school out of Baltimore.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: I studied in the Calvert system from kindergarten through third grade, my brother and I in the class taught by my mother.

Q: How old was your brother?

MARTIN: He's about a year and a half older than I am.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: My mother was the teacher, and a strict disciplinarian. She kept the distinction that she was the teacher in the classroom and not mother, so we had to behave, sit properly, and not look for motherly attention. That was for about three years. We went back to the States in 1950 for furlough and spent a year in Ohio, where I went to fourth grade. In 1951, we returned to India and entered boarding school in Kodaikanal, one of the boarding schools in the hills of South India.

Q: Yes. Well, as a very young kid, what were you getting from your parents, and your own observations, about the part of India you were in?

MARTIN: Well, I was aware of what was going on, albeit at a child's level of comprehension. I remember when Gandhi was assassinated. I remember the emotion that overwhelmed the populace, both Indian as well as foreign. I remember independence. We didn't have a radio and TV was many years away from India at that point. But we had newspapers and magazines, and occasionally a radio notice would tell us what was going on in the world. One of the other missionaries had a radio which we heard occasionally. I remember listening to that, or watching and reading about independence, political movements, Gandhi, and so forth. I was very young, only six or seven, but it left an impression.

Q: Yes. The great separation between the Muslims and the Hindus and all didn't take place down there, did it?

MARTIN: That was mainly in the north. However, Hyderabad was still ruled by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the local maharajah, who was Muslim as was a large percentage of his populace. Quite a number of families did leave for Pakistan during partition. I don't remember that too vividly myself because there were not many Muslims in our particular area.

Q: Did you have an ayah?

MARTIN: Oh, well, not really. Peter was our cook, his wife Deenama helped with the cleaning, and a gardener cared for the garden. My brother and I ran around in short pants and bare feet,

and climbed trees, and played with the cook's son, George, who was our best friend. We had just a normal childhood.

Q: Yes. What about language? Where you picking up any language?

MARTIN: One of my proudest moments was helping my father find the right Telugu word for "chimney" for one of his sermons. I can't remember why he was speaking about chimneys, but I knew the word instantly, and he had not learned that in his language class. I was quite fluent, with an eight-to-ten-year-old's vocabulary, in Telugu, which was the language spoken in the area.

Q: How old were you when you went to boarding school?

MARTIN: I had just turned eight, on the ship coming back from the States in 1951. My mother felt that she had taught us as much as she could at that stage, so we went off to boarding school in Kodai, as it was called, a hill station.

Q: What was the boarding school like?

MARTIN: Missionaries started it in 1902. They recently celebrated their centennial. There were probably about 100 students, mostly missionary kids but quite a wide variety of children -- oil company dependents from the Middle East, missionary and business children from all over India as well as from Burma and Thailand, and even a few from East Asia. Most were American, a few Europeans and Asians, almost no Indians in those days. One of my brother's roommates was a Thai who became a well-known banker in Bangkok.

Q: Well, while you were at the school, was there sort of the old...things must have been changing quite a bit as things became more Indian rather than, you know, sort of, the rajah had gone and all. I mean were you feeling that as this school _____?

MARTIN: A little, but not too much. I was there from 1951 to '56. I finished eighth grade and then came back to the States for high school. But yes, there was some change, but Kodai was really in a kind of a time warp. There were many retired British civil servants, quite a few Anglo-Indians who lived up there. It had very much of a British feel to it --cottages, English gardens, country walks, the Anglican church, and so on. It was quite isolated from the rest of the country in many ways. But over the five years I was there, I did notice an increasing number of Indians building and owning houses in Kodai.

Q: How about your teachers? Were there any Indians within the teaching ranks?

MARTIN: Not really. I think there may have been a couple, who may have taught Indian history, but I recall most of them were foreigners. We had a number of Europeans who had come from Europe either during or after the war and stayed on - a Czech, a Pole, who was a musician, a number of other people who were quite interesting. They helped broaden our perspective of the world.

Q: Did you feel sort of plugged in to what else was happening in India, or was it pretty isolated?

MARTIN: It was pretty isolated! There really wasn't much contact with the rest of the country and world. We had our sports, activities and social events. We were fairly self-contained.

Q: Well then, you went back. You were how old? Had you finished eighth grade?

MARTIN: I had just turned 13. Let me here comment that while I was in India I had my first contact with the Foreign Service. We used to go into the consulate in Madras for passport services or to register. That was my first recollection of the Foreign Service of the State Department. It made a big impression on me because I always awed when I went into the consulate. I was eager to talk to the people who were issuing the passports. I guess that stuck with me through the years because later on, when I was thinking of a career, the memories kept coming back to me.

Q: Yes. Did you get to travel around much or?

MARTIN: We did some, not a lot. Before we left India my parents took my brother and me to New Delhi so that we could see the sights, something we always wanted to do. It was quite an excursion by third class coach on the train, but that was an experience, in itself, with hard seats, coal smoke coming in the open windows, beggars reaching hands through the windows at stations. But we didn't get to Kashmir, as we wanted to; we didn't get to Dehar Dun; lots of places in India we would have liked to have visited, but did not.

Q: Did you get any feel at that time...I mean, well, actually in retrospect, of course...about the impact of missionaries, in particular, that part of southern India?

MARTIN: Despite coming from a long line of missionaries, three generations since my great grandfather opened the mission station in 1866, I had fairly strong feelings, as did my parents, that the time of the foreign missionary was coming to an end. It was time for the Indian church to be run, controlled and manned by the Indian Christians. Christians are a very small minority in Hindu India, of course.

The big mission hospital in our town was probably the only one in over a hundred miles, over Indian country roads. My mother was deeply involved in education. The mission ran quite an extensive mission school system, from kindergarten through high school and teachers' training school. She also was active in evangelism, preaching, as she said, the gospel first and family planning second. She felt strongly about family planning as she saw the problems caused by unrestrained population growth and the resulting perpetuation of rural poverty and disease. And in her spare time she literally pitched in and personally supervised construction on school buildings – dorms, classrooms, and offices.

Q: Did you get any feel for Baptist versus Anglican versus Catholic versus, and I mean all of these inter Nicene Christian conflicts?

MARTIN: Early in the century missionaries adopted a policy that might be called "divide and conquer." They carved up India, not extraterritorially, but ecclesiastically. The Baptist in our

area, the Episcopalians further south, the Presbyterians over on the Bombay side, etc. Occasionally, again toward the end of my time in India, we had a number of what we called itinerant missionaries come through and hold services. My parents always looked a little bit askance at them, perhaps being conservative in the sense that this is our turf, don't come in it.

Q: We'd own it.

MARTIN: I think the important thing was an increasing sense that, as a very small minority, Christian churches in India needed to work ecumenically. If they fought among themselves, proselytizing was going to be even more difficult.

Q: Did you have any feeling for the impact of the missionaries?

MARTIN: I think the missionaries provided a tremendous service in terms of education, in terms of medical services, and to a degree, in infrastructure. My mother built many school buildings, personally out there supervising in the sun, walking up and down the planks, and making sure they did it right. Going back four generations, my great grandfather, who was an engineer by training, was hired by the British colonial government to build part of the Buckingham Canal, a coastal waterway, to help relieve a famine in the 1870s. He supervised the building of five or ten miles of the canal, feeding and paying several thousand workers. That was a physical infrastructure improvement, which is still in use. In general, however, missionary schools, hospitals and social contributions helped India modernize. And most of their work was in rural areas or small towns, which still lag behind urban centers.

Q: In a way, it's off to one side, but how long did your parents continue to be active missionaries?

MARTIN: My father died and is buried in the same Indian town in which he had been born and married, in 1966, the year I joined the Foreign Service. My mother stayed on and finished her term in 1971. They had been there about 40 years.

Q: Oh boy! Well, then, taking you back - you're about 13, and you're back to where? Ohio?

MARTIN: When I left India to go to school in the U.S., I was just thirteen. My parents took my brother and me by train to Bombay. We entered the airport terminal, the first time we'd ever been in an airport terminal, boarded a Super Constellation with "TWA" marked on the sides in big letters, and waved goodbye to our parents, India and childhood. We took off on our very first plane flight, and flew for 48 hours, including 8 stops, all the way to New York City. It was quite an adventure for a 13-year-old and his older brother. In New York, our uncle and aunt met us as our parents had arranged for them to be our guardians when we were in the States. We went to Washington D.C. to see a cousin, which was the first time we'd been to Washington, to Williamsburg to learn a little American history, and finally to Pittsburgh where they lived. I still clearly remember that trip. After a few weeks, they took us to our boarding school in New Jersey, where we went to school.

Q: While you were in India, were you getting much in the way of Americanization, you know, American history, states, capitals, and that sort of thing?

MARTIN: We studied U.S. history and society in seventh and eighth grade social studies. I had a social studies teacher in the eighth grade, who was from the town of Corn, Oklahoma. We were studying Indians, and I decided to report on an Indian tribe. I researched the subject but had no idea how to pronounce the tribe's name. So I began my oral report by saying, "My report is on the See-ox Indians." I thought the teacher would fall out of his chair. Once he set me straight about how to pronounce the Sioux [pronounced Sue], we moved on. We learned the U.S. capitals and states, more than we did the geography and history of India unfortunately.

LOUISE ARMSTRONG
Consular Officer
Madras (1944-1947)

Mrs. Armstrong was born in 1917 in Tokyo, Japan of American missionary parents. After moving to the United States she attended Wellesley College. After graduation, Mrs. Armstrong was a researcher for Time and Life magazine before joining the Foreign Service in 1947. As a Consular and Political Officer, she served in Madras, Prague, Palermo and Montreal. Following her marriage to FSO Willis Armstrong in 1959, she resigned her commission and accompanied her husband to Ottawa, where he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mrs. Armstrong was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q. Well, getting out in 1938, where were you pointed?

ARMSTRONG: Well, I moved into first, the Hamilton Watch Factory, first job that I could get. And that was sorting artificial diamonds for watches, a very simpleminded job. Then I worked in the Science Press, which was the press, which published, the official organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the AAAS.

Q. Scientific America?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, Scientific America, things of that sort. I'm sure they've moved to other publishing houses, but this is where a lot of it was done. And I had the job of proof and manuscript reader.

Q. This seemed to be the prime occupation of graduates of the Seven Sisters schools, being first rate proofreaders at the beginning.

ARMSTRONG: I'm sure it's true because you either did that or you went to Katie Gibbs.

Q. Yeah, Katie Gibbs being the secretarial school.

ARMSTRONG: Right. At any rate, I wanted to go to New York and see what I could do for myself there. So I eventually set off with one or two introductions. It took me a while to get into

anything very solid. But I did finally work for Time and Life. And it was while I was there that, as a so called researcher.

As a researcher you went along with the photographer and got all the materials that related to the story that was being shot, or you helped to evolve the story in the first place, the concept of it and then went along with the photographer. But you also, if you worked in some areas, the responsibility was to check the accuracy of the stories that were churned out by the writers, but since some of them were pretty, how would you say, high flown in their style, making or developing theses as they went along, you found you had to reign them in a little bit on a factual basis.

And I did have the experience of reading what Clare Booth Luce sent back from a trip she made to the Far East, during the war this was, when she joined up with the Flying Tigers and General Stilwell and people like that and made stops, hop skipping around the Pacific. And her reports would come back, and I had the job of reading them from a factual standpoint. And basically, she was pretty reliable, a little fast and loose, but pretty reliable. However, when it came to names, I felt I needed some type of corroboration for the spelling, the names and things like that. Very easy to make mistakes in recording from the scene. So when she would get back from these trips, I would call her at the Waldorf and talk to her, rather I talked to secretary, and I'd say would you ask Mrs. Luce if she can confirm this or corroborate that or spell this and so forth? One day I called and I got right through to the lady herself. And she said to me, "Mrs. Armstrong, what have I done wrong now?" Very pleasant lady. She wasn't being nasty.

Q: Were you initiated into sort of the unique Time writing style at that point?

ARMSTRONG: Well, I never did any actual writing. It was while I was working for Life magazine, which at that point was developing a magazine for the armed forces, which would not only give them news but also would help them in identifying foreign and American airplanes, tanks, ships and so forth – a recognition training process. And that took me to Washington on a number of occasions. And it seemed to me everybody was going overseas except me, so I began to look into the possibility of doing something overseas. And I heard from one friend of mine that he was being hired by ANRA, I think it was.

I decided to walk into the State Department, while I was down there, and I asked if I could have an appointment with somebody in foreign service personnel. In due course I was introduced to the chief of foreign service personnel, and that was in the Old Executive Office Building. He waved me to my seat and said he understood I was interested in the foreign service. I said, "Yes, but not in an officer capacity." And I said, "Is that possible?" Well he tilted himself back in his swivel chair and put the tips of his fingers together and said, "Conceivably." And so somewhat to my astonishment I discovered that State Department security was investigating me. My boss in New York would say, "What's going on here?" And the woman who owned the apartment where I was staying, she was frightened out of her wits because security people had come to interrogate her about me.

And then they made me the offer of joining the Foreign Service Auxiliary, which you've probably heard about. And that was for, on the duration of the emergency basis. And we were

given a course of sprouts in everything under the sun, a couple of months of this. And I wasn't very long into it before an announcement was made of three posts open for bids. And I was afraid I'd get something like Tegucigalpa, so when I heard that these three posts were open for bids, I pricked up my ears. One was Afghanistan; one was Jerusalem; one was Madras. I didn't think I'd be considered for Kabul, and I thought Jerusalem might be pretty depressing. And I'd read *A Passage to India*, E.M. Forster, so I had romantic ideas about India, so therefore I offered my services there. And then as I understand it, the Department made little discreet inquiries among people who had served in India, old India hands, as to whether this young woman would go down in the vice consul capacity in Madras, and they seemed to think there was no problem. So I was the first woman officer in India. And before I left there were about six others gathered around various consular posts.

Q: You went to Madras when?

ARMSTRONG: I arrived in January '44.

Q: How did you get there?

ARMSTRONG: I sailed out of Hoboken on a passenger cargo vessel that was the Hurg Silverstar, Norwegians vessel. And we traveled in convoy, across the Atlantic, until we got to the Mediterranean by which time it was Marc Nostrum, we were free of the convoy business so we moved faster. And [we] went into Karachi. Apart from Suez, that was the only stop we made. At Karachi, I was expected, that is my boss to be in Madras had been in touch with the consular general in Karachi, and he'd made all kinds of plans for me, which made me fly Tada Airlines to Madras. Now Tada Airlines is a little bi plane with about six passengers. Had to stop over in Secunderabad, which is the twin city of Hyderabad, where Tada had its own little hotel, airport hotel arrangements.

And interestingly enough I noticed among the half dozen passengers that there was an older middle aged woman with graying hair, black graying hair, who wore a sari but was plainly not Indian. Olive skin and the sari and these leather shoes that you wear in North India, with a turned up toe. And I thought this is interesting, she is what they say has "gone native." But she was an interesting, arresting figure, accompanied by a younger man who spoke English as well as whatever he spoke to her in. I read her name off the sign in roster when we got to the hotel, and she was Maria Montessori. She was traveling around India fulfilling speaking engagements with her nephew doing the interpreting.

Q: Well, Maria Montessori established this preschool system-

ARMSTRONG: Everywhere.

Q: which is everywhere.

ARMSTRONG: Very big in India, or was. I'm sure it's still there. So anyway, one flew by way of Hyderabad, Secunderabad, overnight there. With nothing better to do, a group of us went into

the local bazaar at night and that was fascinating. The craftsman were working by charcoal fires, beautiful stuff, all very inexpensive. I bought a dozen bracelets.

And then the next morning we set off for Madras. And there it was understood that my boss to be, he would meet me. It was a two officer post, Madras. And Roy Bauer, who had been in the post for some time [and] was very much settled in there, was to have met me. And then a message reached me at the airport that he couldn't leave the office and would I please take a taxi in to the hotel where I was registered and then meet him for lunch at The Madras Club. I found a fellow passenger who was going in; we shared a cab. Looking out of the plane as we approached Madras, it looked very arid and empty, and I thought, "Geez, two three years here, can I stand it?" Then as we drove in to the town, it happened to be after the monsoon so it was a lot greener than it might have been, in fact a lot of green paddy fields everywhere, but kind of a rundown situation. Everything you saw looked in a state of decay, if not from dry weather then from humid weather. And not very reassuring. And part way into town, in the middle of the country, the taxi broke down. The driver managed to flag another car. That car towed us and just as we approached the near middle of the town, the tow rope broke. I finally got to my hotel.

Q: A great introduction!

ARMSTRONG: That's right. Having arrived at the hotel, I then went on to the Madras Club. First thing my boss did was order me a gimlet, my first experience with gimlets. And with a British Indian club. It was really very agreeable, and just what I needed was a drink at that point.

Q: You were there from 1944 to ?

ARMSTRONG: '47, September '47. I left one month after Indian Independence.

Q: What was Madras like at that time? Particularly when you just arrived, still wartime?

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Well first thing that Mr. Bauer did, over a drink and then over lunch, was to explain the social situation to me. Quite clearly I was not to drop any bricks or make any gaffes. The society was dominated by the British Civil Service, ICS, Indian Civil Service really. There was a British governor and his aides were all British. The chiefs of all the administrative offices were British. And then there were Britishers who were there in business, import export, manufacturers, cotton and things like that. And there were British military.

And the situation was such socially, there was a housing shortage, that is, a housing shortage of the West and England. I'm sure there was always a housing shortage for Indians. So the people doubled up, and as my boss explained to me, sometimes the husband would be sent home and couldn't get back, having left his wife behind. And there would be somebody else who needed a place to live, so they would have a paying guest system. And you would have some interesting situations where So and so was sharing a house with Lady So and so, but they didn't have the same last name. And he just wanted to let me understand that such situations existed, from the social point of view so I wouldn't be misled.

He also said that there was one particular charming younger woman who attended all the social functions, as a somewhat unattached woman, I think she was separated from her husband. But she was hired by the British Intelligence, so that anything that got to her ears went straight to Intelligence. They had put her in that situation because so many soldiers would come through, officers through Madras, and they would have time on their hands looking for recreation and go to the several clubs that were open to them. And if they talked too much, she would be there to pick it up. And that was among some other responsibilities I'm sure.

He also told me in local correspondence I should be very careful of what I said because there were a number of British housewives who were employed to read this kind of thing. So my letters would invariably be screened.

Then there was the missionary community, which was very significant. We had about a thousand missionaries in the consular district, which included the state of Hyderabad, Mysore and Travancore, three Indian states - they all have different names now - and Madras, Presidency as it was called then. So missionaries were scattered all over this south Indian area, which was really the lower half of the Indian peninsula. And Roy Bauer was on very good terms with them; they enjoyed coming and chatting with him. He was a very approachable, easy conversationalist. He had a remarkable faculty for getting happily along with the British, the stuffiest Britishers, because he'd served in England, he'd served in Singapore, he was quite comfortable with British ways. In fact he would correct me from time to time. I was not to say "stupid," I was to say "schtupid," can you hear the difference? Because that's the way the British said [it]. He was also very comfortable with the local American community, which was small. But the missionaries were a great source of intelligence for us.

We would report on all kinds of things as they happened in our area. We would report, you see we didn't have an embassy yet in Delhi, we had the personal representative of the United States. Then in due course when it was clear that we were going to have an embassy, we had a chargé. And the first ambassador I broke in for, I'll have to take time on that, but never mind. We would send these reports back to both to Delhi and to Washington, for what they were worth. Basically we didn't have a great deal of trouble in south India. The problems that arose were chiefly in the north. Because we had a very modest Muslim community. They gave nobody any trouble, and nobody troubled them. We had some other interesting curiosities, but mostly it was a very stable community in that sense.

Q: Were we looking at the Indian Congress Party and the Gandhi general movement?

ARMSTRONG: Yes, we had a close friend in a woman congressman, and I made friends with another woman who had been a congresswoman. We had visits from Gandhi, from time to time. He would come down. I shared a platform with him. By a platform I mean a raised dais in the center of a crowd with people all around who had come for holy sight of the great man.

Q: I'm sure in making the namostay.

ARMSTRONG: That's right. The interesting thing for me was one heard so much about his fasting and his general self sacrifice. But when I saw him in person, I never saw somebody who

was better fleshed out than he was. I understood in his fasting, when it took place, included in his diet orange juice and goat's milk, which was a lot better than most Indians had by way of a good diet. And when he traveled third class, in the third class car - third class in India had nothing but the bench around the periphery of the car, with most people sitting on the floor - this third class car was mostly Gandhi and his party. So it wasn't as if he had to sleep on the floor if he didn't want to. I admired him a lot, but he didn't have any great time for Americans. I suspect only for Britishers with whom he had to do business.

Q: As vice consul, what were your jobs? What were you doing?

ARMSTRONG: I had a certain amount of rubber stamping of invoices, enormous amount of invoices. Of rosters of port, and during the war time, we had a lot of American ships come in, so there was some so called shipping. But since we didn't have a Coast Guard there, if there was any serious problem, we'd refer them to Calcutta or to Ceylon, to Colombo. Because you always had incidents on cargo ships where there was some kind of a fracas going on. Some seaman was a problem or some captain was a problem. But I didn't have to deal with that type of thing directly. The invoicing was big. There was a community of Americans working in Bangalore with the Hindustan Aircraft Corporation, which was the beginning in the sense of, Bangalore is now the "silicon valley" of India. Bangalore Aircraft Corporation serviced the codas and other planes -

Q: The codas being the DC 3.

ARMSTRONG: That's right. And also serviced military aircraft. And some which later flew the hump. We had a group of American technicians and engineers working there which inevitably cohabited with Anglo Indian woman. And inevitably there were children and some consular matters involving them. And we had consular matters involving the American community, of which I said we had about 1,000. And then I was expected to mingle socially, which was very agreeable. And as I say do reporting. The more commercial economic reporting would be done by the chief Indian clerk, but it would go out under my name because I would report it. We did oil seeds reporting and reporting on coconut products and things of that sort, mainly for the Department of Agriculture I think, to some extent for Commerce. And any political reporting that we could sniff out.

Q: Was the Consul sort of under the instructions to watch this Indian Independence movement closely?

ARMSTRONG: Well, we just assumed we were under instructions if we weren't, and [we'd] report anything we thought was worthwhile. But as I say there wasn't a great deal going on in south India. South India was just moving with the times.

Q: How about the war effort? Was it your impression that the Indians you got to know, were they with the war effort or did they feel it was a British war?

ARMSTRONG: Oh, distinctly detached. In fact there was such a thing as the Indian National Army, which was working with the Japanese.

Q: In Burma.

ARMSTRONG: Well, also in India. And the daughter of this congresswoman was involved in that. She wasn't living in Madras very much, so it was just quietly spoken about. Yes she was very much involved.

Q: What about your contact with Indians? The British were still in charge, but was there an Indian class that you –

ARMSTRONG: Yes, there was an Indian community that one would regard as just as easy to mingle with as the British. One of the things I liked to do was to escape from the domain of the Raj now and again. You knew that if you spent all your time with Indians that it would create a bad impression, so you had to be a little careful. But I had quite a number of Indian friends who were what you would call upper class, prosperous, and I enjoyed learning about India through them. They provided opportunities like the missionaries. The missionaries were much closer to the Indians and the officials, of course.

Q: How about at the end of the war, which would be August of '45, did that change things at all?

ARMSTRONG: It didn't make too much difference immediately in south India. In north India, there were already riots, even before Indian independence. I went up, I joined the Foreign Service in the auxiliary, and then I was prepared to take the written examinations. They were provided, at a certain point, by courier. And I was going to be able to sit in my own office and take the examination with my supervisor next door, so to speak. The courier was a day late, after I'd done my best to bone up for this examination, I found I had to wait for the next one to come along because it was considered, that particular examination had been, what's the word you want?

Q: Compromised?

ARMSTRONG: Compromised. So when I finally took it, which was about six months later, and was discovered to have passed it I was told that I would be interviewed by a panel a traveling panel. A traveling panel came to Bombay, and I went up to Bombay for that occasion. There was a very well known man, named Joe Green, and everybody said he would be the holy terror. And it turned out he was a very fatherly type. At any rate I passed the orals, as far as I could tell, I think they told me at the time. Then I had to pass the physical. The consulate in Bombay sent me to a doctor that they had in mind, and I found myself stark naked jumping up and down on one foot and then the other for this guy. No nurses or nothing. You put up with a lot in the Foreign Service.

From there I went on to Kashmir. My mother, by the way, had come to India to join me about two thirds of the way through. She and an American woman whose husband had been Young Men Christian Association (YMCA) secretary, the three of us were going to Kashmir together. She and my mother went on ahead, and I went on from Bombay. One went part of the way by train, up to Peshawar, and then a bus from there up to Srinagar. And I could see burning villages on the ridges across the way, at that time in the spring of '47. There was plenty of trouble already.

Then when my mother and I came back we traveled separately from our friend, Marie Buck. We got on board a train with a compartment reserved for us you couldn't lock. The lock was faulty. And under normal circumstances you wouldn't feel too worried about this. But under the circumstances, it wasn't very reassuring. And at every point on the Indian railway's journey, they would stop and there would be a great hubbub of crowds on the platform. That was very characteristic, especially in North India. Crowded platforms where people would eat, sell tea, sell this and that and eat fast foods of their kind. Any hour of day or night; the Indian clock is continuous. So I found us in this unlockable compartment, and I piled everything I could think of in terms of luggage. And I suggested that my mother take the lower berth and I spent half the night screaming at people to get away from the door, that it was private, that it was locked and so forth, ready to leap on anybody who did push their way in. Well people pushed, but nobody pushed their way in. But that was a situation I wouldn't have encountered in south India. There was more turbulence and unruliness up there.

Now in south India there was one episode that gave us concern really. A very fine man who was a member of the high court, the Madras High Court, a Britisher, Justice Byers - he and his wife were delightful, I enjoyed their hospitality more than once - he for some reason had a revolver with him driving back from the high courts, which were at the far end of town from where he lived at the other end of town. His car was being pelted by boys throwing stones and it unnerved him, and he thought the best thing to do was to fire a warning shot. And he got out his pistol and he fired a warning shot and it hit a stone wall and the bullet ricocheted and killed a boy. I have never seen a British community so upset, and I'd never seen a man so shunned after that. He just didn't stay in Madras. He lost his position, and he was out of there. He retired to Vancouver.

Q: Did you find that there was a certain amount of tension between you and the American members, particularly you and the British community and you know, our general feeling is anti colonial? Or had we sort of been absorbed into the colonial society?

ARMSTRONG: I think my experience was in fact colored by the fact of Roy Bauer, who was very pro British. Now mind you he was objective at the same time. And the more I saw of the situation in south India, the more I was satisfied that the Indian Civil Service was really a very well intentioned and well organized civil service and very competent, in the sense that the young officer would go out to a large district so he would be the only one there and somehow could be responsible for local justice, local taxes and everything else. I thought they handled the situation well. The railroads were their creation. And everything India has today, to my way of thinking, is due to a very good colonial period. When I was with Indians who were chafing at the British overrule, I could be sympathetic with them as well.

But I have to say I also admired the British. Now individual British senior people could be a little stuffy. An American was not always considered to be of the same class and status. But happily Mr. Bauer was very well established, and that made a difference in their acceptance of me. I was the subject of a certain amount of local gossip, which was the principal problem I had I would say, because here I was, an unattached woman, circulating [with] a largely identified group of people, some Indians. So my name was often being associated with somebody or other, often

with somebody I'd never heard of. Again, the only thing to do was to forget about it, to laugh at it.

Q: Well did you find, when you came into the Foreign Service, were you being warned this isn't the place for a woman and that kind of thing?

ARMSTRONG: Well I was only warned about the problem of Madras being a port and unruly seamen would be coming in. So I have to tell my unruly seamen story. In fact one man, I think he's the first person I talked to in the state department, said, "You know, if you go to a place like Madras, I know of a woman foreign service vice consul who kept a big monkey wrench on her desk and any time she felt threatened she would rattle the monkey wrench."

Well that didn't happen in my case, but in one instance when there was an American cargo vessel in town and by the way we had constant vessels in town because there was a big buildup for an invasion of Japan and there was a base called Avodi, which was outside of Madras, so we had shipload after shipload of aircraft parts, you name it. And these ships would frequently, almost invariably, be American vessels. Well one day this chap came in and, shirt open down to his belt buckle, he sits himself on the chair in front of my office and my desk and throws one leg over the arm of the chair and leans back and says, "Say, what is there to do in this town anyway?" Bauer had seen him come in. I talked to him – there was the Gimkana Club he could go to, and there were movies. I was scared to death he'd ask me for a date, and I'd have to say no thank you. And he began to study me and he said, "Say, you look familiar, what's your name?" And I told him Louise Schaffner. He says, "I went to school with you, I went to grade school with you. My name's Panny Beanzirfer." And I remembered Panny Beanzirfer, and I said, "I'm going to have to write my grandmother about you." At that point, we had a few other words and then he took off. Roy Bauer couldn't believe it. He couldn't believe it. I found it hard to believe too.

Q: Did you have to get seamen out of jail and things like that?

ARMSTRONG: That we left to the Coast Guard. They would come in, the captain would come in with some of the problems. Roy Bauer would talk to him and advise him what we could and couldn't do. Mainly we should ship them off to the next port. We also had problems with the local madam because these American seamen would come in and tear the joint apart. I got such a kick out of that. She would come in in this black dress, in the middle of the Madras summer heat and sit down in his office. He was very polite and very bland. He told her, "So sorry. Nothing we could do. Take it up with the police."

Q: Sometimes it's handy to have good relations with the local madams because they can sometimes keep Americans out of, they can sort of inform the Consul before they inform the police.

ARMSTRONG: I dare say. I don't know of any case like that coming up. Mostly it was just these guys who would get drunk and raise hell.

Q: You say you left there in '47?

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Incidentally, I'll tell you about Indian independence in Madras. The date was the 15th, and it was at midnight because the 14th was an unlucky [day]. Or the settlement with Mountbatten fell to the 15th. But the sky showed that the 15th was an inauspicious day. So Indian independence was officially effective as of midnight. Nehru was the one who organized it this way. At any rate that night the whole downtown Madras was, of course, ablaze with lights and sounds and music and dancing and what, I don't remember exactly. But the governor of Madras, Sir Archibald Nigh, who was later to become the first British High Commissioner, he had been deputy chief of the imperial general staff during the war, which meant that he was a senior military man. And he was a splendid man. And his wife was very interested in everything Indian. She made a point of taking part in charities, which were for the benefit of the Indians. The two of them and their, his aide, and my mother was invited, not me, my mother, drove down to midtown Georgetown, which was the busy part of the Madras harbor area to enjoy the celebrations. And nobody laid a hand on them. It was in a jeep as a matter of fact. It wasn't in the official car, it was in a jeep.

Q. A jeep, open.

ARMSTRONG: An open jeep.

Q: Now, what was the feeling from Bauer and yourself about [unknown word] India?

ARMSTRONG: I think most Americans felt that India was entitled to independence. One's servants were very upset because they saw their established way of life as crumbling. I think India did deteriorate, initially. And whether it has in some fashion ever recovered, I doubt. I'm told I would see India very much changed. And I'm sure I will; it would be magnificent, the changes. But also you know all the troubles of India at this point too. So when the British left, they left a good system, but the system was disbanded.

Q: In '47 where did you go?

ARMSTRONG: In '47 I went on home leave, and my appointment was to be Praja. And I thought when I saw that, my gosh that must be in Latin America, [but] Praja's a name for Prague. There's a place, Paraj, I believe in Brazil. And I was confusing that in my mind.

ROYAL D. BISBEE
Visa & General Services Officer
Bombay (1947-1948)

General Services Officer
New Delhi (1948-1950)

Provincial Public Affairs Officer
Lucknow (1951-1956)

Mr. Bisbee was born of Missionary parents in India, where he was raised and schooled. After graduating from the University of Washington, he joined the US Army and spent World War II in Iraq with the Army Intelligence Corps. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and served, primarily as Public Affairs Officer, in Bombay, New Delhi, Lucknow, Salonika, Lahore, Freetown, Pretoria and Manila. Mr. Bisbee died in 2010. Mr. Bisbee was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010.

Q: What brought your father to India?

BISBEE: He felt cold. I have a letter on file to the effect that he was drawn to the prospect of serving others, the importance of serving others, and the necessity to aid and assist others in their development. This is what led him to that, and the acceptance by the church for his service.

Q: Let's talk about the state where your father worked in India. What was it like when he got there?

BISBEE: Fortunately, the Maharajah at that period of time was a progressive individual. He was very forthcoming for new ideas, thoughts and desires of new things. For instance, he asked my father at one stage to develop a prayer that would be acceptable to all peoples in his state: Muslim, Hindu, etcetera. My father did this and said, tongue in cheek, "Roy, I didn't develop anything new. All I did was translate the Lord's Prayer into the local language, which was very acceptable."

From then on, my father could do most anything. He was asked to do all kinds of things for the Maharajah. In fact, he aided the Maharajah in coming to the United States to attend one of the large evangelical movements that was held in Chicago in about 1934.

Q: Where is the state in India? I am trying to put it on a mental map of India.

BISBEE: The State of Baroda is in the western area of the country, in the area of the country that was most exposed to early progress. Here you have the Indus River coming down into the western area. All the early excavations that gave evidence for the early cultivation of civilization are here. You have to think about the river valleys such as Mesopotamia, the Indus River, and all the rivers that came together in those areas. They were all talking to one another in one form or another, through shipping or...

Q: There's a tremendous amount of shipping in the Indian Ocean.

BISBEE: What one has to visualize is that you had a state such as Baroda that was not isolated. It had its talons into a variety of civilizations. There was a highly developed culture.

Q: Again, you were born in what year?

BISBEE: I was born on February 21st, 1923.

Q: How long were you there?

BISBEE: On and off, I was there for about 17 years.

Q: Could you talk about your experiences, what you were picking up from your parents, about Gandhi and that Movement. And first of all, what about the British Raj? I don't know whether the Maharajah reached into the state or not, but what about the influence that was there?

BISBEE: First of all, my father wanted us to remember that we were Americans. He was always outspoken, saying, "Remember son, we are American. We do not involve ourselves with local affairs. We may be sympathetic and very attuned to our democratic values, but we are American. We respect the local values, the activities that are taking place, the Gandhi movement, the activities of Nehru, and the needs of the British."

Q: This is all very nice, but there had to be a certain point where you or your family saw either the injustices, the rationale, or something. Did you come away from there with any particular feeling for the colonial world?

BISBEE: You are asking me a question about the injustices of the British Raj. I cannot say that I saw, as a youngster, injustices of the British Raj. What I did see was law and order, the fact that the Indians respected the law and order as they saw it, and they respected it more when the British left. They were asking that the British stay on longer. That wasn't possible to do because of the needs of the times, the political developments, and splitting the country into two parts.

My family was friends of the Nehrus and Gandhi.

Q: Where did you go to school?

BISBEE: I went to school at Woodstock in Mussoorie, the Quadrangle.

Q: Was this a Methodist school?

BISBEE: This was a school that was founded during the days of the East India Company. Other schools were later incorporated into the Quadrangle.

Q: This school is located in Mussoorie, you say?

BISBEE: It is in Mussoorie, which is located at approximately 5,000 feet in the Mani Mountains.

Q: Did the student body consist of just foreign children? Were there students from the Indian ruling class?

BISBEE: At the time I was there, it consisted of children of American missionaries and included children of leading Indians. For instance, Chandralekha Pandit was in my class, the daughter of Mrs. Pandit.

Q: This was Nehru's sister.

BISBEE: Nevertheless, I knew all these people.

Q: Did the political turmoil penetrate to the school?

BISBEE: No, it did not, and it did not involve itself into that kind of turmoil.

Q: Were you able to get vacation time where you could go out on a bike into the village or the countryside?

BISBEE: Oh yes. I was with my father on his tours into the villages. That was how I learned my languages. I can tell you right now that there isn't another person in the U.S. Government who speaks it as well as I do.

Q: How many languages were you learning?

BISBEE: I learned Gujarati, which was my first language. I grew up speaking it. My father encouraged me to learn it. In fact, he often said what a wonderful creature I would make in Gujarati. Then I went on and learned Hindi and, later, Urdu. I was able to translate for Presidents Johnson and Eisenhower.

Q: Aside from your father, did you get any Americanization influence?

BISBEE: How do you mean?

Q: I was wondering whether you were sent to the States from time to time.

BISBEE: No, I was not. We would come home when we had the money. Five years is probably the earliest time we would come home. In one period, we didn't have the money to come home.

Q: Of course, we are talking about the time of the Great Depression.

BISBEE: That's right.

Q: Were you attracted towards missionary life as a kid?

BISBEE: Not particularly. I was more attracted to things which I was able to read and learn. For instance, my father would periodically have to go to Bombay. He would take me as a youngster. Bombay was a big city.

Q: Was that the closest big city?

BISBEE: It was the closest really big city. It was the commercial hub of the western part of the country.

My father would take me, because he wanted the company I guess. He and I would go and stop in front of the American Consulate General. He would point out the flag with the stars and strips, telling me the reasons for them. He would then go upstairs and closet himself with the Consul General, to talk about things up country, as a good American should do. I would be relegated to talking with the Indian staff in the back. They would all be hilarious with this little American boy, speaking in their language. John J. Macdonald interested me in the Foreign Service, and I have never forgotten that.

Q: When you were home, was there the equivalent of a gang or a bunch of boys that you played with?

BISBEE: When I was back home, I would play with the youngsters in the compound. That helped me learn the language. My father encouraged me to translate for a number of his sermons.

Q: By the time you reached college age, where were you pointed towards?

BISBEE: I was already focused on the Foreign Service. I had wanted to go to Tufts, but I couldn't make it to Tufts because of the shipping accommodation at the time. I was a whole month late because I had to go around South Africa and up through Trinidad. So I went up to my grandparents' area. I talked to the people at the University of Washington. I told them who I was, that I was an in-state student. They looked at my record and found that I didn't have all the credits necessary. I could enter the university as a special student, which I did. From then on, I went ahead with my scholastic work for the Foreign Service.

Q: Back in India, were you much of a reader?

BISBEE: Yes, I was.

Q: Where did you get your books from?

BISBEE: They were second-hand books that came from the Methodist Church in Spokane. They were books that nobody seemed to want. I used to read every one of them. That was the way it was.

Q: With your language, being American and not being tied to the British, how did you find the attitude of the Indian military?

BISBEE: The Indian military were very friendly to me. I can suggest to you, [phrase in Indian/Gujarati?], you and we are of one country. I could just about do anything for the embassy. As a matter of fact, I was asked to do almost anything for the embassy. Henderson would ask me to do all kinds of things for the embassy, him.

Q: How was Mrs. Henderson when you were there?

[laughter]

BISBEE: Are you being facetious?

Q: No. I think of the stories that supposedly when he was Ambassador to India, sitting in the grand dining hall, which was very opulent, and she was very carefully scrubbing all her utensils with her napkin saying something like, "You can never tell in places like this."

BISBEE: Elise Henderson was a very sensitive and kindly woman. She was very intolerant of what she would call abuse. She couldn't stand or accept any type of slight. Does that mean that she was intolerant? Yes, she was intolerant as all hell. Was she intolerant towards me? No, because she needed me to deal with the servants and day-to-day aspects of the operation of her establishment. She couldn't seem to be able to keep servants in line, or order things from the bazaar. She would order things and then Henderson would say, "Roy, please take this back. I cannot have this. I cannot pay for this. I have no way to deal with this."

It is strange that you should ask that. No one else has ever asked me.

Q: Don't worry about that.

Was anybody in personnel saying okay, you've got these languages? You're off to India.

BISBEE: There was no discussion. It was just assumed I was going. It was as though someone had already asked for me. I have a sneaking suspicion that the person who asked for me was Howard Donovan. He was Consul of Embassy in New Delhi, and he knew my parents. My father said he asked that I be sent as language and consular officer.

Q: When did you arrive in New Delhi?

BISBEE: I arrived in Bombay first, in 1948.

MRS. BISBEE: It was January 7th, 1947.

Q: Was this during or after the split, partition?

BISBEE: I arrived during the whole process of the split. I had the whole business of the docks thrown at me. I had to sort out all of the embassy's shipping and seamen aspects of this whole thing. It was a nightmare, because you had materials being shipped from Karachi being transferred to Bombay, and materials being shipped back up to Karachi. It was a mess.

Q: I assume you had local employees who were having to split too, weren't they?

BISBEE: Not necessarily the ones in Bombay; they were pretty solid. The ones in the north had more of a problem.

MRS. BISBEE: His parents were in Delhi at the time.

Q: What was the Consulate General like?

BISBEE: There was a general manager, John J. Macdonald, a very fine gentleman. He was a good executive. Without his executive skills, I can assure you that place would not have operated well. You had a number of other staff members who, in my opinion, were not worth a damn. They were more interested in careers that were not possible there at that time. Nevertheless, we were able to operate, because I was immediately thrown into doing visas, the seamen and shipping aspects. I was too worried about how I was going to proceed and learning about the job at the same time, rather than worrying what my career was going to be.

Q: Talk a little about seamen and shipping. This was an era when there were still American seamen.

BISBEE: Very much so.

Q: In later years, they've sort of disappeared. There used to be what they used to call the China Coast. What about the Indian Coast? These were pretty much people who, I won't say the dregs of sailorhood, but they weren't the greatest. They hung around and lived off the ports where they could live quite cheaply. There were girls and booze. They would get on a ship reluctantly when they had to pick up a little money to keep going. Was that the atmosphere?

BISBEE: Very much so. It was in a way a period which was volatile. You never knew whether the seamen that were in transit in nature were actually what they were pretending to be, or whether they were somehow associated with some kind of organization that was out in some fashion to divert goods and services.

As a matter of fact, my first promotion was due to my being able to find 12 cases of Scotch whisky that had not been breached in some fashion for the embassy in New Delhi, for which they were very pleased.

Q: We are talking about the immediate post-war period. Life was quite different then. You had diversions from the supply line to the Red Ball Express in France and everywhere. It was pretty freewheeling.

BISBEE: It was not only freewheeling, but people thought they could do anything they wanted to do. It was just not possible. It was just like this Miss Cox, for instance. She came to the coast of India on a ship from Nairobi. She just thought she could get off the ship, come ashore, and go do anything she wanted to. She couldn't. It was not possible to do that, certainly not without her passport and other documents. So what happened was she landed in jail.

Q: When was this? This was quite an important episode in a much later time.

BISBEE: This was in 1948.

Q: So this is early on in your career?

BISBEE: Yes.

Q: What was her first name?

BISBEE: Her full name was Una Chapman Cox.

Q: How did she come to your attention?

BISBEE: She was incarcerated, in jail. I was called by the locals. "Saab, come quickly. The police have one lady in jail and she has to be taken care of. Come quickly."

As soon as I found out what the evidence was in terms of who she was and why she was there, I went and talked with the Consul General. He said, "Do what you can. Get her out."

That's exactly what we did. What I did was to take my local right-hand man and go and interview her to find out what ship she had come from, and to send word back by the local agent to get her documents and papers, get them validated locally, and get her out of jail. The Consul General put her up and got her off to New Delhi and points east.

Q: How old was she?

BISBEE: I really don't know that.

Q: Was she a young girl?

BISBEE: No, I think she was in her late 20s.

Q: I'm surprised the authorities would make a fuss about this.

BISBEE: They didn't really. I smoothed it out as much as possible.

Q: I'm surprised it went as far as her being arrested.

BISBEE: They didn't know who she was or what she was doing there.

Q: So as far as they were concerned, was she a free floating spirit?

BISBEE: That's right. They didn't know what the hell she was up to.

The captain of the ship was of no account. He was a drunk.

Q: How did she react?

BISBEE: She was very pleased. She was a person who was interested in what was going on. That was the reason why she had come ashore, because she was interested in what was transpiring. Who was to know that later on she was going to be...

Q: You might explain the reason why we are dwelling on this. The Una Chapman Cox Foundation has been a significant factor in the Foreign Service. Many years later, she set up the foundation to help things dealing with the Foreign Service.

BISBEE: She was instrumental in donating large amounts of money to aid and further the ability of Foreign Service Officers to broaden their horizons and academic activities, without which they would not have had the opportunity to accomplish. It has been a very fine opportunity for...

Q: You had no idea this was in the offing?

BISBEE: No, I had no idea who she was or what she was until a couple of years ago when I was informed.

Q: Let's talk a bit about Bombay. Was Bombay at all affected by the partition? Or was that over the horizon?

BISBEE: Bombay was not affected by partition in the sense that you had sections of this and sections of that. Yes, you do have and always will have in places like India sections of the city that are very demarcated as Muslim or as Hindu. But to say that Bombay is one religious aspect or another would be incorrect. Bombay is a very commercial and cosmopolitan city. That's the way that it will always be. The same holds for Calcutta, which is very cosmopolitan.

Q: Had Bollywood made a foothold in Bombay at the time?

BISBEE: Not at that time. It didn't exist.

Q: Did you get involved with visas?

BISBEE: Yes, I was doing that.

Q: Was there much in the way of movement towards the United States? We had a quota of maybe 100 a year for immigrants. For non-immigrant visas, was there much going on?

BISBEE: Not at the time. It was more in the nature of people wanting to go to Great Britain. I did not have that kind of problem, although there were interested people wanting to send their children to the United States for studies. There was not a significant number.

Q: Were there any social unrest or political movements going on in the area that concerned us? The Cold War was getting its start, and you had a little farther south the communist area. Were those things going on?

BISBEE: The movements were. In 1947, you had communist movements going on in what was known as Kerala. Nehru was attempting to deal with that. There were separatist movements going on in Eastern India, but there were not separatist activities in Bombay.

MRS. BISBEE: There was mass slaughter, while Muslims were trying to get to Pakistan, and Hindus were trying to get to India.

BISBEE: I'm trying not to deal with that entirely.

It had to do with money, with wages, and the differences between the people who were members of a scheduled caste and those of a non-scheduled caste.

Q: I'm not familiar with the terms. Does scheduled caste mean the Brahmins?

BISBEE: Yes.

Q: And then moving to the Untouchables?

BISBEE: There were Sudras and others. There were caste differences.

Q: What was the team like at the consulate general?

BISBEE: I found the team fractured. The Consul General was almost by himself. I did not find him to be the leader of a team, but almost by himself.

MRS. BISBEE: Macdonald was replaced by Charles O. Thompson, who was very controversial. His second-in-command thought he should have been elevated.

BISBEE: There were about three or four others in the consulate general who, in my opinion, were all acting on their own and not acting as a team. Quite frankly, I was quite pleased to be transferred to New Delhi.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop. The next time, we'll pick up when you are off to New Delhi in 1948.

How was living in Bombay?

BISBEE: We were youngsters and as far as we were concerned, we were perfectly fine. We did not have any problems. There were just the two of us and one child. We had a nice apartment with free servants. We thought we were doing pretty well.

Q: Very good. We'll pick this up in 1948 when you are off to New Delhi.

Today is May 26th, 2010. This is the second interview with Royal Bisbee.

In 1948, you were rather happy to get out of Iraq and go to New Delhi.

BISBEE: Let's amend that. I was pleased to be able to serve my country and to be able to go on and get my degree at the University of Washington. For that purpose, yes, I was pleased. I also introduced my new wife to my family in Bombay and to see to the birth of my new child.

Q: How did you meet your wife?

BISBEE: I met my wife in Baghdad. It was not a dramatic experience. We were joyfully united. She was a visa officer. In those days, they deigned to send women to do visa work, because they couldn't find men since the men were in the army. We poor young fellows were without the joyful experience of intelligent young ladies.

Q: In 1948, you went to New Delhi.

BISBEE: In 1948, I went to New Delhi.

Q: What was your job?

BISBEE: My job was two-fold. One was to serve with due diligence my ambassador, Loy Henderson. He asked me to do all kinds of services. He knew that I had considerable experience, both educationally as well as linguistically. Secondly, he asked me to do general services work. General services work is, as we all know, whatever you want to call it.

Q: It's the glue that makes the embassy run.

BISBEE: You're exactly right.

MRS. BISBEE: It's a great place to use a person with languages.

Q: Before we get to your work, 1948 rings loud and clear in India. What was happening from the perspective of the embassy then? How were things going?

BISBEE: The embassy itself was being reorganized. It was being rethought because they had no idea that there would be such tumult in the country. Nehru was a new factor to them. In many respects, Nehru himself was a new intellectual. They had to revamp their thinking. They suddenly recognized that India was going to need many things in the way of reorganization, administration, food, and more understanding. There were going to be two countries, not just one. Suddenly, there were two countries. And here they were, unprepared.

The British had not prepared them for two countries, and the British were certainly not prepared for this whole aspect.

Q: We had become used to dealing with the British, as the rulers of the country. All of a sudden, we are having to deal with the Congress Party. This can be very difficult. Sometimes our officers get more anglophile than the British themselves.

BISBEE: I think that some possibly were. Others were not. Henderson was not. He was more of a Middle Eastphile.

Q: And also Eastern Europe.

BISBEE: Correct.

Q: Was his wife from Estonia?

BISBEE: Yes.

He was not, but that was probably the hardest wrench for him in many respects. I think this is where he ran into heavy weather in Congress. As a result, he was eventually replaced.

Q: What was the problem with Congress?

BISBEE: I think Congress suddenly realized that they were going to have to come up with a great deal of largesse. They were very much taken with our friend, Mr. Nehru, and his ability to persuade. Suddenly, there he was on the scene. They wanted to keep him on our side, as it were. There were many who also thought at the time that he was very much left wing.

Q: He was. He was a London School of Economics standard bearer.

BISBEE: And he had Mr. Menon.

Q: When I was much younger, I remember Krishna Menon as the evil presence.

BISBEE: As I saw it and as I advised Howard Donovan, this man was a menace to the joint development of an alliance of a strong nature on the subcontinent. And in my opinion he destroyed the intelligence services of the Pakistan-India compact that was developing at the time. He was a real son of a bitch.

Q: You were obviously a very junior officer, but because of your language ability, were you able to sit in on meetings with Henderson and Nehru.

BISBEE: I didn't sit in on meeting with Henderson, but I did with Howard Donovan who was the Deputy Chief of Mission. I had to be extremely careful. As you suggested, I was an extremely junior officer. As I told Howard Donovan, I was not in any way to push myself forward.

Q: One of the things I find interesting about these oral histories, when I talk to people who were officers, they were often the flies on the wall. While the great people were meeting, there is a Royal Bisbee sitting off in the corner taking notes or something. Were you picking up from the Nehru entourage and the American Henderson entourage a certain antipathy? Nehru had very little regard for the United States.

BISBEE: No, he had a great deal of regard for the United States, but he did not have much regard for Henderson.

Q: Why?

BISBEE: I think because he thought Henderson was shallow. Mrs. Henderson did not help.

Q: From what I gather and I may be putting words in your mouth, I was told she had the racial traits of the petty aristocracies...

BISBEE: He felt that Henderson was arrogant. That didn't mean that he wasn't arrogant.

I probably knew Nehru very well for a number of reasons. One was the fact that I had been to his home in Surrey, where his daughters went to school. His daughter, Chandralekha Pandit, was in my class, and we were good friends. I had been to their home in New Delhi on several occasions. As a matter of fact, Henderson didn't know that, but Donovan did. Donovan requested me to keep him informed of any new developments.

Henderson went to Nehru and said, "I want to send a party to rescue Lowell Thomas."

Nehru said, "Oh fine. How is the party going to be comprised?"

Henderson said, "I'm going to send an embassy officer and a nurse. In addition, I would request that the Government of India send a comparable party of a doctor and a nurse."

Nehru, in his usual shrewd way, said, "And who is this officer that you are going to send?"

He said, "I'm going to send Royal Bisbee."

When he came back to the embassy, Henderson called me into his office and said, "Mr. Nehru has approved of you leading the party. And by the way, Bisbee, I was not aware that Nehru knew you."

"I see, sir. I hope I have been useful."

That was all that was said.

Q: What was this party, the group you went with?

BISBEE: I think it was a birthday party. You always tried to keep things on as low a key as possible, not make it something official.

Incidentally, that's in my book.

Q: Did the embassy sort of divide up into parties? Sort of pro-Indian government and – I won't say anti-Indian government. This was not easy. From what I gather, the Indians have never been

an easy people to deal with. They tend to preach and we tend to preach. Two sets of preachers don't make for a very good combination.

BISBEE: You are asking a question which is extremely difficult to respond to. Perhaps I can put it this way.

There are those who sought to make themselves useful to the Indian government by perhaps acting as favorites. They hoped therefore to be useful to their own embassy. That doesn't always make for success. I think many of them fell short of that. There were other people, like Andrew Cory who was very useful. I believe he was able to play a very good part in the general dynamics of the policy within the embassy. There were others whose – who was the lady who was assigned for social welfare work in India? Somebody in Washington though this was a marvelous thing to do because of the activities of women on the Indian scene. Somebody like a social welfare person assigned to show what wonderful works we do. The name was Hersey.

MRS. BISBEE: She was a relative of John Hersey, the writer who wrote Hiroshima and A Bell for Adano.

BISBEE: She provided nothing.

MRS. BISBEE: The Labor Attaché...

BISBEE: That's another kettle of fish. You could argue that why assign a Labor Attaché to India? There is nothing you could add to the labor scene in India by a Labor Attaché from the United States. They were at right angles to each other.

Q: It may have been somewhat of a reflection of what happened in London. When the Labour Government came in in 1945, we had practically no one who knew the Labour Party people, except for the Labor Attaché. I think there was a boosting of Labor Attachés around the world because you better have somebody who knew something about this.

BISBEE: What is the point of a Labor Attaché in India who cannot speak the language of the labor people? He used to ask me how was this particular labor movement organized? How did this man arrive at this particular position? He was a perfectly fine man. I liked Sokoloff. He was welcomed by the Russians at their festivities. But what use was this?

Q: Where do you find somebody who comes out of the labor movement in the United States who would know about Indian migration? We had a quota of 100. Other countries sent people off to Argentina for instance. They spoke Spanish because they were of Spanish heritage and they were union members. I'm not excusing this...

BISBEE: I know what you are saying.

MRS. BISBEE: You don't mean to say people have to have the language.

BISBEE: No, I don't.

Q: Obviously, we don't make much headway in situation like that, but there it is.

What was your impression of the Indian bureaucracy, which was well trained?

BISBEE: The ICS, the Indian Civil Service.

Q: Were they an effective organization under the new regime.

BISBEE: They were very effective. From stem to stern, the Indian Civil Service was one of the finest organizations then and now, and has been the glue of the country that has held it together. It is going to need that glue. Otherwise, that country is going to shatter.

Q: Was there the feeling at the time that you had this country – I'm sure you called it a state – with rulers scattered about, that it would not shatter?

BISBEE: At the time, no. Most of us recognized at the time that it was the Indian Civil Service that was going to hold the country together and was holding it together. Nehru himself recognized it. He relied on the Indian Civil Service to hold the states together, and to hold the central government together. When in the face of communist problems in Kerala and other areas of the country, it was the Indian Civil Service on whom he relied to hold it together. He didn't rely on anybody else.

Q: Remembering that you were way down in the embassy, but again you were a fly on the wall. Were we concerned about Kerala, where the Communist Party was very strong?

BISBEE: The Communist Party was strong in the eastern, southwest, and central part of the country. And it is today. Don't let anybody tell you it is not.

Q: Today nobody gives a damn, but in those days, from the American point of view...

Given your language and your contacts, were you able to break loose from the embassy social set? Did you get out and around?

BISBEE: I was out all the time. I was not a member of the social set. I didn't live at the Taj Mahal. I lived separately in a portion of my parents' home in Old Delhi. I had little or not contact with the social aspects. All my social contacts, whether with the Indian Civil Service or others, came and visited me. For instance, John Law visited me after our sojourn together up in Tibet. I was a part of it, yet I wasn't.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian society you were dealing with? How were they dealing with this partition? It was the very early days.

BISBEE: They were dealing with it as best they could. I was living in an area where shots were being fired right across our living areas. Let's put it this way: they were dealing with it in a quiet subduedness. That's the best way I can tell you. There wasn't any other way for them to deal

with it. The police weren't much good. They were a bunch of flunkies, as far as that went. Everybody was concerned about their own existence, and how best to survive, where to go and what to do.

Q: How long were you in this posting?

BISBEE: Do you mean the total Indian posting?

Q: No, just when you went to New Delhi in 1948?

BISBEE: I was there until the first period of 1950.

Q: So the Korean War hadn't broken out when you left?

BISBEE: No, the Korean War hadn't broken out. I was asked to join, but I was already a vice consul, and I decided I was going to remain a vice consul.

Q: When you left in 1950, where did you go?

BISBEE: In 1950, I was assigned to Washington, although Washington is not the right word for it. What I was assigned to was the University of Pennsylvania.

Q: Doing what?

BISBEE: At the University of Pennsylvania, I was assigned to language training.

Q: What language?

BISBEE: Hindi.

Q: Good heavens. How much Hindi did you need?

BISBEE: I didn't need any more. I finally had to tell Washington this was a waste of everyone's time. I'm not getting anywhere. I'm not doing you justice. I need an assignment. Isn't there something in the wings? There was. What was in the wings was the Voice of America

They asked me to start up the Voice of America broadcast to South Asia. Wonderful. I was able to recruit, monitor, and tailor the programs directly to the South Asia area in Hindi and Urdu.

Q: How long were you doing this?

BISBEE: Unfortunately, I did it only for about eight months.

Q: This was until when?

BISBEE: Until the beginning of 1952. Then I was assigned to go to India to open up the posting in Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh.

Q: What was the situation? I think of the siege of Lucknow and the Indian Mutiny. I assume we got involved in observing what was going on there.

BISBEE: You've got to understand that there is a saying in India that how Uttar Pradesh goes politically, so goes the country. Just as in the adage of the Middle East, the way that the Pushtunstan area goes, so goes Afghanistan. People better not forget it, because that is the politically controllable area.

I'm sorry. I digress, but what I'm trying to get across is that there are two areas of the world which are very important. One is where we are now, and where we went into Lucknow. It was to Lucknow that I was sent.

Uttar Pradesh was the home of Nehru. Uttar Pradesh is the capital.

We were asked to open up a post at Lucknow. I arrived there with my family in December. Chester Bowles arrived about the same time. He was very generous in that I was not versed in the politics of the time, although I had gotten to know the governor who was a Gujarati. He and I became very good friends. He encouraged me in my Gujarati language. He got a big kick out of Bowles when he first arrived.

I'll tell you this story because it is anecdotal. When Bowles arrived, I had to make arrangements for luncheons, dinners, and for the ladies to see various sights in the area. It's a very historic area. The dining table was beautifully set up. The cards on the table were beautifully engraved. Except for one thing: the name was spelled Bowels.

Q: I'm sure it wasn't the first time it happened.

BISBEE: No, I'm sure. I had to ask, "Why did you do that?"

He said, "I didn't mean to do that Roy. Why would I do that?"

I said, "I think you might have done that simply to have a good laugh."

I held meetings for Bowles. He wanted to know whether or not there had been any individuals who had gone to Everest. He was on his way to send his credentials to Nepal. I told him not to my knowledge, but the time would come, I was sure. It did, and I put it into my book.

Q: What was your impression of Bowles as ambassador? He was a major figure in the advertising world, which was a very important world in that era.

BISBEE: He was a mess. He was coming to a country where the ambassador was looked upon as someone who was well turned out and well featured. When he arrived, he was – what shall I say? – dressed down?

Q: Unkempt?

BISBEE: Unkempt is the right word. What is the matter with people? Don't they recognize what we as a country are? How we should be showing ourselves? At least keeping up with the local Joneses?

Q: The Korean War must have been quite an issue that you had to deal with in your time.

BISBEE: No, the Korean War was not the issue that I had to deal with. What I had to deal with was arms aid to Pakistan. The Chinese propaganda was vicious. I had to fix that. So did our people who came out to make speeches. They had to face some very vicious diatribes.

Q: Were there lots of demonstrations against you?

BISBEE: No, believe it or not, I did not have demonstrations against me. There were demonstrations all around me, but none directly against me.

Q: How was Chinese influence projected in your area?

BISBEE: Through their publications, all kinds of publications. If you want to pursue it further, you could say that throughout the bazaar, the kiosks and through people showing their various Chinese publications. But, there were no demonstrations, per se.

Let me change it a bit. There were such things as *Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai*, that is, Chinese-India brothers. There was that kind of demonstration, but there was nothing jointly of that nature demonstrated against us Americans.

As a matter of fact, I went out of my way to try to make sure that we did not in some fashion do something that would emulate or in some fashion annoy the local Communist Party. The problem with a lot of this is that many of our people will feel that it is essential to counter the demonstrations and the effects of, they think, the local Communist Party movements. There was no need for that, because most of it was hollow. I did not find it necessary to try to counter that. My counter was to present a good American face.

Q: Did you get much direction from the Voice of America?

BISBEE: No sir.

Q: Did they just let you do your thing?

BISBEE: No, the Voice of America never gave me any direction.

Q: For a while you were working with the Voice of America, weren't you?

BISBEE: For a while there, we were operating closely with the Voice of America, with the directions, as it were. But it was always implied directions. There was never any saying, "You will do so-and-so."

Or it would simply be, today the news will be that the Chinese have taken over the Tibetan government. The news would come through Bombay.

Q: Were the Soviets and the Chinese, from your observation, playing the same line in India? Or were they doing different things?

BISBEE: The Soviets were playing their own distinctive line, not a Chinese line. The Chinese were playing their own line. The Russians, in my opinion, were concerned that the Chinese would take matters into their own hands. I was being attacked by the Russians on Radio Moscow as a spy for the Americans in the Northwest Frontier. The Russians were concerned about the possibility to some degree that the Chinese would take that into their own hands on the border.

Q: The border, of course, was a prime focus in Chinese-Indian relations, wasn't it?

BISBEE: Not quite at that time, but it was becoming so. It became so in about 1954.

Q: As a practical point of view, did the United States have much interest in India.

BISBEE: The United States had a considerable interest in India, but they didn't know what they would be able to do with it. How would they be able to protect it? They wouldn't want it to go communist. At the same time, how much largesse were they able to produce?

Q: At that time and for decades, India was not much of a market because of Indian mercantile policies that didn't allow much trade.

BISBEE: What was a concern was who was going to control the trade in Southeast Asia? That was of concern. And it later proved to be the case. The Chinese have attempted, and Mao himself in several of his speeches pointed out their interest in controlling the trade of Southeast Asia, and spilling over into Africa.

Q: Was the atmosphere of the Foreign Service beginning to feel McCarthyism? Was that striking around you?

BISBEE: No, I never felt it.

Q: No people you knew?

BISBEE: No.

Q: India was sort of out of the line of sight. It was more Europe and China, I guess.

BISBEE: McCarthyism was a matter of Europe and China. This is where you began to have the problems with respect to the opening up of China, which was important to the United States at the time.

Q: We didn't really open up relations until the 1970s, but when you and your colleagues, particularly the junior officers, were talking about it, was there a feeling of gee, we should really open up to China?

BISBEE: No, not where I was, but I knew that was going on. Of course, that was where it came to pass – who was the fellow who went off to the island? What was his name? They had to decide.

Q: Do you mean Chiang Kai-shek going to Taiwan?

BISBEE: Thank you. Yes. There was a big decision that had to be made about opening up various parts of China.

Q: It was a very difficult time.

Did you leave there in 1953?

BISBEE: No, I left Lucknow in 1956.

Q: It was a fairly long tour there.

BISBEE: It was a hell of a long tour there.

Q: How did you feel about relations with the embassy?

BISBEE: I felt as though the embassy could have done more. I did not think in terms of what they were doing for me. I was thinking in terms of how we were being able to do for our own policy in the country. As far as I was concerned, I was satisfied with what was happening in Lucknow. I had no issues there. I had all the support I could possibly have. They were sending me people to give speeches and do all kinds of things. I was asked to do give talks, really great speeches. I was asked to translate for the Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson. I was extremely busy.

Q: Did Eisenhower make a visit to India while you were there?

BISBEE: Yes he did.

Q: How did that go?

BISBEE: I don't like to speak about Eisenhower in terms of India, because I was in Lahore at the time. As far as my information was concerned, he did very well. The Indians liked him, particularly the Indian intelligence services. That's what they told me. Good for him.

Q: Did you have good contacts with the intelligence service?

BISBEE: Yes I did. I had to continue to dissuade them however that I was not an intelligence officer.

Q: I understand that. We look at it today and there is a real problem in the neighbor, Pakistan, with their intelligence service. It seems to be playing a two-sided game of who they are supporting.

BISBEE: I understand.

Q: How stood the intelligence service that you could observe the intelligence service during this time? Were they political? Were they professional? Or what?

BISBEE: Excuse me, but the language you used is slightly doubled.

Q: Let's talk about the Indian intelligence service.

BISBEE: The Indian intelligence service is highly trained, and highly Western. You also have to understand it has highly religious aspects in it. Taking those things into consideration, you also have to realize that it also has in it elements of local prejudices. This is where it takes very careful analysis to work out what is essential in their needs. I find it difficult to sit here and respond to your question, because I know there are going to be six different responses, or more, to what you are asking. Yet I understand what you are saying to me. Where is the loyalty? Where is the focal point? Where is the direction that is essential that you can depend upon? This is very difficult.

Q: We are talking about the early 1950s.

BISBEE: When you go back to the 1950s, you had the opportunity, particularly with Ayoub who wanted to have a joint intelligence service.

Q: Do you mean the Prime Minister of Pakistan?

BISBEE: Yes. It fell apart as a result of both Krishna Menon and the problems with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). So you had those issues.

Q: Pakistan was in SEATO and India was not.

BISBEE: That is correct.

Q: Was Kashmir a major issue while you were there?

BISBEE: Let me point this out to you. Kashmir must be treated as an internal issue of India and Pakistan. It must not be given the slightest hint of it being treated separately as a matter of

concern to the international community. If that ever happens, you are going to have a totally different kettle of fish going on in that area.

If I may go back, I mentioned a country, and Kandahar is what I wanted to mention there. That area through Kandahar in Afghanistan – but that's a different issue.

Where was I? Kashmir is an issue that is a tribal issue. It is an issue that has to be treated locally. If it is given the slightest hint of being treated as an international affair, it's going to really be a bombshell in the area. I think you are aware of it as a result of the Maharajah, who was a real idiot, deciding to opt for India, when the bulk of the population of Muslim. He was an idiot.

When President Johnson came to Pakistan, he gave a big speech there. He asked me to translate. I think I did a good job, because he never swore at me. He was asked a question from the audience during the question and answer period saying, "When sir, are you going to do something about the Kashmir question? Are we going to have a solution?"

The President put his hand over the mike and said, "Son, have you got an answer for this? Sometimes there are answers from the mouths of babes."

I said, "Yes, I do. You don't say anything sir. You simply say that this is in the hands of your illustrious leaders, who are very capable of taking care of matters of this nature. They are doing a wonderful job to settle the situation."

It went off okay.

My response to a question of that nature is that is going to settle itself, but it is going to take money and political pressure from within.

Q: Where did you go after you left India?

BISBEE: I wrote to Henderson saying that I have been here long enough. I think you had ideas that I was to go on elsewhere. In the meantime, Lowell Thomas had also written to Henderson and said, "What are you doing for Royal Bisbee?"

I had not written to anybody.

Q: Loy Henderson was in charge of administration in the Department of State, a very powerful figure.

BISBEE: He was. He wrote me back a beautiful letter, as was his wont, and as I expected, saying nothing. He said yes, I must do something. Thank you very much for drawing this matter to my attention. So I found myself in Greece, in Thessaloniki.

HOWARD IMBREY

**CIA Officer
Bombay (1948-1950)**

**CIA Officer
Kerala (1950-1951)**

Upon receiving an education from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Howard Imbrey joined the CIA in 1948. Among Mr. Imbrey's CIA postings included India, Sri Lanka, Congo, France, and Italy. Mr. Imbrey was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in June 2001.

IMBREY: So, that was pretty good. At any rate, after training, let's see. They sent us to various courses in world affairs and in the countries of our interest. I was immediately singled out for India because of the language and the fact that I'd been there before and prepared for a post in Bombay. And we had a little trouble with the State Department as you can imagine getting our people into various posts. The two brothers Allen and John Foster Dulles.

Q: Well, this is still 1948, so Foster didn't get in until '53?

IMBREY: No, Dean Acheson was there at the time, but the State Department was jumpy as usual.

Q: Well, it was a new thing, too.

IMBREY: Yes. Then the guy whom I was replacing, Lennox Fogg, his parents were of the Fogg Museum in Boston. This chap had a drinking problem that culminated with the thought that he might be able to fly. He flew out the first floor or second story window where he was living. Didn't do him any good. He was too drunk, I guess. He survived very well. The State Department said that's enough and they said to the CIA to get that man replaced right away. So, immediately I was shipped out there to replace this guy.

Q: This was in '48?

IMBREY: Yes. '48.

Q: When did the great partition of India take place?

IMBREY: '47.

Q: '47? So, it was sort of immediately afterwards?

IMBREY: Yes.

Q: You were in Bombay from when to when?

IMBREY: '48 to '50. Just two years. The ambassador there was Timberlake. He was a leader and ambassador to the Congo and Peru and a few other places. We got along splendidly.

Q: But you were in Bombay rather than New Delhi, is that right?

IMBREY: Yes, that was in Bombay. It was a Consulate General. There were all sorts of people to meet there. First of all there was a navy. We were interested in the Indian navy's ability to cooperate with us and CIA developed sources there. A lot of funny things that were going on there, the guy that I had there was the chief of operations for the Indian navy and he was an admiral and his headquarters were in Bombay. One of the things that interested him that he tried to get me interested in was pornographic pictures, which he had by the ton.

Q: Well, you already had good training with the comic books.

IMBREY: Yes, I had wonderful training for them, but he said, "Do you think you could get me some others?" So, I didn't tell headquarters about this because I thought that was a little risky, but I had a friend who was the chief of station, Dick Clise, in New Delhi. I said, "Dick, what are we going to do?" And, he said, "Don't worry. I have sources for that sort of stuff and they produce a lot of the stuff here." What they have are these little books, some are even typed scripts of various methods of intercourse you wouldn't believe. So, I always had a supply of these things to give him and so our relationship was very good. The only funny thing about that was I went to Delhi on one occasion with my wife and four of us went out to dinner and on our way to the restaurant a guy came running pell-mell with a handful of these things and saying, "Mr. Clise, Mr. Clise, I have some more for you." His wife didn't know anything about this.

Q: You mentioned a wife. When did she appear on the scene?

IMBREY: We were married in Bombay.

Q: What was her background?

IMBREY: She was the sister of my roommate in college. I used to visit my roommate in New York when she was a little girl and eventually we got together and I proposed when drunk.

Q: Great. What was your impression of how India was settling in as a new nation?

IMBREY: There was enough time for Bombay. There were a lot of people who were being oppressed in Pakistan, the new Pakistan and particularly the Sindhi population. Sindhis are a national element from the province of Sin in Pakistan. They're generally distrusted for very good reasons. They're very sly people and they have a lot of attributes that are not particularly inviting. These people came down to Bombay in droves, set up shops, displaced merchants that had been there for years and Bombay was seething. There was a lot of trouble. A lot of fighting in the streets. A lot of loss of control, but it was a very interesting place to be of course. The key to Indian society for most Americans who, especially those who were in Bombay with parcees who are a very cultivated and interesting bunch, you have sympathies with both the Muslims and the

Hindus. By now by getting with the parcees you could expand tremendously your cover of friendships and relationships. So, Bombay was in that sense a very good post to begin.

Q: How did you find your relations with the State Department people there?

IMBREY: In my case, it turned out very well. The ambassador...

Q: The ambassador or the consul general?

IMBREY: Oh, well, Timberlake, consul general, yes. Ambassador Timberlake stood in as father of the bride when I married my wife in Bombay and all the other people were extremely supportive and happy to have me along. I had no enemies and I appreciated they all had jobs to do and we worked together.

Q: How did you find some of the Indian government? Did they pay much attention to your activities?

IMBREY: No, as a matter of fact I had good relationships with the police and that was one of my chores of my job was to find out from the police what was going on. We had several communist parties at the time and that, of course, was of tremendous interest to us and to the police. So, I got a great deal of information from them that was reportable and through them I also got relations with labor unions and spent a lot of time developing relations with the labor unions who with the nature of their work were very upset and concerned about communism in their ranks.

Q: The Indian communists at that time which you had seen, were they sort of local grown or were they a disciplined group coming from or getting orders from Moscow?

IMBREY: At first it was one united party under a man named Nikay Rondevey, a very able politician who was elusive. He would have been arrested if they had ever found him. He managed to get a number of people behind him. Moscow-oriented, and certainly the Russians were supporting him to a good extent until the split of the Russians with the Chinese, at which time a Maoist group grew up particularly in the south of India. So, we were watching Membership very carefully, too. So, between the police and my military contacts and the labor contacts I could report a good deal on what was going on in the communist party.

Q: Did you cover Kerala?

IMBREY: The Kerala? Not then. Kerala had a consulate general in Madras and our guy in Madras was supposedly covering it. Unfortunately, he too was an alcoholic.

Q: You were saying the consul general of Madras was a

IMBREY: No, no, the consul general who was stationed there was unfortunately an alcoholic.

Q: That was part of the problem, wasn't it? I think in some of these places where they've been doing this a long time, drinking becomes quite a way of life?

IMBREY: Oh, in the Foreign Service we all drank.

Q: It was a real, real problem.

IMBREY: Yes, it was a problem and you probably remember yourself when the houseboy came in with eighteen different kinds of liquor.

Q: Oh, yes.

IMBREY: Yes, a lot of people were under the influence.

Q: So, how did that work out for you?

IMBREY: Yes, they sent me from Bombay; they said well you handled things so well in Bombay with the first incident, why don't you go down to Madras and relieve the situation there. So, they sent the guy in Madras home and I went down to Madras with the kit and caboodle and family, down to Madras and then I did come to Kerala.

Q: Then Kerala of course for a long time was always looked upon with great suspicion from the American point of view because there was a very strong communist party there.

IMBREY: Well, only after the Maoist thing and that sort of a caste thing. The man who was in charge of that was a Nambuteripod. That is not only a family name, but a caste name and a very high up caste name so you show a lot of respect among the other castes. He was taken in by the Chinese and they were doing very well in a community in which every third guy had a Ph.D. The most amazing thing in all of Kerala is that the people are all so over-trained, over-educated and splendidly over-educated, and, of course, there are no jobs. Who needs all of these professors?

Q: So, they couldn't expand outside of the area?

IMBREY: They had that problem, too, but they were tremendously intelligent and the communist party appealed to them as a haven.

Q: Well, what were we doing? Were we trying to co-opt any of these people or just report on them?

IMBREY: No, Kerala was a specialty. You go about it in a peculiar way. For example, there's a group in Kerala of Syrian Christians. They came over with Thomas the apostle in the fourth century I think it was. They were Syrian Christians. Those guys were amenable to recruitment and reporting. Then there was another group the Maccabean Jews, the black Jews of India who have an area around called Bajetown over on the west coast and their own synagogue and their own tabernacle and God knows what and they were recruitable, too.

Q: What were we seeing there, even if the Maoists were going doing well there, it was sort of a self-sealed operation in that they really couldn't penetrate the rest of Indian society.

IMBREY: There was a tremendous evolution and what began merely as a pocket communist party in two different places spread. North of Madras is another province called Ambhra and all of them were under the influence of this man Ramadini who started a civil war. They sent the Indian army down there to deal with this and so there were security situations for the whole subcontinent that you reported on. In Madras I was the only one really reporting on that. So, we had the consul general and two other people who had consular jobs. So, I had a lot of responsibility in keeping the government informed on the status this little war that was going on in Ambhra.

Q: How did you find the Indian officials at that time? Were they concerned about what was going on?

IMBREY: Oh, tremendously yes because their jobs depended on how they treated their own people. We saw them regularly, we had good relations with a great many of them.

Q: How were you able to find out what was happening?

IMBREY: Through agents. As I said we had agents that were Syrian, Christian, Jewish and various Indian communities and we met surreptitiously, got our information, submitted it. In those days we had to type it on the thatch forms, remember those forms?

Q: Oh, yes. Were Indian officials in the central government concerned about I suppose a somewhat obvious operation of the CIA person there?

IMBREY: I don't think so, because they could have easily have put a stop to it; they could have easily identified us. In those days we certainly had a number of security options at our disposal, but nothing like we have today and the Indian government could have penetrated us immediately and probably had.

Q: So, you were both basically working the same side?

IMBREY: That's right. No objections. I don't recall being harassed by the Indians.

Q: How did the Indian army do when it was brought down?

IMBREY: It won the war. After all most of the people who were fighting that war were dirt poor, there were no weapons, nothing much could be done. It wasn't like today's arms or rebellions.

Q: Also, at the time India was just beginning to put itself together, wasn't it? You had the princely states, which were still quasi-independent or something?

IMBREY: Yes. They were going out of fashion and weren't happy about it; so you had that, too.

Q: How did you find society in Madras as compared to the society in Madrid in Europe in your perspective?

IMBREY: Madras was a peculiar place, everybody was super intellectual. Everybody's family has children who must be artists or in some way prove that they are better than the family that lives next door. Well, the result is they all have to play a musical instrument, dance or Indian dancing or classical Indian dancing. When a girl is about thirteen or fourteen she has to do a sort of coming out, a debut. So, they hire a hall, they put her on the stage with an orchestra and she has to do about four hours of classical dancing. You think it is tough on her; it's also tough on the backsides of those people who are called in to witness this. Anyhow, you went to dinner and just about as the dinner was ending somebody would say, oh, my sister is here and she plays the vina and we were treated to a concert of about three hours of vina music. They're all talented. It's not to say they didn't dance well or play well, but ...

Q: You're saying you found that the hand of Washington or even in New Delhi in your point of view your superiors rested lightly on you?

IMBREY: Very lightly, yes. We were concerned with other things. World communism was in fashion and we had other fish to fry. We were in the middle of Bombay then came along Korea. Korea came in 1950 and so the real attention was on Korea, not what was going on in Bombay.

Q: But wasn't there a concern because the Indians were beginning to play a nasty role. I mean this was when the Indians began with Krishna Menon. I mean, all of a sudden, the Indians weren't really the nice guys. They were a problem. They were a burr under the saddle.

IMBREY: They sure were. Krishna Menon and the United Nations? We really hated them. Colonialism.

Q: He was basically a British socialist snob in a way.

IMBREY: He was under the anti-colonist credentials. So, I'm sure he and Kwame Nkrumah got on very well.

Q: Did this affect your role?

IMBREY: Not really. Most Indians with whom we had contact, they enjoyed the prestige of having contacts with somebody in the consulate and even more so in Delhi in the Embassy. They looked forward to those contacts. They, as a matter of fact, they referred to their own people as Buddhist people.

Q: When you were in Madras, did you see any problem with Tamil separatism or connections with at that time called Ceylon; later it was Sri Lanka?

IMBREY: No. That hadn't come up yet. As far as their own aspirations went, all of the southern Indians have a literature that goes deeper and earlier than the Sanskrit literature of the north. You have writings in Talaygoo, Malayan. All of those have a literary history that is four thousand

years old, not to mention Bengal. Bengalis think they have it all, too. So, these are people that are very concerned about the past and their own glory. We have that all the time.

Q: You left Madras when?

IMBREY: '51 I guess.

HENRI SOKOLOVE
Labor Attaché
New Delhi (1948-1953)

Henri Sokolove was born in Philadelphia, PA, and started working for the National Recovery Administration in 1933. He then went on to the labor program in the War Production Board in 1942. He worked for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, taking him to multiple places in China. In 1948, he was sent to India as a Labor Attaché. He was interviewed by Morris Weisz on February 14, 1992.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: You came back to the United States and applied for a position in the State Department in the Foreign Service, and you were admitted as an FSO, first as an FSR, and then as an FSO. Then in 1948, you went to India as a Labor Attaché.

SOKOLOVE: Okay.

Q: That's the sequence that we want. So what it amounts to is that your relief activities, as valuable and interesting as they were, were not in the labor field?

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: And you reentered the labor field...

SOKOLOVE: In 1948.

Q: ...being assigned to New Delhi?

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: And in New Delhi, according to the records that we have, you spent the following years, and let me just get those...

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Five years, 1948 to 1953.

Q: All I can tell you is that our friend Harold Davey in the Labor Department has gotten out a big list of places where labor officers have served and, according to him, Henri Sokolove was assigned to India seven different years from...

SOKOLOVE: 1948 to 1953 is what I have always said.

Q: Okay, let's get that down. Well, he [Davey] may be wrong. He has you down from 1948 to Dave Burgess's arrival, which he has as 1955. Are you telling me that there were three years [in which Embassy New Delhi was] without a Labor Attaché?

SOKOLOVE: That's all right. Either that or maybe Edith Wall performed the function.

Q: Was Edith Wall there at the time you came?

SOKOLOVE: No.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: She came later. She came after 1948.

Q: Oh, boy. We are going to have a good time correcting the careful records of our friend Harold Davey, who has Edith Wall coming in 1950, which would have been after you came?

MRS. SOKOLOVE: We came in 1948 and I think she probably came in 1950. That is conceivable.

Q: She was your Assistant Labor Attaché?

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: After you had been there a couple of years she came in 1950 and she stayed three or four years with you.

Who was the Ambassador at the time?

SOKOLOVE: We started with Loy Henderson.

Q: Oh, my God! Really?

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Was Henderson before Bowles?

SOKOLOVE: Of course.

Q: Then Bowles came for his first tour. I was there for his second. What were the outlines of your function? Did he tell you what to do? Or did you just go out and make your own contacts?

SOKOLOVE: The latter.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: I might add always the latter. No matter what post he was in he set the program.

SOKOLOVE: That's a fact.

Q: If that's a fact, let's have it down. Don't be overly modest.

SOKOLOVE: It's not a matter of being modest, it's a matter of being accurate.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: That's right and I want to be accurate.

Q: And I want both of you to be accurate. Okay, you then sort of made your own thing. Just let me tell you why I think that is quiet relevant, because, as distinguished from when I came, there was a very different understanding, namely I came there to prepare a labor program. I got all sorts of materials as to what they wanted me to do. I had to talk to...

SOKOLOVE: Now, where was this?

Q: When I came to India. So you came there with sort of an open assignment and you started making your contacts.

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: Was there any limitation on who you could approach?

SOKOLOVE: None.

Q: Where you either encouraged or discouraged from seeing the left?

SOKOLOVE: Neither. Just go out and do your thing.

Q: Including making contact with the Communist trade unions?

SOKOLOVE: Yes.

Q: That's very interesting because this is another difference between your service and others, in which we were discouraged or forbidden in some cases from contacting the [Communists].

SOKOLOVE: Oh, really?

Q: In my case, I was forbidden in many cases from getting in touch with them because the Cold War was a little older. It was after 1962. So you sort of went off on your own?

SOKOLOVE: Right. Let me make it clear that the Communists wouldn't have wanted to have any contact with the American Embassy whatsoever, so whatever contacts I had were just casual, accidental [contacts]. They were not structured in any way either by me or them.

Q: *Was Dange the head of the [Communist] union at that time?*

SOKO LOVE: I think so.

Q: *Yes, he lasted a long time. Okay, the next question on our list is how you worked within the framework of the Embassy? I take it you were sort of separate from it? Were you a member of the country team? Was there a country team?*

SOKO LOVE: No, there was no country team.

Q: *You reported to whom?*

SOKO LOVE: I reported to Washington.

Q: *To the Ambassador?*

SOKO LOVE: Well, as far as the Ambassador was concerned, our relationship administratively was that I reported to him.

Q: *To him directly, not through the political or the economic counselor?*

SOKO LOVE: Right, but in fact as far as reporting was concerned, and underscore the word reporting, I reported to Washington. Nobody in the Embassy knew other than by reading my despatches what was going on, and, of course, Washington was just a listening area. They took what I wrote and filed it away. Nobody ever instructed me what to do or not to do.

Q: *Yes, it became much more structured in other cases under different circumstances. What it amounts to is that you were an independent operator. The Ambassador may have signed your cables, but he never told you to do more on this or less on that or something.*

SOKO LOVE: Right. Leave out the commas and the exclamation points.

Q: *And that was the case both with Henderson, who certainly had a different approach, and later on with Bowles?*

SOKO LOVE: Yes

Q: *Bowles took no interest at all?*

SOKO LOVE: None.

Q: *That is so fascinating*

SOKO LOVE: Because he came into a structured situation. I just went on doing what I had done before and currently then.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: There were a number of conflicts between you and Bowles. Let's face it!

SOKOLOVE: About what?

MRS. SOKOLOVE: I really don't know what it was, but I'm sure it was your work. I think he wanted to have his finger into it. Look, I remember it very well. There were times even though he came to you when you were on leave in Washington because he was told, "You see Sokolove. He can give you more information about India than anyone." So we started out very nicely. I thought we were great friends and then there was this coolness. Now I don't know what it was.

SOKOLOVE: First of all, I never felt friendly or cool toward him because what I did was to write despatches about things that I was doing, so he wouldn't have any reason to interfere or try to interfere.

Q: Well, let me then tell you that a guy I served with in India, who later became an ambassador to Bangladesh, Howie Schaffer, was a young officer when I was there in 1965 to 1971. He is writing a biography of Bowles and has interviewed me at length and I am specifically going to suggest that he look into that first term of Bowles in India and Bowles' relationship with the labor program, so if you have anything to say about that, fine. In your days Bowles was the Ambassador there under Truman.

In any event your description of what you did in India was far different from that of others and therefore it will be very interesting to us. You were operating sort of as an independent person, with the Ambassador signing off on your cables but with no effort to supplement or use your information and certainly not to control or even comment on what you were talking about.

SOKOLOVE: Exactly.

Q: What about your relations with the political and economic sections? Did they have any interest in the impact of the labor situation upon the economics or the politics of the country?

SOKOLOVE: None whatsoever.

Q: That's strange. What if you felt the Political Section was going off on the wrong track? Or the labor situation would have affected adversely what we were doing or inhibit it in some way or enhance it in some way?

SOKOLOVE: The labor situation was its own world. It did not impact on the general political situation or the economic conditions of India.

Q: What about a big strike that would affect their ability to ship food from one part of the country?

SOKOLOVE: None whatsoever.

Q: *They had no such influence at that time?*

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: *Did the battles among the unions, the Socialists, the INTUC, the Communist unions, etc., create a problem for the economy or polity of the country?*

SOKOLOVE: None, none whatever.

Q: *That's fascinating.*

SOKOLOVE: At least not at that stage.

Q: *Yes, I understand. Do you have any comments on the personalities and policies of the different labor people in India? Their reactions to you or their friendliness or lack of friendliness?*

SOKOLOVE: They were all personally friendly and were only too glad to tell me what they thought about [general] conditions in India without feeling that those conditions impacted on the labor situation.

Q: *What about the relationship between the various Indian unions and the AFL and the CIO separately? Were there AFL and CIO people who came to India and what did they do?*

SOKOLOVE: Both of them came and visited and came to me to find out who was who in the Indian labor movement and I helped them to make contacts without feeling any complication in the situation, either for them or for me.

Q: *Who came for the AFL? Harry Goldberg?*

SOKOLOVE: No.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: George Weaver?

Q: *No. He was CIO. Irving Brown?*

SOKOLOVE: Brown

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Definitely. I remember we used to sleep outside. I used to say "sleep outside together", because it was so hot when he was there. I remember he suffered.

Q: *Did he stay long?*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Well, he didn't stay briefly. Henri and he went off several times to...

Q: *Traveled together.*

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: *Was he particularly dependent or independent of what you did? He did what he wanted to do and you accompanied him.*

SOKOLOVE: Right. I helped him do what he wanted to do.

Q: *You, of course, knew him from the War Production Board.*

SOKOLOVE: Yes.

Q: *We all worked together. Who, if anyone, was the CIO person who came?*

SOKOLOVE: That's what I am trying to remember.

Q: *Victor Reuther?*

SOKOLOVE: I don't think that Victor came.

Q: *George Weaver?*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: George Weaver definitely came.

SOKOLOVE: Yes, but when did he come?

MRS. SOKOLOVE: That's what I cannot recall.

Q: *What was the purpose of his coming? He was representing the CIO, I suppose.*

SOKOLOVE: Well, I'm not sure. That's why I'm hedging, because it may have been that he was already in Government.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: You see, I'm mixing George's visit to India with a much later [visit], because George came out to Malaya when we were there.

SOKOLOVE: Forget Malaya. Let's stick to India.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: No, no. I'm just saying...

Q: *What she's saying is that he did visit you later. He came to the Government in 1960 as the Assistant Secretary of Labor [for International Affairs]. This would have been before, when he was still with the CIO.*

SOKOLOVE: That would have been the situation.

Q: *Similarly he went around with you or made his separate contacts?*

SOKOLOVE: We wouldn't have had any trouble one way or the other.

Q: *Were the visits by the AFL and the CIO useful in any way or contrary to the interests of the Embassy?*

SOKOLOVE: No, none at all.

Q: *Useful for contacts?*

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: *There was a particular group in the H.M.S. -- You remember the Socialist Trade Union. ...*

SOKOLOVE: Hind Mazdoor Sabha.

Q: *Right. That group was particularly friendly with the Royists in the... and they were close of course to the Lovestone group in the AFL, but that didn't...*

SOKOLOVE: I don't think it impacted on the Indian situation.

Q: *Right. Did you remember Maniben Kara?*

SOKOLOVE: Oh, very well. She was a good personal friend of ours.

Q: *She was a personal friend of every one of our Labor Attachés...*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Oh, gracious yes. She was a remarkable gal. She and I had a very good relationship.

Q: *We did too. She used to stay at the house. She was so wonderful, and I'm sure that carried through. Any other personalities you would want to describe in any way?*

SOKOLOVE: Only if you could mention a name.

Q: *Karnik?*

SOKOLOVE: Yes, well he would have been very close to Maniben.

Q: *Right, I am now going through those people. Karnik was sort of a theoretical leader; Maniben, on the other hand, was the practical trade union leader and later on became very much more famous. Bagaram Tulpule?*

SOKOLOVE: No recollection.

Q: *What about the INTUC people, the INTUC, the conservative, pro-Nehru...*

SOKO LOVE: They really weren't pro-Nehru. They were pro-Congress Party.

MRS. SOKO LOVE: Oh, yes. You knew many, many INTUC people and they came to our home. I'm trying to think of names.

Q: *Ramanujam?*

SOKO LOVE: No.

Q: *Abad Ali?*

SOKO LOVE: Abad Ali, I think he was in Bombay, wasn't he?

Q: *Yes.*

SOKO LOVE: I don't think I had much contact with him.

Q: *Ambekan?*

SOKO LOVE: No, it doesn't ring a bell.

Q: *Did you go very often to Ahmedabad and Bombay? What about your travels? Were you free to travel whenever you wanted?*

SOKO LOVE: Yes, but there was no inclination [to travel] because those people would come...

Q: *...to Delhi, how well I remember, and they preferred to. Did you travel in the south at all, Madras, et cetera?*

SOKO LOVE: What did I do in...

MRS. SOKO LOVE: I know you went to Madras several times and he went to Ceylon.

Q: *Oh, yes, but Ceylon was not within your area [of responsibility] ?*

MRS. SOKO LOVE: No.

Q: *What you have described is a sort of independent operation in which you were a free-wheeler, to put it bluntly.*

SOKO LOVE: Right. Well, maybe it would be interesting from your viewpoint rather than mine to compare or contrast that with other Labor Attachés there.

Q: Oh, definitely with others, especially after I get into the next area that I want to get into and that is the AID program. We had an AID program. Was this before the activities of people like Walkinshaw? Does the name sound familiar to you?

SOKO LOVE: It's a familiar name but nothing else.

Q: He was the AID labor man. This was before the AID program?

SOKO LOVE: Yes.

Q: The AID program came later and therefore you did not influence which trade union programs should be supported and which should not be supported?

SOKO LOVE: Absolutely none.

Q: As was the case later on.

SOKO LOVE: Right.

Q: That is a difference we would want to indicate.

SOKO LOVE: Yes. It would be interesting for me to read that after you have done it, but it had no reality in my time.

Q: You were then an FSR and you became an FSO during the period that you were in India, or...?

SOKO LOVE: I can't really answer that. I don't know but if there was a transition it didn't seem to matter to me.

Q: At some point you became an FSO?

SOKO LOVE: Right.

MRS. SOKO LOVE: It was early on.

Q: Can you remember the grade you had?

SOKO LOVE: No.

Q: FSO-2 or FSO-3?

SOKO LOVE: FSO-3. I think it was three.

Q: And was that the grade you had when you left or had you been promoted?

SOKOLOVE: No, I hadn't been promoted.

Q: *At the end of your service in India, did you attempt in any way to get a more general assignment? Did you want a labor assignment? What was your next assignment?*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: After India we came home and went back to India?

Q: *You went home on home leave?*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Yes. Back to India and from India...

SOKOLOVE: I thought I was in Washington.

MRS. SOKOLOVE: You went to Washington for a period and were assigned to... Was it Manila? Manila was the second assignment? Manila was 1955 to 1957. Malaya was 1957 to 1958.

SOKOLOVE: Yes, but neither of those had anything to do with labor.

Q: *That's what I want to get into.*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: Nothing after that.

Q: *According to our records your only labor assignment was in India beginning in 1948.*

SOKOLOVE: Right.

Q: *Your next assignment then was Washington and then Manila, did you say?*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: 1955 to 1957 was Manila, so I think that...

SOKOLOVE: But it was not a labor thing.

Q: *That's what I want to know.*

MRS. SOKOLOVE: It was a political assignment. A political officer. Yes.

Q: *At the grade three. Now what we are interested in is the degree to which your labor experience, in India and before that, had any effect, plus or minus, on your service as a general political officer. For instance, was there a Labor Attaché in Manila at that time?*

SOKOLOVE: I think there was. I think there was.

COREY VENNING

**Staff Officer
Bombay (1949-1952)**

Corey Venning was born in Spanish Fork, Utah in 1924. In 1948, she received an A.M. in International Relations from the University of Chicago. She served as a Foreign Service Officer in Bombay from 1949 to 1952, and other places as well. This is an excerpt from a self-interview.

VENNING: Air travel in 1949 was different from air travel now. First, it was slower. We left New York on a Sunday morning; we arrived in Bombay near midnight the following Wednesday. Second, such amenities as luxurious hotel accommodations at airports were unknown. But so was the "herd of cattle" effect. Seats were fairly roomy and service was excellent and plentiful.

At Shannon, where we landed late the first evening after a cold delay for engine repairs in Gander, we were shown into a fairly primitive sleeping room where we spent the night. Robin was impressed neither with the sanitary facilities -- he had not previously encountered chamber pots or washstands holding a basin and a pitcher of cold water -- nor with the tasteless oat porridge, beautifully served, that we got for breakfast.

Robin was a superb traveler. He amused himself with his books and crayons when we weren't rubber-necking at the seat window. Only once did I have to admonish him not to run up and down the aisle of the plane and disturb the other passengers. When I consider some later purgatorial trips I have made, with children screaming, steadfastly kicking the back of one's seat, spilling food and drink all over one -- and grownups apparently trying to outdo the young in barbaric behavior (a favorite trick is to slam a heavy bag over the fragile hat one has trustingly placed in the bin above one's seat), I conclude Robin was even at six years old a thorough gentleman.

We got into Bombay about seven hours late, having lost some time in getting out of Shannon, Ireland. Our trip was largely uneventful -- just one airport after another, all looking pretty much the same. We did get a glimpse at the pyramids, from quite a distance, and had a splendid time looking at Arabia from three miles up! At Dhahran, Arabia, Robin began to suffer a bit from fatigue and had a tummy ache. It was nothing serious, but at the moment of course it created quite a fuss. To complicate matters I was having trouble getting a cable through to Bombay with hour of arrival, et cetera. The Army was being coy that day, as usual. Like a typical American I started screaming for the consul. He arrived, just in time to witness Robin in his biggest upchuck, and took off assuring me he would wire immediately through the diplomatic lines. The upchuck resulted in Robin's complete recovery, and all was smooth thereafter. But when we clambered off the plane in Bombay, both in fine shape, we were met by two exceedingly worried young bachelors from the Consulate, who had apparently been informed he was on point of death or something, had a doctor all alerted, etc. It was only temporary, though, and probably due to too many snacks and sweets which I couldn't entirely prevent the rest of the passengers from showering on Robin.

We're temporarily lodged in a boarding house run by an Englishwoman. It is ... much like all boarding houses, and I shall try to get an apartment or bungalow as soon as possible.... it's wonderful to have tea and fruit brought first thing in the morning, laundry called for every day (price for all our stuff dirtied on the trip 12 annas -- about \$.15), and service all over the place. There's no hot water, but we will arrange to have bath water heated, and so forth on the details we Americans tend to miss.... Last night driving in from the airport we got a good look at hundreds of white-garbed figures peacefully walking -- or even sleeping! -- in the road, utterly impervious to the dangers of moving vehicles.

This morning we both went down to the office and met everyone, talked over my work for the next few months and so forth. Robin was fascinated by the ships' loading and unloading, which can be seen from the windows of the office. He had the whole Commercial section explaining all details to him! Then we came home and rested a bit, then went to the apartment of one of the other vice consuls for lunch.... Tomorrow we are invited to Timberlakes' (the consul general and wife), where Robin will play baseball with their boys and I will deliver [the "few things" Julie's mother commissioned me to transport]. Robin is invited to the circus next week.... Incidentally [he] is going to be as much a shark on his rupees as he ever was on his dollars! He has it figured out to the pie (about 1/8 cent).... Do write soon, and as often as the airmail rate [25c] will permit....(November 19, 1949; n.b.: unless otherwise noted, all excerpts from letters are from my letters home)

In truth the boarding house was dark and dirty and rather grim. The food exemplified what can be achieved by combining raw materials of indifferent quality with the lower-middle-class English penchant for cooking everything to death, this augmented by the training by the l-m-c-E memsahibs of Goan cooks, who themselves inherit two of the poorest culinary traditions I have encountered, the southwest Indian and the Portuguese. Despite the absence of any raw food in the menus, I suspect that it was there that the dysentery amoeba got to me.

Only "European" (which included American) guests were accepted. There were several such segregated facilities in Bombay, including the second-best swimming and sports club. Notwithstanding Indian independence there were as far as I know no anti-discrimination laws affecting public places. This may have suited most Indians quite well. Who on earth would want to live and eat in that boarding house and pay its fees, which by Indian standards were very high? Besides, as I would learn, though they differed among themselves as to criteria of cleanliness and pollution, most Indians regarded "Europeans" and their habits, and Indians of lower castes or different religious persuasions, as dirty.

Robin and I had one room, sharing a bath with several other boarders. The furnishings were shabby, and we were crowded:

... in a room about twelve by eighteen feet, we have: two beds, two "Elmiras" (big old-fashioned wardrobes), two wardrobe trunks, all our luggage, one dressing table, one tea table, one small table, two straight chairs, one dressing table bench, one sofa, one big chair, one desk, one six-foot Christmas tree, gobs of books and toys, and the two of us. (December 29, 1949)

No lamps, just a light in a ceiling fixture. Robin didn't complain about the light's being on when he went to bed and I was there reading, but if I had gone out of an evening my coming in would awaken him.

One morning I discovered some of my writing paper in tiny bits and chunks floating loose in the desk drawer. I could only imagine that Robin had done this and that it reflected some serious emotional or psychological problem. What had this move done to my precious child? I consciously and unconsciously worried about this all day. That evening, after he was asleep and I was trying to read, I heard a rustle behind the desk. Shortly a huge rat showed itself, crept over to the fruit bowl, took a few nibbles from various pieces, then scurried back behind. Then I heard noises of paper being chewed up in the drawer. Now my fears of Robin's being emotionally disturbed were replaced by worse ones. He could be bitten, and get rabies.

Though the boarding house was a temporary makeshift pending our getting an apartment, I had been resigned to waiting for some time, as housing, especially housing suitable for "Europeans," was in short supply in Bombay and all new rentals must be approved by the relevant government agencies, whose leisureliness in India was and I think remains legendary. But After Rat I was resigned no more. Next morning I marched into the office of Joe Belehrad, the staff officer in charge of "housekeeping" for the consulate and its American personnel, with an impassioned plea to him to do everything he could to get us out of that boarding house. I said I knew if anyone could get us an apartment, he could, and begged him to try his best.

Joe was one of the bachelors who had met Robin and me at the airport. During the drive into town he had turned to me and said, "I understand you want to do shipping." I had answered that I had no idea of what I would be assigned to and anything would be fine with me, including shipping. To which he replied "Well, I'm the shipping officer here." So he was in charge of shipping and seamen, besides doing the consulate's "housekeeping" chores: housing, getting our stuff through customs, local procurement, managing the custodial staff, and so on. I must have convinced him that I wasn't after that job of his, because we soon were on friendly terms, and he was especially nice to Robin, to whom he became "Uncle Joe." Joe's bearer's wife had become Robin's ayah (nanny) almost upon our arrival. And well before the rat episode I had also learned that "Tim" Timberlake, our consul general, thought the world of Joe. Tim believed Joe accomplished wonders surmounting all sorts of local difficulties. So I had confidence in Joe.

Which was not misplaced. By shortly after New Year's we had an apartment, by coincidence the one immediately below Joe's own. A dingy one-bedroom affair, it wasn't ideal, but it could be cleaned up and spruced up and would do for the time being.

The Bombay consulate was then situated right next to the dock area, in an oldish three-story building with a parking lot and a large outdoor tap at which the chauffeurs would wash the cars and several score male locals would bathe each day. Though not large as such establishments went in some other countries, including its USIS facilities it employed some fifty or sixty people: six FSOs ranging from Claire ("Tim") Timberlake, the Consul General, down to me; a staff officer -- Joe Belehrad; Dorothy Sparks, our code clerk; three American women secretaries, five or six Eurasian women secretaries, five or six male Indian clerks, two or three Pathan chauffeurs, three or four hamals and sweepers as cleaning crew, and a couple of messengers. Once a week or

so a diplomatic courier would arrive with bags of documents and other items sent through the diplomatic post. The USIS office had a Foreign Service Staff (FSS) officer, an American woman clerk, and a number of local employees.

Many of these people will appear later in this story. Of those who do not, I should mention Winnie Burrowes, the senior American secretary, an efficient good-looking, good-tempered person who shocked me when I renewed her passport and discovered she was thirty-five (she didn't look so terribly old, I thought...); two other American secretaries, Martha Darke and smiling chubby Betsy Bradfield, who a few months later embarked on a holiday flight to Kashmir and was killed when it crashed; her replacement, Jamie O'Neill, married Lester McNelly, a courier, who hailed from all places Boise; Bob Dreessen, a FSO formerly posted to Tihwa who when the Communists took China and began arresting American consuls had made the trek out through Tibet with several others in a jeep that became brakeless for the last part of the trip. Bombay was too urban and Western and civilized for Bob, who in short order went off to Kabul. Harry Spielman, our agricultural reporting officer, was a thirty-ish bachelor whose charming sister JoAnne acted as his hostess. Paul Geren, the commercial affairs officer, and his wife were nice people, very high-minded. Howard Imbrey (amusing, mischievous, a bit vicious in fact, not high-minded) called the Gerens "crypto-missionaries." Gerens did not serve alcoholic drinks at their parties so were not close to most of the American business community in Bombay, who were a hard-drinking lot.

...His nanny ... is sweet as can be with him, and looks no end picturesque in her white saris draped Muslim-style, her little turquoise nose ornament and her armload of gold bracelets. But servants here do let the children just walk all over them, especially the nannies, and I think Robin is too old for that sort of thing. So as soon as I get straightened around with an apartment I think I'll keep a bearer (manservant) who will take him to and from school, and look after him while I'm not around, in addition to his other duties.... I am still not completely used to the idea of having three or four people around to attend to my slightest wish round the clock!

Next week Walter Lippmann and his wife are coming through here, and I've been invited to dinner for them at the CG's house. Have already worn evening dress three times!..... last night [Robin] and I had a dinner date, so we started off in a gharry -- a real old fashioned horse-and-buggy deal. Well, the driver couldn't speak English and my Hindi wasn't up to telling him directions in a city whose street names I don't even know, and we had quite a gay time, but arrived only an hour late.... One nice thing about it, if you do get lost, there are always about three hundred people around ready and willing to try to help! People seem to live in the streets here -- many of them do -- and one never worries about fresh air because most places don't even have windows, but are in essence just a floor (always of polished stone), a high-ceilinged roof, and a few pillars with grillwork in between! There are some rather handsome apartment houses, from which I suspect our American architects got a lot of good ideas when they were building some of our modern buildings they look "modern," but are obviously older. (Thanksgiving 1949)

Weekends were full of visits to the beach, to one of the swimming clubs, and occasional sailing.

"Last Saturday afternoon our shipping officer took us out on a ship which was loading cargo.... You can imagine how thrilled [Robin] was, and how he went all over the ship with "Uncle Joe" (the shipping officer) and the Captain and a fine toothed comb! [description of more outings] You see he leads a fairly interesting life -- but he still occasionally gets lonesome for his Grammy and Granddad. (December 23, 1949).

We acquired Goan Antonio, who initially did our cooking and the housework except laundry, floors and bathrooms, but who eventually graduated to cook and, after I convinced him we didn't want to eat like English people -- "just cook everything for us; we'll tell you if we like it or not" -- became a fine one.

Incidentally, would you like to get me a few things? I need 6 grip-tooth side combs (the 25¢ ones)

12 black human-hair nets, cap size

2 bathing caps

a couple of cotton dresses; not too dressy but good-looking enough for office and out-to-lunch and all that.

a bathing suit, size 30. I like the knit wool or latex best

We don't wear stockings here. I can get lovely sandals, saris, evenings wraps, gobs of jewelry...

... at 8 below, the Mode [Boise's women's specialty shop] will probably think you're insane when you order such things, but that's what we are wearing. If you can find good-looking and not-too-expensive washable evening dresses, they would be ok too....four evening dresses isn't really enough. (Ibid.).

This was only the first of a long series of requests for supplies and accountings for their payment. It's a good thing Mama loved to shop.

(After lunch): Robin and I just had lunch aboard the "President Monroe" [a cruise ship] which docked here this morning. It was like stepping from Bombay into a first-class American hotel!

The job is going very well; in fact I have a little spare time these days and may work in some other things I've been wanting a try at. (Ibid.)

"The job" for me was the job most new FSO's got: issuing or refusing visas, keeping the waiting lists for immigration visas, renewing passports and looking after other noncommercial problems that Americans other than seamen might encounter in the consular district, witnessing marriages involving Americans and recording their births and deaths within the consular district, a few odd jobs such as keeping records of the incidence of certain diseases in the district for the U.S. Health Service. Americans in the district were also encouraged to register with the consulate, so that they could be contacted and if possible helped in case of emergency. All this of course under

the supervision of the consul general. Fortunately for me I wasn't stuck in a huge consular factory where I would have been limited to routine work in a single area, but had the whole range of visa and passport matters to deal with and gain experience in.

I also had a great advantage in my two clerks. In the United States exquisitely beautiful Olivia d'Souza and exceedingly bright, pleasantly assertive Joan Fisher would, in any office not completely imbued with sexual prejudice, have long since been graduated to administrative or even executive positions, and their Eurasian origins would not have been the painful social limitation it was in India.

The passport side involved me with the fifteen hundred or so Americans, including dependents, in the consular district. They were about evenly divided between missionaries and business people -- two highly contrasting lots. The consular section renewed passports and sometimes issued new ones to children born in India to Americans, or dependents who had been included on the head of household's passport but now must travel abroad without him. Most of this side of the work was fairly routine, although it could be complicated by divorce and remarriage, birth and long early residence outside the United States, and so on.

One day an ancient lady in a traditional Catholic nun's habit appeared in my office. She said she had been born in France of American parents, had in fact been christened by the American Ambassador, but after her girlhood and education in France and England she had joined a missionary order, been sent to India, and been there ever since. Now in her eighties and failing a bit, she was instructed by the Superior of her order to lay down her missionary burden and go "home" to the mother house, now in the United States. Though America would be strange to her, the dear lady willingly hearkened to her vow of obedience, and duly came to the consulate to get a passport so she could fulfil that vow. She had never had a passport of any kind; when she traveled to India they were not required of Americans going there.

Well, it took several cables between Bombay, Washington, and Paris, and I have visions of a hapless French clerk sifting long through dusty files in some Gallic basement, but her citizenship claim was proved, and this courageous old soul, airborne for the first time in her life, was transported to pasture on the other side of the earth.

The Bombay consular district, one of four in India, included Western India south of the Indus and north of Kerala. Its then eighty-odd million inhabitants gave it third rank among the four in population. Our consulate alone had a waiting list for non-student immigration visas of over four thousand (half of them seemingly named Patel or Patil, a Hindu subcaste designation). What then must have been the total Indian waiting list? The annual American quota for all Indians of non-European origin was one hundred. Issuance of a non-student immigration visa to anyone but relatives of Indians already U.S. residents was a rare thing. Imagine my disgust when a plump Indian lady came to my office for some bit of business, and it turned out she and her four children had gotten five of these precious immigration visas the year before. But "Life is too hard in America," so back she came, to live where she and her brood would be waited on by servants and she would not be faced with the tasks of an American housewife.

Given this formidable and for practical purposes hopeless situation of dealing with regiments of visa applicants for the handful of visas available, and given the general perception that the job was really just a sort of necessary scutwork one must do before going on to greater things, my predecessors' having permitted the visa files to become an incredible mess is easily explicable. But it did impede our work, for whenever an inquiry about an applicant's status came in, and they came in constantly, someone had to delve long and deep to find the file. Joan and Olivia and I worked hard to get those files in good order for once. And once in good order we spent about a third the time on immigration visa matters that we had had to spend before. Then we got to work organizing our other jobs and files.

Immigration visas were impressive affairs. Besides the stamp in the passport the visa holder got an elaborate document tied in red ribbon tape (literally!) fixed with warm wax in which the impression of the great seal of the United States was then impressed, and bearing the signature of the issuing consul in no fewer than eight places. Handwriting and signatures have never been my strong point, and once I once managed, at about signature number seven and having some question for Joan about the seal, to sign "Corey B. Seal." Poor Joan had to spend half an hour doing the whole thing all over again. One day when Robin visited the office, he contemplated Olivia busily typing -- her desk was in my office room -- and asked, "Mummy, how come you get to be consul and Miss d'Souza does all the work?"

Indian nationals of European, or predominantly European, ancestry could immigrate under the quota assigned for the country of their forbears' origin. I remember a gentleman who spent many hours trying to convince me that whatever his appearance (he was a handsome man most of whose genes were obviously of the subcontinent, with a few from East Asia and possibly Africa and Europe as well), his ancestry was pure Dutch from Ceylon. I wish I could have been convinced. Unfortunately the elaborate genealogical evidence he presented on a beautifully inscribed document couldn't be substantiated.

Then there were those who wanted to go to America as students. They must of course have been admitted to a school, but that was no insurmountable problem. More commonly the question of their support in the United States was the stumbling block. The regulations did permit foreign students to take substantial part-time work. Thus when an applicant could not show an adequate source of dollar support in being, or an affidavit of support from an acceptable American source, discussion of this work option would ensue. When I asked one young man, a junior employee of a local Mahrathi-language newspaper and probably of a Vaisya (merchant and artisan) caste, if he was prepared to wait on tables, wash dishes, sweep floors -- these being the commonest kinds of student labor in American colleges and universities -- he drew himself up: "Madam, I am journalist!" I could not issue him a student visa on the supposition that his journalism would support him in the United States.

Yet I didn't know my own country all that well, either. I remember assuring people that in the United States everyone worked, even rich people who didn't have to. I was mostly right, but hadn't really tumbled to the reality of a tiny American leisure class, especially of unmarried women living at home but also some men, who did not feel it incumbent on themselves either to work for money or pursue a concentrated intellectual or charitable or public-interest concern.

One case led me into insubordination. This was in mid- or late 1950, toward the end of my visa-issuing career and shortly before China, to official Washington's surprise, entered the Korean War. China having "gone Communist" and India having recognized the new regime -- as the United States would not for more than two decades -- new personnel had replaced all the former Chinese diplomats and consuls there. One day Tim Timberlake called me into his office and told me in a conspiratorial tone that the new Chinese consul had contacted him. He told Tim he was not in sympathy with the Communists and wanted refugee visas for himself and his family. Tim had said he thought this might be arranged if the consul would quietly turnover his consular seals to Tim. (The seals might be useful, in the current derring-do atmosphere of world politics). What a coup! Our CIA man, who masqueraded none too successfully as a regular FSO, was in on the deal. I think I was suppose to be excited and a bit flattered to be allowed in on it, too.

This went back and forth a bit. I don't remember if Washington was brought in on it. I met the gentleman and for no reason I could put my finger on I neither liked nor trusted him. One morning some time later Tim called me in again, said the consul would come to my office, I should issue him and his family visas, and the consul would then turn the seals over to him, Tim.

"No, Tim. If you or Howard (the CIA man) want to do it that way, you issue the visas. I will issue them if the consul give gives you the seals first. Then you can call me into your office and I'll do the documents and take them back up to my office and have them made up. I am low man on the totem pole here. I am not going to issue visas complete with impressions of our seals to a Chinese Communist official and his family, have him not give you his seals but make fakes of ours from the impressions and then send the lot on to Peking. My neck isn't strong enough to put it in that noose. Yours is a lot stronger."

Tim was annoyed but perhaps saw the logic of my position, for he said he would contact the consul and tell him about the new arrangements. I do not know what happened then. I never again heard from the Chinese consul and never heard another word from Tim or Howard on the subject. The consul remained at his post.

Non-immigration visas could sometimes be interesting, too. I visited another gentle ancient lady, this one Indian, at her sickbed to get the information needed for a visa for her to go to the United States for medical treatment. Reading down the questionnaire she stopped at one point, looked up at me and quavered, "Oh, then I cannot go, because I have been a convicted prisoner. I was sentenced and jailed in a satyagraha [Gandhian non-cooperation demonstration for Indian independence]." I was able to tell her that that kind of jail sentence didn't count.

One of the two occasions in my life on which I bent the law rather hard had to do with a case involving both a citizenship decision and an off-quota immigrant visa. The law had it that illegitimate children born abroad of American fathers and foreign mothers were American citizens if, and only if, the father acknowledged the child. The war had left fewer of these cases in India than in some other parts, because fewer American servicemen were stationed there. But it had left enough. One Eurasian girl had had such a baby, whose father had gone back to the United States, married, and forgotten that little souvenir of his Indian service. In this case it happened, however, that a buddy of this soldier had been secretly in love with the girl. He returned to India, married the girl, and came into my office to apply for off-quota visas for her

and the child. When he told me all this I could see it wasn't going to work. Even if he formally adopted the child, he was not the biological father and while his wife could get a visa the child could not. So after he had said his piece (fortunately we were alone in the office) I simply said to him, What I understand you have told me is that you are acknowledging this child as yours. Sign here. He was sharp enough to see my meaning and say no more, but signed. Later, when the baby was being added to his passport and his wife's elaborate immigration visa was being prepared, Joan (the Eurasian girls were inveterate gossips) remarked, "But Mrs. Sanderson, that isn't his baby!" "Oh, really? He seems to think it is." End of story.

In addition to the Christmas things with Robin, some of the more interesting "social" things I've been in on latterly ... a big Parsi wedding tonight, a reception for the Papal Legate for Australia, a trip to an old Hindu temple on Elephanta island, and a small gathering with Errol Flynn among those present. Also numerous small parties and lots of interesting people. (Ibid.)

Flynn was part of the company making the film "Kim" on location in northern India. Why he came to Bombay I don't remember; no filming was being done there nor did others of the cast appear. Why couldn't Paul Lukas, known as a gentleman, choose to visit us instead of Flynn? Flynn's reputation preceded him -- not only because of the scandals widely aired in American courts, but because he showed himself a thorough loose cannon in Delhi, insulting several prominent ladies and thereby precipitating a couple of diplomatic near-incidents. Before his arrival the MGM man in Bombay, Lee Kamern, some of the consular people -- including me because I handled American citizens' brushes with Indian law and police, and some others from the local American community held a council of war. We decided on policy: find Flynn plenty of pretty girls of a certain profession and some modicum of English and manners, otherwise don't leave him alone for a moment.

Flynn stayed with the Kamerns, who gave a small dinner party for him on the evening of his arrival. The guests, including me, sat at cocktails in the living room for at least two hours after our arrival at the appointed time and before Flynn and Margo Kamern emerged from elsewhere in the house. He was beautiful, ranking with Shannon Caples, Hilbert Higgins, Oliver Rampersad and Adrian Melissinos as the handsomest men I have ever met.

After introductions, with titles, he at once plunked himself down beside me and began the usual teasing remarks about the work of lady vice consuls ("You're good at vice, I hope." "Sorry, no. I just try to give good advice when asked.") Then he took a slightly different tack. What did I think of the brilliant red socks he sported along with his beautifully tailored and otherwise conventional dinner clothes? I hadn't noticed them, I lied, but -- very colorful, I allowed. "My word, maybe I should open my fly. You might work up some excitement about that." "Mr. Flynn, that would no doubt draw notice -- but excitement?" From then on he behaved like a lamb around me, though not, unfortunately, at all times and places during his Bombay sojourn. Nonetheless our war council could congratulate itself that no major crises arose.

You asked about life in India and the people; there is so much and so much of it can't really be explained in words. [I suggest they get a small projector and I send them slides of pictures I take] ... you can [then] get a very good idea of everything except the dirt and the smells... which we're quite used to by now. European dress is common among the men but very rare among the

ladies. The sari drape we see in the States is pretty much confined to Parsis, Muslims and upper class Hindu women; the lower classes wear very ragged clothing, and they catch the back of the sari skirt between the legs and fasten it at the front at the waist, making a sort of "pants." Bare feet are universal in houses (which is really much cleaner), and very common outdoors. Men often wear a European shirt, tail out, and a "dhoti" or long piece of white cloth draped into a sort of flowing trouser-toga effect. Coolies and beggars often wear only the loin cloth. There are some extremely handsome people among all the groups; among the men I think the Sikhs are probably most impressive; they are very tall and majestic, with their elaborate turbans and beautifully coiffed beards. Children of the upper classes wear European dress, children of the lower classes wear very little if anything, occasionally a sari on a little girl, though..... There is magnificent Indian dancing here and I find Indian music intriguing although very strange -- quarter tones and all that. Robin has acquired the comfortable oriental habit of squatting on his haunches -- says it keeps the seat of his pants clean! To an American the absolute poverty of a large part of the population is appalling; one has to get accustomed to it and it isn't especially easy. (Ibid.)

I never did get really used to the poverty. But unless they hid their discomfort very well, many of the other Americans there all too easily took on the attitudes which also characterized so many Indians of the comfortable classes. This extended into modes and tones of speech. Ordinary communication with the lower classes seemed to a foreign ear at least to be conducted in a sharp and scolding tone. So also with the way servants and menials were treated generally. For example, I once made a day trip upcountry with Ashok Mehta, a socialist leader of national standing from whose lips scarcely a sentence escaped that did not deplore and condemn the poverty and misery and indignities heaped on India's masses, laying the blame mostly on the foreign imperialists but significantly also on India's own privileged. We stopped for a picnic lunch on a broiling plain where however there was one large tree just off the road. Mehta, I, our picnic and our car rested under that tree. Though there was ample room in its shade for them, our driver and the flunkies who had come along in a second vehicle, an open small truck, all sat at a respectful distance from us, under the full sun. And Mehta spoke to them as crossly (to my ears) as anyone else would have. So did Maniben Kara, a local Socialist labor leader whom I got to know rather well, speak to her servants.

Americans and Europeans tended also to exhibit general disdain for India and Indians: "If there's a wrong way to do it, that's the way they'll do it."

I have wondered to what extent this callousness is a defense mechanism. Perhaps, in face of such misery and knowing that one can't do much about it, one develops hard-heartedness as a sort of anaesthetic. Yet I found other versions of it in American attitudes in Greece, and later in Italy and Japan -- a mixture of annoyance and contempt. Is this just a natural human reaction to different ways? Perhaps so, because at bottom most Indians thought Americans coarse and immoral -- but so rich! and Greeks and Italians and Japanese have their own tit-for-tat reactions.

For my own part I am sure I made my own lower-ranking servants (the hamal, the dhobi, the sweeper), and others of similar status, uncomfortable when I insisted they stand up before me instead of crouching, turn around and walk out of the room rather than backing out.

Just got a letter from you under date of October 27, inviting me to Charlotte for the weekend! Please, incidentally, do send only airmail -- the other takes from six weeks to two months. I'd rather hear less often and get the news while it's new.... I've been laid up the last few days with an attack of dysentery, but it's gone now, and a couple of days in bed were really quite pleasant....I was silly enough to go out and eat in an unknown restaurant one night a couple of weeks ago.... You should have heard the doctor giving me heck! We use only boiled water for cooking, drinking, making milk, etc. Milk is made from Klim -- powdered -- and is really quite good. Believe it or not, I have tea first thing in the morning, and tea for breakfast -- a defection on the part of one of the champion supporters of the coffee industry... (January 7, 1950)

To this day it is tea -- good strong cheap black Indian tea, with a bit of milk -- that gets me going in the morning. The Klim was not as pleasant as my letters pretend: not instant-mix, it was lumpy and tasted much like diluted evaporated milk. We a substitute in buffalo milk from a dairy, certified beyond belief. This buffalo milk was rich and delicious, one only had to get used to its pale gray tint.

Besides heck and some pills to relieve and control the dysentery, the doctor, the charming one of two Austrians who did most of the doctoring for local Americans, looked sympathetically into my eyes and said Madam, you are not happy in this terrible country; try to bear with it and try to get out of it. Did one get dysentery because one was unhappy? This puzzled me a bit. In fact I was happy as a clam.

I went to the races with the Spanish consul last week -- my first experience with the races and lots of fun. Didn't lose much money, but was livid when an old nag which I'd put five rupees to place on, just because I thought it had such an icky name, won 20 to 1. I got thirteen rupees and could have gotten two hundred! The races are really quite something -- "tout le monde" goes out there to see and be seen... and wears its most gorgeous saris and jewels and Paris frocks and so on.... It is heavenly to have a nanny [and other servants]. You should have had some such opportunity and you both had to work so hard.... we were talking about you and imagining what you would be doing -- it would be about 7:30 PM there. Robin said he guessed Granddad would be working in the garden. That seemed reasonable enough until we suddenly remembered it is the middle of winter in Boise, and you were probably just about to put a log in the fireplace! (January 7, 1950).

The nanny and her husband, Joe Belehrad's bearer, lived with their son, Pullaj, in one of the servants' rooms in the small low building that was a part of many apartment compounds. They had apparently decided to take their chances on having only one child, and educating him, for Pullaj was studying English and other subjects not typical for children of the servant class. He was also a congenial little playmate for Robin. One day I overheard them planning some mischief. Pullaj whispered, "But won't your Mummy punish you?" Robin: "Oh, no. I can do anything I want. I'm never punished." After Pullaj left Mummy told Robin that he was mistaken, that in this case he would be punished in advance, and that the punishment would be that he was "campused" for the rest of that day and the next. He was not to go out and play, nor were his pals to come inside with him. At dusk I saw Robin leaning over the verandah disconsolately telling Pullaj below, "No, I can't come out, and you can't come in. I'm campused."

He spends lots of time flying kites nowadays. His big American ones are gone -- one was eaten up by a rat in the other place (we don't have them here, I think) and the other split in the wind, but he has purchased some small Indian kites and gets a big kick out of them. He has, besides the consulate kids, two little English boy friends and several of his schoolmates, Indians and others, who live around here.... He visits almost all the big American ships coming into Bombay -- being a special pal of our shipping officer (Ibid.)

The little English boys were the sons of Sir Richard Temple, Bart., and his wife Mari. Sir Richard, a descendant of the early nineteenth-century India scholar and statesman of that name, was a delightful chap, himself a scholar, then in his seventies. He had been born and spent most of his life in India. It was his home. He had been long widowed when he married Mari, a beautiful young woman then at most twenty-five who some implied was Eurasian. This was to have been a brilliant marriage for Mari, offering social position, all material comforts, and even the possibility of escaping "this dreadful place [India]." Alas! a head for business was not among Sir Richard's assets. Some bad investments and possibly dishonest partners suddenly rendered him nearly penniless when John, the younger boy, was newly born. Mari's description of the Dickensian scene in which the creditors' men came to collect "everything, even John's layette and bassinet" was so heartrending as to reduce poor Mama to tears when she heard it. When we knew them they lived near us in a cavernous old apartment housekept by Mari's dark gentle mother. "Granny" was beloved by all including their servants, who were reputed to supplement Temples' own pathetic market allowance from their own tiny wages. For Mari, only the social position remained. That and the hope against hope that ten-year-old Peter would inherit the title, which included an income that was now somehow out of Sir Richard's reach. Unfortunately there was another son, now well into his thirties, from Sir Richard's first marriage, who lived somewhere in the West Indies. He, not Peter, was the heir. Mari's unspoken hopes that this son would somehow disappear before he had a son were reflected in her insistence on Peter's being groomed for the title. Peter had everything in Temples' power to give him; John, Robin's age, the barest leftovers. Therefore it was no surprise that Peter was something of a pill, whereas little John was a charming child. John and Robin became best friends, and I believe corresponded for several years after we left India.

Last night I was at a farewell dinner party for one of the higher Indian officials around here. You would have gotten quite a kick out of it. Most of Asia and some of Europe was there (at least as far as the consular corps was concerned), complete to the Saudi Arabian burnoose, et cetera. One gets very used to this sort of thing... it is we who dress oddly! Well... it came up in the conversation that you had engineered the Zion Mt. Carmel highway. It turned out that several of the other guests had been down there, and they were no end impressed....

Hindi is a required subject at [Robin's] school and he practically knows the Hindi alphabet already! -- talks with the servants in the strangest pidgin English I ever heard. What he does is talk English with them with their accent, vocabulary and construction. Sometimes he forgets and talks like that to me, but I remind him I understand good English better. He has named the dog "Mandrake". The servants ... were calling him "Rodji." You should have heard Robin: "Rodji NAY! NAY Rodji. Yat [this] MANDRAKE!!!" and so forth. And to his nanny: "Nanny pi-ress [press] NAY! Is-pi-lay!" and so the ironing doesn't get done for another day, and they "pi-lay." (January 18, 1950)

Oh, yes, Mandrake. I have always been a cat woman myself, but agreed with Robin's "Uncles" that a boy should have a dog. And happily took the first cute little white purebred puppy that was offered us. I had not heard of the bull terrier breed. And I do tend to leap before I look. Well, Mandrake grew into a perfect bull terror -- sixty pounds of pure ferocity. And he elected to be my dog (why have so many dogs loved me? It's rarely mutual), sleeping at the foot of my bed, unwilling to let the bearer bring my morning tea tray in in peace, tolerating Robin but no real companion for him. But we put up with Mandrake for quite a while before finding him a home with one of the "Uncles." Then we got a sweet little pie bitch puppy, Amanda, who loved Robin and promptly died of distemper. So it was back to cats. After some vicissitudes we got a pair of Siamese, Raja and Rani, who lasted with us until we left Athens. The "Uncle" was no cat lover. One evening when he dined with us he caught them clawing at a carpet. "Corey, you'll have to get rid of those cats. Look what they're doing!" I observed that compared with Mandrake they were harmless. "But," he responded, waving his stitched-and-bandaged hand and arm, "at least Mandrake doesn't destroy things." Ah, definitions, definitions. Later --this was after Mama had arrived in late 1951 -- the "Uncle" was transferred and we again had Mandrake on our hands. At last we found him a permanent home with a woman who had a plantation upcountry and kept packs of bull terriers to keep off the wild fauna. They could easily handle cheetah and even elephant, only tiger was a problem for them.

My car has arrived and is ideal for here -- short wheelbase, good mileage and tight brakes. (to Pat, February 4, 1950).

One of the consulate drivers is going to give me lessons... I think two or three rides around town with him should be enough to acquaint me with the technique of driving around here. But there are some problems: (a) one drives on the left hand side of the road, (b) in this city of 2½ million there is not one traffic light that I know of [constables were cheaper], (c) people don't cross at intersections, but anywhere they feel like, (d) more people walk in the streets than one the sidewalks, (e) in addition to people and automobiles, there are trams, buses (both double-decker), gharries (a ""Victoria" horse-and-buggy taxicab), numerous bullock carts, and people carrying things, sharing the roads, which are always winding and usually narrow.... Everyone assumed I would solve the whole problem by hiring a driver, but I already maintain three people besides Robin and me and can't take on another one, even at the equivalent of twenty dollars a month. (January 18, 1950).

Now it should be noted that my previous driving experience had been limited to a few trips covering the half mile between our house and town in Coeur d'Alene, with Mama along as instructor, and one disaster in Boise, also with Mama instructing, during which I drove over the curb turning into Harrison Blvd. and then, a couple of miles down Hill Road, gave up when we rounded a sharp bend and almost collided with a largish house being moved on rollers. Mamma did the backing-up and turning round then, and that was the end of my early American driving career. I of course had no driver's license.

So here I was in Bombay, with a left-hand drive car in a country where theoretically traffic kept of the left side of the road. After the "two or three rides around town" with my Pathan instructor I took the test for driver's license. On the appointed day and hour for the test I, the Pathan, and one

of our Madras clerks got in my car and discovered that its "tight brakes" had become nonexistent.

Narasimhan: "Do not concern yourself Madam. I shall make another appointment for your test."

Corey: "No, I haven't time to do all this twice, and I need to be able to drive now. I'll take the test today as planned."

Narasimhan: "But Madam! how are you taking driving test in car with no brakes?"

Corey: "Not in my car. I'll take it in Abdul's jeep."

Narasimhan (aghast): "But Madam!! jeep is large station wagon with right-hand drive! You are not previously learning right-hand driving!"

Corey: "Well, I'll try it anyway. But you don't have to come along, Narasimhan. Abdul and I can take care of it." (Abdul loftily silent; Pathans are said to enjoy danger and adventure).

Narasimhan, stiff-upper-lip, ready-to-die-in-line-of-duty: "No, Madam, I am accompanying you. Be not concerned with me."

So off we went in Abdul's jeep, Narasimhan cowering in a back seat. Aside from my having to use opposite hands and feet for everything, in this large wagon I seemed to be sitting about a mile above the road. Also I learned that Abdul, ever adventurous, had adjusted the gas gauge so that even without foot on gas pedal the thing moved at at least twenty miles per hour. We made it to the station, amid the typical melee described above, mostly on brake. There we were joined by a spruce police officer who sat besides me while Abdul joined a by now almost pale Narasimhan in the back. Somehow we careened around the city for a half hour or so and I even managed to park the thing back at the station without revealing my utter lack of talent (which continues) for parking. An only slightly wilted police officer jumped out, turned to me, and delivered the verdict:

"Madam, you have passed the driver's test. But Madam, you need more self-confidence!"

In the fulness of Indian bureaucratic time the license arrived, a beautiful accordion-like document which served me well at least once later, back in the States. But the great bargain of a car Bill Decker had negotiated for me was a continuous pain in the neck. A year or so later I sold it -- at a considerable profit, though I had paid at least double what it was worth in the States -- and got a new Chevrolet through the Foreign Service procurement system.

[Our] things are in process of being unpacked.... Every time Antonio's eye lights on a dish or table cloth or piece of silverware he breathes a sigh of relief. We've been getting along with next to nothing in that line. The first night he fixed dinner for us, he came in and said, "Tablecloth, Memsahib?" to which I replied, "I haven't one." The expression that called forth leads me to think that a memsahib without a tablecloth -- and other accoutrements -- is in the same category

as a burly queen without a G-string, but he has stood it manfully up to now. He is really very good -- and what a cook! (to Pat, February 4, 1950).

Robin needed, and benefitted from, special coaching at his school, a small one run by Portuguese Jesuits. Here is an example of the reading dictation he brought home early on:

Potter's Gift -- I

Mrs. Martha Trumbles had been to Ashford to do her shopping. She held a string bag 2 quite full of good things Pitter-patter! Went The rain and (sic)....

Not exactly first-grade stuff in the States.

I am in process of making my official calls.... So far I've seen the Governor, Chief Minister, Passport Officer, dean of the Consular Corps, Chief Secretary, Customs Collector and Mayor, and have only the Chief Justice to go. (Ibid.)

A note on calls and calling cards. Today a card is typically a business card, with not only name, but business address, telephone and fax numbers, and very likely a logo. These were not unknown in the late 1940s, but were exchanged only by businessmen on business and were considered vulgar in other contexts. Social calls and cards were much more important. These cards bore only one's name. A box of engraved cards and little envelopes for them was as much a part of the rites of high school graduation as the yearbook and the class ring (are they still?). When new neighbors moved in, or when people for whom one's friends had sent letters of introduction moved to town, they were called upon, or the newcomers might call first, if they knew the introduction had preceded them. That opened social relations. Calls were then returned. Gentlemen as well as ladies called on one another, and a gentleman who had been entertained at dinner left a card the next day, sometimes accompanied by flowers, for his hostess.

Social calling rules were simple. Gentlemen left cards for the man of the house, for his wife, and for any other adult members of the family who lived at home. Since women never called on men, ladies left cards only for the ladies of the house.

Mama kept a small silver tray on the entrance hall table, on which reposed the cards that callers had left. I, too, did so in my dwellings until I moved to Chase Street in Chicago in 1978. There the entryway was too small for a table -- and no one had left a card for a good ten years.

Official Foreign Service protocol ordained that officers' cards would carry their names only, engraved in Old English script. It differed from the social rules in that the lower-ranking newcomer always made the first calls and the calls need not be returned. A FSO newly arrived at a post would call on a fixed list of important local officials at their offices. These calls had both business and social import. He also called on the wives and other ladies of the houses of officers in his own embassy or consulate who were higher in rank than he. He might also need to call on the ranking officer and his own opposite numbers in other embassies or consulates with which the American establishment had warm official relations and a good deal of business.

What was I to do, given these rules about calling? I must make these calls, which in the case of calls on officials were at once business and social. All these official calls were male. A woman never called on a man.

Back in Foreign Service training, Romaine Alling had been no help at all. As far as she was concerned, there just wasn't any way to get from here to there. So I contrived my own solution. I had two sets of cards made up. One read "Corey Sanderson"; that was for official calls (i.e. calls on men). The other carried the strict social title for a divorced lady: "Mrs. Brown Sanderson." At offices I left only the former; at houses I left only the latter, and only for the ladies. It seemed to work.

Mama and Daddy must have worried about our health:

.... please don't worry about me or my health. I am really feeling fine and have had no compunctions about taking off when I haven't.... The dysentery is about licked by now....It's not so much a question of dirty food -- although that is what brings it on -- but ... it is some times before certain things, probably the spices, agree with you. Robin of course hasn't had a sign of it, as he does eat at home all the time, or if not, at the house of this or that set of friends, and never at public places. He is a picture of health and bloom -- brown as a berry -- swims at least once a day and sometimes oftener.... (February 6, 1950)

Following the common Western perception I had given Antonio orders that Robin's food should be seasoned only with small doses of salt and those spices common in the American diet. Yet when I lunched at home with him, as I did when I had no engagement elsewhere, I noticed he lacked appetite. But wasn't sick and wasn't getting thin. After a time I asked Antonio about it, and learned that Robin wanted to eat with him, and eat the same food he ate. Since what chotta sahib (little master) wanted was what chotta sahib got, he and Antonio would scarf down a Goan meal an hour or so before the lunch hour with me. Spices! Goan food may not be very good, but it is hot! I later discovered that Robin was also buying himself treats from the street vendors. So much for all the protection I assured Mama and Daddy about. Out of all this I came to the conclusion that whereas adult Americans had had resistance to intestinal germs and tolerance for spices sanitized out of them, children might have retained more of Mother Nature's own weapons. I also came to believe highly seasoned food is good for the digestion generally.

I didn't buy much for myself or Robin beyond current needs in clothing, furniture and so on. I did have a teak bunk-bed, desk and chest made for him, and a satinwood headboard and side tables to blend with the bird's eye maple bedroom furniture I hoped someday to inherit.

And the carpets. After I had been in India about a year I became interested in these beauties. The typical manner of buying them was to interview a series of little men who came round with a stack of them, leaving those one might like for closer inspection. For months I had a pile of folded-over carpets in a corner and two or three on the floor. I slowly chose the two Bokharas I still have, several others which have been distributed around the family, and after several months' argument with myself and hard bargaining with the rug man, committed the terrible extravagance of paying \$400 for the glorious silk Kashan that has hung somewhere in every place I've lived in since. When Richard Temple, who knew these things better than anyone else I knew, saw it he was thrilled. He congratulated me on my patience, on waiting until I had found

just the right thing. A couple of weeks after I bought it the merchant came round and tried to buy it back. He was persistent, kept bringing other silk carpets, brighter, larger carpets. He wanted the worst way to make a trade, to get mine back, but I hung on to it.

The Timberlakes became my closest American friends. Tim, a thoroughly competent officer, feisty and yet usually tactful when that was called for. Julie sweet and bright, the perfect diplomatic wife. And fun people.

Last night I had Julie Timberlake, the CG's wife, over for dinner. Tim is in Washington temporarily and I thought of a very informal little hen party à deux. As usual I left the food planning up to Antonio, who is something of a wizard in the kitchen. We came up with soup, fish, meat, salad, vegetables, rolls, dessert and coffee, with appropriate wines and side dishes! This being my first venture in entertaining at home, I was naturally somewhat surprised! The other day I had three of the fellows from the office for lunch, rather on the spur of the moment. When we arrived all was fine and we had a drink and sat down to (sic) table. Then appeared two of my guests' bearers, solemnly serving while mine concentrated in the kitchen! I was quite unaware until then, of course, that they had fixed it all up among themselves. When I think of you giving lunches and dinners for twenty with no help! and doing so nicely, I wonder why it's necessary to have about one helper per guest around here. (February 6, 1950)

On Tim's return I got another surprise. Harry Spielman, our agricultural officer, had been transferred shortly after I arrived. While I was still in training his expected replacement, who had joined some of the training class sessions, introduced himself and we happily pored together over the Bombay post report. After poor Betsy Bradfield's death Martha Darke, with whom she had shared a largish house, was moving in with an American business family. I had just moved into my apartment and was not yet unhappy with it when I was asked if I wanted that house. It seemed too big for me and Robin, and knowing that the arriving agricultural officer had a wife and three or four children, I suggested it be held for them. jener Kraft, Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft. Mephistopheles started from the other end, but I achieved a similar effect -- except that I wanted good for others and got the bad for myself. Not an uncommon phenomenon, of course.

On Tim's return from Washington he called me into his office for the briefing customary for all officers when one was back from home base. In the course of it I asked when we could expect the new agricultural officer -- hadn't he been scheduled to arrive about now?

Tim shot me a glance, then , "How well did you know him?" I told him I had met him in the class, had several coffee breaks and checked out the post report with him. He seemed a nice fellow. When would he and his family arrive?

"He isn't coming. I don't suppose you've seen this. It made me wonder why you had been so solicitous about housing for them." And handed me a clipping of a column of Mary Haworth's, a sort of Washington-Post Ann Landers of the time. I don't remember the exact wording but it went something like this:

Dear Mary Haworth:

My husband is being sent by his agency to a south Asian post soon, and our children and I are to go with him. A few weeks ago I found an unfinished letter in his typewriter. It was to the man whom he will replace at that post, who is a bachelor. It said that an extremely attractive young woman Foreign Service Officer would be coming out there shortly, so the post would be brightened up a bit. My husband told me he and she had talked about the post together. I am not sure it went beyond that, but Mary, I am terribly worried and upset. What shall I do?

Mary Haworth sensibly suggested that there was nothing on which to base the lady's worries. But why did she publish it? No names were mentioned -- but there was only one young woman American foreign service officer in all south Asia.

I was dumbfounded. I said to Tim, quite truthfully, that I had not laid eyes on the man other than in the class and at coffee breaks.

Well, said Tim, I told the Department I wouldn't have him here. If you two are having an affair it would be bad for morale all round; if you aren't I don't want an imbecile female like that on my hands.

So that agricultural officer never came to Bombay. He probably never had any other foreign assignment, either, because Tim mentioned that when a principal officer flatly turned down someone outside the regular service they usually weren't considered for other such feathers in their caps. Too bad for him. One of Harry Spielman's successors, Giles Hubert, was black, as was one of the USIS officers who came on board. The Foreign Service was ahead of its time in making places for minorities and women.

Meanwhile that perfectly good house went to another consular family.

In February I was sent to Delhi for a week's work and orientation, and took some leave so as to see some of the great sights of India:

... I negotiated a car and driver yesterday and am seeing Agra in style! The Taj Mahal by moonlight is beautiful beyond description -- no one can tell me now that the Orientals don't love their wives!... also King Akbar's tomb and other things [notably Fatepur Sikhri outside Delhi; it is one of the great palace complexes of the world]. Agra is full of history and art. Not the least interesting to me was the 120-mile drive down from Delhi. It was my first view of the Indian countryside. Passed through Mathura, the center of one of the strictest Hindu sects. Saw a lot, and believe me, was seen! I felt like I was as much an object of curiosity as the things and people I saw were to me.... we're in the throes of a severe cold wave -- down to 45_ and we're all freezing. Thank heaven Agra and Delhi are full of fireplaces and I have some warm things. It's been 55_ in Bombay. (February 13, 1950).

The Indian countryside. Between Delhi and Agra it is flat, and in February looked like a desert. How could all the people I saw along and in the road -- people in bullock carts, women under huge burdens of wood or pots, the very occasional truckload -- how could they sustain themselves?

It was a dusty ride, inducing great thirst. I hadn't yet learned to bring bottled boiled water along on trips. At Mathura I asked the driver to stop at one of the thatch roadside teahouses and get us something to drink. It would be hot sweet tea in which the milk and water had been boiled together -- not very tasty, but anyway wet. He did so, and apparently asked if there was some private place where the memsahib could be comfortable. The proprietor must have misunderstood and the place one with other functions besides dispensing tea, for he led us into a little lean-to furnished only with a charpoy (wood bed frame with rope or heavy tape woven to support the body). I merely shook my head in the back-and-forth motion indicating "No," but the driver was incensed! Insulted, I think.

Back in Delhi I met the ambassador and most of the other embassy officers. I was given piles of reports and other materials to go through, and learned a good deal. Two of them stick in my mind: first, that (carefully classifying his report "Secret") a senior embassy official took supercilious and I thought really colonialist exception to an Indian counterpart's using his sixteen-year-old daughter as official hostess -- "she is educated [and therefore spoke English] but is much too young for such a function; the man has a wife." Did he think to guess that perhaps the wife lived in purdah and spoke no English?

Second, I visited the biographical-files section, where two young officers were supposed to keep tabs on Indians of interest to the United States. I had a list of people in our consular district whom we in Bombay wanted to know more about. Now I should say the embassy was in the throes of massive expansion, from a five- or six-officer outfit to one treble that size. After all, there had been an American embassy in India for only five or six years. There were more American personnel than desks for them to work at. This by the way was no doubt only the first of many such expansions. God knows how many Americans are at the Delhi embassy now.

My counterparts took my list, searched their files, and came up with almost nothing less than two years old. Quite a bit before then, though. "Geez," said one, scratching his head, "They only had one guy then, and he only did this biographical job part time. How did he get so much done?" I didn't say what crossed my mind then and many too many times thereafter in the Foreign Service, namely, that he had put his finger on the problem. Too many people falling all over each other very soon reach the point of diminishing return of useful work. Six dolts can't do a better job than one competent person. And so on.

Off office time I was well entertained by a number of officers and their families. Least well, I think, by Mrs. Henderson, whom I remember only as distinctly condescending when we lunched at the embassy residence, after she had let me wait half an hour beyond the time she had set. While waiting I counted nineteen pairs of things in the faux-Federal decor of the residence reception room. Dreary elegance.

On the whole, though, the embassy people were most pleasant, and hospitable to me. I especially remember Howard Donovan, the feisty Counselor of Embassy, who was not universally popular among Foreign Service personnel in India but who seemed to me a very sensible sort. And dear Captain Cortner, the Naval attaché. A widower, he had his little daughter with him in Delhi. He told me how he spent many evenings sewing dresses for her! Delhi not being the ideal

geographical spot for watching the physical part of the Indian navy, he also said he would ask his Indian naval contacts in Bombay to get in touch with me, and he coached me in what the various vessels looked like and asked me to keep an eye on what showed up in Bombay harbor. I was flattered with this, given the several World War II veterans on the Bombay staff.

Of later trips to Delhi I remember only that one took place in the Delhi summer. It could reach 120_F. in the shade then. In the absence of air conditioning, how were the embassy offices kept bearable? Well, on visiting it I at first thought a major renovation must be under way. The whole place was draped in wide strips of heavy cloth, flowing over windows and walls. Every few feet there was a rickety ladder running from the ground to the roof, and a small army of little men in nothing but loin cloths and turbans, who made a sort of continuous ant-chain going up and down them. Then I saw that atop each turban was a metal bucket filled with water. The men would climb to the roof, splash the water over it and the draperies, climb back down again, fill their buckets, climb back up again ... all day in that heat, to keep the embassy rooms cool. A version of the ice box Mama fixed up in that hovel in Coeur d'Alene.

I finally fired the nanny, who in addition to tipping my bottle occasionally, did a lousy job of laundry and took to departing in the evenings when I needed her. In her place I've hired another boy. He is quite good, and with two boys I can entertain more easily. Antonio is a good cook but hardly efficient by our standards -- he works practically all day fixing meals just for us! chops vegetables into atom-size pieces for soup, etc. Now I'm getting more service and a better kept house for the same money. One has to get the hang of housekeeping in this new manner. The boys also do better with Robin, I think. (March 10, 1950).

Both my boys are good Catholics from Goa and they [and Robin] go over Catechism and stuff when I'm not there to help. I really have a jewel in Rafael, the bearer. He is wonderful with Robin and I can feel absolutely sure that all will be well when Robin is with him. The other afternoon, having nothing else to do, and with no suggestions from me, they took off for a trip to the museum. (April 6, 1950)

The kitchen sometimes looks like a barnyard, because all the stuff comes in alive. Occasionally I hear loud yelps and cacklings, which means Dog and Chicken have discerned each other's presence. Robin is usually in on it all, including the kill, and takes great interest. The other morning ... he came rushing into the bedroom saying, "Mommy, mommy, come in and see what we've got in the kitchen!" I went out and found four huge lobsters thrashing round in the sink. In about half an hour he reported that "Now Antonio has them in the pot and Mommy they've turned red!" He still enjoys beating eggs and such, which no doubt puzzles the cook, but they all get along beautifully. (April 4, 1950)

End of a somewhat harrowing day... Honestly, sometimes I feel like a cross between Mr. Anthony and Simon Legree, and there have been at least thirty people in my office since nine this morning, each with his own problem, which of course is the BIG one to him. It's something of a challenge being successful in this job and still not becoming one of the most detested members of the community -- as you can understand a visa officer undertakes a job whose public relations are prima facie bad. We just can't do for people what they want in lots of cases. But I guess it's good training in diplomacy. (Ibid.)

Five o'clock, and I have to wait while a lawyer and his client thrash out in three languages whether a draft of a deposition is what they said or not, so I'll take a few moments for a letter. (March 30, 1950)

[Robin] came home [from a beach picnic] with a collection of fancy shells and vivid descriptions of how difficult it was to disengage the original residents from them. I didn't go as, what with two ships full of Americans in and a few other complications, I couldn't risk being thirty miles away if needed. Believe me, things can happen that the most imaginative liar couldn't think up.... Spent Friday afternoon rushing around the docks and local police offices in a boiling sun, trying to straighten out a woman who gaily boarded an Italian ship at Australia without a single visa in her passport, making a great tour and all that. [She] arriving in Bombay and not being let off, the whole thing fell in our lap. Her ire at the local government people wasn't soothed when I asked her what she thought a foreigner's chances would be of taking a sightseeing tour through New York under similar circumstances. (Please don't repeat this to anyone -- it's not secret stuff, of course, but it's just best not to publicize office affairs. I thought it would amuse you). (March 19, 1950)

We've had more visiting firemen than you could shake a stick at... as between that, the FS Inspector's scheduled visit late this month, and what seems like every American ship in the Eastern hemisphere going through, we've had one week of it! Last Sunday I was duty officer and spent the day shinnying up and down gangplanks of freighters, clearing them, etc. Arrived two hours late for a luncheon party for which I'd dressed in a white suit before coming to work, covered with coal dust from one end to the other. It's a good thing I enjoy this sort of thing... (May 6, 1950).

As duty officer I could shinny up and down gangplanks, but the switchboard defeated me. I never did learn to get a call in or out on it. And it wasn't that suit, but another dress, that got its full skirt caught in a greasy ventilator and was ruined. It took several exchanges of letters with the IRS, who took "Corey" to be male, before they gave up and allowed my deduction claim for it.

[The FS Inspector is here and] I never saw such a thundering herd of visa applicants, citizenship cases, passport services, destitute Americans (only one at the moment but ye gods what a corker!), people wanting the lowdown on how to ship dead bodies from the States, Indian boy scouts going to the US jamboree, two-year-old wards of Indian missions tearing off with lady missionaries to visit the States,... sailors on leave and misbehaving, visiting firemen wanting -- and getting if they're official or important -- entertainment from those whom they're supporting with taxes, suicides of American stewardesses on ships (only one of those too thank the Lord)... and minor items I've forgotten, all in the last ten days. (May 25, 1950).

The "corker" was a young man who showed up at the consulate one day, completely broke. I do not remember how he got there, but he demanded that the consulate look after him. All we could do was see that he got minimal sustenance until a ship came in on its way to the States. Then he could be signed on as an unpaid seaman and return to his country. This didn't suit him at all. I told him to think it over for a day or so, and come back and we could discuss the few options. He

did come back, but insisted on seeing the Consul General. Tim called me in on the interview. When Tim asked him how he proposed to support himself in India, he replied that he guessed he'd just have to go on relief. This was too much for me. Relief indeed! I asked him who, or what agency, he thought was offering relief to the maimed beggar children who wandered the streets, to the thousands whose only homes were the sidewalks of Bombay. Whether he finally agreed to ship back or whether he simply disappeared I do not remember. I do remember Tim dressing me down a bit for being "too positive, not feminine enough." Maybe he was right.

.... the new (U.S.) Security Act -- all visas canceled, people getting hysterical and doing silly things like canceling their passages and so forth and then coming to see us, telegrams, phone calls and heaven knows what from Paris and London and all other places en route where hapless people suddenly discover their visas are no good.... I've given out press interviews here saying in effect don't get excited but it has little effect.... the Ambassador is down for a few days, made a big speech yesterday, and we're all in for a grueling round of teas, receptions, luncheons, dinners and so forth... I don't see how he stands it! (October 25, 1950).

With notable exceptions -- especially among the medical missionaries, the Catholic priests, and at the American Marathi Mission, and among a few of the business people as well -- one could not feel that the local Americans represented the best of this country. By and large the missionaries were a self-righteous lot, holding both the pagan Indians and the sinful non-missionary Americans in shocked low esteem. By and large the business people and their families all too soon got used to their privileges and saw only the hardships of their lot and the shortcomings and stupidities of India. Few of the common ways of spending leisure time in America were available there. As a result these people, by no means an extraordinary lot, amused themselves with drink and gossip and various expressions of general dissatisfaction, ill health and so on. That explains the doctor's connection of my bacillary dysentery with unhappiness in "this terrible place." Another doctor called it "Memsahib's disease -- the ailment of women who have nothing to do."

You are so right about the impressions Americans give out here. Of course I can't say it officially, but the way Americans act makes me positively ashamed of them.... Here in India [they] are of course terribly rich by local standards, and live very comfortably by any standards. Women who have washed their husbands' sox regularly take about six weeks to start howling at and about their six or eight or ten dumb, lazy servants, etc. In general, the men of the American community associate with Indians in business, but the women won't stoop so low as to attend mixed parties or anything like that. Consulate people have to stand up against a barrage of criticism for doing so, of course, and you can imagine that the attack is concentrated on the gals. Furthermore, everyone drinks like fish. There is a greater desire for long cool ones in this climate but it is still not necessary to carry it as far as many people do. Lastly, about ninety percent of them forget their blessings, forget that they are living in a style to which they will never again be accustomed, think India is the last post on the way to savagery, want to go home on the next boat You can imagine the reaction these attitudes produce in a society which is proud, puritanical, prohibitionist, and anything but tolerant itself.

The other night I went to a dinner party where I was the only foreigner present.... well- educated upper-middle-class Indians, who had had no previous contact with Americans. Apparently their

ideas were entirely formed by the movies and by hearsay.... they had gone to great lengths to lay in a formidable supply of liquor. I could see they were very surprised by my appearance -- no dyed blonde hair or too much makeup, no loud voice, no over-revealing clothes, etc. Then when drink was urgently suggested [this was during the treatment for amoebic, and I wasn't supposed to take alcohol at all, but saw I must]... I at last settled for a beer [which] came in a tall ice-filled glass, so you can imagine I was more than satisfied with one, but got it all down. Later I learned they had even set aside a special room for me to drink in if I wished.... that is the sort of shock one gets when one realizes exactly what they think of us, and logically so, from movies, newspaper headlines, and the Americans they observe at a distance. Don't publicize any of this, of course -- we'd probably have another Senate investigation or something! (6/7/50)

...the other day I took five little ones to the zoo. One of these kids has apparently picked up some of the nastier traits of his parents, and continually makes disparaging remarks about Indians, etc. A poor old woman was selling peanuts, and as is the custom had them spread out in neat little piles on the sidewalk. This big lummoX just made a running bound through the whole thing, on purpose, and of course destroyed most of her working capital. It was quite a fracas since she spoke a language I didn't speak and naturally was furious. I tried to apologize and paid her and it got smoothed over, but I was kind of furious myself. My only consolation was that I know Robin wouldn't do such a mean trick. I tried to explain that such jokes are all right played against people who can afford it, but not when they are as poor as most people around here are. The kid is just like a lot of his American elders, I'm sorry to say. (April 4, 1950)

And that kid's kids may have been among those American brats I saw trying hard to accomplish pandemonium in a railway station in Japan in 1985. I rather hope Michael Fay will serve as salutary proof that worms may turn.

Mama and Daddy were surprised that such people were allowed out into the wide world to disgrace us:

Re the quality of our Americans abroad -- Washington screens the State Department and other government people very carefully of course, but can't be so particular about others. If someone is obviously going to injure the prestige of the United States abroad, he will not be issued a passport. But this is pretty extreme and can't be done except in a very few cases. The things which cause adverse comment aren't the things which can be pointed out as basis for refusal of passports -- it's just that we're too rich, drink too much, are too noisy and brassy, etc. Sometimes I doubt if we'd be liked even if we were on the average delightful cultured people because the powerful must use their power, and are never liked. We have inherited Britain's role, I'm afraid. (July 20, 1950)

Something of the same sort -- Americans hanging together and belittling the locals and their ways -- could be seen in almost any foreign place. In India they also tended to ape their run-of-the-mill British predecessors in this respect, and this no doubt from the same root causes as with the British: ignorance, fear and lack of self confidence in an unfamiliar milieu. Some of them had no idea on which coast of India they had landed when they got to Bombay. Fear not primarily of physical violence, but fear of strangeness in general. And India offered plenty of strangeness to Westerners. This fear was not entirely unjustified. What of the poor woman who opened up her

baby's bathinette one morning and found a nest of newborn cobras inside? And Westerners, especially Americans, in India tended to suffer from all sorts of unfamiliar ailments arising out of the relative lack of sanitation as we understand it (Indians', or at least Hindus', definitions of what constituted pollution were vastly different from ours). I myself got a bad dose of amoebic dysentery and several of the "three hundred undiagnosed diseases of the alimentary tract" (if they were undiagnosed, how did the doctors know there were three hundred of them?, I wondered). All this did bring on a sometimes neurotic fear of germs and infection. I recall the woman who among other precautions several times a day wiped all the doorknobs in her apartment with Lysol solution.

Apartment kitchens were sometimes furnished with western-style sinks, but usually there was only a floor drain in one corner with a cold-water tap above it. Here the cook would squat and peel vegetables and so on. Then he would prepare them either at a table or on a board elsewhere on the floor. Cooks went barefoot inside the house, as did most Indians. A typical American family whom I met on their arrival in Bombay asked me to ask my servants to find some servants for them. When she instructed the new cook, the memsahib was careful to insist that he peel vegetables and do other food preparation on the table she had had put in the kitchen, and not at the corner drain, and first he must each time wash the table with Lysol solution. About two days later, when I was having a peaceful lunch at home for a change, my cook and the other one both came in the dining room, weeping. The memsahib had become very upset and had fired her cook. What had he done wrong? He had followed her directions to the letter. He had washed the table she provided with Lysol solution, and done all the food and vegetable preparation on that table. Hardly had they returned to my kitchen after I told them that I would look into the whole thing right away than the memsahib burst in, hysterical. "This ghastly place -- I told him he had to wash the table and to fix all our food on it -- when I came in the kitchen, there he was, working away squatting barefoot on top of the table!!!" I think that family didn't last long in India.

Through John Hlavacek ("Check"), the UP correspondent for India, I met the Natarajans, charming dear people, old friends of Check's. They and I immediately took a great liking to one another. "Nat" was editor of one of the best English-language dailies in the country. Sophie had an Oxford or Cambridge degree. They were among the few with whom Check would talk about books and such. We spent many a happy evening à quatre. He was Hindu, she Muslim. They had no children. This kind of marriage there was very much like a black-white union in the United States. It usually meant broken ties with both families, as I think it had with the Natarajans. In late 1951 I was successful in getting their names on a list of "leaders" who traveled to the United States at USIA expense, and to arrange that they would visit not only New York and Washington, where Nat would see the U.S. press in action, but also Chicago and the West, and be squired around here and there by my relatives and old friends. They never forgot that trip. On the day of our departure from India, when we were in our cabin and the ship about to unmoor, a messenger arrived with something in a paper sack "for Sundaresan memsahib." It was the Shiva figure that has graced every living room of mine since, a treasure they had brought back from a trip to South India and that I had admired. We lost touch many years ago, during my dead funk of the late 1950s. To my lasting regret. They being perhaps twenty years older than I, they are probably no longer with us. But I still love them both.

It was early on, only a few weeks after we had moved into the apartment and shortly after the Mary Haworth episode -- and after I had given up our chance for the house that had previously been available, that I found us in what I thought of as Real Trouble. Our apartment left much to be desired, but it was, I had thought, an improvement over the boarding house. And Robin was having a good time, especially since "Uncle Joe" was so nice to him, inviting him to come up to his place for treats, and so on. I don't remember who, or if it was more than one person, who suggested to me that I ought to watch out for my boy in Joe Belehrad's company. Now Joe was a big handsome iron-jawed fellow, dark, with a Cary Grant dimple in his chin. He looked the picture of masculinity, and nothing in his speech or gestures suggested otherwise to me. I at first dismissed the warnings as simply malicious. But then I began to notice all sorts of strange men whom Joe seemed to entertain singly and in batches. Also, Antonio and Rafael seemed reserved about him. They said nothing -- but then they were servants, and well knew their place. When on at least two occasions I was awakened in the middle of the night by loud goings-on above, male shouts of "Joe don't come near me, I never want to have anything to do with you again," and so on, desperation replaced dismissal.

I knew such a thing as homosexuality existed, but like most of my contemporaries I knew nothing else about it except that it was "abnormal" and "evil" and would invariably involve pedophilia. Thus, and especially given the hints that had been dropped, I took it for granted that Joe's interest in Robin was something very bad for Robin. Rob says Joe never made a pass at him, and from today's vantage point I see that I rushed to conclusions unjustly. But at the time I thought I must protect my child from something unspeakable.

Despite the crimp it put in his style, and without saying why, I decreed that Robin should under no circumstances leave our apartment without Antonio or Rafael along, unless the parents of one of his little friends had invited him to their place. Not even with "Uncle Check" or the other "uncles"; I couldn't afford to pinpoint Belehrad as the cause of my prohibitions. Still, this was a poor and at best temporary solution. I HAD TO GET US OUT OF THAT APARTMENT.

But how? There were now no vacancies among the houses and apartments allocated to the Consulate by the housing authorities; I would have to find one "off allocation." But how to do this? Housing for Europeans (and for Indians as well) was terribly scarce in Bombay. My fairly broad acquaintance among Bombay officialdom did not include the housing authorities. That in fact was part of Belehrad's job. I didn't know whom to go to, or whom to bribe.

And I could confide in no one. Not only because such a thing was extremely serious at that moment, when Washington was already in an uproar about "queers in the State Department." How could I support any such allegation? By asking people to stay in my tiny hot one-bedroom apartment with us until the next night a wild party took place upstairs? Hardly. Furthermore, Belehrad was Tim Timberlake's White-haired Boy. For the first (by no means the last) time I witnessed a situation in which a boss had "fallen in love with" one of his young men -- not in the sexual sense, but in the sense of believing this one was special beyond all others, of brooking no criticism of him, seeing only his shining virtues. This affliction is not at all the same thing as being a mentor. It involves no assessment of the other beyond some sort of belief in his excellence and devotion to his advancement in every possible area. Why these "boys" invariably turn out to be sour apples I have never figured out, but it was not hard to figure out some of

Belehrad's attraction in this case. He could be charming, and he saw to it that Tim's slightest wish, or the slightest wish of Julie or Tim's kids, was fulfilled A.S.A.P. and sometimes sooner. He was a lot less regarding of the rest of us, and of his duties as shipping officer -- but Tim seemed blissfully unaware of that, and was sharply disbelieving when anyone tried to tell him or was moved to complain about some negligence of Behrad's. For me to let it be known why I was so eager to move would be dangerous.

Then hope appeared. There was an applicant for a refugee visa, an unpleasant middle-aged Central European anti-Semite who regularly visited the consulate and made my life difficult for a few minutes each time. Information in our files indicated that not only did he not fulfil the legal requirements for refugee status, but that some of his business dealings in India were highly questionable. On being queried by the Department about his status I had forwarded the relevant information to them, only to receive a nasty letter from a Congressmen some of whose constituents wanted this man allowed in as a refugee and had signed affidavits of support for him, followed by a telegram from the Department in effect saying "Give him the visa, you dolt."

This fellow had a shabby apartment in Colaba, a mixed Indian-European neighborhood at Bombay's southernmost tip. It was a decent though not fashionable part of town. There were indeed families living in carton-and-burlap shelters they had made on the sidewalk, there was indeed an ever-more emaciated cow tethered at the corner beneath the apartment, whose morning bellows could tear the heart. But so there were such people and cows -- thousands of both -- all over Bombay. The apartment was not far from Robin's school and our friends the Imbreys and the Temples.

When my "refugee" next came to the office, I implicitly let him know that one visa would be available for him if one apartment became available for me. Agreed. Immediately I went to our executive officer and begged him to get the authorities to allocate that apartment to me. I gave as my reasons the smallness and poor ventilation of our present apartment. It wasn't quite decent, I said, for a six-year-old boy to have to share a bedroom with his mother. Furthermore, I said, Robin was highly sensitive to heat and might well fall ill during the oncoming hot season; the other place was old, had high ceilings and broad verandahs. And when the monsoon did come all of the things we had no place for except on our tiny verandah would be water-logged and ruined.

One fine day three weeks later I watched that old villain of a "refugee" clamber triumphantly aboard a ship bound for New York, where presumably he lived out his days in his usual manner.

I finally have got definite possession of the new flat and am in the throes of negotiating all the necessary details. I somehow persuaded the landlord to paint [i.e. calcimine] the place -- a marvelous thing in this housing-shortage town....(April 4, 1950).

At this point I am more uncertain than ever of just where we'll be laying our heads in the next couple of weeks. After no end of delay, etc., the old boy in the flat I want left and it's been vacant since the 3d. But the housing authorities are insisting that he hasn't gone yet. Since I saw him leave, I can't quite agree with them. Meanwhile I've looked at ... a 2-bedroom flat in a brand new apt. house in the nicest section of town, right by the seaside, near Robin's friends, etc. [that one fell through for me](May 8, 1950).

The biggest news of the last week is that at last I got damn sick and tired of the housing situation... I had been nice and patient up to now, but what with the monsoon coming and I having done all the spade work myself, I did feel that when negotiations arrived at the point where I had to hand them over to our exec and administrative officers, a little action could be called for. So I kept getting negative reports that they and the housing authorities were "keeping it in mind" and so forth, and last week got very sick of it. So I made a practice of visiting our exec's office twice a day -- he's a bachelor and just a trifle intimidated, I think -- and really pouring it on. Result: one house, now being painted, and should be ready for our occupancy by June 1. I'm afraid I'm just not a bureaucrat! (May 15, 1950).

You were optimistic about my moving on the 15th. I practically had to blackmail the local authorities into releasing the flat to me, but after only 2 weeks' delay got it on Friday. On Saturday the painters started in. I have been getting up at 6, going over there from 7:30 to 9 to supervise the day's work, shopping during lunch hours (when I haven't an engagement that is) and from 5 to 5:30. Today the electricians arrived to move the refrigerator from one of the bedrooms, where the former tenant had it, into the kitchen. Also to replace all the sockets, fuses, plugs and other easily removed objects connected with the electric supply, which he apparently removed and sold, along with everything else except a wood-burning cookstove circa 1850 which is sitting in the middle of the kitchen. After painters and electricians get through, I will go through a couple of days with hamals and sweepers, with emphasis on the importance of elbow grease and ammonia in cleaning some of the eleven years' accumulation of filth off all non-painted surfaces like the bathroom for instance. Then arrives my pretty new furniture, and lastly and I hope in an orderly fashion ourselves and belongings. (May 25, 1950).

We ... are finally moved in...The dining chairs haven't arrived, they forgot to send a bed for me (mine hasn't arrived from the Sts.)... they forgot a chest of drawers for Robin and ... they made a love seat instead of a [sofa, which] I sent back.... We have no refrigeration, since the frig went off and is awaiting repairs -- also a matter of a couple of days but I miss ice in this 96 degree heat. They told me it would be like this sometimes! and now I believe it, although how everything happens is beyond me... we'll be very nicely settled by Saturday, I think, and are already more comfortable than heretofore in Bombay. (June 7, 1950)

Thus within six months of our arrival in Bombay we had moved twice and I had gone through the first of my many, many experiences of for practical purposes rebuilding an apartment into which I moved.

It may have been just as well that we were delayed in getting into the new apartment:

I've spent a fairly interesting ten days. Last Sunday morning we went to Mass and a baseball game. Then, as Robin was still weekending with his friend Billy, I went up to Hlavacek's for lunch and a big post-game party. Feeling fine. Right after lunch I got a small "gas pain," so took some bicarbonate and lay down. The pain didn't get any better so after a couple of hours I took some bitters in water and lay down. It began to get much worse, and by 6:30 I was only able to lie on the bed in one position and couldn't even turnover. I was very ashamed of myself because the rest of the party was going strong. At 7:30 "Check" said he was going to call a doctor, and

while I thought I would feel foolish to learn I just had eaten too many baked beans, I said it would be all right. Well, to make a long story short, the doctor took a blood count and did some examining and sent me straight to the hospital, where I've been since, until noon today. It seems that fool who dosed me with pills for dysentery before hadn't bothered with any real diagnosis, and what I had was not a simple case of bacillary dysentery, but amoebic which by last Sunday had developed into a nice big tumor on the scar tissue where my appendix used to be! As soon as I had my first shot of emetine the pain went away -- it was the worst pain I've ever had, not excepting labor -- and I have felt fine since. But I had to stay in hospital for eight days and got a shot every day, besides a lot of other pills, some of which I still have to take. My blood count is down to normal which means that the amoebas inside the tumor have been killed and the tumor is dissolving. I had a lovely private room and lots of company and loads of flowers, and got some reading done.... Thank goodness, this is an "illness in line of duty" so Uncle Sam will pay for it. I am going back to work again Wednesday. "Check" said he was glad I had the painful kind because if I hadn't I would still be running around thinking I was all cured. But I really am now. I am so glad it happened to me instead of Robin.... [who] has spent the week with "Check" and his four bachelor roommates. There's a swimming pool in their compound and some of his best boy friends live there, so you can imagine he's had a wonderful time and I'll have a hard time getting him back here!....[he] is going to join his school group of Cub Scouts -- and is he thrilled about it! He says he gets to start practicing how to tie knots pretty soon, so I imagine we'll be living in a welter of fancy twists for a while....(Monday, April 24, 1950)

Had a bad scare the other day -- our pup got too frisky and bit Robin. I was sitting in the office and got a call to come home, "Robin's eye has been badly hurt." I tore home wondering if he had any eye left and was of course relieved to find that the eye itself was ok. He had a beautiful shiner, though. Besides that all dogs in India are rabid until proven otherwise, and even though Mandrake has had rabies shots recently, poor R. had to have four -- in the stomach -- one each morning at 8:30, which was a beautiful start to days which also included the usual work only more so, the Inspector, me throwing up after every meal (Aureomycin treatment for dysentery -- this is the last gasp of what I think is a successful cure), moving, and so forth. This all sounds kind of harrowing, so I'm pleased to report that R. is fine, I am feeling better all the time, the Inspector was very nice, and life is really quite satisfactory -- just full! (June 7, 1950)

I remember those fearful rabies shots that poor little Robin had to undergo far better than I do the side effects of the Aureomycin. Brave soldier as he was, he couldn't contain a howl towards the end of each long deep painful injection. I am told this procedure has been made vastly less painful now. I hope so.

And I was cured, and I was lucky, much luckier than poor Margaret Amory.

Jim Amory was my predecessor in the consular section, a sweet quiet young man with a sweet quiet pallid blonde wife Margaret. They had no children. They had been in Bombay about a year when I got there. Margaret had contracted amoebic and couldn't seem to shake it. I gather she had never been a very energetic or positive person, and she almost seemed to cling to this debilitating ailment of hers, almost not to wish it gone. Her conversation was strictly limited to minute descriptions of the various unpleasant treatments she was undergoing, and the prospect of going back to the States. This latter was imminent in Spring 1950, as the Department had

decided to bring Jim and Margaret back home and, it was hoped, to make a cure for Margaret more likely.

Very shortly before they left Jim came into my office one day for a confidential chat. You can guess the rest. Jim was sweet and quiet, but he was young and a man. He had fallen in love with Isabel, the thirty-ish British wife of a local British businessman. Isabel was everything Margaret wasn't -- dark, lively, witty, good conversation, great fun, bursting with health and sex. Jim said he was going to take Margaret home and stick with her until she was better and able to get along without him. Then he would come back and he and Isabel would marry -- presumably Isabel would divorce her husband. Or so Jim thought.

So the Amorys left. Isabel was as gay as ever. She took up with a succession of young men. She had only been toying with Jim. Her husband didn't seem to mind any of this. Maybe he had his own little games on the side.

I spent an evening with the Amorys when I got back to Washington. They of course were still married. Jim was still sweet and even quieter than theretofore. Margaret had been cured of the amoebic, but now she suffered from several other ailments. She, too, was if anything more wan than ever. I don't know what happened to them after that.

We were burglarized Saturday night (or Sunday morning) about 4 AM, and fortunately the guy got only my wallet and about 50 rupees, instead of everything in the house. I am feeling especially stupid because I got Mandy especially for a watchdog. Well, he barked and growled something awful, raced around and generally raised Ned, but I was so sleepy I just told him to shut up and went back to sleep! Maybe I should have invited the burglar to tea, too!.... The whole thing has sad repercussions, though, because usually the memsahib accuses the servants when something like this happens, so they are all quarreling with each other and accusing each other no matter how much I tell them to shut up and get on with their work. I am sure it wasn't any of them because (a) there have been lots of professional burglaries in the neighborhood lately, (b) they wouldn't come in at that hour and the dog wouldn't have barked at them, (c) I have had as much as 1000 rupees in my purse -- but won't again! -- recently... and if one of them wanted to steal he'd take that not 50, at the risk of a good job, (d) they know where the silver and my jewelry is and wouldn't be satisfied with Rs.50, and they all have clean records with the police. (June 21, 1950)

Burgling that place was easy, since anyone who could shinny a short floor up a wooden column could land on the verandah and from there through any door or window -- all open to catch any possible breeze. A couple of weeks thereafter a burglar struck again in the middle of the night. This time, not being so doped up with medicine, I was ready for him. When I heard him slither over the verandah rail I quietly got out of bed, picked up the heavy brass cylindrical cigarette box on my bedside table, and when he came in the door I threw it at him. I missed (was blind without my glasses and in the dark) but it made a big crash, causing rapid slithering back down the column and raising servants and neighbors.

After two burglaries I came to be on pleasant terms with the director of police for the Colaba district, a British holdover from the Raj. He would come by for a drink after work, and would

take Robin and me for spins in the country, said it did his car good to get it up to speed. And he gave me a Beretta .944 from the police office collection, or perhaps it was one he had taken off a dead German in the North African campaign. He said I should have some real protection. If I would register it as required with the authorities, but say I had had it in the States and that it had arrived packed with my other things, his own risk in passing it to me would be eliminated. Two or three times thereafter he took me to some vacant beach or field and coached me in how to load it, cock it, shoot it, and so on.

I never got very good or very confident with any gun. At bottom I felt quite safe in India, safer, certainly, than I would have felt in many areas of Chicago. But it was a sweet gesture and I was grateful. I did indeed register it with the authorities, fabricating some passages in letters home about "Martin's" gun so as to cover tracks not only with the local authorities but also the consulate should some question arise. And one fine Sunday morning I took Robin, the servants, and the gun down to nearby Colaba beach, which fortunately was otherwise empty at that moment. I did a bit of target practice for them, then I said, "I am going to hide this gun in our house, and I am going to shoot the next burglar who tries to rob us. If any of you should come across the gun, don't touch it; it might kill you."

Next morning I smuggled the gun to the office in my purse, wrapped it up, labeled the package "C. Sanderson, personal," put it in the back of the bottom drawer of my safe and left it there for the rest of our stay in Bombay. We never had another burglary. Word had gotten round that this memsahib was not to be fooled with.

The wind was up otherwise, too. A neighbor of mine, another Central European but this one a genuine refugee and a nice old fellow with whom I regularly exchanged pleasantries when we met on the street, invited himself to my place for tea one day. After the suitable formalities he lowered his voice and imparted his message to me: "Madam, please be careful. This house is being watched. I see them watching constantly -- you should ask your people to investigate." He was quite right, the place was being watched. From shortly after the second burglary until we moved out of that neighborhood, a little constable stood on the corner across our street, day and night. My policeman was not taking any chances, gun or no gun. Good.

In the middle of another night I was awakened when something bit me. When I turned on the light I found a couple of little round black bugs scurrying for cover. But I was faster than they. I caught one, sealed it in an envelope, and next time I visited Dr. Choksi to collect the weekly report on the incidence of a number of diseases in the district -- this and its forwarding to Washington being one of my routine duties -- I showed him the bug. What was it? I knew only that it bit, and stung.

Dr. Choksi was Chief Public Health Officer for Bombay. He was a tiny burned-out Parsi who had held that frustrating job for three decades, inheriting it from his late father who had suffered with it before him. Dr. Choksi insisted on my being re-immunized for some of the numerous diseases the international rules required immunization for for visitors to India and which Robin and I had undergone before leaving the States. He said that American vaccines weren't strong enough for the Indian germs. So I allowed myself to be pumped full of stuff, to no ill effect. He also took me around on visits to the municipal hospital, a depressing gray place full of patients

accompanied by family members who along with doing much of their nursing, prepared the patients' meals at the bedsides. The maternity ward was a special shock to me -- the average birth weight was five pounds. Indians are not genetically tiny people. Then one day when I made my call on him, I found Dr. Choksi almost in tears: "Mrs. Sanderson, I do not know what to do. As you know we have had an effective anti-malaria program in Bombay and its suburbs for three years, and during the last year malaria has been substantially eradicated. Now the City Council refuses funds to continue the program. They say malaria has been conquered and the program is therefore no longer needed. Of course next year we shall be right where we started from." Poor Dr. Choksi.

On the bug occasion Dr. Choksi took one look and identified it as a bedbug. A bedbug! I was horrified. I had heard of bedbugs but they were utterly out of my field of vision for myself or anyone I would ever know; they were something suffered by terribly poor and dirty people and by soldiers in filthy war situations. Dr. Choksi said they were common enough in Bombay. They could have come in with the laundry from the dhobi, or from any number of other sources. He would send the extermination squad to my house at my earliest convenience.

The extermination squad duly arrived. After a brief inspection its head man gave his verdict: "Madam, it will do no good to exterminate your flat alone. We must exterminate the whole compound, and we must repeat the extermination regularly." Needless to say I agreed enthusiastically to this prescription, and the place was nicely freed of some hundreds of thousands of small fauna. Followed by a night's blessed sleep in peace.

But I had forgotten something. Our immediate neighbors, who lived in the other flat in the compound building, were Jains. Jains really believe in the sanctity of life. They kill nothing, not even the mosquito which threatens them with malaria.

Sure enough, when I got back from the office next day there was a delegation waiting for me. I had done something terrible: all this killing would be on their karma, they would have to go through endless incarnations as bugs and insects and rats, be punished interminably.

I felt awful. I do not like to fly in the face of other people's beliefs, however strange these may seem to me, and I certainly try to avoid forcing my own beliefs on others. On the other hand.... on the other hand, the prospect of living in an ocean of tiny creatures doing their best to sting Robin and me and perhaps make us sick, was also too much. I had just moved in, I couldn't face another move and if I could, where would I find a place to move to?

Thank heaven most problems do have solutions. I told my neighbors I was extremely sorry for having thoughtlessly caused them such concern, for though I did not share their beliefs about the sanctity of all kinds of life, I indeed respected it, and them. But need they really worry? They had not called in the extermination squad, nor would they do so in future. This insect holocaust would be on my karma, not on theirs, would it not? Would it not be possible to continue the regular exterminations, but entirely on my responsibility? After each visit of the squad their representatives might register a protest with me, to ensure their innocence.

There ensued a sort of football-huddle in Gujarati. Then an English-speaker turned to me: Agreed. No doubt even Jains don't enjoy being bitten by bedbugs. So, for the rest of our tenancy in that apartment, the extermination squad made regular visits, after each of which a lady of the Jain house made a pro forma protest to me, and all went well.

Since then, when this tale has come into the conversation, I do ask that if, after my death, some poor cockroach or spider or fly approaches my interlocutor with a beseeching expression on its face, please just put it out of its misery as quickly as possible. That will be one down on the millions of bad incarnations I must go through.

Amid all this both Robin and I were having a fine time:

Tuesday night the American Women's Club gave their annual charity ball I was in the show... all togged out as an opera singer howling my head off with something from "La Traviata" while clowns played on stage, people played ball, blew whistles, etc. the act went over big!(March 30, 1950)

There was a slight downside to all this:

Among life's little problems in Bombay, there's such a shortage of unattached European women that I get a terrific rush. Which is loads of fun, natch. On the other hand, it creates problems as follows: (1) how to keep social contacts which are really business but which take a social form, from developing into "date" situations, (2) how to placate -- or at least avoid -- unfavorable criticism of the consulate by the local [American] ladies who have nothing to do but gossip and be envious of people with entr   to circles closed to them, (3) how to placate a nice American boy friend who gets unreasoning ... fits of jealousy.(July 20, 1950)

But the downside was slight indeed:

I had a "lazy" day ... women's club this morning, then a lunch with some of the gals, took the afternoon off and slept most of it. Last night I had the first of four big cocktail parties, 30 people, and a surprising success if I do say it myself.(June 28, 1950)

I began that June 28 description of a lazy day, however, with "As you can imagine, things have been somewhat exciting around here lately," because

I suppose everyone over there is all excited about the Korea thing. Right at the moment, of course, we don't know where it will lead, but I for one think it's a damn good thing we aren't taking this one lying down. It would be much harder to keep the peace and defend ourselves after Russia had gobbled up the entire rest of the world than now. There's still a good chance they'll back down, too, as they did in Greece and Iran, if we clamp down right now. Frankly, I don't think it will be war [between the U.S. and Russia].(Ibid.)

I was at pains to try to convince Mama and Daddy that we were if anything in less danger from Russian bombs in Bombay than they were in Boise. And they weren't the only ones who worried

that, especially now that India had recognized Communist China, India would "go communist." There was a noisy and in some areas influential Communist Party of India, and a number of splinters from it, notably in Telengana, where however it seemed to me the "Communist" part was mainly a matter of the local communists taking advantage of a richly justified peasants' revolt. I never thought India would "go communist," or be forced under the monolithic Soviet wing. I had a sneaking private thought that Stalin might well welcome India as the tale has it that he welcomed Bolivia. I was beginning to see that, especially for a country with India's problems, winning its independence was child's play compared to governing it afterward. India was, however, more fortunate than most in that the leaders of its independence movement were also reasonably capable of governing. The two talents rarely come together in the same person or group.

And I can't say my general analysis of certain larger political questions has changed much over the decades, though the specifics and situations changed vastly over time:

I'm not so upset about the Korea business as you seem to be. It sounds a bit strange to hear that MacArthur didn't get what he wanted [use of nuclear weapons] because he belonged to the wrong party. Remember he was put in charge in Japan by order of the President -- if the President hadn't wanted him there he wouldn't be there. I am remembering all the clamor to get the boys home ... all the howl against compulsory military training.... Remember I worked in the State Department on the Korea desk, and I'm not the least bit surprised about this thing. The only way it could have been prevented was by our stationing permanently large forces in the Far East. Then, unless we also stationed permanently large forces all over the place, the Communists would simply have struck somewhere else.... It doesn't help much to scream around about free people, spend a lot of money on corrupt governments, and sit back and expect the best to happen. On the other hand, if we are going to maintain the force it takes to keep the world peaceful, and we are the only ones who can do it, we can expect to be as unpopular as Britain used to be, because the policeman is never loved. I for one am not too concerned with popularity. If you want my frank (and confidential) opinion ... we can't prevent [countries' "going Communist"] by trying to bolster governments which are riddled with corruption, or by talking freedom to people who have never been free, don't know what freedom is, are accustomed to violence, disease, famine, injustice, and death.... The hard and unpleasant fact remains that when people are desperate, and ignorant, the man with the most desperate and violent program... which will promise the drawing of the blood of the exploiting classes, has a big edge over the man who has a saner, but slower-moving program. Our main support in the Far East comes from the "haves" among the local population, who are precisely the people most hated -- and sometimes justifiably so -- by the vast majority of the "have nots." (August 27, 1950)

Meanwhile, because they had been favorably impressed with him, I knew it would please the parents that

Yesterday when I came to the office there was a wire from Karachi saying "Have arranged three day stay Bombay beginning tenth. Please wire if convenient, love, Bill Decker".(August 8, 1950)

Yes, Bill looked as good as ever, and was the same old Bill. He told me he hadn't written because he was so discouraged ... Not only was his departure postponed for about nine months for no

compelling reason -- and he was the eagerest beaver in the class -- but it seems he fell in love with a beautiful and somewhat overprotected daughter of a Woodward and Lothrop official in Washington, who first consented to marry him and then at the last minute changed her mind, saying either he give up these notions about going abroad and take a good job in Papa's store or no marriage. Bill was somewhat low about the whole thing, but is taking it quite philosophically, for him! I reminded him of his classic remark to a sad young man in the class to whom the same thing happened last Fall -- "Well, Ed, if she won't go to Jeddah she won't go to bedda." (August 31, 1950)

A few months later I learned, from Arthur and from several others, that my old friend Arthur Hummel had also fallen in love, but with more luck in his case, for his lady and he were duly and married, and he seemed more than happy when I saw him later in Washington.

My excellent clerks and I had reorganized the visa and passport work to the point where we had quite a bit of extra time. At the same time, Joe Belehrad played the loyal overworked administrator to the hilt. Possibly at the Foreign Service inspector's suggestion and almost certainly at Frances Dailor's,

I have another job -- not instead of, but in addition to.... I am to take charge of shipping and seamen's affairs from now on. Now all the other jr. officers have been coming in to congratulate me with left-handed compliments about how they hope I won't have too much difficulty with no woman's job, but I just sweetly reply that I guess I'll have to bear with it -- I remember a number of masculine condolences on Why I Wouldn't Get in the Foreign Service, too. This puts me in charge of all the strictly consular functions of the office, which isn't so bad for a neophyte. I think I'll be getting an assistant in August, but till then it will be largely a matter of organization of the work. (June 7, 1950)

I didn't get an assistant during the six months before I was transferred to economic work. What I did get, after a couple months' smooth sailing, was a visiting "efficiency expert" from the Department, who recommended that because the combined job was prima facie too much responsibility for such a junior as I, the Department send a mid-level officer to head up the section, with me as his assistant. When I found this out I went to Tim and blew up. It must have worked, for no such boss appeared, though the section was later again divided among two officers, with a third assigned to Belehrad's former administrative housekeeping.

Shipping and seamen was fun, at least in retrospect. Whenever an American vessel (or a Panamanian or Philippines one; the US consulate took care of their affairs in Bombay as a courtesy) the captain would bring his papers to the office for certification and other formalities, and there were some duties connected with both American and Indian customs. The most interesting part, however, was dealing with seamen and their assorted problems and complaints.

There was the Sunday morning, about 3 a.m., when a constable showed up at my door. An American sailor had been arrested and insisted on seeing the consul. I told the constable I would get in touch with the district chief of police in the morning, and to make the sailor as comfortable as a Bombay jail permitted. My pal the district chief had this story to tell: the guy had been enjoying himself in a local cathouse when he got into a fight and somehow fell or was thrust out

of a third-floor window onto the composition roof of a car below. That didn't hurt him but it did the car roof. When apprehended, our hero was dashing stark naked up the street, chased by several score of angry neighborhood inhabitants. The administrative judge in charge of the case, a fairly puritanical type, wanted to sentence him to two years, thus making an example so that his fellow-countrymen would behave themselves better in his port.

Two days in a Bombay jail was a fine lesson, and would serve as a horrible example of the results such carryings-on could be expected to have. Two years would very likely kill any American, not to mention the hullabaloo (Michael Fay wasn't the first such "victim"). So on Monday I got together with the judge, said I fully agreed that what the man had done was heinous both to property and to propriety, pointed out to him that his keep in jail for two years would cost the municipality something, and suggested that he be required to pay a substantial fine and compensate the car's owner, and be released on my recognizance and his ship captain's undertaking that he would not be permitted ashore in any other Indian port. Agreed, after some considerable palaver. So he was released into the captain's custody.

He did however have the right to see the consul. On the following morning I heard a scurrying as of people getting out of the way in the outer office: "I'm gonna get that consul and make the biggest grease spot in hell out of him. Leaving me in that place for two days!" My door was shoved open. "I wanna see the consul!"

"Yes?"

"I said I wanna see the consul, God dammit!"

"I am the consul."

Oh. What would such a fellow do when confronted with a lady, and one who must be aware of his recent history? Today he might well just make that grease spot. But those were gentler times. He muttered and mumbled around, finally said he wanted to tell me he was sorry for my trouble over him.

"Thank you, but that is just my job. But I'm afraid if anyone else gets in the same trouble here, I won't be able to head off a two-year sentence."

I had no more trouble of that particular kind. Some of the Panamanian vessels were magnificent, those of the Isbrandtsen line, for example. Sparkling, in excellent condition, beautifully run by well paid and courteous officers and crews. It was on those ships that Robin and I regularly feasted, and whence our Thanksgiving turkeys came, and that I decided would be an ideal berth in which for us to go home when leave time came.

But some of the others were filthy unspeakable old tubs, questionably seaworthy and manned by the dregs of the Eurasian shoreline. One day I heard another disturbance in the outer office. I went out, to find my two women clerks as well as the several men huddled in a corner, and thirteen fierce looking characters, some brandishing knives, shouting and imprecating in what seemed like several languages, none even faintly comprehensible to any of us, except that I

caught a few words that sounded vaguely like my old Freshman Italian. It was Portuguese. Their speaker managed to convey to me that they were the crew of a Greek ship under Panamanian registry, come to complain of the inhuman conditions under which they had to work and the terrible food and other accommodations provided them, and demand redress and more pay. For starters they wanted "flavoring either spiritual or soft," in addition to the water they had for drinking during work in the engine room, where the heat, they said, made the body demand more than just liquid. No, none of them understood English.

This was a bit more than I could handle with no help. I sent the girls into my own office and asked the angry sailors to wait while I called the Portuguese consul, who was a bachelor and a friend of mine. He suggested I send them over to his office. I arranged with him that they should come in the afternoon, after I had had a chance to check on the ship's condition and amenities and on the relevant regulations. I went back out, pointed to the clock: "Three o'clock", made a drawing showing three o'clock; "Portuguese consul," showed the Portuguese-speaker how to get there by pointing out the window, and watched them leave.

Three o'clock and, lo and behold, here were thirteen furious sailors again ruffling the calm outside my door. I went out. "Portuguese consul!" "NO!! No Portuguese! American!" "You go Portuguese consul or I call police!"

Again the girls got herded into my office. This time, before I could call the police, I had to call downstairs and get permission to do so. Tim was out of town, our then second-in-command no model of courage. I briefed him on what had been going on, asked if I had his permission to get the local police in on it. "Oh," he said, "but let me know first if it looks like trouble."

"That, Les, is what I am doing now!" and hung up.

Just then one of the male clerks dashed in. "Mrs. Sanderson, they have gone!" I went down to report all clear. The exec was ready -- half into the well of the CG's desk. The sailors never visited to the Portuguese consulate.

I already had a contingent of the police along one Sunday morning when I went aboard one of these floating (one hoped) disgraces in response to a call to quell a disturbance. It was the high monsoon. I was soaked to the skin, even wearing my bright red-hooded rain cape. We got aboard. The fracas was in the mess room. I could hear shouts and grunts and groans and the crashing of furniture and the shattering of glass. But when Little Red Riding Hood materialized at the door everything STOPPED -- for just long enough for the police to take over the situation.

The other day the Women's Club got terribly sentimental about our poor boys who get hospitalized off ships, and took the Consul General to task for sending them to a local hospital, which of course isn't any great shakes when it comes to comfort. After explaining that hospitalization was up to the shipping companies and they are required by law only to accommodate them in rather plain style, and that the Consulate has no funds for maintaining them in more luxurious surroundings, the CG said anything the Women's Club felt like contributing would of course be welcomed by our boys. So they thought of reserving a nice private room at the local luxury hospital -- the one all of us go to. The CG had to put his foot

down on that, however, in view of the fact that Bombay would rapidly become the mecca of every beach combing American in the Eastern hemisphere. As it stands, I am to inform the ladies when hospitalization or destitution cases occur, and escort them to visit and take small gifts if they like.... I don't think this will last long, however, as about ninety percent of the hospitalizations are in either for VD or as a result of brawls, usually in what are euphemistically known as "houses of ill repute", and the girls will no doubt soon tire of being Grey Ladies! (this is for your amusement only!) (July 6, 1950).

Belehrad had by no means subsided. I had of course breathed no word of my concerns over Robin, for the reasons noted above.

This shipping has been something of a headache. The fellow who has been doing it for the last two years has done a lousy job for my money, but the boss thinks he's wonderful -- mostly on other counts. I of course try to do as little as possible to give the boss the idea that maybe I don't think so. Anyway, he's also one of these characters who makes a great show about how overworked he is -- spends most of his time doing that, if you ask me -- and then refuses to give up a job. Under these circumstances you can imagine I've had one hell of a time. But it's easing up now. At first I found it almost impossible to get hold of files, instructions, information or anything else; was simply told it was all routine and I needn't worry about anything but signing my name to papers. This I dislike doing -- too easy for someone to pass you a Mickey and I wouldn't put it past this character as he's done it to others in the past. The whole office hates him like poison. Then, a month after I'd taken over, I find he's still handing cases and not telling me about it -- "In case you might make a mistake." At this point I blew up, at least blew up inside. I talked it over with the boss, using the tack that I know how hard it is to give over an old job to a new person, but there is only one way to learn, etc., and after all, the technical side of shipping is child's play compared to visas and citizenship and everyone knows it. This was about three weeks ago. I took an awful risk, but came out of it the only person in the office who approached the boss about something involving this guy who didn't get a meat cleaver in the head, so to speak. I think my work record was in my favor, maybe. Things have improved considerably since then. I also found he didn't know any of the local officials and people we deal with on these matters -- had either neglected it completely or left it up to the [Indian] clerks -- we didn't even have the right names or addresses in a lot of cases. So I went around, made about twenty calls, which seemed to surprise and flatter them all no end, so now we're getting cooperation all over the place and things are running beautifully..... Before I came out the head of the shipping section [at the State Department] wrote the CG suggesting I be put on shipping, which is really unusual because they don't generally want women in this particular job. I was also privately told that they wished to God someone would take over here

.... So when, after six months, the job was dumped in my lap, without my connivance, I expected a reaction, and got it. A lot of this -- the boss's apparent lack of interest in the thing and so forth -- can be explained by the fact that the consular side of FS work is generally regarded as routine, dull, boring, unglamorous and fit only for new recruits.... But no one can say it's not important, because in my opinion you can spend a lot of time trying to make friends for the US but you lose a lot more if you mess up one visa and the guy gets held on Ellis Island; if you let one real subversive in the States, or welcome a guy with a forged passport as a real American, you not only do a big disservice to your country but you will get your neck in a nice tight noose when

discovered.... No one ever hears about a good job if a shipping officer does it, but plenty of union people and shipowners will raise hell if you really do a bad job. Besides, in this job I have constant, unrelenting and often exhausting contact with all kinds of people, always wanting something, often wanting the impossible. It is wonderful training in diplomacy if you ask me....

On the other hand, shipping is one part of consular work that has its points, other than those I've mentioned. If you want to and don't care too much about local customs regulations and the reputation of our outfit, you can very neatly practically feed, clothe (male), and provision yourself with things like cigarettes and liquor, free of charge. I think it's one thing to ask for something and offer to pay for it if you are really desperate (like last week when we were out of sugar and I got a birthday cake!), but it can be carried a long, long way. Ergo why some people particularly like the job. I might add here that I can at least say that this jerk isn't in our career service; he's "staff" -- which means someone who got in by the back door.... I probably shouldn't write you about this, because you won't be interested and it isn't discreet, but you can understand I can't talk it out with anyone here (though I certainly hear a lot -- both in and out of the office!), and it's good to get these things off your chest. I suppose you must know it isn't all moonlight and roses out here, but I can't think of anything else I'd rather do One of the fine points is assiduous practice of maintaining cordial relations with one and all no matter how skunkish they are! or at least making the other guy take the first thrust in open warfare. (August 8, 1950)

I had no further trouble with Belehrad thereafter. Not so my successor, Dave Ernst, a decent chap who was on his first post and was given the shipping job when I moved to the economic desk in December 1950. I offered to lend him a hand should he feel the need for it any time during the shakedown-cruise part of the job. So, very quietly, did Belehrad, adding that it was a great relief at last to have someone there who unlike me could do the job, and warning Dave not to mention that he, Belehrad, was volunteering help. Before the poor guy had a chance to get his feet on the ground, there was a murder on one of the ships. Being uncertain of how to handle it and being a normal male, Dave called on another male, Belehrad, for help. What a mess that one turned out to be! I was defending poor Dave to Tim before it was over, still not fingering Belehrad however. Then this in a personal letter from Frances Dailor:

.... what gives on the shipping desk? We have a report on the USNS Tomahawk that just came in showing that Ernst boarded the ship, followed by Belehrad (apparently on an independent mission) and then Small got in on it. All sounds quite confused. What's the lowdown and is there anything I can do? (Dailor to Sanderson, January 22, 1951)

.... I can't add much to what was between the lines on the report itself. Dave nearly went crazy with it.... [he] has a very good head on his shoulders and despite his newness to the job I think he can handle it and could handle it then. However, half the others in the place got in on it and the last we heard (whether our activities have any bearing on this part I don't know), [the ship] had run aground somewhere. I really know little about it except what Dave told me, but I do know he had the same trouble I had, and may still have some of the same ahead. I had hoped that he, being a man, wouldn't have to put up with it but apparently it's just as bad for him. This is of course a tale out of school, although both Dave and our exec. asked me to tell you what I know about it all. I myself feel that now Childs is here the situation may ease up, as he seems to be a

believer in each person doing his own job. He hadn't come yet when the "Tomahawk" was here. (Sanderson to Dailor, February 15, 1951)

As this exchange indicates, we were seeing some new faces -- and more of them. Of Prescott Childs and George Small more later. Of Belehrad just one postscript:

1950-51 was the height of the uproar in Washington about homosexuals in government, especially in the State Department and the Foreign Service. At about the same time as the Dailor-Sanderson letters we were visited by another emissary from the Department, a nice gray-haired senior officer who, when he came to my office for a one-on-one chat about what all knew he was there for, brought up the subject roundabout and with considerable equivocation. Eventually, and with embarrassment, he came out with it: did I know anything about the truth of the rumors that had gotten back to the Department, that there were two "men of, er, irregular morals" on the Bombay staff?

I truthfully said I knew nothing about either of them in that respect, and about one of them (a USIS officer) I had no basis for any kind of judgment. But then I told him why I had so precipitously moved from one apartment to another that was not, really, all that much more desirable per se. I was careful to repeat that I knew nothing, that I had moved because as the mother of a little boy I felt I could take no chances.

Very shortly afterward Belehrad was transferred back to the United States and was not heard of or from again. I am convinced he should have been fired. He was a bad guy. He did a disgracefully poor job and displayed disgraceful ethics. I hope, though I am almost sure it is a forlorn hope, that the main, or even only, reason for his departure was not the homosexual part, and especially that it was not my at last 'fessing up' to the investigator.

By that time the Tims were being transferred to Delhi. Tim had gone there to arrange for the family's move when Julie invited herself to my place for a drink and a tête-a-tête one evening. I had somehow been expecting the conversation that ensued. Julie and I were close and real friends and Tim knew it. The conversation came round to Why Oh Why, Corey, Didn't You Go To Tim About Belehrad? I said I had gone to him, about the only thing I could prove and that had to do with the job, namely, Belehrad's interference in shipping after it had been put under my responsibility. As to the rest, I heard rumors and more of them as time went on, I heard goings-on above when we lived below him, and I had gotten Robin the hell out of the guy's way and into another apartment in another neighborhood. But how could I be expected to tell all this to Tim, when I had absolutely no proof, and when all well knew that Belehrad was Tim's "white-haired boy," that everyone else who had tried to tell Tim anything about Belehrad had been slapped down peremptorily and I had no reason to think I had carte blanche to be the exception. I said that Tim was a fine officer (which I believed) and this didn't reflect on him, really (which I didn't). Tim was indeed a fine officer and a good boss; he did suffer from a bit of overconfidence about his judgments, always very quickly arrived at. In this case, as it developed, Tim seemed to think my not having brought the whole Belehrad affair to him at the beginning constituted some kind of disloyalty. You can't win them all. And as this was only the first of several cases of the "White-haired Boy" syndrome I have encountered, so it was only the first experience of a uniform reaction to the disillusion when it comes: denial to oneself that one had become more

than a mentor and to an extent a tool, and refusal to hold oneself responsible for any of the consequences.

[Robin] is going through a rather "clownish" stage ... walks around in a sort of cakewalk, whistling through his teeth, generally acting like a cross between Bob Hope and Red Skelton!..... [but] isn't all clown -- you would be very gratified to see how much the gentleman he has become, saying "How Do You Do" and so forth with really amazing savoir faire. He needs it -- we've had Sen. and Mrs. Pepper, Marquis Childs, and several other notables passing through here lately, and many of them drop in for tea or something so he meets them.... Dr. Ambedkar, the famous "untouchable" Law Minister in the Nehru cabinet, had tea at our house the other day with Mrs. Ambedkar along. So a few manners are very handy things for Robin to have.

[We] are going to ... Aurangabad... which is near some very famous ancient Hindu temple caves.... He and "Uncle Check," who's going to do the driving, have been gazing at road maps and so forth for days.... Our agricultural officer, a nice grandfatherly sort, is going along to get a look at some of the local farm areas and methods.... I have to visit a number of my missionary constituents in the area, so I guess this is an example of mixing business and pleasure. (October 11, 1950)

.... all four had a wonderful time, especially Robin. The countryside is lovely this time of year, but you should see the roads! The best ones are like the old hard-surfaced un-oiled two lane affairs in Idaho. Most of them aren't that good -- just dirt roads, one lane, and since most of the traffic is in bullock carts, there are always two well defined ruts.... One of the main problems is cows -- you never saw so many cows and water buffaloes in your life as there are on the roads of India, and they all decide to mosey across the road just as the car gets up to them. Of course if you hit one of it's almost worse than hitting a person. Also a common sight is long lines of people, usually women, with great loads of things on their heads, walking single file along the road, with a baby on the hip and another by the hand. The country is fairly high and hilly -- looks a little like some parts of Idaho and Montana, except that the trees are not evergreen, but tropical. The ghats (mountains), are beautiful, almost like the Kooskia-Lolo area but not so high.... The villages are just huddles of adobe huts.

When we arrived at Aurangabad, we found that a local movie company had taken over the hotel. So we stayed at an Indian hotel, which was nice and clean although it took us a while to get used to the lack of plumbing! ... the Ajanta caves ... [are] really a sight. Most of the mountains around there have a large solid stone scarp at the bottom -- well, in the old days the people used to carve their temples and monasteries right out of the stone, making huge caves. There are over twenty like this at Ajanta and almost a hundred at Ellora. At Ajanta, which was built between about 200 BC and 700 AD, the caves are Buddhist. There is some carving and sculpture, but mostly fresco painting, and it is really magnificent....[at Ellora], besides the caves, there is one huge Hindu temple, all cut out of the rock. The sculpture at Ellora is marvelous, but the constant repetition and the peculiar writhe forms of Hindu sculpture, especially when you see so much of it in one place, is rather frightening to me....

The high point for Robin came on the morning of the day we went to Ellora, when we went to Daulatabad... a hill 600 feet high, with a 100-foot solid rock scarp around the circular bottom....

used as a fortress from about 700 AD until about 1700, and is about the most formidable thing in its line I have ever seen. There are three rows of outer walls and fortifications, the outermost being 2½ miles around, and the present town is inside these, although the walls are in ruins now.... people are still living in the remains of old buildings.... Then there is a big gate, and a 100-foot moat with the only entrance a drawbridge. On the hill itself there are three more rows of fortifications, with some huge guns still mounted where they were in 17th century. The only known entrance is a sort of spiral staircase cut out of the solid rock, and having a regular labyrinth of secret passages, false passages, places for defending soldiers to hide and spring out at an attacker, places where hot oil and rocks and things could be thrown down from above, etc. I'll bet that place was the envy of all the kings in India in its day! Robin was simply thrilled to death with it (he's been reading King Arthur and is very much interested in knights and castles and such). About three-fourths of the way up is a small palace, and on the very top another gun tower. There is a spring high up on the hill -- I'll bet they could hold out for years in that place in the old days.... Robin has been picking out likely hills for fortresses ever since! (October 18, 1950)

Very shortly later Norton Ginsburg stopped by for a few days en route to the Far East. This occasioned more parties and another trip up-country; I have a small snapshot titled "Robin and Uncle Norton at Poona." All seemed well, his letters indicated a fine time and fruitful research. But early in June 1951 I got an anguished wire from him from Singapore. His passport had been taken by the US Consul there and amended "valid only for direct and immediate travel to the US." No explanation given, but many questions "about my security status. whether I had had troubles in the past, etc. etc.... The implications of the whole affair are sinister and shocking." (Letter from Norton, June 4, 1951). Norton returned to Washington as directed. He never did get a full explanation, though the whole matter was dropped and he "cleared" eventually. Meanwhile he had lost two excellent potential jobs.

All Norton's friends, including myself and some who had more commanding positions in the corridors of power, took up his case. I wrote the authorities, and got my Consul General, Prescott Childs, to do so as well. To its credit, UC stood by its young faculty member, and Norton remained there until his retirement. Now the geography department has been eliminated. A pity in this day when college juniors screaming about the evils of the Serbs in Bosnia place Bosnia somewhere in mid-Africa on outline maps.

From the beginning of the tour of duty in Bombay I had been much in demand for press interviews and to give speeches to civic groups and so on; this also because of my being a woman. The early interviews were nothing much, fluff about bringing feminine charm to diplomacy and so on. I have never been fond of public speaking, but my consuls general wanted me to do it. I remember ones about women's position in this-and-that, at one of which the chairman closed his introduction with, "And Mrs. Sanderson says there has never been a cocktail party in her family home!" That is when I lost all credibility with that audience, teetotalers who like most Indians who thought about Americans at all or knew what they were, thought that unless Americans were missionaries they wallowed in alcohol and other debauchery. Then there was the speech commemorating the anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, in which I commented that Americans regarded the U.N. as one of man's great and most hopeful experiments on the road to world peace. Sure enough, the headline next day: "U.S. Regards U.N."

as Experiment." But on the whole these P.R. jobs were successful enough. I am not sure, though, that I convinced the earnest young student who insisted on knowing the condition of the American "peasants" in the part of the U.S.A. I came from. I replied that about the only people who might qualify as peasants were the sharecroppers in the south; in my part of the country farmers owned their land. They often hired help in busy seasons, but these people were employees, not bound to the land or by anything else except the terms of their employment. I could see disbelief in my audience's eyes. A land without peasants? Impossible!

When reports reached Bombay in late October or early November 1951 of some sort of brouhaha in Nepal, John Hlavacek ("Check") went off to investigate. Nepal had been recognized as an independent state several years before, but still was a bit of a hermit among nations, and its border with India was closed at the time. Check ventured a bit too close to that border and found himself a prisoner of some Nepali soldiers. He then entered Nepal, escorted by his captors, by the odd little funicular that was the main mode of doing so. While there he managed to make himself persona grata, and came out with a great deal of interesting material, some of which he put on the press wires and the rest, which was of greater political interest but not of the sort that would grab the American newspaper reader, he turned over to me and from which I was to make a highly commended report to the Department (classified, of course, though Check himself, the source, was free to tell whomever he pleased; ironically, I couldn't show him the report when it was finished). He also brought me the leather-sheathed Gurkha knife that hangs on my wall. Very useful for hacking cane and heads, and notched so that if blood should be drawn otherwise while it was unsheathed the owner could prick his thumb and therefore satisfy ancient cultic ritual.

Check had one further tidbit. Now, six months into the Korean conflict, he had some evidence that carbon black, an essential in the manufacture of tires for trucks and military vehicles and one of the numerous items interdicted by the U.S. for export to the Communist world, was being imported into Calcutta, then transshipped to North Korea. I passed this along through Tim to the Embassy. Neither the Embassy nor the Calcutta consulate had any information, nor were they interested. I was upset, and so was Tim. He leading, we rather built a fire under the contented denizens of our other establishments. I don't remember how it all came out, but no more carbon black was so transshipped, if any had been in the first place.

Meanwhile, worrisome things were happening at home. Since early on I had hoped Mama and Daddy could visit us, sent them all sorts of advice about the best season for it (winter) and the best and safest way for a person in Daddy's state of health to travel (a good passenger ship). But:

Please cable any adverse change Daddy's condition letter follows love Bettrobin (cable to Mama, September 5, 1950)

I'm so glad Daddy is better. I haven't told Robin about his granddad's illness at all, as I didn't want to worry him. Let me know when Daddy gets home and how everything is going. I do worry so about pneumonia. (September 13, 1950).

Thanksgiving was to be at our place, with Robin and me hosting all the Timberlakes, Check, and some other lone Americans, to a total of sixteen, for a true American feast. The captain of one of

those magnificent Isbrandtsen ships had insisted on loading me up with a beautiful big turkey, several tins of cranberry sauce, and some pumpkin and mince pies and trimmings. What matter that the buffalo cream for the pie would be pale grey? I proudly bore the turkey home and called a conference with Antonio. His one question: "How cooking, Memsahib?" "In the oven of course." "No oven, Memsahib."

I went out to the kitchen, where I must confess I had probably not set foot since I had had it cleaned up before we moved in. Sure enough, no oven. A two-burner kerosene hotplate only.

"But Antonio, how cooking pies and pastries for us with no oven?"

"Cooking in Miss Darke's oven, Memsahib." Only then did I realize that all those nice things had been baked in Martha's "oven," which today we would call a toaster-oven.

So off to the market to buy two enormous round pots. That was the day before Thanksgiving. That evening came the wire that told me the visit with Daddy was not to be. Daddy was gone. My feelings were a mixture of grief, guilt, and indecision. The natural grief of a child who loses a loved parent, exacerbated by guilt at having been less good and less close to him than his love for me warranted, and at having taken Robin so far away from him during that last precious year of his life. Indecision as to what, or rather when, to tell Robin. Should I tell him now? I was certainly in no mood for Thanksgiving festivities, and I knew he would not be either, when he knew. But he had so looked forward to Thanksgiving. And what about all the others? At this point to give them a grey day instead of a holiday? Would it be decent to put my own feelings first in that way?

I decided to say nothing until the day after Thanksgiving. I would simply steel myself not to mention or hint of it, and not to show how I was feeling inside.

We stuffed the turkey and browned it in one of my newly-acquired pots, then covered it with the other one and steamed it (or I supposed the proper word is braised, though we used as little liquid as possible). It wasn't half bad. Antonio outdid himself with all the rest.

I must have done a fair job at concealing my emotions, because a wonderful time seemed to be had by all. Tim showed his true talents at their best when, to meet the requests of the four young fry at table, he carved four drumsticks from one turkey. He did it of course by using the thighs as well, and cutting off the skin areas. On such a huge bird that would have been necessary anyway.

Next day, when I did tell Robin the sad news about his grandpa, his response was, "Well, I know he went straight to heaven." He had previously told a little friend of his that his Granddad was a saint. "I am going to encourage Robin to look to the spirit of his grandfather for help and guidance in becoming a real man, as a man should be. Maybe that's what being a saint really is." (November 23, 1950)

His grandfather was of course a Christian saint. But Robin's heaven was well supplied. He had not only Baby Jesus and His mother and God and several saints, but Baby Lord Krishna and a

dozen other Hindu figures, including the charmers Ganesh and Hanuman, and for all I know or remember Baby Mohammed as well. Safety in numbers, I have always felt.

His school, however, being run by a bunch of charming Portuguese Jesuits, Robin duly took First Communion on December 1, 1950. There is a snapshot of him and his little colleagues on that happy day, Robin almost staggering under the monster candle Rafael and Antonio made him for the occasion.

In that month I was transferred to the economic/commercial section. In a way I was sorry to leave consular work. I had enjoyed it, and in retrospect that was the best year I had, professionally, and the most fun, in the Foreign Service. But it was no way to real advancement.

I've been trying to get the new job under my belt, and it isn't so difficult. Unfortunately, my staff in this section can't compare with the ones in the old section, and I spend half my time redrafting their stuff and so forth. They are all on high pay, for alien staff, too, and even though they're not too good it would probably be impossible to get new ones as good as they are. So I just have to work it out as best I can. The commercial and economic work is fascinating, though. (January 22, 1951)

Economic work at the consulate involved not only keeping abreast and reporting on developments of economic interest to the U.S. within the consular district, but also of forwarding to the Department of Commerce information about possible trade opportunities, trying to help American businessmen establish trade relations with Indian opposite numbers or resolve trade problems arising from them, and association with other countries' trade commissioners in the district.

My academic training in economics helped me get a grasp on part of this work, and the year's intensive informal training in diplomacy that visa, passport and shipping work had given me, was enormously helpful. But I knew nothing about business as such, and had only the faintest notion of finance. So it was back to the old grind of learn something new from the beginning. As usual I found this most interesting. This time the learning came not so much through books as through perusing our files and listening to opposite numbers and businessmen, learning the lingo, so to speak.

One of the immediate lessons had to do with the great difference of approach followed by Americans and Indians. An American would breeze into my office of a Monday morning, fresh and full of beans after a two- or three-day plane trip and a good night's sleep in the Taj Mahal Hotel. He planned to see this one and that one and the other one today, then sew up the deals, get the contracts in order and be on his way Friday afternoon. Great. After one or two such experiences I would suggest he might want to consider that a more flexible schedule might be necessary, for deals, and especially finalizing them with business opposite numbers and going through the Indian bureaucracy -- and very few such deals were exempt from this latter -- might take more time than he had scheduled. (These, by the way, were almost all trade deals, and relatively minor. Any significant private American investment in India -- and it was exiguous then -- went through the Embassy). The usual response was, well, in business we don't take our time quite the way you people in government do.

Say all this took place on a Monday. By about Thursday in he would come again, this time somewhat ruffled. These people didn't seem to operate the way businessmen operate. They weren't really ready to deliver. And why did they have to go through such conniptions with foreign exchange authorities and import control regulations and God knows what other governmental stumbling blocks?

By two weeks later the vein would be popping in the poor man's forehead. I never had a real heart attack case on my hands, but I felt it close a couple of times. Sometimes the deals did in the end go through, thereupon often giving rise to more of the numerous trade disputes that filled our file cabinets.

On the other hand, there were Clarence Hulford and Andrew Price, two officers of the National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, who had business in Bombay and made a courtesy call on me at the consulate. Intelligent, agreeable, knowing their work thoroughly, and flexible -- they conducted their business in India without noticeable hassle. I saw them several times and may have included them in a couple of social events or visits to the Willingdon Club. They planned to go on to Indonesia next. Since I was interested in Indonesia as a possible next post, I asked them to let me know their general opinion of the place and its desirability or otherwise as a post for Robin and me. Not many weeks later there arrived a four-page letter, in style and content worthy of the best kind of reporting, in which they gave me their considered opinion that for the time being at least Indonesia might well not be the exact best spot. I have always been grateful to these men.

For their part, Indians -- businessmen and others -- seemed to have a sort of cloud-cuckooland idea of American business and industry, all of which they tended to lump together under the rubric "Wall Street." They seemed to picture American industrialists -- "Wall Street" -- literally as the huge-paunched men wearing gold watch chains and silk top hats so often caricatured. I remember more than one conversation under the orchids that festooned the loggias of the Willingdon Club, in which I was at pains to explain that to an American businessman, "investment" meant putting capital into plant and equipment, hiring workers who would very likely have strong unions to protect their interest, sticking with the business for years and with much hard work, luck and good management watching their fortunes grow. It seemed to me, after visiting a number of other textile and other factories where dust and filth prevailed and machinery bore dates like 1883, that with some notable exceptions the Indian entrepreneur's idea of enterprise was to buy a crumbling enterprise, hire the cheapest possible workers (and they came cheap indeed) and work them and the machinery as hard as possible, do nothing to improve either plant or equipment or human skills, and a year or so later turn the whole over for a hundred-per-cent profit.

Well, I was sort of right. But later experience indicated I had idealized American business practice in my depictions of it. If anything, the reality I idealized has deteriorated since then. And quite possibly Indian practice has made progress in the opposite -- i.e., productive -- direction.

Shortly after I took over the section I acquired an assistant. The Foreign Service was expanding, and we along with the rest. Harry Barnes was a fresh-cheeked young man, good looking in a nice

wholesome blond way, on his first Foreign Service posting. He was bright and pleasant and fun to work with, although as I recall, with two of us on board we certainly weren't overworked.

Among the most pleasant of the economic officer's duties was to represent the United States at meetings of the local trade commissioners --our opposite numbers from other countries. These meetings usually took the form of a monthly luncheon hosted by one of us, and would be held at the Taj Mahal hotel unless the lucky host had a house large enough and well enough appointed to accommodate twenty-four for luncheon. There we settled any business of mutual interest; this was usually a quick and easy job. Then settled in to a good social luncheon. I was of course the only female member of the group. I do remember one puckish host who placed me at one end of a long table, with the Bulgarian on my right and the Czech on my left. We not only had only about twenty words of common language, counting such English, German, and French as we together commanded, but they were obviously terrified, as if they were sitting next to a twenty years' sentence in Siberia. Such was the Cold War in its early phases.

Then came the British Trade Commissioner's turn to play host. Now I should say that on the whole the upper-class Brits I met were delightful people, and I had some good friends among them. But every so often all but the best of them would begin to feel the sting of Not Being Top Country Any More. Then out came the needles, and I am sorry to say many of my American colleagues did not know how to handle being needled. They got angry and red-faced. They weren't equipped to respond in kind. Possibly, as my Foreign Service oral examination and some other episodes many illustrate, I had more experience with being needled, patronized, and generally put down, than my male colleagues, and was used to it and ready for it. I have always hated teasing, but this wasn't exactly teasing, it was very delicately inserting the knife in the tenderest spot -- and as far as I was concerned, even on the receiving end (I certainly didn't dish any of it out) it was business, not private. One Brit remarked to Mama that if all the Americans were like me everything would go beautifully, always. Was he just flattering her through me? was he implying high gullibility on my part? I have often wondered.

At any rate, came the Brit's turn to play host. All had been set up and secretaries notified of time and place and so on, when, an hour or so before the luncheon was to take place, he telephoned me. He was awfully sorry, Mrs. Sanderson, but he had scheduled the luncheon at his club -- the only really suitable place, you know -- and unfortunately the club did not admit ladies except on specified occasions of which this was not one. Would someone else from the consulate perhaps be able to come in my place?

But of course. I would see that we were represented, I said. The phone call over, I called Harry in. Harry would go to the Trade Commissioner's lunch. Not quite in my stead, however. Harry was not authorized to make any comments whatsoever on any substantive matter that might arise during the business session.

Harry was a truly good man. He understood exactly what I was up to, and I think he approved -- not all that common a trait in those macho days. He lunched. He kept quiet. And it so happened that (as I had known it would) a question of real significance did for once hit the table. It was a question that could not be dealt with without input from the U.S. A frantic call from our host: what to do? I sweetly explained that Harry was a delightful and

intelligent chap and a real Foreign Service Officer, but one who had been fledged only very recently and had hardly had a chance to become au courant with the affairs of the trade commissioners. Best, perhaps, they all enjoy their lunch, then convene in my office for discussion of the issue.

Which they did. Twenty-four sweating trade commissioners, in my office, which measured about ten by fourteen feet and boasted two desks, numerous file cabinets and bookshelves, and four chairs: mine, my secretary's, and two for visitors. I should say it was also the stifling hot season just before the monsoon broke -- and air conditioning unknown. The issue, by the way, got resolved in record time. And I attended trade commissioners' lunches regularly thereafter, until I was transferred to labor and political reporting.

One of the real pleasures and privileges of my economic work was membership in the Economic Discussion Group, a collection of about twenty businessmen, professionals and academics concerned with economics and business in India. We met monthly, rather formally in a seminar room made available by a local bank or business (I don't remember where it was exactly), a prearranged topic was discussed, with some participants working from notes they had previously prepared. Aside from the theoretical and practical learning this experience gave me -- especially in areas where theory and practice meet and react on each other -- I very much enjoyed the ladies and gentlemen of this group, whose conversation always left me elated, as if I had drunk and refreshed myself at some rare spring.

January 1951 brought us a new consul general. Prescott Childs was older -- perhaps in his mid-fifties -- and less obviously active and energetic than Tim Timberlake. He also was obviously not, or no longer, looking for glory as an ambassador. He was happy to do a good and satisfying job as consul general. He had a nice dry humor, and was one of the fairest people I have ever met. He needed all these virtues as time went on in our Bombay shop.

Shortly after they arrived, and before the Timberlakes had left permanently for Delhi, I invited them all to dinner. I also invited Tommy and Dorrie Thompson, an attractive couple, he the head of Pan Am operations for south Asia. What I didn't know -- and without asking to I heard a great deal of the gossip in the American community in Bombay -- was that for some reason Tommy had offended Tim. Towards dessert Tim exploded, allowed as how he had kept quiet because of his being consul general but now he could let it all hang out -- and he did, and swept out with Julie in his wake.

I was amazed, and concerned. Here I was, supposed to be a good hostess and knowing about what went on among the local Americans, and subjecting my new consul general and his wife to this, first crack out of the box! I apologized profusely. Neither of the Childs seemed to think I was blameable, and Roberta endeared herself forever to me by remarking that it was really very interesting.

Both of them were dears. I loved the Timberlakes but there are virtues to a more measured approach to life, as well. I think the Childs, whose children were grown and gone, looked on me with just a trifle of parental attitude. Roberta and Mama became great friends when Mama came to stay with me later on.

And I made a couple of other bloopers as a hostess. Once I had a small dinner party for a visiting businessman, who proceeded to get thoroughly drunk and over coffee stretched out on the sofa and snored so loud conversation among us others became somewhat strained. Then there was the dinner at the Taj Mahal hotel that Bert Evans, our agricultural officer, whose wife had not yet come out to Bombay, asked me to look after for him. On the seating arrangements I decided to place the senior lady at Bert's right (I knew who was senior because I had renewed all their passports). She also turned out to be a lush, which I hadn't known before. Later on I concluded that if your parties are successful 90% of the time you can't really blame yourself for the utterly unexpected barbarism that some people think it quite all right to perpetrate on hostesses. But you should look for possible trouble as well.

One lovely Prescott Childs story. Some time in 1951 Eleanor Roosevelt visited India, with a two-day stop in Bombay. She was scheduled for a number of speeches, meetings and other events there. Excitement was high in the American community, especially among the ladies. Partisan quibbles all seemed to be forgotten. Several of the prominent ladies, including the wives of some senior consular officers, were vying for the role of on-site assistant and companion to Mrs. Roosevelt.

One day Childs called me into his office. He said he was designating me to be Mrs. Roosevelt's "aide-de-camp" during her visit. I was horrified, and said so. I said all these wives of senior people were already at each other's throats for the job; they would do their best to make mincemeat of me.

"Don't worry about that," he said dryly, "I'll see that the word gets around. Let me tell you a story. During the war at some army base in the States the wives' club decided, when the commanding officer was to be transferred, to present a silver tray to Mme. Commanding Officer. So a large luncheon was put on. It so happened that a WAC officer, a lieutenant or captain, was present at this function. When after all sorts of mouthings, they brought out the tray and the mistress of ceremonies announced that it would be presented to the senior-ranking lady present, the WAC got up, went to the head table, firmly took the tray, turned around to the audience and thanked them. As the only woman in the place who had official rank in her own right she was of course senior-ranking. And departed, with tray.

"You are the only American woman here who has official rank. You are obviously the only proper aide-de-camp for Mrs. Roosevelt."

And ADC I was. An exciting couple of days. The first function was a huge dinner at the Taj Mahal hotel, after which Mrs. Roosevelt would speak to the assembled guests. Unfortunately her plane, which had been due to arrive some hours before the dinner, had not done so by an hour after the dinner was scheduled and the guests assembled. After some discussion it was decided that the dinner should be served while it was still edible, and another prepared for Mrs. R. and her party.

Dessert was being served when in swept Mrs. Roosevelt. She was one of the ugliest and most ill-groomed women I had yet seen in public life. And now, out of consideration for those who had

waited so long for her, she limited her freshening up to a rapid face and hand wash and a pass through her hair with her comb. She had not changed from her traveling outfit of ill-fitting cotton twill skirt and blouse, large flat shoes not much polished, and lisle hose that tended to droop at the ankles. She had not dined, but she went to the podium and made her remarks. And when she spoke all the lack of physical beauty, all the carelessness of dress, became as nothing. She was wonderful. And remained that way. One could not help loving her. It was a great two days for me.

The consulate was growing, fast. Shortly after Prescott and Roberta Childs arrived we got several more officers. George Small was a staff officer, transferred from Johannesburg to take over some of Belehrad's old duties. On learning that he would come on board Check, who had known him in "Jo-Berg," had remarked to me that George was a nice fellow, but not very bright. An understatement. George was a brash young man whose constant grin was a sort of composite of Bugs Bunny's and Alfred G. Neumann's. And could he mess things up! Rare the shipment that didn't arrive after endless delay on the docks, often showing considerable post-trip damage and occasioning endless bureaucratic wrangling. Rare the consular car that, needing repairs, didn't go to the wrong shop and come back in worse shape than before. George seemed never to get it straight which of his own staff, let alone which Indian and local government offices, were handling which items or kinds of work. The one professional quality with which he was amply endowed was self-confidence; that oozed from every pore. But he was a nice guy, and his own dimness was partially offset by his wife, a plain looking but very pleasant and sensible woman. When after a truly scarifying series of experiences with getting my things and money transferred from Bombay to Athens, I called him "that damned George Small" in a letter to Mama, I suppose I was unkind. He couldn't help being stupid and a fool. But there are limits.

In early February 1951 Check and I made a few days' trip by steamer to Goa, a significant source of manganese ore. My journal notes are a mixture of personal observation and items to be included in reports after my return, and will illustrate the sorts of things I looked for on these expeditions up country. Incidentally, few of the consular or embassy officers thought it necessary to bother with up-country trips except by air to big places like Nagpur or hill stations, or the sites of ancient artistic miracles like the Taj Mahal. My gypsy feet made all these trips a joy, one for which I was in a sort of continuous campaign with the consul general and the Department. I didn't need modern plumbing or familiar food. I saw so much that no one staying in the big cities would see. And possibly my reports were read by someone in Washington.

Wed. Feb. 7: Was gratified to find myself not seasick -- had worried as this is my first sea trip, albeit only coastal. Others aboard: Lawson of Burmah Shell, Mr. and Mrs. Prideau, going to Goa for Killick's, my cabin mate a Mrs. Mouledine, sweet thing but with two small children and an ayah, whose foot I fell over when going to bed thus waking the world. Also Colm and Gabriels, and -- everyone else seems to be in manganese. A heavenly day... After dinner had rather desultory conversation with Check, Lawson and the Prideaus, livened up when Check told them about Nepal.

Thurs, 8: [Several officials and others met Check and me and] took us, and Colm and the Gabriels, to the Antigo Palacio hotel in Marmagao. This is said to be the old Governor's Palace, about 400 years old. The hotel is on the top floor -- cavernous rooms, baths larger than the

rooms but strictly antique (no plumbing).... as long as they fetch bath water energetically it really doesn't make much difference. Above the hotel the ruin of old fortifications -- quite a sight. After a rather good breakfast on the hotel verandah (overlooking the Marmagao docks -- space for two large ships -- 29 foot draft -- and three small ones -- rather good warehouse facilities I should think ... drove over the Panjim for shopping. Beautiful country -- lovelier than I've seen elsewhere in India. Houses adobe, tile, thatch.... People not so handsome as further north but look as well off and possibly more contented. Young Russeklal comments apropos this: "they do nothing but pick coconuts off trees, drink country liquor and sleep." To me this seems at least as satisfying as working liking ants, starving, and being generally miserable in India. Good roads. Must take ferry from Cortalim to Panjim ... a charming and picturesque place, and wonderful to go into shops and find things you want, and shop. A fair lunch at the Imperial Hotel in Panjim. I shouldn't mind at all if the Americans decided they needed a female vice consul here to handle the manganese business! After Panjim, drove to Margao, about 20 miles distant and again across the ferry. More shopping. Margao likewise picturesque but not so much for tourists as Panjim -- Kantilals have their offices here. Then back to Marmagao and a hot bath. How these drivers go like the wind! and the roads are smoother but very winding -- people stay on the side of the road here and for good reason. Dinner and early bed.

Friday, 9th: the biggest day. Drove out to Kantilal's mine. About 50 miles each way -- almost to the Indian border. Stopped at Sanvordem where the loading takes place. Two hundred people, vast majority women and children, sitting on top of huge pile of manganese ore (about 7000 tons in K's plot there now), working with little hammers, sorting the ore out. Russeklal says they can tell by looking whether it's high grade, low grade, etc., put it tiny piece by piece in little baskets, then it's carted off to the wagons (on the women's heads), loaded, and sent on its way to ship side at Marmagao. For this they are paid women Rs. 1/1 [about \$.23], men about Rs. 2/6 [about \$.53], per day, 6 days a week. No holidays with pay or other such amenities, but on-job injury compensated (not by law, just a policy of Ks firm). From Sanvordem, which is on the railroad, to the mine, just a track road -- how they transport heavy truckloads down it is beyond me. Road owned by govt but maintained by company. Russeklal says their firm mines about 15,000 tons/yr. -- half the total for Goa. Others in about 80 different mines, and this where the middle-man business comes in. Ks eliminate a lot of this by being mine owners, operators, and doing their own transport to railhead and arranging onward to ship side. They have a lot of trouble getting sufficient cars, due general shortage and usual squeeze tactics at every point. They were working feverishly at this angle today. The mine itself is amazing. Strip-type, just a hole in the hill, about 200 feet hollow now; 800 people working (approximately same wage and conditions), dig it out with picks, carry on heads to screens, load into trucks and drive off to railroad. Operations carried on 10 months of year, exclude monsoon's worst months. The country has never been surveyed so it is not known how much manganese ore is there or what type, except where working is actually going on. I should imagine many of the hills have workable deposits. Difficulties of setting up large-scale operations in jungle... without tremendous capital outlay obvious. Ks now thinking of eliminating rail transport by shipping stuff down in barges. But no one willing to put in a real modern operation when boom may be over in a year or two. Laborers live in shacks made of twigs -- hope my snap of one shack and its 16 inhabitants comes out.

After running over mines for a couple of hours (I've never been so filthy in my life), had beer and snack in manager's shack and went back. Noticed Goa govt. is putting in fairly extensive

irrigation canal system -- should double present food output and make Goa about 75% self-sufficient for food (will try to see irrigation people tomorrow). Have been trying to assess various interesting political angles but will leave noting it till later when more info has been gathered. Should add two more points about the mines -- labor is recruited from surrounding villages, and as far as I can see is highly efficient in each job as such, but I am also convinced they have no notion whatsoever of what the manganese is, what it is used for, etc. I often got the feeling, "So this is what our steel production lies on." It can't be much different in Africa or ... in Siberia either. Would seem to me that anyone who said to them, look, follow me and you'll be driving around in big cars and they'll be carrying this dirt around on their heads, could be most successful. I suspect CP is much the same -- maybe all "modern" industries in this part of the world, regardless of plant and equipment and so forth, labor itself is ignorant of what it is really doing, it is their rupee a day to keep body and soul more or less together. Two, blasting operations, as an example of method -- to get the overcoat of silica off, they bore little holes, plug them with gunpowder repeat gunpowder, set it off. The whole thing is strictly on a shoestring basis. You can't blame the operators, for they can't see expending capital on long-term basis as things stand now, neither could I in their shoes. they lease the land from the govt at very low rates -- about Rs. 1000/100 acres per year -- govt gets most revenue from export duties and excise.

.... skipped lunch, spent a solid hour washing iron and manganese dust from hair and skin (I'll never get my feet clean) napped, then took a walk with Check up to the fort. It isn't really a fort but a fortifications wall with gun emplacements, etc. Some nice bungalows on top of the hill -- magnificent view. Then drinks, dinner and bed.

Colm and Gabriel are having a lot of trouble. I knew the manganese business in India was a mess but never realized quite how much of a mess. They work day and night, and so do all the Kantilals. Main struggle: getting ship space, getting wagons for loading, greasing enough palms, overcoming terrific and dishonest competitors. I can't feel too bad about the last, as they'll all cut each other's throats, but feel that in view essentiality manganese and lack supply in [U.S.], we should now cartelize temporarily and begin calling the tune, instead of having a dozen competitors out here forcing prices up and making business difficult -- contracts not worth their paper now, etc. (Kelsner, of course, just laughed at me -- but surely the companies themselves would get together at only the merest hint). Example: I believe Colm has chartered a ship -- Killicks have sneaked 500 tons aboard for a customer of theirs, with the connivance of Colm's company's agents in Marmagao, now the captain of the ship offers to put 500 more aboard for Colm if the palm is greased a bit. Harbor master has been making life difficult for them, insisting ship go out at a certain time, seeing that they don't get cars for loading before that time, etc.

Meanwhile, the countryside is lovely, the weather so beautiful, and I feel wonderfully refreshed. I see the point in holidays -- it's not that you get more sleep, it's that the mind doesn't have to work and the usual conflicts aren't there; one gets a rest impossible at home.

Saturday: More shopping in Panjim. I've bought a lot of stuff -- several pieces of Indian cotton produced only for export... perfume, toilet water, candy, a few bottles of brandy and liqueurs, can opener, brassieres, sox for Robin, a camera -- all the things you can't just go in and buy in Bombay. A lousy lunch at the Imperial, then asked for a room for an hour's rest. How glad I am

we're not staying there! Filthy, tiny rooms, people screaming, partitions don't even come up to the ceiling and the "sanitary" ha ha facilities shared by one and all almost regardless of sex. At least where we are is cool and as clean as possible for a place overlooking manganese and iron ore shipments and loading operations, and my mosquito-netted bed is hard but not uncomfortable.

Saw Bailey -- not much impressed. He had nothing new to add on his personal troubles. Says radio Goa is actually operating on 300 watts although they say 1000 because no one will buy time from such a tiny station as they really have. Usual gripes about advertisers objecting to paying for program time -- the bazaar mentality I guess -- as if anyone would listen to a day full of ads. More gripes about slowness (no telephones in Goa -- thank God as far as I'm concerned but hard for high pressure business men. Correction: a few local lines, but no inter-city and only in Panjim). Seems they are building a new transmitter, it is strictly a step at a time. Asked us to come around later, maybe get in touch with the irrigation people, but we were too tired. Check went to Heraldo newspaper office. There are 2 Portuguese papers, "Heraldo" and "O Heraldo." All news gotten from listening to BBC and other radio stations, subscribing to Portuguese new service at Rs. 50 per month. Three Konkani papers. Heraldo, largest, claims 5000 circulation, Check guesses it is really about 2000. All papers censored page by page before publication. Back to Marmagao, cleaned up, went to see Prideaus but they weren't at home, dinner, and bed.

Sunday: A lousy day, mostly waiting around to go aboard. Went aboard at 4, ship supposed to sail at 4:30, finally got under way at 8. My cabin mate, of all people, Lady Rama Rau. She says India must have Goa. It is not suitable for Goa to be foreign. How? By attack if necessary. Check says more effective would be to make conditions in India better than in Goa. "That would take too long." [Check] pointed out business people, including Hindus, prefer Goa as is because at least possible to do business there. "That doesn't matter." Interesting, but hardly nonviolent or live and let live (cf. our conversation at my dinner party). Dinner, and bed. I practically fall asleep over coffee these days!

At dinner at my house some weeks before Lady R.R. had given us a homily on Indian nonviolence as contrasted with Western truculence. Well, consistency is a virtue of small minds. Sir Bengal and Lady Rama Rau had become frequent associates of mine. Not intimate friends, but congenial. They were close friends of Nehru; Sir Bengal had some important diplomatic and other positions both under the Raj and after independence, and Lady Rama Rau had founded and was a moving force in several local and all-India organizations devoted to various aspects of the betterment of the lot of Indian women and of the general welfare. She was my ideal of what I would like to be at 50 or so -- classic features (which I would never have of course), perfectly groomed, lovely silver-gray hair, intelligent, excellent conversationalist in a rich contralto. Sir Benegal charming in his less obvious way. They had two daughters. The elder, Premila, was also beautiful, and "very fair," a prized quality. She was married and had a couple of babies. The younger one, Santha, about my age, was neither beautiful nor fair, but she was very, very bright and articulate. She disliked me on sight, I think; at least she did her best to ignore me and my approaches toward becoming friends. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, her Wellesley education, Santha was if anything more critical of the United States and Americans than most. Santha married an American, Faubion Bowers, who was there part of my time in India, and later moved to the United States, where she became a several-times-published author.

While I was gone one of our bachelor friends came to stay with Robin Robin loves these "vacations" with his men friends.... This time, when I kissed him goodbye, I said, "It won't be long, sweetie, only five days." He looked a bit disappointed and said "But Mommy, I thought you were going to be gone for a month!" He's quite happy, though -- I brought him candy, stamps, and best of all some samples of manganese and iron ores. He's already been trying to make steel by burning them in a Crisco can. He's reading quite well now, but is slow on spelling. I think other things are much too interesting to keep him very interested in school. (February 13, 1951)

After I got back, I spent getting caught up on personal mail... taking a complete inventory (what an awful job! but pays off for insurance purposes, assessment of repairs necessary, and so forth), and getting my household in some kind of good shape. But tragedy struck: I was so enthusiastic about Goa that Rafael, my head bearer, Robin's best friend, and the mainstay of "Jairaz House," got homesick, decided he'd have to quit and go back to the rice paddy. He says it's for good, but I think maybe he's just going for a few weeks to help plant. Everyone's servants depart about this time of the year, and they don't seem to realize that a straight request for leave will get reasonable consideration, so they make up stories about how their father died or they are sick or something, and then show up again in a couple of months. (March 3, 1951)

Unfortunately Rafael didn't show up again. Shiva, his replacement, was older and smoother. He had been in service with British families for forty years. I thought very highly of him. Not a Goan or a Christian, he seemed to get on fairly well with Antonio, and with the lower servants, and served me meticulously.

[He] is so punctilious he almost scares me! Then I got a nice strong young fellow for the heavies, and with the cook, plus the three part-times ones (laundryman, mending ayah, and bathroom sweeper...), and our darling Siamese puss Rani, we make up quite a household. Come along, there's more than room for another! I decided against getting a driver until you come. We will need one then as you will need the car during the day, but I rather enjoy driving, nerve-wracking as it is in Bombay. (June 11, 1951)

From early 1951 on my letters are increasingly taken up with plans for Mama's visit. Over the ensuing months there followed a shower of advice from me on the best ships, what to bring, and all sorts of other things. Plans changed because her arrival was more than once pushed back and in the event she got there only in November. She had followed my suggestions as to what to bring to the letter, and then about doubled them.

Her impending arrival created another housing problem for me. Our apartment was fine for the two of us, but could not comfortably accommodate a third. There followed the usual number of false starts and lost chances, the latter effectively aided and abetted by the incompetence of George Small: "who's in charge of housing and is also a dolt" (April 17, 1951). I was not enthusiastic about living in an apartment in the consulate compound then being built. I preferred if at all possible to live at some comfortable distance from professional colleagues. Finding a new place wasn't easy:

[the] flat I told you about in the last letter went the way of many good things, unfortunately. The Government won't assign it to us, and if they do, a senior officer gets it. ... the senior officers get good places because of their rank, and the clerks get good places because of "democracy." This leaves the junior officers holding the bag, and we still have to put up a good front for the sake of Uncle Sam's prestige. (April 3, 1951)

But there was a happy ending:

... our new house... is just lovely... has a nice wide central corridor, and a 16x32 foot living-dining room... a veranda about 8 feet wide running the length of the main room.... two bedrooms, each 15x21... I'm having some nice furniture built for [Robin's] room, in sizes he can use both now and later.... why not live like human beings -- we'll always be moving around.... each bedroom has a huge bath, and I've fixed mine up for a dressing room [building a large curtained clothes closet along one side, putting a dressing table on another wall]... The apt. house is on a sort of circle, off the main road, so children can play safely and in nice gardens... [it] is leased by Caltex Oil company, and I don't know why they were so nice as to offer me the place when it came vacant! (June 11, 1951)

HARRY G. BARNES JR.
Vice Consul/Rotation Officer
Bombay (1950-1953)

Ambassador Barnes was born in Minnesota and raised in Minnesota and New York. He was educated at Amherst College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army in World War II, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted in 1950 to Bombay, India. His other foreign posts include Prague, Moscow, Kathmandu and Bucharest. He served as United States Ambassador to Romania (1974-1977; India (1981-1985) and Chile (1985-1996) in addition to having several senior level assignments at the State Department in Washington. Ambassador Barnes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Where did you go?

BARNES: The consulate general in Bombay. From February 2, 1951 until roughly July, 1953.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

BARNES: Prescott Childs who subsequently went on to be the Consul General in Antwerp before retiring.

One anecdote before we go on. This is from my wife's experience. There was a course for wives during the period while we were taking our junior officer course, taught by, don't know if I remember her first name, her last name was Alling. Her husband had been ambassador to Pakistan and had died at post [Editor's note: Paul H Alling was the first American Ambassador

to Pakistan and served from February to June 1948. He contracted amoebic dysentery at post and died in January 1949]. Her job was to try to make sure that these new Foreign Service Officer's wives understood what the obligations were of the Foreign Service wife and the thing that stuck most in my wife's mind anyway was Mrs. Alling's description of how to entertain the king and the queen. Fortunately, in a sense we hadn't, at least at one point later in our career we had passing acquaintance with the king and queen of Nepal but that's about the closest we got to using that information. Not to mention questions of gloves and turning cards and so on.

Q: In Bombay in 1952, what was it like then?

BARNES: At one level, it was a shock, having never been outside the States before.

Q: You were married by this time?

BARNES: Yes. I got married actually while I was still at Amherst. I came back from the Army, almost three years and we had one child and the visual shock coming into Bombay in the late hours of the night, early hours of the morning in March, which is not really hot compared to the way it gets later but it was hot enough too and as you got off the plane it was as you were coming into a small furnace. And then going through the..., even at whatever hour it was but it was late, but it was still very,...the streets were very, very crowded. Going by a funeral procession, which was all very visible, and so on.

We should have been put up, according to consulate procedure at the principle hotel of town is some ways still is the Taj Mahal facing on the sea, on the bay, with a view of the large gate, called the Gate with India with which the British commemorated the visit of, I think it was the King. Anyway, for some reason, there was no room at the inn at that time so we were put in another hotel, which was OK but not great in terms of cleanliness, sort of what one worries about when one has a small child. We decided after a, because our apartment wasn't ready sort of after a week so that we really had to move to something that was more passable and we selected a place and just as we are getting into a car to take us to the new hotel, a consulate car pulled up with another couple and their children and they were moving into the place we were leaving and we asked them where they were coming from and they were coming from the place to which we were moving. So there was that aspect of getting used to a place but it was soon overtaken by a fascination with the country and over the couple of years we were there, we did a lot of traveling around the country often taking our child and then we had another child born in Bombay, as a matter of fact.

My work was fairly typical of a new officer; a rotational type assignment, consular work for about a year or so. I was the consular officer, I was the GSO (General Services Officer, i.e., administration) for about six months, I was one of three at that point; economic officer for another stretch, and then finally the last few months I was the one political officer at the consulate. In November 1952 the consul general departed and Everett Drumright replaced him. You may know of Drumright, who had been in China. Since July of 1951, he had been a counselor of embassy in New Delhi under Ambassador Chester Bowles. Another first tour officer there, who arrived the same month as Drumright, was Paul Kreisberg, who later would have a China connection.

Q: An old China hand.

BARNES: Right. Prescott Childs was a combination of very, very strict, very demanding and at one point he thought it was important to tell me that I should be more careful about the way I parted my hair. We got to be good friends and I saw them subsequently and so on. On the whole I would say it was a good experience. I felt I learned a lot about basics in the Foreign Service.

Q: I realize you were in a consulate general and a very junior officer. How did you see relations with India at that time? I am just thinking that, was it Krishna Menon was riding high.

BARNES: Not so high as he did somewhat later.

Q: But it was not the easiest of times, it never is, but...

BARNES: At the some time it was close enough to independence, independence having been '47 and '48, and some of the excitement that came with an old country that was a new country at the same time. Nehru was the dominant figure and I remember going to what was called Chapati Beach in Bombay and listening to Nehru talk. I also remember some of the people who were attempting to carry on the Gandhian tradition, both of non violence, but also the simple life. The problems were clear in the sense that Bombay had become home of sorts to refugees from Pakistan so there were a lot of squatters, a lot of slums and a lot of shanty towns. But my basic recollection at this point is more one of fascination and again a certain excitement of becoming in a small way involved in another society.

Q: When you were doing consular work, did you get involved with Indian authorities on consular matters?

BARNES: Occasionally, I did have some liaison responsibilities with the police, for example. The problems though were...well, there were not that many Americans who presented problems as such, although there was a fairly, not large, but not small American colony, a business colony, primarily missionaries as well. So I would say more of the standard consular problems. For a while we had regulations about the need to issue individual visas to seamen, something that came out of the 1951 Immigration Act and I so I ended up having to interview a lot of seamen. I would say having done consular work subsequently as well,

Q: You didn't end up seeing Americans in jail and that sort of thing?

BARNES: One or two had sort of brushes but nothing too serious. One American citizen died and I had to take care of that situation.

Q: I always think of the Indian bureaucracy as being difficult to deal with, in that it is a vast bureaucracy which is used to employ a lot of people.

BARNES: But it was my bureaucratic contacts or contacts in the sense of seeking help and so on. That worked OK.

Q: What about Indian society? Did you get involved with people?

BARNES: I got involved some, yes, partly through consular contacts. The Consul General would include us in what he was doing as would the deputy principal officer through some of the people in the USIS (United States Information Service) who had other contacts more on the cultural side through some of the American business people who were there. So it was in good part a mixing with Indians, less so Americans as Americans. The consulate group was fairly small..

Q: The Bombay consular district included what states?

BARNES: Well, it included the West Coast essentially from the state of Gujarat – where the earthquake took place not too long ago - I am giving the current names rather than the names at the time because the reorganization wasn't done until later in the decade. Maharashtra. Madhya Pradesh, which is inland, those are the three principle areas.

Q: Did you have French or Portuguese enclaves in your territory?

BARNES: I had Portuguese enclaves in Goa and a few, not that big in Gujarat. The French enclaves were under the East Coast. We took a trip to Goa and actually called on the Portuguese governor. Spent some time on the beach in Goa.

Q: Looking back on your political work, were we concerned at all about a Communist movement within India?

BARNES: Not seriously at that point. The section of what is now considered properly south India but at that stage was partly central India and partly south India, the state of Andhra Pradesh, the eastern part of that state had groups that are called Naxalites who were sometimes thought of as Communists. I am not sure whether they were Maoist in later jargon but were essentially rural based. It was the closest but that was sort on the border of our districts.

Q: I guess the Madras consulate covered Kerala...

BARNES: ...and Calcutta was covering West Bengal, which was the other communist influenced area in India.

Q: Kerala was one place I remember; now I never served in India, which was considered where the Communists were.

BARNES: They still are a force in Kerala and the sharing of power has gone back and forth between the Congress Party in Kerala and Communist. The Kerala Communist and for that matter, the West Bengal Communists didn't ever, what should I say, have much success in expanding their influence into other states. It was strong in only those two states.

Q: Did you get involved in the, what was it, later known as Bollywood?

BARNES: Bombay Hollywood? Just on the fringes. I believe it was getting started at that point, but no, not a lot.

Q: What was the language there?

BARNES: Bombay at that time, it was called Bombay State and as I said it covers now essentially the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, there was a later split on the so-called linguistic states principle. There are two principle languages were Gujarati and Marathi and I began on my own to try to learn some...FSI had no language training before I left and I got to the point I could manage the script and some fairly elementary language but it convinced me that I was at least going to try after that wherever I went to get some language training. I wasn't terribly successful at the beginning but subsequently I managed to do it.

HAROLD G. JOSIF
Political Officer
Madras (1951-1953)

Born in Burma in 1920 to American Baptist missionaries, Harold G. Josif graduated from the University of Chicago in 1941. Josif served in the Army Air Corps during World War II, received a M.A. from Tufts in International Relations and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His overseas posts included Pakistan, Portugal, India, Iran, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka, Somalia, Libya). Josif also served as an instructor at the Air War College. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

JOSIF: Yes. Bedford was one of the big centers. Providence.

Q: In 1950, whither?

JOSIF: In 1950, I was selected for South Asia language and area studies, which were then conducted at the University of Pennsylvania. I was brought back in August of 1950 and spent the school year plus the following summer (in other words, about a year calendarwise altogether) at the University of Pennsylvania taking their courses. They weren't designed specifically for the Foreign Service, but they were generally pretty good for us. Part of it was language training. They taught basic Hindustani that could be used in most of India and even in West Pakistan. The area studies were important. Economics of South Asia, social conflicts, art, history of art. One survey course was called "The History of Indian Civilization." It was given by W. Norman Brown, who was the chairman of the department, certainly our best-known scholar at that time of the history of the subcontinent. I undertook to write a thesis. It wasn't really required that I go to that much effort, but I wrote an 80 page single spaced paper. It was entitled "Political Stability on the Northwest Frontier of South Asia." The area covered was basically West Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Again, we enjoyed this interlude. It was good to get reamericanized. But we were then assigned to Madras. That was unfortunate in one respect. I was not able to use my Hindustani in Madras. I certainly lost my facility in it. I'm not sure how much better it would have been if I had gone to a Hindustani-speaking post right away.

Q: You went to Madras and you were there from 1951 to when?

JOSIF: To April 1953.

Q: What was Madras like at that time as a post? What was its role in India?

JOSIF: Madras was one of the four most important cities in India. It was the recognized center for affairs concerning the southern quarter of India. The population of the consular district in those days (we had only four) was roughly 80 million people. There was a consulate general in Bombay and one in Calcutta and then New Delhi, of course, took up the fourth. South India is an area of minority groups who speak the Dravidian languages. There were four regional languages: Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kanarese. I had four local employee assistants, one for each of these languages.

One of my first jobs as the head of the Political Section (Actually, I was the only American political officer.) was to report on the upcoming general election, which was the first one in independent India, in 1951-1952. These elections were to the Indian Parliament. Indian elections are spread over a period of a couple of months. I had just arrived, but concentrated on this reporting. Then I started to study why the communists had succeeded in several areas. There were three areas where the communists got a majority of the vote.

The three areas were first Travancore-Cochin (later converted into Kerala State), where they spoke Malayalam. There was one district in Madras State, where they spoke Tamil. And then there were a couple districts in Andhra Pradesh, which were Telugu-speaking. So, my task, I thought, was to find out what was common in these three areas and what made people there vote differently than in other parts of India, where they voted in general for Congress Party and regional "communal" candidates.

In South Asia, the really basic political unit is the community. By that I mean people who belong to the same caste or who are otherwise identified by some common ethnic characteristic. Generally, this is stronger than any other force - nationalism or ideology or religion per se.

At first, it was striking that these three areas spoke three different languages. There was a lot of difference in the climate, too. But then I began to get into some "pay dirt." Statistics showed that each of these areas was unusually productive agriculturally. Communism had reared its head in South India not because of the poverty of these rural districts, but precisely in the areas where they had the best rice production, the most income per capita - and the most education! I was able to gather about 12 characteristics like that that these districts had in common. Some prevalence of Christianity was another factor that was common. That went along with education by and large. I submitted a long report with statistical tables and maps showing these areas in red. The overall conclusion was that they voted communist not because of dire poverty. They were all

poor by American standards, but actually better off than other areas around them. It was because of the disparity in the incomes between the landowners and the landless peasants, usually sharecroppers. That combined with literacy. Some missionary activity had had an inadvertent role in the communist success, because it had educated people. They were somewhat aware of how the outside world lived and therefore more dissatisfied with the disparity in income in their locale. So, that made an interesting report. I was commended for it by, among others, Paul Nitze of Policy Planning.

Actually, I liked this post. Chester Bowles was ambassador. Robert Taylor was consul general. I felt very confident in my role. My output was very high.

Overall, my reports from Madras were singled out for 15 commendations for excellence and seven commendations of very good by the Department. The South Asian Office at the Department then had a program for commenting on field reports. They also commented, "Largely because of Mr. Josif's efforts, the Department probably has a more coherent and up to date intelligence of the political situation in Madras and South India than in any other consular district in India." Ambassador Bowles wrote in February of 1953, "Mr. Josif has shown a marked ability to go beyond the more conventional kind of reporting and provide analyses of basic social, economic, and political conditions underlying political events and trends. It is apparent from his reports that he has well cultivated personal sources of information and has made extensive and intelligent use of documentary materials."

Q: When I was in the Foreign Service during most of the Cold War, although I never served in India, I think all of us knew about this enclave of communism in South Kerala. This sort of stuck out like a sore thumb. So, there was a lot of interest in this during the whole period.

Did you get into what kind of communists were these?

JOSIF: Most of them were nominal communists. Kerala was a very interesting case because it had by far the highest literacy rate of any state in India. Perhaps due to the caste structure there, there were equalitarian tendencies, too. It's the only area in India that I'm aware of where they had a matriarchal social system - not all of them, but in some of the communities there. I think that it was because they were more aware of social inequalities and the promise of communism for equalization that made them cotton onto that ideology. Again, you have to say that this correlated with Christianity. Christianity came to that part of India in the first few centuries of the Christian era. It's interesting that the other major center of communism in India is West Bengal, where they've had a communist government for many years. There is a similarity between the educated Bengalis and the educated Malayam people of Kerala.

I had an amusing experience going to Kerala once. I was traveling with our labor attaché from Embassy New Delhi. His name was Henri Sokolove. We called on a prominent newspaperman in Kerala, an editor. I had just introduced Mr. Sokolove when the editor interrupted and said, "Oh, it's so good to see you here. We are great admirers of the Soviet Union. It was very nice of you to come and see us." Then I introduced myself, saying, "I'm from the American consulate general in Madras." He said, "And you, too. We're so happy to have Americans here with the Russians."

Q: As a practical measure, did you see any translation of this communism in a local state translating itself into anti-Americanism or problems for us?

JOSIF: Not that I recall now in any detail. It was a local phenomenon due to local circumstances, basically, but we took measures to counteract anti-American propaganda in some areas. We had no reports of the Soviets or any other communists coming down and exhorting the people. This was just something that came from their reading, their outlook, and their social and economic situation. However, much of the material in local bookstores was communist, very cheap, and probably subsidized. We took steps through USIS to counteract such material.

Q: This was during the McCarthy period. Were you feeling any heat as a junior officer there?

JOSIF: Yes. I was going to mention this at the end, but maybe I should do it now. I don't want to go into this in great detail, partly because I've lost touch with the details. Briefly, when I was still in Karachi, I received a questionnaire and request to answer by affidavit about two things. One was, did I know certain named people (There were eight of them.) at the Library of Congress in 1942? Secondly, was I a member of the Communist Party at any time?

I answered to the first question by explaining that three names there were of people who were leaders in this trade union local that I belonged to when I was at the Library of Congress. Regarding the other five, I had no recollection of them. On the other question, I said, "No, I never was then or ever have been a member of that party." That was the last I heard of that. Then in 1953, the Eisenhower administration came in and a new standard of proof was instituted - it was incumbent upon the employee to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his continued employment was in the national interest. In other words, they shifted the burden of proof from the normal place, on the prosecution, to the accused. So, this reopened my case apparently. I was called back from Madras to Washington in April of 1953 and went through a very harrowing experience for over a year. One month, I was given make-work in the public affairs area under a gentleman named John French, who was extremely understanding. There were several of us junior officers under him, all in a problematical status. But I had a lot of time to work on my case. I was separated from my family for over four months.

Q: Your family was still in-

JOSIF: Yes. They left my family in Madras.

Friends said I should get a lawyer, and I read a book by John Lord O'Brian about civil rights law. He was a Washington lawyer, very prominent, elderly, perhaps the dean of Washington lawyers. I called on him and asked him his advice and he said, "I'll get a lawyer to work with you for a minimum charge." This designated lawyer, from a law firm on Jefferson Street, urged me to write an autobiography to show what kind of person I was (and that, therefore, it was unlikely I would have ever belonged to this party, which was the real issue). The question about my associates at the Library of Congress, whatever they were, presumably arose because they were considered to belong to that party, too. He felt that the implied guilt by association here would not be decisive.

Q: When you say "that party," you're talking about...

JOSIF: The Communist Party. So, my lawyer said, "Write your autobiography." I wrote a very thorough one, perhaps 50 or 60 pages. On reading it, he complained that he was getting only "charwoman's pay," actually 50 dollars.

One day at the Department, I was summoned to see a man named Scott McLeod, who had been a big wheel in the congressional investigations of communists in government. I think he was chief of security. He tried to pressure me to resign, which I refused to do. I said, "I'm innocent." So the lines were drawn that summer. I spent a lot of time going back and looking up people that I had known at the Library of Congress, many of whom were still there, interviewing them, asking them to write an affidavit on my behalf. Most of them were just character references. What could they say? The Department finally recalled my family in September. We were separated for four months and then reunited.

Then beginning in December, I was suspended without pay for five months. I had a lot of time to think, of course. It was really an impossible situation. How do you prove that you have never been a member of a group? My replies to the charges, with the autobiography and 64 exhibits, had failed to outweigh the word of my accuser, an informant said to be of "known reliability." Only I knew different. One of the things I tried to think of was who would be the informant, who would have made such a charge? It was obviously somebody who didn't know me, at least not well. What was the basis of his or her information? It had something to do with this union I had belonged to in 1942. I admit, I had been active in it, but so what? It was a local labor union. I didn't know who controlled the union and I still don't know if any party really controlled it. One of the things I learned, however, was that in 1943-1945, there was another man surnamed like me, at the Library, who was reputed to belong to that party.

Eventually, I was called in by the Under Secretary of State, the deputy to John Foster Dulles. His name was Walter Bedell Smith. He upbraided me for having belonged to a union of government employees, and said I or someone else was lying. He then offered me a lawyer of his acquaintance "to see that you have a proper defense, assuming he agrees to take you." It turned out the lawyer was Stuart Hedden, recently retired inspector general of the CIA. In my first interview with him, he lit into me for belonging to a union of government employees. I said, "Well, you have to remember that the Library of Congress was and still is a very large, practically industrial organization. Thousands of people work there. Working conditions were not good. The pay was very low, the turnover high. I viewed it like a factory with labor problems. That is why I joined the union." He accepted that. He went through my documents, by then inches thick, and represented me at my hearing. No question of my paying him ever arose. It was all pro bono work. He also offered to pay personally for travel to the hearing by any witness against me. The authorities chose not to accept that offer - or his request to interview the investigative agents involved - or my offer to take a lie detector test.

They had called a number of witnesses to my hearing, held in April 1954. One of them was the chief of the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress, Dr. Ernest Griffith, a former professor of political science, a Methodist and a strong church man. He described me as having been a very liberal young man, but definitely anti-communist. Another was the deputy

librarian of the Library of Congress, an old administrative hand who had been there for 35 years, I think. I had interviewed him some months before and told him I had finally guessed the identity of my accuser and would like to interview her. He strongly advised against doing so, implying a danger in it. He chewed me out later for having done what he had advised against. I said, "Well, I was desperate, Sir." For background, I had heard several times that the likely informant was a woman who had worked at the Library of Congress in 1942. I hadn't known her at all. The name was completely unfamiliar to me. But she was now retired and living with her mother in one of those townhouses in Georgetown. I decided that if I interviewed her, I might discover the basis of her suspicions of me. Incidentally, if she didn't recognize me, that showed something: she had informed on somebody she didn't know by sight. So, I went and started asking questions as if I were an investigative agent. I talked to her for 10 minutes before she finally said, "Could you show me your identification?" I must have been an untypical agent. So I said who I was. She seemed very embarrassed. In effect, she admitted she had made a mistake, but blamed others, too. I wrote an affidavit on the interview, all four hours of it. I learned later that the board asked to interview her, and did so, eventually.

So, there was this hearing. Finally, I was cleared by the members of the board, unanimously. I am sure that I had the best representation. But I never learned the details of their reasoning.

Q: But it is very indicative of the time.

JOSIF: Oh, yes.

Q: Scott McLeod was the chief of the Bureau of Security and counselor-

JOSIF: He was sent over by Congress as an enforcer of the new Loyalty/Security program.

Q: In a way, you were somewhat helped by being a missionary kid, weren't you, being part of the missionary establishment?

JOSIF: Yes, I was. As it happened, my father had been a student at Union Theological Seminary when the president was a Presbyterian who was very well-known to Dulles, himself a Presbyterian church leader. I had written to Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen hoping to get a character reference about my family. He decided to put in a word to Dulles. I don't think that would have helped, however, if I had not made a case in writing. Also, I credit the hearing board and the others who applied some common sense to the rules and to the claims of anonymous informants and their nameless handlers.

Q: This was a very dark period and I think this is very illustrative of what happened. What does one do if you're suspended without pay and you've got a wife and kids? What do you do?

JOSIF: Well, we ran down our bank balance. It was down to \$50 when I was reinstated with back pay.

Q: Did you get back pay?

JOSIF: Yes. I must say that the sequel was really very satisfactory. I was immediately made the India desk officer. I was promoted the next month to class 4. I've never been very curious about my Personnel file, but did have a glance at it a couple of times. I noticed that it made minimal reference to this whole episode and commented something like this: "Apparently, he was mistaken for another person. It was a case of mistaken identity." Somebody who had read it had sort of underlined that in pen.

Q: What was the reaction of your fellow officers and all while this was going on?

JOSIF: There was one who declined my suggestion that he write me a character certificate, somebody I thought knew me better than that. But in most cases, they came through for me very well, and fully accepted me after I was cleared. If anyone, it was I who changed the most. I became more circumspect, I believe, and thus less confident or articulate. For instance, I wrote a long analysis of "Federal Employee Security Procedures" for The Foreign Service Journal (September 1954 issue). It was critical, but in such "constructive" and academic terms as to bore almost anybody.

Q: When did you start on the India desk?

JOSIF: Right away. I think it was June 1954.

Q: And you did that from 1954 until when?

JOSIF: 1957, three years. I was India desk officer for three years.

Q: How did your wife do under this thing? This must have been terrible.

JOSIF: It was a great strain. At first, our friends at Madras thought I had been called back for some honorable recognition, but as my absence went on, people stopped asking her about it. She got very anxious to rejoin me or have me come back to Madras. I wasn't able to explain very well why there were so many delays and uncertainties. It was a complex situation. I was separated from my daughter, too. I felt guilty about both. It's something I don't look back on with any pleasure, to put it mildly.

I was pleased that I was accepted back by my friends in South Asian Affairs (SOA). I'll mention them. Jeff Jones (J. Jefferson Jones, III) was the office director. I worked under Bill Williams, who was officer in charge for India/Nepal/Ceylon. I was the India desk officer. I had somebody to help me, another officer. I had served in Pakistan and India and was one of the relatively few officers in the Foreign Service then who had done both. I felt that I had a role to play in supporting a balanced policy. This was a period when India was not popular in the United States or in Washington, understandably so. I mean, Krishna Menon was-

Q: He was the bête noire of..

JOSIF: You see, he had this combination of British snobbery and British socialism. He was a product of the London School of Economics. He represented a part of Nehru. Nehru was a much

more likeable person. But he too stood for non-alignment, neutralism, equidistancing between the East and the West. All of this was detestable to some people and was at least suspicious to other people. John Foster Dulles called it immoral.

Nehru was a moralizer and he would moralize against us. We were moralizers, too. So we rubbed each other's fur the wrong way. He criticized us about neo-colonialism as seen in our security alliances. They were really bothering him. We were boxing him in with SEATO on one side and CENTO on the other. We were establishing bases in these places. Of course, he was especially irritated with any military aid to Pakistan.

We in SOA felt that we should give India economic aid and that there shouldn't be so much hassle about it. One of the problems was that Nehru was reluctant to ask for it. He thought that was beneath him, his dignity. Even when we gave aid, it was not much appreciated. My theory was that economic aid, if it was to be effective, had to be addressed to actual needs and therefore should be more or less proportional between India and Pakistan according to population. India had about four times the population of Pakistan.

One of my duties was to brief new ambassadors going out to India. There was John Sherman Cooper.

Q: He was a senator from Kentucky.

JOSIF: Yes. He only stayed there about a year and then he came back to run for the Senate again, I think. Then Ellsworth Bunker. He was a very impressive person. He had been head of a sugar manufacturing company and then an association of sugar industries. But he had a broad approach to things. I was in a meeting once when an American railroad man was talking about improving railroads in India and how they should have private railroads there the way we have in the States. Bunker put him down very effectively. Here was a person with his background in private enterprise who said, "Look, we're about the only country in the world that tries to run its railroad system with private companies. We've got better things to do in India than try to change the ownership of the railroads."

I was not entirely happy with the Department in the 1950s. I certainly felt up to the job and so on. But I had, thanks to Wristonization, been set back from FSO class 4 to 5, which was demoralizing.

Q: That was a change in the calculation. At one time, they had six grades and then they moved to eight grades.

JOSIF: So they had to set back people in some of the middle grades to keep the shape of the pyramid. As a result of that, I applied to a Washington think tank about possibly shifting jobs. They seemed to take me seriously. But when push came to shove and they took me out to lunch, I said, "Well, I've thought about it some more and decided that I'd better stick with what I've got." I had built up some assets in the Foreign Service. That was my decision. But it showed that I was looking around.

Q: I think 1954-1957 was a very interesting time. I've seen criticisms today... Right now, there is another coup in Pakistan and people are looking at our attitude towards Pakistan vis a vis the Indians and all and wondering why we seem to have come down so heavily over the years on supporting Pakistan as opposed to the democracy of India. I think you were there in one of the critical times which helped set the standards. The Indians were really not considered to be very friendly. As John Foster Dulles said, they were basically immoral by playing up to the communists.

JOSIF: Right. I wrote many briefing papers trying to explain the Indian position and why we were having so much trouble with them and how it was partly just a difference in perspective. Here were two moralistic peoples, both democracies. They should be reasonably friendly, but we were talking past each other to a large extent. We ourselves had put a cat in the henhouse by giving so much aid to Pakistan. It was not known at the time, but one reason for that was we were basing a U2 plane there. That came out later when the plane was shot down in the Soviet Union. Things like that enter into decision-making, and even the desk officer might not know about it. My idea was that we have a balanced policy and try to get along with both sides. Of course, that is what most of us have tried to do for 50 years, not with any great success.

Q: Were you seeing any of the battle of the capitals, the battle of the embassies, particularly when you get somebody high-powered like Kenneth Galbraith or Bowles or something who seem to have gone overboard on love for India? Did you see the difference between our Pakistan embassy and India? Were you watching these salvos go back and forth or was it a fairly benign period when you were there?

JOSIF: I know what you're talking about. I was later, in the early 1960s officer in charge of Pakistan Affairs during the pro-Indian period. So, if you don't mind, I'll comment on this whole problem when I come to that stage.

In 1957, I asked the Iran desk officer if possibly there was some consulate in Iran where I could serve and get some experience as officer in charge. I felt that I needed that type of experience. He got me the most important consulate in Iran, I would say: Tabriz. I was asked to arrive in May. This meant taking our daughter out of school a little early. As it happens, when we left the post two years later, we were asked to stay on through an inspection. So, we didn't get out until August. It was a direct transfer to another post, but meanwhile, we had home leave in Washington. So, we put our daughter back in the school where she had been. We felt this was a great idea. She came back in tears the first day. Nobody recognized her. You know how kids are. Two years is an eternity. They had already made new friends and they didn't recognize her. She was really devastated. On top of that, she became deeply worried about how she was missing school at our new post.

Q: I always found in our moves, the hardest ones have been when we've come back to Washington. The kids don't really adjust very well.

JOSIF: I don't know if a study has been made of this, but there is some feeling in the Foreign Service that our kids don't turn out as well as kids generally. I don't know if there are any

statistics that would support that. But there have been many cases of kids who have had a lot of problems adjusting.

EVERETT DRUMRIGHT
Consular Officer
New Delhi (1951-1952)

Consul General
Bombay (1952-1953)

Everett Drumright received a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Oklahoma in 1929. His Foreign Service career included positions in China, the United Kingdom, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Drumright was interviewed by Mr. Lee Cotterman on December 5, 1988.

Q: What brought about your assignment to New Delhi and Bombay, India? Can you tell us about that?

DRUMRIGHT: Well, they said I had been there about three years. They wanted my views back in Washington. So I was given a ride back with John Foster Dulles, who was out there on special mission in Japan.

So I got a ride on his aircraft back to Washington. And I think they had hoped there that I would support this armistice, but I never did. I was against it and I said so. That's one of my failings in the Foreign Service, I guess. And I was then shunted off to India.

I had said I would like to go to Singapore as consul general, but they had already assigned another officer to that post. So they said Loy Henderson would be interested in having you in New Delhi, so I went. But I was there less than two months when Loy left. Chester Bowles came to be ambassador and we never did get along too well. He always wanted to run the shop strictly his own way, and he brought out his own people, and so on. But I stayed with him over a year when one day the post in Bombay came open. I went to see him and said, "I would like that post, if you would like to recommend my going there." And he said he would.

So I went to Bombay and spent less than a year as consul general, which I enjoyed. I found Bombay very agreeable after Delhi, where the Indian people, the officials, were not all that friendly towards us.

HOWARD FRANK NEEDHAM
Information Assistant, USIS
Madras (1951-1952)

**Information Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1952-1955)**

Howard Frank Needham began his career in journalism with the San Francisco Chronicle. In 1942, he enlisted in the U.S. Army. His career with USIS included positions in Vietnam , Guatemala, Paraguay, Lagos, and Nigeria. Mr. Needman was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on March 29, 1990.

Q: *This was 1951?*

NEEDHAM: Yes. I received my letter of appointment from the Department of State in April of 1951, and reported within a few weeks to the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C., for preliminary training. Subsequently, I was assigned to Madras, India -- in South India -- as an assistant information officer and vice consul, and at a very low grade I might add, which was later corrected.

Q: *So you were assigned to Madras in Southern India; that was a fractious time in India, as I recall. I'd like to ask you what was your impression at the time; what experiences did you have as you got there that were important to give you the atmosphere of the place?*

NEEDHAM: Well, atmosphere was certainly strong, Lew. To this day I have a vivid, almost immediate recollection of every detail of my arrival at Sahar Airport, just outside Bombay. The ride into town was really jolting to an American brought up with very little overseas experience. I had never seen poverty or squalor to the degree that I saw it along the roadside from Sahar Airport into Bombay. That was very jolting and gave me second thoughts as to where I was bringing the family, which by that time consisted of a wife and three children.

I arrived at the hotel, the famous Taj Mahal Hotel, commonly known as the Taj, on a bright, sunny afternoon after a very long flight. In those days we had no jets. It was a motor flight, with the only stop at Cairo, all the way from London, and I was exhausted. I remember sitting on the bed and bending over to take off my shoes, and that's the last thing I recall until about 8:00 the following morning when I awakened. There was a bearer in my room and he was drawing a bath, and unpacking my suitcase.

Oddly enough, I awakened with the same question in the forefront of my mind with which I had drifted off to sleep. That was, "Where am I bringing my family?"

I stepped to the French-doors window, opening onto a balcony, and looked down into the beautiful garden below, and watched some of the gardeners at work. It was a bright, sparkling, sunny day, and I was struck with the vivid foliage and colors of India, in a most picturesque -- almost Hollywood-type setting. And something about this reassured me, and as I stood on the balcony and listened to the chatter in Gujarati language -- at that time, I understood not a word of it -- I realized that these were a very poor people, and a very cheerful people. I was somewhat reassured. I felt that perhaps it was going to be a very good experience for all of us. I never had

reason, in the subsequent four years that I served in India, to reverse that feeling. It is something that I find a little amazing, even today, to realize.

I look upon the Hindu people, and the people of that subcontinent, as a very happy and courageous people, in spite of their hardships. I find it humbling to compare their lot with our lot, or even with the lot of Western civilization. I doubt that there would be the same amount of cheerful acceptance of hardship anywhere west of the Suez.

I perhaps should mention that en route to Madras I went from Bombay by air to New Delhi for consultation with Clare Timberlake, at that time Country Public Affairs Officer for all of India. He later became ambassador, and is best known for his career in the Belgian Congo -- what is now known as Zaire.

After several days' consultation in Delhi, I proceeded on to Madras, where I took up my duties as assistant information officer, and publications officer.

The first problem that we seemed to have was getting a small pamphlet printed, which had been in the printing shop for several months. When I inquired as to why it had not come off the presses, the reply was that they were lacking a certain drying agent for their inks, and had to send to Europe for it -- a chemical. They stated it was impossible to print without this drying agent in the dye, for the colored cover of the proposed pamphlet.

I took this up with the foreman of the plant, an ex-RAF officer who had elected to stay on in India -- a very charming fellow. We had a long lunch, during which he said there was one thing they might try, and it struck me as very odd; they could substitute the white of an egg for this chemical and perhaps that would react under the heat of their gas jets as a drying agent. At least it would be worth trying, and we'd get a dye fix for the deep blue color, which was part of the cover. And this worked. I had never heard of it before, nor since. I think it's probably the first time and the only time that a USIS pamphlet was printed with the help of the white of an egg.

Q: I think when we had the tape off, you said something about this being a new post. Was it? Were you just opening the post at that time?

NEEDHAM: Yes, it was midsummer of 1951. Construction of USIS Madras had just been completed, with a substantial public (USIS) library as a nearby annex. Media and cultural affairs offices were housed in a large and airy building in Mount Road. We had the five languages of Madras State in which to work. They are actually distinct languages, having their own writing systems. I emphasize they were not dialects or sub-dialects. Each language had to have its own translation staff. We hired translator editors; people with some journalistic experience, but who were at least bilingual in two Hindu languages.

This was the staffing pattern with regard to the publications and press programs. We had the wireless file coming in at that time, and it was circulating in a limited version to about thirty publications in the countryside, and to five large daily publications (in three different languages), in Madras and its environs, on a daily basis. So the need for the translating desks to get fully operating was immediate and a matter of pressure.

In addition to not having all the furniture in place, we had not completed our hiring program. At the same time we were endeavoring to get into pay-dirt operation. The pamphlet came off the press and the advice had been good. The cover was fine, the colors were fixed, and it, I think, was the first pamphlet published from the new headquarters.

The next job of size or moment was a quick call from Delhi in late June, asking if we could arrange to publish thirteen American book titles -- American literature, classics for the most part, in each of the five South Indian languages. I remember that the book I was most interested in was George Orwell's 1984, which I thought would be an excellent think piece for all five language-audiences.

About George Orwell -- of course, we know he was a British officer, and we know that his work was highly political. My reason for including Orwell's work among the list of other titles, most of them less political, was that I felt that the Orwell thesis was a very strong counter to the rather frightening inroads into popular opinion local Communist Parties were making throughout India at this time of great change; and at this time when the Indians were coming out of centuries of not having any popular government of their own, most of them never having been concerned with government. Some of them didn't know what "government" was.

Ferment and public confusion contributed to what might have been a very fertile ground for communist takeover at that time. We did not feel that such likelihood was imminent, but neither could we ignore it.

We finally got the books translated, edited, printed, bound and published, and the next step was to get them distributed to where there were people who were literate, and with a few rupees to purchase them. They were sold at a very low price. They were paperbacks. They were printed, published, bound, and translated at very low cost. That was a phenomenon of operating in the communications field in India in those days.

Distribution was accomplished largely through the little book stalls, which you would see in every railroad station of South India. And it was a happy circumstance that these kiosks existed. We had the cooperation of the new Madras state government in gaining a franchise to distribute these books through the state-operated railway system.

We then proceeded to go to more conventional targets, and began to build our mailing lists of literate purchasers in all five languages who were asked to fill out a card giving basic biographical data, which became part of a language-circulation file. Most of them were pleased to sign on to a new learning source. We scrounged directories and libraries for lists of doctors, lawyers, educators. We visited colleges and high schools, where bright students were completing their education. And we encouraged the general public to come in and see the library and make a visit to the Mount Road office. At that time, we had gifts of pamphlets and other literature to hand out to visitors.

Q: You already answered part of my question. I assume you were aiming these books at, primarily, the elite of India, the educated of India, and those who had a reasonable reading

capability. And I gather that you probably thought that the mass of Indians, who were clear down at the poverty level, weren't going to be very influential in the Indian political scene. Is that a correct assumption?

NEEDHAM: In part it is, Lew. We did feel that the mass was unfortunately illiterate. But you can't live in India very long without realizing that the most illiterate group in any language is alert; they're attentive, they are receptive, and the job of getting a response from them is really facilitated by their keen interest in the world about them, in spite of the poverty conditions which are overwhelming.

We had other means of approaching these people, both the literate and the illiterate. There was the motion picture program, the mobile units which went out to the villages and presented USIS films, all of which had some spoken message of encouragement and often a message of how to improve things in general. Many of these films were acquired from American sources, and soundtracks dubbed in, in the native languages.

I feel that also our exhibits program, perhaps, was even more effective, especially in urban areas, where we could put on a large exhibit, and where there was avid interest in anything foreign, especially in anything American, in those days. The hunger appeared to be inexhaustible, whether it be for books, exhibits, films, or visits to the office. We often were crowded with people in our reading room.

Q: I don't remember whether you mentioned earlier, but you did mention, first of all, Orwell's 1984 -- the British author. I gather most of your books, however, were of American origin. About how many titles did you put out? What were some of the other books that you published? Do you have any fix on the number of volumes that were sold, or distributed?

NEEDHAM: It's difficult to recall right now what the print runs were on these 14 titles, and subsequent titles which were published. It's even difficult to remember all the titles. But we were not printing heavy tomes, or massive works, such as you would expect from early American literature. We were putting out contemporary literary works.

When I say contemporary, I go back as far as the early 20th century, and maybe even a few in the late 19th century. It seems to me we put out three of Mark Twain's works, in an effort to provide something interesting for the youth audiences, the literate youth audiences. Other works were abridged so that the end product could be something handily carried by the dhoti-clad passengers along the South India railway system. And I also might mention that our best customers, of course, were from the first class and second class carriages. Pamphlets were also available on the railroad platforms for third class passengers, some of whom had sufficient reading ability to be interested in obtaining them.

Tamil was our richest language. It seems to me that we published, and sold successfully somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 of these various 14 titles, to the Tamil audience alone. The other language audiences took proportionately less, but I would say that in all we probably sold between 80,000 and 100,000 books that year. I emphasize that this is many years ago, and I have not kept notes. But this estimate feels right to me at this time.

Q: You've been talking about editing and publishing these books in the five different languages that were prevalent in Madras State. I don't think you've named them yet, except incidentally. Can you tell me what those five languages were?

NEEDHAM: Well, I can recall, of course, Tamil, which is the main language of South India. And its running mate, Telugu. Then Malayalam, which is the language spoken over on the west coast.

Q: Would you spell that for the transcriber?

NEEDHAM: As I recall, it was M-A-L-A-Y-A-L-A-M. I wouldn't say that I'm a Webster authority on how you spell Malayalam; the fourth language was Kannada.

Q: You'd better spell that, too.

NEEDHAM: That would probably be K-A-N-N-A-D-A. The fifth language was Hindi.

Q: I don't know whether you want to say anything more about the book program right now, but you mentioned, also, that you were using the wireless file extensively, and therefore I assume you had to have contact with the editors of the press. So you might tell me just exactly how you operated there, and what sort of material, besides the wireless file if any, you got into the press. And finally, was this government press or was this an independent, private press operation?

NEEDHAM: To answer your last question first, Lew, as far as the press was concerned, it was, for the most part, private enterprise, in all languages. Even though we were in the highly urban area of Madras City, there were a great many small, lingual newspapers, some of them weeklies, and some of them bi-weeklies. In addition to that, there was one English language daily, The Daily Mail, and another daily, which was owned by Goenka. Goenka was the William Randolph Hearst of the subcontinent.

Q: Could you spell his name, as well as you can recall it?

NEEDHAM: Yes, that would have been G-O-E-N-K-A, and I'm sorry, I don't remember Goenka's first name, because he was a charming fellow, and a generous host. He delighted in having Americans to his house for dinner about once a month. And the occasions were always enlightening as well as enjoyable.

We contacted editors of the language press, as we called it, largely through our local employees. This was because they were familiar with their own translations. They, for the most part, had previously worked at one or more of these publications, and were on close professional terms, and in some cases, close personal terms with the editors. And we felt that their entrée and their welcome would bear the weight of daily, or semi-daily contact with these local staffs better than the U.S. consular presence inflicting itself too frequently.

We saved ourselves for visits on occasions such as anniversaries, promotions, the presentation of a new project, or similar occasions, and left the day-to-day press contact to our local employees, who did an excellent job, and placed a great amount of material. I might emphasize here that the press reflected the intellectual hunger of India in general in those days. They were so excited at being a free country, they were so hopeful of overcoming their illiteracy, hope sprang eternal. And it was a time of joyful anticipation, really. The press of India, particularly South India, reflected that mood at that time, which operated to a great extent in our favor; it made our materials welcome.

Q: What kind of materials were you getting into the press? I presume you got in much from the wireless file, but did you get any other kind of material -- of an editorial character, or so forth -- into the press?

NEEDHAM: Yes. Considering that Madras State was composed of five former political entities, either provinces or city-states, and 80,000,000 people speaking five different languages, it was a rich, sort of garden variety of a placid, methodical people, who for the most part got along very well together. And we were able, always, to place current news in the daily press, without any difficulty whatsoever; it was welcomed.

The Sunday editors were open to us for long-length features. Their primary interest was "what is America like? Is it truly the fairyland that we've heard?" And we were balancing our act to explain to them that, comparatively speaking, it was a fairyland, but that it was founded on hard work, and without identifying the puritan principle or work ethic as such, we described it.

Also, their interest ran to things cultural. They were fascinated with our motion picture industry. And incidentally, they had a very strong motion picture industry of their own in South India, Gemini Studios, run by a charming and able person, named Vasan. Vasan saved USIS Madras from a great deal of embarrassment during an international film festival, at which the Communists had arranged an elaborate exhibition -- a five-day exhibition -- on the beach, on the Bay of Bengal Beach, (of Madras City), whilst the Americans apparently had overlooked the fact that this event was coming to Madras. But I'll get to that later.

Q: We just started your discussion on the film industry when we stopped for a moment, and I think I may not have asked you before, but I guess you did not produce films in India at that time, that is, USIS did not. Were you getting all of your films, or nearly all of them, through the Agency or from the States? And what did you do about linguistics? Did you dub them, then, in India?

NEEDHAM: We in Madras depended largely on USIS New Delhi for guidance and materials with regard to the motion picture program. The pictures that we were showing were acquired by USIS headquarters in New Delhi, and were farmed out to the branch offices in the consular districts.

At first we were working with whatever we could get, frankly. And whatever we could get often was something out of Hollywood; something out of the documentary studios that dot Hollywood, on various subjects; films that were not exactly box-office appeal, but had some remote, or closer,

relationship to the problems that India was facing at that time. I'm thinking primarily of films that dealt with education, with child care, with prenatal care; the forerunners of the great amount of how-to-do-it, how to live, how to improve conditions films that were produced later for USIS audiences.

From there, of course, it has developed now to the point where the film output by USIS is a sophisticated product. Also, the audience in India is a different audience from the audience that I am talking about, which after all, we must remember was back in the 1950s.

Q: You did say earlier, I think, that you went out with the mobile unit program -- went out into the hinterland. Where were you going? What kind of audiences were you reaching with this mobile unit program? And about how many mobile units were you operating?

NEEDHAM: It seems to me we were operating between 14 and 20 mobile units at almost any time in Madras. We had the capability of putting 20 on the road, but I would say that out there four or five were generally on down-time, and our active fleet was probably 15 most of the time.

As to where they went, they went to small villages in the hinterlands. South India is dotted with small villages; it's impossible to count all of them. But one cannot travel two or three miles without coming across at least two or three villages. They are so close as to be within eyesight of each other, separated largely by the dikes, paddies of rice, farms and occasional desert areas.

We felt that the motion picture program, and the exhibits program really filled a gap when it came to contacting an illiterate audience. Here was the spoken word. Here were pictures that they could stand in front of and study. And they did.

It was an enjoyable thing to watch an Indian crowd amble through an exhibit. It was the slowest moving crowd you ever saw, and gradually queues would build up behind a given shot, or a given item in an exhibit, while they stood transfixed with it. And one or more members of the audience, who were literate and could read -- that was usually the proportion of literate to illiterate -- would kindly step forth and read the native-language caption, which we had placed alongside of the item.

It was a rudimentary time, and a most enjoyable time, because we were welcomed at that time.

Q: Who was dubbing your films in the different languages?

NEEDHAM: They were done in Delhi, at a large studio in New Delhi. I cannot remember the name of the motion picture officer at that time, but he was excellent; he kept a steady stream of titles coming to us.

Q: I think you mentioned earlier, when you went to New Delhi initially for your orientation in India, that Clare Timberlake was the Country PAO. I had not been aware that Clare Timberlake ever had a USIS career, or a USIS career. This must have been just one assignment, or maybe one of two assignments that he had in the information program. Can you enlighten me on that?

NEEDHAM: Yes, Clare was, of course, a Foreign Service career officer with the State Department. And you're quite right, Lew, this was I think perhaps the single assignment, which he handled very capably, in India, with the information program.

As you may recall, in those days occasionally somebody in State would suddenly get the idea that perhaps this, (USIS), new outfit was doing something in which they ought to be interested. It might possibly round out some of the abilities of their officers. And in any case, Clare said to me, during our consultation, that he had taken the assignment because he felt it had a lot to offer anybody who planned to work in public affairs abroad, to get to know opinion molders; to understand the motivation behind professional communicators in various fields, he felt, was almost another department of diplomacy.

Q: Do you remember who the ambassador was at that time?

NEEDHAM: Yes, that was Ambassador Loy Henderson.

Q: Oh, Loy Henderson. I knew Henderson later; I never knew whether he really understood the information program or not, but if he had a man like Timberlake at that point, it didn't make much difference.

NEEDHAM: That's right. Ambassador Henderson left India very shortly after I arrived, and for years I was completely out of touch with his career.

Q: When we had the tape off for a few minutes just now, you were mentioning an event that occurred at the time. It was a rather interesting anecdote, and I wish you'd pick up and talk about it now. And spell the name of the gentleman that was involved in it.

NEEDHAM: Well, Lew, this is perhaps not an earth-shaking anecdote, but it has a certain Hindu charm for me, largely because the principal figure was a very charming, 85-year-old man, who had long been, under the British Raj, a father to the Indian people, and a great representative. His name was Rajagopalachari; that was his last name, I never knew his first name. It seemed enough if I could master Rajagopalachari. Rajagopalachari was a man, cadaverous, six-feet tall perhaps, a Brahman, very distinguished in the Indian sense.

He had operated with Mahatma Gandhi as a pioneer organizer of the Congress Party of India. He knew the British Raj extremely well. As I said previously, was a marvelous representative; had been a bridge, if you like, between the Raj and his people. And he had the respect of the British and of his people. He had held many high offices in the government of India, under the British Raj, not least of all he had been a governor of Madras during the time of Raj.

In 1947 he had been tapped by the British, by Mountbatten and his group, out of retirement to become the pro tem governor of Madras State, in preparation for the first annual elections to be held under independence, which as you know, came to India in 1951.

The work of organizing this took place during the seventh year of a continuous drought, and particularly in South India things were very, very difficult for people. The water tanks were

almost dry. Disease had broken out in the cities and the villages. The crops had been light, down to almost non-existence for the last three years.

And came the day in 1951, finally, when all delegates had been elected and Rajagopalachari, still pro tem governor, was convening the very first congress of the newly independent state government of Madras. And as he did so, the chamber filled up with a large, and noisy, and jubilant crowd, which was perhaps peppered by the frequent outbursts from the front benches, where the communist delegates were seated, waiting for governor Rajagopalachari to come on stage and commence the ceremonies, which he did. And he was greeted with great applause. He was a beloved figure, particularly in the south of India, but also in the north.

This was like a crowning of his life's work. He was, early on, a Mahatma Gandhi disciple. To a great many of the Indians these were the times and events of a fulfillment of all of the Mahatma's programs. So it was a momentous and emotional occasion, interrupted unfortunately, as the old gentleman proceeded with his introductory remarks, by the communist deputies down in front, who every time Rajagopalachari paused for breath, would leap to their feet, singly or collectively, and shout, "Mr. Speaker, may we know?"

And finally Rajagopalachari stopped in the middle of his address, lowered his spectacles on his rather long and aquiline nose, and like an ancient grandfather or professor peered over the stage-apron at the communist deputies and said, "Yes, may you know what?"

And the deputies said, "We have been starving for seven years. We are thirsty. Our tanks are dry. Our children and wives are getting sick. And we want to know what is the new government going to do about that?"

Rajagopalachari paused and raised his hands in the traditional Hindu gesture of the Namasté blessing, and said very solemnly, "We will pray for rain." That stopped the raucous behavior of the communist deputies, and the proceedings went on to a happy conclusion and an orderly one. And we all started home at about 4:30 in the afternoon.

At approximately 5:00 a typhoon blew into Madras and dropped four inches of rain in about five hours. This "miraculous" episode, of course, was reported throughout the Indian press.

At this time we had a picture in the exhibits section of another event, in which Rajagopalachari was shown giving the Namasté sign of prayer-greeting and smiling at the camera. We enlarged this picture and put it in the lobby of the Mount Road office for some time. Needless to say, it drew many response-smiles from our visitors.

Q: You were discussing earlier, when we were off tape, about an incident that occurred when a film festival was given unexpectedly -- or unexpectedly to you, at least, in Madras. And I think that's worth putting on tape, so I'd like you to proceed with that now, will you Howard?

NEEDHAM: Yes, I'd be happy to. I'll start by apologizing, which is always a bad start, for not having all the details at my fingertips. But this was an exciting event and maybe just the raw substance of what really happened will suffice.

The film festival we are talking about took place in 1952 on Elliot's Beach, which is on the Madras (Western) side of the Bay of Bengal. It was attended by Western delegations from Western film-making nations, as well as from several European and Asian nations. The largest and most elaborate pavilion was the Soviet pavilion. In those days the Soviets would put on a festival, not sparing any horses, and I mean not any. We, on the other hand, in our little office over on Mount Road, had been absolutely unaware of this event. How it happened that we were unaware of it, I cannot explain. But we were unaware of it until about a week before it was due to open up, when we first heard of it.

At that time our public affairs officer, Paul Sherbet, was very concerned. In his opinion, the festival had weight around the world, and particularly out in Southeast Asia. So was there any action we could take to counter this immense budget-spectacle which we had been reliably informed the Soviets were putting forth for the occasion?

And it seemed at first that there wasn't anything we could do except sit there and take a whipping. Paul began to plunge around in his own mind and recalled that he had a friendship with Hollywood's famous producer/director Frank Capra. And he thought of having Frank fly out as a guest so that we could at least, perhaps, capture the interest of India's film brass and whoever else the Indian film brass might wish to invite from other delegations. And in short, we might be able, through the aegis of Mr. Capra, to attract an audience of multinational film moguls from Asia and Europe who were there, attending the festival.

So this was set in motion and Delhi tried to reach State and have State contact Mr. Capra. At first, State took a dim view of the idea but later, under urging from Ambassador Timberlake -- or I should say, at that time, Public Affairs Officer Timberlake -- they revised their opinion and did put the request through to Frank Capra in Hollywood. He immediately recognized Paul's name and said yes, he'd be glad to come out. And as a result, he was there in three days.

Capra's presence in India was of marked impact to people like Sri Vasam, who was the president of Gemini Studios, (one of the largest movie studios in the world), and who for years has achieved record box office revenues throughout Asia with his pictures. Vasam was delighted to have Frank Capra as his guest the whole time Capra was there. Vasam also volunteered something to us while we were waiting for Frank to arrive. It seemed that an independent film producer -- Indian, a Tamil, another Brahman -- named Sundaram, had an international cast, making what people call a French Western, down in Kerala State at that time. And among the cast was Cesar Romero, Rod Cameron, and a couple of other well-known American stars, whose names I do not recall at this distant juncture. Perhaps they, too, could come up to Madras and be honored guests?

So the result of all this was that we had Frank Capra and four American stars and numerous other Asian film lights, who were in the Sundaram Company, in the garden at PAO Sherbet's home in Madras. And the party went on variously -- in Mr. Vasam's garden, the gardens of other film producers who lived and worked in Madras -- for three days. We didn't exactly win the game, but we certainly did attract the brass from most of the delegations who had been spending all their time out on Elliot's Beach. We felt we had countered, from a defensive position, rather well.

Q: Well, it sounds to me as though even if it wasn't gathering all the crowds, it was at least a show of one-upmanship against the Soviets. Do you have anything else about the tour before we go on to your experience in Delhi?

NEEDHAM: Well, Lew, there's much that I could tell but it all would boil down to what amounts to -- in my mind, even to this day -- as a love affair with the people of my first post. And I think this is typical of most Foreign Service people.

Q: I just want to ask one final question then. We spoke briefly about radio activities earlier. You said you did have a radio officer there? What kind of a program were you putting on?

NEEDHAM: We did not have an American radio officer there. It was handled by one of our senior locals and he worked off the wireless file. I would provide him with a copy of the wireless file early in the morning and he would go through and make his own picks as to what the various radio stations would be interested in, and we would review his choices together. Normally I did not question his judgment. He was a graduate print journalist who had been a radio announcer for years. He was a man in his middle forties and mature and well known in the community.

Q: Was the radio controlled by the government at that time or was it free as the press was?

NEEDHAM: No, radio at that time was still under government control.

Q: So there was a certain limitation to what you could get on the radio then, because of that?

NEEDHAM: Exactly, yes. However, the limitation was seldom exercised.

Q: Well, I guess we've covered Madras now. Before we ever started this you told me that you were later brought up to Delhi. Can you tell me when that occurred and what were the circumstances under which you were transferred to Delhi and what assignment you had there?

NEEDHAM: Well, I was transferred to Delhi in June of '52, largely as a result of our finally getting five language desks set up for the South Indian language editions of the American Reporter, which was a USIS weekly newspaper that was published in eight languages throughout India, with the parent publication, of course, being in English, and produced at USIS New Delhi. Madras was, I think, the first post to get its language editions in operation. And I was direct-transferred up to Delhi as managing editor of the American Reporter at that time.

Q: So this was then a nationwide publication, but it went out in various languages, from the basic English that was prepared in Delhi?

NEEDHAM: That's right. I was no longer involved in the language editions. The staff in Delhi was already established. It was a very competent group and also the source of many friendships during the following three years.

Q: Was Clare Timberlake still the PAO at that time? Or had he been replaced then?

NEEDHAM: He had been replaced by that time. He had been replaced by Teg Grondahl. By that time, also, Ambassador Chester Bowles was on post, succeeding Loy Henderson.

Q: I guess, from what you said, that after you were transferred to Delhi, you had no other duties but that regarding the editing and issuance of the American Reporter. So there really isn't a great deal more to say about your first tour.

Now, I understand you went on home leave and then came back to a different assignment. So just how did that work and when did you go on home leave?

NEEDHAM: I went on home leave in the latter part of July or perhaps the early part of August in '53. In any case, George Venable Allen had arrived and was ambassador to India at that time.

Q: Didn't you also think that was about the time that you were getting the first notice of the big cut that the Eisenhower Administration ordered in the latter part of '53?

NEEDHAM: Yes. There was a very large cut and we reduced the audience size -- our circulation expenses -- on the American Reporter in order to conform to that portion of the cut which applied to the American Reporter.

Q: But the cut in personnel, which came subsequent to that, had not taken place at the time you went on home leave? That was occurring while you were on home leave.

NEEDHAM: That's correct.

Q: As I understand it, the notification of the cut in personnel occurred while you were on home leave. And at the time that you started on home leave, and most of the time you were there, you were not sure whether you, yourself, were going to be cut, or whether you were going to be retained and go back to Delhi. So will you pick it up at that point and tell me what happened on home leave and then your return to Delhi and your assignment and what you did thereafter?

NEEDHAM: Well, of course the first thing to do on home leave always was to park your family where convenient and get yourself into Washington for your debriefing, and the routine medical examination, which all officers take when they return to Washington.

That went rather smoothly. I was unable to determine whether or not I was going to be RIFed or fired. The corridors of Washington were ominously laden with conversations speculating about who was going to be fired and who was not going to be fired. It seemed to be a government-wide cut. My desk officer told me to go on home leave and to wait for a call from him, which I did. Had a most enjoyable home leave and a most enjoyable phone call at the end of it, when I was told to get back to India, that my berth there was secure and they were waiting to receive me.

So we re-embarked via Monarch Pan Am clipper, which was a propeller ship, and the five Needhams returned to India by way of Honolulu and Wake Island. We refueled there and went

on into Tokyo. From Tokyo we flew to New Delhi via Bangkok. That was the Pacific route to India for Pan Am in those days.

Duty during the second tour involved a lot of routine information work. There were no particular highlights in terms of the post's relationship with its host government.

Q: Specifically, what was your position at that time?

NEEDHAM: Specifically, I was Information Officer for the New Delhi Consular District. And it involved support of other sections in USIS at the time. We all managed to cross-fertilize our ideas as well as our materials in those days.

I haven't very much to recount. It seems to me unfortunate that the thing that stands out in my mind is a very severe bout with hepatitis, which I contracted while on special duty in Kandy, Ceylon. I'd been sent there to act as Information Officer for the American delegation to the 10th Plenary Session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which was being chaired by, at that time -- at first, by Ambassador Crowe, who was then ambassador to Ceylon -- but about the third or fourth day of the conference he was stricken with a mild heart attack, which proved to be not too serious, but which eliminated him from the running for the rest of the conference. And the chief delegate from Washington -- I think it was Dr. Merrill Gay -- took over as leader of the American delegation throughout the remainder of the three-week session.

During that period of time, some way or other, I managed to contract hepatitis and by the time I got back to New Delhi I was acutely ill, and rather dangerously so. I was examined by two doctors from the embassy clinic and they decided not to move me to Dhahran, which would have been the nearest hospital; that I would be better off taking my chances staying right in bed at home, which I did for three months and eleven days, then recovered slowly and returned to partial duty until, finally, it appeared that I was not going to make a complete recovery while in the tropics. And so I went home rather early in the second tour. I would say it must have been a good ten months before the natural termination date.

R. SMITH SIMPSON
Consular Officer
Bombay (1952-1954)

A graduate of Virginia, Cornell and Columbia Universities, Smith Simpson has served in foreign posts including Brussels, Athens, Mexico City, Bombay, and Lourenco Marques. He also worked for the Department of Labor and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Mr. Simpson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Ambassador John J. Crowley on May 13, 1991.

Q: Then you left Mexico City. You were there from 1949 to 1952. And then you went to Bombay from 1952 to '54. Was this still as a labor officer?

SIMPSON: No, by that time I felt that I ought to broaden out. What I was trying to do in my Foreign Service career, in addition to serving my country and the cause of peace, was to educate myself on diplomacy, to see if it could not be made a more effective instrument of peace. So I wanted to see the process from as many angles as possible. Never having served in a consular post before, I wanted to get that experience and perspective, that insight into the contribution of consular posts to diplomacy. So I requested a consular assignment, and asked for one in the Far East. I may have specified India, because I remember thinking about the different consular posts available in the Far East and I didn't want Japan because I felt that was too Americanized. I think I specified India, and drew the number two post in our Bombay consulate general.

I was in charge most of the time, because the consul general who was there when I arrived, Everett Drumright, was soon hoisted to Washington. His friend in Congress, Walter Judd, who was pro-Chiang Kai-shek, wanted to fill the post of deputy assistant secretary of state for the Far East with somebody who was definitely, irretrievably pro-Chiang Kai-shek. So Walter Judd came to Bombay on a look-see. Drum had me to lunch with Judd, in the course of which Judd said to Drumright, "You're not going to be here for long."

After the lunch and Judd had departed, Drum turned to me and asked, "What did he mean by that?"

I said, "It's pretty evident he wants you in Washington."

So he did and Drum shortly left. There was a long hiatus before Bill Turner showed up. Bill had been counselor for political affairs in Tokyo. His tour had come to an end and, as too often happens to good officers, there was no assignment awaiting him in Washington. He had to hoof it around the corridors to find out what was available. When he found that the post of consul general in Bombay was available, he put in for that and got it.

Q: This '52 to '54 period was a very difficult time in American-Indian relations. The Korean War was on. We felt the Indians were being, to say the least, non-helpful.

SIMPSON: Plus the fact that we had negotiated an arms pact with Pakistan to supply it with arms. This reached us in India as a stunning blow. Not even George Allen, our ambassador in New Delhi, had been advised of it. He read about it in *Newsweek* magazine.

Q: This was the first. Since then, it's been a fairly steady thing, but this was a real blow. What was the situation as you saw it in Bombay, and how did you deal with it?

SIMPSON: We, of course, bore a lot of the brunt of it in Bombay, because we were a very large consular district, the size of France. There was a lot of government, press and industry in Bombay itself. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of India was located there. The leading newspaper of India had its head office there, the *Times of India*, plus others. The textile industry was located there. Labor unions were strong. The Principal communist periodical was published there. So we got severe reactions from all of these sources, government and non-government.

We worked to counter-act the blow through personal relationships, and doing a lot of entertaining and talking over things with the Indians, demonstrating a desire to understand their point of view. We couldn't do some of the things in India that we had done in Belgium and in Greece, such as showing USIS films. The government in New Delhi was too sensitive.

A problem arose over Goa. We were accused by the Communists of having our eyes on Goa for a naval base. Since this erupted in the general environment created by our pact with Pakistan it was dynamite. Since Goa was in the Bombay consular district...

Q: At this time Goa, of course, was under Portugal.

SIMPSON: Yes, it was Portuguese territory and we were alleged to be negotiating with the Portuguese to establish a naval base there. This occurred when I was in charge, so I got in touch with George Allen and said, "How should we handle this? Do you want us to handle it, or will you handle it in New Delhi?"

He said, "It's in your district, you handle it."

So I had a talk with Frank Moraes, who was editor of the *Times of India*, and said to him, "Frank, how should we handle this?"

He replied, "I think the best thing to do is for you to issue a statement denying it. I will display this in a prominent place on page one, so it will be read."

That was the way we scotched that story. That is the way we operate generally, by talking to people like Frank Moraes and saying, "These are the facts, how can we get them across?" Some Indians, like Frank, were pro-Western and pro-American, and always very helpful in advising us how to do things. We tried to make these moves joint as often as possible. It made them feel needed, elicited a constructive attitude, and nourished a cooperative relationship. We reciprocated whenever we could and filled in with entertaining. Entertainment is no idle affair when done intelligently.

Q: Did you have any problems meeting Indians, people that you should meet? Was it a pretty open society?

SIMPSON: No problems of that sort, but we had another problem stemming from the fact that the Parsis were numerous in Bombay, and they were far more Western-minded than the Hindus. So they wanted to see us, entertain us, mix with us, attend our USIS lectures, and other cultural events. Our problem was to make time for the Hindus without offending the Parsis. But we had to reach out to the Hindus. Few came to us.

Chester Bowles, our ambassador when I first arrived, was well aware of this, and he had given as strict orders as he could to the consulate general to consort more with the Hindus. We were not really under the embassy; we reported directly to Washington. (This goes back to the days when India was a dominion. We had only consular posts then and they reported directly to Washington. This continued after Indian independence.

One problem was that the Hindus have eating habits disturbing to some Westerners. They eat with their fingers, they don't use knives, forks and spoons. So I was often asked by Hindus, "We'd love to have you at our home, but do you mind our eating habits?" And I'd say, "Of course not, not at all. I'll do the same." So I accepted their invitations.

Q: This was a time when we were fighting in Korea, NATO was forming up, we looked upon the Soviet Union..., it was a time of great tension. And we had a secretary of state, Dulles, who was saying (I may be misquoting, but not very much), "Neutrality is immoral." And here you were in the country that was par excellence the neutral country.

SIMPSON: Neutral country with a bias. At least a bias among top officials.

Q: Yes. How were you seeing India at that time, from your vantage point, vis-a-vis the United States and also the Soviet Union?

SIMPSON: We were not subjected to as much of that feeling about our foreign policies and our secretary of state, as our embassy in New Delhi was. In Bombay we were distant from New Delhi. There was a better balance of sentiment and opinion in Bombay than in New Delhi. So that we were aware that the feeling existed, but it was not by any means as sharp as it was in the capital and by reaching out to Hindus we were able to reinforce the more cosmopolitan outlook.

Q: But you didn't have the feeling that you were in sort of a hostile territory, or that there was something endemically biased within India towards the Soviet Union and against the United States?

SIMPSON: No, no. We gathered, in Bombay, that this was largely governmental and came from Nehru, Krishna Menon, and a relatively few people like them at the apex, that this was not a widely spread view in India. I felt relatively sure of that for I traveled rather extensively through my consular district. I felt the American media made too much -- and Secretary Dulles made too much -- of the Nehru-Krishna Menon utterances. Nehru and Krishna Menon were not India in this respect.

Q: Within the Bombay consular district, where you would be meeting officials and all, was there a distance between them and Nehru and Krishna Menon as far as when you talked to them?

SIMPSON: I don't know that I can answer that question in those terms. I wasn't aware of any rift or difference, in the usual sense of those words.

As I traveled around, I found officials, including governors of the states, were amenable to the personal touch. If you met them in a friendly manner, showing a desire to listen to them and understand their point of view, including their political situation, they warmed up to you. Governors of states would come to see me when they visited Bombay, and accept invitations to lunch at our apartment, which was in Washington House. They were very impressed by the fact that an American was interested in what they were doing and thinking.

I can remember on one occasion I visited the State of Saurashtra where a Maharajah had done a great deal for the people, unlike other maharajahs I had met, including constructing a public market so that the farmers of the area had a place to come and vend their products under hygienic conditions and protected from the sun and inclement weather. I was impressed that such a man would have this social conscience, so I didn't refrain from commenting on this. The word reached him, so when he came down to Bombay, he let me know and I had him to lunch at our apartment. Come Christmas or New Year's, he sent a representative of his down to Bombay with a present. It was a silver tea set. I said to the representative, "It is most kind of the Maharajah to offer this beautiful gift but, you know, I'm embarrassed for I cannot accept it."

He was completely flabbergasted. He said, "But you have to accept it. It comes from the Maharajah."

I replied, "I understand, and that's why I'm embarrassed. My government will not permit me to accept it."

He insisted, "You can't reject it. I'm going to leave it here. I'm going to go back and report that I have presented this present to you. And I hope you will give me words of gratitude to relay to him."

I said, "I give you those words of gratitude and I indeed thank the Maharajah most profoundly for his thoughtfulness." And I said, "I'll stop there as far as you're concerned."

People abroad are astonished that we are not allowed to accept presents.

It's very amusing how my assignment there ended. Turner took over in early 1954, and I resumed the position of number two, the political officer. Jack Jernegan came to India for a look-see. Jack was then deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asian Affairs. After visiting New Delhi, he came to Bombay, and we took to each other. He wanted to know whether I would be interested in an assignment to the embassy in New Delhi. I said, "If you're asking me my personal predilection, I would say no, because that's just a government town and I wouldn't have the range of contacts in Indian affairs I have here and the ability to travel into the countryside and talk to the villagers. But if you want me to go to New Delhi I'll go there." He said nothing further, but shortly after he got back to Washington, I got orders to proceed to Lourenço Marques.

I was in my office, looking out the windows over the harbor and admiring the sparkle of the monsoon on the ship masts, when in comes our administrative officer with a little smile on his face and a piece of paper in his hands. He said, "I have news for you." So he handed me this paper which purported to be a cable from the Department transferring me to Lourenço Marques as consul general. I responded, "Ha, ha, big joke" and tried to give it back to him, because I thought he was reciprocating a hoax I had played on him.

I had heard him say on one occasion that if there was one place in the world he didn't want to serve in, it was Reykjavik. Come April Fool's Day 1954, I had faked a telegram assigning him to Reykjavik. If I had had any thought of the traumatic effect it would have on him, I wouldn't have done it, because he was quite desolated, to put it mildly.

So I felt this was just a quid pro quo. But he said, "No, no, no, no, it's authentic."

So I said, "Well, you'll have to prove that to Bill Turner." We went in to Bill Turner, who had taken over, and the administrative officer persuaded Bill it was indeed authentic. Bill pounded on his desk and said, "I won't have this, I won't have this! I've just arrived here. You're my political officer, and I don't know anything about India. They're not going to do this to me!" Which astounded me, because we both knew how the assignment process worked. If the department had decided to transfer me, it already had somebody backed up as my replacement and somebody to replace him.

I said, "Bill, don't do this," because I knew what would happen. I knew the Department would assume that Simpson didn't want to go. But he insisted. He even got George Allen, who was our ambassador in New Delhi, to support him. George got in touch with the department also, but of course none of their objection had any effect.

WILLIAM L. BLUE
Political Officer
New Delhi (1952-1955)

William L. Blue was born and raised in Memphis, Tennessee in 1914. He attended Southwestern College, Vanderbilt University, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Mr. Blue entered the Foreign Service in 1941 and has served in Niagara Falls, Ciudad Bolivar, Naples, Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Paris, Bern, and Lisbon. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 11, 1991.

Q: You then went to New Delhi where you served from 1952-55. What were you doing there?

BLUE: I was in the political section. Most of my time was spent taking care of visitors -- Adlai Stevenson, Foster Dulles, Richard Nixon. I never was able to attend Hindi classes because I was so busy with all these visitors. I was the number two in the Political Section.

Q: What was the situation in India as we saw it -- the American interests?

BLUE: Nehru was in his prime. It was a fascinating period to be there because Nehru was at the height of his power. And, of course, when Eisenhower came in our relations were very cool because of the decision to give military aid to Pakistan. As a matter of fact, when Nixon came he expected to be received with open arms but was only greeted at the airport by the military secretary of the President.

I did do something that the chief of protocol objected to, although he never said anything to me about it. The American Women's Club was making important contributions in many ways to an Indian school for kids of around 5 or 6. We had an embassy bus to take the kids to the airport. When Nixon and Pat arrived the kids presented him with leis. The chief of protocol looked at me

as if to say, "You are the son of a bitch responsible for this." At least Nixon didn't know who was responsible for these leis. But he got a very cold reception. By that time George Allen was there. Bowles was there when I first got there. He thought he was going to stay. I don't know why he thought that.

Q: Because Bowles was a Democrat.

BLUE: Yes. Rather controversial figure. In any case, George Allen came right away. To show you how little the White House anticipated the Indian press blackout of the visits, they sent an advance party which indicated to George Allen where and when they wanted the route of the Vice President to appear on the front page of all the papers every morning. And George Allen said, "There is not going to be any publicity about the Vice President's visit. The Vice President and the Administration are in the dog house as far as Nehru is concerned. So don't be surprised if you don't get any publicity at all."

Q: Was there any attempt to call off the trip?

BLUE: No. He was making a trip all around.

Q: Your ambassador for a while was George Allen.

BLUE: I got there in January and George must have come out around March, I'm just guessing.

Q: How long was he ambassador there?

BLUE: He was there until late 1954 and then John Sherman Cooper came.

Q: Then you had two ambassadors there. Bowles had left...

BLUE: Bowles was there about a month and a half after I arrived. He left about a month or so before George arrived. After George Allen left, John Sherman Cooper came in. He was pretty hopeless because he had never been an ambassador. He had been a Senator from Kentucky for a long period. He was a nice man, but he would go to sleep during briefings and we would have to start all over. He was rather elderly. He had just married a woman who had chased him for seven years. My wife described her as the American bald eagle -- she didn't have much hair. So, George was ambassador for most of the time I was there.

Q: And he was a professional.

BLUE: Yes, he was first class.

Q: During this period when you weren't doing your escorting, did you have much contact with the Indians?

BLUE: We had a lot of contact with the Indians and the Indian populace on the whole liked Americans. Bowles was very close to Nehru. I think he was quite effective with Nehru. George

Allen was treated perhaps not as graciously as Bowles had been. The people in the Foreign Office were all Indian Civil Service, ICS. They did their job.

Q: Indian Civil Service going back to the British time.

BLUE: Oh, yes. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry was decked out in morning coat and stripe trousers. He was really very formal. I had difficulty with the much lower-ranking contact I was in touch with most of the time. He was rather cool and some things we wanted done were not done. The Indians were very independent. For example, we had several congressional visits thinking that they were going to tell the Indians where to get off and the Indians told them where to get off.

Q: It was also during the time of the Korean War in which the Indians, from our point of view, were not playing a very constructive role.

BLUE: They were playing games with the Chinese you see. That cooled relations even more. But I don't remember any unpleasantness. Nehru's principal private secretary was a very close and warm friend of ours. We stayed in contact with him long after we left. He has died but I still write his wife at Christmas.

Q: What about getting around and reporting on local developments?

BLUE: That wasn't a problem. We traveled a good deal. I got down to Madras, to Bangalore, to Bombay and Calcutta. I traveled around with several congressional groups and they were treated well. The only time they weren't treated well was when they were belligerent with people from the government and the people from the government had no intention of being pushed around by a bunch of American congressmen. As a matter of fact I admired them because the Pakistanis were bowing and scraping to an extent that was almost undignified.

Q: Were there any crises or great problems during that time?

BLUE: Goa was always a problem.

Q: Goa being at that time still under the Portuguese.

BLUE: It wasn't solved until around December 1961, just before I went to Lisbon.

The whole question of aid to Pakistan was a major problem. Also Kashmir. For example, I arranged for Adlai Stevenson to go up to Kashmir and stay on one of those house boats. While he was there the Indians decided they could use his visit...I think he called on Sheik Abdula who was working towards independence for Kashmir...Nehru used that as an excuse for denouncing Adlai Stevenson after he had gone. He said he had been consorting with Sheik Abdula encouraging his efforts to bring about the independence of Kashmir. We had very cool relations after that. As a result, the ambassador forbade any of us to go up to Kashmir.

Q: What did we feel about Soviet influence in India at that time?

BLUE: All the people in the CIA, and I suppose with good reason, felt that Mrs. Gandhi, who later became prime minister, was strongly influenced by the Soviets. We were concerned because the Indians tended to use our aid to Pakistan as an excuse for warming up their relations with the Soviet Union. But at that stage I don't recall that the Soviets were giving them anything of importance. I think they were building a steel plant near Calcutta, but the Indians weren't purchasing aircraft or anything like that.

Q: *You left there in 1955?*

BLUE: I left there right before July 4 and was glad to get out of there. Ambassador John Sherman Cooper didn't want to have liquor for the July 4th party. He said that the Muslims didn't like it. I tried to point out to him that there were not just Muslims, there were a lot of Hindus in India. I also said, "Mr. Ambassador you don't know how expensive fruit juice is." Most of the juice was canned and very expensive. Also I said, "If you don't have liquor lots of people are not coming, and they will know that you don't have liquor. I won't tell them, the staff won't tell them, but they will find out." I think he ended up having a place for those who drank liquor. You know, in Malaya they had a room upstairs where the men would go to have their drinks and the ladies stayed down stairs and drank tea or something.

Q: *By the way, you had gotten married.*

BLUE: I got married in October of '54 and Joan loved India. She had a wonderful time. We left India in late June. I was to be assigned to London as the Near East representative in the embassy. Meanwhile the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, decided that I had not had a sufficiently broad experience in the Near Eastern area. I believe my refusal to be Indian Desk officer was also a factor in their decision.

ROBERT ANDERSON
Political Officer
New Delhi (1952-1956)

Ambassador Robert Anderson received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1944 and served in the U.S. Army during World War II. His Foreign Service career included positions in Shanghai, Chiang Mai, New Delhi, Bordeaux, and Paris, and ambassadorships to Dahomey, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Anderson was interviewed by Horace Torbert on March 12, 1990.

ANDERSON: But finally, a very good friend of mine found an opening in New Delhi, India, and I was sent out in 1953 and had a wonderful assignment there. It was absolutely fascinating, in the political section. George Allen was one of the more imaginative ambassadors I've ever met. He made me his special assistant. I also was told to cover internal politics, to serve as the acting labor attaché for my two years there (because a very colorful gentleman, named Henri Sokolove,

became ill, and had to leave, the AFL and CIO couldn't agree with the State Department on who could come out as the labor attaché until just before I left).

So I had three jobs, all of which were absolutely fascinating because India was still a very new country. As you know, it's a country that has many different languages. The linguistic-states problem, under Nehru, was a very difficult question. How Nehru managed that, I will never know, but he did and he was able to form a single nation out of such disparate groups. And I had to try to cover all of that.

And incidentally -- and this is an historical fact of interest -- while I was there, the first communist government that ever came into power through a democratic election was elected in the state of Kerala, in south India. But I don't need to say any more about that. I can assure you there's plenty of reporting on that one, if anybody wants to read it.

Q: Did you see Nehru some?

ANDERSON: Yes. George Allen was thoughtful. He had me with him on every single thing that you could imagine. He introduced me to Nehru, I went with him a couple of times on his calls. Nehru was a fascinating human being and very calm, unassuming, quiet, but with a mind like a steel trap. He and George Allen got along absolutely beautifully.

Q: Nehru and George Allen?

ANDERSON: Yes. And then John Sherman Cooper came out as ambassador three months before I was due to leave. He told me that I was not to leave until July 5, 1955. My wife and the children had left in March and I was anxious to join them. But he said: "Look, we don't know anybody. We have this July Fourth reception and you're about the only one left that knows anybody," which was true. So I stayed through that and we became very, very close friends as a result of that and saw each other through the years, after he joined the Senate.

Q: Was he a pretty good ambassador? Of course, he didn't stay in India very long. I knew him later, as a senator, of course. He was a great guy.

ANDERSON: Yes. He did not stay there very long and there's a little story about that I want to tell you. I can't say that he stayed there long enough to make any particular mark on United States interests with India; I can't recall any. I was back in Washington as the Ceylon/Nepal Desk Officer and the assistant India Desk Officer, after I left India.

We might jump to that right now, because it involves John Sherman Cooper. He came back shortly after I arrived in '55, and he asked if he could talk with me alone. We went into his office and shut the door and he said: "Bob, I have a difficult problem. I don't know what to do." "President Eisenhower wants me to run for the Senate from Kentucky. But I haven't been in India long enough. What's this going to do to our relations, and what's Nehru going to think of me and think of us, with my leaving so soon? I don't really know what I should tell the president. I really don't know what to do."

And I said: "Mr. Ambassador, if you don't want to run for the Senate, that's one thing. If your concern is about what Mr. Nehru is going to think, I don't think you should be worried about that, because Nehru is very much of a politician, and he knows that if the President of the United States asks you to take on a political assignment, such as being one of 48 senators, he's going to understand that. I don't think that you need to worry about that aspect at all. Plus the fact you haven't been there a year yet, almost. You go back, it'll be another six months before anything really happens; you know that. Then you'll have time to campaign. And I really think that you've got to make up your mind on what the president has asked you to do. And if you want to be a senator, I think you ought to do what the president wants you to do."

And he put his arm around me, thanked me and walked out. He went back, saw Nehru, and eventually came back, to become a senator.

TERENCE A. TODMAN
Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1952-1957)

Political Officer
New Delhi (1957-1960)

Ambassador Terence A. Todman was born in 1926 and raised in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. He attended the Polytechnic Institute of Puerto Rico and served in the U.S. Army. Ambassador Todman received a bachelor's degree from Syracuse University. His Foreign Service career included positions in Tunisia, Togo, Chad, Guinea, Costa Rica, Spain, Denmark, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Michael Krenn on June 13, 1995.

Q: Now being assigned to India and that area, was that, did you have any familiarity with that area prior to this particular job?

TODMAN: No, but that didn't matter. I'd read about India. I told you that my interest from high school was in learning about different countries. We knew people who came from practically all the countries, because they came by the Virgin Islands. I didn't know anything special about India. The Foreign Service in those days didn't expect area specialization before making an assignment. Later, people started doing that. But for the longest time, you were just assigned and you were expected to learn it while you were there. And it's one of the things that, knowing it, led to an enormous amount to irritation on my part, when later I traveled to Eastern Europe, I was then ambassador to Guinea, and I noticed that we were having a hard time getting anyone to believe that we believed in equal opportunity for our multiracial society. We were putting out a lot of information, which no one paid any attention to. And on my return to Washington I told the then Director General that it seemed to me that if we assigned a couple of officers to positions in these embassies, public affairs officer, assistant political officer, whatever, that their very presence there, as black Americans in official positions, would tell the story far better than all the junk we were putting out. And he said, "You know, that sound very good. I have a friend

who has a son who's just entering, (I think it was Harvard, one of the Ivy League universities,) and I will suggest that his son specialize in Eastern European studies, so that when he is finished we can assign him, properly prepared, to one of the Eastern European countries." I said, "What damned nonsense. You pick up people every day who have just entered the Service, you send them for a quick introductory course, and out they go. Why is it that for a black American he has to go specialize in Eastern European studies before he can get an assignment?" The Foreign Service had never done that. We started later. In fact, much of the specialization was done while in the service. If people showed somehow an aptitude for a particular area or language, then they would be allowed to go and do the additional specialization. But there was never any question of your needing to be familiar with an area before you were given an assignment. You were expected to be able to learn quickly on the job. So, my job to Indian Affairs didn't come as anything that bothered me.

Q: During your early years in the State Department, your record indicated a lot of work with the United Nations.

TODMAN: Yes.

Q: How did that come about?

TODMAN: Well I guess about a year and a half after I entered State, the United Nations had a program of taking interns from all of the countries, and we were allowed to compete for that. I competed and was selected by the State Department as the U.S. nominee for an intern program. I accepted very happily and went up there and spent some time on the Secretariat, working primarily with Fourth Committee issues: trusteeship and non-self-governing territories. But I learned from the inside how the UN worked because I was on the Secretariat. In one of the more logical moves made by the State Department, after I completed my internship I was assigned to the United Nations Bureau. That led then to a very long period of activity on UN affairs, a couple of years, and to my making a major difference, because a colleague and I proposed a way to get the colonial powers to comply with their obligations. For the trust territories, the metropolitan powers had undertaken a sacred trust to bring them to self-government or independence. One of the things that struck me very much was that we got a lot of talk about how terrible the people were or how unprepared, but no details of any programs being undertaken to prepare them, just a sense of, "It'll take a long time, but we're working on it." And the idea occurred, well look, if these people were forced to establish some targets that were measurable, two, three, four years, what can we do in this period, not what are we going to do in thirty years, but two, three, four, then you would have something against which to measure their performance in carrying out their sacred trust. And I was able to get that sold to, first the bureau and then the Department of State and the U.S. government. And once the U.S. backed it, we got the UN to adopt it. It was intermediate targets and dates. "What are you going to do within which time?" And once that was adopted, we would ask them to say, "In four years what are you going to do in education?" Then at the end of the first year, we'd say, "Good. On this four year plan, how much have you accomplished? How many schools have been opened? How many people have been trained, how many have entered?" In the second year, "Are you halfway there or how are you doing in regard to your four years?" This allowed us to keep pressure on for performance which had not been

there before. And I'm convinced that it forced the metropolitan powers to move ahead and hastened the time of independence for the former trust territories.

And that came about in my second assignment. I was brand new to the whole thing. I remember one incident with the head of the office, Ben Gehrig. I used to present so many objections to things they were doing, going along with the colonial powers, that they sent out a few things without my having seen them. I went in and saw him and said, "Ben, we don't work that way. When these things go out we say that they have been cleared by the office. We have the right to dissent. And I insist that if you're going to say here is office clearance, then you're going to need to put, with Todman dissenting. We've got a job to help bring about independence for these countries, we have a job to get them on their feet and not to go along with what the colonial buddies want." And he said, "Young man, when you were born, I had already written a book about this subject." And I said, "Ben, when are you going to write another book?" I thought it was the end of my career. But it just so happened he pulled out his drawer and showed me a manuscript and said, "As a matter of fact, I'm working on one now." So, we talked about his new book and the kind of thrust that would be given. He had been present at the creation of the United Nations and was a man who knew and believed in it. But the policy of the United States at that time was to follow very, very closely the wishes of the colonial powers.

One of the problems I had later, in Africa particularly, was that the Department expected all of us in the field to check with the former metropole before taking any action of making any statements on our own. If you were in a former French ruled country, then find out what France says before you say or do anything. If British, then check with them first. And I kept insisting that the United States was the world's leading power and we were not there to follow anyone. Instead, we should establish an independent American position which we would then discuss with them. And we should make accommodations to the degree we could so that there wasn't any breach among us. You know, get a concerted position, but at least go in having decided what it is the United States wants to do. And this was a rather revolutionary thing, but it worked. It made a difference in terms of the way the United States was seen in those countries: not as a follower of the French or the British, the two major former colonial powers, but as a country that stood for something, represented something. The result of that was that we had people coming and speaking to us about what was happening. In many of the embassies, we were as well informed, if not better, than the former metropole. I know during my time in Togo, the French ambassador used to ask me what's going on, because the Togolese confided in me since they knew there was a strong, independent position adopted. They didn't have to worry that there was some maneuver going on around their backs. These were the kinds of things where I know a difference was made in American foreign policy and in the shape of events as they occurred.

Q: During your time there working in the UN, just based on you perceptions, were racial problems here in the United States of real interest to these other countries? Did it ever interfere with the work? For example, some historians have argued that during this period that you're talking about often the colonial, the metropolitan powers would come back and say, "Put your own house in order before you talk about how we're treating our people."

TODMAN: That happened often. The United States was not openly attacked very much. But the British and the French often made such comments privately and the Belgians very often. Also,

there was, and there continues to be, a major split between the haves and the have nots, the north and the south. And that split was there. And having a minority American there made a lot of difference, because we had access to information that wouldn't have been shared otherwise. It comes down in the final analysis, however, to the ability of the person. Others recognize that the power is in Washington and they are interested in getting access to that and getting it to work in their favor and not just in having a nice buddy relationship that doesn't produce anything. So, sometimes you got that separation in the approaches. If you could combine them, then you had an enormous amount of power. But the tensions were there right from the beginning and there was a feeling that the majority should be able to do things. But the majority were all the small countries which didn't have anything. Our determination throughout was to resist getting caught in the middle.

Q: Since you were an identifiable presence there in the U.S. delegation were you ever approached by black American groups in the United States, NAACP and so forth, with issues that they wanted to get before the United Nations?

TODMAN: No, they took very little interest in it, at least as far as the issues that I dealt with. Those were the issues that primarily touched Africa because those were all Fourth Committee items: non-self-governing territories and trust territories. There was an occasional show of interest on some particular thing and there was some attention paid to heads of delegations, Nkrumah got some attention and Julius Nyerere did, you know, some of the stars of the dependent world. But I never got a sense that black American organizations or individuals paid a great deal of attention to it. It was a marginal factor.

Q: Well, after you years at the UN, you got your first overseas assignment and that was in New Delhi. Was that a surprising appointment for you?

TODMAN: No, that seemed to make sense.

Q: Right, with your earlier work.

TODMAN: Because I had spent two years working on it. I had written instructions. I had read all of the things coming in. I had met all of the people I had attended all of the embassy functions. I knew the people from the embassy, at least I had a speaking acquaintance with the place. So that seemed an absolute natural, and to me it was the most reasonable thing in the world to do.

Q: Sure. you were political officer there.

TODMAN: Right. Political/Labor.

Q: What kind of duties did you normally have during your time there?

TODMAN: Well, it was both political and labor. I did reporting on the political parties. So, I was supposed to go out and meet leaders of some of the parties, go to Parliament for discussions. I learned Hindustani, which became a big advantage because I could go and report back without waiting for the translations and so on. I was supposed to meet with the labor leaders, attend labor

conferences, go to party congresses, basically keep in touch. And we were assigned, there were three or four of us, I guess, we were assigned parties to follow, and you were supposed to get to know the leaders of those parties: what they were planning, what they were thinking, and to give some sense of how this might impinge on the activities of the government and the effect on the United States. In the labor field I did some editing of the materials; we got lots of information from the Department of Labor and from the AFL-CIO. We used to put out a bulletin, on which I did the primary editing, and I went around and met a lot of the labor leaders and found out what issues they were following. One of the fascinating things was that as escort officer for visitors, one of the visitors I escorted was Martin Luther King when he came to India on his pilgrimage. That was during the days of Nehru, I knew a lot of the old Gandhi people. Indira was a little girl. It was a long time ago. It was at the time when the Congress Party was still with the old leaders operating. And it was fun getting to know some of these people. I also got to know the newspaper people and the intellectuals, because that let one see where the ideas come from that political leaders espouse later. It was a fascinating period.

Q: India was often mentioned in the black American newspapers and journals here in the United States as being one of the leaders of the Third World, speaking out for peoples of color. Were the Indians themselves very interested in the racial problems that were going on back here in the United States, or was that something very foreign to them?

TODMAN: As a policy matter it wasn't something that they pushed a great deal. Again, because you're looking at reality, what difference would it make to India? On an individual basis the reaction varied. You had people who came over here and made sure that they were identified as Indians, with the dress and everything else, so that they wouldn't be mistaken for black Americans and be subjected to what black Americans are subjected to. You had others who were very sympathetic. It's quite likely that some of the especially nice treatment we received were reflected efforts to show how totally open they were and the rest of that. I don't make too much of it because, quite frankly, it was too widespread for it to have been something that was planned for that purpose. But again, it was not a major issue.

Q: While you were in India, were there many other black Americans serving in India, the State Department, USIS, Foreign Service?

TODMAN: No, no. I'm trying to think if there were any. There may have been somebody in Bombay, but it was...no.

Q: What were your perceptions, that's a very general question, but just your overall impressions of India? It's obviously a very fascinating nation at that time, with the East-West struggles...

TODMAN: Very much so, very much so. The tie-in with China and close ties with Moscow; the efforts that Moscow were making to get in. The existence of a real democracy, with people free to say and do as they felt. A country that was determined to have its own place in the world, a place it felt justified by its size and its industrial development. A country of greater contrasts than I ever could have imagined, because you had the enormously wealthy people living in splendor that I never could even visualize, and then you had the people who had absolutely nothing. A country of such uneven development; a country that had the most modern technology

of the day and was able to produce and was producing and selling everything that any other country could make, including the United States; yet a country that had areas in which you would think that you were back in some other age. They hadn't arrived. The impact of religion, dietary habits, which meant that cows were around, just absolutely amazing. Because of the strong contrasts, you felt the sense of the poverty even greater; greater than I have felt anywhere else. A country with the great obsession against Pakistan; a feeling of fear a feeling of conflict and even in the most reasonable times, when India, the peacemaker, was preaching unilateral disarmament and all of these other noble things, it was prepared to say in the same breath, but "we can't do it because you can't trust those Pakistanis, you never know what they'll do." So, you had this tremendous contrast. A country of an enormously rich culture: the art and the music and the literature, just fantastic. An intellectual ferment that was really a cry for creativity. Also, it was the first time that I had experienced a sense of the difference in the concept of what time is. The Japanese experience didn't prepare me for this. I'm accustomed in the States if you want to get something done, you go out and do it, and it's got to be done now. And in India a sense of, well, maybe it'll take twenty, thirty, forty years, another couple of generations, but we're dealing with things that are four, five hundred years old; we'll get around to it. A sense of old things which, for me, with a desire to get on with the new, provided quite a shock. A country that wasn't well planned, yet one that we had to take fully into account. A very, very hospitable people. The caste system was something that struck one very much. If something fell to the floor, only a person of a certain caste could pick it up. That business, the stratification, was something that made a major impact on one. But the contrast, contrast, contrast.

ROGER C. BREWIN
Consular/Economic Officer
Bombay (1953-1956)

Roger C. Brewin was born in Columbus, Ohio. He entered the U.S. Army in 1944. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Miami in Ohio in 1948 and a master's degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1950. Mr. Brewin joined the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Switzerland, India, Bolivia, Paraguay, Iran, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 9, 1990.

Q: Then you were in Bombay from 1953 to 1956. That must have been quite a jump from Zurich. How did you find matters in Bombay?

BREWIN: The post had been just been devastated by a 1953 reduction-in-force (RIF) which abolished three or four officer positions. Bombay, like the other two Consulate Generals in India, was a fairly large post even after the RIF. It had its own traditional political reporting, not too closely superintended by the Embassy; it had a Consular Section; two or three economic officers. This was a point in India's history when the issue of linguistic states were erupting and when the state of Bombay in the political sense was very much in doubt. It was uncertain of what state Bombay would be the capital. There were fairly extensive riots, quite extensive and violent.

People were killed solely because of the language they spoke. Finally, in Bombay State there was a Chief Minister, Morarji Desai, who a couple of decades later -- although unforeseen in the 1950s -- was later to become Prime Minister. He ran the State with an iron fist, had varying interests, including foreign affairs strangely enough. Bombay was an interesting place. During the two and half years I was there I started in consular work and ended in the Economic Section.

Q: What were our economic interests in Bombay?

BREWIN: A major function of the Section was its liaison with the large American community. It was not as large as the British community, but it was large enough. There were two large American oil companies, which have since then been nationalized. The secondary function was economic reporting. We had four very good Indian employees who did the bulk of the economic and commercial reporting. They had been at the post for a number of years. India at the time was poised to decide the future course of economic development -- a route of substantial laissez faire in the private sector or a route involving substantial central economic planning with allocation of resources by the center. This debate which occurred primarily in Delhi nevertheless had its repercussions both in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.

Q: Did you have any problems dealing with the Indian officials?

BREWIN: Not really. There were one or two celebrated protection cases in which we felt that the government was being too arbitrary and extreme on blameless American citizens. Both cases involved the ugly issue of race and color. There was an American magician who had a show in Bombay. I had seen it a night or two before the incident. I had been called to the stage and asked to cooperate with the magician in the deception. I did what he said. It was perfectly plain to me that the lady was not being sawed in half. Two days later, one of the Indian in the audience was called up by the magician. He refused to cooperate in the deception. He insisted that he and the audience were being deceived. A shouting match occurred between the Indian and the American entertainer. The magician was upset that the Indian was ruining his act. In the end, assault charges were filed by the Indian. The Consulate's position was as long as the case was being pursued in the Indian courts, the American should have his day. We didn't think that there were any foundation for the assault charges and thought that the whole thing should be forgotten. The Chief Minister told the Consul General that he didn't care whether the case would come before the Indian courts or not. He thought that the days when the white man could push the Indian were long gone. He was going to order the magician deported from India forthwith. That would be the end of the case, regardless what the courts might say in the future. The C.G., William Turner, felt compelled to write up the whole thing as a biographic sketch on Chief Minister Desai and observed at the end of his piece that if Desai were ever to go to Delhi as a minister or Prime Minister, the United States might well have some problem with him. He did become Prime Minister years later and we had fewer problems with Desai then we had with Indira Gandhi or Nehru.

Q: Did you have any feeling about the relationship between this rather large Consulate General and our Embassy in New Delhi?

BREWIN: Basically, I think they were good. Turner and his predecessors felt that they had as much latitude as they needed to call things as they saw them in Bombay, both in economic and political terms. There were some tasks that naturally the Embassy had to pursue for us -- e.g. the expulsion of General Motors. This was a matter on which the Embassy could speak for the United States in the halls of the Indian Ministry of Commerce. But in general, we had enough room to call the situations as we saw them. We were certainly not interfered with in the pursuit of trade promotion opportunities or in political developments in the area.

Q: Did you see any effects of the McCarthy period?

BREWIN: Not particularly in Zurich. There were two or three passport cases -- American citizens whom the Department had deemed should not be living abroad because of their political opinions. One of these was a China scholar and although the post was never explicitly told why he should return -- we had to amend his passport to limit its use only to return to the U.S. -- it was presumed that he had friendly view of the Chinese communists. He objected and stayed in India notwithstanding the limitation. Another passport case concerned a naturalized American of German origin. It was quite clear from the messages we received that he was a suspected member of subversive organizations and having engaged in subversive activities. The third case was about a woman who although not politically tainted as a Court might see it, had been subject of a number of messages from security officers in the Embassy concerning her conduct especially vis-a-vis Indian males. she was given a passport valid only for return to the United States. She pursued her case to the Supreme Court and won. This was a period in which the Department lost a whole series of cases in the area of passport issuance discretionary authority. We had a couple of days in the *Indian Times*.

Q: I assume that India, being somewhat neutral, left of center period at that time, was a natural attraction which meant that you probably had more of these kinds of cases.

BREWIN: That may well be. In the case of the naturalized American citizen of German origin who was a scientist and was employed by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, became so angry that he stomped into my office one day to renounce his American citizenship and did. It was an unfortunate case because I can't imagine in retrospect that he could have been a real threat in any sense.

STUART P. LILLICO
Information Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1953-1955)

Stuart P. Lillico was born in Seattle, Washington in 1909. After graduating from the University of Washington, he joined the United States Information Agency in 1953. His career included positions in India, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, Rhodesia, and Japan. Mr. Lillico was interviewed by John Hogan in 1988.

LILLICO: I was in India almost exactly two years. I went out just ahead of the McCarthy troubles and had a series of jobs around USIS New Delhi until late in '53 when some of the editors of the USIS magazine, the American Reporter, came home.

Then I took up the job as editor of the American Reporter. I kept that job until '55 when my wife had a medical emergency. We came on back to the states at that time.

Q: Now, Stu, tell us something about American Reporter, in New Delhi.

LILLICO: The American Reporter was originated during Chester Bowles time as the U.S. ambassador in India. It was an effort to put the American point of view in front of the people of India. Traditionally, they had been dependent on either British newspapers or, since their independence, on Indian-owned papers. They were extremely conservative, and poorly informed on the United States. So Chester Bowles who was very much a public relations man, started this magazine.

The first effort was in English. Then, over a period of a couple of years, up to eight different language editions were established. By the time I took over as editor, we had what was said to be the largest circulation of any publication in India -- something like eight hundred thousand copies.

As we used to say, it was a daily paper issued twice a month. It was tabloid size with articles furnished by IPS and some of our own local writers. Quite a few special writers, American newspaper people, did articles on order. Others did articles on their own particular interest back in the States that we wanted to present to the Indian people.

We did the editing in English and then turned it over to translators to do into the other Indian languages. Part of the printing was done in Bombay; part in New Delhi and, in the latter days, some of it was done as I recall in Calcutta.

We had an American staff of two editors. Howard Needham was, in a sense, the production manager and I more or less was the managing editor. The PAO, of course, was our overall boss. We did work quite closely with the Embassy people, although after Chester Bowles left, the DCM and the succeeding Ambassador had less feeling of urgency on the American reporter so they gave us a minimum of direction.

Q: You edited this newspaper for how many years?

LILLICO: For just about two years, I think it is safe to say that Howard Needham and I were the first professional newsmen to run it. Previously, it had been run by primarily public relations and Madison Avenue types rather than professional newsmen. The character somewhat changed when Needham and I were doing it.

EDWARD INGRAHAM
Consular Officer
Madras (1954-1956)

Edward C. Ingraham was born in New York state in 1922. He received his undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College in 1942 and subsequently joined the war effort and served in the U.S. Army overseas between 1943-45. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. In addition to Islamabad, his posts included Cochabamba, La Paz, Hong Kong, Perth, Madras, Djakarta, and Rangoon. He was interviewed on April 8, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: From Perth, you still did not go back to Washington for an assignment. You were still within the Asian area weren't you?

INGRAHAM: I went to Madras. Why Madras? Well, we saw a movie when we were in Perth, John Renoir's The River. It actually was about Bengal and it gave us thoughts about exotic India, where we had never been. So I asked for India. In those days if you asked for India you got it. We requested Bombay and ended up in Madras. There again an utterly delightful experience. Madras was a consulate general. We had a Consul General. I was the number two, substantially farther down. We had 3 or 4 other officers and a separate USIS post.

Our mission was to follow what was going on in south India, which, as we kept emphasizing, was a totally different world from the north. There was always a certain amount of built-in tension between Madras and New Delhi.

Q: They looked down upon you?

INGRAHAM: Well, our Consul General kept trying to make the point that south India was different. The southerners speak different languages, are from a different ethnic group, from a different culture. They see themselves as Indians but also as Dravidians. They look upon northerners as fellow Indians, yes, but also as foreigners. There was a good deal of ethnic pride in south India at that time. If you spoke Hindi in the street, they would glower at you and small boys might even throw stones. We had a Hindi-speaking officer who was assigned to Madras so he could practice his Hindi. It didn't work.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

INGRAHAM: Hank Ramsey. He died in California two or three years ago.

Q: How did he run the post?

INGRAHAM: I think very well indeed. He gave us our heads. He was the boss, no question about it. He would say, "You do this and you do that." He would keep us all moving. He would also clue us in on whatever was going on, too. We would meet daily to discuss what was going on. He was a good man. We were following the very lively politics of south India. This was just before the big realignment of the Indian states along linguistic lines that took place in 1956.

Much of the agitation and the political activity in south India was aimed at influencing or pushing for linguistic states. All the Tamils would be in one state, the Malayalam speakers in another, etc. Up to that time it had been divided along the old British lines.

It was a revelation of sorts to me because, having been in another developing country, Bolivia, it seemed to me that for the first time I was in a place where we were really in touch with the local political life. For the first time we were reporting what was actually happening rather than just reporting on the little European sliver at the top.

Q: What would you say was the predominant attitude of the Americans towards the Indians and the Indians towards the Americans in your area? We had gone through a rough patch where the Indians had not been very helpful--the Korean business. Was Karela in your district?

INGRAHAM: Yes it was. Karela was the first communist governed state...as far as I know the first state in the world where the communists had been voted in in a free election. Bengal might have been but I think Karela was.

Q: Maybe San Marino.

INGRAHAM: San Marino may have been, but Karela was a substantial state with maybe 10 million people. The best educated people in all of India. And the highest number of Christians, most of whom voted communist.

I think we at the Consulate General were far more sympathetic toward the Indians because we were there. This was the time of Foster Dulles, who felt neutrality was immoral and that if you weren't with us you must be at least partly against us. We had to operate within those strictures. But at the same time, I think, all of us were, at least in Madras, far more sympathetic to the Indian side. At the same time, we would argue with them. I remember giving speeches here and there pointing out the dastardly deeds of the Russians and getting very tough questions from the Indian audience.

Incidentally, English was the language of communication in south India. Almost all the Indians right down to the village level knew at least a few words of English. So our lack of knowledge of Tamil or Malayalam didn't cut us off from people. It was a fascinating period.

Q: Were you under any pressure to do anything about the communist state there?

INGRAHAM: In a way we were. We were to keep a very close eye on Karela and report what was going on, particularly anything that could be used to show what swine they were. Fortunately, it was a very well run state before the communists took over and they didn't ruin it. They actually ran a pretty good government. Yes, they were communists, but I can remember taking a trip through Karela in 1955 or maybe early '56 and being fascinated not only by the problems of the state (which was grossly overpopulated) but by how well they were coping with the mess and--I suppose Bolivia was in the back of my mind--how the poverty seemed to be reasonably well shared. More so than in, let's say, Madras or other parts of south India. Although even in Madras, where poverty was extreme in some places, you didn't have the feeling of a little

class at the top running everything and exploiting the people on the bottom- everybody was poor.

From then on I knew that this was the part of the world that most fascinated me and I had no intentions of leaving.

Q: You left Madras in 1956. Then you went where?

INGRAHAM: I decided I wanted to be a political officer. In Madras I was a jack-of-all-trades. We had a political officer, the one who spoke Hindi, and an economic officer. I did some of the political reporting and also rode herd on the consulate. I was the consular officer, but we had a couple of...this is something common to many South and Southeast Asian posts...Indian employees who had been with the consulate for many years. One of them knew far more about visas than I did and probably as much as the Assistant Secretary who ran consular affairs back in Washington. They had worked for the consulate forever, their loyalty to us was total. They considered themselves part of the family. When we had in-house parties we would include them. They ran the consular section. At first I remember saying, "I had better check out everything very carefully," having come from Hong Kong (where shortly after I left a number of Americans in the immense consular section had been transferred--one direct from Hong Kong to Atlanta Federal Penitentiary). So I watched the consular work closely in Madras. Everything proved to be absolutely impeccable, so from then on I relaxed and let them get on with it. I would do some political reporting, this and that. At the end of the day I would sign 15, 20 or 30 consular documents absolutely secure in the knowledge that they were properly prepared. That was another virtue of life in Madras.

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

**Political Officer
New Delhi (1954-1955)**

**Political Officer
Calcutta (1955-1958)**

After receiving a Ph.D. in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University, Christopher Van Hollen joined the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Murree-Rawalpindi, and Ankara, as well as at the Department of State Secretariat, NATO Affairs (RPM) and the Bureau for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. From 1972-1976 he served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 23, 1990.

Q: From 1954-55, you were in Delhi and from 1955-58 you were in Calcutta. How did you get into the Indian circuit?

VAN HOLLEN: I became interested in India because of the belief in that period that this country in its post-independence days would become an increasingly important power in Asia. India

emerged under strong leadership with Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister. India played an important role in the non-aligned movement which was important in those days with Nehru, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nasser of Egypt and Tito of Yugoslavia as the major leaders. I was drawn to India by what I anticipated as the emerging importance of India internationally. This did not turn out to be the case. I would say that India's role internationally and India's position in U.S. foreign policy priorities has not been as high as I had anticipated in the mid-50s. There were people during that period -- Chester Bowles, in particular, who was twice Ambassador to India -- who put a great deal of emphasis on India's international importance and who saw India as a key competitor to the People's Republic of China. They emphasized the need for the U.S. to take into account India's global importance, not just regional. Chester Bowles exaggerated this importance and in the eyes of many, India has not achieved the international role that it had aspired to in the 1950s or others had expected of her.

Q: As a member of the entrance class of 1955, we looked around the world, looking for places that would be exciting and at the same time, would not become a back-water.

VAN HOLLEN: This was undoubtedly a calculation too from a career point of view. After I had finished my tour in the Secretariat, the question then became "What post should I seek which would be substantively interesting and would also be a positive post from the point of view of career progression". I was as interested in that as anybody. Looking back, I don't know that people who had gone to South Asia in the Foreign Service have in relations to the geographical areas moved ahead all that fast. It is hard to judge.

Q: The compass keeps swinging from one point to another depending on the time. The Soviet specialists used to be that stars at one time, but probably have not done as well recently. What type of work were you doing in New Delhi and then Calcutta?

VAN HOLLEN: I was basically a political officer. Let me say that originally, I had wanted to go to Calcutta rather than New Delhi, but I started in that latter until an opening came up in Calcutta and I was transferred there after only serving in Delhi for eight months. I was not very happy about it at the time because by then I had become adjusted to the Embassy and enjoying myself, and then all of a sudden, orders came from Washington saying "You are transferred to Calcutta". People who sent the orders though undoubtedly that I should be happy, but initially I was not because I was very happy and satisfied with the Delhi assignment.

It turned out that Calcutta was a very stimulating post. It was not in the Capital and therefore one had an opportunity to get in touch with a number of people who were not part of the Indian bureaucracy or who were not part of a very large diplomatic corps. It was a very exciting place -- politically because you had to cover all the Eastern India and you also covered the relationship between East India and East Pakistan (now known as Bangladesh). The political officer in Calcutta in those days was also duly accredited to Nepal. You also had, at the height of the cold war and the Sino-Soviet cooperation, to cover a whole host of East-West political battles which were being fought out in Calcutta. The politics there were very volatile.

Q: As a non-expert at this time, how did you report Indian politics?

VAN HOLLEN: One of the great joys of serving in India was the fact that it was in fact a new democracy. You did have easy access to all elements in the Indian society both in New Delhi and Calcutta. There was a general hesitancy at that time in dealing with members of the Communist Party. We were not prohibited, but it certainly was not encouraged. I remember that I did have an opportunity to have a number of contacts with members of the Communist Party in West Bengal. I felt pleased that I was able to talk to them about political developments. The task there was to report on domestic political developments in four large East India States: West Bengal, Bihar, Assam and Arissa. In those days, much more than now, there was a great deal of emphasis on keeping Washington informed on the political developments in individual Indian States. With budgetary constraints and personnel cut-backs, that is less so today, but as a young officer in my thirties, I would travel outside of Calcutta to these other jurisdictions, often with my wife and talk to Chief Ministers, Cabinet Ministers and others.

Q: What were our major concerns in India?

VAN HOLLEN: On the broad international level and in terms of US-India bilateral relationships, our main concern was that India, while professing to be non-aligned, was in tilting toward the Soviet Union and China, in a period during which those two countries had a close relationship. It was a period in which Krishna Menon, the Indian Foreign Minister, epitomized non-alignment and anti-Americanism, at least in the eyes of a lot of Western officials and the American public. So in the international and bilateral fields, the concern was that Indian policy not undermine American objectives which were to a substantial degree designed to develop a containment policy vis-avis the Sino-Soviet block. Domestically, we were concerned about the Indian drift to the left. India has had for many years significant Communist Parties of various types. The Communist Party in West Bengal was particularly potent as was the Communist Part in Karama in West India. Therefore, in terms of domestic reporting, it was focused on the question to the extent that East Indian governments were likely to move to the left, meaning Communist elements gaining power. These were the two concerns.

Q: You might say that the over-all policy even in Calcutta was part of the Cold War.

VAN HOLLEN: That is correct. It was in the mid 1950s and the Cold War was the dominant concern. We worried that the Communist strength, which could be seen in the close relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union, would expand into South Asia. It was felt that India because of its "soft" non-aligned policy and because of the strength of the indigenous Communist Parties was a prime target for the expansion of Communist influence. It did not turn out that way, but that was the concern.

Q: How did you and colleagues see these dangers?

VAN HOLLEN: I would have to review my own reports. I don't remember them in that much detail, but my feeling is that I was careful not to over-emphasize the "red menace" because India had enormous strengths through the Congress Party which was the vehicle for Indian independence. It had a very effective leadership cadre, not just in New Delhi in Jawaharlal Nehru, but in a number of the State governments. While there was concern about the growing strength

of the left, in retrospect certainly that seems to have been overly stated. I hope that my reporting was as balanced as it might have been under the circumstances.

Q: We are all creatures of our times. What was your impression of the officials you met. How did they view the U.S.?

VAN HOLLEN: Like so many other matters, it is hard to generalize. In India, you had a very broad spectrum and you could talk to people on the right who were very concerned about what they saw as excessive Communist and left-wing power in India. You could talk to people on the left who were critical of corruption in the Congress Party and who believed that the United States, in part because of its support of Pakistan -- that was a very important element in the picture then -- was acting against Indian interests. There was abroad enough spectrum in India so that one can't say that then prevailing view was X, Y or Z. There were many view points and that is what made it so fascinating to serve there.

Q: Were you able to report much on East Pakistan -- now Bangladesh?

VAN HOLLEN: We didn't report all that much on that from Calcutta. Sometimes we would report on border clashes. I went up to Dacca once or twice. We sometimes took turns taking the diplomatic pouch from Calcutta to Dacca. I can remember going with the pouch meeting the Consul General -- who was a man by the name of Doe Williams, who sometimes dressed as if the British had never left. He would wear a white tunic, white shorts, white stockings to his knee and a pith helmet. He would receive very kindly and serve gimlets, made with Rose's Lime Juice. We would spend the rest of the day in Dacca and then return to Calcutta. We each did about once every eight months. So there was a contact between the Consul Generals in Dacca and Calcutta. We did some reporting but most of the Indo-Pakistan reporting was done by New Delhi.

Q: How were the relationships between Delhi and Calcutta? Were they reporting one India and you another?

VAN HOLLEN: We had a lot of autonomy in Calcutta. I was lucky enough to receive several commendations from Washington for my reporting which gave me a certain amount of self-confidence that I was doing at least what Washington wanted. Copies of the commendations would go to the Embassy. So I did not feel, as some constituent posts have felt, that we were kept on too close a leash by the Embassy in the Capital. On the contrary, I felt that we had a lot of freedom and autonomy in terms of picking political reporting priorities and in terms of trying to get out to develop the information. Having said that, we did operate under certain guidelines from Washington. At least once a year, you get guidelines from Washington on the kind of political reporting that it was particularly interested in. This was helpful. That kept one focused in the reporting, but beyond that I did not feel under severe constraints.

EMERSON M. BROWN
Economic Officer
Bombay (1955-1957)

Emerson M. Brown was born and raised in Reed City, Michigan. He received a teaching certificate from Olivet College. His Foreign Service career included positions in Bombay, India; Bonn, Germany; the Hague, the Netherlands; Ottawa, Canada; and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted in February of 1990.

Q: I have you going to Bombay from 1955 to 1957. What were you doing there?

BROWN: I started off as the second economic officer and in the middle third of the tour, for eight months, I was the consular officer, I ended up as the senior economic officer.

Q: What was the situation in Bombay at that time?

BROWN: Oh, Bombay, well it was wonderful, really. India was just beginning the second five year plan -- I think that's the case. And they were full of socialist beans and development beans. The Reserve Bank of India headquarters is at Bombay, and the senior staff had organized an economic discussion group. At that time, every big name in the business came to India to look at the five year plan. I met Galbraith, Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, and other names that don't register so well now -- for example, Rosenstein-Rodan, a leading development poling economist. Fantastic!

The Indians of course are bright -- talk your head off. The women are beautiful. In India you had everything from utter opulence to people living in the street.

Q: How did you view the Indian economy at that time?

BROWN: Well, in Bombay, you are an optimist. And it was justified.

Q: Then in Calcutta, you're a pessimist.

BROWN: I guess. I never saw Calcutta but I would guess that would be the case. But Bombay -- the PL 480 program got going in a big way while we were there. This was surplus wheat, and Bombay was a big port for it. I had good relations with the Bombay port labor leaders in particular. I knew the shipping guys. Real pirates!!

An example. Do you know what a T-2 tanker is? It was a Federal Maritime Commission tanker built before the war. It had steam turbines, and dynamos, which delivered electricity to electric motors. Wonderful ship, about 15,000 tons, which at that time was big. And this particular outfit, I think they were headquartered in Baltimore, had gotten hold of some T-2s and started shipping wheat in them. They had portable blowers that they could use to unload wheat at Bombay. They loaded wheat in Washington, up the river.

Q: This is the state of Washington?

BROWN: Yes. Up the Columbia River. Loaded 300 tons more than the insurance allowed, because they had virtually empty bunkers. Then at the mouth of the river they bunkered, and

until they burned that 300 tons of fuel, they were an illegal ship. So about the first two weeks out across the Pacific, they were illegal.

The Suez Canal had at this time been blocked by Nasser. These T-2s went around Singapore, came up to Bombay, unloaded the wheat. They went empty up to the Persian Gulf, loaded crude. They went around the Cape of Good Hope to the east coast of the United States, unloaded the crude, loaded product, went down through the Panama Canal and unloaded the product in Los Angeles or San Francisco and went up and got another load of wheat.

The ship was empty only from Bombay to the Persian Gulf, and from California to Washington. They paid for the ship on every voyage. Really wonderful.

Bombay was really active in those days. Local industry was beginning to take off. Lots of political ferment because the Maharashtras wanted a separate state, a state of Greater Maharashtra, whereas Bombay at that time had incorporated both the Maharattas and the other big ethnic group, the Gujaratis. There were riots while we were there. Burned buses. People killed. But I guess we were never in any serious danger.

It was a great tour. I met my first real consul general. An old Rogers Act guy who was proud that he had been a consular officer before the Foreign Service Act.

Q: That was in 1924, was it not?

BROWN: Yes. His name was William T. Turner. This is another way of saying he gave me a good efficiency rating, but I found him just great.

Q: Did you find the Indian authorities... Could you work easily with them?

BROWN: I had no trouble with them at all. But of course this was back in the days when we had all the chips. We took a certain amount of criticism because of the Krishna Menon -- John Foster Dulles confrontation in those days. John Foster Dulles, the lawyer as well as Secretary of State, said that "Well, technically Goa is part of Portugal." That took a little walking-the-cat-back-home, as one used to say. But personally, we had wonderful relations with the Indian officials. The chief minister at that time it was Morarji Desai, a good guy, particularly from our point of view. He was very effective, if a bit nutty (he drank his urine every day). A strict Gujaratis, he wouldn't be vaccinated. This was a problem, because you always want to get the chief minister off to the States on an Important Visitor Program. We finally had to get a waiver on the smallpox vaccination to get him to go.

DAVID S. BURGESS
Labor Attaché, U.S. Department of Labor
New Delhi (1955-1960)

David S. Burgess was born in New York, New York in 1917 and spent nine years of his youth in China. In 1939, he received a bachelor's degree in history and economics from Oberlin College. He also graduated from Union Theological Seminary in 1944, and became an ordained minister of the United Church of Christ. In 1947, Mr. Burgess became a full time labor organizer. In addition to serving in the U.S. Department of Labor, he also served in the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, UNICEF, Harvard University, Habitat for Humanity, and was minister to several churches. The following is from a self-interview on April 7, 1991.

BURGESS: The FBI field investigation, as I discovered thirty-three years later, almost knocked me out of contention for this position. This investigation took place at the end of the McCarthy era. After I had read 275 pages of my 400 page FBI file in 1988, I learned that top FBI and State Department officials had opposed my nomination in 1955. I now wonder if the FBI should have the power of declaring a person eligible or ineligible for any position in the Government. It would appear that anybody with a liberal, labor or agitator background had difficulty getting FBI clearance at that time. I don't know how many other people were knocked out by the FBI I was lucky because I had the support of Walter Reuther and to my surprise the support of Senator Walter George of Georgia (the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), who wanted to run for re-election in 1956. He went to bat for me in part, I am sure, because he thought that the AFL and CIO would endorse him if I were cleared and became the Labor Attaché at the American Embassy in New Delhi, India. In 1956 after I had gone to India, Senator George withdrew from the Democratic Primary and as a result former Governor Herman Talmadge won the primary and was elected to the US Senate in the General Election of 1956. I was finally cleared on November 1, 1955, and I was sworn in as a reserve Foreign Service Officer on that date.

For several weeks I took special training including courses at the Foreign Service Institute. I was briefed by the International Division of the Labor Department and by top labor attaché officials in the State Department. I visited some officials at the AFL and CIO headquarters just before the amalgamation of these two labor federations. I attended the unity convention of the AFL and CIO held at the 71st Armory in New York City. I was very alarmed at the convention where I heard a speech by President Meany condemning neutralists - that is the Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, Lumumba and others whom he called fellow travelers and Communist stooges. As a result of his speech the INTUC Labor Federation in India, the labor affiliate of the Congress Party and the HMS labor federation affiliated with the Socialist Party, threatened to withdraw from the ICFTU. Before I left Walter Reuther told me that he hoped to come to India to prevent this from happening. He came to India in April of 1956 on this special mission.

Alice, I and four of our kids arrived in New Delhi just after Christmas of 1955. After a month living at Hotel Cecil in Old Delhi, we finally found a home in Friends Colony, south of the city. We were among some of the first Americans to live in this colony. We enjoyed that experience for the next five years very much. My first task in this new job was to try to repair the breach that had resulted from Meany's speech at the first AFL-CIO Convention. Walter Reuther finally arrived in April of 1956 and stayed for a month. I took him all over India. He was introduced to Communist, socialist, and Congress labor leaders. He made a tremendous hit. He spent three

hours with Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister. He told me that he was considering the possibility of sending labor union advisors to work with the HMS and INTUC unions. Partly as a result of Walter's trip, the leaders of INTUC and HMS decided not to withdraw from the ICFTU and I was very happy about that.

After his trip to India, I began to realize that there were basic differences in international philosophy and action between these two powerful men, George Meany and Walter Reuther. Meany, in my opinion, was working too closely with agencies of the US Government such as the CIA and the Department of State. He believed that labor unions abroad should be less political and more economic as they were in the United States. He did not look kindly on neutralists such as Nehru and others. Walter Reuther had a much more tolerant attitude towards Third World labor unions and their growth in developing countries. His main concern was how to strengthen these unions, how to help them in the bargaining process. He agreed with Meany that trade unions in India should not be too closely associated with political parties but that wasn't his main criticism. Walter's main criticism was that the Indian labor leaders didn't do solid organizational work; that they didn't prepare themselves for contract negotiations and that they were more dependent on agitation against than they were in negotiations with the employers.

About a year later, I wrote a classified confidential memo to the State Department that stated that our government and the labor movement had to choose between the philosophies of Meany and Reuther. I also realized that Jay Lovestone, Irving Brown, Goldberg and other people - who molded Meany's view of the world - had a certain point of view towards communist nations and 3rd world neutralists. Walter Reuther, who had his difficulties with Communists within the U.A.W., was strongly anti-Communist, but because of his connections with the socialist labor movements in Scandinavian countries, France and Germany and the Socialist Party of our own country, I believed that Reuther had a much more tolerant and helpful attitude toward labor unions in India and in other developing countries. I am sure that Meany knew the contents of my confidential dispatch because he and certain AFL-CIO leaders had access to certain State Department classified materials. He probably was suspicious of me because Reuther had nominated me to the post of labor attaché at the American Embassy in India. This dispatch probably confirmed his worst suspicions about me and led him to inform the White House in 1961 or early 1962 that he was personally opposed to my nomination to any high post in the Kennedy Administration. His opposition dogged me during all of my eleven years as a Foreign Service Officer.

As to my general situation within the Embassy, it couldn't have been better. Looking back on my final years in New Delhi I think these years were almost idyllic. We had two excellent Ambassadors during those five years. The first was former Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper, who later became Senator from that state again. He was a fine person, who really understood India. He was succeeded by Ellsworth Bunker, who was also an excellent ambassador. I was given great freedom by my immediate superior who was Ted Maffitt, the Political Counselor and his later successor. I traveled all over India. My travel budget during these five years exceeded the total travel costs of all my political section colleagues within the Embassy. These were the golden years. I was my own boss. I was a team player within the Embassy but I enjoyed great freedom in my work. I was probably known by more Indians outside of Delhi than any other American during my five years in India. I went to every single

state of India and became a friend of labor leaders, state and national government leaders, employers, politicians who were also labor leaders, and the various unions affiliated with the Socialist HMS, Congress INTUC, and Communist AITUC federation led by then Parliament Member Dange from Calcutta. I became acquainted with these folks and eventually gained their respect. I was assisted by a full time secretary named Barbara Griffith and an able full time local assistant named P.K.V. Krishnan. Sometimes I had an assistant labor attaché officer in my office.

The head of the CIA at the Embassy, after I had been in India for two months, came to me and said, "I don't know how the hell you got in the State Department." I said, "Well, I got in." I resisted requests from some of the CIA associates at the Embassy. Later in 1959 in the State of Kerala, I refused to be the carrier of money to bribe labor leaders there during a parliamentary election. The Communists won and have been the ruling party there for many years. The CIA chief at the Embassy was not overjoyed with my refusal. I refused to be associated with CIA operations within the Embassy or outside the Embassy during my years of service in India.

Reuther's visit in 1956 had many good long term results. The members of the National Security Guard in India - those who closely guarded Reuther during his four week visit - told me that he had received the "warmest reception of any American in India since Independence" in 1947. The trip was a smashing success. Reuther was able to persuade the Ford Foundation to underwrite sending trade union leaders from Scandinavian countries and America to India. When Irving Brown as the official representative of the AFL-CIO President came to India a few weeks later I was sitting on the dais with the Labor Minister Khundabhi Desai at my side. This was a summary of Desai's remarks while we were both listening to Irving Brown speak. "Reuther's approach to India is the correct one. His main message is to tell us what the American labor movement does and what the American people have achieved and at the same time he gives some mild advice to us. Brown does it in reverse. He spends little time telling us what goes on in America but gives us extensive advice." Desai later remarked to me that the reason for the success of the Chinese and Russian success in India is the fact that these nations used "the Reuther approach."

I remember going to Walter's house near Detroit during my home leave in 1958 and advising him that it was very well and good for him to criticize the international policies of Meany and Lovestone and Brown. The difficulty was that he, Walter Reuther, and some of the liberal unions in America were not sending their representatives abroad to India and other Third World countries. Until he could get a group from his own union and other unions to come to India frequently, liberal labor attachés like myself were not protected against criticisms and attacks by AFL-CIO President George Meany and his major international policy adviser Jay Lovestone. My warning proved to be prophetic as I learned when I returned to America in 1960.

In 1958 when Nehru visited the United States, Walter Reuther and Mrs. Roosevelt had planned an informal tete-a-tete at someone's house in Washington. In a letter to me Walter Reuther wrote, "Mrs. Roosevelt had worked out a small dinner at which she, Nehru, Chet Bowels, Adlai Stevenson and I were to have a down to earth chat. This unfortunately was messed up by the two striped pants diplomats present. We were forced by the State Department to expand the dinner invitations to include these people. The down-to-earth talk never took place."

I think one of the most fortunate results of Walter's trip was his ability to persuade the US steel industry and the United Steel Workers Union, AFL-CIO, to send technicians to India and also to train Indian steel technicians in American steel plants. In July 1957 I wrote to Walter and Victor and the State Department that 115 steel technicians would arrive in New York City on August 7, 1957, and a second group of such technicians will begin formal training in December of 1957. Then I listed the factories that they were trained at and the US educational institutions that they were connected with. These trips were a direct result of Walter's trip to India in April 1956.

In 1957 I was present as one of the American delegation members at the Asian Conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Very little came out of the formal discussions at the conference. I met with some European trade union representatives who were there and we came to the following recommendations which I conveyed to the State Department and various international secretariats. 1) Michael John, President of the TATA Workers Union - INTUC, needs some immediate financial assistance and a trade union advisor from America to work with him in his attempt to strengthen his own union and to organize steel workers at the three new steel plants built by the Soviet Union, West Germany and Great Britain. 2) a representative of the ICFTU should be sent to Indonesia to assist the emerging labor unions there. The name of George Weaver, a US labor official then in Singapore, was suggested for a six months assignment. 3) a report written about plantation workers in Kenya by INTUC plantation organizer M.M. Sharma was most critical of AFL-CIO funds given to Kenyan unions. These unions, Sharma wrote, were not sophisticated and their leaders may use these funds for secondary purposes. After this conference I concluded, "Finally I am convinced that there is little profit of us labor liberals to be over critical of Meany-backed Lovestone operations abroad until we are able to recruit and train some representatives from the more liberal international unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO who will be willing and able to work abroad in a variety of capacities. At present such chaps are few in number and I see few signs that these international unions are doing very much about this recruitment."

In 1958 I made a trip to the three new steel plants that were being constructed, one by British money, another by West German money, and another by Russian money. In a letter to my own mother in January 1958, I wrote after a visit to the Russian-built plant in Bhilai, "The Russians are winning over the Indians not by an ideological approach but by friendly methods. For example, two young Indian steel technicians who had been trained in Russia told me that they never heard politics discussed during 14 months there. The Russian engineers in Bhilai, most of them are simple sons of toil, follow the same line. The construction of the steel plant at Bhilai is already two months ahead schedule. The Russians at the beginning of the construction flatly refused to take sole responsibility for the construction of the plant. Unlike the West Germans at the Rourkela Plant and the British plant who were turning over their completed factories in so-called 'turn key style,' the Russians have made it most plain from the beginning that they are here only to help rather than to direct. Consequently no Indian technician is technically under a Russian. In the end the ever proud Indians much prefer taking the responsibility and getting help from the Russians who came as equals and 'fellow Asians' as they call themselves rather white superiors. It is obvious to me that the Indian technicians going to Russia are given superior training to those technicians going to the United States. In Russia, I have been told, the Indian technicians are allowed to operate the machinery in training. In the U.S.A. they are only observers rather than participants."

I worked within the Political Section of the Embassy. I worked with other sections too, also with the AID Mission very closely, known as ICA at that time. I was instrumental in getting a labor advisor there to the ICA or AID Mission named Bob Walkinshaw, a staff member in the Boston office of the United Automobile Workers Union, AFL-CIO. He and I worked very closely together for over a year and he remained there after I went back to the United States in November of 1960. I worked closely with the USIS that put out a publication about organized labor. It was a monthly magazine which was circulated all over the country. It was very well received and I was very proud of that. It told much about the labor movement and about labor-management relationships in the United States. I don't feel I had any difficulties carrying out the assignments because of the support of the two Ambassadors I was graced with during my five years there. I was the host to AFL-CIO Vice President Joe Keenan and other members of the labor movement after Walter's visit in 1956. I took them around India. Joe Keenan and I became very close friends until his death.

In 1958 I wrote a letter to a friend containing my conclusions about the situation in India. Quote, "The curse of India is the people's dependence upon their superiors whether they be a land-owners, employers or government officials. The joint family system and the caste system are the root causes of this condition. Of course centuries of colonial rule contributed to the condition. Right now the Government of India has launched the Second Five Year Plan in the head long race to defeat economically Red China to the north. In the area of labor relations national leaders are too inclined to believe that the restriction of the right to strike and the insistence on 'voluntary discipline' are the ways to force the working people to cooperate with the Plan. They forget that the average industrial worker feels like a cog in a machine, has not heard about the Second Five Year Plan and if he had heard about it, he sees no connection between himself and the Plan. It is my belief that the Plan cannot succeed without the cooperation of labor. Workers will not become nation minded until they are encouraged to join unions of their own choice, and to work with private employers and public sector employers through these unions. Essentially although I am aware of need for more physical resources and capital in this country, I am convinced that India faces a crisis in the whole area, for want of another word, of volunteerism. There can be no salvation of this country unless Indian citizens both high and low are willing to assume responsibility for their future and unless national leaders realize that even with a National Five Year Plan, there must be freedom of choice and a certain willingness to allow people to make mistakes and to benefit from these mistakes."

I was greatly impressed with Jaya Prakash Narayan, one of Nehru's closest colleagues during the fight for independence against the British. In 1952 or 1953 Nehru offered him the position of Deputy Prime Minister. JP, as he was popularly called, turned down the offer and shortly thereafter became a leader in the bhoodan movement headed by Vinoba Bhave for the distribution of lands to the rural poor. By 1969 the movement had been instrumental in distributing more than four million acres to these poor. JP was active in this movement and the affairs of the Socialist Party of India during my five years in India (1955-1960). We became friends and in 1957 he invited me to spend three days at his ashram near a poor village in the heart of the State of Bihar, which was one of the most poverty-stricken states in India. My lengthy despatch describing my visit and analyzing the role of JP in India puzzled my political counselor Ted Maffitt and Foreign Service Officers manning the India Desk of the State

Department back in Washington. They thought that I had been dazzled by this sometime mystical leader of the poor in India and had overrated his importance and influence in India. Most of my critics had never met him. Most of them did not understand that JP remains one of the best men I have ever known. The last time I met him was in Bangkok, Thailand, in early 1971 just before the outbreak of the civil war in East Pakistan - a war which resulted in the defeat of the Pakistani Army and the emergence at the end of 1971 of the independent nation of Bangladesh with the assistance of the Indian Army. JP had come to Thailand to meet with the King of Thailand, the Prime Minister, members of the military and the Parliament. JP was there to convince them that the battle for an independent Bangladesh deserved their moral and financial support. After talking with him, I left confident that he would succeed in his mission. I never saw this impressive man of the spirit again before his death a few years later.

In October 1958 I described the troubled labor situation in Kerala in these terms after the Communists had captured the State Government. "After the initial period of peace and tranquility, the Communist (CPI) Party administration of the State has been running into more and more trouble. The students of the state went on strike when the state upped the rates for boat travel and the CPI Administration was forced to back down. In two strike situations the police controlled by a Communist run state administration have opened fire on plantation workers. This has not helped the Communist reputation. The latest crisis involved a strike of the Communist-controlled Plantation Workers Union in the tea and coffee area of the high ranges of Kerala. Planters were threatened; workers were intimidated; and the Government of India was asked to intervene by the planters. I was able to see the government, labor and plantation officials who during the current crisis went to government offices in Cochin and Trivandrum in order to air their troubles and to convince the government officials that their intervention was most needed. Back of this situation was the fact that the 19th Century method of living in the grand English style is now a thing of the past for most planters, even though many of them still live according to 19th Century standards and still call local people natives. The Central Government is having more difficulty with the situation. The Government wants to protect the planters in order to convince the West that capital investment in India will be profitable. At the same time because of the long history of colonialism it does not want to be associated too closely with the planters of Kerala."

I think that some of my best writing was an essay which I wrote for the Department entitled, "Can Hinduism and Hindu Culture Provide an Ideological Foundation for Democracy in India?" I concluded the long essay with an answer of "no". Modern ways would not come to India, I concluded, because "the reformation of Hinduism has not yet taken place. At present there are few Indian intellectuals who seem to be concerning themselves with Hinduism as such, to say nothing of reforming or finding within the record a past example of wisdom and truth of Hinduism, records which could be a light or guide now. If India really wishes to become a formidable and at the same time a democratic rival to the strong aggressive and totalitarian China, she must import some ideology and techniques from the democratic West. Unless this nation is able to discover a new and distinctive democratic faith which has definite, indispensable linkages to the democratic elements of her past, her efforts to imitate the developed democratic countries of the West will fail. India must find her own soul, her own faith and her own distinctive form of a democratic ideology if she is to save herself."

In mid-1960 a few months before I was scheduled to depart India, I was asked by the Government of India to negotiate a settlement of a nation-wide strike in August of that year called by postal workers, railroad workers and other workers in the public sector. I tried the best I could to talk to both of the contending parties but unfortunately the Home Minister under the Central Services Maintenance Act of 1956 declared the strike illegal and proceeded to arrest the strike leaders before I had met them and key government officials. I had had permission of Ambassador Bunker to assume this role at that time.

With my wife Alice and our five children - our youngest son was born in New Delhi in 1957 - I left India on Election Day 1960. I wrote a final despatch with the following conclusion: "Fearing that the leaders of Pakistan might launch a holy war against India as a means of preserving their power and creating unity among their divided and poverty-stricken people, the Government of India is not only critical to America's arms aid to Pakistan but also is charging that America is a nation which puts its primary faith in armed might, atomic bombs and gunboat diplomacy. Added to these governmental criticisms of America is the popular view that America is rich, materialistic, devoid of culture, gadget-ridden, and populated by people who have no understanding of India's problems. These critics fail to realize that the fundamental greatness of America is not in its impressive material accomplishments. It lies instead in the ability of most Americans to face her own nation's problems frankly such as economic inequalities and racial discrimination. It lies in America's essential equalitarianism and in the dignity of the individual in most parts of the country, factors which are in most striking contrast to the great chasm of inequality dividing the rulers from the ruled in the totalitarian countries of the USSR and Red China. We have the Bill of Rights, which in many ways has become the foundation stone for the struggle against colonialism in India, Asia, and Africa. We have built a great country because our liberties have made cornerstones of our society."

EDWARD E. MASTERS
Political Officer
Madras (1955-1958)

Edward E. Masters was born in Ohio in 1924. He received a bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1948 and a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949. Mr. Masters served in the U.S. Army for three years and then joined the Foreign Service in 1950. His career included positions in Germany, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Bangladesh. He was interviewed on March 14, 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: *How about in Madras? What role did the consulate play in Madras? This was in India?*

MASTERS: Yes, and again, it was a tough time. India had moved more toward the -- not affiliated with, obviously -- but more sympathetic toward the communist superpowers.

Q: *You're talking about 1955 to '58?*

MASTERS: This is '55 to '58, right. We had visits, while I was there, of the top Soviet leadership -- what was it? I guess Bulganin and Khrushchev at that time. Our consulate general was on the main thoroughfare in Madras. I remember being out on the balcony, watching this big entourage go by. Then we also had a visit by Zhou En-lai, and the top Chinese communist officials.

We were much on the defensive. We were criticized as trying to impose our will on Asia; being neo-imperialistic, and so forth. And, of course, we were also criticized for failing to recognize what India saw as the value of its neutrality.

Hank Ramsey -- who was consul general for most of the time I was there -- was a broad thinker. He spent a lot of time worrying about global issues, and where India fit in. I was more down in the trenches, looking at what was happening within these key four southern states of south India. They were then called Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Mysore, and Andhra Pradesh. (The names changed later, after the linguistic reorganization.)

I did a fair amount of traveling; travel funds were not as limited then, thank god. I traveled fairly widely in south India. [I] got to know the local leaders; [I] got to know the local problems, and so forth.

Two very important things happened during the time that I was in there, particularly in '56 and '57. One was the linguistic reorganization of states, where the boundaries of the states of India were almost totally redrawn to reflect the linguistic divisions; so that each linguistic group, in effect, had its own state. That involved regrouping of the population, and was a very dramatic development.

Then the second major event was the 1957 Indian elections, which were based on the linguistic reorganization. But the particularly interesting part was that for the first time the Communists won a majority in the state of Kerala. We were told that -- I think except for San Marino, or some fairly small place -- this was the first time that the Communists had been voted into power in a major -- not a country -- but a major political unit.

So they came in, in Kerala, because of a lot of problems in the state. It was the most literate state in India, but it was also one of the poorest, if not the poorest. And the people were not only poor, they knew they were poor, and they were literate enough to know that there was a better life. It was highly Christian, also. And the result was that they -- I guess in a move of frustration and desperation -- voted for the Communists.

I got to know the communist leadership. A very interesting group came in, and I called on them several times during visits to Kerala. And I usually got a better reception from them than I did the Congress Party leaders, who were in power in the other states. Not necessarily that the communist leaders in Kerala liked Americans, but they were out to show that they were moderate; that they were responsible people. Similar to the Congress leaders, only more efficient -- I think this was the basic line they were trying to push. And certainly -- not necessarily anti-American.

So I used to have good talks with them, and tried to assess their policies. [I] wrote what I thought were some interesting reports, about how the communist government was consolidating its position; what the makeup of these people was; and so forth.

I remember writing a biographic profile of Chief Minister Nambuodripad at one point. I have no idea how valid it later turned out to be, but it was interesting to do it; to try to get into these guys, and see what made them tick.

Q: Was there any particular pressure on you to report the right way about the communist takeover? We must have been rather apprehensive about this.

MASTERS: Yes, we certainly were. But I don't recall feeling any great pressure. My own inclination was to view it with concern, certainly. I felt, and I think all of us did who were in India, that this was a tremendously important country. One which was moving in the wrong direction; moving away from us. And that we should -- first, have a better understanding of what was going on; and secondly, we should do what we could to try to stop the drift of India toward the Communists. And, in effect, to reduce the strength of the Communists within India.

HAROLD M. JONES
Advisor, USAID
Bhopal (1956-1963)

Harold M. Jones grew up in Virginia, and earned a bachelor's degree from Virginia State in agriculture education. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1997.

Q: So what was this job you were applying for?

JONES: I was applying to be advisor to the Minister of Agriculture of India, specifically to help set up a farm machine, tractor and testing center in central India, in the state of Madhya Pradesh. Everything went along, and I wrote a letter to the president of the college and got released for two years and told him that if things went well I might not come back. He said all right. I never did get to see my chief head of the department about sending the application and results. I left Tennessee State and went to India.

Q: Did you spend any time in Washington to get some orientation?

JONES: I had two weeks' orientation in Washington. My wife, Loretta, came up for a few days at the end of that orientation because it was near the early part of January.

Q: What year was this?

JONES: 1956. It was January and the girls -- we had six of them then, still in school, at different levels and we didn't want to break them away from school until June. So my family didn't join me until mid-June.

I went on to New Delhi, where I had two more weeks' orientation, more Indian-oriented and with more Indian participants in the entire program. After orientation, I was issued a new station wagon and I drove about 500 miles south to central India to a place called Bhopal. My orders indicated my post to be Bairagarh, which was down the hill from Bhopal a couple of miles. Of course my family had to stay in Bhopal, since there was no place at the project for them to stay, and I would have to see them on weekends. The project site turned out to be Budhi, sixty miles from Bhopal.

When I got to Bhopal, I saw two Americans, a husband and wife, living there. He was an extension specialist from Montana. They gave me the mail. I went over and sat on the steps of our building and opened the mail. It was from a man named Mr. Elam, who was the supervisor for agriculture education and teacher training in the 17 southern black segregated colleges. Teacher training had to do with training vocational agriculture teachers for high school. My boss at Tennessee State was the teacher trainer. Once when Elam came to look around, I accompanied him to west Tennessee and other places and he did not seem very happy with my boss's work. I think it was kind of a political move to get him away from Tennessee State, and assign me the job by annuity, Flowers to take the Indian job. The letter from Elam read, "We got rid of the wrong man. Come and see me after your two years are up in India." So it was kind of a coincidence that I got in with AID. But that's how it all happened.

Q: What was the project you were supposed to work on? Was this a countrywide project?

JONES: This was a government of India project under the Ministry of Agriculture. It was to convert a jungle warfare training camp of World War II into an agricultural, farm machinery training and testing center.

Q: But this was just one institution you were working with?

JONES: It was just one institution. This was a part of the U.S. total assistance program to India. And this was a relatively small, one-person project. I was the only technician there. I was to advise and assist with the development of the project.

Q: Remember the name of the overall project?

JONES: It was the Farm Machinery Utilization Center.

Q: But was that just for that place?

JONES: The idea was that it would serve the whole country, training people how to operate, maintain, order, and standardize agricultural equipment. It was a tough assignment.

Q: What did you find when you got there?

JONES: I found a few shells of old buildings scattered about a very thick jungle, and were being rehabilitated. The building that they gave me was small, but adequate for a bachelor. It had been whitewashed with the roof repaired. Outside was a dug well that I drew my water from with a bucket and a rope. Back up a little bit....US had bought and had shipped to the location \$120,000 worth of agriculture equipment that had been manufactured in the United States. Most were still in boxes and had to be assembled before it could be used. We got busy and got it assembled with a staff of young mechanics and Indian engineers.

Q: So there was a staff to this center?

JONES: Yes, there was a staff. A lot of the staff was in place, but there was a gradual adding of staff as the center developed. Interesting enough, to give you how jungly and wild the place was, I was told by one of the local citizens that they had walked by the place that I was to live in two weeks before I got there, and there was a big male Bengal tiger standing in front of the building.

We plugged along. After I arrived in Bhopal, the next day I decided to drive to Budhi, finding out that my post was 60 miles away from the place that my orders said they were. I met the then officer in charge of the place, a south Indian named Rao. We had a long chat. He showed me what was going on and introduced me to his staff. I asked him, "Have you ever been to the States?"

He said, "Yes, I spent a year there." "What do you think about the States?" "I think you people have lots of nice materialistic things that you provide for consumers, and a lot of them are useful. But I find spiritually you people are babes in the woods."

When he said that, I looked around and there was nothing but jungle, and I said, "We're all babes in the woods out here."

He said, "You know, when we come back to this country we must go through a spiritual cleansing, I'm now at the end of my spiritual cleansing, a series of exercises that cleanses me spiritually after being in the West, where the spiritual part of me was contaminated and we have to get that cleaned up when we return."

Q: He was a Hindu?

JONES: He's Hindu, of the highest Hindu caste. So I talked to Rao about what the center was to do and what he thought should be the approach to setting up the center and getting a program going. He starts spouting out -- he was, I think, a mechanical engineer, I'm not quite sure -- he lectured so much about machinery and principles of machinery I felt a little bit lost. I thought this man has a great capability. Why on earth have I come 10,000 miles to instruct an assistant with establishing a machinery training center, when this man seems to know everything about it. I was a little bit disturbed. When I rode back to Bhopal I said to myself, I wonder if he's a guy who just talks, or whether he's able to put anything on the ground, whether he can do it, the hands-on stuff.

I said, maybe that's the difference between Rao and myself. I think I can do it. I found out as time went on that this was exactly the case. He was a well-educated engineer but didn't know anything about the practical aspects of farm machinery.

I came back the following week to work. My main counterpart was a fellow named Mohan Taneja. Taneja was from the Bataan country in northwest India but had finished the Presbyterian college at Allahabad, where many of the faculty members were Americans. They taught farm mechanics at that school. I got together with Mohan. He was a very active, energetic, pushy type. I said, you know, this is the guy to link up with and just forget about who's in charge, and we'll go ahead and do things.

When I got back to work on the job, the second week, Rao said, "The Minister of Agriculture wants to see you in New Delhi." I said, "Is he in a hurry?" "Oh, yes, he's in a big hurry." "Why's he in a big hurry?" "They want this center opened by the first of July." This was in February. I said, "Well, give me a chance to get with Taneja to figure out a few things, and then I'll give you a date to get me an appointment with the minister in New Delhi."

I got with Taneja and we decided on some things that the Minister has to do before this center could open. There were other things that they should do after the opening to improve the quality of training. Rao took the initiative and called up the Minister and got me an appointment. I got on the train in the evening in Bhopal and rode that 500 miles overnight to New Delhi arriving the next morning and immediately went to the hotel to get cleaned up a little and got some of the dust and dirt out of my eyes. I went to see the Minister of Agriculture the same day.

When I arrived, the permanent secretary was -- as one often saw in Indian offices -- hid behind a stack of dog-eared files. He saw me and looked up and I said, "I'm Harold Jones, coming from Bhopal, from the tractor training and utilization center that you're setting up there." He said, "Oh, yes, we were expecting you." He called the minister who soon arrived. We shook hands and we sat around a table. I said, "Mr. Minister I have 10 things on the list that were worked up by the chief instructor and I at the center. Five of these things, we think, must be done before the center can open. Five others we wish you would do shortly after the center opens to keep it going and to build quality training as the center expands." I read them.

Q: What were they for?

JONES: They were the kind of things that most any facility would have to have put in place, classrooms, supplies, teaching aids, etc. A lot of help was needed to clean away the trees before the monsoon. You must provide the means to do these things. I asked, "Can you get these five things done reasonably soon?"

The minister looked at the permanent secretary and didn't say anything, but came back to me and said, "Can you open the center by the first of July?"

I came back to him and said, "Can you get these things done between now and the first of July?" This was repeated for three times. Finally he gave that usual sideways head motion to the permanent secretary, which I took to mean yes, and then he finally said, "Yes, we can do that."

They had agreed to do all the items requested. I told him I appreciated it and invited him to come down and see the center sometime. Then I left there and went on over to AID and checked in with the TCM (Technical Cooperation Mission) office and Dr. Frank Parker, who was the agricultural officer. I told him about the project and he filled me in a little bit more about what they expected the project to do. I got on the train and traveled overnight back to Bhopal.

Q: So you were fairly independent in your operations?

JONES: Very much independent.

Q: AID wasn't trying to tell you --

JONES: AID was minimally involved. In fact, only one -- TCM (Technical Cooperation Mission) -- person ever saw the project. That was because Senator Allen Ellender, from Louisiana, visited the project. The director had to accompany him, so he got to see the project.

Q: Who was the director at that time?

JONES: Houston. Howard Houston, I think. Anyway, Taneja and I went ahead and set up a training program, got the farm machinery assembled and ready to go into action. Notices were sent to all states, apprising them about the training program. They were invited to send applications for people that they wished to sponsor for training. As a result, we received 400 applications for only 20 seats for trainees. That gave us a great chance to select the best out of 400. We went on ahead.

Q: From all over the country?

JONES: From all over the country, in every state in India at that time. They responded right away. We spread out the selection as much as possible. We got together and set up the whole program of these courses, and gradually filled in all places for those different courses that we decided to conduct. When the officer-in-charge came back into the picture, we figured that he may be as much of an impediment as he would be a support. So Taneja and I got together and went ahead and set the program up. When he got back into the picture, all of these things had been done and he hadn't kept abreast of the happenings.

Q: Why wasn't he there?

JONES: He was there, but he didn't seem to be that much concerned. Either that, or he thought what needed to be done should be left to myself and Taneja and me one or two of the other instructors there.

Q: How many in the faculty?

JONES: We had about seven instructors, one chief instructor and myself, several mechanics and equipment operators.

Q: What was their training? Were they also academic engineers?

JONES: Several of them had had some practical training in different kinds of mechanics and they were willing to get down and get a few things done.

One of the things that had to be overcome in India was the attitude towards education. It didn't matter whether your training was technical or not hands-on. Tasks were not for the educated. This was education for education's sake, nothing else. The educated saw themselves alone, doing things to get their hands dirty. The hands-on doing was generally missing. We had one who felt that way and when they saw me moving around, supposedly the big educated advisor from the United States, doing things, trying to put things together, and getting my hands dirty trying to make things happen, attitudes began to change. One of the instructors came to me and said, "I notice you're around here in all this heat and dry weather full of energy and going about like you were 15 years old. You know what I think it might be? I think it might be that lemon that you use in your tea."

Whenever we had tea, I wouldn't take milk with it. They all drank milk with their tea. I asked them to put lemon in my tea. He said, "I just figured out why you do that and why you have so much energy. It's that lemon you put in that tea. I'm going to start using lemon in my tea." He started to come around and finally they all came around to do the needed tasks.

Q: What was the living conditions like?

JONES: Living conditions were rough. No electricity, no bathroom. My quarters was a small A-roof stone building with a partition. I used one side for cooking and boiling water, and the other part to sleep. The table that I ate on, and did my paper work, was one that I built from the crating material that the equipment came in from the States. And for my bathroom, I had a tin tub and a stool with a hole in the middle of it with a pot underneath sitting in one corner of the bedroom, which was emptied each morning and cleaned. I used candles and had a kerosene lamp for night lights. That's about all.

Q: What was the climate?

JONES: Climate at that time ran from 110 to 120, zero humidity. I drank several gallons of water a day and never any a bit of moisture on my skin anywhere. AID had issued a kerosene refrigerator. If you want an extra something to pull you down and get you aggravated, light a kerosene refrigerator in that kind of temperature. Every now and then, I had ice cubes. I had a kerosene stove for cooking. My driver, a young Muslim, decided that he would clean my kitchen and wash dishes, and so forth. Outside where I lived was a dug well with a rope tied to a bucket for bringing the water up. I called it running water -- I ran from the well to the kitchen with it. That was the water system.

Q: Did anybody give you any orientation or preparation for living in a condition and situation like this?

JONES: No. This was far worse than what I experienced in rural Virginia as a youngster during depression years. It was not a good condition. After one year, there was generator that provided lights until about midnight, when it was shut down.

I did everything imaginable to try to get a little relief from the heat and dry weather. In India, offices were cooled at that time by using something called “Khas-Khas.” Khas-Khas was a sweet smelling grass root that was dug up, dried and put over big wooden frames and set outside the open windows. Someone would dash water against the Khas-Khas all day long, and as the hot breeze blew through, the hot air was cooled slightly. At least it had a good pleasant odor to go with it.

Q: Because it was so dry, this was....

JONES: Yes, that’s right. I put Khas-Khas over my window, and I dipped my mosquito net into buckets of water and hung it back on the rack over my bed. The dripping water evaporated, giving enough relief for an hour’s sleep in the night. But for the most part, I got to sleep at four o’clock in the morning, when the air cooled slightly. Then got up about 6:30 or 7 to go to work, but this soon began to take its toll on me. Then after my family came in June I’d go to Bhopal on weekends to be with them. This went on for four years, roof sleeping there was very comfortable.

The other part of living was getting things to eat. I had my shotgun and rifle with me, so I went to the jungle and shot a few antelope and deer and a peacock once in awhile. That was my meat supply, and the family’s meat supply, the whole time we were there.

Q: At anytime did the TCM office in New Delhi ever want to know what’s going on and how you were doing?

JONES: No one bothered that much about checking on the project. I was out there alone battling and toiling and trying to get things going.

Q: Did you have any kind of a supervisor?

JONES: Nobody came down. I told you, Howard Houston was the only mission person to show up at the project.

Anyway, those awful living conditions was the thing that was knocking me harder than anything else.

Q: But what about for your family in Bhopal?

JONES: Well, the family in Bhopal had been able to get a rented place on the palace grounds of the former princely ruler from the days when Bhopal was a princely state. It was a Muslim state and they called the ruler, a Nawab, versus a maharajah for the Hindu states. We had what was called his weekend guest house. He had two big weekend guest houses on the palace grounds. One was rented to an extension advisor and wife from Montana, and we took the other one. My

family lived there. It was a big place with about eight big rooms, eight big bathrooms, which were almost as large as any of the rooms, but with no hot water and no kitchen, because in the days when they had guests, the food was cooked in another place and was brought in and served. So they didn't need a kitchen. I had to design a kitchen. AID sent us a kerosene stove and kerosene refrigerator, and we had shipped our own deep-freeze. There were problems with keeping it operating because of different current voltages. We had running water but no hot water, which meant we had to boil all of our drinking water and to bathe, we had to heat the water.

Q: With a kerosene stove, that's slow going.

JONES: Kind of rough going. I converted one of the bathrooms into a kitchen by building a long workbench over the bathtub and a storage cabinet over the toilet stool, pushed the refrigerator in one corner, deep-freeze in the opposite corner, the kerosene stove required patience but was modestly efficient. We were in business. We carried on that way the whole time we were in Bhopal, which was four and a half years for me and four years for the family. One room was used for the family school. I made the desk and seats from the shipping crates and procured a blackboard in the local town market. Loretta taught the six girls, ranging from kindergarten to junior high for four years.

At the center, we struggled along. Finally, the government had what they called a Central Tract Organization. They had borrowed \$11 million from World Bank to set it up. CTO had big heavy equipment mainly to clear land for agricultural purposes. They operated in many places, clearing acres of grassland and bush for farming areas.

A group of those tractors were sent to the project site called Budni. Budni was as remote as you can get. When I got there I called it the one-step post. Which went on to say that one step backwards and you'd fall off the earth into eternity. There was nothing beyond Budni. I didn't believe there was. That was a bit of exaggeration, but not much.

Q: You mean there weren't any villages around?

JONES: Well, there was one small dirty village 200 yards from the center where one could get a cup of tea, basic staples were sold: rice, beans, cloth and some hardware materials. Otherwise you'd have to cross the river to get something that was reasonably edible and fresh. I used to go across the river to a place called Hoshangabad, located along the Narmada River. The Narmada River was central India's most holy river and its the only river in India that runs to the west coast. To get across that river I used to drive the Jeep station wagon. Sometimes I'd walk. A flat bottomed boat was just large enough to accommodate the Jeep, the wheels almost sticking over the edges, and it would be propelled to the other side with about eight men with poles pushing against the bottom of the river.

Q: How wide was the river?

JONES: The river was probably an eighth of a mile. I'd go there because there was a little village where fresh vegetables, tomatoes, and other fresh things were sold. They supplemented the meat that I'd got from the jungle.

Q: But this was not a heavily populated area, then?

JONES: No, it wasn't heavily populated. Not at all. We managed to survive. CTO came in and cleared about 200 acres of the bush country with the big heavy dozers, and pushed it all up in wind rows. At least there was enough land there to group crops and to allow us to utilize the different kinds of machinery for training.

Q: This was part of the training center.

JONES: This was part of the training center. On the first of July, the center opened. We had it opened right on time and it's been running for the past 40 years.

Q: Your 40 students arrived?

JONES: Oh, yes, every class was filled. Then we set up two other courses, giving us a total of three courses going simultaneously. One was six months and there were two for three months each.

Q: You designed the curriculum?

JONES: I and the chief instructor. I worked with him for setting up the curriculum. He was a good type to work with and he'd had exposure to the US missionary types of training at the Presbyterian college, which to some extent copied the land grant college models in the U.S. Not quite, but not without the U.S. missionary work ethics.

Q: What were the three courses?

JONES: Well, we had a course on farm machinery utilization and maintenance, another course on repairs and a third course on special machines and skills.

Q: What kind of equipment were you working with mainly?

JONES: Well, we had a variety of US-manufactured equipment. We had grain drills, threshing machine, weed control equipment, cultivators, and plows for plowing up the land or lightly tilling the soil. There were a number of pumps for irrigating. But there was no water available. At the end of the training center area, a stream ran through during the monsoons carrying large quantities of water. I suggested to the officer-in-charge that a couple of the dozers be sent there to push some dirt across the stream in kind of a dam form and that would hold enough water after the monsoon was over that would allow us to irrigate small plots. But they said, "We don't have pipe nor money to buy any. What do you do? I took a walk through the areas of the old jungle warfare training camp, and there I saw old two-inch pipe lines used for their water system. I demonstrated how to use a blowtorch and heavy pipe wrenches to disconnect some of the pipes.

They were hooked to the pumps, attached to tractors which pumped water up the hill to level ground. Crops were grown by irrigation as a teaching demonstration on an approximately ½ acre area. I assisted with the entire operation, which was totally improvised. This was a good example of doing the best with what was available. It was an effective little demonstration.

Q: Were these students ones that would have access to this kind of equipment when they would finish this training?

JONES: Well what was happening was that a number of government farms were being run with some fairly modern equipment, and they could use these trainees. Others were employed by small equipment manufacturers. At that time, India's main form of power was bullocks. They pulled everything similar to what we did in this country a hundred years ago. They had primitive kinds of equipment that had been there for hundreds of years. But then there were a few entrepreneur types of manufacturers that were beginning to try and design and build a better type of farm equipment for bullock power that would be more effective in the farming operation. They took on some of the trainees to help with manufacturing and demonstrating to farmers.

Some of the people who had had some of the basic form of mechanic type training went with these manufacturers, and others went back to their village farms and tried to encourage improved methods. We even went to the point of trying to design and bring into being better hand tools for chopping weeds and cultivating. There was not much of a problem of placing the people who had attended the courses.

Q: Did it grow beyond the 40 students? How many students did you eventually have during your four years? Was the enrollment only 40 each year?

JONES: It started expanding. I don't know what it expanded to. When I was there we had approximately 140 students per year. When I was there in 1996, the yearly output had been as high as 1560 per year. At least six courses were being offered, along with a vigorous testing program.

Q: And they lived there on school grounds?

JONES: They had a dormitory in one of the old buildings that were left from the World War II jungle warfare training center that was converted into a cooking and feeding and dormitory facility. It wasn't all that great, but livable. They had a few portable tanks for water supply.

Q: You weren't so much involved in the administration of the school?

JONES: I wasn't involved in the administration. Indians handled that very well. The officer-in-charge had an administrative officer, who had two administrative assistants and there were several clerks in the office.

Q: How did you find the students?

JONES: The students were very enthusiastic and willing to learn. Many of them wanted to learn how to do things. Once in awhile some of the traditional types didn't think that this was the kind of thing that they ought to be doing, so they didn't apply themselves well. They thought that the more machinery was used, it meant that people would lose their jobs and wouldn't have a way of making a living. That kind of attitude was common across the whole country, which isn't unusual. The other thing that was a bit of a problem, as far as I was concerned, was the starting time. The morning temperatures at about sunrise were bearable for field work, but the government working hours was of such that they didn't want to change. I got together again with the chief instructor, whom I knew to be progressive about things, and we ended up sometime going to work at 6:30. So with no declaration by government or anybody in terms of changing working times, the students were willing to do that. When it got hot they'd come in and cool themselves. Then later on, toward sundown, field activities were scheduled.

Q: You must have done a lot of teacher training, teaching the faculty.

JONES: A lot of the teacher training of the faculty was mainly in helping with assembly of equipment. They had a trouble putting it together, assembling the equipment and grasping the general principles of operation. I did a lot of demonstrating of how to do things, for instance, checking out the accuracy of a grain drill in terms of planting seed. It is called for calibrating and adjustments. I did an awful lot of that. We had one or two Indian instructors who had worked with power equipment -- a round tractors and pumps -- and they were very useful in helping to get that over to the rest of the faculty. Improved teaching methods were emphasized from time to time. Problem solving played a key role in the training.

Q: Were the student body and the faculty of mixed background or were they all --

JONES: Very much mixed background. Some of the instructors may had gone through certificate level training for agriculture but had little exposure to agriculture mechanics other than primitive aspects in use at that time, using the bullocks.

Q: What about their religious and cultural background?

JONES: Muslims, Hindus and Christians made up both the faculty and student body. Their religious and cultural orientation came out mostly when we had the animals from the jungle destroying the crops that were being grown, particularly the corn and the wheat. The wild boars and monkeys were the biggest problems. Monkeys are sacred to many Indians and the officer in charge realized that this could be a problem. But he was able to get a permit from the government to buy a couple of shotguns to shoot monkeys. But he would have difficulty to get anybody to shoot monkeys. So they thought that since I was from the West and didn't mind, since I had my own guns.

I told the chief instructor confidentially, "You know the quickest way to heaven, or the quickest way out of here back to the States, is probably to shoot a monkey. I'm not going to shoot any monkeys."

He looked around and got a local person that would come in and shoot a few of the animals. This was totally against the Hindu religion, but none of the students protested.

Q: All these people were Hindus?

JONES: They were from everywhere and mixed culturally. We had some big Muslim operators who they didn't mind. But the nearby village area was predominantly Hindu and whatever happened there in that village that was against their religion, would likely result in protest. No cultural or ethnic outbursts occurred during my four and a half year stay.

Q: But all these people of different backgrounds got along?

JONES: Oh yes, they got along very well. They seemed to have realized that we've come here to be trained about certain things. Everybody took to it as something new and something different with the hope that this would open up at least some job for them or a future that would allow them to get a job to earn a living.

Q: Were there any major incidences or crises that you faced or was it all just one big crisis?

JONES: Just one small crisis. I didn't come up against any particular problems. I did run into one government official at one time. A villager would often come and ask me if I would shoot a tiger or leopard for them that was killing their cattle or coming into their village. One villager went to the jungle with his bullocks near the training center to cut some wood for his village for cooking purposes. While he was out cutting wood and trying to get a load for his bullock cart, a tiger came by and killed one of his bullocks. He asked me if I would come out and shoot the tiger, before it killed his other bullock. This was his life, his livelihood. This pair of bullocks meant everything to him and his family in terms of making a living and doing things he had to do to survive. So I went out and found the tiger chomping away on the bullock. I shot and killed it.

A week or two later, a letter came from the state government forester, saying that we hear you shot a tiger in that area and what we are concerned about. We had spotted that tiger for the King of Nepal. The King of Nepal was coming down, and we were going to take him there for a tiger hunt.

When I went into Bhopal over the weekend to join the family, I stopped at the Forester's office. He was a tall, mixed gray south Indian. I told him the story, why I killed the tiger, and that I had no idea it had been spotted for the King of Nepal. I said, "If you want the King of Nepal to have a hunt, you contact me and I'll show you where two or three tigers live there that he can shoot. And frankly, when I went to shoot that one, a few hundred yards away, two others were coming to join him. They saw me and ran away." I said, "There are a lot of tigers out there. You get in touch with me and I'll show the king where he can find a tiger."

So he was satisfied and he appreciated me coming by to talk with him about it. That dissolved the case. The king never came.

Q: But there was a large tiger population in that area?

JONES: A big population. They were killing people's livestock and leopards were doing the same thing. Leopards were killing their goats and dogs. There was always a problem with the big cats and what they came to prey on in the villages.

Q: This was well before the concern about preserving wildlife?

JONES: Well before. In fact, when I first went there, peacocks were wild like turkeys, and could be shot in that Muslim state without any repercussions. It was very dangerous shooting them in Hindu villages, though. But since a lot of Muslims lived in that area, they had become wild. For our Thanksgiving dinner for several years in India, we had peacock . Very little had been said or done about preserving wildlife in those days.

The mixture of religious beliefs there meant that one had to sort of walk in between them, and to maneuver for one's safety.

Q: All the people spoke English?

JONES: All of the people at the center involved in administration and repair assistants spoke English. There was no problem with language, so far as I was concerned. My driver spoke Urdu and Hindi.

Q: And the students?

JONES: Students didn't speak English that well. Some of them did, but we had such a great leeway in selection there, that we had enough information on the forms to indicate whether or not they could get along in English or Hindi or whatever the case. But we had people on the faculty that could speak practically any of the major languages in India.

Q: Did you learn any of the languages?

JONES: I took some courses in Hindu, but not enough to carry on a conversation, but I could ask directions to places and speak to people and meet people, but nothing outstanding.

Q: Did you understand why you were there, apart from your technical role in training, why the US was sending somebody 10,000 miles away to work in this community?

JONES: I didn't think too much about US interests and US concerns. I thought I realized that US was highly concerned about India as a country, because of the massive assistance being given all over the country. Rockefeller Foundation was there, Ford Foundation was there and other U.S. organizations. I saw it as a major international effort, really, because other countries were there trying to get India moving in terms of its economy, in terms of its political objectives and whatever they had in mind to do, to develop the country.

But the situation I and my family were in was of such that missionary zeal was needed to deal with it. Even if I had paused a little bit, I hardly found time to think about much more than my

job and what my family had to deal with living in Bhopal. So I never thought beyond job and family. But we were sensitive to and aware of the need to maintain a good U.S. image. We were proud of our actions in that regard. In Bhopal we were referred to as a new kind of "Rajah." All over India I could see things happening that I thought eventually would come together and India's agriculture and some of its rural development, would push on into bigger things, once these factors came into some kind of confluence.

Q: Such as?

JONES: Well, there was irrigation/hydroelectric dams being built, fertilizer factories being built, steel mills were going up, land grant college types were being established. All of these happening at the same time. Big extension programs by a Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation was doing research and development in agriculture. One could see all these things moving toward each other, and coming into some kind of confluence, and that's exactly what happened as the years went by. Agriculture production soared. India was able to take advantage of the Green Revolution.

Q: Did you have any connection with any other agriculture programs we were sponsoring there at this time?

JONES: I visited several of the university's projects there, interacting mainly with their agriculture engineers. I made a number of trips there to various locations exchanging ideas. In fact, several of the agriculture engineers with the universities came to the center at Budni, where I was assigned.

Q: Which University project?

JONES: Ohio, Illinois, Kansas, Tennessee.

Q: Working where?

JONES: Ohio was working in the Punjab. Illinois was working at a place up called Tarai in Uttar Pradesh state. Tennessee was in the Bangalore area and Kansas was in Andhra Pradesh. I visited all four of them several times. We discussed new equipment design ideas and things that they might include in the agriculture engineering curriculum. Because I had had that experience dealing with the basic kind of stuff that people were interested in. I went to Udaipur, where an agriculture engineer of Ohio lived. There were four of those university contracts in India. Missouri came in later.

Q: How did you find their programs?

JONES: They varied from place to place. I thought the place at Tarai near the foothills of the Himalayas were probably making the most progress. They had a huge state farm there where things could be done other places. I think they faced different problems depending on their location and people's attitude towards being helped. But they all turned out to be wonderful institutions and all five were established. I think they made one of the greatest contributions that

could be made in the area that I was working, farm mechanization, by producing agricultural engineers, and these specialists. When I went back to India last year, I was amazed at what the agricultural engineers had done and the organization they had for doing things to improve India's agriculture. India followed up by establishing 15 additional colleges, giving a total of 20.

Q: Like the one you were....?

JONES: No. I was assisting with an institute less than college level. But the one that I was connected with was used as a model to establish three other centers in different places in the country.

Q: These were sort of pre-university level vocational schools?

JONES: Yes. The one where I originally worked later changed from a center to an institute.

Q: What was its full title?

JONES: Central Farm Machinery Training and Testing Institute. This is its present title. The title changed over time. It went on first from Farm Machinery Utilization Center, to Training and Utilization Center. As the center grew with greater impact on agricultural production, titles changed.

Q: What was the situation at the institution that you saw recently?

JONES: When I went back in February, the only thing I could recognize are the hills and forest in the distance. Everything was completely new, completely redesigned and functioned very well in terms of competent testing and training. They had divided into two wings, a testing wing and a training wing. They had trained more than 23,000 students and had done tests on nearly 700 different kinds of machines, all in terms of standardization to make equipment more suitable for Indian agricultural conditions. Seven tube wells had been dug for irrigation and running water for the center.

Q: Was there anybody there that you knew?

JONES: Nobody was there that I knew. The first clerk who was there when I arrived lived in the village nearby the place. He had retired in the village. I told somebody later on if he had retired in the village at the time I was there they'd have called him a crackpot for retiring in such a place. The chief instructor that I found there 40 years ago was located in New Delhi. He was our host for the whole time we were there. We had a grand reunion. His son, trained in the U.S. in aeronautical engineering and business administration, was doing finance consulting in New Delhi.

Q: He had moved up the line in terms of position?

JONES: No, what happened was that he had worked at the center for a number of years, then joined FAO and worked in Africa, retired from FAO, and was living in New Delhi. I called the

officer-in-charge -- our first director, named Zachariah, in South India. I didn't contact Zachariah personally. I called him on the telephone and we chatted for about a half hour. Coincidentally, his little girl when he was director is now a medical doctor in Connecticut, and was visiting my family in Washington when I was talking to her daddy from New Delhi.

I've been in contact with these people since I left India, either through Christmas card greetings or a note once in awhile. So I've kept up with them.

Q: What were the agricultural conditions around the school when you were there?

JONES: Scattered around the area were very small subsistence village farms using hand tools and bullocks, growing mostly basic grain crops, pulses, and a few vegetables.

Q: But in any of the surrounding areas there was no farming going on?

JONES: Well, there were small village farms. But the people grew hardly enough to survive. But in terms of farming and farming country, across the river six or seven miles away, was the wheat research station. I spent a fair amount of time working with them to improve their bullock powered equipment. I helped design things they could use in their wheat research, particularly with land leveling equipment for more effective irrigation.

They were using all bullock power. I went over and met the director there and he and I hit it off well. I said, "You know, you're up against a pretty uneven situation here. That land that you're trying to irrigate, you can't get water to flow evenly over it. I could design a few simple wooden type implements that you could hitch behind bullocks and pull across that land and move some of the high spots into the low spots and you'd have a much better flow of water."

So I did that. We got them across the river in spite of having to put them on a flat bottom boat to be pushed over by poles. They found out that they worked very well to the extent that the government made a film of it.

When I was in Kenya, I was invited by the Minister of Agriculture to come and observe a film. To my surprise, it was the film of the work I had done at the wheat research station in India. That was the extent to which any kind of government farming was being done in that area.

Q: Was there any impact of this farming program of yours on the area? You cleared this land, but --

JONES: Well, a number of farms would borrow that equipment, not so much to irrigate their land, but when the monsoons came, it was better leveled they didn't have water pockets standing in different places in the field. But not a lot in terms of impact around that area at that time. But I understand now that that kind of thing led to people wanting to do things differently, better and more efficiently.

Another thing that occurred while I was there...USAID had spent \$12 million buying large size farm equipment for community development, but they didn't have anybody there who knew

much about it. Consequently, it was prorated and issued to the different states, and went to the state headquarters and that's where it stayed. I found some of it in Bhopal, and I went to the chief of agriculture officer and I said that some of this equipment ought to be put to use. So he allowed me to take a couple of the big stationary threshers that we used in this country to thresh wheat early in this century. I took them to a number of villages and demonstrated the first mechanical threshing of wheat in that area.

I hooked up with a Canadian missionary and I took one of the stationary threshers to their place and demonstrated it. They liked it and asked to keep it. Villagers were delighted to see how their grain could be threshed without being trampled under the bullock's feet. For hundreds of years, the age-old practice was to trample it under a bullock's feet, grinding the straw to bits, and tossing it into the air to let the chaff fall away and the grain fall to the ground, after it had been well-flavored with bullock urine and manure. This went pretty well. Many of the villagers couldn't stand to see a grain of wheat being wasted. When you use the machines you don't get 100 percent efficiency, you lose a few grains. They'd scratch around on the ground looking for the few grains that would fall, careful not to waste anything. But the idea caught on and resulted in manufacturers building hundreds of small threshing machines. You go across rural India and most villages do threshing with machines. They range from huge self-propelled to small stationary types.

Q: Well, is there anything else on that assignment that you want to emphasize?

JONES: I connected up with extension people as well and often went to the extension meetings in towns not far from there. I would visit with them to get my points in about the extension program being more involved in trying to bring about the use of mechanical devices to increase agricultural productivity, and to increase labor and efficiency. I traveled over much of the state in that regard. The conditions found everywhere were very primitive.

But the British had done a pretty good job in setting up guest houses, so one had some kind of accommodation to depend on. I also took a couple of trips to Cuttack, below Calcutta on the east side where rice research was being done. I helped with equipment design and utilization there for planting and threshing rice.

Q: When did you leave?

JONES: I left Bhopal in September 1960 and was transferred to New Delhi.

Q: What was your job there?

JONES: My job there. They weren't quite sure what to do with me. Finally, they gave me an assignment to see if I could move about over the country and get the ministers of agriculture and agriculture personnel to use more of the community development equipment that they had been spread over the country. That job I did for one year. In one year of bumping around, I drove cross country 25,000, trying to get that equipment into use. I went to every minister of agriculture in the country.

Q: Did you have counterpart with you on this?

JONES: I didn't have a counterpart. I worked with many of the governments that had either a mechanical type person or some kind of engineer in their state department, and I worked primarily with them trying to get them to understand the principles of operation and demonstrated how certain pieces of equipment could be used.

I don't know if that was an astounding success if you think of \$12 million worth of equipment. But during the first year, I got about a million dollars' worth in use.

Q: This was a time when community development was a big thing. What did you think about it?

JONES: Community development was a good thing, no question about it, in principle, but I don't think AID had the kind of approach, particularly in India, that was appropriate to the conditions. There was a tendency to want to do things in a big sort of way. You couldn't do things in a big sort of way in India at that time. You had to start small and grow incrementally.

Q: What do you mean by a big sort of way?

JONES: Well, for instance, this farm equipment. Whoever was in charge of community development in New Delhi at that time decided they needed bigger, more efficient farm equipment to get agriculture going in the communities, so they bought this equipment and it just sat there. There was no way Indians were going to translate a bullock drawn plow and a bullock-threshed wheat crop and to a big stationary thresher that broke up the wheat and threshed it. You can't make that kind of jump. In the first place, they couldn't afford it. You had to deal with things that were doable and affordable and build incrementally toward bigger things. You had to build attitudes as well as practices. That was a primitive system, a very primitive system. But it had been there for thousands of years, people knew what they could get out of it. And what they could get out of it was dependable survival. They trusted it. To interfere with that in the way any new community development, there was resistance.

Q: Did you find the people weren't prepared to take risks?

JONES: That's right, because they had depended for years on this minimum input, minimum output, survival system. They just didn't do it. That was the biggest exposure I had to community development in my time with AID, but I could see that in India it's going to take time to get this thing moving in terms of developing any kind of community spirit and attitude.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the program, how people were involved with the program at all, how that process was supposed to work?

JONES: I didn't get that much appreciation for the community development people that AID had outside of the headquarters. I knew the community development people at the headquarters level. But I didn't have any contact in the field with the people working with the village people to see what was being done there to move the people. But the attitude I saw at headquarters was just

buy something, send it out there and hope that it is put to good use. The contact I did have with the villagers told me it was not working.

Q: But traveling all over India, did you develop a view about agriculture, the situation and prospects?

JONES: Well, I could see the little things happening as well as the big things. I named a few of the big things that were happening. But I could see a few of the extension people working incrementally and this in the time would probably lead to larger kinds of efforts and larger outputs.

I'll give you another example. I went to work with the Ford Foundation. I went to one Indian community where CARE had been involved. CARE had decided to give 100 sets of improved farm implements to the village people. These were implements to be bullock powered. I did a survey on utilization of these implements by the local farmers. The local farmers took to them right away, and used them well. But when I did the survey, every piece that CARE had given them had been put away in storage. I asked why was that so. They said, "The implements were good and they do a good job, we like them, but they're worn out." They didn't have any replacement for plowshares or for the cultivator shovels to control weeds. CARE hadn't bothered to see that they had replacements. There were village blacksmiths. They showed me one. I said, "There's no reason why these village blacksmiths can't be equipped to make these replacements." I looked at his little devices for heating iron and shaping it, but his biggest problem was he didn't have any way of giving it a finished shape after the blacksmith stage. I said, "You've got a grindstone here and you've got a pulley on it. We can rig up this grindstone in such a way that it'll give you enough grinding power to shape these things." I took an old bullock cart wheel and made a pulley out of it and put a leather belt down to the pulley on the new grinder. A young boy turning it was able to give the grinder sufficient revolutions to grind and shape metal.

But he says, "I don't have any metal." I said, "Well, I think you can find metal at that scrap metal place in town. He lived a couple miles from town. I said, "Why don't you go down and take a look?" He went and took a look and he came back to me and said, "They'd charge me money for it. I don't have any cash." He said, "What I do for the village farmers, they pay me in grain and a couple buckets full of beans. But I don't have any cash, I've never used cash."

I said, "Well, this is a problem." I got some extension workers in that area together and told them what this was all about. But, you see, at the same time, AID was accumulating local rupees from the PL 480 grain sales. And they would allow us in the field to have an account at a local bank and we could spend it on things of this sort. So I went to the controller in New Delhi and asked him to put a few thousand rupees in the local bank and I could authorize the blacksmith to procure a few pieces of scrap metal for replacements for the CARE implements, which were put back into use. That's the first time the village blacksmith ever handled any money. In a sense, I introduced capitalism for the first time into that village.

This is the kind of fundamental thing that often had to be done. Not to be critical, but many of the people who came with AID in those days came from urban backgrounds and they didn't have

a clue what poor, devastated Indian villagers were up against, what they had to overcome. They had no appreciation for it. You didn't have people with the kind of practical approach that met the conditions that they were facing. It so happened that I grew up in rural Virginia and much of my work as an agriculturalist was with poor, black farmers in small places with little money, where resources were scarce and you had to be truly resourceful and do a lot of things for yourself and for each other in order to survive. With that kind of background I thought I fitted in reasonably well with the Indian situation.

Q: Was this a time when India had major famines and had to be helped by massive PL 480 assistance?

JONES: U.S. PL 480 provided five million tons of food grains, enough grain to feed and to keep 65 million people living for three or four years. Otherwise, they'd have faced starvation.

A result of some of the projects that AID was involved in and things I mentioned that India was doing with help on many fronts combined to provide chemical, biological, and mechanical technology, needed to convert agriculture food grain production from an import deficit situation into an export situation.

Q: So you would say that foreign assistance had had a major impact?

JONES: No question, foreign assistance had a major, major impact. Practically every one of these items that I told you that were being constructed or were being put in place, was being done with technical assistance, including Russian, U.S., Germany, UK, and many others. No question about the impact of foreign assistance. I don't know how long it would have taken India without assistance to produce enough food, feed and fiber to meet the needs of its people. Maybe 20 to 30 years longer.

Q: Maybe that's done well for the Indian side of things. Well, you left India and what year was that?

JONES: Maybe I should back up a little bit and tell you a little bit more about working with the British. Before leaving the training center, I assisted the government to get \$20,000 from the British to fund the testing component at the center. After I finished with this equipment inventory and getting some of it utilized, I was appointed liaison officer with the Ford Foundation. Ford Foundation had a number of major district projects.

Q: You left AID?

JONES: No, I was still on AID's staff, but was liaison between AID and Ford. I think it happened because the people at AID and Ford realized the approach that I had taken in central India could be duplicated effectively in the Ford Foundation district projects.

The big project that was closest to us in New Delhi was at a place called Aligarh, where the Muslim University was located in India. They had a big extension element in that district. I went

there and looked at their workshop. It was in this area that I told you about the village blacksmith that I worked with.

Ford was trying to demonstrate some improved farming practices on crop production. So I decided that what was needed were some good demonstrations. They could observe improved, affordable practices that were better than some things that they were doing. One of the things was that I had observed was that farmers were irrigating the plots of land, spreading water over it, letting the moisture evaporate until the land was pliable enough to plant their seed. I saw this as a waste of water, and waste of time, because I knew some places in the U.S. where they were planting rice, maybe in Arkansas, and other places, in dry land. There's no reason why Indian farmers couldn't plant rice or wheat in dry land and then flood the water on it and the crop would germinate and grow, saving time and moisture.

So I decided at the District Headquarters where there were plots, I would do this, beside two plots that were planted the traditional way. I invited a group of farmers and explained to them that this was what I had done. They looked at the crop plots which looked better than the plots done the traditional way, plus they had saved water and time doing it. A couple of the farmers came to me and said, "Do you think we should try this?"

I said, "You make your own judgment." This is exactly the way I did it, and the people at the extension office can verify that this is the way I did it. These are the people that come out to see you every day, and they would verify that this is how it was done and this is how it looks. You go home and try it.

Next time when planting time came around, one of them came back and said, "Jones-san, me want to show you my crop."

I said, "Well get in my jeep, we'll run over there. He was as proud as he could be that he had done it this way and his crop was looking good. He had saved water and time and the crop was off to an excellent start.

I guess what I was trying to say is you had to demonstrate things and things that you demonstrate must be affordable at that particular time until you can get things moving through the use of improved practices. That's another example of what I had done in India working with the Ford Foundation in addition to the blacksmith story.

Q: Was that replicated in other places?

JONES: Oh, yes, it was replicated. It was becoming a habit then. I was called up once to the Illinois University project, because they were planting sugar cane and the farmers were complaining that the cost of planting an acre of sugar cane was so much that it cut too deep into their profit. It took about 200 people to plant an acre in traditional fashion. I went up to look and they were hauling the sugar cane on bullock cart. They had people making furrows with the tractor.

I said, you know you can beat this method. You can save 12 or 15 rupees just on planting I showed how to space the rows so that two cartwheels go down the row and a third row in the middle. You can have funnels that run from the cart down to the furrows and just slip the cut sugar cane into the funnel, slide down into the furrow. Two people can do this sitting on the back of the cart. They calculated that saved about 15 rupees in the planting along.

So I asked some of the farmers what they thought about it and some of the local people what they thought about it. They said it's good. We'd like to do this, but it puts so many people out of work. You've got two people on a bullock cart -- a driver, and a tractor and driver, doing the same thing that about 200 people were doing. So they didn't take to that right away, but later on I understand they were using more mechanical devices for planting sugar cane.

Q: But that brings out a fundamental issue in technological change, doesn't it?

JONES: Right, it does. But interesting enough, just before we left India, I had done a few more useful things. Then came the industrial fair. The people at the Embassy who were concerned about the U.S. display at the fair were thinking showy, colorful. I got concerned about it. I don't remember what they had in mind, but it certainly didn't suit anything I thought was right for India.

Here I would like to mention a family happening: our seventh daughter was born at the Family Hospital in New Delhi.

I went to them and said, "You know, what you're talking about makes no kind of sense for this rural oriented India." Most of the population depended on farming for their livelihood and their well-being. They said, "What do you suggest?" I said, "If you can come up with some kind of a device that can quickly turn a piece of metal into a plowshare, that would fit their plows, would be the greatest exhibit that you could put on. You'd have crowds of people looking at the display all the time."

They rethought the idea and came up with a big electric hammer, a huge thing. It must have weighed tons. It was set up as a demonstration. A person could take a piece of mild steel and move it in such a way that in a matter of minutes a plowshare was done. When they put that display on, there was never enough standing room.

Later on, a friend of mine whom I'd worked with that was making small farm implements at Allahabad near the college, came to me and said, "You know, I'd like to have that piece of equipment. Can you find out how much it costs?" I said, "I'll talk to people and they might even give it to you." But they didn't. They said, "We could let him have it for \$5,000."

I went back to him and said, "They'll let you have it for \$5,000."

He said, "I don't have that much money."

"How much do you have?" "I have the equivalent of what would be \$2,500 and I would have to hustle around to get the other \$2,500. But I talked to the Presbyterian missionaries and they're

willing to give me a trip to the States so I can go the Presbyterian churches and raise the rest of that money.”

He went to the States, and returned with the rest of the \$2,500, plunked down the \$5,000 and got the machine moved from the fair grounds to his workshop in Allahabad. He was banging out plowshares that would cover the whole countryside in a very short time.

Anyway, with all this under my belt, I was getting ready to leave India. We were accompanied by Doug Enismenger and his wife, who was the head of the Ford Foundation in India. I couldn't imagine why. I got ready to get out of the car at the airport and walk up to Customs and he said, “Why don't you come back and work for the Ford Foundation.”

I said, “I'll think about it.” I went home and thought, I've got too much time with AID (government) and I don't want to risk that, and not knowing what Ford's offer would lead him to, I wrote back and told him I decided to stay with the government. He wrote me a letter back, said, “Needless to say, I'm sorry. All the best.”

The Marshall Plan had done an excellent job of restructuring the war-torn economies of Europe after WWII. The success had prompted the U.S. Congress to pass legislation to provide monies assisting the economic development of many newly independent third-world countries. I had often thought about leaving my faculty position with the department of agriculture at Tennessee State University to join the hordes of technicians being sent world-wide to assist in third-world development. My salary was not especially high. Occasionally we had to resort to pawning the family's silverware to keep up with growing family expenses. Though I knew working abroad would offer increased pay, I had discarded the notion as many times as it had come to mind. My thoughts were laced with media images of the Third World. Disorder. Chaos. Strife. Dire poverty and deadly diseases, imminent internal conflict and strife. The thought of raising a family there, already up to six daughters, was too daunting. I shared these reservations with my wife, Loretta. None of these doubts were expressly communicated to the children.

One day at the university I was in my boss Walter Flower's office.

“Say Jones,” he greeted me. “Maybe you'd like to try this,” he said as he reached over his desk to pass me some papers.

“What is it?” I asked.

“Take a look and let me know what you think.” Flowers leaned back in his chair and thrust his cowboy boots across the corner of his desk.

“Thanks,” I replied, “I'll take a look and get back to you in a day or so.” Just to get an appointment and find Flowers actually at his desk was an event in itself. I had been on his staff since I had left an agricultural faculty position at Fort Valley State College, Georgia, in 1950. Chief Flowers, Dean of Agriculture at Tennessee State University, Nashville, was the most

sought after individual on campus. I wasn't quite sure why, but Flowers was close to the university's president. He was a master at evading people and missing appointments. Lots of patience, skill and intuition were required of his staff and others to catch up with him. Chief's secretary, Mary, had become very skillful at supporting his evasive habits. "Is Chief around today?" people would ask. Her standard reply was: "He's around all right, but he's not around here." In spite of the fact that every day brought new reasons to dislike him, I found it difficult to become disaffected with Flowers, like most of the other staff members. His charm, disarming personality, and his repertoire of tall tales conspired to dispel any ill feeling one might harbor towards him. He always seemed to want to project the cowboy image. He wore the boots and sometimes the hat, but his Mississippian birth and background always showed through.

The papers Chief had given me were application forms sent to him from the U.S. Department of State, encouraging him to apply for the position of farm machinery advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of India. More specifically, the incumbent was to advise and assist in the setting up of a farm machinery training and testing center at Budni, a remote corner of central Madhya Pradesh State, in India.

It had finally happened! After so many months of indecision something concrete presented itself. A torrent of new thoughts rushed through my heads. I had to weigh our present job prospects against future prospects. Was a pigeon in hand better than the many pigeons I hoped to catch? What did my job at Tennessee State hold for me? What about Loretta's job future? Loretta taught remedial mathematics and her salary helped meet family costs. But her chances for staying on looked dim, since she was recently called on the carpet for giving one of the school's top women Olympic prospects, Wilma Rudolph, a failing grade in remedial math. Loretta stood her ground and would not change the grade. The administration was unhappy. There goes the extra money, I thought.

As to my own position, I too discovered that I had to compete against financial preferences for the athletics department. When I had been initially hired, I was told to establish in the Department of Agriculture a Division of Agriculture Engineering in conjunction with the School of Engineering. My office site consisted of only a hulk of a building. On cold, wintry days the wind often blew in snow flakes through the broken window panes. I made substantial improvements with the help of student labor. We heated the classroom with a wood stove that I had built out of a fifty-five gallon oil drum. Wood had to be collected by me, the instructor, and the students. While this was better than nothing, the stove heated the room very uneven. Students on the side of the room farthest from the stove were freezing, and those closest to it roasting. This was not, needless to say, conducive to learning. This was Tennessee State for African-Americans in 1955. The college entrants from Tennessee's African-American high schools were terribly deficient academically and positive attitudes towards applying themselves to scholastic pursuits were sorely lacking. My department had been promised funds but never the likes of those actually allocated to the athletics department. Even though the university's president was a trained agriculturist his main thrust was athletics. He often said, "Black schools have to get well known, then they can get good." His vision of getting known was through the football, basketball, and women's track teams winning the state and nationwide competitions. They had dominated the annual AAU (Amateur Athletic Union) meets for several years. But his plan for getting good otherwise was less obvious. Athletics were thus pushed to the forefront and other academic

interests came second, third, even fourth. I knew that my department would never get the required funds. In this kind of situation I began to feel like a volunteer with a stipend. So why not move from slow developing situation to another in India, I thought. After weighing the pros and cons, I decided for the pros. All I needed then was family sanction.

The family responded enthusiastically. Everybody agreed that they wanted to go to India, in spite of not knowing anything about the big sub-continent. The girls were enthralled about the prospect of going to school at home. Loretta was prepared to forego beauty parlors that treated African-American hair. "There's no one who could do my hair over there in India." Mr. Flowers had fretted once to Loretta. That did not daunt Loretta. We were accustomed to being resourceful. It was decided that we would try it for two years and see what happened after that — *que sera sera*. Several trips were made to Chief's office to tell him what I thought about the papers from Washington, but he was never there and I never got any closer to him than Mary's stock answer, "He's around alright, but not around here." The application was submitted. Shortly thereafter, Mary Nichols called from Washington saying, "You have been accepted for the job in India and I have mailed all the instructions for you, and the family to make preparations for departure." All this had transpired, plus a letter from the university president granting me a two-year leave of absence before I actually got a chance to talk to Chief about the decision.

The preparations began with physical examinations at the nearest government facility, which was the Smyrna Airbase, just outside of Nashville. Several trips there confirmed that all parts were functioning up to normal standards, and I was given enough inoculations to bring on the pin-cushion syndrome.

With final details in place I was set to leave ahead of the family for my orientation in Washington, D.C. On the day of my departure, the girls came en masse to demand that I tell them something about India before I left.

"I shan't be able to tell you much because I haven't thought that much about it. But I will make a deal with you I'll tell what little I know if you older girls will agree to get the encyclopedia to read about India and share it with the younger sisters." They agreed.

"India is a long way away," I began to tell them, "more than 10,000 miles which is nearly half way around the world. I hear many many people live there. They have lots of floods and famine, but no floods in the place where we will live. Many people are poor and hungry and sleep in the streets in the big cities. People have many different kinds of diseases and unfortunately there are few hospitals, and not enough doctors to give them good treatment. They live in villages of many houses which are made from mud and cow dung. Millions of women dry cow dung into cakes and use it to cook their food. There are also lots of nice things and places in India, good beaches, good mountain resorts and lots of nice buildings. There are people with lots of money, rich people who live in palaces and very nice homes, all of whom have servants. We will have some too. I expect. But many village people are very poor and hardly have enough to eat. Much of my work will be with the poor people, farmers and village folks helping them grow more food so they can have enough to eat.

I thought it best not to mention what I had once heard about India while attending a lecture by Dr. Howard Thurman, the renowned religious leader then of Howard University. He had recently returned from India and spoke of the whole catalogue of human miseries. Particularly the caste systems and the plight of those at the bottom, the “untouchables.” He referred to them as cringing and demoralized people who were able to carry on in part because they had heard that somewhere between them and the bottom of the human scale of suffering were the black Americans. I had discussed this with Loretta, who thought it was not necessary to relate this to the children.

If she could arrange it, Loretta was to come to Washington after my orientation for a final farewell before our six-month separation. Even so, our Nashville parting was difficult.

“Loretta, soon the family will take their first trip by air, halfway around the world. You must be brave for the girls’ sake,” I said with my arms around her. “If we are successful with India and are bitten by the foreign service bug, there may be lots more time in the air.”

She gripped my hand and with a tear falling on her cheek, she said, “I’ll be brave.”

Holding each other close for a few minutes, we said nothing else. Then all the girls gathered for a round of hugs, kisses, and promises to write. With a concert of goodbyes, I was off to Washington.

The old DC-3 lumbered through the Tennessee mountains into Virginia, through snow showers, strong winds and local visibility. The trip seemed unending, and the thought of eventually having to fly over 10,000 more miles was less than appealing. Finally the wheels were down, almost touching the waters of the Potomac River, before they grabbed the tarmac. What a relief. There is nothing to beat the feeling of having your feet on solid ground.

Flagging a taxi on arrival, I settled in to admire the monuments along the route. Instead, I found myself a captive audience to a social commentator.

“I get so mad with them raising my taxes all the time,” the driver proclaimed.” I guess you have to blame this on all the women who keep on getting pregnant, having all these babies and going on welfare and we hard working people have to bear the bill. I’m damn tired of it. Why does a hard-working taxi driver have to pay for somebody else baby when someone else had all the fun helping to bring them into the world?”

“That’s the way the system works,” I commented absent mindedly.

“I reckon so,” he sighed as pulled his official looking cap down over his brow.

“That’s the Lincoln Memorial just in front of us, isn’t it?”

“Yes,” the driver replied. “He sure was a good old man and helped us black people out a lot. Hadn’t been for him I might still be in Georgia hoeing Mr. Charlie’s cotton. Yeah, we owe a lot to Abe! He was one of them better white people of his day. But they killed him, you know, he got

‘sassinated right here in D.C. at the Ford Theater. Anybody that was good to us in those days, stood in danger.’

A few minutes later we pulled up to a sprawling building that filled a city block.

“Here is state! Your fare is \$4.50,” he announced as he recorded the ride in his log. I tipped him a dollar, for which I was profusely thanked.

Awed by the massive structure, and with baggage heavy enough to add to the unbalance, I lurched through the swinging doors and up to the information desk. I began to get the feeling that the whole of Washington had a roof over it. After checking my credentials, orders, and identification, the desk person began to direct me to a room on the third floor.

“You are here” she pointed out on the building plan, “and this is where you want to go.”

Then the trouble began. This was a big place! The signs, arrows, and numbers began to confuse me. Being a woodsman, I always used the sun, land marks, or even moss on trees to find my way. This place was too orderly, with endless corridors and elevators that deposited one on identical floors. I began to wander, pushing button after buttons often the wrong ones, and traversing corridors which seemed to lead to the same place. The more I asked people where room 3311 was, the farther from it I became. I sat down on my bags to rest and began to think how best to punish the architect for coming up with such a design. Suddenly the answer: bring him back to this place, put him in the middle of the building, and make him find his way out. Yes! A fitting penalty for his sins. Just then a young man came down the corridor with a handful of files. “Where is room 3311?” I inquired.

“You’re very close, just down the hall on your right.”

As I entered the evasive “3311,” I thought, my point of light at last!

Mary Nichols, the recruiter, was quietly pleasant with a slight smile. She had a good start on middle age, and her blond hair was mixed with gray. She had always referred to herself as Mary Nichols on the phone and in the letters I had received in Nashville, so I didn’t know whether she was a Miss, Ms, or Mrs. She gave me the packet crammed with information and explained how the next two weeks would be structured. I would be attending seminars with people from many different backgrounds: historians, diplomats, economists, sociologists, Europeans, Americans, Indians, the lot. She had made reservations at the National Hotel, which was within walking distance. Her instructions for getting out of the building seemed much simpler than those I had received for getting in. She stood up and graciously wished me all the best, promising to guide me through the maze of paperwork and activities. She could now carve another notch on the corner of her desk for a successful recruitment.

The National Hotel had probably been in Washington longer than dirt. From the looks of the lobby it was by no means plushy but livable for a couple of weeks. Generations of paint seem to have given it some extra strength. Steam oozed out of the radiators and pipes clanged and popped

at times. Every step was accompanied by a squeaking floorboard. One could imagine that George Washington might have slept here. But it was clean and comfortable and I was going to be too busy to mind the little inconveniences.

Washington - The Orientation Capital

Orientation went by in what seemed like minutes. It loaded me with enough facts and figures to last the rest of my life, although we had only signed up for a two-year assignment. Indian history, politics, economics, traditions, and mores were all talked about. U.S. government officials, Indians living in the U.S., including some from the Indian Embassy, and hordes of specialists came to give of themselves and their knowledge. They kept repeating “You are all U.S. ambassadors to India and you must act in that image at all times. The fact that you will live in other cultures means that you will never be totally American again.” No one mentioned how much American would be left over after exposure to other cultures over time. Nor was mention made of minority Americans who had already lived on the fringes of their own country’s culture. Nor were the vast inequities of living standards among India’s social classes referred to, but my own experience in the U.S. prepared me for that. Nevertheless, by the end of orientation I was full of facts and figures as an inflated life jacket.

To top this off, I was advised at the end of the last session to report to room 3644 for any further clarification I needed about India. This I did.

“I’m Harold Jones sent here by the orientation people to get you to put the finishing touches on my knowledge about India.” My first and second impression of my instructor was that she would be an excellent candidate for the Miss America Contest, of the first order.

“My name is Marie and I am delighted to meet you, Mr. Jones.” She stood to shake my hand with a firm grip. “I am afraid I can’t tell you much about India. You see I joined the agency only two weeks ago.”

“Where did you come from?” I asked.

“I’m from Crossville, Tennessee.”

“Interesting, I’ve passed many a time through your town. I’m from Nashville. At least we have that in common.

“I wish I knew more about India to tell you,” she lamented.

“Maybe my grandmother was right,” I said. “She used to tell me after living for ninety years that ‘Every devil must figure his own salvation.’ Anyway, it’s awfully nice to meet a fellow Tennessean. When I return in two years, maybe I can tell you about India.” We shook hands and I wished her all the best in her new assignment.

“You too,” she returned. This last point of light at the Department of State had shone rather dimly, with respect to her knowledge of India. But she lit the place up with her presence.

Loretta arrived by train to spend three days with me before my departure. She made her way to the National Motel after a racial hassle with taxi drivers at Union Station. After a compassionate embrace, she brought me up to date.

“I had mixed feelings about coming because all the girls got the measles, and the twins are still recuperating. But they’re in good hands, so I thought it was safe to come.”

“You’d better have, or you would have been in real trouble.” I said as we headed back to the hotel.

Over the next few days, I filled Loretta in on what I had learned in orientation. We planned and speculated, sharing our excitement and apprehension. The last evening was a passionate farewell, prompting Loretta to say forlornly, “Maybe I should go with you now. Six months is a long time to wait.”

“It will be six long months for me, too” I affirmed. “I sure hope the airlines will let us put those life jackets on while crossing the Atlantic, and not keep them under the seat. I won’t be happy until all of us are together again.”

The Lumbering Four-Motored Aircraft

January 1956, marked the beginning of my arduous journey to India. It started with a local flight from Washington to New York, then a transfer by helicopter to the international airport where I boarded my transatlantic flight on KLM, the Royal Dutch airlines. As the glow of New York’s artificial aurora borealis faded, I tried to prepare myself for what lay ahead. I would have to endure nearly three days of changing altitudes and time zones, cramped quarters, and the constant rumbles and vibrations of the four-engine prop plane.

There were a few bright spots to distract me from the Atlantic’s pitch-black horizon. I was traveling first class, as was standard for foreign service employees in those days. This meant a continuous deluge of sumptuous food and drinks and a pillow fluffing administered by one of the world’s loveliest young women.

After thirteen hours in the air, we struggled through a dense fog to land in Scotland for refueling. Then we were up again, crossing the English Channel to Amsterdam. The sky brightened and the flight became smooth, even pleasurable. Schipol airport, home of the flying Dutchman, was framed by the Atlantic Ocean on one side and the flat windmill and canal infested countryside on the other.

I could look forward to a twenty-four hour layover in Amsterdam. All I knew about Holland was what I recalled from primary school geography and fairy tales — wooden shoes, windmills, and the story of the boy who prevented a national disaster- by plugging a hole in the dyke with his finger. Soon I would be able to compare the real Netherlands with what I had read of it from “Other Lands,” my geography textbook in the late 1920s.

The urban spread of Amsterdam looked especially well laid out and orderly. The landing was smooth and welcomed. While proceeding through customs I had my bags examined by a very young looking, personable man.

I said to him in a friendly tone. "I didn't think a nice country like your Netherlands would have these kinds of checks on people coming in and out." He came back with, "Oh yes, we have to have a little McCarthyism also." Apparently I was not seen as a suspect, for he smiled and waved me through. I took the airport bus to the hotel for some food and rest. Lunch was well prepared, tasty, and served in a pleasant atmosphere of soft violin music. After a short nap, I was ready to browse a bit around Amsterdam.

I got a feeling of compactness and efficiency on my tour of Amsterdam, The people were determined and knew where they were going and how to get there. Old-world charm abounded in the below-sea level historic city. The people were warm, hospitable and cheerful bustling around day and night on bicycles, footmobiles, and boats in this city of bridges and canals. The city was remarkably well kept and the canals provided much of the means of transportation in this city of bridges and canals. The people were warm, hospitable and cheerful. I wondered if they had ever taken a bridge census. It would take a lot of counting for the bridges that connected the city's several hundreds islands reclaimed from the sea.

Amsterdam-Cairo-Lebanon

The next afternoon, my "flying Dutchman," heavy and clumsy, lifted under a bright sun Suddenly the phenomenally flat countryside of windmills and canals stretch-d out in all directions. My window view of towns and cities, rivers, lakes, farms, forest, and a constantly changing skyline held me fascinated. The second leg of the flight took us across the Swiss Alps and over the Mediterranean to Cairo. Night fell as we approached Switzerland, turning the panorama into patches of sparkling lights amid darkened hills. Our refueling stop in Geneva was routine and, back in the air, the sumptuous candlelight dinner, the soft music and quiet ambience did wonders to relax me. A bright neon allowed a spectacular view of the Matterhorn, with its unrivaled grandeur. Simply contemplating its majesty is enough to immobilize a human feelings of arrogance or superiority.

As we approached Egypt, clouds and fog forced our flight to be rerouted to Beirut for servicing. Our plane was already banking for Lebanon when the pilot announced the changed plans. The mention of Lebanon sent my thoughts back to Sunday school and days in rural Virginia, and the Bible's mention of the Cedars of Lebanon: "And say, thus saith the Lord God; a great eagle with great wings, long winged, full of feathers which had diverse colors, came unto Lebanon and took the highest branch of the cedar," (Ezekiel 17-3). "King Solomon obtained wood from these cedars to build his beautiful temple in Jerusalem," (1 Kings 5: 6-10).

Soon we were over the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the snow-capped Lebanon mountains parallel with the coastline. Their foothills nourish the roots of biblical cedars. The beautiful capital city, Beirut, was just ahead. Once we landed on the tarmac, the summer heat melted my memory of snowy peaks. Flies and other signs of uncleanness did little to cheer up the lethargic, wilted, and aggravated passengers as we disembarked into the warm, humid airport.

Only warm Coca-Colas were available for refreshment, adding to the wilt. Maybe this was what they had referred to back in orientation as “culture shock.” Overwhelmed by heat and exhaustion, we passengers sat dejectedly in silence.

I felt a tapping on my shoulder, and I turned to face two men whom I had seen on the plane.

In heavily accented English one asked, “Aren’t you getting off here with us to go to Syria?”

Caught totally off guard. I haltingly replied, “No, I’m headed for India.”

“We are sorry, we thought you were Syrian,” the other said as they moved away.

“Passengers are requested to return to the aircraft.” This announcement injected new life into the listless passengers, who seemed delighted to scramble aboard. All four engines roared into action and the aircraft was let loose down the runway, accelerating past stationary landmarks, and finally lifting into the warm air for Karachi. My seat companion was a dainty, elderly woman, who, at regular intervals, shifted her small, flat-top hat over her gray hair, making sure that it maintained its proper angle.

“Where are you from?” I asked.

“New York, yes. I am from New York.” she said in a thoughtful tone.

“Off to where?” I questioned.

“Every year I take a trip around the world by air,” she calmly replied, readjusting her hat.

“You are not afraid to do that?” I asked.

“No, I am not! You can’t get anywhere being scaredy cat. You see, I like this airline and all of its nice people,” Leaning closer to me she whispered. “Have you ever seen anybody more efficient than the damn Dutch?”

“They are good,” I replied. “May I ask your name?”

“I’m Gracie, Gracie Thompson.”

“I’m glad to meet you, ma’am. My name is Harold Jones. I’m coming from Nashville, Tennessee.”

“So nice to meet you, Mr Jones. Nashville!” she exclaimed. “I once went there. Heard much about Grand Old Opry, Minnie Pearl and all of them folks and my curiosity got the best of me, so I decided to go South for the first time, just to see that place where they make all that country music. I enjoyed it, but you know it doesn’t take much for me to get filled up on country music. You like country music, do you?” she asked.

With no hesitation, I answered, "I like all forms of music: country, classical, spiritual, down the line."

"Where is this trip taking you to?" she queried, as she again patted her hat.

"I am off to India for two years"

"India, for two years. What on earth for?" she asked. looking at me in disbelief .

"I've just joined the U.S. Government's Foreign Service Assistance Program. I will be assisting the Indian Ministry of Agriculture in setting up farm machinery training and testing center, in a remote jungle area in central India. The place is called Budni, really in the bush."

"You going out there alone?" she asked.

"No, my family will come later when school is out in June."

"Do you have a big family? You don't look old enough to have much of a family."

"But I do. I have six daughters and a wife." I explained.

"With six daughters, I certainly hope there's a wife," she said and laughed. "No sons?"

"Nope, no son."

"I hear it's the man's fault when the children are all girls. Are you going to keep on trying until you get a son?"

"I wasn't trying the last time when we got the sixth girl. I stated. "It just happened, ma'am. We're looking for a way to put an end to having children. You see, we had planned to have four, but the fourth came as twins, making it five. This threw our plan right out the window. We then went to six." Both of us laughed.

"Have any good suggestions how I could put an end to this children thing, not have anymore?" I asked her.

Gracie laughed and said, "There are known ways one can prevent pregnancies. I'd think you must have heard of some by now, haven't you?"

"Yea," I answered, "but they don't seem to work for us. At least they have not up to this time. Seems like all I have to do is hang my trousers on the back of the chair in the bedroom and my wife gets pregnant."

"I certainly can't help you from my own experience," she said. "We never had any children. My husband passed away a few years ago I never became pregnant during the forty years we were married. We never found out whether it was his fault or mine. And here you are with six and

can't seem to turn off the faucet. Life can be so uneven, so unfair." A forlorn look came over her face. "And here you are going out to India with all those children. I have seen some of India's teeming millions in Bombay and Calcutta living under sub-human conditions. It is beyond the imagination! If I had a family of young daughters like you, I would have to search my conscience thoroughly, before deciding to take them to India. You are a brave man. Godspeed," she added.

"You see, U.S. assistance is all about helping the poor people of the world, like those you spoke of. Those kinds of people have far more meal times than they have meals. We hope that what I and others have come to do in agriculture production, over time, will make it possible for more people to produce more food. As long as they have food, people can live in caves, but without it they can't even live in the best of hotels."

"To that all I can say is the best of everything. You certainly seem to believe what you say," she added, giving one more adjustment to her hat.

"It's been a pleasure talking with you, ma'am. Continue to have a good journey around the world. I see we're near Karachi, where I get off to transfer to a flight to New Delhi."

"The pleasure's mine," she said, turning to gaze at the approaching landscape. The red, tile roofs of the Pakistani city and its mosques and minarets seemed to be just beneath the wheels of the plane as it glided gradually down to the runway for a smooth landing. The "dam Dutch" had done it again. As we taxied to the terminal, I was lost in the thought of Loretta and the girls' so far away and still having to come by the Royal Dutch Airlines to Karachi without me.

The Desert Dance

For the final segment of the journey, I transferred to an Indian Airlines DC-3, WWII vintage, piloted by two turbaned Sikhs. So too was my seat mate, dressed in neat western clothes, with a classy looking turban, and a tightly pulled shiny beard. He spoke to me in what I assumed to be Hindi. Seeing me struggling to respond with a puzzled look on my face he came to my rescue in English.

"You are Hindustani, aren't you?"

"No, I'm American," I responded.

"Sorry, you look so much like one of us."

"There's some American Indian in my family. I'm Harold Jones, headed to Bhopal." I explained the purpose of my journey.

"Delighted to meet you Mr. Jones, my name is Ball Singh. Let me be the first to welcome you to India. We need all the help we can get from people like you."

The noisy twin-engine DC-3 lifted off the tarmac and headed for the Indian border. Buoyed by the hot desert air as it began to skirt the edge of the Great Indian Deserts the plane began flopping

about like a drunken duck. One had the feeling of being thrown about rather than being flown. Vast areas of this plant-sparse, sand-bullied landscape showed minimal animal life or human habitation. Only small villages and herds of goats raising trails of dust, could occasionally be seen.

“We are nearing our first stop, Jodhpur,” Mr. Singh informed me. “See the hill and rocks in the distance, and the lake there with the buildings? Those are the palace grounds of the Maharajah of Jodhpur. The palace is reported to have 250 rooms built back in the 1920s. Maharajahs means ‘great kings.’ They no longer rule these territories since we gained our independence. We now have state and central governments for governing the country. The palaces are used to live in, but mostly for ceremonial purposes. The Maharajah here is but a young boy and I believe is at the private, preparatory school for boys, called Eton, in the UK.” Mr Singh explained.

“Thanks for all the information. You seem to know your country well,” I commented.

The DC-3 danced down, swaying from side to side in a crosswind and scattering thin layers of sand on the tarmac from the sand dunes at its sides. The few minutes at the sand-dusted airport with minimal facilities did little to ease the wooziness brought on by the jostling flight from Karachi. No one got off or on. Only a few bags probably mail, were loaded on and the desert dance was resumed until we reached Ajmee, the last stop before the 200 plus miles to New Delhi. The landscape showed a much stronger expression of plant life, nothing suggestive of an Amazon, but sufficient enough to increase the frequency of village life and animal activity. As the sun moved just over the edge of its horizon of sand Ajmer came into sight in a rocky valley, a lake was visible with a collection of good looking buildings lining its shores. Mr. Singh explained it was one of their ancient cities and that the wall surrounding the city had five entrance gates. He told me of a tomb in the city for the Muslim Saint Kwnaja, revered as a place of pilgrimage.

“It’s also a center of education with Ajmer College which is linked to Calcutta University and Mayo Rajkumar for the education of noble Rajputs.” Again I thanked him and praised his knowledge of the place.

The brief stopover was as uneventful as that in Jodhpur with the exception of taking on two passengers. One was a phenomenally beautiful Indian woman, wrapped in a sari which seemed to have “expensive” written all over it. Exuding a look of royalty, she had unlimited powers for generating wistfulness in any man. With daylight almost spent and the desert air temperature becoming considerably more pleasant, the DC-3 was off for the last leg of the big journey. I was secure with the thought that the trip was not as long as it had been and not as short as it was going to be. The flight proved to be much smoother and we were nearing the end of a long journey. My spirit soared to exaltation, which all but took me through the roof of the aircraft as New Delhi came into view. Its lights retread out endlessly across the flat plains. The metropolis was dimmed over by thin blue clouds of smoke drifting lazily from the thousands of wood and cow dung fires cooking the evening meals. The dependable “drunken duck” came to a bouncy rest on the tarmac of the New Delhi Airport. Eternity, lay behind me.

“Mr. Singh, you’ve made my introduction to India a pleasant one. I enjoyed sitting next to you. Hopefully, fate will see fit to have our paths cross again before I return to the U.S.” I said as I shook his hand.

He replied, "It has been my pleasure. If you are ever in Amritsar, I have a small cloth business there. You would be most welcome." We bid farewell.

The Newest of Delhies

At the terminal I was met by a contingent of American technical personnel assigned to various agricultural projects, headed by Earl Julson, a personable extension specialist from Great Falls, Montana. He had broad-shoulders, noticeably large hands, and a distinct Burt Lancaster look. His mouth tended to go askew as he smiled with almost every comment. Earl, along with a U.S. Embassy-employed Indian, who was apparently well-known to the custom officials, whisked me through customs rituals. The other eight or ten members of the welcoming party showered me with warm greetings, which gave me a genuine feeling of their sincerity, with one exception. During the introductions, I overheard one the party say quietly to another, "I hear he has a very large family. That's all India needs these days is another large family, especially all girls." Though it took some effort, I concentrated on all the genuine welcomes and let this remark pass without retort. I later learned that arrivals and departures of American personnel were taken very seriously and everyone was treated as a member of one big family. As we rode into town, Earl let me know that his family would not come for a while yet and that I would be staying with him in a bachelors setup.

"You've arrived a few hours ahead of one of India's biggest annual events, the Independence Day celebrations. It starts nine A.M. tomorrow morning, just a short distance from where I live," Earl informed me.

"They shouldn't have done it. I didn't expect such a welcome, but it's very decent of them," I commented.

"These are very considerate people," Earl replied as we both laughed.

Shortly, we were having dinner at Earl's quarters in a duplex housing project. Strictly bachelor style, the dinner was a potpourri of wild game and vegetables cooked beyond recognitions. It didn't taste bad. Thanks to the seasoning that came to its rescue. The graciousness and enthusiasm of my host made up for his lack of culinary skills. After some small talk about living in Indian, my eyelids grew heavy. Earl suggested we get a good night's rest, since I was worn down from the travel. The next day would be full attendance at the Independence Day parade, followed by an afternoon hunt in the Punjab.

First Day In India

My first sunrise on the sub-continent of India shone dim through the ever present morning hale of smoke that hung upon the cool morning air. Beneath the smoky haze, the city of New Delhi was ablaze in mosaic splendor, heightened by millions of blossoms woven into garlands of every conceivable color. The Independence Day celebration had begun and Earl had worked us into an enviable position to view the parade. I watched this spectacle in awe of the Masses of humanity, animals, vehicles, and military equipment. School children were clad in all colors of school

uniforms, bands were draped in gold and navy uniforms, together with colorfully regimented elephant, camel, and cavalry brigades. It went on and on. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru passed on foot barely a few yards from us. Smiling incessantly and possessing a humble, friendly, and unruffled demeanor, he slowly moved among the masses, shaking hands, giving special attention to the children. India's teeming millions had become a reality to me. They all seemed to be there.

It took a special kind of adroitness to avoid being trampled when the parade was over. Earl's experience came in handy for getting us back to his place. After a cold drink, a bowl of Earl's warmed-over stews, hard-crust rolls, and some black Montana-brewed coffees strong enough to jump-start a car, we were ready for the afternoon hunt. Earl supplied me with a shotgun and we stowed the water jug in his Jeep. We were heading north to a location he had hunted before, crossing the Jumna River to reach the Grand Trunk Road, a major artery that ran from Kashmir to Calcutta. That day it was jammed with holiday travelers, as well as the usual traffic: trucks, cars, bullock and horse carts and bicycles.

Eventually we left the congestion behind, reaching open countryside. Turning off the main road, we followed an irrigation canal through farmland and villages, giving me my first look at India's rural poverty. Irrigation and farming tools were at their most basics and living conditions were impoverished. There was little activity due to the holiday, aside from tending to domestic animals and the perpetual collection of dung for cooking fuel. "About sixty percent of India's domestic fuel is cow dung," Earl commented.

Beyond the farms was an area of gullies coffered with scrub plants, a popular grazing spot for the chincara, or ravine deer. They are small, fawn-colored antelope, with both male and female sporting horns, so one had to take care to avoid shooting a doe. Earl explained their habit of bolting when startled, only to halt after fifty yards to look back, made them rather cooperative targets.

Earl perched atop a ridge while I scouted the ravines. It wasn't long before we had each bagged a buck and were heading back to New Delhi in the twilight, making much better time on our return trip. At Earl's place we salted the hides and prepared the meat for freezer storage. Over a dinner of liver and onions we exchanged hunting stories from Montana and Virginia. Then I had to give in to exhaustion, ending a memorable first day in India.

Being Stuffed With More About India

On my second day in New Delhi, I began a two-week orientation intended to prepare me for my field assignment in Bhopal. The priority for the day was spending time with Grace Langley, the organizer and animator of the program. Grace was a very striking, personable lady from Minnesota. According to Earl, she had been an assistant to Senator Hubert Humphrey of the same state. Grace went straight to the point, gave a clear succinct picture of the structure of the orientation, and handed out packets containing detailed instructions for the next two weeks.

"I hear you're staying with Earl Julson," she said as I took leave. "Our bus will come for you every morning."

“Thanks, I look forward to an interesting two weeks.” I responded.

On my way out I met Eddie Daniels, an economist from Kentucky and also a newcomer. He had already seen Grace, and agreed heartily with my praise of her. We seemed to hit it off right from the beginning, maybe because we both saw humor in most things, and laughed at of each other’s jokes. Eddie was about five feet, seven inches tall and his graying hair had distinct cowlicks on each side and was thinning on top. For the most part, he carried a very sober look which, without the slightest provocation or warning, could burst suddenly into a smile and loud laughter, easily followed by some sort of earthy saying or joke. He showed me a picture of his family, and his children looked quite young to have middle-aged parents. I already had six and was considerably younger. He had no doubt spent more time pursuing academic accomplishments, having a Ph.D. in economics, than thinking about marriage and procreation. But by own standards and biases, he was headed in the right direction, starting with two daughters.

The rest of the day was spent meeting the members of the U.S. development assistance family, referred to as TOM (Technical Cooperation Mission). Heads of divisions, their staff, and mission support services personnel were warm, friendly, and impressive. I had the feeling I could count on the system to give the needed support in the field and that I could concentrate on the project to which I was assigned.

None was more striking than my agriculture department head, Dr. Frank Parker. An experienced agriculturist, he was tall, straight, and white-haired, with a constant, gentle smile that seemed linked to his eyes. He was clearly one of the most impressive in the mission: confident, encouraging, and quietly personable with a gentle sense of humor. He gave me a rundown on India’s agriculture program and what my project was designed to accomplish. He had an incredible knack for making one feel good about being on his team. The office support staff of Indian secretaries had strikingly good looks, warm personalities, and were competent. My eyeing mechanism had been fully exercised. I thought of Loretta’s all too frequent reminder: Be strong and resistant, eyes on, hand off, and remember, I always put the blame on the man and never the woman. The limits were clear.

The bus came regularly each morning like a school bus to pick up the orientees. Near the end of the run, Grace, the coordinator, would board. On the first day, I had taken my seat beside Eddie Daniels and we had decided that there should be a special way to recognize Grace’s presence as she boarded the bus, something that had a devilish touch but expressed our sincere appreciation for a top-notch coordinator. We decided to have the group sing: “Amazing Grace how sweet the sound to save a wretch like me. I once was lost but now I’m found; was blind but now I see.” Being the kind, pleasant person she was, Grace gave a slight bow and smile of recognition of the group’s off-tune singing. It also seemed to have a wake-up effect on us all.

In some areas the two-week program repeated my orientation in Washington, but was more specific. Indians coming from universities, government, religious groups and other private organizations dominated these presentations. U.S. Embassy personnel taught us in on how to behave and how to preserve and build the American image while contributing to India’s development. India desperately needed to become self-sufficient in basic food grains; for years it

had suffered a deficit. The Indian professionals, sociologists and historians as well as the bureaucrats, provided insight on how to survive and adapt to India's social Patterns. Their information left me with the impression that the farther you set from the Department of State Headquarters in Washington the closer you were to reality. Maybe that's the way it's supposed to be. We had the advantage of being in the midst of it all, and the field trips we made brought the whole picture of India into an even sharper focus. The contrast between rich and poor became evident on a trip to Old Delhi, where gold and silver were being fashioned into exquisite jewelry alongside dirt and poverty where the sunlight never entered. Dark, one-room hovels, sheltering as many as twenty people, on streets so narrow that two people had to turn sideways to pass, stood next to the grand and glorious monuments of old. The most impressive of these were works of Shah Jahan, the seventeenth century Mogul emperor and founder of the City of Delhi: the Jama Masjid, India's largest mosque, and the Red Fort, a magnificent sandstone structure. I had never seen such exemplary architecture indicative of Mogul refinement. Salmon pink in color, it was for me a picture of enchantment, and definitely one of the extraordinary sights of India.

In Old Delhi, people seemed to lose their identity and blur into one mulled mass that moved like a monolith. The cows, in sacred immunity, roamed or lay in the streets. They seem neither tended nor owned, nibbling from food stalls or patches of grass, and impeding traffic. The main road, the Chandni Chauk, a wide thoroughfare, had nearly a mile long strip of warehouses and shops, where a staggering mountain of gold, silver, and embroideries could be purchased. Our tour took us along the road runs from the Red Fort to the old walled city, with even more ancient monuments. Eight capital cities had been founded overtime in the Delhi area. Few things in the area were more striking than the mausoleum of the Emperor Humayun, the Qutab Minar, a 238 foot tower from the twelfth century, and the iron Pillar of Rsja Dhavs, which is 319 feet tall.

The many scholarly presentations given us during orientation were hardly a thumbnail sketch of the vast history of India. But we had been stuffed with enough information, including dos and don'ts, that would take a lifetime to use up. The time came to move on to Bhopal and Budni, the "doing" end of why I had come to India. I was ready, keeping in mind my grandma's words. "Every devil has to figure out his own salvation."

After two weeks of Earl's and my cooking, and a good number of invited-out meals, I showed no signs of the much talked about affliction of dysentery, better known as Delhi Belly. I was assured that it was simply delayed, because as sure as night follows day, no newcomer was spared. There is even a more devastating variety called amoebic dysentery. Fortunately my initiation to India included neither.

With a newly-issued green Jeep station wagon, DL371, a cache of the U.S. Embassy commissary items, and my air freight containing among other necessities, my trusty Springfield WWI, 30-06 rifle and a shotgun, I was ready to start my trek south to Bhopal. The familiarization with the ICA administrative structure and its support system had given a feeling of confidence that field people would be properly looked after. My 400-500 mile journey to Bhopal, the capital of central India's Madhya Pradesh State, had finally begun.

Driving On The Wrong Side

Driving on the wrong side, the left, that is, of India's bumpy, dusty, pot-holed fareways, one soon got the idea that every inch required weaving and veering amid waves of animals and what someone once referred to as "unthinking humanity." Evidently, there was an unwritten law that gave the country's mobile big-mass a right to share the road, and to take their share from wherever they wish. The first priority went to the millions of almond-eyed, large, white bullocks with colorfully-decorated horns and necks, often seen in cart convoys of fifty or sixty, all following the lead cart even when the drivers went to sleep. Bullock-powered carts carried the bulk of the country's cargo. An occasional Arabian one-hump camel with an unromantic snooty look plodded along on broad-toed cushioned feet. They were hitched to a four-wheeled cart, higher at the rear, with shafts and straps that seemed to defy the laws of leverage, with carves stacked higher than the camel's head. Herded and unheeded cattle, buffaloes, donkeys, sheep, goats, and loose fowl all had equal rights to the center of the road. People on bicycles and foot seemed to hold second priority, and the third place went to trucks and smaller vehicles. Increasingly, motorized vehicles were gaining in prominence and challenging the more traditional means of transport.

Monkeys of many kinds played along the tree-lined roads. The only critters that reacted to car or truck horns were goats. They jumped off the road if they could find the room when blown at. The rest exercised their rights and moved as the spirit dictated, but the spirits didn't do much dictating. Bumping rear ends and rubbing sides was a constant amid the mixture of movements.

India built its roads with dirt from along the side thrown up on the roadbeds to give it a slight raise. In February, the dry season, the roadbeds turned into loose particles which seemed to delight in flying into the air when stirred by the slightest breeze or traffic motion. The big Mercedes and British Leylands trucks cause the roadbed to gradually become airborne, temporarily blinding all travelers.

Once visibility returned was and the Jeep was not bumping up against some animal's rear end, I was able to observe the passing landscape. Scattered across the flat plains between New Delhi and Agra was village after village with clusters of mud-walled houses. It is estimated that seven to eight-tenths of India's millions of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians still live in the countryside. I came to know them as mostly simple, peaceful, illiterate farmers, endowed with hand tools, draft animals, and small acreage. The villagers constructed their mud-walled homes and compounds from dirt dug from a common pit at the edge of the village compound. The first monsoon rain filled the holes, which became the village water reservoirs. In it people wash their clothes, dishes, pots and pans, watered the animals and bathed. Its water was used for drinking, cooking, even the call of nature got answered in the same vicinity. In early February, more than halfway through the dry season, the ponds were mostly used up and the water turned murky and rank covered with its green scum.

Green patches of crops spread from the village and gave a little relief from the brown dusty countryside. A few sparsely scattered trees about the farmland and villages provided shade for the farm workers from the scorching sun of the dry season and broke the monotony of the open plains. The first, tiring 125-mile segment of my drive in India brought me to Agra, the site of the famous Taj Mahal and Akbar's Tomb. A much needed lunch break at the town's tourist hotel came to my rescue none too soon. It was a pleasant place with old, snarled shade trees and neatly arranged

gardens struggling against the dusty dehydrating air of the dry season. Maintaining this semblance of flowering beauty was a corps of men with watering cans.

I had arrived in the middle of lunch hour. The young Indian maitre d' sized up my dusty condition quickly as I stood in the dining room entrance. He came over and said, Perhaps Sahib, you would like to use the men's room. You seem to have collected much dust in your travel. It is just around the corner to your right, he said and pointed. Some beating and shaking got most of the dust out of my clothes, and with water and soap I flushed away several layers of dust from my hair, neck, face, nostrils and hands. I felt lighter and refreshed. My appetite needed no further stimulation. The big, white-walled dining room had high ceilings and was furnished with lights and fans. The refreshing ambiance eased my nerves, sorely tried by the hassle of the road. Only a couple of wealthy-looking Indian men and a half dozen Europeans were dining. They were hardly enough to keep the white-uniformed waiters busy. At least half were standing around. I ordered tomato juice and chicken with vegetables, rice, carrots, gram (chickpea) and gravy. This was followed by hot lime tea and biscuits. I skipped dessert, which I had been told was the wise thing to do, since it had the risk of dysentery. The cooking was bland British-style, but the chicken nonetheless was quite tasty, although it required some extra chewing.

From Agra it was on to Gwalior approximately seventy miles away. South of Agra the volume and variety of traffic had lightened, but there were at least two funeral processions of a few hundred people and a wedding party. The bride rode in a covered, slow-moving, bullock cart hidden from view, and was followed by long throngs of people, all playing havoc with my average speed. As the road sloped down, I arrived at the one major obstacle of my trip; the Chambal River. One could be delayed for hours waiting to cross by flat-bottom boat. At the river bank traffic was backed up with trucks, cars, more bullock carts, and herds of sheep and goats, giving me concern that nightfall could catch me here. The roadside and riverbank were strewn with signs of those who had spent their nights waiting. People milled about buying food from vendors, bathed in the river, drank, filled all sorts of containers with river water, watered their animals and kept them corralled for the crossing. The flat-bottom boat, partly poled and partly engine cowered, kept shuttling back and forth over the few hundred yards of water with loads fitted as tightly as sardines in a can. They hardly kept abreast of the growing accumulations on both banks of the river.

"How much longer will it take?" I asked a couple of Sikh truck drivers leaning against their overloaded Mercedes truck.

"With no ferry breakdowns, at least two hours," they replied. "We won't have to wait like this a year or two from now, God willing. The government is to construct a bridge a hundred yards down the river."

Two hours passed. The Sikh's prediction was right on. I was beckoned to drive my Jeep along the left edge of the ferry with hardly five inches to spare. Nervous in this precarious position, I was ferried across. The wet slope of the far bank called for considerable acceleration and four-wheel drive. Suddenly I was driving along the Chambal river ravines, a great expanse of crisscrossed hills and hollows twelve to fifteen feet deep, and reputed to be a hideout for dacoits (robbers) who often preyed upon travelers. Their exploits and uncanny moves to elude the police

were well-known and often a topic of conversation at all levels. Several people had told me about them in New Delhi. Not until the ravines were well beyond my rear view mirror did my feelings of foreboding ease off. With only an hour or so of daylight left, the remainder of the trip to Gwailior was relatively traffic-free and less demanding.

Gwailior, a City of 200 to 250 thousand was known for its high-quality, colorful pottery. At the first service station I filled up and got perfect directions for finding Mr. and Mrs. Bell, a couple from Arkansas with whom I was to spend the night. Mr. Bell was an extension specialist. The straight, wide tree-lined tarmac west of town led me to their European-type residence, no doubt a leftover of the British days. His green Jeep station wagon, the same as mine, and a standard TCM mission issue for field folk, pin-pointed their house on a small road right of the thoroughfare. I had phoned ahead from Delhi headquarters so the Bells were expecting me, though I was a bit late, understandable in India. They were in the midst of a devoted British ritual, afternoon tea. Both came to the closed gate with their dog to welcome me, the dog being less than cordial, but under control. Mrs. Bell immediately called her male Indian housekeeper to take my teas and show me my very clean and neatly arranged room. It was a great relief to find that their shower was working. With layers of dust gone I felt almost human again. I joined them for tea on the front porch of their very adequate, single-story bungalow. The setting sun shone through a wall of bush and trees laden with climbing vines casting long evening shadows and dust-specked rays across the entire front of the house. The home-made chocolate chip cookies, Mrs. Belle's handiwork, made this tea time a special high. Much of the conversation centered on our respective families. The Bells were approaching the senior citizen status and their children were grown. Small talk continued until nightfall, including a lot of advice regarding servants, until a bell announced that dinner was ready. Mrs. Bell was quick to admit that she had helped with the preparation of dinner. Her servants were gradually, but reluctantly, changing over from the somewhat insipid British version of cooking, to Arkansas culinary arts. Our dinner was a same stew of antelope, potatoes, carrots, served with local greens, gravy, home made bread, cookies and ice cream for desert all tasty and enjoyed by candlelight.

The Bells seemed relaxed and very comfortable living in India, probably a bit lonely and less than fully integrated socially with the local residents. They spoke of their visits to the Maharaja and the Marharani, useful contacts. He was reputed to be a very fine gentleman and still very popular with the people who were happy and prosperous during his rule prior to India's independence. Yet acceptance of the basic elements of the American agricultural extension approach was not going like wildfire, as Mr. Bell had hoped.

The next morning, after a breakfast of scrambled eggs, toast, jam and coffee, Mrs. Bell presented me with a teas of her chocolate chip cookies to take along on the last leg of my trip, about 240 miles. The Bells led the way until I was through town and on the right road south towards Bhopal. A toot on the horn and a wave beneath a pleasantly bright morning sky, and I was off.

The Last Leg To Bhopal

All of a sudden India was showing the spaciousness of a totally different landscape. The flat plains had turned to hills and valleys full of trees and bush, with small to massive rock outcroppings and a few low-lying wetlands where various wild waterfowl bathed. The tarmac

road, though chipped and pot-holed, was comfortably free of traffic as it snaked its way south in the direction of Bombay. Some of the long unpopulated stretches gave me reason for concern in case of breakdown. I encountered several forty to fifty bullock cart convoys. An American soldier stationed in India during WWII had told me that these convoys traveled all night, all carts following the lead bullocks while the drivers slept. Sometimes, in a prankish mood, the GIs would turn around the lead cart, all other carts following, in the opposite direction they were traveling. The innocent frustrated drivers must have blamed the spirits for their predicament the next morning. The GIs never followed up to see the unhappy results of their joke.

I passed several towns along the way before coming into Guna, where I could top off my gas tank and relax under a big banyan tree for a few minutes. Back on the road I observed partly deteriorated stone palaces of former eras situated on higher ground and perhaps still occupied by deposed princely rulers and their families. I reached Biaora, a small market area and my turnoff point for Bhopal. A small mango grove a few hundred feet off the dusty gravel road looked innocent and safe enough to have a drink and a bite to eat. Hardly had I stopped the Jeep when there appeared at least a half dozen people gathered around to look. I had been told that in India where there are no people, there are people. They tried to speak to me in Hindi, but my puzzled look and unresponsiveness seemed to give them the answer. I explained that I was American and was headed to Bhopal. I started up again. Soon I was billowing dust on the narrow circuitous road to Narsingarh, where the town's most prominent landmark, the palace, stood tarnished with its moldy, darkened exterior. The remaining road to Bhopal was the worst yet. Ruts and rocks kept me shifting back and forth across the road searching for the least damaged patches. Many had come before me and set the pattern for driving over this stretch of road. Finally, the last two miles of the more than 10,000 mile from Tennessee were in sight. I saw Bhopal in the distance, perched on a modestly raised plateau above a lake, the palace grounds being visible at the highest point. The palace grounds were my destination. I spotted an old bearded man, seemingly content with the world, sitting on a stone beside the road. I inquired of him how to reach there.

Bhopal Palace Arrival

I drove through the gates leading to the Palace grounds. I passed a mosque. I stopped and got directions from a young man standing at the mosque entrance to where the "Amereicans" lived. On the way I was beset with mixed feelings. I had never been on palace grounds. How did one behave in such a royal setting? What kind of image were we likely to give to the door villagers whom we had come to help? I knew that India had already set in motion a policy to narrow the economic gap between its super rich royalty and its poor masses. I made up my mind we would make the adjustments and maintain a balanced image across the social spectrum.

The palace road ended at a pavilion. It was the home of George and Velma Puckett. George was an extension advisor to the State of Madhya Prsdesh. Bhopal was the capital. George and Velma, without children, greeted me on the steps accompanied by their two dachunds. "The building on the other side of the roundabout is where you will live." George pointed out. "Come inside and we'll have some coffee and chat. There's only one thing better than a cup of coffee and that's another cup," George added.

I saw what he meant as he chugged down his first cup, black and steaming, followed immediately by another. To my cup I added some sugar and milk, which was apparently against George's coffee creed.

"Ever try making a custard out of it?" he joked.

"I drink coffee for what you can put in, and not for the coffee itself," I countered.

"I was out to your training center location in Budni some weeks ago," George said, turning to more serious topics. "Just a few paces from what will be your quarters stood a huge male Bengal tiger, as motionless and regal as a stone carving. It is really wild jungle out there. Did you bring any guns with you?"

"Yes, I have an old, note old, WWI 30-06 rifle and a 20 gauge shotgun," I responded.

"They don't recommend anything that light if you plan to hunt tigers," George added as he puffed away on the rest of his cigarette.

"Well, George, if I decide to go after tigers and leopards, and if I can get close enough to make a solid hit in the right place, using soft-nose or silver-tipped ammunition, they will tumble."

"I hope you're right, but it's dangerous business, even with the big guns which have the extra shock power. I have a .375 caliber, the lightest they recommend for tigers," he warned.

Velma broke in, "Oh, we forgot to tell you. There's already some furniture sent down from New Delhi and a guest kit already in your pavilion to help you get started. Why don't you come over tonight for dinner with us and come back for breakfast tomorrow morning?"

"Thanks, that awfully kind of you. I shall be more than happy to join you and talk a bit more about the place and people here. Tomorrow I plan to run out to Budni to pay a visit to the first and newly appointed officer in charge of the training center."

"One more thing," said George, "Tomorrow morning after breakfast, I can take you up to meet Mashuq Ali, the key administrator to His Highness the Nawab, to do the necessary paper work for the rental of your pavilion. The cost is \$65.00 per month; utilities are extra. Mack, the Nawab's private pilot, and his servant, Seamy, are living in the back end of the Pavilion, but they are looking for a place to move to and may well be gone by the time your family arrives, which we understand is six months from now."

"That's right, Loretta and the girls will join me in June. Thanks for all your help. I look forward to being with you tonight for dinner," I confirmed and rose to leave. "By the way, some mail came here for you," Thelma said, handing me some letters.

Thanks so much, I see one from Loretta and the girls. I'm anxious to see how they're getting along."

I made it as far as the front steps of the pavilion then plopped down and ripped open the letters. Loretta and the girls were fine and making progress in their preparations for moving to India. Innoculations and check-ups were going well with one exception. Carol, number three, pitched a few tantrums when the nurse approached with a needle. She finally gave in, but not before swearing she would someday become a nurse just to get even. News from home overshadowed my travel weariness.

The other letter, with a U.S. Department of Agriculture seal on the envelope, was a bit of a mystery. It was from Mr. Elan, the supervisor for the African--American Vocational Agriculture Teacher-Training program in the seventeen southern and southeastern states, which had segregated school systems. The letter read: We got rid of the wrong man. Good luck on your two year tour in India. Contact me when your two years are up.

Got rid of the wrong man. What did all of that mean? Then I recalled that I had accompanied Mr. Elam on one of his trips to West Tennessee. He seemed unhappy with the work of Chief Flowers, my old boss who was also in charge of the teacher-training program in Tennessee. Quickly it dawned on me. The application for the job in India which Chief Flowers had given me, and had resulted in my now sitting on those steps in Bhopal, had been meant for him. Innocently, and without a clue of the politics involved, I had gotten the job.

No doubt Elam had instigated this ploy from the federal level to entice Flowers from his state job. Chief might have had some idea of what was going on, and in passing the application to me, made me the wrong man to which the letter referred. It was thus by coincidence that I had joined the Foreign Service, and that proved to be the biggest and best one in mine and my family's life.

After a cursory look over the pavilion, its vastness left me with a lost and empty feeling. Exactly what had this building been used for? The slightest movement inside created echoes that bumped about the ceilings. The lights and plumbing worked well and the place was clean. Beds were in place, sent down from New Delhi by the Technical Cooperation Mission's support services. I had a good sleep my first night. In spite of the feeling of being in a big, roofed-over piece of outdoors, I felt secure, thanks to the palace grounds being guarded.

Late in the evening, I was visited by a young Indian lad, inquiring whether I needed a driver. He possessed a driver's license, a high school diploma and several other papers that were quite worn and dirty. Each told what a fine young man he was. After a short interview, I decided to give him a try. His English was good and he spoke Urdu and Hindi. Quite diminutive, he would no doubt need to sit on a couple of pillows to see over the steering wheel. He was a handsome lad, aggressive, self-assured, and intelligent. His apparent dedication to the Muslim way of life seemed total. His name was Abdul Rafiq Khan (Rafiq means Friend.)

Come tomorrow about 10:00 A.M. and ride with me out to Budni, I told him. "I'll give you a road test to see how well you drive."

Dinner afterwards with the Pucketts and their other guest. Paul Hassar was a good chance to get filled in on what it was like to live in Bhopal and on the palace grounds. Small talk about servants, together with the latest gossip on His Highness the Nawab and his two wives, made up most of

the dinner conversation. Much of the focus was on the younger wife, the junior Begum, who deviated too from the public's expectations of royalty. She was said to be a local commoner, a dancing girl with Anglo-Indian looks, and lacking the social graces for royalty. In spite of the public's obvious disapproval of her shortcomings, the Nawab provided her with attention and material needs in keeping with her junior royal status. The senior Begum, a descendant from Afghanistan's royal family, apparently met with everyone's approval.

The number-one gossip link between the Pucketts, the palace and local happenings was Paul Hanger, the other dinner guest. From Germany, he was the palace grounds engineer. When he spoke, which was plenty, his strongly accented English and his insider knowledge commanded an attentive audience. His ruddy face, golden wavy hair and white flashy teeth went well with his strong physique. He gave an interesting run down of the royal family's history, their good side, quirks, and quaint actions. For the most part, Paul had the center stage. To me he was an adult version of the Katzenjammer kids, those mischievous young imps of the 1920s and 30s comic strips, or Dennis the Menace. Paul often betrayed the royal family's trust, as when he was assigned to escort home guests who had over imbibed at the Nawab parties. He sometimes fueled the rumor mill of the conservative Muslim community by purposely switching spouses of the drunken couples.

Velma was the number-two gossip link. George got in a word sideways every now and then. I mostly listened. My few comments about my experiences in Germany slowed Paul down and caught his attention. Velma was proud to show off her cook. Aziz. She had taught him to bake good bread, loaves, rolls, and buns. Her training had hit the target and saved him from the art of butchering food the way the British had earlier taught him. Tall and slender in stylish Muslim dress, including a head piece, he served with pride a variety of well-prepared vegetables. The meatdish was nilgai {blue cow}, a large Indian antelope. Aziz had a modest, continually pleasant smile, which my copious compliments on his cooking and serving never failed to affect. My refusal to drink coffee at night didn't seem to sit well with the rest of the heavy coffee drinkers around the table. Aziz was too happy to prepare for me some tea with lime. George's assault on the coffee was extreme and his hands shook slightly as he lifted his cup, betraying his dependence on coffee and cigarettes.

The evening was interesting with its local news, information, and gossip as seen through a foreigner's eyes. I enjoyed it, but succumbing to my weariness, I was the first to turn in, thanking my host and saying good night to Paul. I trudged back across the moonlit, flowered walkway for my first night in the vast rambling pavilion. My long day ended in a night that went without any interruptions.

Upon completing the usual morning routine of shaving, cold water showering, and minimal preening the next day, I went to breakfast with George and Velma. I was very pleased to find eggs, hashbrown potatoes, toast and jam, and (guess what?) plenty of coffee. Without it, I don't think George could have found his Jeep keys. Velma quizzed me on the plans for the girls' schooling. Back in U.S. Velma had been a Primary school teacher. I told Velma that Loretta was also a teacher and planned to set up a home school for the girls.

“That kind of things always intrigued me.” Velma remarked, and I have often wondered how a mother/teacher combination on a sustained basis would work out.

“We aren’t sure how it’ll all turn out, but we don’t have many other options. The school material will arrive by air freight, and I’m going to turn one of the rooms into a classroom before the family gets here,” I explained.

The morning stroll to the Nawab’s palace with George was pleasant and exhilarating. A brilliant sun out of a deep-blue, cloudless sky sent rays through the trees and shrubs. One could discern that some of the palace’s ostentatiousness was beginning to fade. The bright green mosque, still much in use by the town’s public, was well maintained. As we passed through the main gate of the palace grounds the bronzed monarch himself, riding high in the operator’s seat of his red tractor, whisked past us and gave a semblance of a nod.

“That’s His Highness, the Nawab,” George noted. “He goes regularly to his farm these days where he does much of the work with his tractor.”

As we approached the palace, a gracious, most gray-haired lady sat relaxing in a rocker on the veranda with a shawl about her shoulders. She retained much of what must have been phenomenal good looks with a strong aquiline nose and pleasant face. She gave a pleasant “good morning,” and nodded as we climbed the steps.

George leaned in her direction saying. “Your Highness.”

I nodded and said, “Good Morning, Your Highness.”

“That’s the senior Begum,” George whispered.

We walked down the corridor lined with a number of items denoting past eras. One of the bigger and more eye catching was a grayish carriage with two extensions jutting out from each end for resting on men’s shoulders. George explained that it had been used to transport the Begums to public events and audiences with the townsfolk in the streets and public squares during their 200 year rule of Bhopal State. The Nawab was the first male monarch in two centuries. The one-way glass in the carriage allowed the Begum to see the people, listen to their concerns and complaints, and respond without being seen. This was in keeping with the Muslim way. Especially the women of high status were not to be seen in public places.

Climbing the stairs to Marshuq Ali’s office on the second floor presented a crammed display of hunting trophies. Many had lost their color and lustre, but they told the story of the grand hunting days of the monarch.

Marshuq Ali was partially hidden at his desk behind stacks of frayed and worn files. He greeted us with Salam U Lakum.” Mr. Jones, I assume, we have been expecting you. Welcome to India.”

“Thank you very much. I’m Harold Jones,” I responded as we shook hands. ‘It is nice to be here. We appreciate you allowing us to reside here on the Palace grounds. My wife and six daughters will join me in June.’”

“We must make things comfortable for our American friends who have come to help us. Marshuq Ali was a tall, gaunt, sunken-eyed, eagle-nosed gentlemen, who ran the business end of the palace. Muslim in every aspect: dress, mannerisms, religious dedication, and rationale. Somehow, I got the impression nonetheless that he might have a devilish streak near the surface. The rent agreement was simple. I paid the monthly rate of \$65.00 and the electric bill. The palace was responsible for the maintenance.

Royalty And The Palace

Ten years before our arrival the Nawab lost his power, but not his palace, to Indian Independence, together with over five hundred other princely rulers. The Nawab had been the only male in the royal lineage for two hundred years. He had two daughters, one living in Afghanistan. The family was receiving a Privy Purse from the government to maintain their previous life style, and had been allowed to keep a portion of their land holdings. Rumors had it that our Nawab got \$35,000 per month. The Bhopal Palace grounds were still highly livable, but a creeping shabbiness was visible. The main quarters of the palace had taken on the air of a museum, filled with a collection of interesting objects from other eras. The number of occupants had been dwindling, leaving more rooms than people to stay in them. The senior begum still lived there along with the junior begum. Respect for the family was still high but signs of their royalty seemed to be fading. The Nawab still had five, little-used planes, twelve vehicles, and an English pilot. His many hunting trophies were dusty and corroding. Prostate surgery in France and progressing age gave cause for him to order the removal of ceiling and wall mirrors from his pleasures playhouse down the hill from the palace, according to Paul Haggard, his German engineer. The 200-man hunting staff had been reduced to near zero. His Highness seemed content to spend lots of time driving a tractor at his farm a few miles from Bhopal. He had built a farmhouse, at the end of a lake, which from a distance, looked like a ship. The farmhouse was literally a game trophy museum. The stairs, balustrades and uprights were made entirely of deer horns. Animal heads looked at you from every direction. A few paces away from the country home was a village of abject poverty, populated by women.

“Why this?” I asked once Rafiq, my driver.

“This is where the ladies all lived to make the men happy when they visited His Highness.”

“What do they do now?” I inquired.

“Mostly they serve any men for small money.” he replied.

A remnant village of women who served guests’ needs in earlier times was still trying to survive on earnings offered from the world’s oldest exploitation. That the Nawab had established such a service for his guests brought to my mind the saying, “The advantage of being rich and famous is to be able to do things that don’t make sense.”

The Sixty Mile Last Leg

Rafiq showed up on time, 10:00 A.M. He wore a baggy, locally stitched khaki uniform and a dark-blue beret. There was a bit of disappointment on his face when I said, "Show me the way to Budni, I'll drive and I shall give you your driving test on the way back." The road down the hill from the palace made one moderate turn before turning up hill into town. I took the narrow, dirty city streets with open sewers running down each side through town until I reached a tarmac strip too narrow for two vehicles to pass without dropping off its badly chipped edges onto the rough bumpy shoulders. I drove through mostly flat countryside, crossing a causeway over a small glistening stream. A few slight bends, a modestly steep hill with rock outcroppings, and shrub bush were the only variations in the twenty-two mile ribbon of tarmac. Young green wheat and gram fields stretched out on both sides to rocky, distant hills. A few rasped, dirty children from several of the improvised huts watched over their animals who nibbled away at the sparse grass and bush at the ease of the road. The tarmac strip ended at a large village where a dilapidated sign read "Obaidullagang." It had a good-sized school, some shops, houses, and a police station. Following a ninety-degree turn onto a rutted gravel road, we came quickly to a stop. The iron gate at the railroad crossing was closed. Twenty minutes passed, and the train had not come. This I thought was carrying safety a bit to the extreme. Rafiq made some inquiries and reported back to me. People were arguing with the gateman but to no avail. Apparently the gateman felt a special obligation to keep all travelers safe and unharmed. This attitude was attributed to an encounter he had with Mr. Nehru. Once when Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister, and his entourage had arrived at the gate, one of the Prime Minister's assistants requested that the gate be opened. The Veteran refused. Mr. Nehru thereupon congratulated the gatekeeper and gave him a small reward for being a firm, dedicated employee. The moral of the story was that once the gate was closed, even if the Bombay-New Delhi Express has not even left from either end of its run a few hundred miles away, there was only one thing travelers could do; wait.

We finally continued our journey over rough dirt roads, snaking through jungles on both sides. We passed over several wooden bridges high above sluggish streams. They creaked and shook from the weight and motion of the vehicle. Not realizing that the plains we had crossed were elevated, I was surprised when we suddenly began a decent via hairpin curves to a distinctly flatter, lower level. Halfway down, Rafiq pointed out an area carved in the hillside where hundreds of decrepit cattle were kept, called Pinjrinpoles or gaushalts. He said the owners paid an eleven-rupee entrance fee for each animal to spend the rest of its life there. They roamed about the jungle all day, feeding on the grass and shrubs. At night they were corralled into thorn bush enclosures to be protected from marauding tigers' leopards, and hyenas.

The dirt road ahead seemed to go right to the top of the trees to meet the horizon in the distance. The jungle had begun to recede as villages and farms appeared. The crops were more wheat and gram, the basic food grains of the area. An occasional village pond could be seen.

The last few miles had more bridges across ravines and were lined by bamboo clusters and dense jungle. Another railroad crossing, this time with an open gate, and a left turn brought us into the village of Budni. There was a fairly well-kept elementary school and a whistle-stop railway station. The rest was a jammed series of dirty shops crowded with basic amenities: kerosene,

cloth, some hardware and basic food staples. A few tea stalls rounded out these minimal retail offerings. Being without was obviously a way of life, no different from most of the rest of rural India. A few more paces down the road. I came to the place on the other side of the world for which I started out six weeks ago. My first impression: Budni was definitely a one-step post. One step backwards and you would drop off the ease of the world into oblivion. There could be no place less basic than Budni.

After driving through the training center's main gate, we alighted from the Jeep with relief. Mr. E.G.K. Rao, the Officer-In-Charge, walked up to greet me.

"Welcome to India and to Budni. We are delighted to have You, Mr. Jones."

"Thank you, Mr. Rao, I'm delighted to be here," I shook his hands warmly.

"How do you like India so far?" he questioned.

"It is also way from where I started, but I'm sure we'll enjoy being here. My wife and six daughters will join me in six months when school is out in the USA."

Rao was a south Indian Brahman with a round, pock-marked face, a middle-aged bulge, and had short, curly, salt-and-pepper hair. He wore a flowing dress of white, thin, starched cotton. There was just enough of a pair of sandals on his feet to stop contact with the ground. Rao introduced me to his administrative officer, Mr. Varma, and Mr. Gansuly, the chief agronomist. Both extended pleasant welcomes.

"It is a great pleasure for me to meet the both of you" I said as we shook hands.

"Why don't we walk around a bit to see some of the place, and meet some of the staff before having some tea," Rao suggested.

"That's quite all right with me," I replied enthusiastically.

"Those are your quarters just ahead. We have done some renovating to make it livable for you. There is no electricity, running water, or indoor toilets. However, we do expect to have a generator for lights at night within a year. In two to three years we plan to have the center electrified."

Here I am two notches below living conditions of my boyhood in rural Virginia, I thought. The partitioned building, with a little ingenuity could be turned into a crude bachelor's quarters for the five-day work weeks I would spend at the center. All of the U.S. financed equipment, approximately \$120,000 worth for research and testing, had arrived. The young, technical staff of agriculture school graduates were struggling with the assembly of the equipment. Mr. M. L. Taneja, the chief instructor, joined the tour. He was a pleasant man of average height, a sturdy athletic type from the rugged Patan country on the northwest frontier of India. He seemed to be the practical mover and shaker of the place, perhaps because he was a graduate of the Presbyterian missionary agricultural college at Allahabad, known for its practical work-ethics

approach. I sized him up as the person to cultivate for setting the center's program established. The center consisted of no more than the remnants of old buildings left over from a jungle-warfare training camp used during WWII. Thick jungle still surrounded the outpost that housed the program's operation, staff, families, and trainees.

The tour ended back at Rao's quarters, where sitting on floor pads and propped up with bolsters, we engaged in one of India's favorite pastimes, having tea. The tea leaves were boiled in a pot with milk and sugar already in, and was strong enough to walk around and serve itself. I didn't care for it, but politeness prevailed. The biscuits, cookies to me, helped to cut the tea's strength. I even indicated that the tea was good. With the sipping in full swing, Rao went into a relentless chatter about the center and his prowess as a mechanical engineer. Much of the dialogue centered on the application of basic, mechanical engineering principles to farm machinery. He seemed to have all the answers to all the things about which I thought I had come to advise and assist. Why do they need me? I thought. I was beginning to feel inadequate. Why had I come 10,000 miles to have a counterpart of such great capacity. I wondered if this was a display of more saying than doing. Could there be a gap between rhetoric and doing? On the other hand, was there a greater capacity to say it than to do it? Could there be a rhetoric/doing gap? Let time and performance bring out the real truth, I concluded.

"Mr. Rao, have you ever been to the States?" I questioned.

"As a matter of fact, I was there for more than a year," he said. Pulling off his sandals and rubbing between his toes.

"What do you think of the place?"

"Technically, you are very far ahead, and I must say lots of good consumer items are available for the people. But spiritually I find the States terribly deficient. You see, when we visit the West, U.S. included, we must undergo a spiritual cleansing on return. Overtime we go through a series of rituals to regain our spiritual level. It has only been a short time since I completed my series to get me back to my accustomed spiritual level. We look at you people as advanced in the physical world of technology and materialism, but spiritually you are babes in the woods," he commented.

"We are all in the woods here at Budni, and it's going to take a lot of doing to get us out," I jokingly countered, but I got no reaction from anyone.

"Enough of the spiritual talk, Mr. Jones, I would like you to know that the Ministry of Agriculture has set July first, four and a half months from now, as the target date to formally open the center for training. This means we must have all the physical facilities in order, training programs in place, trainees selected and ready to begin. The instructors have been appointed; most of them you met today. Mr. Taneja is the chief instructor and is responsible for organizing and conducting the training Programs." Mr. Rao announced, as Mr. Taneja gave the now familiar, sideways Indian head nod. "By the way, the Central Tractor Organization headquartered in New Delhi, has a field office by the airport in Bhopal, and will send heavy equipment here to clear 200 acres of land for our farm machinery training and testing area."

“Gentlemen, I feel good despite the tiresome 10,000-mile trip to reach Budni. I’m glad to meet all of you. It’s good to get a first-hand feel of what we shall be trying to accomplish in the next few years. The July target date for opening appears to be reasonable. When I return next week, we can have a closer look at what needs to be done on this and what support the government in New Delhi should give to help us meet the deadline. I look forward to working with all of you and I know we’ll get the job done. Thanks for your hospitality. The tea is a little strong for me, but we can work on that over time.” They all laughed at that.

Return To Bhopal

Lengthening shadows were beginning to claim their daily place in the landscape as the sun hung momentarily on top of the distant hills. We were on the way back to Bhopal with Rafiq at the wheel for the first time. I was beset with a mixture of delight and apprehension. I watched closely how he maneuvered the rough spots, curves and hills. His way of handling the brakes, clutch, gear shift, and accelerator were under derailed scrutiny. Vehicle speed and clutch handling were the only thing that elicited criticism from me. He seemed to sulk a bit, but all and all he was doing quite well. Once I could relax, I focused on the delights of my new environment. A variety of wild game were on display in their natural habitat. The daytime feeders were beginning their retreat, while others began their night Prowl. Rafiq kept up a dialogue about them and their habits. Little wonder, much of his knowledge had come from his father who was an important member of His Highness, the Nawab’s hunting staff during the great days of his jungle forays. Several groups of Indian gazelles bounded from near the roadside across the cultivated areas, with their long graceful leaps. A black buck with white undersides and long, back spiraled horns accompanied with pride his light-brown herd of females. The heavily wooded area, about twenty miles long, brought on a display of several groups of langurs. These long-tailed, gray monkeys with shiny black faces and thin lips artistically framed with gray hair, resembled the serious faces of well-trimmed dignified gentlemen. Their short-lived curiosity gave way to long, ground-consuming leaps. They were as comfortable on the ground as in the trees. The females carried their babies clinging to their chest between the front legs. This in no way hindered their agility. Several sambhars, a large, six-pronged native deer with an erectile mane, accompanied by a group of smaller hornless females showed up several times. Their uniform brown color is the same for both sexes. Then a herd of ten to twelve spotted deer bounded across the road. A short distance away, they immediately braked en masse, turned, and looked. Rafiq yelled, Cheetal! Their hides are decorated by nickel to quarter-sized white spots on a fawnish-brown background. They resemble the American whitetail deer fawn, which loses its spots with age. The spots of the cheetal, however, become more prominent and beautiful with age. A male with six-pronged, thirty-inch antlers, two young bucks, and a number of does observed us with still attention. Spooked, no doubt, by our voices, smells, and movements, they gave a high-pitched yell and bounded away gracefully like Santa’s reindeer.

Several pairs of four-horned antelopes dashed across the road with lightening speed. At a safe distance, they slapped on their anti-lock brakes, being overcome by curiosity, and turned to look back. I was fascinated by their horn arrangement: two on each side of the head, with the rear two an inch or more longer than the front two. Called charsingha in Hindi {char-four, singha-horn), the little brown antelope is unique.

“The best meat,” Rafiq yelled, as they dashed away.

Wild peacocks, sour fowl, green pigeons, and small partridges appeared frequently as we went along. Rafiq noted that the small partridge or button quail were very much liked by His Highness, the Nawab. They help him do better with his women, he smiled. They were thought to be an aphrodisiac. A clumsily flying hornbill would at time show up along side the vehicle, adding a dash of color, piercing the air with its peculiar call.

Nearing the old cattle home we began our treacherous climb to the under plateau, and we encountered a sea of decrepit cattle hobbling back to their night shelter. They had scars, deformed legs, broken horns, leaking wounds, swollen udders; a livestock producer’s nightmare, but a veterinary apprentice’s training ground. As Rafiq slowly maneuvered past them, rubbing up against some and blowing his horn to get them to the side, he observed. “Many fat tigers and leopards live in this jungle making fodder of the cows.” The steer curves were skillfully negotiated by my trial driver. Rounding the curve at the top of the climb, a herd of wild pigs trotted along on the driver’s side. Rafiq spotted them, and without signaling, swung the vehicle to the right into an opening off the road. Sufficiently far away from the pigs, he steered back to the left side of the road.

When I questioned about his action, he said. “It is not good to run over the ground where pigs have crossed, if you avoid it. I was trying not to let them cross the road in front of us.” The real reason suddenly dawned on me, the Moslem aversion towards pigs.

“What if they would cross in front of you and you could not drive around them?” I questioned.

“We stop, let them run until they are out of sight, then we drive on. But if we have a chance not to let them cross in front of the car, we must do so,” he responded.

The famous railroad crossing was coming into sight. Off in the darkening distance a large cow-like animal stood motionless. Rafiq spotted it. “Nilgai over there,” he pointed out. “He is a very big Indian antelope and makes lots of meat,” he explained. High in front and sloping to the rear, he had two stout six to, eight-inch pointed horns, a short tail whisk, and feet that seemed to be clothed in white socks. Apparently he was determined to cross the road as he trotted in our direction. His short, stiff, black mane and cumbersome movement made him appear like a cross between a cow and a horse, suggesting a product of legislation, rather than a creature of nature’s design. He gathered speed and dashed across the road in front of the vehicle.

The railroad gate was open and we were back on the tarmac strip to Bhopal. Halfway down a straight stretch parking lights of a car shone in the distance as twilight disappeared from the sky. Rafiq pulled off on the shoulders and stooped.

“Why have we stooped?” I queried. There was no answer.

When the car had gone by, Rafiq answered. “His Highness, The Nawab, of Bhopal, passed.” He had pulled off in respect to His Highness.

“Rafiq, I have seen many shikar between here and Budni. I have for a long time been a shikari. I have brought my guns with me,” I told him.

“You a shakari?” Rafiq excitedly responded, repeating the word for hunter. “I will show you many good place to go for shikar.”

“Thank you. We shall see.” That was enough to set him the job, plus his good driving of course. Back at the pavilion, I told Rafiq, “there are a few things we need to talk about, like driving off the road for His Highness and driving around pigs and a few other small things about handling the vehicle.”

“How did I do?” he asked.

“You have the job, come back tomorrow,” I responded. He gave a big smile, a bit of a foot shuffle, bowed with thanks, and was off. This was the beginning of seven-and-a-half-year relationship that turned into a close friendship as time passed.

Bush Living - Budni The Work Place

On Monday, the twentieth of February, 1956, I started my official task: to help convert 200 acres of dense jungle surrounding a WWII jungle-warfare training center into a farm-machinery training and testing center. To me, this task had the ring of turning swords into plowshares. My initial visit to the Budni site left me with many questions: What could one technician in the remotest area of this vast sub-continent do? Why had the Indian government decided to build this center? What long-range significance or benefits would this center have on development of the agricultural sector and the economy of India?

No sooner had I arrived when Mr. Rao, the Officer-In-Charge, informed me that the Minister of Agriculture had requested my presence in New Delhi to discuss the project. I had a feeling that the minister wanted to be reassured that the center would open on schedule. I told Mr. Rao that I needed a few days to review and evaluate the situation, including having discussions with Mr. Tannin, the chief instructor, in order to determine what we had yet to accomplish and what the ministry could do to facilitate it. After some deliberation, we listed ten “must” items that the ministry would have to perform at their end. The first five had to be accomplished before the center could be opened, and the second five had to be done immediately thereafter to insure quality training. Rao then arranged an appointment for me on the following Monday morning.

Riding overnight on a clacking railroad car from Bhopal to New Delhi was not conducive to sound sleep. My compartment mate was Pritim Singh, a Sikh gentleman beyond middle-age. Congenial and talkative, Pritim welcomed me to India and apologized for the noise and dust as if he were responsible for them. The pitch-black night was pierced only by the dim, intermittent lights from the towns, and we tried to ignore the sudden jerks, noisy braking, and voices beneath the windows whenever the train pulled into a station. As Pritim settled into the bunk above me, his bed sagged into my air space, about a foot above my nose. The pleasantly cool, February air came through the open windows and apparently helped Pritim sleep well. He snored fitfully and

periodically broke wind, unaccompanied by the “excuse me,” which he had offered earlier in the evening. As for me, I slept fretfully.

When dawn finally arrived, Pritim descended from the top bunk and replaced his loose, billowing sleepwear with a robe tied at the waist. He started his morning ablutions, which included grooming his hair and beard and wrapping his turban, insuring that both tasks met century-old standards. This was my first encounter with these operations. I was convinced of the patience and skill required to handle this intricate task. Tradition requires that Sikh men allow their hair and beard to grow uncut. The beard is groomed with hair oil, that makes it shiny and manageable. Then it is rolled tightly against the chin and secured with a net Pritim accomplished this deftly, then swept his waist-length hair into a bun on top of his head and tied it with a strip of cloth. The crowning touch was a length of fabric that, when unfurled, reached from Pritim’s head down past his feet to spread across the compartment floor. With one end tucked around his top knot, he wound the cloth until he had shaped it into a turban. The wrappings rivaled those on a finished maypole. In contrast, my morning ablutions were simple: a quick face wash in the basin, a shave with a battery-operated razor, and finally a lick with my hairbrush and comb. I was ready for the day.

After forty-five minutes of starts, stops, squeaks and jerks, the train finally arrived at the New Delhi Station shortly after sunrise. Pritim Singh and I went through our glad-to-meet-you and good-bye rituals before disembarking from our dusty sleeping compartment. A half dozen taxi drivers with little boy helpers, and thousands of flies, swarmed around. The former trying to get passengers and the latter food and blood. An Indian railroad station is not just a place to embark and disembark from trains, but a living community. People beg, eat, sleep, wash, tend to children, barter, harangue, and perform religious rituals amid the bustle of travelers. Holding on tightly to my baggage, I weaved in and out of the crowds, selected a tonga (two-wheeled horse-drawn taxi), and was soon on my way to the Hotel Claridge, bouncing to the clackety-clack of horseshoes against the pavement. The rear end of the little horse had more scars than a Swiss watch has ticks, and the driver was using his stick as vehemently as a jockey urging his horse to the finish line.

“Why do you hit him so much?” I queried.

“He no go fast unless he get stick,” the driver replied.

We arrived at the hotel and I gave the driver an extra couples of rupees and suggested that he treat the horse better.

“Yeah Sahib, yeah Sahib, I will,” he replied, but I wouldn’t have bet on it.

After checking in at the hotel, I had time for a quick shower, breakfast, and a short nap before I left for the Ministry of Agriculture.

The meeting was held in the office of the Permanent Secretary. As I entered the office, he emerged from behind several high stacks of dog-eared files on his desk and shook my hand. I had seen a little of this file dilemma at Budni, but apparently at the government headquarters it was on a grander scale. The Permanent Secretary introduced me to the Minister of Agriculture, a short

man whose facial features strongly resembled a cross between an owl and a frog, with a continuous smile. As we seated ourselves in wooden, hardback chairs, the Minister remarked, "As you know Mr. Jones, the target date for opening the center is July first. Will the scheduled date be met?"

"With certain actions and decisions, Mr. Minister, made from your office as well as at the Budni site, the center could open on the target date. I have a list of ten tasks that we developed at Budni that require action on your part. Bear with me while I read the list." They listened, I think, as I described what Taneja and I had determined, but no discussion ensued.

After a significant pause, the Minister said, "Will the center open on July first?" It was becoming more and more apparent to me that a political commitment had been made to open the center on a certain date.

"Will your ministry accomplish the first five tasks set forth by mid-June?" I questioned.

He repeated the question three times and I gave the same reply three times. Then the Minister and the Secretary looked at each other, and slowly made that sideways nod that meant "yes."

"Does this mean you'll do all ten tasks set forth on the list in a timely manner?" I queried.

"Of course," they replied.

"If we receive your support to establish and operate a quality training and testing center, the center will open as targeted," I assured them. They listened attentively to my version of the time-phased development program being considered at Budni, which was to be operated with a practical technical, hands-on approach for both animal and motor-powered farm machinery and equipment. Over time the center would set the stage for increased application of machinery technology in India's agriculture.

After a profusion of thanks, handshakes, and well wishes, I was ready to return to Budni.

"Mr. Minister, I realize you have a busy schedule, but please visit us at Budni when you can," I said as I turned to leave.

"I shall," he assured me.

I had held my ground and they finally acquiesced to our terms.

Before leaving New Delhi I met Dr. Frank Parker, the U.S. Mission's agriculture officer, to bring him up to date on Budni, and assure him that things were going on planned. He advised me to keep him informed and that we should get together for lunch on my next visit. My last stop was at the U.S. Embassy commissary to purchase a few essential items not sold in Bhopal. It was now ready to be rattled back to Bhopal overnight. By a stroke of luck, I had the sleeping compartment to myself.

Lonesome

“What is hell — Hell is oneself. Hell is alone, the other figures in it merely projections. There is nothing to escape from and nothing to escape to. One is always alone.” —T.S. Eliot, 1950.

I had arrived at my place of work. The site was called Budni, remote and deep in the bowels of central India, a tropical Siberia surrounded by heavy brush jungle. A few hundred yards down the road was a one-whistle train stop and a destitute village of dingy shops that sold basic food grains, kerosene, cloth, sugar, and teapot stalls with dirt caked all around. Quickly, I sized up Budni as a one-step post. One step backwards, and I would step off the universe and float into eternity. I felt nothing lay beyond this place.

I soon learned that in Budni one could be subjected to two major kinds of blues: the hot, dry-weather blues, and the high-humidity, monsoon blues. Not much lay between these extremes. And in this habitat, I soon became a victim of a serious case of the loneliness blues. The temporary duration of this condition in no way affected the vital intensity of my experience. I understood most people undergo these feelings as a result of perceived deficiency in the social networks of their life. In my case, I had been temporarily cut loose from all that makes for a sense of belonging, family and community. Separation from my family had been inescapable as the girls had to remain in the States to finish out their school year, and I had to make money for the necessities to maintain the home: a piano, sofa, and king-size bed for Ma and Pa.

Everything in my new world was abruptly strange and different. My life had become extremely remote from any past experience. I arrived in the soaring heat and aridity of an Indian summer. In such an isolated place, Indian culture was quite difficult to break into for socially meaningful contacts that might have restored some of the loss in my sense of connection. I knew to be lonely was no sin and that the local people would voluntarily offer little to make me feel a part of them. Their customs and conservative ways did not allow them to meet me halfway. Many of the center's new staff were young married couples living under difficult conditions. Others felt I was too removed from their class to socialize with me. Their living conditions at the center were entirely too austere to think of sharing and socializing with a stranger, albeit advisor, such as myself. Their meager government allowances were barely sufficient for their own survival.

Thus during the week, social engagements were few to non-existent. The social contacts I had were centered around sipping tea with cookie biscuits in the late afternoon with the director and chief instructor. I must admit some of my own initial mindless reactions did not ease the strain in my relationships. I must have been obnoxious in my declination of the customary tea they so cherished. The strong tea, boiled with milk and sugar made browner than usual from foreign sediments in the sugar, was a bit much for me to take. I requested lime or lemon with my tea instead. Still, I felt my demands were almost immoral in the social scene, although they seemed happy to accommodate.

Beyond tea, no one ever invited me to a meal. Did they feel their own dishes were unpalatable for me who could not even consume a regular cup of tea? I think they assumed they could not offer me cooking competitive to that food I could prepare in my own kitchen for my own tastes.

To improve my condition, I knew I had to engage in the difficult process of making friends in a totally new and different maze of an environment. I felt their friendship had to be earned and that I had to take most of the initiative. On my part, I often shared the meat I hunted from the bush with the staff who were non-vegetarian, that is the Muslims, Punjabies, and a few Hindus. Yet I could not completely and comfortably break through that invisible barrier that divided us. I felt my greatest loss was the lack of a family circle. After all, family networks were the key to how the Indians survived in their own culture. My physical environment, the harsh climate, insects, lack of conveniences and insomnia conspired with the haunting thoughts of my family and Loretta's companionship to eventually throw me into almost intolerable despair.

Sleepless nights in Budni emptied my emotions and physical vigor. The hideous heat propped open my eyelids seemingly all night. My insomnia kept my mind racing on what I was missing most in life. My thoughts turned constantly to the family. Over and over I wrestled with questions on their well-being: How is the family doing? How they might be making out in preparing for the long arduous trip abroad to join me? A photograph clutched to my chest might have helped, but I had none. I had no radio, TV, or books to give me some distraction. My only diversion was to step to the window or outside and admire the starlit heavens, capable of producing wondrous views on a cloudless night.

But fatigue from the day's work forced me inside to my sagging cot for rest. There on the cot, I twisted and turned in an attempt to fend a cool spot. The day-time temperature lasted deep into the night, making sound sleep impossible until just a couple of hours before daylight. I screamed inside. How was I to find a solution to my torment?

Sleep was fast becoming just a sweet memory. My worry over my lack of sleep compounded my lack of sleep. I had never taken and did not have sleep-inducing drugs. I had to grin and bear it. But my whole mental process at night was becoming diseased as I whirled down in a spiraling vortex of gloom. I had to get a grip and find a distraction to the stabbing wakefulness. I wondered how I was ever going to find a solution to my deprivations.

In one attempt, in my typical practical fashion, I built upon traditional technology to handle my situation. Across much of the country, Indians used a method based on the natural principles of evaporation to help cool air. Khas khas - dry, aromatic grassroots - were installed on frameworks in my windows. They had to be kept drenched in water to be effective. Dry air passing through the loosely woven material cooled the air, if only slightly. The pleasant scent helped make the experience worthwhile. In public buildings, a carp of water slingers were hired to maintain moist khas khas.

But I had no water slingers and brought a substitute to my rescue. I built wooden box tanks with holes in the bottom to fit over the windows. The holes allows water filling the boxes to drip over the khas khas. However, the water had to be replenished too frequently through buckets from a well outside my quarters. This activity proved too tiring and disruptive for nights already ruined by my condition. Instead, I soaked my mosquito net in a tub of water, then draped the mesh over my bed. This method gave me about thirty to forty minutes of relief.

There was little in my mind's storehouse that I could do. But then the counting began. I counted jumping air conditioners, swirling fans, and jugs of ice cold water. Several times over I would count little demons dancing and dripping with icicles. After that I tried counting backwards from a hundred in twos and threes. Then I would see them — the image of a woman with six little girls slowly descending the staircase of an airplane, then charging ahead to greet me. But the phantoms failed in the end. Internal pressures began to build.

I looked forward to the daytime when my enthusiasm for the job and the consumption of several gallons of water daily made the heat tolerable. Days were filled with newness — new people trying to do new things. I learned about them as they learned about me. I discovered how and why they accepted or rejected my suggestions and reached compromises. We combined to put new pieces in place daily, an activity essential to starting the center.

But at night the demon of loneliness returned, swinging its monstrous head. I tried to recall solutions from my psychology 101 in college to deal with the combination stresses induced by weather and loneliness. No luck was to be obtained traveling down that road, however. I was isolated from everything except total darkness. I could not share my problem with a sage authoritarian figure or anyone else. I dare not raise the topic. And after all, I was the one in the role of dispensing advice. I felt complaints about living difficulties were the last subjects they wanted to hear from me. I came to give help, not seek it. I did not want to risk my good standing with a show of such vulnerability.

I simply could not rest my body or my mind. But I fretted that my nocturnal disasters would eventually affect my performance and self-esteem during the day, leaving me a haggard, dreary shell for the day. I tortured myself with questions. What would my lack of sleep lead to? How much damage could this intolerable weather, sleeplessness, and unanchored social sense inflict in combination in the long duration? These disturbances could be sickening, corrosive, and a hindrance to the quality of my professional performance. My entire reason for being there could be destroyed. I despaired in a deep-seated pain.

I was aware that my position was a matter of change and adjustment. But I direly needed to hasten this process. The government was urgent about opening the center by June first. But how was I to cancel my blues or at least keep them under control to meet these professional demands? Being cut loose from family and community must be the problem of any advisor assigned to a strange, remote location, I reasoned. I just had to find the cure.

I realized that dwelling on my condition only deepened by sense of my predicament. I thought one way to acquire a positive view was to focus on the better times I anticipated. I repeatedly told myself the weather was going to change to the monsoon before the end of June and my family would be arriving in early June. The monsoon would herald a different world and maybe a new set of problems, but at least the chance of gaining a better quality of sleep would be improved. This change would thus equip me to handle my stress better. I brightened at the thought of regaining the family connection and companionship with Loretta and the girls. But these reflections proved insufficient for the moment.

An epiphany struck. "Have faith," I said. I realized I needed something to believe in far bigger and beyond myself. I knew I had faith in God or some higher logic in life. Everyone needs that belief. I needed the steadying effect of someone's hand on my shoulder, someone higher than even Loretta.

Eventually, I augmented my schedule with excursions into the edge of the wild brush in the afternoon to observe the plant and animal habitats. This activity tended to ease my pressure and placed me a different frame of mind for coping with my lonesome, restless nights. The environment gave me another object on which to reflect and reframe images in my mind. I used the pressure to turn my thoughts into more positive thoughts to make my personality coalesce again. These excursions included visiting the terrain opposite the center where the Vindhya Mountain range abruptly stopped. There I observed the bird life along the steep rock face. Many ornithological types made their home there. Lying in the dark at night, I would recall the birds' habits and other activity: how they nested, how they soared on the air currents, dived to capture prey, sang, and displayed rich, feathery coloring.

I tried giving myself pep talks. I am doing okay, I told myself. I can handle this problem. I can't let it get the best of me.

I expanded my work contacts and found more outlets to put my ideas into action. I journeyed across the river to talk with personnel of the wheat research station to learn about their activities and problems. The staff was attempting to find more effective ways to use water for irrigation. I offered and built some models of bullock-drawn implements which leveled land for agriculture. These tools were successfully constructed and effective in performance. Even a film was produced, showing the implements in action and how they led to better and more economical water use.

By now my dwindling self-esteem had been restored. I had made new friends, increased my social contacts, and gained some sense of being a part of the community. I felt an emergent sense of my ability to constructively contribute to that community.

Time was approaching for me to make a trip to Bombay to meet the family. The center opened on time and the training program was launched. Faith and slugging it out had united my splintered parts. My progress was wonderful despite the fact that I was not completely satisfying my sleep requirements.

In early June, I made fast tracks to Bombay to meet the family. A palpable sense of joy came over me as my number one deficiency fell away at the sight of the family. The adjustment had been tough, but I had made it!

Living Alone Mostly- Four and Half Years

It would literally be a long, lonesome dry spell before Loretta and the girls arrived in Bhopal. I had nearly four months to bake until the monsoon began in earnest. Every sun-bullied day had an assembly-line pattern of temperatures ranging from 100 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity close to zero. The air was relentlessly arid. Despite the weather, I felt I had to keep my promise

that the training center would open on time, and spent the week days in Budni under rather lonely and primitive conditions. I lived in a sparsely furnished shell of a partially restored building with exposed rafters. The floor was laid with ill-fitting slabs of gray flagstone, held together with weak concrete. New cracks appeared each day. The five rectangular windows had half-inch steel bars, top to bottom, spaced four inches apart to keep out nocturnal growlers: tigers, leopards, hyenas, and bears. Cats, bats, and rats had access to the house, unless the heavy, wooden, battleship-grey blinds were closed. When shut, I felt as if a plastic teas had been placed over my head and I was suffocating. Furnishings were sparse: a chest of drawers, a metal frame, single bed with a sagging mattress and mosquito net, and a crude table and bench which I had constructed from shipping crate lumber. The table did double service as a desk and a dining table. Standing in one corner was a crude closet, open on the sides and closed at the ends, also made of crating material. Here I hung my wardrobe.

The bedroom and dining room were separated from the kitchen by a crude, whitewashed stone wall. The kitchen equipment consisted of a kerosene stove and refrigerator. The stove worked quite well, but the refrigerator ran on a lick, a promise, and a prayer. It occasionally provided a cool drink, and it slightly retarded food spoilage. I did all my cooking and water boiling myself and learned to manipulate the stove's quirks so that it served me well for over four and a half Years. Of course, cleaning and changing the wick were essential to maintaining the kitchen appliances, and I did this on a regular basis with Rafiq's assistance. Rafiq freely and willingly cleaned the kitchen, including washing dishes, scrubbing the floors, and cleaning the refrigerator and stove. I would never recommend to anyone to try to keep a kerosene refrigerator operating and cooling under the severe weather conditions of India's dry seasons. One has to have the patience of a mother elephant completing her pregnancy.

Only once in my life did I see water freeze. Water I had stored in a glass jar had approached freezing point, and when I removed it from the fridge into the dry, hot room air, the condensation on the jar evaporated so quickly that the temperature lowered just enough to cause the water to freeze. Like a slanting shower of rain, the freezing process moved from one side of the jar to the other. I had just witnessed one of life's sweetest little delights, a jar of frozen drinking water in my hand, in the midst of Central India's dry season.

My bathroom consisted of a tin tub in the corner and a potty chair with a hole in the center and a small bucket underneath. No curtains hung in front of my convenience corner. Each morning the sweeper (custodian) came by and disposed of the waste and cleaned the container. I did have running water. I ran to the open well, tied my bucket to a rope, and dropped it in. I had to drag it across the surface a few times to fill it and then drew it up. Pouring it from one container to another made it running water.

For lights, we had four kinds: daylight, twilight, lantern light and candle light, not necessarily in that order. At night the entire center would have been in total darkness if it were not for candles and the cooking fires. When these sources of light were put out or burned out, the beauty of the firmament and its billions of distant stars was accented. Let there be darkness, and there was darkness!

The delicate mantle of my kerosene lantern was often shattered by big flying bugs drawn to their flames, and resulting in lights out. Thus, I preferred to use candles. After a year and a half we got a big generator installed at the center to provide electric lighting until midnight. Twenty-four hour electricity finally arrived at the center near the end of my four-and-half-year tour.

The Family Arrival

Four and a half months after I arrived in India, it was my family's turn to transplant their home to another land. Loretta — courageous as a soldier and enthusiastic as only a mother could be — packed up and journeyed three days - three nights with six young daughters, one less than a year old, to join me.

They were truly a welcome sight as they struggled down the steps of the aircraft at the Bombay airport helping one another and testing the patience of the other passengers. They all wore rumpled but fashionable navy-blue jumpers, a product of Loretta's handiwork and her dependable, portable sewing machine, a standard piece of luggage for the next twenty-one years. My six months of bachelorhood had ended. Waiting for them to clear customs seemed to take a lifetime. Once they were through, we greeted with a profusion of hugs and kisses in the steamy monsoon heat. There is no joy more fulfilling than a family unites halfway around the world in a strange land. Overcome by hordes of coolies, I appointed several to load the luggage. We successfully boarded the Hotel shuttle bus but left little room for other passengers. Rain fell in sheets and the vapor on the windows blurred the street scenes. The great buildings of Bombay's once rich European heritage had to be seen some other time. Water gushed from the gutters and overflowed into the streets. "Daddy, does it rain like this all the time in India?" one of the girls asked.

"No, sometimes it doesn't rain for six months," I answered. "This is what is called the monsoon season, when most of the rain comes."

Registering at the Taj Mahal Hotel was slow, but finally completed. This well-known landmark still showed signs of its nest beauty. The deleterious effect of time had kept a step or two ahead of the effort to maintain it, but it was comfortable and provided a nice retreat from the rainy outdoors. After a huge pot of steaming tea, and dainty open-faced cucumber sandwiches, plus a bit of exploring about the hotel by the girls, we put them to bed. Then Loretta and I had time for ourselves.

Loretta talked about the family's first air journey, which proved far from smooth. Well over the Atlantic Ocean, she had seen one of the aircraft engines on fire, but hearing no announcement from the captain, she thought all was well, trusting that the crew knew what they were doing. She assumed that the plane was ready for landing at its next stop. She then awakened the girls, combed their hair, and freshened them for the landing. Then an announcement was made: "We regret to say we have to return to New York due to engine trouble. There is no need for alarm."

"Since I took it in stride, showing no alarm, the girls did likewise. Loretta explained. "I had long learned that if I remained calm, the children usually followed suit. They were also probably too tired from a full day to be scared. In New York for the second time, we spent the next thirteen hours at the Plaza Hotel. Airborne once again, we encountered a few minor disasters. My blood

pressure shot up momentarily when the hostess gave Estrellita a piece of hard candy which caught in her throat. Choking and gagging, she was pressed, probed, and hit between the shoulders until it hopped out. There was no after effect. During our first stop at Prestwick, England, the wind snatched her hat as we walked from the plane. Some onlookers saw her plight and went hat chasing, but each time they got within arm's reach, the wind pressed its claim, ending up with the hat for its own disposal. For the rest of the trip she was the saddened, hatless one, which did little to curb her wandering.

“Arriving in Amsterdam, we learned that our connecting flight was waiting on the runway to take off. A hurried change of planes and we were on our way to Geneva, where we would have dinner. On the ground once again, all the other passengers on our flight had been seated by the time we arrived in the dining room. The waiters hurried over and began serving us with great flourish. Suddenly service slowed and stalled. This strange turn of events was later explained by the airline hostess. After noticing the extra attentiveness lavished on us, airline representatives realized they would be charged extra. The waiters assumed we were the family of some wealthy oil magnate or royal family from the Middle East, because we weren't dark enough to be Africans and not clear-skinned enough to be Caucasians. Once it was made clear we were just late arrivals, we were demoted to our Peon status with adequate but regular passenger treatment.”

“Off again, we crossed the Alps at night, and saw daylight just outside of Cairo, Egypt, where we landed for breakfast. Wilting from the moist heat, we were bussed to the City. Before disembarking our passports were collected, no reason given. I trembled at the thought of being held hostage. From the bus stop, we walked up a narrow street to the restaurant. Seeing the men in their robes and fazes, one of the girls remarked, ‘Mama, these men are still wearing their nightgowns.’

“No, baby, those are their regular clothes here. We're no longer in the West, this is the Middle East where the people dress differently’, I told her. Breakfast was served: cornflakes with warm milk, toast, juice, eggs, bread, tea and coffee. The eggs were hard and rubbery, if rolled into a ball and hit with a firm swing, they would have competed in distance with any golf ball.

“Back at the bus, our passports were returned, much to my relief. From Cairo, we flew to Karachi, where we spent the night. A Pakistani, apparently assigned to look after us, met us as we disembarked from the bus at the KLM airport facility. In loud English he announced to us, ‘Don't drink the water! Don't drink the water! I get good water for you.’ Later, he came with bottles of soda water. He sat down and began to talk to the girls, asking about the U.S., their names, et cetera. After the girls washed up and were tucked away, he said, ‘Madam, maybe you like good Pakastani bath?’

‘What is Pakastani bath?’ I inquired.

‘Very good thing. I bring nice warm water and while you sit in tub I pour water over you,’ he explained.

I told him, “No thank you. You bring water, leave it, you go, I'll bathe myself.’ He brought in the hot water and left. We had communicated. Early the next morning he was his usual attentive self,

making sure we enjoyed our breakfast. He was there to help us board the bus. Looking back over my shoulder as I boarded the bus. I said, 'Maybe the Pakistani bath next time.' He smiled.

"From Karachi we flew non-stop to Bombay, and here we are." Loretta and I had some catching up to do and then came the long hard sleep.

Next day the late afternoon brought light drizzles and spells of sunshine. It was dry enough to walk along the waterfront to the big stone, Bombay gate. Despite the wind and mist blowing in from the Arabian Sea, the girls were ecstatic with their first good glimpse of India's most westernized city, except one. She was quietly turning over in her mind the scenes she had witnessed on her way from the airport. For through the windows she had caught a glimpse of an entire family, half-naked, lying on the side of the street. The experience did not depress her, but struck a chord of lively conscience that was to accompany her for a lifetime.

Dr. and Mrs. Ernie Neal, the rural development officer for the U.S. Mission in New Delhi, were visiting Bombay and came by the hotel to welcome Loretta and the girls to India. In the small world of African-American colleges, he and Loretta had a number of mutual friends, which became the subject of an extended dialogue. I didn't remind him of his earlier statement. "All India needs is another big family of girls," when I met him on my arrival in New Delhi in January.

The next day, the long journey ended when our Indian Airlines flight landed at the barren airfield in Bhopal with one wind sock in place of a control tower. Rafiq was there with the faithful, green Jeep, which took us to the palace pavilion, our home for the next four years.

Our Pavilion Home

A dazzling white exterior gave the pavilion a strikingly tranquil appearance. The breeze prompted the shadows of mango trees to shift against the walls. It seemed conscious of its place in the royal getting. It was a very pleasant place in spite of buffalo and goats roaming about. Located high above a ninety-nine acre lake it was surrounded by several large mango trees and big, shady date palm trees. Across a flowered round-about was another twin pavilion, both having been built in the 1920s by the Begum for guests. Marble steps led one to a portico graced by four large Romanesque columns. Entry was through heavy wooden doors with twenty-four panes of glass. Inside the rambling single-story structure were eight rooms spacious enough for any of the girls to run away from home without having to leave the building. My usual competition for bathroom access in a household of females completely dispelled by the house seven washrooms — no more standing in line with agonizing patience.

All floors throughout the house were tiled in diamond shaped white marble. In the center of the house was an open skylight that allowed maximum airflow into the windows of the rooms. A wall-placed drainage system kept ponds of water from accumulating but strong winds at times brought in dust, leaves, and other debris. Each room opened into a covered walkway that ran the length of the house. If these walls could talk, some bizarre stories of excess would be told of their royal occupants.

Our problem was how to turn this more than adequate space into a home fit for a family. The most pressing need was to set up a kitchen. No provision had ever been made to cook inside the pavilion. Food for the Nawab's guests had been prepared in another building and carried to the guest houses. Only the bathrooms had running water, but only cold. This left us with no option but to turn a bathroom into a kitchen. My basic woodworking skills came to our rescue. I had dismantled and saved our shipping crates, and with this lumber I built a counter over the bathtub, enclosing the sides for storage. Side extensions were attached to the sink, and the toilet bowl is boxed in by a storage cabinet. Our deep-freezer, kerosene stove, and kerosene refrigerator completed the kitchen setup. We were in business to boil, chill, chops and wash.

The entrance from the portico became the living room and home to the piano. The pavilion furnishings, together with thong provided by the Embassy in New Delhi, created a non-matching but adequate living room set. One large room accommodated all the girls, each with sufficiently demarcated space to minimize territorial dilute. Loretta and I had our own bedroom. We were close enough to the girls "dormitory" to keep an ear on what was happening and to get to them if need be. Rooms in the back and along the site corridor were used for the steady stream of visitors passing through Bhopal.

A great variety of biological specimens constantly shared the pavilion with us. None were more prominent than the little bug-catching geckos. They were so prevalent that I felt like asking them to pay rent. But having seen the variety and number of insects they consumed, I felt better about their free-loading. No living specimen is more innocent and determined than these little translucent creatures. They constantly drove themselves over the ceilings and up the walls. On occasions they drove us up the wall. To watch them spot their prey, flies, mosquitoes, gnats, ants, et cetera, track it down, and lash out a lightning-fast tongue to devour it is one of nature's interesting prey/predators displays of keeping the balance. "Tigers" of the walls they are. At times their suction pad feet would let them down literally, for during the excitement of catching their prey, they would fall with a hard plop on the marble floor or onto the bed, still holding on to their catch. Knocked out momentarily, they soon got it together and scampered back up the walls to continue their upside down pursuit, gave a big gulp, and another course had been added to the daily meal. There was always the possibility of one landing in our soup at mealtime, particularly when we had dinner guests. Chameleons also showed up without invitation. This angular-headed lizard, each eye moving independently of the other and matching skin color with its surrounding is one of nature's great fascinations in deception. Its snail-like pace gave the impression that it would never get to where it was going. This too could be another dimension of deceptions, the prey probably thinking that it will never get there. How such a lightning-fast tongue for catching insects got mixed up with such a slow creature is a true mystery.

Toads during the rainy season laid claim on their share of the place together with boosted insect populations. They hopped about freely and harmlessly. The sudden onset of the dry season sometimes caught them with no chance to hide away in a moisture-laden spot. Some were left as dried, mummified forms, minus their hop of course.

What caused real worry for us were the poisonous snakes and scorpions that crawled into the house. We warned the girls not to be friendly with such visitors. The second oldest daughter was made responsible for stuffing old, folded newspaper under the door at night to discourage

scorpions. A morning ritual consisted of shaking out the bedroom slippers to make sure no stingers had managed to by-pass the newspaper barriers. The cobra for the most part stayed away. Kraits, a very deadly snake, had a strong inclination to crawl inside. Once, upon returning from an evening out, we spotted one struggling to squirm across the beige tuft of our carpet. Needless to say its life span was made short with the end of a bludgeon. An on-going dialogue kept the girls snake-wise as well as how to use the anti-snake bite kit supplied by the U.S. mission. We were very grateful for our snake-bite-free four years in Bhopal. India loses hundreds of people each year to snake bites. Only once did I have a scare. The household helper, Lal, had been bitten by a poisonous black scorpion. I rushed him to my Jeep, threw up the hood and held the injected finger to the pole of the car battery to burn out the poison. It was painful but life saving.

During the day there was little hope of escaping the sweltering temperatures. We awaited the night with great anticipation for there was cooler air to be had just twenty feet above the ground. Evening brought a mass migration to the roof, which was a flat expanse surrounded by a three-foot high parapet, thankfully above the mosquito zone. To the extent of her size and age, each of our daughters was accountable for the nightly ritual of getting her things in place for sleeping on the roof. Occasionally we had breakfast there too, a special sunrise treat. I was the weather forecaster during the approach of monsoon season. Cloud formations and distant lightning and thunder always gave cause for alarm among the girls, causing several interruptions of the weatherman's sleep during the night. "Is it going to rain? Do we need to go inside?" came alarmed questions from all corners of the roof. The weatherman had a tendency to wait right up to the last minute, sometimes after a few drops of rain had fallen, to announce, "We had better get inside." This way, no one needed convincing.

Our other escape from the heat was across the road from the pavilion: the lake. It lay at the bottom of a steep slope. At the top of the slope was a fifteen by forty foot catwalk, which was beginning to share in the shabbiness of the other palace structures. But its aging, mold-stained marble flooring with it rusting, ornate cast-iron rail did not discourage our enjoyment. Here evening teas and small receptions could be held in the cool air as twilight gave away to bright evening stars. The lake waters mirrored the surrounding hills. The city lights along shore, and in the monsoon white masses of clouds constantly passing overhead. As a place to escape from the dust and irritations of the sun-scorched day, there was none better in the area.

Executive Household Assistants

No story about Indian servants is more widely known among expatriates than the one of the memsahib (wife) complaining about the breakfast toast being cold. As the story goes, the cook showed up the next morning with his own solution to this national disaster. He came into the dining room and took up an erect posture with his arms held tightly against his body. When questioned by the memsahib about the strange stance and behavior he replied, "I am keeping the toast warm." He had a slice tucked under each armpit.

In the diplomatic circle of receptions, small talk about servant behavior was and still is a major topic. Many of the true stories leave no room for exaggeration. India is a servant society. Servants have servants, and these servants have servants. Every newcomer goes through the trauma of coming face to face with "professional" servants for the first time. Loretta was no exception.

They came in a steady stream carrying motley letter of recommendations from earlier sahibs and memsahibs that often dated well back to the colonial period. Most of the papers no longer resembled paper. Key words were obliterated by holes worn at the folds. Several generations of dirt seem to be the only thing holding them together. Each servant who came was as dirty as the others. All were the epitome of innocence and honesty. They couldn't possibly have a dishonest bone in their body, nor could they think of the word "cheat," even in Hindi. We had to learn by trial and error. In Bombay at the Taj Hotel, the grapevine made us known, and a few men appeared at the hotel door with high recommendations. We decided on only one, Joseph, a short Dravidian sporting a white Muslim cap and a buttoned-up jacket, the uniform of colonial servants. He promised us he could cook, wash, clean, and he was prepared to leave his family 500 miles behind to take the job with us in Muslim Bhopal. Once in Bhopal where he had no ties or friends, he soon grew tired of being in a large family of women who were trying to get him to change his long imbibed habits, e.g. not to use the same linen cloth that was his constant companion on his shoulder for dusting and furniture polishing up the silverware before he laid down each piece for setting the table. When he announced his departure back to Bombay to seek his fortune anew, we decided to rely on help with ties in Bhopal. After considerable dickering, Loretta selected three: a cook, dhobi (laundry man), and a cook-helper/house cleaner. Things always went well the first few days. Then memshaibs tended to let their guards down and began to downplay all the awful stories heard on the cocktail Circuit. We in Bhopal were so far removed from the formal cocktail happenings that we had no way to keep up with the latest. But we did find out that the first few days of good impression soon wore thin. A wall-climbing for the average housewife was just around the next day, and close supervision was continual in order for Loretta to keep six daughters as well as ourselves in good health.

On the books, India's caste system has been totally abolished. But servants are more in a traditional rut than the necessary. They don't read books. A practice as old as India itself, servants don't touch each other's work. We found a greater flexibility of attitude in this regard among Muslim servants than among Hindus. Two of ours were Muslim and the laundryman was Christian. This finely tuned division of labor is often the reason for some households to have up to twelve servants. Too many foreigners tend to compare Indian servants with those of their native country. We often thought that our house helper back home, an eighteen-year-old girl, could do the work of a half dozen Indian servants. However, the low levels of nutrition, and the lack of other basic human needs together with the hundred plus degree temperatures are obviously not taken into consideration when making such claims.

As sure as there is something that could go missing, sooner or later it was in fact. When Loretta found something missing she called the servants together and told them what it was and asked them to look around and find it. Most of the time one or the other would discover it, or it would be left in a place that a member of the family would surely see it. For some unknown reason, the blanket and sheet missing from the baby's bed never returned. Repeated reminders and memsahib's chastening threats came to naught. Ismail, who had been brought up ever since a boy as the servant of an old British civil retired in Kashmir, had learned the art of making a dining table with fantastic napkin foldings. Ismail once indicated in his self-taught English that he always collected something from his sahibs and memsahibs to remember them by. We often wondered whether or not the baby's blanket had been added to his memorabilia, because it was never returned.

When the servants had something they wanted to ask the sahib or memsahib, instead of coming out with it, it was often acted out. A sad expression, a dull response and slacking off with their daily routine were signs we learned to interpret. Their hope seemed to be that we should drag it from them.

“Ismail, what’s wrong? You seem like something is bothering you,” Loretta inquired.

“Memsahib, my heart is today very sad. My brother maybe passed away. He bit by snake,” Ismail answered.

“What happened, Ismail?”

“He working in rice field early morning. When he go to pick up bundle of rice to land on hillock cart and both hands go under rice bundle, the cobra bite his finger. Hospital few miles away in Sehore and bullock cart taking too long to get there. My brother turn very black and puff like a balloon before he get reached. Doctor says he finished.” Ismail closes his eyes and lays his head on his hands “I need off for afternoon to go Sehore,” he added.

“We are sorry, Ismail. May Allah blesses him,” Loretta replied. “You may go to Sehore.”

“Shukriya! Sukhiya!,” he thanked her as he bowed and touched his clasped hands to his forehead.

Dr. Mama

A Britisher once commented that the average foreigner had only enough disease resistance to last about three and a half years in India. Our home location, away from the public and town filth, and with generally higher standards of sanitation at the palace grounds, minimized the family’s exposure to illness. Furthermore, recommended prevention measures were followed to the letter. All of the drinking water was boiled, fresh vegetables were Detol disinfected, and foods were well-cooked, especially meats. Although all the meat came from the jungle, there were still possibilities of tapeworm infections. At the slightest sign of illness, and before the victims could squeeze out their complaint, the family doctor of preventive medicine, Loretta headed for her frayed copy of Family Physician to match the symptoms with recommended treatment. The victim was then administered home-concocted remedies. It certainly must have worked, both at home and on trips. The entire family stayed relatively healthy for the entire period of foreign service. However, I was in a much more vulnerable position to contract any one of number of illnesses common to Indians and foreigners. Living alone for stretches and traveling extensively for work brought me in constant contact with less stringently prepared food. Sharing in the meals and snacks associated with social and work situations was unavoidable. Many of the Indian offerings were very tasty. Strangely enough, the only major bout with illness came on Thanksgiving weekend. Luckily, I had bagged a big, wild peacock for Thanksgiving dinner before the fever set in. As far as I could tell the illness resulted from a small cut on my hand, in which I got some dirt I don’t think there is anything more rife with infections than Indian dirt. I had to be spend in a prone position with a local Indian doctor in attendance. He diagnosed my problem to be a fever. Pretty obvious, I thought, I was burning up. But he assured me that the

fever would soon pass away and that I would not pass away with it. Loretta. made her diagnosis, but wouldn't venture to say what. She too thought it would pass and not take me with it. They were both right. Encouraging indeed.

Though a bit woozy, I was back in Budni on Monday morning as usual, keeping my sick leave allowance unused. Two bouts with amoebic dysentery in the course of my tour meant having to be subjected to extended periods of listlessness and low energy. This meant incessant spells of embarrassing gas expulsion. Talk about being a walking windmill in polite society! The local people seemed used to it. Maybe they expected it. The twenty-day pill treatment caused as much of a burnt-out feeling as the attack. In spite of the many precautions taken, I truly believe one can get amoebic dysentery by simply breathing the air, something one can't very well avoid. The winds must pick up a myriad of stubborn cysts as it sweeps across open grounds where millions of people leave tons of feces every day of the year. We had been advised that once in the system, these tenacious organisms may go dormant in the liver and other organs without any noticeable effect for years. Suddenly they may burst forth with a devastating attack. In my case, thirty years have passed without any sign of recurrence. Maybe the little microscopic fellows have grown lazy and refrain from causing me to malfunction in order to avoid the threat of medical treatment. I hope so, for I'd prefer to let sleeping amoeba lie.

Actually I had not realized the long-term effect of dysentery until I went home on the first home leave. My doctor, neighbor, friend, and hunting companion met me at the airport and later told me, "Jones, I was aghast when I saw you emerge from the plane. How wasted and drawn you looked. I felt like coming up the steps to help you with your hand luggage." Maybe he should have, because twenty-two hours of flying on top of the twenty-day treatment for amoebic dysentery is enough to make any weak.

Teacher Mrs. Jones - Mother Loretta

"Education is the gleanings from humans and books and laboratories, from field and forests and whispering winds. But it is more. It is learning from promptness and thoroughness, kindness and helpfulness and every form of purity; it is the mastering of mind and spirit, appetite and passion, thought and word and glance. It is knowing that service brings worthy living, that selfishness means sin, that courage lies in doing right. Education is implanting of good habits, the acquirement of efficiency, the development of twenty-four carat character." Anon

"Foreign service messes up the lives of many families, particularly those children who are moved a lot, changing school settings." I overheard these words at my first U.S. Embassy reception in New Delhi. Although they struck a sensitive chord with me, I set these aside momentarily. I was too absorbed in treading my way through the bramble and thickets of cocktail party diplomacy: a smoke-filled atmosphere where drinks and hors d'oeuvres were consumed amid polite small talk, and it was difficult to distinguish the artificial smiles from the sincere.

That phrase, "messes up the lives," came back to mind as I anticipated the arrival of my six children. What was the price of rearing a large family under a series of changing cultural and

social environments? How would the broadening of our perception of the world and its people weigh out against the disruption of our lives? The cost of our happiness and security was unknown, but I had already accepted the job. The answer would come only with time, and would depend on how well we could adjust to change. That is what life is all about wherever one is. I assured myself: He can do it! I know we can! Loretta and I had both the commitment and strength to get it done.

Our goal had long been to give girls a good education, no matter what the circumstances. Loretta and I had struggled, I more than she, since her parents could help her more financially than mine to obtain our bachelor's degrees from African-American colleges that were said to be separate but equal. Separate, yes; equal, a big, big no! We had both taught up to college level in segregated school, at a time when career opportunities elsewhere were more scarce than hens with gold teeth. The majority of African-American graduates from both segregated and non-segregated colleges went the teaching route as an end to justify the means. I had completed my master's degree from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Loretta had taken two math courses toward a master's degree. At that point, her preference for caring for two children and our lack of finance, combined to keep her from finishing her course of study, but knowledge of teaching methods, classroom organization, and instructional material gave us the qualification and the confidence later to set up and run a home school where formal education was not available. We knew that living in relative isolation in central India would be the ultimate test. After observing Indian students with only a shade tree for a classroom, a slate and crayon for equipment, and in the evenings only light from a dim city lamp for their reading, I was impressed that, even in such meager circumstances, learning could take place. I shared these thoughts in my letters to Loretta back home. We decided to keep the family together, rather than send any of the girls to boarding school as many foreigners did. The local schools were conducted in Urdu and Hindi, so our options were squeezed down to one: supervised home study. Before leaving the U.S., the children were enrolled in The Calvert and Nebraska correspondence schools, acquired the necessary instructional material and books from Baltimore and Lincoln, and arrived in June on schedule after the closing of public schools in Tennessee.

Our school had five to enroll: Anita, Estrellita for entering the first year; Burnetta, the junior-high student who had a combination of public and catholic experience, all segregated; Carol, who had started out in the public school; Christina, who had attended the laboratory school at Fisk University; and Carlotta, the one-year-old formed the nursery school component. Their school experiences had been by and large within the segregated school system of Tennessee. Fisk laboratory school had been the exception a token school off integration within the otherwise segregated system. Fisk, one of the prominent, black liberal arts colleges, had some white faculty. The lab school offered an integrated learning environment for children of faculty members of Fisk, Meharry Medical College, and Tennessee State University, all African-American schools, up to the third year of primary school. For some reason still unknown to me, Fisk was never brought under scrutiny for carrying on its semblance of integration, especially noticeable at Fisk's Christmas programs that were liberally attended by Caucasians.

Carol and Christina spent the remaining primary school years in segregated public schools. They were puzzled as to why the school was like this, but we never discussed it with them openly. The

all white school across the street from us did little to dull their curiosity. We figured they would know the true story in time.

In Bhopal, India, we ran a segregated school. It was for African-American females only, a double-barreled prejudice. It was clearly separate and equal to nothing we had experienced before. Any shortfall this engendered could only be blamed on ourselves, Pa Harold and Ma Loretta. This parent-run school was for our own children, no prejudice intended. All the students happened to be African-American because their parents had been categorized that way by U.S. ethnic codes. However, we do spare the blame for all the students being female.

The day-to-day operation of the school was modeled on public schools around the world. Each morning at eight o'clock the girls dressed for school, gathered their books and homework, and went through the routine of leaving home. Saying, "Goodbye Mother." They walked around the big, flowered round-about (British for traffic circle), between our guest house pavilion and an identical one facing ours, which was occupied by an American couple, and their two friendly dachshunds. The big circle completed, they climbed the dozen or so white marble steps of our pavillion, and greeted their teacher with "Good morning, Mrs. Jones!" Just inside the door was the piano, where they sang "God Bless America," or "America The Beautiful." This was followed by the Pledge of Allegiance. Then they proceeded in orderly fashion to the classroom and arranged themselves for study. Mrs. Jones, the teacher, moved about the classroom giving assistance and encouragement to each of her six students as needed, some needing more than others. At noon, Mrs. Jones became mother and assembled her daughters at lunch. For the rest of the hour they were free to do as they pleased, play, nap or whatever. The sole nursery school student always napped. The afternoon class continued from 1:00 to 3:00 p.m., ending with the students setting their desks in order, tidying up, and gathering their books. With a "Good-bye, Mrs. Jones" spoken in concert, the school day came to an end. They again trekked round the round-about and back to the pavillion where they greeted Mother, who welcomed them home. She remained their mother until school time the next day.

All completed lessons and tests were regularly mailed to the Calvert Correspondence School and the University of Nebraska, stateside to be graded. Anxious looks were always on the faces of the students as they received their grades, comments, corrections, suggestions and encouragements from their counterpart teachers in the USA. "Mrs. Jones" reviewed the returned lessons for any clarification that might be needed. All were anxious to go to school, which was just as well, as we couldn't afford a truant officer anyway.

There were lots of pluses for our family school. Plenty of individual attention could be given to each student and their successes affected their schoolmates and their siblings all at the same time. Certainly there was no shortage of parental involvement in the children's schooling. Combining the role of parents and teacher challenged our ingenuity, wisdom, and not surprisingly, our patience. We wondered sometimes what would have happened to Job's patience if he had to stretch it into being a parent-teacher in a formal home-school setting.

The school was never without a few uninvited guest which sometimes created a scare, but often stimulated the learning environment. The sudden arrival of frogs and toads assured prompt scientific inquiry. Often a bird flew in, perched on the wall ledges, looked for a place to build a

nest, preened or pecked at some insects before flying off. Or, a slow-moving chameleon came through the door or open window, with his independently moving eyes, angular head, and prehensile tail. Its mission was to catch small insects with his agile, lightning-fast tongue. One visiting chameleon was once introduced to our cat who stood over it with curiosity. The frightened fellow threw his color changing mechanism into gear and ran through his whole repertoire to throw the cat off. The cat must have been unimpressed, because she just walked off.

Less welcome was the scorpion with its lobster-like claws and long curved tail capable of inflicting devastating pain. Anyone with anything with which to strike a blow went into action with caution of course. Also nobody's friend was the krait, a small, brown-banded snake whose venom was lethal. Its arrival commanded real caution and concern to destroy it. Some of the men servants had to be called in on these occasions, and despite their own fear they managed to set the job done. Geckos frightened our students at first but they gradually warmed up to these harmless lizards. Their soft translucent bodies patrolled the walls and ceilings in pursuit of insects. These and other creatures, whether delightful, disruptive, or dangerous, brought to the classroom a knowledge of biology in action. Loretta often took advantage of these intrusions momentarily diverting from the specific subject at hand to give brief lectures on the importance of these creatures in the natural scheme of things general information on their importance in the natural scheme of things.

The shortfalls of our school, even when compared to the separate-but-equal system we had known at home, were obvious. Equipment and resources were sorely lacking. Desks were rough, unfinished, and uncomfortable. They had been constructed by me from freight crating materials. Tools for science were limited to a microscope and slides. The library consisted of two sets of encyclopedias and fifteen volumes of *Childcraft*, accumulated by the family over the years along with a children's Bible, with copies of *Reader's Digest*, *Ladies Home Journal*, and the *Nashville Banner*, our home newspaper that sporadically found its way to India, often moist, frayed, swollen and faded, no doubt dammed up at some point until someone had pity to send them. The news was always stale, which was true of any news coming to Bhopal.

More prominently absent was the opportunity for social interaction, which educators consider a basic necessity to a balanced education. A neighboring family, also from Tennessee, had three children studying by correspondence, but they left after two years. Though we would get together with Indian, British, and visiting American families, and even the two oldest girls were invited to the masquerade ball by the Nawab's grand children visiting from school in Switzerland, and an occasional swim in the moldy outdoor pool or to tea with the Begum to taste her wonderful self-made goat cheese, it was not enough to develop lasting friendships. In addition to the cultural and social differences, language presented the greatest barrier. There was no chance for the children to participate in competitive sport or school activities requiring team work and cooperation of their age group. They got along very well with each other and with visiting children, making us their own badminton and table tennis teams but there just weren't enough other people to gauge their social progress in setting also with others. We were also concerned that they learn responsibility and independence outside the classroom, but there was only their large bedroom to keep organized and the pets to take care of. Otherwise, housework and cookies was done by the servants. Only the two-hour afternoon break for the cook and evenings when all went home were

they free to barge into the kitchen to learn baking cakes and bread and ice-cream making from their mother.

Diversions consisted of trips to the market to buy and barter with the merchants. This was a lesson in itself and totally different from walking into a store back home where the stamped prices on the items ruled out positively no customer/clerk exchange. Other periodic diversions were the receptions we gave for the graduating classes passing through the training center where I worked. The girls participated quite willingly and graciously in the preparation and serving of refreshments during the reception, our tiny version of diplomatic function. These receptions were concluded with group photos of the students and family, which are preserved in our family archives.

As time went along, individualized patterns of behavior began to emerge among the girls. None comported herself in an unacceptable manner, though in the beginning one was close to the edge. Before we had moved to India, our eldest, Burnetta, had been a well-rounded, junior high student, with above-average grades and a clarinet in the school band. After I left for Bhopal to start my job and prepare for the family's arrival, her grades went down to average and stayed there. She never pulled out of the slump and tended to be somewhat of a dreamer after arriving in India. But there was no way to tell what was on her mind. She never asked questions about anything, neither did she complain. If curiosity killed the cat, she hardly had enough to disturb one from its nap. She followed the school routine religiously, but netted mostly Cs. An excellent hostess, she was at the apex of her delight whenever there were house guests or a reception —happy, smiling, congenial, contented, composed. At the top of her list of things she enjoyed was being well-dressed and looking good. Possibly, the affectionate glances thrown in her direction by our twenty-year-old Muslim driver provided some motivation for glamorizing herself, but we concluded that this was a typical adolescent - phenomenon that would have occurred with or without an audience.

If curiosity could be used as measure for determining whether our two eldest were sisters, the conclusion would have been reached: not related. The second eldest had the potential to become a cat lover's most disliked person. Her curiosity was enough to kill a small town of cats. I was always on the defensive trying to come up with answers to her questions that would make sense to her. When she was barely three years old, she asked. 'what holds that tree up? She was speaking of the big oak tree in our yard in Nashville. I found myself in the pose of The Thinker as I searched for a suitable explanation.

"Part of that tree is buried under the ground. That part is called roots. We can't see them. Put your feet close together, I demanded of her." With a little push from the back I demonstrated how easy it was to push her over.

"Now spread your feet farther apart," I required. She was then pushed from the side. See it is much more difficult to push you over when you spread out. The tree roots spread out on all sides, like your feet were, far from the tree and attach themselves deep in the ground so the wind can't push it over.

"Can we dig and see the roots?" was the next question. We did.

“Why did all the leaves fall off that tree, except those two up high?” was the next inquiry.

“Let’s go inside now,” I commanded. “We shall talk about that later.”

“Don’t forget,” she said as we walked through the backdoor.

Her curiosity never seemed to let up. By the time she had finished the fourth grade, right before leaving for India. She had decided she wanted to study law, a goal she kept throughout her home-school training. She remained studious and knew that to obtain her goal in life she had to be educated. She comported herself as self-appointed teacher and mother number two, determined to keep her other sisters in line, organized, and participatory. Her grades and work quality were exemplary. All of this won appreciative praise from Loretta, mother/teacher number one.

The third oldest of the student body was a non-conformist. She was highly energetic but was determined to spend her energy in ways other than on books. She cared not for the routine and strict discipline of the school. She was good at pretending to be studying, but when questioned about what she had read, her response showed that she had not read the material or had not understand it. “I don’t want to be fooling around with those numbers in math,” she would assert. Clearly, she needed extra attention, sometimes at the expense of the other girls. Giving her extra work reduced her diversionary tendencies. The Bible stories read at Sunday morning breakfast and retelling of the movies Loretta and I attended Saturday nights were the only things that totally captured her interest.

Being the middle girl she seemed to have trouble deciding whether to side with the two older sisters or to go with the younger ones. What the other girls loved, she loathed. Budu, our female rhesus monkey, was dear to the heart of the whole family. Carole abhorred it. Budu knew it, and was usually adept at showing disdain for her. She would Give Budu a sly look out of the corner of her eye and keep her distance. Adventuresome, she was more at home down by the monsoon-created mud holes or the shores of the lake catching bullfrogs. She was frequently successful and no one appreciated her efforts more than Squeezy, our Pet Python. The frog catch seemed to be a gustatory delight for him(we were never sure which).

Soon, a change in her attitude toward studying began to emerge. Sometimes when playing with the younger girls outside, she would tell them things she wanted to do with her life. Gradually, she became also an avid reader, going through books and other reading material like wildfire. She liked her newly found image as a source of information on a great variety of subjects.

Our youngest students were the twins, first graders. As fraternal twins their thinness went little beyond being born during the same birthing. They have enough of the same gene mix to look like sisters. One has always been physically larger. The often pronounced concern that twins have each other’s emotions, problems, in their case was not true. The smaller twin showed deep concern for her sister’s welfare, at least emotionally. The larger twin did not respond with the same depth of concern on this level. The small twin had a high self-esteem with a matching strength to vocalize. Listening to her at times, I was prompted to say, “If she is ever able to synchronize her ability to vocalize with her thoughts, she will be on her way. She clearly wanted

to give the impression that she was a good student. She was a good average student, but tended to depend on her sister to set her through the more difficult problems. The larger twin applied herself consistently resulting in good grades, but on social occasions she seemed to depend on the other for fitting comfortably into the social mix. Overall there was more of a balancing of dependency between them than first met the eye.

Nestled in the corner of the classroom was our one year old in her playpen, Carlotta. Easy to care for, she got lots of attention from her sisters and was quite content with her play routine. As she matured, she revealed a cleanly competitive spirit. Being at the bottom of this skyscraper Of sisters, she seemed to be saying. "I must fight to set a share. While pleasant and amiable, she continued to let her sisters know that she was not to be left out. One evening about dusk as the girls were out walking they decided to play a trick on her. They ran ahead of her then hid in the bushes. Poor Carlotta feeling abandoned and lost, arrived crying at the door, much to the chagrin of their mother. The other girls merged from their hiding place laughing at their own joke. But the tables turned. An angry mother ordered them straight to bed after a supper of bread and water.

An accomplished pianist. Loretta was firm about adding music to the curriculum. With the arrival of our piano in our sea freight, lessons began. A clarinet and two violins made up the remainder of our instrument inventory. Loretta had collected sheet music for various levels of competence since college. Our collection of records (classical and pop) widened the range of music available. The radio reinforced our collection, tuning us in to high-pitched India music for which an appreciation gradually grew. Our three senior students already had varying magical starts to build on, and the younger students got a chance to discover their musical interest and talents. We wanted the whole family to appreciate music, to feel happiness and pleasure in the sound of music. To raise the music appreciation level of the whole family was a hoped for spin-off to feel the happiness and pleasure in the sound of music, and to understand its meaning.

Our musical efforts made a relatively isolated life less monotonous, providing relaxation and entertainment, and it increased family sociability with a chance for the girls to cooperate in a group activity. Loretta often organized group made up mostly of the more accomplished students. At the beginning of these musical forays, the sounds bordered on "every note threatening to be a tune," a definition someone once gave to classical music. But the group made steady progress and lots of pleasure came out of their participation, both for themselves and for the rest of the family. Their rhythmic beat of sound had many of the recognized features of good music. Loretta gave each of the girls individual piano lessons, which most took quite seriously, some continuing into college. The violinist gave up after several years and the eldest student mastered the clarinet and piano, and later gave piano lessons. Loretta herself derived great pleasure from singing "Indian Love Call" while accompanying herself on the piano. Late at night while I was away in Budni she would, after all the girls were in bed, play the plaintive notes with such emotion that our neighbor in the other pavilion, who was often without her husband, felt shudders down her spine. She eventually pleaded with Loretta to confine playing that song during the day.

Stitching cloth into useful items was our second-most important extracurricular activity. Among the twenty-two pieces of luggage accompanying Loretta and the girls was our 1940 electric sewing machine. More than half of the dresses ever worn by the six girls and Loretta were products of our portable Singer. Mother, an accomplished seamstress, had stitched them all. Still

fresh on all the girls' minds are those lovely dresses mother Loretta had stitched until the wee hours of the morning for their travel from Nashville, Tennessee to India. All the same color, style, and design. The amount of uncut cloth we brought to Bhopal suggested that a dry goods store in Nashville must have still been restocking. During our first years in India, all the girls were quite content to be dressed alike, particularly after so many individuals heaped compliments on them for how good they looked.

Soon enough, the girls wanted to establish their own styles, which served as impetus to master sewing. All went through the basics of how to operate the sewing machine, how to cut material from patterns, and make alterations and repairs. Several went on to make their own designs, producing garments from start to finish.

Religious education was given primary attention. Loretta and I had both come from strongly religious families. As my grandmother instilled in me "Each devil has to figure his/her own salvation," I found it a good thing to show each devil the different choices available. Just as Loretta had gathered the children during the week days around her to impart the secular education, I gathered them around on Sunday mornings to read the dramatic stories of the Old and New Testament. Through contact with colleagues and my Muslim driver I learned too that India is in itself a living book of religious knowledge from the deep wells of which much moral and ethical wealth can be drawn. So I shared with the daughters what I had come to know and imbibed them with a deep tolerance of others' genuine beliefs.

Eventually our little school gained attention across India. One of the leading magazines of the day, called TREND, published in Bombay, came to interview us. The article appeared with the following headline: "IN BHOPAL IS A UNIQUE ONE-ROOM SCHOOL WITH JUST SIX PUPILS AND ONE TEACHER." Following are some quotes: Loretta recalls: "Holidays for the whole family posed a major problem back in the states. Harold could not always get away from his work when school was closed. Now, whenever he can get away the whole family takes a holiday and we move the school along with us or put in longer hours in class to make up the lost time."

One of their American neighbors said: The Jones school is typical of the little, red school of rural America. Every morning when I stand in the garden and listen to the children singing in class, I feel I am back home."

Educators have long said that "the difference between a good school and a great school is parental involvement," no doubt in reference to public schools. If there is a grain of truth to this, what we had established — a school where the parents and family are the PTA, school, and superintendent — must be rated super great. Its day-to-day operation was all-parental, though mostly one parent was involved, Loretta being the mother/teacher. It is a general consensus among school educators that what children do in one place affects what they do in many other places they may find themselves. Success at the school place makes them more amenable for getting along not only with other family members, but with those outside the home. "The home child and the school child is the same child," educators often say. Nothing could be truer in our case. But in our remote corner of India, we had scrambled all of these good philosophical things together. We knew that the children would each of experienced educators claim is gained by

students who go through the normally unfolding steps of growth in public school. We had only ourselves and our personal philosophies to guide us. Our first academic aim was to prepare the girls for reaching the big goal of meeting university entrance requirements. The correspondence schools had guaranteed that if all lessons were completed with average to good passing grades, there would be no problem with university entrance any where in the U.S. Our hope ran deep to turn out students who had a good start on being well balanced and who would gain much from their wider exposure to other cultures and locations. Beyond qualifying our students for college entrance, we realized that our school, like life, was an exercise in praxis, not just an institution for theoretical learning. It was a tight situation where children and parents were involved in an educative process, both in and out of the formal classroom setting. We were sensitive to what educators refer to as the differences between instruction and education. Instruction means training in skills referred to as the three Rs: reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic. Competency in the three Rs is thought not to be enough to assure a so-called successful individual. Education, on the other hand, is said to have a lot more depth. It is supposed to extend people so that their skills, talent, and attitudes are developed for their welfare and for that of all others. The key to education then is the competency to be warm and loving, when this is consistently up front, competency in the fourth and most important of the Rs is achieved. This R refers to the relationships with other people. Living in peace and harmony with others is said to be the true function of education, which still has a long way to go. Knowledge in itself is not worth much unless it is put to wise and prudent use. For adults and children to make good use of knowledge they need sound mental health, a prime requisite for living in harmony with others. To create this state of being, students need what is sometimes called "emotional vitamins." These are the unbottled vitamins like: Love, Acceptance, Security, Protection, Independence, Faith, Guidance, Control. Nothing is more important to the balance of a child than knowing that their parents love them and enjoy them. All children must know that they are accepted, liked, loved for what they are, as they are, and not just when their behavior complies with parental ideas of how they should be. The feeling of belonging to a family group is necessary to gain a feeling of security, to know that in a time of crisis parents and other family members will be on hand. Security cannot be at one's side all the time, but one needs enough of the feeling of security to make insecurity bearable. Dependency is unavoidable in the lives of all children. At the same time they need to know that they are independent and will be allowed by their parents to grow up and be encouraged to try different things. The existence of confidence in their ability to do things for themselves should be made known to them. This helps them build strong wings for leaving the nest. Faith and belief in moral standards and human values is an essential vitamin for all children. Kindness, courage, honesty, generosity, justice, and sharing are essential ingredients to live by in any society. Guidance is needed to convince children how to behave towards people and things. Role models who show by example how to interact with others can provide the best guidance. Control is basic to any society. Without it chaos is the result. Children need to know the limits and what is permissible. It is important for them to feel that to give vent to anger, disagreement, jealousy and other destructive urges cannot be let loose without penalty. Years later one of our daughters related to us the following comment of a budding suitor of hers at university on her sisters and their glowing memories of the Bhopal home school: I felt somehow our faith in home education was rewarded: "All of you are so generous and just because your parents took responsibility for the totality of your upbringing."

The Center Opening

Meanwhile progress towards opening the farm machinery center was on schedule. Mr. Taneja, other staff and I, established both a three and a six-month training program. He sent out to all Indian States announcements and invitations to apply. For the twenty slots available in each course, we received over 400 applications, giving us an opportunity to select dedicated and good students. Dr. Rao, Officer-In-Charge, was not following the overall progress very closely. Three months passed before he raised any questions about the preparations. When he did ask, he wanted to know where we stood in the schedule for opening the center. The chief instructor and I had already conspired to set around any of his ideas that might slow us down. His main concern revolved around which basic engineering principles should be emphasized in the training. Mr. Taneja responded to his concerns by explaining the training would simply emphasize practical aspects of operation, maintenance of tractors and tractor-drawn equipment. Adjustments in the training program would be made as experience dictated. Furthermore, it was too near the opening date to make significant changes. Our approach proved to be a good one later on.

The big iron monsters arrived in Budni on schedule. The D-8 Caterpillar tractors were delivered on flatbed trailers that had squeezed their way over narrow, rough roads, and began to clear two hundred acres of dense jungle for our practical training area. Two D-8 Caterpillars, each hooked to a long heavy chain of a calculated length, moved in parallel and created a U-shaped loop. Each link weighed 125 lbs. The chain was further weighted by heavy iron balls spaced along it. All trees coming within the loop were uprooted and felled: monana, teak, both valuable in furniture making, and banyans used in construction due to their toughness. The dozer blades pushed the downed trees and vegetation into windrows to decay and return to the soil from which they had come. From dust to tree to dust, or more accurately, from dust to tree to dust to rice and wheat for our program to help India feed its growing millions.

Each problem solved had its way of generating other problems. This endeavor unfortunately created a mini- ecological disaster. Budni became a prototype of what happens when humans compete with flora and fauna for survival. With the destruction of the forests, the monkeys became our number-one pest, eating the grain crop planted in the cleared areas. This prompted the director to ask for special permission to purchase two shotguns to control the monkeys. But this solution had the potential for a disaster because many local people viewed the monkey as sacred. When it was hinted that I might be the one to shoot the monkeys, I thought “No thank You!” Despite the fact that I had enjoyed hunting tigers and game animals, I would never entertain the idea of shooting a monkey. Nothing could produce a one-way ticket to heaven or out of the country taster, than the wrath of local religious groups. The monkeys continued to eat, one or two were shot by a local on the quiet.

A small but colorful ceremony with ample government representation from the Ministry of Agriculture, was held for the opening of the Farm Machinery Training and Testing Center on the first of July 1956.

Monsoon

Big, white, billowing clouds projected themselves like leaders of a marching band, followed by gray, moisture-laden, floating ghosts, which spread the pleasant smell of wetness over a bone-dry landscape. These formations ushered in the monsoon, pushing aside the punishing dry season for

the arrival of spring. The eternal cycle of monsoon-dry season-monsoon demanded severe survival adjustments. Ready or not, here we are, each season seemed to say. All that is here, all that leaves and returns is a part of this parade. India is monsoon, monsoon is India. Rains come as morning, afternoon, or night showers, or in torrents lasting up to twelve hours, causing flash floods. Keeping dry and saving the essential things of life becomes one big scramble, as a roof may cave in or the mud walls of village homes may collapse. The fight against keeping weeds out of the crops in the muddy fields can be never ending. Road transportation can be delayed for hours, cutting into the normal flow of supplies. Insects, scorpions, and snakes come out from everywhere, exposing everyone to the dreaded malarial mosquito and the other painful bites and stings of the season. Roof leaks and rain blowing through open windows often had me sweeping out large puddles of water and dragging my bed to the only dry corner of the building. Then, like a faucet being cut off, the rains stops for six or more months. Heat and low humidity take every drop of moisture out of the landscape, and all living things suffer from the lack of water. Polluted and unfit drinking water often is the cause for cholera outbreaks.

No matter what the seasons brought, my life was devoted to expansion of the Training and Testing Center. We concentrated on improving the buildings and curriculum and experimented with simple and more advanced farm equipment models. I assisted a workshop in Bhopal to construct a small, power-operated threshing machine and spent an inordinate time testing and modifying it at Budni. We also began to extend simple technology to villages and small implement manufacturers. I built two models of bullock-drawn equipment for the wheat research station across the river, to demonstrate how land leveling could enhance better water utilization for irrigation. A film was made on small-farm irrigation, depicting the use of this equipment. I had the opportunity to view the film ten years later in Kenya.

In the meantime, Shri (Mr.) Vedantia temporally became Officer-In-Charge, replacing Shri E.G.K. Rao. Shri P. John Zachariah replaced Shri Vedantia as the first director of the center.

Bhopal The City

Bhopal is the capital of Madhya Pradesh State (Central Provinces) which constitutes a very large Portion of the mid- section of independent India. The city lies on the shores of a ninety-nine acre lake. Its narrow streets are lined with open sewers, from which rose a stench that took some getting used to. The custom of chewing pan, a nasty mixture of betel nut, lime, and spices wrapped in a betel leaf, resulted in red spittle splattered over most surfaces. The whitewall tires on our station wagon had to be scrubbed after every trip to town to remove the stubborn red stain. Whenever the locals offered me pan, I pulled out my chewing sum and said, "I'll stick with my Amereecan pan."

Scattered about the edge of town in the direction of the palace and around the government buildings were better kept areas. A few modest to palatial homes were built on the outer perimeter of town and near the lake's edge. The lack of stop lights, parking meters, or traffic jams compensated for some of the perils of city navigation. Bicycle and foot traffic were dominated by men. Some Hindu women dressed in western clothes, or saris could be seen, and Moslem women were totally covered, seeing the outside world through eye slits in their burkas. No cover-up could be more complete. School children wore uniforms.

There were no finished clothing stores. Cloth of great variety and quality, sold by the yard, was readily available in many shops to be worn for saris, or cut and sown into finished clothing. Equally available were stitchers, who turned cloth into finished clothing. We had no need for the services of stitchers or tailors, since Loretta, with her portable Singer sewing machine, could do it all. We needed only cloth and thread.

Services and finished products were meager. We were able to obtain powdered milk from a provisions store that sold a liaised number of goods from Bombay and abroad. It was called the Bombay Store. We needed milk for cooking, cereals, for homemade ice-cream, and to nurse our younger pets. On trips to New Delhi we stocked up on powdered milk when available, but the U.S. Embassy commissary tended to carry more booze than milk. A flour mill on the outskirts of Bhopal provided a supply of protein-enriched, brownish flour. I honored an invitation to visit the plant, run by a Bombay business family. They generated as many weevils as they did flour. The walls and floors in the grain storage area literally crawled with brown specks, at least an eighth inch deep. The management did not seem concerned, hence the unplanned protein enriched flour. Sugar was available, light brown, and brown, and brown brown. The intensity of brownness depended on the amount of foreign material it contained. We boiled the light brown variety — which was sold as white — let the sediment settle out, and poured off the clear syrup. Some years later the younger girls were to discover that not all sugar was not brown syrup. Rice and gram were available. Extra washing was the norm before cooking the gram and rice. Fresh vegetables, such as potatoes, greens, cabbage, and tomatoes, were seasonal. All fruits and vegetables were heavily disinfected before storing or cooking.

Mangoes were seasonal but limes were available most of the year. Limeade was our breakfast drink and beverage throughout the day. Our maximum lime consumption for one week was twenty-two dozen, perhaps a world record. Later Coca-Cola, in its quest to colonize the world, occupied India, rivaling the British. An old, worn-down ice plant provided ice enough to supplement that from our deep-freezer, to allow Loretta to make homemade ice-cream flavored naturally with local fruits. Frequently, this was shared with our Indian friends and acquaintances, who were pleased to see local ingredients used and often requested the recipe. Of course, we had plenty of Jones girl-power to hand-turn the ice cream maker. On one of our home leave visits to Nashville, a salesclerk, tried to sell us the latest in electrical ice cream freezers, but when a unified shout of “and miss out on all that good hand cranking?” she backed off. Needless to say, we purchased the hand-cranked model.

The Bharat Talkies — the local cinema — was the downtown place most frequented for entertainment. On a dimly lit street beyond the town center, it was not a place of shine, glitter, or artistic decor, but was rather dullish, fitting in well with the town character. It was not very clean and the air not exactly scented with Jasmine. The seats were hard but bearable. Red stains from pan chewers were common, but there were no buzzard roosts as were once provided for African-Americans in the U.S. south to separate races or castes. Prices were competitive but there was no freshly popped popcorn, so we carried our own snacks. In spite of the theater’s appearance, we spent much of the week anticipating Saturday night, the only night films were in English, and we attended regardless of the content. After the movie, we often came back to the pavilion with Indian friends who had accompanied us, and topped off the evening with some cookies and

homemade ice cream. When a film was rated for adult audiences, the girls stayed home and Loretta, a fantastic story teller, described it in detail at Sunday's breakfast. The girls frequently spent Sunday acting out portions of the movies. At the dining table the conversation flowed from the movies to worldly affairs. Relating my experiences during the week at the remote work place about tigers, leopards, and snakes, visits to Indian villages and the recall of WWII and Korean War stories, helped fulfill their never-tiring curiosity.

A three-ring circus spent one week in Bhopal, a great and welcome diversion. They put on an excellent show. We spent much of Sunday afternoon with our Montana friends, Dr. and Mrs. Keyes and their three sons stationed thirty miles away in Sehore. They had shared our pavilion until their house was ready in Sehore. Our light snacks and the great show made us feel pretty close to being back home. Christmas also had a special touch in Bhopal. For the first time we encountered Boxing Day. The British custom had permeated deep into the Indian culture. On the twenty-sixth we awoke to find a stress of visitors queuing up before our front door on the portico. Rafiq explained to us that Boxing Day had raised high expectations among the people. All public service employees — post, electrical, water — plus anyone who had on a social uniform of some sort, expected little boxes from the sahibs and memsahibs. These were in fact the “baskeesh” (a few rupees) of thanks for the year's services and non- services. At first we had nothing against the custom, but somehow it seems too materialistic for the nature of Christmas. So we modified the custom with equal success. We set up tables of goodies and tea with sugar and milk from early morning to sundown under the large mango tree to the left of our pavilion entrance. A steady stream of public utility employees, this time with wives and children, came to share a repast and talk. Our girls took the role of servants on this day. We made one exception on Boxing Day. We always kept an envelope ready for the strong, bow-legged, Dravidian dark gardner, Moti, who without our ever asking always took the imitative to weave a beautiful wreath for our front door. He always presented it without uttering a word, but with bright eyes and a huge, contented smile. We also told the girls that Christmas was different too in another way than in the U.S. In Bhopal, Santa Claus, whom we soon came to call Father Christmas in good British-Indian English, was poorer. The girls took the challenge. They worked hard in the weeks before Christmas making their own gifts to help Santa out. One, for example made out of a string of light bulb boxes an ingenious train for the younger sisters. The Christmas tradition started in India left lasting impressions on the girls even up to this day. The palace ground officials allowed us to cut a few limbs off one big evergreen tree resembling a Pine, which I converted into a semblance of a Christmas tree. The girls generated some colorful design from various colors of paper to decorate the tree.

Services

Several trained doctors were available in Bhopal. However. I felt a little squeamish when one told me that despite the fact that he had obtained his medical degree from a school in U.S. and that he applied the latest available scientific knowledge in his practice, in his own mind he had not yet accepted the germ theory. Religious and traditional beliefs were no doubt the culprits. What a contradiction in the eyes of us westerners. Fortunately during our four and a half years we had to call a doctor only once, when I experienced a high fever over one weekend.

A big sign with a painting of a large set of pink false teeth stuck out from a small rundown building on a narrow, dirty street. It signaled the office of a dentist. It was the Chinese who said centuries ago that one picture was worth a thousand words, and in fact the dentist was Chinese. I had broken a tooth on my partial plate, and in a matter of minutes he had it repaired. He then offered to build me a new partial. I saw the sense in having an extra, so I agreed. It was finished in one day. It looked and felt good and cost less than five dollars. I told him I had never seen a Chinese dentist before. He said that many of the Chinese in India were dentists. I asked about his training, and was told that in China, dentistry is a craft passed down from father to son.

None of the services were more quaint and adoring than those of my barber. A few doors from the dentist, tucked away in shanty-like building, was his dingy, but orderly barber shop. There was a baby-like high chair, straight razors, straps, mirror, hand clippers, combs and brushes. A hand basin with soap and water served to make foam for shaving and cleaning instruments. Oily, caked-on dirt had accumulated throughout the shop. Mounted on all walls were pictures of notables, and framed under glass was an inexhaustible collection of hair samples he had cut over the years from distinguished people. Dates and names were attached. He had kept a few curls from maharajahs, kings, Viceroys, visiting British officials, administrative officers, and popular politicians. I don't think my status was high enough to qualify for such distinction. He was able to understand how customers wished to have their hair cut, and tried hard to please. I was satisfied with his workmanship. However, after the first severe case of barber itch and other hairline infections, I had to rush home to administer my own sanitized prevention methods, mostly rubbing alcohol, hoping to beat the microbes before they became firmly established.

The Family and Bhopal

From a material standpoint, our car, our household, possessions, and our appearance, though minimal by American standards, created in the minds of Bhopalis an image of great wealth. Yet the respect we showed for people, regardless of caste or position, earned us the designation of a new kind of Rajah. This meant that although we lived like Rajahs, we didn't act like them. Periodically, the girls out on a meal or special reception to serve government officials or local private citizens. They did the same on special occasions for our household assistants, serving them and their families.

However, a family of girls in India is considered a disaster. Partly responsible for this attitude is the Hindu dowry system, money or goods paid by the bride's father to her groom's family in an arranged marriage. Social position is judged by the size of the wedding and the amount of dowry. Baby girls are sometimes murdered or aborted in order to avoid the burden of their future financial oblations. Wives are sometimes beaten or burned after they have moved into their in-law's household if the dowry is considered insufficient. Families borrow heavily and so deeply in debt to marry off their female children that many never recover. Even when a father is prosperous, marriages can still lead to ruin, since pride and custom constantly urge him ahead of his resources. All of this is reflected in the India adage, "Even a king will go bankrupt if he has five daughters." Not having the means of a king, I stagger to think what would happen if he had seven! As the locals saw it, I was in for a life of hardships, financial devastation, and sacrifice. Not a total misconception, but not for the same things Indians had in mind. For us parents there was always

total sympathy from our Indian friends, though I assured them having many daughters is not nearly as much of a calamity in the United States.

The Muslim dowry system would have suited us better, since it obliges the bridegroom family to pay the bride dowry. But the social prices in the minds of us parents was much higher: total envelopment in a Burka in exchange for financial improvement.

A Congressman With a Fool-Proof Camera

Budni was no place to expect traveling “heavies” to visit. Even the U.S. Mission officials from the New Delhi office didn’t bother to come. However, the embassy had sent word to Bhopal that Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana was visiting India and had expressed his desire to see the Budni term machinery training and testing project, which had been open for less than two months. There was no explanation for the purpose of the visit. Could it be that he was looking for ammunition to prove that overseas projects were unnecessary expenditures? He was, after all, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Arrangements were made at the government guest house for the Senator and two AID mission officers from New Delhi who were also visiting for the first time. Their chartered DC-3 which must have cost a few taxpayers dollars, landed at the Bhopal airport, where the Nawab’s five private planes were still hankered. Welcomed by several Madhya Pradesh state officials, the senator, in his trademark fedora hat and pin stripe suit, hit the ground politicking. After introductions, he exclaimed how happy he was to be visiting the world’s largest democracy. Jokingly, or maybe not so jokingly, he made several host officials honorary Democrats by pinning a party button on them. The officials and crowd seemed to enjoy the antics in good humor.

Chatting constantly, with an occasional question about our work in India, the Senator took the sixty mile trip to Budni in stride. Much of his talk was about the other ninety-eight countries he had visited around the world. The latest on his list was the Soviet Union, where he saw some encouraging developments in housing, hospitals, and community development. He seemed to think that life in that country was not nearly as dismal as was often portrayed by the non-communist world.

Introductions of officials at the training center resulted in the making of more honorary Democrats. From the beginning of the tour to the end, the senator’s 16mm movie camera ran constantly. He delighted in it as much as a child with a new toy. He called it foolproof, because he had only to aim and push the button. The Department of State had furnished the camera for his trip. As he filmed, he barraged us with his opinion that much of the \$120,000 worth of equipment furnished by the U.S. was out of touch with Indian farmers’ needs. He focused his criticism on a \$122.00 wheatland plow, used by Midwestern wheat farmers in their large operations. Seeing that I was under fire, his pilot spoke softly to me about the senator’s monologue. It’s costing more to fly the old so and so one hour in that plane than the cost of that plow. I’m sure he was vaccinated with a phonograph needle and there is nothing you can do or say that will cause him to put his mouth in park. Just don’t worry about it.

My attempt to explain that the equipment was bought on a trial-and-testing basis fell on deaf ears, neither slowing or changing the direction of his discourse. But it was all done in a pleasant, jovial manner and with what some say is high-political style. New to this business of development assistance, I was perplexed at the Indian and U.S. officials tendency to rush around like unguided missiles when a congressman made a request. There is a lot to be said for ignorance being bliss.

After the tour, Mr. Rao and his staff offered their standard recast, strong tea and biscuits. The Senator seemed to relish it and praised the center's establishment. For some reason, every half hour or so he mentioned the wheatland plow and its inappropriateness for India. But he promised to send the Officer-In-Charge, a copy of the 16mm film. At dinner that evening, the senator continued to relate his travel impressions, and everything went smoothly. The next morning our trip through the countryside of Bhopal gave the senator an expanded exercise for his foolproof camera, and he agreed to my request that he write my parents about his visit, which I thought would delight them. I saw him off at the Bhopal airport with great relief.

Within several weeks, a package marked "U.S. Senate" arrived. With so little to do in Budni, the prospect of seeing a film of our fledgling center and its staff had caused excitement to skyrocket, and some of the community folk had been invited to attend. Luckily, the Officer-In-Charge decided to preview the film, only to discover our copy was completely blank. Suspecting the original to be the same, I concluded that the State Department's ability to pick a foolproof camera for a non-foolproof operator was clearly not foolproof. Or had the Republican administration overestimated the Democratic Senator? Was it intended? If so, it worked.

A year or so later, during my first home leave, I stopped at the India desk in the State Department. The officer immediately brought up the senator's visit.

"What did he have to say about it?" I inquired.

He was still talking about that \$122.00 wheatland plow that was not suitable for Indian conditions.

"What was the response here to his comments?"

"We simply forgot about what the old codger was saying. It's insignificant. You too should forget about it," the desk officer advised.

"I never thought that much about it in the first place," I countered. His letter to me stated that he planned to make good use of the information he gathered on his trip, particularly in connection with future appropriations for our foreign-aid programs."

However, the senator did keep his promise to write my parents in Virginia about seeing us and the good work we were doing in India. That's quite an accomplishment for a politician! Following is his letter to me:

Houma, Louisiana
November 16, 1956

Dear Mr. Jones:

I was very grateful for the courteous attention you showed to me when I visited the extension projects at Bhopal last August. I was very interested in every thing I saw there, and I certainly appreciated the efforts of you and others in charge of the project in furnishing all the information I obtained.

I feel that my trip this year was an especially enlightening and rewarding one. I plan to make good use of the material I have obtained, particularly in connection with future appropriations for our foreign aid program.

Again thanking you, and with kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely Yours,

ALLEN J ELLENDER U.S. Senator.

Pets - The Menagerie

Pets occupied a unique place in our family life in Bhopal. Truly treasured members of our pavilion house, they brought to everyone immense joy and at times sadness. Each one coincidentally happened to be female, furthering the family syndrome. Oh yes, there was one exception, the Python. We were never sure of its sex. Our menagerie, in both variety and number, would rival a small town zoo. They played an important and delightful role in our family life in Bhopal. Appreciating the value of animal companionship observing and learning their different behavior patterns, and the responsibility of caring for them, were lessons from which each of us benefited. Everyone's favorite was equally catered to. The seven-foot python was probably the least loved.

Gori, a small, black-and-white terrier with one ear slightly bent down and a pigeon-toed left foot, was alert and intelligent. She epitomized the adage, "A dog is man's best friend." though it was the girls to whom she was devoted. Wherever the girls were, so was Gori. She had only about three inches of tail, which was constantly in motion during all of her waking hours. We were never able to get any information as to Gori's roots. She was clearly the fox terrier breed. Her behavior was classic, loving and protective. She was the leavening factor in keeping the rest of the menagerie's temperament on an even, tolerant keel. When they bristled or showed resentment for each other, she would walk up, and sniff them as if to say. "We must recognize everyone's right to be there." She once rescued Cathy from an attack by an Alsatian dog by jumping on his back and sinking her teeth into his skin. She kept peace among the other pets and protected them from intruders. Gori actually belonged to Mr. Rao, at the Budni training and testing center. He had shipped Gori from Madras to Bhopal by rail, and had asked me to intercept her at the train station, since he would not be able to get there for her arrival. Though he knew we had her, he made no mention of reclaiming her and neither did I. The girls had become truly attached and Gori fit right in. Not until two and half years later, did Mr. Rao finally came to claim her, at the family's deepest regret and sorrow. It brought home the lesson, "All good things must come to an end."

BOODU was a brown Rhesus monkey. My driver gave her the name to indicate how silly he found the monkey. She never did less than wild monkeys are expected to do. With her speed and agility, she was a big tease and somewhat of an annoyance to all the other pets and indeed the people of the house, too. She liked being loved and petted and had a very keen sense of those who had the slightest dislike for her. Clearly she realized that she had little claim on Carol's admiration, our third oldest. She watched Carol very closely and stayed out of her way. A favorite pleasure of her's was to ride on the bundle carrier of the Christina bicycle with total ease and contentment, grasping her delicate hands around the pedaler's or the second passenger's waist. She hated being washed in the bathtub, screeching at the top of her lungs whenever Christina approached her with soap in hand. The reason for this antipathy was discovered by accident. Instead of filling the tub with cold water, the girls one day poured into the tub heated water remaining from the dhobi's supply. It was almost impossible to pull Boodoo out of the bath. She swam and dried with pleasure. Hereafter during the monsoon, the girls took her to the buffalo's mud holes to allow her to show off her swimming prowess. Boodu was more familiar with the kitchen than the cook. She was a big sneak, always looking for morsels to stuff into her mouth, making her elastic jaws jut out like Dizzy Gillespie. She was a veritable storeroom on the move, and move she could. We knew she had acquired some forbidden item when we observed a brown blur streaking from the kitchen. During the day she had to be staked out by the tree where she was content to pluck at the bark, looking for small busses to snack on and conduct her toiletry as needed. Although she slept in a large cage I had built out of freighting crates, she clever enough to pick the lock on the chain holding her to the large shade tree. While loose and free to roam one day, her curiosity took her exploring up an electric pole which serviced the pavilion. When she reached the top she made the fatal mistake of grasping a live wire in each hand to swing between them. She was immediately electrocuted and fell to the ground bluish and lifeless. Two boys in the neighborhood found her and delivered her corpse to the girls. Family bereavement again hit a very high pitch. Boodu was given a dignified funeral with a simple wooden cross to mark the grave.

At the time cats were admitted to our menagerie the girls were just learning the gods and goddesses of Greek mythology, relating the proverbial curiosity of cats to their new-found knowledge. The girls baptized the cats. Pandoras were a series of cats of pure or mixed Siamese lineage. The three with us in Bhopal had the physical appearance of the more common seal-point Siamese. They thus had light-colored bodies with dark-colored ears, face, feet, and tail. The darker areas are called Points. Other variations of the Siamese include chocolate-point, blue-point, and lilac-points. We suspected that our first litter of Siamese cats had their more recent roots in England. However, the series of litters born in Bhopal and fathered by stray tons of dubious purity shook the Siamese features to the rafters. Even though the offspring were not purebred, these marvels of strength and balance were always a pleasure to have around and watch. Although credited by some as being more independent than other breeds of cats, our Pandoras didn't conform enough to convince us of this accusation. They were friendly and faithful companions and responded gratefully to good treatment. Bhopal offered a constant parade of creatures that kept their curiosity and hunting instincts totally riled with excitement. Birds, lizards, chameleons, moles, mice, crickets, frogs, screeching shrews and snakes were their constant victims. Our Pandoras had the more mournful meow which is credited to their breed, and is said to be an attention-getting technique. They were quick to purr when pleased, but ghoulish when

unhappy or angry. The arched back, hair standing on end, and puffed up tails were consistently displayed in response to the various creatures running around the pavilion. As time passed, familiarity and the lack of any real threat from their encounters, they began to take things for granted, easing their anxiety.

No matter how domestic their situation, they remained cats first and always. Their swift, soundless, padded feet were their chief weapons for stalking their prey, often playing with their victims by tossing it about and recapturing it as it tried to escape. When bored with this part of the act, the captured is abandoned or eaten though the meal did not stay down if it didn't set well with the cat's stomach. Cats, no matter the size or type, are principally meat eaters. We left them to their own devices on that score, but supplemented their diet with milk, either powdered or fresh from goat, cow or buffalo. Proud and fearless, our Pandoras adjusted well to whatever the conditions. Our cats and dogs showed far less aversion to each other than most, always snarling and quarreling. They came as close to living in harmony as cats and dogs can.

Twitchy never seemed to know she was a rabbit. She came to us from an Indian acquaintance, little more than a fluffy, oversize powder puff. There could never be a better example of living in harmony amid a collection of big-types so totally different from herself. She had to put up with a dog, cats, a monkey, a python, a tiger, and all of us. Whatever food was out for the other pets Twitchy shared, including meat. Never in fear wherever the others gathered, her hippety-hoppy motion eased her up among them. Twitchy's peculiar flair for music set her apart from the rest of the pets. Whenever the piano was being played, which was very often, she would hop to the middle of the floor facing the piano and sit up straight on her hind legs. From this meditative posture both ears went into a twitching, quivering motion. Every other part was as motionless as a stone. There wasn't even a blinking of the eyes. Only when the music stopped did her ears turn off like windshield wipers. Whether the piano music went on for a short spell or was extended didn't seem to matter. She adjusted her attention or participation span accordingly. As the last note on the piano faded she relaxed and went back being a rabbit. No matter how far away or what she might be doing, the first few piano notes brought her hurrying to her favorite spot. We were baffled by this strange action, but the Indian explanation was that she had been associated with music in her last life. She might even have been a pianist. Somewhat of a backward step, we thought, on the road to spiritual perfection. We never had the gumption to accent reincarnation as the last word, but it was interesting and something to wonder about. The great propensity rabbits have for procreation aroused our sympathy for Twitchy's predicament among such a group of non-appealing companions, all female. We bestowed much affection upon her to make it up to her.

Squeezy was a seven-foot python youngster of indeterminable sex, though odds were it was a female. It had lived in a windrow of trees, bushes, and dirt created by the D-8 caterpillar tractors that came to Budni to clear away the jungle trees and bush. These decaying heaps became the homes of many creatures: mice, rats, insects, frogs, snakes, and lots more. They were incubators for termites, ants, and other types which hastened their decay. Squeezy no doubt found it a good place to catch frogs, rats, and other creatures. While sitting one morning on one of the pushed-over trees, I saw the head of a python push out from under the debris. His fascinating color markings and sheen was a slithering thing of beauty. A big wood rat had just run out, went forward a short distance, and dashed back under the pile of rubbish. I think Squeezy must have

been on its trail not being poisonous, and not large enough to attack and squeeze me to death, I decided to capture it. Quickly, I shaped a forked stick I could push down over the back of its head. As a young country boy I had caught snakes that way before, but nothing nearly as stout and long. Patiently, I watched it ease away from the stacked trees. It seemed unaware of my presence, engrossed in the pursuit of its prey, perhaps the big rat that had gone by. It seemed to be smelling along the ground as if to pick up the trail of the big rat that had gone by. As it moved into a clearing, I got between it and the heap, and was able to gush the stick down over his head. It curled, twisted and wrapped himself around the stick. Unsure of what to do next. I grassed the soft portion of its neck behind the head between my middle and fore fingers. It curled tightly around my arm above my elbow. I started to lose my grip as it squeezed my arm muscle, but just when I thought I had lost the battle, it suddenly relaxed. I am not sure why. I walked to my quarters and placed it in a closed wooden box. Here it stayed until the next day when I returned to Bhopal for the weekend to join the family. I wondered all the way home how the girls and Loretta would feel about the newest addition to the menagerie. Soon enough I got the answer.

“Why on earth did you bring a python home?” they cried.

“They’re harmless at this age and we can let it go whenever the vote is in favor.”

Carol blurted out, “I can catch bullfrogs to feed it.” She had made an art of catching frogs from by the water’s ease down at the lake by using the technique of tying a small red rag to the hook on her fishing line. She dangled it in front of a frog’s nose and, presto! She made a catch. Frogs and sometimes a small rodent became Squeezy’s daily bill of fare. We never watched it swallow one, but they disappeared from the box and Squeezy seemed to thrive. Too bad it could never socialize with the rest of the menagerie. Although it never gained more than partial respect from the family, there was a sadness when Squeezy met its fate. Escaping unnoticed from the cage, it crawled across the palace grounds towards the mosque. We learned this when several small boys came down the hill to the house with a dead python. they had seen Squeezy near the mosque and beat it to death with sticks. Obviously it had not done a good job at convincing the youngsters that it was the Jones’ pet python. There was nothing left to do but to hold our second pet funeral, with all the girls participating. Squeezy had gone where all dead snakes go.

“Daddy, is there a snake heaven?” they asked.

“Probably so,” I answered solemnly.

Cathy, the Bengal tigress, was clearly the royalty of the family pet group. She joined the menagerie during our second tour. Cathy was short for Catherine I, wife of Peter the Great, and Empress of Russia, whom the girls had just learned about in school. It has been said, “God made cats so that people would know what it was like to pet a tiger.” We had both, and sometimes they could be found snoozing side by side. Our day-to-day comparison clearly corroborated that cat behavior is the same, regardless of breed, size, shape, color and circumstance. From the other pets, Cathy got the respect she deserved, but none stood in fear or awe of her.

I found Cathy, only a few days old, on one of my tiger hunts. We got her started by feeding her milk from a baby bottle, which she adjusted to with ease. In a matter of weeks. she came running

at the sound of the plastic bottle being tapped against the floor, our signal for feeding time. Flipping over onto her back, she would extend her front feet straight up. The bottle was placed in her paws and in less than a minute she dropped the emptied bottle. Then she bounced back on her feet and was ready to carry on her typical cat routine. We almost lost her when she lost enormous weight through dysentery. Relying on her medical book, Loretta decided to feed her charcoal. To our great relief, it worked. Wild meat was a supplement to her diet, with charcoal pills thrown in to control dysentery. We were all amazed at how her character changed when she was eating meat. She took her meat to a corner and would not allow anyone to approach her. The meat seemed to kindle aggressive behavior and the instinct to protect her kill. She went into blood curdling growls and snarls with teeth skinned back and ready for attack. When the meat was finished, she immediately went back to her quiet house cat manners, twitching her tail and rubbing her head gently against anyone's legs. Then she was ready to hop up on the foot one of the girl's beds and stretch out for a nag. In seven months the milk/meat/charcoal diet turned her into a tiger the size of a full-grown police or Alsatian dog, only she was much heavier. Standing on her hind legs, she easily put her front paws on Loretta's shoulders.

Life with Cathy was a delightful experience for the family and friends. However, she did cause some consternation for visitors. Once outside on her daily routine of stalking and jumping at things in cat fashion, two young Indian boys came by and started to tease her. A warning had been given them several times not to incite her. She tried to ignore them, but they persisted to the point that she charged them. They ran but she caught one by his leg. A superficial injury resulted, and he was taken to the local infirmary. Word quickly got around that it was not good to tease the tiger. Cathy eventually became just another member of the household. Consequently when friends or visitors came we neglected to tell them there was a tiger in the house. When she walked through the doors unannounced. People's reactions took many forms, including fearful facial expression, making ready to run, or hiding behind the sofa. None quite outdid one Britisher who had recently come to Bhopal without his family. He had heard we had a piano and dropped by to play. While in the midst of a number, Cathy walked up and stood in the doorway near the piano. He immediately took to the air and landed on top of the piano. We calmed him down, apologized, and got him back on the stool. When he got back to playing, Cathy came and laid sentry at his feet under the piano. He then got the idea. What a great picture this would make to send back to his wife in the U.K. with a note: This is India for you. We obliged with a camera shot but never had a follow up resort as to how it went over with his family back home. We wondered if the photo kept them in London.

Our First Home Leave

We returned to the U.S. in June, 1958, after two years overseas, for our three months home leave in Nashville. The trip home began by driving our tightly packed station wagon from Bhopal to New Delhi, where we left our car with friends. We flew on BOAC to London and due to the vagaries of air travel, we missed our connecting flight on Pan Am to New York. The offending airline, BOAC, was obliged to put us up and arranged rooms for us at the Westbury Hotel.

The girls were ecstatic. The mattresses and covers were made of rich down feathers. In the dining room they were introduced to their first alcoholic desert in the form of a beautifully decorated chocolate cake flavored with liquor. Upon placing that first bite in their mouths, they donned

some humorous expressions, and used lots of facial muscles to force down the morsels of unexpected taste. We spent most of the day at the hotel before I called PAN AM and told them our story. This led to a rip-roaring brouhaha with the BOAC representatives. PAN AM had a flight which left about the time of our arrival, with which we could have connected, but BOAC had led us to believe there was no PAN AM flight. After threatening to write a letter to the CEO of BOAC, we received a profusion of apologies from the British representative.

Both airlines had evening flights to New York, departing about the same time. We received a series of telephone calls from representatives of each airline, trying to persuade us to fly with them. Eight first class tickets were at stake. We finally decided to fly PAN AM and informed BOAC of our decision, because they had misinformed us about the morning PAN AM flight. We arrived at the airport and were met by officials from both airlines intent on blaming each other for the mix-up and confusion. Finally, the BOAC representative departed in a huff, beating an elegant retreat. At boarding time, the PAN AM representative escorted us to the huge plane and directed us to what was called the "Elite Suite," or "Presidential Suite," located at the front of the plane. The suite was a two-level circular arrangement, connected by a spiral staircase. Each of us had a bed, secluded and separate and first-class service. The luxurious flight back to New York was our most pleasurable. We landed in the morning, June ninth 1958, knowing how Presidents travel.

Our Nashville neighbors and friends gave us a big, gracious welcome. Most of our vacation agenda was spent sprucing up our house, shopping, visiting friends and neighbors, showing slides, and displaying a few of my hunting trophies. I was invited to appear on WSM-TV's Noon Show with Jud Collins. Collins interviewed me about life in India and displayed two of my tiger and leopard rugs, complete with heads. Collins closed the show saying, "This is something for you Tennessee rabbit hunters to take note of," as the cameras zoomed in on the head of the large tiger. Mrs. E. Perry Crump, wife of Dr. Crump, who headed Pediatrics at Meharry Medical College, and our neighbor, made the initial contact with the TV station which led to the invite. After packing our air and surface freight, we completed our home leave, and on September first, we left New York on PAN AM to return to India.

We landed in Rome for our connecting flight and as we attempted to proceed to New Delhi, we discovered we did not have visas to re-enter India. It hadn't even occurred to us to check their expiration date, since they had been sent back to Department of State in Washington for renewal. The airline recommended a good hotel in Rome while our passports were submitted to the U.S. Embassy for updating. Being a weekend, we had to wait until Monday to get our visas. However, while standing in line at the airport, we ran into Larry and Ester Lewis whom we had known from Manassas, Virginia, when Loretta and I worked at the Regional High School there eighteen years prior. They had joined AID and were on their way to Turkey. The few happy moments of nostalgia with them were among the brightest of our stay in Rome. For the girls it was an extra treat to explore the city Cicero, Brutus and Caesar had once strolled and stormed as told in their history books, and they could verify for themselves the types of architectural columns they had to memorize from their art books. We resumed our trip after renewing the visas and arrived at Palam Airport in New Delhi, September eighth 1958. We spent a couple of days in New Delhi at the Claridge Hotel. I picked up our station wagon, touched base with the AID Mission, and visited

the embassy commissary to purchase food items. Our usual pre-dawn morning start allowed us to complete the 500 mile long, dusty, tiresome trip to Bhopal by midnight.

Road Trips

In India, road trips had the potential to be hazardous due to heat, poor road conditions, and limited services. Happily, we had little trouble despite the fact that it took at least fifteen hours to travel to either Bombay or New Delhi. The trips gave us all a chance to see the country's diversity. AID agricultural personnel throughout the sub-continent gathered yearly for a conference, usually in New Delhi, although we did meet once in Hyderabad and Bangalore, where the weather is more temperate. Wherever the location, employees and their families amassed at a first-class hotel, giving the wives and children a chance to make new acquaintances. For the most part, our family and John and James Ella Bull, from Alabama, were the only African-American families. On our first trip to New Delhi, we had the opportunity to meet Marion Anderson, America's prima contralto, who had come to India for a concert. After getting her autograph and handshake, the girls didn't wash their hands for the rest of the day.

More than once we took time to visit the Taj Mahal on the banks of the Yamuna River in Agra. The tomb stands in a garden, its image perfectly reflected in a long pool at its entrance. The Mogul ruler, Shah Jahan, erected the white marble monument in memory of his favorite sultans. Requiring the labor of 20,000 workers over twenty-two years, the Taj is probably the most beautiful example of Moslem architecture. Its magnificence has earned it many endearments: "a poem in marble," "the marble queen of sorrow," and "romance in stone," to name a few. With our shoes removed, we entered to admire the interior's mosaics of precious stones, arabesques, and prayers from the Koran written in black marble, decorating the columns and ceilings. One room contains two monuments visitors can see through a screen of carved alabaster. The bodies of Shah Jehan and his wife, Mumtez, lie in a vault below.

On one of our trips to the Taj Mahal, we received a royal welcome. As we proceeded along the streets of Agra, crowds of people lined the streets, cheering vigorously. Not an uncommon event in India, we assumed some important official would soon be passing. We drove unimpeded up to the guarded entrance to the Taj Mahal. A guard rushed up to the vehicle and opened both doors. To his amazement and our embarrassment, we were not the expected guest the crowd and officials had assumed, and for whom the preparations and cheering were intended. They were expecting the King of Saudi Arabia. We rationalized the incident by saying, "maybe our dry-run made all the actors perform better when the King did come." Without hesitation, we were happy to ease the apprehension of the guards and to high-tail it out of the entrance as fast as possible.

We made another trip to New Delhi at the invitation of our Embassy to join in the festivities honoring President Eisenhower's visit. We had made our usual, tightly packed, 5:00 AM start and were within 150 miles of our destination when we approached a small town. Masses of people were heading toward us, and bystanders lined both sides of the road, leaving hardly enough room to drive through. As we moved slowly through the crowd, a small girl suddenly darted in front of us. She was hit by our front bumper, which cut a small gash in her forehead, and fell down screaming. Like a flash flood, the crowd flowed into the road around the station wagon, not allowing us to move. Screaming in Hindi, one big, lightly clad man leading the crowd came to

my side where the window was partially open and thrust a big dasher against my face. All of us remained quiet but there was enough adrenaline flowing to float the Queen Mary. Luckily, the police saw what was happening and came quickly to our rescue. The crowd was dispersed. I offered to pay the girl's parents through the policeman for her treatment at the nearby dispensary.

"What would you suggest as a fair amount?" I asked.

"Oh, give them thirty-five or forty rupees," he replied, which is about five American dollars. After all, she is just a girl. He then added. "It is much more important that you get on with your trip to Delhi to honor your President Eisenhower, than worrying about hitting a girl." He had assumed correctly, the purpose of our trip. "Thank you for your help," I said.

"We are happy to be in place to help you. It could have been a nasty incident, not uncommon when crowds become aroused. All the best, and have a good journey," he said, as we drove away, feeling much less festive, but greatly relieved that all involved had survived.

Nature's Display

Pursuing and studying flora and fauna consumed much of my spare time, and in the process I caused a wealth of jungle lore. Clearing 200 acres for the center's crop fields had destroyed part of their habitat, but the animals were able to retreat further into the jungle and readjust. The area was a bird -watcher's paradise. One could see many birds of beauty, like the peafowl, bee eaters, doves, green pigeons, kingfishers, rollers, weavers, and the strange looking pied hornbill, to name a few. Some were known for their melodious songs such as the fly catchers and rollers, while others had the job of aerating the soil with their scratching, normally spur fowl, thrushes, and peacocks. The ones intent on keeping the insect population in balance were the fly catchers, bee eaters, weavers, and partridges. A bird watcher could also feast their eyes on such winged predators as hawks, kites, eagles, and owls. The huge, strong-beaked vulture could be seen often taking advantage of the thermal current: to soar out of sight or dive with folded wings down on a dead carcass. No group of living things in India display a greater proficiency of purpose than the Indian vulture.

Watchers could also see a wide diversity of animals that lived on the ground. The deer and antelope displayed speed, grace, and beauty, while primates added human likeness, stature, and agility. Pigs, bears, and porcupines aerated the soil. Monkeys, langurs, deer, squirrels, and peacocks warned others of danger. The scavengers like the hyenas and jackals could be seen cleaning up the areas. The tigers and leopards, together with a group of smaller species and wild dogs made up the four-footed predator group. All of these creatures of the air and ground, worked in a complex mosaic to maintain the balance of nature.

Legless and legged crawling creatures were also in abundance. Poisonous snakes included cobras, kraits, coral, and vipers. Non-poisonous snakes were pythons, grass snakes, and rat snakes. Scorpions in black and white varieties were omnipresent, ever lurking in or under stones and unworn shoes. Another large group of birds, bugs, frogs, snakes, terrapins, and turtles lived in and at the water's edge. I encountered these creatures either in the living quarters, around the

centers' compound, or in the jungle which bordered the center area on all but one side, which had been cleared for cultivation.

One of my more fascinating observations occurred in the late afternoon as I rested against a tree a few yards from a waterhole. My legs were straight out in front of me with my rifle laid across them. A group of thirty-five or forty velvet monkeys came swinging from limb to limb for a drink of water. When they spied me, they started making loud noises, warning each other of my presence. Eventually, they calmed down and quietly sat among the branches, reluctant to approach the waterhole. Twilight was quickly approaching, and a large male decided to risk climbing down a few feet from where I was sitting. I had my hand under my chin in the nose of Rodin's statue, the Thinker. Leaning his back against the tree that he had descended, the monkey put his front paw under his chin emulating my position. Then he walked away, nicked up a stick and laid the stick across his legs as my rifle was laid across mine. There he sat perfectly motionless, but with his eyes intently focused on me. He gave a few squeaky sounds, apparently to tell the pack I was harmless and to come down. The entire group quickly descended the trees either by jumping or sliding down and gathered about the waterhole. As they drank, they kept their eyes on me. The leader finally tossed his stick aside and slowly sauntered over to the waterhole to drink. At his signal, the whole group climbed the trees and disappeared. Probably to their sleeping quarters for the night. Monkey see, monkey do had come alive in this most appropriate setting. Observing nature's system of check and balances was like reading a book with no beginning and no end, and my time at Budni was only a few interesting paragraphs in this great story.

The Film Makers

My work, the serenity of Bodni, and my nature studies were shattered when a movie-making company descended upon us to shoot a film. The training center, which was the only place that had any semblance of accommodations became their operating headquarters. This forced us in daily proximity to India's top stars of the late 1950s, playing badminton, sharing tea, and conversation and observing the filming. The major participants were Dilip Kumar, India's top male star, Ajit, Johnny Walker, the comedian, and Vjantamala, the top female dancing star, a very attractive woman, who was chaperoned by her vigilant grandmother. The movie, Naya Daur, was about tonga wallas (horse-drawn taxis) competing against busses and other modern motored modes of transportation. To stay in business, the horsemen cut a road cross-country on which the buses couldn't go, which greatly reduced their traveling distance and allowed them to compete.

One of the few trips that brought my family to the center occurred during the filming. This provided the girls a chance to meet and have their picture taken with Dilip Kumar, their first encounter with a real-life India movie star. It was my first opportunity to observe how skillful the movie makers are at creating makeshift scenes and giving them an aura of authenticity. Interesting, the movie was shown twice fifteen years later in Nairobi, Kenya when we resided there and is even available today in video in New Delhi. "They made good films in those days, better than today's," commented the shop assistant as my daughter asked to his surprise thirty years later for a video copy to present me on my birthday.

Central India's Holy Water

To go anywhere south of Budni, the Narmada River had to be crossed by ferry. Sometimes a crudely made sail was hoisted to propel the craft, but more often it took the efforts of six men to pole the passengers across. When the water level was high, and the monsoon winds stronger, the ferry traversed the river on a diagonal course to maneuver the current. During the dry season, the river was at its lowest, and the boatmen could pole straight across with no problem. The town of Hoshangabad was spread along the opposite shores, and was the only nearby source of fresh vegetables. I made the trip weekly as a pedestrian to the market. I also crossed with the Jeep on numerous business trips, since the boat could accommodate a few vehicles at a time.

The Narmada is central India's major river, and is the only one that flows to the west coast. While not as well known as the Ganges or the Jumna, it is perhaps the holiest, said to have sprung from the body of Siva. To get the full spiritual benefits from these other rivers, one has to bathe, drink and make other uses of the water. But in respect to the Narmada, some say just to behold it is sufficient to meet all religious needs. Certainly the day-to-day human drama in the river and along its shores was and still can be fantastically interesting to an outsider. I often moved slowly and quietly along it, or sat on its shores to observe the importance it has as a place to worship, bathe, wash clothes, water and clean animals, cook and eat, even give birth. Funeral pyres were constantly constructed for cremation of the dead. During the monsoons, it was extremely difficult to keep the fires hot enough for a complete burning to ashes, and as a result, many bodies were thrown in the holy waters only partially cremated. River turtle then fed on the remains.

Cattle, buffalo, goats, and pigs showed as much delight as the people when relaxing in the river's shallows. Dozens of buffalo submersed themselves with only their glistening nostrils visible above the water. Chewing lazily on their cud, they seemed to challenge creation's design for relaxation. The grotesquely scarred trees along the eroded riverbanks housed thousands of flying foxes (big, fruit-eating bats). All day they hung by their feet, the epitome of serenity. Twilight triggered their instinct to take to the air. Literally blacking out the evening sky they made a series of sweeps up and down the river, scooping up water in midflight. Then they flapped away on their ribbed, leathery wings to feed on their favorite fruit of the season, to the dismay of many farmers. Dawn brought them back to compete for a perch as they rejoined the pace of river life.

The Holy River Boss

Among the more colorful characters I met during my seven plus years in India was Shrimati Dubai, the Narmada River Boss. A Hindu of about fifty years old, she probably would not live long enough to be as old as she looked. Her seemingly neutered appearance was most likely due to the brutality of the seasons, the strain of eking out a living along the river, and a poor diet. She ruled over the forty odd men who poled her flat-bottom ferry boat loaded with river traffic, tended her animals, and worked her plots of vegetables on the damp sands of the river's edge like the potter's widow of Kipling's Akbar Bridge. In spite of her being a bit shy with me, due mostly to her rudimentary English, which was light years ahead of my Hindi, we developed a very pleasant relationship. Our conversations ranged from vegetables to philosophy.

“Amereecans, I find, are quite good and nice people. I remember some of them well from the jungle warfare training center in WWII,” she said one day, as she tucked her sari around her bare, wrinkled midriff.

“We Americans believe in trying to make the world a better place to live.” I countered. The several times I talked with her, making the world a better place was the eventual direction of our discussion.

“That is a worthwhile goal for any civilization,” she began. “But some of us Hindus, and I have said this before, believe that the world is made up equally of good and evil. No matter how much we worry, how much energy or money we expend, man will only be able to shift the balance slightly. Say fifty-two percent good, forty-eight percent bad, and vice versa. If you consider the efforts of religion, human-made laws, regulations, people in prisons, police and the military and what little progress is made towards reducing wrong in the world, I think you will agree with me,” she asserted.

“I certainly hope that someday humans can upset the balance by more than two to four percentage points. You do make a strong argument for your assumption. Personally, I have a greater faith in humans to make right reign over wrong in the long run.”

“I am not sure how long we have to run. But humans are the reason. If they could ever overcome themselves, there may be some hope. Getting right that much ahead of wrong is a long way off. It is way beyond the horizon of your and my time, and the horizons of many generations after us.”

“Madam Dubai,” I interrupted, “let me change the subject to something more practical and close at hand. What would you say if I asked you to sell me one of those good-looking watermelons along the shore over there?”

Smiling, she said, “Mr. Jones, I wouldn’t dare think of selling you a melon. It would be my pleasure to give you one.” At the flick of her wrist one of her workmen had it there in a flash.

“I am grateful,” I said and I cupped my hands and held them across my chest in typical Indian fashion. “Madam, I have brought with me from America some vegetable seed. When I pass this way again, I’ll give you some of them to see how they do here in your garden.”

The seed was delivered. Some did well, carrots and melons especially. I made numerous safe trips across the river under Madam Dubai’s supervision. Whenever I waited for crossing or had tea with her under a tree on the riverbank, we exchanged simple day-to-day points of view from our vastly different beliefs, education, and experience. Needless to say, we never agreed one hundred per cent, but we always respected each other’s position.

The melon was crisp and sweet, truly a rare treat in my remote outpost, and valued for the spirit in which it was given.

The Freelance Photographer

The stranger climbed down from the horse-drawn tonga, fumbled through her cloth teas, and handed the driver the fare. His smile and the profusion of shukriyas indicated that the tin was more than adequate and much appreciated. Numerous cameras and attachments hung from her neck and shoulders, swinging with every move. Otherwise, she was traveling light, and wearing a washable skirt that flared below the knees, a good choice for India's humid wet season. Loosely fitting Indian sandals flapped as she walked. A little less than blonde, her complexion showed no semblance of melanin and suggested that it would turn red, blister and burn, rather than tan when exposed to India's strong tropical sun. Her facial expression was serious, with only a glimmer of a smile. She climbed the back steps of the pavilion where I had gone to wait after seeing the tonga drive up.

"You are Mr. Jones, I assume?" she said, dropping her bag to extend her hand. "I am Marilyn Silverstone, a freelance photographer."

"You're right, I'm Harold Jones. Welcome to Bhopal," I replied as we shook hands. "Come and meet Loretta and the girls." I took her bag and led her to the front portico.

"You're probably wondering why I'm here," she said as we walked.

"We have had a string of unannounced arrivals since being in Bhopal. Let me call the family together so you'll only have to explain your mission once."

Everyone gathered in our open-air living room to meet the new arrival and hear the purpose of her visit.

"I am a graduate of Vassar college, and I work in New York as a photojournalist. I am traveling in India in search of interesting material, and I thought an American family working in development would make a good story. The people at the Indian TCM mission headquarters in Delhi suggested your family in Bhopal as a potential subject for my photographic essay. That's about it, and here I am!" she declared.

"I'm not sure how typical we are, especially since we have all girls. How do you see the story you want unfolding? What do we do and how and what do you do?" I inquired.

"I observe whatever you and your family do from day to day, no matter what it is, and I'll simply keep my distance, take pictures, and make notes without disturbing or interfering in any way. That goes for family's activities as well as your work and leisure routine, Mr. Jones. I want to see some normal days in the life of the family without any change or preparation to accommodate me. I would like to hitch as many rides with you Mr. Jones, wherever you go, but the more you can forget I am here, the better." she explained.

"Sounds like a workable arrangement. We can provide comfortable living quarters here in Bhopal. At Budni it will be necessary to rough it a bit. There are already eight of us around the table here. Nine will not make much difference. You are welcome. At Budni I do my own cooking. If you are game for taking a chance, fine. I usually eat alone and it would be a pleasure to have company. There are lots of mosquitoes and mud. The wrenching daytime heat and humidity during this season can make things very sticky and heat rash is easy to come by. At the

moment, my work schedule is split between Bhopal and Budni. Here in Bhopal I'm working with a local workshop to build a small grain thresher for use on small farms. It's a joint project by myself and a Ford Foundation agricultural engineer. Two to three days a week are spent at Budni. Luckily, you will not have to put up with my cooking for a full week! What happens during our time off we play by ear. Could be a tiger or a meat-gathering hunt, Saturday-night movie, or the circus now playing in town."

For the next ten days Marilyn was our shadow. She didn't say much to us. However, she talked to the local people who knew the family and/or worked with me. She was determined to keep up with me. At Budni in the fields she was sometimes in mud up to her ankles trying to keep her equipment in order and her sandals from being pulled from her feet by the sticky black cotton soil. What a far cry from moving about New York City, I thought.

With the added weight of her equipment, she once called for a push as she maneuvered to climb a tree up to a machan (platform) I had roped to a limb on a weekend tiger hunt. I was unable to shoot the tiger that had been troubling villagers, but the foray did expose her and her camera's lens to a close-up view of an isolated, poverty-stricken Indian village and its friendly people. Never grumbling, she went where I went. Though we discussed many issues during our off-duty routine, nothing was ever mentioned to indicate how she was doing or what she thought of the family activities or my work routine. We had not the slightest clue of what would come out of Marilyn's Bhopal adventure or what would happen to it all.

"I think I have a good view of your role in agricultural development in India and how your family copes with living here," Marilyn announced on her final day.

The girls saw to it that she did not get away without signing the family guest book. In the column labeled "Remarks" she wrote: "The sauce is Hal, and I look forward to seeing you all again. Thanks. After a round of embraces and best wishes, I drove our temporary shadow to the railroad station. Her impressions remained a mystery.

Slightly more than seven months passed before we had any word about Marilyn's efforts. We were pleasantly surprised when we received a big brown envelope containing the March 1960 issue of SIGN - The National Catholic Magazine, with my beleaguered face spread across the cover. Below the picture was the words: "Harold Jones American Abroad." The story within was entitled, "American In Action In India."

It was Marilyn's first magazine cover story and the magazine's first story on a Protestant. Following are excerpts from the article:

"Harold Jones, an agricultural technician from Virginia, is engaged in one of the major revolutions of our time: the struggle to make India capable of feeding itself before being overwhelmed by its soaring population. The task of building up an economy to support 415 million people is stupendous and needs the help of an army of technicians like Jones. He was sent to India three years ago by the Technical Co-operation Mission of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (which has 3000 experts working in underdeveloped countries). Jones is a farm machinery advisor at an agricultural training center at Budni, where young men

throughout India come for three-month courses. He teaches Indians how to irrigate land, drive a tractor, and even the use of such simple devices as a pitchfork and a plumb bob line for stringing fences. With a patience and gentleness that have endeared him to the surrounding community, Jones explains the principles of machinery so that students can apply what they have learned when they return home. ‘They need to get started,’ Jones says. ‘You get ‘em thinking, then they come up with some pretty good answers.’ Says a village elder, ‘Jones is the first man who has made people here like Americans.’ ”

The Joneses Mix With Indians

“Harold and Loretta Jones and their six daughters, ages seventeen to four, live in Bhopal in an old pavilion which has plenty of insects and no hot water. The training center is sixty miles away, and Jones is gone all week. He lives on canned food and game he shoots in the jungle; his prowess with a gun and fearlessness when wild animals are loose have boosted his prestige. His wife teaches their children, who are made to follow strict school hours, opening with the singing of the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’. The Joneses mix in the community life of Bhopal; they go to a weekly movie and visit with friends. Despite the frustrations frequently encountered on his job, Jones stays calm and accomplishes a collection of small things, and in the process he has learned a lot about the Indian character. He has a M.S. from Cornell, and would like a year to brush up in the U.S., then return to a foreign posting. ‘This is going to be my life.’ ”

Two years later I ran into Marilyn in New Delhi. She was residing in Bombay, doing photography and writing. I congratulated her on the fine Sign Magazine article and how much we appreciated it. As the Years went by we periodically came across her photos in Time, Coronet, and National Geographic magazines accompanying news stories out of India. Fifteen years later, I was standing in line behind a young lady at Barclays Bank in Nairobi, Kenya, and began a conversation. She was heading to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean off the coast of East Africa. She declared herself to be a freelance photographer, which prompted me to ask if she had ever heard of Marilyn Silverstone.

Enthusiastically she responded. “Indeed I have! In my profession, she’s considered the dean.” I told her how I had met Marilyn. “Marilyn, wherever you are, all the best.

Special Moments At Budni

Two Trophies- One Shot He was thin and looked like a boy in his teens. His wide-brimmed hat with its leopard skin band, safari jacket, back-pack and rifle gave him the appearance of a serious hunter despite his youth. As I watched him come up the road from my seat on the veranda, my curiosity rocketed. Who could he be? Where is he going. He looked western enough, American or European. But no one comes to Budni unless they are ordered, even then reluctantly. His pace slowed and he entered the gate of the training center.

“Good afternoon,” he said. “Could you tell as where I might find Mr. Harold Jones?”

“Good afternoon. I’m Harold Jones.”

“Good” he responded. “I’m Wilson Giles coming from Indonesia where my parents work with AID. I hitch-hiked from there to hunt here in India. The Embassy people in New Delhi told me that you would be the person to hook up with for tiger hunting.” He stepped onto the veranda with worn dusty boots.

“You must be a very brave young man to hitch-hike all the way from Indonesia to hunt.” I said in amazement. “Have a seat, put down your rifle and pack, and relax.”

“A cool drink of water would do more for me right now than anything I can think of,” he answered.

“My kerosene refrigerator has been functioning quite well today and I happen to have chilled some boiled water.” When he finished drinking, my cold water jug was very close to being empty. During India’s dry season when the temperature can reach to dehydrating 120 degrees fahrenheit a drink of water can mean the difference between life and death.

“You say you’ve come to hunt tiger?” I inquired.

“I’d like to get a tiger for a skin rug, and a trophy head of a cheetah, the Indian spotted deer. I would consider that a successful and a worthwhile hunt in India,” he declared.

“That’s a pretty a tall order,” I stated. “They’re both here in the jungle, though it might take some doing and a bit of good luck to get them. How much time you plan to spend here?”

“Several days if necessary,” he replied.

“You caught me at a very busy time. I won’t be able to be with you as much as I’d like, and I go home to Bhopal for the weekend tomorrow afternoon. I can show you some water holes where many animals go in the morning and late afternoon. With patience and a good hideaway, you may have some luck. In fact, this may be the best time to show you a spot where you could sit until twilight. What do you think?”

“I’ll have to depend on your judgement. I know nothing about the area.” he admitted. The area I had in mind for him was only five to ten minutes away by Jeep. We loaded his gear and took off, driving over several dry stream beds and nest heavy bamboo groves. Then we parked the Jeep and took a three minute walk to the water hole. A bamboo cluster nearby provided seclusion to Wilson and his rifle. I gave him some tips on positioning himself for a good view of the most likely approach to the waterhole.

“I’ll return early evening,” I assured him. “Good luck!” Not knowing anything about the young man’s woodmanship, his ability to handle his gun or to deal with a dangerous wild animal, I was quite worried. I had accommodated him, and now I felt responsible.

Signs of twilight signaled that it was time to check on Wilson and retrieve him from the jungle. As I headed down the straight stretch of road from the training center, a figure appeared in the distance carrying an extra load. First to come into view were the antlers of a deer. The figure had

a pouch tied to a pole across his shoulder and rifle in hand. As I came closer, I could see it was Wilson with a smile on his face bigger than all outdoors.

“Say, tell me what happened. What is it you have there?” I asked.

As he dropped his bundle to the ground, I could see a tiger skin and the deer antlers, but I thought I had to be seeing things. It couldn't possibly be what it seemed.

“It was a miracle! Twenty minutes after you left me, I heard this crashing noise that sent my heart racing like never before. I grabbed my binoculars and I could see a tiger dragging an antlered animal towards the water hole. Eventually it reached the edge, released the dead deer and took a broadside stance, giving me a perfect target. I slowly took aim and squeezed the trigger. The tiger leant a few times and fell flat on the ground. What was I to do? Was the tiger really dead? Should I shoot him again? Or dare I venture from my bamboo hideout? All these questions crowded my mind, but I had no answers. I was paralyzed. I did nothing but sit there, trying to calm down. Ten minutes passed before I crept slowly toward the tiger, with my rifle half up for a quick shot if necessary. There was no sign of breath or movement, so I picked up a stick, tossed it at the tiger. No response. I nervously moved close enough to see that it was a tigress and the shot had been fatal. She lay in a puddle of blood. At last I felt safe, though I hoped that a mate would not show up. The deer she had been dragging, as you can see is a cheetah with a good trophy head. I immediately went to work to skin out both of my trophies. I don't know how to thank you for putting as in the right spot. But I still find it too fantastic to believe. A few thousand miles of hitchhiking and one single rifle shot to get the two trophies I have so longed for. I am still on cloud nine!”

“We'd better get back to my place. You need to salt those skins and place them in the shade to dry out. Luck and fate certainly figured in what you accomplished today. This might well be one for the books!” His backpack sleeping gear got him through the night. Wilson rode with me back to Bhopal the next day when I went home for the week end. We packed his salted skins in a bundle attached to a handle for easier carrying. I took him to the Bhopal railroad station for a night departure to New Delhi. I never heard from him again.

The King's Tiger In the midst of feeling exhilarated about how well things were going, though not without difficulties, the center's clerk handed me a letter in an official government envelope from the Conservator of Forests, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. What had I done to warrant mail from the state government? Consternation came over me like an avalanche. The letter read, “Sir Jones. It has come to our attention that you have shot a tiger in the Budni area that we had demarcated for the King of Nepal. He is to come there [no date indicated], as a guest of the Nawab.” My anxiety heightened as I continued to read. “You did not have permission to shoot a tiger, nor had you purchased a hunting block. We shall have much difficulty keeping our promise to the king. We would appreciate hearing from you. Sincerely, Chief Conservator of Forests.”

I replied with the following letter: “Please accept my apology for killing the tiger demarcated for the King of Nepal. One day a villager came to the center and pleaded with me to shoot a tiger which had just killed one of his bullocks. He had gone into the forest to collect wood, leaving his

bullocks out to graze and returned to find one of them dead. He was afraid that the tiger would come and kill his other bullock. I returned with him to the site, found the tiger eating his kill and shot him. I thought I was doing a good deed for a person who depended so much on his bullocks to make a living for himself and his family. If I have done something wrong, please again accept my apologies and I am willing to make amends financially or otherwise or by any measure you wish to impose. In regard to the king's tiger, before I shot it, two other large tigers were walking up to share the kill. They ran away when I shot the one eating the dead bullock. I would be glad to assist you or your personnel by showing them the territory which the tigers prowl, where they drink and so on. Sincerely, Harold M. Jones."

When I returned to Bhopal that weekend, I called upon the conservator. He was a kind, courteous, middle-aged man from South India. We had tea and I assured him that I could put the king and his assistants in proximity of the tigers. The conservator expressed his appreciation for my coming by to see him and my honest response to his letter and willingness to assist, when the king came to Budni. The king never came.

The Cobra Freeze Nawal Kishore was a shy mechanic-driver assigned to the Budni center. Dedicated and loyal to his job, he exuded a quiet contentedness. His smile always seemed to maintain the same intensity, even when he looked at you out of the corner of his eye. I had never seen his wife, but I knew where they lived. Their a-roof, one-room spread was small but not uncommon for the artisans assigned to Budni.

The pre-monsoon rains had come to the Budni area in sufficient quantities to give a wake-up call to many of the creatures which go into a partial hibernation during the brutal death-dealing dry season. The amphibious types, such as snakes, beetles, and flying termites are the more notable of these groups. No less bothersome are the scorpions, both black and white. This is the time of the year when extra precautions are taken against the potentially lethal inflictions from some of these creatures. While the rains offer some relief from the devastating heat, it also brings the nuisance of the crawling, hopping, and flying creatures. One sometimes wonders if the trade-off is worth it, but that is the way it is in monsoon country.

The welcome breezes stirred my mosquito net most of the night, making for much more comfortable sleeping than the restless nights of the dry season. In the midst the soundest sleep I had ever had in India came a banging at my loose wooden door.

"Who is it?" I yelled out.

"I am Nasal Kishore. I have much trouble. Could you help me?"

I eased out from under my mosquito net, and released the latch off the door. No night could be darker, for there was not the smallest light in the area.

"Nawal, what is the problem?" I asked.

"My wife attack by cobra. She sleep on bed and wake up and see cobra standing high and waving back and forth," he said, moving his hands in imitation. "My wife go out of sense, stiff like a

piece of wood. I slip out without hitting cobra. He might bite her if I hit at him. I come to ask you to shoot the cobra. Quick, he may kill my wife!”

“You think he is still there?” I inquired.

“Yes,” he excitedly confirmed.

I quickly slipped on a shirt, shorts and shoes, grabbed my twenty gauge shotgun from the corner and a shell from the nearby table. I followed Nawal through the darkness, a few hundred yards over to his place at the edge of the woods. The door was open. A nearly burned-out candle glowed faintly from a table in the middle of the room, illuminating the frozen form of his wife on the bed. The cobra was there still in striking position over her. I moved slowly along the wall, reaching an angle that would allow me to fire without hitting his wife. Though a bit excited, I was confident that a scattered shotgun blast would do the job. I flipped off the safety latch and fired from the hip. In the close quarters, the blast sounded like a major explosion. The cobra slumped on the floor like a limp rose and remained motionless. Nawal’s wife didn’t budge. I picked up the candle and moved over to investigate. The blast had cut off the cobra’s head as clean as the swipe of a sword. Yet there was a large clean hole in the wall beyond where the snake had been. What had happened? a number six shot would not blast that kind of hole. Then the realization hit me. I had by mistake picked up a slug instead of a shot-loaded shell. Both were side by side on the table near my bed. This accounted for the big hole in the wall. It was by pure accident that I had decapitated the cobra shooting from the hip. But all had ended well. However, the sound of the blast had not brought Nawal’s wife out of her trance. Nawal shook her a few times and she slowly gained consciousness. The trance most likely saved her life for had she moved, it is likely that the cobra would have struck. In India it is said that a cobra can kill by biting a person’s shadow. I trudged back to my quarters in the dark feeling a bit heroic.

The next day I happened to go to an all-girls school to talk to the lady principal about establishing a school garden. During our conversation, I related the previous night’s experience feeling quite sure she would say something like: “You are a brave man, Mr. Jones. That was a good deed.” But instead, she took all the wind out of my sails and left me feeling flatter than a runny pancake when she responded: “What a pity! Who would want to shoot something as beautiful as a cobra?” She was Hindu. By my standards, and I am sure Nawal’s and his wife’s, it was a good deed.

Wild dog heat The wild dogs of India, known as Sona Kutta (sold dog), is an excellent example of canine beauty and ferocity. Golden chestnut in color, with a bushy black-tipped tail, it is one of the most interesting animals of the tussle. Its very high intelligence and the communal organization of the pack, places the wild dog on a different plane than other animals. They travel in packs of six to two dozen, and they normally weigh anywhere from thirty to forty pounds each. Unlike other carnivores, they sought in India their food during the daylight hours. The tranquility of the jungle was frequently disturbed by these roving canines. They caused unrest among the other denizens seeking food and rest, forcing them to seek new territory. The tiger and more formidable animals were no exception. The local people told me stories of tigers being killed by the highly efficient wild dog packs. Their gang action seemed to disregard all recognized animal customs of the jungle and theirs could be looked upon as being the Huns of the woodlands. The

slow, remorseless hunt of a pack of wild dogs in the heat of the day is no comparison to the sudden spring of a tiger or leopard and the quick death that follows. I had heard no stories of them attacking humans, but they certainly were given credit for boldness in their presence. They seemed to regard human as a curiosity upon encounter, and then move on to their lawless pursuits. I had seen some pairs at various times in the jungle. They appeared calm and curious, and no doubt viewed me as something new, different and ugly enough to warrant closer study. Standing on the opposite side of a dry, sandy stream bed, I watched two leap in the air and just miss a peacock as its fast beating wings clawed at the air to lift itself out of their reach by a hair, as they calmly watched it fly away. I took aim with my rifle and just nicked one of them. They dashed away in the jungle, the slightly injured one whining.

Once about noontime, I walked along a meandering streambed. It was laced with frequent waterholes. Rounding a bend, I heard what seemed to be the brutal images to flash through my mind. Was I to end up as wild dog meat? Instinctively, I raised my 30-06, and started firing as I turned in a full circle. The first shot was aimed at the dog crouching in front. Then I swung clockwise while sparks and ricocheting bullets spewed into the night, as I emptied the magazine. Judging from the squeal-like noise of the dogs as they vanished in the twilight, at least two had been hit. Hit or not was unimportant: just the fact that they had run away was a welcome relief. I had escaped the flesh tearing teeth of these vicious creatures. It was truly one of the big scares of my years, including WWII maneuvers. I spent no more time getting away from there than the dogs had. A quarter-mile walk up the main road to the center save me a chance to calm down. Some of the staff had gathered, wondering about all the shooting, and were amazed that I had survived. The local villagers must have thought that the jungle warfare center had been reactivated for its original purpose.

Finish At Budni

The training and testing center had began to take its place in the gigantic effort to feed India's burgeoning bio-mass. Personnel changes had been smooth and without negative impact. Mr. P. John Zachariah had replaced Mr. E.G.K. Rao as director. Mr. M.L. Taneja, chief instructor, had transferred to the Rice Research Station at Cuttock to do research on farm machinery applications for rice growing. I had visited him there on two occasions. Other than a few changes in instructors, the original staff was still intact.

The center was a relatively small but a significant link in the multiple-imitative attack India was taking against its food production-import dependency gap. Coming from the USA alone were sixteen million ton of wheat and one million tons of rice requiring 600 ships, the largest assemblage since WWII, to help India weather its food shortage. For more than two years 60 million Indians were sustained entirely by American food shipments. The center was setting the pace for determining the most suitable agricultural hand, animal and engine powered machinery and equipment for India. The chief objective of the center was to train a corps of personnel to handle equipment importation, determine the most suitable types for India to manufacture, and set up distribution, operation and maintenance centers. Simultaneously with massive amounts of development assistance, India was building hydro-electric dams for electric power and irrigation, steel mills, fertilizer factories. AID and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations were extensively

involved in India's educational, research and extension institutions. The plan was that all of these forces would conjoin to impact on the country's food deficit problems.

The major attitude gap between knowledge and know-how as well as show-how, due to attitudes, was beginning to close, because of hands-on approach being taken on many fronts. At the Budni center we had emphasized this approach from the beginning. In the highly applied science of agriculture, where the generation and application of technology is essential to increased production, know-how is a must. I encountered many educators who taught only theory and did not engage themselves in manual activities because of their place in India's social ladder. However, my esteem for physical action and the ability to demonstrate the application of knowledge did more to win local respect than anything else. India's training methods, in a sense, had short-changed its students in both attitudes and skills needed to apply knowledge in a practical sense. To some extent this was a trait acquired from the colonial education system. In our approach, of making the best use of what you have was often stressed and demonstrated. Several water pumps had come with the U.S. financed equipment, but had never been used. The reason given was that no pipes were available, and no currency to purchase them. However, there were lots of pipes left over in the jungle from WWII days, but still connected. I demonstrated how they could be disconnected and used to deliver pumped water from a nearby stream, which grew into an excellent small irrigation training model. To induce more lively participation from students in the classroom I suggested classroom conversation to discuss problems and selection of the best solutions to fit. While the training program had progressed very well and the effect was spreading in most states through better design, maintenance, and utilization of both mechanized and bullock drawn equipment, the testing program had lagged. The staff was now in a good position to begin a testing program having had extensive experience handling various types of farm machinery and assisting small manufacturers with design of improved models. The Indian government would not or could not provide the finance necessary to procure basic testing equipment. I had spoken to several British persons about the situation. They put me in touch with their organization that provides technical assistance. The necessary paperwork was completed and submitted through the Ministry of Agriculture and the \$20,000 grant for testing equipment was approved just prior to my departure from Budni.

With supportive policy and marketing systems in place, the many development efforts across the country eventually came together and brought dramatic food production increases. But India for a long time will be faced with the formidable task of keeping pace with its enormous population growth. Budni became the model for three other centers. The government of India established later in the south, north, and Assam.

Saying Goodbye To Budni

Presentations, including a bust of Mahatma Ghandi were made to me during an elaborate going-away reception. The following poem was read to close out the party .

AU REVOIR Mr. JONES
Adieu, Jones adieu.
You are separating from us today
Even though you are leaving this Centre,
We will remember you forever,

We believe that you will not forget us,
It's due to your hard labor at this Centre,
Every second of your stay,
You have laboured for the benefit of the Centre.
You never worried whether it was day or night,
But it's a fact that you were completely immersed in it,
The job was hard but you managed it.
You have upheld the name of your country,
You faced everybody with a smiling face.
With no wrinkles on your forehead, with simpleness,
good manners and a clear heart.
Anybody who met you once,
Has always heard you in obedience.
This is all due to your good manners,
We used to talk to you frankly,
We were proud of your friendship,
You never had the feeling of a boss.
Respect for you comes foremost in our minds,
Love for you in the heart of everybody,
We pray that you should be happy and prosperous in life
And earn a good name wherever you go.
All friends are telling me,
Who will give us shikar meat when Mr. Jones goes away?
Shri R.G. Dutt, Staff Member

Hunting

The country life is to be preferred for where we see the works of God, but in the cities little else but the works of man, and one makes a better subject for our contemplation.- Reflections and Maxims of William Penn.

Hunting wild game in the forest was one of the ways Native Americans obtained food along the James and Chickahominy Rivers, home of the Chickahominy Indians for many centuries. I grew up near those rivers, in Charles City County, Virginia, and was a product of a heritage that included customs and traditions of primal survival passed from generation to generation. The custom of supplementing the diet with wild meat was an integral part of my community, especially during the depression years. Acquiring food involved agriculture, hunting, and fishing, all requiring much preparation. Children and adults grew vegetables, planted field crops, raised farm animals, and regularly gathered nuts, berries and fruits from the forests. Food preparation included pickling, salting, smoking, preserves, jams, and drying for the winter.

Of all my family chores, pursuing small animals in the nearby forests, fields and streams fueled my interest and adventurous nature. Known widely for my love of the forest and my keen desire to learn all about the animals that it sheltered, I eventually acquired the nickname "Nature Boy." At an early age I knew the names and habits of all the birds in the area. I could identify them on

sight, by their call, song and flight patterns as far as I could see them, their nest design and egg shell colors. My journeys into the forest began at an early age and increased in stages.

In stage one, using a sling shot or gravel shooter, I chased birds and later, squirrels and rabbits. Ammunition was small rocks propelled by stretched rubber bands, cut from old inner tubes. At close range, my good eye-hand coordination resulted in a bird, squirrel, or less often a rabbit as a relished game dish for a night's dinner.

Stage two consisted of forays into the forest accompanied by ours and the neighbor's dogs. Before school, often in the pitch dark of frosty mornings, a couple of whistles and yells summoned six or eight of them for a rabbit chase, and they sometimes succeeded in cornering one in a hollow tree or a hole in the ground. I would then recover the animal by either tightly poking into the hollow of a tree twisting it into the rabbit's fur and dragging it from the hollow tree or by pushing leaves into the hole and setting fire to them generating smoke to render the animal unconscious making it easier to retrieve it.

Stage three started at the age of fourteen and involved the use of a single shot 12-gauge shotgun and hunting dogs. I first fired this gun at a squirrel's nest, resulting in a blasted nest, a busted bleeding under lip whose scar I bear today and no squirrel. My yearly hunting years were during the depression when to shoot and not hit your target was considered wasteful. Obtaining extra shells required some extra hustling on my parents part for the vice was six shells for 25 cents. "How many pieces of game did you bring home and how many shells do you have left?" was often the first question my parents asked. As the years passed, the skill and accuracy with which I handled the gun brought me quite a reputation and the many hours I spent hunting substantially boosted the family food supply with minimal ammunition being wasted. Easing the family hunger pangs was high priority.

As the depression eased and I entered adulthood, hunting became less of a means of survival and more of a sport, a way of staging intimate with nature and learning about the wild creatures that shared it. Any gustatory delights from hunting was now a bonus for my family and later my own family.

Nearly four decades after my first hunt, my own family of eight and I found ourselves in the heart of India, in the midst of vegetarians. For hundreds of years millions of Hindus and Buddhists held religious beliefs that forbade meat consumption. The Hindu's belief in the sanctity of life prevented them from killing even the tiniest living creatures. "We are not able to give life, so we have no right to take a life, they declared." Most Hindus and Buddhists are teetotalers and did not eat animals or their products, like eggs, milk, or cheese. The minority that do eat animal products rationalize their behavior by saying this in no way had anything to do with taking a life. My family and I had never known any vegetarians nor, before going to India, nor had we discussed the topic. While we realized some adjustments in our way of life would be necessary we were not prepared to change our omnivorous eating habits. and I realized that hunting would be the only means of providing a fresh, safe supply of meat for the family. Our family division of labor made it my responsibility to harvest, dress and package the meat for the freezer, an appliance for which we were most grateful. Without it we might have been forced to become

vegetarians. This situation took us back to the days of yore when husbands hunted and brought home the meat, while wives kept homelife intact and harvested vegetables and grains.

Fortunately, we were living in a Moslem dominated community which was less sensitive to meat consumption than Hindus. The Moslems hunted and ate wild and domestic animals. Their only prerequisite for eating meat was the execution of halal, a spiritual ritual performed at the time of killing the animal. This ritual originated in the days of Mohammed when numerous people unknowingly ate decaying or spoiled meat and died. The throat of the animal is slit and while the blood flows a prayer is said to make the meat edible. Halal can be performed by any Moslem. Rafiq, our Moslem driver made sure he performed the ritual on all the animals I shot. The meat could then be shared with his family and friends. Rafiq showed great disappointment if no blood flowed when he cut the animals throat. He only needed to see a few drops as he prayed. However, this ritual was never performed on a wild boar because Moslems have a strong religious aversion to pork and any of its by-products. We respected this religious tenant when sharing meals with them.

In modern India, the prestige of hunting reached its peak during British rule. The princely rulers--maharajahs and nawabs--considered it the cream of all worldly sports. Many rulers maintained that hunting was the exclusive right of royalty. Non-royalty could only shoot a tiger with the consent of the Begum or Nawab in Bhopal, one of the Moslem principalities was for many years a hunting reserve for the Nawab of Bhopal and his guests. It was frequently said that the only activity that rivaled hunting was in the harem where both concubines and wives were trained to be demure and permissive.

Many rulers had an elaborate organization for hunting with distinct divisions of labor, often involving several hundred people. One told me, "I don't mind roughing it but I do appreciate a few comforts on shikaris [hunting trios]." Special crews set up and operated camps, serving alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, and elaborately prepared food, eaten on fine china. Portable showers and plush pillowed sofas and chairs were provided. Gun bearers transported and maintained expensive ammunition and hi-powered weapons which were kept loaded and ready at all times.

Royalty had several favorite hunting methods designed for minimal risk and effort. In one method elephants were used to transport supplies and people. From a howdah, a roomy box on the backs of elephants, hunters often shot tigers. Forming semi-circular arcs across an area of the jungle that contained a tiger, the servants screamed and beat drums to drive the tiger and other animals into the hunter's shooting range. Assistants on elephants would sometimes help to herd tigers in the desired direction.

Another favorite technique for hunting tigers involved a machan, an elaborate timber platform constructed in a tree or on the ground to provide comfort and safety while the hunter waited for the game to appear. Meanwhile the party would sip a beverage or eat if the wait was long.

The method for night hunts used either a live buffalo or goat as bait which was tied to a tree and affixed with a bell to alert the hunter who might be dozing in the machan. Flashlights were often

attached to the rifle or someone in the machan focused a spotlight when the game arrived to claim the bait.

World War II technology Produced the Jeep, a blessing and a curse. This vehicle allowed men to Penetrate more easily the jungle interior and wildlife's habitats, thus beginning the decimation of the big wildcat populations and the many species on which they depended for survival. Prior to WWII the footmobile and domestic animals were the only means of transportation into the deep jungles, limiting man's access to its wild life areas. The advent of the Jeep made wildlife the losers in the competition with humans for land. In addition, malaria control programs involving the cutting of vegetation contributed to the reduction of wildlife. New lands were opened, cutting deeper into game areas.

Reportedly, our Nawab of Bhopal had a 200-man hunting staff--drivers, spotters, beaters, bearers, campsite crew, and machan builders. He replaced his elephants with Jeeps and shot thousands of animals of all kinds---predators, hoofed types and a great variety of fowl. His palace and country home contained massive trophy displays of all kinds--skins, horns, heads, rugs and whole mounts. On one of his birthdays, during the height of his rule, so I was told he set out to establish a record for the largest number of tigers killed in one day. To be number one, he had to surpass the record of ten bagged tigers held by one maharajah. Men scattered over Bhopal's countryside to spot the animals, and to plan a strategy for driving them in record time within shooting range of the Nawab. Elaborate machans were constructed all over the state and the entire population rallied behind their leader to make him a national champion. On the eventful day, the Nawab moved hastily from kill to kill, but at the day's end the maharajah's record was still intact: the Nawab had killed only eight Bengal tigers.

Many of the Indian royalty had killed hundreds o tigers during their hunting careers. It as estimated by one British naturalist. E.P. Gee that there might have been 40,000 tigers in India in the early twentieth century. A maharajah of Gwailor, often mentioned as a great hunter and is credited with more than 700 tiger kills. The ruler of Guaripur shot more than 500 in his grand home time. But apparently the grand home of them all was the maharajah of Surguja, who was still living when we resided in India and was said to have killed over 1100 tigers. The British colonists also did their share in reducing the wild cat species of this sub-continent. One colonist bagged approximately 300 tigers during his civil service tenure of 25 years: another shot 173 in one year. Yet another is said to have poisoned a great number during his time. Villagers, over time, particularly during the middle of the 19th century, killed a few thousand tigers and leopards. The famed Jim Corbett, British game hunter and author, warned in 1946, ten years before our arrival that only 3000 to 4000 tigers were left in India. A more accurate count in 1969 put the number at 2500 and declining.

When India became independent from Britain in 1947, the princely rulers lost their absolute power over vast portions of the country to newly established central and state governments. Hunting privileges fell within the public domain and open access to the princely hunting estates resulted in unmitigated slaughter of wild life--tigers, leopards, and their prey. Anyone with means could hunt and collect animals from the jungles and plains. At the time of a hunting block purchase, the government forest departments authorized specific limited number and kind of animals which one could take from a block area within a specific time frame. However, there was

no policing or other follow-up controls, and people exceeded the established limits. At the same time, guns became readily available and people shot wild animals for crop protection or coached. Commercial hunting firms were established to cater to the romantic side of the sport for wealthy globe-trotting foreigners who came to India for big game trophies, especially Bengal tigers and leopards. Some of the hunters pursued the heads of buffaloes and the royal antlered deer like the sambhar, barasinga and cheetal. These firms were contracted to place the game within killing range for about \$6000 for a two week stay. Although the companies usually fulfilled their obligation, the hunters were not always successful.

Our stay in India offered me my first sustained foray into the arena of big game hunting, naturally without the background of royalty, prestige, renown or the big capital means. Nothing spoke the truth more clearly about my economic situation than my weapons—a 20-gauge shot gun and a fifty year old World War I vintage 30-06 Springfield rifle. These meager weapons solicited serious warnings from the big game experts regarding their inadequacy against big game, especially tigers. Additional advice came from the modular book of hunter Jim Corbett. His stranger than fiction books included *Jungle Lore*, *Man-Eater of Kumaon* and *The Temple Tiger*. Friends had given me these three books with advice that I should do some serious reading before I attempted big game hunting. The books are quite scary and after reading a few chapters I put them aside and decided to learn from my own hunting experiences, and not clutter up my mind with the fear these books had generated. After some blood-curdling experiences where only my guardian angel made the difference between my still being alive and not being mauled or killed by a tiger. I read all of Corbett's works, with a clearer understanding, but with no less excitement. If I had to do it over, I would read all of Corbett's books before attempting big game hunting. However, I did bring to India considerable woods lore, a keen eye and some adroitness in handling my ancient weapons, boundless energy, and a love for the great outdoors. I had a keen desire to broaden my horizons of jungle lore, to obtain some trophies, and to provide a dependable supply of fresh safe meat for a family. In addition, I helped the villagers, when requested by killing crop-destroying wild pigs herds, antelopes, cattle and man-eating tigers and leopards that threatened their livelihood or themselves.

A sixty mile trek separated my work place, Budni, from my family in Bhopal. For four years on every holiday (Indian and American) and weekends, I made this trek, leaving Budni on Friday evening and returning on Monday morning. Thirty of those miles were through dense uncle home to a game and varied population of wildlife. These early morning and evening trips provided me with the opportunity to see and bag a variety of wild animals, including five species of antelopes and deer ranging from twenty five pounds to several hundred. One of the main differences between the deer and the antelope is the shedding of the horns. Male deer shed their horns annually while the antelope never shed theirs. Female antelope often have horns less developed than the male, but female deer have none. The quality and taste of their meat is very similar but without the strong gamey taste of their North American counterparts. On my trips I often saw and killed many different kinds of fowl—green pigeons, partridges, spur fowl, wild peacocks, and ducks. Some of which I usually consumed during the days of the week I was a bachelor. For our entire four and a half year stay in Central India, all the meat for the family's supply and guests, which was considerable, was generally bagged on Friday evening or on the eve of holidays as I trekked from Budni to Bhopal. For Thanksgiving dinners the piece de resistance was peacock instead of turkey. Peacock breast was certainly no competition for the plumb breast of butterball

turkeys but its light and dark meat is quite tasty. The peacock had not yet been declared India's national bird. Our freezer was always stocked with fresh game meat including wild boar. A few 200 to 300 pounders of wild boar per year gave us a chance to prepare our own variety of sausage, souse, and choice pork cuts.

The Cattle Killing Tiger That Came Early

Early one Saturday morning during the dry season, two villagers clad only in dhotis (a loin cloth pulled tightly up between one's crotches and tucked into one's waist, giving the appearance of baggy-legged mid-calf pants and worn by Hindu men) and turbans of soiled cotton, squatted on their wrinkled, spindly legs on the back steps of our pavilion. They quietly proceeded to remove their stiff mud-hardened shoes in order to clean dry between their toes with their fingers. When they recognized that someone was standing above them they quickly stood, bowed, and with hands together greeted me with "Namaste Sahib."

"Namaste" I replied raising both hands together in front of me. "Qap-kaa Naam Kyaa hat" (What is your name?)

"Mera nam Suni Lal," one said, while the other said. "Mujhee Amrit Kehtee hai." (They call me Amrit.)

Greetings over, the villagers launched into an excited barrage of Hind. Despite my language limitations, I knew they were talking about a tiger. Fortunately, Rafiq was around the other side of the building removing a week's supply of dirt and grime from the green Jeep station wagon. I stuck my head around the corner of the building, and called for him to come. He dropped his wet rags and joined us.

"These two villagers have been telling me something about a tiger. Can you talk with them and tell me what they are saying?" I asked.

Rafiq conversed with them for a while and then turned back to me.

"They have heard that you have a gun and ask if you can come to their village to shoot a tiger that has been hounding them for several months. It has killed over thirty of the cattle in a three-villages area and the people are afraid to leave their homes. The tiger sometimes comes late in the afternoon, and sits in the middle of the road leading to the village to wallow and plays in the dust. This prevents the people from bringing their herds of sheep, goats and cattle in from the fields. Bullock carts returning from the market and women carrying wood and water to their homes have to walk long distances to avoid the tiger. Some farmers have lost one or two of their bullocks, and can't afford to replace them. They say the tiger comes to a water hole around 2:00 P.M everyday."

Through Rafiq, I told the villagers that I was going next door to speak to another sahib, who had a gun, and ask him to join us at their village to learn more about the tiger's habits. I rushed next door to Andy Renshaw's house. He was admiring the lake from his front verandah. As I told him the villager's story, his enthusiasm flared like an oil well on fire. Earlier in the week someone had told him about the same tiger and he had intended coming to relate me the same thing.

“If we can, it would be good to help restore normalcy to those villagers’ lives.” Andy noted.

“A trophy with a good cause attached to it, wouldn’t be bad either,” I nodded.

We loaded our guns and canteens into the Jeep, and with our drivers, Rafiq and Majid, and the two villagers, we drove through Bhopal and headed east for the village, approximately five miles away. The dry season’s sun, which felt like an acetylene torch, was heating up the dusty dry air. Soon we turned off the main road onto a narrow rutted, bullock cart trail. The Jeep created billowy dust clouds as it bounced slowly along, rendering the rear view mirror useless. The fine dust particles seeped through every crack and crevice of the Jeep, turning its interior into a veritable dust bin. Shrub bush, some palmetto-looking plants, with needle sharp points, and occasional large trees lined the left side of the trail. Open farm and grazing lands were on the right. As we slowly drove along, one of the villagers excitedly pointed out the direction of the tiger’s lair. All heads turned to look. Just ahead slightly off the right was their village, and we were spared further suffocation by dust.

Our arrival at the poverty stricken-village was an event. Children, many naked, suffering from diarrhea, and batting flies swarming around their infected eyes, instantly surrounded the Jeep, making it difficult to disembark. Men and women stood close by chatting among themselves but with their eyes riveted on us. One of the village elders gave a command and the crowds withdrew slightly, giving us a bit of room to maneuver. Our first obligation was to pay our respects to the village’s headman. Under the only big shade tree, we were officially greeted, and thanked for coming to help them. As we listened to the headbands version of the situation, the elders periodically signaled the crowd to maintain some distance. Some backed away. Rafiq interpreted the headman’s story. Their great fear was that the tiger would become a man-eater. He had killed 36 cattle in the three village area. Village life had been badly interrupted--people would not take their herds of animals to graze, collect wood or fetch water. At the end of the story, we were offered tea, which we diplomatically declined because we needed the time to study the tiger’s movements and plan our strategy for killing him at the water hole later that afternoon. We promised to celebrate after we had successfully eliminated the tiger. The village headman agreed to allow two men who knew the area to accompany us into the jungle. The six of us, Rafiq, Majid, Andy, two villagers and I-- in single file with one villager leading the way walked slowly into the jungle towards the waterhole. The breezeless 100 degree air under the canopy of jungle brush and trees began to take its toll. Perspiration began to drip from under our pith helmets, and wet spots began to appear on our khaki shirts. We made our way slowly until the leading villager held up his hand and said, “Mullah” (ditch). We had come to a large dry stream bed cut six to seven feet deep by repeated monsoon rains. Slowly we climbed down the embankment on to the trampled sandbed. The lead man spoke again, “Pani,”(water) as he pointed downstream. Quietly and uneasily we inched along Suddenly the lead man stopped and pointed to a waterhole.

“This is the water hole? I don’t see any water,” I complained disappointedly.

The villager kept pointing to the hole as we gathered around him. Nothing could be closer to being a non-waterhole. In a small, sandy depression about the size of a water pail, was less than a gallon of water beneath a thick coating of green algae. I couldn’t believe we were at the right

spot. Rafiq questioned the villager, who continued to affirm that this was where the tiger comes. Andy and I looked at each other and worried that this could be a “wild goose chase.” Had the villagers told us what they thought we wanted to hear? As despondency enveloped us, one of the villagers who had stepped a few yards away started yelling, “Skier! Sher!” (Tiger! Tiger!) He had discovered two pug marks of a very large tiger near the edge of the streambed where the sand was undisturbed. Excitement took hold! It was difficult to imagine that any self-respecting tiger would come to a near non-water hole to drink, but obviously the tracks indicated that he had been there. But when and why?. Perhaps he had no other option. It was deep in the dry season and our face water everywhere was very scarce.

Andy and I needed to select trees overlooking the minuscule waterhole, where we could wait safely later in the afternoon to see if the tiger would appear. I walked upstream, checking each tree for ease of climbing and a sturdy limb where the tree trunk could provide a good back rest. Andy walked in the opposite direction looking for the same kind of perch. I spied a low-branched tree that showed considerable promise, though it wasn't entirely safe from a tiger's leap. I struggled up the right bank of the nullah. With my trusty 30-06 I climbed the tree until I located a limb that offered an ideal seat. After a lot of twisting and turning, my backside meshed perfectly with the limb and trunk, and I decided that this would be my lookout that afternoon. I was not sure where Andy had gone, but the rest of the group had climbed the opposite stream bank, and all were relaxing behind a big tree. I could hear them mumbling. Very comfortably situated, I glanced at my watch. It was 10:30 AM. Out of nowhere shocking as a nightmare, came a huge Bengal tiger moving through the bush as quietly and softly as the sun rays. It was only about forty feet away. Tiger fever hit like a bolt of lightning. My heart pounded loudly and rapidly, and throbbing pains shot through my kidneys. I had absolutely no power of recall of any previous experience to deal momentarily with this first instant shock. The tiger standing on the opposite bank was about fifty feet from the others crouching behind the big tree. It gave the false appearance of looking me square in the eyes. As it approached the bank's edge it slowed its gait, carefully looking right and left. Time seemed like an eternity - longer than a life time. Now the tiger was only 25 feet away and staring in my direction without blinking. I was sure that at any moment it would actually focus on me then dash into the jungle out of fright. Instead it lowered his head and slowly started down the embankment, carefully surveying the landscape. With its head lowered, his eyes were no longer aimed at me, but I still felt the blood-curdling tension of the moment as my heart raced and my body froze. As if stalking something, it stopped several times before finally reaching the streambed. It inched slowly and gracefully towards the water hole, then made a 45-degree turn which gave me a broadside view. With barely enough presence of mind I eased my rifle to my shoulder, making sure the loose leaf sight was pushed into alignment with the front sight. I aimed at his front shoulder and squeezed the trigger, shattering the jungle silence. The tiger leaped high into the air, fell back on the sand, danced momentarily, and began to bite on its hind legs before finally giving up life. I was never more astounded. Shouts came from the jungle and from Andy who was down stream

“What happened, did your gun go off accidentally?” Andy yelled.

“The tiger came, I shot him! He is lying here on the sand,” I yelled.

“Are you sure?” Andy shouted.

“I am sure, he is lying here in front of me. Stay where you are until I am sure he is dead,” I yelled. Because no signs of life were visible, I descended the tree and nullah bank and shook the “Big Fellow.” “He is finished” I called, “You can come out now.”

The villagers danced and chanted on the bank. Andy approached the tiger, touched him and looked at his teeth in disbelief. The rest of the group descended the bank and gleefully stroked the king of cats.

Rafiq and one of the villagers set off for the village to enlist some help and to bring an axe and the camera from the Jeep. When they returned, Andy and I took turns being photographed sitting or standing by the tiger with our rifles. Rafiq and Majid were photographed beside the tiger, which measured nine feet and ten inches, from its nose to the tip of its tail. Having eaten well over the past several months, it was a hefty 350-pounder. Two villagers tied the animal's feet together, while another cut two poles, then slid them between the legs. Four men, each with a pole end resting on a shoulder, hauled the big cat to the village for viewing. With telegraphic speed, the word of the killing spread across the countryside, luring hundreds of local residents to a colorful impromptu celebration. Chanting and dancing the villagers admired the dead tiger. After much jubilation and gracious acknowledgments to us, the tiger was loaded on the Jeep and we prepared to leave. Due to the tiger's early appearance at the waterhole and its sudden demise, the villagers had not had time to prepare food or tea. But it was a good feeling to see them rejoice that one of their great fears had been alleviated, and a degree of normalcy had been restored. Heaven knows their poverty-stricken lives did not need the added burden of a cattle-killing tiger that had the potential of becoming a human-eater.

Back in Bhopal, we skinned the “big fellow” and salted the skin for drying and preservation, before sending it to Van Ingen and Van Ingen, a Dutch family-owned taxidermist business in Mysore. Ten quarts of stiffish, bright yellow, tiger fat was distributed to the local townsfolk. At that time, tiger fat cost approximately \$2.50 to \$3.00 per ounce in the local market and the locals considered this fat to be nonpareil for curing whatever ailed one. Many locals were ecstatic to have just a pinch for free. They felt if you had an ailment and tiger fat did not cure it, you weren't ill. I kept a small jar of fat in the Jeep's glove compartment. Little did I know that one day it would save me from a life-threatening situation. After that incident, I too bordered on the belief that tiger fat could cure anything.

The Tree Tiger

Hank Hannah and I were having lunch at the home of J.A. Stevenson, the Vice-Chancellor of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University. We were engaged in a lively conversation about the progress in establishing a land-grant type of institution in North India. Mr. J. A. Stevenson, a slightly rotund, dark-haired, articulate Anglo-Indian, had recently been appointed to his position and, he dominated the conversation. Hank Hannah was the Chief-of-party for the University of Illinois team, which was assisting in the 4600 hectare Tarai State Farm project. The purpose of my visit was to provide ideas for establishing the Department of Agriculture Engineering for the university.

The trip to Tarai State Farm had been long, dusty and tiring, and I heartily consumed the toothsome meal of curried meat and vegetables set before us while listening to Stevenson and Hannah. Slow-turning ceiling fans stirred the moderately cool, dry air. Several servants, dressed in white starched uniforms with white towels across their arms, stood nearby, moving only to chase flies away and await the next order from Sahib Stevenson.

The unexpected sound of horse hooves just outside the open window stopped the conversation. A horse and buggy driven by a tall aristocratic-looking Sikh stopped at the front entrance opposite a flowered round-about. A short, khaki-clad young man quickly alighted from his stand-up position in back of the buggy to hold the horse's bridle as the driver disembarked. One of the servants uttered a few Hindi phrases to the vice-Chancellor, who gave a nod and a couple of hand signals, sending the servant scampering to open the door for the gentleman. The turbaned gentleman, sporting a well-groomed salt and pepper beard, stood tall and lean in the doorway. As he entered the dining room, he apologized for interrupting our meal and introduced himself as Pritam Singh. We rose and shook hands, and he accepted Mr. Stevenson's invitation to have a cup of tea. Mr. Singh seated himself at the table, then spoke with agitation.

"I have an emergency on my hands, and have come to see if you gentlemen have a rifle and could help me!" The three of us looked at each other, then I said "I have a rifle in my Jeep. What is your emergency?"

"I wonder if you could come with me, not far away from here to shoot a tiger my circumstances are this: I am a farmer in the area and have a crew of workers, mostly Burmese. These fellows set snares to catch animals, mostly deer, for meat. Early this morning three of them checked their snares and to their surprise, they found a fairly large tiger cub. Money signs danced before their eyes because they know that wildlife dealers who sell tigers to zoos and circuses will pay \$300-400 for a tiger cub. This would be the largest amount of money these farm workers would have at one time. The three workers approached the cub, which had a noose well secured around his neck and attempted to tie his legs together to carry him to the village. Unbeknown to them, the mother tiger was crouched in the high grass and ferociously charged them. Miraculously all the men escaped by scampering up a nearby tree, out of the reach of the tigress' jaws and claws. When the men did not return to the farm for several hours, I sent three other farm hands to search for them. They, too, did not return in the expected time.

About an hour ago, a neighbor came by and told me the following story. He heard shouts in an area near his farm and he went to investigate. He found six men sitting high in a tree, yelling. When the yelling men saw him, they told him not to come near because all six of them had been treed by the tigress who was shuttling between her cub in the snare and the tree in which they were sitting. Their predicament had worsened because the tigress had just been joined in her defensive duties by her mate. Therefore, I need someone to shoot at or kill one of them. A shot may scare the tiger and tigress away, but if not, I would prefer the male be killed, leaving the female to care for the cub in case he escapes the snare. I am assuming that the farm workers will not be able to get the cub as long as the mother is around. No one has ever been known, to my knowledge to take a tigress' cubs without killing her. "I need my six farm workers back," Mr. Singh concluded.

“Let me finish my lunch and I’ll investigate the situation,” I responded.

As Mr Singh departed, he said, “I’ll leave my servant, who is reliable and knows the area well. I now must go. Thanks, but be careful, it could be a dangerous situation.”

“Tigers are a big problem in the area. There are many of them, and the grass is extremely dense. We lose 8 to 10 people each year to tigers,” added Stevenson.

Fifteen minutes later, I finished lunch and walked to the vehicle. Hari Lal, Mr. Singh’s buggy assistant, climbed in the back seat, assuming this to be his place.

“I’ll need you in the front to show me the way,” I said.

He seemed delighted to be needed and scrambled into the front seat. By now it was clear that I would have to communicate through gestures, broken English, and Hindi phrases. After driving a mile or two on a gravel road, Hari Lal gave a signal to turn left cross-country into an ocean of luxuriant elephant grass that was taller than the Jeep’s roof. We had to move at a snail’s pace and I feared that the vehicle would get stuck in a hole or smash against a rock or tree stump. Only the upper portions of large trees, mostly mangoes, could be seen above the undulating grassy plains. Slowly the four-wheeled drive vehicle pushed a path through the giant mass flushing out moths, butterflies, grasshoppers, and birds like a fire. Hari Lal seemed confident about the direction. The grass screeched and rubbed against the surfaces of the vehicles like scratching finger nails.

Hari Lal spotted the tops of two large trees a few hundred yards away, and pointed “The men may be in one of those trees over there.”

The men were indeed sitting con the high branches. Half of them had been languishing under the sun for more than eight hours, without food or water, knowing if they descended from the tree, somebody would lose a life, and it would not be the tiger and tigress. Hari Lal, yelled to them and their spirits soared. The men guided us to a place where we could monitor the tigers movements and see the snared cub. I maneuvered the Jeep under a low hanging mango tree which provided us with coverage. I laid my rifle on top of the Jeep and climbed through the window onto the roof. Then I swung onto the limbs and climbed the tree, avoiding, the risk of walking through the dense grass . Hari Lal handed me the rifle without leaving the vehicle. After some shuffling and twisting, I found a comfortable yet stable position that would withstand the rifle recoil. From this position, I had a clear view of the weary farm workers, and some visibility to my left. Hari Lal climbed onto the Jeep’s roof, and talked with the men, who reported excitedly that the tigers had moved away in the tall grass, when our Jeep arrived and were somewhere left of our tree. We expected the tigress to return if she heard the cub growling as it struggled to get free of the noose, so Hari Lal told the treed men to be perfectly quiet.

The evening shadows lengthened and light breezes stirred the dense grass, creating rhythmic sounds. Birds flitted in the air, scrounging for their evening meal. Suddenly the grass beneath my tree rustled, and I recalled that tigers are often compared to ghosts, they simply appear without warning. Looking down through the dense foliage, I glimpsed a flowing form, reddish in color and slashed with black I smelled the strong, familiar odor of a tiger, and was instantly engulfed

by shivers of fear that ran through me like electric currents. It is just not possible to see one of these magnificent beasts in their natural habitat without a quickening heartbeat and a sense of awe. Appearing as abstract art through the shimmering tree leaves and tall grass, the powerful mass moved near the drip-line of the far side of the tree. With nerves tingling, heart racing, and pains shooting through my lower back, I slowly raised the rifle to my shoulder, adjusted the sights and I aimed at what I thought was the front end of the male tiger, knowing that it was a bit risky not to have a clear view of the vulnerable spot. Carefully, I squeezed the rifle trigger. The blast thundered in the silent dusk, echoing against the distant verdant hills. In a flash, the tiger disappeared into the tall grass.

The men in the tree, shouted “Skier! Sher!” (Tiger. Tiger), and pointed in the opposite direction. Hari Lal questioned them, then translated that at the sound of the gun, the cub lunged, freeing itself from the snare and galloped off with its mother. This confirmed that I had shot at the male. Recovering my composure, I handed Hari Lal my rifle and descended the tree onto the Jeep’s roof. The six men gradually came down from the tree, being extremely happy that they were no longer hostages, but disappointed that their instant wealth had vanished. They gathered around the Jeep, smiling and chattering. With a mixture of fatigue and gratification, the six men thanked me in typical Indian fashion, of hands clasped in front of chest, bows and sukriyasst (thank yous). I returned their bows and watched them vanish as the last of the sun’s ray glistened against the billowing elephant grass and mango tree leaves. It was too late and risky to venture into the tangled mass of vegetation to see if the tiger had been wounded. But the hunter has a responsibility to his/her prey, as J. W. West author of a British hunting manual aptly put it, “Let it be said that when a tiger is wounded, and has to be finished off, every white man, (I assumed this applied equally to black men) goes in and takes the risk without hesitation, many a good fellow paying the extreme penalty, may they find good sport in the happy hunting grounds.” (Shikar notes for Novices by J.W. West.)

Hari Lal and I got back into the Jeep and followed the path it had cut earlier through the elephant grass. When we reached the road, we departed company after agreeing to return to the site the next morning.

Upon returning, I showered and had tea with Stevenson and Hannah. They listened intently as I described the details of my adventure.

“What about the tiger you shot at?” Stevenson inquired.

“I plan to visit the site very early in the morning to see if there are any signs that he was wounded Hari Lal agreed to accompany me.” I replied.

“All my life I have heard that the hunter must follow a wounded tiger and kill it,” Stevenson added.

“That’s’s right,” I said. “I will do that. I am told there are many tombs in India of hunters killed by tigers. I’ve heard what Louis Gordon’s epitaph read: ‘Killed while following up a wounded tiger with a gun he had forgotten to load’ I have seen my driver’s father, once a member of the hunting staff of the Nawab of Bhopal, and a living reminder of the severity of injuries inflicted by

tigers can be. He has a terribly distorted, withered and useless leg, that was bitten right through the bone, as he climbed a tree to escape a charging tiger,” I responded.

In spite of being very tired, I had a restless night that seemed endless. Finally, the neighborhood roosters announced daybreak, none too soon for me. The guest house cooks had tea, eggs and toast ready. Hari Lal arrived at 7:00 A.M., and under the brilliant sun we headed back to the mango tree. The cool breeze ushering in from the foothills of the Himalayas seemed to shake the trees and grasses awake as it passed over them. Even during the dry season in Tarai country, the rolling hills can support heavy farming, as well as large trees and vast plains of waving elephant grass. Each day is a carbon copy of the previous one. From November to March the area’s climate has no equal. Blessed with massive amounts of water, surface and artesian, draining from the top of the world, the region gives rise to a great variety of flora and fauna. Prey and predators maintain the balance of nature.

A symphony of bird songs cascaded over the country side. This, our third trip over the trail was much easier and more relaxed. As we traveled through the tall grass, pairs of red jungle fowl, cock and hen, flapped frantically as the air lifted them momentarily above the elephant grass. Quickly they settled down after a short glide downwind. These beautiful birds, both gray and red species, are said to be the ancestors of today’s domestic fowls. As we proceeded, a wild-eyed hog deer, with bristling, short antlers, darted across our path and disappeared from sight as quickly as it had appeared. We glimpsed a number of small creatures, who provided much of the bill-o-fare for the tiger, leopard and wild dog population. In the distance a big brown hawk, with slowly rhythmic wing beats, skimmed lazily just above the grass tops, yet fully alert and ready to capture a less watchful creature for breakfast. While seeking a meal many animals become a meal. Few of nature’s creatures are better at taking advantage of other’s mistakes than these sharp-eyed birds of prey.

We came to the end of our grass trail, at the mango tree. With my rifle in hand, I examined the vegetation in the direction the tiger had run the day before. In these remote grasslands and with no back-up gun, it would have been an understatement to say that I felt uneasy. The lay of the grass suggested that the tiger could have been off balance and stumbling. After several slow tip-toeing steps into the grass I spotted a very small speck of blood on a blade of grass. The tiger had been hit, but was it blood from a solid hit or just a superficial wound? My foreboding heightened, I checked my old rifle to make sure that the bolt and the cartridge ejector were functioning properly. When I pulled the bolt back the cartridge in the chamber did not move with it. In complete shock, I examined the rifle closely and discovered that the ejector in the end of the bolt had snapped. Nothing could have been more devastating. The Cordon Lewis epitaph flashed before my eyes. Hari Lal and I slowly walked to the Jeep with absolutely no defense against a tiger attack. Suddenly, a tiny ray of hope came to mind; I remembered that more than a year before, I had stripped an even older 30-06 rifle and placed the bolt in the Jeep compartment. The chance of this bolt fitting and functioning properly was about one in a million. The bolt was dusty and filled with grit from many miles of India’s roads and cow paths, and needed special cleaning. I whisked off most of the dirt with a couple of dirty rags and a small brush I had in the tool box. With a few drops of engine oil from the vehicle’s dip stick I lubricated the bolt. The moment of truth had arrived. I slipped the bolt into the rifle. It was a perfect fit and withdrew the cartridge

when I pulled it back. To be doubly sure, I fired a round into the tall elephant grass. My elation and confidence soared higher than the distant Himalayas.

Hari Lal and I cautiously returned to our search half-step by half-step, listening and scanning every square inch of the thick over-our-head- towering elephant grass. The blood stains on the grass became less apparent as we continued walking. Finally, we could not see any blood. The only sign of disturbance was the grass pushed aside as the tiger struggled through it. After thirty minutes of creeping and watching we had only traveled approximately a hundred yards into the unrelenting grass. As we continued onward, we heard the sound of gurgling water ahead. Soon we were on the banks of a swiftly flowing, clear stream coursing its way between banks lined with black boulders, a few small trees and scrub bush. No sign of the tiger was visible in the thinning grass, nor was their evidence of its crossing the stream. It could have easily jumped across if not badly injured. I was able to make Hari Lal understand that he should ford the stream to locate any trace.

Wearing shorts and no shoes, Hari Lal grabbed some small branches that were overhanging the stream and lowered himself down the slick bank into the water, which came up to his waist. He just stood where he was, and despite my motioning him to move across, he remained motionless and a very confused expression appeared on his face. He then began to move first one foot then the other as if to get a feel for the depth of water or to get a good footing. Then with a cry of surprise, he waved his hands, shuffled his feet and shouted in broken Hindi and English, “Skier’ Sher!” Hari Lal was standing on the tiger. What another stroke of lucks I thought! The spare rifle bolt had been a perfect replacement for the one that malfunctioned, and now we had selected the right place for Hari Lal to enter the stream and land on the drowned tiger. It all seemed too much to be true. I tossed Hari Lal the short piece of nylon rope that I carried as part of my standard hunting gear. Submerged in the water, Hari Lal successfully tied the rope around the tiger’s neck. He then scrambled up the bank with the other end of the rope. The water gave the tiger some buoyancy, so we floated it down stream a few feet where the bank was less steep. With relatively ease, we pulled the tiger onto the bank. Cold and well preserved the carcass was clean and fresh-looking. It had been shot through the rib cage. Highly exhilarated, I started skinning it with my razor-sharp Louisiana muskrat skinner, a three blade pocket knife, which I carried as religiously as the orthodox Sikhs carry their kirpan (a knife). Methodically, I removed the winter pelt, the black striping over a rich reddish-yellow background much more colorful than any I had seen in central India. To wash the skin, we pulled it through the clear stream water and then rolled it up for transport.

Needless to say, the return trip through the elephant grass was made with much less trepidation. Under the shade of the mango tree beside the Jeep we unrolled the skin and rubbed in a good amount of salt to preserve it until it could be thoroughly dried (I always kept a bag of salt in the Jeep). Hari Lal was very excited and pleased, as this had been an experience of a lifetime for him.

“My Sahib sends you much sukiryaa (thanks). He very happy all the men back to the farm. The men too happy you came to help them down from tree.” Hari Lal explained. He gave a “Namaste” (goodbye) and seemed to exude a ring of light above his head as he disappeared through tangle of waving elephant grass on his way to the farm. The one hundred rupees I gave him for his assistance, more than a week’s pay, gave him a boost.

I pondered the episode as I drove back to the vice-chancellor's house. Three innocent farm hands get a snare to catch deer. Instead, six men were held hostage by two tigers defending their cub; 10,000 miles from home in the vicinity of the top of the world, I came to their rescue. Two unusual strokes of luck allowed me to become the proud and uninjured owner of a rare-hued tiger skin. It all seem to be guided by fate, and seemed like a dream. Call It natural luck, or a guardian angel not being away from his/her post, something intervened at critical moment to keep Hari Lal, the farm hands safe from harm and me safe from harm. After all, my mission was technical assistance to agricultural development and any good farmer needs employees on the farm and not up a tree.

Cathy the Great

Cathy's entry into our lives was due to Mr. Bradfield's tiger hunt. Brad, as we called him, was a slow-moving, slow-talking Texan whom I had met through a mutual colleague, another Texan named Ted Elder. Cathy, on the other hand, was a Bengal tigress cub. Brad and Ted both worked in New Delhi, about 400 miles north of Bhopal. Ted had made two trips to Bhopal to go on safari with me, and under my guidance he had successfully killed a large tiger on his first trip, and a large male leopard, whose coat was rich and dark, on the second. Both animals had been bagged within a few hours. When Ted returned to New Delhi, he bragged about his safari adventures, whetting Brad's curiosity and desire to go hunting with me. Texan friends, who have similar interests especially braggarts like to be evenly matched, if not top one another. I am sure Ted did not omit anything. If anything, he added to my reputation as a woodsman and big game hunter. Ted loved to exaggerate, particularly when he talked about his hunting successes "I have little respect for a hunter or fisherman who is not a big liar," he would frequently state. Ted's and Brad's wives, Cecil and Mary, saw each other regularly. Cecil could never resist showing off Ted's trophies, the skin rugs and her gold-trimmed "lucky-bone" brooch to visitors. The "lucky bone" is a two or three inch long, crescent-shaped, floating bone located in the shoulders of tigers and leopards. Indian craftsmen do an excellent job of setting them in gold or silver filigree. They make great conversation pieces, especially if the husband bagged the tiger or leopard.

Brad called several times asking when he could visit Bhopal and go on a safari. We finally settled on an Easter weekend. Brad and Nyah, his driver, arrived Thursday night. A slight breeze crept across Bhopal's arid countryside on Good Friday, providing faint relief from the heat. The outdoors had been drained of every molecule of moisture by six months of a bright, searing sun. All living things, including human beings, were waiting for the monsoons. Our hunt could not begin until late afternoon when the heat abated. As dusk slowly approached, night prowlers awoke to start their nightly vigil of stalking and using their finely tuned skills to kill for a meal. Brad, Nyah, and I loaded guns and water cans into my Jeep and climbed in. I drove over a bumpy, dusty bullock-cart trail for about fourteen miles to a small spring, which usually carried imperceptible trickles of water throughout the long dry season. I knew this spot to be the place for animals to drink, lounge, and graze on the sparse greenery. Both predators and prey of foot or wing took chances with their lives for a drink of water.

Eventually we stopped on a small knoll. As we stepped out of the Jeep, we heard the calls of a long-tailed peacock, sitting high in a nearby tree. These sounds were followed by barks of cheetal,

India's spotted deer, and in turn their barks were punctuated by the hacking calls of langurs, the gray, long-tail, black-faced monkeys. These animals had spotted a big wild cat or cats and were sending out signals, not unlike the motorist who blinks his headlights to indicate the highway patrolman hidden away in a cove down the road. In the jungle it is not just a warning to avoid a ticket, but a life-and-death alarm. Animal danger calls are completely different from those for mating or congregation and I had become an expert at distinguishing them.

Faint odors of a tiger or leopard were apparent. But were these odors from the actual animals or from the bark of a nearby native tree that exudes a near perfect duplication of these animal odors? We proceeded cautiously until I could verify the source of the odor. To our right was a matted, low-growing bush. A small, moist depression ran through the center. At the far end of the depression, we observed several large tiger pug marks in the soft soil.

"That's a big male," Nyah, said softly with some apprehension in his voice. The bush had been an ideal shelter for some wild cats, with a natural leaf roof just tall enough for one to slide under and maneuver out of sight. Next to a small water supply, the bush was an excellent escape from the scorching dry season sun, a good place to stash a kill from flies, vultures, and other scavengers, give birth, or sleep and laze away after an over-stuffing meal.

From the bush we moved in the direction of the cheetal calls, which were intermittent. Slowly and in single file, we walked north through a mullah about six feet deep and banked with dry reddish dirt. Sand patches made walking difficult at times.

With eyes as big as pool balls, Nyah nervously whispered, "Suppose the tiger jumps down on us in the mullah; we would all be mauled to death."

I gave him the hand signal to keep perfectly quiet. We could see over the edge of the mullah, although at times our heads were below ground level as the depth of the ditch varied. Tiger odor permeated the air, accelerating our adrenaline flow. We spotted a herd of cheetal on a nearby slope. Their head and eyes seemed glued on something in the distance to our right, but the mullah was beginning to curve away from them. Signaling the other men to stand still as statues, I climbed out of the mullah quietly and slowly creeping along the bank. Suddenly I spied a large Bengal tiger some forty yards ahead, sitting stone-still on its haunches. With its back toward me, I watched its tail twitch slightly as it concentrated on a quick meal so near its grasp. I eased back into the mullah and motioned Brad to follow and be ready for a shot at a tiger. Crouching and moving at a snail's pace, we quietly made our way through the ditch without being detected, thanks to the cheetal who were occupying the tiger's attention. Brad and I changed positions as we raised our heads above the mullah banks. Slowly and quietly Brad raised his .375 rifle to his shoulder. The cheetal spotted Brad, gave a barking noise and, resembling Santa's reindeer in flight, leaped gracefully into the bush. The tiger remained still. Quickly adjusting his rifle, Brad carefully aimed and squeezed the trigger. Like a small exploding bomb, the big rifle boom created triple echos, each one reflecting from a surface a greater distance away, as the sound gradually dispersed across the jungle. The tiger leaped high into the air and quicker than a wink, the yellow-black-stripe flash disappeared into the bush.

“I’m sure I hit him,” Brad exclaimed as he nervously pulled out and lit a cigarette. “What do we do now?”

“Nothing,” I answered. “It’s too dangerous to follow up a potentially wounded tiger in the dimming light of dusk.” I advised.

Hurrying back to the Jeep to beat the nightfall, we decided to return early the next morning, the Saturday before Easter Sunday. The trip home was filled mostly with silence, regret, and nervous speculation. The occasional scampering deer, antelope or wild pig, and the call of peacocks offered little to ease the disappointment.

When we arrived home, Nyah went to visit a friend and Brad and I dressed for dinner. Our dinner conversation focused on plans for the next day. We decided that we needed an early start to discover the fate of the tiger at which Brad had fired. We assumed it was wounded and if this were true, we would have to track it and put an end to his suffering. We retired for the evening.

Just prior to daylight, and before the bird songs burst forth from the nearby mango trees, Brad was nervously pacing the outside verandahs. After overhearing Brad’s slow Texas drawl asking Ishmael about the status of coffee, I quickly rose, washed, shaved, and dressed.

“Good morning, Brad. How was your night?” I asked cheerfully as I stepped onto the verandah.

“Sleepless, absolutely sleepless. I couldn’t get my adrenaline flow down to normal all night. Never thought I would ever have a night counting leaping tigers to help me sleep. A couple cups of hot, black coffee should get me off to a good start for today’s pursuit I hope we don’t find a wounded tiger,” Brad drawled.

“Everything will work out, but we must be very careful,” I responded.

“I’ll follow you,” Brad asserted.

Ishmael soon announced that breakfast was ready and we went inside. After breakfast, Brad, Nyah and I drove to the spot of the previous day’s shooting. Cloudless and bright blue with a moisture-robbing sun, the morning was another in the succession of many during the dry season. The monsoon rains were still one to two months away. An occasional destitute villager walked along the dusty trail. Once in the jungle we passed many of the creatures on the move which depended on daylight for their survival. Back in the dry nullah we progressed in spurts, pausing to listen and observe. All we heard was the rustling leaves, stirred by the early morning, omnipresent “seven sisters” birds, congregating in their typical style. According to landmarks we were approaching the exact spot on which the tiger had been. We climbed out of the nullah and proceeded along its banks to find the exact spot on which the tiger had been sitting. There were no signs of blood or injury, just marks where the tiger had dug its strong claws into the soil as he dashed into the bushes.

“What do we do now?” Brad inquired.

“Let’s skirt the edges of the bush canopy over to the right,” I replied.

We had to crawl, putting us in a very dangerous position. From the edge of the bushes we saw a small patch of dull tiger stripes, far too small to be a whole tiger. Nyah volunteered to crawl a little closer.

“It looks like a small piece of dried tiger skin,” he said softly and nervously.

As we all pondered the patch, it suddenly squirmed, causing Nyah to retreat at break-neck speed. What was the patch? All eyes were glued onto the patch; all minds were pondering the possibilities. Another close inspection revealed tiny tiger cubs entwined and nestled in a small leaf-lined depression. None of us had ever seen such a sight. I’m not sure many people have, especially under these circumstances. We retreated again, speculating that Brad must have shot their mother, who was trying to catch a meal and that the tigress must be dead or severely wounded; therefore it would be safe to retrieve the cubs, saving them from starvation. Once again Nyah immediately volunteered to crawl the ten to fifteen feet under the bush to retrieve the cubs. Brad and I “covered” him just in case our supposition about the tiger was inaccurate. At less than a snail’s pace, Nyah crawled up to the cubs. He was visibly nervous, and slightly shaking. So were Brad and I. Then like a hawk, Nyah grabbed two of the cubs by their neck. The cubs burst alive, snarling and spitting. Instantaneously, the tigress’ loud roar exploded from under the low-hanging canopy. She had been watching from a deeper part of the bush. Our calculations could not have been more inaccurate. She was there, very much there. If she charged with blood-curdling fury, it would surely spell the end for Nyah and probably ours as well. Brad and I rapidly backed away from the bush, dropped on our knees and aimed our rifles in case she charged out of it. She did charge to the edge of the bushes, shaking them as violently as a hurricane, but then retreated. Nyah, like a streak of greased lightning, flashed out of the thorny bush with a cub dangling from each hand. He had escaped by a hair’s breadth the killer claws and fangs of the tigress. Brad and I, tense as steel and feeling more like running than being brave, continued to aim our guns as we waited for the tigress to emerge. She never did, she just continued to roar and finally even ceased that. We slowly backed away from the bush, then quickly turned and headed for the Jeep, a couple of hundred yards away.

Leaning against the Jeep in shock was Nyah, literally scared out of his wits. His vise grip on the cub’s necks had rendered them breathless and unconscious, with their eyes literally popping out of their heads. It took a couple of light blows about his neck and severe shaking before Nyah regained his senses. We persuaded him to release his grip on the cubs, one male and one female. By blowing into their noses while shaking them we revived them. They started kicking and snarling. They were the size of an adult house cat, with their eyes only partially open. I took a cardboard box from the Jeep, lined it with leaves and grass, and put the cubs inside. We were still shook up, but Nyah was by far the worst, so we helped him into the front passenger seat. Brad sat in the back, keeping an eye on the cubs, and I took the wheel. I reversed the Jeep to turn around, but it jolted to a stop. What had I hit? We climbed out of the Jeep to discover a jagged stump had punctured the fuel tank a steady stream of gasoline gushed from the tank, threatening to drain it in record in time. “Not this!” I moaned to myself. Had our luck run out? We had been so close to the edge all morning. How to stop this dreadful leak and avoid a ten-to-twelve mile trek or a bullock cart ride to the main road to get help? Suddenly my country-boy resourcefulness surfaced. I

remembered how we used to temporarily repair small leaks with soft soap. The problem was, there was no soap. But I did have the mayonnaise jar of stiff yellow tiger fat in the glove compartment a quick twist with a stick removed a sizable glob from the jar. Instinctively, I reached down at my feet and got a handful of the black clay soil and mixed it with the fat. When moist, this kind of soil swells, giving it some sealing power. I molded the mixture into a patty, squirmed on my back under the Jeep and pressed the patty hard against the spewing hole. Like magic the gas stream was reduced to a small, fast drip. The next problem was how to keep the pressure on the concocted sealant while jolting over the bumpy road, and the tourniquet principle came to mind. While keeping pressure on the patch, I freed my handkerchief from my back pocket and tossed it to Brad to tie his handkerchief onto it for more length. Nyah, who was quite calm by now, tied one end of two handkerchiefs to a bracket on the front side of the tank, and the other end to the bumper bracket, and pulled it tightly against the patch. Brad cut a small stick, which I forced between the handkerchiefs and tank, and gave it several twists, to tighten the tourniquet further. This reduced the leak to an occasional drop

“This certainly must be one for Ripley’s Believe It Or Not, Brad,” proudly proclaimed.

“My grandmother always told me you have to do the best you can with what you have,” I said.

“That’s well and good as a philosophy, but I’m sure she never thought you would be 10,000 miles from home, in an Indian jungle repairing a punctured gasoline tank with tiger fat and clay. I don’t believe it either,” Brad said with relief.

As we rode along the bumpy dirt road, we counted our blessings and pondered events. Why did the tigress stop her attack? Was she wounded? Was it because we had left the third cub? Nyah quietly pondered why he had escaped a worse fate.

“Maybe the local people are right when they say tiger fat will cure anything,” he mused. I tended to agree, especially if they would let me throw in a handful of black cotton soil. The cubs rested peacefully all the way home. When we arrived, Loretta and the girls gathered around the surprise package, which contained their substitute for an Easter Bunny a mixture of delight and trepidation swept over their faces as they looked into the box. Any attempt to touch the little closed-eyed, striped bundles brought out snarls, spitting, and vicious angry noises.

“How do we care for it?” they queried. Loretta warmed some milk, put some in a cup and some in a baby’s bottle, something of which we never seemed to be short I put my finger in the warm milk, pulled open the female’s snarling jaws and put my finger against her tongue hoping she would lick the milk from it. I did this several times to no avail, when suddenly the female cub began to lick and suck my finger. Loretta immediately replaced my finger with the nipple of the bottle and the cub sucked it, as all our six babies had done before her. She was truly a suction pump in action. The girls christened her Cathy, for Catherine the Great of Russia, about whom they had been studying in their history class. Brad’s cub took the bottle more easily, was also fed, then cozily tucked away into a well-lined box for his 400 plus miles journey to New Delhi. He had not yet been named.

“Mr. Bradfield, we are depending on you to keep us informed about your cub. We want to know his name, too,” the girls requested.

He promised to do so. Although he did not return with trophies that matched Ted’s, his hunting trip proved to be unique. The pluses and minuses of raising a tiger in his household were an ongoing adventure, making Brad’s safari as memorable and rewarding as any of Ted’s or mine. The story of Cathy and her brother’s capture soon spread around but fell on unbelieving ears. The Nawab and members of his hunting staff, who had shot hundreds of tigers, refused to accept it. “It is not possible to take a cub from a tigress without shooting her, inflicting some casualties, or both,” was their usual response. The professional hunters were no less convinced. “That simply can’t be done,” many asserted.

Cathy took the bottle for the next seven months as she grew into a big tigress. Heat supplements and charcoal pills to control dysentery became part of her diet. She never seemed to look back. Working hard at it, she barely managed to keep her body growth in near proportion with her oversized big feet. Brad didn’t keep his word. A mutual friend of ours later told me that his cub was healthy and growing into a nice looking tiger. We never heard about its final disposition.

Other Pursuits

While at Budni, a nearby village headman requested me to shoot a leopard that had the people in a total state of fear. During its nightly visits to the village, it entered their thorn-bush- fenced corral, and took away their goats and young calves, paralyzing the people with terror. Occasionally it snatched a village dog before the front door of homes. I made several late-evening trips to the village to see if I could learn something of the movements and behavior of this cunning cat. Leopards are smart, sensitive, and tricky. While I talked to a villager one evening, it snatched a small dog from a veranda and dashed into the jungle. We recovered the dead dog and used it as bait the next night, but the leopard stayed away. For nearly a month, I attempted to pursue this animal that kept the village homes buttoned up at night as tight as a bass drum. About dusk one evening, Rafiq and I were driving up the bullock cart trail to the village, when a sparkling set of eyes reflected in the headlights, and then scampered up a steep bank beside the road. When we reached that spot, I could see the shoulder of a leopard protruding above the top of the slope. I took a quick aim, squeezed the trigger, and a leopard leaped into the air, danced about, and then tumbled down the slope into the ditch by the Jeep door.

We waited for a few minutes to make sure it was finished. It was. All we had to do was to open the door, reach down, and drag it into the Jeep. The tightly locked village homes unbarred their doors, and all went immediately into a celebration, another night of alertness, but this time in merriment. Their abject fear had disappeared. More people touched my feet to show their appreciation for my help than I could count.

I encountered four other instances of leopard’s eyes showing up in the head lights as I traveled from Bhopal to Budni or on other road trips. None escaped.

The bears in the Budni area were relatively small and their color ranged from black to a ginger brown, but they were seemingly of the same species. Moving about the wooded area and at the

edge of the cleared farm area during late evening or early morning over a period of five years I saw five of them. Early one morning walking down a jungle path I came up upon one crouched as if he was ready to spring only a few yards away. Out of immediate fear, I made a quick rifle shot that bagged him.

On safaris accompanying other people, I had spells of fantastic luck. My Texas hunting buddy, Ted Elder, came to Bhopal for a tiger hunt. On the first evening we drove along a narrow trail through the woods for about two miles, with a stream on our left, and staked out a buffalo for tiger bait. On our way back to the main road, a huge Bengal tiger was caught in the head lights, crossing the trail. I turned the headlight in its direction, and Ted got out of the vehicle, walked behind the tiger for a short while until he got his gun in the right position, and shot it. I told Ted if he got any closer to the tiger, he would surely take his gun. Ted said, "I didn't think I could get too close to the son of a gun."

On a second occasion, he came to go leopard hunting. We drove to the edge of the jungle at sunset and were speculating as to where we should stake our bait. Suddenly, a huge, dark-skinned leopard trotted out in front of us and headed down the road. Ted got out and followed him a short distance, and when he turned right to head across an area relatively clear of bushes and undergrowth, a single shot from his .375 rifle dropped it instantly. One of the shortest safaris I have been on.

George Puckett, my neighbor across the round-about, wanted a tiger trophy too. So I agreed to accompany him. We crisscrossed a scrub bush area several times where the villagers said a tiger often roamed. With the sun setting and daylight dimming we decided to move towards the main road where the vehicle was parked. Walking down a narrow path with George following, I spotted a huge tiger sitting under small bushes ready to spring. I dropped back, pointed the big cat out to Puckett and urged him up front with his big 375 cal rifle. I thought it would take him forever to line up the animal in his scope sight. He finally did and the blast from the gun literally shook the bushes, but the tiger ran off. We trailed it to a dry stream bed where we found some drops of blood. By this time George's nerves were on the verge of cracking and he said, "According to Jim Corbett, the noted British hunter, under these conditions, one should take time out to light up a cigarette." George sat on a rock, lit up, and nervously puffed away. In a more calm mood, he asked, "What do we do now?"

"It's getting too dark to pursue it further. I suggest we go home and come back tomorrow morning," I advised.

We returned the next day, picked up the trail, and found the tiger lying on a small mound of dirt too weak to charge, but not too weak to snarl and roar as if it were ready to attack. George, struck instantly by tiger fever, seemed in no mood to go closer to finish it off, in spite of my attempt to persuade him that the tiger was not mobile. I finished him off with a shot in the neck.

Ray Davis, our chief agriculture officer from New Delhi, journeyed to Bhopal to go on a one night tiger hunt from a machan. Using two of the omnipresent village charpoys (sleeping bed), I secured them side by side to the limbs of a large tree with nylon rope. The evenly spaced limbs that grew close to the ground made climbing relatively easy. We used a young, sickly buffalo

from a nearby village for bait, and lashed a bell about its neck and staked it out. Then I lifted our rifles, water, and light snacks by rope, and we both climbed the tree. The breezes rocked the tree at intervals, but otherwise the night was one of deafening silence. Both of us began to nod. About midnight, the buffalo rustled as if frightened. Davis turned on his flashlight strapped to his rifle, and tiger eyes flashed like headlights. He quickly zeroed his rifle sight on the tiger and let go. The boom seemed to echo several times against the big hardwood trees. The tiger ran off and as many hunters would say, Davis said, "I'm sure he was hit. I don't see how I could miss him." Our only hope to find it would come after daylight, after we removed our gear from the tree. Laying on the banks of a sluggish stream partially bloated, about two hundred yards away, we spotted our spoil. He got the usual treatment of being skinned and salt rubbed into his hide.

I was beginning to get worried about my reputation for short, painless, successful safaris getting out, and being flooded with requests from New Delhi. But such luck at least took a temporary break when Robert Wallace and his son George from Pullman, Washington, and stationed in Pakistan, drove from there to Bhopal on two occasions to hunt leopards and tigers. My usual luck of accompanying others on safari had momentarily petered out and their net on both trips was one leopard.

Lady's Remains For Bait

Jim Corbett, the famed British hunter and author, once wrote: "There is no more terrible thing than to live and have one's being under the shadow of a man-eater." My one-time experience of shooting a tiger that had killed a woman was as close as I had come to realizing the significance of that statement. Although in deep fear while trying to catch up with the killer, I realized that it must have been only a fraction of the intensity of fear that grips village people when dozens of their people are killed by "man-eating" tigers. Stories, true and exaggerated, of man-eaters constantly circulate among rural people who are illiterate, superstitious, and are firm believers of rumors and tales regardless of their validity. A story of that time, from far south of Bhopal, told of a tiger that had killed sixty people. There was little one could do to convince them that if a tiger killed only one person, it was not necessarily a man-eater and is not likely to kill again. I had this confirmed when I was requested to come to the village shakapur and shoot the tiger that had killed a woman. I consented, but the surge of dread of taking on the task was no doubt as intense as that of the villager upon discovering that a person had been killed by a tiger. Whether it is a validated man-eater or not seems to have little bearing on their feelings and fear. With no protection against the powerful animal, they were not inclined to listen to any argument that the tiger may not be an habitual man-eater. Take no chances, quickly becomes their creed when a person is attacked and killed by a tiger. Tigers are not natural pursuers of humans, but extreme hunger, or tasting as a cub human flesh killed by the mother eating carrion which contains human flesh, an old age and discrepancy preventing catching natural prey can cause them to become man-eaters. Villagers were not willing to analyze whether the tigers were a serial killer or not. Their one wish was to have the culprit destroyed.

I drove to the village over a bullock cart trail about two miles off the main dirt road. The headman village man who had already approached me came out and welcomed me, and offered to show where the half-eaten body was located. It was gruesome. My first nervous thought was to stake out a buffalo calf as bait. When I asked the villager to provide one, he told me to use the

rest of the dead lady's body. This was a bit more than I could handle, sitting over a woman's dead body waiting for the tiger to return, and told him that I would prefer to move about the area later to see if I could pick up signs of the tiger's presence, in spite of the surge of nervousness and foreboding from the thought of tracking down a woman-eater not yet authenticated. Whether to pursue the killer or not gave me a gnawing concern.

A day or two later, one sunny, bright mid- afternoon, the thought hit me to drive to the village and look around for signs of movement, still with the feeling that this could be my most risky undertaking yet, especially with no backup gun. Slowly and cautiously, I moved about the sparsely wooded area, staying mostly in the scrub bush and near the dry, sandy streambeds. As I moved down a small, sloping foot path, leading to a winding, dry streambed, I spotted tiger stripes. A closer examination revealed a huge tiger looking straight at me and seemingly ready to spring I quickly whipped my rifle into position, took a fast aim, and with a gentle trigger squeezed the blast sounded across the countryside. The tiger soared high above the bush and ran down the footpath and out of sight. There were no signs of blood, but claw marks on the path showed it was headed for the streambed. When I came to the soft sand, I spotted fresh pug marks that seemed to indicate a staggering or unsteady gait. It was too late to pursue the animal. I went by the village and chatted with the village head, whose main concern was about my intentions to follow up I assured him I would return the next day because I felt that the tiger had been wounded and could be dangerous if people ventured into the area. I suggested that he inform the people of other nearby villages and encourage them to stay away from that wooded areas.

I had a restless night, seeing the partly eaten body of the woman, and wondering what might be my fate if I followed the tiger. The sun had moved high in the sky by the time I left the next morning. I went to the streambed and picked up the pug marks where the unsteady gait seemed more exaggerated as it went along. The streambed forked, leaving a small island in between. From this point I spotted a curled-up tiger on the island. When I moved closer with my rifle half in position, it looked at me but seemed too weak to muster a killer charge. A quick shot caused it to roll over and tumble into the streambed. A ten-minute break sitting on a nearby boulder was long enough to get my nerves back to near normal. With my trusty muskrat skinner, I went into action to remove the skin and head I saw no signs that would lead to the conclusion that it was or would soon have become a serial killer. It was in good condition and had an excellent set of teeth. There was a quarter-sized pus pocket in its front left leg caused by a quill fragment from a porcupine. That might have eventually led to a deteriorating condition that would cause it to kill even more people. My arrival at the village with the skin brought villagers rushing in from their daily tasks like ants at a picnic. All came to see the skin, and the celebration was on.

The 13th - a Psychosomatic Cure

Of course there were less fruitful expeditions, but they were exciting nonetheless. One such trip worthy of note was with my avid hunting companion, Ted Elder. I had planned the trip with the hope that it would cure a painful psychosomatic condition in my lower backside, resulting from the pounding of 25,000 miles of Indian roads.

Night had fallen, and after a short stroll Ted came back to the campsite. He went to his footlocker, unloaded and laid down his rifle, and brought out a full bottle of bourbon. He took a swig and

immediately spat it out, spraying his boots and the rocks he stood on. He dashed over to his diminutive south Indian cook, pointing his finger menacingly.

“Thomas, there are three things you can’t do for me,” Ted shouted. “Drink or tamper with my booze, fool with my old lady, or wipe my behind. How many times have I told you not to take whiskey off the top of a new bottle and then top it up with water?”

Apparently, Thomas had just finished doing just that when Ted walked up. The tiniest alteration of Ted’s bourbon was a cardinal offense to his sensitive liquor taste.

Thomas dropped his head, sulked, picked up his soiled bag, stuffed it tighter, and said, “I quit, I no longer work for you.” He started up the rocky slope towards the gravel road. We were at least fifteen miles from nowhere.

Ted came over to me and sat down on a rock. “He does this all the time. He’ll be back in a few minutes. He’s not crazy about the dark and he knows that tigers and leopards roam about at night.” Gone hardly long enough to get out of sight in the deep darkness, Thomas came creeping back, dropped his bag and went over to Ted, and started unlacing his boots.

Ted jumped up and shouted, “The other thing you can’t do for me is to take off my boots! Get me something to eat.”

Thomas heated the canned pork and beans, sliced some cheese, stacked the crackers, and had the pot of black coffee simmering over the glowing wood coals between carefully arranged rocks smiling, he served Ted, me and my driver, Rafiq. Ted’s rage fell to a more tolerable level at the prospect of dinner.

Late that afternoon after our 400-mile drive from New Delhi, I selected this campsite, which was roofed over by a heavily foliated banyan tree, and encircled with rock masonry. It had probably been one of the choice campsites during the Nawab’s hunting days, for it was equipped with a ten-foot diameter platform three feet high. Equally attracted to the tree was a great variety of birds that lodged among its Protective branches. It soon became obvious that the tree’s foliage did not provide us with protection from the birds’ droppings. That would be too much to ask for; after all, we were the trespassers. I was reminded of the expression often heard in India regarding Prime Minister Nehru’s effectiveness: “The Prime Minister is like the great banyan tree, thousands seek shelter beneath it but nothing grows.” For several days we were to put up with this shared relationship.

A cacophony of night sounds from the wilder segment of India’s burgeoning jungle bio- mass was in full swing But none of us tired. worn-down travelers could be distracted from the call of Morpheus, the Greek god who shapes dreams. Ted and I had already set up our folding army cots, mattresses with one-inch foam rubber. It was too far into the dry season to worry about mosquitoes Thomas and Rafiq preferred the Jeep wagon as their best chance against marauding carnivores.

The residents of the big banyan tree burst into song at the first sign of daylight, aided by return calls from their respective types throughout the jungle red was first up, washing and shaving Thomas had the coffee steaming, Ted gulped down two cups, adjusted his hearing aids, threw his rifle across his shoulder, and took off down the road past an old cattle corral on the hill where moos, grunts, and moans were contributing to the morning sounds. His habit of walking off into the jungle alone became my main worry. Even with his network of wiring and his hearing aid turned up high, he still couldn't hear. He depended mostly on reading lips. If we ever encountered trouble, got separated, or attacked, there would be no point calling out to him. There were few readable lips in the jungle. Tigers, leopards, and wild dogs use their lips only to surround mouthfuls of prey, and if Ted was that close, it would be too late for him to reply. Fortunately, he always found his way back.

After a breakfast of eggs, canned wieners, and hot tea, I spent my morning gazing at birds in the banyan tree, which was a veritable bird watcher's paradise. That day I counted thirty species. Ted returned about 10:00, and we decided we needed to replenish our water supply. This meant a trip to Bhopal by Rafiq and Thomas. They returned with enough ice to restock the coolers, and some six packs of carbonated apple juice drink. When the day's heat passed its peak, I left to scout the area for a spot where Ted could get a clear shot at a tiger. I followed a narrow overgrown track up a steady incline for about three-quarters of a mile until it ended abruptly. A short distance to the left, I spotted a shabby, three foot high circular structure. It had a stone base, and was partially enclosed with weather worn, termite-eaten bamboo, but it had good potential, requiring a minimal rebuilding effort. A diversion on the way back to camp led me to a small active spring oozing out of a hillside. Around it were animal prints, including a couple of old pug marks of a tiger Back in camp I talked about my find.

Rafiq chimed in with, "That enclosed machan you saw is one the Nawab used when he was a good hunter. Maybe it's still a good spot for tiger."

We decided it would be the place for Ted to spend the night along with a buffalo calf for bait. Rafiq hustled about and was able to buy a young buffalo from the villagers, complete with a bell around its necks. Before sunset the camp crew reinforced and cleaned out the enclosure. With a bag lunch and a canteen of water. Ted crawled in and located a good slit for viewing and shooting. We staked the buffalo, gave it some grass to chew on, and left Ted on his own for the night.

With daylight in full blaze the next morning, I drove the Jeep within a hundred yards of Ted's machan. With rifle in hand, I slowly walked to the site Ted was sitting on the front edge of the stone wall, and the half eaten buffalo carcass lay out by the stake with the rope still tied to it. Obviously, a tiger had been there, killed the buffalo, eaten his fill, and had left. I continued to look but saw no sign of a tiger. I was within arm's reach of Ted, before he knew I was there. When he saw me, he braced up slightly, but had a sadness on his brow worse than if he had lost a loved one.

"Ted, what happened?" I asked loudly, looking straight at him in case he had to read my lips.

"The son of gun came here, killed the buffalo, and when I woke up this morning I saw what you see out there now."

“Didn’t you even hear the bell when the tiger attacked the buffalo?” I asked.

“Hell! I haven’t heard a bell in thirty years,” he responded sadly. Ted’s morale was lower than his boot soles. We collected his bedroll and rifle and walked slowly to the Jeep. The vultures had already loaded two nearby trees, waiting for us to clear out. They cleaned up what was left before we turned the Jeep around. Ted’s day was off to a sad start. Only after a couple of good swigs of his bourbon did he brace up a little.

Shortly after breakfast, I followed a nearly erased footpath which passed within a few yards of the spring, well hidden behind a cluster of bamboo. The sunlight was still young, but well on its way to its burning maturity, slight breezes stirred the dry leaves a group of seven sisters, robin-size brownish birds, scratched in the bush to my left. They traveled in sets of seven, hence the name, and continually chatted as they searched for bugs and other morsels. They were the biggest jungle noise makers that morning.

As I approached the bamboo cluster, I detected a slight movement and heard a low growl to my right. I kept inching along, and through the small opening in the bush I discerned wet tiger stripes amid the shaded foliage. It must have been cooling off in the spring, and hearing my arrival, took cover. The water, no doubt, had rinsed off the usually strong odor tigers have preventing me from picking up his scent.

I had reached the end of the bamboo cluster where I could better see its movements, but the bush was entirely too thick to risk a shot. Up ahead and in the direction it was moving were two large trees with an opening between them. Dropping on one knee, I moved the rifle sight over to the opening. Shortly the big wet cat entered the clearing. With a quick aim, I squeezed the trigger. The blast echoed across the jungle, and the tiger went down, biting its hind legs momentarily. Then, like a bolt of lightning, the striped bundle of fury came straight down the hill at me. My heart raced and my hair must have stood on end under my pith helmet I had not reloaded another round; it had never even occurred to me. In seconds it was within springing distance a flash of immortality and eternity clouded all I had left of thought. By now it was bigger than a eighteen-wheeler and traveling twice as fast. For some reason which I’ll never fathom, it made a ninety-degree turn so close to me that its tailed whipped against my right leg. Whew! It kept running at full speed down the slope and out of sight.

My right leg trembled like a leaf in the breeze. Then the whole of me became one big shake, which receded as quickly as it had come. It had to have been divine intervention, I was convinced. Once again my guardian angel was on duty.

Quickly I collected myself, reloaded my rifle and got on its trail, observing every inch of the ground. Splatters of blood on the dry leaves led downhill to a small dry streambed of gray slate. Patches of sand along the edges were also spotted with blood, and marked by toe prints of a fast-moving tiger heading upstream. Further on, I found a puddle of blood with tiger hairs around its dried edges, so I knew it had laid down briefly. After about a mile, I rounded a bend and caught a glimpse of the tiger a hundred yards ahead, stretched out on the rock licking its paws. It was too far away to hazard a shot without a rifle scope. The thick bush and rocky stream banks made it

too difficult to sneak out and get within range without being detected. It must have sensed my presence, since it raised his head and glared straight at me. I had my first good look at it, which confirmed my suspicion that I was dealing with a large male. With his eyes glued on me, he slowly rose and disappeared behind a cluster of blackened boulders along the streambed. I crept to the rocks with my rifle raised and came upon a cave, the mouth of which was blood stained. Tossing a few rocks against the sides of the cave entrance did nothing to arouse him, and I did not risk firing into the cave. My thoughts were that I had followed the wounded animal as diligently as a hunter should, and I was not sure I wanted to tangle with an injured tiger without a backup gun, as I had unwisely done too many times before. Possibly, my luck for one day had been fully consumed. My thirteenth tiger had gotten away, and with divine intervention, I too had miraculously escaped.

Back in camp, I related the story to Ted, Rafiq, and Thomas, who were both excited and thankful that I had come out unscathed. They had heard my shot and had been eagerly waiting my return. Ted was still down on himself for sleeping through the tiger's visit the previous night. For the two of us, it had not exactly been a dream day in the jungle. For me it could have been much worse.

Shortly after sunrise on the third day I decided to sneak back to the hillside spring. This time I neither saw nor heard any movement as I approached I figured if the tiger- were still strong enough, he would return to lay in the water to heal his wound and protect it from flies and other pests. Peering through the bamboo, I saw that the hole looked freshly disturbed a close inspection revealed that the tiger had been there only moments before. Hairs and pug marks were pressed into the mud, and the water was stirred and muddy. He had either heard or smelled me coming and moved on. Maybe some mutual respect had set in. Dripping wet, he had left a path of wet leaves which led straight up the hill for about ten feet. A mild attack of tiger fever came over me as the thought sprang through my mind that he might be hiding close by, plotting revenge, even though I knew tigers attack straight on and don't hide out, or sneak up from behind as leopards are known to do. A cautious check of the nearby bushes revealed that he had left the vicinity, apparently in fair to good condition, leaving me with no more than to do the same.

Back in camp, Ted and I spent most of the day lazing. We went out to shoot a couple of antelopes for meat. I took a shot at a wild dog trying to make a lunch out of a long-tailed peacock. Crouching and sliding along on its stomach, he sprang at the peacock and just missed as the big bird dug his strong wings into the hot dry air just in time to escape, squawking loudly away into the jungle. As the dog stood there lamenting its miss, I fired from about fifty yards, just nicking it. It too ran off into the jungle screaming.

There had been a gradual reduction and finally a disappearance of pains in my back side. Early the next morning I decided to run my own psychomatic test. With the Jeep loaded, Rafiq was asked to drive off down the road for a few minutes, return then blow the horn before picking us up for our trip back to New Delhi. The horn no longer triggered my back pain as had happened over the past several weeks, when the vehicle's horn blew at the front gate to transport me to the office. It had gone. Horns no longer triggered pain. The thirteenth tiger and all connected with him had effected a complete cure of my psychosomatic condition.

A Night In a Machan

I was preparing to spend a night in a machan between Budni and Bhopal, in hope of bagging a leopard or a Bengal tiger. Rafiq and I, along with a small buffalo for bait, had arrived at a location in the jungle where the large treeline gave way to tangled, low-growing bush. While the dimming daylight bathed the jungle, and the sun lowered itself behind the tree line, I selected a climbable tree of about twenty inches in diameter and forty feet tall. To its stout limbs I planned to attach a platform about halfway up to hold me and my gear. My machan would not be as elaborate as the royal version during the Raj years. I was going to use a charpoy, the ubiquitous cot of India on which all kinds of backsides reclined. Charpoys had lightweight wooden frames on to which a woven rope was strung to make a taut, hammock-like mattress. I tied one end of my rope to the charpoy and the other to my belt at the rear, climbed about twenty five feet, then pulled the charpoy up after me. I set it across some level branches, lashing it down securely. Several more lines I extended to overhead limbs to secure against rolling off the cot. On my second climb I hoisted up my equipment: the bedroll, rifle, water bottle, a few tools, and some dried snacks. After I was well situated, Rafiq tied the emaciated buffalo to a small tree, leaving it a mound of straw to munch on. Then he returned to the main road in the Jeep, where he would remain for the night.

Twilight, as usual in the tropics, came and went quickly, taking with it the last daytime sounds of the langurs, wild dogs, peacocks, and other birds. Full moon showered the jungle with soft light then sunk out of sight. Pitch darkness was upon the jungle. I felt secure on my perch, but a night alone in a machan is not for those leery of ghosts, ghouls, banshees, or haunting sounds. My own feeling is that there is nothing out there but the natural order of things where lives depend on what they can scrounge in the darkness to survive.

Most beings out there, I figured, had no interest in me. I had no reason to curse the darkness, and I had purposely left behind candles. I admired the stars that winked through the gently swaying branches on my first night solo in India's jungle. The buffalo gurgled as it chewed its cud, the essence of contentment. I was cozy and drowsy, but the night had an eerie quality. The silence was overwhelming, and the call of the owls, sambhars, and cheetah, and the hackles of langurs warning of the prowling cats, only deepened the silence when they faded. I couldn't help thinking of Loretta, and the miles that separated us both from the continent we called home. As I contemplated my nearly total union with nature the strains of high-pitched chant floated faintly through the jungle night. Aided by the hypnotic rhythm of the village drummers, I drifted off.

I awoke to the rustle of leaves, as if something was kicking them about. The sound came closer and closer but the buffalo did not stir or show concern, indicating that it was not a big cat on the prowl. It passed directly under the machan, and I hoped that whatever it was, it had no intentions to climb the tree. As the rustling receded, my curiosity could no longer be held in abeyance. I took a quick look with the flashlight and revealed two porcupines in an amorous position. I couldn't imagine a more prickly affair, and concluded that true love has no fear of spikes and spines. My luminous watch dial showed ten o'clock. A small, flapping creature made a couple passes through the tree, no doubt a bat. Some moments later the slapping sounds of larger wings suggested, either an owl or nighthawk. The wind had died down, then the heat and silence engulfed my senses and I dozed off despite the perspiration gathering on my forehead.

Again I was awakened, this time by the howling of an approaching wind. A dead tree limb crashed to the ground. Gusts rocked my tree from side to side, causing the charpoy to strain and screech against the limbs. I nervously held on as the wind buffeted the grove. To allay my concern, I began to think up a message to send to society in regard to living in trees. "Continue with the business of civilization, because living in trees is not all that promising."

Eventually the turbulence abated. I was able to rest for an hour or more, until the distant but nonetheless spine-chilling roar of a tiger wrested me from sleep. This continued periodically a half dozen times and the deep rumbling sounds reverberated in the still, night air. Two and half hours later the growls of a big cat were mixed with squeals and snorts the sounds of a typical tiger attack on a wild boar. The noise flared repeatedly for thirty minutes, suggesting a strung-out battle between these arch enemies. The massive neck of the boar is a problem for the tiger, which captures its prey by twisting or biting through the back of the neck. The boar is also capable of inflicting some serious injuries with its sharp, gashing teeth. According to local lore, the tiger usually wins, but not without a price. In time, the grunts and squeals of the boar weakened and finally faded, suggesting that the tiger had landed a TKO.

Below me I heard the jingle of the buffalo's neck bell, but it had risen only to stretch and relieve itself. After nibbling on a few mouthfuls of dry straw it curled up to sleep. The chances of the buffalo fulfilling its potential as bait were diminishing. The air had begun to cool slightly, signaling that dawn would soon break through the darkness. The morning star shone brightly through an opening in the tree cover. After a near sleepless night, I nodded out and when I awoke rays of sunlight shone through the open jungle spaces. It was all over, I consoled myself. The feathered family of the jungle provided a variety of unblended sounds, with the loud call of the peacock dominating.

I stood up on my charpoy, and reached for the limb overhead to stretch and yawn. Suddenly a huge Bengal tiger burst out of the dense bush and hit the buffalo, slapping it to the ground. It sunk its teeth into its neck and held on, twitching its tail as the buffalo kicked, trembled, and gave up the ghost. I raised the trusty 30-06, took aim at the tiger's left shoulder, and squeezed the trigger. The silver-tipped projectile hit the target and the tiger sprawled over the buffalo, losing its grip on its neck. It twitched its tail a couple of times, then was still. It happened so quickly that my adrenalin didn't surge until after the shot. Tiger fever set in as I stood watching for any further movement. I began to gather my regalia, keeping one eye on the tiger. This gave me time to calm down and make sure the shot had been fatal. It was.

I vacated the tree and pulled the tiger away from the buffalo. With my famous Louisiana muskrat skinner knife, which I was never without, I skinned my prize in forty-five minutes. Then I went a short distance to cut a pole from a sapling, on which I tied the rolled up skin. When I returned, four huge vultures were tugging over the skin and dragging it along the ground. Nature's instant, efficient clean up crew had lost no time doing their job with the best of tools, their strong sharp beaks. They had dragged the skin ten feet, and when I tried to pull it away from them they refused to let go. I waved my stick and hit the ground beside them as we tugged against each other. I literally had to hit one with a light blow before the rest broke their hold allowing me to recover the skin. After such a hassle they simply stepped aside and watched. I was puzzled at first that

they chose the skin over the carcasses. Then I realized that the bright orange skin is what they had spotted from the air, not knowing that it was empty.

With my bedroll, skin, and rifle, I walked out to the road to find Rafiq still curled up on the back seat of the Jeep. I put the head of the tiger up against the window and banged the sides of the Jeep to awaken him. A mad scramble ensued, and he was more than relieved when I showed myself. He took it all in good spirit, but was disappointed he did not hear the rifle shot. He went to fetch the charpoy and to remove the bell from the buffalo. He came back saying he had to fight off the vultures to get to the buffalo. I related the night's events as we spread the skin on the grass, gave it a good salting, and rerolled it. To experiencing the abiding quietness of a pitch black night in a machan, with the drama of the winds and the wild life, touches both body and soul.

Meat Harvesting

My India-wide travel schedule continued, though I returned to New Delhi most week ends. Our meat supply still came from the jungle and plains, obtained while returning from trips or short forays. Much more duck and goose meat was being consumed than previously. Daybreak Saturday and Sunday morning often found me and a friend in waders walking through waist-deep water beyond New Delhi's International Palam Airport. Monsoon rains flooded low-lying grain fields of sorghum, millet, and corn, and migrating water fowl stopped to feed. We had to carefully measure each step out into the submerged, unmarked irrigation wells fields to avoid the unmarked irrigation wells. A misstep into one of them would likely mean being permanently ducked.

To make sure they would never be accused of letting daylight sneak past them, the village roosters announced its arrival all over the countryside. Second in line were a few well-spaced quacks of the blue or green teal flying sixty miles per hour down-wind, offering nothing more than a dark speeding image as a target. Big flocks of flapping, cumbersome pelican flew past in silhouette, with drawn necks and food pouches tucked away. They could be mistaken for geese by the less experienced hunters, who felt the pangs of disappointment when they found the goose they had shot was a pelican.

Appearing next on the horizon were mallards, pintails, canvasbacks, teals, shovelers, several varieties of geese, and occasionally India's rare pink and chocolate duck. The brown, downed crop stalks provided excellent camouflage under a sky streaked with smoke from dung-fueled cooking fires. At intervals the peaceful scene would be shattered by jets landing at the airport.

Not all of the pleasure came from bagging a few ducks and geese, but also from watching the morning regimen of nature's creatures. Hustling to make a living from the swamp were snakes, turtles, terrapins, fish, and flying and wading birds. Duck hawks patrolled back and forth in search of still or flying prey. Once they spotted a potential target, immediately their wings folded, and they went into a plunge at more than a hundred miles per hour, grasping their prey with piercing claws or knocking it out of the sky as a cripple no longer able to fly, literally making its prey a sitting duck. More often smaller breeds were scooped out of midair.

A snake striking at a frog who was snatching at bugs, demonstrated that if there is something to eat, there is something to be eaten by. Everything lives at the expense of something else. Man is not an exception.

A half dozen different kinds of ducks and a couple of geese were my usual bag. Eighteen in forty-five minutes was my record during two and half years hunting this spot. Our deep freeze seldom had legs than six, and at most seventy frozen waterfowl. Needless to say, we and our friends became connoisseurs, preparing these birds in an endless variety of ways.

The Transfer

I had received orders from TCM that our transfer from Bhopal to New Delhi would be effective September 1, 1960. We had about a month to close out in Bhopal. With packing, shipment, receptions, and good-byes completed, the time had come. As usual we got an early morning start for the long wearisome trip. Greenery and lingering moisture from the monsoon rains made the trio less dusty than usual. Both the station wagons, Mercury and Jeep, labored under the load of pets and people. The Mercury carried two adults, six daughters, three cats and a tiger, plus food baskets, water ins, and every child's special keep-close-to-me item. The one item that one of the daughters sadly had to leave behind however was the large wooden box laden with soil and the long growing vine for a watermelon that had sprung from a simple seed she had planted herself and meticulously nurtured for months in the open, inner veranda of the pavilion. Rafiq, driving the Jeep, followed with stacks of baggage. All cargo was special, but none more so than Cathy, as she took her place on the folded-down seat by the right rear door. No tigress ever displayed more of an air of royalty as she sat on her haunches, serene and totally absorbed in the changing scenery. She was truly the least bothersome female passenger of the six who rode with her. We all loved Cathy. But it was Cathy who was the model of good behavior. At rest and eat stops she hopped down, walked about, relieved herself, went into some stalking postures and lumped at anything that moved. Always ready to finish off her bottle of milk, she was again at peace with the world and ready to ride. Hopping gracefully back on her special seat, her regal posture and perfect deportment was resumed. Cathy got most of the attention when we stopped to have refreshments and visit with the Bohis in Agra. Wayne, Norma, Becky and Jennifer Bohl had visited us in Bhopal. He was one of a two-man team in India collecting species of same birds which showed surmise for being established in suitable areas of the U.S. Cathy seemed to know she was among strangers and that good behavior was in order. After about an hour, it was late in the afternoon and we started on our last leg of the trip. Our friends gathered around to see us pack in, with all eyes on Cathy and how she would ride. We had said good bye, turned around and were pulling out of the driveway when Mrs. Bohl yelled, "Wait a minute!" She then dashed into the house, and returned to thrust a book through the window, saying "This is for the mother of Cathy, the tiger psychologist." The book was *Born Free*, by Joy Adamson.

The 450-mile trek ended at the One Mansinsh Road Hotel, in New Delhi, after the reception desk had closed. The night guard had instructions nonetheless and led us to our reserved rooms. While he never said anything about Cathy, he kept his eyes glued her way. We moved into our two double rooms, tiger and all. After removing a few layers of dust, everyone was within minutes flat out. Cathy was no exception. The lone hard day had exacted its toll.

Tigress In The Hotel

Early the next morning there was a knock at the door. The sweeper appeared at the door with an early warning signal. "Mr. Singh, the hotel manager come. He heard about you tiger in the hotel. He very angry. He soon coming up stairs."

Quickly a thought came to mind to beat Mr. Singh to the punch. Slipping my robe on as I headed down the steps, I saw Mr. Singh in a hurry, on his way up with an excited face. From above, I said sternly, "Mr. Singh, I checked into your hotel late last night, with a tired wife, six fretful daughters and a worn out tiger. I am terribly disappointed that you had no place to accommodate the tiger. What kind of hotel do you run anyway?" Mr. Singh was completely disarmed.

He apologized profusely, then declared. "I did not realize you had a tiger. I have just the place you need. There is a cottage out back with plenty of room for all of you and the tiger will have room to run around in the yard. I'll send my people up to start moving you right after breakfast."

This was an excellent arrangement, complete with housekeeping facilities and space for the girls and Cathy to run about. The screened-in veranda was perfect for having tea, and for Cathy's sleeping quarters. This was our home for about ten weeks before we were due to take home leave.

School - Prime Minister Nehru-Cathy-Home Leave

Although we would be going back to the U.S. in a few months, Loretta lost no time enrolling the girls in the American International School in New Delhi. The three youngest had never attended formal school, only Mama's home school. With eagerness and enthusiasm they seemed to welcome the challenge. Mrs. Jones, the one-woman teacher, principal, and PTA, retired to become mother, transporter of children, and PTA member. Although she surrendered the main control of her daughter's education, she maintained high standards for their attendance and homework.

My role in the education process remained advisory, reading and commenting on the literary essays and borrowing the office's portable typewriter occasionally so that Christina could bang out longer term papers into the wee hours of the morning. Not to be left out, Cathy was adopted as the mascot of the Taj Tigers, the school's athletic teams. Her reign was to be brief, for our impending departure and her increasing size required that we find her a more suitable home. This prompted the following story in the Taj Times, the school paper: "SCHOOL LOSES MASCOT". The Taj Tigers are soon to lose their real-live tigress mascot, Cathy. She is to be donated to a zoo or some other such organization when the Jones family, her owners, go on home leave.

"The six-month old tigress was found in the jungle of Bhopal on April 16 and brought to Delhi in September. Cathy, who has attended one baseball game, the Taj Tigers-Woodstock game on October 15, will be given away sometime before November 7, 1960, the departure date for the Joneses."

“Cathy has some unusual habits. She picks up her ears when a child passes. She also likes to drink from a baby bottle. Cathy, who has learned to respond to her name, is said to like Mrs. Jones best of all. Whenever Cathy is eating raw or cooked meat she does not like to be disturbed.”

“The family fox terrier used to play with her, and their Siamese cats once fought Cathy. Cathy likes to Play with soft things. She once had a rubber pig which she ate to pieces. She also loves to be rubbed under the chin. The tigress cub, who sleeps on the Jones’ enclosed veranda, is taken care of by the whole family.”

With the school routine established, and Loretta’s mastery of streets and traffic well in hand, the family had settled in as far as the office car took me to and from work, and I spent the days preparing for my new assignment after home leave, and attending session meetings. I had not had such an ordered and centered lifestyle since 1956 prior to arriving in India alone. What had happened to my world? It seemed to have tilted on its axis and was rotating counter-clockwise. But it was nice to be home more with the family.

Prime Minister Nehru

To climax our stay, the girls had gotten together and sent a Loretta-prompted letter to Prime Minister Nehru saying that they would like to present him with a tiger cub. This was done unbeknownst to me. Shortly afterwards we were invited to have dinner with an Indian family and became suspicious when they insisted that all of the girls sign their names as we left. We thought this could be for a comparison of signatures on the letter sent to the PM.

In the meantime we had been hounded by the head of the U.S. two-man bird collecting team as to what we should do with Cathy. We thought he was intervening on behalf of a local wildlife dealer who sold to circuses and zoos. It was our guess that the local man had done a favor for the U.S. and to facilitate his work in India. Getting us to turn Cathy over to him was his way of reciprocating. With no response from Prime Minister Nehru, we hoped that a CBS man who had come to collect a white tiger from a maharajah would also take Cathy with him. We were unable to contact the CBS man, so we agreed to let the Indian wildlife dealer take Cathy the day before our departure. He informed us that Cathy would be sold to a zoo in the Netherlands. She had become an unwilling dropout from the International School and her role as mascot.

The last day had come. We all were losing a loved one. Chicken Little’s sky had truly fallen on all of our heads. Tears flowed in torrents as we watched the wildlife dealer disappear out of sight with Cathy walking on a leash on a clear, cool November day. Instantly, a family resolution was passed to visit her in the Netherlands. The image of Cathy being led away hindered the arduous task of setting our usual twenty-two to twenty-four bags packed and stacked on the veranda ahead of departure time.

The next morning, while scurrying around tidying up loose ends, we were amazed to see a long, black, shiny limousine drive up in front of the cottage. What is this all about? we wondered. The most we expected was a simple van to take us to the airport. A chauffeur hurriedly dismounted and walked up to the cottage veranda.

“Good morning,” he began, “I’m a driver from Prime Minister Nehru’s office. I have come to collect Mrs. Jones and her daughters and their tiger to be presented to Mr. Nehru and to have tea with him.”

Completely caught off guard, we finally managed to say, “We got rid of the tiger yesterday because we are returning to U.S. today.”

“What happened to the tiger?” he inquired.

“We gave her to a wildlife dealer,” I answered.

“Where is he?” he demanded.

“We have no idea. Yesterday afternoon he came and walked off with the tiger on a leash. He did not tell us where he was taking her. Earlier he had told us he would ship her to the Amsterdam zoo in the Netherlands.”

“I would like to find him, get the tiger, and take you with me to the Prime Minister.”

“We are terribly sorry it happened this way. To have been able to present the tiger to Mr. Nehru and share tea with him would have been one of the great moments of our lives. Please express our regrets, appreciation, and best wishes to Mr. Nehru. Our transportation to the airport is expected any moment now. Thank you for coming.” Loretta answered. The chauffeur departed. What a moment to miss, we thought, especially for the girls. Loretta and I had tea with the Prime Minister during one of his visits to Bhopal. However, a second time with the girls would have been very special.

Home Leave Number Two

Mentally set for the most direct twenty-two-plus hours flight from New Delhi to Nashville and the usual big family hassle, with customs, head-count and baggage enough to fill a medium-sized warehouse, our out-of-sync bio-rhythm journey was on. Jet flights had now replaced the lumbering, propelled, four-engine aircraft, a pleasant bonus. This trip was in keeping with our home-leave pattern, alternating with summer and Christmas, which allowed for the least interruption of the school year and gave us the chance to spend a holiday at home and to be updated on the latest Americana, every two to three years.

Just to see a live, decorated tree was a great Joy. The best we had been able to do in Bhopal was a few green limbs cut high tree an aged, distorted casuarina tree after getting special permission from the Palace office. As it had been in all previous years, it was my job to go into the forest to cut, deliver and decorate the tree. A Joyous Christmas was had by all. After contacts with kith and kin, and shopping for things not available in India, which then had to be packed and shipped our home leave vanished like vapor.

Back In Hindustan

We were never sure what the side effects were of upsetting our bio-rhythms. Whatever they were, we had by then a substantial accumulation of them having completed our fifth trip between Nashville and New Delhi. Home leave had provided a cushion against the sorrows we felt moving from Bhopal to New Delhi. Our Jet lag and memories of the loss of Cathy combined to make us hostages of lethargy at One Hansinsh Road. The need to find a new home and get the girls conditioned for school soon shook out the drag, and our daily routine was re-established.

After a short stay in our temporary quarters, house hunting had landed us in the Defense Colony community, so-called because the Indian government had made plots there available to servicemen to construct new homes. Our two-story, pale-yellow house stood well above some of the adjacent homes, but gushed tight against the lot's boundaries, leaving a narrow strip of yard on one side and just enough area in front for some grass and shrubbery. The driveway and garage left no space between the adjoining property line on the other side. Captain Balwant Singh, a very congenial naval officer, was the owner. But like all landlords in New Delhi, he knew more about U.S. government workers' housing allowance than we did. Accordingly, rent costs were set at the allowance level or slightly above. In spite of our serious attempt to negotiate, we had to supplement the rental allowance. The house was new, an architectural centerpiece by Carl Van Heina, and quite adequate for us, a not too common find within our allowance.

Continuing the tradition started in Bhopal for having separate rooms for the girls to study and read, we set aside one of the rooms off the dining room as a library-study with shelves full of books accumulated ever since Loretta's and my college days.

There was no semblance of a striking rear view. The barren lot in front was twice the size of a football field and had several shanties scattered on it. It served as one vast latrine. And what an extra ordinary view it could be at times! The early morning scene was of fifty to a hundred bare bottoms relieving themselves, with small brass pots filled with water for the after-act cleansing. Thank goodness for curtains. When gusts of wind blew across the dry area, my imagination ran wild with what the air might contain that we were breathing. Frequent blowing and cleaning of our noses was our only defense. Christina with her tender sixteen years saw a child born in one of the huts hastily constructed with leftover bricks and a jute sack for a roof. She recalled her first jolt into a world of less privileged than hers on the way to Bombay City from the airport years ago. Again she challenged me with her cosmic curiosity. "What are we going to do to help the child? What if I had been born over there in that field?" I left her to find the answers.

The house was located directly under the straight line that the crow flew. The early daylight and late afternoon skies were filled with a city-block expanse of thousands of black, flapping wings stretching as far as the eye could see. The migration lasted thirty minutes or more, the crows heading out to the farm lands to feed all day and returning in the evening to roost in town. Where they found enough room in New Delhi to spend the night, and who cleaned up after them, I never learned.

The Girls' Participation

Comforting to us was the fact that the girls were having an opportunity, some for the first time, and others after four and a half years of interacting with others in school, making friends and

participating in school activities. They all adjusted well after having been steeped in the importance of maintaining a routine at their home school in Bhopal. Report cards ranged from B averages to all As. Mama didn't let them rest on their Bhopal laurels. Christina became feature editor of the school newspaper, and Anita and Estrellita served as class president and reporter. All soon developed close and rewarding friendships, in spite of having lost Cathy. There were never any problems of promotion to the next class. The overall performance in each case paralleled that of the past four years in the home school.

The church serving mostly the American community provided another focus of activity for the girls. Regular services, playing piano for Sunday school, and other youth programs kept the girls from having to repeat the Bhopal experience of minimal social interaction outside the home.

Pets Down

With our pets down to the Siamese cats only, an alltime low for us, I had an opportunity to add another. One Sunday morning while looking out of our bedroom window, I noticed a mongoose going into a road culvert. The far end of the culvert was choked with dirt. I figured it had to come out the way it went in. Rushing outside, I placed a box over the open end. Then I turned an empty five gallon kerosene into a trap. I cut out one end, then reattached it with strings poked through some holes that I punched. This gave the trap a swinging door. After more hole punching, I ran a string from the door through the can and out the back end, so I could pull the door inward. I nailed a small wooden block to the front of the can to act as a doorstop. With the door pulled open, I placed the can over the opening of the culvert. One of the girls hit at the culvert with a stick, and the mongoose ran out into the tin. I released the string and the door swung shut against the block. This resourceful boyhood operation took ten minutes. Snorting violently and biting at anything it could set its razor-sharp teeth on, the captive was successively transferred to a box which we covered with wire netting. After it calmed down, we managed to get a collar on it to which we could tie a leash. It was a mature male and did not take kindly to domestication, although captured young mongooses are reputed to tame easily and make good pets. The mongoose is known for its ability to kill snakes and rodents with lightning speed. It attacks similar to a tiger, having carnassial teeth, a pair on each side which perform like scissors to slice through meat when its ferocity is up. The cobra and mongoose were often a source of entertainment in India in street or road shows. I have seen the mongoose circle a raised, hooded cobra until there is a chance to apply his lightening-fast moves for the kill. Between the girls and the mongoose there was respect but little love and affection. His stubborn, relentless resistance to domestication prompted our letting him go.

On The Road Again

Soon after our arrival in Delhi from home leave, parenting had again become the major responsibility of our household executive, Loretta, for my new assignment again took me to the road. I had to travel back and forth, up and down and across India to locate and to persuade state officials to utilize some of the twelve million dollars worth of agricultural equipment which had been purchased by the TCM Mission for community development. My survey of about forty percent of the equipment revealed a hundred percent non-utilization. During my survey, I was once asked by a Sikh gentleman in the Punjab State a series of questions. His rapid-fire responses

promoted me to stop and ask: “Why are you so forthcoming with answers, when I’m a total stranger to you?”

He answered, “You have an affidavit face. I trust you,” he responded.

Affidavit face? That’s a new one, I thought. Sounded good though.

The twelve-month assignment meant traversing India to the tune of 25,000 miles taking me to nooks and corners of the country, from the foothill of the Himalayas to the last square foot of the sub-continent at Cape Comorin. I called on nearly every state government’s agriculture ministry. The effort resulted in slightly more than one million dollars worth of equipment being put into use. But what was more important was that a much broader understanding of how it could be utilized was realized. My Budni experience had stood me in good stead.

When I had worked at Budni I had seen some equipment laying idle without having any background knowledge of why it was there. Since it was not being utilized, and had the famous AID hand clasp insignia, underscored by: “Donated by the People of The United States,” I had been prompted to demonstrate its utilization to a number of local officials, missionaries, and village farmer groups as an extension of my Budni center responsibilities. My objective had been to show that there are better ways of doing what had been done in the villages for hundreds of years. The big stationary grain thresher, utilized in the U.S. more than fifty years prior, demonstrated the principle of machine grain threshing and cleaning versus trampling the straw and grain under the feet of cattle for separation, then winnowing the chaff from the grain by tossing it by hand into the air after it had attained a substantial bullock urine and feces flavor. The machine’s size was the prohibitive feature to widespread village use but it did demonstrate a principle by which smaller more suitable models could be built locally. Within a few years, small mechanical threshers using the same principle were built in India and enjoyed widespread use.

One of my scariest experiences in India grew out of one of the demonstrations. While I was towing a stationery thresher behind my Jeep, the hitch busted near a village where the spring festival Holi was being celebrated. A large crowd was coming in my direction, singing, dancing, and dousing each other with colored water, as is the custom, and dashing off to avoid return fire. Hot, sweating, and irritated, I kneeled down over the broken piece trying to repair it. The crowd had shifted to the other side of the road and was passing. Suddenly, I felt wet hands raking across my sweat-filled eyes. Temporarily blinded, I sensed someone running away. In an automatic response, I threw the hammer I was holding. Out of nowhere the angered crowd closed, shouting and pointing their fingers at me. They then produced a person with an injured elbow, pointing at it and accusing me. Apparently the hammer had found its mark. My apology and use of my weak Hindi did little to ease their rage. Two nearby police came to my rescue and sent the crowd on with their celebration, all except the injured person. After retrieving my hammer, I offered to take him to the nearest hospital. At first he angrily refused and said he would find his own way. I had hit the young village doctor. When we reached the hospital his elbow was bandaged but found not broken, and he had become much more amenable. With some help from Rafiq, I was able to tell him who I was and what I was doing. He apologized profusely. My whole day was one of total regret. You are here to help not to hurt, my conscience reminded. I invited him and his wife, who had accompanied him to the hospital, to have tea with us at the palace pavilion, which they did.

Later I stopped at his village several times when passing through on my way to work. We became good friends. He told me later that he had summoned the police and appealed to the crowd not to be revengeful because he was to blame, not knowing who I was.

or me, it resulted in being away from home about seventy percent of the time, rivaling that of the past four and a half years in Central India. One of my trips took me to Bhopal for an overnight visit. Our pavillion there had been turned into a hotel. I registered there, and by coincidence was given the same room Loretta and I had used as our bedroom. Through my travels I realized that riding over India's roads and trails and open country is equivalent to a lot of hammering to one's sit posterior and its connective tissues. The results: an excruciating painful posterior condition. The most painful attack coincided with the end of the one-year assignment. Within several day of sitting in an upholstered office chair away from the jolting, the pain subsided, except when riding to and from work. At night and weekends there was absolutely no pain. But the sound of the horn of the office car at the front gate to pick me up brought back the awful feeling. This went on for several weeks without change. It had become psychosomatic. The pain lasted ten to twenty minutes into the ride to the office before it eased somewhat. This condition persisted, until I decided to take a week off, to go camping, trapping, and hunting in the jungle of Central India. This cured my psychomatic illness.

The Plus-One Trip

In October of our second year in New Delhi, we made arrangements for a family vacation within India. We left home in plenty of time to complete the 170-mile trip to the foothills of the Himalayas well before dark. Stuffed tighter than jigsaw puzzle pieces with eight passengers, the eight-cylinder Mercury station wagon took it all in stride as it had so many times before. After a short delay at the Jumna River Bridge, where the road and rail traffic used the same crossing, we were on the Grand Trunk Road heading north for Simia. Much of the trip was across the flat, Gangetic plains, India's major bread basket. The countryside was distinguished by a network of irrigation canals, hundreds of shallow wells with animal-powered water lifts, new green fields large herds of grazing sheep goats and cattle, and a variety of wild antelope. We passed numerous villages and ancient ruins, as well as many shrines still in use. An occasional distant rise in the landscape broke the monotony of the plains. Buzzards rode high on the air currents, searching for fallen animals. Several times they could be seen in piles like ants, devouring a carcass. They came together fast and in such great numbers that even the laziest of animals could be stripped clean in minutes. In one instance a huge flock covered the entire roof of a slaughterhouse, and a cave-in seemed imminent.

Traveling on the Grand Trunk offered the usual bumping of our rear ends. Constant rocking and rolling gave the vehicle and its load a total bashing. At times it seemed as though we were being thrown to our destination rather than riding there. No part of the vehicle got more of a workout than the shock absorbers. This all led to my coining of the expression: "As busy as a shock absorber on the Grand Trunk Road."

After close to five hours of rocking, rolling, being thrown around, and a few rest stops, we had come to Chandigarh, the newly constructed capital of the Punjab, a monument to the architect Le Corbusier. This is the only state in which Sikh religion is dominant, and Chandigarh was built to

pay homage to its founders. Unfortunately, we had to just refuel and keep moving. The last thirty miles or so was a constant climb on sharp curves past scary, craggy drop-offs, and through magnificent, forested mountain slopes.

Finally, we had reached Simia, the capital of Himachal Pradesh, a landscape of lush hills and valleys. Large public buildings were located in the city center, and European-style homes were spread over a crescent-shaped ridge five or so miles long. Simia had been the summer capital of British rule, and since independence, also for segments of the Indian government. The air was cool and damp and the residents dressed accordingly, giving the city an ambience of a Swiss resort. The population fell to its winter levels of about 20,000 versus 80,000 during the warm summer months. One reason for visiting Simia during the hot months, I was told, was to see and be seen. This was, in part, a reference to the constant parade of well-dressed, sari-clad and otherwise well-to-do eye-catching ladies who caused male head-turning to become a phenomenon of perpetual motion. I vowed that some day I would return when I could stretch to the limit Loretta's mandate, "Look, but don't touch."

We made our way from the bazaar to the other side of the hill to the bed-and-all-meals home of Mr. and Mrs. Singh. He was a member of India's parliament, but spent much of his spare time at their mountain home. We had made arrangements to stay three or four days but we were never able to get an exact price quote. This gave us considerable concern as to whether we had enough cash with us to pay the bill or whether they would take a check.

Mrs. Singh, a genteel, gracious, motherly type, met us when we drove up and sounded the horn. She did a good job of not showing surprise and of accepting such a crowd as ours and the heaps of things we carried. Like most dwellings in Simia, ours had an endless view of the great mountains of India, China, and Tibet. A tasty and well-prepared welcoming dinner was served family style, with all of us sitting around the table with the Singhs. They persuaded Loretta and me to taste their homemade wine after the children went to bed. We sat around the blazing fireplace with a grogginess slowly overtaking that soon prompted us to turn in. We slept so soundly that little of what went on was very clear to us the next morning. However, there was strong evidence that we had engaged in the kind of activity that had added up six offspring over the years thus far. We awoke still in the familiar position, limp and totally relaxed of course, and the condom that I did not remember putting on had come off with a good chance of having spilled in the wrong place. Loretta was still too sleepy to discuss it. Thoughts of inordinately small cells of life flashed through our minds the next day, wondering if the unplanned had happened. Had it truly become the Plus-on trip?

The second day, Mrs. Singh accompanied all of us to the bazaar to shop. Loretta and the girls were a bit suspicious when she discouraged them buying things that caught their eye. Her attitude set us wondering whether or not she knew how much money we were carrying. The less we spent, the more we could afford to pay them for our stay. The sum of our purchase was a pair of small white marble elephants and some little packages of Indian candy for the girls.

Reading, radio, games, climbing the hill behind the house, and keeping warm and cozy around the fireplace occupied much of the time. There was an over abundance of spectacular views. We began to notice the snow-line coming closer each day pushing cooler air ahead of it, which

demanded increasingly heavier clothing. Out of habit I carried my 20-gauge shot gun on short walks, hoping to add pheasant to the menu. Twice I flushed the same pheasant close to the house. Since it was slow to take off I got the impression it was tame, so I didn't shoot.

Within walking distance of the house was the monkey temple. Monkeys were spread over the temple in every possible posture; climbing, lounging, grooming one another, relieving themselves, carrying their young, and rushing up to people for a handout. The temple and the monkeys seemed unattended and the troop showed all signs of primate miseries. Some of the older males manifestly threatened to attack unless food was given to them. We kept our distance. The temple was built to pay homage to Hanuman, the monkey god, of Hindu mythology. In the Sanskrit epic, The Ramayana, Hanuman and his fellow monkeys built a bridge across the strait of Ceylon, assisting Rama's rescue of Sita, his consort, from the demon king.

At the house that night, I attempted to get some idea from Mr. Singh for what the total bill would be.

"Don't worry about it, it will be within your means," Singh replied. "Furthermore, we totally trust Americans. I think they are the most honest people I know. My experience with you folk corroborates this belief.

"Some years ago a young American man was passing through New Delhi and ran into money problems. He came to me, he said, on a friend's recommendation. After some talk about his money problems, I loaned him 10,000 rupees, strictly on the basis of his signature and promise to pay. Some years went by without any word from the young man. I took up the matter with the U.S. Embassy, but never got any encouragement that my money would be returned. After a busy week in Parliament, we decided to spend a few days here in Simia. Early one morning, someone knocked on my door and there he was. After apologizing for the delay, he went into his shoulder bag and counted out 10,000 rupees with interest. I thanked him and invited him to breakfast. He only thanked me profusely and departed, saying he needed to return to New Delhi as soon as possible. He sped off in his taxi. Only an American would do something like that," he concluded, looking me straight in the face.

The mountains in the distance had become a vast expanse of white and the snow line was just a few days from Simia. The next morning, we got the car packed even tighter than before, due to heavier clothing. Nervously, I went to settle with Mr. Singh. After paying the bill, we had just enough left to buy gasoline back to New Delhi. We always wondered whether an inventory had been made of our cash during our semi-drugged condition the first night. It was a great relief to have had enough cash to pay the bill and not have to come back years later.

We headed back down the twisting, thirty-mile run to the flat lands. The first time I applied the brakes to maneuver a curve they failed to respond. Amid shouts of, "Daddy, slow down!" I pumped the brakes madly until the car finally slowed, diminishing our chances for an upside-down view of the ravines and forested slope. With a better feel of how much pumping was required, I finally was able to get the vehicle speed and braking back into balance. Once all was under control, passenger excitement drastically reduced. We had a safe return, taking a bit longer

to be bumped/thrown back south than when going north. Two days later the newspaper reported that two inches of snow had come to Simia.

We had indeed taken a Plus-one trip. All the telltale pregnancy signs Loretta had experienced five times previously gradually reappeared after a six-year hiatus. When we announced it to the girls, Christina spoke up saying, “Why are we having another child? I thought you didn’t do that any more.” The rest were mum. So were we.

Our driver Rafiq said, “I didn’t think people your age do that any more. In our place, you become only companions when you are that old.” What does he mean that old?, I wondered.

Ford Foundation Liaison

During my final two years in India, I was assigned as AID’s field liaison officer to Ford Foundation’s Integrated District Program, at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh State. There, I completed a utilization survey on 100 sets of improved agricultural implements distributed by CARE to small farmers in the district. They were simple bullock-drawn implements: a moldboard plow, cultivator with shovels, and a planter. All were designed to be more efficient than the indigenous counterparts. My findings were as follows: a.) All farmers liked the new implements and had used them extensively; b.) All sets were in storage because there were no replacement parts; c.) All farmers were back to using indigenous implements; d.) Farmers would continue to use CARE models if repaired.

My conclusions showed it was worth the effort to have the needed parts, mostly plowshares and cultivator hoes, made locally by village artisans. This would increase the district’s self- efficiency as well as improve its farming practices. I sought out the area blacksmiths and spent time with Suni Lal, whose business was repairing the age-old implements that we hoped to replace. At his workshop, I demonstrated some revisions of his equipment, including speeding up his grinder with a cart wheel as a pulley, which was essential to shaping and finishing his fabrications. This enabled him to make replacements for the improved but worn-out plowshares, hoes, and other parts. Suni Lal was receptive, but had no regular source of steel, so I suggested he investigate the stock at the Aligarh Junk Yard.

I thought all was well until he came to me at the district headquarters a short time later. He had one problem: cash. I had failed to realize that there was no cash exchange between the farmers and the village blacksmith. He was paid for his work in grain, and had never handled money. Luckily there was a solution to this dilemma. U.S.-controlled, Indian rupees, generated from U.S. grain exports to India, could be used in U.S.-assisted development activities.

I established that this was a legitimate need, and set up an account in Aligarh, from which I could draw on a small portion of these funds. Receipts and accounts were submitted to the AID controller. My initial cash outlay was to purchase some scrap steel to get Suni Lal started. Meetings with extension workers and village leaders were held to explain that when parts were made for farmers, they would have to pay enough cash to replace the cost of materials; e.g. a meager amount for a piece of scrap metal, a few traditional farmers resisted at first, but after seeing what could be produced locally, and what it meant to their farming operations plus their

strong desire to keep in style, they conceded. After a few thousand years, the germ of capitalism had finally reached down to the village blacksmith level.

There were many facets of the district program, including a workshop for teaching farm mechanic skills and maintaining project equipment. Agricultural extension was key. Even a songfest, an idea that emanated from a Ford Foundation extension advisor, was sponsored as a means of communicating improved agricultural methods and information to farmers. A large audience of villagers came to listen to compositions by a variety of groups who sang and played instruments. All renditions were supposed to carry a convincing message, much like today's rep groups. Judges determined the most effective performance and prizes were awarded. Starting in the morning, the program went well into the night and I am not sure the thing ever ended. We had failed to limit the number of groups, and didn't realize that in Indian music each song is repeated over and over. Every group took more than twice the allotted time. Entertainment had overshadowed the purpose of the songfest.

We dared not leave it all to singing. Field demonstrations at district headquarters used methods well within the means of cooperating farmers. Many Indians found it less taxing to stick with the music, but I often reminded them that I had never heard a song that had the power to increase potato or wheat production. One conversion lecture was aimed at the practice of flooding wheat fields before planting, then allowing the plot to dry out enough to seed. I had tried to convince the farmers to plant their grain crops in dry soil, then flood, saving water and time. Not until I had demonstrated the technique using both methods and having them observe the results at different stages of growth were they persuaded. The dry-planted plot surpassed the plots that were flooded and then planted. They had actually seen the convincing results.

We didn't ask farmers to do anything we could not demonstrate or was not within their means. Teaching simple practices and underlying principles to the area agricultural extension workers and helping them plan their work programs turned out to be relatively effective. One of the barriers to effective implementation across most of India was the attitude of the educated towards manual tasks. Being educated meant an escape from manual labor and setting one's hands dirty. Many felt that being in agriculture meant being equal to coolies (unskilled laborers who did heavy work for little pay). In the highly applied science of agriculture, such feelings have no place if extension is to be effective. I once attended an extension training seminar where an Indian with a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois was to open the program by being photographed holding the handles of a bullock-drawn plow. He hadn't shown up, and the seminar was held up for his arrival. He never came. Finally he sent word by a runner to start without him because in my position and at my educational level, it is not necessary in our society to be photographed holding plow handles.. I fumed under the collar. It would take time to change attitudes.

Being assigned to Aligarh brought back weekday bachelor living. My weekend commute from the field office to home and back totaled 160 miles. Parenting and the upcoming need for increased parenting was once again thrown on Loretta, who was moving rapidly towards giving birth for the last time, for sure.

Two to three of us bachelors lived in a modern, two-story house, sharing housekeeping tasks. The house was tucked away among trees, shrubs, and vines which gave it maximum insulation against the torturing sun and heat. Periodic jaunts into the nearby plains country were taken to procure any of the several varieties of antelopes for meat, to be shared with the family at home. Locally produced vegetables and some staples from the U.S. commissary in New Delhi kept us well nourished. Competitions on the tennis court, among ourselves and India counterparts, occupied much of our spare time.

During one late afternoon drive, I thought I was seeing ghosts when I spotted a figure ambling up ahead resembling Paul Hassar, the German ground engineer at the Palace in Bhopal who had been our constant visitor, and treated us each Christmas by singing “Oh Tannenbaum” in German. When I pulled up and saw it was Paul, he dashed over to the vehicle saying, “I didn’t know ghosts drove Jeeps!” We embraced in Moslem fashion.

“We ghosts get around in however we can,” I responded. “I’m assigned here now with the Ford Foundation, working down the road at the district headquarters.”

“Ferocious me, what a coincidence!” Paul exclaimed.

“And you Paul? I thought you were still in Bhopal.”

“I left about a year ago after the Nawab passed. I thought I should move on. I’m ground engineer at the university here.”

“Hop in, I’ll run you wherever you’re going.” Still a bachelor, Paul had a very adequate bungalow a short distance from the main campus that he shared with a couple of young men he worked with. Some tea, and reminiscing of Bhopal, filled the rest of the evening. I dropped by to see him several times during my stay.

The U.S. Exhibit at the New Delhi Industrial Fair

Dulal and Rose Bopujari were a diminutive handsome, Assamese couple, both strikingly beautiful by the most discriminating standards. Both were graduates from the Presbyterian-supported mission agricultural school at Allahabad. Our mutual interest in promoting the manufacture and utilization of improved animal-powered implements had brought us together several times. I had been a guest at their home and visited his small factory at Allahabad, where bullock-powered implements were being made. They had both been our dinner guests in New Delhi. I had spoken to him about a particular piece of equipment to be demonstrated by U.S. at the 1962 New Delhi Indian Industrial trade fair. I stated how simple agricultural equipment could be produced on a mass scale at the Industrial Trade Fair my discussion with officials at the U.S. Embassy about a U.S. equipment exhibit, at the New Delhi Industrial Fair. The demonstration which resulted was transforming a piece of round mild steel into a moldboard plowshare to replace the centuries-old traditional type. A big, high-speed electric hammer was set up with the capacity to do the job properly in minutes, compared to several hours by the current methods, a constant line of spectators were enraptured by what was being turned out before their eyes. Both

villagers and urbanites readily identified with the meaning of the plow and its place in India's agricultural production cycle.

Dulal, an innovator, had been swamped with dreams of having the machine that would multiply his output several times. He had come to me inquiring how he could procure the piece of equipment. Contact was made on his behalf with those responsible for the U.S. segment of the exhibition to determine what would be involved in the procurement. I expected them to be delighted to keep the machine in India. It was available at a price of \$5000. Dulal had about half the amount and felt he could make a trip to the U.S. to solicit help from the Presbyterian Church to raise the remainder. I assured him he would have ample time once he committed himself to buy it. After all, the multi-ton hammer was not an item that would generate flocks of anxious competitive buyers. His fund-raising journey netted the cash needed to buy for the equipment, its dismantling, transport, and get-up in his workshop. This was a gigantic undertaking, given the excessive weight and the inadequacy of Indian mechanical aids for handling heavy items. Within months Dulal had plowshares literally pouring out of his shop, together with a number of other equipment parts.

Plus One Arrival

Before I could pull completely into the driveway at 505 Defense Colony, I was met by a chorus of excited Joneses shouting, "Mama went to the hospital to have a baby!"

"How did she set there?"

"Mrs. Sprague, our next-door neighbor," they replied.

"When?"

"This morning."

We had calculated that she would go to the hospital during the week end, Friday evening to Monday morning when I would be home. She went there Friday morning. I had arrived late in the afternoon.

Repeatedly the girls declared, "We hope it's not a boy. It would be too much for a young boy to survive among this many girls." I too had begun to wonder, given my twenty years in a house of all females.

"Let's not worry about the sex, but instead hope that it's well and healthy," I responded.

Predictions by neighbors and friends that it would be a boy ran as high as eighty-twenty. This will be your first son was often adamantly declared. First and only, if a boy, I thought.

The first word at the desk when I arrived at the Holy Family Hospital in Delhi, after telling them my name was: You have a fine baby girl, wife and child are doing fine. The last one had been added.

Loretta was exhausted but smiling and awake when she saw me standing over the bed, as I held her hand and kissed her forehead with the reminder, “Your capacity to forecast is atrocious. This was supposed to happen after I arrived from Aligargh.”

“I tried hard, but couldn’t make it work,” she countered.

The little one was resting well and had no idea who I was. Once again we had added to the species not by spontaneous generation, as the girls tended to believe, but rather by the cooperation of two individuals in a state of rejuvenescence. As had been the case with the six before we readily agreed on a name. I had done all the naming except Carol. This one had to be called Loretta Jr., to signify an end to our string of offsprings, a must for us. Loretta, the beginning, agreed; Loretta Jennifer Jones, the ending had no vote. Alas! with her name, we brought to a halt the flow of offspring which had started in August 1942, and ended August 3, 1962. Twenty years can teach so much. Loretta’s accumulated experience of caring for babies automatically kicked in, in spite of a seven-year hiatus. The longstanding unevenness of sharing parenthood was still with us, since my being home only on weekends and holidays would last for at least another year. Placid and good-natured the lost little time becoming all joys and smiles. Constant attention from her older sisters was clearly appreciated but did little to slow her fast-growing independence.

The Oldest To College

The first run in our close-knit family fabric began only weeks after the last stitch had been added. Like colorful kites, the time had come for them to start flying off to college. A gradual unraveling, it would take thirteen years to complete. No matter how good the workmanship, the time is relatively short before the unraveling starts. The wish to hold on to them as long as possible is contrary to the order of things. At least ours would not be instant. Number one, Burnetta, had completed the twelfth grade at the American school in New Delhi and was accepted at Fisk University in Nashville. She had only four years of formal schooling under the Mother-Mrs. Jones arrangement, albeit some of the more critical of her pre-college study. We were for the first time up against the discomforts of being too far away to give her timely, critical, family support. Knowing that she would be near and in contact with some of our dearest and closest friends was comforting. One of her classmates would be Betty Treherne, the daughter of our long-time friend and neighbor, Dr. Treherne, who was head of Gynecology and Obstetrics at McHarry Medical College. He had been responsible for getting our family planning out of kilter when he delivered the twins, bringing the total to five instead of the preferred four. Faculty friends at Meharry, Fisk University, and Tennessee State University had given us assurance that Burnetta could rely on them if need be. Keys to our vacant home were with the Trehernes and available to her. However, we learned that she was a bit unhappy once when denied the keys, due to suspicion that a student invasion, with less than best intentions, might take place. We stood by Mrs. Treherne’s decision. News later reached us that there had been a house break-in. Students were suspected.

Representing the family, Burnetta made a presentation of a mounted Indian tiger, as mascot to Tennessee State University Tigers during their annual Thanksgiving football game. I had shot the

tiger in central India, then had it mounted and shipped. The student body contributed to pay the \$500 price tag. Otherwise her freshman year contained the normal share joys and irritations. Her grades were average.

A Touch of Diplomatic Action

New Delhi, being the capital and center of diplomatic playtime, meant that we became more and more steeped in receptions, dinners, and other functions. Loretta was caught up in this much more than I, since my time in town was limited. However, our guest book signatures grew rapidly, a total of ninety over a two-year period. World-renowned persons were regular visitors to New Delhi. During our time they included Queen Elizabeth, Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy, her sister Lee Radziwill, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson. We felt privileged to see and be close to them, especially the queen on her arrival. We were simply one in the crowd, but received an invitation from our embassy to attend her departure ceremony. Loretta, Christina and I arrived at the appointed time, but no one was at the entrance to direct us. Spotting the American Ambassador and other Americans. We went straight to them. Other foreign representatives were at their appointed seats. The queen and her group were at the front, and we noticed other people entering, going first to the queen, and then to their appointed places. Loretta nudged me, saying we had committed a faux pas, and should go immediately to the queen. We did, but did not curtsy. She graciously greeted us with niceties, but then casually mentioned that we had greeted our mission people before coming to her. There was no reprimand. Instead, we think the Embassy crew preferred us greeting the Ambassador first. Little did we think our second-oldest daughter, who greeted the queen, would one day be awarded her doctorate degree from the University of London by the Queen Mother.

Good-bye to India

May had been at first freakishly cool, but more than half gone. New Delhi was back to being nature's closes thing to a furnace. The school year was over, all were promoted to the next higher grade, resigned from extra-curricular activities, and were busy closing out seven and a half years in one of the world's most interesting countries. Little Loretta was close to one year old and the smiling and independent ruler of her playpen, but too young to share in the memories of the family's great moments in India. Hers would start with Africa. We all knew it was time to move on, but to leave was more wrenching than we had anticipated. During our exhilarating and difficult moments amidst the heat, dust, bugs, and amoebic dysentery, we had made some lifelong friends. The unfamiliar things had become routine. There was no getting out of India without engaging in dinners and receptions both in Delhi and Aligargh. The inscribed brass bucket given as a memento from Aligargh read: "To Harold M. Jones in Grateful Appreciation For Your Valuable Service and Advice. From The Aligargh District Intensive Agricultural Project Headquarter's Staff - May 11, 1963."

It was time to say good-bye to India, our many friends, and its myriad of fascinations and problems covering every aspect of the human condition. We would miss its monuments to tales of great history, its unmatched ecosystems, the growing elements of modernity existing side by side with old traditions and customs in which class and caste were clearly still distinct. In a small

way, we had helped to put in place some bits of agricultural production technology necessary to close the gap between meals and mealtimes for its escalating millions.

Saddened were the hearts of our household help, Lal, who had accompanied us from Bhopal, and Rafiq, the driver, as we piled our warehouse-load of luggage in the van and pulled away from 505 Defense Colony. Among our AID co-workers who saw us off to the airport was Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Ensminger, head of the Ford Foundation in India, who had offered me a position in their India program, which I promised to consider. The Pan Am 707 lifted through the heat-laden, cow-dung and wood-fire scented air, dimming out the vast expanse of New Delhi's lights as it climbed into the black star-spangled night, with its nose pointed towards the Middle East.

CARLETON S. COON, JR.
Economic Officer
New Delhi (1956-1959)

India Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1965-1968)

Carleton S. Coon, Jr. was born in France on April 27, 1927. He served in the U.S. Army from 1945-1946 and received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1949. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Frankfurt, Damascus, New Delhi, Rabat, Kathmandu, and Washington, DC. Mr. Coon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 26th, 1989.

Q: *All right. Then you moved to New Delhi.*

COON: Yes.

Q: *This was from '56 to '59 as Economic Officer. What was the situation in India at that time as we saw it?*

COON: I might mention, because it was one of my more brilliant memories, that my wife and I chose to drive there from Damascus in a Ford station wagon. This was considered very crazy, and at first was vetoed by the State Department, but I lobbied while I was back in Washington, got permission to do it. It took us a lot longer than we expected and I spent half my time underneath the Ford, rather than in it, trying to fix its shock absorbers and one thing and another...

The only paved roads I saw between Iraq and Pakistan were in the cities, so we were somewhat notorious on our arrival in Delhi. And I was in the Economic Section and I was supposed to report on industrial development, five-year plan matters, and population, and stuff like that.

Q: *In India, what were the sort of major developments going on in India at the time you were there, that were of interest to the United States?*

COON: There had been a war with Pakistan, the first major war, and the Indians had been aided by the Russians, and the Pakistanis by the Americans. And there was a great deal of feeling about American arms aid to Pakistan. The country had basically been pro-western, pro-American until then but was full of very serious doubts as to its future orientation. Nehru was very much in the ascendancy. He was making marvelous speeches all over the place, was furnishing me with a wonderful case study in how you pull a disparate bunch of people together and instill a sense of nationhood in them, and get them to work together. The democratic processes was still rather new and were shaking down. I mean the political process, the judiciary and so forth, was in place from the British days. A lot of things were in place from the British days, railways, administration, a whole lot of things. But how does a country of 450 million -- I think about in those days, or maybe 350 million when they were independent. How does a country of 350 million, soon to be a billion people, govern itself in a democratic fashion?

And I did examine in depth some questions. I wrote an analysis, for example, of what socialism really means to the average Indian -- something quite different from what it means to the average American.

But basically I was running around the country a great deal. I was traveling a lot and looking at factories, and looking at various developments here and there.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian economy at that time? I mean you were looking at this, you could see it was already approaching a half a billion people and nothing was stopping it. It was still a relatively poor country. What was your impression about its future on the economic side?

COON: I find it hard to separate out my impressions at that time from my impressions subsequently because I've been involved in Indian affairs so intermittently ever since, and not just from a Kathmandu perspective. But I don't recall believing anything at that time of a fundamental nature that I've had to change since then. I mean nothing has happened since that has really surprised me in terms of my basic analysis. For example the gradual but increasingly rapid emergence of a modern India sort of sitting on the shoulders of traditional India. So you had hundreds of millions of people in the villages living -- the women gathered and gossiping around the well -- and essentially a bullock driven economy. Not much different from the kind of life style of a couple thousand years ago, and not improving very much except for certain elements of public health which made it possible for the population to increase much too rapidly.

And then you had an industrialized urbanized educated India with an elite sitting on top. A lot of rather restless factory workers and dispossessed urban people. And it was a totally different society which was rather like American society in that American society was fed and formed by a process of immigration, but from outside. Whereas in India this society is being fed by immigration from within the country. And that picture has stayed with me, and has stood me in good stead since then. And I think that is a structural view of India that makes sense and holds up over the years.

Q: How did the two sorts of official societies get together? I'm talking about the American diplomat, and the Indians. I mean here you have in some ways, as somebody from the outside

described, as two highly vocal groups full of advice for the other. They often got spurious advice, and they're really rather disparate in a way, aren't they?

COON: No. I think what you need to do in dealing with an Indian official is to forget your restraint and let yourself run off at the mouth. They love it. I remember I went to Bhopal, and I was going to see the Secretary of the State Planning Commission. I had set up an appointment with him and I went around to his house and he carefully served me some tea. We sat down and he said, "Now, Mr. Coon, before we start on planning I want to ask you a question. What is the meaning of life?" So I answered that, took me about 15 minutes, then he had about 15 minutes, and we got along fine -- a wonderful time. Since then, since I've been on the Indian desk on several occasions, I've had occasion to argue at great length with my Indian diplomatic friends about various aspects of our policy, and their policy. And I find sitting down and making a very articulate persuasive presentation involving kinds of legalistic arguments, and Brahminical arguments they hadn't thought up before, really appeals to them. And they'll come back and they'll come up with new arguments which their government hasn't sanctioned and you'll have at it. And by the time you get through, you'll go away and you will be in complete agreement as to what good fellows you both are. Even though neither one of you has budged a bit from his government's position. But you will go away with a better feel for what makes the other fellow tick, and that is important.

The Indian diplomat tends to be rather full of rhetoric, and in the last analysis he gets into a discussion like this, and the discussion becomes more important than the substance. It's more important to him to have a good bull session, than it is to score points. Americans who are capable of that kind of verbal effervescence, seem to get along quite well with like-minded Indians. I mean certainly I give myself a credit for a high content of BS, but I'm nothing compared to the great master of all times in that department which was Chester Bowles. And Chet got along fine with the Indians. He got along too well with them.

Q: Well now, let me ask the obvious question; you have the quintessential Vermont Yankee there -- Ellsworth Bunker -- whom I would think would be just the reverse. How did he get along with the Indians.

COON: He got along fine with them, and that's a very good point. I never quite understood it because he was very laconic, very shrewd, tight-lipped but...I guess they valued him because he was effective. The smarter ones knew that he was effective; the same reason they didn't really value Chet, for all they loved him. Because he wasn't effective in Washington, and Ellsworth was.

Q: Maybe an essential point that we're talking about is, how did you in the embassy -- I'm speaking of the embassy as such, and the officers in their field -- feel about dealing with Washington. Because we were at the time when we were almost always at odds with the Indians because the Indians were doing things in the Third World that we felt were wrong and in a way there was almost a sense of betrayal that they weren't on our side, and they were siding up too often with the Soviets. Were we trying to understand what they were doing and trying to pass that on to Washington, or did you feel that we were just reporting on what these beastly Indians were doing?

COON: Well, the area in which I was supposed to report really was way outside the domains that you're talking about. I was supposed to report on whether in fact they were putting in heavy weapons, or having a machinery plant up in such and such a place with Soviet aid, and how it was coming along, and what was the outlook for such and such a dam project. And what were the contours of the second and third five-year plan, what were the dynamics. I mean, what was the process that helped them determine how to allocate their resources. So I was working on that side of things pretty much.

I did mention that I did a report on socialism. I think I got pretty good marks from the embassy for that one. Ellsworth noted, and liked it, and Carol Laise who was then in the Political Section, took particular interest in it. I mean it was the first time she'd noticed me, and then I think it was probably good for my career that she did. But in that I tried to explain socialism in terms of what had happened in the Indian villages. And the equation in the Indian village mind between the village banya, who was the money lender at notorious rates, and capitalism. And what happened in the 19th century was that the banyas took their money from the villages and moved into the cities and established factories. And the villages started getting over populated and as excess population drained off from the villages into the cities they found themselves working in factories for the same banyas at the same extortionate practices. So this business of anti-capitalism had very deep roots.

And when the Americans came in, they came in with a totally different set of business practices, and ethics, but they came into an area, and to a public opinion that had already been pretty deeply polluted by these other events. And they couldn't understand why they weren't making out. There was a lot more to it than that, but essentially I was trying to explain something about India to the U.S. government, and it worked. It was helpful. That despatch has been quoted and was used in various ways.

Q: There was a feeling then that the embassy was playing a role of almost intermediary between these...

COON: Not intermediary, interpreter. There's a difference. Interpreter, yes. Intermediary, no. I don't think, certainly not during Ellsworth's time, that we found ourselves as an embassy in the position of advocacy. I think Ellsworth managed to avoid that. With Chet it was different, of course. Chet was totally an advocate of the Indian position. And as I say, he was less effective and credible in Washington as a result.

Q: Just touching on the Indian arms business. Communist China had attacked India up in the Himalayas, and had defeated them rather soundly and we were organized in an emergency arms aid program to them. Had this helped things with us with the Indians, turned things around at all?

COON: It helped enormously for a little while. But John Kenneth Galbraith made one of the great classical misperceptions of South Asia. I don't suppose you'll get this coming out of him, but certainly it was my perception, from where I sat, and I think a detailed study of his policy messages to Washington would bear out that his basic approach was that, "We have built up capital with the Indians by arming them against China. We have built up capital previously with

the Pakistanis by arming them against Russia. Now is the time for us to cash in our chips, and get a Kashmir settlement that once and for all will get rid of this animus between India and Pakistan." Well, you can see the magnitude of the misconception. The animus not being based solely on Kashmir. Kashmir being as much a symptom as a cause. And the sheer arrogance to think that we had enough chips to effect something this basic. But Kenji for all his brilliance, and he is a brilliant man, and he's a very likeable man. He is a very articulate, and humorous guy. As an individual I find him enchanting. But this was a colossal error on his part. And he has enough of an ego so he would not suffer being told that it was a colossal error. He somehow saw the Kashmir problem as a kind of fiendishly complicated jigsaw puzzle, which only he had the intelligence to solve. So he sat there with maps, and charts, and generals, and statesmen, and so forth, and he snookered the British High Commissioner into joining his camp. And he coozied the Indians and the Paks up to a certain point where Nehru suddenly...Nehru went along with this for quite a while just to keep Kenji happy and to keep the arms coming from America because he needed them badly at that point. But as soon as Nehru saw that Kenji was getting into a position where he could do something affecting Indian interests, basic interests, as India perceived them, Nehru wasn't there anymore. He pulled the rug out from under leaving Kenji spinning. And the dispute simmers on. The goodwill that we gained from arming India was very rapidly dissipated.

The other thing Kenji did, he did manage to ram this through to a successful conclusion, an air defense agreement between India and the United States where we could come to India's defense. It was almost but not quite a treaty alliance, or a security treaty alliance relationship. It wasn't quite that because the Indians, even in their moment of maximum desperation, were not about to sign up as military allies of the United States. But it was a lot closer than they were comfortable with but Ken managed to get them to sign that. That was '73, I think. In '76 was it, it was not very much later after Tabriz when I was back on the India desk...it was only a couple of years later, after the air defense agreement had been signed, that I accompanied some National War College group to talk to some high Indian brass...

Q: You talking about '66? I have you on the Indian desk from '65 to '68.

COON: The air defense agreement was before I went to Tabriz. That was '63, and when I came back I was on the India desk, '65-'66. It was in that period. I'm sorry. I'm mixing my '60s and my '70s up. I had this occasion, in a couple of years it was as though the air defense agreement didn't exist. No, it was later than that, it was in '68. I was a student at the National War College. They had a top Indian general who was there talking to the National War College and the students gave all the pre-programmed questions. Then I asked him about the air defense agreement. He was totally startled, totally lost his composure, and he pretended he couldn't remember it. It became a dead letter, in other words, almost while the ink was still wet.

So those were Kenji's two achievements, and the way he blew the credit we got. It was by an unsuccessful attempt to ram a Kashmir solution down the throats of the unwilling Indians and Pakistanis, and through the conclusion of an air defense agreement that was dead the moment it was signed.

Q: Looking chronologically you went to Tabriz as principal officer.

COON: Yes. I had about seven or eight, nine very vigorous months working on this arms business for India, and then I went to Tabriz.

Q: On the Indian Affairs, did you find...just to give somebody whose coming from outside a feel between the two desks. You're saying Pakistan, Afghanistan on one side, and then there was another. You were in charge of the Indian, Nepal, and Ceylon side. How did the two organizations work together? I mean, were there problems tending to...

COON: Bruce and I always got along fine. We didn't have any problems -- occasional problems with Sid on something or other, but that was not Indo-Pak, it was econ-political. We didn't have anything serious there either. No, the office as a whole presided over this situation. And then the office was subsequently broken up by the Country Directorates System into basically a Pakistan Country Director, and an Indian Country Directorate. And everybody agreed that this might be a good idea in West Africa or someplace, but a lousy idea in South Asia because it meant that inevitably advocacy penetrated a level higher in the Department. And it did tend to work that way.

Q: Were there any major problems at this particular period?

COON: We had the perennial problem of arms aid to Pakistan. I think Chet Bowles was there, yes, during this period of '65-'66-'67. I think that was Chet's second incarnation there, and he was, of course, constantly trying to remind Dean Rusk about India being the world's largest democracy, and our stake in India, and what were we prejudicing it all for, for this army of Pakistan.

Q: What was the rationale, and how much did those of you who were looking after the political side, subscribe to our strong military support of Pakistan which obviously was souring relations with India?

COON: I never got too worked up over it. I argued rather vigorously with my Indian friends that they should understand this, and that they should swallow it, and that they were much bigger than Pakistan, and much stronger, and that this wasn't going to hurt them. They argued that it was hurting them, and that Pakistan was the enemy, and I just didn't understand the ancestral antipathies. Whereupon I would explain that I did understand them and give my interpretation of them, and we get off into that. And then we'd end up good friends but not changing.

Q: What was our rationale, and how well founded was it, of putting so much arms into Pakistan?

COON: I think our Pakistan policy has always been one of the more complex national, bilateral policies, that we've had in the Department. Pakistan has so many facets, and so many different ways it impinges on U.S. interests that balancing them out has always been a very, very tough thing. And, of course, early on, in the '50s our rationale was the Cold War rationale. Here we saw Pakistan standing stalwartly facing the Soviet threat, and pretty much blind to the fact that Pakistan was stalwartly facing mostly the Indian threat as they saw it. Later on the thing got complicated as nuclear proliferation became an issue. And I did have a considerable role to play in the late '60s, the period we're talking about, as sort of the Indian nuclear guru and I got to

know a whole lot of people who were in the non-proliferation business, and helped advise them on how to keep the Indians from developing the bomb. And our policy worked during the '60s. It wasn't until a little later that Indians went and got the bomb. But that's another story.

Q: *We do keep hopping around...*

COON: That's my fault.

Q: *No, no. It's mine. I would like to dwell on this but I know there's a time constraint here.*

COON: My only constraint is I've got a house guest arriving about 11:00. Other than that my time is yours.

Q: *We'll move to...you were in the War College. Let's talk just a little about the nuclear side. Did we feel in India that they were on brink...what could you, at the desk level, do to stop nuclear proliferation?*

COON: The first thing, and the most important thing I could do was, stop the U.S. government from threatening the Indians with retaliation of various sorts if they did go ahead with the bomb. Because they would have gone right ahead just to show that they weren't subject to U.S. blackmail. The second thing I encouraged, I wasn't exclusively responsible for this: I encouraged a meeting of peer groups on both sides -- scientists, economists, strategic thinkers, and so forth. They organized a series of basically non-government think tanks. I think the first took place in Poona around '68, in which eminent American scholars got together with their Indian opposite numbers and discussed the pros and cons of Indian nuclear weapons programming from India's point of view as they saw it. The Indians respected this kind of thing, being consulted as equals and having their two-bits in. And they were equals. I mean, hell, they could argue with us 'til the cows came home.

This negative approach of not threatening them, this positive approach of intellectual discourse outside the strict inter-governmental framework, I think was reasonably effective. The Indians themselves were very divided as to whether to go ahead with the weapons program or not. And a negative approach did not strengthen the proponents, while the positive approach did strengthen the other.

Q: *Who were on the negative side within the Department, or within the government?*

COON: Do you mean the Indian Government?

Q: *No, our government, on the negative side of trying to use the threatening position?*

COON: I think it was tending to be a kind of visceral reaction of some of the "hard nosed" managers of foreign policy up at high levels -- "God damn, if the Indians are going to do this, they ought to know that such and such..." But it really wasn't a big enough issue to command their undivided attention, as they were always busy doing something that was capturing

headlines, and this was not capturing headlines. I can't give you an office by office rundown on this, but ACDA was always off in left field someplace.

Q: *That's the arms control...*

COON: They required more educating than most, and SP was pretty good at that point.

Q: *SP being?*

COON: Policy Planning. I think it was Ray Garthoff or somebody was up there at that time. And there were various other power centers that were concerned with this around the Defense Department, the NSC, and various parts of the Department. I dealt with all of them, and then they would deal with each other without me on other things, and then with me on the Indian nuclear thing. On the Indian nuclear thing I packed a good bit of clout because I was the only one that knew the subject at hand.

EUGENE ROSENFELD
Information Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1956-1960)

Eugene Rosenfeld began his government service in the Census Bureau. When the 1940 Census was over, his background in journalism led to a position in the Office of Emergency Management (later called OWI). Mr. Rosenfeld's career included positions in India, the United Kingdom, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. This interview was conducted by Jack O'Brien on November 28, 1989.

ROSENFELD: I was offered the job of Chief Information Officer in India -- New Delhi -- I was delighted and so was Chris.

By this time we had four children which I think caused some people to say, "Hey, you can't take four kids to India at this stage of the game." We said, "Well, we will worry about that. We think we can do it," and we did.

We went off in, I guess it was, April of 1956. We arrived in New Delhi. It was 118 degrees at the airport. Every one of us was sick except me. Fortunately, Abe Rosenthal, the NY Times correspondent, who was an old friend from U.N. days, and his wife Ann, were at the airport to meet us -- we had told them we were coming.

They had provided an ayah and a bearer and a car, so we all -- there was somebody from USIS there with me -- went off to a hotel that was less than acceptable. I will not give the name of the administrative officer who did this. When I complained about the cramped, non-air-conditioned quarters, he replied, "Well, I was just trying to save you some money." He really meant his budget, because temporary housing could have provided for far better accommodations for a good period. At that time, in our condition, we were not interested in saving money. As a matter

of fact, after about a week of it I was ready to pay our own way back. We were so sort of depressed and scrunched, but this is something for everybody to remember. Coming into a tough assignment -- and I do not know if they are still as tough as that, maybe they are -- you have got to stick it out, because this is the discipline of the Foreign Service, even having to attend or give a reception when it is 98 and you have got to stand up there for two hours shaking hands with people you do not know and you probably will never meet again. That is important to do. It is a discipline that helps keep you straight.

Anyway, the Indian assignment began to shape up pretty quickly. I was supposed to replace Bill King, who was the Chief Information Officer, and there was about a two-week overlap, of which Bill graciously gave me fifteen minutes to tell me what to worry about. He didn't really tell me even that. He just told me what a lousy place it was and what I ought to watch out for, but not anything to do with the job.

It was not a very -- it did not look to me like a very happy post, although the PAO was a very good guy but he had his own approach to things, which was very relaxed and not really very directional in terms of the people who were working for him -- but a lovely guy, anyway. I guess I learned something from him, which is: be relaxed.

After three months I went to him and I said, "Tom, for God's sake, what am I supposed to do here? I am under three feet of water and I do not know where to go. I have eight Americans responsible to me. I have a budget of about \$10 million and five hundred Indian employees scattered all over the place. I don't know what the hell is going on."

He said, "You are doing terrific, Gene. Hang in there."

I said, "Come on, Tom, tell me, where am I going wrong?"

He said, "Oh, no, that's okay. You're doing okay."

As I said, a lovely guy, but no help at all. PAO's have to lead. The deputy -- he may have read a newspaper at one time but he didn't really know very much about information at all. Decades before, a missionary social worker in Bombay where his main job was to try to convert the prostitutes into the straight and narrow, but he was a decent guy who eschewed all forms of liquor, so when he had a representation thing he would provide rather weak orange juice. People who were there at that time will know who I am talking about.

It should be something that we should remember, that the Agency should remember, in sending somebody out. I don't suppose it is a problem anymore, but this business of overlap should be taken seriously. If somebody is going out to a new post, especially a young or uninitiated officer, he ought to have sufficient time with the incumbent and that the incumbent ought to be under strict orders, no matter how difficult, how much he wants to get out of there and how difficult it is to get things packed and all the rest of it, that he must have to devote a significant amount of his overlap time to getting his successor on track.

One of the things I discovered pretty quickly in India was that the political office and the embassy were absolutely stupid when it came to dealing with the press. Abe Rosenthal and Jimmy Greenfield, who was there for Time, took me aside pretty quickly and said, "You had better do something about these guys. They haven't got a clue. They don't know what is going on. If they do, they are not going to tell us anything. We simply cannot have any kind of feeling for what they are trying to do if they treat us like we are a bunch of spies."

So I felt that this was very, very important to do and I began to try to educate political officers. Maybe this is something that still needs to be done. I have a feeling that political officers are a little bit more sophisticated about this now, don't you, Jack?

Q: *Yes, yes, indeed.*

ROSENFELD: At that time after setting up an interview, you would bring a newspaper man in and the officer would be sitting at his desk reading a telegram, and as soon as we walk in he takes the telegram and puts it in a drawer, turning it over, hiding it from sight, which is not exactly a good psychological beginning for a discussion on important political matters.

John Sherman Cooper was ambassador when I arrived, but he was not in India at that time except for about three days to say goodbye. He was back in Kentucky running for the Senate.

There was a career officer in charge who really did not have any feeling at all for press relations even though he had to run this embassy at a difficult time. We were in bad shape there because of the Dulles arms-aid-to-Pakistan policy, so we were on a rocky road.

Ellsworth Bunker came in early 1957 and was very forthcoming with me. He asked me what I wanted him to do and I told him. I said, "I think you ought to get together with the American press at least once a week and once a month with the Indian press. You can have it off-the-record if you want, but you should have it a very outgoing relaxed thing, because, frankly, you are going to learn more from them than they are from you. You are going to be able to ask them questions about what's going on because they are out on the street, they are talking to people, they are talking to cabinet ministers, they are traveling up and down the country and they are going to give you a lot more information than you may be from your own political officers in certain areas. I am not running down the political office, I am just saying this is an additional dimension for you to get."

He agreed, said it was a good idea. So we established what became an institution. Every Wednesday the guys came in. Now, this turned out to be very good except one time.

This is one of those stories you can either use or throw away. It is a story that I remember because it was important to me. It was -- let's see, in the U.S., 1958 was an off-year so the newsmen wanted to get the ambassador's feeling on the congressional race.

They asked, "How do you think it is going to go? Do you think the Democrats are going to get a majority or the Republicans, or whatever?" He said, "I don't know. I can't really tell. All I know is that I try to keep my host country informed of as much as I know."

He continued, "I remember when I was ambassador to Italy and Mr. De Gasperi, the prime minister, called me in and wanted to know what was going to happen at the time of the 1952 election. This was when Taft and Eisenhower were competing for the Republican nomination. "He knew that Eisenhower was pro-Europe and Taft had been making a lot of strong statements about cutting off aid. So De Gasperi asked me, 'What is going to happen?'"

Bunker continued, "I just told him, don't worry about it. No matter who wins, the policy has been set. Aid to Europe, especially to Italy, will continue because of the political factors that exist in the United States today."

Then he said, "Fortunately my bluff wasn't called. Eisenhower was elected."

Everybody thought that was a good story and that was it.

Next week one of the guys who had been out of town asked: "Mr. Ambassador, what do you think is going to happen in this upcoming election?" Bunker went through the same story again with the same group of guys.

The following week, believe it or not, the same thing happened and he told the same story again. So the DCM looked at me and I looked at the DCM and he said, "You are going have to try to tell him, Gene." I said, "No, I'm not. You're his number two. You are going to have to tell him that he just can't tell that story anymore."

The following week he told it again! When I got back to my office there was a call for me from Pat Killen of the United Press. Pat said, "Gene, what was that wop's name?" I said, "Pat, go bleep yourself." That was the response of a tactful, diplomatic Foreign Service Information officer!

Anyway, that was funny. What was not so funny was Arthur Goodfriend. You may remember Arthur Goodfriend.

Q: *Very well, yes.*

ROSENFELD: Arthur Goodfriend was a total disaster. He thought he was going to save the world and damned near destroyed us in the process.

By then Ken Bunce was PAO. A finer guy and a more devoted and conscientious one never lived. He really worked hard and he knew what he was doing. He had been a history professor and when he had a USIS-India staff meeting he would take his watch out and put it on the table and he would proceed to talk for 55 minutes, at the end of which he would say, "Any questions?"

All of us knew Ken and all of us loved him because he was such a decent guy. Then, here comes Arthur Goodfriend with his absolute knowledge that what he was going to tell was gospel, was the truth, was the necessity for this post to follow, that it was important for us to reach the masses.

Now, in India at that time, the "masses" only ran somewhere about 450 million to 500 million people. We figured that we were going to have a hell of a lot of problems just reaching the "elite", because we figured they amounted to four or five million.

Dr. Goodfriend was absolutely certain that he was going to turn everything around, make America the beautiful and beloved to the Indian masses. Of course, he was full of crap and created an enormous amount of tension in the sense that he was seeking to subvert people away from the program that we had conscientiously, devotedly -- midnight oil -- organized so that we all understood what our function was. Goodfriend wanted to throw all this out and concentrate on "reaching the masses."

Anyhow, another thing that bothered me was my concern at CIA involvement with certain newspapers -- bribes, peddling highly tendentious material, buying off newspapers -- of course, without telling us anything about it. I mean, somebody in the USIS Delhi office would come up and say, "Hey, look at this story (in the Umbala Gazette or wherever), did you ever see this?" I looked at it and said no, I didn't think that was one of ours -- a pretty good story, though, very anticommunist. But I suspected something unorthodox was going on. And I began to resent it.

I was in a quandary, I could go to the station chief and say, "Hey, why don't you stop this stuff? It is not doing you any good. All it is is creating problems for us and it just makes it obvious." For one thing there was this venal but communist-leaning tabloid down at Bombay, a scandal sheet called Blitz that was throwing everything back at us, including Soviet disinformation, forgeries. But we were under orders; you don't talk to the CIA and you don't deal with the CIA.

I discovered later that that is a lot of nonsense, but those were my orders at the time. This is something -- I don't know what is happening now in the Agency. Jack, do you have any inside information as to whether the CIA has placed people with USIS?

Q: I am not uptight with that, Gene, but certainly during my assignments overseas I felt complete freedom and liberty to discuss anything with any of the station chiefs that I have known.

If I did have instructions on that matter I ignored them, frankly, because it was simply impossible to do business without exchanging notes from time to time, at least.

ROSENFELD: That is not what I mean. I completely agree with that. If you came up against a situation where you think a CIA officer or station chief can give you some lead-ins on what is going on, so that you can do your job better, I see that as okay, but I remember there were specific caveats, don't let the CIA try to get you to do something for them. That was something that we had to be very careful about.

On the other hand, I always felt that the less we had to do with the CIA the better. I mean, if we wanted to keep our virginity at least. Maybe I am wrong. Maybe I was being too naive about these things.

Q: A basic rule -- which I think might apply in the future as it has in my case in the past -- is that it is not, repeat not, necessary for the PAO to know everything that the other side is doing, the other side of the embassy. It is very good at times to be able to say honestly, "I don't know."

ROSENFELD: I agree. I think that is generally standard practice.

Q: Normal curiosity sometimes leads people to say, "Well, I want to know more about it" even though it does not impinge on his own territory.

ROSENFELD: Impinging on territory is what I am talking about. I think that is dirty pool. I don't think it helps anything. I don't think it won us any points anywhere.

Now, for instance, turning it around a little bit, I got a call from the reception/desk that there was a newspaperman here to see me, and the receptionist said, "He wants to see the head man." I said, "Well, you had better tell him to see -- better check with Ken Bunce."

After a minute or so she called back to say, "Mr. Bunce says since this man is a newspaperman I think you should see him." I said, "Fine, send him in."

It turned out that this young man -- let's call him Ram -- was a reporter with the Communist Party paper and working in the Communist headquarters. He was unhappy because of several things. One of them was that a member of his family had been considered disloyal by the party and had been severely beaten up or even killed, as far as I can remember. To make up for this overdone discipline the party said, "All right, Ram. You have got your younger brother who is out there in one of the provinces. We will send him to school. We will send him to college," which they never did.

The third thing that bothered Ram was that the editor of the paper had an air conditioner in his office, and that was not right for communists. Communists should be "of the people" and should suffer like the people, and he discovered that the editor was making more money than others on the paper, and that wasn't right, because everybody should make only fifty rupees a month, or whatever it was.

So I said, "Look, for one thing, I think it is not very smart of you to come in here, walk in here, because if your party is being rough on you I think you should avoid being seen publicly coming into our office.

"However, let me suggest something. Why don't you come around and have tea with me tonight at my place?" I gave him my address and he came over and he talked and talked in my air-conditioned bedroom, which he didn't seem to mind because after all, we were Americans. The other rooms were not air-conditioned!

He told me several stories about what was going on in the Communist Party headquarters. It sounded legitimate to me; I said, "Well, look, I think that you deserve -- that your brother deserves, to get some attention and go to school. I am going to see what I can do about getting him some help so that maybe you can feel better about that and feel better about us and that we

can be trusted. We do not want anything from you but we think that you are a deserving fellow, so why don't you come around here again tomorrow night?"

The following day I went to the CIA station chief and related the story and suggested that he pick it up from here. I didn't want to have any more to do with this. "This is over to you."

Well, it turned out, as far as I could learn that this guy provided inside information of communist party activities from the headquarters for at least five years. It was a hell of a good walk-in. It was a great catch and I only did what I felt was needed. They did provide the guy's brother with tuition to go to college. I think we made a friend.

Q: *It was a bridge.*

ROSENFELD: This is the old story, evidence of effectiveness. How many Communist Party cards have you torn up today?

Q: *That is right.*

ROSENFELD: You can't prove that. But, it is the kind of thing that could happen in a place like India.

Q: *I am told you had a total of four-and-a-half years in India on that assignment.*

ROSENFELD: Yes.

Q: *Your next job was where?*

ROSENFELD: One more India reminiscence. Ed Murrow came out to India. He was just on his sabbatical, you remember, in 1960. He had had a fight with CBS, with Bill Paley, and he had been in the Middle East and he showed up in India. I heard he was in town. I called him and told him who I was from USIS, and asked, "Is there anything we can do for you?"

This is something I suppose that most people do. If they don't they ought to. This is something that, no matter who comes into town if he is a decent newspaper man he ought to be called up. He shouldn't have to wait to call us. We should have good intelligence, perhaps information from other newsmen or other parts about who is coming in, one way or another and call the guy and let him know. You make a lot of points that way.

Anyway I asked Murrow if I could do anything, he said, "Yes, I want to talk to you." So he came over and he talked to us for about a good hour-and-a-half. Ken Bunce came in and said hello. Ken, being not too much at ease with newsmen, sort of backed off. I think he was working on the budget or something. John Lund was the deputy and he and I talked to Ed.

At his request, we briefed him very fully about what was going on in India. That was a very important job for us.

Then I asked him, "What about U.S. politics? What is going on back there?" He said, "I haven't been back there for months," but he made it clear he was a Stevenson man.

I said, "Well, what about this guy Kennedy? He seems to be moving up pretty fast." He said, "Well, I'll tell you; last summer he called me up and wanted to talk to me, so I went up to Hyannis and we sat out in the back yard and killed a bottle -- " mostly it was Ed killing the bottle, I think, but Jack didn't mind having a drink or two.

He said, "I came away from there still -- admittedly -- I still think Adlai would be better, but I came away from there not really liking this guy because he seemed to be so sure of himself. He seemed to think that there wasn't anything he couldn't handle and there was nothing that he didn't have an answer for. So I am still hoping that Adlai will get the nod."

CAROL CLENDENING LAISE
Political Officer
New Delhi (1956-1961)

Carol Clendening Laise was born in Virginia in 1917. She received a bachelor's degree from American University in 1938. She worked for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. Her career included positions in India and Nepal. Ms. Laise was interviewed on April 17, 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

LAISE: I transferred into the Foreign Service in 1955 and in 1956 I went to Delhi.

Q: *How did this assignment come about?*

LAISE: In large part because of my interest in going to Asia and, quite frankly, having had considerable experience negotiating with other nationals in the United Nations and in UNESCO, I was conscious of where a woman could be effective and where she couldn't. India seemed to me to be a place that, first of all, I was interested in and, secondly, I had very satisfactory dealings with the Indian delegates in all the organizations. They had the background of British administrative experience and so it was easy. Their concepts were not strange and it was easy to negotiate with them.

Q: *In my small dealings with Indians -- I've never served there -- I've found them absolutely maddening when you try to pin them down on certain points. They probably felt the same towards me.*

LAISE: I must tell you another factor which was that the UNESCO conference was convening in Delhi in 1956 and the Department was persuaded that it made sense that I should go out for that and then stay on.

Q: In 1956 how did you see American interests in India at the time? What were our concerns there?

LAISE: I arrived during the period of the Eisenhower Administration and, obviously John Foster Dulles didn't have much use for neutrals. I think things were changing, attitudes were changing in Washington, about the time that I went out. There was a very great interest in the United States in seeing a democratic country with the potential that India had succeed in its efforts and development along democratic lines as a model, in contrast to the communist Chinese.

Q: Were the embassies briefed to bring these neutral Indians to realize the value of joining the United States in an anti-Communist front?

LAISE: No, I'm saying that period had seemed to me to have passed because with the leadership of ambassadors such as Ambassador Cooper and Ambassador Bunker and the evolution of perception of our interest, there was greater willingness to accept the fact that a non-aligned country wasn't necessarily against us and surely it was far less costly than being aligned with it.

Q: You were there from 1956 to 1961 and you went to the political section. What were your responsibilities in the political section?

LAISE: Initially, it was for reporting on internal political developments which, of course, was very interesting. I used to attend the Congress Party sessions.

Q: This is the Indian Congress Party.

LAISE: Yes. I would follow the domestic political scene mainly because the question existed then, as it still does, as to whether or not India would be able to survive as a united country and was it politically and economically viable. There was a great interest back here in Washington in knowing how they dealt with internal conflicts and what the emerging problems were that would lead to what the Indians called the vociferous tendencies to overwhelm the stability of the Indian state.

Q: These interviews are designed for people who are interested in American foreign affairs but perhaps don't know too much about how we operate. Here you are, a political officer in a tumultuous democracy, a huge country. How did you operate?

LAISE: Basically, I developed relationships and attended open party meetings to maintain an insight into where the balance of power was, what the underlying issues were, and how serious the language problem was. After all, they had parliament there and so one cultivated relationships with members of parliament to get their insight into how all these problems were being dealt with. We in the Embassy attended national events which would give us further insights such as at the Congress Party meetings. I knew officials of the Congress Party fairly well, but since we had consulates with political officers in other parts of India, we didn't try to follow the details in Bombay or Madras or Calcutta because our consulates followed that. Essentially,

we factored those perceptions into a national perception reports that we did regularly, and particularly at the time approaching elections.

Q: When you say "cultivate," how does one cultivate a relationship of this nature?

LAISE: Indians are very open and willing to talk. The best and most useful of doing it is to go and call on them or invite them around to your house for tea or coffee. That's a much more popular way of social interaction, at least among the Indians I'm talking about where you are basically dealing with members of parliament, than with what we usually think of in terms of evening social occasions. Also, India had a very extensive press. The Indian journalists were extremely informative. I remember the ambassador used to hold periodic and regular informal press conferences with the Indian press just to keep them informed of the U. S. policies and to explain to them questions they had so that before issues grew up between us, they the background. I always attended those. Because India is an open country and a democracy, between the press, the members of parliament, and then traveling in the consular district which Delhi covered -- the state government that I was most familiar with was the Punjab which now, as you know, is the source of great problems in India.

Q: There is a separatist Sikh movement going on there.

LAISE: At that time, while the Sikh were very prominent in local politics, they had not split off from the center.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Krishna Menon who was the stormy petrel of Indian politics who drove various administrations up the wall? At one point, he was Minister of Defense.

LAISE: Yes, he was. I did, indeed, know Krishna Menon mainly because I knew him here at the U. N. before I went to India. His attitude was extremely interesting. When I first met him in India, he asked me whether I was a political appointee or a career Foreign Service officer. I said that I was a career Foreign Service officer, after which he had nothing to do with me. [Laughter] He thought we were useless, that the bureaucrats were not ones that he could successfully exercise his charms on. He just didn't think much of professionals.

Q: Were there any other figures who were prominent at the time that you dealt with particularly?

LAISE: I knew Mrs. Gandhi. At that point when I was there she was simply the daughter of the prime minister. I got to know some of the old Congress Party leaders who had helped in the independence movement. [One of them] was also a member of parliament and was a neighbor of mine [and his name was] Acharya Kripalani. He appears in the film on Gandhi. He was a prominent Gandhi-ite.

A member of the opposition I knew quite well was Minoo Masani. After I came back to the Division of South Asian Affairs, I arranged trips for both leaders and delegations of the parliament and grew to know them.

I guess the person I knew best was the president of India because I had known him in UNESCO.

Q: How did some of these figures feel about the United States? What was their attitude? It had moved away from a confrontational policy but it was not a very close relationship.

LAISE: It's been a prickly relationship all along, perhaps because we have a lot of things in common. [Laughter] It's not easy for two democracies, two large one, to get along with each other very well. Both of us are sensitive to criticism and that makes it difficult. Basically, I felt that Indians have always had a friendly feeling about the United States, but we have gone on several swings of the pendulum. During the period of the Chinese attack on the Indians in 1962 at the same time as the Cuban missile crisis, I was recalled by Galbraith to India to help out because I did know so many prominent Indians and the embassy had just turned over. He needed as many people to establish contact as he could. The present name of the president of India is Radhakrishnan, and Radhakrishnan was one. He was president at that time. General Thimayya was one of the chiefs of the Army staff that I knew quite well. I had many contacts that he needed at that point, so I went back. The interesting thing was that the Indians then were saying, "Oh, for John Foster Dulles," because here they were under attack by a communist --

Q: This was the border war where the Chinese had taken quite a bit of territory and the Indians had not fared very well.

LAISE: They didn't take a lot of territory. They invaded, but much to the astonishment of the Indians and not to the astonishment of our Chinese analysts -- when I arrived in November of 1962, the Indians were certain they were coming down to Calcutta. They were in a panic, but instead, the Chinese having made their point, withdrew beyond the McMahon [Phonetic] line. They didn't take any territory, but at that point India was wanting the United States to be so anti-Communist that we would pour a lot of military equipment in to India. We were much more measured in our response, (a) because our estimate of the Chinese threat was different from theirs, and (b) because of the effect in Pakistan. At that point the United States was responsive, and Kennedy was seen as very sympathetic to the Indian cause.

Then things went backward again during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. I was in Nepal at the time, but the Indians have never forgiven us for sending the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" into the Bay of Bengal. The Indian ambassador in Kathmandu, who again was a very old friend, a very distinguished Indian, said he never, in his wildest dreams, thought the United States would threaten India, and this would never be forgotten.

Q: Going back to the time that you were in India, 1956 to 1961, how was the embassy viewing Pakistan?

LAISE: That was a period in our relationship where our embassies in Pakistan and India were working in team work. It was also a period when the relationships between India and Pakistan were not so strained. You see, the Chinese first moved into Indian-claimed territory in the west, not the east, in 1962, but the disputed territory in the northwest area of India, the Chinese had moved in. When the Indians discovered it -- this was in 1959 -- Krishna Menon came immediately to Ellsworth as ambassador and made an urgent request for airplanes to get supplies up to the area to get them better prepared and to establish a presence there to reinforce their

claims, because they didn't know what the Chinese were going to do. The United States did respond with planes very quickly. This was a period of our relationship with India.

Also it was a harmonious one in our handling of the Tibetan refugees. You see, 1959 was also the time that the Dalai Lama came across and the Tibetan refugees began to come in large numbers. The Indians initially were very leery of our helping because they were afraid we would turn it into an anti-Communist exercise, beat the drums, etc. They obviously wanted to assist the refugees and keep native Tibetans friendly to the south rather than to the Chinese. We had a common goal, but they simply didn't want to beat the drums on the whole matter. At that time they did not know whether they could ever bring the Chinese around to reconciliation on the border issue.

During that period of time we did assist a great deal in Tibetan relief, but we did it very quietly through private organizations and did it in a way that the Indians appreciated. It didn't appear as though we were trying to over-trump them. So our relationship in that period of time with managing third-country problems, i.e., Tibet and Pakistan, I think was a reasonably harmonious one.

Q: The ambassador during that time was Ellsworth Bunker most of the time you were there. Aside from the fact that he later became your husband and looking at it as a Foreign Service officer, how did he operate? Each ambassador operates quite differently, and Ellsworth Bunker is one of the major figures in American diplomacy.

LAISE: As in all of his diplomatic assignments, his hallmark was to take his time, set his own pace, and develop the trust and confidence with the leadership throughout India, because he traveled quite a lot. He was there four years. He had the reputation of being absolutely clear and honest in reporting his government's views and not softening them to what the government might like to hear. Equally, he was considered sympathetic to the Indian situation and that, therefore, they could count on him to report back to this government accurately as well. His method was one of interest of building everything, as one Indian said to me, "a person without sides," so that they knew that he wasn't saying one thing to one individual and another thing to another individual, one thing to their government and another thing to our own government. They knew that he was dependable in representing them to the United States and the United States to them. He didn't have to prove himself.

Q: I always think of Ambassador Bunker, for whom I worked at one time when I was in Saigon where he was ambassador, as being someone who takes his time but is very solid, a good Vermonter. I think of the Indians as being rather volatile, of being more emotional and moving back and forth. Wasn't this a play in contrast, or was it, that in actually with the Indians on a diplomatic basis, a much more solid way?

LAISE: Let's not forget that the Indians, particularly in government and with whom he was dealing, were very much influenced by their experience with the British and their education with the British. Most of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers and some of the politicians and Nehru himself had been educated in England. There was a tendency to see America through English eyes which meant we were that loud and noisy but charming -- there was a bit of a feeling of

looking down their noses. They respected the British aristocracy and the British reserve. Another aspect of that respect was a lot of tolerance on the part of the British of this volatility you mentioned and of the criticisms. After all, anybody who is brought up and served in the Oxford Union or the London School of Economics, enjoys the exchange and criticism and sharpness of the dialectical process. So they developed this with the British and the British are very tolerant of it but we aren't. [Laughter] Ellsworth is, so he was basically seen as one of America's aristocrats who could see all these things in perspective and was tolerant of their idiosyncrasies and mistakes, and he didn't hold it against them. He did just fine, the noblesse of British worked very well. [Laughter]

This is an additional interview of Carol Laise by Ann Miller Morin conducted in 1985.

Q: You already knew Indian people from your other situations?

LAISE: From being colleagues on the U.N. delegations, not only in the educational field, but in the political field and the journalistic field.

Q: Would you like to tell us something about the scope of your duties as a political officer at a large embassy?

LAISE: I was there for four years. The first two years were primarily on covering internal matters in India. This was a good way of getting to understand India. Now by this I mean the political section usually, in a large embassy, has somebody trying to understand domestic developments and the effect of international relationships on their policies and their stability and their evolution as a country. Since India was relatively [new], well, the year I got there it was just barely ten years old, it was still evolving its many institutions and political systems. So that essentially I was in the position when I first went -- working with Douglas Heck, for example, who was a very good mentor in education -- to follow the fortunes of the Congress Party and then the evolution of the parliamentary system. Now of course, this meant attending party conventions to understand the programs and the point of view of the ruling party in matters that affect [them]. So we attended Congress Party sessions. This meant getting to know all the members of Parliament and Indian leadership, seeing them in their own environment, trying to understand the dynamics of their political system, and reporting it.

Then the last two years, I guess, that I was there, I focused more on the international matters, in which India and the U.S. were in communication. That involved more representation for the government in Delhi and less travel into the countryside. To understand the Indian dealings, political systems and the policies that evolved from it and what its elections meant, we used to follow their elections as well. It was in that context that I got to know Mrs. Gandhi, of course.

But then later on, I moved into handling some of the international issues of India and the West, the most notable one being the driving of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, and all the Tibetan refugees with which the United States played a considerable role. (Initially, of course, India was

leery of United States involvement with the Tibetan refugees, because this was politically such a hot subject for them in their relations with China. I must say that the United States handled it very subtly and understood their position, and essentially what was created were nongovernmental channels through which assistance to refugees could be funneled. I think the Indians came to trust us in that regard.) Then, of course, with the increasing Chinese pressure on the northern borders of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Ladakh, it meant the Indians were requesting military assistance. This led to the Chinese attack in 1962 in Bhutan, when we actually sent a military mission out there to help them.

Q: I see that you got the Commendatory Service Award in 1960. What specifically was that given to you for?

LAISE: (Pause) You know, I don't remember. (Laughter) But I suppose . . . (Q: Reporting, perhaps?) No, I suspect that it had to do with a combination, perhaps. President Eisenhower's visit to India in 1959 was the first visit of any president of the United States to India, so therefore, it was very, very important.

The male members of the embassy were so involved in planning the visit in absolute detail, serving as control officers and so on, that I was the only one left in the embassy who was worried about what they were going to talk about, namely the issues. So I think it may well have been for my role in helping to shape policy with regard to the Tibetan refugees, with reporting on the meaning of the Chinese activities on the border and its implications for India and the United States which culminated in the president's visit in 1959, and my role in the presidential visit. I guess that must have been it.

Q: How many people were in the political section in New Delhi at that time? Was it a large section?

LAISE: Well, let's see. (Long pause) I don't know what you'd consider large, really. I suspect that there were three first secretaries and probably two seconds.

Q: So you were at what level? You were a first secretary but you were number two?

LAISE: The political section was split between those following the domestic involvements and those following the international. It wasn't in any sense hierarchical.

Q: I was thinking specifically of efficiency reports. Did you have to write efficiency reports for the more junior members?

LAISE: I was always with my political counselor and he wrote all the efficiency reports.

Q: Did you feel any bias from your men colleagues or were you just "one of the boys?"

LAISE: I don't put it that way. (Chuckles) No, as I say, I think I was extremely fortunate in that I was given every encouragement. The minister at that time was Win Brown and the counselor was Edward P. Maffitt. My colleagues were all extremely helpful and they shared alike. The only

problem that I ran into in India was, (and it wasn't a problem, it was just a nuisance) given the tendency in political circles to somehow assume that women in political sections were spies, I had sometimes hit the Communist press, or the Communist-supported press, as being Mata Hari in the U.S. embassy at Delhi.

Q: Oh, for heaven's sake!

LAISE: And it still goes on.

Q: Does it really?

LAISE: It comes back again and again. In fact, whenever there is a big CIA plot, they go back to their files -- it totally comes from the left -- they dig up stuff that then gets repeated and repeated and repeated. One certainly gets the notion of the lie, and it's now been built up that somehow or another, because of my activities in financing the election of one of Mrs. Gandhi's opponents, who was variously ascribed to different provinces, I was thrown out of India!

Well, the first really major story on this erupted after I had left India. I remember coming back from a trip on a senior seminar, and going to a party at the Indian Embassy, and the ambassador who was a very good friend of one of the Nehru family, sort of gleefully holding up his story from the *Blitz* about my being the Mata Hari of the Indian Embassy. They changed the spelling of the name, but it was very clear who they were talking about. As far as I recall, from the way that the Indian press sort of dug it out, a European woman, (and they include us in that category) was seen to be campaigning for Ashok Mehta who was a member of the opposition in the state of the UP [Uttar Pradesh]. Then they go through the list of the embassies to see where there is a woman and find that on an old embassy list my name was on the list as first secretary, political. So they then produced that as the story.

Galbraith at the time was ambassador, and raised the question with the editor of the newspaper about this. He said, "Well, why didn't he check his facts?" There was no truth in it. I wasn't even in the country. He shrugged his shoulder, and said, "Well, you know, it makes it less interesting," and dismissed it. Then an opposition newspaper dug out the story of what really happened. A member of the same party as this gentleman in the opposition, an Indian, of course, was married to an Austrian, and they were campaigning for him. She was the one who started this in the first place. But then it didn't die there. No, it was raised then as a question in parliament and Mr. Nehru responded and dismissed the whole thing, and said, "What an irresponsible paper this was anyway." And that ended that, but you see, that ended it as far as the substance was concerned, but then the custom is for it to repeat itself in various versions until it just becomes a legend. So it still gets regurgitated. I got a copy of it from someplace, somebody in India, only within the last year.

Q: Really, twenty-five years later!

LAISE: Yes, isn't it amazing!

Q: Ridiculous, yes, terrible. It's been suggested that FSOs have to function in two different ways, one way in the States and one way overseas. Overseas, you're doing the reporting and so forth, but you're not responsible for policy, which is done here. And I have heard it said that often overseas, you have to be more "feminine." That is, the men do too, because they must be conciliatory and so forth, and not make waves.

LAISE: You're not implying that men should be more feminine?

Q: Yes, yes, actually in this context.

LAISE: I don't consider grace as purely a female quality.

Q: I don't either, but is it possible that because women are brought up to be more conciliating, it makes for greater success overseas, and less success back in the Department? Do you think there's any truth to that?

LAISE: (Pause) You know, quite frankly, I don't accept the thesis to begin with, and I certainly don't accept the division of it on a sex line. Nobody, I think, demonstrates it better than my husband. I do not consider that courtesy and the qualities of consideration, that are a part of seeking to reconcile differences, are in any way antithetical to the need to be firm and effective in holding your opinion or advancing your point of view, whether in the bureaucracy at Washington or in foreign cultures.

Q: No, I quite agree. I think I'm giving you the wrong idea. Putting it briefly, I guess, it is, do you have to switch gears when you go overseas, just within yourself, of course? Back here, doesn't one have to be more aggressive to get ahead? Because there is a final arbiter here, and things get bumped upstairs and upstairs and upstairs, until somebody makes a decision. Do you think you function the same way here as you do overseas? A male ambassador brought this up to me, and suggested that I ask it of women to see how they felt, which is why I'm putting it to you. He feels there are two different ways that an FSO functions.

LAISE: I think it is a perfectly natural thing, that when you're functioning in your own culture, the givens are understood and you don't have to explain yourself, you can proceed at a speed without having to worry about perceptions as to how you're viewed. Whereas in a foreign culture, even a culture from a common background such as England, you have to function with some understanding of the norms of that culture. But it isn't a conscious thing. It's no different from what you are in your family and what you are in the broader social world. What I'm trying to say is that they are not ones that are consciously calculating and create strains. No, you're just playing a different tune of the same music, and the same notes are used. Therefore, I think the basic grounding of qualities serves well in both places. It's the notes that you emphasize that are important in terms of success, I'd say.

Q: Would you repeat the remark you made yesterday about a first secretary's job?

LAISE: I guess, as you were leaving, I remarked that I thought it was the best job in the service, because, at least in New Delhi, it was high-enough ranking to be included in interesting social

functions, but not so high that one had to engage in representation for its own sake and go to a lot of social functions that were pro-forma and not very interesting.

Q: (Chuckles) I thought that was good to have for the record. Were there any other women officers at the post when you were there?

LAISE: No, I don't think so, when I was there. There were, during my period of service in South Asia, either in New Delhi or in Washington. When I was in Washington (I was deputy director and director of the Division of South Asian Affairs), there were a number of women, but we did not serve concurrently. One was Jane Coon, who is now an ambassador, and the other was Anita Love, who was an economic officer, but I think she didn't stay in the service.

Q: And naturally you had your own secretary, as you do in all jobs. There was no problem with a woman secretary, was there? She didn't feel that she would rather be working for a man or anything of that sort?

LAISE: You're talking about Delhi? Well, first of all, I didn't have my own secretary. We shared a secretary; I usually did with another officer. I really couldn't tell you. In any case, she was working for a man as well as a woman. I certainly didn't have any sense of a problem.

Q: Could you tell us a little about the role of women in India? That would be in the sixties.

LAISE: Well, of course, the women were encouraged during the independence movement to play a role in the Congress Party. There were many prominent women in the Congress Party. As a consequence, when India achieved its independence, there were women in prominent positions in the Indian government; there were women in their Foreign Service. One of my best friends, Indian friends, was one of the first women, if not the first, in the Indian Foreign Service, but she had to resign, as ours had to do up until the seventies, when she married. That no longer obtains in the Indian Service any more than it does in ours. So Indian women were encouraged to have a professional role, and I had a number of Indian friends who were in journalism and radio and in the foreign service. Education, health and social welfare were the areas that I can think of quickly.

You see, at least in the families in India where they were of the educated elite, shall we say, there was a structure that enabled women to work and at the same time have families, because with the joint family system there was a support system for rearing children that made it easier for women to enter professions than sometimes it was here, where choices had to be made very often on economic grounds because of the inability to afford the kind of help that was necessary here. Whereas in India, at that time, at any rate, both the joint family system and the availability of servants made it possible for children to be properly looked after and reared while the parents were working.

Q: When you say "joint family system," is that a multi-generational family? Exactly what is that?

LAISE: Yes, no, no. It's an extended family system that's characteristic of many of the Eastern cultures, and probably also Latin American, where extended family not only very often lives

together in the same area, but the responsibilities of the young to the old, and vice versa, is very much practiced.

Q: And there is a universal system of education for girls in India?

LAISE: Oh yes, there is.

Q: It's rather strange, isn't it, if you stop to think about it, because it would seem that they have evolved even more than the British women under whom they were for so many years.

LAISE: Well, of course, it's true in Britain today, too. There's universal education and India, after all, achieved independence in '47, and I think the pattern adopted was based on the liberal practices, the progressive practices of the Western democracies. The aim was certainly universal education. That does not mean there is universal education, largely, in many cases, for economic reasons. But there certainly is no sex bar.

Q: No, I just had been under the impression that higher education for women is not the norm in England, whereas it seems to be in India, or is that an erroneous assumption on my part?

LAISE: I am no authority on this subject, but my impression is that higher education is harder to come by in England for men *and* women. A tradition, as in the United States, of swelling ranks of students going to higher education because of a state university system and the community colleges and so on which make it economically possible, just didn't exist in England. So that there's not the same sort of tradition of young people going to college for higher education as there is here. But education in India is very much sought after, because it was viewed as an avenue to better jobs, and education is also highly valued in their value system. The Brahminical tradition puts a high premium on education. Therefore, there is, I think, much more of a move in India of students toward higher education. The universities proliferated, in fact, to such an extent that they were giving in to pressures for admission and very serious questions have arisen about the standards of education in India. But that is a different question.

Q: Are they state supported, these new universities?

LAISE: Yes.

Q: Did you have a very active social life as a first secretary?

LAISE: I don't know quite what you mean.

Q: Visiting Indian families, families of diplomatic peers, that sort of thing. Were there a great many formal dinners and receptions that you had to go to?

LAISE: Let's put it this way: there certainly was the opportunity for it. However, keeping in mind that my first two years in India were in the area of understanding the evolution of Indian democracy and policies, my social life was more related to Indian functions and Indian friends than to the diplomatic community. In fact, there was a very large diplomatic community, and I

elected to give less priority to social life in the diplomatic community and really found my place, in both work and pleasure, in the Indian community.

Q: You have said you traveled a great deal. That must have been very interesting too.

LAISE: I traveled by car and by train.

Q: They have a very good train system, don't they?

LAISE: Wonderful trains. Yes, in fact, that's a good way to see India.

Q: Did you come back to Washington very often while you were there? Just once on home leave?

LAISE: Just, I think, once on home leave. I had promotion board duty in connection with home leave in 1958, I guess it was, so I was home for longer than the usual period of time. But my recollection was that I came home only in connection with home leave and that assignment.

Q: Are there any other recollections you have about your stay in India you'd like to share?

LAISE: (Pause) Reflecting on our conversation yesterday, I think one point perhaps is worth making about the Eisenhower visit. One of my concerns, which I think got reflected in my reporting perhaps contributed to an ultimate outcome that transformed that visit into the kind of long term success that served the U.S. interest. I was very struck during the course of that visit by the fact that, since the president was in his last year in office and it was a Democratic-controlled Congress, when he came, he was not able to offer anything to the Indians of a concrete nature, to undergird his protestations of friendship and concern for India's security.

I might say that the visit came at a psychological moment that transformed it into a great experience. India, adopting a non-aligned policy, was feeling very lonesome at that stage, given the fact of the incursions that the Chinese had made on its borders in the North in 1959 and the driving of the Dalai Lama out of Tibet. That was on the one hand; on the other hand, the familiar support and prop that India had always looked to in Great Britain had become a diminishing value as a result of the decline in British fortunes after World War II and the attempt of Britain and France in regard to the Suez Canal. Both of those factors caused Britain to appear in Indian eyes as less of a bulwark in their calculations, and caused them to turn more attention toward the United States.

Those two factors meant that when the president of the United States paid his first visit to India, the president being such a well-known hero as President Eisenhower, the outpouring of enthusiasm was absolutely overwhelming. It was very difficult for us to get to the airport even to meet him because of the blockage of the road with the crowds and the traffic. And indeed, nobody of importance would have been there on time if he had not been delayed in his arrival by a holdup in Afghanistan. Then he rode in with the prime minister and the president of India to the center of Delhi at Connaught Place. The crowds were just so great that the entourage could not move. Our security people were, of course, wild. Mr. Nehru got out of the car and used his

stick in a good humored way to push the crowd away so the car could get through. I've heard my husband say that the president had never seen anything like it. It was a great experience.

But to continue with the substantive aspects of his visit: During that period of time, I entertained some of our newspaper correspondents who were accompanying the President. They were extremely distressed at the sort of platitudinous nature of his speech to the Parliament, proclaiming friendship for India and understanding of its problems without any follow through in a concrete sense.

Yet on the other hand, the Indians were just overjoyed with this, the approach of the president in proclaiming and saying the things they wanted to hear without coming as "Greeks bearing gifts," because that would have made it very embarrassing, and in their terms, would have detracted from the sentiments expressed. So it was my task and the task of the embassy to convey to Washington and to keep reminding them after the President had left, the fact that while the visit was a wild success and viewed all the way around as outstanding, the sentiments voiced had conveyed to the Indians a pledge of friendship. To them, the terms of friendship meant that one understood enough to follow through with the kind of specific and tangible gestures that would help them over some of their problems. Therefore, there was joy that we did not come as "Greeks bearing gifts," but there was expected return farther down the line.

The message got through, and the result was that six months after the president's visit, the administration and the Congress did approve a four-year PL 480 program for India to enable it to conduct some agricultural reforms that were needed by assuring them a supply of grain for four years. I think it amounted to a shipload of grain a day for four years to keep their stores of grain high enough to enable them to take some stringent measures in agricultural reform. But that was seen as a kind of responsiveness to Indian requirements that a friend could make, the kind of friendship that was pledged by the president.

Q: Yes. That must have had quite an impact all around, I should think.

LAISE: Yes, it was an unforgettable experience for everybody who was there. Now there was another visit, and as long as we're continuing to deal with the substantive problems, I might as well go on with this, and we can turn later to some of the living aspects. The other memorable visit was the visit of Vice-President Johnson in 1961. He had been on a mission at the instance of the president, in Southeast Asia, and on his way back to the United States, he stopped in India. It was a very brief stop, but it was a very memorable stop. I believe it was the stop when in Pakistan he invited the camel driver to visit the United States.

Q: (Chuckles) I remember that, yes.

LAISE: Which had all kinds of repercussions. In the case of India, he visited the Taj Mahal and a village very near Agra. My most vivid recollection was more social than substantive. A reception was given for him at the embassy residence. The ambassador was then Ambassador Galbraith. Since at that stage I was the member of the embassy staff who had been longest in place and knew the most, had the widest acquaintances as a result of my work and travels in India, the ambassador laid on me the responsibility to introduce the vice president to everybody important

in Delhi, because there was not a receiving line. He came late and he came into the garden, and all of the guests were collected in the garden. It was a very difficult job, because the custom, and it seems to be a custom in an occasion like this, that when an important entourage comes into a party, everybody falls away so they're not within reach to introduce. It was a very difficult experience of darting into the crowd and trying to pull people into the circle, to introduce them to Vice President and Mrs. Johnson. But it was, I think, on the whole, a thoroughly satisfactory experience all around, but it was a little nerve-racking at the time.

Q: Oh, I can imagine.

LAISE: About the living arrangements, the whole time I was in Delhi, I lived in a part of one of the lovely old bungalows that the British had built there, in a tree-shaded area of New Delhi not very far from the embassy residence or the embassy. It had a garden. It was divided essentially into three apartments, and initially, I had the smallest apartment.

I remember when the chargé, Fred Bartlett, and his wife came to visit on a social occasion when I was entertaining some Indian friends, he was pretty shocked to see the arrangement. He thought it was not suitable for a first secretary, because you had to walk through the bedroom in order to get into the living room, the way that particular apartment was structured. I think he instituted action to see that I moved to a larger apartment on the front of the house when it became vacant, which was perhaps more appropriate for entertaining. It had the disadvantage of not being on the garden side. However, I did have a patio where I could entertain out-of-doors, as well as in. But it was a modest type of an apartment. I had a cook/bearer, the same one the whole time I was there.

I did do a great deal of informal entertainment, mainly related to bringing Americans, visiting Americans very often, and journalists and academicians, and Indians together to discuss issues and development, economic problems in India, and political trends in India. But usually it was the kind of entertainment related to developing a better understanding of their political institutions, their aspirations and their economic development, in order to be able to make my contribution to reporting to Washington on matters that were of interest to the United States, relating to the kind of policies the United States was following, particularly in the aid field.

Q: What sort of parties did you find were most suited for this?

LAISE: There was a range, depending on the circumstances. The working hours in India, and this is also true in Nepal when I later went there, usually were ten to five with no break for lunch. This tended to mean that coffee hour before work was the time when I would call on members of Parliament or they would drop in on their way to work, and equally tea at the completion of work. It was an appropriate form of entertainment, because as you know, many Indians have different dietary requirements and strictures. And also, it was a basis of meeting which could be mutual. In other words, if I were to go to their places, it would be for tea or coffee, and no obligation was incurred on either side. So a lot of it was that.

For those who functioned in hours that were more along the lines of the West and had a lunch break, which would be a different group of people, and especially visitors who wanted to meet

their counterparts, lunch was a very open way in which to entertain. Dinners usually were informal. Buffet dinners were very much more the custom in India than the sit-down dinners, partly because it was a cooler way of spending those hours. And also because I had a very small dining room, so the parties were never large, and provided an opportunity for a real exchange.

Q: And you had representational allowance, I presume.

LAISE: No, the embassy did. You would put in a claim, and get reimbursed if the number of foreign visitors exceeded the number of Americans present.

Q: You weren't given a set amount then?

LAISE: No.

Q: The embassy owned the apartment, or rented it for you?

LAISE: It owned it.

Q: Did you find any particular problems that were unique to a woman living alone overseas?

LAISE: (Long pause) Well, I really didn't encounter anything special that I can recall, except one thing that I think is not surprising in a traditional society, as India is and was, and where form is quite important. I think one had to be aware of the fact that a woman living alone, and especially a Western woman living alone, had to observe certain proprieties, for there was a very great tendency to assume that the activities going on reinforced their notion of the promiscuity of the Western women.

Q: Yes, yes, you had to be very aware of that.

LAISE: I think one had to be very aware of that because of the patterns and the customs. It meant the importance of great discretion in one's entertaining style and also in one's conduct.

Q: Well, in connection with that, were you supposed to have a host to be your counterpart when you entertained, or was that acceptable that you would be the sole host of the evening?

LAISE: There was no requirement of that. Since at that time innocent Indian women didn't socialize at Western parties as much as perhaps they might today, for whatever reason, there never was any shortage of male guests to fill out a dinner party, let's say.

Q: What about your health while you were in India? Did you experience any particular problems there?

LAISE: No. Of course, I had dysentery; both kinds, bacterial. . . and what is it? Bacterial and amoebic. But, you know, I got over it. It never plagued me very much, and it never plagued me subsequently.

Q: Did you find that. . .or can you make such a judgment, that the women were healthier or less healthy than the men at the post?

LAISE: I don't have any idea about that. I don't have any impression of any great problems in the professional service or in the embassy staff. I don't recall if there was tremendous problem with illness.

Q: How were you treated for your amoebas? Were you treated at the post by the doctor?

LAISE: Yes, yes.

Q: I guess the State Department is quite an expert in amoebas.

LAISE: Yes.

Q: When you traveled, were you alone or did you go with other people? Was it considered proper for you to travel by yourself, or safe, I should say.

LAISE: Well, I never felt unsafe in India. But most of my traveling was with friends. I went on various holidays in the North, in the Himalayan region, with Indian friends, or traveled by train with an Indian friend with whom I was very close. I mentioned her before, she had been in the Indian Foreign Service. She opened up a great deal of understanding of part of India that I normally would not be able to contact because of lack of language. She herself was, in addition to being a career officer, or had been a career officer, also a sociologist and a person of great distinction in her field, and had a great feel for Indian art and Indian philosophy and culture. So I was very privileged to have a friendship with her, and to have been able to see rural India with and through the eyes of someone who related very well to women and who understood their traditions and their values and was able to interpret it in a context for me.

Q: Oh, that must have been a wonderful . . .

LAISE: It was a marvelous experience, yes.

Q: And you went to the Taj Mahal. Is it as lovely as . . .

LAISE: Yes. Beautiful. This Indian friend, I might say, has for several years been at Radcliffe at the Bunting Institute. So they know her very well there. Her name is Rama Mehta.

Q: Like Zubin Mehta? What sort of things did you do for recreation?

LAISE: Golf. That's where I took up golf for the first time, the most beautiful golf course in Delhi. First of all, it's very centrally located, and it's in and around a lot of old mosques. In the early morning the birds would just sing. The sound of the birds and the beauty of the birds is in addition to the golf game, so that just walking was fun, quite apart from the golf. Golf and tennis were the major sports.

Q: Swimming?

LAISE: Not very much, because, well, again, there's the problem with the water. So it didn't make much sense to take all these precautions about water and then go swimming.

Q: You had to boil water? That sort of thing?

LAISE: Yes.

Q: When you did entertain, did you have to outline for the cook what he should do, or was he able to . . .

LAISE: Yes, always. You had to give them the menus, yes.

Q: Did you ever go to the Vale of Kashmir and stay on a houseboat?

LAISE: Yes, I did. That too was beautiful. However, my stay there was very short and quite tragic, because again, I went with this friend that I was mentioning. When we arrived there, we got the news that her father, who happened to be there, and a prominent Indian, had died of a heart attack that morning. And so it basically consisted of dealing with a very sad situation. So my association with Kashmir is not the same as . . .

Q: Not the most fortunate. (Pause) I don't think I've brought it up before: Did you have a mentor all the time you were working in the department, or did your career evolve by itself?

LAISE: No, I think it just grew like Topsy. But I have to say that I did receive great encouragement from various people that need to be mentioned. Initially, in the Department, the two that stand out in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs are Bill Hall, William Hall, and Walter Kotschnig. Then Fran Wilcox certainly was one who gave encouragement.

Q: Is Fran a man or a woman?

LAISE: A man.

Q: Francis Wilcox. It's difficult with the name of Francis.

LAISE: Yes, he just died recently of a heart attack. He was aide to somebody who's head of the staff at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Fulbright, and then he became assistant secretary of state for the United Nations. (Pause). In Delhi, I think it was particularly Winthrop Brown. He was the minister, the DCM [deputy chief of mission].

Q: I see. Did you find that your work in the States, all of the many interesting jobs you had, were very relevant to what you did overseas? Or did you have to learn a whole new set of work skills?

LAISE: Well, I guess they weren't all that different; the emphasis was different. If we go back to, say, when I started in the international field, in UNRRA, I was mainly involved in what we in the

department would call program management. Whereas when I moved into the department and in the embassy in New Delhi, I moved in a different direction. The skills required in the Bureau of the United Nations Affairs were intellectual skills of writing and conceptualizing and justifying actions on the one hand, and on the other hand, negotiating and political -- what do you call it? I don't want to say political bargaining. Political, (Pause) well, that's really what it was, I suppose, trying to resolve differences in approach and differences in semantics, and resolutions, and that sort of thing. It was very much developing the contacts as well as being able to persuade others to compromise, to meet agreed solutions.

Then in the embassy at Delhi, it was very much a matter of developing relationships and writing skills and analytical skills, to be able to synthesize for Washington information that related to policy matters affecting U.S. interests. So that's as I see it. Those were the skills that were required, and they were perhaps used in a different sense in all these places but essentially they all involved the major skills that are required in our profession to rise to the top. It covered the spectrum between the program management skills, the interpersonal relationships, and the intellectual skills. I will say that certainly there was more development of the intellectual skills in the Department than in the UNRRA assignment.

Q: Summing up, how would you describe the Indian experience, both personal and professional?

LAISE: I think it's obvious from what I have recounted that the Indian experience was a very challenging one. It was one that afforded personal growth by my good fortune in my friendships. And certainly the quality and the depth of the Indian culture constitutes a challenge to anyone coming from the West. In extending myself to understand, it also required of me to understand our own culture much better. Therefore, it was the kind of challenge that developed greater depth in my understanding of my own culture as well as the Indian culture. And then it brought with it some very deep and continuing friendships.

As far as the professional experience is concerned, I think it is equally evident that we always had outstanding leadership in our embassy in Delhi while I was there. It ranged from Senator Cooper to Ellsworth to Galbraith. I learned a great deal about the conduct of bilateral diplomacy, both the importance in presenting U.S. views, of accuracy, the importance of integrity in relation to the reporting, not only of the U.S. scene, but also being faithful to the understanding one has of the Indian scene, and reporting that with honesty.

(Pause) Also, the embassy at Delhi had a dimension, a large dimension in those days, that was important to understand and develop, you know, broaden my experience, in that a great many of the economic and commercial interests of the United States had to be funneled through the embassy rather than, as in other countries of the world, taking place between business organizations without any regard to the embassy. This grew out of the nature of the Indian system and the highly centralized control the Indians exercised over their economic policy. It meant that the embassy was called upon to open doors and to assist in developing policies that would improve the commercial relationships between India and the United States. So that this equally brought certainly the economic dimension into my job, not only the commercial dimension, but then we had very large economic development programs there in that time. And so, the economic development aspect of our role in India was extremely important.

Indeed, I was there at a period of time when India and U.S. relations were perhaps the best that they have ever been. India was seen in U.S. calculations as being an important democratic alternative in economic development to China. Therefore, it constituted a model, a potential model of economic development along democratic lines that were very important to our interest to foster. This meant that that period of time was a very creative one, as well as a very, on the whole, a very beneficial one in our relationship.

ALBERT ASHTON LAKELAND, JR.

**Consular Officer
Bombay (1956-1958)**

**Political Officer
New Delhi (1959-1963)**

**Indian Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Washington, DC (1963-1965)**

Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr. was born in Baldwin, New York in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree in English from Princeton University and a master's degree from Columbia University. He served in Bombay and New Delhi, India, as well as in a number of positions in Washington, DC. Mr. Lakeland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 27, 1992.

Q: *This was 1956?*

LAKELAND: Yes, 1956. I entered in March, 1956 and after a very short time filling in and then FSI, I went in the beginning of September 1956. I was a consular officer there, which was a great assignment for a brand new officer. I was totally unprepared in the sense of being trained for what I had to do. Except for one thing. They did give at FSI a very useful course in visa work. I guy named Mr. Auerbach.

Q: *Yes, Frank Auerbach. I remember him well.*

LAKELAND: Well, you probably had him too. Other than that the training was really nothing.

Anyway, that was a job that is now being done by four officers, including a senior officer. We were in an old rented building and the consular office was separated from the rest of the Consulate. I was up there all by myself with a staff of four Indian locals and did actually half of the consular work for India, because Bombay was the main area. I had some very interesting and somewhat amusing experiences.

Q: *Could you tell some of them?*

LAKELAND: Yes. As you know Bombay is a major port. The United States had just begun a gigantic push to get PL 480 wheat into India. We had at one time over 40 American ships waiting to get into the harbor, much less in the harbor. All the berths were tied up with grain ships, but we had such a backlog. There were obviously going to be some seamen with problems.

There were two that I particularly remember. There was a fight on a ship between the first cook and the second cook and the first cook ended up slicing up the second cook and putting him on the stove and cooking him or whatever. Fortunately, for me, the captain notified the Indian police, which he really should have. They came and arrested this guy and put him in jail. The next day they came and told me. The ship was owned by Isbrandtsen who then was a non-union line. They were very aggressive.

Q: Very tough. They were going into China when we were telling people not to go into China. It was a very hard-nosed outfit.

LAKELAND: Anyway, the crucial thing came when the ship was ready to depart and there was a hearing set. It cost something like \$2000 an hour for ships and there was a delay for this trial. Isbrandtsen raised hell with the Department as to why I hadn't asserted jurisdiction? Under the old regulations the consul can assert jurisdiction provided the local authorities had not taken jurisdiction. Well, I didn't even know that I could have. Their captain had called in the Indians before I was informed.

The ship is waiting to go and they are having a felony trial before the chief magistrate in Bombay. They put out on the guy and he is all cut up and there are witnesses, etc. Then they call the accused and asked how he pleaded. He said, "Not guilty." So the prosecutor and the magistrate look at me and I say, "What do you mean, not guilty? Look at the man, he is all carved up." He said, "I am not guilty and plead not guilty." So the magistrate says, "Take this away and get something better." So they come over to me and say, "Tell that man to plead guilty." I said, "I am here as an observer and can't tell him to plead guilty to this kind of thing." They go on and say, "You have to do something, you are the American Consul." I say, "Vice Consul." This goes on and on so I finally say, "Well, look, if the matter is not adjudicated here, it can then be pressed in a Coast Guard court back in New York and you probably would be better off that way. At least you could probably get the charges...." The captain didn't know anything about that, but it turned out to be true.

They did some huddling and agreed to withdraw the charges. They called the accused back up and the magistrate then says, "Now, are you sorry that you stabbed that man and almost killed him?" "Well, I guess so." "All right, take this man..." And the ship gets out of there.

Another incident, there was an American seaman who died in a brothel in Bombay. There is what they call the cages there. He was Hispanic. Apparently his widow had a lawyer who thought she was going to get a big deal out of this and raised all kinds of stuff. When the notice of death went back there hadn't been an autopsy report. This lawyer was raising hell with the Department. The Department, of course, got scared and began bombarding me with telegrams. We kind of soft peddled it.

It ended up that he got the police report and the certificate of death and it was stated very graphically...so and so died in brothel number 44. The prostitute said that he was feeling ill and went for his pill. Apparently he was 70 years old and had a heart condition and died in anticipation.

One other interesting thing that I thought was pretty ingenious. Air India was seeking to open an office in New York. We had just had a breakthrough with an agreement with Air India landing rights. India had never signed a treaty trader treaty with us so they were unable to get a visa for their manager to go open this office. It was beginning to cause some difficulty. Their headquarters were in Bombay but they had been trying for this visa up at the Embassy and had been formally refused. To make a long story short, the man, himself, had been born in Kashmir. One parent had been born in what subsequently became Pakistan and one parent had been born in what subsequently became India. There was a loop hole, the Asia Pacific Triangle Corps. In the old days 100 visas were reserved for parents born in two or more separate court areas. The quota was under subscribed. I issued him the visa and became a hero. There was consternation in Delhi and cheers in Washington that we had found a solution to this problem through the partition of India.

I started learning Hindi while I was there, sort of in my own. I was ordered back for area language training. When I got there, there were only three students and two instructors. One was Pakistani and one was an Indian. With three students and two instructors they sort of had no choice but to split us up into two groups. Since I had already served in India and perhaps had a leg up, I ended up having private instruction. I finished, actually, both the Indian and Urdu material about three months before the course ended. Partly because I thought it wasn't really adequate. How could you have a course where a student could exhaust the material in less than the time, much less two courses.

I did a research paper. The head of FSI language school thought this was a big thing so he offered me a choice. I could either go the second year out at Berkeley for a year of area studies, which was normally the deal, or a special deal. He offered me three and a half months of detached duty in India with per diem and more or less unlimited travel funds with a job promised in the political section in the Embassy. So naturally I chose...

Q: Before we go to that I would like to go back to Bombay. What was the political situation as you saw it in Bombay and what were the American interests?

LAKELAND: I went there in September 1956 and United States relations with India were tense, to say the least. Beginning in 1957, something of a breakthrough occurred because the United States more or less decided to bail out the Indian second five-year plan. That was not entirely altruistic. A big part of it was PL 480 wheat which we wanted to get out of our granaries. So relations which had been quite tense, particularly...

Q: Kashmir problem and the non-align movement when Dulles was feeling that if you are not with us you are against us.

LAKELAND: Yes. What happened after Stalin died was that the Soviets made a big move towards India. Bulganin and Khrushchev came to India, struck an arms deal, and did all kinds of stuff. The Indians seemed to be moving close to the Russians. In fact they did move close to the Russians. Nehru, you know, was very prickly towards the United States. He did not like to be part of our global strategy. So it was sort of the height of the cold war period and India was, at that time, regarded as a key battleground between democracy and communism.

The Kashmir issue was very, very emotional in India. It is really very raw ethnic...sort of like Serb and Croatian feeling.

So that was the political situation. The United States was respected and somewhat feared, but not really beloved.

Oh, one other little thing. My first brush with the CIA occurred there. As consular officer I got to know a major Indian mathematician, who was really a world class mathematician. He had happened to have done graduate work at Princeton where I went as an undergraduate. When I got him a visa he sort of befriended me. I suppose because of the old school tie, I was not a mathematician. He was a very interesting fellow. He also was interested in politics. I got to know him socially fairly well. Then he became the secretary of an Indian delegation which was the first non-bloc delegation that toured the major scientific institutions in the Soviet Union. He went to...a lot of these really closed places.

I mentioned this to the CIA chief and they wanted to interview this guy. I said that that was up to him. I said that I was not going to bring him to them, So they gave me a long list and asked if I would ask him these questions. So over lunch one day I started to ask him all these questions. Finally he said, "What is all this about? Who did you get this from? Did you get this from your CIA?" I said, "Yes, they asked me to ask you." He said, "Well, give it to me and I will fill it out, but I don't want to do it here." He did it and I think later they were able to establish some kind of relationship with him. They pressed hard. That was my first wake-up experience with the Agency.

Bombay was something of a bastion of the opposition within India. It was more pro-business, pro-American. I wouldn't say it was an anti-Communist bastion, but the men who more or less could challenge Nehru were centered in Bombay.

Q: What was your impression as a consular officer in dealing with the Indian bureaucracy? I have never served in India but it has always struck me as being a very officious, difficult group of people to work with.

LAKELAND: Actually, that was not my experience at all in India, mainly I suppose because I really had minimal and rather routine contacts with the Indian bureaucracy. We would get police clearances and things like that. A few incidents with the port people. As vice consul in the consular office I really had no problems with the Indians.

One other thing that happened, an American who worked for TWA got caught smuggling 44 pounds of gold into India, confessed and got sent to jail. I did go up and visit him in jail one time,

but there was no problem there. Indian jails in those days were relatively decent places because almost all of the leading Indian politicians had served a lot of time in jail. So their jails were fairly spruced up in those days. Not places where you wanted to spend your vacations, but they weren't filthy, with poor food, etc.

No, I had no problems with bureaucrats in Bombay. There were a lot of very wealthy young businessmen who had studied in the United States who loved to invite Americans to parties. In fact it was a great place for a young officer in terms of being wined and dined by rich Indians.

After my language training I went up to Delhi and ended up spending a lot of that time in UP, Uttar Pradesh, the biggest state in India. It was the home state of Nehru. It was the political...sort of like the combination of New York and California, politically of India. And it was also the center of the Hindi speaking belt, not all of India speaks Hindi. I spent most of my three and a half months up there.

Q: What a wonderful way of learning. Sounds enlightened.

LAKELAND: Well, it was and they never seemed to have repeated it. I would spend my day getting up and reading the Hindi newspapers, going down to the coffee house where I met journalists and politicians. I made excellent contacts that really stood me in great state later on. So many of the senior ministers from the central government had come from there or later came from there. Then I would go to a Hindi movie at night. I really got so that I was one of the few Americans who was pretty good in Hindi.

In Delhi, almost all of the Indians who Americans deal with speak English. When they don't want Americans knowing what they are talking about they speak Hindi. For conducting your business, Hindi is not a necessity, particularly to people who deal with the Foreign Office. But as I discovered, it is a tremendous asset because you get all of the asides and all of the by play whenever they don't want the Americans to know what they are talking about. Also their English makes much more sense if you know Hindi because they are frequently translating into English rather than speaking it.

My language background led to one very interesting and amusing assignment. I was the Hindi interpreter for Lyndon Johnson when he made his...

Q: He was Vice President.

LAKELAND: He was Vice President. He made his famous world tour through there. I discovered later that he had been a bear on Foreign Service interpreters. Two of them had been tossed out. One in Thailand, I think, and one in Vietnam. It was an amazing experience. The man was a colossus of energy and determined with an agenda of his own. He came there with a 707 plus a 707 load of American journalists. I was thrust into this job.

What would happen is, we had this sort of motorcade and he would be in the first car with Ambassador Galbraith. Then there would be a security car and then myself and then Lady Bird and Mrs. Galbraith. Wherever Johnson saw what he thought was a crowd he would jump out and

start talking. Well, in India there is almost a crowd everywhere. I would have to leap out and try to catch up and listen to what he was saying. He would talk until he reached a point and then would stop. I then had to ad hoc translate for him. It wasn't technical translating so I was able to handle that part, I guess, pretty well.

He stayed there three days. He wanted to go down to visit the Taj Mahal, but they needed sort of a cover for it since he had all of these press people. They cooked up a visit to what I called, an underdeveloped and overdeveloped people. One village was kept poor and nothing had been done for it. Then they had a village that showed off their community development projects. It was in late April and on our way between the underdeveloped village and overdeveloped village...it was 117 degrees in the shade that day and we were driving along this great cloud of dust and Johns saw an Indian walking past this well. He decided to stop the music. So a giant party surrounded this Indian peasant. There were Indian security and officials and Indian and American journalists and 6 foot 4 Lyndon Johnson and me standing next to him sort of bellowing at this poor Indian.

It turned out to be quite a comic situation. This guy was just taking a shortcut and it wasn't his place at all. This well was one of these Persian well where they use bullocks and run down a rap and drag up giant skins of water, but it wasn't in use that day. So Johnson went into his routine about how when he was a boy in west Texas he used to have to water the cows. He got a bucket and got it down into this thing. He is saying how much water cows drink on a hot day. This guy says, "Cows don't drink a lot of water." Johnson couldn't understand it and the Indians are trying to keep a straight face and I am trying to keep a straight face. I said, "Well, the Indian cows aren't as thirsty as American cows." Then Johnson would say, "Well, it is still a lot of hard work doing that." The guy says, "It really isn't, the bullocks do all the work." So I am doing my best, faking it and Johnson finally says to this guy, "Now, you, the typical Indian man on the street, I want to bring a personal message from you to President Kennedy. What in your personal opinion is the best thing the United States could do for India?" So I translate this. No reply. I ask again. And he says, "I am just a little guy. I don't even know who President Kennedy is." Finally I harangued him into saying that he would like to have electricity in his village. Johnson had been making this oration about rural electrification program having been successful under the New Deal. So I said, "Yes, if America could only help to bring electricity to the village." At that point Johnson decided he had better quit while he was ahead. He beamed with great satisfaction and off we went to the overdeveloped village.

Indian people in general tend to affect a very, very meek exterior, especially when dealing in their official capacity. There was this woman in the village who was head of the development program there. She is giving her long spiel in a very restrained whisper and round about way. Johnson is getting very itchy. He wanted to get back to the plane and back to Delhi and have a beer. She is in her spiel and Johnson is getting really restless. Finally he said, they had some handicrafts on display, "Bird, don't you thing that rug would look good in front of our fireplace?" "Yes Lyndon," she said. "Lakeland, buy that rug." The rug is not for sale, it was just on display. I asked how much they would take for it. He said, "You have money, you pay them." So I buy this thing and the women starts her spiel again. Johnson says, "How about the other one?" Bird said that that would look good too. So he tells me to buy it and then tell the women that we had to go. So I buy the toe rugs and off we go back to Delhi.

When Johnson was leaving, his secret service detail came up to me and said, "The Vice President would like to see you." I thought, "Oh, shit," because he was rather skeptical of the Foreign Service. But he patted me on the back and said, "You _____." I guess I was supposed to be very pleased. Later on Galbraith called me in and said, "You made a big hit with the Vice President." I said, "What did he say?" He said, "Galbraith, I don't know what your man Lakeland was telling those Indians, but they sure did like it."

In Delhi I was a political officer. I covered first north India and did a lot of traveling and got to know a lot of Indian politicians, most of whom were my father's age, very senior politicians. It was like dealing with virgin territory. If you were a young officer in Paris you would never be able to get near these people. You wouldn't even get to their private secretaries. But governors of states and their ministers, the chairmen of the Congress and the opposition parties, I got to know all of these people quite well. They were very flattered that somebody from the American Embassy was interested in them. In their minds, because they are very status conscience, they decided that I was the third man at the Embassy. There was the Ambassador, then there was a First Secretary and then a Second Secretary. I was the Second Secretary. So that is how they reconciled relations with me.

Later I became head of the internal reporting for all of India. We had the India-China war in 1962. That was a really major event where China and India actually went to war and India turned to us for military assistance. It then led to the 1965 India-Pakistan war. There was a great change in America's relationship with India and the role of Americans in India. It really crested at that time. It later disintegrated back down to where it had been or worse, but that was sort of the plateau of Indo-US relations.

While I was in India, I served under three Ambassadors, all of whom were eminent men, political appointees. Ellsworth Bunker, John Kenneth Galbraith and Chester Bowles. I found that of them, only Galbraith was interested in Indian politics. He believed that he could win over Krishna Menon.

Q: He was Minister of Defense wasn't he?

LAKELAND: He originally became famous or infamous as the Indian representative at the United Nations where he clashed with the United States.

Q: He was the symbol of everything America disliked about India for some time. It still rankles with a lot of people.

LAKELAND: Yes, he had a gift for vituperation and nastiness. He was a brilliant man. A considerable gift to the English language. A great maneuverer and intriguer. He was called to become Defense Minister by Nehru. Galbraith thought that because the Kennedys had come in and there was a new era and they had some mutual friends in the left wing of the Labor Party, he could work with Menon. But that did not work out at all.

But generally speaking, not only did our eminent political ambassadors but our Foreign Service people really spent a lot of time in India without even leaving the United States if you ask me. Now I don't know which is right. Whether Foreign Service people should just be Americans in a foreign country representing their country, thinking like their country, interested in really reflecting Washington and the United States, or the degree to which they should seek to get a much more fundamental grasp of the country that they are in. Especially a country as different as India. India is totally different. It is a completely separate civilization. Independent of Western civilization. There are only three or four in the world that still exist. Chinese, Indian and maybe Islam culture. Its own music, its own morality, its own philosophy, its own way of looking at things. Totally different society.

Our politics have really failed in India. We got very little for our effort and our money out of India. Our goals in India tended to be somewhat fatuous. There was a misconception that India was about to turn communist. There was also...I remember Ellsworth Bunker, who was a great gentleman and a fine man and devoted public servant, had real blinders in dealing with India and with Nehru. When he saw Nehru he saw a graduate of Harrow and Cambridge, a gentleman, and very much believing that underneath it all here was a western gentleman who would be with the US in the heart of his soul. He was only nasty to us because he had to be, which was not true in my view.

Nehru was a dedicated more or less Marxist. He was basically Marxist in his thinking. He was a democrat but he never had his democratic principles challenged because the peculiar political circumstances allowed him to operate as a democrat without a threat to his autocratic power. He was not friendly to the United States. He really believed that the Soviet Union was a more natural friend of India than the United States. And certainly his daughter, Indira Gandhi believed that.

The United States in 1957 made a fundamental decision to bankroll India's five year plans feeling that the alternative would be a communist revolution. I think that in retrospect that turned out to be a real mistake for India and the United States. It was really a Brezhnevian kind of regime. The kind of Romanian, Eastern European, Yugoslavia, and Soviet state economy which sort of guarantees poverty. India was not a communist society, but it was a statist society and its economy was real socialist/Marxist oriented. All the commanding heights of the economy were to be in the hands of the government. All the steel mills, the trading, the oil, the aircraft, etc. If you look at the economic progress of India, where it was say in 1950 and where it is today, compared to many Asian countries...India had a larger GNP than Japan in 1950. Per capita GNP was greater in India than in Korea in those days. India really got off on a wrong path and I think, particularly in retrospect, although I tended to feel that way when I was an officer there, we should not have bought into subsidizing this big public sector which was really a way of maintaining the status quo, controlling the country. They eventually preempted the business community through this licensing monopoly system that they had. If you gave enough money to the Congress Party and hired enough relatives and the right Ministers and civil servants you were guaranteed a monopoly business position. So the Indian business private sector never made the contribution that it is capable of making. Indians are very capable businessmen. But India has lagged economically.

Q: Well, within the Embassy were there any voices saying let's stay out? What was the alternative for example?

LAKELAND: The alternative was to tell the Indians that if they want major assistance it would have to be channeled through the private sector. Now if you think you don't need it and can stay in power without it, more power to you. But why should we have subsidized a left wing socialist economy which was gauging us on almost every issue in the world, merely because there was an implied threat that they might go communist unless we did it?

Q: Was there any sort of division within the economic section or the political section while you were there about wither India and what American policy was?

LAKELAND: Not that I was aware of. Occasionally you would get some peeps out of AID, occasionally out of the Commerce people, hut generally the word was that it was a five year plan. The Indians seem to have fairly impressive senior civil servants. Our officials who were dealing with the top level of the Indian civil servants tended to be impressed with what they were saying. "Well, we have to do this, once we let up, once you have control it leads to more control, to more control, more control." There was a tremendous reluctance to say, "Wait a minute, once you accept the first control then all the others follow." The Indians screamed that it would be imperialistic if we interfered in domestic affairs.

When Kennedy came in there was a feeling that the United States can work with these third world socialist countries. Galbraith certainly went there with that view. That there is nothing wrong with building third world democratic socialism. And it was not really challenged. In fact, the only real challenge came in sort of muted ways. The only way that this became attacked was when the India-China crisis reached a head. Nehru and Menon were very reluctant to give up the idea of third world solidarity. The Nationalist view and the anti-Chinese view then sort of became the pro-American view were more the Indian right wing, which had been very strong at the time of independence. In fact it dominated. Nehru really became Prime Minister almost by accident. These guys had a chance to challenge Nehru and Menon in 1962 and to some extent they did challenge and forced Krishna Menon out of office. Every once in a while there is a faint movement towards free enterprise and then it generally goes back into this socialist bureaucracy which is maybe 1 percent gain in the standard of living. I think the overall conditions in India consist of a lot of acute problems which haven't been addressed.

Q: You were saying that the Americans who went there sort of remained Americans and didn't get out to see the people, but at the same time...again I am talking as a retired Foreign Service Officer who never served in India...one had the feeling that people who went to India got sort of absorbed by the Indian and pretty soon became ardent proponents of whatever happened to be going. The disease is called localitis. And India, to me, has always been one of the prime examples, but, again, only from a far.

LAKELAND: I think certainly the Americans who served in India tended to take the side of India vis-à-vis Pakistan and vice versa, the Americans in Pakistan took the Pakistani side of that issue. And I think that the American Embassy people tended to deal with the elite of the Indian bureaucracy, who were very plausible people. Once you buy into...there are certain premises that

we run the country but we have to run it this way, otherwise it would get out of control or otherwise the poor people wouldn't be heard. They had plausible things that were never vigorously challenged. And I guess Foreign Service officers aren't there to vigorously challenge the assumptions of a government. It was a vested interest in the relations. There tended to be a corps of old India hands who had their contacts with the experts and could intermediate with the Indian establishment. But I don't think that was who they were intermediating with. A Delhi elite establishment many who had been educated abroad, but left wing socialist in their economic feeling. Indians managed to establish the fact that because the United States favored Pakistan we tended to treat India in an imperialist way and that India had to defy us because we were arming its deadly enemy and that is why it was friendly with Russia. That view was rarely, if ever, challenged. Sometimes in Washington it was challenged, but I never knew it to be challenged in Delhi. Not vigorously.

Chester Bowles had a vision that India was like the United States in the 1820s. There was a populous school and a federalist school. He constantly was trying to...whether we were going to have Jackson or an Adams. He is a marvelous man, Chester Bowles, but he had such a crazy view of what was going on in India because the analogy couldn't have been less apt in my own view.

Another kind of amusing thing was the Jacqueline Kennedy visit. Jackie Kennedy's sister, Lee Radziwill, lived in London with her husband, Prince Radziwill. The Maharajah and Maharani of Jodhpur, great international jet setters, spent summers in London. They invited Lee and Jackie Kennedy to see them in India. It turned out that it couldn't be just a visit, it got into a state visit. It escalated up... Nehru made a decision that Jackie Kennedy would be given the exact same protocol treatment as Queen Elizabeth had been given when she visited India. So this thing really got escalated into a really big deal. Instead of going only to Jodhpur it became a national tour. But there was a three-day tour in Jodhpur.

I was assigned control officer for the Jodhpur stop which was divided into a day and a half official visit and a day and a half private visit. To complicate matters the Jodhpur family were the leaders of the Indian opposition. The Maharani of Jodhpur was the Parliamentary leader of the largest opposition party in Parliament and had outpolled Nehru in the 1962 elections. For the first time Nehru didn't get the highest plurality in India.

To further muddy the waters, when Queen Elizabeth had visited Jodhpur six months or so before, to sort of stick their finger in the eye of the government, the Maharajah of Jodhpur staged a feudal which was the direct feudal relationship between the Maharajah and the Queen. He had excluded also the public from this thing and then held another reception to which he invited his friends and sold tickets.

So the powers to be were very, very furious ...well, let me put it this way, it was a very touchy visit. We had endless negotiations about every step and minute of what would take place during that visit.

Anyway it sort of went. I am going to tell a sort of out of school tale. At the end of this three-day visit...it was the last stop outside of Delhi, and that ended just at sundown. There was a dinner at

the Embassy that night, which was the biggest social event of the Embassy. All the officers who had been control officers were invited to the dinner even if you were only a second secretary. To get a ticket to this dinner was the biggest thing not only in the American community hut in Delhi and I had a place. I was very much looking forward to it.

There was this elaborate departure ceremony from Jodhpur with an elephant and all this sort of stuff. Just as I was about to board the plane, 6 foot 8 inch John Kenneth Galbraith claps me on the shoulder and says, "Pete, come here." He says, "You are staying here." I said, "Why?" He says, "Because your job in the morning is to get Lee Radziwill back to Delhi." I said, "How am I going to do that?" "We are sending down o special plane for her. She is going to stay over with the Maharaju and the Maharani. The plane is going to be there at 8:00 to take off. I want you to have her at the airport at 8:00 tomorrow morning." And off he went, and off everybody went. Here I had to stay in Jodhpur to collect Lee Radziwill.

So I went over there the next morning, I guess around 7:30. They were having breakfast hut there was no sign of Lee Radziwill. They offered me breakfast. I said, "Well, you know we are supposed to catch this plane." The Indians were sending in a bomber! No sign of Lee Radziwill. About 8:00 this door opens and out walks Lee Radziwill arm in arm with an Italian journalist. She said, "Oh, by the way, Luigi is going back to Delhi with us." I said, "Oh, I think I can arrange it with the Indians." But I knew there would be a manifest for this Indian bomber and I didn't know if I could just add o name to it or not. But it all sorted out.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Galbraith and how he operated?

LAKELAND: I think he was probably the most effective of the three or even though in some ways the most misguided, if you will. He fought hard for the United States to finance one of these, what has turned out to a white elephant, public steel mills, and lost. But he presided over the change. India and China got into a war and there was a great flood of goodwill and the United States really rode high. They asked us for military assistance and all kinds of things. He was a sharp man and he was interested in my reports on what is going on in India, who is doing what to whom, etc. There is so much that is personal in India. It goes back so many years when they were in jail together, or when factional fights in 1937 turned out to have been...very, very formative in India politics. I would write these things and he would love them. None of the others were interested in this sort of stuff. He also had a famous DCM. I don't know whether you ever knew Benson Ellison Lane Timmons III.

Q: I know of him.

LAKELAND: One of the most extraordinary Foreign Service Officers I have ever known. He was the bete noire of the Administrative part of the US Foreign Service. He was a man of enormous energy and a man of tremendous organization and detail and control. He left the running of the Embassy to Lane Timmons. Now under Timmons and Galbraith, partly because of the war, Delhi sent more telegrams then any other Embassy in the world at that time. More then London, more then Paris, more then Bonn, more then Tokyo, etc.

Timmons had a particular management style. He had an inner core of officers that were very much in his confidence and he really collected, almost as a personal staff around him. I had the good fortune to be one of them. My relationships in working was great. However, more than half were sort of in the outer circle. They were given sort of a hard time. The administrative section was always too little and too late with everything.

Timmons was there from 7:00 in the morning and he read everything that had come in during the night. Then he would go down there and hang over the code clerks as they were decoding more cables as they came in. He would have all these cables and anybody who came into the Embassy, I guess we started about 8:30, he would see somebody coming in and no sooner were they at their desk then he was on the phone saying, "What are you going to do about such and such." The guy hadn't even seen the telegram. But that was his style.

Delhi was a very social place. You always went to two or three cocktails parties, a dinner or two. But every night before he went to bed he dropped by the Embassy and read again. So he was up on everything. And for a junior officer, I was still a second secretary, to he one of the favored few was very heady experience. Galbraith also had his favorites which more or less overlapped, but not entirely. I happened to have the good luck to he also one of his fair-haired boys. So I was within a fairly small magic circle. So to me it was a time when you could get things done and get the attention of the top people there. I could approach the Ambassador directly and certainly could approach Timmons directly. This didn't always sit too well with our counselors as I found out later from n y efficiency reports.

My view...I went to some length to explain it, because from the perspective of some other people who served there they would have had quite a different view and quite a different experience. But I found that it was a liberating, very energetic, can-do kind of experience. Galbraith would send a cable to Washington on almost anything at any time.

I made a contact with a very large number of senior politicians who were not approached...Nehru was his own Foreign Minister and most of the cabinet officers, if they dealt with anybody it was the head of AID and usually they dealt with bureaucrats. I got to know a lot of these men quite well just because no other American, I suppose, ever talked to them. I would mainly go to talk to them about politics. I used to go and visit cabinet members in their office mainly to talk about politics. I also got to know a group of people who controlled the executive committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party. The Congress Parliamentary Party selects the Prime Minister. These people had a number of grievances. They tended to be anti-Nehru people. People who had lost out or who Nehru had allowed to be pushed out. This was the niche they found. some of them were Cabinet ministers too. They tended to be a more conservative group, anti-Communist and very intensely anti-Krishna Menon group. These people used to consult me all the time. They asked me really seriously whether I thought the United States was going to give arms to Krishna Menon. I told them that I really doubted that the United States would give arms while Menon was still the Defense Minister. I didn't think the United States would have any hesitancy but I didn't think they would be inclined to provide our arch enemy with the means for his political salvation.

Q: We are talking about after the Chinese Indian war had started.

LAKELAND: Right. It had started. So this was taken, I later learned, as an official signal. They confronted Nehru when Parliament was reopening. They met with Nehru in the morning and demanded Krishna Menon's resignation. They said that among other things they had learned that the United States was not going to give any assistance while Menon is there. And Nehru fudged and tried to have Menon as Minister of State for Defense Production. And they weren't having that. So two of them went back to see Nehru again just before Parliament opened and said to him - they told me and I think it leaked out in the press later confirming it-that perhaps he didn't understand that we are not going to have him as Defense Minister in any Prime Minister's cabinet. And so, they gave him an ultimatum...get rid of Menon or he challenged for the Prime Ministership. And Nehru backed out. He announced when Parliament opened his acceptance of Menon's resignation as Defense Minister.

I later found out reading Galbraith memories of his years in India, that...

Q: *Called "Ambassador's Journal."*

LAKELAND: Yes. ...that he had been engaged in this private fierce war in Washington with the Pentagon and insisted that we not hold up military assistance for Menon's resignation. And had eventually carried the day, but fortunately the timing was such that Nehru announced Menon's resignation hours or days...I think it was the next day that the United States announced this massive military assistance to India.

You realize that here am I playing with history a little... I wasn't flying totally blind, at least in my own view. Timmons had asked me about this question. Obviously there had been some "EYES ONLY" or "NODIS" traffic going back and forth. He said, "What do you think about this?" And I said, "I think very strongly that it should be this way because of all our friends, etc." He said, "Look, you ought to write a memo to the Ambassador explaining the political situation here in India and what its implications would be in giving arms." So I wrote a memo laying it out very clearly that we should not do it...you know, recommending it very strongly. Timmons took it and gave it to the Ambassador and I never heard anything more. Then the Indians asked me. All this is going on in fairly tight time frame.

The Ambassador took my recommendations generally on political things, but in this case it turned out that he hadn't. But I had not been informed that he had made the other decision. But I had been asked for my recommendation, had put it in and had gotten no reply, either affirmative or negative. And when asked, I said that I don't think the United States will be doing this. This stiffened these guys and they confronted Nehru and that was the thing that pushed Menon out of office.

The United States decided to turn this thing into a great effort to solve the Kashmir dispute, which turned out to be a mistake. Harriman came out to crack heads and force the Indians and Pakistani to settle.

Q: *Harriman was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs.*

LAKELAND: He was then Under Secretary Political/Military Affairs. Anyway, that operation turned out to be a big fiasco. I experienced the kind of amusing thing that happens to Foreign Service officers from time to time where the high and the mighty get their comeuppance when they step on the toes of a Foreign Service officer. I was given the job of taking Harriman over to Parliament to meet Nehru. He was having these big discussions with Nehru. We got into the Ambassador's limousine. Now in India they drive on the British side. I used to go to Parliament almost everyday and knew that when cars come in there they are going to open the door on the left hand side and there is little room to open a door on the right hand side. So I got around and sat in the right hand side going there.

Mr. Harriman took great umbrage about this. He asked me what I thought I was doing sitting in the place of honor. I tried to explain to him that when we arrive at Parliament you really want to be on the left hand side because of the way you enter. He said, "Don't argue with me young man. This is the flag seat. You get over there and I don't want to hear another word about it." I said, "Okay." He was in a terrible mood about something and he just wouldn't listen.

Well we drive up in this narrow space and this Indian in his full guard uniform opens the door and I am sitting there. Nehru is holding out his hand and I step aside and Harriman is across the way sitting there stony faced. He didn't know what to do. It would have been very difficult for him to slide across because of the big bump in the floor. So he is sort of sitting there stony faced waiting for somebody to open the door. Finally somebody comes in and gets his door partly opened. He gets out and is standing there on the other side of the car looking very uncomfortable and flustered. He comes around behind the car and I am standing aside there and he just shot me a dirty look. He never said a word about my being right or anything like that. He was blaming the whole thing on me. But I must say that I took a certain pleasure in the event.

Q: We have to find our pleasures where we can.

LAKELAND: One of the things from my personal memories...Nehru was getting old and starting to get ill. His political reputation had been considerably eroded by the China-India war. He had been first of all against military expenditures. He wanted the military established to be very small. India didn't need a defense establishment, the Chinese were to be trusted, the Americans were to be trusted, etc. So a great subject of interest and speculation over the years was after Nehru who?

So a lot of my last year in India was exploring this idea. I came up with the idea that a relatively...an Indian politician who was not well known to the Western world at all and not featured in the foreign press at all, Lal Bahadur Shastri was really the logical choice. You give all the dynamics of the left and the right and they could agree on him.

So I went around and talked to a lot of Indian senior politicians about this. They loved to talk about their politics with any American. I said, "What do you think? Do you think that Shastri...I think when it comes down to it that he is the logical choice." So I made the prediction that he would be the one. When Nehru did die, relatively shortly after that, it was a big coup that I had discovered who the next Prime Minister was.

I'm also convinced in my own mind that I simulated a lot of the thinking among the Indians that "Yes this is a solution." Unfortunately Shastri only lived for about a year and a half.

Q: He died in Tashkent.

LAKELAND: Yes, in Tashkent. Anyway, after Delhi I was summoned back to the India Desk office.

Q: This was in 1963.

LAKELAND: Right, September 1963.

Q: You went to the India Desk where you served from 1963-65. What did the India Desk officer do in those days?

LAKELAND: Those were my two by far most frustrating years in the Foreign Service. To me it was the Foreign Service at its worse. I am speaking subjectively.

Q: That is what these interviews are about.

LAKELAND: Remember what I said about how things were really great for me personally as a relatively young officer, class 4 officer there in Delhi and particularly under Galbraith and Timmons. I am dealing with cabinet ministers and heads of the party. I knew the heads of all the parties. Within the Embassy the chain of command was not oppressive, direct access to either the Ambassador and the DCM was available.

I found that the SOA (in the NEA Bureau there were three divisions, one was called South Asia (SOA) and included India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan) was really a very bureaucratic operation. I had the unfortunate, I guess it was the reverse of my good fortune in Delhi...my immediate superior was a man who excelled at all the routine skills of the Foreign Service. And I really think lacked the non routine. But he was a very good bureaucrat for organizing and producing routine work and decision consensus clearance, etc. He was somewhat resistant to new ideas. Anything that upset the consensus. There was hound to be some...you know I am used to wheeling and dealing in high policy and whatever. I felt my talents tended to be much under used. Essentially, it turned into something of a two year battle where I was more or less pitted against the rest of the office and bureau because I had become convinced that India and Pakistan were on collision to go to war. And that this would really deep six more than a decade of US policy and umpteen billion dollars that had been poured into both countries, particularly India, to ward off such an event. I was convinced that this was going to happen because a number of things had been set in motion by the India-China war. There was a consensus that India and Pakistan always pulled back from the brink. This was a dogma. It was the word and India and Pakistan would go to the brink of war but would pull back. A large part of my experience was interpreting events and saying, "We are going to a war."

Q: What were some of the things that brought this about?

LAKELAND: Well, India decided to try to consolidate its hold in Kashmir beyond the status quo anti. Nehru had had a sort of puppet thug in there and his regime collapsed and they had to take more direct control. The more India decided to more directly integrate Kashmir into India then it had been previously, that set the Pakistani going. In addition to which India was massively arming. The theory was that India now needed an army not only big enough to check Pakistan, but equally to check China. The Paks saw this as "we know who this army is going to fight and it is not going to be China. But before the Indians can really get going...this is our last chance. The Indians are trying to foreclose anything new on Kashmir. They are going to go beyond even what their previous "aggression" was and fully integrated constitutionally in India. And they are going to have this great big military buildup which is going to end up sitting on our heads."

The Paks felt that it is now or never for them. The Indian military, smarting from their rather humiliating defeat by the Chinese were kind of spoiling for a fight with the Paks.

So you have some very important new elements in the situation. It just, to me, added up that the Paks were going to push it beyond where the Indians would take it and the Indians were going to push it beyond where the Paks were going to take it and there was going to be a war.

Sort of fighting that bureaucratic battle was really quite an unpleasant experience, because it wasn't appreciated at all. In fact...I couldn't get out of the job, when my two years were up they didn't want to let me go even though I am in constant battle. I had to find my own replacement, find my own next job.

I finally left on August 15, 1965. I hadn't gotten my efficiency report in July when they normally are done. On my last day I got my efficiency. I will never forget something in it. There was the usual stuff and then "However, Mr. Lakeland's usefulness to the office and the bureau over the past year has been very constrained by his insistence upon pressing the warning of the dangers of a Pakistan/India war thereby making the achievement of a bureaucratic consensus more difficult." I was a naughty boy.

About five days later the war broke out. After it was all over, and the promotions came out, I didn't get promoted. So I went to the Boards and asked them what happened. "Well, you were judged in the middle of your class." At that point I thought, "Look, I am willing to say that if you stick out your neck and you are wrong you are going to get your head cut off, that is fair enough. But when you stick out your neck and you are right and you get your head cut off, I don't like it." So at that point I made up my mind that I was going to start looking for something else. That is why when I got an offer from Senator Javits a couple of years later I took it. It turned out to be the greatest thing I ever did.

But that experience really soured me on the Foreign Service. It is not fun fighting with your superiors and trying to make it an argument of substance. I found those years very frustrating and most of the work was very routine, low level kind of work.

Another anomaly, I was also placed in a very difficult situation. I was still at the Embassy when Bowles came back, but I left a couple of months after he came back and took over. He had

formed an impression of me that I had been one of his fair-haired boys because he was told by people that I knew a lot about India and that I got along with Indians very well.

Actually I had a very different view of India from him. He had a very romanticized view. He and his wife used to walk around in saris and this kind of stuff. So he and the Bureau and also the office had major differences of opinion. He wanted this big new thing. He abolished the political and economic sections combining them into a political/economic section. He did all kinds of stuff and he really thought that we were dealing with the Indian populous and we had better do this, that and the other thing. He made an enemy of the head of the Congress Party, who was the king maker. He took him on because he didn't like the bosses....

He and Phil Talbot, who was Assistant Secretary of State, and the general bureaucracy were on different wavelengths. He had just been Under Secretary of State and believed himself to be very much a Washington political figure who had been right about Vietnam and had been ousted. So he used to come back to Washington almost every two months or so. I was designated to be his special assistant while he was back.

It put me into a very difficult position because he regarded me as his trusted agent and the bureau regarded me as their spy to tell them what he is doing because he is operating on his own. We are going around to see everybody...going to see Rusk, Ball and McNamara, Orville Freeman of Agriculture and Carl Rowan, head of USIS. He is wheeling and dealing for India and I am his special, trusted assistant. He is a very open man and when I go back everybody asks me what he said. I was in a major dilemma. I could not satisfy either side in this situation.

But I did get to go in Washington to a lot of very interesting and high level meetings and experiences...I was used to that kind of stuff in Delhi, but as a desk officer you never got it. He would come into town and he and I would go to see Dean Rusk and talk not only about India but about everything. George Ball and McNamara, the whole smear. It was interesting. He had a rosy view of India's political situation and, of course, did not believe there was going to be a war, and if there was a war it would be totally Pakistan's fault. I had a different view of that and was saying a different view of it back in Washington. Because I had been a good political officer in Delhi one of the ways they figured they could sort of use me...because I didn't fit too conveniently in the slot I was in, they assigned me to the job of politically second guessing the Embassy's political reporting. Reinterpreting what was going on because they didn't have confidence in the Embassy's political reporting. The negative would be politically reported and the stuff that was positive would be overblown.

So I had a rather miserable two years there on the Desk. I had one experience which is typical of Foreign Service officers, more mainstream. I was the notetaker whenever the Indian Ambassador came in to see the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary. Just before the India-Pakistan war there had been some skirmishing and the Paks sort of made a deal with the Chinese that the Chinese would rattle their saber to pin the Indian divisions down in the east so they couldn't be transferred to build up against the Paks. The Chinese dully rattled their sabers saying that if India invaded Pakistan we will move in the east.

B.K. Nehru, who was Nehru's cousin and the Ambassador, came in to see Rusk to make an extraordinary request which never really surfaced in history. Knowing the way the Indians talk and knowing the thing, you know, and the Indians leave and you come around the corner and it is there. So I am sitting there writing just as fast as I could write trying to get every single word because I knew B.K. Nehru was coming in to ask the United States for a security guarantee that we would intervene militarily if China resumed hostilities with India.

Now this is something the Indians said they would never do. They would take military assistance but they had begun to get snotty, they didn't really need it. They had gone way back again to being arms length...we'll do you a favor and on our terms take some military assistance. Here they came in asking us to come in and chase the Chinese out if they come back in again. I was very sensitive to what he was leading up to and I am literally writing as fast as I can in order to get every single word. So when he is finished there is sort of a pause. I look up and Secretary Rush says to me, "Did you get that down?" I felt like saying, "What the hell do you think I have been doing scribbling getting writers cramp?" He was a little surprised by the request and to have a notetaker there at an historic moment.

So the United States did issue a muted warning and did send a carrier into the Bay of Bengal, but it all sort of faded away. But that incident never got into the history books.

Q: I heard reference to it some other time, at least at a later date there was talk about a sort of assumption on the part of some Americans and some Indians that there was an agreement.

LAKELAND: Yes. And the government of India officially denied it and we said nothing. There was an Indian who later on had access to this and surfaced it in a way on a trip to the United States that raised some great interest and the Indian press went wild over it and the Indian government absolutely denied it and we never said a word.

But I was there. I came back down and they all wanted to know what happened. I said, "Wait, let me write the telegram." So it went out as a "NODIS IMMEDIATE" to Delhi. Then Nick Veliotis, who was a political/military officer in Delhi, never saw the telegram. The DCM later asked him, "What are we going to do about this?" And he said, "What about what?" He finally, with great difficulty, got to read the cable. I guess they held it in the front office. Being a notetaker you can be there at interesting times.

From there I went to another very interesting assignment. Well, to get off the Desk, this is a very interesting thing because it supposedly is out of Foreign Service experience. My tour of duty is up. It is time for me to move on. I ask what is up and get a job offer in another Bureau. They say, "Well, we are not going to release you until we get a replacement for you satisfactory to us." I said, "What does this mean? Personnel assign officers. They have guys in Delhi. I know two guys in Delhi who are perfectly capable of handling this job." "No," they vetoed all the NEA Personnel nominations. Now this is ridiculous. This is a crummy little Desk Officer job. And we had been fighting for two years anyway. And I was really kind of desperate to get out of that place.

Now there was an Indian analyst over in CIA who was well liked and well regarded. I asked whether they would take Herb Haggerty. They said, "Oh, yeah, Herb we would take," not thinking anything would come of this. So I persuaded him to resign from the Agency and come over and become a desk officer. He got a Reserve appointment and later became an FSO and took my place. That was the only way I could get out of that damn job.

VERNON C. JOHNSON
Agricultural Program Assistant, International Cooperation Administration
New Delhi (1957-1959)

Dr. Vernon C. Johnson was born in Mississippi in 1918. He received a bachelor's degree from Southern University in 1948 and a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1954. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1942-1946. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania. Dr. Johnson was interviewed April 12, 1994 by W. Haven North.

JOHNSON: This was 1957 and, I believe, it was the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Any way, I received a reply to my letter saying the position in Guatemala was filled but that a position was open in India. After follow-up I was employed and assigned the position of agricultural program assistant in New Delhi. As it happened, this was a very low level position not withstanding my degree, but I was determined to make the best of it.

Q: Had you known anything about Point Four type work before?

JOHNSON: I had skimmed articles on development theory, etc. since much of the subject-matter was related to agricultural economics. It was a new adventure, nonetheless, but I said "well look, it sounds O.K. so I'll give it a shot." The mission in India was called the Technical Cooperation Mission (TCM).

Q: Left over from the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) days or Point Four.

JOHNSON: That's right, so I worked in India for two years.

India was a most interesting country. Independence had come and the country had been partitioned to create Pakistan. It had just emerged from terrible internal fighting between Muslims and Hindus. Language issues, food shortages, and population pressures were among India's many problems. Among the basic institutions, there were several universities, but they had little to do with economic development. They were in the tradition of the British university to highlight the professions (law, medicine, etc.) and to teach but in the meantime far less on subjects having to do with economic development.

Q: These were universities in general or agricultural universities?

JOHNSON: When our Mission decided to assist at the university level, we selected those that taught more agricultural courses, but even at such institutions agricultural research was weak. You may recall that one of the most successful of AID's projects is the university development that we fostered in India in which features of our land grant system were introduced to these universities in India. We sent literally hundreds of Indians to the U.S. to earn U.S. degrees. Each Indian university was assisted by, and attached to, a "sister" U.S. university -Ohio State, University of Tennessee, Missouri, Kansas State, etc. I was one of the persons who drafted the first PPA(project paper) to support these universities in India. In such papers we laid out the project purpose, objectives, courses of action to be taken, U.S. costs, how much and how many of each resource to be provided, numbers of Indians to be trained, responsibilities of the Indians, etc.

Q: You were there when this university project was started?

JOHNSON: Yes, even before it was started. Because the main purpose was to upgrade agriculture. The Agricultural Division of the Mission rather than the Education Division was assigned this project. Our Mission like other A.I.D. Missions had agricultural, education, health divisions and, of course, administrative units. I have some of the old papers downstairs covering our assistance to the Indian universities.

Even these universities, which are now successful and are making a real contribution to development, went through a long transition period of 15-20 years before their impact was felt. It was not until U.S. trained Indian scholars filtered into high positions at the universities and into government positions where support decisions are made and until an institutional structure was laid that change became a goal in itself. When all of these things began to come together, the universities became very progressive in doing agricultural research work and other work in development. So even if you do the right thing, nothing much happens until a lot of variables come together so that a critical mass is formed around a particular intent; that certainly was the case in India. So that was my first post.

Q: How long were you there?

JOHNSON: I was there only two years-1957-59.

Q: Did you have any particular impressions of India; did you get out into the rural areas and the farming communities? What was your impression of Indian agriculture at that time?

JOHNSON: Yes, well compared with American agriculture, it was antiquated, bullock powered, more people than you have ever seen, rural villages everywhere. However, the production of food was spotty. As for production complements, there were tube wells so that irrigation covered thousands of acres. With U.S. assistance, fertilizer plants commenced production. There was also a railroad system that could move goods. It was one of the best in Asia, at the time. So transportation did not present the kind of problems that was experienced in a lot of other developing countries. India had some things going for it that were quite beyond anything that I later experienced in Africa. And therefore, it is misleading to make a comparison that the Indian case is good example of what can be done in Africa. I never took this idea as being very helpful.

Q: Wasn't that the time when people despaired of Indian agriculture; that the country would never feed itself?

JOHNSON: Very few gave the country much hope; it was a big country steeped in tradition; religious elements including the caste structure was said to hold back development. The historical make-up of India was considered to be a constraint to development. There was some despair at the time and it took twenty years to work through it; to get people educated, to put the right emphasis on development, to put capital into agriculture and other elements. As noted, we helped to establish the first fertilizer plants in the country. Steel mills came in at that time; the Germans assisted as did the Russians. The Americans helped to improve several that were already in the country, e.g., the Tata Plant, that kind of thing. So India strengthened its infrastructure, but it took time to develop and to mesh other elements of development into a growing country. India's products are now featured on the New York Stock Exchange here and are doing very well in that market. They found a way. Population has grown by 200 million people over the past 25 years; yet, they found a way to feed themselves.

Q: Did you work with the Indians; what was your relationship?

JOHNSON: Well, of course, there were Indians within the A.I.D. organization; they were among the best local employees anywhere, in terms of knowledge and ability. The typist in our office could do 90-100 words a minute on manual typewriters and had a memory of elephant proportions; he was a person who remembered the name of every person we sent overseas for training; and, on every other subject, he made a point of not having to go to the files. So we had excellent people to work with in India. In the rural areas we had, of course, our counterparts and we visited villages together to observe farming practices. The counterpart system has had its flaws in India as well as elsewhere. But we did the useful things that A.I.D. does well. We knew what was going on and that kind of thing and had some success in bringing change.

Q: Were there many direct hire agriculturists (A.I.D. employees) as well as the university contractors?

JOHNSON: Most were direct hire; but there was a considerable number of contract people as well.

Q: How many would you say?

JOHNSON: I'd say 150 something like that, plus contractors at each of the assisted universities. You may recall, however, in the Nixon Administration, direct hires were reduced to persons called "generalists." Contract employees were from universities and PASAs (Participating Agency Service Agreements with U.S. Government agencies). They did most of the technical work. This was unlike the technical work in India which was mainly done by direct hire people.

Q: What was your impression of the Agency's development policies in those days?

JOHNSON: As I said, I went there with no clear conception of where the priorities should be. But, I think, the most lasting thing is the institution building that we did. Other work was useful; we had a large Mission; it was well staffed; it was well funded considering the time. India was one of the countries that was reasonably high on AID's priority list; we thought it was a good place to test ideas about development.

Q: Apart from the institution building were there any other dimensions of the development policy or strategy at that time that were particularly distinctive?

JOHNSON: Well, we had the education division, the health division: all of these were elements of our development work there that went very well. We associated ourselves with clinics. Most assistance took the form of resource transfers. Development loans were just appearing on the horizon. Food aid was a major program; it had come into prominence during the late 1950s. You can imagine that in a country like India famine was weighed by the size of every crop harvest.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Embassy or the Ambassador or sense of U.S. overall policy?

JOHNSON: Not at my level. I was functioning as an Agricultural Program Assistant whose duty was to grind out the paper. Except for Indian friends and Indians in agriculture as counterparts my contacts were limited. At higher levels, our Food and Agricultural Officer, for example, actually had his office in the Ministry of Agriculture, not in A.I.D. That was Dr. Parker. That proved to be a very fruitful way because they trusted him fully.

Q: The relations with the Indian bureaucracy was on good terms?

JOHNSON: The Indian civil service had many good people but the bureaucracy itself was ponderous with many flaws. The caste system had a deleterious impact on almost everything that occurred in India. Some people in positions of influence were competent while some were not; so there was a variation in the quality of people who were in charge. Indians were always very zealous about their sovereignty; despite that fact that the U.S. was providing assistance, there was always a question of how far as a foreign entity we should be trusted. Therefore, ours was a particular relationship.

Q: In other words there was considerable sensitivity if you pushed too hard on policy issues.

JOHNSON: That's right though many strong friendships existed at personal levels. My Indian experience was my first one and a useful one. After thirty years, I still correspond with people that I knew there. Many were Indian agriculturists who were trained here and who worked in the A.I.D. office at the time.

Q: Anything else on the India experience?

JOHNSON: No, in summary, I think it was a country of great importance. Later we began to dampen our assistance there, but, I think, they are grateful for our help during their early days of independence. Currently, India is doing much better economically. It is a democracy with a

market economy and a good university system, so perhaps A.I.D. should receive more credit than has been given.

MILTON LEAVITT
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Bombay (1958-1960)

After serving in the Air Force in World War II, Milton Leavitt worked for IIE (a predecessor to the U.S. Information Agency) in Legaspi and then at Amerika Haus in Munich. He also served in India, Colombia, Peru, and Thailand. This interview was conducted on February 26, 1989.

LEAVITT: When I finished that assignment, I requested an overseas post again. I had a medical problem which wasn't serious. This was a residual from my prison camp days, a liver problem, which I cleared up. Then I went to India as a Cultural Affairs Officer in Bombay. Dan Oleksiw, at the time, was the branch PAO. There again, Bombay was an interesting and exciting assignment. We traveled extensively throughout the Bombay area with our mobile units, traveling exhibits, and speakers, and so on. India was a new experience for me. It was a part of the world that I had not been to before. I had been to the Far East and Europe by this time, but India was new and exciting, and very, very rewarding.

Bombay was the center for printing for USIS at the time, *SPAN* magazine and a lot of publications came out of Bombay. We had the entire building to ourselves on Queen's Road, if I remember correctly.

Q: *The was during Nehru's incumbency, wasn't it?*

LEAVITT: That's right.

Q: *How did you find the attitude of the Indian people? Nehru was always sort of at arms length with the U.S. Government, and he didn't seem to adhere too much to the American viewpoint. I wondered if you found any reaction on the part of the Indians?*

LEAVITT: Bombay is the city in India to which important cultural events come. So we worked closely with the Bombay music group and other organizations to help bring in these cultural activities. We didn't find any of the "anti" feelings in Bombay, not even in the outlying areas where we traveled quite extensively. Now this might not have been true of Madras or Delhi or Calcutta, but in Bombay we had no problem with that. Madras was quite cooperative and worked closely with us and we worked closely them. We had a very compatible relationship with Indians, at least the whole time I was there.

Q: *Was the general population of the Bombay area again supportive of Nehru politically or did they pay much attention to him?*

LEAVITT: They were quite active politically, and I'd say the Parsi group especially was quite active. They were quite aware politically of what was going on, and I think they were very pro-Nehru. When he came to give a speech on the beach area, hundreds of thousands of people would be there. Of course, there are hundreds of thousands of people all over the place anyway, but he drew enthusiastic audiences all the time.

Q: *What period was that when you were in Bombay?*

LEAVITT: That was up through 1958-1960. I was then returned to Washington, and again, I had a medical problem which was cleared up. But I had a stateside assignment for about a year with the International Visitors Program. That was a very interesting time for me. I worked closely with two people whom I remember quite fondly. One was Norman Cousins, who went to India for us, and Henry Kissinger who went to Pakistan and India. And I can recall how impressed I was with Henry Kissinger at the time.

Q: *He was still a Harvard professor.*

LEAVITT: He was a Harvard professor at the time and married to his first wife. He was connected with disarmament. He had just written a book on disarmament or something at Harvard at the time. He went through and lectured for us in India and Pakistan, and Norman Cousins also lectured for us in India.

I remember a very cute little incident with Cousins. After he got back, the Agency owed him quite a bit of money for per diem, not travel, but per diem. I called him up and I said, "Where can I send the check?"

And he said, "Gee, I was wine and dined no matter where I went." He said, "I really don't deserve that money so you better keep it."

I said, "Well, all right." So I gave it back, turned the problem over to administration and what they did with it I don't know. But he didn't want the money. He felt he didn't deserve that money since he didn't have to spend any money. I thought that was quite admirable of Cousins at the time.

STEPHEN H. ROGERS
Economic Officer
New Delhi (1959)

Ambassador Stephen H. Rogers was born in 1931 and grew up in New York. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956, where his posts included in India, France, The United Kingdom, Mexico, South Africa, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Swaziland. He was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing on July 27, 1994.

ROGERS: I had to go back and finish the A-100 course. Remember at that time they sometimes split it. So I went back to the second six-week portion and learned about consular matters, which I had absolutely nothing to do with anytime since.

As I remember I told the Foreign Service that I didn't mind where they sent me, but I would rather not go to India because it was hot, sticky, crowded and there was disease, etc. So in April, 1959, we left for New Delhi and spent a little over two years in the embassy there in the economic section. We enjoyed it immensely. It was a very exciting experience.

Q: Who was the ambassador there at that time?

ROGERS: It was Ellsworth Bunker. I always think about him when we talk about the difference between career and non-career ambassadors. He was as close to a career ambassador as you can come without being one. He had five or six different missions in his time with the State Department. I had tremendous respect for him. I had a certain amount of contact with him, not a great deal of contact, but enough to see him in action and develop respect for his integrity, his sensitivity to the Indian scene, etc. It was a little bit difficult for us at that point in India for various reasons.

Then John Kenneth Galbraith replaced him about two months before we left New Delhi, so I got to know him a little bit.

Q: That was at the beginning of the Kennedy administration in 1961. You were the junior officer in the economic section and did a range of reporting?

ROGERS: Yes.

Q: And commercial work also?

ROGERS: No, not as such. It was economic issues and economic reporting, a certain amount of contacts, a certain amount of travel to see how the economy was coming. It was the time when Nehru was the prime minister and he believed very firmly in building a base of heavy industry. Of course, we had some problem with that approach, but it went ahead without our assistance. He got his assistance from the Russians and to some extent the British and the French and others. But we pretty much stayed out of these major heavy industry projects because we disagreed in principle to the approach.

Q: We had some assistance programs of our own at the time, didn't we?

ROGERS: Oh, we had very substantial programs. We had a very large mission, TCM, Technical Cooperation Mission. My recollection is it was agriculture, education and that kind of thing. But I don't remember it in great detail. But, a very important part of our program was PL 480. While we were there we signed a very large agreement for PL 480 grains for India with the expectation that this would cover the time until India could be self-sufficient. Well, it took far longer, I take

it. I haven't been back to India since 1961. It took far longer than we had anticipated, but finally it seems to have happened, and that is good.

Q: This is a period not long after partition and independence for India and Pakistan, but before the next major war between them in 1965. Did you travel to Pakistan?

ROGERS: No. We were certainly aware of the tensions and the history and all, but we could not, as I recall, we certainly did not, cross the border on land. Flying in we flew from Karachi, so there was that link at least.

While I was there the main focus of concern was on China. There was an incursion by the Chinese into Ladakh in the north and there was a certain amount of fighting there, which I take it sounded far worse back here than it did to us sitting in New Delhi. But still, it was a matter of concern. The Chinese were building their embassy very close to ours in the new diplomatic enclave, Chanakyapuri, and they stopped work on it. Things became quite tense.

Q: Had our new embassy been completed during the time you were there?

ROGERS: The chancery, yes, but the residence not.

Q: The architect for the chancery was Edward Durell Stone.

ROGERS: Right. I liked that building. It had been opened for just three months when we got there. I thought it was beautiful and enjoyed it. A lot of people didn't care for it because it was an open rectangle and you had to walk around the courtyard to get somebody from the economic section over to the political section or other parts of the embassy. I thought it was a magnificent building and was very pleased with it.

Q: Did your wife teach in New Delhi?

ROGERS: She did. There was an American school. She taught about half time because we had a little girl by that time.

Q: Born in New Delhi?

ROGERS: No, she was five or six months old when we went to New Delhi. So Kent could teach...she wasn't really asked, she was sort of told that they needed her. She taught in what was called the old Taj Barracks, which had very high ceilings and pretty surroundings. But she loved it because she could do anything she wanted in her room. There was lots of wall space way up if she wanted to put things on and nobody cared about whether there was going to be a little sticky stuff left over and that kind of thing. So she enjoyed teaching there.

ELEANORE RAVEN-HAMILTON
Wife of USAID Officer, Jacques Raven

New Delhi (1959-1962)

Ms. Raven-Hamilton was born and raised in New York and educated at Rosemont College and the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. After working in the Visitors Center in New York City, she joined the Foreign Service in 1957. Shortly thereafter she was required to resign her commission upon marriage to a USAID officer in 1957. Mrs. Raven then accompanied her husband on his assignments to New Delhi, Beirut, San Francisco and Paris. In 1974 she rejoined the Foreign Service and was posted to Teheran, The Hague and Belfast, where she served as Consul General. She also served several tours at the State Department in Washington, DC. Ms. Raven-Hamilton was interviewed by Edward Dillery in 2009.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: We arrived in India just before the famous visit of President Eisenhower. It was the first visit ever of a sitting American president. Delhi went wild. The excitement was extraordinary. Because hotel rooms were so scarce, we had to stay in Old Delhi, away from most of the action. We stayed in a lovely old government house from the British Raj, now a hotel, out on the "Civil Lines" (a British division of cities to denote areas with civilian buildings and residences). The house had wonderful gardens and high ceilings with fans -- and aggressive monkeys in the garden and some very large bugs. It was like being in a novel or watching a film about the Raj.

In fact, at the hotel, we met another American guest, James Ivory, who went on to make so many famous films about India with Ismail Merchant. We did a lot of things with Jim during the time we were all at the hotel, including going to hear Eisenhower speak to the huge crowd.

Q: Now this was 1959 right?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, just before Christmas, 1959. After the Eisenhower visit, we moved to a hotel in New Delhi closer to the Embassy. Then we moved to a "bungalow" (an Indian word) that turned out to be a two story building housing four families, three Indian and us. That was a great experience. Sunder Nagar is now considered a posh area of New Delhi. We visited it in April 2010, and it looks very prosperous, indeed. I was pleased to see how some of the nondescript maidans (large grassy squares surrounded by houses) had been transformed with trees and flowers into beautiful gardens. Some houses were unchanged, but our bungalow has been replaced by a very large house built for a single family.

We lived on the second floor, in a three bedroom apartment with a balcony veranda, again very high ceilings, and thick walls. We also had access to the flat roof, part of which was covered -- a great place for an evening dance party. The house was built to protect against the heat in a pre-air conditioning time. In the winter, without any central heating, it was quite cold despite some small heaters. But it was bearable in the summer, even when we lost electricity. We did have air conditioning units in the bedrooms, so we could sleep. However, in the heat of summer, just before the monsoon, the air in Delhi was thick with sand because there had not been any rain since the previous summer. The winds were so high that dust was everywhere, including inside

the air-conditioning units. We had ceiling fans in every room, another touch of the Raj. The fans helped but mainly blew around the dust.

I got to know two of the women in our bungalow fairly well. They were Punjabi sisters-in law, and I discovered how strong Punjabi women were. They ran the house and their husbands, but even they probably had little power outside their immediate family and outside the house. Our neighbors all lived in nuclear family arrangements, but were tightly woven into the family of their husbands, whose father ruled the whole family.

Our other neighbor in the bungalow lived a more restricted life. Her family came from a small sub-caste in the middle of the country. Her husband owned a travel agency, but his wife never went anywhere. Their very bright daughter started university, but was pulled out, because, in the culture of their sub-caste, they might never have found her a husband for her if she were too educated. She also should not have been in mixed classes and associating with boys. She told me she loved it and was doing well academically.

But, she was married off -- into a family that mistreated her. Our neighborhood Punjabi women were angry about that. Shortly before we left India, our Punjabi neighbors confronted the girl's father and forced him to intercede on her behalf with the husband's family and also demand that she be allowed to visit her family alone. They succeeded. Just before we left I was told that the girl would be allowed to visit. Those Punjabi women were tough.

Q: How did they manifest that?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Well, for example, they invited me sometimes, to join a group of women for morning coffee. One Punjabi woman asked me how many children I wanted. I said, "Oh, my husband and I thought we would like to have two children." The women jumped on me and demanded, "What does your husband have to do with this? This is your decision."

Q: Oh, that kind of tough. I see. And you were about to greet a newcomer around this time. Is that right? Your first child.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, Rob was born July 5, 1960, the day before the monsoon broke.

Q: So you were pretty well acclimated by the time Rob was born.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: We had been there about six months. Rob was born in a very good hospital, Holy Family hospital, run by an American order of sisters, who were doctors, nurses and medical technicians and administrators. His father was able to be in the delivery room for the birth and was given an introduction to the process of childbirth by the American obstetrician-surgeon who ran the hospital, another nun. She explained to Jacques what she was doing and why. When we were leaving Delhi, I was about six months pregnant with our second child. We planned to stop in Afghanistan, Turkey, Austria, France and New York on the way back to Washington. She said, "Don't worry, I don't think the baby will be early. I told your husband exactly what he has to do if the baby starts to come. It is going to be all right, don't worry." Which I didn't, and we went ahead on our indirect travel home.

Q: Did you meet other Indian families?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, in addition to the three families sharing our building, a lot of foreign and Indian women supported the Holy Family hospital, and I worked with them. An English woman with whom I volunteered became a life-long friend. We had several close Indian friends too.

We also met a lot of foreigners and Indians when we joined the Delhi Gymkhana Club, which was an old institution of the Raj. It used to cater to the British and Europeans, but now has mainly Indian members. It was the kind of place you would find in a film of the 1920s or 30s. High ceilings, portraits of the “good and the great,” many servants in turbans and livery, and all that. There was a covered swimming pool in the gardens, the “Lady Willingdon Swimming Bath,” where I practically lived. It was so hot, and we didn’t have much running water except in the middle of the night. I would collect water then and fill bathtubs and various containers, so we could cook, wash ourselves and clothes, and flush toilets.

It was such a sight in the Gymkhana to see the Indian Army and Navy officers, who were leading members of the Club in postcolonial India. We watched them walking along with their swagger sticks in a way no other group of officers seems to manage. Another vestige of the Raj.

I also met some members of the legendary Indian Civil Service created under the British Raj to help run the country. They were such an amazing group of people. Their training and exams were formidable. I was delighted to have had the chance to talk to a few of them and even more delighted that I never had had to meet their standards to join the American government.

We traveled as much as possible and met Indians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians, many of whom seemed more British than the British. The Anglo-Indians lost their place in society when the Raj ended. They had been educated for a world that no longer existed and had lost their privileges and the jobs reserved for them. Many were impoverished and sadly rootless in independent India. Some spoke to me of England as their home, even though they had never actually been there.

We went to Kashmir at one point and spent two wonderful weeks on a house boat on a Dal Lake (Nagin Lake). That was an amazing experience. Absolutely wonderful. Kashmir is so beautiful!

At that point, Rob was just a year old. I had filled our suitcases with jars of American foods for toddlers. But the cook on the house boat started feeding him curry.

Q: He liked it?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: He loved curry. He ate fish and duck and chicken and curries of all sorts. He absolutely refused to have anything to do with the tasteless “junior food” I had brought for him. We flew part way from Kashmir in a DC 3 through the mountain valleys and then had to take the train from Pathankot, a cantonment town on the Indo-Pakistani border, back to Delhi. It was tense at that time, and Indian and Pakistani troops were confronting each other along the

border. We had a very long wait in Pathonkot's train station before trains were allowed to move again. I was pregnant and not feeling very well.

Rob would not eat the baby food, nor would he eat the rather awful "Western" food we had ordered. His Ayah, Kamila, said, "Don't worry; I will take him to the Indian restaurant. Don't you come with me." Rob was as happy as could be and seemed to have eaten well -- but I never asked questions. He drank tea whenever he could possibly manage to get some. He still drinks tea Indian style, maybe not with quite as much sugar now. He still loves curry and rice.

Another trip we made a little later was to Nepal. Katmandu seemed to me to be a Shangri-La accentuated by the giddiness I felt because of the high altitude. On the way back to India, our plane was delayed by several hours, and we lost our hotel reservation in Calcutta. We did not know exactly what to do. It was quite late, and, as usual, when I was pregnant and tired, I was not feeling too well. A young man we met on the plane said, "Why don't you come home with me? My wife is also pregnant, and we are all about the same age." He took us home, and we took them out for dinner. We spent, I guess, two days with them, and he introduced us to Calcutta. We had a wonderful time with them. I was surprised when he started singing a long nineteenth century American sort of music hall ballad that my father used to sing and that I had never heard anywhere else. They were a terrific couple. Although we never saw them again, we kept in touch for a while. I am very grateful for their welcome and for teaching us so much about Calcutta, which I think is an amazing, vibrant city with so many beautiful buildings in the midst of such poverty. I thoroughly enjoy the Bengalis, the literary leaders of India.

Q: Did you miss working?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes, to some extent. Shortly after I arrived in Delhi, about three months pregnant, I was at a party having after-dinner coffee with the Embassy's admin counselor and someone in the political section. They were bemoaning their fate because the assignment of a junior political officer to Delhi had had to be broken. I had learned quite a bit about India by that time, reading as much as I could and talking to people. So, I reminded them of my experience at State and told them that my security clearance should still be good. I offered to work until someone could be assigned to the Embassy. The admin counselor turned to me rather angrily and said, "How dare you ask for a job now. You have made your choice. You knew the rules on marriage."

Q: Another memorable encounter.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: I was so floored; I was at a loss for words. After that, I just stayed away from the Embassy as much as I could. My husband was working with USAID (United States Agency for International Development), and I found that group much nicer. I really liked them very much.

Q: And they weren't in the same building or anything?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: No. They were in another building. I only had to go to the Embassy for shots and things like that.

Q: It didn't do you any good.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: No, and I never mentioned it again.

This was in 1960, and the American elections were coming up. Everyone was interested in our elections. All kinds of people, European and Indian, would ask me about the election. My close British friend, who had read economics at Oxford, and I agreed that, while our children played in the maidan (the little park like space in our neighborhood), I would teach her about American history and politics and she would teach me economics. Our children were the same age and were easy to supervise. So, Mary and I did that, but excitement over the upcoming American election focused our minds. I did not learn much about economics!

Q: Everyone was so curious about our election.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Oh yes. It was Kennedy-Nixon. People were fascinated by Kennedy, the young man who represented the changing of the guard. The Embassy was able to get the TV footage of their debates, and invitations to watch them at the Embassy were prized. We took as many friends as we could to see them, including Mary.

Q: Reminiscent of what happened in 2008.

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Yes. There was so much interest abroad and a feeling that the torch really was being passed to a whole new generation.

When we were in Kashmir, I used to have long talks with a Kashmiri man who spoke English quite well and was very well informed about the American political system. He asked me questions about the election process and about Kennedy. He really knew a lot of the ins and outs of technical parts of our electoral system, even asking about voting in the electoral college. I was impressed and asked him what he was reading to have kept up so closely with our elections. He replied that he listened to the radio, but he did not know how to read. His granddaughter read the newspapers to him every day. Here he was, illiterate in his own language, and he practically could have taught, in English, an American high school class about the American political system.

Q: Amazing, and all second hand through the newspapers and radio. Did he listen to Voice of America or BBC?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: BBC probably. Maybe both and Indian news. I don't remember anymore. I was stunned when he said he couldn't read.

Q: How long were you in New Delhi?

RAVEN-HAMILTON: Just two years. Jacques was reassigned to Washington in November. On our way back, we stopped in places I had always wanted to see. Kabul was one. I was fascinated by Babur, the first Mogul emperor, and also wanted to see his famous gardens of which there

was not much evidence. One of the interesting things I remember was being outside the big market in Kabul and seeing a woman completely covered in a burqa (head to toe covering) leading by the hand her son, who was wearing a New York Yankees baseball jacket. There was a big market for second hand clothes in Afghanistan. That is where his mother must have bought it. We could not see the Bamiyan Buddhas, later destroyed by the Taliban -- the roads were too rough for me -- but we saw a lot.

Then, we went to Istanbul, a city I had long wanted to see and have visited many times now. We went to Vienna, where we had friends, and then spent several weeks in Paris, where Rob met his French grandmother and his great grandparents and to New York to meet his American grandparents. When we arrived in Washington, Rob and I started looking around for a house.

FRANK E. SCHMELZER, JR.
Political Officer
Madras (1959-1962)

Frank E. Schmelzer, Jr. was born in Massachusetts in 1927. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a master's degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Germany, India, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Washington, DC. Mr. Schmelzer was interviewed by Mike Springmann on December 1, 1992.

SCHMELZER: After that I had some more university training. This time it was courtesy of the State Department. First I had nine months of Hindustani at the Foreign Service Institute, then a year of university training at Berkeley consisting of more language and history, etc.

Then I went to Madras as a political officer. Here we begin to pickup another theme. This was in that period of our history in the Foreign Service when it was fashionable to believe that we had to know everything about everything. I was in the political section and I wanted to stay on until the 1962 general elections. The result was that I stayed in Madras for four years.

I remember we made an assessment of every one of the constituencies in south India and there were approximately a thousand of them. We made a projection as to who was going to win in each one.

Q: *These were the districts for the...?*

SCHMELZER: ...For the 1962 general election. Most of these were for the state assemblies in the four states of south India, but they also included the members of Parliament that are elected from there to go to New Delhi.

Galbraith was Ambassador at the time. I remember the word from the Embassy was that he was wondering why we were going to all this trouble. Why not just wait until after the elections were over and read in the newspapers what had happened?

Well, of course, the answer to that is that if you adopt that more relaxed approach, then you don't know what the election results mean, whereas you do know if you have really been grubbing around beforehand. But I believe we were over-doing it at that time.

During this period in Madras I was fairly aggressive, perhaps overly so. The result was that at one time the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi sent a Diplomatic Note to the Embassy complaining about me. They said that I was being too aggressive in pursuing the Communists in south India. But that was not the real reason, I think. I think the reason I got their goat was that I discovered on one of my trips into southern Madras state that the Congress Party had kidnapped some members of the opposition party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), or Dravidian Progressive Federation, and kept them sequestered while some of the local elections were going on so that the DMK, could not exercise its majority rights. And thus the Congress Party maintained their control of that area. I made the mistake of letting one of the local officials know that I had that story. I think that was what was behind the Diplomatic Note.

Before I went out on tours I would write ahead and make appointments. On one of my trips to Kerala, where the Communist Party is very strong, I had written to make an appointment with the General Secretary of the Communist Party in that state and had no answer from him, but I went to see him anyway. I don't think he liked it.

Then one time while on tour in Andhra Pradesh I heard that Sanjeeva Reddy, President of the All India Congress Party was in his home. I am afraid I burst in on him and got him out of his bathtub. I was overdoing this.

But this raises an interesting story. Earlier, while I was in New Delhi, I think I came to the attention of the Communist Party. For one thing I was a Harvard man. Now I read one time that the KGB took out files on anybody who graduated from Harvard. I find that hard to believe because it would be excessive, I think, even for them. But there I was working as a clerk in the Embassy. I had all these friends in New Delhi. A lot of Indian Army officers. I used to give all these parties. Maybe I had a little more profile than I should have had for a clerk, particularly in the eyes of the Russians who used chauffeurs, etc. as their KGB agents.

One time I gave a large party. I had a lot of thirsty Indian friends and we decided to have some fun and give a "one million BC" party. So we had a greased flag pole, a couple of girls came in tiger skins, all men were stripped to the waist as they came in. I had a 40 gallon barrel of beer that had been sitting there in the shade for about a week so the hops would settle. Indian beer in the bottle was great but in the barrel it wasn't good. The only people that would drink that stuff were the Indian Army officers. We had a dancing bear and a couple of roast pigs.

So we were having a pretty good time. As the men came in they stripped to the waist, put on a beard, and I gave them an earthen pot of this beer. This began to draw a crowd. One of my Indian buddies and I were feeling no pain after a while and we went over to the crowd and grabbed this one little guy who was looking in at us. We just lifted him up over the fence, stripped him and made him drink a pot of this stinking beer.

Well, we shouldn't have done that. About three weeks later the Communist monthly, "The New Age" had a story about our party..."Culture of the Vulture." It turns out that the little fellow that we had grabbed was the editor of that magazine and he didn't like it.

Q: Was there fallout in the Embassy about that?

SCHMELZER: No, and I thought there might have been, but there was not. They thought it was rather amusing.

I mention this because later, while I was in Madras sometimes some Indians would confuse me with somebody else from a sister agency. I looked somewhat like him. This was confusing to any Communist who might be following the scene. I also was very friendly with someone with a very sensitive position in one of the Indian Services and there was a very interesting arrangement I had with him. We were just friends.

Subsequently, an officer came out from Washington to look for somebody to be sent to Afghanistan. They wanted someone with a little pizzazz because it was difficult to operate in the police state environment there. Based on my record they chose me. So I went up Kabul.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of questions. What was your role in the consulates...Madras and Frankfurt...with the Embassy? Were you running your own independent fiefdom or was it like my experience in Saudi Arabia that whatever you wrote had to be cleared with the higher ups in the Embassy? Did you have your own show?

SCHMELZER: Yes, we did. In Frankfurt we had our own operation, the Refugee Relief Program. We were the largest single unit doing this Germany-wide, although we were getting guidance from the Embassy. In Madras, however, the consulates did their own political reporting and sent copies to the Embassy. We took some guidance from them. They told us what they wanted us to place emphasis on, but, no, we had our own reporting and sent the Embassy copies of it.

Often we had a different point of view than the Embassy. Sometimes we were better informed than they were, too. For example, I remember the question of Goa when Galbraith was the Ambassador and he was reporting back...the consulates would see some of the Embassy reporting, but not all of it...so we knew that Galbraith was reporting back to Washington that Nehru had assured him that the Indians would not move into Goa. We knew god damn well that he would. We had seen troop movements. It was not that we could read Nehru's mind but we just knew Nehru was going to move in. It was just quite clear. And he did. We tried to tell that to the Embassy, but they couldn't do anything because Galbraith was giving them the line. He was just wrong on this and wouldn't take advice from us or his own political officers on that issue.

This, of course, gets to another point...You have heard this before and probably have been subjected to it yourself. I refer to the junior officer who seems to be closest to the ground and sometimes comes up with an analysis or a point of view which the seniors don't like. This happened to me in Madras. After two years in Madras I was well tuned in. I would go home at night and the phone would begin to ring and by 8:00 o'clock there would be 20 or 30 Indians there. Of course, they wanted to drink my free booze, but I just had very good relations with

these people. So I was extremely well informed. One result of that was that I knew very well what the opposition party, the DMK, was doing. I would tell the Consul General that they would move way ahead in the coming election and in five years would take over the government in that state. Well, that would make him furious because he was getting the New Delhi line from the governor and the chief minister, that the Congress Party was strong and was going to win the elections and that the opposition party was a bunch of creeps and not reliable, etc.

The Consul General got so mad with me that he would not let me report on Madras state, which I knew so well. I did the other three states. Indeed, I had the best record in India in predicting what was going to happen. But the Consulate "blew" Madras because the guy he made do the reporting on Madras had to reflect the view of the Consul General. I kept telling him that he was making a big mistake.

Q: Did this show up in your efficiency reports?

SCHMELZER: Well, it didn't help me any.

Q: Had you ever sent a dissenting cable to Washington or official-informal letters saying you disagreed?

SCHMELZER: I think that I probably did, I don't remember. I must have sent a letter or two, perhaps not a cable. But you see that sort of thing all the time in the Foreign Service. It is a pity.

I thought I might say one or two things about the foreign cultures you serve in, because I think this is important.

Q: Yes, a lot of people nowadays do not get plugged into a culture. They sit back with their VCRs and do their time and get out.

SCHMELZER: I was fortunate because before I went to India I had already had graduate training and had studied Sanskrit, Hindustani, Indian culture, etc. and had a pretty good idea of what to expect. I had also been exposed to Americans who had focused on the language, the history and philosophy of India and then had been shocked by the reality of the thing when they actually got to India.

Q: You get the taxi driver who wants to take you for a tour of New Delhi instead of going down the road a half mile to the hotel.

SCHMELZER: Precisely. So you know all about this. An extreme example of the importance of this occurred while I was in the Embassy in New Delhi. You know secretaries assigned to the Embassy would usually get one, two or three weeks orientation at the Foreign Service Institute. It was rather short, probably useful, but not always effective as this example indicates.

Two girls had arrived and within two weeks or so they decided to go out on their own to a temple about 25 or 30 miles north of New Delhi during a festival period. There was a big celebration. They went on their own. Most of the rural people who flocked to this temple for the big show

were peasants who had never seen white women before and certainly had never had an opportunity to pinch them on the bottom and the breasts, which they proceeded to do. So these women were jammed into a corner of the temple and were pinched black and blue. They finally got out of there and came back to the Embassy the worse for wear. One of these girls was psychotic and should have been evacuated immediately. She stayed on in the Embassy for two years and hated India and Indians and was a focal point of rage and hatred for those two years she was there. It was just so foolish. She obviously didn't learn anything in that orientation at FSI. Had they gone out to that temple with just one male, Indian or American, they would have had better treatment. And, of course, there really should have been two or three males along. That was one instance.

Another thing used to happen often, very curious, at cocktail parties. Let's say half of those standing in the room were Indian and the other half Americans and Europeans. You would notice a motion begin. The European and American would begin to back up. And I would watch this...it would be kind of fun to see it on a video and I bet you would have a circle there. What was going on? The Indian and the Americans have a different sense of space. So while the Indian was trying to get close enough to you to be comfortable in his relationship, the American has to back away to regain his proper sense of space. This creates a tiny bit of tension both for the American and the Indian. The Indian senses that the American is not being friendly and the American senses that the Indian is being too pushy. I caught on to this right away and would not back up. Immediately the Indian would sense that I was a friend, that I was on his side. That was very interesting.

Q: Did this make you more effective because the Indians would automatically open up to you?

SCHMELZER: Right. Absolutely. This was particularly true later on in Madras because I already knew this. When I got to Madras I had no problems at all.

While I was in Madras the Chinese attacked India. The Cuban missile crisis arose at the same time. I happened to be on tour in Kerala that same week. It was very interesting because the Indians for years had been at pains to be neutral, to exploit their neutralism and to trot out this expression "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai Hai," that is the Indians and Chinese were brothers. Within hours of that attack suddenly everything had changed. The Indians were running up to me in the streets and saying, "You Americans, of course, will come and help us after you take care of the Russians, won't you. The Chinese eat rats you know." It was interesting. Just like that. Here again, the cultural divide. They eat rats! The cultural divide, just like that. Wham!

Another thing about the Indians that was fascinating to me was their skill in argument. Of course this has been developed over centuries, particularly among the Brahmins. They are masters at this. And the Americans are not so good. We had this type of culture until Gutenberg came along and then we began to read, and no longer to memorize things. We no longer have the classical education which we had until the 19th century where they taught you logic and debating skills. Most Americans don't have that anymore. So in New Delhi I would see Americans reduced to tears from frustration. They would not know how to debate with these Indians. I would watch this and be terribly amused because I could see what the Indian was doing. He was comparing Indian ideals against American practice. And, of course, the deck is obviously stacked in his

favor when he does that. The trick is, of course, to state American ideals and compare them to Indian practice. Then the Indians would start to sputter. Of course, people like Krishna Menon and Nehru were using the same trick in a sense. It was really quite interesting.

The Russians, and I saw this in Kabul, also had strong cultural divides that were interesting. One of them, was with the Chinese...I think the Russians were really innately afraid of them. I remember one time when I was talking to some Russians about Chinese missile development, and you could smell a change, emanating perhaps from their armpits as if some chemical reaction had taken place. Curious.

In Stuttgart, in 1978 toward the end of my tour, I knew I was going to retire and study music, and I related this to my German friends with interesting reactions. Many had studied music when they were young, had always had a love of music, but had gone on into business, banking, and were married and had children. The German educational system and culture are in some ways more rigid than ours. You could see the eyes of some of these Germans light up. This was something they would like to do, but they couldn't. Their wives would immediately get nervous because they didn't want Hans to even entertain the idea of leaving his good position in the bank to go back to university to study music. It was a threat to them.

You mention this to an Indian and, of course, it was a great idea. To the Indian it was just the most natural thing in the world. Why? Because the Indians had that traditional sense of the four stages of life. You are young and a student, then a householder, then a civic member of society, and then you prepare for the fourth stage. In the fourth stage you go off into a jungle, read the religious books and prepare to die...to climb up the chain of consciousness, etc. In fact once I actually met a couple of Indians who had done this, who were living up in the foothills of the Himalayas. One had been the president of a medical school in the Punjab and the other one had been a professor.

Let me say one more brief thing about India, and these are personal experiences that I used indirectly in my second symphony, which I entitled "Taj Mahal." One of the things that some of us used to do in Delhi was to go out to Humayun's Tomb. I would take a flute and one of the ladies from the Embassy had a guitar and the acoustics in there were so wonderful that a guitar chord would sound just like an organ, and the flute was wonderful too. Another place we visited was Mathura on the Jumna River which is supposed to be the birth place of Krishna. There was a great scene there near his temple. People would go there for the so-called Arati ceremony at evening. They light a little candle and put it on a small piece of bark and float it down the river. They throw chickpeas in the river to feed the turtles, thereby keeping them away from the candles.

In Agra these turtles are not well fed. An American who had been through there told me the following unhappy story. One morning he happened to be behind the Taj Mahal on the river side where some people were washing clothes. One old man took off his turban to wash it and it got away from him. He stepped into deeper water to get it and a lot of these turtles grabbed him, pulled him under the water and ate him alive in front of everybody. These were the same turtles that you would see at Mathura, but here they were not well fed. A terrible story.

Q: Are these the same turtles they are reintroducing back into the rivers to clean up the pollution?

SCHMELZER: Yes, I think so. They have a head the size of your fist. They are a good size.

In Agra...I saw the Taj Mahal there three times in the full moonlight. A wonderful experience. It just seems to float. I mention this for two reasons. One, because I understand now you can't get in there anymore at night, that they have locked it up, which is a pity. It is a wonderful thing to see in full moonlight. It is almost a mystical experience. And I tried to get a sense of that in the last movement of this symphony...a sense of floating.

Q: I was severely criticized in Jeddah for entertaining and in Stuttgart they simply cut off my funds. I got no cooperation from the guy who used to rent out his maid for parties. I eventually packed it in and said, "The hell with it, I just can't do it." I was frustrated. But then nobody else entertained.

SCHMELZER: Well, we certainly did. We always did. In Madras I used to have parties anywhere from two to two hundred people. I was really set up for it there.

Nathan, my principal cook and bearer (I also had an assistant cook and a gardener), had great aplomb and could handle anything on short notice. He also could be relied upon the next day for a full report (X had this many whiskies, Y had so many plates of curry, Z tried to take A into the bush). And as I noted above, prohibition made my ample supply of booze quite attractive. (We also had an ayah, or nurse-maid, after our son was born -- dismissed, unhappily, when she was found to have leprosy).

ROGER ERNST
Development Officer, USAID
New Delhi (1959-1962)

Roger Ernst was born in New York in 1924. He graduated from Williams College in 1948 and the National War College in 1956. He served as an overseas Captain from 1943 to 1947. His career with USAID included assignments in India, Taiwan, Korea, Ethiopia and Thailand. Mr. Ernst was interviewed in 1997 by Arthur Lowrie.

ERNST: In the meantime, at one point, I was at the table one morning when the Ambassador went through the list of upcoming visitors of importance, and he said "Now we have the President's brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver, coming on a tour of exploration to see whether the Indian government would accept the American Peace Corps." And he looked around the table, he said "Ernst, you're the youngest, you're more like The Peace Corps." This was 1961, so I wasn't 40, 37 or something. He said "You take care of Shriver, you be his control officer." And that was wonderful. I made the hotel arrangements, set up the cars, arranged the meeting at the airport, and the itinerary, and I took the notes at the meetings. And the last night Shriver was there, he dined with the Ambassador, and the next morning I was called in and he said, "You're going to

set up the Peace Corps in India, I loaned you, I've donated you to the Peace Corps. And I made some reply to the effect, "Well, I'm not in a position to dispose of myself, I belong to Tyler Wood." He said "That's settled." I went to Tyler Wood and I said "What about this?" He said "Well, you do have a choice." I said "What do you think I should do?" He said. "You've got to settle whether you want to stay with AID or go with the Peace Corps. I don't know how long you'll stay with the Peace Corps." And I must have looked perplexed. Wood went to his bookshelf, he was in his home, his residence. And he took out a volume of Winston Churchill's works and he opened it, he knew what he was looking for, he said "I quote Mr. Churchill: 'To few is it given to know their interest, but to all to do their duty.'" He said "Roger, you have to do your duty, your interests will be taken care of." He said "Your duty, probably, is the Peace Corps job, because you sat through all those discussions, some of them just Shriver and you with X, Y, and Z India staff. And you went to the meeting of the Ambassador and Shriver with the Prime Minister. There was only one other Indian there, you know what went on. That's your duty, make it happen." So I spent a year with the Peace Corps.

Q: Did you go back to Washington for orientation?

ERNST: Well, there wasn't any orientation. This was before the Peace Corps existed. We created it. So I negotiated the agreement with the Indian government. Shriver had a vision of 500 volunteers for India. The Indian government had an idea of having 5; the embassy, the political section, was very unhappy about the idea, more Americans would make trouble. They were thinking 25.

Q: Wasn't that the general sentiment in the Foreign Service?

ERNST: Yes. And the Indian government was thinking five. Well, I was rounding up votes, if you will, lobbying the government. And one day I went to see Ras Kumari Amrit Kaur, who was the Minister of Health, wonderful woman, to whom I'd been introduced by a third party. Another story. And I was talking about the Peace Corps, and she said "Do you know, Mr. Ernst, if we take the American Peace Corps, we'll have to take Russian volunteers, too." She was playing on our alleged antipathy with the Russians. I said "Madam Minister, we have no problems with that. We know the sophistication of your Government is such that you can handle any group that comes in here." She said, "Alright." And then there was a meeting with the Prime Minister, and I'll give Ambassador Galbraith the credit for pulling off the agreement. The Prime Minister had been briefed by the Minister of Home Affairs. Half the cabinet - security people, Defense, Foreign Ministry - was against the Peace Corps. The only people for it were the Ministers of Agriculture and Labor, plus the leader of the Socialist party, Ashok Mehta, and the planners.

Q: Not education?

ERNST: Yes. The Minister of Education. But the most were against it. And Mr. Galbraith turned around finally to face the Prime Minister, and he said "You know, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to tell you a story about my childhood, my youth in the province of Ontario. One summer I worked on a farm. And at the end of the summer agriculture had not declined, and public morality had not been abused, because of my presence. I will guarantee that 25 young Americans will not

cause a decline in your agriculture.” And the Prime Minister roared with laughter, and he said "Bring 'em. You overrode the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Interior, the Defense Ministry."

Q: For 25?

ERNST: We actually brought 26. I went back to Washington, I made the agreements with the Punjab government, got them approved in Delhi, the central government. Learning a little about the federal structure. Back to the States, ran the computers with various of the staff at Peace Corps headquarters.

Q: Gee, you had computers?

ERNST: IBM, those big three-by-ten cards. They had all these kids who had signed up as being interested on cards, and we were looking for land grant college graduates from farms, farm backgrounds. I made an agreement with Ohio State University for training. We picked Ohio State because they already had a number of people who knew India; they had a contract with AID in the Punjab. We were going to use the PCVs as the technical mentors in the extension apparatus of India. We invited 100 to training, 65 came, I brought two people from India to help train and select, so that if there were some who were unsuitable the decision wasn't just American, it was Indian. 35 qualified, we actually ended up with 26. I brought them out to India just before Christmas, and stayed with the program until the following summer when Shriver asked me to become a permanent Peace Corps Officer. He said "You're going to have to take Peace Corps salary and give up your diplomatic status, take your children out of the American school, give up the commissary." I wasn't prepared to do that with my family, two little kids who were five and seven. So I went back to AID. And someone else took over the Peace Corps. Joe Wheeler, a good person.

So, anyway, Peace Corps turned out to be a great success. The volunteers were spread on the Grand Trunk Road between Delhi and Damritsar, in pairs, working with Indians. No one got in trouble. They were constructive. They used their knowledge. They all learned. One of them, for example, Tom Kessinger, is today the President of Haverford College. He came back to India as the Ford Foundation representative. Got the spirit of the foreign adventure in his genes. Another young fellow came back to Washington and became a lawyer working for the Federal Trade Commission, left the Federal Trade Commission, went to the Department of Interior, became the Counsel for Agana, Guam. Still lives in Guam. Another fellow went to finish business school after the Peace Corps, went to work for Kodak, became their West African representative. A lot of payback for America.

Q: More than for the Indians?

ERNST: Well, I think so, yes. I think it enriched our society more than it did good in India. Individual villages were improved. Out of it came some methodologies that were useful, but total impact, not much. And I spent my time, I traveled, I was three days a week in the Punjab, one day a week at the office, and two days a week I went to other parts of India to negotiate agreements for additional programs. I got to see all of India, practically. I didn't go to Assam, and I didn't go to Manipur or Cape Comorin.

Q: You were there how many, three years?

ERNST: Three years. And been back several times. We had wonderful collaboration, I should mention, very importantly, with what are now called PVOs, in particular the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and with the international institutions, with IBRD. We worked together in a very close collaborative manner.

Q: What about relations with the CIA? The Embassy, and the Peace Corps?

ERNST: There were no relations between the Peace Corps and the CIA that I was then aware of. There were relations, obviously, with the Embassy, and were with the AID program.

Q: I mean, were they good?

ERNST: Yes. Constructive. My own knowledge may be limited, but what I knew did not upset me. One individual who worked in the Food for Peace Program, his assignment for AID, for Food for Peace, Title II, was to follow up on use by the recipients of the food, which gave him a ticket to go everywhere around India wherever there were "work for food" projects, where you got paid in food. He traveled all over India, traveled five out of four weeks, so to speak. And he did a good job for the Food for Peace Program, Title II. What he did for the Agency, I don't know. I never was privy to that. My experience in Ethiopia was a little different, it wasn't uniform, let's put it that way. Let me say, the people who ran the stations were mostly friends. People we respected, enjoyed socially. We respected what they were up to.

Q: Then you left India, you returned to Washington?

HOWELL S. TEEPLE
Information and Press Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1959-1963)

Howell S. Teeple was born in Texas in 1921. He received his BA from Louisiana State University in 1943 and served in the US Army from 1943 to 1945 overseas. His assignments abroad include Seoul, Manila, New York, New Delhi, Adana, Tripoli, Monrovia and Cebu. Mr. Teeple was interviewed by Earl W. Sherman in 1999.

TEEPLE: I stayed in Washington from '54 to '59. USIA [United States Information Agency] Personnel was continually asking me to go overseas during this period. We transferred from State to USIA when they established a separate agency in '53. At one time they had me going to Teheran as information officer, but it didn't work out. In 1959, I was selected to go to India as information officer for USIS [United States Information Service]/New Delhi, and had the designation also as press attaché.

I was married then. I met my wife, Jane, in Washington in January 1957. We got married on June 1st, 1957 and had a nine-month-old baby, James Leland Teeple, when we went to New Delhi in April of 1959.

Q: And this opens up a whole new chapter in your career, does it not?

TEEPLE: Exactly. It was the first post I'd been to overseas married, with a family, and yes, it was quite a different situation for me.

Q: What was the name of the ambassador then?

TEEPLE: At the time we arrived in '59, the ambassador was Ellsworth Bunker, a well-known ambassador, and an outstanding man. It was such a pleasure to be there and to work under Ambassador Bunker. We had three really outstanding ambassadors in India during my period there, from '59 to '63. We had John Kenneth Galbraith following Ambassador Bunker, and then we had Chester Bowles after Galbraith left.

Q: Well, those were certainly three well-known and illustrious figures in American history.

TEEPLE: Indeed. I had quite a bit of contact with the ambassadors, being in the press and press attaché.

Q: Of those three, Howell - we're talking about Ellsworth Bunker and Chester Bowles and John Kenneth Galbraith - of those three, working with them, probably more intimately than some of the others, which one of those three impressed you the most?

TEEPLE: Ambassador Galbraith was very impressive, of course, and he was interested in the press. He liked to have press conferences, and he was such a figure in his own right and had an outstanding reputation as a scholar and economist. He also was well connected with the White House at that time, the Kennedy administration. Chester Bowles was most impressive also. I only had about six or seven months with Ambassador Bowles. We left India in 1963, about six, seven months after he had arrived. Ambassador Bunker was the great diplomat of the three. They were all quite different in their approach, completely different, in fact. Ambassador Bunker was a very smooth, suave diplomat and got great respect from the Indians. It was exciting times in India then because Nehru was alive, and his daughter Indira was his hostess, more or less, because he was a widower. We had a large USIS establishment in India. Ken Bunce was the first PAO, with John Lund as the deputy when I arrived. Then Bill Weathersby came in, and later went on to be ambassador to Sudan and then went back to India as DCM. That is unusual in the Foreign Service - to become an ambassador and then go back as a DCM. Barry Zorthian was our deputy PAO under Bill Weathersby. We had outstanding people with the embassy and with USIS in India during my tenure - 1959-1963.

Q: Yes, among those leaders who were not from the United States, Admiral Mountbatten was there at that time, wasn't he?

TEEPLE: Admiral Mountbatten was in India at the time of partition. He did come out to India, again while we were there, and we met him. Lady Mountbatten used to come out quite often, and she used the same dentist we used, so we would get all the news about Lady Mountbatten from our dentist.

Q: Well, there was some very interesting linkage, was there not, between Lady Mountbatten and Nehru?

TEEPLE: There was. She was a good friend of Nehru's, and he had her out every year as his guest. They were very friendly and there were many rumors linking them romantically.

Q: Yes.

TEEPLE: Those were exciting times in India, and also while we were there, President Eisenhower visited India. He was the first U.S. president to visit India. Unfortunately, just as he was coming, I came down with hepatitis. We had been over to the Maharaja's palace in Jaipur visiting and I apparently got hepatitis there.

Q: So India and the fact that President Eisenhower had come, as we continue:

TEEPLE: Yes, and unfortunately I came down with hepatitis during that time and was unable to work. It was one of the biggest news events of my career, and I missed it, the President of the United States coming to India. As I said, we'd been over to the Maharaja of Jaipur's palace, which he'd turned into a luxury hotel. It wasn't opened to the general public, but they would take people in who were "invited," so to speak. People from embassies could go stay there, and it was a lovely place. They assured us that the water was boiled, but it wasn't, apparently, because I got hepatitis exactly three weeks after coming back from Jaipur and was laid low for the Eisenhower visit.

Q: I ask the question, wasn't it common practice at that time to keep people confined to bed in order to handle hepatitis?

TEEPLE: Oh, yes. I was in bed for six weeks, and the doctor said, "Don't get up except to go to the bathroom." I said, "What about shaving?" He said, "Let your wife shave you." I said, "Oh, no." So I grew a beard. When I went back to the office after six weeks, no one recognized me with my full beard.

Q: Well, isn't that something of real importance for those outgoing officers from the State Department representing the U.S. overseas, that health hazards enter into the lives of virtually every single Foreign Service person in one fashion or another-

TEEPLE: Indeed.

Q: -because of the very limited health facilities people have in those overseas countries?

TEEPLE: We did have an American doctor at the embassy and an American nurse, but the doctor was assigned as the regional medical officer. He traveled throughout the area covering other posts, and we used a list of qualified Indian doctors. There were some good doctors in India, American-trained. My doctor - I remember his name - was Dr. Mehra, who had been American-trained, and he's the one that put me to bed for six weeks when he said, "You've got jaundice." Health hazards were a major problem. Our young son got very sick in India at one time, and it was critical, but he survived. India was a difficult post for maintaining one's good health because of the enormous population and different hygienic practices.

Q: Amoebic dysentery seems to have been something that was so common in so many of these locations.

TEEPLE: We used to call it "Delhi belly." Oh, yes, that was a common occurrence.

Q: On reflection, fortunately there seems to have been, since that time that you and I were overseas, many new medications now available to deal very quickly with common maladies.

TEEPLE: Yes, fortunately all the antibiotic drugs had come to the fore and many other types of medicines which have been a great help to people living in Third World countries.

Q: When you were the IO [information officer] and the press attaché there in New Delhi, did you have a staff of some size? I would expect-

TEEPLE: I had a staff of one American, an assistant information officer, and quite a large national staff. There were two press attachés in New Delhi. There was the press attaché at the embassy, who worked directly with the ambassador, and I was at USIS and handled the local press, the vernacular press, the Hindi papers and Urdu papers and English papers. India had a very active press. It was interesting to work with those chaps. Many were well-educated. They'd been to Cambridge or Oxford, mostly British-trained, and worked on the English newspapers. And then there was a large vernacular press. I dealt with the local press and got to travel around all over the country, visiting newspaper editors to get them to use our materials. I must say, the personal approach to Indian editors paid off and I was able to place a great many USIS press articles and features in newspapers and magazines.

Q: Did you find that the rail system in India was one of really exceptional size and-

TEEPLE: It was excellent at that time. The British had put in the infrastructure during their 400 years of occupation, so to speak, and India had a fine rail system. I understand it's changed since then. We did travel by train quite often, but we flew most places because India's a large country.

Q: What part of India did you find to be of really superior interest or of intense interest? You were posted to New Delhi most of the time.

TEEPLE: I was in New Delhi, and it was a very interesting post. As I said, Nehru was alive. There was a very active press there. We had many foreign correspondents from England, the United States, Germany, France, and Japan, so it was a busy press operation. I think at that time

USIS India was one of the largest Information and Cultural Programs in the world. It had a large American library and a big exchange program, the Fulbright Program. We had a lot of visitors come through the post for lectures and exhibits. It was a very active post. We participated in the World Agricultural Fair, which was held in New Delhi in 1960. We had an American pavilion there which we publicized and promoted. India was an exciting place with so many different cultural activities. We enjoyed India very much. Of course, I was in India during the height of the Cold War and we were very competitive with the Soviet Union in our information and cultural programs. The Russians had a large press and information operation in New Delhi, quite a bit of it covertly done, which made the competition complex and involved.

Q: Did you have much contact with your counterparts from other governments that were represented there?

TEEPLE: Yes, especially with the British. We had good contacts with the British Information Service. They had an active information program also. They also had the British Council, which dealt with cultural and exchange programs as well as library operations. We had limited contact with the Soviet embassy press people and on the surface were friendly with them. Some of the Russian correspondents were KGB [Soviet security service] operatives, working under a Russian news agency, Novosti, and while we were cordial with them, we remained wary of them.

Q: I wonder if you had English teaching programs such as our own binational center programs.

TEEPLE: We didn't have a big English teaching program in India because English was the *lingua franca* of all the educated people at that time. They kept saying, in 10 or 15 or 20 years, English would not be the dominant language, but it has remained so, I believe, because of the diverse sections of the country all speaking different dialects and languages. For instance, down in south India, the Telugu and Tamil languages are completely alien to Hindi and Bengali in north India, as well as different from Urdu and Gujarati. English has been the glue that's held the country together, so to speak, language-wise. Therefore, the English-language press and English education has been maintained. I don't think English is as strong as when we were there, however.

Q: Considering the great size, the magnitude of the U.S. representation in India, what impression did you have of the people that you were working with that came from the U.S. at the time that you were there? Was it a fledgling group? Was it because of the expansion of the U.S. representation there?

TEEPLE: No, we had outstanding people in the embassy and in USIS, as I mentioned, by the ambassadors who were there, Bunker, Galbraith, and Chester Bowles. The same way, down the line, the career people were very good, some really outstanding people. India was an important post. It was one of the largest American embassies. And in USIS we had equally high-level people. So from that standpoint it was a vital post and very competitive for the American officers assigned to New Delhi.

Q: Considering the experience you had before you went to India and the variety of things in information services that you enjoyed prior to going to New Delhi, did you find those who were

sent out by the Department to work with you directly had ample training and that they were able to fit in quickly with your programs?

TEEPLE: Generally, yes. We didn't have too many Hindi speakers. Incidentally, I had to go to Hindi language training at FSI prior to my assignment to India. I spent a year at FSI studying Hindi, and I must say, it was pure torture. I did manage to pass the vocabulary and the conversation tests. I never got literate in the language, of course, but then on arriving in India, I found I didn't use Hindi that much, because the people we were contacting were educated people and all spoke very good English.

Q: Well, in your Hindi training at the Department for that year, how much area study did they throw in with the actual language?

TEEPLE: There was no area studies. I took a separate course in area studies for two weeks, I believe, but the Hindi language was strictly language, and it was intense. It was six hours a day.

Q: That's heavy.

TEEPLE: It was four hours with a lecturer, and there were just one or two others in the class with me; four hours of tutoring, and then two hours on the tapes every day.

Q: That's intense.

TEEPLE: Intense.

Q: Did you feel that there was some success in that degree of time involved?

TEEPLE: Well, I learned to speak Hindi on a limited basis. I wasn't fluent.

Q: Did the Indians respond to this?

TEEPLE: Very much. Yes, they loved if you spoke their language, of course.

Q: They were patient?

TEEPLE: That was a benefit. We did have some excellent Hindi speakers in the embassy and in USIS. We had Tom Pinch, who was very fluent in Hindi, and we had people in the embassy who were very fluent, but they took the two or three-year course.

Q: Yes, one of the aspects of representing the U.S. overseas that I found in my own experience, if I may take just a moment for that, was that anyone who came armed with, for instance, a talent in music, automatically had a ticket into most homes or most target audiences that he might wish to contact. I always regretted that in my own experience, that I had not learned the guitar or learned the piano or something involving music. I don't know if you share that at all.

TEEPLE: Yes, it certainly gave you an entrée into a lot of places if you had musical ability. I remember a chap we had in Korea who was a really outstanding musician. He was asked to be the conductor of the Korean Symphony Orchestra. He was an accomplished musician, Rolf Jacoby.

Q: Well, from that time that you were in India, for what length of time was it?

TEEPLE: We were there for a four year assignment. We had two two-year tours with home leave in between.

Q: I see, you went to India in '59.

TEEPLE: We left in '63.

Q: In 1963. You went where in '63?

SIDNEY SOBER
Economic Officer
Bombay (1960-1963)

Sidney Sober joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in Antananarivo, Prague, Reykjavik, Ankara, Bombay, Rawalpindi, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted on February 21, 1990.

Q: You left INR in 1960 and you went to Bombay, where you served until 1963. What were you doing and how did the consulate general in Bombay operate?

SOBER: I was sent as the number two in the consulate general with immediate responsibilities for economic work. That was interesting. Bombay, first of all, was, and still is (my wife and I were there just a few months ago) a vibrant city. If you detached Bombay from the hinterland, you might look upon it as, westernized is not the word, but modern in many aspects. With a middle class that you could see fitting into a commercial environment in the west. Obviously there's a lot of poverty, and hovels, but a good part of Bombay gives you a cosmopolitan outlook. A fascinating place that we enjoyed very, very much. People were quite friendly. Economic work was okay because it was and still is the major center for American economic interest. It's where investments are, and a big financial center.

Relations with our embassy were fine. But varied. Our first ambassador was Ellsworth Bunker, for whom I had the greatest admiration and respect. The next one was Kenneth Galbraith, and a very different person.

Q: I wonder if you could talk about your impression of him. I understand there was a tremendous ego there.

SOBER: I think saying he had a tremendous ego is a considerable understatement.

Q: Did this impact on what you were doing?

SOBER: No, it didn't really. No, to his credit, never did we have instructions as to what not to do, or what to do. We reported directly to Washington, with copies to New Delhi. I was there, for example, for the Goa takeover in 1961. I was there and happened to be in charge during the whole period of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. That was of considerable interest to the United States. No, I don't recall ever being directed by New Delhi, "do this in a particular way."

Q: How about the Goa takeover. This did not sit very well in the United States.

SOBER: No, it did not.

Q: What happened and how were you reporting it?

SOBER: The dispute had been brewing for a long time. Back in late '55, John Foster Dulles had issued a joint statement along with the foreign minister of Portugal who happened to be in the United States, in which there was some reference to Portuguese overseas provinces. The Indians took that very badly and said, oh you're taking the Portuguese position. The Portuguese had been quite adamant about not doing what the French had done, for example, agree to give back their Indian possessions peacefully. So this had been building up.

What happened in 1961 was that the Indians got tired of the Portuguese adamancy about not giving up Goa. India organized their military, surrounded the area and claimed that someone had fired on them. They said therefore it required a police action, and in retaliation, they had to go in.

Well, it was pretty clear that the Indians had decided enough was enough and we're going to finish this off once and for all. And they did it in very short order.

You're right. This did attract international attention. The American ambassador to the UN was Adlai Stevenson and he had been considered to be very friendly to India. This was the Kennedy period, and Kennedy was also friendly to India. And I think that's why he sent Galbraith there. Another reason he sent Galbraith, I think, is that he was happier to have Galbraith in India than in Washington.

When Adlai Stevenson took out against the Indian aggression, use of force to achieve a political end, it sent the Indians up the wall.

Q: Did that have any repercussions?

SOBER: Oh yeah, they were mad at us, but it was passing. Whatever ill will existed because of that was overtaken surely the next year, by the Sino/Indian War. There was a tremendous turnaround, as you recall. There had been trouble building up for six or seven years, with disputes over the borders between China and India in two regions. One in Ladakh and the other in the northeast frontier region.

The war broke out in 1962. The Chinese thought that they had had enough of threats and disputes with India and thought there was a need for some reaction. They sent their forces over the border. Especially in the northeast the Indians were badly prepared. Krishna Menon, somebody who was not liked in the United States, the minister of defense, was sacked. Lo and behold, Nehru made a 180-degree reversal of course and, in panic, called upon Washington and London for military help. Now that's quite a change, since he was the apostle of nonalignment. It was unexpected. Jack Kennedy (of course I was there and not here, but my guess is that he) spent not more than five minutes cogitating about how to react to this request. He said go, and we sent some military transport planes from Germany, the closest place, with some things like tents and small arms. Nothing that could really affect the course of the war in these far away, very high altitude places. You're talking about the Himalayas and the foothills. But politically it was a momentous turn of course, in India's position. How did it affect us? Well, at the time I happened to be in charge of our consulate and it was quite a development in our relationship with the Indians. I remember being asked to come sit on the platform at various public meetings, when people were exhorted to do their best, the women were encouraged to throw their gold bangles and bracelets into the war chest. There was a tremendous euphoria regarding US-Indian relations because of Kennedy's willingness to do what we could, which was, in the event, not very much.

Q: I've heard it said by somebody else whom I interviewed that there has been this perception in the area that when a republican administration is in the tilt goes to Pakistan, and when a democratic administration is in, to India. And looking at it I can see a certain amount of validity about it. Is this valid?

SOBER: This is a fact that is deeply believed in by the people of Pakistan. In fact, also by people in India. And I think, historically, if you check it out, you can support this. I'm not sure this is a result of a deliberate interest or effort by democratic or republican administrations. But that's the way it has worked out. It's a fact of life, in the political map of the subcontinent, certainly as to what they believe and expect.

Q: Part of this is because Republican administrations tend to be a little more hard line towards the confrontation with the Soviet Union. That's changed considerably now. Therefore Pakistan is more interesting than India.

SOBER: I think you can carry that through to a point where it doesn't work out. For example, Jack Kennedy. Yes, he said, let's help India. He was friendly toward India. He was friendly toward India before he became President. As a senator, not too long before the election campaign, he proposed a resolution which would have pinpointed India as a country to help. Why? Well, he might have liked India but we were concerned about Communist China, and we didn't want China to be seen as the model for third-world uplift. We wanted to have a democratic model. So again it was China, and it was still the Cold War context. And why did he accede instantly to Nehru's request for help in 1962? Remember it was China - a communist country. So he wasn't out of accord with the American procedure. I would jump ahead a little bit. Jimmy Carter also liked India. Remember Ms. Lillian, who had been in the Peace Corps in Gujarat, north of Bombay. In fact he sent her as his representative to the funeral of the President of India. So he was favorable to India. Still when the Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1979, he immediately

made some efforts to reconcile with Pakistan. Relations with Pakistan had gone to their nadir. They had never been so low as they were just before then. But he wanted to open up the relationship, because the Soviets had gone into Afghanistan. So there he wanted to do well by Pakistan, because it was in our interest, because it was again in the context of the Cold War. Thus I'm not sure that it's correct to say that there is something inevitable or inherent in the democratic or republican makeup which makes one favor Pakistan or India.

Q: You were then assigned to NEA?

SOBER: Yes, the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. My first job was one which no longer exists - officer in charge of economic affairs in South Asia. I stayed in that job for a couple of years. Then I was transferred within the same bureau to be the deputy director, and then director, for regional affairs, covering the entire bureau, which as you know includes the Middle East.

Q: Other than reporting on economic matters, did we have economic interest in the area.

SOBER: As for South Asia, no, not really. There is virtually no product of South Asia that is necessary to the United States. Certainly nothing like oil which is essential. We have business interests there. We have AID interests. It was a period when Kennedy had already gone, but there was a considerable interest under LBJ in economic development in the area and particularly in India. It was a carryover from the idea I spoke of before, that India, as the second largest country in the world, might be seen to be an example of successful economic development along generally democratic lines. As a counterpart to China with its backyard furnaces and such. So there was a good deal of interest.

I think the economic element of our interest in South Asia at the time, which is most strongly remembered in the region to this date, revolves around one of those failures of the monsoon in the subcontinent. India had a failure of the monsoon as I recall in 1965-66, and there was a threat of famine as they had ever so often. Recall the enormous famine of Bengal in 1943-44. They appealed to the United States for substantial help. I might say that the euphoria of Indo-US relations that began and followed for sometime after the Sino-Indo War had pretty well washed off by this time.

The United States under LBJ was quite willing to help except that he had some other concerns. The Indians were not being at all helpful on Vietnam issues which more and more were preoccupying LBJ's attention. He also felt that the Indians were not doing enough in their own agricultural system to help themselves. It was a period when self-help was a very big thing to us. So LBJ engineered this policy. We would help India but we would do what we could to make sure they helped themselves. We had what we called the short tether policy. Which meant that LBJ, and the White House, would reserve unto itself, the authority to release segments of PL 480 assistance in accordance with perceptions of how much India was doing to help itself.

Now it was a very important program. Some 10 million tons of grain were shipped to India by the United States in one year, 1966-67. An unprecedented amount of grain. It used to be said that there was an almost unbroken line of ships from the American gulf ports to India.

On the other hand, we did press the Indians to do more than they'd been doing, in the way of self-help. In the way of rodent control, pesticide control, better storage/silage, better transport facilities, easing up on credit facilities to encourage farm production. A wide variety of things. Despite the fact that in many ways the aid program was successful, and widespread famine itself was averted, what tends to be remembered in India, I have found, is not how much we did for them, but what we did to them, as to "political" strings, aid strings, where we were mean and hard. Well, some people might say that that was for their good but it one of those things that didn't leave too good a taste.

I was in the Bureau dealing with these issues.

Q: We were watching the Indian economy very, very closely then. What you were reporting on had a direct impact.

SOBER: I was in Washington, of course, and we got our reports from our people in India. The Agriculture Department here was quite active, Orville Freeman was LBJ's Secretary of Agriculture. He was designated as the key point man here, and we had meetings with the Indian agriculture minister here, Mr. Subramaniam. We sent people over there. We watched pretty carefully what was going on. As we watched we did send very substantial amounts of grain.

GEORGE M. BENNSKY, JR.
Economic/Political Officer
Madras (1960-1964)

George M. Bennsky, Jr. was born in Hickory, North Carolina in 1923 and raised in Georgia and the Washington, DC area. He served in the military during World War II. Mr. Bennsky received a bachelor's degree in foreign affairs from George Washington University and a master's degree in international studies from the University of Michigan. His career included positions in India, Lebanon, and Peru. He was interviewed on January 19, 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You left NEA and went to Madras.

BENNSKY: I thought I was going to end up in a Middle East post again, which was all right with me. But, that was not to be. My first overseas post in the Foreign Service would be Madras. One thing I have never been able to figure out is the personnel system of the Foreign Service. Anyway that is where they wanted me to go and that is where I went.

Q: You were there from 1960-64. What were you doing when you first went out?

BENNSKY: I went out to head the economics section of the Consulate General. India is so big that the Consulates General are a pretty good size and cover big chunks of the country. We covered all of south India -- four states, Madras, Mysore, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.

The Consulates General in India perform functions that maybe they don't in a lot of countries. There is significant economic and political reporting, some consolidated by the Embassy in New Delhi and some sent directly to State.

For the first two years I ran the economics section, reporting on general economic conditions and economic development in South India. We would always be getting a cable from the Embassy saying, for example, "We are doing a study on hydroelectric power in India. Provide us with a report on South India -- what they are doing, what their needs are, etc."

We also acted as commercial officers spending a lot of time with Indian businessmen. And there was a lot of traveling throughout South India. The road system was good.

The second two years I was the political officer and number two.

Q: What was your impression of the political and economic situation in your area of responsibility in southern India at that time...1960-64?

BENNSKY: There were several different trouble spots. One was within Madras itself...the whole Tamil issue. Tamil was an ancient language, coming south when the dark skinned Dravidian people were pushed out of the north by the Sanskrit-using Central Asian invaders centuries ago. It was a language with a great deal of depth and poetry. It was a powerful force among these people. They were greatly resistant to the idea that Hindustani would be pushed south against their language. A Tamil based party was becoming a political force against the Congress Party. Over in Kerala there was strong Communist influence.

Q: Yes, an awful lot of attention was placed on that state.

BENNSKY: Those were the two main political issues of a local South India nature. Overall India was the India as I remembered it in World War II. Out in the many villages, people were living pretty close to the ground as they had for centuries. But it was a friendly part of India, more so than up north. I must say in south India the people are very friendly. You would just meet them and in the next minute they would have you in their house. They were just as friendly and open as you could get. English was the lingua franca. After all they had four different languages in the south, and they had to speak something that everybody could understand.

Two things happened while I was in India which were quite important. The first was the Chinese invasion of India in the Himalayan area near Tibet. That drew India together in a striking way. Here were people who were always unhappy with each other, one way or another, because of their different languages and different interests, etc. But not then. People all over the country were turning in their jewelry, volunteering for military service. That was an interesting event to be around, experience and to report on.

The second and most momentous event was the death of Nehru. Before Nehru died, but when it was clear he soon would, the question was who would take over as Prime Minister. Embassy

New Delhi decided that each of the Consulates General should take an in depth look at the issue, talking to everybody with political insight on their particular regions, thinking on the succession.

I headed the political section at that time, so I did the Madras ConGen paper. I talked to all the politicians and businessmen that I knew. I had four tremendous locals in terms of their contacts and knowledge of the politics of their States. We gathered a tremendous amount of information, and I wrote a paper which in essence stated: "The political leaders in the four southern states led by Kamaraj are going to back Shastri and that they were gaining influence with a number of other powerful leaders in other parts of India. Shastri was going to win the succession."

To many the successor would either be Desai, the Finance Minister, or the political leader of Bombay. In any event, as was to be expected, the Embassy received differing views from its ConGens. In fact, in my paper I said that Shastri would probably turn out to be the Truman of India. Actually he did win. You know, it was a very unfortunate thing for India that Shastri died of a heart attack. He was a politician who was unknown, somewhat like Truman, but a very skilled politician who I think may well have had some workable ideas about how to deal with the Pakistani and Kashmiri problem.

Also, Kamaraj, the Madras political boss, who was a tremendous man, about as big as that door, and spoke nothing but Tamil, with influence in Madras that was incredible, as well as all over the country, ended up going to New Delhi, as a sort of overall Congress Party political boss. He was a powerful person. Not educated, but with great skill as a politician.

Those, I guess, were the two big internal Indian issues that happened. A relatively minor event was the Indian invasion and taking of Goa from the Portuguese. I recall Ambassador Galbraith seeking to the end to stop it when we all knew that the Indian Army was not massed on the border for just a show of force.

Another event of significance was the death of President John F. Kennedy. The outpouring of grief in India has to have been seen to be believed. Indians took his words seriously, very seriously indeed.

Q: I remember the state of Kerala. For years that was on our political radar because it had a communist rule. Were we doing anything there to combat this?

BENNSKY: Mainly we did what we could do in terms of economic assistance and we had a big USIS program there. Kerala was one of the more literate areas of India, which is one of the reasons the communists were strong there. Other than aid and information there wasn't much we could do. The Indian Government had it pretty well under control. The governor there was a man named Giri who had been an important labor leader in India during British rule. He was an interesting and strong person. He ran Kerala much of the time under Presidential Rule.

We, of course, had a CIA station in Madras which watched the Indian commies. When I took over the political section I had to read some of their material. It was boring as the dickens. The fact of the matter is that there was never really any danger in India of the communists taking over anything. The real power in that country was the Congress Party. No matter how you cut it, even

today, although things have changed some, India is still a pretty damn conservative place. Villagers are conservative, traditional people. They didn't have any guerrilla movements or that kind of stuff going on when I was in India.

An interesting thing there was, to me...the first and last time I really did a political post...that if you got an Indian politician in your house you couldn't keep him quiet or get rid of him. He would talk forever and tell you everything. More than you ever wanted to know or ever cared about. He would keep talking as long as you kept filling his whiskey glass, which he wasn't supposed to be doing, since India frowns on drinking.

There is only one thing I regret about my Indian experience. I wonder if I wouldn't have been better off if I had just spent two years in Madras and gone up to Delhi for two. But it didn't turn out that way.

Q: Then you came back to Washington?

BENNSKY: Oh, I did one other thing while I was on my India assignment which was of significance. I received a telegram telling me that State wanted me to be part of a special mission to Yemen. My Near Eastern friends thinking of me again. This was just after the considerable turmoil and struggle in Yemen. The Egyptians had intervened and there had been a civil war which caused a great deal of consternation to the Saudis. In fact we had air force in Saudi Arabia to counteract the Egyptian air force in Yemen.

I flew to Saudi Arabia for consultations and briefing and to join the other member of the party, an official from AID. We flew first to Aden and then to Taiz in Yemen.

The purpose of the mission was to determine the budgetary assistance need of Yemen and whether such assistance was feasible. We knew one thing, there would be no data. Nobody was going to hand us pieces of paper telling us anything about the government's budget or the country's balance of payments. So when we began our inquiries in Aden, we started asking officials and business people about the trade, finances, etc. of Yemen since Aden was its key gateway. Then we came up to Yemen linking up with one of the FSOs in our Taiz mission. Jim Cortada chaired our mission. Our program was to go to Sanaa and to Hodeida and talk to as many knowledgeable officials and business people as possible to gather information. The AID official I was with said to me, "George, I can speak Arabic up to a point. We are going to do the best we can."

We just moved around the country talking to people who were running this, that and other things in government and commerce. It reminded me of my Near Eastern days as a Treasury Rep. You would go into these so-called government offices only it was a little more chaotic. All around you were Yemenis carrying machine guns and the usual knife. You would sit there drinking tea it seemed interminably. The official would be responding to your questions and out of the blue some Yemeni would come in with a chit which the official would take interrupting the conversation with you and dealing with whatever the chit said. You could spend a long time getting relatively little information. The officials were just inundated with these chits.

Q: *And you would sit around and listen to the conversation.*

BENNSKY: Exactly, except it was all in nonunderstandable to me, Yemeni Arabic.

Q: *I served as economic officer in Dhahran at one point a little earlier on and I know exactly what you mean.*

BENNSKY: I was getting frustrated. I couldn't find out what I needed to know to determine or at least estimate the Yemeni financial situation. But one thing was becoming clearer and clearer to me. There wasn't any government structure that could possibly handle budgetary aid.

Anyway we had to gather enough information about Yemen's trade, financial situation, balance of payments, economic development needs, etc. to produce a coherent report. And we didn't have too much time to do this.

Finally we got through our Yemeni interviews, 50 plus I recall, and headed for Cairo to see what the Egyptians could tell us. Actually the Egyptians provided us with significant information. I still knew some of the Egyptian officials, especially on the financial and economic side.

When we got back to Washington, I wrote the report on Yemen's financial and economic situation, including its budget and balance of payments. I was pleased with my assessment and wish I still had a copy. My bottom line was that there was no way that the US should provide budgetary aid. I said, "You might want to aid this country but you don't want to give them any budgetary aid. There was a bottomless pit there, and we wouldn't know where any of the aid went. There wasn't any structure or even anybody in charge." So that idea got shot down. Whatever the US did I don't know because I went back to India.

MARY SEYMOUR OLMSTED
Economic Officer
New Delhi (1960-1965)

Ambassador Mary Seymour Olmsted was born in Duluth, Minnesota and raised in Florida. She received a bachelor's degree in economics from Mount Holyoke College and a master's degree from Columbia University. Ambassador Olmsted entered the Foreign Service in 1945. Her career included positions in India, Iceland, Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Papua New Guinea. Ambassador Olmsted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: *...About 1960, where did you go?*

OLMSTED: Then I was assigned to New Delhi.

Q: *You were there for five years, weren't you?*

OLMSTED: Four and a half years, yes.

Q: *What were you doing?*

OLMSTED: I was in the economic section, and I did a variety of different things there. New Delhi was a very large post at that time, and I found that it was the custom there to shift responsibilities within the economic section rather frequently. And people when they entered started doing the grubby work, and eventually moved up to doing more interesting, more important, work. I understood the rationale for it. It was my own feeling after I'd been there a relatively short time, that anyone who tried to make any pronouncements about India was either repeating something that had become an absolute cliché, or was probably wrong. It was extremely difficult to get a grasp of the country.

I had been serving in Vienna, and as I mentioned before, Vienna also was a very large post. There were some interesting differences between them. In Vienna the embassy was very much compartmentalized. I didn't know very much what was going on in other parts, even of the economic section. But in New Delhi I did almost all kinds of economic work, and I was in close contact with the people in the political section, and the people in A.I.D., and I had a much broader view of things than I ever managed to get in Vienna.

Q: *What was the situation in India in the four and a half years you were there, '60-'65 approximately? I mean the political situation at that time?*

OLMSTED: Nehru was still the Prime Minister, and he was, of course, the person. He had his opponents, and there were people who had influence on him, but yet he was the man of tremendous importance in the country, and he died when I was there. India was such a large country that, as I said before, it was very hard to get a feeling for what was going on. I think that made a difference in my own approach to my work. I was far more willing than I had been in some other posts to do a lot of different things because I thought it was going to be necessary before I ever came to have any real feeling for what India was like.

Q: *Just to get a feeling, what types of things were you dealing with?*

OLMSTED: In my work?

Q: *Yes.*

OLMSTED: I was initially doing rather small things, small segmented things. It was only later that I began feeling that I was able, and that the embassy was willing to have me try to pool them all together, and look at what was going on in India broadly. And that was the transition in my work, going from the particular to the general.

Q: *In India, as an economist, you had to deal with both the Indian bureaucracy, and Indian statistics. How did you find these?*

OLMSTED: Well, of course, a little bit difficult. I spent a good deal of time working on the Five Year Plan, and trying to measure what was happening against what their hopes were for the third Five Year Plan. The statistics were obviously very imperfect. On the other hand, what do you do? Do you just throw them out the window and forget about them. Some of the reporting that I did, and others did, I think was impressionistic, rather than statistically based. But you've got to have some statistics to peg things on even though you realized what their flaws are. I worked mainly with the people in the planning commission, which was composed of professionally competent officers to a large extent. They were intelligent people who were willing to talk about various aspects. They were defensive sometimes, but I didn't find that they were obstructionists.

CIA used to claim that it could get any document in India, "Just ask for it, we'll get it for you." So I put this to the test once and I've forgotten now what the document was, and they provided it for me the day before it was released publicly, which was not what I would consider a major achievement. CIA was very, very active there. I know Ambassador Bowles, for example, had some real reservations about their activities, feeling they were adding to the corruption of the country.

Q: What was the impression that you got at your level from India? Was India a potential enemy, a potential friend, or just a big mass of problems out there? Or what?

OLMSTED: Well, India was a big mass of problems out there. There was no question about that. As Galbraith sometimes said, there was a thin layer of planning on top of the largest operating chaos in the world. There was truth in that. I thought potentially, yes, India could be our friends. Certainly there were people in the government who were anti- American, and there was a left wing which was the Communist Party. And I think that the Hindu culture created certain types of personalities which made people very resentful of the American presence. I sometimes felt that what some of our people were doing tended to turn India away from us quite unnecessarily.

Q: What type of thing would this be?

OLMSTED: Well, trying to tell Indians how to run their business. Now, a certain amount of that was necessary because the Indians did not always make the best decisions. On the other hand, such things as the Kashmir problem were very, very touchy. I saw two American ambassadors try to solve it to the Kashmir problem and that was not to the benefit of our relations with India. No doubt of that.

I served for three different ambassadors there: Ellsworth Bunker, then John Kenneth Galbraith, then Chester Bowles. Three enormously different men.

Q: Could you describe your impression of what they were like, and their method of operation, and how they approached the thing from your viewpoint? First Ellsworth Bunker. He was there until '61.

OLMSTED: Yes. Our overlap consisted of only a few months. I never knew him as well as the others. He was on his way out when I arrived there and consequently neither he nor I saw this as a long- range association. So I can say probably less about him. He was the least aggressive of

the three, I thought, in his relations with the Indian government. He was the least inclined to tell the Indians what to do. On the other hand, I thought he had some tendency to sweep problems under the rug, and to tell Washington, and anybody who wanted to listen to him, that all was rosy. And it was less than rosy.

Then when Galbraith came in...

Q: *In '61.*

OLMSTED: ...in '61, the spring of '61 -- late spring. He was a man of great intellectual arrogance, who was quite willing to tell anyone and everyone how to do their business. He had very little interest in, or sympathy for, the embassy staff and he fired a number of people and brought in his own people. There was a morale problem in the embassy. No doubt about that. The staff meetings were indicative of that. He'd look around the room and his eyes would fall on somebody, and everybody would stiffen. We would wonder what's going to happen to that poor devil. It was sort of a Mogul court atmosphere. Some people cottoning up to him, and others just trying to stay out of his way.

He gave a series of speeches there which I thought were good in that he could say some things in a very polished speech that perhaps would be better accepted than sitting in a minister's office telling him something. And he was respected for being an intellectual, and for having a worldwide reputation as an economist. Those things were for the good. On the other hand, he really got himself a little bit too enmeshed in some things. When the Chinese incursion on the northern border took place, Galbraith jumped in with both feet, with great enthusiasm. He got the American military there. I, myself, always had some reservations that those incursions were all that serious, although any country gets a little nervous when its borders are invaded. Perhaps it did bring India somewhat closer to the United States in that we were portraying ourselves as the great protectors of India's borders. On the other hand, I don't think it was really very long lasting.

Q: *It didn't appear to be. Here you had a man who I think...didn't he win the Nobel Prize in economics, or something later on? And here you are an economic officer. How did he impact on the economic section?*

OLMSTED: Well, to a considerable extent he ignored it. He got some of his own people in although Bowles was much more effective than Galbraith in getting his own choices into various jobs. I remember writing a rather broad report on how India was getting along, assessing the economic, and to a certain extent the political situation. I finished it and sent it into the Economic Counselor who would ordinarily sign it. Then I didn't hear anything about it, a copy didn't come back that it has been signed. I didn't know what had happened. I think I went on leave, and when I came back I was very surprised to discover that it had returned to my desk with a little note from Galbraith on it. The note said something to the effect, "You're a little more pessimistic than I would be, but this is a good report and it will be useful." And I said to the Economic Counselor, "That's not exactly wild praise, is it?" He said, "Well, you ought to see some of the notes that come back here. You can be very, very pleased with that note." I didn't see what he sent back to other people, but I can believe that he felt nothing but contempt for the Economic Counselor. And I think the Economic Counselor had a very hard job there.

Q: *Who was the Economic Counselor?*

OLMSTED: Rufus Burr Smith.

Q: *It must have been a very uncomfortable situation.*

OLMSTED: Yes, and Galbraith had a very sharp tongue.

Q: *What was your feeling about his estimation of India? Sometimes you get an ambassador who comes in, particularly from outside, a political ambassador, and particularly one with a big ego, who arrives, and particularly in a large country like India, and sees this as sort of the center of the universe. Whereas, as a very practical measure looking over the last 40 years, India has played a very small role. We've always made due obeisance to the...India being a major democracy, but it hasn't been much of a factor in whatever we're interested in.*

OLMSTED: We used to refer to this attitude of politically appointed ambassadors as localitis, an expression I'm sure you've heard. We used to say that Galbraith had galloping localitis. He felt quite free in telling ambassadors all over the world how to run their business. He was quite disdainful of Dean Rusk, the then Secretary of State, and thought the President himself should be reading all of his messages.

Q: *Galbraith came from Harvard, and the President had been a student of his.*

OLMSTED: And he'd worked on the campaign for Kennedy. So he was very happy to send hot messages about such things as India's takeover of Goa...

Q: *Which had been a Portuguese territory.*

OLMSTED: Galbraith was very sympathetic towards the Indians about the takeover and sent off some hot messages to Burke Elbrick, who was then the ambassador to Portugal. Elbrick maintained in his cables that good relations with Portugal were necessary because of the importance of the Azores. Galbraith responded that the Azores were just a few acres of asphalt in the Atlantic Ocean, and why should we be bothered with them. So Galbraith earned himself quite a reputation.

Q: *He was also, by doing that...the takeover of Goa was not that popular. Because it was a takeover by basically overpowering military force, rather than any referendum or anything like that.*

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: *When Galbraith left, did he leave any lasting monument? Or was this just a big storm that blew through, and then moved on?*

OLMSTED: As far as I could see it was a big storm that blew through, and then moved on. I think he may have made the Indians do a little more thinking about some of their economic decisions. But how much he really influenced them, I really couldn't say. And I don't think he influenced them, I think he antagonized them on the Kashmir question. And I don't think he got very many brownie points for what he did, either his attitude towards the take-over of Goa, or the incursions on the northern border.

Q: You had some reservations about the seriousness of this incursion of this so-called Indo-Chinese war, which really was fought very high in the Himalayas over a small bit of unpopulated areas. Did the embassy get very involved in our support of the Indians?

OLMSTED: Oh, yes, very much so. We had no advance information about it, of course, and the Indians did not tell us immediately. The incursions took place -- if my memory is correct -- on a Saturday afternoon or evening. And it wasn't until the following day that somebody in the Embassy picked it up from the radio. Our contacts in the Indian Government were not so good that they immediately informed us.

Q: What about the Soviets? What was our feeling towards the Soviets at that time? Were they courting the Indians?

OLMSTED: Yes, they were. I think not as much as they may have subsequently, but they had some very large aid projects. They had an aid mission, and a large embassy there. We saw very little of them socially, or otherwise. The Cold War was very much in evidence. I once visited the Soviet-built steel plant in Bhilai in central India. The Indian staff was obviously very much taken aback by this request for an American embassy official to visit, and they didn't quite know what to do with me when I got there but they did take me around, and I went through the entire plant. And I agreed with the comment that I had heard before I went there, that it was a steel plant built by peasants for peasants to run. It was not a sophisticated operation at all. But I also thought perhaps it was the right level for the Indians to handle, and they didn't have the trouble with it that they had with some of the more advanced steel plants that other countries had built there.

They wanted us to build another steel plant for them to be located in Bokaro. Galbraith pushed very hard to get U.S. financing for it. He pushed too hard. In fact, he got out in front of Congress and everybody else. Congress retaliated by putting a rider on a bill which effectively prevented U.S. financing. Galbraith practically promised that the United States would finance it when Congress pulled the rug out from under his feet. And then in what was a very graceful gesture, the Indian parliament withdrew its request for the financing, and Galbraith got off the hook that way. But it was a humiliating defeat for him although I don't think it bothered him very much.

Q: Did he go back and try to lobby Congress, as often ambassadors do?

OLMSTED: It's a long way to go, and I don't remember that he went back as frequently as an ambassador in Europe might go. But certainly he lobbied at long distance, and he did make some trips to Washington for lobbying. Galbraith is no politician, a brilliant man, but he rubbed a lot of people the wrong way.

Q: Did he use the embassy staff particularly?

OLMSTED: Not very much. He tended to do things himself, or maybe a few of his own close associates, but he really didn't have very many close associates. Not like Bowles.

Q: It was a court, but it was a court with one king and not...

OLMSTED: That's right. He had a DCM, B.E.L. Timmons, who was widely disliked, even detested. Timmons was a bright enough man, but I thought of very little imagination. His idea of the way to run an embassy was to see to it that press summaries were quickly prepared and transmitted to Washington. And he didn't seem to care very much about commentary, or about analysis, or about things like that. He would have had a fit over this press summary if it had been done incorrectly. He was a great man for detail.

Q: ...whether you used a hyphen with cross-section, or whether its two words. That type of thing.

OLMSTED: Yes. He was a great man for the typographical errors, and a great man on detail. But the big picture, he didn't see.

Q: What was your impression of the economic, and also political reporting of the embassy? Were you able to get out and talk to people, or did it get translated very well if they did get out and talk to people?

OLMSTED: I think there was an effort made to get out and talk to people. I did a lot of traveling. I visited almost every part of India. My goal was to spend one week a month out of New Delhi but I never quite achieved that goal. But I saw it was just disastrous getting involved in the diplomatic cocktail circuit, and spending so much time in Delhi talking cocktail chit-chat with the same people. So I made a determined effort to get out and visit different parts, and go to villages and talk to villagers, and try to keep the bureaucracy at arm's length to the extent possible. When someone from the American embassy went out to a rural area, it was very likely that the district commissioner would get a whole train of jeeps and would want to parade the embassy official around to various villages. I tried to get away from that, not always successfully.

Q: Galbraith left in '63. How was this viewed by the embassy?

OLMSTED: With relief. Most of us were saying, "Well, we survived." That was the test, whether you survived Galbraith, or not.

Q: Then Chester Bowles came.

OLMSTED: Yes, a very different man.

Q: How did he operate, and what was your impression?

OLMSTED: Well, of course, Bowles had a considerable advantage over Galbraith in having been an ambassador before, and having been an ambassador to India before. Therefore, he knew

a lot of things that Galbraith learned only slowly. However, the disadvantage was that Bowles didn't know quite as much as he thought he knew. He moved into action very, very quickly, and I think probably without careful enough assessment to what had happened since he was there last. Bowles is a man of tremendous creative imagination. I have great admiration for him on that score, but he was not a terribly practical man. I always thought he would have been the ideal person to be special assistant in charge of ideas, and come up with new ideas that other people could select from. But when he did the selecting, as well as creating the ideas, we got some lusus.

Q: Can you give any examples?

OLMSTED: He is a reformer, pure and simple, and he wanted to reform the Indian government in all manner of ways. His technique...not to answer your question immediately...his technique was to call in two or three or maybe four different staff members individually, and give each one of them the same project with the idea that he would see which one was best. He would call the person in maybe Thursday afternoon, or maybe Friday morning, and say he wanted a paper written on this or that, and then he would say, "No hurry about it, just let me have it Monday morning, 10:00." Well, there went another weekend down the drain. We caught on to what he was doing, and at the inevitable cocktail party we'd get together and figure out that we all had the same task. We would divide it up instead of each of us doing it all. That simplified things a little bit, but not a lot.

Galbraith, for example, wanted one of these weekend studies to be made of the...

Q: You mean Bowles.

OLMSTED: Oh, excuse me, Bowles. ...of the restricting impact of all the rules and regulations of the Indian government. India is a bureaucracy among bureaucracies, and there were vast numbers of rules and regulations, but for an outsider to try and go in there and evaluate all those rules and regulations in a short period of time, of course, was sheer nonsense. That was a very interesting idea, and one that had great merit, but it would take months and months of study by a task force to do it. It's nothing you're going to whip up over a weekend.

Another, when he was trying to solve the problems between India and Pakistan, he instructed me, and I'm sure a couple of other people, to write a paper on what kinds of economic cooperation there could be between India and Pakistan which would be to the advantage of both countries, which would put an end to some of the problems, or at least nearly erase some of the problems that both of them faced. Well, that's a very interesting project, and if you set aside the impracticality of it, and just think about what could be done, you can have a lot of fun. Well, I eventually got to the point where I just had a lot of fun with his ideas, and realized that they were going to fall on the floor off the drawing board someplace at a more senior level than mine. But I wrote, with the help of some other people, quite a long paper about possible economic cooperation between India and Pakistan. There were really a lot of things they could be doing. It was fun to work on. As I said before, I had high regard for Bowles' intellectual capacities, but when it came down to practicalities something was a little lacking.

Q: At least it sounds like he kept the intellectual juices of the embassy running.

OLMSTED: Yes, he did, very much so. And he brought in a lot of outsiders, and he made a lot of staff changes. In fact, all the senior positions, I think, were changed to bring in people that he wanted, and we had some interesting people there.

Q: Any ones that stand out?

OLMSTED: Well now, let me see. There was one man he brought in, A.A. Jordan, from West Point. He was brought in as a special assistant and he was very good. He brought in John Lewis from Princeton to head the A.I.D. mission. I think Lewis was very good although I think he eventually became very discouraged. He had written that book, Quiet Crisis in India that caught Bowles' attention, and that's why he got the job I'm sure. I think he found that things on the ground were a little different from the way they looked in the groves of academia. And there was someone in USIS, whose name had slipped my memory, a man of very broad capacities. And he brought in Jerry Green as DCM, who was a great relief after Lane Timmons. There were others but I can't remember them all now.

Q: How did he deal with the Indian government?

OLMSTED: He was always talking to the Indian government. I think that he drove the Indian government up the wall with his incessant advice.

Q: Did you find there was much American business interest in India? What was your impression?

OLMSTED: There was some. American business saw these 500 million people, and thought, "what a potential market" if it ever really pulls itself together. And Bowles was very eager to have American private investment in India, and he pushed hard on that subject. But it was an uphill effort because of the reluctance of the American investors; and because the Indian government was not at all sure it wanted foreign capital invested by American capitalists.

Q: How about the agricultural side? Was this an area where we did seem to be making some positive accomplishments, or not?

OLMSTED: Yes, although I think probably the Ford Foundation did as much as the U.S. government. We had a large agricultural contingent in our A.I.D. mission, some members of which were better than others. A.I.D. doesn't always pick its people too carefully, and there were some that really were accomplishing very little. But the Ford Foundation had been in India for a number of years, and was working very hard, and I think probably did more than the A.I.D. mission did, although that's a matter of dispute.

Q: You were mentioning earlier about Bowles and the CIA. Did you get any feel for that relationship? The CIA's operation in India?

OLMSTED: Well, it was very large, and very invasive. The CIA was everywhere.

Q: What were they trying to do? They weren't really an enemy, or really much of a potential enemy.

OLMSTED: In part I think it's another illustration of CIA having too much money, too many people, and here was this great big country with some communist influence, and let's find out everything that's going on.

Q: Basically we're talking about pay-offs, aren't we?

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: And again we were probably against corruption all the time?

OLMSTED: Yes, that was something that troubled Bowles, I know. But the CIA was deeply involved in the Indian Government. I can remember an incident when I was having a dinner party for people who had attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. There were some Fletcher grads in the Indian government and there were some in the Pakistani embassy, and a couple at our embassy. I was very much surprised when a CIA officer came into my office one day and said, "I understand you have invited," and he mentioned the name of an Indian government official, "up to your house for a dinner." And I thought this over. I had not discussed this party with anyone at the embassy. I had not submitted a list of invitees to anybody, there wasn't a list lying around on my desk. This was more of a private thing than an official party. I concluded that one of his informants had seen my written invitation on the desk of this man, and the word had gotten back to him that way. The reason the CIA was interested in this man was because he was in the archives, and had access to the most highly classified information in the archives. I was very taken aback.

Q: I'm sure you were. How did you find, from your aspect, the use of our consulates? I mean we had a number there, did they play a positive role in helping on economic reporting, or not? Or did you find it was better for you to go out on the spot?

OLMSTED: We had three large long-established Consulates General in India in the major cities, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. All three of them tended to operate as private principalities, and were occasionally reined in by the embassy. When I went traveling in India, we always told the Consulate General that I would be in thus-and-such an area, and some of them would send somebody to travel with me. Well, I liked that actually, it was very pleasant to have somebody to go around with me, and sometimes it was very helpful as well as being socially agreeable. Galbraith tended to ignore them. Bowles pulled them in a little bit more. Bowles paid a protocol visit to each one of them, and I think part of that was to impress upon them that a new ambassador had arrived, and he was looking at what they were doing. I was the control officer for his protocol visit to Bombay which explains some of my gray hair. That was a real dilly of a trip. My boss, the new economic counselor, had fought bitterly to keep me from being assigned as control officer because he thought I ought to be doing economic reporting on his staff. He did nothing to make my efforts any easier. There were the usual administrative details: getting the aircraft out of the military attaché's office, arranging schedules, getting things set up, and

working with the Consulate General by telephone largely, and telephone connections weren't always very good. It was a great relief to me when that was over.

I, myself, sometimes tried to draw the Consulates General into the economic reporting. When we would get an assignment from the Department for a certain type of country-wide report, I would try to assign parts of it to the Consulate General. Sometimes it was more successful than others, sometimes they gave it a slap-dash treatment, and it's pretty hard for the embassy to exert authority. Other times they were very pleased and interested in participating in an embassy report.

Q: You left there in 1965. What was your impression of whether India economically when you left?

OLMSTED: I think I probably felt that India would survive, but exactly how was very difficult to foresee. There is a certain strength when you get out to the rural areas. Things have been done pretty much the same way for thousands of years, and for thousands of years they're going to continue. Maybe new seeds will be introduced, and better ways of doing things, but there's a certain sense of the eternal when you get out to the Indian peasantry. But whether India would have the exact same boundaries and borders down the road would be much more difficult to foretell.

Q: When you came back you went to the Senior Seminar for a year.

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: '65 to '66, and then you went to the Economic Bureau.

OLMSTED: No, I went to NEA to be the senior economic officer for India.

Q: What were your main interests there? What were we thinking about about India in this particular time, '66 to '69?

OLMSTED: The year that I was in the Senior Seminar was a year of drought in India, and the threat of famine, and a very large PL 480 program was instituted.

Q: PL 480 being Public Law and 480 which is mainly food.

OLMSTED: Yes, provision of U.S. food for purchase by third- world countries for local currency. I came on the scene for the second year of the drought and I discovered very quickly that the bureaucracy in the State Department, and elsewhere, was getting awfully tired of hearing about starving India. It was much more difficult to carry my little tin cup around the second year than it would have been the first year, plus the fact Lyndon Johnson was then President and had been concerned that the Indians were not doing enough themselves to bring about the changes that would be necessary for them to increase their own production. He decided the year before I got there to put Orville Freeman, then the Secretary of Agriculture, in charge of the PL 480 operations, an action which cut out the State Department to a very considerable degree.

When I arrived, and we were just starting to talk about PL 480 food for the second year of the drought, I was told that Lyndon Johnson had made this specific designation, and I was to stay out of it. I looked up that designation, I got hold of the original copy, and it was very clear that this was for a limited period of time. It was not an on-going matter. I took that document around and shoved it under the noses of various people who had been telling me to stay out of it and I said, "We are not restricted by this. This is for a limited period, and that period of time has elapsed. There's no reason why the State Department can't play a major role in this."

However, Lyndon Johnson decided that the best way to make the Indians get off the gravy train of the PL 480 food was to make the supplies very uncertain, and therefore he would permit us to negotiate only very short term agreements, one month-two months like that, and he might let time elapse from one agreement to another. I understood why he was doing it, but from the point of view of a bureaucrat who was trying to get food to a country where there were real food shortages, it was a nightmare, just a nightmare. And the people in the Department of Agriculture were feeling very frustrated over the fact that Orville Freeman was no longer running this program, and they were not inclined to be cooperative. Some of the hardest work I ever did for the Department of State was in connection with those food agreements.

Q: Here we were pulling a certain stall, at least from the Presidential level on this, that the Indians were ducking necessary agricultural reforms, and that we had to break this tie...we had to do something about this otherwise...because they could meet their own food needs.

OLMSTED: Over the long haul, of course, they could meet their own needs. I don't think there was ever a question about that, but it was on the short term in a drought year. That was what gave us the power over the Indian government to make them make many, many changes, introducing new methods, and doing things in land reform, and all kinds of things like that.

I can understand why Johnson felt it was necessary to do that, and I think it did have some beneficial effects over the long run. But it's a painful thing to watch at very close hand.

Q: What was your impression of the staff at the Department of Agriculture when you were dealing with this?

OLMSTED: They had some people who were technically competent, I think. Most of them were very cautious bureaucrats who were not inclined to climb out on any limbs, and who tended not to see a very large picture. There was one fellow that we worked with who was a special assistant to Orville Freeman, and he has become very prominent in ecology matters, and things like that since. His name will come to me. Yes, his name was Lester Brown, and he was very bright and very helpful.

I can remember once when Bowles was back on consultation, and I accompanied him over to see Orville Freeman. They nearly got into a fist fight, Bowles was so mad at him over the way the Department of Agriculture was handling matters.

Q: Feeling that it was not being responsive, was that the problem?

OLMSTED: Yes, and feeling that they were encouraging Lyndon Johnson in the position he was taking. The first year I was in NEA, my work was almost entirely with the food for India program. I spent very little time on anything else.

Q: Did that change later? You were there for a number of years.

OLMSTED: Yes, it did. It changed over a period of time. The rains came, and the food situation in India very much eased, and other situations were much improved. And then I turned onto the other things that one does as a principal economic officer with regard to another country. Actually I was responsible for India, Nepal, and Ceylon, and I was able to spend a little more time on Nepal and Ceylon than I had that first grim year.

Q: What was the impression of how the economy of India was working? Was it basically a socialist economy? Or was it a mixed economy?

OLMSTED: Oh, it was mixed. As I've quoted before, Galbraith said there was this little layer of planning on top of the largest operating chaos in the world, and that describes it very well. It was socialist at the top, but the rest of it was sort of tribal capitalist.

Q: Were there any more American business efforts to get American business in there, or not?

OLMSTED: I should say Bowles made more of an effort than Galbraith. I don't think Galbraith was all that interested in American investment but Bowles was, and he made his pitch to a lot of American corporations. Sometimes no more successfully than his pitch to the American government, or the Indian government.

Q: You left there just about the time the Nixon administration came in in '69, didn't you?

OLMSTED: No, I left India in '65, then I went to the Senior Seminar. Next I was in NEA/INC: India, Nepal, Ceylon, and then I left there after three years -- I left there in '69 and I spent a year in an out of agency assignment to the Office of Economic Opportunity, and it was after that I came back to State.

Q: What were you doing in the Office of Economic Opportunity?

OLMSTED: Planning and research was the department that I was in, which had a lot of bright, young people who really didn't know what they were doing. It was kind of interesting in a way but I didn't think that they were very realistic.

Q: It was designed to find solutions to poverty.

OLMSTED: Yes.

Q: It was now the Nixon administration. Was the feeling the Nixon administration was giving much support to this type of operation?

OLMSTED: They did maintain a quite large Office of Economic Opportunity. I was very surprised to find out how large it was, and how much it was doing. But, as I say, I think a lot of the efforts were unavailing. Maybe some good things did come out of it, but there were a lot of impractical ideas that were bought and paid for.

Q: *Were you brought there specifically because of your Indian experience -- I mean dealing with a country with major poverty problems? Is that one reason why you were there?*

OLMSTED: Well, it was my own interest. I wanted to see what the United States was doing in this field, and came away rather disappointed.

JANE ABELL COON

Consular Officer

Bombay (1960)

Political Officer

Bombay (1961-1964)

Political Officer

New Delhi (1965-1967)

Ambassador Jane Abell Coon was born and raised in Dover, New Hampshire. She received a bachelor's degree from Wooster college in 1947. Her Foreign Service career included positions in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Ambassador Coon was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin on November 4, 1986.

COON: I didn't have enough cutlery to handle more than twelve people. And after I'd had typhoid it was nice to be in a place with somebody else. That's a very depressing disease. I look back on Karachi as just an awful lot of fun and a place where I learned a lot.

Anyway I went on to Hindi training and got ready to go out to Bombay as consular officer. My assignment was made in January, and I wasn't going out until the following summer. I was told not to communicate with the post, because the consul general, who was retiring in June, was unalterably opposed to women in the Foreign Service. He was very much old school. And Personnel said that it would be unwise to communicate with the post until absolutely the last minute before he was leaving.

So it was finally communicated. I guess by that time I'd finished Hindi language, was taking the consular course, and I went to a party to meet my new consul general, who was going out to replace this gentleman.

My new consul general -- I can still remember the party -- said, "Oh, I'm so glad to meet you, Jane. I guess I really ought to tell you what I've been doing today. I had a letter from my

predecessor, a long letter, three pages, explaining all of the reasons why a woman could not do consular work in Bombay, so I have been going through the Department today to see if I could break your assignment."

So far he was unsuccessful. But this was literally days before I was supposed to leave for the post. He wasn't in a position to make a judgment himself, and he accepted the judgment of his predecessor that a woman couldn't do consular work. When I think of how many women are in consular work, now. [Laughter]

Q: I know, I know. That's where they're supposed to be naturals.

COON: Fortunately, he was unsuccessful. I went out, but I went out again with that wonderful feeling that my boss thought I shouldn't be there. He had been a long-time economic cone officer, knew nothing about consular work, and it was a one-person consular section, so I was on my own.

It turned out to be really a piece of cake. I mean it was hard learning the job in terms of a one-person operation, but there was no problem in being a woman. In fact, again, it turned out in some respects to be an asset.

What the old consul general had particularly emphasized that it would be impossible for a woman to handle, was shipping and seamen.

Q: Same old story. They use that in any part of the world.

COON: Same old story. Yes. In fact it was probably easier for a woman to handle shipping and seamen than any other part of consular work. I very quickly discovered that most seamen had been raised at the knees of a strict mother, who had beaten into his head that you don't swear in front of ladies.

They'd come into my office, and I had arranged it so there wasn't a handy chair to sit in, so they would stand. They would start complaining about food on the ship, or working conditions. They'd say, "Ma'am, that go-uh. That da-uh. That -- the captain is serving us absolute sh-- ma'am the food isn't good." [Hearty laughter] It would only take them five minutes before they were so absolutely paralyzed by their inability to communicate that it generally solved the problem. The captains were, in many cases, equally docile.

I found that jail visits and that kind of thing were no problem. The Indians were extremely helpful. Usually an American sailor in jail was appreciative of anything you could do, like getting him put on a non-veg diet schedule, rather than a veg diet, and arrange to have some food sent in. So that it didn't turn out to be, again, at all a problem. In fact, as I say, it was probably an advantage being a woman.

I wouldn't trade that consular tour for anything because I think you learn as much as a consular officer as you do in any other job in the service. You learn an awful lot about people.

Q: *Yes, I imagine you must. Is it monotonous work?*

COON: No. It wasn't monotonous then. By present day standards Bombay would have been a very low volume visa post, so you could spend quite a lot of time on each case. There was a mix of protection and welfare. You know, the odd American who died or was hospitalized. Shipping and seamen. It was before the hippie phenomenon, but you had this wonderful phenomenon of world travelers at that time, who were traveling from England to Australia. Americans going from England to Australia. They were usually very interesting, if a trifle off-beat. If I found one interesting enough I'd have him or her home for lunch. So you met a lot of interesting people.

I traveled in the consular district, mostly by train up through Madhya Pradesh. Made one two-week trip up through central India. Again, I was certainly the first woman consular officer anybody had seen. I was calling on Indian officials and visiting mostly missionaries.

Then the second year I moved into the political position, and I spent the next three years as political officer in Bombay.

Q: *What was your housing there?*

COON: That's another slight incident. I initially was put into an apartment, a government-leased apartment in an Indian apartment building where we had several flats. Very pleasant, overlooking the Arabian sea. But that was temporary, and I was going to be moved from Jivanjyot into Washington House, a US government-owned building.

Then the very energetic, rather aggressive PAO, who was protecting some USIS apartments, worked out an arrangement where, in the course of the year I would be moved six times.

The consul general called me in to tell me about this arrangement, which again, I'm perfectly certain would never have entered their heads with a male officer. At that point I put my foot down, and I said that was just an impossible situation because I needed to have my own apartment. If you're going to build up contacts, you can't move every two weeks.

Q: *Plus the amount of time it takes.*

COON: Plus just the amount of time it takes to move. So I think I did two moves. I moved into a one-bedroom, and then ultimately got a two-bedroom apartment, my second year. That made me mad. By that time I guess I was beginning to get mad. Which we all should have done sooner.

Q: *I think you were very forbearing if it took till then to get mad. [Laughter]*

COON: You just took this state of affairs for granted, as the way the world was constructed.

Q: *Your needs were just not important.*

COON: No.

Q: Although, of course, you had a very important assignment.

COON: So as political officer in Bombay, I think probably that's the post where I made what reputation I got as a political officer. I traveled widely in the consular district. It was a period of substantial change in western Indian politics, and I made a breakthrough in terms of getting to know the chief minister of Maharashtra, whom no Westerner had gotten to know up until that time. He was very much of a product of middle caste Maratha culture.

It turned out, as luck would have it, the first year I was political officer there, the Indians took over Goa. The "invasion" is one term used; the Indians use the term "liberation of Goa."

Q: Depends where you're standing.

COON: Depends where you're standing. In 1962, at almost the same time as the Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Indian War occurred. As a result of the invasion of Goa, Krishna Menon had been elected to parliament from Bombay. As a result of the Sino-Indian War, Krishna Menon, who had become Defense Minister, was eased aside. To everyone's astonishment, the chief minister from Maharashtra was brought up to Delhi to be Defense Minister. This was of course, an extremely crucial time in our relations, and I was the only person who knew him.

Q: He'd been one of your contacts?

COON: Yes. I had worked very hard on trying to get to know him and also to size him up and assess his views.

Q: That was a coup for you. The sort of thing young political officers dream about.

COON: That's right. That was a real break. After he was defense minister, I'd only see him when he came back to Bombay. Again, I got to know a lot of Indians, made a lot of Indian friends. I can't think of any difficulties I had with Indians on the account of being a woman. It just didn't seem to be an issue.

Q: There seem to be a great many very important Indian women. Was that true even back then?

COON: There had been Indian women who'd been very active in the independence movement and in the Congress party, and there were a fair number of Indian professional women in a number of walks of life. So it was, I think perhaps, a little more open than --

Q: Than Karachi?

COON: Yes. I had a great consular district that involved Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and Goa.

Q: So your consular work really fed right into your political work, didn't it?

COON: Yes. One other interesting aspect: I guess being a woman was an oddity -- and I didn't quite realize what an oddity it was until about 1963. My mother and father came out to visit, traveling on one of the last Anchor Line ships through the Suez Canal, and landed in Bombay and spent about three months with me.

They arrived before Christmas, and my Indian friends were just absolutely delighted to have my parents there. It somehow made me human to have family, to actually be born of woman, so to speak. I realized that it humanized me.

Q: You weren't sprung from the head of Zeus.

COON: Exactly. [Laughter] They just fell all over themselves giving my parents Christmas presents and inviting them out for dinner. My parents, I think, were really quite overcome by the amount of attention they got. But it was clear my Indian friends were just delighted to find that I indeed was human like the rest of them.

Q: Yes, yes. Isn't that fun.

COON: Bombay was my only four-year tour. I think your first tour is special and your longest tour is special, because you get to know a place so much better.

I was transferred to Delhi in 1965. The political counselor who'd gotten to know me and my work in Bombay asked me if I would come to Delhi at that point. Which I did, and I spent two years as first secretary in Delhi. There we didn't have a political and economic section. We had an external section and an internal section. I was in the external section following Indo-Pak and Indo-Nepalese affairs among others. So I traveled several times to Nepal. It was also during this period that, very early in that tour, there was a very bad downturn in Indo-Pak relations over the Rann of Kutch affair. I remember being over at the British embassy with my British counterpart, and the two of us down on the floor with a whole lot of maps, looking at the Rann of Kutch, when the British ambassador walked in, and the two of us sort of leaping to our feet. [Laughter]

Q: Now all this time had you been getting promotions consistently?

COON: Yes, I got two promotions, really, out of Bombay. I was promoted, I think it was after my consular tour, and then I was promoted when I first got to Delhi, which was really based on my Bombay work.

Q: So this would make you about a three now, would it? As first secretary, you'd be a three.

COON: Yes. I was a three.

Q: The old three.

COON: The old three. I was a young -- in age -- a young three, because I made three when I was thirty-five or something like that, which in those days was young.

Q: So it certainly didn't hold you back, being a woman, did it? You certainly got them when you should have, and in fact that's very good to go from four to three in less than three years. Very good. By this time, though, you were building up a very good reputation, because we heard about it in another part of the world. So you must have been doing very well.

COON: That was an interesting period in Delhi, because we had the Indo-Pak War, after the Rann of Kutch, that September of '65. Then in the winter of '66 was the Tashkent settlement, engineered by the Russians between India and Pakistan, and the death of the Indian prime minister in Tashkent, of a heart attack. Something which you couldn't possibly write a novel about. It was extraordinary. None of us had expected the Russians to pull off a settlement, and they did, and then Lal Bahadur Shastri died of a heart attack that night.

Q: That same night the settlement came out? My word.

COON: It was a wonderfully talented external section. Almost everybody in that section has gone on to be an ambassador. Doug Heck was the political counselor for part of that time, became ambassador to Niger and Nepal. Galen Stone succeeded him, and he became later ambassador to Cyprus. Nick Veliotis was in that section, was a colleague, went on of course to Jordan and Egypt. Roger Kirk was our Soviet specialist. Mary Olmsted was across the way in the internal section, and Howie Schaffer, who's now ambassador in Bangladesh. Looking back on it, I suspect Delhi was a little overstaffed with talent.

Q: I should say. But what an exciting time to be there.

COON: It was an exciting time to be in India. Of course at the very end of my Bombay tour, Nehru had died, and that was a transition in India. When Lal Bahadur Shastri died, Indira Gandhi became prime minister. So that was another transition.

Q: Did you feel any fallout from the election of Kennedy overseas?

COON: I was in Bombay at the time. I don't remember any particular fallout from the election. The Indians were generally, I think, very well disposed, because in the history of the subcontinent, the Indians generally felt they fared better under Democrats and the Pakistanis under Republicans, so that I think the Indians were quite positive.

I was in Bombay when Kennedy was assassinated, and the impact was absolutely phenomenal. It was unbelievable. To this day, I don't understand the magic that he managed to project around the world. This chief minister that I mentioned said that he had been up in his village home -- and he came from a real Indian village -- and he said his nephew came in that morning to tell him, weeping, with the tears running down his face. There was a tremendous amount of emotion involved in that.

Q: And as you say, worldwide.

COON: Worldwide. And it spread on the Indian grapevine. I think every Indian must have known in a matter of hours.

Q: Did you have, in Bombay at the consulate general, a period of mourning where you weren't supposed to entertain and go out and so forth?

COON: Yes, we had a month, as I recall; a month's period of mourning. We had a book to be signed at the consulate general. You're never prepared for these things. I remember tearing around, and we ended up with a ledger because nobody could find a proper condolence book. Then we had to rush out and get black crepe, which wasn't readily available, to put around the ledger. Later we arranged a memorial service at the Catholic cathedral. It was just packed.

All the women at the consulate were desperately trying to find something to wear on their heads, because almost none of us had hats. When I came out as a consular officer, I had gotten a white veil and a black veil. Identical veils, one for weddings and one for funerals, so I was equipped. But I remember that period vividly. Every Foreign Service officer remembers, who was overseas. I was woken up with the news in the middle of the night because of the time difference. It was early morning.

Q: It was quite something. In Baghdad, even the Russians came in with tears in their eyes to sign the book.

COON: It was just amazing.

Q: Of course, at that time we didn't know a lot of things that we know now. We've had rude awakenings for many years, with our leaders, haven't we?

COON: He projected a dynamism and a youth and an energy and hope that was just felt all around the world.

Q: Yes, definitely. Well, after that, there is a great gap in your career in Who's Who. Ten years.

COON: All right. I came back to Washington from Delhi. In the course of my Delhi assignment, the India desk officer had come out, actually a couple of times, a man named Carleton Coon.

Q: I see. He was the desk officer.

COON: The first time I met him I was up to my ears in a rather complicated arrangement between India, Nepal, and the United States, where we were attempting to help the Nepalese and also encourage some better relations between India and Nepal. In the course of this effort, we undertook to provide some construction equipment to the Indians. The Indians were going to use it to build an east-west highway in Nepal. This was a road that would go from the eastern to the western end of Nepal at the southern edge where the terrain is not as mountainous, in the plains area called the Terai.

Well, the Indians were skeptical about whether we were going to come through with our construction equipment, and I had been sending off messages, and there had been great

negotiations in the United States about breaking some equipment out of Army stores, I think. I was very anxious to get a token shipment at that time of four bulldozers and ten dump trucks.

So I was introduced to Carleton Coon for the first time in the political counselor's office and apparently turned on him roundly, as he remembers it, and said, "Where are my bulldozers and my dump trucks?" [Laughter]

He was astonished because he had seen my name at the bottom of reports as J.S. Abell and didn't know I was a woman. So we met initially over bulldozers and dump trucks. Then he came back on another trip, and I don't remember very much about that trip. I think we had dinner together, but it was strictly as professional colleagues. He was married with a family, and I certainly didn't think twice about the contact.

I was assigned back to the States in February of '67. I had arranged to have furniture built in Delhi before I came back, and after I came back I bought a small house on Capitol Hill. Just a gem of a place, a lovely little place right on Third Street. And I settled and moved my furniture in June.

DANIEL L. HOROWITZ

Labor Officer

New Delhi (1961-1962)

Dr. Daniel L. Horowitz graduated from New York University, completing a Masters Degree in Political Science and Labor Economics. He served as the first Labor Attaché in the American Foreign Service. This interview was conducted on May 27, 1994 by Herbert Weiner.

HOROWITZ: As far as my own assignment was concerned, in the period immediately before my transfer in 1960, I was slated to go to the National War College. This assignment was changed when it was urged on me that instead, I accept an assignment to India, where it was felt the situation was tense as a result of the policies of the Nehru Government in playing a third-world role of neutrality leaning toward the Soviet Union. The trade union picture in India became terribly important as the independent trade unions, the trade unions independent of the Congress Party, mainly Socialist unions -- the Hind Mazdoor Sabha trade union organization (HMS) -- could play a crucial role in whether or not the general political scene swung more definitely in the direction of the Soviet Union. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha, being a Socialist-oriented trade union organization and very much a minority, nonetheless had a very vital importance, because its principal strength was in the transportation field -- the longshoremen, stevedores, railroad unions -- and it counted for a great deal as a result.

In any event, I agreed to go to India and did go there toward the end of 1960. For me, India was a fascinating assignment in that it was the first time that I served in what could genuinely be called a completely different culture. I traveled a good deal around in the country, made associations with trade union people and political people around in different parts of India.

With respect to the HMS union and the concern with its general orientation, the head of the organization was a member of Parliament from Hyderabad, Mahadeov Singh, and so he spent a good deal of time in Delhi. In any event, we got to know each other quite well. Singh liked to discuss ideological questions and general political orientation questions, and we did at great length to a point where I saw him often enough that one of his colleagues, who was generally Western oriented, once in a conversation with me said, "Look, it is hopeless. I know what you're trying to do with Singh. You're not going to succeed because with Singh it is not a question really of ideology. It is a question of color." Well, it turned out actually that this was something of an exaggeration, because with time Singh's general orientation was modified enough that he did in general begin to favor a Western orientation.

One of the things which had an influence on him was a trip to the United States. I had, after some time, suggested to him that he consider a leader grant to visit the United States. I was in Bombay on a trip at about that time, and Singh came through Bombay. We met in my hotel room and discussed the possibility of a leader grant. He had considered it, and he was prepared to accept, but he said, "Look, the only shoes I own are these sandals I'm wearing. I don't own any ordinary shoes. How can I go to the United States without any shoes?" I leaned over, took my shoes off and handed him my shoes. He made the trip, which turned out to be a very good one from the point of view of his exposure to the United States and meetings with trade union people and others. He came back quite impressed, and it had some long-time influence on him.

The principal trade union organization, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), was Congress Party controlled and oriented, and the Congress Party, of course, reflected the policies and positions of Nehru and his government. By and large the policy was neutralist. The relationship between the trade union movement and the government was a close one, but one in which the direction of things generally ran from government to party, or from party to government, and to the trade union rather than in general the reverse. The HMS played a more independent role, and in this regard did have greater independent influence.

Because of the very different cultural background that characterized India, I volunteered to stay an extra year. . . -- At that time the assignments were two years. -- . . .an extra year in order to maximize any benefits that would come from my associations. Nonetheless, again, the National War College possibility raised its head, and Foreign Service Personnel decided that I had better go to the National War College that year, the fall of 1962. As it turned out, when I got to Washington in August of 1962, I was told in Personnel that I was no longer scheduled at the War College. This was rather startling to me, because I had had an assignment to the War College washed out three times in the past. The first time had been in 1948, when I was in ILH, and in 1948 the personnel office had slated me for the National War College until they looked at my age and decided I was too young at that time to go, and so I was told, "No, you'll be recommended some years from now." 1953 was the second time that I was recommended by Personnel to the National War College. This time, at the time I was Labor Advisor in EUR, and without consulting me the Executive Director of EUR notified Personnel that I simply could not be spared from the Bureau, and therefore my name should be scratched from the list. I didn't learn this until some years later. The third time was, of course, in Paris as I mentioned, when my assignment was scratched in order for me to go to India.

In any event, when I got to Washington in 1962 and was told that I was no longer slated to go to the National War College, I was quite angry and upset and tried to track down what had happened. I couldn't get any answers until I finally got to the Under Secretary for Management, and he explained to me that this was a decision that had not been taken in the State Department, that the State Department had no control over it, that it was a White House decision, and we'd better abide by it. It turned out on investigation that the decision had been made in a conversation between George Meany, then head of the AFL-CIO and President Kennedy.

JOSEPH F. DONELAN, JR.
Administrative Counselor
New Delhi (1961-1962)

Joseph F. Donelan, Jr. was born in New York City, where he attended City College of New York for a year. His first job with the Department of State was an assignment with the Foreign Service Planning Division. His posts include, Paris, Nagoya, and New Delhi. He was also a comptroller for NATO.

Q: Going to New Delhi, what was the problem? Why did you go and why had the other man left?

DONELAN: John Kenneth Galbraith was the new Ambassador to India. He was a close friend to President Kennedy, he really was. I guess the President, as President's are wont to do, told him he could have whatever staff he wanted. Since Galbraith didn't know me from a hole in the wall I've always assumed that the culprit was his Deputy Chief of Mission, a man by the name of Benson E.L. Timmons, III, more familiarly known later in the Embassy, Bacon, Lettuce and Tomato! I had known Timmons briefly in Paris where he had been deputy chief of the aid mission to France. And I suppose that was how my name got there. So we arrived in Delhi in I guess August 1961, and I was Counselor of Embassy for Administration. That was an exciting time.

Q: How did Galbraith operate as an Ambassador from your vantage point?

DONELAN: Actually, I liked the way "Professor" Galbraith as the Indians always called him, operated. He was the Chairman of the Board, he had a staff and he expected them to operate with a certain amount of initiative and independence, and he had a Deputy Chief of Mission to whom he delegated all of the day to day operations of the Mission. This was the preferred way for a "political" Ambassador to operate, that is by delegating the usual stuff to a career Deputy. Galbraith functioned very effectively; he traveled the country widely; he met with and knew countless Indian officials, and certainly had complete access to the highest levels of government. If the operation had any weakness it was the manner in which his deputy worked; and to a considerable extent the deputy was the one who discouraged initiatives and individual judgments, but this mostly was a result of his insecurity.

It was the conventional wisdom that early in his tenure, the Ambassador was inclined to be overly impressed with the requirements/demands of the Indians, but that didn't last as he quietly adjusted his own attitude after sufficient exposure, and I guess toward the end of his tour he perhaps was more inclined to shake his finger at some of the complaints rather than being convinced of the need. He was terribly skeptical of the professionals and the career Foreign Service Officer in particular. And he may have had good cause for that, but I don't know. He personally wrote short, terse and classic cables to the Department which frequently became conversational pieces. (And yes he had a good personal relationship with President Kennedy, and yes on occasion he would pick up the phone and call him at the White House). In terms of personal relationships, once he decided you knew what you were doing, that was it until you might prove otherwise. I guess I had been there for a week when a disaster cropped up somewhere in that vast country.....

Q: Famine or earthquake or flood?

DONELAN: As a matter of fact, as I recall it was a flood - and areas of India almost always flooded after the monsoon season, and with great damage to life and property. The Ambassador called me and said "We've got to give the Indians \$50,000 or \$60,000. The United States is rich and they expect us to help out in this catastrophe. So I want you to draw a check right now". And I said "We can't do that". Well, the simple matter of fact is that American Embassies, no matter how big they might be, never have been known to have 50,000 or so dollars hanging around loose in an allotment account which at any given moment could sustain that amount. I did remember that there had been a mechanism provided in the foreign aid appropriation, under which in case of an "emergency" an Ambassador could draw down an amount up to \$50,000 without prior approval of Washington. But that had been a couple of years ago, and verification of the authority would be prudent. He didn't like anybody to tell him what he couldn't do, but then I told him if I could have twenty minutes or so to check something out, I thought it might be done. I did check it, it was still a valid authority, and it was done, and the Ambassador called the Prime Minister and notified him of the gift. From then on the Ambassador didn't expect me to do everything right away, but twenty minutes or so later was okay. He was a fascinating man, renowned in his own right as an economist, a forecaster of the '29 depression, a facile writer of books, and a great conversationalist, although some people said he did most of the conversing. But I think he was a good Ambassador and a very successful representative of the President and US interests.

Q: How about your dealings on your side as administrative officer with the Indians because you must have had probably more contact with the Indian bureaucracy than anybody else in the business? How did this work?

DONELAN: I dealt with the Foreign Ministry, and with various other officials of the Indian government on a continuing basis - principally in the areas of immunities and privileges of American personnel in the Mission (Mission being, Embassy, AID, USIS, Military Attachés, Agriculture and Commerce, Treasury and other assorted US representatives, and after the invasion of India by the Chinese Communists in connection with the USMSMI (U. S. Military Supply Mission, India) accreditation and diplomatic status, free entry of personal and official materials, diplomatic pouch, and diverse other instances - e.g., an official American is in an automobile accident - and what to do about it? Etc.

The Indians were always very picky on everything we did in this area, part of it understandable sensitivity, part of it their nature, and their bureaucratic operation, which probably was the worst I'd ever seen (not that we're simon pure), and part of it other Ministries such as Finance, resenting the authority of the Foreign Affairs people. (And that happens in all governments!)

We had a good American School starting up and we needed a lot of equipment, for instance microscopes for the labs in the High School. And they said: "Well, you must pay duty on these things". And the duty of course was about five times the cost of the item in the States. Since they were adamant, we simply changed the name of the addressee, and had the stuff consigned to the Ambassador personally. So the Ambassador got these huge supplies and equipment, and they never fought it. But there was a definite technique in working with the Indians, which once learned, was quite effective. I remember when I first heard the term "red tape", I thought it was sort of a joke, but I learned that it originated with the British in India, and that their students, the Indians learned their lessons very well.

And you can actually see "red tape". Quite contrary to the American penchant for making five copies of everything; the Indians made no copies of anything. They registered documents in and out but they never made copies. As a paper moved from office to office and as each unit or office made its comments or gave an approval or disapproval, the new piece of paper was added to the file so that in a remarkably short time on its way through the bureaucracy, the bundle of paper was tied together with "red tape". So you learned that there was a natural progression through certain ministries from this desk to this desk and to this desk. And you discovered that if you got to know this man very well on any one of these items, he could always call up a document from lower down in the chain. So this is the way it worked. You found out who was closest to the Minister, or the Minister, and you went to him. And automatically you could save three or four weeks on anything that had to be processed through the government.

And then there was the Chinese invasion of India. That was a very busy time for the Counselor of Embassy for Administration. Later on I said that I thought that the invasion of the American Supply Mission to India was much more difficult and troublesome than the actual invasion of India by the Chinese.

Q: How did you as Administrative Counselor, become involved with the Embassy efforts during the India and Chinese War?

DONELAN: The Ambassador could see what was happening - with the Chinese threatening and posturing on the northern borders and the Indians pretty much defenseless particularly in the mountain conditions - although the Indians had made pretty short work in '61 of Goa, the hapless Portuguese enclave in warm southern India.

The Ambassador wanted help and he wanted it quick from the US. The President sent Averell Harriman out with a special mission - which included a four star general, the chief of the newly organized "Strike Command", headquartered in McDill Field, Florida. There were about twenty people in the party which included Harriman's aide, Bill Sullivan, a fairly junior officer at the time, but who later was Ambassador to Manila and then to Tehran.

This was in November 1962 - we were having our little Chinese Communist invasion and the US was having its "Missile Crisis" in Cuba (October '62?). All of the Harriman group and most of the "Country Team" members had Thanksgiving Dinner at the Galbraith's - we all pretty much sat around on the floor, kicking around courses of action and what should be done when. It really was typical of the Indians that in later discussions, they were adamant as to what the planned assistance group should be called. At this point the US quite commonly had MAAG - Military Assistance Advisory Groups - in many countries whose function was to provide technicians and technical training and support, including supplies and equipment, to the host country military., The mission to India was identical but the MAAG name was felt by the Indians to be an affront (to their dignity?) - so it became, as I indicated earlier, USMSMI.

First thing we got on to was arranging radio frequencies for the flow of American aircraft, which was to and did airlift supplies and equipment into the country. This was pretty much handled by Bob Richardson, Embassy Communications Officer. It was decided over the next few days that the group would require a staff of about ninety people. And that's where we were totally involved. When they said they would need office space (obvious) the Ambassador said " Joe, you take care of it." And this was followed by need for temporary quarters, people coming and going on TDY (I leased a small hotel); by housing, which was set aside in a new residential area of town, mostly by pulling and tugging with the Indians, this for the sort of permanent staff, and then of course furniture and stuff to make the houses habitable -which I might add included putting in Western style toilets, and stoves and refrigerators and of course air conditioning, etc. So that's the way it worked. And that was my part of the thing and we did it.

Q: I hadn't realized that we'd had such an extensive military assistance effort in India.

DONELAN: Yes, actually we did, not nearly as large as in many countries, but there for a fairly extended period of time, in fact long after I left the post. As is understandable, politics of relationships was involved; remember that up until that time Mr. Nehru had been very pious about his non-alignment, and was not averse to sticking his finger in our eye on occasion. This was a breakthrough; he needed help and the US provided it. It was a fairly short lived invasion and I believe the Chinese accomplished exactly what they wanted - which was to humiliate Mr. Nehru.

We in the Embassy were watching to see if the Chinese would use aircraft to bomb Delhi - they never did. But we put up blackout stuff and lights were dimmed in the city. I didn't think they had any intention of doing so. I made an observation at a meeting and some people were pretty upset with me for saying I didn't think the Chinese were coming at all. I wasn't pretending to be a military expert, I just felt that the Chinese were too smart to conquer India, because if they conquered India they'd be responsible for all these millions and millions of people. It would simply destroy the whole Chinese Communist movement. But they did march into India, they pushed some military units around, they spiked some artillery, and then left, just like that.

BARRY ZORTHIAN

**Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1961-1964)**

Barry Zorthian, a graduate of Yale University, served in the U.S. Marine Corps during World War I in the Pacific. His career included positions in India, Germany, and Vietnam. Mr. Zorthian was interviewed by Cliff Groce on October 20, 1988.

Q: So after VOA, India.

ZORTHIAN: After VOA, India. We had three very exciting years in India -- our first Foreign Service post. India in many ways was an exciting country, in many ways a depressing country. I was deputy PAO. I was supposed to be deputy to Bill Handley, got over there, and Bill Handley was preempted for something else. He became ambassador to Mali and never showed up. John Lund, whom I replaced, left. Ken Bunce had already left. So I was acting PAO for about five or six months, till Bill Weathersby was selected, wrapped up his business, and got out there. We worked for John Kenneth Galbraith, who, again, if he liked you, was a very exciting guy to work with. Full of ideas, very difficult in some ways but also very stimulating. If he didn't like you, he was hell to work with. And he might not like you for all kinds of reasons: you were too tall or too fat, or you didn't comb your hair right or you wore the wrong ties, or he just didn't have much respect for your intellectual capabilities. But we got along fine. Bill Weathersby also got along fine with him. We had three good years in India. The family enjoyed it. India still had enough touches of the Rudyard Kipling era to be great for youngsters. Our children were quite young then. My wife enjoyed it. We traveled a lot in India. And I think we had a hell of a good program. One fortunate thing was, we didn't have budgetary problems because we had so many PL 480 rupees we didn't know what to do with them.

Q: What Henry Loomis used to call "funny money."

ZORTHIAN: Funny money. Well, it was great in India because we did all kinds of things -- book programs, university programs, all the conventional programs, big Fulbright program, English teaching. AID was founding universities. We had the one political crisis there of the China invasion of Ladakh, and that was a pretty exciting time. It was almost the same time as the Cuban crisis here. But there's where the political connections of an ambassador help. John Kenneth Galbraith's ability to go directly to Kennedy got attention for India even in the middle of the Cuban crisis. And airborne assistance -- supplies, equipment, and so on -- arrived in India on big, impressive -- whatever they were -- C-141's, big impressive American transport planes, and of course impressed the hell out of the Indians.

We had a problem in India. The Bhopal steel mill had been turned down -- if I remember, under Dulles -- and that negative impact had to be recovered. Galbraith was very public conscious. He was used a good deal publicly, was respected by the Indians because he was a professor, because of his reputation in the economic field. So those were very good years. And many of our close USIS friends today came out of that period.

WILLIAM HENRY WEATHERSBY
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1961-1965)

Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (1967-1969)

William Henry Weathersby began his career in 1951 working for a predecessor organization to the United States Information Agency. His career included positions in Cairo, Tehran, New Delhi, and an ambassadorship to Sudan. This interview took place on August 1, 1989.

WEATHERSBY: Well, a vacancy developed in the job of Public Affairs Officer in India. The Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, was pressing his friend of long standing, Ed Murrow, to fill the job. We proposed a series of names, and the Ambassador kept turning them down. In one message he said he would like for us to reach outside and get someone of the stature and talents of a Carl Sandburg or a Robert Frost. Finally, a friend involved in personnel work in the State Department called to tell me that Ambassador Galbraith was arriving the next day and one of his objectives was to get the matter of a Public Affairs Officer settled. He realized that Galbraith had turned down about a dozen nominees. He asked if I would like the job. I told him that I would like to go but that Murrow had said that he wasn't ready for me to leave. "Well," he wanted to know, "do you mind if I mention your name to Galbraith?" I told him that it didn't matter.

A couple of days later my friend called to say that Galbraith wanted to see me and made an appointment. We talked for an hour or so, and I wanted to go over the best names we had for Public Affairs Officer in India, but he was interested in a more general conversation.

The next morning Murrow summoned me with all the background on our best candidates for PAO India and told me to wait outside his office until he called me into his session with Galbraith. I did, but instead of calling me in, Murrow came out with Galbraith and told me that the Ambassador had convinced him that I should go to India. It turned out to be an extremely interesting assignment for me, in large part because we had in place a strong USIS program with some able people, including Barry Zorthian, Deputy PAO, and later Lawrence J. Hall in that job.

Q: *We had branches in how many cities, do you recall?*

WEATHERSBY: We had a branch in each of the four cities in which we had Consuls General, those being New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In addition we had about a half dozen centers with libraries in lesser but still important cities. Prime Minister Nehru had allowed these centers back in the early days of Indian independence. Later, when I was back in Washington, the Soviet Union was operating a center in Kerala when the roof collapsed and the question arose as to whether they had permission from the Government of India for the center. Apparently they had not. It became an issue for the Indian press. Of course, there was no written evidence of

governmental approval much earlier for the American center in Kerala. Both of the centers had to close.

Q: Did Ambassador Galbraith take an active interest in USIS?

WEATHERSBY: Very much so. His travels through India were planned with USIS, he spoke a great deal, he made himself available to the press frequently, and he was primarily responsible for bringing some outstanding speakers and other talented people to India. He had high visibility in the Indian press and also in our own publications, including the periodical, The American Reporter. He prevailed upon a number of scholars, including some of his colleagues from Harvard, of course, to tour India.

After the Sudan I went back to New Delhi as Deputy Chief of Mission and concurrently Consul General for Northern India.

Q: Who was the Ambassador to India then?

WEATHERSBY: Chester Bowles, the only person I know who served as U.S. Ambassador to the same country twice, first in the administration of President Truman and then in the time of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Q: I had forgotten that if I ever knew it. Of course, he was the Bowles of Benton and Bowles, one of America's great advertising agencies back in the '30s and '40s.

WEATHERSBY: They began the business, as I recall, when they both were fairly fresh out of Yale. In the hard times of the great depression from the crash of '29 they had remarkable success in their new advertising firm. As Chet, as he was generally known, sometimes said, the work had to be very good, but the real secret was in convincing business leaders that in a deep depression there was no way to survive without putting whatever was needed into their advertising budgets. At the outbreak of World War II he went into government as Federal Price Administrator, then as Director of Economic Stabilization, and later served as special assistant to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie. In 1948 he was elected Governor of Connecticut, in 1951 went for the first time as Ambassador to India, and thereafter was elected to the U.S. Congress.

I remember that Ambassador Bowles appraised the work of USIS in one of his numerous books. Let me find it. It's in Promises to Keep, an account of his years in public life. Here it is; he wrote: "Much of the burden for correcting the distorted views of America held by many Indians was on the United States Information Service.....During my first assignment to India, the USIS had published The American Reporter, a twelve- page fortnightly newspaper in eight Indian languages with a circulation of 450,000. When I returned to India, I was delighted to see that this paper was still in operation, still well edited and still dealing honestly with the common problems of America and India. It also reported world-wide developments in the fields of science, education and politics, interviews with recent prominent visitors, and excerpts from speeches by prominent American officials. In 1964 I began to contribute to The American Reporter a regular column, which was also published regularly in papers throughout India with a total daily

circulation of two and a half million. In these columns I outlined my personal views on such questions as economic development, economic justice and world politics.

"At least half of our information program in India was designed to reach young people. A particularly effective USIS program was its series of American Cultural Weeks at various Indian universities. These comprehensive presentations of American problems, accomplishments, music, art, and political views often lasted four or five days. To help conduct the various seminars, we recruited wives of Foreign Service officers, Fulbright Scholars and specialists from a variety of fields, as well as our own USIS staff." [Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (Harper and Row, 1971) pp. 466, 467.]

Q: With his background, he had more than a passing interest in the U.S. Information Agency.

WEATHERSBY: He had a great deal of interest and was very helpful in many USIS activities. For his return as Ambassador his re-entry was from the east and I flew to Calcutta and accompanied him and Mrs. Bowles in the flight to New Delhi, doing some briefing on the way. He was delighted to see that USIS was still publishing The American Reporter, which was begun with his encouragement during his first term in India. Earlier when I was with Ken Galbraith in the far reaches of eastern India -- the Ambassador in a speech had taken pride in saying that he believed he was the first American Ambassador to have the pleasure of visiting Shillong, and an Indian arose in the back and said, "No, Ambassador Bowles was here." I would say that both Ambassadors Galbraith and Bowles looked upon the work of the U. S. Information Agency as an important part of American diplomacy and participated in a wide range of activities.

Q: What were overall Indian-U.S. relations during this period, as you recall, Bill?

WEATHERSBY: Relations generally were good ever since Indian independence. It was recognized by many educated Indians that President Franklin Roosevelt had been an advocate of Indian independence in his talks with Sir Winston Churchill, even though he failed to convince him to preside over the liquidation of the empire. Prime Minister Nehru strongly believed in nonalignment and so have all of his heirs who have been elected to Indian leadership. In the Eisenhower years, Secretary of State Dulles was heavily engaged in putting together defensive military pacts around the world. India turned aside offers of arms and other inducements to join but that would not have greatly disturbed U.S.-Indian relations if Pakistan had not joined and begun strengthening considerably its armed forces. With Pakistan in an alliance with the United States and China building its military might with the help of the Soviet Union, India saw itself as nearly surrounded by potential enemies. In fact, the course of events brought wars with both Pakistan and China.

The difference of view on the values of alignment and of non-alignment was a major cause of friction between India and the United States for many years. There was an important exception to the general supply of U. S. arms to South Asia in 1962 when the Chinese-Indian border dispute resulted in Chinese attacks in Ladakh and the northeast frontier. The Soviet Union had agreed to supply MiG warplanes to India and to aid Indian aircraft manufacturing. In reneging for awhile on the promises, the Soviet Union referred to a serious international crises, which might be taken to refer to the Indian-Chinese border or concurrent problems between the U. S. and the USSR

around Cuba. Nehru asked our Ambassador at that time, Galbraith, for weapons, and American cargo planes began flying military equipment to Leh in the high center of Ladakh near the battle areas. Later Nehru said that Indian leaders had been "living in a world of our own illusions." A large request for arms went to Washington but was blocked by Congress.

Through all of this USIS India was engaged in the cultivation of improved relations, and I believe over the years there has been considerable success. Later when Pakistan and India engaged in one of their brief wars, all U.S. arms to the region were stopped, but the supply to Pakistan was later resumed. Over the years India and the U. S. certainly have managed to know each other better.

Of course, U. S. aid to India has been an important factor and was helpful, even though Indians mainly were responsible for a green revolution which achieved self sufficiency in basic food production.

Q: What was your next assignment, Bill?

WEATHERSBY: Next came a temporary job in India as Chargé d'Affaires. That was because there had been another change of administrations in Washington, and after Ambassador Bowles went home President Nixon took some months to name a new Ambassador. Even though I was due back in Washington, when the new Ambassador, Ken Keating, arrived I was asked to stay on in New Delhi for a visit there by President Nixon.

HOWARD B. SCHAFFER
Economic and Political Officer
New Delhi (1961-1967)

India Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1967-1969)

Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer was born in New York in 1929. He graduated from Harvard University and then served overseas in the US Army before joining the Foreign Service in 1955. Overseas, Schaffer served in Malaysia, India, Korea, Pakistan, Cyprus, and as Ambassador to Bangladesh. In Washington DC, he served in the Office of Personnel, as the Country Director for Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia. Ambassador Schaffer was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.

Q: Then, in 1961, you were assigned to New Delhi as an economic officer.

SCHAFFER: Right. I went as an economic officer because in my naivete I thought that having been a political officer in Seoul after having done considerable political work in Kuala Lumpur it would be useful to broaden my skills and experiences. Fortunately, 1961 was before the

Department instituted its rigid “cone” system; so I had no problem being assigned as an economic officer--not as far as I know. I might note that one interesting aspect of my career is the limited time I spent in Washington, particularly in my early years as an FSO [Foreign Service officer]. Of my first 11 years in the Service, only one was in Washington and that was in language training. So my naivete about the personnel system and Department bureaucracy more generally came easily.

I had been in Delhi briefly during my journey following my Seoul assignment. But I had no idea how huge the embassy was. It was an enormous mission which aside from the embassy proper had a very large AID staff. AID was established in 1961 as the successor to ICA, the Development Loan Agency and a number of other operations. I remember looking at the Delhi phone book in 1961 and noting that almost every page had the name of at least one American official on it. So we had a very, very large mission.

The embassy was lodged in that beautiful, but not very efficient building that Edward Durell Stone designed as an abstract from Mogul architectural forms. It was presided over by John Kenneth Galbraith who had arrived in April--three months before I got there. It should be noted that there was a considerable wild life supply in the “water court” in the center of the embassy and the renowned “duck ceremony”--when the ducks marched out of the pool every afternoon to their night resting place--was already in effect. Although not directly related to the “water court,” we even had a representative of the Fish and Wildlife Service on the embassy staff. His task was to find appropriate Indian wildlife to be sent back to the U.S. where they were domiciled in various state and federal parks and wildlife preserves.

Galbraith was our ambassador from April 1961 to July, 1963. He was followed by Chester Bowles, who so interested me that I have written his biography. My first DCM was Benson E.L. Timmons, III--known as Lane. He was a very hard-driving martinet who was always cracking the whip. He was minutely involved in both the management of the embassy and most of the substantive issues facing us. He became known by his initials “BELT” and was called by some “La Cinture” [French: belt] in French. After Galbraith and Timmons left, Joseph N. “Jerry” Greene came as DCM. Bowles and Greene were there for the balance of my tour. After I left to become India desk officer, Greene was succeeded by William Weathersby who had been director of USIS [United States Information Service] in New Delhi and later became our ambassador to the Sudan.

As I said, I was assigned to the embassy’s economic section. I served in that job for about eighteen months. I didn’t much like it. I didn’t know much about economics and I wasn’t learning much in the Delhi job. My principal responsibility was commodity reports--particularly on industries. It wasn’t very exciting nor particularly sophisticated. I really didn’t have the background in economics to turn out sophisticated reporting. The best economic reporting in the embassy did not usually emanate from the economic section, but from the AID staff. I had a fairly substantial official relationship with AID, and, on a personal level, I knew some of the staff quite well. Physically, the AID staff was quite removed from the Chancery, with the exception of the titular head of the Economic Section--the Minister--who was also the AID Mission Director. In my days, that was C. Tyler Wood. This physical separation was a barrier to an effective liaison with AID.

I got to know Wood well. He was a wonderful, good hearted man who was also a crafty bureaucrat. He was one of the few people in the embassy whom Ambassador Galbraith - in his sometimes insufferable arrogance - really respected. I think that may have stemmed in part because Wood enjoyed a strong relationship with important power sources in Washington and Galbraith was a man who knew where power rested and had a great respect for those who could effectively wield it.

I worked more closely with Ty Wood later following the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war when the U.S. undertook an effort to rush military supplies to the beleaguered Indians. I was included in a special organization that was established in the embassy under Wood to deal with that problem. At that time, I was theoretically still a member of the economic section, but by then, I had begun to make moves to leave it and transfer to the political section. This was in Galbraith's waning days as ambassador, the summer of 1963. My efforts to shift worked. I had support from my friends in the political section. An appropriate job at my grade level was coming vacant and I made the case that my Hindi language skills were probably better than those of anyone else who might be coming out of FSI. No bureaucrat in Washington said anything and fortunately for me the man who actually ran the economic section--counselor R. Burr Smith--liked me and agreed to the transfer if that was my wish. But there was a problem. Because of the personnel changes in the embassy, and particularly in the economic section, I was informed that the transfer could only take place if I were willing to postpone my home leave for about eight or 10 months. That was fine with me.

When I first started in the political section, I was assigned to the domestic affairs unit and given two major responsibilities: a) to cover developments at the state level within the Delhi consular district--the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, and Kashmir and b) to deal with the opposition parties. (In those days of Congress Party domination of the Indian political scene, [the opposition was] a weak lot and could safely be entrusted to an officer who was just getting started in reporting Indian political developments.) My colleague in the unit was Craig Baxter. He had covered the areas that I was to follow and took on the responsibilities of the job on the domestic political side that had become vacant, namely covering the Congress Party and the operations of the national Parliament. I mentioned that I had the brief for political developments in north India. We also had in those days political officers assigned to the three constituent posts--Calcutta, Madras and Bombay; who similarly followed political developments in their consular districts.

The political reporting system changed during my tour. When I first began to work in the political section, I believe that the constituent posts sent their reports directly to Washington, with copies to the embassy. Later, the reports came to Delhi first where they were incorporated into messages from the embassy or retransmitted to Washington after the embassy had vetted them.

I might at this point just interject a comment about Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy's visit, which took place while Galbraith was still ambassador. It was a very interesting operation. According to reports that I believe are correct, Ambassador Galbraith had been one of the principal promoters of the visit, which (inevitably in those days) included Pakistan as well. I believe he did this not

only because he enjoyed these occasions - he loved being in the company of great people or their spouses. But I'm convinced that he also saw the visit--and his role in masterminding it--as evidence of his close ties to the Kennedy White House that would impress the Indians. Since he was seen to be choreographing the visit of the First Lady; he must have seemed to the Indians to be very close to Mrs. Kennedy and, hence, to the president. Much of this staging was designed to show the Indians that he was a person to be reckoned with because he had full and meaningful access to the Oval Office.

The visit went off very well. The important aspect, from our point of view, was that the preparation for the visit became first priority for all embassy staff. Other work just had to take second place for months. Officers were sent to various parts of the country. Some very remote indeed -- to check out accommodations, scout sites that the First Lady might wish to see, and look for places appropriate for public relations purposes. I was not involved in this exploration of India; in fact, I was not a significant player in the embassy in any respect for most of Galbraith's tour. When Mrs. Kennedy came, I was still pretty much of a fledgling. But like everyone else in the embassy, I was drawn into the preparations. I was much impressed by the attention that was devoted to every detail by Galbraith. He even ran a rehearsal dinner designed to ensure that all would go smoothly at the official dinner, which was loaded with VIPs from Prime Minister Nehru on down. This visit was taken as seriously as a presidential visit. It was a very glamorous occasion.

When I was in Sri Lanka many years later, Mrs. Clinton visited Colombo. I must be the only U.S. government employee who was in the subcontinent for the visit of these First Ladies--Mrs. Kennedy (1962) and Mrs. Clinton (1995). The two visits could hardly have been more dissimilar. This reflected the different personalities of the two women and the roles they each played in their husbands' administrations. In addition, over the 30 plus years we Americans have changed our views of the appropriate role of a senior official's wife. Mrs. Clinton's visit was full of substance. She went to U.S. assistance projects; she talked substance to other women who like herself were active in public affairs. Mrs. Kennedy's program was altogether different. She was photographed dancing with maharajas and going up mountains to medieval palaces on the backs of richly adorned elephants.

It is important to note that during the Kennedy presidency, many Indians viewed the White House with great admiration. The Indians have a love of pomp and circumstance, for royalty. I think they saw in the Kennedys their image of a young, vigorous royal couple. I use the words "young and vigorous" quite advisedly because I do feel that part of the attraction the Kennedys had for Indians was their youthful beauty and exuberance. Indians compared this with the tired and aging leadership of Nehru and the other chieftains of the Congress Party.

The visit was obviously a public relations success. Mrs. Kennedy was photographed everywhere. But it was all fluff; there were no serious discussions. She sat with Nehru on the embassy stairs after dinner, but the visit had no lasting impact. It did show the U.S. in a very favorable light and I think one can say that Indian public opinion moved in our favor--and it was wonderfully good for Galbraith in terms of his standing both with the White House and the Indian leadership. Yet soon after Mrs. Kennedy's departure, Indian-U.S. relations sagged once again.

As I said, the opposition parties were not a substantial factor in Indian political life at that time. They had been badly defeated in the 1962 elections by the Congress Party, which garnered three quarters of the parliamentary seats and got approximately half the popular vote. I don't believe that any opposition party was able to meet the 10% threshold; i.e. a party had to win 10% of the seats in Parliament to be declared the official opposition party. In any event, the Congress Party occupied the center of the political stage--in both senses of the term--and the opposition parties were scattered in different parts of India and occupied the political fringes on both the left and the right. For example, the Communist Party in those days used to garner 10% of the popular vote--election after election--but fewer parliamentary seats. Its strength was confined to a few Indian states, most notably West Bengal and Kerala.

My bosses--the DCM and the political counselor--showed some interest in my work. Even Bowles, Galbraith's successor, was somewhat interested. But what really brought me for the first time to the attention both of the front office and the people in Washington who dealt with Indian matters was the trip I took in the late winter of 1963-64 to Kashmir. I had by then been in the political section for about eight months. Kashmir was included in the Delhi consular district and covering political developments there was part of my job.

My first official trip to Kashmir was very important because it was an ice-breaker in terms of the embassy's coverage of the politics of the disputed state. In December 1963, a relic--a hair of the Prophet--was stolen from a shrine near Srinagar, the capital of the state. Initially, the police were unable to come up with any clues that would lead to the perpetrators. Widespread rioting followed, carried out by people who thought that both the theft and the lack of police action had political motivations. The Kashmir government, like all Kashmir regimes in those days (and these), was deeply dependent on the central Indian government for support. Its collapse in the face of the demonstrations gave rise to a very serious political and security crisis in the state. The situation was given wide coverage by both the Indian and the international media. Some of the most insightful pieces were written by a Washington Star reporter, Richard Critchfield, who had somehow managed to find his way into Kashmir. It was a bad and dangerous predicament for the Indians. The Kashmir people used this theft as an opportunity to protest the way they had been treated politically over the years since the state acceded to India in 1947. It was a very undemocratic state of affairs. The state government was very heavy handed and corrupt. The government was run by a political party, the National Conference, which was aligned with the Congress Party. Ambassador Chester Bowles felt that it was important for someone from the embassy to visit Kashmir and observe the scene on the spot. A new government had been installed but our reports indicated continuing tension.

Up to that time, no embassy officer had ever proceeded on what was an avowedly political visit to Kashmir, primarily because of the opposition of the central government. It was feared that since many Kashmiris were opposed to Indian rule, an embassy observer might come away with the "wrong" perception of the situation, particularly if he met with dissident political figures. We also regarded Kashmir as a disputed area. This too kept our approach very careful and low key. Embassy staff had visited on holidays and some of the political officers had taken the opportunity to observe. Some may have even talked to some Kashmiri politicians, but we had never sent an officer on an official visit to discuss politics as we did in all other Indian states. The central government had some reservations about Bowles's idea, but it finally concurred. His

position was that it was better for the Indians themselves if the embassy and Washington had first hand analysis, particularly by an embassy officer who spoke the language, than to have to rely on tendentious accounts in the press.

To tell the truth, I was quite nervous about being the embassy's first official visitor to Kashmir. This was by far the most sensitive political assignment that I had ever undertaken. Ambassador Bowles personally counseled me before I left. He didn't provide any detailed guidance; he left that to what he considered my good sense. But he did warn me to be careful. The trip was very long. It was February, and air travelers had to worry whether they would ever reach their destination because of the weather. On the way, I had a very interesting conversation with a prominent carpet manufacturer and merchant, Ghulam Ahmed. He proved later to be very helpful to me in putting me in touch with politically useful people. I helped him by purchasing a large number of carpets.

During my visit, I was able to talk to everyone of importance in Kashmir political life. I assumed that the central government had sent advance notice of my arrival. The embassy had not because we just hadn't had the time. When I arrived at my hotel, I immediately began to call for appointments. Much to my pleasure, every one was willing to see me, both those in the government and those who opposed it. I was able to get around quite freely in Srinagar. I had heard from Richard Critchfield, the Washington Star reporter to whom I referred earlier, as well as from Ghulam Ahmed, the merchant I had met on my journey to Kashmir, about a student activist named Farooq Kathwari. Farooq, who turned out to be Ghulam Ahmed's grandson, had been very helpful to Critchfield, taking him around Srinagar and introducing him to many political dissidents. Critchfield had suggested that Farooq might be similarly useful to me. So I got in contact with him and he was indeed very helpful. He guided me through the university and put in me in touch with other student activists who had participated in the demonstrations that had forced the state prime minister to resign a few months earlier. So I was very grateful to Kathwari. I later learned that because he had helped me, he got in trouble with the authorities. He belonged to a very politically active family--his father had been a member of the "Azad" Kashmir government which ruled the areas of the state held by Pakistan -- and because of his activities on my behalf he was expelled from Indian-held Kashmir and had to go to Pakistan. He stayed there only briefly and then managed to make his way--with some help from me--to the United States. After that, I lost contact with him.

But more than twenty years later, when I was ambassador to Bangladesh , I learned that the former student had become a very successful business man. Kathwari was by then the CEO of the Ethan Allen furniture company, one of the largest manufacturers and retailers of furniture in the United States. In one of the negotiations that Ethan Allen had with the Department of State on the sale of furniture for use in embassies and overseas residences, Kathwari met John Condayan, then I believe a deputy assistant secretary of state for administrative affairs. During the course of the negotiations, Kathwari asked what ever happened to Howard Schaffer, whom he had known in Kashmir before his emigration to the United States. That led to our renewing our acquaintance, in 1985 or 1986.

I am convinced that had I not entered Kathwari's life and developed a mutual beneficial relationship, he would have remained in Kashmir, probably in the family's business, living a

respectable life rather than attaining the multimillionaire, big businessman status he now enjoys in this country. It is a good example of the right thing happening for the wrong reason. We are now working together in the Kashmir Study Group that he has organized, and we see one another frequently both personally and professionally.

There was no question that while I was in Kashmir I was under close surveillance by the Indian intelligence services. I didn't allow that to bother me. Indeed, during one of my visits to Kashmir the bearers (servants) at the hotel would point out the security officers assigned to watch me. As far as I know, the government never took any action against any of my interlocutors other than Kathwari. I talked to anyone worth talking to--at least, those who were not in jail or otherwise detained. For example, I did not get to talk to Sheikh Abdullah, the famous "Lion of Kashmir" who had been deposed in 1953 and remained in jail in India proper. Both in Srinagar and, soon afterwards, in Jammu--where the government moves in winter time--I saw everyone I wanted to see without difficulties. That included the recently installed prime minister of the state, G. M. Sadiq, who represented the left wing of the ruling National Conference Party and had become New Delhi's man in Kashmir. The state's home minister, D.P. Dhar, who later became very important in the national government in the 1970s, facilitated my trip by car from Srinagar to Jammu--all plane service having been suspended because of bad weather. I remember writing my report in longhand in the railway retirement room in the station in Pathankot--the first town in the Punjab after leaving Kashmir which was then the northernmost point of the Indian Railways. When I got to New Delhi, I found out that Phillips Talbot, the assistant secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs, was in town. I made my report orally to him and to Ambassador Bowles. As I mentioned earlier, it was that report, which I had typed out in final version in my embassy office, that brought me to the (favorable) attention of the Washington authorities. It also raised my standing with Bowles.

I came away from my first and subsequent visits with a good deal of sympathy for the Kashmiris. The Muslim majority in the Valley of Kashmir feel a great sense of alienation from India. Most of them do not consider themselves Indians and refer to themselves as Kashmiris--not Indians. They feel they have been badly treated both politically and economically. In their view, they have not benefited from their connection with India. When they go south to look for work, they feel discriminated against--both as Kashmiris and as Muslims. Within Kashmir itself, even though they hold the reins of political power, many of the civil service positions are (or were before their flight from the state in the early 1990s) occupied by the minority Hindu community. Some of the Kashmiris are attracted towards Pakistan. The Indians were viewed as the power behind an authoritarian, corrupt regime that remained in power only because it did Delhi's bidding.

Despite the persistent Indian claim about pouring many resources into Kashmir, there was a widespread sentiment--which persists to this day--that much of the money was going into the deep pockets of Delhi's favorites, leaving precious little to the masses who needed the assistance. Major land reform had been implemented in the late 1940s and early 1950s, carried out by Sheikh Abdullah's government before it was forced out with the connivance of the Nehru government in 1953. Therefore by the 1960s, land distribution was much more equitable than was the case elsewhere in India. That was very important in Kashmir because it is essentially an agricultural area. Kashmiris are a small society. The Valley itself, which is the key to the Kashmir problem,

is only 80 by 25 miles in size. The Valley profits not only from agriculture, but also from tourism, handicrafts and forest products. Despite the complaints, there were merchants in papier maché, carpets and the owners of house boats who were doing well. Nonetheless, these businessmen felt they were discriminated against by India. No efforts were made to build up a manufacturing base in Kashmir aside from traditional handicraft industries. The government viewed Kashmir as the end of the line, geographically, where it did not make economic sense to invest in production facilities. Furthermore, the transportation system between Kashmir and India was very primitive in the early 1960s. There were no rail lines from India proper either to Jammu in the south or the Valley in the north.

These geographic barriers almost forced the Kashmiris to develop their own culture--the Kashmiriyat. It was different from India and Pakistan. I concluded in my report that the Kashmiris, if given a choice between independence or integration with either Pakistan or India, would support independence if there were strong enough leadership which could articulate the people's desires. Many mentioned to me that they could foresee themselves as the "Switzerland of Asia" with friendly ties with both India and Pakistan. The international community, they said, would be quite prepared to spend large amounts of money for the development of such an independent state so relieved would it be to have been rid finally of the Kashmir problem.

I visited Kashmir officially several times after that first trip. I made it a point to go there twice a year. I retained the Kashmir portfolio even when I changed jobs in 1964 and became responsible for covering the national political scene focusing on the Congress Party. I never felt very optimistic about a solution being found for the Kashmir problem.

I served in India this first time during a major change in India-Pakistan relations. In 1965, the second India-Pakistan war broke out. This of course had a great impact on the Kashmir issue. The Pakistanis had triggered the war in order to win control of the Valley. If initially, I had entertained some dim hope for a resolution of the Kashmir problem - and surely had never been very optimistic-- after 1965 I saw no hope whatever. The Indian attitude was just too uncompromising. It had been manifested vividly in the U.S.- and British-sponsored negotiations between Pakistan and India following the Sino-Indian war, which took place in 1962 before I was given responsibility for following Kashmiri developments. The 1965 war made it clear, as the Indians stated, that Pakistan could not be allowed to win at the negotiation table what it could not win on the battlefield.

Punjab was another issue that I dealt with. It was interesting even in the early 1960s though the more dangerous aspect of the problem the Indian government confronted there did not arise until later, in the 1980s. In the mid-1960s there was a dissident group of Sikhs led by Tara Singh who wanted a separate state for themselves "within" India. They called their scheme "the Punjabi Suba" and periodically agitated for it by fasting and demonstrating. Many leaders and the more excitable of their followers were jailed from time to time. They were dealt with severely by the Indian authorities, who usually managed to keep them under control. Tara Singh, the longtime leader of the Akali Dal, the party that spearheaded the Punjabi Suba movement, was discredited when he broke his fast; he had promised to fast until a separate state was established or he died. He was succeeded by Fateh Singh. Fateh Singh was a very heavy set man. He too promised to fast and went even beyond that; pledging to immolate himself if India did not agree to the

Punjabi Suba demand. This led me to follow Marshall Green in the punning department; I told London Times correspondent Neville Maxwell, "If Fateh Singh does that, the fat will be in the fire." He quoted that in his account, fortunately without attribution.

It must be noted that the loyalty of the Sikhs to India in the India-Pakistan war of 1965, despite blandishments from the Pakistanis, led the Indian government, then headed by Mrs. Gandhi, to agree in early 1966 to the creation of the Punjabi Suba they sought. This created a state within India in which the Sikhs were the majority--excluding to a large measure the areas occupied by the Hindu majority in the earlier undivided Indian Punjab state who spoke Hindi. This Hindu group took over the remainder of the undivided state's territory in a new state called Haryana. By the time I left India in 1967, the Punjab was not an issue any longer; the establishment of a new state had "resolved" the tensions. It was only much later that the problem arose again when a demand was raised for an independent Sikh state, separate from India.

So that issue had been resolved--apparently-- in 1966 by a reorganization of states in north-west India. Everyone seemed to be satisfied with these new arrangements. I left thinking that the solution to the Punjab issue had been found. The Hindus in the new Sikh- dominated Punjab might have been somewhat unhappy, but they had their own state--the newly formed Haryana where leadership was in the hands of Hindu agricultural castes--and domination of the Delhi municipal scene (in large measure by Hindus from Pakistan) as well. So I believed that that problem had been solved--very much unlike the Kashmir issue.

As I mentioned, my original assignment in addition to Kashmir was to cover the opposition and Delhi consular district politics. I had those duties for approximately one year. With the departure of my colleague in the domestic reporting unit of the political section, I took over responsibility for Parliament and the Congress Party--in other words, an overview of the national scene.

The opposition parties always welcomed me. They were interested in talking to American officials. We did not have any dealings with the Communist Party--a policy decision that had been made before my arrival that was just about engraved in stone in those Cold War years. To my knowledge, no one challenged that policy and it remained in effect throughout my tour and probably far beyond. We did see everyone else. I was the principal point of contact with these opposition parties, but I knew that CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] had its own sources within many of these groups, particularly those on the left of the political spectrum.

As I have mentioned, the opposition parties had been badly defeated in the 1962 elections--for the third straight time. But the Sino-Indian war, which broke out about six months after the elections--in late 1962--was a jarring event to Nehru's government. He lost a good deal of personal prestige; one of his closest confidants, Krishna Menon, who was the defense minister, was forced out of power. That did not bring many tears to our government which regarded Menon as the "enfant terrible" of India (a status he valued and advertised). These events gave new hope to the opposition. Their hopes were bolstered by victories in some important by-elections in which principal opposition leaders, defeated in the general election of 1962, beat the Congress nominees. So when I arrived in my job, I found the opposition parties much more vigorous and much more hopeful of the future than one might have expected from parties that had so few Parliamentary seats. None of these opposition parties had held power in any state

since the victory of the Communist Party in Kerala in 1957. That government did not last very long. Forced out of office with Nehru's connivance, it was superseded by a non-communist regime supported by the national government.

It was different following the Congress Party because some of my superiors had contacts there and I shared the liaison with them. Congress was ruling the roost throughout the country when I came to New Delhi. The opposition was scattered around and what ever influence it might have had was exercised through the contacts of opposition parties and individual member of these parties with like-minded people in the Congress Party.

I am fairly sure that the embassy was surprised by the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962. I really don't know for certain because I did not have access to the more sensitive reporting. I was not very much involved in the embassy's work on this issue. As I mentioned, I became much more familiar with it when I was later assigned to the special unit which had been established to handle the military and security assistance which we provided after the beginning of the war.

It was clear, however that tension was building. Nehru had said, in a much quoted interview, that he was ordering the Army to throw the Chinese out of the disputed area. This area was south of the McMahon line, which the Indians maintained was the boundary between India and China. The Chinese did not recognize this British-drawn demarcation.

As I mentioned, after the war started, I was assigned to work for Economic Minister/AID Director C. Tyler Wood on a special task force handling military assistance. Essentially, we were to stay in touch with Indian authorities and with our military on security issues and later on Indian needs for assistance in expanding their military production facilities. We had had no security relationship with India before this time. We were not an arms supplier to India; we had no MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group]. A very few Indian military officers came to the U.S. for training, but that was minimal. In part, our position stemmed from the fact that we were allies of Pakistan.

My unit worked very closely with the Defense Attaché's office and then with a special group that was sent from Washington--the Office of the Defense Representative. I applauded the strengthening of our relationship with India and had no problem with the United States becoming involved with India's security. I thought it was the only thing we could do and I believe that all embassy personnel who were knowledgeable about the issue supported the new policy. There was some disagreement among both Indians and Americans about the extent to which our security relationship should go. As for responsibility for the Sino-Indian War, there was a universal belief among official Americans that the Chinese were the culprits. In this view, it was China that had invaded Indian territory. Whatever the Indians might have done to provoke this was brushed aside. Some people wondered to what extent the Indians would be willing to play a more helpful role in Southeast Asia, where Vietnam was beginning to loom large for American policymakers. In fact, the Indians confined their anti-Chinese and anti-Communist views to their Himalayan border with the Chinese. They did not see it in their interest to join in any kind of U.S.-led arrangement to contain communism in Southeast Asia.

One interesting result of the war was the changed attitude of the Indians toward the United States and its representatives in India. The Indians were grateful for our assistance, although I think that over time they became uncomfortable with the reliance on the United States that the new relationship entailed. But initially, they were extremely grateful and pleased that we didn't exert pressure on them to join a vigorous alliance with the United States. One factor which helped to abate the initial enthusiasm was our insistence that India engage Pakistan in a dialogue about Kashmir. A lot of Indians saw that as our taking advantage of their country when it was in dire straits and forcing them into something that they had rejected for many years; i.e. the surrender of Kashmir to Pakistan.

One other consequence of the war was the large increase in U.S. government officials in India. People in American uniforms were no longer an exception; there were lots of them. We arranged for special American military flights to carry weapons to areas threatened by the Chinese. I think we all experienced a much friendlier attitude on the part of the Indians toward Americans.

The Wood task force was designed to work with Indians to sort out what it was that the Indians needed. We civilians focused mostly on delivery of ordnance plants to give India a greater capacity to build its own weapons. I was selected because I indicated an interest; I thought that the work of the task force would be interesting, which in fact it was. This work lasted 3-4 months. I worked full time on it for that period. I thought its work was very useful and successful.

I think we did the only thing we could have done; we supplied weapons and military capacity. That was the right policy. I think we did expect more in return than the Indians were willing or could have delivered; they could or would not become one of our allies on global issues--or even on Asian issues. They had another foreign policy agenda; they did disappoint Bowles in their refusal to play a helpful role in Southeast Asia. I shared in that disappointment, although I don't think that I was surprised; in fact I don't think I spent much time thinking about the potential quid-pro-quo for our military assistance.

I don't remember Vietnam becoming a problem on a personal level. I was berated much less on the issue than I had expected during the 1961-67 period. By the time I left India, we were heavily involved in Vietnam--and had been for at least two years. Yet there were very few recriminations from my Indian contacts and friends. I did not normally raise the issue with them; discussion about Vietnam was held at more senior levels. No systematic effort was made to persuade Indian politicians of the virtues of our Southeast Asia policies. So I did not feel compelled to raise Vietnam and the Indian politicians rarely raised it with me--perhaps out of politeness, perhaps because of their insularity. Vietnam did not loom very large on their scope.

I was not at all surprised when the Kennedy administration tried to use its leverage after the Sino-Indian war to bring about a better India-Pakistan relationship--specifically, to try to bring about a resolution of dispute over Kashmir. We did try; we did sponsor bilateral discussion between the two countries--I think there were five sessions into 1963. But nothing came of this dialogue, which did not come as a surprise to me.

After six years in India, I came to like Indians on a personal level; that was especially true for some of the people with whom I have continuing contacts. There was, I think, a general

difference of views about Indians between officers like me who dealt with political figures, and those who dealt essentially with the Ministry of External Affairs. We who dealt with political figures found the Indians we were in contact with much more congenial than did our colleagues who had to deal primarily with the Mandarins of the MEA. They were not then, by and large, a very congenial group; nor are they today. I built up good relationships with the politicians, most of whom were older than I. I tried to get the junior officers, when they rotated into the political section, to make and maintain contacts with the younger politicians. I thought that system would be useful in carrying out our objectives and would also be enjoyable both for our junior officers as well as for their Indian contacts.

I covered the national political scene for about three years (1964-67). I was meeting on a regular basis--breakfast, morning tea, afternoon tea, dinner--with about 100 members of parliament. These included some very important figures. They would call me sometimes and sometimes I would initiate the contact. It was a wonderful series of relationships. There were some who would come to chat with me on a regular basis--particularly on a Friday evening. I was basically interested in finding out what was going on and reporting it to my bosses and Washington.

I was well regarded by Bowles and Joseph N. "Jerry" Greene, the DCM, for the contacts I had made and maintained. By the end of my tour, I had a vast knowledge of and insight into the Indian political scene. People used to tell me that for someone of my rank, I had achieved great influence in the embassy's front office. I had no way to judge the merits of those comments, but I think my views were carefully considered by my bosses. I think it is fair to say that I probably had more influence in the embassy than my rank (FSO-4) and title (second secretary) would have suggested. It was useful to have an ambassador like Bowles who was more concerned with the capabilities of officers than their rank and titles.

No discussion about Bowles is complete without some reference to the people who worked for him. As I mentioned in my book about him (Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War, Harvard University Press, 1993), the staff was quite remarkable. Basically there were two elements. They initially eyed each other with some suspicion, but soon came to work very well. Bowles had his own group--as he always had had in prior positions. These were people primarily recruited from outside the government but it included one Foreign Service officer--Brandon Grove--who achieved considerable success in his career. Other people in the inner circle included Richard Celeste--a future governor and now himself ambassador to India, and Doug Bennet--later AID administrator and NPR chief. There were others who had been part of Bowles's entourage in earlier incarnations. Bowles had a great knack for recruiting people. Many of his immediate staff had been prominent in their chosen professions, but nevertheless left their jobs to join Bowles. The best example is John P. Lewis, who had been a member of the Council of Economic Advisors. At Bowles's urging, he agreed to come to Delhi as chief of the AID Mission.

The only common denominator among the people in the inner circle was their intelligence. Otherwise they were a disparate lot. But they all believed in the importance of India and of Indo-U.S. relations, and were enthusiastic about the opportunity the embassy had to play a meaningful role. In their view, the embassy had to be a major player in fashioning U.S. policy towards India in accordance with Bowles's concepts, as well as in influencing the Indians to follow policies

along the same lines. Without that commitment, no one in the embassy, neither this “Chet Set” (as I nicknamed them) or anybody else, had any hope of winning Bowles’s confidence.

In my book, I included a long passage on Svetlana Stalin’s 1967 defection; I should say that I was not aware of her presence in the embassy and in fact did not find out about her defection until she was well on her way out of India. Her presence in the embassy was held very closely. She arrived one evening and was gone in less than eight hours. Word did not spread, in part helped by the fact that the embassy was closed, it being after working hours when she arrived. She had taken advantage of a reception which was being held in the Soviet embassy right down the street from us to slip over to our chancery. during the night she left on a plane to Rome. I did piece it all together later for my book, using reports and interviews of those who had been involved.

My book also discusses Indian domestic politics at some length and I will not repeat the comments I made there. But I should note that those politics changed markedly during my six-year tour. Those six years encompassed the Sino-Indian war, which had a profound effect on Indian politics, by significantly weakening Nehru’s position; Nehru’s death--May, 1964; the 19-month government of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and his death after the India-Pakistan war of 1965; Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s assumption of power; and the serious defeats suffered by the Congress Party in the general election of 1967, when it for the first time lost power in many of the states. All this provided much room for analysis of the changing nature of Indian politics which was carefully read in Washington. I was asked to extend my tour in Delhi so that I could cover the 1967 election--which helps explain why I had such a long tour in India.

During my last two years in India, as I have mentioned, I was assigned responsibility for coverage of the Congress Party and the national political scene. I was able to maintain a very close relationship with Indian politicians which was possible for a second secretary of the U.S. embassy to do in those days. It was quite remarkable how available the politicians were and, in some cases, how interested they seemed in developing a warm, trusting relationship with a member of the political section of the American embassy. Some of these politicians were pro-Western and welcomed contact with the embassy for policy and ideological reasons. Some saw such contacts as a way to bolster their own egos--it meant something to them because they saw themselves--and I assume that they made sure that others saw them-- as major and continuing contacts with American diplomats. Some undoubtedly viewed such contacts as profitable--not in monetary terms, but as a source of little favors - visas, getting embassy officers to bring back small items for them from the States after home leave, etc. (Few western goods were available in India in those days.) Some may have viewed the contact as a potential basis for obtaining grants to visit the U.S. Others just found it interesting to talk politics with a well informed outsider. Of course, some of them also recognized that I could be a valuable source of information about Indian politics for “them.” So there were many different motives, but I want to stress that the key element making this kind of close and extensive relations possible was the remarkable openness of Indian politics in the mid-1960s and later. So there was an interest in foreign representatives; for different reasons, as I’ve mentioned, and politicians saw such contacts as useful, important and in often enjoyable. They were quite prepared to see me and even to invite me to some of their functions--although most of the invitations to social events came from me.

In some respects, these contacts were heady stuff for a second secretary; in other ways they were not. My predecessors had enjoyed this access, so that I was not pioneering anything new--except on the Kashmir issue. I was simply assuming a portfolio ably handled by my immediate predecessors, Craig Baxter and Albert "Pete" Lakeland. But these contacts, which I developed and maintained assiduously, gave me an importance in the embassy hierarchy that was unusual for someone of my rank--at least that was what I was told. So my work gave a cachet, and at the same time, access to the front office, which was very interested in my analyses of the political situation as drawn from my conversations with various Parliamentarians. I would be used by some of the embassy senior officers to make contacts with these MPs, sometimes to set up a meeting and at other times to convey messages back and forth. So I think my work did raise me above the level that second secretaries usually reach.

I loved my tour in India. With the exception of my subsequent ambassadorship, it was the best job I had ever had--including the tour as chief of the political section in Delhi which I had ten years later. Looking back now that I have retired, I can say that I enjoyed my assignment to the political section from 1963 to 1967 more than any other non-ambassadorial jobs I had in my career. It was an exciting time to be in India. I felt that I was given important tasks. I knew that I was considered an important cog in the embassy machinery--after having caught the ambassador's eye. I took the job with great seriousness, worked very long hours very cheerfully, and enjoyed what I was doing immensely.

I was constantly on the move. My days would often start with breakfast with an important politician, followed by teas in morning and afternoon--rarely did we have business lunches since parliament did not take a mid-day break. And then dinner with one or more of my contacts. I figured that I was regularly seeing about 100 members of the Parliament--roughly 12-15% of the members. It was unusual experience for a young officer and as I said, I enjoyed every minute of it.

I developed bonds with a number of the politicians which hold even today after more than thirty years. When I go back to India, I manage to talk to a number of these old friends. These bonds allowed me to get "inside" stories about important events. Even before I inherited the national portfolio, I had contacts which allowed me to monitor Nehru's health in the period after his stroke--January 1964-- leading up to his death in May 1964. One of my fondest memories is about a high level meeting which I was asked to attend. The ambassador turned to the station chief and asked for an updated report on Nehru's health. The station chief said, "You better ask Howie. His information is better than anyone else's!"

In light of my subsequent career, I should talk at this juncture about our relationships with our embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. The relationship between the two embassies was very poor at the highest level. Each embassy took the side of its host government. It was one of the most egregious cases of clientitis that I ever encountered in my years in the service. Indeed, it was possible with very little imagination for us in New Delhi to write a telegram that would mimic a message that might be sent about a current development in India-Pakistan relations by our colleagues at the embassy in Karachi. In addition to these divergent views on substance, embassy-to-embassy relationship was not helped by the greatly divergent personalities of the two ambassadors--Bowles and Ambassador to Pakistan Walter P. McCaughy during one period

and then Bowles and Eugene Locke afterwards. Bowles and McConaughy had known each other in Washington; Bowles thought that McConaughy's foreign policy views were outdated. To Bowles's mind, they resembled the hard Cold War ideas propagated in the 1950s by Secretary John Foster Dulles. Gene Locke, who succeeded McConaughy in 1966, was a political appointee, a wealthy Texan who was a personal friend of President Johnson. His appointment as ambassador to Pakistan turned out to be a way station for Locke; he moved on in 1967 to be deputy to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon.

I recall vividly the stop-over in New Delhi which Ambassador and Mrs. Locke made on their way to East Pakistan. They came to the residence, dressed to the nines in their most expensive clothing, probably straight out of Neiman-Marcus. Bowles, for his part, was wearing his usual loose bush shirt. Mrs. Bowles, as I recall, was dressed in a particularly sloppy sari and sandals--if she had any footwear on at all. The contrast in dress symbolized for me and others the different planes on which the two ambassadors and their spouses operated; their styles were of course also reflected in their embassy's operations and the different ways official Americans related to Indians and Pakistanis in those days.

At my level we had good relations with our counterparts in Karachi. We tried to institute reciprocal visits. In light of my portfolio, I didn't get very much involved in the Karachi-Delhi relationships because I was assigned to cover Indian domestic politics. On one occasion, in 1964, following my visit to Kashmir, I stopped at Karachi on my way back to the United States on home leave to brief the embassy there on my findings in Srinagar and Jammu. I stayed with Don Gelber, with whom I had studied Hindustani at the FSI and with whom I had developed a good personal relationship.

The higher embassy officers, although having good personal relationships with their counterparts in the other embassy, tended to reflect the views of their host government--perhaps not as much as the ambassadors did. By that I mean that they favored U.S. policies that would better Washington's relations with their host governments and paid rather little attention to the impact these policies would have on American ties with the other country.

Bowles was a great believer in meetings that brought together senior U.S. representatives in the region. He had his own ideas about who should be invited to these sessions. He tried as he did in many other ways to break out of bureaucratic rigidities which he felt tied his hands for no valid reason. For example, he invited representative from our embassies in Southeast Asia as well as from the South Asian missions. The meetings were quite useful, but I think for the development of a consistent U.S. policy, it would have been better had there been more exchanges between senior level embassy staffs from Karachi and New Delhi. To the best of my recollection, Bowles never went to Pakistan during this second tour as ambassador. (He had gone there during his 1951-53 ambassadorship.) He should have. He had very decided and negative views on the importance of Pakistan and the value of a close relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. He might have reexamined these more critically if he had been exposed to Pakistani views.

Of course, all this came to a climax with the India-Pakistan war, which was a disaster for our relations with both countries and led to a prolonged period during which we placed South Asia much lower on our foreign policy agenda than we had before.

Working for Bowles was a rare experience. I think his style had an impact on me. I took his emphasis on informality very much to heart. There was also a marked interest on Bowles' part in encouraging junior staff to learn what the embassy was doing on important matters about which lower-ranking officers at most other embassies are often kept unaware. For example, he had them invited to attend larger meetings where major policy issues were discussed and argued over. In Bowles' days, Embassy New Delhi was a very open operation and I tried to emulate its approach when I reached senior positions. I think such an open atmosphere is helpful to both an embassy's leadership and the junior staff. This approach was operational outside office hours as well. Bowles extended the contact with the junior staff to social occasions, inviting many of them to the Residence for dinners and receptions. This gave them an opportunity to expand their social contacts beyond what might have been expected under a "normal" ambassador. It thus gave them a better understanding of India and of Indo-U.S. relations.

Bowles was a great believer in getting to know India. It was a very important feature of his leadership. He believed that it was extremely important for embassy staff to get out of New Delhi and into the countryside. That goal was clear during both of Bowles' tours. He pushed this policy so far that on official trips outside of Delhi, the U.S. government would pay for the travel of the officer's wife. He firmly fought against R&R (rest and recuperation) leave, arguing that if a staff member felt the need to get away from his post, he could do so without leaving India. He tried to facilitate that. As a result, in the six years I was in Delhi, I never left the sub-continent except for home leave in 1964 and participation at a seminar in Hong Kong in 1966 (when I also visited a number of countries in Southeast Asia). I spent all of my vacations in India or in neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka and Nepal.

I think Bowles, for all of his emphasis on India, was remiss in not learning more about the country. He had a vision of India and would quite easily overlook those aspects of life which did not fit his predetermined outlook both about current conditions and future prospects. In my book, I mention that in all of the years Bowles was in India, he never visited places such as Benares, which were the epitome of conservative Indian Hindu society and culture. He didn't want to know about that aspect of Indian life; it was distasteful to him. He would visit factories, dams--the signs of modernization. It was a remarkable performance which led many to believe that he was a font of knowledge about India--having spent so much time there and having given so much time and thought to the country. But Bowles's knowledge was selective; there were whole areas of Indian life about which he knew little or nothing.

Bowles was not interested in a dialogue with people like myself who might have brought him information which did not fit his preordained views. He felt uncomfortable when people would bring up ideas about India which did not match his. He really didn't want to hear them; so the staff learned quickly that it was not a good idea to initiate a conversation which might have led to some differing views.

My India tour was my first experience in a highly structured society--the caste system. I learned about it and accepted the situation as it was. I obviously had some regrets that things were as they were and always hoped that this societal rigidities might slowly evolve into a more modern society--a better break for the lower castes. But my focus during these six years was on the job I

had to do--analysis of the Indian political scene as it affected U.S. interests. I met people from different caste groups of course. It would have been impossible for me to have done my job properly without doing so, though the participation of lower caste groups in Indian politics was much less significant then than it later became. I would discuss the Indian societal system with my contacts at times. I always knew what caste my interlocutor belonged to because that was important in enabling me to do my job right. But I didn't spend much time worrying about the defects and problems of Indian society. It is also true that if you live in India for any period of time, you come to terms with its societal structure and after a while you stop even noticing it--seems strange, but it is true.

After a while, you don't really see the poverty of the country; it just becomes part of the scenery. There was only one exception, at least for me, and that was Calcutta. It didn't make any difference how often I visited that city; it always seemed dreadful. There were some who were not upset by the Calcutta scene; that was particularly true for people who lived there. I always felt that Calcutta was a terrible place to visit, but not bad to live in--the direct opposite of the old saying about New York City. Bengali society is a wonderful, exciting society once you come to know it and are accepted by it. Calcutta is a very active city--culturally, politically, economically. It offers a broad and exciting range of intellectual life; it is filled with interesting, flamboyant, warm-hearted people. But outsiders have an entirely different reaction. They never really become acquainted with the attractive features of Calcutta and are greatly turned off by what they do see in their brief times there. But, as I said, with the exception of Calcutta, I had no significant negative reaction to what I saw and experienced in India.

There was a very good relationship between the embassy's political section and the political officers at the consulates general. I was considered responsible for that liaison and for the coordination of reports which the CGs used to send directly to Washington (with a copy to us). I made a special effort to stay in touch with my colleagues in the CGs; we would have meetings in Delhi supplemented by visits by me to the three posts. Also, the Congress Party--and sometimes other parties as well--would have meetings in different parts of India. I would attend those meetings accompanied by the political officer who covered the area where the meetings were taking place. These meetings and joint efforts helped develop a warm relationships among the political officers in India that was very useful in many ways.

I would from time to time ask these officers to assess certain issues which were important to the national scene. I also asked them to maintain contact with parliamentarians from their consular districts. I would get suggestions from our political officers about which MP's were worth my meeting with in New Delhi. This enabled us to maintain contacts with these key parliamentarians both in New Delhi and in their home districts.

One of our consuls general--Albert Franklin in Madras--was a rather strange guy. He didn't much like this arrangement because he felt that his autonomy was being challenged, but he lived with it. Information flowed very freely among us; we were constantly communicating with each other. We did not use telephones very much in those days. Connections were usually bad, and it took a major effort to make a long distance call. But I had very good feed-back from the consulates general and I was confident they felt the same way about the embassy.

Let me turn now to the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. A few days before hostilities broke out, it was relatively clear that a chain of events had been set in motion and that there was little chance of avoiding a collision. But before that, I was surprised that tension had risen so high. The first episode took place on August 5 when Pakistani infiltrators entered the Indian-held portions of Kashmir. Some date the war itself from September 1, when the Pakistan Army moved across the boundary which separates Pakistan proper from the Indian-held portion of Kashmir. Some say it began on September 6, when the Indian Army invaded West Pakistan.

But I think it is fair to say that had someone asked me in July whether war would break out between the two countries, I would probably have replied in the negative. By mid-August, it had become increasingly clear that relations were going downhill in a hurry and that there would be a major confrontation.

When hostilities broke out, I was put in charge of organizing teams which were sent to the border areas to alert Americans living there about the situation and to encourage them to evacuate southward. We were prepared to house them temporarily in New Delhi while the conflict was taking place in Kashmir and the Punjab. We had had a warden system--that is, a system which used one American to keep track of several of his compatriots in a pyramid structure, but it had grown rather rusty. Bowles was not interested in activating the system lest we be accused of expecting war; he in fact forbade us to update the wardens' list. So we did not in mid-1965 have as good a list as we should have had. Thus we were painfully aware that we did not have a good enough handle on where American citizens were living in India. Nevertheless, we sent these teams out and that was a memorable experience.

I arrived at the border town of Amritsar the day after the Indians crossed into West Pakistan. I must have been one of the last foreigners to get through. Soon after I arrived, there was a Pakistani air raid. I went further north along the border, urging Americans to evacuate. I had sent embassy officers to other areas to do the same. The area I covered was only a few minutes from Pakistan by air. I got to one town which was the home to a number of missionaries. It turned out that they had been in China a few years earlier and had been forced to leave when the Communists took over. They told me that they appreciated my efforts to insure their safety, but they had been booted out of China already and were not prepared to leave their flock behind a second time. Since they were obviously quite prepared to ignore their peril, I wished them good luck and moved on.

I think in fact missionaries were the major part of the American community along the border. There were also some people who had American citizenship which they had acquired by birth in the United States or residence there, but they were ethnic Indians and were essentially part of the Indian community, not foreigners. The border areas were essentially not economically developed, at least not by large-scale industry, and therefore did not attract the kind of investments which would have brought many more Americans to the area.

Like everyone else, I remember where I was when Kennedy was assassinated. Since it was in the middle of the night in India, I was home asleep. My servants, who heard the news, chose not to wake me up. So I learned of that tragic event from the front pages of the Indian newspapers. It was a terrible shock--to me and all Americans. It was a terrible loss to the Indians because

Kennedy, as I mentioned earlier, had become an almost heroic figure in India. There were many Indian hovels which had a picture of Kennedy hanging from their earth walls.

When the news of JFK's death permeated throughout India, there was an enormous outpouring of grief. We had extensive lines of people waiting to sign the condolence book. The attendance at the memorial service was remarkable. People came to me almost in tears; the death really gripped the soul of India. Bowles happened to be in the U.S. when Kennedy was assassinated. He returned almost immediately and I believe he attended the memorial service which took place three days later--on a Monday. I remember the embassy staff working all week-end long sending out invitations. Of course, the tragedy was accentuated by the absence of information about the perpetrator(s); we knew almost nothing about what was going on in Dallas--these were the days before CNN. The news that Jack Ruby had murdered Oswald came as a bolt out of the blue. At one point, while working on the invitation, some of us just burst into hysterical laughter over nothing--we were so tense and so distraught that we lost our composure.

The memorial service was quite remarkable. It followed a special session of the Indian Parliament called to commemorate JFK and to mourn his death. Nehru spoke quite eloquently. The memorial service was held in front of the chancery, on a large stone plinth, where seats were set up.

The event had an interesting consequence. The Communist Party of India was at that time badly divided following strong disagreement about India's position toward Communist China in the wake of the Sino-Indian war. The pro-Moscow wing of the Party decided to attend the memorial service. It was, after all, a period of U.S.-Soviet detente. The other, more radical wing chose not to attend. The question of attendance at JFK's memorial service became one of the factors that led to the break up of the party a few months later.

The Indian reaction to JFK's assassination was quite different from that for example that was manifested after the Martin Luther King murder. The Indians, in general, accepted that the president had been killed by a single deranged man; they did not believe in the "plot" theories. I think they probably compared the JFK assassination to Gandhi's. After King, we had riots in the U.S. Then the Indians began to worry about the conditions in the U.S.; they had the same reaction when Bobby Kennedy was assassinated. They wondered about the stability of our country as well as its culture.

I think that the 1961-67 period was important in India. It witnessed both the high-water mark for U.S. involvement in South Asia as well as a quite sudden cooling off of our interest to the point that our major concern in India became economic development and famine relief. By the time I left, the possibility of India playing a useful political role in the sub-continent which might have assisted the U.S. in achieving its global goals was relegated to the dustbin.

Let me make a couple of additional points. The first, which I stress in my book, was that Bowles was a remarkable man in making his staff feel that it was part of a great enterprise--that they were engaged in something really important in India. The importance of this management style really came home to me when I returned to India ten years later to find that instead of being very much caught up in what was going on and feeling they were engaged in history-making, the

current staff viewed New Delhi as just another assignment. That was surely not the case for most of us who served under Chester Bowles.

There is a story which I want on the record, which I did not include in my book because it seemed so frivolous. It is an interesting tale because it illustrates clearly Bowles' approach and management style. One day, he held one of his periodic large meetings attended by many embassy staffers. He was to be in the chair--that was somewhat unusual because most often these sessions were led by other staff members. The topic for this meeting was "New Look in South Asia"--a typical Bowlesian theme. After his presentation, Bowles opened the meeting to questions and comments. After many issues were discussed, the session ended. As I was leaving the room, one of my colleagues--I think it was Nick Veliotis--turned to me and said, "Same old new look!" It was typical Bowles; he had a certain, unchanging vision of India and how it could be helped and improved, which he tried very much to promote with his staff (and everyone else). Nothing could shake it. He did make us feel that India was important, but I don't believe that his vision became the guiding light for many of the staff. Very few of us shared his idea of how tremendously important Indo-U.S. relations were.

I might mention another meeting that also illustrates Bowles' leadership style. The ambassador was from time to time upset with some of his political officers. He was unhappy with the reporting that was being sent to Washington--largely because it was quite negative. Things were not going very well and we reported what we observed as accurately as possible. But Bowles was nonetheless unhappy. He sometimes used the line that one can regard a glass as half-empty or half-full. To encourage us to change our negative ways, he proclaimed at a staff meeting that he had not brought us to India to write history but to make it. He wanted his embassy to be actively involved--and not just be detached observers reporting on developments (particularly when they did not fit his vision of how India should progress). Again, Nick had a comment, "Yes, the ambassador has said that he brought us out here not to write history, but to make it. But he left out one word. What he should have said was, 'I have not brought you out here to write history but to make it up.'"

Q: In 1967, you returned to Washington to become the desk officer for India. First, tell us a little about the NEA Bureau at the time.

SCHAFFER: There was a deputy assistant secretary--William Handley-- in charge of South Asia who reported to Lucius "Luke" Battle--the assistant secretary. Handley had been a USIA officer. Below Bill were two country directors - L. Douglas Heck who was responsible for India, Nepal and Ceylon--NEA/INC-- and James W. Spain who was responsible for Pakistan and Afghanistan. I don't remember including an assignment to the India desk in my list of desired onward assignments. I must admit that I was not sufficiently aware at this stage of the workings of the personnel system. To my regret, I had spent 10 out of my first 11 years in the Foreign Service overseas--the one year in Washington being language training. When I returned from India, I was somewhat disappointed by the NEA assignment; I thought it was pretty far down the bureaucratic chain for an FSO-3. I had been promoted during my last year in New Delhi. I recognized that I had to spend a tour in Washington; in fact at that stage I had no interest in serving anywhere else. I wanted to stay in Washington both for professional and personal reasons.

Of course, I had culture shock when I began to work in the Department. This was driven primarily by the marked change of my position in the bureaucracy. In New Delhi, I had access to the front office and felt that I was an important cog in the machine--I had a unique position. In the NEA Bureau, I was the junior political officer of the two assigned to NEA/INC; I was the low man on the totem pole. My colleague was Carleton Coon--later our ambassador to Nepal.

I performed a variety of political work--contact with other parts of U.S. government on our programs in India, some political analysis, drafting messages for the signature of senior officers, and perhaps most important, the care and feeding of Chester Bowles who was our ambassador for my two year tour on the desk. That was a difficult assignment because Bowles had a predilection for writing long messages about India, always singing the same tune--i.e. the importance of India to the United States. His messages were generally ignored in Washington. So our challenge was to keep the "Old Man" happy in light of Washington's attitude his own continual exhortations to do more for India--a policy which did not find favor with the Johnson administration.

India's less consequential position in Washington goes back to 1965, when the India-Pakistan war was taking place. The Washington bureaucracy dealing with India- as well as those who were only marginally involved but in positions of influence -- became disillusioned with India. They concluded that neither Pakistan or India could be of real help to us in meeting our global objectives. India was too consumed with its struggle with Pakistan to play a global role, especially in our drive to contain communism in South East Asia. Bowles would not accept this view and eventually was almost the sole petitioner for India. He became somewhat of a "nag;" his messages became increasingly tiresome, repeating over and over and over again the same themes. It was up to us to brush him off-- in a nice way. Let me illustrate. Bowles would send a fifteen-page message to the secretary of state--Dean Rusk. Some one in the secretary's office would highlight a few sentences; we assumed that Rusk read them. In the meantime, we on the desk would prepare a warm response--to Chet from Dean. Invariably, the message expressed appreciation to Bowles for the fine job he was doing. It might also have touched on other matters. But it never responded to the substance of Bowles' message. In other words, it was a warm, dignified brush-off. This was sad since we all knew that Bowles spent a lot of time preparing these lengthy messages. But he seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the pleasantries he was getting back from Washington. We never tried to suggest to the DCM or the political counselor that these messages were not well received; we knew that Bowles would continue to send them in.

I think Bowles was realistic enough to know that he was not affecting the policy-making process--at least not in the way that he wished. The big mystery was why he stayed in India. The answer, I think, was that his options were not that promising. So he stayed on, ineffectually, suffering increasingly from the ravages of Parkinson's, receiving anodyne answers to his messages. But he never wavered in his position. It was a sad ending to an exciting career.

I certainly sympathized with the Washington view that India was not the most important country on earth. I did not think that India could play the role that Bowles continued to envision for it. I think that is was very evident, judging from the way India behaved under Mrs. Gandhi's

leadership, that India would not be helpful to us in Vietnam nor in our general interest in stemming the spread of communism in Asia--with the exception of the Himalayas, where India was interested in receiving whatever assistance we could provide to thwart the Chinese.

To the best of my knowledge, Bowles did not use the phone--partly because the connections in those days were something less than satisfactory. Making a phone call from India was akin to an heroic act. That was a blessing for us. Furthermore, and most importantly, Bowles was suffering from Parkinson's disease by this time. It was my responsibility as the officer in charge of taking care of Bowles to make certain that every month he got a supply of "L-DOPA"--an experimental drug being tested at the time for the control of Parkinson's. This was somewhat difficult and Bowles became increasingly nervous as the time grew near when he needed to replenish his supply but no shipment had yet arrived. It seemed to me, in retrospect, that I spent a lot of time on the phone to the supplier of "L-DOPA" in New York to ascertain that timely delivery would be made to New Delhi as required. I don't think Bowles was ever left without, but he was understandably troubled as his supplies dwindled each month. The drug had a temporary positive effect, but eventually proved to be of little use in controlling the disease.

Bowles would return to the U.S. from time to time on consultations. When he was in Washington he would make the rounds seeing friends and other high ranking officials. Those were sad moments because it was becoming increasingly difficult for Bowles to get around--Parkinson's had effected his motor capabilities. It was so sad to see this wonderful old man moving ever so slowly with what he called his "snow shoe" shuffle through the long halls of the Rayburn building and other edifices. He still had access to everyone he wanted to see. He never lost such access, even to those who may have disagreed with him. Bowles was able to see anyone he wanted to, including President Johnson.

My tour on the desk was during a period of relatively calm relations between India and Pakistan. We had no intra-bureau tensions stemming from issues on the sub-continent. The situation in Pakistan changed as demonstrators took to the streets both in East and West Pakistan against President Ayub Khan. In 1969, Ayub was forced from power and was replaced by General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan. In India the focus was primarily on domestic political infighting with Mrs. Gandhi successfully battling her opponents in the Congress Party. In light of the situation on the sub-continent, we severely downgraded our relations with both India and Pakistan.

Despite the low place of India and Pakistan on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, Luke Battle gave us more time than most NEA assistant secretaries had previously devoted to South Asia. This was due to the fact that in the summer of 1968, a meeting was held in New Delhi between India and the U.S. at relatively senior levels. Our delegation was led by Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach; Luke was part of the delegation. That meant that Battle had to prepare himself and learn much more about India than he might have otherwise done. So I think we got enough senior attention. I think that the deputy and office directors--Heck, Spain, and Handley--had good access to the front office; so that if we ever needed the assistant secretary, it was easy enough to get the problem before him.

One of my last tasks on the desk was to prepare Kenneth Keating for his ambassadorship to India. I found him to be rather vain. I think he would have preferred to go to Israel, where he eventually

was assigned after India. He considered himself God's gift to women. I and others felt that Keating believed that his masculine charms would be very useful to him in dealing with Prime Minister Gandhi. In fact, those charms did not prove useful at all. Keating had a very difficult and distant relationship with the Indian prime minister; there was no way that he could charm the sari off her. He had a very well developed self-esteem and self-importance. I did not escort him on his calls in Washington as he prepared himself for New Delhi. In his preparation for his assignment, he was assisted primarily by the officer who had replaced Carleton Coon--Grant Mouser. That particular personnel shift was somewhat of a disappointment to me as I had hoped to move up into Coon's position.

In the same vein, in light of my imminent departure from the desk, I participated only a little in the preparations for President Nixon's trip to India in the summer of 1969. I probably worked on some papers, but I certainly was not deeply immersed in that activity. As I recall, that trip was scheduled on rather short notice. Nixon decided to stop in India and Pakistan after the moon-landing-splashdown in the Pacific.

I did participate quite fully in a trip taken by Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh, who visited the United States in May 1969. The whole trip came about in an interesting way. During an encounter a few months earlier, Secretary Rogers had mentioned to Dinesh Singh that he hoped that whenever it was convenient the minister would come to the United States. Singh took that as a firm invitation. We discovered that Rogers was perfectly happy to receive Dinesh Singh, but that there were no funds available to pay for such a trip. I did manage to squeeze out a USIA leader grant for the foreign minister. I was very proud of that achievement. But then we got word that the minister's wife was planning to join her husband on his trip to the U.S. That raised a further question about what we could do for her. I figured that having dipped into the USIA's account once, it was worthwhile to try to do so again.

I said that I understood that Mrs. Dinesh Singh was an important personage in her own right. She had indeed shown great concern for development of vocational training for disadvantaged young women in the Lucknow area in the Singhs' home state. In fact, I had no idea what Mrs. Dinesh Singh had done, what her interests were or anything much about her. We did know that she was a woman of some importance in India, but I did not know what professional or charitable interests, if any, she might have had. But I sent a message to New Delhi saying that it was my recollection that Mrs. Dinesh Singh was an important person and that I had some recollection of her showing considerable interest in vocational training. Just as I hoped, a message came back from the embassy stating that indeed my recollection was accurate. That was adequate justification for USIA to issue another grant so that both Mr. and Mrs. Dinesh Singh were able to come to the U.S. on leader grants.

But there's more to the story. A couple of months later, in connection with Nixon's visit, CIA prepared biographic information on all the leaders and their spouses whom the president was likely to encounter in India. I read the material, which included a sketch of Mrs. Dinesh Singh. Sure enough, she was described as "a personage in her own right who for many years had taken an interest in vocational training for disadvantaged young women in the Lucknow area." That may still be part of her biographic profile; I think she will forever be known for her alleged work in vocational training. So are myths made!! And so do desk officers function!

My first experience with the Washington bureaucracy was of course quite instructive. The most important lesson I learned was that the Department's strongest asset was its knowledge of foreign areas. It was important that State officials have recent experience in the area in which they worked in Washington--as I had had. It enabled me and others to battle other agencies more successfully. Many agencies were involved in India, starting of course with AID, in those days. The fact that I had such a long tour in India and knew many of the personalities quite well was an important asset for me as it would be for any desk officer who had transferred directly from a country to its Washington desk.

I was terribly frustrated by the Washington bureaucracy. I was totally unfamiliar with the Washington tribal customs. Eventually, I got the hang of it. Even after as large an embassy as ours in New Delhi, the vastness of the Washington scene is culture shock. I had had no idea about the number of people who had to pass on everything I wrote. I was particularly bothered by the clearance process--a system which invariably strikes officers new to Washington as extremely frustrating and is a distraction to anyone working in the bureaucracy.

I was told that once there was a contest called "The Clearance of the Month." The prize went to that drafting officer who could get his cable out with the most clearances. One month, it was won by an officer who drafted a message on food aid for India and included in the clearance section the acronym for the State Department cafeteria. He then got one of the ladies who served the food to initial next to the acronym. That added to his score!!!

Our assistance program for India was still considerable in the late 1960s--particularly food aid. Although the worst part of the 1965 and 1966 famine and the relief efforts that it prompted were in the past, assistance was a major element in U.S.-India relations. With the downgrading in Washington of political relations between the two countries as a result of India's unwillingness to play an international role helpful to us, our economic interest in India came to dominate the overall relationship from the U.S. viewpoint. Economic assistance was our principal tool in our efforts to convince the Indians to reform their socialistic policies and liberalize their economy. I had no problem with this thrust, although I did come around to believing that the whole AID program in India was misconceived. Instead of improving relations between the two countries, the assistance we provided became an unhealthy element. The Indians are a proud people; they thought they knew what they were doing--they could have been wrong, but not in their own minds. They did not feel that they needed the constant advice that we were dishing out--certainly not to the extent that some of our active AID zealots (and Bowles) believed warranted.

The donor-recipient relationship is always difficult; In the Indian case, given their views of themselves and their role in the world, it was bound to cause some friction. For example, in retrospect, I question whether John Lewis' presence in India as AID director was entirely desirable. John was very much involved; he believed that he could open useful dialogues with the Indians. He may have managed to do that to some extent, but it fostered an unhealthy relationship. I also came to the conclusion that the aid program in India was far too large given the returns that we were receiving. The size of the program stimulated misplaced hopes on our side and a feeling of dependency on India's part. Neither aspect was helpful in developing a

sound relationship between the two countries. But my views, as a desk officer, were of little consequence; I usually did not get involved in the issue of assistance levels.

I did get involved when Mrs. Gandhi would sound off on U.S. policy anywhere on the globe, as she did most famously about Southeast Asia after the 1966 devaluation of the rupee had put her on the defensive about American influence on her government. We tried to explain away her negative comments or took other defensive measures because we wanted to continue a large assistance program to India. I thought that this was not a very healthy policy on our part. But I did find myself, as the desk officer, defending India against attacks from one part of the bureaucracy or another. That was my job: I tried to explain why India did not take as helpful a role as we wanted in both its domestic economic policy and on foreign affairs issues.

We always had some struggles with AID. They had a huge bureaucracy. I think they danced to their own drummer, resisting any efforts by the Department to influence the nature and direction of their programs. We had jurisdictional problems and other bureaucratic problems which often made for a difficult relationship. They wanted to throw their weight around.

In retrospect, my tour as India desk officer took place during a fairly quiet time in U.S.-India relations--despite the Nixon and Dinesh Singh visits. Nothing very important either in the political or economic sphere transpired during those two years.

TERRELL E. ARNOLD
Economic Officer
Calcutta (1962-1964)

A native of West Virginia, Mr. Arnold served in the US Navy in World War II and in the Korean War. He was educated at Champlain College, Stanford University and San Jose College. Entering the Foreign Service in 1959 he served in Egypt, India, Ceylon (Deputy Chief of Mission), Philippines, Brazil (Sao Paulo as Consul General) and at the State Department in Washington. From 1983 to 1985 Mr. Arnold served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism. Mr. Arnold was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: So then in '61 what happened?

ARNOLD: Well, it was time to move on - two years, you know, for junior officers. They sent us to Calcutta.

Q: From one teeny place to another teeny place.

ARNOLD: Actually Cairo was very good preparation for Calcutta. Yvonne and I became very fond of Calcutta. Marvelous place to live, terrible place to visit, is the way we summed it up. If you lived there, you adjusted to its circumstances and you knew what to do and how to do it. You could live quite comfortably and safely in health terms. We were never threatened by

anybody, but health was always at risk if we didn't pay attention. That was the big difference. Cairo, heaven knows, was filthy on the ground, but it was dry, dry, dry, and the moist environment of the monsoonal region of India is a different matter. We got acquainted with it. We learned to live there. We had a marvelous time.

Q: You were there from '61 to...

ARNOLD: Well, the beginning of '62 to '64, because we took home leave in between.

Q: What was your job in Calcutta?

ARNOLD: Again the junior economic officer, but a different situation in that staffing changed. The senior economic officer eventually was Roy Atherton, and the Consul General was Bill Baxter. Bill decided he needed a deputy more than he needed a senior economic officer, so he moved Roy up front, and I became the economic section, which again was great fun. It was a very different economic situation, of course, much lower level of economic development but an enormously diverse and busy economy.

Q: How were relations between India and the United States during this period, and what was the political situation in India?

ARNOLD: The relationship was good between us and India at that time. Radhakrishnan was President, and Nehru was Prime Minister. There was again evidence of competition between us and the Russians for big projects, and the big project that I competed around was iron and steel, whether or not the United States would build the next basic steel plant in India or whether the Russians would do it.

Q: There already was the Tata plant.

ARNOLD: Yes, the JRD Tata plant in Jamshedpur. That was a privately owned Indian steel plant, a very good little operation as a matter of fact. I became very fond of the Tata family. Spent time there, visited with them, walked through the plant, could go back and forth as necessary to do my study of the steel situation. I also went to the iron ore producing areas associated with that plant, all of that. That was part of my education for purposes of whether or not the United States would do the next steel plant. We didn't. The Russians did at Bhilai in the region south of New Delhi. Hard to say how much of a success it was. They did end up making steel there, and they're still making steel there. But the Indian economy did not take off with anything like the speed that we imagined. I think that on this issue we were unsophisticated. I don't think that our leadership back here, especially the Congress, and the public, had any sense at all of how long it takes to transform an economy. We were not even detached enough to look closely at how long it had taken us to get where we were. So we expected miracles and we expected quick results, and when we didn't get quick results, we refused to adjust our expectations. That's where we've been ever since. We don't know how to do this. We don't have the patience for it. Our Congress doesn't have the stomach for it.

Q: What were we doing in the Calcutta area? What were our interests and what were we doing?

ARNOLD: Well, as I found out also in the Philippines, we were interested in food production. We were looking closely at the steel plant possibility. We were looking at promoting trade. I spent a fair amount of time on tour with traditional trades of eastern India; one was tea and the other was jute, and we were very interested in those. There were Boston-based companies in both jute and tea. Ludlow was a Boston-based firm in jute (burlap to most people). Of course, the major tea companies were all involved in one degree or another, ours and the British mainly.

Q: The Indians until really very recently have been going through a period of sort of being self sustained.

ARNOLD: Yes, they have. They were onto that. Very necessary from the point of view of what they could afford to do, and philosophically they wanted to do it. India structurally, philosophically, religiously, economically was more complicated than Egypt could ever be. Of course, it's enormously larger, culturally and linguistically much more diverse. But if you look at the class structure of India and then look at the sub-cultures other than Hindi, such as the Marwari, the Sikhs, the Parsi, you found groups of enormous wealth and power in that country. The political leadership these groups may not have had, but the power behind the scenes they had on a grand scale. The economy and the culture were more complicated by far than the Egyptian situation and, if the Indians chose, they were capable of marshaling resources to do things.

Q: Was this a place where America could sell things?

ARNOLD: Oh, yes. We sold a fair amount of stuff. In fact, we did and do sell fairly actively in India.

Q: I want to talk about this '62-'64 period.

ARNOLD: There was a small, by comparison to now, middle class. The middle class of India today is probably as big as ours in absolute numbers, but it's a much larger society. It was coming along. There was a growing market for a wide range of goods and services. I think it flowered probably more significantly after we left there, however. I've been back a number of times. Some things in my visits have not really changed for the better. I have a pattern that I like to repeat every time I go to New Delhi, and the last time I did that was in the late '80s. I get up first thing in the morning before dawn - I mean five o'clock - and take a taxi down into old Delhi and get out of the taxi and walk around and smell the place, sense the place. I did that over a period of two decades in frequent visits. In these visits there hasn't been much change or improvement in old Delhi. The rest of the country may have been going places, but the bazaar was pretty friendly and I'd go down there to test the breezes.

Q: Did we have projects, sort of AID type projects, going in India at the time?

ARNOLD: We were trying. We had an AID mission, a fairly large AID mission in Delhi, no AID officers associated with Consulate General Calcutta, in fact I was it. That was one of my side portfolios. It was kind of fun as well. We were doing a fair amount in agriculture, and we

were looking closely at iron and steel. We were looking at the promotion of industrial activity. We were still in that phase when we thought long-term developmental change occurred through a fairly sizable infrastructure project. We had not yet concluded that all we needed to do was feed the poor. That is where we are now, and it makes us feel good, but it merely serves biological survival needs, not development or growth. We don't have the patience for infrastructure and other big developmental stuff. We don't have the political stamina for the budgets involved. In a very crude sense, our political cycles are too short for this kind of long term development.

Q: How did you find the Bengali intellectual elite there? Were they interested in the United States? It's quite a self-enclosed area, great ferment and all that.

ARNOLD: The Bengali sort of separated himself from the rest of India. Oh, they were quite accessible as people, quite accessible socially. So were all of the others. The ones who probably were the least accessible were the Marwari. I knew them professionally. I knew the managers of those companies that are all parts of the old East India Company that the Marwari had slowly taken over. They were running tea and jute and everything else. I could see them at that level of professional encounter but very seldom if ever saw any of them socially. But the Parsi were very open; so were the Punjabis, as well as the wealthier, more educated Hindi families, and the Bengalis. It's a genuine melting pot, Calcutta, a complex melting pot.

Q: I've never been there, but I'm told that one can get overwhelmed by the poverty that you see in the streets and all that. Was this difficult to deal with?

ARNOLD: Very. The first morning in Calcutta, Yvonne and I arrived on PanAm, which was the way to get in there, at five in the morning. We landed at Dum Dum Airport, went through customs and out to a waiting Consulate car. Our driver took us on a trip from Dum Dum (the famous dum dum bullets were made nearby) along Chitteranjan Boulevard to Chowringee Road in the business and tourist heart of Calcutta. As we drove toward the city in the semi darkness, the first impression all the way along that boulevard was of gray to black objects on the sidewalk all over the place. As we moved toward the city, it became lighter and I began to see what was happening. What we were seeing was an enormous street population that was just waking up. That image of the drive to the airport never changed, except that it got worse. Those images took some adjusting to, and the sheer closeness of people took some accommodation.

Americans, I think particularly, are not prepared spiritually to deal with this kind of proximity. Some other societies manage it quite well. As one sociologist put it, making an opportunity out of a disadvantage, recognizing that you can't avoid getting or being close, how do you make a positive thing of proximity? We didn't live too terribly well until we got accustomed to it. You have to fend people off on the street. They get close, they slap you with their hands, not necessarily with malice or anger, and you just have to learn to live with that. We learned to accommodate it. We had a great assignment, because we learned to live in India, but you had to reach a *modus vivendi* with extreme poverty and crowding. The most pervasive quality of India was poverty. Poverty there is as extreme as it is anywhere in the world, and you can only fix a little piece of it. You can't fix it all. There was not a family I knew there that didn't involve itself some way in trying to alleviate the suffering on the street.

One of our favorite people was Mother Theresa. She had her mission, and we helped her with time and with donations and with our support. One of our consular officers, Frank Collins - I replaced Frank, as a matter of fact - was very much affected by Mother Theresa, and he decided that the Church ought to pay attention, should be aware of and should recognize the work that Mother Theresa was doing in her mission. He developed and carried the papers back to the Vatican when he left Calcutta to initiate the process of getting her order recognized and confirmed as an order in the Catholic Church. It was a remarkable kind of accomplishment that probably few people even know about. But there was only one way to approach this problem. You had to recognize that the poverty was deep, abiding, and that you did not have either enough spiritual, physical or financial resources to beat it. But then you had to do what you could; and if you did that, then you could be at peace.

Q: You were saying you didn't have the time to penetrate the Raj?

ARNOLD: Or the know how to plug into that infrastructure. The period was virtually the last of the Raj, but the Raj was complex. It was British, it was American, it was French, it was German, it was an expatriate community of some size that sort of in and around, socialized and consorted with the Indian elites.

Q: Well now, with the Indian elites was there a different breed of cat than you'd find in New Delhi? You were dealing more with sort of the business community, you say, than with, say, the Indian bureaucracy, government bureaucracy?

ARNOLD: I had dealings with the Bengali bureaucracy, not terribly satisfactory but not in any way hostile. It was just that I could never find exactly who had the handle on a given problem. One marvelous moment: I went to call on a local minister, a Bengali government minister, to raise an aviation issue when we (meaning Pan Am) were changing our routes through Calcutta. I went into his office and sat down, and he was, of course, very traditional, white cotton dhoti clad (in lieu of trousers), long open shirt outside of his dhoti. He occupied an office that was probably 14 feet high and ten by twelve feet. All four walls were filled with shelves, and all the shelves were filled with files. Virtually half of the files, ranging randomly from floor to ceiling, had red urgent stickers on them. That's the picture. I'm sure that's changed a great deal at least in parts of the country, because some of the best software programmers in the business come out of Bangalore today.

Q: During this period, if I'm correct, you had the Indo-China War up in the Himalayas. Did that impact on you at all?

ARNOLD: It affected the economy particularly, because the tea growing areas were close to the conflict zone. I pursued the same custom in India that I pursued in Egypt, which was presume that I could go anywhere I wanted to go if I just asked. So I went to the heads of the tea trading houses, and this is how I really became acquainted with the Marwari.

Q: The Marwari, what is this?

ARNOLD: This is a cultural, social group, religious sect, very wealthy. It's the business class of India, very rich and very standoffish but accessible at least professionally, I found, with a little help. So I went to them and said, "You know, I have tea as one of my accounts here in the Consulate General. I would like to go visit some of the major tea estates." And they said, "Okay, we will set up an itinerary and we will open the doors for you. You manage to get yourself and your wife - and it is important to take your wife - up there, but we will take care of you when you get there." So we did a series of estates, the first one on the south side of the Brahmaputra River. Naya Gogra, the estate was named, and it was run by an educated Naga tribe member - his name was Nag, as a matter of fact. He ran a Boy Scout troop of young Nagas and used them to demonstrate tribal dances for us. This estate was fairly small, but it was making tea by the then current machine process called Crush-Tear-Curl or CTC. That meant the tea leaves were broken up by machine, then fermented, dried, graded, and packaged. The second estate was a very traditional estate making tea by the hand rolling the leaves, fermenting, drying, grading and packaging. This process yielded the finest, slow brewing tea that is the top of the market, if you are a tea lover. The third, fourth and fifth estates were much larger and very modern, using the current generation CTC machines and a crude but effective grading device called a Java Tunnel. For this, bins were arranged along a tunnel, a powerful fan was placed at one end of the tunnel, crude tea was poured in the wind and blown along the tunnel, falling into bins in accordance with its weight. The stuff that falls at the far end of the tunnel is dust that we Americans get as tea bags.

When we were on the fifth of these tea estates, the Chinese came across the frontier, right off to the north of the Raj Guri Ali, which is the traditional King's Highway between Assam and the Northeast Frontier Area. The Chinese were not far away, because we heard the cannons going off up in the ridges as they began firing. Needless to say, we cut our tea travels short, and the estate manager sent us out of the area on his estate mail plane - my wife riding on the luggage behind the pilot. We were scheduled to go to Darjeeling for a visit, because that's big, important tea country up there, and we did get to Darjeeling. We had a brief glimpse of Mount Everest across the shoulder of the intervening mountain called Katchenjunga, but the Consulate said that it was time for us to come back. The Indian Government was canceling all commercial flights, but we got down off the mountain (Darjeeling is close to 8,000 feet above the plains) and onto the last passenger flight to Calcutta.

Back in Calcutta, the Consulate was suddenly called upon to assist an airlift, supporting the U.S. Air Force and Army ground troops in bringing supplies to India for the NEFA campaign. Diplomatic life is filled with the unexpected, and our airlift had some interesting sidelights. My secretary was a Parsi, Purveen Manekshah, and her uncle was General Sam Manekshah, who was head of the Indian Army, and therefore running the campaign in NEFA. Sam was a very accessible, very presentable, very knowledgeable, English speaking, Sandhurst trained military officer. We were invited often to Purveen's home, and had the opportunity to sit and talk with Sam about what was going on in NEFA. We were bringing in large quantities of military supplies. At that time we were using two facilities that went out of existence not too long after that. One was Chateau Rouge in France, which we lost when DeGaulle pulled France out of NATO. The other was Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.

Q: All places to get kicked out of.

ARNOLD: Different time, different place, you know, but I remember our communicators coming in and setting up and creating their long log periodic antennas lined up so they could talk to Wheelus. A very interesting little sidelight on that experience: We were doing a good job of bringing in C130 loads of small military supplies. You have to remember that this was right in the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, so the fact that we had resources to devote to India's NEFA problem, was a mark of the way we viewed the Indian relationship. That they turned to us is a mark of the relationship as well.

For us the NEFA campaign then took a novel turn. While Yvonne and I had been in Assam we had visited the Kasiranga game preserve. Kasiranga is famous for being the last refuge of the two-horned rhino, the Indian two-horned rhino. The Indians contacted us shortly after that at the Consulate and said they would like to give us a mother rhino named Depali and a young offspring named Rajkumar. We got in touch with the National Zoo, and the National Zoo said they would love to have them but they didn't know how to get them home. We then approached the Air Force and asked, "Can you handle delivery of two rhinos for the National Zoo," and they said, "Yes, of course. We're flying back empty. This is no big deal." So we contacted the Alipore Zoo in Calcutta and began to arrange the transfer. We visited the zoo to meet Depali and Rajkumar, the baby, and he was teething at the time. I let him have my arm up to the elbow to suck on. Thanks to the Air Force we were able to pull it off. The crew of a C130 rechristened their plane Noah's Aerial Ark. Once the decision was made, the Indian wildlife authorities had a host of critters they wanted to give us, I mean birds and other specimens, so the two rhinos and a whole planeload of wildlife left Calcutta for the National Zoo.

Q: Did you talk to the pilots?

ARNOLD: Oh yes. They thought it was the most fun they'd had in a long time. Lear Grimmer was the deputy director of the National Zoo at that time, and you wouldn't know Lear Grimmer from Adam. He was the brother of Mitch Miller - remember Sing Along? Well, Lear came out and escorted his charges back to the United States, and Depali and Rajkumar were brought to the National Zoo. Depali did not survive terribly long after that, but Rajkumar surprisingly is still there. That certainly was an unexpected consequence of the Chinese invasion, because I have no idea how this move could have been made without the Air Force.

Q: After that support there, were doors opened more than they had been?

ARNOLD: Not for us in Calcutta. I think they probably were in Delhi, because we had been a real practical support to Indian authorities at that time, and their military people knew it quite well. But that would not have had the same effect on us in Calcutta as it would have had in New Delhi.

Q: Bangladesh, East Pakistan...

ARNOLD: That was still East Pakistan.

Q: How was that considered from your perspective? Were we concerned about it?

ARNOLD: Well, it was obviously less stable and poorer, if that's possible, than West Bengal. How this was going to sort itself out was a puzzlement to us, because East Bengal and Pakistan had very little in common, and as it developed ultimately, they didn't develop very much in time and didn't stay together. That was a peculiar accident of expatriate decision making about geography. This was not a local decision by any means, and it didn't ultimately make much sense. People from East Pakistan came over to Calcutta for R&R, so, you know, uphill is defined by where you start.

Q: I remember I used to see people getting R&R from Afghanistan coming to Dhahran.

ARNOLD: There you go, probably a sizable step forward. Actually we were perfectly comfortable in Calcutta and didn't find New Delhi all that appealing.

Q: What was the Bengali attitude that you were finding towards both the Congress Party and New Delhi and all?

ARNOLD: To be sure, the Congress Party was there very much, but the Bengalis were pretty standoffish. They wanted to do their own thing pretty much, and Bengali leadership was reasonably smart, I would say, in these terms but more with the Congress Party than separate from it. Nehru came for, I think, a very popular visit while we were there, and we were able to meet him and sit on the platform with him when he made a speech to the Bengali people. He was well received. Back in those days security around a person like that was very light, not even visible. Things have changed. With people who walk up to Indian leaders with bombs strapped to their bodies—we now live in a much, much different time and place. Calcutta was another fun assignment.

Q: Well, it sounds like it.

ARNOLD: We're running two out of two at the moment.

Q: Then in '64 whither?

ALFRED LEROY ATHERTON, JR.
Economic Officer
Calcutta (1962-1965)

Ambassador Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania and raised in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. Ambassador Atherton's career included positions in Stuttgart, Bonn, Damascus, Aleppo, Calcutta, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Egypt. This interview was conducted in 1990.

ATHERTON: Then the fantasy had to end. And so we, having got ourselves thoroughly exhausted by going around and visiting friends and not taking time to get over our jet lag, got on a plane and got even more jet-lagged flying to India.

Arrived in Calcutta and plunged in. I was replacing an officer named Tom Hocter for a contact transfer, which in those days was more possible than it is now. So I was able to spend the first week or two understudying the man whose job I was taking. It was a two-officer section, and the junior officer was Terry Arnold, with whom we have kept in touch almost ever since. It was a big Consulate General. There was a Consul General, and he had a Deputy whose only job was being deputy, named Bruce Butties. We got there just as Consul General Bill Baxter's predecessor, Gordon Mattison, was having his farewells.

We got there just in time to go through a round of farewell parties for Gordon Mattison, which is one way to meet a lot of people in a hurry. It was also quite an introduction to the social life of Calcutta. We discovered that, although the British had been long gone, the British customs stayed behind. Almost every evening there was a black-tie affair.

We arrived there in August, maybe early September; it was still part of the very hot season, and air conditioning was not as widespread in those days as it has become. We were put up, temporarily, in a small residential hotel near the Consulate, which had no air conditioning. I can remember the first evening, getting into my black tie and being soaked through by the time I walked out the door to go to the reception at one of the clubs, a farewell for Gordon Mattison.

We stayed for maybe a couple of weeks in the hotel until the Hocters left. And then we were able to move into the apartment that had been their apartment (it was assigned housing) and began to do the usual things. Where do the kids go to school? Where do you shop? I was getting oriented to the office, but the family was getting oriented to the whole new life from their point of view. The job was, well, to put it mildly, all very new to me, and I was very lucky to have overlapped with Tom Hocter, but even more lucky to have Terry Arnold as the number two officer, who had been there for some time, and who was a better economist than I, even though I had just had a year of economic training, and who already had developed quite a network of contacts.

So I was able to plug into the world that I would be mostly dealing with, which was the business world and the state government's economic departments that had responsibility for food distribution and other matters of special interest to the United States.

There was a big AID program in India in those days. We had a program shipping grain to India. We had technical assistance projects throughout our consular district. Because the embassy in Delhi was so far away and the AID mission was so far away, a lot of the monitoring of these projects was done by consulate personnel going out around the consular district, sometimes with visiting AID officials.

The consular district, of course, was enormous. Everything in India is enormous. We had a consular district of 125 million people, counting the states of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar, and a couple of the smaller tribal states that bordered what was then still East Pakistan on the north, running up to the foothills of the Himalayas. And the problem was, in the first instance, to

get acquainted with the consular district and with who the key actors were in the economic life of the area. It was a very complex economic system in the Calcutta consular district.

Calcutta itself is a port city, and it's a very large, traditional commercial city. Calcutta was the capital of British India for a long time, and almost all the communities of India are represented in Calcutta.

It's Bengal, the language is Bengali, but there is a large Marwari community, a large Maharashtran community, a large Punjabi community. They all pretty much led their own communal lives, but at the top there was social intermingling.

And there were large merchant houses. The British were still very big in the business world. So it was still a very important city from the point of view of commerce and trade.

But the consular district also included what was basically the Ruhr Valley or the Pittsburgh of India. The heavy industry is largely in that part of India, the steel factories, heavy-machinery factories.

We had to learn about and analyze the Indian attempt to pattern their economy to some extent on the Soviet model. They had five-year plans. They had physical production quotas. They had public-sector heavy industry, steel plants and a very large heavy-machinery plant, where they manufactured machinery to make machines, and there were a couple of older private-sector steel plants nearby, too. So one could compare the performance of public and private sectors. In most cases, the private plants were the more efficient. We had a good chance to observe an attempt to superimpose a Soviet model on an economy that had been, before that, much more free enterprising.

Q: Where actually was this? In Calcutta?

ATHERTON: No. The steel complex, the heavy-industrial complex, is in Durgapur, which is north of Calcutta. And one of the oldest steel plants in the country was the private-sector plant, Tata Iron and Steel. The Tatas were an enormous economic factor in India, with interests in heavy industry, airlines, hotels. They are a part of the small Farsi community, centered largely in Bombay, the Farsis came originally from Iran. They were not more than 100,000 people or so when we were in India, but they were an enormous factor in the economy of the country. They were enterprising entrepreneurs, capitalists.

Q: I've heard them described as the Jews of India.

ATHERTON: I think that is more often applied, frankly, to the Marwari community than to the Farsis. The Marwaris are the merchants, the bankers, the traders. They also were well represented in Calcutta.

It was not a melting pot, because they all kept their separate communities, but it was a place to get to know all of India without ever leaving the consular district.

We did a lot of traveling. We did try to get to know the rest of the consular district. We had a certain schedule of required economic reports that had to be done. A lot of the legwork was done by very able Indian employees of the Consulate, but obviously I was responsible ultimately for the final reports, and I felt I had to have first hand knowledge and to make my own judgements. And so we did a lot of traveling out of Calcutta.

Again, on-the-job training. Most of what I've learned in the Foreign Service has been on-the-job training. Not school training, not even formal training courses, and, except for that year at Berkeley, not even in-service training.

I had a good teacher in Terry Arnold and learned a lot, in a very short time, about how this complex economy worked in the public and private sectors, the commercial, industrial, and food sectors.

Of course, in India, that's the key. If you had a bad monsoon year, you had a food shortage. They had terrible memories of earlier famines, of people dying on the streets of Calcutta back in the '40s. No democratically elected government could let that happen, so they had to be sure they had plenty of food in reserve, and U.S. wheat in particular. PL 480 was a major source for financing Indian food reserves. Because Calcutta was a port, a lot of these grain shipments came into the storage areas in Calcutta. One of our jobs was to keep an eye on this and make sure that it was properly stored. It was mostly a job for AID, but the Consulate was very much used as a sort of extension of AID to do a lot of things that AID people couldn't always come down from Delhi to do. And we would frequently do some of the field surveys on their behalf. We would also go to the inauguration of small AID projects.

The AID program gave us a lot of entree. It opened doors into circles that we might not otherwise have been able to penetrate. And, of course, being a believer in the inseparability of politics and economics, I not only did the necessary economic reporting and analysis, but also was able to get a handle on what were in some respects political as well as economic issues.

West Bengal was extraordinary in this respect. It had its very traditional wealthy class. It also had one of the best-organized, most effective Communist parties in India. While the Congress Party dominated, there was a very active Communist opposition in the West Bengal parliament. In the Indian federal system, the local government has considerable authority. Jyoti Basu, who was the head of the Communist Party, a very able politician and a very charismatic street politician, did eventually become the Chief Minister. But in our days the Chief Ministers were Congress Party politicians.

I had been in the Foreign Service by that time -- '47 to '62 -- 15 years, and three of my posts had been consular posts: Stuttgart first, then Aleppo, and then Calcutta. The only traditional Embassy I had ever served in was Damascus. Bonn was a High Commission in transition from occupation to Embassy. So I never served at an Embassy again until I went to Cairo as Ambassador. But already, in Calcutta, I was on my third consular post. It was a consular post that did everything, because we had such a large district, and we were so far from Delhi.

The consulates in India in those days were like little embassies, really. I can remember one visit by Ambassador Galbraith to Calcutta when I was there. He was replaced in mid-term by Chester Bowles. I can remember only one visit by Chester Bowles to Calcutta. Ambassadors in Delhi didn't much like to go to Calcutta. And so we really were quite autonomous in many ways. Our substantive reporting went directly to Washington, with copies to the Embassy. We didn't have to filter things through the Embassy.

But there were some events during our time which were national events and not just local. The very first thing that happened, literally in the very first weeks of our tour in Calcutta, was the sudden and unexpected invasion by China of the Indian northeastern provinces. The Chinese came across the border into our consular district, in effect. We got there in late summer, and it was fall of '62 when this sudden, out of nowhere, Chinese invasion came across the border. They poured down into the eastern part of West Bengal, and nobody quite knew where they were going to stop. The Indians asked for help, and the U.S. government saw a chance, with very strong recommendations from Ambassador Galbraith, to increase our stock with the Indian government. We were in a period when the Soviets were seen as the special friend of the Indians. But it was to us they turned for emergency military supplies following this invasion.

It was assumed that the airlift, bringing in emergency military supplies, would go to Delhi. But somebody looked at the map and realized that the closest place to unload military supplies for an invasion coming into the upper part of West Bengal was Calcutta.

So Dum Dum Airport was suddenly converted from a civilian airport to receive an airlift of American military supplies, on very short notice. And the Consulate was the only official American institution on the spot to help put this together. So our job suddenly became, in these very early weeks, organizing communications between the airport and the Consulate and the Consulate and Delhi, finding accommodations, liaison with the Indian military command, to whom these supplies were to be turned over.

I think, considering that we were not a very large number of people involved in this, we did remarkably well in helping get the airlift organized. Basically, it was the responsibility of the American and Indian military, but we were the people who helped build the system they could take over, the infrastructure, if you will, communications and all. The Indians then took the equipment and transshipped it at the airport to their own transport planes and off to the front.

Q: I'm curious, what was the pretext for the invasion?

ATHERTON: Well, you know, it's kind of lost in history, but there have always been border disputes over where the border lies between China and India up in the Himalayas. My recollection is that the Indians had been asserting, by forward patrols, their claims to the border being where they said it was. And the Chinese, from their perception, thought the Indians were trespassing on Chinese territory. At least the theory at the time (and I must admit it's been a long time since I've thought about this or even read about it) was that the Chinese decided that the Indians had to be taught a lesson.

There has always been enmity between China and India. There is a very strong enmity, which is one of the reasons why the Indians, I think, looked particularly to the Soviet Union. They felt the Soviets were a counterbalance to the Chinese threat. They've always seen China as the real threat to them in Asia. The Soviets were nearby, and the Soviets gave them military equipment and helped them economically. And they saw this as a way of balancing the Chinese threat. But it was interesting, it was nevertheless to the United States that they turned for emergency military supplies when the invasion came.

Well, the Chinese came quite a long way into India, as a matter of fact. And we suddenly found ourselves dealing with the problem of helping our military and the Indian military liaison and get the system working. Communications were incredibly primitive in just getting messages to Delhi and back. Telephones didn't work very well; we did not have high-speed radio transmission. It seemed forever, getting through to the Embassy and getting responses, to say nothing of the Department. I don't know that we had any direct classified telegraphic links at all with the Embassy or the Department. Our reporting was by despatch, pouch and courier. But somehow the airlift did get put together and worked.

Meanwhile we suddenly found ourselves facing an influx of American missionaries who had all been up in this area and had fled, or had been urged to leave, I guess. Technically, we decided on evacuation and got word out through the grapevine network that had been set up under the E&E plan that they should all come to Calcutta. And so there was an influx of American, mostly Baptist, missionaries, from way up in the tribal country of northern West Bengal and Assam, Tripura and Manipur, who had to be dealt with. Again, we did what you always do in situations like this, you mobilized the spouses. It's not considered very popular to say it any more, but it was two for the price of one.

Q: It's free labor.

ATHERTON: Free labor. So the Consul General's wife, and Betty, and Bruce Buttle's wife, and all of the ladies, and some of the men, too, consular officers, had to work out the logistics arrangements. Fortunately, there were missionary headquarters in Calcutta, and most of them could go to their own missions. They set up emergency sleeping quarters and pretty well took care of themselves, but we had to be there to backstop. We had to document them. We had to find out who was there. We had to make sure that we had a record of them, that nobody was missing in action, in effect.

Q: You didn't take a course in advance on how to do that.

ATHERTON: No, you just learn as you go. It's more on-the-job training. But we had quite an influx of evacuees, some of whom resented having been asked to evacuate. Some of them said, "We wanted to stay with our people, with our flocks." They felt that they had abandoned their little Christian communities to the Chinese, in effect. It was interesting, this reaction. Many of them were resentful that the U.S. government had asked them to evacuate. But who knows what would have happened to Americans in that area, given the state of U.S.-Chinese relations in those days, if they hadn't evacuated.

In the end, the Chinese left almost as quickly as they came. They didn't march on Calcutta, which some people were afraid might happen. They were pretty extended, and they had the Himalayas behind them. The Indians were in their own territory, so I think while the Indians were caught off guard militarily, they probably in the end could have held the line. But the Chinese did not stay. They had made a point, they had given the Indians a lesson. And then they withdrew as mysteriously as they came.

Q: *A lesson learned.*

ATHERTON: A lesson learned. But that was the introduction to the duties that are not in your job description at a Consulate. A Consulate that size, a large consular office by today's standards, could not have total divisions of labor. Everybody had to do some of everything. I can remember I took weekend duty officer duty and had to deal with the sailors off the American ships who got in jail, or who missed their sailings and came to the Consulate to be documented and financed to get back to their boats or back to their home ports. We all had our share of dealing with consular emergencies on the weekends or during the night.

We lived in a compound in an apartment building which was just a wall away from the Consulate building, and the Consul General's house was on the other side. So it was compound living, which was pretty much the custom in those days. You didn't have individual houses. So we had more than our share of emergency calls, being that close.

One of the other major things that occurred early in our tour there was the assassination of President Kennedy. It was the middle of the night in Calcutta when the Marine guard rang. I was the duty officer, I guess, or the Consul General was away. I can't remember why he called me. He called, and I vaguely remember Betty saying, "He's very tired, can't this wait until morning?"

And the Marine guard said, "Ma'am, tell him that the President of the United States has just been assassinated."

Well, that woke us all up. And we quickly organized all the things one has to do: get black-bordered stationery printed, arrange memorial services, and arrange a condolence book at the Consulate for people who'd want to come and sign. We were totally unprepared for the overwhelming reaction. We had the foresight to set up two condolence books. We thought one would be for VIPs and one for everybody else. And in no time at all there was a line of Indians going all the way around the block and into the next. It was incredible, the outpouring of sympathy.

Kennedy had caught the imagination of India. There was an upsurge of hope for better American-Indian relations. We were seen as doing a lot for them economically by that time. Galbraith had been quite a figure. He was the embodiment of the United States in India, and he was very visible. So there was a reservoir of good feeling there which came out in an expression of grief for the death of our President.

All kinds of people, from the humblest to the dignitaries, all got in this line. Very unIndian, normally, to have the castes mixing that way. We would go out and try to spot people we knew

who were dignitaries, and say, "Won't you come up to the head of the line?" And many of them would say, "No, no, I'll wait my turn." Quite incredible.

So we had the period of official mourning and services for the American community. And then back to work after that was over.

I guess the next major event that overwhelmed the routine preoccupations of the Consulate must have been in '63 or '64 when there was suddenly an outbreak of the periodic communal violence between Hindus and Muslims.

This started over a story, which in the end I think proved not true, of the desecration of a mosque by Hindus in East Pakistan. Muslims in East Pakistan turned on the Hindus, so the Hindus in Calcutta turned on the Muslims. There were a lot of people killed and a lot of burnings of each other's communities.

This always happens to the poor. It was not in the well-to-do sections of the city. It was always in the slums and the poor sections.

None of it turned xenophobic, none of it turned anti-foreign or anti-Western. There was a curfew. We had passes, consular people who had to get out could get passes. Never did we feel threatened at all by this.

I can remember we had a cook who was actually Christian, but he lived down in one of the poorer sections of town, and he was afraid to go home one night after work. It was a Saturday, and he wanted to be home because he wanted to go to church the next morning. He was a very devout Catholic, originally from Goa. We did not have a car and driver, by the way, only the Consul General and the Deputy Principal Officer had their own drivers. But Betty got in our car and drove the cook home, through the part of town where stores were burning and people throwing stones. There was absolutely no hostility towards westerners, and she was able to deliver Peter to his quarters, where he felt safe, and drive back all alone to the Consulate.

In retrospect, one wonders, but it never occurred to us at the time that we were in danger. These were Indians killing Indians. And it never did turn anti-western in any sense of the word.

It was a typical sort of Indian explosion, convulsion you might almost say, of which India has seen many. This was nothing compared to the communal riots and massacres which followed partition. But it did lead to a new refugee problem. A lot of Hindus left East Pakistan, who had still stayed on there. In many cases, they were Biharis, not Bengalis. They came across and poured into the Calcutta area, adding to the already large street population. There were still refugees in Calcutta in those days, living in shanty towns around the railroad stations, which is where they ended up after the partition in 1947. Fifteen years later, you still had them there.

Q: No assimilation.

ATHERTON: Children had been born, and people had died, and they still were living in these lean-to shanty towns right around the railroad stations -- Howrah Station in particular, because

that was the station that used to connect Calcutta with East Pakistan. And that's where a lot of the Hindus came from.

Q: One always hears of these beggars sleeping in the streets of Calcutta. Are these refugees?

ATHERTON: No, just poor people. A lot of the refugees in fact worked. They lived in shanty towns, but they weren't all unemployed. But you had a lot of people who did not have any place to sleep -- the homeless population. Nobody knew, they never took a census, but it was several hundred thousand, probably, maybe even half a million. You would see them huddled under blankets on cool winter nights, on the main thoroughfares around the big hotels. They would go off and do whatever they do during the daytime.

Very often, if they were able, they would work, and a lot of them were rickshaw pullers. This was the one place in the world, I think by then, where you still had man-pulled rickshaws. In most places, they had converted to bicycle rickshaws. But the man-pulled rickshaw, which had been brought originally to India by immigrants from China, still persisted in Calcutta. You could still go out and hire a rickshaw. When our cook would come back from the market and he had too many groceries to carry or bring on the bus, he would hire a rickshaw. He would always give my wife the accounting for what he had spent on the marketing, and every now and then on the bill there would be something that was all one word, and we finally figured out it said: "rickshawfar," in other words, rickshaw fare.

It was probably the city the most impossible to fix of any city I've ever seen. And yet it goes on. It had a pulsing economic life because of the industrial hinterland and because of commerce and the port. It was a very difficult port, a river port, not on the Bay of Bengal. It was on the Hooghly River, which was one of the distributaries of the Ganges Delta -- one of the outlets of the Ganges into the Bay of Bengal. But it had been a great port. It was still a large port, but there was a lot of silting. They were constantly dredging to keep the channels open so that large ships could get in and out. A very expensive port; turnaround time was very slow.

That was one of the reasons why we had so many problems with the seamen, because their ships would be in Calcutta Port for so long and they would get in trouble. There wasn't all that much to do except get drunk. So there would always be problems. You know, what do you do with a drunken sailor? They come to the American Consulate, if they don't go to jail.

Anyway, I'm getting off the story a bit. But the refugee problem was just compounded by this new influx of new refugees coming across from what was still then East Pakistan.

The next and final crisis of our tour of duty was in 1965, when there was one of the periodic outbreaks of warfare between India and Pakistan. This one was mostly in the east, so we were on the side of the country where most of the military action was, rather than in Kashmir and on the main border with West Pakistan.

We actually had a couple of air raid warnings around Calcutta. A lone Pakistani plane would come over, drop a couple of bombs. Usually they fell in the river. But there would be an air raid warning, and everybody would head for the totally inadequate air raid facilities, unless you

happened to have one in your house. There were signs all over the place saying that in case of air raid take shelter in a pukka house. Pukka houses were the strong stone- or concrete-built houses and therefore presumably able to withstand shell fire or bomb concussion blasts more than the non-Pukka houses that were built of mud and were without foundation, and would collapse.

Anyway, this crisis came at a very inconvenient time for us. We had by then been in India three years, and we were coming to the end of our tour. We hadn't had home leave. We had opted for a three-year tour and then home leave and transfer. I had orders to report back to the Department, and we thought, well, we're going to do this right. We've got lots of leave time, and this will be the last chance for a long time for the family to take a boat trip. So we worked out elaborate arrangements, and got reservations for all of this, to go by train from Calcutta to Bombay on the Bombay Mail, the overnight sleeper which is really one of the luxury trains of India.

We traveled a lot in India by train and went by car some, too. Got to know the Indian system pretty well. We knew the south even better than the north, because our two sons went to boarding school in south India, in Kodaikanal, a hill station near Marudai. So every year in May, which was the worst month in Calcutta, we would spend the month at 7,000 feet in the hills in Kodaikanal. Betty and the children would. I couldn't go for that long at a time, but I would go down for part of the time.

Anyway, we decided we would take the Bombay Mail across to Bombay from Calcutta. We would embark on a British steamer coming from the Far East at Bombay, and from there up through the Suez Canal, and eventually to Italy. In Italy we could connect up with an American flagship, because we had to transfer to American flags at the nearest possible place, and that would have been Naples. We had this elaborate trip worked out to join either the Independence or the Constitution and sail from Naples to the States. It was going to take us several weeks. We knew the Department would say, "Well, part of that's leave," and we said, "that's fine." We had a lot of leave coming. It was all allowed under the travel regulations. It was a chance to get the family to rebind, because our two sons had been off at boarding school, and we hadn't been together as much as we would like to have been as a family.

Our daughter, by that time, incidentally, had been out to visit us, but she was in college in the States. I had gone back in '64 to sit on a selection board, and when I was there, met the young man she announced she was going to marry. The wedding was set for early October of 1965, and so our whole trip was timed so that we could get back to the States in time to be in Chicago for our daughter's wedding. And then, most inconveniently, the Indians and the Pakistanis went to war. And the decision was, I suppose rightly made, that they couldn't have people leaving the Consulate while there was a war on.

By then, incidentally, I was the number two at the Consulate, the Department having decided there was no need for a Deputy Principal Officer. That position was abolished, and it was decided the next senior person would also function as the Deputy and would be the Acting Consul General when the Consul General was away. And I was that person....I had just recalled that my tour in Calcutta was coming to an end. We had orders to go back to the States. We had elaborate plans for a long sea voyage by way of the Suez Canal and all of that. Then the war

broke out between India and Pakistan, and all the people were frozen in place. We were standing by for the possibility of another evacuation of Americans.

So the first thing we did was to cancel the first leg of the trip, which would have been from Bombay through the Arabian and Red Seas and the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean to Naples. But we tried to hold onto the second part, which was to have been from Italy back to the States. In the end, we had to cancel all of our plans and fly the whole way, with just a one-night stopover in London, because we had a deadline at the other end, namely our daughter's wedding in Chicago on the second of October. So we finally left, with no time to spare. And of course because of the Indo-Pak war flights had been rerouted. I think we went out on British Air. Normally they flew from Calcutta to Karachi and across that way, but because of the war, they had to reroute the flights. I think we had to go via the Persian Gulf, with a stop in Doha, and from there up across the Arabian Peninsula and eventually to London.

Q: Before you get out of India, what was your role during the Indo-Pak War there at the consulate in Calcutta?

ATHERTON: As it turned out, we didn't have much of a role. The war was far from the city, obviously. We had occasional air raid alerts, and a couple of Pak bombers actually did get across and drop a few bombs, as I recall, up the river from Calcutta. I don't recall that they ever did any serious damage.

But our job basically was to just be there in case there was a need to evacuate Americans. We didn't have any role in dealing with the Indians on this. This was all done through the embassy in Delhi. We reported, obviously, the attitudes of the people about the war from our consular district. We did try to keep Delhi and Washington informed of what the war looked like from the vantage point of Calcutta, and the Calcuttans and the Indians in this area thought about it.

Calcutta had a large Muslim population, and there was always concern that there would be Pakistani sympathizers in that area, so Indian security was tightened considerably, as I recall. But there was no immediate impact of the war on our lives, except that it froze us in place. We couldn't leave.

Perhaps our major contribution, ours being the consul general's and mine in particular, was to resist pressure from Washington to order the evacuation of Americans from various parts of the consular district.

Our reading was that it was not going to be the danger zone, that the war was not going to create that kind of a crisis situation. And as you know, once you've started evacuation, it's very hard to reverse. It takes on a life of its own, and you disrupt a lot of lives. A lot of these were not just the official Americans, they were the private American business community and missionaries. So we did take the position that we did not think evacuation was justified and, in effect, I think came very close to just being ordered by Washington to call for an evacuation. We took the position that this was a call for the people on the ground to make, who had a better feel than somebody sitting way back in Washington. I think, as I recall, that the embassy in Delhi supported us. They said they would take our judgment. Bill Hitchcock was then our Consul General, and he had a

good standing in the embassy and a good reputation with the Department. He was a particular friend of Carol Laise, who was then I think the director of South Asian Affairs. And so we prevailed. We did not go through an evacuation. And it turned out that we were right. There had not been a need for it, and it would have been a great expense, and a great disruption, and probably created a lot of ill will among private Americans for panicking. And so, that's my main memory of that period, the resistance to the evacuation and the general sense that the war was somehow far away, and that it was not something we seemed to be terribly caught up in.

In any case, it didn't escalate, and eventually, after several attempts, I got approval from Washington to continue with my transfer.

BRUCE H. MILLEN
Labor Advisor
New Delhi (1962-1965)

Bruce H. Millen was born in Wisconsin and attended Northwestern University. Millen served in the military during World War II and joined the Foreign Service in 1950. Millen served as Labor Attaché in Rome, Oslo, New Delhi, and Ankara. Millen was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle in 1993.

Kienzle: After Brookings, what did you do?

MILLEN: Then I went to India.

Kienzle: At some point you worked in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State]?

MILLEN: That was between Wisconsin and Brookings.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe your duties as the Labor Advisor?

MILLEN: In NEA, I sometimes thought maybe I was the conscience of the organization. I did my best. I helped the Peace Corps get into the region, because I convinced everybody that I should sign off on all outgoing telegrams unless they involved a policy matter. This meant that about nine-tenths of all the bureaucratic chit-chat could go through without having to be cleared by all the [country desks]. In various ways I tried to make life easier for them. One of the higher ups wanted me to come to work for [the Peace Corps]. I said, "Look, I like the Peace Corps, but I don't like it as a 24 hour [a day] matter. It's going to be great for the Americans who go over. I'm not sure what the long term impact is going to be abroad, but I think it is a marvelous experience for those who participate. But that's not my life." I also warned my special contact about infiltration which lead to meetings between Director Shriver and Allen Dulles.

Kienzle: Were there other highlights of the NEA tour that you recall?

MILLEN: Oh, just the little petty stuff. Actually there were some friendly people there. Some of the people on the India desk were really great: Wes Adams. He was a very liberal guy. And [there were] others. Well, the things that happened. . . Again in a big bureaucracy. Bob Senser was just coming in, and the Department wanted to send him to India. Well, at that time he had a black wife, and somebody up in personnel passed the word that he would be totally unacceptable in India, because Indians would not accept [someone of] color.

Kienzle: Was that true?

MILLEN: Well, some of the Indians were sensitive to the issue, yes, but not to the extent that you couldn't send somebody there. At any rate, I went down to the desk, and I think almost universally Bernie Horgan, Wes Adams--There were about six guys working on the Indian Desk at that time--and they asked, "Who passed out that kind of information?" They said, "Sure, maybe down south there might be a little bit of a problem, but are we in the business of sending people out there to please the prejudices of a few Indians?" So again, somebody up high thinks that he's got wisdom and you get this kind of a response. Well, as it turned out, Bob Senser went some place else. I've forgotten [where]. But these are some examples of the interesting things that happen in a bureaucracy.

Looking back on the NEA experience really revealed some of the weaknesses of the Labor Attaché Program. The Paul Hall issue, for example, bordered on turning into an incendiary affair and yet my Bureau made very little use of the Labor Advisor, me, and I was kept away from the policy decisions. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO, Arthur Goldberg, etc. made not a single contact with the one person within NEA who might have been able to help the unions extract themselves from a very sticky situation.

I recognized from the outset that NEA, because of the political nature of their client states, the Israel issue, etc. represented a difficult area within which to work, and my fears were realized quite soon. Despite the high quality of many members of the staff, and even the desire of some of them to be helpful, the Labor Advisor had little leverage. Doing day-to-day chores were easy, but trouble arose whenever I raised issues outside of the immediate and most narrow definition of my function. For example, through happenstance I became friendly with a Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of Interior and uncovered a program designed to foster the development of water desalinization in arid countries. Efforts to raise discussion of the program with NEA were frowned upon within my immediate office and I came close to being reprimanded.

Another instance: A brief memorandum to the NEA Assistant Secretary pointing out a weakness in a speech by the Secretary of State, which appeared in the publication *Vital Speeches* gained me an invitation to spend an hour with the Assistant Secretary but earned me only demerits from my supervisor.

A report to another NEA Assistant Secretary (after returning from a trip to Iran) about the activities of SAVAK (Iranian Intelligence) which was battling with the Iranian Department of Labor for control over trade union activities was met with instructions to my boss that he did not want such reporting, that after all "I helped establish SAVAK." Later I was to discover that on a

subsequent field trip to the general area the Assistant Secretary in question had instructed all missions to supervise all of my contacts. Fortunately, most of the missions chose to ignore the instruction.

One last comment and then we will move to another subject, the posting to India. On two or three occasions the NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary told me of an upcoming meeting with Agency people to discuss labor issues. He apologized sincerely and said he would like to have me present, but the Agency had a rule never to meet when a Labor Advisor was present because they might reveal names of certain U.S. trade union leaders with whom they had dealings. On one occasion I laughed and told him that, if he wished, I could return in a few moments with the names of at least 20 trade union leaders or employees in the Washington area with whom the Agency had regular contact. He looked chagrined and that was the end of that. I have often wondered whether or not Labor Advisors from other Bureaus were subject to the same restrictions.

Kienzle: When did you go to India?

MILLEN: I went to India in the fall of 1962. But you probably don't know that I had been slated to go to Brussels after Brookings. That bubble burst about three weeks later when Assistant Secretary George Weaver from ILAB at the Department of Labor told me that "16th Street" (AFL-CIO) had blocked the Belgium assignment. I was not surprised- understanding the political winds at play in this situation-but I was disappointed.

Kienzle: This was after your tour at Brookings?

MILLEN: Yes, after Brookings. [Before leaving Washington] there was a two or three month period when I was doing a few things in the Department. I got to India in October of 1962 and stayed until late April or early May of 1965. India was not really my cup of tea. On the other hand, I am sure glad that I worked in a country such as India or one like it, so I could really get an understanding of the dynamics of the situation. It was fascinating.

Kienzle: How would you characterize India at that point in history?

MILLEN: Well, in a way, it was sad. The political structure was under great stress, partly as a result of the fact that Nehru was coming to the end of his life and had obviously lost a lot of his vigor and a lot of his capacity to control events in India, to the extent that anybody can. He had lost a good deal of that, and I had the impression that the corruption level was rising. While corruption is endemic in all developing countries, I had the feeling that it was on the rise, and part of it was [due to] Nehru's increasing age. He was a remarkable person to watch. [When you looked into his eyes, you almost felt that you were looking into a person's soul. And the day he was buried, everything, of course, closed down except for the events surrounding the funeral, and it was not inappropriate that earthquake tremors went through Delhi on that day. It was almost in keeping with the event. Something cataclysmic had happened, at least in the life of India, that this man, who was a brave and highly intelligent man, and, I think, for the most part a good man, [had died].

Kienzle: Was there any institutionalized corruption in the Congress Party?

MILLEN: Oh, yes. The Congress Party was just kind of a place for boodle and payoffs, but it is hard to separate out that which is endemic to countries with this level of poverty and this level of diversity and challenge. The first time I went to India, I was on a study trip for the Department of State. I came back and I opened [my trip report] with the sentence, "In the functioning anarchy called India. . . ." And it wasn't until two or three days before I left [India], as I was going through the files, that I found Ambassador Bunker's commentary on my report. He fairly well accepted most of what was in the report, but he said, "I have trouble coming to grips with Millen's opening statement on functioning anarchy."

Shea: It is like what somebody said about the Austrian-Hungarian Empire prior to the First World War. It has a policy of calculated negligence.

Kienzle: Was Ambassador Bowles there?

MILLEN: Ambassador Galbraith was there when I arrived. He gave speeches and was a public figure, but he didn't pay much attention to the running of the embassy. He wrote some very fine essays in the form of cables that were very interesting and deserved to be published, but he was a "stand apart" guy [with] that big ego; nothing mattered [to him] but what he was doing. Once in a while you would feel that he missed the lecture class, so he would call a staff meeting, and after a couple of administrative comments had been made, one of them always being that there had been so many security violations in the last month, Galbraith would pick up the burden and give us these sometimes rather interesting little essays or commentaries. His writing style was fluid and so forth. I got the impression that he must work on his writing very hard, because when he spoke he would use a word, then pull it back and insert another word, and sometimes [do this] even a second or third time. He was very careful with each word, and he seemed [to be] almost listening [to himself]. When I would pick up something that he had written, [I thought] "God, he must spend an awful lot of time editing." His speaking style was just so different from his writing style. Not that the words didn't come out fine, but he searched for the appropriate words. It was an interesting experience. Of course, we were kind of amused when the Chinese attacked India in early 1963; he obviously had so much fun marshaling military support and going out to meet the planes that our military sent over. He also got a great deal of pleasure out of bare-knuckling Krishna Menon. He set it up with Nehru where he didn't have to do business with Krishna Menon during that period.

Kienzle: Krishna Menon was the Foreign Minister during that period?

MILLEN: No. Defense Minister. When Galbraith left, everybody [in the Embassy] was looking forward to a change, because morale was not exactly high, and everybody was saying that it's got to be better [under the new ambassador]. Of course, Bowles came in and nothing much changed.

Kienzle: How would you characterize the labor movement at that time, INTUC, and the Communist Party movement and H.M.S.?

MILLEN: Obviously the Communist Party's labor movement, the All India Trade Union Confederation or AITUC, was a superior group and much better organized. I used to make rough comparisons with the Italian situation. You had the Communist movement, the Congress Party federation INTUC (The Indian National Trade Union Congress), the feisty H.M.S., which was a mildly socialist movement, and the revolutionary socialists plus a plethora of independent unions. Once I put Victor Reuther up to posing a question to the head of the revolutionary socialist trade union movement, who was a very interesting personality. In India, you could cross all these lines. So Victor, who was traveling through the country, asked -- I can't recall the name. -- the leader of the revolutionary socialist union what was so different between H.M.S. and his union that would make it impossible for them to merge. He was very polite to Victor and said, "Well, look, I need these guys from the Communists. Do you think I would be a member of the state parliament, if I worked with H.M.S? You're crazy. I can't do business with H.M.S."

Kienzle: Rampant opportunism.

MILLEN: Not from his point of view. Jatin Chakravarti-that was his name. I remember it now-- was effective in trade union affairs because of his political position; he knew it; and I wanted Victor to understand it .

Oh, God. I got into a little bit of trouble over two people I sent on leader grants [even though] I didn't have much influence over the leader grants. Dave Burgess, one of my predecessors, had negotiated an agreement with the Ministry of Labor, which put almost the entire authority [for the selection of grantees] in the hands of the unions. And we were getting some real bad ones! So I went to the Ministry of Labor and I complained. I said, "I know that you don't personally pick these people, but I wish you could convey to the unions that they have got to pay more attention to the quality of people that they are sending." Then I went to each of the unions and I made my little spiel. One of them said, "What the hell! We don't know what else to do with this guy. He's worked hard." I said, "Well, that's fine from your point of view, but you have to look at the quality factors. You just can't send dummies." In the meantime, we sent one fellow from Kerala, who was a Christian, a big dark fellow, who when he left for the United States was in the middle of a word war that involved some anti-American sentiments. The politics of Kerala are particularly volatile. It is a heavily Communist area and comparatively speaking a highly educated group. So he went, and the Consul General in Madras didn't complain to me, but he complained to Bowles about this kind of a guy going. Then earlier this revolutionary socialist fellow Chakravarti went. He was one of my favorite people. He had been nominated [earlier] and I came along during the processing [of his grant]. There were objections to his going, and I said in a somewhat flip way, "Well, Christ, he has been to Moscow, Prague, London, and China. Why don't we continue his education?" So he went.

Well, both those cases [worked out successfully]. The fellow from Kerala came in after his trip pleased as punch. He would like to go back again and take his wife. He said, "Before I went I thought that American women were loose [and had] poor morals, and that you had an immoral society. I talked to a lot of parents and I talked to some grandparents, and I realized that you are just different. It's not loose morals. It's a different structure than we have." I thought that was quite an accomplishment for six weeks in the United States. And the revolutionary socialist came into my office not long after he returned and said, "Hey! I turned down an opportunity to

demonstrate in front of your consulate in Calcutta a few weeks ago." I said, "Well, what about that!" He said, "You know that trip to the United States? [That visit] proved that all of the things that I have been accusing America of in the last ten years are wrong. Unfortunately, I wrote this to a friend of mine and he's got the letter and he's threatening to release it." So I thought that [his change in outlook] was quite an [accomplishment]. I told him, "Look, the price of admission to the United States is not that you never demonstrate in front of our consulate again." He said, "No, I understand that. But I just didn't feel like it." He used to like to come up to my room. He would never drink in public, but he would come up to my room and he liked scotch in moderation.

Kienzle: How influential were the union leaders in the political process?

MILLEN: The process was so muddy and so gigantic it was hard to tell. But when one measures pay scales and the decisions coming out of the Wage Board structure, one must say that they did rather well. When George Fernandez shut down the city of Bombay under a process called a "bund" or general strike two years in a row, reluctantly followed by the Communists, the unions got changes in the state cost-of-living index. The unions had great influence in the banking system and on the docks. They could often pose a threat to public order at time which gave them intermittent power, but not in the daily running of government.

Kienzle: Excuse me, could you define "bund"?

MILLEN: It is like the German word Bund, but it is an active word. It is not a noun. It's an action. It's a general strike. Well, Bombay unions following Fernandez lead that twice. Once, for example, one of their main complaints was that the so-called cost of living index as reflected by their state government figures was inaccurate and that the workers were getting cheated. Well, as a result of this particular direct action, the government set up a committee and they concluded that the index was inaccurate; in fact the government admitted that certain items put in that budget in 1936 had never been changed and the products were no longer on the market.

The [Indians] set up of wage boards, which are an anathema to us. To me they made very good sense. The only way you could ever get some kind of a wage structure was to have a reasonably impartial group study the whole history and more or less lay out the benefits to be paid. Over a period of time the textile industry [developed] a pretty decent wage structure, which could never have been attained through direct collective bargaining. Not those levels. They also had, I think, a wage board for the iron industry. These wage boards were very influential economically, and they came about primarily through trade union actions, for the most part [through] politics. Here again what's politics and what's trade unionism? It's hard to separate them. I think the trade unions had an influence but not on the order of what we would see in a European structure, where you could trace where the trade unions said this and the government said this and you can watch the process go on. Everything [in India] was too oblique and all the lines were dotted and so forth, so it was very difficult to apply any standards of measurement. But yes, the trade unions did have influence, a considerable amount of influence. For example, in the United States, during my days working with CIO, we could never organize the EXXON workers. In Bombay EXXON refineries were organized. Now they weren't organized in the tight compact form that we would have it, but by God, they had influence in that plant.

Once I found an American pharmaceutical manufacture, I think it was Pfizer, which, when I talked to the manager about the fact that the unions in the industry were communist dominated, said yes, he knew that and they were worried about it. And I got him to pretty well agree that if I could get [a non-Communist] union-I was thinking about using H.M.S., because it had a fair amount of strength in that industry-and if we could get a couple of breaks from the employers' side, H.M.S. might be able to break the lock that the Communists had. And this guy said, "I would be willing to take some strikes on it." This was totally foreign to most American employers, because they won't take a strike for an ideological reason. Unfortunately I couldn't put the H.M.S. thing together, so it never did work out.

Unions did have considerable strength in the banking industry.

Kienzle: What about the influence of INTUC given its special relationship with the Congress Party?

MILLEN: Well, INTUC was represented, [for example] over in the Bombay textile industry, and of course in its home location in Ahmedabad in Gandhi's union. That was a local which Gandhi personally organized. Now these organizations had considerable influence, but it was hard to measure the impact and hard to trace the connecting points.

Shea: What about unions organized along religious lines?

MILLEN: That was beginning to develop strongly when I left. The Janata Party and the Hindu revival groups were just forming into influential political elements. They may have been organized at the plant level long before, but you first began to see evidence of them or hear discussions them about the time I left in 1965.

Shea: Do you recall a trade union leader by the name of George Fernandez?

MILLEN: George was famous, and George was fun.

Kienzle: Could you identify George Fernandez?

MILLEN: He was a Goan by origin and started out to be a seminary student. I am not quite sure how he made the connection with trade unionism, but he did in the Bombay area. He ended up having a large proportion of the taxi cab drivers and a lot of others [in his union]. His was an independent union. He was building strength. He was putting fight into the government. During the Chinese invasion period, the government put him in jail for about three months, because it said he had connections with the Chinese Communists. When I told the Consul General I would like to see George in jail, the Consul General damn near shit.

Kienzle: Who was the Consul General?

MILLEN: I forget. Once Phil Bradley from USIS and I set up a one day conference. We didn't have any money. We couldn't even offer lunch or anything. We did get hotel space for the

meeting. I invited industrialists, academic people, the trade unions, and so forth. In the morning we talked about collective bargaining and tariffs, in the afternoon about politics. No records were kept. It was just absolutely fascinating. That was the kind of activities that were fun to do in this job. The problem was that I never wrote up my notes and sent them in to boast about what we did. It was just like opening the flood gates. Everybody had something to offer. Ideas were brought up and knocked down, but there was no rancor to speak of between employers and unions.

Kienzle: I think the Indians like a rigorous discussion.

MILLEN: Well, they do. They are great talkers.

Shea: George Fernandez was from Ga.

MILLEN: He was very important in throwing up these twenty-four hour stoppages everywhere, which were organized and had an impact. He once had a meeting, which I attended together with my British counterpart. We got there early, and, of course, the honored guests were invited to sit on the platform, but [in India the organizers] frequently do not have any chairs, and you are put on cushions. The floor is padded and you have cushions behind your back. For someone not accustomed to spending a couple hours [like that] it's pretty hard. Generally one way you told the difference between an H.M.S. meeting and an INTUC meeting was that at an H.M.S. meeting most of the participants came with a Western shirt and pants on. [At an INTUC meeting] many of the Indians came in a dhotis; there were no chairs; and they squatted. They are trained to do that and could spend hours in that position. This was kind of a fundamental [difference] in the behavior patterns of the two groups.

So George invited me to a meeting. I don't remember what the event was. One of the H.M.S. people gave a speech. He was a good guy. I basically liked him, but his speech had an attack against Americans, because we weren't solidly enough behind India in a little war that was taking place up north along the Pakistani boarder. So he used that as a takeoff point to attack the Americans. We were being pro-Pakistani, etc. I read his written speech, which was three or four pages long. When my British friend Gordon came up-I have forgotten his last name-I said, "We're not sitting up here. Let's sit in the audience." He didn't know why I said that. I said, "I'll tell you why when we go downstairs." Of course they weren't attacking Great Britain, I just took it upon myself. I said, "I don't mind sitting here. I don't care if he wants to attack us, but I am not going to sit on that God-damned platform as if I am agreeing with him. If I sit up there, I'll ask permission to speak." So we went down and sat in the audience. Later I had a cup of coffee with George. He said, "Bruce, I have never seen you angry before." I said, "I wasn't really angry. I just didn't feel I wanted to sit on a platform while you guys were attacking us. After all, there are about eight shiploads of American grain out in your harbor right now, and there was no mention made of that. George said, "Yes, I noticed you weren't smiling today."

Shea: What about the coal miners in India. I always had the impression that they were highly organized.

MILLEN: They are pretty well organized. I once went to one of their national conventions, which was held outside under tents and so forth. It was so hot that they delayed the opening until after 5:30 at night. For Indians to call [a delay] it has to be really hot. This was an INTUC meeting and there were about 2,000 delegates.

Shea: What about wages and hours and working conditions in the mining industry?

MILLEN: Oh, I would hesitate to say. It's not easy to make a comparison in the first place. They had their wage boards over the years.

Kienzle: Was there a problem with child labor?

MILLEN: Oh, there always has been. You just see it all over the place. You look around the construction sites and there were kids. Maybe they were not even getting paid, but they were helping their mothers. Women do a lot of the burdensome work on the construction sites there. One of the most impressive things that I ever saw was [when] I was with Victor Reuther on his tour there. We were down in Hyderabad, which is south. We took a trip about 40 miles by jeep to where they were putting in the tallest and widest mortar dam in the world. They would start with these great big rocks that looked like granite. Everybody in the area was breaking these rocks up into little [pieces] for road beds and so forth. People were all over the place: men, women, and little children just chipping away. That was a major source of employment. There must have been 30,000 people just working on rock chipping. They were up to the 200 or 300 foot level when we were there. They were walking on bamboo ramps which go up and down, and men were carrying rocks which must have weighed 300 or 400 pounds hanging from bamboo sticks carried on the shoulders of four to six people. The women carried mud and cement. (End of Side A, Tape Two) There wasn't a machine in use for the first 250 feet. Then they had cranes up at the 250 foot level. Everything came up by hand. It was most impressive. It just staggered me.

Shea: Almost like building a pyramid.

MILLEN: Yes, on that order. I remember we used to get pictures during the Second World War of building airfields in China, and you saw those flanks of people out there. Well, this was the same kind of a picture, except they were going up the side of what was damned near a mountain. Now they did not have authority to put sluices in to make that a power plant. This was to be for irrigation and flood control. But they were putting the sluices in anyway on the assumption that in short order somebody would say, "By God, why aren't we developing power here?" So that gave them a little bit of a head start on that project.

India was a fascinating place, but one of the things that made [my tour there] unpleasant was the atmosphere in the Embassy. For reasons I am not quite sure of, I ran into troubles there almost from the day I landed. And, of course, I wasn't a perfect citizen. I sometimes reacted. I never did see a so-called efficiency report from there, except that I did get a special letter saying that the problems with me even extended into the distaff side of the house, because I had not praised my assistant's wife sufficiently. That was the only solid comment that I ever saw about my days in India.

Shea: What about Ambassador Bowles in all this?

MILLEN: Well, Bowles was a charmer! But he had never left the New Deal behind him. I can see how he would be a terrific advertising executive. He had a real flair.

Shea: I got to know him quite well, because he was not only the Governor of Connecticut but he was also the Congressman from my home area. He was a charmer all right.

MILLEN: He was a real charmer. But I heard him once ball out three consuls general for reporting honestly. He was just furious with them. They were giving very good reports but you had to report according to Bowles, if you wanted to get along with him. He was beyond his prime. He had Parkinson's disease. He died just recently, but he lived a long time and [I don't know] how he kept up the active life he did. He was a hard working guy. I have been at his place when we had small groups and he would almost push people out of the door, because as he said, "I am so tired I have to go to bed."

His main problem was that he so loved the Indians that he just didn't want to ever say anything bad about them. I was present one night and he was saying how soft the Americans were to send our kids to special schools. His kids would go to the Indian schools. Of course, I knew the school that they would go to. They would go to the Modern School for high level civil servants. He went on about the superiority of these Indian schools and how soft we were, and my former wife, not noted for diplomatic skills, said, "Mr. Ambassador, I couldn't agree with you less."
[Laughter]

Kienzle: Did the Ambassador laugh too?

MILLEN: No, he didn't laugh. But what he probably did not recognize was the snobbishness of a large part of the Indian school system for the elites, nor the fact that any seat taken up by one of us reduced the total for Indians. Furthermore, Indian schools followed the British model.

Kienzle: Well, shall we stop here and resume at some later time?

MILLEN: Yes. I think so. (End of Part I of the Interview)

Kienzle: Is there anything else that you would like to add on your assignments in either Oslo or New Delhi?

MILLEN: Well, I can't quite recall what I said about India. I may have said this. India was an interesting experience. I'm glad I was there. It was hard. I was not accepted not by the Embassy, but I was accepted by the Indians. I had good rapport with many academicians, many British, American and Indian business people, and a good share of the trade union movement. I felt like I made a contribution there, but I had an internal conflict in the Embassy which made life hard for me. I got to the point where I was watching my back a good deal of the time, and that was unfortunate. Looking back, I am not in the mood to discuss who struck whom first. Personally, I did feel I did a great deal of creative work in cooperation with AID, but it all ended on this note as expressed by one colleague, "We are afraid to be seen talking to you."

Kienzle: I think we left off last time at the end of your tour in India. Do you want to talk about your subsequent assignment in Turkey?

MILLEN: Yes. I went to Turkey and I was initially assigned as Executive Assistant to the Secretary General of CENTO . Given the kind of unfortunate circumstance I had in India, that [assignment] was to get me back in the shadows where I could hide for a while.

KATHRYN CLARK-BOURNE
Consular/Political Officer
Bombay (1962-1967)

Kathryn Clark-Bourne was born in 1924 in Fort Collins, Colorado. She received a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Washington. She later received a master's degree in mass communications from the University of Minnesota. Ms. Clark-Bourne's career included positions in Iran, The Netherlands, Nigeria, and Cameroon. This interview was conducted on August 2, 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Bombay from when to when?

CLARK-BOURNE: '62 to '67.

Q: '62 to '67.

CLARK-BOURNE: Our Consular District included Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Goa. In Gujarat, they speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra, they speak Marathi. In Goa, it's some South Indian language. In Madhya Pradesh, they did speak Hindi but it was so far away that I only got over there once or twice a year. So, I just didn't get to use it. Most of the city people all spoke English. It had been an English colony. So, it didn't matter that much, to be very honest. If I needed an interpreter, my local employees could interpret.

Q: From '62 to '67, you were in Bombay. What was your position?

CLARK-BOURNE: The first two years, I was a consular officer, head of the Consular Section. Then, the rest of the time, I was a political officer, head of the Political Section.

Q: Who was the Consul General at that time?

CLARK-BOURNE: I spent last night trying to remember names. Milton Rewinkel was the first one and Dan Braddock was the second one.

Q: From your perspective, what were American relations with the Indians during the '62 to '67 period?

CLARK-BOURNE: Oh, very good. There were no problems at all. We had Peace Corps. We had AID. We had everything there. We were experimenting on increasing production of wheat in, I believe, the Philippines, and we were bringing the results over for India. We helped them really increase their production of wheat. In fact, I'll never forget it, because there was an Indian woman who wrote a book. In it, she had interviewed a farmer and she said, "Now that you're getting twice as much produce to sell, what are you doing with all the extra money?" He said, "Well, I don't need any extra money. I have a bowl of rice for breakfast, a bowl of rice for lunch, and a bowl of rice for dinner. What do I need money for?" I'll never forget that. It's so different from the average American outlook on life.

But the relations were good. I had no problems whatsoever. I had many, many Indian friends there. As a political officer, I was also a labor officer. I met with the major labor union officials in Bombay, who were socialists, but I was taken in by them. They confided in me on everything.

Q: During this time, I guess, Nehru was still the Prime Minister, wasn't he?

CLARK-BOURNE: Yes, I guess so. Chester Bowles was Ambassador part of the time, and John Kenneth Galbraith was Ambassador part of the time.

Q: These were two of the stars of the Kennedy period in particular. Did you have any reflection of these two strong personalities?

CLARK-BOURNE: Chester Bowles was really liked by the Indians. He had two different tours there. Galbraith was something else. I remember, as consular officer, I was always the control officer for ship visits. And COMIDEASTFOR, Commander of the Middle East Forces...

Q: Was stationed in Bahrain.

CLARK-BOURNE: ...in Bahrain, would drop by quite often. I remember Galbraith coming down once by train. I think he took over seven cars on the train for all of his friends and relatives. He arrived in Bombay and the COMIDEASTFOR had come down on his flagship. Then there was a destroyer.

Q: It was a seaplane tender or something.

CLARK-BOURNE: You're right, it was a seaplane tender.

Q: Large Bay, I think, was one of them. I served in Dhahran at one time and we had these two rather small ships.

CLARK-BOURNE: Galbraith announced that he and his wife were going to stay on the captain's ship during the visit. In that day, a woman staying overnight on a ship was practically unknown. The captain wasn't very happy, but felt that he had to acquiesce to the Ambassador. My problem was that Galbraith was almost seven feet tall and the bunks on ships were short. I remember sending a junior officer down to the bazaar to find big cushions to pile up at the end of a bunk so that he could sleep on it. But he absolutely insisted. That's the kind of person he was. And yet, he

wrote magnificently. We loved to read his cables and his telegrams. We'd look forward to them. He really was very talented. But there were two sides to the character.

Q: You were there during the assassination of President Kennedy. How did that...?

CLARK-BOURNE: That I will always remember because I had set out in my car with a bunch of friends to drive up to Kathmandu. That's quite a drive, let me tell you. I was driving a Mercedes 190 in those days, which are pretty sturdy cars, and I remember stopping along the way for servicing. To get up over the border, AID at that time was building a road that went from the border and over the mountains into Kathmandu. I remember that the road en route to the border went out of existence at one point. We tried to cross a stream and got stuck and had to hike to the nearest village to get them to pull us out. Somehow, we got in contact with AID. They sent a jeep down to get us out. We got over the border up to Kathmandu. While there in the hotel, I came down one morning for breakfast and was met by one of the employees, saying, "Your President has just been assassinated." So, of course, we dashed over to the Embassy to find out what it was all about. I was up there for another week before I returned to India.

Q: You were also there during the China-Indian War, weren't you?

CLARK-BOURNE: Yes I was and this was a problem, although the troops were over in the East and we were in the West. We had a blackout and I was ordered to get all the Peace Corps people down out of Gujarat and to Bombay to be evacuated. I remember going up to Gujarat to find them and arriving back in Bombay during a total blackout. But they managed to land the plane. My former husband -- my fiancé at that time -- came out to the airport to meet me. We had to drive back to Bombay without headlights. But that didn't last for too long.

Q: In a way, that was sort of a high point, wasn't it, of Indian-American relations?

CLARK-BOURNE: Yes, I think you're right. It probably was, at least at that time.

Q: As a consular officer, did you have any particular consular problems?

CLARK-BOURNE: This is where we did have trouble with young people.

Q: This was the height of what we'd call "the Hippie Movement," of young people going off as far as they could and running out of money.

CLARK-BOURNE: What they were doing was taking cars into Nepal and exchanging them for drugs and then bringing the drugs down to sell in India. They'd often camp on the beaches near Bombay. I remember working with the Brits trying to get it under control.

As consular officer before I became political officer, we had shipping problems. I'll never forget one involving one of the big shipping companies, a Greek company named Kulakundis employing mostly American seamen, had gone bankrupt. When they arrived in Bombay port, they couldn't leave and their ships were stalled in several ports in the Middle East. The Consulate General was told one night, at about 10 or 11 at night, that the seamen on the ship were revolting.

They'd locked all the officers up in the saloon. I found out about it and called the Consul General. The Consul General said that, as a woman, I couldn't go out on that ship. And I said, "I certainly can," but I promised him I'd take my fiancé with me. We got out and had to climb up the Jacob's ladder to get on. By the way, I had learned in The Netherlands that seamen are respectful of women, but not necessarily of men. This is something that the Foreign Service learned and started assigning women these jobs. I got to the saloon and climbed up on a table and addressed these people. I said, "Alright, you guys, we want you to come ashore. I'm going to find a place for you to stay and then I'm going to find a way of getting you home by air. I want you to let the officers alone." And they went right along with it. There was a YMCA where I put everybody up. Many telegrams went back and forth and we got a chartered plane and finally got them out. They were most grateful. I got letters from unions for months thereafter, thanking me.

Q: What had been the problem on the ship?

CLARK-BOURNE: They hadn't been paid for two weeks. Kulakundis had gone bankrupt and couldn't pay them. So, that was one of the high points as a consular officer.

Q: How about with the young Americans? Were you having people in jail and things of this nature with drugs? How did the Indians handle this?

CLARK-BOURNE: I don't remember them being in jail. I do remember having consulted with the Indians on how to get them out of the country. That's what they mainly wanted. I spent time and effort contacting relatives and Heaven knows what, trying to get them out. It was a long time ago. Some of them may have been put in jail. I just don't remember.

Q: As a political officer, what were your responsibilities?

CLARK-BOURNE: As I mentioned, reporting on labor, as well as political affairs. For instance, they had elections when I was there. I traveled to all the four provinces to interview people from the various political parties and sent in reports. We predicted the outcome of the elections in our consular district and were 100 percent accurate.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian political system from the perspective of Bombay?

CLARK-BOURNE: At that time, it seemed to work. The parties were there. They were all allowed to operate. It was what we would call a democratic setup. They had their elections.

Q: Did you find that you had pretty good access to the political leaders in the area?

CLARK-BOURNE: Yes. There was no problem with that at all. Good access with Indians of all kinds. They had, of course, a big movie industry. The Ivory-Merchant Production Company had its studio there and I was very good friends with Jim Ivory and Ismail Merchant. So, I got to know all the movie colony people.

Q: The Indian movie is so different than the American movie. Bombay, of course, probably turned out more movies than Hollywood, I guess.

CLARK-BOURNE: I would not doubt it. They were horribly long and they had to include everything. We'd go occasionally to them. But, of course, the Ivory-Merchant films were made for Westerners, so they were not that way.

Q: Did you ever get involved in anything equivalent to turf disputes? Were American movies coming in?

CLARK-BOURNE: I never saw anything like that, no. Maybe up in Delhi, they ran into something like that, but I didn't see anything like that.

Q: Were there any other major events?

CLARK-BOURNE: I traveled around quite a bit. I mentioned that, while I was in Tehran, Hope Cooke was there. In fact, when I was there, she had her coming-out party, which was a fantastic evening. I'll never forget it. It started at 10 o'clock at night and they had fireworks at midnight. At the conclusion of the fireworks, there was a display of a peacock spreading its tail, with her name written across the sky. She and "Aunt Mary," Selden Chapin's wife, had gone up to India and obtained the fireworks. I think that's where she met her future husband, the Maharajah of Sikkim. We partied and danced all night and then had breakfast and swam in their swimming pool. It went on most of the next day. Hope was married in Sikkim while I was in Bombay and I was invited. I remember flying across India and up to Sikkim -- was quite an experience.

But, back to the Consular District, I can't remember anything really outstanding.

Q: You were engaged there?

CLARK-BOURNE: I don't know whether you want to know about this or not. I was engaged. My former husband was an American businessman. His family company is the Singer Sewing Machine Company and he covered the whole Middle East. We went back to the States to get married. I took leave and wanted him to come to Washington to meet the India desk officer. Carol Laise was the India desk officer and she said, "Kay, are you crazy?" I said, "Why?" She said, "Don't you know women officers aren't allowed to be married?" I said, "No, why?" She said, "They feel that a husband would not follow his wife around the world." I said, "My husband has more foreign office posts than we do!" She said, "That's beside the point. You'd better get out of town fast, before they pick up your diplomatic passport." So, we dashed off back to India.

Milton Rewinkel was still Consul General and he said, "Kay, why would you want to keep working when you're married?" Well, the memos went back and forth, because I was fighting it. Milton said I could stay on only as a local employee. They kicked me out of my apartment, which was no problem, because my former husband had his apartment. Of course, I received no allowances. Then Milton left and Dan Braddock came on as CG. Dan was very nice and very understanding and tried to back me up. He sent cables, but didn't get very far.

DENNIS KUX
Desk Officer for Nepal and India
Washington, DC (1962-1964)

Ambassador Dennis Kux was born in England in 1931 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1952. He entered the U.S. Army in 1952, where he worked as a prisoner of war interrogator. His Foreign Service career included positions in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast. Ambassador Kux was interviewed by Thomas Stern on January 13, 1995.

Q: Now we are in 1962. You have been assigned to Washington as Desk Officer for Nepal and the Assistant Desk Officer for India.

Could you tell me what your responsibilities were? You were the sole Desk Officer for Nepal.

KUX: I was the support officer in Washington for our Embassy in Nepal. Basically, I was supposed to know and to be involved in anything that happened in the U. S. Government regarding Nepal -- anything that had foreign policy ramifications. It was an "across the board" responsibility, including the "care and feeding" of the Nepalese Embassy in Washington. There was a steady flow of correspondence with the Ambassador and DCM of our Embassy in Nepal. The Ambassador wrote to the Office Director, Turner Cameron, but I drafted the replies for his signature. At the time Nepal was of interest because the Chinese Communists and the Indians were jousting for influence. Let me put it this way. Nepal, which the Indians consider part of their defense zone, was trying to gain a little breathing space by expanding its relations with China. As the Chinese had bad relations with the Indians at the time -- this was right before the Sino-Indian War -- the Indians were very nervous and we in turn became very nervous.

The organizational structure at the time was as follows: under the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs [NEA] there were four offices, one of which was the Office of South Asian Affairs. Turner Cameron was the Director of that office. He had been DCM in Colombo but was really a "Europeanist." The Deputy Director was Carol Laise, who had been Political Officer in New Delhi. Ambassadors Galbraith and Bunker liked her. In fact, Ambassador Bunker eventually married her. Galbraith had Carol Laise sent back to the Department. I think that the Department "fired" the man who had been Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs. He didn't move fast enough for Galbraith. The Office covered India, Pakistan, Ceylon as well as Afghanistan and Nepal. There were two subgroups. One was concerned with India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and the other one covered Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I was a staff member of the group that dealt with India, Nepal, and Ceylon -- now Sri Lanka. The desk officer for India said, "Well, you are probably not going to be busy full time, so you can work on India on an 'as assigned' basis."

The first assignment I had, which was a bit of a shock for me, was to review and appraise something like six months of political reporting from the Embassy and Consulates in India. The desk officer said, "My God, I couldn't get to it. Why don't you go through this stuff?"

One of the major reasons for the Consulates in India was to serve as "listening posts" or political reporting posts. At the time, we had Consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras -- the same ones as now, although they do much less reporting. The people who prepared these reports assumed that Washington was listening, but there was the India desk, the main repository and the main "target" for this reporting and nobody read the reports. So, as the junior officer in the office, I read and appraised the reports.

This exercise made me think a little about the value of the political reporting. I realized later on, though I did not realize it at the time, that there is a broader audience in Washington than just the State desk. Perhaps it was too broad an audience, with the CIA, the Defense Department, and the INR analysts all reading the reports. However, we clearly did not need all of the information in the regional bureau of the State Department.

Eventually, I concluded that there was value in the reporting different from what I originally believed. It served as a training ground for the junior officers who were doing most of the reporting. They learned about the country in a way that they otherwise would not have done. They honed their reporting skills. In 1962 we had political reporting officers in each of the three Consulates and in Bombay we had two. They sent in a of material on local and state level politics, in addition to Embassy reporting airgrams.

At a certain point the India Desk Officer left, and I think that there was something like a year's gap until his replacement came. In effect, I became the India Desk Officer, as well as the Nepal Desk Officer. That was at a very interesting time. J. Kenneth Galbraith was the Ambassador, and he would come sauntering through the Department from time to time. He was always handled by David Schneider, the Officer-in-Charge, and Carol Laise, the Deputy Office Director.

A question arises periodically concerning the desirability of having one Office responsible for both India and Pakistan. In fact, from a policy point of view, it didn't make any difference. The policy was set at a much higher level than the Office Director. In 1962, when India and Pakistan had far higher priorities than they do now, policy was set by the top echelons of the administration. In the Eisenhower administration there was a greater emphasis at first on military assistance and military arrangements, a dislike of neutralism, and a tendency toward Pakistan. This shifted under Kennedy. The Office of South Asian Affairs implemented the policy; it didn't make it.

The policy level began at the Assistant Secretary level and there was friction there, which I didn't realize between Phil Talbot, the Assistant Secretary, and Galbraith. If you read Ambassador Galbraith's book, you can see that he heartily disliked Talbot. Phil knew much more about South Asia than Galbraith. He had spent most of the years between 1939 and 1947 dealing with the subcontinent and had a very balanced view. Talbot felt that the United States should have good relations with both India and Pakistan. He didn't jump fast enough on the India band wagon to suit Ambassador Galbraith.

Talbot wasn't "anti-Indian." Rather, he considered U. S. interests in the region as a whole and designed U. S. policy accordingly. The goals of the Kennedy administration were affected by the

personalities whom I have mentioned. Ambassador Chester Bowles was on one extreme. He wanted to say, "To hell with Pakistan and let's go with India", when he was Under secretary of State. Ambassador Galbraith also "tilted" toward India, but he was more erratic than Ambassador Bowles. I think that Galbraith took into account, to a greater extent, the interests of Pakistan. Bob Komer, who was the South Asia man on the National Security Council staff, and Talbot were pretty close on US policy. They wanted greater emphasis on the relationship with India than had been the case during the Eisenhower administration. However, they did not want to give up the relationship with Pakistan. There were two reasons for this.

One reason was that, after the disaster of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, which came very early during the Kennedy administration, the administration did not want to dump an ally. The ally, in this case, was Pakistan. The Kennedy administration felt that it could lay itself open to a lot of criticism from conservatives. The second reason was of more direct interest. We had intelligence facilities in Pakistan -- electronic listening posts which, according to the intelligence community, gave unique information on Soviet missile and nuclear testing. That was a threat which the Pakistanis held over us, if we leaned too far toward the Indians. That was in the back of people's minds.

There was also the feeling of others -- Dean Rusk, for example -- that you really couldn't count on the Indians. You would be giving up a known quantity in the sense of an ally -- maybe difficult at times but still an ally -- for people [in this case, the Indians] who were considered unreliable. Krishna Menon [former Indian Defense Minister] was still around and was always an anti-US menace. Nehru was fading at this point. In any case, the Indians didn't make it easy for Americans who wanted a stronger relationship with them.

Very early on, one thing that happened, which was probably a tactical mistake, was for the Kennedy administration to greatly expand our aid program to India. That came almost immediately after President Kennedy took office. So we gave away, if you think of it in those terms, a bargaining chip. The aid program had already increased under the Eisenhower administration. It increased further under the Kennedy administration. I don't recall the exact figures, but my recollection is that it was \$1.0 billion a year, which was big, big money in those days. Basically, this economic aid underwrote the Indian economic development program. Other countries were also involved, but we were the key.

The office director was really the "mechanic." He carried out the policies set by the assistant Secretary and his superiors. He did not initiate the policies. The Office Director did see Talbot and Bowles frequently. There also was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, who was very important, just because of who he was. I refer to Jim Grant who has just died. He was very much involved in the more important issues. He was into the policy process -- the first level of that process really, really an informal, inter-agency process. It involved Talbot and Grant, for the State Department; Bill Gaud the Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Bob Komer from the NSC staff at the White House, and Critchfield from CIA and someone from Defense. In those days it was a very informal White House. Komer had direct access to the President.

It was not a formal structure, but there still was a process. There was also an NSC process, in the sense that on a number of occasions President Kennedy met different agencies on India and

Pakistan. Rusk had experience with South Asia because he spent part of World War II out there. There was also McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

There had been trouble all the time along the Sino-India border, going back a couple of years. There were serious clashes. We had intelligence that the Chinese Communists had increased their troop deployments, as had the Indians. However, what we didn't know was that the Chinese would actually strike the Indians. That took people by surprise. Then the next thing that took people by surprise was the poor performance of the Indian Army.

When the word came that the Chinese had struck, as a relatively junior officer I went scurrying around, because I knew how to get the press tickers faster than anybody else. I was constantly running down to the press room or wherever the wire service machines were kept. We got much of our information from the wire services. That was my contribution. I was given the task of writing a daily "Sitrep" [Situation Report] which then went to the Secretary of State and the "Seventh Floor" of the State Department so that the principals would know what was happening.

No task force was set up. You have to remember that this happened simultaneously with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962. You had the rather strange situation -- and Ambassador Galbraith points this out in his book -- that for a 10 day or two week period there was the threat of a major regional war and the threat of an even larger conflict involving the major powers going on at the same time. The Sino-Indian War was obscured from the general vision by the Cuban Missile Crisis. So the Sino-Indian War was handled by the informal task force composed of the South Asia office of the Department of State and the Pentagon. The immediate U. S. response was to add a person to the India desk to handle Political-Military issues.

The policy decision to provide immediate military aid to India was made in a matter of days; we then tried to persuade the Pakistanis not to take any unhelpful actions. This last goal was basically not achieved. The actions that we took were all handled expeditiously, without a lot of paper work. The results were seen in Presidential messages to Ayub Khan and Nehru, and this correspondence moved back and forth very rapidly during the crisis.

There were two phases of the crisis. The first phase occurred on or about October 20, 1962. The Indian Army was kicked in the teeth, and then there was a lull. Three weeks later, in mid to late November, the Indians launched an offensive. The Chinese were waiting for this and beat the hell out of the Indians. At that point the President decided at a White House meeting to send Averell Harriman -- then the Assistant Secretary for FE -- to India to find out what the Indians really wanted. He went with Paul Nitze and others. This was, I think, the highest powered official American mission that has ever gone to South Asia. Nitze may have been an Assistant Secretary of Defense at the time. Jim Grant also was on that mission as well as Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence & Research, Carl Kaysen, from the White House, and General Paul Adams, a four-star general.

There was a separate British group that went out to South Asia at the same time. The Kennedy administration -- more than the Eisenhower administration -- was interested in getting the British and the British Commonwealth in on the act. Secretary Rusk felt very strongly about that --

having "more flags flying." He felt that we should not be alone. Since South Asia had been a British territory, they should be present. So the British sent Duncan Sandys, a cabinet minister at the time.

In December 1962, there was a conference in Bermuda between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan. It was decided to provide another \$120 million in short-term military assistance to India. The aid provided was split 50-50 between the Commonwealth and the United States, with India and Pakistan each getting about \$60 million.

The crisis did end when the Chinese pulled their troops back and, in effect, imposed a settlement. Then there was a dispute within the State Department. I remember that quite vividly. On the China desk, Lindsay Grant, who was the equivalent to David Schneider, said that this is simply a border conflict and that the Chinese were just teaching the Indians a lesson. They were not out to conquer India or get the U. S. involved in major hostilities. On the India desk, I think, we saw events more as the Indians saw them. We felt that there was a fundamental challenge to the democracy and the security of India.

The Kennedy administration had seen these events as an opportunity to strengthen our relations with the Indians, which had been its goal, by providing immediate assistance and by going along with the Indian view that this was a fundamental challenge by the Chinese. The Indians basically panicked. Indeed, Nehru sent a message to President Kennedy, which has never been released, during the middle of the second crisis with the Chinese. It may have been this message from Nehru which precipitated the despatch of the Harriman mission. In effect, Nehru asked for American military, he wanted the U. S. Air Force to intervene, to provide tactical air support, and to bomb Chinese supply lines. The Indians didn't want to use their own Air Force because they were afraid that the Chinese would attack India's cities.

This was what I called Nehru's "Dunkirk" message. The Indian Ambassador to the United States was so embarrassed that he kept his only copy of the Nehru message in his desk at the Indian Embassy. I remember seeing the message when it came in. We were all stunned by it. The crisis receded in a day or so when the Chinese announced their cease-fire, and I don't think that Nehru ever got an answer to his message. The matter spun out into talks and discussions. Gradually, the pressure for action by the Kennedy administration diminished.

The major problem was with Pakistan whom the Kennedy administration did not want to "lose", because of the military facilities which we had there. There was a Pakistani "club" in Washington in the U. S. intelligence community and among the military. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan took the view that the Chinese were not really a major threat to India and that therefore the United States should not respond to India's requests. Ayub became angrier and angrier as we increased our assistance to India. The Pakistanis in turn developed their relationship with China right at this time.

We tried to use the crisis to get a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. We did get the Indians to agree to talks, but with much, much difficulty. These talks went on for five rounds, from December, 1962, to May, 1963. They got nowhere. The Office of South Asian Affairs played a considerable role, working with the Office of Policy Planning and the NSC in

prodding both India and Pakistan into these talks and doing the backstopping. When these talks faltered in the spring of 1963, there was a U. S.-British plan which was presented and rejected by both sides. Ambassador Galbraith commented wryly that we finally got the Indians and Pakistanis to agree on something! So it was a very busy time in the Office of South Asian Affairs. I was still only a helper.

The working relationships between the India and Pakistan Desks were good. Basically, Carol Laise, the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, was rather pro-Indian. She had a stronger personality than Turner Cameron, and the Pakistan Desk suffered accordingly. I mentioned that some people tended to "tilt" toward Pakistan for a couple of reasons. First, they felt that the Pakistanis had gotten the short end of the stick from the Indians in the Kashmir dispute and had been treated badly. Secondly, they felt that the U. S. had more at stake with Pakistanis, that we had more assets at risk in Pakistan. Thirdly, they liked the Pakistanis better than the Indians. This was the human equation.

Everybody saw Pakistan through the prism of the Cold War. India was seen largely through the prism of the Cold War, but there was a generalized feeling that perhaps transcended the Cold War. That is, there was the view that India was the world's largest democracy and required help, quite apart from Cold War considerations. Certainly, at the top level of the U. S. Government India was seen in terms of the Cold War. The second Eisenhower administration and the Kennedy administration did not differ on that.

I was lucky that I had served in both India and Pakistan and so I personally felt some sympathy toward both of them. I have a feeling that if you served just in one of the two countries, it was very hard not to soak up some of the local prejudices. I had the feeling that India was the right side to support. India is the larger country, so that you could make out a geopolitical case in favor of India if you have to pick one country over the other. Unfortunately, it was a "zero sum" game. In the security area it was very hard to work with both India and Pakistan in any substantial way, because each saw the other as their principal enemy.

This was shown in the reaction of the Pakistanis when we gave emergency help to India. They "went through the overhead," just as the Indians had "gone through the overhead" when we helped Pakistan seven years before [1954] or during the years after that. To some extent, those views were mitigated by our large economic aid programs, which gave us an important stake in both economies. However, basically, it was a "zero sum" game. It probably would have been impossible to establish a large security relationship with India and maintain a good security relationship with Pakistan. That situation still exists today.

I personally did not view that the provision of military assistance as a cause for further heightening of tension between the two countries. I did have the feeling that we had gone over our heads in the case of Pakistan. I thought that we were too committed to the Pakistanis. I was not aware at the time, at my level, of the intelligence side of things. At the same time I felt that, although we shouldn't "ditch" the Pakistanis, we should have a stronger relationship with the Indians -- as frustrating as the Indians were, and God knows that they were frustrating. That was always the problem. They, themselves, were a major hindrance to improved U. S. - Indian relations. They were constantly doing things that annoyed Americans -- taking policy initiatives

that annoyed us. These were not personality conflicts. In my own view, I feel rather strongly that nations disagree or nations have trouble with each other because they disagree usually on security interests and not because Minister X and Minister Y can't get along.

Look at Korea. I don't think that the Koreans are easy people to deal with. But they are our allies, and it is my feeling that our national security interests parallel. Similarly, with the Turks. They are not easy -- they're harder to get along with than the Indians, in many ways. However, they're our allies.

So the fact that the Indians are difficult, I think, was not the point. The point was that we and the Indians disagreed on basic national security concerns: the world struggle, for example. They didn't see this as a "Manichean" struggle between good and evil. They saw it as two power groups struggling with each other. Nehru, for his own reasons -- which weren't necessarily stupid or ill-considered -- wanted India to stay out of this struggle and be neutral. I think that the Indians would not have annoyed us to such an extent if, for example, they had done what some of the other countries in Asia did. Those countries stayed out of this struggle -- really stayed out and said nothing. The Indians felt that they had to "stick their noses into it," to act as a great power and to be a "go-between." When you go back and look at the various issues, they really leaned toward the Soviet side, more often than not, and more than I thought at the time.

As I look back on it, this tilt was a surprise to me. On disarmament questions they had a lot of clout internationally and continued to have it until 1962. They really were a major world force. One of the major results of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 was to destroy India as a major factor in international affairs -- for quite a long period. On issues like Berlin, for example, we had trouble with the Russians on access and so forth. Why did Nehru have to make a pronouncement that sounded pro-Russian? That got everybody angry. On the next day, he retracted the statement, but why did he have to do that? Why did he become involved in it at all?

On the other side of the coin, in their own neighborhood, in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indians took what was pretty much a "realpolitik" position. They had the territory. Although earlier, in 1947-1948, they had suggested that the problem be solved by a plebiscite, a year or so later they decided that maybe they didn't want that after all. Thereafter, from 1949 on, whatever suggestion was made to help to solve the issue, it was always the Indians who said, "No." This attitude made US officials feel that the Indians were rather hypocritical on the issue. They preached morality on many other issues, when it didn't concern them. But when it came to their own interests, then they acted the way that other nations act.

In 1962, Kashmir was, in effect, part of India. It had acceded to India. It had a legal relationship with India which was somewhat different from that of the rest of the country. It had more autonomy. I should say there were two Kashmirs -- Azad or Free Kashmir, a part of Kashmir which Pakistan held, and the part of Kashmir which India had. India had the more important part, the valley, which is people usually think of when they talk about Kashmir. In fact, Kashmir is actually a much larger area than that.

Part of the Sino-Indian border dispute was over a section of Kashmir, called the Aksai Chin. This was an area which the Chinese claimed -- very far north, on the other side of the Karakoram

Mountains. I think that the Indians had rather carelessly laid a claim to this area. It was a "No Man's Land" where virtually no one lived. It is a high altitude desert, a salt plain. No one, as far as I can tell, really "owned" it. In earlier years it had been no great value to anybody. However, in the mid 1950's the Chinese built a road across it to link up Sinkiang and Tibet. So it became important to them. The Indians didn't even know that the road had been built, even though it was in an area that they claimed.

While I was on the desk, the Kashmir issue was not raised in the UN because of a potential Soviet veto. It came up, I think, in 1961 or early 1962, before I got to the desk. What had happened was that in the 1950's, the issue had been regularly on the agenda of the UN Security Council. After 1954 the Indians had the advantage of a potential Soviet veto in their pocket. That pretty well blocked the UN from doing anything. In 1962-1963, as I said before, we got the Indians to enter into bilateral talks with the Pakistanis. Nothing happened. Then, a year later, in 1964, the Indians released the major political leader in Kashmir, Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, who had been in jail or under house arrest most of the time since 1953. He was a personal friend of Nehru's. In 1964, Nehru perhaps wavered to some extent during the last month of his life. Abdullah went to Pakistan and got agreement from Ayub Khan and Nehru that they would talk about Kashmir. Then Nehru died. It is not clear what would have happened had Nehru lived.

We were not a player in that episode. In 1963 we tried to do something about Kashmir but it didn't get very far. By that time, the India desk was once again fully staffed and I had much less to do on India.

Other things happened in 1963. We decided -- and this was a policy decision by President Kennedy -- to provide a small amount of military equipment to Nepal. The Nepalese had been after us to provide such equipment because they wanted to offset the Indians. They felt a little bit uncomfortable about the idea of the Chinese providing them with military equipment because that would "drive the Indians up the wall." Our Embassy in Kathmandu favored providing the military equipment. I was for it. We obtained agreement within the State Department that the U. S. should do this. Carol Laise, the SIA Deputy Director, was not happy about it even though we were talking about non-lethal equipment -- small amounts of communications gear. However, it was symbolically important. Carol Laise wanted us to tell the Indians about it first, before we proceeded. The Nepalese did not want us to do that, and I did not want to do that -- because the Indians would say, "No." The whole point was to have a policy vis-a-vis Nepal that was separate and apart from Indian desires. We -- the Embassy and the desk -- finally won out on that.

We were interested in providing this military equipment because we were worried that the Nepalese felt so isolated. Nepal is a land-locked country. They were -- and still are -- dependent on the Indians who intervened in Nepalese internal politics. We were concerned that the Nepalese would turn to the Chinese, who were then very active and had a historical claim to Nepal, going back to the 17th or 18th century, as a tributary state. It was in the U. S. interest to prevent the expansion of Communist Chinese influence and to ease the pressure on India which Nepal might apply. During the Sino- Indian War, Nepal had been very loyal to India, although it had been given the opportunity to "kick" India, the way the Pakistanis did.

The policy to provide military assistance to Nepal was a presidential decision. This was an issue which was not of major importance, but it involved India, and there were two sides to the question; so the bureaucracy didn't like to make a decision. The issue was finally joined by a visit to the United States of Nepal's Prime Minister, a man named Tulsi Giri. The King of Nepal at the time, King Mahendra, was very shrewd. He had two "teams" which he moved in and out of power. He had a pro-India team and he had a pro-China team. Nepal at the time was a monarchy, and the King actually ruled. They had a democratic government for a year in 1960, but the King dismissed the democratic government and resumed direct rule.

Prime Minister Giri was regarded as pro-Chinese. Some people within the U. S. Government were leery about him, but he came to the United States and made his case to the President. After Kennedy saw Giri, he decided to go ahead with the small military assistance program. Even before Giri made his visit, we had prepared a memorandum to the President recommending approval of military assistance, but no decision had been made by our superiors on this issue. Phil Talbot, the NEA Assistant Secretary, was at the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Giri. I wasn't at the meeting. I escorted Prime Minister Giri to the Oval Office and then sat outside in the Cabinet office while Giri saw President Kennedy. I recall that Talbot came out of the meeting and said, "Well, you got your program. The President liked Giri and liked the way you made your case. He said, 'Let's go for it.'" That was the way the decision was made.

After the decision, there was a lot of work for the desk officer in getting the program going. It was not a big one -- about \$2.0 million, but you had to work with the Pentagon to get it moving - - getting approvals and so forth. There was a lot of work to do on the economic aid program. That was not a large amount, but it was important for Nepal. The Nepal desk officer in AID and I were constantly moving papers forward, getting approval, and fighting to keep whatever it was that we were trying to do. I considered both assistance programs to be political tools to achieve our objectives in Nepal. The desk's role was not to fuss over the details of the programs but to see that the programs were actually implemented.

One aid project involved a "rope way." At the time the communications between India and Nepal were very poor. The project involved building something like a ski lift to carry goods from the plains over the mountains and into the Kathmandu Valley, the most important part of Nepal where the capital was. This was a fairly expensive project. My recollection is that AID didn't like it. The Embassy in Kathmandu liked it because it was tangible, and there was more political "payoff" in a program like that, rather than education, or malaria control, and other things that AID tended to like. So there was friction about the projects to be carried out under the economic assistance program. The State Department liked visibility and a "payoff." AID was less concerned with that.

I did not have the opportunity to visit Nepal. That was very strange, because I would often be asked about it during meetings and the Office Director and the Deputy Office Director would interject, "Yes, we were there." However, the desk officer had not been there which rather annoyed me as the desk officer.

One other dispute that we had concerning Nepal involved a police program. This was an aid program run by people, some of whom had been with CIA. The traditional AID people didn't like this at all. The Nepal desk was always pushing for the "Public Safety Program." Most of the people running it had a public safety or police background. As I said, some of them had been with CIA, but it was AID funded.

The other thing that I remember was the introduction of a Peace Corps program in Nepal. Peace Corps representatives breezed into our office in 1962 -- just after I got there -- and they said, "We are going to Nepal." The Embassy and the Nepal desk, reflecting Embassy views, said, "Oh, we love the Peace Corps, but, really, Nepal is too sensitive a place. There are too many, potential problems there," and so forth. The Peace Corps people said, "Thank you very much. Get out of our way."

They proceeded to install themselves in Nepal and did very well, and have been doing very well since then. In six months or a year they had a Peace Corps contingent going into Nepal, and it has been one of the real Peace Corps successes. It has been a major success for the United States in Nepal. We on the desk were wrong. We were being the timid State Department. The Peace Corps was right.

I might just add some recollections of backstopping Chester Bowles when he was in Delhi for the second time starting in 1963. Almost immediately after he arrived in New Delhi, we had a big "dust up" with the Indians, when they welshed on an agreement to build a "Voice of America" transmitter in India. This was something that Ambassador Galbraith had rammed through at the height of the crisis of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The VOA was looking for a transmitter site. The Indians agreed to set up a transmitter in Eastern India. We would use it for a couple of hours a day, and they would use it the rest of the time. We wanted to use it to broadcast to China.

As the crisis abated, this became a political issue in India. It clearly was not in accordance with Indian "non alignment" to have a VOA transmitter operating there. Therefore, Nehru changed his mind. He claimed that he had never signed the original papers and that he was never properly briefed on it. Of course, then there was no question of our proceeding with it.

I was assigned to be the "Action Officer" on this matter. Everybody was angry at Nehru. We drafted an instruction to Ambassador Bowles the substance of which was: "You should go and tell Nehru, We are concerned and that he indeed had agreed and we did not like his backing out, etc." I remember marching that draft instruction around for clearance and taking it into the office of Edward R. Murrow, who was then the head of USIS [United States Information Agency]. He was a major radio and TV news figure, as you recall. There he was seated at his desk, puffing his cigarette. He read through the cable and said in the voice millions knew well, "It looks all right." He cleared the cable, and off it went to Ambassador Bowles in New Delhi. For two or three days we heard nothing. Then we received a message from Bowles, which said: "I called on Nehru yesterday and gave him the most recent book of Martin Luther King's speeches." Bowles went on and on about Martin Luther King. Somewhere in there, he mentioned something about the VOA transmitter. He didn't say anything much about it and didn't follow the instruction.

During his second tour in India, when I was on the desk, Bowles was seen as an enormous wind bag. He sent in wordy telegrams which went on and on and on. He was more of a pleader for India than for the United States. He was a disappointment.

Bowles was not nasty and wasn't difficult at the personal level like Galbraith. He was difficult because he would go to the White House, he would go directly to the President. He couldn't stand Phil Talbot, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, and he didn't like the Secretary of State. He was terribly difficult. He had the Deputy Office Director and the India Desk Officer removed. That was why there was a big personnel gap on the India Desk. He staffed the office with people that he wanted, at the top level. He wanted people that moved in tune with him and serviced him. Bowles didn't operate that way. Bowles convinced himself, wrongly in my view, that he had a great mission in India. In fact, he was being "shuffled off to Buffalo."

Before we finish our discussion on my tour on the Nepal desk, I would like to mention in some further detail the issue of military aid to India. During my last year in the Office of South Asian Affairs that assistance was moving along very slowly. President Kennedy hadn't decided whether to go ahead with a sustained program. The emergency program had been approved, but he hadn't decided on a long term program of military aid to India. The problem involved concern about the Pakistanis, on the one side, and uncertainty about India on the other.

Finally, in November, 1963, there was to be a decision meeting on the subject, with Ambassador Bowles, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, and President Kennedy. I think that the meeting was scheduled for November 24 or 25. Of course, the meeting never took place. Probably, Kennedy would have agreed to the program at that time. I didn't know this at the time, but I learned from research I did for my book from interviews with Bob Komer, Jimmy Grant, and Phil Talbot, that there was general agreement that the "ground work" for a long term military assistance program to India was set. However, Kennedy died and therefore we never did engage in a long term military assistance program with the Indians. I was not directly involved. Carl Coon was handling military aid. However, I knew about the meeting.

I had lunch that day with Carl Coon at "Kitty and Al's" restaurant, a "greasy spoon place" that used to be across from the State Department on Virginia Avenue. People say that they will always remember where they were when they learned of Kennedy's assassination; I certainly do. We went right back to the office. Turner Cameron and Dave Schneider dismissed everybody and said, "Well, obviously, there's not going to be a meeting on aid to India."

I believe that India-US relations would have been different -- and better -- if Kennedy had been able to approve the assistance program in 1963. It was important for our South Asia policy. We may have been fooling ourselves. Maybe I am fooling myself. I think that we overrated -- not the importance of South Asia, because I think that it is important -- but the role that South Asia played in the Cold War. In effect we walked away from South Asia five years later in 1965.

One of the other remembrances that I have, which is very vivid, is not about India but about Nepal and the Cuba Missile Crisis. As Nepal desk officer, I was sitting in on the briefing held in the State Department Auditorium with all of the resident foreign ambassadors in Washington --

just before President Kennedy spoke to the nation. Harriman briefed everyone on what had happened and then we watched Kennedy on a big TV screen. It was a tremendously dramatic moment.

ABRAHAM M. SIRKIN
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Madras (1963-1966)

Mr. Sirkin was born in 1914 in Barre, Vermont, and attended Columbia College, graduating in 1935. He was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1941. After he left the Army he served at number of posts with USIA and USIS, including England, India, and Greece. Mr. Sirkin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: So you are off to Madras in '63 and you were there how many years?.

SIRKIN: Three years.

Q: So '63 to '66. What were you doing in Madras?

SIRKIN: I was Public Affairs Officer for South India. At that time, we had three sub posts and one sort of little library in different parts of South India.

Q: Well, what was the status of our relations '63 to '66 with the Indian Government from the perspective of Madras?

SIRKIN: Well, the Ambassador was Chester Bowles on his second tour. The main issue between the U.S. and India was relations with Pakistan, at least at that time, and there was still a kind of a love affair from the Nehru days with the Soviet Union, at least at a national level. So it was a kind of respect for the democracy on the part of the U.S. but unhappiness with the orientation with the wrong side of the cold war. But very little of that carried over into our activities. That was for Delhi people more or less, but for Madras most of the relations in terms of the United States were very cordial, very friendly. It was a place to go to for education so struggling to get visas to get to the United States aroused very great interest in all kinds of American things.

Q: One of the states you dealt with was Kerala. Was that the one that had a Communist government in it?

SIRKIN: Yes, at one stage there was a Communist government, but a Communist government at the local level doesn't mean very much. They take over, just run the local state government in some ways a little differently than the Congress party and were probably at some point likely to be somewhat cleaner than the congress party that was beginning to get pretty corrupt back then after many years of sole control of the country and the state.

Q: Did you have any problems, demonstrations against our libraries or information places or anything like that?

SIRKIN: Not that I recall while I was there. I knew about them later but, no, there weren't any. We used to run American weeks at local universities where we brought in a bunch of American professors to give a few lectures and even courses, and just generally be on the university campus and they were very popular. As a matter of fact, the only demonstration I remember is when one of our people, the Cultural Officer, was at one of these universities at one of the provincial towns of Madras State the night Kennedy was killed. Kennedy was so popular there a lot of people had pictures of Kennedy along side Gandhi in their houses. There was a kind of a silent demonstration outside the room where this American officer was staying. People would come to empathize him on the occasion of the death of their hero.

Q: Were the Tamils a problem at that time?

SIRKIN: The Tamils were a problem in Sri Lanka not in Tamilnadu. The Tamils ran the state. The State of Madras is now called Tamilnadu and there were a lot of local political battles between the Congress party and the native kind of separatist Tamil party. The Congress party was presumably run by locals who way back when came from the North and the Tamils were the more indigenous people.

Q: Did we have to do some fancy footwork to keep from getting identified as too much a friend of one or the other?

SIRKIN: I think there was a suspicion that all the foreign people are much closer to the better-educated and more English speaking Indians of the ruling party. But, our Consulate developed pretty good relations as I recall. I wasn't in on the other side of the work but just the information side. We scrambled and managed to get some of the Tamil Party people on VIP tours to the States. They had no problem. They were very happy to get the offer. I remember talking to one these guys through an interpreter as he spoke very little English. I don't know how he made out in the States. He was very interested. The South was more relaxed in every way, including politically, than North India. They don't have these Bengali screamers. It's not like Calcutta. Madras is much the quietest of the four cities. It's not like all the rest of them, full of terrible traffic jams.

The biggest issue in the South, where the riots were, was after my time when Indira Gandhi came in and tried to make Hindi the national language. There were actually murderous riots in South India because of the Tamils and the other South Indian languages that were related to Tamil as opposed to the North Indian languages related to Hindi. Knowing the language at an early stage means government jobs. If the national language was going to be Hindi, the South Indians preferred English because then they were on more of an even level with the North Indians. But if it becomes Hindi then it becomes their third language, their second language being English. So Tamil people rose up, students especially, and there were language riots and Indira finally backtracked and it didn't become formally the national language.

Q: Were there any major developments from your perspective during the time you were there?

SIRKIN: Between the U.S. and India?

Q: Yes.

SIRKIN: There were a couple of Pakistani War scares. They even had the air raid sirens once or twice and they grumbled that the U.S. seemed to be closer to Pakistan than to India because of India's relationship with the Soviet Union. It didn't impinge much on our work in the South, nothing like in Delhi, or Bombay or Calcutta.

Q: In 1966, where did you go?

SIRKIN: '66 I came back to FSI to study Greek.

ERNESTINE S. HECK
Secretary to the Consul General
Bombay (1963-1967)

Ernestine S. Heck was born in Oregon in 1940. She received her bachelor's degree from Oregon State in 1962. Her career has included positions in Bombay, Saigon, Teheran, Niamey, Katmandu, New Delhi, Colombo, and Madras. Mrs. Heck was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.

Q: I'd like to get this at the beginning of tour. You were in Bombay from when to when?

HECK: I was in Bombay from September of 1963 until early July or late June of 1967, so almost four years, three years and nine months.

Q: Had you heard anything sort of by the State Department grapevine or something, or did you have a grapevine about either the people or the post of Bombay before you went out?

HECK: Well, we had the post report. First of all, I had this awful image of the Towers of Silence and the bones. We had the post report, which told us how many black ties to bring and how many long evening dresses to bring and other information of minor importance. I was so new, I didn't have the money to buy anything anyway, so I had to go with what I had and pick it up later. Very little information. In today's world we do have a lot of information. We have a briefing center that provides all sorts of things - no, not in those days.

Q: I was wondering whether you had run into anybody who had been there and said, "Oh, that's an awful post" or "You don't want to deal with Messrs. So and So."

HECK: I remember a man I worked with who told me to drink Bombay gin, which was a brand name in those days and perhaps still is. I was shocked by that in those days. But no, very little about the post. I knew I was going to be the secretary to the consul general, and I knew that this was quite an honor because it was about four grades over what my grade was at the time. But

other than that, no, I had no advance notice and I hadn't heard from anyone and I didn't have any sort of connection, although all that was there when I got there. Somebody did meet me, and somebody had food in the house. There was no information given to me at the beginning.

Q: Looking back on it, how competent were you as a secretary? You had taken secretarial science, but there are certain things. Stenography was the big thing in those days.

HECK: Well, I took shorthand at about 140, and I typed at between 92 and 98 depending on the typing machine. I was good.

Q: That's good.

HECK: I was fast, and I obviously had a degree and I had taken a lot of other courses, and I'm sure that's why they assigned me to this job. Probably the real reason was they probably had trouble finding somebody to take it, which is always the thing in the State Department. But to get a stretch of three grades is unusual. So I suppose they sort of looked at all the cards together and picked out mine because I had the education. I can't think of any other reason for it. I had never asked specifically for India or for that part of the world at that point. Later I became very interested in it, but, no, I was very, very green.

Q: Could you describe the post and some of the people in the post first and working conditions.

HECK: The consul general or the consulate general is located on the sea, on the Indian Ocean, at something called Wonkaneer House. The Maharajah of Wonkaneer was the head of a very small state in Saurashtra in southern Gujarat. This was his town palace. I never met the man or any of his relatives, but I gather that he must have been quite a playboy. The building itself was 1920s', probably British colonial architecture with a beautiful vista of the sea. By the time I got there, the consulate general itself was located on the ground floor in what amounted to an L-shaped building with a side building for administration, and the upper floor of what was a two-story building was the home of the consul general. That particular home - I remember his wife telling me, my first consul general there, and showing me, as a matter of fact, had beautiful, cloudy pink mirrors, and these mirrors had covered the ceilings of all the bedrooms, which is why I say that I assume that this is where the Maharajah of Wonkaneer came to play, but I don't know anything particular about it. We got it apparently at about the time of independence around 1947. We had been located in the city for years and years, as we had been in all of the major cities of India. Our consulates in India go back to the late 18th and early 19th centuries in most cases. But the consulate at that point had a rather large staff - much larger than it does today, I suspect - but much differently apportioned than we have today. In the '60s visa law was such that Indians only were allowed a hundred people a year or a hundred families - I'm not sure.

Q: A little earlier, I was the vice consul in Dhahran and I used to meet Indians, and they'd ask where they were on the list as far as waiting- (end of tape)

HECK: It meant that we had very little consular work of that sort. We didn't issue Visas. Our consular operation for a quarter of India had one American officer. It was a full-service consulate. By that I mean we had somebody from the Commerce Department, we had a CIA sub-unit, we

had a rather large administrative section because we did bring a lot of things in for New Delhi as well as for Bombay. The hierarchy was a consul general, his deputy principal officer, and perhaps 26 other Americans. I was the senior of four secretaries of whom two belonged to State and two to the CIA. We had two communicators. Our major interests were twofold. One was business. We had a big American business presence in Bombay in those days including the major oil companies. Secondly, to report on the political stabilization and political situation in the country. Being a political officer in the mid-'60s, early in the mid-'60s, meant covering every single district race in a national election. Forty years later we don't really care about that at all and pay very little attention to internal politics. It's all done more or less in one place out of New Delhi. But in those days we had major attention paid to, as I said, every race in our three states, which were and are Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh in India. Life was completely different than it is in the Foreign Service today. We had a few apartments in very nice buildings for our senior officers under the rank of the consul general, and they all tended to look out on the ocean, beautiful. Those of us who were single, including all the single officers, lived in something called Washington House, which is still there. It sits at the top of Kambala Hill. From my balcony on the top of three stories, in those days I could see the ocean and watch the sunset. Today, of course, there are high-rises everywhere and all you see are canyons of traffic and other buildings, but my view in those days was of palm trees with the ocean behind it and the sun setting into the Indian Ocean. It was very lovely. Our apartments were all one-bedroom apartments in this building full of singles. Each apartment was a living room/dining room combination that ran the width of the building which was not air conditioned and which was open all year long to the elements. There was a balcony on one end, and you did have windows to close on the other so that you could close it off if the rain were pouring in, but basically, because of the heat and humidity, you kept everything open. You were allowed one air conditioner for your bedroom, so the bedroom was air conditioned. I still own books, including my Shakespeare text from college, which, when I open them, smell of mildew, because after they sit in bookcases in that sort of thing for almost four years, you never get the smell of mildew out of them, nor do you get the little holes left by the silverfish or all the other things. But anyway, it was fun. Life was much different than it is now. We had no access to commissary. The commissary was in New Delhi, and Bombay was not allowed to use it. We could use it when we went up there. We could go into it and buy things and carry them back with us if we could get them on the train or on the airplane, but we didn't order. So what we did do as a group was to order some things from abroad. We would put in joint orders to Denmark, Osterman, Peterson and Peter Justisson. You got things by the case lot, and we usually concentrated on paper products and things like alcohol for entertaining and special foods for special occasions, Christmas-type things and so on. You couldn't bring anything in that might melt, things like chocolate or candles, because they would be ruined before they even arrived. But things that mattered particularly were paper. You could even buy liquor in Bombay in those days as a foreigner at the ship's chandler's downtown, but you couldn't get decent paper of any sort including toilet paper, which was a commodity held in great esteem. And we ordered meat from Kenya, which would come in by the PNO liners from Mombasa through The Seychelles to Bombay. So we would get food that way. The Indian government at that period did not allow anyone except the consul general to have an automobile, so we all relied on taxis and local transport. I took the bus a lot. The buses, of course, were the same ones that are there 35 years later, so they were in much better shape in 1963 than they are in 1997. But we managed all right. I do remember sitting around on the balcony one evening having drinks and watching the sunset

with other singles from the building, and this included people from USIA as well as from State and the CIA, and we fantasized about food and we would talk for hours about a hamburger and what it would be like to have lettuce. We never saw lettuce for four years. Chocolate was also a big commodity to dream about, and you could discuss an ice cream soda with chocolate on it as if it were something to kill for. But I was young, and it seemed like a great life in those days. I wouldn't perhaps like it so much these days.

Q: What about the social life for a young woman in a non-European society?

HECK: It was marvelous. It was really marvelous. First of all, Bombay was and still is the New York of the country. It's much more sophisticated than New Delhi, for instance, which is the capital. It had the movie industry, it had the finance industry, and still does in both instances. It had what amounted to be the beginning of an advertising industry. It was a sophisticated city. It even had a few Indian women - very few, but a few, and they were my friends - who were working women. They were almost nonexistent. I should qualify that. The Christian community and the Anglo-Indian community allowed their women to work, and those were the women who were the office staffs of most buildings, but I'm thinking now about what I would call professional women, young women who were in advertising, for instance, who were from Hindu or Muslim families. There were even a few of those, and that's what was so unusual. But as to the social life, I remember out of the four years I was there I kept a calendar, a diary, for two of those years, and in one year I had five nights at home and in one year I had eight nights at home, and the other nights I was out every single night. There were dinners and parties and dances. We did things as a group usually. It was not necessarily a personal relationship. But there was a market to being young and a single woman in a society that needed extra women at dinner tables and things like that. So I went to diplomatic do's, consular do's. I spent a lot of time with the Indian Navy. I got involved with an Indian officer, and then it became quite serious, but even as somebody without a specific male in tow, there were parties to go to on the carrier. The Becraunt was the only Indian aircraft carrier at that point, and they would hold their New Year's Eve party on the flight deck and there would be dancing and champagne, and it was all great fun. Those days have changed too. In those days there was that and there were opportunities for parties on American ships. India was having a great shortage of food in those days, and our aid program in those days was sending in lots and lots, ships and ships, particularly of grain under PL480. I've forgotten whether we called it USAID in those days or not.

Q: I'm not sure it moved, but USAID had several permutations. This was, of course, a huge program.

HECK: Yes, it was, and the ships came into Bombay because it has the best harbor in India. These big carriers would come in loaded to the gills with grain, and they couldn't dock. They had to be offloaded in midstream, and we would go out on the launches and climb up the ladder. Aside from parties, what I really remember here - we spent so much time talking about food - we would ask them to invite us for breakfast, because they would have things like blueberry pancakes. We could make pancakes, but there were no blueberries to be had anywhere. They would have all sorts of goodies. They would give us Western ice cream at breakfast, just things we hadn't seen for a while. We would just pig out on the food, and then they would let us shop in their little whatever they called it - it was not a commissary, but their little ships' stores where

they would have things like razor blades for the crew, but it was stuff that we couldn't get because India was in a period in those days of self reliance and everything that was available legally tended to be made in India, and the quality in 1963 was not anywhere near what we were used to, whether it was cloth to make clothes or sunglasses or razor blades. So we would stock up on things out there. Also, I was very lucky because my consul general, Milton Rewinkel, and his wife, Peppa Rewinkel, were very generous to me, and they took me in like a daughter. I was on virtually all of their party lists, so I got to meet all sorts of interesting people whom I would not have met if I just were left to myself. So I had on one side a very sort of glamorous - what seemed to me to be glamorous - life and on the other side perhaps not so glamorous. First thing I learned was that a single woman, at this point 23, in India was viewed by most Indian males certainly and by families in general as having something wrong. You must be from a very poor family, because why would your father let you travel halfway around the world to work, why isn't he taking care of you, why aren't you married; and so I found out that a few introductions that I had from people in the United States turned out to be situations in which I didn't feel very comfortable. The men would come to meet me, and I knew they were married, and it would only be them and they would want to take me to dinner. Now I think that was probably meant as friendship as much as anything. Then, coming from my background which was terribly small-town and Protestant moral, I found this very uncomfortable. So that was a problem. Perhaps my best Indian girlfriend, her father started to make obscene telephone calls to me at night, and I recognized his voice. I found situations like that which were difficult for me to handle. Much later in my life, a very wise friend of mine, who has also spent a good deal of his career in south Asia, said to me, "Well, you know, Ernie, then you were a young woman and now you're something else, because when Western women reach a certain age, they become sort of a third sex in that part of the world, and you're safe now. Nobody's bothering you in 1983 in India because you're old, but in 1963 you weren't, and that's the difference." I think he may have had a point. I'm not sure. India has changed a great deal in 35 years, but also there is that aspect. Western women alone without male protection in the early '60s were considered to be wanton and sort of fair game for a lot of people, and one had to learn how to deal with it.

Q: Was there concern sort of from the security angle? I'm thinking of compromise by a single American woman working for the consul general being compromised by some male sneaking up on you and having an affair and getting all your secrets, that sort of thing, in the Indian context.

HECK: Oh, I suppose it's possible. At the time, I didn't notice it.

Q: I mean, were you being warned about this?

HECK: No, I was not. On the other hand, I'm sure if I had gone over a certain line, somebody might have warned me. Also, of course, there are very few secrets to sell in the consulate general as opposed to an embassy. We dealt with, as I said before, commercial matters and just some local political reporting and so on. Of course, I had not mentioned before the major role that USIA played there, the public information angle of presenting our ideas, American ideas and American films and so on, was a very big part of our life.

Q: This period of '63 to '67 is a very interesting one in America. In the first place, within two months President Kennedy was assassinated. Did that have any impact in Bombay or not?

HECK: President Kennedy's death had a tremendous impact. I suspect it had that all over the world, most certainly in India and most certainly in west India. I for the next three years was the deputed person to go out and meet Indians of all types and levels of society and education, who came in bearing the most extraordinary range of gifts for Mrs. Kennedy usually, sometimes for the United States in general. These were almost always things that were handmade, and they were about President Kennedy or pictures of President Kennedy, articles about President Kennedy, poems to Mrs. Kennedy or to the children. I have seen his face woven into cloth, painted on things, wood-crafted, just an extraordinary range from the sublime to the ridiculous, but all very heartfelt. We had a memorial service for him in the Anglican cathedral in town. The mob was tremendous. The church was absolutely packed, and there were people outside, and everyone wearing white. White in India is the color of mourning. People stopped you on the street to say how sorry they were. No, the outpouring from India was absolutely tremendous. President Kennedy grabbed the imagination of the world, certainly of the Asian world in a way that perhaps no one else had done, as far as I know, up till that time. I only remember one sort of negative note, and here again it was from some of my British friends, and I think it certainly is not a sign of being British; it's a sign of being young and selfish. By the time I heard it happened on what for me was a Friday night, Saturday morning, I was lying in bed. It was two o'clock in the morning, and I was reading *The Portrait of Dorian Gray*.

Q: Oscar Wilde.

HECK: And somebody knocked on the door, and I went to the door. I guess I was not surprised. Nothing seemed to surprise me in those days. It would if someone knocked on my door today. It was one of the communications, one of what we call code clerks. It was one of the guys who was a communicator. He stopped by. He said he had seen my light on, and he came in to tell me that President Kennedy had been killed. I put the book down, and to this day I've never finished *The Portrait of Dorian Gray*, and I don't even want to. To me it was like closing a door. We all went into the office the next morning, and we pulled out the FAMS, the Foreign Affairs Manuals, to find out what we were supposed to do in the case of the death of a President. Certainly I didn't know, and my boss didn't know either, but there is in the book somewhere a whole section on what you do. One of the things that you do is send out black-bordered announcements. Normally one has more time. One knows if somebody is ill. It takes time. We didn't expect a young vibrant man to be shot at the age of whatever, 40-something. So we had none of this stuff on hand, and there was nowhere in town to buy any of it, and so we sat around with what amounted to black magic markers, the equivalent in 1963, and we made by hand black-bordered paper to send these notices out, and we sent them out. After we had taken care of all the normal things, finding a book, getting the book open, putting up the prep.

Q: You're talking about a book in which people sign, a condolence book?

HECK: A condolence book, I'm sorry - and doing all of the things that one does in the death of an official. I began to take care of my boss's social calendar to call people, to explain why things were being canceled or why he could not come; and when it was all over, I did my own. Actually we did our own, because the other secretary and I did this very much as a team. In any case, we were going to have a party, and we had to cancel the party at very short notice. Saturday night

was the party, and this was Saturday morning, and so we started calling around, and everyone was very gracious except one of our young British bachelor friends who worked for the P&O steamship line who was very miffed that we would dare to cancel this party that they were looking forward to just because of this silly thing about our President being killed. Didn't we understand that they wanted the party? But that was one instance, and no one else. We were joined by the love of many, many thousands of people in Bombay over the death of President Kennedy. It was a real turning point for all of us.

Q: Were you feeling any reflections from the fact that, I guess it was in 1962, there had been this confrontation with China up in the Himalayas and that the United States had given some support there? Did that ring at all within Bombay?

HECK: Yes, it did. It rang all over. Well, it certainly rang to some extent in Bombay and most definitely among the more sophisticated, more educated people who followed what was happening in the world. I suspect it resonated all over India. India had not expected to be attacked by China in October of '62. The government certainly should have seen it coming. The army was terribly ill prepared, and perhaps the powers that be in New Delhi were aware of it, but certainly the people weren't. When this happened, the issue at hand had to do with disputed borders which had been drawn on the maps both on the northwest and the northeastern borders between India and China, had been drawn on the maps by the British. Of course, they just took a pen and drew a line down a map. It didn't matter when they were ruling the earth, but after they left, it did matter. The Chinese attacked simultaneously in both the northeastern and the northwest areas. In the northwestern area the argument had to do, of course, over disputed borders, but the Chinese really needed the northwestern area that they wanted from India because they were building a road or had built a road and it cut across the great thumb of what belonged to India. The northeastern border may or may not have been a diversionary tactic, but in any case they did attack at both places. The people in India were absolutely shocked. The people hadn't expected it. There had been some rhetoric, but there's always rhetoric and who pays any attention, that sort of thing. All over India people were collecting gold. Women were throwing in their bracelets and this sort of thing to pay for it. The bottom line is that the Indians got their nose really bloody. In the process the United States offered help to Pundit Nehru, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and we did in fact send some military and other kinds of assistance, about which I know very little, to the Indian government. India knew about this and India was grateful, Indians themselves were grateful. So in 1962-63 when we had helped against their enemy, the Chinese, and were providing food to help them face the problems that they had agriculturally, things were good. The India-U.S. relationship is very closely tied to the Pakistan-U.S. relationship and the Pakistan-India relationship, which brings us to 1965 when there was fighting between India and Pakistan both in May and in September of that year. At that point, I guess, one could say, although, believe me, I was no political officer at that time and I was sitting a long way away, but I would say that with that and our ties with Pakistan, our star went on the descendant for a great period of time with India. But the relationship is a triangular for us always with India, and I'll talk about that at some other point. So in 1963 things were fine. We were very much a friend. India was still licking its wounds from what it had learned in fighting with the Chinese on the Malayan line in the northwest and in the northeast, and we were a friend.

Q: Did you pick up, at the dinner parties working for the consul general at the diplomatic consular parties and all and business class, any feel for sort of the view of Nehru and the United States, his view toward the United States and what we considered Nehru to be?

HECK: By the time I reached Bombay in September of '63, the favorite party game in India was After Nehru, Who? Nehru was by then an old, tired, sick man. The war with China had probably been the final straw that changed him. He did not die until May of 1965, but it was a twilight period for him. It was something of a death watch about him by the foreign press, the local press, less noticeably and less openly but definitely there. A book was written after Nehru, who was, as I said, the subject of a great deal of conversation. So, no, it didn't cross my radar screen at that point. Yes, he was still the Prime Minister, but he was increasingly tired and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, was in effect protecting him from the outside world. Other members of the Congress Party, his party, were jockeying for position. It was a time of transition. So at that point his life was behind him.

Q: Did you get any feel from what you were picking up about India and the USSR, the Soviet Union?

HECK: In Bombay in those days the Soviet had a much larger consulate than we did, but I suspect that they were more appreciated in New Delhi, where they represented the diplomatic force of their nation, than they were down in Bombay, which was, and I think still is, a rather happy, gay, ebullient society, and the Soviet diplomats of those days were not in that category. They in many cases didn't have a lot of English. They did have a lot, I must admit, of regional tongues. They were very good at that, but they were very serious and very dour, as one expects from that period of time. So their influence locally had to do with what they had purchased, and I think that's probably true of most of India until the fall of the Soviet Union in the late '80s, beginning of '90. The Soviet Union, until they could no longer afford it, owned a good deal of the press in India. I mean by that that they supported, surreptitiously but supported, a wide variety of leftist press all over the country. They put a lot of money in Bombay into what I would call a tabloid called *Blitz*, which was read all over the country. It always had spicy pictures, ala the British tabloids - well, not very spicy by our standards, but by Indian standards pretty spicy - lots of interesting gossip, but always with a really vitriolic twist to anything that had to do with politics. The support was for the leftists in the government, lip service at least and probably more to the Congress Party, and we were enemy number one - well, for the foreigners, as the rightist political types in India were the enemy number one for them internally. At that point in Bombay the rightist parties in the '60s won the Shiv Sena, which is a state party in Maharashtra built around the concept of supporting Maratha people against outsiders from other parts of India, particularly south Indians then who were taking over jobs in the city. That was one of their bugaboos that got a lot of this, and the Swatantra Party, which is more into other things now. I suppose you could say it's the grandfather of perhaps even the BJP or the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is the major opposition in India in the late '90s. But we were definitely the foreign enemy number one. We outranked the British on this, because we were more powerful.

Q: Was there any reflection - you were young and single and going out - in society were you picking up, was there a leftist inclination in the academic institutions, or were the people you were seeing more involved in commerce?

HECK: If there was then, I did not see it, no. The leftist inclination in Bombay in the '60s would have been - it was a class thing, I would have said. There were leftist trade unions. There was a major trade union, and still is - I believe it to be still existent today - that at that point in time was getting a lot of money from the Soviet Union, and it was their trade union, as it were. Trade unions had a major role, still do, in India. A lot of what happened in India in the mid-'60s really came from the London school of economics in London of the mid-'30s. Part of the reason is because Nehru was impressed by this, but it came at the country from other directions as well. So there was a leftist, socialistic sort of bent there aside from what the Soviets might or might not be doing. Of course, in this period the Chinese had been, as it were, rolled up. There was a Chinese community locally in India, and there still is, people who came some time ago as well as reasonably recently, so there were so-called Chinatowns in the major cities, but the Chinese government had been closed with the war, so there was no competition there. We did have quite a strain of various kinds of Arab pressures in Bombay in those days. The Kuwait consulate was very important. The Emir of Kuwait came every year. But there were also honorary consulates or regular consulates representing a number of the countries in the Middle East in those days, and there was a good deal of trade back and forth including, I might add, smuggling. I remember going out at one point to a place called Madh Island. It's not spelled M U D; it's M A D H. But anyway, we were going out to spend some time with a Bohemian Australian artist and his wife who had a cottage on the other side of the island. We took the ferry across to the island. We were met by a bullock cart. We rode in this bullock cart for what seemed like forever - because a bullock cart is not a very comfortable place to be - to the other side of the island, and there we were in this very, very lovely sort of get-away place with a cottage. The cottage was made out of mud and was actually covered with cow dung as a paste that makes the walls smooth. The roof was made of palm fronds and was full of all sorts of things that went bump in the night, and it had a mud floor. We slept outside. We just ate inside of this place where we had a little sort of a campfire built, and Indian wooden stove - I don't know how to explain it. But in any case, we stayed in this what seemed to us to be paradise-lost sort of atmosphere until we walked down to the village. There we were in this country where nobody could import anything, and all of these men were wearing the cloth of choice that year which was Terylene, a shiny synthetic something-or-other with shiny synthetic shirts - terribly uncomfortable in the climate, but that was modern - and they were all smugglers. They had fancy radios, and they had all sorts of electric equipment that we didn't see in the city, because they were smuggling into Oman basically, I think.

Q: And Trucial states too, because I saw the other end of it again when I was in Dhahran. Gold used to go in and all sorts of stuff. This was part of that trade that had been going on before the United States was even dreamed of.

HECK: Absolutely. So there was that sort of smuggling, but there was more legitimate support from the various Arab countries. That remains till this day. One has to remember when dealing with India that the second largest Muslim country in the world is India. So other countries which are Islamic have an interest.

Q: Indonesia is number one?

HECK: And India is number two.

Q: You were talking about economic matters, the smuggling and the economy and all. Were you picking up anything, gnashing of teeth or something, at the consulate general because of the Indian controls over attempts of Americans to develop commercial enterprises and that sort of thing?

HECK: Well, India did not open its doors commercially in reality until about 1991. So between Indian independence in '47 and 1991, it was a very controlled economy. Yes, it was a very complicated thing to be an American businessman. We didn't really have American small business in those days in that part of India at least. The major firms, I suspect, had all been there before the British left, although I do not know that for a fact. They were mainly the oil companies. Esso was there. Was it called Esso in those days? It may have been called Standard Oil. I don't remember what it was in '63, but what is now Exxon was there, and there were three or four others which were big, and the Bank of America and CitiBank were both there. There again, they were later closed out during Mrs. Gandhi's reign in the '70s, but while I was there, they were big players. And there was a rather large Chamber of Commerce, but it basically represented that sort of firm. There wasn't anything else. So the opportunity for American businesses to come in really didn't pertain at that point.

Q: Well, from what you could see, did we tell American business no point in trying, because part of our business is what is called trade opportunities, and this would be a good place to send your goods or set up shop or do this sort of thing? Do you know how we dealt with that?

HECK: I don't think that we got too many of that sort of request, although I was working for the boss, so I didn't see the letters that went back and forth from the economic and commercial people. I just don't know. It's a good question, and I don't have an answer for it. I do believe that at that point Bombay probably had not yet overtaken Calcutta as the major business city, although it might have just begun to overtake it.

Q: What was the role of the consul general in Bombay as far as his influence and all?

HECK: To be a consul general in India is a rather difficult position, because the ambassador, of course, is the ambassador and yet you're a thousand miles from him. So in a way you're the vice ambassador for your region, but on the other hand, depending on what the relationship between the ambassador and the consul general is, he may want you kept on rather short leash. While I was there, our ambassador was, first of all, Chester Bowles, who was there on his second tour in New Delhi and of whose background you are probably aware. He is very much a man of the people. This was the image that he projected. He liked the glad hand, and he liked to get out in the crowds. He liked to ride a bicycle, when he was there on his first tour, with his kids around New Delhi. He was very - I'm searching for the word - not progressive necessarily but very much on that side of society, whereas my consul general, Mr. Rewinkel, of whom I was very fond, had come to this post from a career in Europe. Between him and his wife, they spoke nine languages, European languages, none of which except English they could use in Bombay, but he came from a much more old-school type of foreign service. So there was less than complete accord between the two, and I think he was rather circumscribed by New Delhi. He did a lot of representational

type things, both in his own home and that sort of thing, but tours, sort of grand tourné sort of things, where he would go out and show the flag around the consular district, giving speeches and meeting governors and meeting chief ministers and this sort of thing; in other words, the ceremonial role was very much a part of his bailiwick. Of course, like any principal officer, he was responsible for everything else that went on in the place, and he did an awful lot of work with the business community but he had a very able number two who was in charge of the economic and commercial side of things. So I would say that basically his was a role of pro-consul for the American community and American presence. He was the flag.

Q: Those were the days of high Cold War, and were we watching the Communist influence, the local Communist influence?

HECK: Well, very much so in our district. I'm sure they were from Madras watching in Kerala. Our major political problem within the district at that point, aside from just watching these various things going on about whether the Shiv Sena was growing and whether it was driving out the south Indians and so on - our consular district for Bombay includes Goa. Goa had been a Portuguese colony. It's where the remains of Saint Francis Xavier are, and even today it looks very Portuguese in many ways, parts of it at least. The Indians took it over against the Portuguese will a few years previous. This was a major concern of the United States government. Of course, it didn't really matter, I suppose, so much to the American consulate general located in Bombay, India, but it made a good deal of difference in terms of American policy in Europe, because the Portuguese, of course, were very upset and they were trying to gather support amongst their friends and allies in Europe and in the United Nations. So watching what was happening in Goa was rather important for us. You know, I don't even remember what year this all took place, maybe in 1959 when basically the Indians just walked in from three sides and there was nothing the Portuguese could do except leave. It was not a bloody conflict at all. But since the take-over - however one wants to describe it - until 1964, no American diplomat was allowed to go to Goa. So it was a big thing in 1964, late summer of '64 or early fall, when it was decided among Washington, Delhi and Bombay, our consulate general in Bombay, that our political officer would be sent to Goa, and that was our first chance, four years later, to get any sort of feel on the ground for how things were.

Q: Rather obscure political point. I mean one could have made it just the other way, that we paid a lot of attention. These things get rather exquisite sometimes.

HECK: Well, yes, and I doubt very much that anyone in Lisbon cared one way or another or even noticed whether two political officers, one from New Delhi and one from Bombay, actually went to Goa in the fall of '64.

Q: Ernie, how did another place which became rather important to both of us play at this '63 to '67 - talking about Vietnam? How did that play during that period?

HECK: I don't think the Indian press paid much attention to it. My major knowledge of Vietnam - believe me, in this period, Stu, it might as well have been on the moon in terms of my own personal understanding of what was going on. What happened was that the Peace Corps came to India in 1964, I believe. We got Peace Corps Four. The first three groups went elsewhere, but

our district got Peace Corps Four, and from then on through 1967 when I left, we had a rather large Peace Corps presence in our district. I don't remember the numbers. I would guess perhaps 100 in the district. As I remember - and this may be faulty remembrance - what they basically did was help farmers. They did an awful lot of work with chickens. I cannot tell you how important chickens were in the district at that point, because, as you know, a number of people in India are vegetarian, but some vegetarians will eat eggs if those eggs are not fertilized. So we were helping teach farmers how to improve the strains and how to have better chickens, and there was also an effort afoot by some of our PCVs, our Peace Corps Volunteers, to market veg eggs. There were veg and non-veg eggs. A veg egg meant that it was a vegetarian egg and there was not a rooster in the henhouse, and a non-veg egg meant that there was a rooster in the henhouse, so people could buy the kind of egg they wanted in case they were vegetarian but would be willing to eat the egg as long as no rooster had been around.

Q: I guess that happens, doesn't it?

HECK: That roosters come into henhouses?

Q: No, no, I mean that a chicken lays eggs no matter what, fertile or nonfertile.

HECK: A chicken just keeps on laying eggs, whether there's a rooster around or not. But what I remember about the Peace Corps was that it was populated with a very nice bunch of young guys. Even as the Peace Corps is today, there were a few people who were further along in their life. In fact, there were even some retired couples, a couple of them. But basically these were grad-student-age people, probably younger than the Peace Corps would get today. It was common knowledge - in fact, they would talk about it - that the reason most of these young men were there was to get out of going to Vietnam, because they wanted to avoid or perhaps they knew their numbers and their numbers were too high on the draft list. But in any case, I remember laughing at the fact that here we had all these sort of nice young boys from Brooklyn and places like that out there teaching these farmers, whose families had been there for thousands of years, how to raise chickens. Probably the only chicken you'd ever see in Brooklyn in those days was frozen and in a store somewhere. They certainly didn't have them running around the streets. I think that they would have been better off with a bunch of farm kids, but basically they weren't farm kids, they were draft dodgers or at least those who wished to avoid military service.

Q: Who tended not to come from the farming or small town areas which tended to be more patriotic...

HECK: And were sending their boys out to be killed.

Q: Be killed, yes.

FRANK P. COWARD
Education Officer, USIS
Madras (1953-1968)

Frank P. Coward was born in New York in 1918. He graduated from Union College in 1942, served in the US Army from 1942-1946 overseas, and received his Master's in Education from the University of New York at Buffalo in 1952. His career with USIA led to assignments in India, Thailand and Burma. In 1993 Mr. Coward was interviewed by Fred Coffey.

COWARD: In November, 1962, the Agency, forgetting that November 11 was a national holiday, gave me an extra day of freedom as the orientation began on the 12th instead of the designated 11th.

In February, 1963, we were assigned to India. I had not anticipated going to India. It was interesting to me as a critique of American education, although I had been entirely privately educated, there was absolutely nothing in my education that prepared me for India.

Q: So in no way did you indicate to the Agency that you would like to go to South Asia or India. You had no preferences?

COWARD: That is interesting because I wasn't even asked whether I had a preference and I had joined having spent a reasonable amount of time in Europe, not only with the Army but also doing graduate work at the University of Lausanne. I assumed we were going to go happily off to Europe. We were two thirds of the way through the orientation and I had heard nothing about an assignment. I asked and somebody thought it was strange that I didn't already know. I didn't. So we were assigned to India, where we went in February, 1963, and stayed for 4 ½ wonderful, learning years.

Q: When you went off to India, Frank, you were already established in how many languages?

COWARD: In two, French and German.

Q: Where were you assigned in India and what was your position?

COWARD: I was assigned to Madras as Education Officer. In India the big push at that time was in education and I would think few countries anywhere pay as much attention to and spend as much money on education as India. This is probably prevalent throughout Asia, but in India it is absolutely noticeable, the amount of money and preoccupation of families with the education of young people.

Q: So the Agency in fact drew upon your professional background as a teacher as an assignment.

COWARD: Absolutely, because we were then reaching out for university students. We selected certain major universities in each of the consular districts and the Madras consular district would have been the size of France and the Benelux countries. Each one of the districts, Calcutta, New Delhi, Bombay, Madras had an education officer. The purpose was to work entirely with

university officials, reaching students. In that area I traveled probably two and a half weeks out of every month operating what we called university programs.

Q: What is a university program?

COWARD: Well, a university program was first of all contacting the vice chancellor of the university to find out if he was interested in having a group of American university professors come down and...typically we spent a week, an academic week on the campus. I would have anywhere from three to six American university professors who would be sent out. Of course this had been planned out in our budget request. They would come for a fixed schedule of dates arranged with the university in whatever subject matters, whether history, science, literature, etc., that the faculties requested and the American professors took over the class periods.

We also had entertainment programs for the evenings where one of the big things that we did...We were fortunate in India that it was the time when the musical "My Fair Lady" was coming. That was a natural because it was Bernard Shaw and, of course, all of the Indian universities were British oriented. So this enabled us to have a sure fire...you could sell Bernard Shaw, whereas you couldn't sell all American literary giants. So we would do that sort of thing in the evenings.

The professors would also have bull sessions, or we would bring in people from our own posts to involve students in informal discussions. We took exhibits and a mobile unit. So we had films and exhibits, in connection with the visiting American professors.

Q: Considering the competition for student and faculty attention at universities can you describe what competition you did have? Were the Soviets pretty active in your area? Or other groups that really weren't encouraging American penetration into the universities?

COWARD: Well, there was no serious competition at that time. My memory is that the Russians never did much cultural activities. What they pursued was science and I have no recollection of them bringing in groups as we did. The nearest would have been perhaps the German Max Mueller Bavan and, of course, the British Council. But there were enough universities and enough students and the territory was sufficiently large that I would not say we were ever competitive in that sense. In any event, particularly with the British Council we were very cooperative in our programs. We had very friendly relations with them.

Q: Did you feel that this was a worthwhile program for the US Government to be involved in?

COWARD: Oh, absolutely. It was good both ways in that it brought American professionals out, gave them a variety of experiences and the universities were most hospitable and the students lapped it up. It was a very happy association in those days. That was during the end of Galbraith and during Ambassador Bowles tenure. It was very buddy, buddy. Those were good years.

Q: Did you have other activities other than the university programming?

COWARD: No, those university programs...that was an office in USIS, an adjunct, of course, of the cultural activities, but it was a separate entity. Due to the size of the consular district, the territory to be covered... Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil-Nadu and Kerala, our entire area...and, of course, the Madras universities as well. So there wouldn't have been time for any other activities.

Q: What interest did you find other than just the discussion brought by the professors in the United States amongst the university students?

COWARD: The Indian university students, of course, were fascinated...the two cultures were so different. The Indian culture with the family unit being so strong, a paternalistic society, except in Kerala which is a matriarchal society. They were very structured. We used to say that no Indian boy becomes a man until his father dies because the family structure is so strong. They were very much interested in the freedom of choice that Americans had. Particularly in southern India, an area where the arranged marriages and other cultural ties were still very, very strong. Northern India, in the sense of Delhi and Bombay, were more liberal because that is where the big impact of both the British and American cultural activities, social contacts, commercial interests came together. South India had never been a battleground in the sense that northern India had due to the capital and major commercial interests being there. Therefore the most conservative ties in Indian society were in the south.

It made it very worthwhile. The difficulty was that most American professors have a rather missionary approach to life. It was very difficult to get them to listen. In general, they only wanted to preach. I always felt it was a good thing when Jimmy Carter came out and reminded us that this was a two-way road and that we should listen and learn. Of course, that was nice rhetoric but it never really worked because as Americans our tendency is not to listen but to preach and Asian societies are very much aware of our tendency to do just that.

Q: Did you feel that all of our programs in your area were in fact one way, preaching?

COWARD: By and large I am afraid that is what happened. I remember AID was down there. We had some interesting experiences. When Abe Sirkin, for whom I had a very high regard, was PAO, he was very much concerned that we be of service to these people and that we fit ourselves to their specified needs and not take whole cloth Washington's set goals, bring them out and put them on.

I can remember my experience at Carnatic University, an agriculture university, going over and speaking to the vice chancellor because it was felt we should be pursuing agricultural activities and helping them to become self-sustaining. I asked the vice chancellor about a program. I remember him saying, "Now, if all you are going to do is bring out a group of professors to tell us how to operate when two-thirds of my faculty are American trained, I am not interested." "But," he said, "If you will bring out some people who will tell me why when two-thirds of my professors have been American trained and it still isn't working, you have a program." So we organized ourselves on that basis and the Agency sent in a professor from Japan. I can still see Abe Sirkin's face when this professor, with no Indian experience, began to tell the Indian students and professors at the university how things worked in Japan. It was a dreadful moment

because it was absolutely what the vice chancellor had not wanted. The man knew nothing about India and instead of cutting the program, which we wanted to do, we were aware that every American professor has a congressman who is a friend and that meant that it wasn't always as easy as it might have been. You didn't have your druthers.

Q: You were in Madras for how many years?

COWARD: For four and a half.

Q: During that period you must have established some very interesting, if not strong, relationships with the universities after they had seen your programs, approach and adaptability.

COWARD: We had very interesting times. One unusual thing we did in working with students...certainly the first time anywhere in the south...we took male and female students from two different colleges up to the Laurence School at Wellington, which is in the Ooty Hills by Coimbatore for a weekend of just plain student activities...getting together, sharing ideas. The principal at the women's college from Madras had said, "If it were anybody else I never would have allowed the girls to go." This was quite an extraordinary breakthrough. They went from two separate campuses. One reason why it worked was that at a Hindu college, and I can't remember which, there was an American nun, Sister Ann Xavier, who was vice principal. The principal was a good Hindu lady. Sister Ann was just the most remarkable person. She went along as an escort for the girls. It was a wonderful weekend and a good experience because we were all trusted. I think all the way around it turned out to be a rewarding experience. Sister Ann Xavier (was her name) was from Maine.

Q: Was this towards the latter part of your assignment?

COWARD: Oh yes, that would have been towards the latter part, after I had established credentials and was known. Most Asians in my experience operate on vibes. They are perfectly aware that you probably have all the credentials, you are assigned to an embassy, you have an official title and all that, but what they want to know is: Can you be trusted? Are you really being honest? Are you being a human being? When they have established these vibes at the warmth level it works. But if the vibes are bad, you are not going to get to first base because while Asians never say no, that does not mean they are saying yes.

Q: Frank, are you emphasizing the importance of the last ten feet of contact, person to person? How important is the individual versus the material you had in hand?

COWARD: My experience is that the individual makes the difference. I came out of teaching, therefore, I suppose I had a makeup which led me to feel that I was supposed to be of service to somebody. So I guess I tended to personalize most of my relationships, but for me personally in the assignments that worked. While it takes all different kinds, I think that kind must be included, although my experience with the Agency suggests that personalization of relationships is not by any measure a priority approach. But where I have seen that happen the happiest relationships, the nearest contacts, the most appreciation, it seems to me there was a quality of

personalization that underlay the activity, that underlay the success of some particular program or contact or relationship.

Q: That is an interesting viewpoint. May I ask you then what are the qualities of an Agency officer in your experience in India or elsewhere which will provide the quality of relationships that is so important in exchange of information.

COWARD: Well, that is a little difficult perhaps to define. I can remember when I had my Fulbright in Vienna there was an American girl from New Jersey in our group who was majoring in music as a singer. She made the comment that the differences in singing...if you were to bring out the emotion that was intended in an opera, and I use her New Jersey accent, "Yeah gotta be a Mensch." Everything was in the word "Mensch" and what it means. It has to do with being a human being and understanding that you are addressing a human being and expressing the emotion of a human being. It has nothing to do with your personal prejudice, politics, it is one human being to another. I think that is vital because in the final analysis of cross-culture, that is what you are doing.

Q: Are there any particular incidents, activities, programs within your sphere in South Asia that you would like to mention at this point?

COWARD: I had an interesting experience during the Indian language riots when I had a program including 5 visiting Americans going on at Sri Venkateswara University and I was there as the personal house guest of the vice chancellor, a very impressive person. I was staying at his residence while the program was going on. The campus was under guard because all of south India, particularly university students, was going up in smoke at the arbitrary imposition of Hindi as the national language.

Q: What year are we talking about?

COWARD: This would have been 1967, I believe. People said it was worse in south India than during the separation of India. We had people tied to trees, burned, and, of course, they always attacked school buses and government property.

Anyway, a group of demonstrators came towards the vice chancellor's residence and officials called and said they had ordered the gates closed. Any group in India always picked up all kinds of bystanders. No matter the original question, everyone else has some grievance so they just get into the act, they look for the spark.

Anyway, the vice chancellor said, "Well, what do you want to do make it worse? Open the gates and let them in and I will talk with them." So they came down the drive and Dr. Vaman Rau, that was his name, he had been a minister of education in Hyderabad, listened to them. They said that they did not want Hindi pushed on them because the best English was spoken and taught in south India. I remember he patted the head of a little boy and asked him what he was there for. The boy's reply was, "No speak English, sir."

We did "My Fair Lady" outdoors in a pavilion with troops with guns lined up across the front of the stage in case there was a demonstration. My big concern was getting the American speakers back to Madras. We were probably 70 or 80 miles away. The speakers, each one when he had finished his assignment, would go back in a car. I had one lady from Connecticut University whom I had asked, when she was through doing her lecturing, whether she would meet with the students out on the lawn for a bull session. Her reply was, "I do my job, I don't socialize." Well, she socialized at every road block all the way back to Madras, was very distraught, rushed into the office saying they were all going to be murdered on the way coming back into town.

Well, I had to pick my time carefully so I figured the demonstrators would have lots of enthusiasm in the morning but after mid-noon lunch they all liked a little nap, so with one Indian professor of psychology from Madras, who had an American degree and had gone up with us, I figured we would start back at 12:30 hoping everybody was having a little nap. There were about eight roadblocks and we made it through six. When we came to the seventh we were stopped. We were in a government rented car and I felt I had to do something. My Indian psychologist got down on the floor of the car when I got out to talk to the people who were prepared to paint and break windows. They had buckets of white wash to mess up the car. I am talking to the chap who seemed to be the head of this small group...by no means unmanageable because the rest were having a nap. So finally he said, "Say, 'Down with Hindi, up with English.'" I said, "Well, all right, I will say that provided you will say with me, 'Up with the United States' when we are finished." So we did. It was almost a joke because I shouted, "Up with English, down with Hindi" with them and then they all bellowed, "Up with the United States." Then we shook hands and I got in the car and drove away.

Another time at Sri Venkateswara University, when we had a group of American professors and visitors there for a program, we were to have a luncheon outside afterwards. There were a lot of monkeys around and I noticed that the servants were beginning to put out some of the food for the reception that would be three or four hours later. I mentioned to the vice chancellor when I saw him at his office later that I thought it was a little early to put these things out because there were all these monkeys around and they were going to go right after the fruit. His reply was, "Don't worry, we have other monkeys to take care of those monkeys."

Q: How many years were you there before you felt comfortable in this milieu?

COWARD: Oh, I suppose I was there a good year because it was all brand new. As I said I had no preparation for India. Everything was brand new. That was the challenge. That was the sheer delight of it all because you could do what you could do but you didn't know what you could do until you tried it. The Indians were very hospitable. Those were the good years. There was no suspicion of any kind.

Q: What about your children and family situation ...schooling, housing...how did that work out for you?

COWARD: That was interesting because fortunately my wife was very well adapted to this. Her father had been a Woolworth executive as she was growing up and they were regularly moved around. She had attended 8 different schools. So it was natural for her to be moved around, to

cope with change. For schooling, in those days only certain officers, and the university affairs officer was not one, could have a car brought in, you had to buy one on the local market and it was very expensive. So we sent the children, because we wanted them to get into the local culture...as I said one reason we did this was to educate our two young children...we sent them to the Theosophical Society School in Adyar, which was just behind us; our house backed up to the Adyar River and facing us on the other side of the river was the Theosophical Society. They went in a rickshaw each morning to the Theosophical Society. They were there for a year. After that we sent our daughter to a local convent school. Our son went from there to a school in Germany for a year. When he came back he went to a Catholic boys school in Madras. Finally both of them went up into the Khodi Hills to the Khodi Kanal School. So for them it was a very wide experience and at their ages...our daughter when we went out was nine and our son turned eleven shortly after we arrived...there were very unforgettable and valuable experiences that opened their minds. It taught them what it was to be a member of a minority. I remember discussing it with them, explaining that we would be a minority as long as we were in India. When they went to the Theosophical Society they were the only white children and our daughter was the only blond. One reason why we moved her into the convent school was that a blond, blue eyed, white child was such a novelty that people liked to pinch her cheeks and pat her head. Neither one did she particularly appreciate, so we kept her there for only one year. I would do it again if I took children of that age because the academics are not nearly as important as the cultural exchange experience.

Q: You were obviously there during the time of the Kennedy assassination. I know the assassination news rebounded throughout the world and all of us were shocked. How was it in your activity?

COWARD: I had a university program at that time at Annamalai University, south of Madras. The vice chancellor there was Sir C.P. Ramaswami Ayer, a major figure in south Indian history. He had been the Dewan of the State of Kerala and made every effort to prevent it from joining the Union, a monumental individual. We received the news about 7:00 in the morning on a Saturday. It was the last day of the program and my chief Indian local came in and said somebody had told him that they had heard on the early news of the assassination of President Kennedy. Well, I could hardly believe it, but I said that this was something we had to check out right away. So he did his checking and discovered that it was true. I immediately canceled the remainder of the program.

Now this all happened between 7:00 and 7:30. I then received by 9:00 a note from Sir C.P, as he was called, saying that he had convened a memorial service in Convocation Hall for 11:00 that same morning and he supposed that I would like to say a few words after him. It was the first memorial service throughout Asia, a fact that demonstrated Sir C.P. 's caliber. However, I was not at all sure that I wanted to say a few words after Sir C.P. given his qualifications and importance. And in any event as an American citizen this was a tremendous shock, something that I could scarcely believe could have happened in my life time.

I was staying in the college guest house and was suddenly aware of shuffling feet outside. There wasn't a sound to be heard except feet, so I went out on the balcony and one couple who were still there with me was one Dr. Cumming, a close friend and former professor of Dean Rusk's at

Davidson College in North Carolina and his wife. We went out on the balcony and all the students were marching silently from the four compass points of the campus to the guest house where we, the three Americans, were staying. There wasn't a sound except those feet. When they arrived they stood in complete silence for probably five minutes and then dispersed.

When we went to the Convocation Hall at 11:00, it was an unbelievable sight. The cavernous building was filled to overflowing. They were standing in the windows, hanging in the balconies, out on the lawn, and coming down the aisle, was a portrait of President Kennedy draped in black. The portrait was probably 3 feet tall by 2 feet wide. Where had it come from? Then we had the ceremony. Sir C.P. spoke and then I did very briefly...about three minutes. And that was the end. It was a very moving ceremony. Throughout south India in the smallest, rural villages, they knew John Kennedy. People who would not have known anything about New Delhi or where it was knew that name and felt somehow involved in this cataclysmic event.

Q: It was a cataclysmic event and a wonderful tribute. Frank, after your experience of four and a half years in India, you moved on to where?

JOSEPH N. GREENE, JR.
Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (1963-1968)

Joseph N. Greene, Jr. was born in New York, New York in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1941. Mr. Greene joined the Foreign Service in 1942. His career included positions in Canada, Algeria, Italy, Singapore, Germany, Nigeria, India, the United Kingdom (England), and Egypt. Mr. Greene was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: You went from Lagos to New Delhi as DCM and were there from July 1963 until January 1968. Could you give me a feel for what kind of an ambassador Chester Bowles was, and how he operated, and how he used you?

GREENE: He operated as a political person trying to sell to the Indians and his own government his view of the way Indian society ought to be shaped and sustained -- money and arms -- to defend itself against China. And if need be, against Pakistan. He demanded of his staff fidelity to his causes. I was expected to run the mundane part of embassy business. We reorganized the embassy at one point so that the heads of the economic and political sections were both Minister Counselors and the DCM was a Minister. I got to do more of the unpleasant tasks. Tasks that the Indians would see as unpleasant like arguing with them about whether we would provide high-performance aircraft. We had an understanding with them we would do that if they didn't get any MiG 19s or 20s from the Russians. I was the one who reached that understanding and recorded it. Our airplanes came and a couple of weeks later one of our air attachés saw MiG 20s flying around an air base near Agra. After a lot of consultations, I had to call the Indians on it. Chet couldn't think ill of the Indians, he didn't want to call them on it when they were lying. But the

rest of the U.S. government expected someone to do that. Once they even sent the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to ream them out.

Some of the relationships between India and China, and India and the Soviet Union, affected American relations with India, such as the Indian zeal for developing a nuclear weapon. India refused to sign the Non-proliferation treaty despite our urging. The U.S. government went to some pains to assure that the public and political leadership -- the thinking people who in the end would be party to the decision, understood that one got very little security out of having one or two nuclear weapons. In fact, as we tried to explain both publicly and indirectly, the French experience of force de frappe only made them that much more vulnerable to a preemptive, first-take-out strike. We tried to convince the Indian leadership of this. That was part of an intelligence operation. Twenty-five years later, I'm not sure where the bounds of discretion or secrecy are anymore, but I think it was one of our better operations. Our intelligence people were able to get articles printed in the French press which were picked up by the Indian press. In very subtle ways like that, we were able to get the contrary word around about nuclear weapons. That didn't stop the Indians from eventually exploding a device in the Rajasthan Desert some years later. It said nothing for their military capability but presumably made them feel better in that they showed that they could, although maybe not all that smart to proceed from one nuclear explosion to a weapons system. There were a lot of things useful mutually between the Indian services and ours, and, of course, we shared everything with the British.

There were pretty sophisticated operations directed against China. We had a way of keeping track of some of the Chinese nuclear missile tests with systems based in India with Indian cooperation. Even when things went mechanically or scientifically wrong, they were able to get fixed, or at least concealed without public uproar. Going back to the Russians, I remember one day the Chief of Station came in with a blueprint of the latest MiG. I asked him how he had managed that and he said "it only takes one traitor."

I just wanted to flag for further exploration whenever it is appropriate that we did have these cooperative intelligence relationships, and we also ran some operations to be sure we could find out what they didn't want to tell us when we felt we needed to know. None of this was among Chet Bowles' favorite topics. He felt uncomfortable running intelligence operations within or against India.

Q: How would he deal with it? Did it become almost understood that you would be informed of these things so that he wouldn't get stuck?

GREENE: It was very awkward for me sometimes because the theory that you can protect an ambassador by not telling him, is very dangerous. On the other hand, the NSA (National Security Agency) had a unit there monitoring telecommunications in south Asia and they were under Army Attaché cover. I tangled with them a few times over what they were doing. The CIA station chief thought it was more prudent in the end to have someone in the front office aware of what was going on so if there was trouble, or choices had to be made, the DCM at least could help them deal with such things. The station chief and I had a rather close personal and professional relationship that the ambassador didn't share.

Sometime, with a broad brush, it might be interesting to look at how well that arrangement served us. As uncomfortable as my role was at times, I felt it was the right thing to do.

Q: Here you were, you had a very aspiring ambassador. He belonged to the school which didn't want to touch "dirty" things. You are the DCM; our relationship with India wasn't that close, and we use intelligence gathering to keep on top of things. How did you deal with Ambassador Bowles since almost every ambassador tells his DCM he doesn't want to be surprised?

GREENE: Intelligence operations are one of the easiest ways to be surprised if you don't know about them. I just hoped it would never come up, I finessed it. When something did come up I would suggest to the station chief that he tell the ambassador.

President Kennedy, early in his administration, said the ambassador was in charge of everybody and everything in the field. CIA never really went along with that and were always keeping things from the front office.

In India it seemed to be working in affecting the course of political events, by subtle press placements. Certainly we had to "buy" agents. We had to "buy" the guy who got the MiG blueprint. And, of course, one always has the feeling if they will sell to you, they'll sell to other side too. When Ramparts Magazine blew the cover off the Asia Foundation in the late 60s what had been, ostensibly a cultural, educational effort, funded entirely by the CIA through the Asia Foundation office in San Francisco, caused many people who had wanted to help to back off. It was too hot for them in their own society. Any Indian wanting to play the game was at some risk of being exposed.

Q: You mentioned you had problems with the NSA.

GREENE: The army attaché had clued me into what they were doing. One day it was clear that the Indians were going to be moving troops. I thought it was important to make them think twice about it. One very effective way to learn what was going on was to listen to their communications. I said I could run the diplomatic end of it if I could share in the take on what they were getting from the Indian military communications. They said they wouldn't do it. I told them they were just taking up space in the embassy if they weren't going to be a team player. Of course, they couldn't do anything about it there at post but I did raise a fuss back home and in the end, they told me enough to shut me up.

Q: This is one of the problems of intelligence. Often it is filtered to the highest level where, frankly, they don't give a damn. At the lower level where it can be of use, the folks are cut out.

GREENE: That's right. That is not only to protect the operation from unfortunate disclosure. One of the troubles of having information clandestinely obtained, is that by using it you give away the fact that you know it. All too often, if I tell you what I found out, you will figure out how I got it. And I don't want you to do that. So, in a way it is an inhibitor. Once it all gets back to Washington where it becomes part of a massive effort, the question is, who is screening it?

Back to India. There were three episodes involving Soviet defections which I haven't seen recorded. They didn't seem to be mentioned in Dennis Kux's book, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States. It was very thoroughly researched and well documented account of the relationship during a sequence of American and Indian administrations. There is no reference to the defection of Svetlana, Stalin's daughter, to the American Embassy in New Delhi. She just walked in, told a Marine she was Russian and told him she wanted to go to the United States. He called the consul in to discuss a visa with her, and it came out she was Stalin's daughter and that she was unhappy with treatment in the Soviet Union and India. She was in India primarily because she had taken up with an Indian in the Soviet Union. She lived with him several years but he had recently died and she had brought his body back to be cremated. She had no where to go so she came to us. I think it was only three or four hours from the time she walked in to the time she was driven to the airport for a plane to Rome. She had a passport with her name in it, everything done legally. On the same plane was a senior level CIA officer who spoke Russian. They traveled together safely and routinely. A lot of communications were flying back and forth. It had happened at an early hour in New Delhi so it was mid morning in Washington. By the time the plane arrived in Rome, the cat was out of the bag and all hell was breaking loose. The Soviets were angry and the Italians were embarrassed. She was detained several days in Italy until the Swiss agreed to take her until her future could be determined. The Soviets demanded that she be returned. Eventually, she traveled on to the U.S. I learned about all this when I returned from Manila where I had been attending a Chiefs of Mission conference.

The next time I was in Washington, I had lunch with my old friend Malcolm Toon, who was at that time our Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs. We reminisced about the uproar that episode had caused in Washington, particularly during a time when LBJ and Dean Rusk were very sensitive about their relations with the Soviet Union. They didn't want apparently irrelevant things to upset apple carts they were working on. They were mad at Chet for sending Svetlana on her way. Malcolm Toon told me Dean Rusk had commented that it would never have happened if Jerry Greene had been there. I was offended by that, I really didn't know why Dean Rusk thought that, and that was not a rap I wanted to carry.

Q: It certainly shows the bureaucratic mind, up to and including the President and Secretary of State level. Often there are nasty little bits of life that get in the way of vast political maneuvering. Like it or not, there are those people you just know are going to get to the United States. Bowles was absolutely right.

GREENE: There are two other episodes which illustrate that defection question. Some weeks after the above episode, all the embassies in New Delhi got a circular note from the Foreign Office saying the Government of India had decided that it would be regarded as an unfriendly act if any embassy assisted in the defection and departure from India of a person from another country.

There ensued two defection episodes. The first was a man who spoke Russian. He turned up at the British Deputy High Commission's office in Bombay, saying he wanted to go to England. They weren't aware of his credentials nor did they trust him. The British consulted with us and we suggested that we try to find something out about him. One way or another, the British ducked and he wound up as a houseguest in the American Embassy residential compound in

New Delhi. The one thing we had to be careful about was whether this was legitimate defection or whether we were being set up by either the Indians or the Soviets. We wanted to be more forthcoming than the British so we granted him asylum while we debated.

The British and we determined it was best to level with the Indian government. In the context of leveling, the defector wrote Ambassador Bowles a letter saying he thought he would be in danger if sent home because of what he had said and done. He requested asylum and asked to go to the United States. I shared the letter with the Indian Home Secretary. Washington didn't want to defy India but we need a resolution. It eventually occurred to me that the ambassador's written reply should be in consultations with the Indians. I asked the Indian Home Secretary what would happen if, following the Indian government's directive, we turned him over to the Indians. We told him we had an obligation to preserve his freedom and the Home Secretary concurred that they did too. Then it took the Indians a couple of weeks to agree to making such assurances in writing through a letter from Chet Bowles to the defector. We explained to him we would turn him over to Indian custody, he would be well looked after and given an opportunity to decide where he wanted to go. In that connection, we had offered the Soviet ambassador a chance to talk to this guy and he told the Soviet ambassador he didn't want to go home.

The denouement was one of the most painful Christmas Eves I had ever spent. We had a tunnel from the main embassy building to the AID annex. It was elaborately arranged that I would walk this guy through the tunnel and when we got to the other end there would be a car from the Indian Interior Ministry, a driver and one guy in it. He had everybody's assurance that if he got into that car he would be free and not persecuted for his defection. It was only a four minute walk but it seemed to take all night. We shook hands, said good by and wished each other good luck, and it was over. Not long after that, after I left India, he wound up in England. The Indians wanted him out of India and eventually the British changed their minds.

Q: In a good sense, you were also putting India on the spot by making sure that they were on record to take care of the situation.

GREENE: The third episode was even more dicey. I still think it was a case of someone trying to set me up. I was at home with my family one evening, the doorbell rang. I was told a Mr. Miklos was here and wanted to see me. Jack Miklos was our consul in Bombay and I wondered why he hadn't sent word. In came someone whom I had never seen before. He spoke passable English and said he was a Russian named Miklos. He had a passport. He had been working on an agricultural development project and didn't want to work on it anymore nor want to return to the Soviet Union. He wanted to go to the United States. I told him that would be difficult. Then I got on the phone and called some colleagues to come over to the house. I didn't want to go anywhere, so instead of going to the embassy, we did it there, including getting the CIA. If the guy had been sent in by the Indians, it was a good act; if he had been sent in by the Soviets, it was still a good act. By the Indians listening to my telephone, they quickly knew who was in these things. All the discussions with this fellow took place out in the garden where no listening devices could pick it up. All the conversations designed to ascertain his authenticity were conducted by our Russian specialist, Roger Kirk. "Miklos" only asked that we not take too long because he had to explain to his boss his absence. Finally, the CIA and the State Department agreed to send him to the U.S. We arranged for him to pick up a visa at the embassy. He was to go in to the press office. I

stayed home during all this. The phone rang and our station chief commented that this one had just gone through the cracks. "Miklos" had said he wanted his visa but also wanted the name of a good psychiatrist he could talk to when he got to New York. At the visa office they asked him why he would want a psychiatrist. He said he had told us about his wife and family, but actually, the wife was male and that he really needed to do something about his homosexuality problem and that maybe a psychiatrist could help him. The CIA and all dropped him like a hot potato. The deal was off. The next day I was leaving on an Air India flight through Moscow on home leave. I thought I would see him on that flight but no one ever saw him again.

Q: Two questions occur to me. I have no feeling for the Indian press. How did you find dealing with them?

GREENE: The Indian Express was a very responsible newspaper not given to sensationalism. The Hindustan Times was a reliable paper. The editor of the Express was a good friend of the ambassador and the embassy. The Delhi correspondent of The Hindustan Times was an intelligent, responsible journalist who wound up as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard. There were inflammatory papers and it was difficult to know what effect they had on the political course of events. Some of the most excitable rhetoric used to come from the papers in Calcutta where the Bengalis are excitable people. The Indian Express was more of a peoples' paper. I thought there was responsible reporting and when we wanted something in particular reported, we could get it in, even if it was about American policy in Vietnam. The Indian government felt we were wrong in Vietnam and that our policy and intervention were not supported by the body politic in the United States. LBJ resented that, of course.

CHESTER BOWLES
Ambassador
India (1963-1969)

Ambassador Chester Bowles was born in Massachusetts in 1901. His career included being the Governor of Connecticut (1949-1951); foreign policy advisor to President Kennedy, a member of the 86th U.S. Congress, and an Under Secretary of State. This interview was conducted in 1969.

Q: This is an interview with former Ambassador to India Chester Bowles in his home in Essex, Connecticut, on November 11, 1969. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz.

Mr. Ambassador -- it's kind of hard to know what to call you, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Governor -- you've had too many careers. Let's talk a bit about what you were telling me just a moment ago, and that is Mr. Johnson and Indian aid.

BOWLES: You've started with a big subject. In his long record in Congress Mr. Johnson demonstrated that he was for the aid program, I think, very fundamentally. He supported it in the Senate and also in the House. I first knew him when he was elected to the House and kept in touch after he was elected to the Senate. But after he became President he seemed so focused on

the problems here at home, that he did very little for the aid program. As President he continued the AID program but didn't work very hard for it. There was one aspect of foreign aid that I don't think he, as well as many other people, understood very well. For twenty years or so we gave the American people the wrong reasons for foreign aid. I'm not talking about specific programs, but it was as if we always felt we were doing "them" a favor, on a personal basis, and they ought to be grateful to us.

Q: It was a kind of charity in a way.

BOWLES: Yes, and that of course is not what it should be. We told the American people that the world would like us better, which it won't. Nations, like people, don't like those they owe something to.

Q: No one likes the banker.

BOWLES: We also told the American people that it would buy votes for us in the U.N. On the contrary, as a sensitive state when you get aid from America, you're inclined to disagree with America to prove that you're sovereign. We also told them that foreign assistance would be over pretty soon, which was not true. And finally we said that economic growth assured political stability, which it certainly doesn't do. On the contrary, economic progress creates internal conflicts over who should get what share. I remember Dean Rusk saying to me a couple of years ago, with great irritation, "Just tell me one damned thing those Indians have ever done for us." And I said, "They've survived for twenty-two years as a democracy, as a vast common market, independent, and that's a fantastic contribution to a stable world." All you're ever going to get out of the aid program in India is the chance of a viable and independent India; maybe its leaders and people will like us, maybe they won't, but it will be free to operate as an independent nation that will resist outside pressures from any source. That's an awful lot. If you can help assure independence for one-sixth of mankind who live in India, you've done a great deal.

I remember talking with LBJ on this subject one time and I said, "I'm not sure that you understand the aid program in India thoroughly, but I know your grandfather would." He asked, "What do you mean by that?" I said, "Your grandfather was a Populist, an agrarian non-Marxist radical. He believed in lower freight rates and lower interest rates; he believed in schools and more doctors and rural roads. He believed in a better break for the little guy. Now that's all our foreign economic assistance is all about. These countries don't want Communism or any other totalitarian ideology. They're much more likely to be with us than the Russians on these things. They just want a better break. They want to see their resources used to their own benefit."

Johnson asked me to write a speech about this, and I agreed to do it. I heard that he wanted to give it at the Associated Press dinner in April, I think, '66 or '67, but I got through with it too late and missed my chance. It could have been a good speech though, which might have provided a fresh insight. I remember Ted Sorensen one time Jokingly told me never to speak about foreign aid in Nebraska, which is his home state. He said, "They'll lynch you out there if you talk about foreign aid." But I went there, a little nervous, to speak to a large audience in Lincoln, and I opened my speech by saying, "I'm not sure you'll understand what I am going to say, but I know your grandfathers would understand." It was the same theme I had brought up with LBJ. I went

on to describe the populist Nebraskans of fifty-sixty years ago, and I concluded, "your inability to understand what I'm going to talk about indicates how far you are away from your grandparents in your perspective and ideas." In this framework, my remarks were warmly received. I think that this idea was also effective with Johnson. He didn't work for the aid program in the last two or three years; but this was chiefly because he felt there were so many other problems on the agenda. My own feeling is we don't have to choose between good programs abroad and good programs at home -- we've got nearly a trillion dollar gross national income. Nevertheless, we know the difficulty of getting these domestic problems through and how difficult it is to keep Congress in line. I go back to the fact that we never really told Congress the whole story. Only on rare occasions have we really been honest about foreign aid with Congress. Each year, rather, it has been an expedient effort to get the bill through at any cost, and wild promises are made that can't be kept. Too frequently, the aid program has been in the hands of the country desks in the State Department, which have used it politically. Instead of striving for economic growth, the objective has been to quiet down this general or to buy that admiral, to avoid a revolution or to encourage whatever you're after. My own belief is that AID's sole purpose is to help the recipient country function better, stand on its own feet, and maintain its independence. There should be no assumption of gratitude expected for it. Our country has no right to say to another country, "You've got to vote with us in the UN." We would have a right, however, to say, "You've got to spend the loan or grant we're giving you in an intelligent way, not waste it; and you've got to see that it goes to the priority needs. You've got to see that your tax program really taxes your people, that your people are allowed to own the land they farm, that you're doing all you can to make the best use of the aid." I've always felt that aid given to countries that just aren't doing their share or their own part in their own behalf is wasted. This is true in large measure in Latin America, where they have taken aid from us, but in the meantime have not taxed their own well-to-do people very much. And a lot of the money we give to Latin America promptly goes abroad to be invested in Wall Street or tucked away in a Swiss bank. This makes no sense. I would have been a lot tougher on demanding economic criteria to prevent this misuse of our funds. Now, India, by and large, is pretty good on this score. Almost no capital gets out of the country. Foreign exchange is very scarce, and they're very rigid about it, very austere. They want it to go for essentials not for luxuries for a few. Put it around another way: If Latin America had been half as tough as India has been, Latin America would have been over the hump long ago. One story concerning LBJ and American aid which might interest you concerns the Food for Peace Program. India in '65 and '66 had two droughts back to back. This was the first time that had occurred in a hundred years. And the horror of it was this: there are always a lot of unseen food reserves in India -- tucked away in family reserves, dealer reserves and government reserves; so when a drought hits they draw upon these reserves. But on the rare occasion when another drought occurs on top of the first, there are no reserves. As a result, the Indians needed about ten million tons of wheat a year, which could only come from us. At one point we were delivering wheat at the rate of three shiploads a day. The schedule was so tight that we called it a "ship-to-mouth" program; it just never went through a warehouse at all. It went right to the villages and towns where it was required. It was very close.

I told LBJ beforehand that such a massive request for assistance was going to come and that a positive response was going to be very crucial. I said, "You've got the authority to go ahead with this program through Congress already." And he replied, "Well, we ought to do all we can, I agree, but I should go back to Congress and talk to them further about it." I said, "Why? You've

got the authority." But he, with a much better knowledge of politics than I, proved himself to be right. He called in twenty-eight or thirty senators, and gave them one of the most thoughtful talks I ever listened to on why we should agree to provide the wheat.

Q: You were there?

BOWLES: I was there. He gave an extremely thoughtful presentation on why we wanted to do the right thing. He explained that if we were doing it simply to "stop the Communists", we would appear very cynical. There was not one sign of that sort of view in it. He said instead, "We've got a lot of wheat, and we've got some very poor human beings in deep trouble; we have the power to help them and give them some hope in the future. Shall we do it or shan't we?" And the whole room, including some pretty hard-boiled reactionary individuals who had never shown much interest in people of any kind

Q: Not exactly aid advocates?

BOWLES: The President turned to each one of them -- particularly the ones he expected trouble from -- and said, "Do you agree that we should go ahead with this?" He went right around the room and asked each one of them. And the response was unanimous. There was only one question raised and that was, "Why don't we give the wheat as a grant? Why don't we just give it to them?"

The next day he called in about sixty members of the House, including many of the doubters and rebels, and he put on the same performance. It was excellent.

Now, here's what puzzles me. Later, after the program of shipments had begun, he held this food up on many occasions. He took personal charge of many aspects of this program, when he might normally be expected to leave the details to other officials, such as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Director of A.I.D.

Even though he already had the authority to send the wheat and had the arrangements made, he would wait until the last moment before he would personally authorize the wheat shipments. As a result, the Indians found it very hard to maintain a rationing estimate, because they couldn't know what to count on. The American Embassy in New Delhi was in an awful jam, because we couldn't blame LBJ or blame the U.S. Government. Yet we had to explain to India why we weren't giving them wheat, or looked as though we were about not to give it to them. This has always puzzled me; I have never understood why he did it.

Q: You never got any clue as to his method here?

BOWLES: One thing I think that caused it is that he felt, as I feel very strongly, that you should not help nations that don't help themselves. And I think he properly felt that Indians should modernize their agriculture and do all they could to feed themselves. Actually the Indians were making amazing changes in their agricultural techniques and were more eager to be self-sufficient than anyone. But Johnson was fed some utterly false information from some

embittered businessmen who could not persuade the Indian Government to let them set up plants there. And he believed them instead of those of us who had full access to the facts.

Now, to diverge just a minute. In the fifties, we also sent wheat to India -- two or three million tons a year -- for the purpose of holding down urban food prices. There's a mild Marxist strain in India, and the "proletariat" of the cities were supposed to be potential trouble-makers. So the Indian government came to us and said, "We've got to curb this worker discontent, and please give us some wheat so we can hold these prices down." This we did. But in holding down price to the consumer, which was good, we held down the incomes of the farmer, which was bad. The farmer had no incentive to produce at all. He had no way to market his surplus production. Therefore, he just raised enough to live on and remained backward. We inadvertently helped to create this situation, from which wrongly emerged the image of the Indian peasant as a hopelessly apathetic person who never tried new things.

Now, my AID director in India, John Lewis, and I and some of my other associates in India, I think to a degree, changed this. As prices started to go up in '64, '65 and '66, the incentive for the farmer went up too. And suddenly this supposed apathetic, dead-to-the-world peasant became interested in seeds and fertilizers and irrigation and all kinds of new things; his mind opened up incredibly. We reported on these changes, but I don't think LBJ ever really took note of them. I think he persisted in the mistaken belief that the Indians weren't doing their part. This was part of the reason Johnson would wait until the last minute and we'd just barely get the food there in time. The result was That everybody would be panic-stricken; nobody would dare speak for fear that LBJ would become irritated and do something unpredictable; it was pretty rough.

In late 1966 I got a little angry about the reports on India's supposed lack of agricultural progress that I heard LBJ was getting and I cabled to him, "If you don't trust my own estimates with what's going on, you ought to get another Ambassador. In any event, please send out some people whom you know you can trust to see for themselves what is happening."

I received an apologetic reply stressing that it was not a question of lack of faith in the embassy but the need to convince Congress." Three or four Congressmen came out, including Jack Miller of Iowa, Poage of Texas, and several others, and they gave exactly the same report we had. After this there was less difficulty getting the wheat through in 1967. But I don't think LBJ ever quite believed the Indians were doing as well as we knew they were doing, or trying as hard.

The last year I was there is particularly interesting. India had a very big crop in '67 -- and '68, too, a huge crop -- following these two disastrous droughts. When I went back to Washington on consultation I was asked how much wheat India would want from us next year; (they had been taking about ten million tons a year) I said about two million tons. The officials I talked with said, "We've got a huge wheat surplus building up, the election is coming along -- can't we persuade them to take more than that?" I replied, "India doesn't need it." But they said, "Well, can't you get them to take another three million tons?"

So I went back -- this was all reversed from the earlier period -- and I told the Indian Government, "You can put the additional wheat in storage, you can use it to hold your prices down in the future, you can use it against future emergencies." And finally, after a lot of talk,

they agreed, but not at all enthusiastically. I reported this back to the Department of Agriculture and the State Department in July, 1968. Of course, they were very pleased.

Based on the proposed new shipments, the whole rationing system in India was altered. But come October, no wheat. We got more and more panicky. I wrote to Dean Rusk, cabled Orville Freeman and others, pleading with them to realize what we had gotten ourselves into. "We've urged this wheat on the Indians," I pointed out, "they didn't want it in the first place; but in agreeing to take it from us, they built their rationing system around a certain rate of flow, which is now in jeopardy." They went to the President several times and pleaded with him, I'm sure very hard. They, too, were very upset about it. The Friday before the U.S. election, a group of people, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, went to see LBJ for one last effort. Without explaining why at all he simply said, "No. This is up to whoever wins the election -- Humphrey or Nixon. I'm not going to act."

They wrote me disheartened cablegrams that night and we were deeply distressed. Then on Monday came a cablegram from the President saying, "Here's your wheat." Now, why, I don't know. Was LBJ playing games with these people? I don't suppose he changes his mind all that fast. Moreover at the last moment we were so desperate we had said, "well, give us at least a million tons of wheat;" but he came through with the full 2.9 million. Also, at that time he had been holding up the AID money for non-project loans, used to pay for fertilizer, copper, zinc, lead and so on. We said, "At least give us a hundred million dollars to start the fertilizer purchase," all authorized by Congress. He said no on Friday; but on Monday he said, "here's the whole \$225,000,000."

Now, these things leave me completely puzzled. I don't think Dean Rusk understood it either, although I've never talked to Dean about it since. There's a curious combination of idealism and right motivations in LBJ which I've heard him express in brilliant terms, side by side with his unpredictable, difficult attitudes.

Q: Did he ever project a trip himself to India after you were there?

BOWLES: No, he had been there for one day about in '61 or '62 -- before I got there.

Q: It was in his vice presidential days?

BOWLES: Very briefly. I tried to get him to come. At least before the wheat hold up, which created much bitterness among the Indians, he would have had a warm reception. As a matter of fact, I pleaded with him to come.

India was never very sure about our role in Southeast Asia; they were torn badly between two impressions; one a big white nation clobbering little villages and killing brown people which produced a visceral reaction. On the other hand, the possibility that the Chinese would move into Southeast Asia -- and where would India be then? These two ideas were both in their minds at the same time. As a result, while I was in New Delhi there was almost no public reaction to Vietnam in India at all. Mrs. Gandhi said things that nobody in our government liked very much, but they were about the same things the Pope, U Thant and other respected people said. However,

Mrs. Gandhi was bitterly blamed by LBJ and also by Rusk. But the Indian people barely protested about Vietnam. The biggest demonstration they ever put on against me, my associates and the U.S. embassy consisted of only about 150 people. You could hear that thousands and tens of thousands were coming to storm the embassy, and only a handful would show up.

Q: They get much more intense about what went on in Karachi.

BOWLES: Yes, but now even that doesn't upset them very much. But most of our visitors expected to run into opposition to our role in Southeast Asia. I remember Richard Nixon visited India as a private citizen and said, "How do I answer questions about Vietnam?" I said, "You won't get any." He said, "What do you mean I won't get any? This is the big subject wherever I go." And I said, "Well, it isn't in India," because the Indians, as I say, were sorely torn. They were frightened about our walking away from it, yet they wished we weren't there.

I had regular off-the-record press conferences every couple of weeks. I rarely got a question about Vietnam. I had to bring the subject up myself. There's a latent and very powerful warm feeling in India for the U. S. that we shouldn't forget. A lot of Asians, including Indians, don't like the country "the United States," which they believe is powerful and arrogant, but they like Americans very much. Americans are easy and informal, by and large, and most of them pretty dedicated to what they're doing. And this produces a curious ambivalence.

Q: And they have a kind of kinship in experience in breaking off from Mother England.

BOWLES: Yes. And this is one of the things that hurts them a good deal. They say, "Of all the people that should understand us, it's you. You were a colonial country, and you took a long time to get over your suspicions of the British." I would tell them the story of Mayor Thompson of Chicago who in the twenties said that he would keep the British out of Lake Michigan if he were elected, and everybody applauded greatly over that. The night before election he went further and said that, "If King George tries to get into Chicago, I'll personally throw him out." And somebody said, "King George III or King George V?" He said, "Good heavens, don't tell me there are two of them" This story meant a great deal to the Indians. I said, "This demonstrates that we too took a long time to get accustomed to the British being what they are. We suspected them for generations, much as you Indians are going to suspect the West for generations."

The Indians, I think, were hurt that we didn't understand them better. They said, "We admit that we have a chip on our shoulders and certainly we moralize too much. We're not being logical in all of our reactions, but neither were you." They felt very deeply about this. For two hundred years there were signs that hung on the benches saying "For Europeans Only," and signs outside of restaurants, "No Dogs or Indians Allowed." And there were still clubs when I went to India for the first time that were exclusively white men's clubs. They're all gone now, thank Heaven! But these things hurt them and affected them.

The British loaned us money to build the Erie Canal. Now, if they had insisted on showing us how to build the canal, we'd have thrown them out. The Indians are in that same mood, in fact so is the whole underdeveloped world. You can't go out and buy nations as we've tried to do. Nor

can you go out and push people around with armies and tanks. We have to do more to understand what the world is all about and fit into it.

I remember talking to U Nu one time in Rangoon. I told this story to LBJ -- he was very interested in it. We were talking about Russia and China, when he said, "Don't worry so much about Communism; that's not your problem." He said, "Your problem is, are you Americans still relevant, and are the Russians relevant? I'm beginning to think neither of you is relevant to the future. You may be like two dinosaurs that are doomed by history, but who look very powerful at the moment. You've gotten too ingrown with all your tortuous problems and antagonisms to each other; your greatest danger will be that you will be so divorced from what's really going on in the world that you won't understand it." I think this is true to a great extent. We are very well off, very affluent, and as a result, it's impossible for us to understand developing nations and how they feel and how sensitive they are. We find it very difficult to understand the problems of the lower income groups in our own country.

I remember one time when our government was holding up wheat shipments to India -- there were a lot of these times that I suffered through -- and finally the 2,000,000 tons came through just in time. The Communists took advantage of this shipment to attack Mrs. Gandhi, saying that she had sold out to the American imperialists, the Wall Street warmongers, and she had been purchased with these 2,000,000 tons of wheat. The next day Mrs. Gandhi sent birthday greeting to Ho Chi Minh. The two incidents were connected. LBJ, of course, went right through the roof and so did Rusk. I received a bunch of cablegrams in the middle of the night saying, "What in the world has gone wrong with your 'clients' out there?," I understood what it was. It was Mrs. Gandhi's effort to illustrate that India was sovereign, that India could not be "bought." She had to do this. Now, until we are sophisticated enough to understand that sort of thing, we're going to be in trouble. The main thing is to get the job done, not try to shape people to our way of thinking but to help them stand on their own feet. As a matter of fact, I think the Indians are closer to us philosophically in matters of ideology than they are to the Russians -- far closer.

Q: Did you find a tendency in the State Department, except at the Indian desk and so on but over all levels of the State Department, to generalize about Asia rather than break it down into individual countries?

BOWLES: Oh, very much. For one thing, take as an example the way the whole bureaucratic structure theme is divided. The Asia Bureau does not include India. It starts with the western borders of Burma and goes all the way up through Japan. Bureaucratically, India is in the Near East/South Asia Bureau -- along with the Middle East. Well, it really isn't in the Middle East at all, and everything we do should be to help India build a closer relationship to Japan and the nations to the east of her. The British always pushed India west towards the Middle East, The stabilizing force there was the Indian Army, the British Navy and the British diplomacy. Also, all the invasions of India had come from the west through the Khyber Pass. To help turn them around and get them pointed towards Japan, toward such responsibility for the future of Asia and the stability of Asia, had a very high priority with me. But the State Department didn't understand this. Right now, for instance, Joe Sisco, the Assistant Secretary, he's a good person, but I think he has spent only one day in India in his life -- is devoting all his time naturally to the

Arab-Israeli struggle. India's getting very little attention. Unless India really hits the skids, nobody will pay much attention to it.

Q: Here's a big segment of the world's population among other things-

BOWLES: When a country as big as that starts to go, it's too late to stop it. It was too late to stop the disintegration of China, for instance, in the '40s. If we'd been able to act in the '30s, it might have been different. But it was impossible for political reasons to act when our help was needed and when it might have been effective. By the time a critical situation hits the front page, it's usually too late to do much.

One test of a nation is whether it can look ahead and plan thoughtfully. It's very difficult to do in a democracy because long range plans often require short term actions which are not understandable to the public and often are unpopular. So the tendency is to put them off, and therefore you fail to develop a long range program. One day Dean Rusk spoke to me of "shaping" our Asian policy. And I said, "We're not shaping our Asian policy; it's accumulating." He asked, "What do you mean?" And I answered, "Well, for example, we have a crisis. Everybody stays up all night and cables are flying in all directions and everybody is exhausted and a few changes made. And then a month later, or a few months later, comes another crisis; again we stay up all night and again a few things are done. And after we've had five crises, we have a policy." But we're kidding ourselves if we think we shaped it that way. Events, and our reactions to them shape our policies. This is one way the totalitarian nations have some edge on us, because they can ignore public opinion of the moment and act in long terms, and we find it more difficult.

However, there is much we can do to cast our actions in longer-range terms. Woodrow Wilson has been ridiculed for many things -- a do-gooder and so on, but Wilson's fourteen points spelled out the objectives of World War I; and they were instrumental in building among the American people a tremendous morale it also gave the Germans the feeling that their defeat would not mean oblivion. Although we couldn't carry it all out, it fulfilled a very big function. The Germans could have fought for perhaps two more years if it hadn't been for that.

During World War II, outside of the vague "four freedoms" we offered nothing. If we had offered to Europe in those years, or to Germany, a United States of Europe with fifty billion dollars of money contributed to rebuild those cities -- something we did anyway- the chance for the Germans to become a free people, and respected, once they got rid of the Nazis, the war might have ended a year or two sooner. But we said, "unconditional surrender," which to the Germans meant oblivion, and they fought all the harder.

I talked to LBJ a lot about this and particularly in reference to Southeast Asia. I said, "In Southeast Asia we need a policy as to where we're going. What are we there for? What are the conditions for us to leave?" I tried to get Kennedy to see this. I pointed out that in Korea we never knew what we wanted there. After Inchon we had no policy. Should we stop at the 38th parallel with our military positions secure; should we go to the narrow "waist" between Wonsan and Pyongyang and dig in there, which we could have done; should we push to the Chinese border or the Yalu River? Or should we attack China? We could have stopped at the thirtieth

parallel; our casualties were then about seven thousand dead. Instead we went to Yalu with no thought of where we were going, left the whole thing up to MacArthur -- and MacArthur's judgement wasn't very good politically -- and we ended up with more than 30 thousand dead. More than twenty thousand of them were killed after we made the decision after Inchon. What I wanted to get across to LBJ and also to Kennedy, was the need to think out immediately in long terms what we wanted in Southeast Asia. Would we settle for a neutralized Southeast Asia? Would we put in money to build up the Red River Valley, as well as the Mekong? What role did we want to play there, and for how long? What would be left behind after our departure? I never could get this done; and one reason I couldn't get it done was because in a democracy it's damned hard to do those things. We'll probably survive anyway, but it will not be because of this.

I probably wrote LBJ a dozen letters when I was in India, suggesting alternatives in Southeast Asia. I remember one series of letters particularly in which I said that if the government of Vietnam would offer every peasant family fifteen acres of land -- this was done in Taiwan, where the offer was ten acres and Japan where it was seven -- with simple tools and two bullocks, it could have an enormous effect on the people, who would feel that at last they had a part in the future.

The word came back -- I'm sure these weren't LBJ's words, somebody probably did it for him -- "The trouble with this is that we don't control much of the countryside. So therefore it's meaningless, and it won't have any effect on anything." In reply I said, "Think of the Emancipation Proclamation. In 1863 it had no effect in Mississippi or Alabama either." It was largely a moral statement or purpose, not carefully worked out, but successful in arousing people both at home and abroad as to what we were fighting for. Now here was the same thing. We could have said, 'This is what you people are fighting for. If we succeed in what we are trying to do, you're going to have fifteen acres of land and a chance to live decently.'"

If Eisenhower had said this in '55 or '56 after the Geneva Conference, in my opinion, there never would have been a war in Vietnam after the French left; its people would have had no need for a war. I tried terribly hard to get these things across; I always felt strongly that we were, wrong in being in Vietnam. In 1963 I felt hesitant about going to India because I felt so strongly about this. And once there, I felt that I didn't really have to debate the question because my views were well known. So I simply said, "Don't let's argue about how we got into this mess, let's worry about how to get out of it." The whole South Vietnam question was a tragedy for President Johnson because, as I said to you earlier before we started this recording, I feel he had a chance to become one of our very great Presidents. I think he wanted more than anything else, based on my visits with him, was to negotiate some kind of way of living together with the Russians, which is a primary problem we all face.

Q: If he could have pulled it off, it would have done a lot for the world.

BOWLES: If anyone could have pulled it off, LBJ could have, because I believe he could have been most effective in negotiating with the Russians. The Glassboro meeting was an eye-opener to everybody. Here was this sudden burst of emotional fervor for a peaceful solution to things, both in Russia and here. I think LBJ sensed this and would have been very good in moving with it. But he never had the chance. Prague, of course, was a tragedy. But before that, Vietnam. If

you look back at his record in domestic affairs, it's quite remarkable. I think that he felt deeply about the racial question and frankly when he was elected, I hadn't thought he would. But I was wrong on that. I think he felt deeply about it and did an awful lot to bring about the improving conditions we have today.

Q: Did you know him back in your OPA days?

BOWLES: Yes, as a Congressman in 1937.

Q: He was the first Congressman to volunteer in World War II, and then was called back when the rest of them were called.

BOWLES: He supported the New Deal, and I remember that FDR was enormously pleased at his election. Was he elected to the Senate in '42 or '44?

Q: '48. He'd run once in '41 and lost to a squeaker to old "Pappy" O'Daniel, who didn't exactly distinguish Texas.

BOWLES: Well, he won by a very narrow margin in '42-'44 -- I was in Washington --

Q: No. In '48 he won by eighty-seven votes for the Senate.

BOWLES: Causing the "Landslide Lyndon." I knew him then casually. He was one of the two members of the House from the oil-producing areas that voted to support OPA. The other was Mike Monroney. I always felt indebted for that. In the late '50's when I was in Congress, I knew him but didn't have an awful lot to do with him -- saw him from time to time and was always on good terms with him. He frankly surprised me as President. He was much more liberal than I anticipated.

Q: As Vice President?

BOWLES: Yes, and as President too.

Q: You were Under Secretary of State there in the early days in the Kennedy Administration.

BOWLES: That's right.

Q: You wouldn't have had much relationship with Mr. Johnson on that, would you?

BOWLES: No. I saw him from time to time and tried to get some good staff people assigned to him so that he would be able to depend on people, thoughtful people. I did get one or two people assigned to him. When he took his various trips, we sent people along with him also to help. But he didn't play much of a role then; he stayed in the background as the Vice President usually does, except for Mr. Agnew.

Q: He inherited you as Ambassador to India, was there ever any consideration on his part to withdraw, or you to withdraw because you did have a new President, or did this continuity just-?

BOWLES: I asked him, naturally, if he wanted me to stay and he said to me very strongly that he did. I stayed there five years under Johnson. I made up my mind I would stay as long as I could be useful. I also had a lot of capital out there in the way of good-will I had built up over the years, which I was fully prepared to use. I think a person's capital should be spent and not hoarded, and therefore I offered to take on very difficult tasks with the Indian Government.

Like most ambassadors to India, I probably ended up looking as though I was favoring India over every other country -- you become sort of an Ambassador of India to the United States. The reason for this, I think, is because understanding of India is so very shallow in the U.S. that any Ambassador, no matter what he thinks, tries to explain it. The Indians are very sensitive, over sensitive. It's all the more pronounced if they feel you look down on them or don't understand them. So an Ambassador to India is constantly trying to convince the President and Congress back at home that it's different than they think it is. LBJ used to kid me about that once in awhile, and I'd say, "Well, you go out there and spend a month and you'll feel the same way I do."

Q: You had two tours as Ambassador -- once in the latter Truman days. Was there a visible change of policy; in other words, would you compare those two India's that you saw? The first one was much short term, of course.

BOWLES: Yes, two years only -- less than two years. The changes physically were tremendous. Very few Americans today realize the change that has taken place in India economically. India is now a fairly industrialized nation for its people to still ---

Q: You have had a revolution in a sense.

BOWLES: In agriculture a very definite revolution. The changes are quite spectacular. India is very close to being self-sufficient in food, I think within two years, three years at most. It doesn't mean that they'll have all the protein they should have, but it means that they'll have the calories at least. Tea and jute used to be their big exports. Tea and jute have now declined, and yet the exports were up eleven percent last year. Earth-moving machinery, jeeps, generators, railroad cars, locomotives, steel towers, machine tools -- things that you'd never associate with India -- now this is moving along very rapidly.

Q: These are export items.

BOWLES: Yes, their main export items. Sold in the Middle East and also in Southeast Asia. Another change, of course, is that people have a lot more confidence now. And -- a very explosive matter -- they feel much more sure of the promise of their future; therefore, they are going to be much more upset if this promise isn't realized. In 1951, when I first got there, I suppose no more than five percent of the Indian people dreamed that they could someday have a better life. Now ninety-five percent not only dream it, but they demand it and want it tomorrow. The fact that you can't get it tomorrow is one of the great causes of unrest all over the world, and particularly in India.

The biggest problem now is birth control, and the Indians know that. President Johnson understood this; he and I discussed it a good deal. To develop a birth control program is not an easy thing to do. With agriculture, if you get one farmer out of five to use modern methods of farming, you've got a terrific change in your rural area. But if your objective is population control, you've got to get at least eight out of every ten married couples of child-bearing age, or you don't get very far. It's a far bigger task, but they're attacking it with great energy and a lot ~ money. They have an unlimited budget for family planning and a lot of publicity. There are no significant religious or cultural barriers in the way.

Q: There's no feeling that the United States is doing this as a sort of plot to deplete the population?

BOWLES: No, occasionally you get somebody

Q: You get that charge some in Latin America...

BOWLES: but this is not a factor. I've never heard any political leader of any party oppose birth control in India, which is very unusual. But I don't think they're going to be able to do an adequate job until they get an up-to-date contraceptive. One thing that shocks me is we put ten-fifteen-twenty billion dollars into military research, and last year we put six million dollars only in contraceptive research, of which the government spent only two hundred thousand dollars. If you spent fifty million to one hundred million dollars in contraceptive research, attracting top scientists, I think you'd solve the technical problems in three or four years. The answer might be an injection. Once you got an injection, there would be a real chance of stabilizing the population. Until then all you can do is keep population from growing quite as fast as it has been. President Johnson, I think, understood this very well and was in favor of what I was trying to do.

Q: Did you have any great conflicts with LBJ?

BOWLES: Except for the wheat question, I had no real difficulties with him. But I'll tell you one thing that was very disappointing. The war of 1962 between India and China opened up a whole new situation in Asia. It shook up the whole set of relationships. India had kept their military budget low in spite of the fact that Pakistan had built up quite an army, on the assumption that the U.S. would never let Pakistan attack them. Since 1954 we had told them we never would allow them to. Every U.S. Ambassador -- Allen, Cooper, Bunker, Galbraith and I -- had assured them of this. I don't know why I was foolish enough to do so. And so when the attack came, they were spending a little less than one and one-half percent of their GNP on military. They were very poorly equipped -- old World War II equipment. And, as a result, the Chinese Army ran rings around them. We had every reason to move in as we did to help India against China, and in doing that we won an enormous lot of goodwill. Then, however, India decided they had to modernize their military, and they came to us for help. The Pentagon and some people in the State Department were reluctant to give them anything because they felt that this would upset the Pakistanis -- we had a large military base at Peshawar and it was supposed to be terribly important to our future security, although I've always had my doubts about that. There are other places where we could have gotten the same information. But anyway this was the gambit that

was used when military aid to India was discussed. When I left Washington for New Delhi under Kennedy's instructions in the spring of '63, he said, "Find out how serious the Indians are about this. I'm inclined to agree with you that we should go ahead with one hundred million dollars of some of our military equipment, but find out and make it top priority." Once in India, I explored, discussed and negotiated. By early November the Indians were prepared to say that they would buy no further equipment from the Communist nations, meaning the Soviets and the eastern bloc, and that they would try to negotiate a ceiling with the Pakistanis that neither side would spend above a certain amount, and they would otherwise cooperate with us if the Chinese ever attacked Southeast Asia. Although they said they couldn't participate directly, they'd help wherever they could.

I went back and almost triumphantly reported this to Kennedy, and he was very pleased. I think our assistance program would have gone through in about two or three days. But just before a meeting on it was to be held, Kennedy was assassinated. I hoped LBJ would go right along with the whole thing; it was all set up; McGeorge Bundy knew all about it, so did Bob McNamara and Dean Rusk. Instead, Johnson insisted that he must personally review the situation.

I then asked General Maxwell Taylor out to India, whom I knew President knew well, to make his own study. He came in early December and made a report similar to mine -- that by putting in one hundred million dollars or less a year for five years the U.S. could help build up an Indian army perfectly capable of keeping China out of India, and also bring India closer to us. By April 1964, I had the whole proposal almost back on the tracks again. In May we had the key negotiations between the Pentagon and State Department and the Indians, and by mid-May our government decided to go ahead again. I felt satisfied that I'd won a victory. The meeting to approve the program was set for President Johnson's office on a Thursday. But Nehru died on Wednesday, the second death of a key man in six months -- and again the decision was postponed.

I returned to India for the funeral accompanied by Dean Rusk and a few others. Before we left, Mac Bundy and others told me that they felt the program was ready to go through, and if I would persuade Rusk, and if they could persuade McNamara, who was remaining in Washington, they could have the cable in my hands when I arrived in India so I could give to the new government the assurance we were solidly behind them. Dean wouldn't even talk about it; he knew what I wanted and he ducked it. And apparently they couldn't get Bob McNamara to go along without Rusk. So the White House said, "We'll wait until the dust settles. Let's see what this new government is like." I replied, "when the dust settles, you'll find India in Moscow buying everything there."

By August this was just what had happened. I don't think it was really Johnson's fault; he was ill-advised. Today, of course, the Soviets are providing India with whatever military equipment it has. Actually India is producing fifty-five percent of its own equipment now, which is a good thing. That's the best answer. What we ought to do is not to give the Indians or Pakistan arms, but help them to build factories to take care of their own needs with no obligations to or dependence on a foreign power.

Q: When the Soviets give military aid like that, do they send along technicians? Is this just part of the package?

BOWLES: Yes, they have sent a great number of technician's -- I imagine there are two thousand of them in India now. India has missile defenses around its cities, which, originally I am sure, the Soviets had a lot to do with. The Indians have a small group of submarines, four, five, or six, which the Russians work on. And complicated machinery such as the MiG-21s. They're actually building the MiGs now in India. They would have preferred to build F-5's with our help. And Canada had a surplus F-5 plant that we could have turned to use for India, the Indians would have leaped at it. They didn't want to deal with Russia. But when the U.S. failed to come through, the Russians offered them the MiG plants on a favorable basis and they had no alternative.

Q: At a sensitive diplomatic post like New Delhi, do you and the Russians get together?

BOWLES: You can't, really. I tried very hard and there were two Russian Ambassadors there during my last assignment who were perfectly congenial people. When I first went to India in 1952, the Soviet Ambassadors wouldn't even speak to me. On one occasion I told a reporter that I was going over to speak to the Russian Ambassador and to see if he couldn't get a good picture of us together. I walked over to the Ambassador with outstretched hand, and as I anticipated he turned his back on me in '52. When I came back in '63, it was different. They were friendly on the surface, but you couldn't talk about any substantive matter. They were nervous, fearful and inhibited. I remember one time, about four or five years ago -- in '64, I guess -- I was having lunch with the Soviet Ambassador alone in my garden, and I said off the top of my head, "China will fall apart someday. It may not be able to solve its food problems; or its fertilizer problems; it's trying to do too many things at once. Even the Chinese, who are tough people, can't carry the load indefinitely. When this occurs, are you Russians going to move into Manchuria? If so, Chiang Kai-shek will try to move into the coastal areas opposite Formosa. Would it be wise for us to agree to some program in advance, some plan to prevent chaos in China and hopefully end up with a benevolent China we can all live with? Could we start cooperating with you on this?"

He looked absolutely aghast. I'm sure he reported to his government that afternoon that a trial balloon was shot up by the American Ambassador to New Delhi. They wouldn't believe an Ambassador would talk about such things without specific instructions from his government.

Q: There's no such thing as a casual conversation?

BOWLES: Oh, no. I tried to encourage our young people to see their young people, and we made some progress on that. But they play a tough game out there -- although friendly on the surface. I have a feeling that they have two policies operating in opposite directions at the same time, one an old cold war policy which calls on them to do all kinds of mean things -- they forged my name to letters fourteen times in one year --

Q: Oh, really?

BOWLES: Yes, At the same time, they move in the opposite direction, "Let's get along with the

Americans and if possible, find some means to work with them." There are probably different groups within the Soviet government that operate on these different tangents. Just as often, I must admit, do ourselves.

Q: Well, I would gather also they've got the same bureaucratic problems we have, sometimes of one group not knowing what the other one is doing.

BOWLES: Absolutely. For instance, they used to put out some awful stuff on the radio about American "evil intentions" in India, spreading disease and so on -- incredible stuff! I used to complain to the Russian Ambassador -- I would give him transcripts of the broadcasts -- and he would look quite embarrassed. He practically told me one day, "This is the KGB, not me...you know, we can't control all of these things." I think this probably was true.

Once the Soviet Ambassador told me, "That's a private radio station anyway; we have nothing to do with it." I said, "Really?" And he said, "Oh, yes, it's private." So I wrote a letter to the manager of this radio station saying, "I understand you're a private corporation operating in India. Your Ambassador here assures me that the Soviet government doesn't have anything to do with this; therefore, I appeal to you personally to stop all of this anti-U.S. nonsense over your station." I mailed the letter, and when the Ambassador saw me at a party a little bit later, he said, "That was a good letter you wrote." He laughed about it. He knew perfectly well that it was a game.

Q: Did they try to make propaganda value out of the Vietnam situation in India, or did they pretty well recognize what you've said earlier that the Indians didn't look on that as a matter of crucial concern?

BOWLES: They tried to some degree, but it wasn't a high priority for them.

Q: It wasn't any serious irritant in your life?

BOWLES: No, the Communists in India -- speaking of the "Communists" and "Russians" as being synonymous actually is wrong, because there are all kinds of Communists today, and to use the word too generally I think is dangerous -- but there was a parade on May Day, 1966, and a very good friend of mine watched on the street corner. He took count of all the banners that went by and all the placards, and ninety-four percent of the placards had nothing to do with India at all. "Get the Americans out of the South Indian Ocean," "Down with Imperialism," "Down with Wall Street," "Throw the Yankees and other Barbarians out of Southeast Asia," all issues that mean nothing to the average Indian. The average Indian citizen or farmer wouldn't know what they were talking about. Only six percent of the signs had any relevance to India.

To expand a little on my remark about there being all kinds of Communists in India, there was a wing of the Communist Party that was an instrument of the Soviet Union; that is, the Soviet wing. There's another wing now that's called the China wing, which is closer to Mao. The third group is the so-called Naxabaria, who are even to the left of Mao. They are named after a town up in the Bengal where the peasants took over the land, goaded on by a group of people who were obviously educated in China to Mao Zedong's methods. Thus, the Communist party in India is split three ways, with the Soviet branches relatively stable, much more so than the others. They, I

think, would like to work with Mrs. Gandhi if they can; I hope she's not foolish enough to try. She may think she can handle them, and they'll think they can handle her. I don't know who will turn out to be right, but it wouldn't be good for India.

Q: Did you have to shift policy during that period following Nehru's death? There was a lot of confusion before India finally settled back down.

BOWLES: Well, I knew Nehru very well in the early 1950's and saw a great deal of him. He was a remarkable human being who was much misunderstood and unappreciated in the West. He was right, very right, on many things to do with Asia.

For instance, he would not sign the Japanese Treaty in 1951 or '52, because, as he said, "You've made the mistake of making as part of the treaty an arms agreement with the Japanese government, and you'll live to regret that. What you should do is sign a treaty with Japan, setting it up as an independent power, and next day negotiate with that sovereign power a military agreement so they can never say that you forced this down their throat." Well, he was right, we're facing the problem now. He saw the whole crisis coming in South Vietnam. He knew the French couldn't win; he prophesied Dien Bien Phu; he feared that the Chinese would come into the war.

He also saw that Stalin would have to choose between educating his people to become a technologically advanced nation, recognizing that educated people may ask unpleasant and difficult questions, or controlling them tightly, in which case he would not have a modern nation but a very backward one. And he said in '52, "I think that Stalin has undoubtedly decided to opt for an educated nation," and he was right. It took us some years to see this.

Shastri was also an extraordinary man. He was a little like Harry Truman. I divide Indian leaders into two groups: One group I call the Adamsses and the other is the Jacksonians. The Adamsses are people educated in the U. K. or the U. S., therefore very anxious to prove to the Indians that they're not pro-American or pro-West and they go overboard the other way to prove they're not. They have one foot in Asia and one foot in Europe; charming, attractive and bright people, but they're not thoroughly Indian or deeply Indian. Now Shastri was a Jacksonian; his roots were in India. He'd never been out of India until after he became Prime Minister. And there are a lot of those. I have much more faith in that type person for the future.

One incident involving LBJ caused us to lose a lot of ground. Again, I don't know how it happened. I was anxious to get Shastri to come to the United States for a visit, and everybody finally agreed it was a good idea. He wanted to come in October, 1965, and LBJ wanted him to come in May. I tried to get him to shift and he said it would be inconvenient because the Parliament would be in session, but he finally agreed after a lot of talk to come in May. Meanwhile, Ayub Khan of Pakistan had been invited for about the same time -- out of our mistaken notion that India and Pakistan must always be bracketed. I was sitting in my office one day, and a person came in and handed me a bulletin from the radio station in Pakistan, announcing that the Ayub Khan visit was to be postponed, and Shastri's as well. I thought it was a mistake, so I called home saying, "What in the world is this?" -- This was about six days before Shastri's visit -- The answer came back, "this means what it says; that the President is very tired

and is overladen and feels he has too many obligations and can't carry them out; and we're sorry to impose his problem on you; we know it's very great, but nevertheless that's all we can do."

That night I had a perfectly horrible talk with Shastri, who was deeply hurt; he was a sensitive man; he felt he had been insulted. My wife had worked very hard to get Shastri's wife to go with him, and she had agreed to go. Shastri was hurt and very bitter, and I had to work awfully hard to restore his confidence.

What I hear happened, although I can't vouch for this, is that LBJ in April sometime said, "I've got too many things on my plate, and we've gotta chop a few things off," and told the State Department to cancel these two visits or postpone them. They were as startled as I was and wanted to talk him out of it. Rusk was away at the time and he cabled back, "Wait until I get back to Washington; I want to talk to the President." When he got back, he was unable to get the President to change his mind. But by this time it was so late that when the President remained adamant, I was given no time at all to make adjustments. Now, if I had a week I could have gone to Shastri and said, "You remember you wanted to come in October, and we wanted you to come in May. We've now had second thoughts, and I've advised the President that we should agree to October because you'll have more leisure." And Shastri would have been greatly relieved and pleased. But, as it was, the announcement came from the Pakistan radio, and it couldn't have been worse.

One of the things that troubled me about President Johnson was that these things didn't seem to trouble him at all. He would just say, "Well, we're giving them all of this money, why should they get so angry at us?" Which again is an attitude that is so deep in our country; and it's very wrong.

Q: No real feeling for the sensitivity of a leader like that.

BOWLES: No. It goes back, as I said and you mentioned before, that this is all charity being handed out to these people from the goodness of our hearts. I think all of you can get out of aid is an independent nation ready to stand on its own feet and defend its own interests, not tied to anybody probably. You take France. In 1946 France was a shambles, chaotic -- I visited France then. The Communist Party was very strong, and the government looked as though it was going to come apart. The Marshall Plan aid saved the day and put the country on its feet. Later we ended up with de Gaulle, who intensely disliked America. Does this mean we were wrong in helping to build up France? Of course it doesn't. I'd far rather build up France and end up with de Gaulle, but with a solid France. De Gaulles aren't immortal.

Q: You forget what the alternatives might have been.

BOWLES: Just give me an independent India, with one-seventh of mankind, reasonably democratic, reasonably open minded ---

Q: Ornery

BOWLES: Yes, they can be just as ornery as they want to be; that's unimportant. But we're not that sophisticated yet, and maybe it's too late now.

Q: Did the assassination of Kennedy give you any great problem in India, or was this just accepted

BOWLES: Oh, everybody was terribly shocked. I wasn't there at the time; I was back home on consultation. My deputy, Jerry Greene, who is a very able man, in my absence managed the ceremonies. There was a huge turnout in front of the Embassy -- thousands and thousands of people. The whole Indian Parliament turned out -- everybody -- the whole Cabinet.

You go into the most remote villages of India and you'll still find pictures of Kennedy; it's just unbelievable -- way, way in the back woods -- pictures of Gandhi and Kennedy. Now, the only explanation I have of this tremendous hold Kennedy had was that he was young, and it looked to be the young generation taking over, and people identified themselves with this breakthrough of a new generation. I think Kennedy had a little more understanding of India, but not an awful lot more. But he was certainly revered all throughout that part of the world, as he was in Europe too.

Q: When you went back you had no great problem though, as I've had in Latin America, of explaining that Johnson didn't plot the assassination? There's no great conspiracy feeling?

BOWLES: No. Oh, crackpots, the extreme left, an article or two in the press, but no general belief in it...

Q: Of course, India had gone through this same thing.

BOWLES: Yes, this is true. But when Martin Luther King died, this had a horrible effect; and when Bob Kennedy died...we had so damned many of these ceremonies in commemorating the loss of these men --

Q: You weren't running an embassy; you were running a memorial service over there.

BOWLES: When Bob Kennedy died I felt we -- Indians and Americans alike -- had all the emotion we could absorb. We simply placed a book there in the embassy for people to sign. These deaths hurt America greatly. We appeared violent; Indians see our movies and our television sometimes; and this makes them feel we're violent people. But I think generally Americans are well liked in India and individually popular, I would say more so than the Russians; the Russians, contrary to all the theories, do not speak ten languages each and prefer sleeping on the ground. On the contrary, they think India is full of hardships, which never particularly troubled me. Very few of them speak English or Hindi, and most of them don't like it there. It's hot and dusty, and they don't bring their families because they believe there are health dangers -- which they grossly exaggerate. America had every advantage in the world in India, and we probably still have, if we'll only grasp them. I'm somewhat discouraged at the moment about our ability to do this.

Q: Were you pretty free to go wherever you wanted to, to --?

BOWLES: Absolutely. Nor was I ever threatened at the time I was in India, I wasn't mistreated, I wouldn't hesitate to go anywhere at night. I felt that I could walk through the slums of Delhi in the middle of the night without the slightest fear; I wouldn't do that in New York or Washington. During my first tour one of my daughters, who was sixteen years old, worked in a hospital every day after school on the other side of Delhi. She had to bicycle back at nine o'clock at night through the whole city of old Delhi; it never occurred to me that this was dangerous for her. I was threatened once by some college students in Calcutta in a mild sort of way, but I opened up a dialogue with them and ended up debating with them; and before we got through, they were laughing and relaxed.

Q: Is Communism to a great extent sort of an intellectual Marxism, or is it pretty pragmatic now?

BOWLES: Well, I think the Soviet wing is just whatever the Soviet Union wants it to be. But they've got their problems, because if they campaign as Communists, bringing fire and destruction and revolution, they don't get elected; the people don't want that. They're mild and moderate, most of them, and they don't like that. There are some riots, but the people generally dislike violence. And so in order to get elected, the Communists have to appear as very moderate and say, "We're living under the Constitution, we'll serve the people and serve them better, but there'll be no more graft, there'll be no more corruption." But once they get in, the hard core which has worked to put them in, says, "Now comes the time for Lenin and the terror." And of course the people who got elected are by that time very sobered by the process. They say, "Well now wait a minute; we'll lose everything we've gained," whereupon the hard core go off the handle; you've got this built-in difference between those who believe at least in the first stages they must work within the democratic system and those that don't.

You see, Marxism doesn't fit Asia. I never get tired of saying this to the Indians, indeed all the Asians that I talk to. In his Manifesto, Marx devoted one sentence to agriculture; and it just made no sense. He saw the urban slums; he did not see the rural slums. Yet, agriculture is the base of every economy. This is becoming apparent to people, and it makes Marx a little out of date. I wrote a column in India for an Embassy publication, which has 400,000 circulation, and which was then syndicated to every paper in India -- we got a big circulation on it. I would say Marx and Jefferson are both out of date, and this was the sort of thing that would make them listen to you, by coupling America with the problem. Marx could only see the cities, and Jefferson could only see the country. Things turned out to be very different than either of these views. Blindly following Marxism must be as silly as blindly following Jefferson, much as we may revere him as a person.

Q: A necessary part of our lives at one time maybe. Were you involved in the rerouting of Stalin's daughter?

BOWLES: Oh, very much involved.

Q: Do you want to tell me about that?

BOWLES: Yes. It's quite a story. In the first place, we didn't know she was in India. This idea of this great intelligence network of ours, this idea that we knew what was going on, was nonsense; we didn't even know she was there. The only Americans who had any contact with her were two young Peace Corps volunteers who lived in the same village with her. They mentioned this "very attractive European lady" as they called her.

Q: They didn't know who she was?

BOWLES: They had no idea who she was. The first thing I knew was -- when I was in bed with a brief case of flu -- My assistant called and said he and two or three of my associates wanted to come to see me about something. They came at seven o'clock p.m. and said that a person describing herself as Stalin's daughter had just arrived at the Embassy, with a Russian passport in good order, and "what should we do about it?" The first thing I said was, "I don't think Stalin has a daughter." And one who was a specialist on the USSR said, "Oh, yes he has,"

I then said, "Let's take some time to think this through." I suggested they put her in my office with a yellow pad on the desk and have her write down for us who she is, and what she wants to do, which would give us time to consider the alternatives. In the next hours she put together a very eloquent sixteen-to eighteen page statement in excellent English, a dramatic story of her life and who her father was and her mother, and why she wanted to leave Russia and come to America.

We then tried to figure out what to do. I put down three possibilities on a yellow pad: One, send her home; we're trying to get along better with Russia: this is a delicate period; this will upset the Russians; tell her just to go away. I didn't see how we could do that.

Two, give her asylum officially which will mean she stays in the American Embassy, which will be surrounded by police and reporters and television cameras with a great public uproar, while the case is taken to the Indian courts. The Indian courts are as basically independent as our courts. Regardless of what the Indian government wanted them to do, they would, I believe, insure her right to leave the country and go where she wished. But this would upset the Russians even more against us, because it would be so well publicized and we, or rather she, would win the case.

Third, get her out of the country as fast and quietly as possible and then figure out what to do later. I asked, "When does the next plane leave India?" My aides said, "for where?" And I said, "Tehran, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Paris, London, anywhere but Moscow." And they said, "Well, there's a Quantas plane at one a.m." It was by then about nine p.m. I said, "Get a couple of tickets on it," so they did. I assigned a young officer, a Russian speaking officer, to her, although she really didn't need an interpreter because she spoke such good English. I then sent a cable to the State Department and the White House --

Q: This was their first knowledge?

BOWLES: Yes. At about nine o'clock p.m. in India, eleven in the morning Washington time. I said, "I have a person here who states she's Stalin's daughter, and we believe she's genuine; unless you instruct me to the contrary, I'm putting her on the one a.m. plane for Rome where we

can stop and think the thing through. I'm not giving her any commitment that she can come to the States. I'm only enabling her to leave India, and we will see her to some part of the world -- the U.S. or somewhere else -- where she can settle in peace. If you disagree with this, let me know before midnight." No comment ever came from Washington. This is one advantage that non-career Ambassadors have; they can go ahead and do unorthodox things without anybody objecting, where a foreign service officer might not dare do it. We talked to her and said, "Point number one -- are you really sure that you want to leave home? You've got a daughter and a son there, and this is a big step to take. Have you really thought it through? You could go back to the Russian Embassy right now, (she was staying there in their dormitory) and simply go to sleep and forget it, and get up Wednesday morning and on to Moscow, as your schedule calls for." She immediately said, "If this is your decision, I shall go to the press tonight; and announce that (a) democratic India will not take me (they had turned her down prior to her coming) and (b), now democratic America refuses to take me."

Q: That was pretty good blackmail.

BOWLES: Well, she didn't need to do it; I was just trying it on for size to be sure she had thought it through. But she was very quick on this. In reply to the second possibility -- asylum in our embassy -- the publicity would have been great, the Russians would have blamed the Indians, and the Indians would have blamed us, and we'd have all been at swords' points; I think the Russians would have been much more badly hurt. So we gave her fifteen hundred dollars so she'd have money, which by the way, she returned to me within three weeks.

Q: You had no problem getting her to agree to go?

BOWLES: No, oh no, she was eager. I told her, "I can't imagine that you're going to America; we can only guarantee that we will see you out of India to some place where you can live. It may be America, and if not, Denmark, Australia or Sweden or some other place where you will be welcome, we'll see you to a safe place and see you established there."

Q: This was where she wanted to come?

BOWLES: Yes, she wanted to come to America. So when she got to Rome, the government blew up immediately, and said they didn't want to have war with Russia over Svetlana Alliluyeva; and they wouldn't let her stay. We had an awful time getting a delay for even three or four days. We tried to get her into Switzerland, but the Swiss at first refused for the same reason. Finally, at the very last minute we decided she had to go on to Washington at once. There was no alternative. The Washington plane had actually been called for boarding when the word came through that the Swiss would take her temporarily. So my young man took her to France, chartered a plane and took her to Geneva and she stayed there three months. And I suggested to George Kennan by mail that he go over there and see her and talk with her. I knew she had this book she had written -- she had showed it to us. And I said, "She must not be allowed to fall into bad hands among people who will take advantage of her; she's a charming person."

Q: Kennan didn't know her?

BOWLES: Knew of her. I don't think he'd ever actually met her. And Kennan did this and introduced her to the peace and quiet of Princeton, New Jersey. I ate lunch with her there a week ago yesterday. She came up here about three weeks ago; I see her about three or four times a year. She's a good friend of ours now.

Q: She's reasonably satisfied with her choice?

BOWLES: Oh, yes, she's very happy with it. She feels badly about her children, but -- maybe it's a rationalization, but this is what she says: "I knew you had a freedom of speech in the United States, but when I see it in India -- a poor country where they debate subjects and I can pick up any newspaper and read all kinds of different viewpoints and listen to debates in Parliament -- you can't believe what a shock this is to a person like myself. To find democracy even in India which has so many problems, is deeply heartening. I can't go back because if I should go back, I'm already a member of a group of literary people who are criticized by the government anyway, I would write things, then I'd violate the rules, I will write things that will circulate throughout Russia and it will be known and I will be in great difficulties. How will my children be any happier or secure? If I'm there constantly reminding them of my presence and trouble with the government, or if I'm far away somewhere else?" This may to some degree be a rationalization, but she felt that in America she could say what she wished and her children would not be responsible for it.

Of course, the Soviets tried very hard to get the children to turn on her. KGB put together a half hour television show with her children denouncing their mother for being mentally ill and all kinds of nonsense. One network, which should perhaps be left unmentioned, was about to put this on the air when one or two of us heard about it. We called them and said, "For God's sake, this is a pure KGB film, drop it quickly." And they canceled it.

Svetlana is quite a person. I tried to get her to act as more of a bridge between Russia and America; I said, "We've got plenty of people trying to burn bridges, let's get a few trying to build them. If you could describe in another book what Russian youth have in common with American youth, and the common desires and hopes for the future -- what you hope for your children in the future -- you could play a brilliant role here. It could have a terrific impact." But she's in no mood to write that book now. She's very bitter about the Soviets. And if you try to say, "They're trying to modernize, they're trying to ease things a little bit, trying to let some of the steam out of the boiler," she'll just say, "Nonsense !"

Q: She hadn't come to India expecting to stay though?

BOWLES: No, she expected to return to Russia in two weeks, but she went to this little village in the United Provinces where her husband had lived, and this family was very warmhearted and took her in immediately; and she lived there in completely new surroundings. She told me that she read a book of mine there that was in the library about Gandhi and this had a deep effect on her. So she told me, perhaps just to flatter me, that it was the first time she had thought about a whole lot of things. We like her very much, and I think she's quite happy here.

Q: Princeton accepts her -- no problems there?

BOWLES: Oh, yes. She's still sensitive to the fact that she's Stalin's daughter, and she's constantly imagining rebuffs. She says, "People think that because my father was a monster, I must be a little monster myself." But I have told her, "This isn't true; these people are thoughtfully trying to avoid embarrassing you and taking your time. They think you want to be alone and this is a tribute to you and you should see it that way." Actually, she already has many friends.

Q: You never had any real problem in India then once you got her on the plane?

BOWLES: Yes, I did. The Indian Government. Well, in the first place, the Russian government hit the Indian government very hard and said if we'd ---

Q: They undoubtedly suspected collusion?

BOWLES: Oh, yes -- because in their country you couldn't possibly get out of the airport without the government knowing it. And they assumed that the Indian government must have been in cahoots with us or she never could have gotten through the airport. Actually, she sat in the airport for two hours; the plane was late starting. But the Soviets were completely convinced the Indians were in this with us. It was, of course, said to be a CIA gesture and effort. The Indians wrote me a very sharp aide-memoir (memorandum), using some pretty strong language, under pressure from the Russians. And I said, "Please don't hand me this because if you do, I will have to write a sharp reply saying that democratic India wouldn't take her and wouldn't give her freedom and opportunity and so we had no choice but to help her ourselves. I can write just as sharp an aide-memoir as you can, and I promise you I'll do it. Why don't you just withdraw this official statement which will help no one?" So after bickering about it for a day, they withdrew it.

Later I kidded the Soviet Ambassador, saying, "You should thank me from the bottom of your heart; I saved you from an awful mess, because you would have forced this into an Indian court, where you would have lost. It would all have been well-publicized, the whole world would be watching this court case, and you would then be in real trouble." He smiled, and didn't exactly thank me, but I think he got the point. We had occasional defectors coming through. There's evidence of a new spirit among the people in Russia. Svetlana Alliluyeva thinks change will come from the younger members of the Communist Party who are growing up in a different world. She thinks it'll take a lot of time but eventually it will happen. I hope she's right.

Q: Did the Kashmir problem give you a good bit of concern?

BOWLES: Well, it did, yes. In the first place, the problem was never understood. As you know, when the British left India broke into two parts, and the princely states were allowed to go as they wished, provided they joined a country with a continuous border. In an analogy to the U.S., Kansas couldn't decide to go with Mexico, for instance. Kashmir had a border on both nations; it had a Hindu maharajah, and the Muslim leader, Sheik Abdullah, who had been very friendly to Nehru. The maharajah wanted most of all to win some kind of autonomy like Nepal, Sikkim or Bhutan. And so he stalled when the closing day came by which time he was supposed to have made up his mind. The Pakistani, in an effort to force his hand, sent in Pakistan guerrillas who

had no trouble pushing aside the maharajah's police force, and almost reaching Srinagar, the capital. At that point the maharajah lost his nerve totally and cabled Lord Mountbatten, then governor general, that he had decided to go with India. The Indians troops immediately and just barely saved the airport and held on. They then took the case to the U.N. People always think Pakistan put it before the U.N. but India brought it there. The Indian army probably in a week's time could have driven Pakistan out. The difficulty is that the Pakistanis always presented the case as a Muslim versus Hindu situation. "The people of Kashmir", they say, "are largely Muslim, therefore, they belong with Pakistan." The Indians looked at it as a test of their secular state. There are sixty million Muslims in India, and if the two million Kashmir Muslims belong to Pakistan because they're Muslims, where do the other sixty million Muslims go? Also, after Pakistan attacked twice, which created deep feelings in India, President Johnson one time asked me, "Why in the world don't they have a plebiscite, just decide it that way?" I replied, "Let me ask you a question. Suppose an American President about 1875 received a letter from the President of Mexico saying, 'We'd like to have a plebiscite in Texas, to see whether it wants to come back to Mexico or remain as part of the United States.' If you were President of the United States, what would you do?" "I would think he was out of his mind," LBJ replied. Well, Mrs. Gandhi is in exactly the same position. Any Indian government that gave Kashmir back to Pakistan would be out in two minutes. Now, there's comparatively little agitation about it. I think eventually there may be an agreement or kind of semi-autonomy for Kashmir like Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S. That's the best hope. But right now Pakistan needs the issue as a lever to hold the country together, and the Indians can't move because they're caught in kind of a political vise.

Q: Because of the old camel driver incident, the Ayub Khan business to the ranch and so forth, did the Indians regard Johnson as more pro-Pakistani than ---

BOWLES: They believe most Americans are. The Pakistanis are very able people; they're good people. Most of their leaders act more like Westerners than almost anybody in Asia. Here's Ayub Khan with his British Army methods speaking excellent English, arguing with his western counterparts whether you ought to put an olive or an onion in a martini. And our people say, "well, there's one Asian I understand; he speaks my language."

Q: He could have come off Madison Avenue nearly.

BOWLES: Well, sure. He's a brown Englishman. And Indians are not that way quite so much. though some are. Also they played the Peshawar base issue very hard. The base had a function a few years ago, though I doubt it has had much function the last two or three years, and we were prepared to do almost anything for Pakistan to maintain that base. I argued with President Johnson and others that we were paying a terrible price for these satellites of ours. They are in fact setting our policies. The more we gave, the more they demanded of us. After the war between Pakistan and India ended, we almost restored all the damaged U.S. tanks that the Indians blew up. We were on the verge several times of even replacing those tanks which had been destroyed. This, I thought, would be absolutely outrageous. Make one mistake, if you will, but don't make it twice.

Q: In August of '66 you made an offer to provide India with radios.

BOWLES: Oh, yes.

Q: That fell through.

BOWLES: Yes, it did. And it was a good idea too. They were talking about television, and I said, "That will take many years and you've got to move faster than that; why not build a lot of small transistor sets and set up a radio station for each of your three hundred districts, a million and a half people each, and broadcast in the local dialect or language."

Q: They don't have that?

BOWLES: They've got some big stations. You can get radio all over India, but you can't get much television. I suggested that an intense radio network of this kind would make the people of that area feel closer together. The stations could put on weddings, send people out with microphones and recording sets, talk about the crop conditions, broadcast debates about current events. There might be, in effect, three levers; one lever for local programs; secondly, the state lever, and third, the national lever. You could hear broadcasts on each basis. Well, Mrs. Gandhi thought it was a great idea. But at that point it got in the papers, and the Communist Party was operating with its usual skill in trying to take over the communication system of India. This was "an American plot." So it was put aside, I thought very wrongly. I think it may be revised in time. Of course, television is the ultimate answer, but television takes a long time and costs a lot more money. They should move on along in the meantime with this localized radio.

Q: Did you get the feeling that the Johnson Administration didn't pay enough attention to India?

BOWLES: I did very definitely. Half the people of the Johnson Administration who were in a position to make policy had never been to India. Two or three of them came for funerals while I was there but that's about all.

Q: You don't learn much at a funeral.

BOWLES: Until I got to India, the average number of visiting Congressmen per year was seven. One year we got thirty-two. The average while I was there was probably twelve. Most of them stayed three days. And this was just enough to confuse them. They'd see things they didn't expect to see, changes they hadn't anticipated, and they felt unsettled about it. But it's the same way with this new Nixon Administration; very few people get out there. India is far away and strange, it's leaders are sometimes difficult. Of course, the more difficult we think they are, the more difficult they'll be. In India we are dealing with a culture rather similar in its nationalism to Andrew Jackson's America in its early nationalistic days. If they think you like them and generally approve of them, you can argue with them, criticize them, question them, even abuse them, and they'll take it in their stride, because they know you're a friend. But they've got to first know you're a friend.

The Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration have ignored a major nation which I think

is going to have in the future a very big impact on the world. I'm not at all sure what will happen to India politically; it is having political difficulties. But its economy is gaining rapidly. But I was never able to persuade the White House and State Department of its key importance. I had a few friends who saw it, but not a lot of people.

Q: Was Dean Rusk fairly approachable on the subject of India, or did he have these rigid ideas too?

BOWLES: No, he held rigid ideas. He was in Asia during the war and saw it then. I spent a month there with him in the '50's when he was president of the Rockefeller Foundation and for a while I thought he understood pretty well, but he didn't have the broad view. He didn't see the whole. He saw only the present problems, although he saw those very clearly -- in an emergency or crisis, he was an extraordinarily able man. But for the long range -- where is Europe going, where is Asia going, what's our relationship to them, how can we get India together with Japan more and bring the two together -- these things he would appear not to be interested in.

Q: Now, you had a relationship along two lines with John Kenneth Galbraith; one, as Under Secretary of State, he was in a sense a representative of yours and then you were his successor also. Did that pose any problem, did he leave you any problems other than ---?

BOWLES: Well, Kenneth is quite an extraordinary person. I knew him first in OPA because he was the first Deputy Price Administrator, and he persuaded me against my judgement to go to Washington to work for OPA. He left shortly thereafter. So we had a long acquaintanceship, never intimately. But I was delighted when he went to India, because he's an economist and I thought he would help a lot on development; he's an agricultural economist basically. I think he spent less time on agricultural economics than he did on politics which he's very interested in. He got along well with Nehru and I think he did well. Ellsworth Bunker did a wonderful job out there, and Sherman Cooper also was a success. We're very lucky with the people we've had there, because it's a place where an individual can have quite a lot of impact personally. They'll listen to you if they like you and if they think you like them.

Q: Does having a woman leader pose any particular problems?

BOWLES: I don't think so. I knew Indira Gandhi very well and saw a great deal of her as a friend. When she became Prime minister she changed and everything became very formal overnight, suddenly she was very hard to talk to. When I went to see her and talk with her, there would often be silences. Once or twice I remember saying to myself, "Well, I'm not going to break this silence; she's going to have to break it." I'd sit there for three minutes and there would be stone silence, and I'd finally capitulate and ask her a question. But I'm sure I could go back now and see her on a quite different basis, much more relaxed. She's very smart, knows very little about economics, but she's very shrewd politically.

Q: Was there any foreshadowing of any essential changes in that brief period you served Nixon?

BOWLES: No, I don't think so. Nixon was out there twice and, curiously enough, he got along there quite well. I think he understands the AID program better than people think; but I doubt

that he will do much about it, which is tragic. You see, if we stop now, and there's a damned good chance we will stop, the whole "Green Revolution," which is moving India rapidly towards self sufficiency in food and wheat, based to a large extent on American fertilizer provided by the AID program is going to slow down. It would be tragic if we pull out now. If we could maintain an adequate aid program there for five years, even four years, I think it would go far towards assuring India's success. But I just don't know if we are going to do it.

Q: How would you sum up briefly President Johnson?

BOWLES: That's a big order; he is a complex man. But I would say that his record on domestic legislation was extraordinary; his handling of world affairs very limited; his involvement in Vietnam tragic and costly to him, to us, and to Asia and to the world. More precise analyses would be better left to the historians.

MARJORIE RANSOM
Assistant Information Officer, USIS
Bombay (1964-1965)

Marjorie Ransom was born in New York in 1938. She received her bachelor's degree from Trinity University in 1959 and her master's degree from Columbia University in 1962. Her career includes positions in Jordan, India, Iran, Yemen, Washington D.C., Abu Dhabi, Syria, and Egypt. Mrs. Ransom was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 2000.

Q: Whither in '64?

RANSOM: Bombay, India.

Q: That's a good place to work on your Arabic. You were there from '64 to when?

RANSOM: From January of '64 to March of '65. I became engaged in the fall of '64 and was told that, if I married, I had to leave the Foreign Service. I looked in the regulations and never could find anything that was clearly written down, but I asked the authorities in the Consulate in Bombay and they asked the authorities in the Embassy in New Delhi, because they didn't know themselves. I was instructed that I had to resign to marry.

Q: This is one of the great... scandal is not too bad a term for it. It never was really written down, was it?

RANSOM: No. I knew that other women had done it, that I wasn't the only one. It was part of the mentality of the time. I'm appalled now that I just laid down and did it. I thought it was what had to be done. It's what women did. I wanted to get married. It was terrible. I thought later, "What if the marriage doesn't work and I've given up my career?"

Q: Where did you meet your husband, David? I've interviewed him.

RANSOM: We met studying Arabic in a summer course at Princeton University in 1961. Then we saw each other that summer and saw each other the following summer at Harvard, where we both did Arabic again. Then I went into the Foreign Service and he went into the Marine Corps. We met in August of 1964 in India to decide what we were going to do and we decided to get married.

Q: He was a Foreign Service officer then?

RANSOM: No, he was still a Marine Corps officer. When we married, he was in the Marine Corps and entered the Foreign Service just after we married.

Q: Had he been planning to?

RANSOM: Yes. He had taken the Foreign Service exam and then had persuaded the Department to let him finish his three-year Marine Corps stint. He had prearranged his entry for December '65.

Q: You were in Bombay from January '64 until early '65.

RANSOM: Yes. I was Assistant Information Officer in charge of the audiovisual unit, which meant that I had two film units that went around India and showed movies about the United States. I was also in charge of getting permission from the Indian government for U.S. films to be shown in India.

Q: This was before TV was around.

RANSOM: There was no television.

Q: This must have had a pretty good audience.

RANSOM: They were extremely popular. While I was in Jordan, President Kennedy was assassinated. I was in Beirut on vacation when it happened. I learned about it in Arabic first. I saw the newspapers with a black band all around them and looked at the newspaper and read the news. When I was in India, the film, "Year of Lightning, Year of Drums," came out and was shown to huge audiences in India.

Q: This was a production that talked about Kennedy.

RANSOM: Yes.

Q: Who was the Consul General in Bombay?

RANSOM: Myron Rewinckle.

Q: Was USIA in India in those days under any particular constraints from the Indian government?

RANSOM: Well, our films were subject to scrutiny when they first came to be sure that they didn't violate what the Indian government called the "third country rule." It couldn't be critical of any other country.

Q: Was this a problem?

RANSOM: No. I had a wonderful Indian friend who was in charge of censorship and we never discussed the word "permission." Somehow, things always moved through. I don't remember having any problem with any particular film. It was just a matter of getting the paperwork done.

Q: How did you find the Indians?

RANSOM: I liked them very much. Bombay is a very eclectic city. It is very sophisticated and has a very active art community, music, everything, wonderful museums. It was great.

Q: Did you get involved with the movie industry there?

RANSOM: I did. I became very good friends with the MPA – the American Motion Picture Association – representative there in India and some of the other major American film distributors. I also met a number of Indian film producers. They loved to have me come and look at their movies and would ask my advice. Of course, I knew zilch about movie production, but I saw a lot of Indian movies and gave advice.

Q: Bombay is, next to Hollywood, the second largest producer of films. But there is little carryover from the Indian movie to the United States. There is no market for them here.

RANSOM: It's very hard. A lot of their films are not so interesting. I had seen Satigit Ray's films when I was in college.

Q: Those were Bengali films.

RANSOM: Yes. That's very different from the film producers in Bombay.

Q: They were mainly musical, weren't they?

RANSOM: They were musicals depicting love triangles – the conflict between the two male suitors – while the beautiful heroin swung on a swing covered with flowers, singing.

Q: When you decided to get married to David, were you thinking of still staying in the Foreign Service?

RANSOM: Well, I was fortunate. The minute he got word of his assignment – he entered in December of '65 – we had been married a few months and he was assigned to Yemen. Days after

he got news of his assignment, I got a call from USIA asking me to work for them in Yemen. I couldn't work as an officer, but they hired me at the highest level they could, which was executive assistant. I could work 32 hours a week. That was great. I don't know what I would have done in Yemen if I hadn't worked. I would have gone crazy. So, I ran an English language program in Sanaa.

Q: You were there from when to when?

RANSOM: From sometime in April 1966 to May 1, 1967.

ROBIE M.H. "MARK" PALMER
Rotation Officer
New Delhi (1964-1966)

Ambassador Palmer was born into a Navy family in Michigan. He was raised both in the US and abroad. He was educated at Yale and Kiev University. He became a civil rights activist and entered the Foreign Service in 1964. He served in New Delhi, Moscow, and Belgrade and held an ambassadorship in Hungary. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You were in India from what, '64 to ...?

PALMER: '64 to '66.

Q: What were you doing in India?

PALMER: I was doing rotation. I worked for the ambassador, for Chester Bowles, as his aide for a very short time. Then, I worked in the... I'm trying to remember the order now...let's see...I worked in the political section. Then he changed the whole embassy into political-economic internal and political-economic external. I worked in internal on both political and economic issues. I worked in the consular section. Then for my admin rotation, I set up something called the visitor center.

This was the idea of Chester Bowles, who had founded Benton and Bowles Advertising. It was his idea that an embassy in a developing country ought to reach out to visiting Americans of all types, including just ordinary tourists. It should try to help them understand what America's role was in that country. In India he felt that it was very important for us to be helping India. He wanted to have a more consistent effort by the embassy to have materials and programs that educated Americans about India.

Q: What was your impression of Chester Bowles and how did he operate?

PALMER: This was his second time as ambassador, so he certainly knew India and he was very much loved in India. I felt he was a little bit beyond his time in a certain sense. India no longer

really wanted to be told how to suck eggs, and he loved to tell people how to suck eggs. He did it with all the good will in the world, but Indians didn't necessarily react to that very well. They didn't always say it to his face.

I was very young and I immediately got Indian friends. I ended up marrying an Indian whom I had met at that time. You could see when you got inside Indian families that this was not something that they particularly wanted, even though they loved him. I mean it was a rather complicated attitude toward Bowles.

Q: I was talking to somebody who was public affairs officer not too long ago. This person was saying that the dealing between the Indians and the Americans is really a dialogue of the deaf. Each loved to preach and was not very accepting of preachment from the other side. Were you getting any sort of emanations of this?

PALMER: Yes, absolutely. At that time Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi, and what's his name, who had been their ambassador at the U.N.?

Q: Krishna Menon?

PALMER: Krishna Menon, who really did not like our foreign policy.

Q: It was reciprocated!

PALMER: Yes, and he loved to lecture us. I dated his niece for a while so I used to go there to pick her up. So I had some contact with him. So, yes, I think that "dialogue of the deaf" is a good phrase to describe our relations.

Q: From your perspective, what was the political economic situation in India during this '64 to '66 period?

PALMER: Well, all the problems that still persist of poverty and hunger, etc. were certainly dominant in the scene, as was all of the ethnic strife. War broke out while I was there in 1965 in Kashmir. Ostensibly, from the KashmiriPakistani point of view, it was local people.

Actually, it was the Pakistani army fighting the Indian army, but the local people in Kashmir were clearly anti-Indian. So the interethnic strains in India were very visible at that time, as they are still. I was in Kashmir when the war broke out. I stayed there for a good part of the war, reporting or doing whatever the hell I was doing. It wasn't clear.

But I would say also very visible were the strong connections between India and the United States, and the fact that we are both democracies. Despite all of the "dialogue of the deaf" business, there are still and were then many things that brought us together and made us closer than we are in certain ways to others.

Q: Were there still residual effects of the Chinese-Indian War? This was what, '62?

PALMER: Right. We had an active intelligence cooperation as a result of that business. Our military mission had grown because we had supplied the Indians with military equipment. So, yes, that was all still very present.

Q: What about the Kashmir problem, which remains a problem? Was there sort of an accepted attitude on the part of our embassy, particularly at the junior officer or senior officer level about who was right, who was wrong, or what we should about it?

PALMER: I think there was at a minimum a clear understanding of the dynamic among the professionals, the Foreign Service group, and people in the agency. Bowles, on the other hand, because he was so immensely pro-Indian, really wanted to suppress embassy reporting on that. When I came back from Kashmir from the fighting, he did not want me to send out a cable reporting on the views of the people in the valley. I had talked to dozens and they all were anti. And so a cable never went. We did some back channel stuff that he didn't know about.

I think that a few people like Howie Schaffer, Nick Veliotis, Roger Kirk, Lindsey Grant, Dave Blea, who was the station chief...there was a very distinguished group of people in the embassy at that time. Brandon Grove. I think all of us understood...I was by far and away the most junior...but anyway all of them understood what the facts were. And I think Bowles probably understood, too, but he just didn't want... it was an inconvenient thing.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling, particularly with our ambassadors...one always thinks of Bowles and Galbraith and a few others...that they, or at least it seems that they kind of fall in love with India; and that they have a coterie, a very important coterie, in the United States who also have this? Yet we're Foreign Service trying to look at this in a practical measure and the two aren't necessarily in synchronization. Do you find that?

PALMER: Yes, and I think it's a terrible mistake that ambassadors do this again and again. It's bad enough to fall in love with a country. That at least I find a little bit excusable and sometimes even beneficial.

What's much worse though is to fall in love with a leadership in a country, a particular leadership, and to promote their interests. That happens almost without exception in my experience, including with career ambassadors and American presidents. There is much too much of a tendency, which Bowles definitely had, to identify with the local leadership at that moment in time.

Q: Were there any sort of strains in the embassy? You did mention the fact that you couldn't get out through regular channels your impressions of Kashmir. Were there any strains in the embassy?

PALMER: Yes, I think there was a general perception, and this is really making the same point again, that Bowles was not objective about our interests and about India. There was a perception that we were to some extent not taken seriously in Washington because that perception pertained. Therefore, there was resentment that we weren't thought of as highly as we should have been, as

objective reporters and as a group of professionals pursuing America's interests in an objective way.

Q: This is, of course, always a problem: that if you have, particularly an ambassador, who does fall in love with a country, its very apparent back in Washington. Soon whatever he or she proposes for the mission comes to be somewhat dismissed.

PALMER: Right, and that was definitely the case then. It was also a perception that Bowles had been sent out there during this tour by Kennedy to get him out of Washington. This was because the inconvenient fact was that he'd been right about the Bay of Pigs as Under Secretary of State. Kennedy didn't like that nor did Dean Rusk. So they sent him back to India to get him out of their hair and out of their faces. In terms of his credibility in Washington, that was another inconvenient fact.

Q: Was it a feeling that he didn't have clout with the administration? Of course, by this time it was the Johnson administration. But was the feeling that he didn't have the clout that somebody of his caliber would have had?

PALMER: Should have had. Right. That was very much the impression. And of course he, also, was not unaware of that; and that made it difficult for him. He also had very bad Parkinson's disease, so that was another factor.

But I don't want to sound anti-Chester Bowles. I worshiped Chester Bowles. I thought he was a wonderful man and with much of what he did, I absolutely identified. With his concern about village India, the poverty in India, and the necessity for American health, he was a role model for me in many ways.

Q: Did you find as a junior officer, coming out of the civil rights movement and your activism, that you had a problem internally or with your other officers? After all, if you want to deal with problems of racism and poverty and so on, this is the world's greatest playground for that. Were you running around trying to save the world or save Indians as opposed to being a Foreign Service officer and looking at this rather dispassionately? Was this a problem?

PALMER: Well, I guess I sort of did a little bit of both. The first Christmas I was there as a bachelor and I was very lonely. I found an orphanage to go and spend Christmas in. I didn't know who these people were that ran the orphanage, but I found out about a year later. I then started to spend about two days a week there. As it turned out and as I later realized, it was Mother Teresa's. At that time she wasn't known as anyone in particular.

I worked with her order to establish a home for homeless men and I actually slept in this place. I spent a lot of time in the slums. So, totally separately from the embassy and unknown to the embassy, I did my thing to try to relieve part of India. However, I think that in terms of what I did in the embassy on my official time, I tried very hard to be intelligent. I tried to use common sense and not to get into this kind of pro-Indian stuff.

Q: You mentioned on the Kashmir issue you used a back channel. I've designed these talks also to explain to people who study foreign affairs how it really is. Could you explain the process?

PALMER: Well, it was possible to do letters, long letters to the desk. That was one of the forms of back channel. To do a telegram that went out front channel, through the communications center, meant that everybody in the embassy was reading it. You couldn't very easily do that without the ambassador's being aware. So one of the back channels was to do official, informal letters which is what I did with the encouragement of some more senior officers.

Another, of course, was to talk to visitors from Washington or to talk on the phone in slightly guarded ways, but nonetheless to make clear what the message was. Then there was always the agency. The ambassador didn't always see what the agency was sending and you could talk to the agency and they could get stuff out. And I'm sure there were other ways that as a junior officer I didn't know about but anyway, those were ways that I was aware of.

Q: Did you have any contact or feeling for our embassy in Pakistan? I suppose it was in Karachi in those days or was it in Islamabad? I'm not sure. It moved.

PALMER: It did move, but I think it was Karachi also.

Q: Was it an us and them type situation?

PALMER: I didn't really work very much on the international side. I was in the internal side of political economic affairs. I don't really remember an "us/them" vis-à-vis the embassy in Pakistan. Maybe Bowles had a little bit of that, but I don't think the others in the embassy did have that perception.

Q: What about when you did consular work? What did that consist of?

PALMER: The usual run of things: people who had gotten sick and you had to try to help them in hospitals; who were in jail; accidents; both immigrant and non-immigrant visas. I really loved consular work. It was great because you could deal with people.

I got particular satisfaction because at one point I was left alone in the consular section. The consul had gotten sick and had to go for rehabilitation.. I had noticed that Indians were expected to wait in a long line when they came to apply for visas. It seemed to me that they had to wait forever and that Americans were immediately taken care of. I thought that was discriminatory, so given my sort of civil rights-y kind of nature I thought, "This is outrageous!"

So I called in all of my local employees, all of whom were twice my age and had worked in the embassy for years. They were quite used to this sort of system even though they were also Indian. But mostly they were south Indians and they were mostly Brahmans. They didn't really like north Indians. So I think they got secret pleasure out of having everybody wait in the long lines and telling them to come back and this sort of thing.

I said to them that we were not going to treat Indians differently than Americans. We were going to treat them on the same basis and the same time frame. They were going to get answers. If we had to refuse visas, we'd refuse them; but we weren't going to discriminate against.

Well, there was a whole lot of grumbling. We made a lot of headway in doing things faster. Then, unfortunately, the consul came back and didn't like what I'd done. So it was all reversed, but at least for a short time I had some success. I think consular work is terrific work. I did it also in Moscow for a year and loved doing it there.

Q: This is my specialty.

PALMER: I didn't know that so I'm not saying it because of you! (Laughter)

Q: Well, the '64 to '66 period was at least the beginning of the great sort of student wanderjahr, which was intimately tied to particularly hashish from Nepal and all of that. Were you getting any reflection of this as far as kids coming over and getting into trouble?

PALMER: A little bit but I can't remember any massive problem that we had in dealing with that. Maybe there was more than I was aware of. I didn't stay in the section too long. I don't remember a lot of that. I do remember going up to Kathmandu and it was a major thing up there.

Q: What about in India? You were working on internal matters. Was there any sort of difference in the reporting attitudes picked up by the reporters? Those in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras are among the ones I can think of.

PALMER: Do you mean that they saw India differently?

Q: Yes, differently, or were they all pretty much in line?

PALMER: I think they were pretty much in line. I wouldn't swear that my memory is right about that, but I don't recall any stark differences.

As I recall, Bowles was very good about bringing the consuls general and their staffs to Delhi, or our going out often. So there was a lot of interaction, as I recall. We were encouraged to do things in the consular districts as political officers or whatever. So I don't recall any particular tensions or differences.

I had a distant cousin and A 100 classmate who was serving in Madras as a Foreign Service officer, John Washburn. So I used to go down to see him and stay with him; and he came to see me in Delhi. I think that we had good relations, as I recall.

Q: Did you get out into the field and talk to Indian politicians at the local level?

PALMER: To some extent. I guess probably because I was so junior I didn't do a lot of that. I certainly did get out a lot to travel, but I don't remember seeing politicians so much. One of my things was youth politics, that is, dealing with youth organizations.

Q: There's a youth officer, isn't there?

PALMER: I was the youth officer, and so I did see a lot of young political types. Not members of parliament or ministers, but younger people. So I remember doing that. I spoke a lot to colleges. Bowles urged us to get out and we did get out.

Q: I've heard somebody in another interview say that Marxism in the Indian colleges was not something that had been imposed on them. It was something which they felt comfortable with and so, unlike most places where Marxism was expected, the Indians accepted this and the philosophy behind it. Did you find this in dealing with the students and, if so, how did you deal with it?

PALMER: Well, a sort of soft Marxism, yes. I would say it was more London School of Economics socialism than hard core, brutal Leninist Marxist thinking. Indians are very tolerant by nature. Hinduism is a very tolerant faith or set of faiths.

I think that among students there was a dominant left socialist mentality, but the worst communism...I never it felt was a strong strain in India. It didn't seem to fit, to root really well. When communists were in power, they were in Calcutta. It wasn't the same as communism in Russia or in China.

Q: Was it your impression that the Soviets had made much headway in India as far as competition with the United States?

PALMER: Yes, they had done very well. They had a huge presence in terms of their aid projects. They had big cultural programs. They were very visible and present. They were thought of as India's number one friend. You know, the Nehrus and everybody thought of them as a big friend. So they got big play.

Of course, I like Russians a lot. I am very definitely a Russophile, but I never liked their government. I thought it was terrible that they were in that position in India, that Indians didn't look realistically enough at what the reality was in Russia. This was no role model for India.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Nehru and his group were just by training, by attitude anti-American? Was this an accepted thing?

PALMER: Bowles used to say that the big problem is that they were insecure, that they didn't believe in themselves, that they had a "little brown Englishman complex." I think that's right. It wasn't so much that they were anti-American as they weren't secure in their own skins. As a result of that, they had built up a whole set of defenses by which they defined themselves, partly in opposition to the United States, but also in other ways. Some of that persists up until today, unfortunately.

Q: Was there a difference between, say, the British who had been the colonial rulers, and the Americans, I mean as far as what you had been able to sample?

PALMER: Yes. The British were not perceived to be as big of a threat and challenge as we were, even then. The British Embassy had a softer time with India. When there were demonstrations, we were the butt of the demonstrations, not the British Embassy, usually, even though we may have had the same positions on an issue. We were the imperial power, not the British at that time.

Q: I would imagine that at certain points it would have been rather frustrating. Here we are trying to be friends, only to have the students come out and demonstrate against us. Particularly, you were young and sort of in the “demonstrating mode,” not too far away. “So what the hell are you doing? Go down the street to the Soviet Embassy or something!”

PALMER: Well, I used to go out and talk to the demonstrators. I demonstrated yesterday on human rights. I mean I was there in Lafayette Park. I think it’s a good thing to demonstrate. I think it’s a very important part of the democratic process. So the fact that people demonstrated against us, I never thought it was so bad. I thought it was a good thing in a way.

Q: At this time, did you marry a woman from India?

PALMER: Yes. More or less. I met her in 1964 and I proposed in ‘66 before I left India.

Q: Was there any problem marrying a girl from a foreign country then?

PALMER: Well, we had to resign from the Foreign Service right away. I did, and then I informed the ambassador. I said I was really concerned because as far as I could tell, there had never been a marriage to an Indian in the Foreign Service. I said that I’d heard that if you wanted to marry a Brit or a Canadian or an Australian, there was never any question. There had been questions and people had been turned down for trying to marry people from other countries. I said I was really nervous but I loved her and I was going ahead. I had done my letter.

So Bowles said this would be outrageous if they turned down an Indian so he sent a cable in support. I had an amazingly fast response. I gathered they liked to take six months to make sure the marriage was solid. And I got my clearance in two weeks! (Laughter) I remember being astounded. The security officer was told by Washington to go up and do his thing quickly which he did. That was to look at her family.

Q: You mentioned at one point you were dating a girl who was a niece of Krishna Menon. Krishna Menon is one of these interesting characters. He was one of our devils during the early-late ‘40s, ‘50s, and slightly into the ‘60s. What was your impression of Krishna Menon?

PALMER: Well, I remember once Malati, his niece, wasn’t ready to go out. So I sat with him while I was waiting for her to get ready. We had talked about the Soviet Union and he knew that was my main interest and that I spoke Russian. He said, “I bet you think that I really like the Soviet Union and I’ve spent a lot of time there.” And he said, “And I bet that you think that I really hate Americans and that I don’t like the United States at all.”

And I said, “Yes, that is my impression.”

“Well, that’s absolutely reversed,” he said “I’ve spent very little time in the Soviet Union. They invite me all the time, but I’ve rarely ever been there. I love New York. I don’t dislike the United States at all. You Americans simply don’t understand anything about me.” (Laughter)

How much truth there was in that, I don’t really know. I don’t know, but my sense of him was that he was an extraordinarily arrogant, opinionated man; and that communism was not his cup of tea. A regimented, unthinking, monolithic kind of thing was not Krishna Menon, who was a free-wheeling, brilliant, difficult person. He wouldn’t have lasted a minute in the Soviet Union, and probably understood that at some level; but loved provoking the United States.

He adored doing that, but it didn’t necessarily mean that he disliked us. I think he probably did love New York City. New York City was his kind of city. Irreverent, messy, bright, creative, full of people just like him. Half of New York is full of people just like him. Arrogant everybody. (Laughter) Taxi drivers with opinions, you know. So anyway, for what it’s worth, I think it’s important not to demonize people, and not to worship them either.

Q: How was Krishna Menon? What did the people think about him in the embassy?

PALMER: Strong dislike. (Laughter) Including Bowles, as I recall. I don’t think Bowles had any use for him, as I recall. I mean, I might be wrong. My relationship with him was really just the niece.

Q: Oh, I understand!

PALMER: It didn’t have anything to do with the embassy. I don’t remember ever even mentioning to the embassy that I had this relationship with his niece.

Q: How about with Nehru? What was the impression? How did Nehru feel about the United States, that you were picking up?

PALMER: I don’t know, actually. I was much too junior, I guess. I don’t remember even thinking about that now. I worried about the Youth Congress, the youth wing of the Congress Party. Those were my kind of people, people that were 21 and 23 and 25. I really don’t know. Krishna Menon was through a twenty-whatever-she-was year old niece.

Q: Oh, yes. Did you find with the students you were dealing with sort of loved debate?

PALMER: Yes. And a liking of engaging Americans in that debate. I think that was a big satisfaction. And in that sense, India was palpably, clearly a democracy. There was plenty of open and free debate in the press. It was wonderful. It was a politically mature society, in a way.

Q: Did you change your mind about an assignment to India while you were there?

PALMER: Yes. In hindsight, I thought it was good for me that I was forced to look beyond Russia as a country to be interested in. And the mission was an extraordinary place because it was the largest Peace Corps, the largest A.I.D. mission, the largest USIA. It was huge everything.

So, in that sense, it was a good place for me to get started to see all of this. And if I hadn't done it, I never would have had it in the whole rest of my career. This is because then I ended up just doing "Commie countries," where we didn't have any of those things. We had no Peace Corps or A.I.D. missions.

Q: This is early in the height of the enthusiasm about the Peace Corps. What was your impression of it in India?

PALMER: Well, I didn't have a lot of experience. I remember that they did have a very good chicken and egg program. Beyond that I don't really recall much. Sort of results kind of things. I don't know how they did.

Q: In '66 you left New Delhi, and whither?

PALMER: I came back to Washington, and I worked on NATO political military things in the European bureau.

LEONARD H. ROBINSON
Peace Corps Volunteer
Paraphour (1964-1966)

Mr. Robinson was born and raised in North Carolina. After graduating from Ohio State University he joined the Peace Corp, serving first in India and later at Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C. His varied career took him to Capitol Hill, to AID and to the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Mr. Robinson was also active in a number of private organizations having to do with African Development and with Population Programs. Mr. Robinson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Go on about 1964.

ROBINSON: In 1963, I had applied to the Peace Corps. Why did I apply to the Peace Corps? I had always been interested in international affairs. I think that came out in our earlier conversation. I was very interested in India in particular starting when I was seven or eight years old, I had this fascination with India in part because of a television program that came on Saturday morning called Gunga Din. Then there was the Jungle Book. I had a fascination for Kipling's writings.

So I applied for the Peace Corps. I can recall an impromptu conversation that I had in 1963 on our front porch with my dad and the then president of North Carolina A&T University, Samuel

DeWitt Procto. We talked about the Peace Corps and whether I should join. I can remember both of them chiming in at the same time saying, "Governor, the Peace Corps experience would be worth the equivalent of two Ph.D.s because of the exposure to the culture and the language and the history of another country. This would be an in-depth immersion for two years." They were encouraging me strongly to join the Peace Corps.

Q: The Peace Corps also was quite new and on everyone's mind at this time, wasn't it?

ROBINSON: It was the era of the Kennedys and Shriver. He was Jack Kennedy's brother-in-law and was appointed as the first head of the Peace Corps. There was an aura about the Kennedy administration, and there was something very exciting and adventurous about the Peace Corps. So I applied, and interestingly enough the first invitation I got to train for the Peace Corps was for Iran. It wasn't India. In those days, in the early 1960s, the Peace Corps application form allowed one to indicate one's top three preferences in terms of country assignments. India was probably the only country I listed. But I was invited to train for a Peace Corps program in Iran.

Believe it or not, I think on the day that Nehru died (Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of an independent India who was very much involved in the independence movement with Mahatma Gandhi), I got a letter from the Peace Corps re-assigning me to a training program for India. That was kind of extraordinary because I really believed, and it certainly was proven to me after I got into the Peace Corps, that there has always been sort of a spiritual connection between me and India.

I accepted the invitation to go to India. I had intended to go to law school. I had applied to Duke University among other law schools. But when it came time to make the choice between the Peace Corps in India and law school, I did not hesitate. Interestingly enough, outside of my immediate family -- my mom, my father--and maybe some close friends with whom I grew up, a lot of my friends and classmates did not understand why I was going to Oregon State. Oregon State University is where the Peace Corps trained its volunteers for India. I can remember saying to a lot of people, "Well you know, I have always done things differently. I have always had an interest in international affairs. Beyond the fact that I really do want to help people to serve people from a humanitarian standpoint, it is difficult for me to say to you what is really motivating me to do this. This is my own personal calling if you will. This is something that I am feeling inside very powerfully."

So two days after I graduated from Ohio State, I was on a plane to Corvallis, Oregon. I flew from Greensboro to Chicago, Chicago to Portland, and then took a DC-3 to Corvallis, Oregon. I have to mention that in Portland I met a guy who was also on his way to Corvallis, Oregon, to train for the Peace Corps. I mention this because he and I are still best friends to this very day. His name is Artie Miller. Artie had graduated from Penn State. He grew up in Pittsburgh in a Jewish family -- not well to do, comfortably lower middle class, I would say. But Artie was a brilliant mathematician, just a brilliant mathematician.

There were 66 of us in the India training program. We lived on the Oregon State campus, and we trained there. There were four things that were notable about this group. First, we were all men. Secondly, the vast majority of us came from the east coast. Thirdly, most of us had gone to pretty

good schools. Fourth, I was the only person of color. On our first night at Corvallis, six of us decided to walk down to the town to go to a bar and have a beer. It was Artie and I, a guy named Chip Wall, and some others. We walked into this bar, where there were two lumberjacks sitting at the bar. They both turned around, I am 6'4" and was pretty muscular at the time. Artie was to my left, with a couple of other guys. One of the lumberjacks said, "Well I'll be damned. This really must be America, because in walks this black guy." He didn't say "black guy." He didn't use the "N" word, fortunately. But in the way he said it, it was threatening. Artie immediately put his hands out like "let's go get them", which endeared me to Artie Miller from that moment. He just immediately became very protective.

Oregon State University was a very interesting experience because we were there to train to go to India. India "Eight" and "Nine" -- there were two groups. India "Eight" was a group to be trained in swine cultivation. India "Nine", of which I was a part, were to be trained in poultry management, rearing practices, diseases, etc. With the exception of perhaps eight guys out of 66 who had grown up on a farm, we didn't know anything about chickens or about pigs. But in three months, we learned a lot. It was a very rigid, intense training program that included the history and the politics of India, the caste system, the culture, etc. We clearly had to understand that. We had to learn a totally foreign language. Hindi is, in terms of sentence construction, the use of verbs, etc. is totally opposite to English.

We had to take all kinds of psychological tests. We had individual sessions with a psychiatrist once a week. We had group sessions with a psychologist every week because the management really wanted to see how tough we were. You have to realize that India in 1964 was quite different from American culture. Furthermore, we were all essentially just out of college, going away from the U.S. for the first time and didn't know anything about any other cultures or any other regions of the world with the exceptions of what we might have studied in college or read about. Going to India in 1964 was like landing on the other side of the moon. So our training program focused on all the various cultural aspects including the caste system, and on learning the language.

The training program ran from early morning until night every day for three months. At the halfway mark, six weeks, came the first selection process. In the early days of the Peace Corps, the selection process was pretty intense -- very pervasive in terms of the daily awareness that just because you were invited to train for a Peace Corps program did not necessarily mean that you were going to be selected in the final analysis. So after six weeks we had a selection process. As I said earlier, our training was primarily in poultry management and disease control. We had to learn how to recognize diseases and treat them, how to dissect birds, how to sex them -- males and females -- how to determine whether eggs were appropriate for market to sell, etc. We were evaluated by our trainers on the basis of our language competency in Hindi, our ability to read and write Hindi, our knowledge of Indian history and culture, and on our technical knowledge, plus the psychological profiles that we had all undergone individually and in group therapy sessions.

The first selection process took place in an evening. When the results were read, out of 66 guys, I think about 19 were selected out. It was a very traumatic event; grown men were crying. Those who were selected out were crying, and those of us who were left behind were crying because

they got selected out and we were still in the program. There appeared to be no rhyme or reason for the decisions. There was no common thread that ran through those who were selected out. It was a very intimidating process.

At the end of the training program in December of 1964, 35 of us were selected to go on to India. Fortunately I was among those 35. We had a graduation ceremony. The president of Oregon State University gave us diplomas which I still display at home, indicating that we had graduated from this Peace Corps program at Oregon State University. We then flew back to our respective homes for about a week, met again at John F. Kennedy at the airport in New York on December 3, 1964, and took the Pan Am-1 flight to India via London.

Q: That was the flight that circled the globe. Let me ask a question or two about the training. In the first place, were you under rather strict injunction not to mess around with the caste system?

ROBINSON: That is a fascinating question. A lot of the teachers and trainers that we had at Oregon State were Indian. I think that they represented two or maybe three of the major castes. There are four major castes and maybe sub-castes. What I remember about that aspect of the instructions was that we were told that as Americans, as foreigners, as outsiders, we would have the opportunity to run the gamut, to intermingle and have contact with Indians from all castes. We were not warned to stay away from the so called "untouchables" -- the lower caste Indians. We were frankly encouraged to demonstrate that one could have contact socially and professionally with Indians across the spectrum, across the social and religious structure without fear of being reprimanded. We certainly were told to avoid situations that would be embarrassing to our hosts. "Don't commit any social faux pas. Don't try to force contact between a Brahmin and an "untouchable". Don't go out of your way to do anything like that. Don't try any social experiments." But we were certainly encouraged to have contact with people from all castes and we did that consciously. We didn't do it with arrogance. We had lots of conversations with Indians while in India as a Peace Corps volunteer about the caste system or about arranged marriages.

Obviously there were a lot of views that immediately clashed with our Americanism. But one of the things you learned real quick was to shift your focus from an American view to an Indian view. That is the only way to some extent that you can survive in that environment. You had to understand their way of doing things. Understanding the caste system however did not mean we accepted it. We always railed against it. We always talked in social settings about the disadvantages that the caste system brought to India. We would point out that there were people in India who are downtrodden; if they were educated or exposed to many of the educational opportunities that people of a higher caste enjoyed, perhaps the "untouchables" could make a stronger contribution to the development of India.

I became friends with an Indian woman whom I call my "Indian mother". She was a tribal member. So she was even outside the caste system. She was even lower than the lowest caste. The so-called "tribals" were Indians who, historically and biologically speaking, came from a different ethnic group and who evolved differently over time. They weren't Muslims; they weren't Hindus. They were known as "tribals" -- a lot like native Americans in this country. One of the first tribal females to attain a medical degree was a woman named Dr. Tiriki. Dr. Tiriki

lived and practiced medicine in the village of Paraphour where I was assigned as a Peace Corps volunteer. Paraphour had a population of 40,000 people. She was quite an extraordinary lady. I would say she was in her mid-60s when I met her. She had silver hair. She was extremely nice, very friendly. Practically every afternoon when I was in Paraphour, Dr. Tiriki came out with her nieces and nephews and we would sit around and have tea together. She was able to get a medical degree because the government of India had reserved a certain percentage of seats for the “tribals”. It was a quota system -- a certain percentage of seats in the medical college, in the engineering schools, were reserved for lower caste and tribal people. She was fortunate enough to get one of those seats. She was known to be a very good doctor and was a prime example of what I kept telling Indians in conversation about the advantages of providing opportunities to lower caste people who could achieve and contribute to the growth and development of India. The caste system in India even to this day is extremely pervasive. It is difficult concept for most people to understand. It is rooted in Hinduism. It is a culture unlike the west and was similar to our understanding today of Islam, and the impact of Islam on the Middle East and parts of Africa. Religion is the way of life. The religious tenets of Hinduism are part of the fabric of the culture of India. It is very difficult to separate the social structure, cultural mores and folkways from religious tenets. They are all intermingled. Religion drives everything including a lot that happens in government. That is Hinduism. Islam works the same way.

Q: One can make the same argument about Christianity, although we are so close to it that we don't see it.

ROBINSON: But we do have, comparatively speaking, a pretty clear separation of church and state.

Q: I am talking about mind-set. In a way, I am lumping in the Jewish one, since both Christianity and Judaism come out of the same box.

ROBINSON: Hinduism is a very profound religion, but its dictates, including the caste system, are so imbued in the Indian psyche, in the Indian ethos, that nothing is done in their daily lives without Hinduism driving it. For example, if you have a conversation with an upper caste Hindu about the evils of the caste system as they impact on lower caste members, they will turn around and say to you, “But Hinduism preaches in part that you are an untouchable on this earth and in this life because during your first dimension, you were not a very good person.” (Hindis believe that there are three dimensions in each of our lives. There is one before you are born. Your life in earth is the second one, and the afterlife is the third dimension.) So if you were not a good person in your first dimension, you came into your second as an untouchable. You deserve to be treated the way you are. You deserve to live the way you live. However, if you are a “good” untouchable, if you are a good *sudra*, then you will be rewarded in your third dimension.

One of the aspects of Indian belief that used to boggle our minds is how Indians tended not to question anything. I used to liken it to your mother giving you castor oil. You know that when you were a kid, if something ailed you, your mother would say, “Take this; it is good for you. Don't ask any questions. Don't resist.” A lot of times Indians would do things according to practice and according to the dictates of the religion, according to the dictates of their caste system, and not question their actions at all. You would look at them and say, “Why don't they

challenge that?" But the caste system is so prescriptive in terms of how they would lead their daily lives that it dictated their every move.

Q: Did moving into the field of chicken culture put you into any particular caste set or something?

ROBINSON: If it did, we didn't notice it. Being Americans, we were viewed as upper class people. We were status symbols. We got invitations to weddings. We got invitations to everything. We were not shunned. No one didn't want to have contact with us. Absolutely no one. It did put us on a higher plane.

Artie and I and Chip Wall, another Peace Corps volunteer, got a monthly allowance from the Peace Corps headquarters in New Delhi. We took that check, which was in rupees, to the bank and cashed it and paid our cook. We all had cooks because cooking was an all day affair. You had to buy everything fresh everyday. Then it had to be prepared. That was a long drawn out process. So we couldn't be tied down by doing our own cooking. We never would have gotten any work done. So Peace Corps paid for a cook. The money was for a cook, to buy food, and to pay for incidentals; e.g. travel and things like that. Housing was provided by the government of India. Our allowance was meager and we had to travel on a third class train or a bus, for example. For the most part, most volunteers did not have a jeep or a motorcycle. But we had access to a jeep and a motorbike. We had bicycles, which were provided to us by the Peace Corps. But if you wanted to go any distance, you had to take a train—for example from Bahawalpur, where I lived, to the state capital, Patna. We had just enough money for third class train travel. There are three classes of train travel in India -- first class, second class, and third class. Third class is what we used to call "cattle" car. If you wanted to travel second class, that meant you might get a reserved seat. If you were lucky, you might even get a reserved seat and a little bunk on top to sleep on overnight. Arnie and I got to the point where we learned how to cajole; we learned how to maneuver. Sometimes we would appeal to the conductor to let us ride second class even though we had third class tickets. That would not have happened had we been Indian, but because we were Americans and Peace Corps volunteers, we were treated differently.

There were a lot of what I used to call "world travelers". They were hippies but we called them "world travelers." There was a lot of concern for those of us assigned to India in the 1960s that we not be identified as hippies because hippies were disheveled. They had long hair; they looked scruffy. For the most part they were white, either Americans or Europeans. Indians looked upon them with a certain amount of disdain because they were so scruffy looking. They had money, but looked scruffy. That was just part of that hippie movement. Indians didn't like that look; so we as Peace Corps volunteers tended to dress differently. We were neat and clean shaven. Some of us wore sandals, but we didn't look like hippies. We consciously did it that way because we did not want to do anything that would diminish our ability to relate to Indians up and down the social spectrum.

As I said, we were treated differently. We were invited into homes and had access to practically anybody we wanted to see. From time to time, in the course of conducting our business, we would have to go to see high ranking government officials. We had access to them. We didn't abuse that privilege. But to get things done in India, you had to constantly push, push, push. There was a certain amount of inertia that you had to overcome. The importance of time which is

a western attribute. For example, how to get from point A to point B was always a challenge. In India, if you ask for directions from a shopkeeper or somebody on the street, you would be told, "Sir. Go straight".

"What do you mean go straight?"

"Sir, just go straight."

"How long will it take? "

"You will get there sometime today."

There is an imprecision about things in India. One of the first things I learned was take my watch off. After about six months I did without my watch. There was a lot of waiting, but you had to adjust to their ways of doing things. But being a foreigner, and particularly a Peace Corps volunteer, if you were respectful, you could get some things done that they couldn't do or couldn't do as quickly or as efficiently. However, that posed a problem because from my perspective, one of the reasons why I wanted to be a Peace Corps volunteer was so that I could work with my Indian counterparts to try to get them to consider different ways of doing things within the confines of their own reality. Working with them closely to influence them over time is what I call the intangible impact of a cross cultural in depth experience which you gain as a volunteer. If you didn't learn that, you ran the risk of operating in a vacuum. The Indians could have said, "OK, we are going to tolerate you as the volunteer for two years because we know you are going to leave. So we will let you do your thing. But after two years, everything that you do may collapse. We may not retain it." I recognized that possibility right away; so my partner and I worked very hard to work with our Indian counterparts so that they didn't view us as being outsiders who would be gone soon enough. We wanted them to view us as being their partners, their counterparts. We were going to do these things together, so that, long after Artie and I had left the scene, the new approaches to which they took a liking, those new patterns that fit within their milieu, those activities which they could do without us, would continue to be done because somehow over the course of a year or two they grew to respect and accept a different way of doing things. I don't think anybody learned to tell time or to pay attention to time because I was an American, but certainly because of the style and manner with which we worked with our Indian counterparts and friends, some of our Americanisms, some of our way of doing things rubbed off on them.

Later I moved to the state capital from the town in which I had worked. We had some new volunteers that came in. One group of volunteers came as mechanics to work on UNICEF jeeps and other things in and around Patna. One of these volunteers got frustrated one day in the mechanic shop and struck an Indian because the Indian wouldn't do what he was being told to do. The volunteer was overheard to say, "You know, I am an American. I come from the most powerful country in the world, and if you do things the way I am telling you, one day you too can become powerful." That is not the way to get Indians to do things differently -- by being arrogant, by saying, "I am an American; do it my way because we know best." We sent that volunteer home in a strait jacket because he could not make the adjustment. He did not understand; he never learned how to work with the Indians to bring them along. He was busy

dictating to the Indians. My Peace Corps experience taught me after two years that I had to motivate and influence people of a different culture. I figured that if I could do that in a different culture, certainly I could do some of that back in the United States.

Q: Could you talk a bit about both the town or the city, I take this to be a town, where you were, and how you went about, what were you contributing to the chicken business.

ROBINSON: Bahawalpur was on the Ganges River. It is in Bihar State which is sandwiched between West Bengal to the east and Uttar Pradesh to the west. It took an overnight train ride to get to Calcutta. Calcutta was where we went for rest and relaxation. Bahawalpur had about 40,000 inhabitants. The streets were dirt with the exception of maybe two or three paved roads. The Indians referred to one road as a “trunk” road -- what we call an express highway. There was a trunk road leading into Bahawalpur from West Bengal. There was a trunk road leading out that went from Bahawalpur to Patna, the capital of Bihar. Bahawalpur had two engineering colleges. It had a hospital, but it wasn’t a very good one. It had a train station -- every town in India practically had a train station, thanks to the British who constructed an incredibly extensive network of railroads throughout India. This was something that aided India’s development tremendously. I can recall the Anglican church. We lived in a little compound called Bose Park. We had a lean-to -- what I would call a lean-to which was attached to the back of a house. The government of India and the state government had to agree to provide housing and transportation for the Peace Corps volunteers. The government poultry farm was maybe four miles outside of Bahawalpur. We got there everyday either by bicycle or by jeep.

My Indian counterpart was a Muslim named Mister Jamal. Jamal was an extraordinarily progressive Indian -- very dynamic, full of energy, lots of good ideas. He was a Muslim which meant he had no hang-up about working with animals. There are lots of Hindu Indians who won’t eat meat. A large percentage of Indians who are Hindus are vegetarian. They won’t eat eggs. They are pure vegetarians. They will wear a mask so they don’t breathe any microbes or have any flies come around them. They will be careful where they walk because they don’t want to kill anything. But Muslims did not have any social or religious prohibitions about working with animals. Jamal was well trained as an expert in animal husbandry including chickens. When we first got to Bahawalpur, my partner was Chip Wall from Seattle. Chip was in piggery and I was in poultry. Our housing was not ready, so we were taken to what was called a bungalow -- a guest house -- about 12 miles outside of Bahawalpur, in the middle of nowhere. We were deposited there with a cook named Jalil who remained as my cook for two years. Jalil was also a Muslim.

Most of us had Muslim cooks because they could handle meat without any social or religious prohibitions. They knew that we Americans ate meat. The Muslims knew where the meat was. That didn’t mean we could get beef readily because cows are sacred in India. He could get beef from time to time. He would come back and say, “Sahib, I have got some beef for today.” He knew that would bring a smile to our faces. Most of the time we had chicken or fish.

I tell the story about being in this guest house-bungalow because it was our first experience in India. This was mid December. In addition to waiting for our permanent housing, we were also waiting for our assignments. Each of us had an Indian supervisor, known as the block

development officer, the BDO. My BDO's name was Mr. Yadav. Mr. Yadav's office was in Bahawalpur. He was to give assignments for both piggery and poultry work. But for two or three weeks, we sat out there in the bungalow and we never heard from the BDO. So one day I looked at Chip and said, "You know what, they are going to let us sit here. They don't know what to do with us." In our stateside training program, we had been taught that we had two options as Peace Corps volunteers. Option number one was to work with the BDO, and to find out what he needed. We have been trained to be an expert consultant to the Indian government in poultry or in piggery, to help them with every aspect of their program. You can either get yourself involved in the government apparatus as far as piggery or poultry are concerned, or you could work with individual farmers to help them to improve their ability or capacity to grow either herds of pigs or chickens for the purpose of selling the eggs and using the meat for marketing purposes. But we are sitting for two or three weeks, doing nothing. Chip had a very different kind of temperament from me. Chip was very intellectual, very smart guy, but he wasn't a pusher. I was very energetic, very dynamic, and probably a bit brash in those days. I said to Chip. "You know, we have come 12,000 miles from home. We are just sitting here all day long cooling our heels."

One day I persuaded him to jump on our bikes and go to Bahawalpur. We rode 12 miles into Bahawalpur. It was hot as hell because Bahawalpur is on the Ganges Plain. It was late December and therefore the so-called "cool" season. It was very warm during the daytime because the sun is was directly overhead. We went to see the BDO. I will never forget walking into the BDO's office. He was chewing beetle nuts. This is sort of a stimulant that a lot of Indian men chew. It causes the saliva to turn red. In every government office there was a spittoon. The walls were splattered with red residue. The Indians would chew this stuff and try to talk at the same time. It was really funny. Yardav had a mouthful of this stuff. He was sitting looking very relaxed -- sort of blasé, very casual--when we walked in. We kind of burst into his office. It was an unpleasant confrontation because by the time we got to his office we were tired and it was hot. We said, "Look we have been here for almost a month. You haven't come out to see us. We didn't come all the way to India just to sit and do nothing. We came here to help you, and to work." I think we certainly showed our impatience. I can remember Yardav looking up at us and saying, "Your housing is not ready yet, so we thought we would just leave you out there until the housing is ready."

"When is it going to be ready?" we asked.

"We don't know when it is going to be ready,"

We went back and forth. We made our point that we were not going to sit for another two weeks and just cool our heels; we came to work. Yardav is the one who put us in touch with Jamal who became our ace in the hole.

Bahawalpur had a lot of farmers. We ran into some difficulties in part because there were tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus. You find this all over India even today, perhaps even more pronounced today than ever before. We came to the conclusion that the Peace Corps had made a mistake in participating in a piggery program. In essence, Chip really didn't have a job. He didn't have a job because it was socially almost impossible to do anything in piggery. So Chip was confronted with decisions. "Should I stay? Can I become a poultry expert?" I told Chip

that I would teach him about poultry farming. He had another option and that was to participate in a teaching program because he had majored in education in college. He chose to do the latter. He chose to retool himself and become involved in education.

I just did my poultry thing with Jamal. As I mentioned earlier, I made friends with Dr. Tiriki, the Indian doctor who became my sort of Indian mother. I worked very closely with Jamal to upgrade and improve poultry management within the government poultry farm system in and around Bahawalpur. During the time I was there we built a whole new block of poultry houses. We probably built at least eight new poultry houses, and we upgraded the facilities to sex chickens and to grade the eggs. I must say that I had a pretty rewarding experience in Bahawalpur.

Maybe almost a year after I got to Bahawalpur -- late 1965 -- I got sick -- probably a heat stroke. In those days we didn't have American physicians in the Peace Corps. What Peace Corps did was to visit the doctors who practiced where the volunteers were being assigned. They interviewed Indian doctors to evaluate whether they would be suitable. Real medical care was only available in the big cities like Calcutta, Delhi -- large cities like that. The local physicians were to provide some coverage in the event of an emergency.

I went to the doctor that had been assigned to us. He didn't touch me. He didn't take my temperature; he didn't take my pulse; he just looked at me. He made his diagnosis on the basis of just looking at me. He said, "Well, maybe you have had too much sun, maybe a little delirium. Let me give you some medicine," and he prescribed codeine. I had a reaction to codeine. I broke out in hives; I was sick as a dog. I called around; there was no place in Bahawalpur that could detox me. Of course, I didn't know what was happening. I learned all this after the fact. I sent a telex, either a telex or a telegram, probably a telegram because that was a reliable telegram service in India. I sent a telegram to Artie who was in Patna. Patna was an overnight train ride to the west. I told Artie that I was coming to Patna. There was a big Catholic hospital in Patna -- the Holy Family Hospital. Patna was a city in 1965 of maybe 200,000 people with a big airport.

I crawled onto a train that night and got into Patna the next morning. Artie met me there and took me to the hospital. By this time I was in semi delirious condition. I spent a week in the Holy Family Hospital. Corgi was a little community outside of Patna, and I stayed there for five days while they detoxed me from the codeine.

Right after this episode, the Peace Corps office in New Delhi and I made the decision to move me from Bahawalpur to Patna because Jamal had been reassigned. We had done a lot of good work in Bahawalpur, but it was a good time to stop. Furthermore, Artie did not have a partner in what he was doing. He was setting up egg marketing centers all over the city of Patna. He and I were much closer friends than I was with Chip, my first partner.

There are two kinds of chickens that were being bred in India. We used leghorns which were the white birds, for egg laying purposes, and Rhode Island reds for broilers or meat. Artie and I came up with a scheme to grow Rhode Island reds which could be processed after three months. They would grow for from six weeks to three months and then they would process them, ice them down and ship them to Calcutta to all of those incredible restaurants and hotels. Calcutta was an

overnight train in an express train. We managed to convince a number of farmers to grow Rhode Island reds. We said, "Look, we can make you some money. We'll process these birds anywhere from six weeks to three months depending on how big they are and send them to Calcutta in iced boxes. They will be received by merchants in Calcutta, and in the morning we will come back and give you the money."

So we set up very lucrative egg and meat marketing schemes for farmers in the capital area of Patna which really brought much welcomed additional income to the farmers.

The egg marketing scheme was interesting because we ran into a lot of problems with eggs in India. For one, a lot of Indians had religious superstitions about eating eggs -- it made the consumers oversexed they thought and therefore out of control. Secondly, strict vegetarians did not want to eat eggs. Three, when refrigeration is lacking, eggs will spoil quickly. You could cool them, but you couldn't always refrigerate them. If you had a lot of eggs coming in for processing or a lot of hens coming into production at one time, that meant we had a flood of eggs, and had to figure out how to process them quickly.

That is one reason we had egg marketing kiosks all over. We came up with this idea to sort of saturate the capital with kiosks, so we could spread out the distribution of the eggs and sell them quicker instead of throwing them away. In 1965-1966 there was a drought in India. Food became scarce. Therefore getting feed for chickens became difficult. We wrote a letter to Lyndon Johnson and appealed for maize because maize was the staple of the poultry feed formula that we used. We learned how to make poultry feed. Yellow corn (maize) was one of the ingredients that you had to have in order for the yolk to come out yellow, or deep orange. Without the maize, the eggs tasted horrible. In 1965-1966 the "cold war" was an active ingredient of politics in many parts of the world including India. The Indians were playing the United States off against the Soviet Union, and there was a real rift between the Johnson administration and the Indian administration headed by Shastri who later died in a taxicab in Tashkent. In light of the U.S.-India political situation and the drought, we couldn't get maize. We learned how to cut up red chilies and put them in the feed. That caused the egg to return to the yellow color.

We had lots of other problems, which we overcame one way or another. The egg marketing distribution program that we installed throughout Patna and the meat program that we had with Calcutta were huge successes. Artie and I became Peace Corps volunteer leaders, meaning that we helped to train the new volunteers as they arrived in India. We helped to select sites where volunteers could be assigned throughout the eastern region. By this time the Peace Corps had opened up an office in Calcutta, and we did a lot of administrative and programming work for the Peace Corps. It was an altogether very satisfying experience for me.

Q: You left there in 1966?

LAWRENCE J. HALL
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1964-1966)

Lawrence J. Hall was born in Jersey City, New Jersey in 1920. He attended both New York University and the University of Wisconsin. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, and Morocco. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Hans Tuch on August 23, 1988.

Q: Let's start with India, because you were in India from 1964 to 1966.

HALL: Yes.

Q: So, really, let's start with your assignment in India where you were the Deputy PAO.

HALL: Yes. That's right. I was deputy to Bill Weathersby who was a friend from the Middle East. He had been PAO in Cairo when I was PAO in Beirut and Baghdad. I volunteered for that assignment because Bill was there.

I arrived on the day of Nehru's funeral. So, since the entire establishment -- American as well as our Indian employees -- were turned to for that funeral, I was quickly hustled into someone's house and told to sit quiet for forty-eight hours until called for. Then I joined the USIS staff at Bhawalphur House.

I was the deputy for the biggest, at that time, USIS establishment anywhere in the world. (Ed. Note: Actually, India was probably smaller than USIS/Germany and possibly smaller than USIS/Japan at that time.)

Q: I was going to say, at that time, it was the largest?

HALL: At that time.

Q: Of course, part of its being so large was because it was able to spend a lot of local currency.

HALL: Yes, indeed. The rupee account was huge but we did have sixty-five American employees and several hundred Indian employees.

It was my first experience with a huge operation in which most of the authority had to be delegated to Information Officers and Cultural Officers and especially to Branch PAOs, since the branch posts, the three main ones in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, each had ten American officers.

Nehru was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri, an elderly man and a saintly type. It was a time when Lyndon Johnson was carefully meting out the amount of food aid that was vital to India's survival and which amounted to millions and millions of tons of grain.

The president was not very sympathetic to the neutralist foreign policy of India and especially unhappy with the criticism of the Vietnam War and his conduct of it, that the Indians were constantly voicing.

Therefore, he reacted by holding them on a very tight leash as far as our food aid was concerned, much to the consternation of Ambassador Chester Bowles, who had been appointed by President Kennedy as the result of power politics within the Kennedy Administration.

Q: Right, because Kennedy wanted to get rid of Bowles out of the State Department where he had been the Under Secretary and sent him to India.

HALL: That's right.

Q: He was your Ambassador during your entire time there?

HALL: That's right, he was. He was a good friend, too. Of course, he was very sympathetic not only with Indians but with the Third World generally and the problems of its emergence into the 20th Century.

He never really gave up the idea that he should have been Secretary of State and, therefore, he acted like a Secretary of State and kept the Secretary of State and the White House advised of everything that it should do on a global basis.

Q: It seems that our Ambassadors to India have had that proclivity. I mean, here was Kenneth Galbraith who was his predecessor, wasn't he?

HALL: Successor.

Q: I remember the telegrams that Kenneth Galbraith sent back. No, he was the predecessor because he sent back telegrams for Ed Murrow and I was working for Ed Murrow, you know, criticizing the wireless file and everything else that we did.

HALL: Yes, yes, you are right.

Q: Okay. Running a huge operation like USIS India must have been a tremendous operational burden and a tremendous policy, great policy problems, and what all did we do there at that time?

HALL: Amazingly enough, USIS India was traditionally one of the best operated posts and had the best system of internal communications. I am a bug on the need for good internal communications in order to properly run both USIS and its posts in the field. I felt we had an excellent system there.

We did profit from having direct teletype connections with our major branch posts. In addition to that, Bill and I visited those posts often and we had officers coming in to Delhi from them constantly.

Q: Who were at that time your primary target groups in India?

HALL: The young people in the universities we regarded as possibly the most important, since they would constitute the leadership within a very short time. Our University Program was one that I think was probably imitated in many other USIS posts.

Q: Did that include academic exchanges?

HALL: It did include academic exchanges and it included sending teams of Americans -- visiting academics and other specialists, U.S. government people, our officers or Ford Foundation people or any qualified American who was a good public speaker -- to go out to a specific university and spend several days there, holding seminars and meeting students and faculty members. There were, at that time, I think four hundred universities in India. With the teams we sent young Americans to hold bull sessions with the students. This program was enormously successful because the team members offered only friendship and their experience.

These teams would go out and spend a week, live at the university. They would have been previously scheduled by our branch post or cultural division officers to give any number of talks, hold seminars and then especially we would bring our young people with us, put them in the dormitory with the students and they would hold bull sessions with students nightly. That plus lectures and meetings with faculty members.

It was a multi-media interdisciplinary full, holistic approach to intercultural relations.

Q: With lots of personal contact.

HALL: With lots of personal contact and many questions and answers.

Q: Did you have a Fulbright Program?

HALL: We had a huge Fulbright Program that was separate but closely integrated with our operations through our cultural programs, such as the University Programs mentioned earlier. Happily we had one of the few cultural attachés who were political appointees, hand picked in this case by Chester Bowles. He was expert in his own discipline, but could also adapt to the demands and constraints of a government organization. His name was Robert R. R. Brooks. He had been Dean at Williams College and an economist in his own right. He could and did lecture on four or five subjects, a true Renaissance man.

Q: What were your main media products at that time in India?

HALL: In India we had a magazine called Span, which annually in competition with the scores of Indian magazines won awards for the best typography and lay-out and also for its editorial content, as well. That was sent to the elite on our list because its cost was high. I think it was restricted to about twenty-five thousand copies.

Our large publication was a news periodical called The Reporter, which we did in six languages - English and five Indian languages -- and I think its circulation was four hundred thousand and that was, I think, a monthly or perhaps a fortnightly.

Q: You just answered that question in part. Were your products mostly in the vernacular languages or mostly in English? There has always been this dichotomy with our PAOs in India. Should we primarily work with the English language or should we try to communicate in the vernacular?

HALL: We continued the debate and it was always a good debate worth continuing, to keep us on our toes. We actually did about half our emphasis in English and about half in the vernacular languages, which were so important. Language, as you know, is a tremendous political force in India and a very divisive and very sensitive one.

Riots can start in which fifty people are killed over the question of whether or not English should be a second official language in that part of the country.

Q: The reason I asked the question is even later, when I was at VOA, there was always the discussion on whether we should strengthen our broadcasts in the vernacular, in Hindi, Bengali and, of course, we also, towards Pakistan, we had Urdu. Hindi and Bengali were the only languages we were broadcasting and the BBC was broadcasting in other vernacular languages.

The then-PAO felt, "Forget about the vernaculars. Just concentrate on English." We did not agree. That question was not really resolved until after Iran became a major issue and the hostages were taken.

Suddenly, VOA was instructed, "Go into Farsi. Go into Pushtu. Go into Azari. Obviously, also, strengthen our Bengali and Hindi services."

HALL: That, of course, and the timing of it -- to divert a minute -- I think it was in part a reflection, even a subconscious one, of the fact that we had obviously in our policies toward Iran failed to contact this large and unseen population of people influenced by the Mullahs throughout the country in small towns who only spoke the local language, whatever it was.

MELBOURNE L. SPECTOR
Counselor for Administration
New Delhi (1964-1966)

Melbourne L. Spector was born in Pueblo, Colorado in 1918 and raised in Colorado and New Mexico. He received a degree in government from the University of New Mexico in 1940 and entered the U.S. Army in 1945. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, France, and Mexico. Mr. Spector was interviewed by W. Haven North on September 12, 1996.

SPECTOR: I went to New Delhi in '64 as the Counselor for Administration. I went there because Chester Bowles, who was the Ambassador, wanted to combine the two administrative staffs of AID and the Embassy. With my background in both AID and State, Bill Crockett sent me out. I

tried to put them together. I think it would have worked there. It would have gone even better later, when you had one overall, comprehensive Foreign Service system. But I brought out a man named Orbin Powell, who was one of the best in the business to help me do it. We proposed the first head of the operation be an AID guy, not me. The efficiency ratings of all of the people working in the combined operation would first be done by the AID man and then reviewed by the Ambassador, so that the staff would feel they had just as much obligation to take care of the AID people as they did of the Embassy. But I could never get it approved back here. Again, it was Bill Hall. It was Bill who was the Foreign Service Officer, Assistant Administrator of AID, who blocked it. The local AID people approved it: a first rate AID Director, John Lewis. So we didn't bring it off. But, once again, AID had enormous resources of physical stuff that they would not let the Embassy use.

NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES
Political Officer
New Delhi (1964-1966)

Ambassador Nicholas A. Veliotes was born in California in 1928. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of California in 1952 and a master's degree in 1954. He joined the State Department in 1955. Ambassador Veliotes' career included positions in Italy, India, Laos, Israel, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Jordan, and Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Then your next assignment was to New Delhi.

VELIOTES: Yes, but it almost didn't happen.

Q: We're talking about 1964 to '66.

VELIOTES: Right, it almost didn't happen. Vietnam had become very big by that time, and I had been told that I was going to Vietnam to become the deputy political counselor, replacing Bob Miller. I wasn't wild about the idea, with two little kids and my wife, and not sure I could take my family. This was early in '64. Then the embassy was bombed, and the ambassador said there can be no transfers. So my assignment was canceled.

My assignment to India grew directly out of the fact that while I was in the Secretariat, I worked with the office of the under secretary, now the deputy secretary, very closely, and I was actually detached to Chester Bowles on some trips abroad. His executive assistant was Brandon Grove, in India. Brandon was back in Washington on a recruiting trip for the ambassador. Shortly after my assignment to Vietnam had collapsed, I saw him and he asked me if I'd like to come out to Delhi. If so, I was one of the people the ambassador would be interested in having. So I asked my wife, and she was delighted at the thought of going to India. And that's how we got to India, in the summer of '64.

But just as my wife and children had left for California, and our household shipment had left for New Delhi, I got a phone call, about midnight, congratulating me on my new assignment to Vietnam. And I just said, "No way. I don't care who, I'm not going. I was ready to go, I've gone through this, my wife and children and the household effects. I'm going to India."

Q: What were you doing in India? What was your position?

VELIOTES: It was rather interesting. I was a Class-Three officer at that time, which is today equivalent to a One, which made me rather overranked for the job that I got. I became the deputy, in the internal political section, to Howard Schaffer, who was ranked below me. But I'd just been promoted to Class Three, and I thought the best way to learn India was through Howard Schaffer, whom I'd known before and who even then was a great expert. So I spent a year doing domestic political reporting in India. My responsibilities were North India. I spoke a modicum of Hindi, just enough to get in and out of taxis, but fortunately, the English level in India is quite high.

Q: What was the situation in North India at the time?

VELIOTES: Well, at the time, you had to look at the Indian context. It's hard to believe today, but '62, '64, those times, no one was paying much attention to the Middle East. Vietnam had not yet grown to the point where it was to be a few years later. The last major flashpoint that could have threatened a Soviet-American confrontation had occurred in 1962 when the Indians and the Chinese went to war, and the Indians were soundly defeated. That led to a secret American-Indian agreement that if the Chinese were to attack India, we would go to India's defense with our Air Force. So, insofar as we had a major interest involving Soviet-American relations outside of Europe, it was the subcontinent. India, Pakistan, this was really big politics back home.

Q: And at that time, Pakistan had not been seen as the dominant key to the situation and where we were as concentrated on Pakistan...

VELIOTES: No, we had been, through the Dulles years, but with the Kennedy administration, particularly with Chester Bowles going there, remember John Kenneth Galbraith had gone earlier, the chips were on India, more or less, and the Indian democratic experiment, which is and was real, India's prominence in the world; nonalignment was very important. It's hard today, if you hadn't lived through that period, to think of India as one of the central pillars of American policy, but it was.

Q: Well, this is what we're trying to recreate now, to have scholars understand how we looked at the situation.

VELIOTES: Well, as I say, we had a secret agreement to go to India's aid should the Chinese attack. Those were the days when you could have secret agreements, by the way. The Indians wanted it because it reassured them, but if we had had to go up to the Congress with it, we never would have had one. I'm not sure that's bad, I'm just making a comment.

Q: Well, the Indians probably would not have accepted it either.

VELIOTES: But this was a time when, as I say, the thought of going to India was very exciting because it was central with respect to the national security interests of the United States. So when the chance came and they offered me the job of political/military officer in the embassy, I took it.

We had 135 American soldiers stationed in the embassy to run our military assistance program in India. Apart from that, we had a very large economic assistance program, and an extremely large PL 480 program.

Q: PL 480 being the surplus wheat, surplus grain.

VELIOTES: Surplus foodstuffs. My goodness, we were the largest embassy in the world by far. I've already mentioned the military mission. They had to build a whole new office building to hold our AID mission. USIS was extremely large. Then much of this was replicated in other posts. Madras, we had cultural centers all around the place. We had the three consulates.

Q: Those were Madras...

VELIOTES: Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. It was during that time that we had two wars between India and Pakistan. The first was in the spring of '65, as I recall, and it took place in a strange place called the Rann of Kutch, down outside of Bombay, a desert.

Q: A horrible place.

VELIOTES: And I'm not even quite sure why the hostilities broke out. They were contained at the time.

That was the only experience I've ever had with fraudulent newspaper reporting. The Rann of Kutch made headlines all over the world when an American, who was a pool reporter (meaning there was room for one person on this plane, he went on the plane, from the Indian side, and whatever he learned, he was to share with all of the other reporters), came back reporting that he had seen Pakistani tank tracks in Indian territory. It was a scandal. It turned out later that it didn't exist; he made it up in order to get a byline in his newspaper.

This really escalated the tensions, but that calmed down.

However, some months later, in the fall, there was the outbreak of a very serious war between the Indians and the Pakistanis.

Just by coincidence, my wife and two children and I were up in Kashmir on a houseboat. And the last day we were there, we took the children and a guide, we rented horses and went up to see the glacier at Golmarg. To get there, we had to go through this enormous stand of timber. We came back down that afternoon, got on the plane the next morning, and flew to Delhi. When we arrived, we learned that Pak infiltrators, in that area that we had just ridden through, had started the hostilities that quickly escalated from the Indian Army against the Pak infiltrators, down to Lahore, where we were quite concerned about the possibility of a Pak breakthrough. Remembering what had happened in 1962 when the Chinese broke through up in the mountains,

when the entire Indian civil administration collapsed, we were very worried about what would this mean.

So Jerry Green, our DCM, called me in and said, "You're in charge of our emergency evacuation. Keep me informed." But he let it be known that it was probably best if I didn't inform him of everything I was doing, because then he would have to tell the ambassador, and he was sure the ambassador would not agree. Chester Bowles was not known for his objectivity in assessing the Indian scene. Indeed, as we had been trying to predict the imminence of hostilities, he would predict the other way, because it didn't fit his own view as to what should go on out there.

So one of my jobs, then, was to prepare the evacuation plan, but beyond that, to look around at contingencies. And the big contingency we had to deal with was if the Paks broke through in the Punjab.

Now the Indians were already getting hysterical on the civil level. Rumors of Pak paratroopers sent scads of Indian vigilantes out trying to find people who were circumcised. Strangers who were circumcised were Pak parachutists. Howie Schaffer was stopped at gunpoint, in an embassy car, with an embassy driver, and he was fluent in Hindi. How could they think he was? He and I together one night were stopped. Vigilantes were roaming the streets. In our compound the Muslim servants all moved into the homes of the Americans, because the Christians, for survival, were siding with the Hindi majority servants, and they were worried about their lives and their families' lives.

In this kind of an environment, it would have been criminal for us not to look at the contingency of a breakdown of law and order and what that would mean with respect to the American community, indeed, the diplomatic community around the compound.

So, without telling the ambassador, we devised a plan to go up to the hill station where a lot of American kids were in school and bring them out.

Q: Was this Simla, or someplace like that?

VELIOTES: Somewhere like Simla, as I recall. And we devised a plan (I had a lot of soldiers, I told you, we had 135 soldiers there) on how to get to the airport if and when the planes came in, getting our air attaché and others to work on a plan to seize the airport and secure it. If law and order had broken down, that was the only thing. And then the question of hostile mobs coming out. Our guys were looking at perimeter defense, and perhaps suggesting that the British and the Japanese and the others out there come and join us. And, of course, we had the Pakistani Embassy right across the way.

Q: Because they hadn't broken relations, had they?

VELIOTES: No. In that time frame we had set up a hospital, a school, all quietly. And as far as weapons, we had been supplying the Khamba tribesmen. We did that so we had plenty of weapons in the compound. Fortunately, none of this had to come to pass, but in talking about things you do in the Foreign Service, well, you do things like this.

Q: Well, I assume part of this was an evaluation of the ability of the Indian Army, which had not shown itself to be very capable, at that particular time, against the Chinese.

VELIOTES: Right, and there was a lot of belief, amongst the American military, anyway, that since the Pak Army was armed by the Americans and indirectly trained by the Americans, they'd be irresistible. The soldiers in our Embassy said, "Look, the Indians are well trained, they're professional." I had no reason to believe it would happen or not happen. However, as a contingency, we had to plan.

Q: And particularly when you're talking not just about a military action, but civil unrest, which was your real concern.

VELIOTES: Civil unrest, that was our concern. The Indian authorities would have done their best to protect people, but that wasn't the point. They were in a war, and civil unrest, what could we do to protect ourselves? We had the fleet off on the horizon, ready to come in with airplanes if they needed them. Fortunately for us and for India, the Indians defeated the Paks soundly in the tank battles that took place, and the feared breakthrough never took place.

There were some other things that happened there. Much of this has not been reported, in the context of my relationships.

I had a newsman friend, a Canadian, working as a syndicated columnist for an American newspaper, who had a very good friend in the Polish Embassy, the Polish counselor from a previous...

The Chinese had delivered an ultimatum to the Indians. The Indians had done some humiliating things once they were safe from the Paks. And the Chinese had been threatening to support the Paks in this. The Indians went to the embassy, in the compound area, and taunted them -- no threats, but taunted them. The Chinese had threatened reprisals unless the Indians returned some Tibetan llamas, or something, that they claimed had been stolen -- a rather silly thing. The Indians came to us and said, "Okay, the Chinese are threatening us, we want to dust off the air agreement." It turned out I was the only one in the embassy who knew about the air agreement, because when I had inherited all these files the year before, as is my wont, I went through them, because I wanted to know what was there; I winnowed five or six file cabinets down to one, and, stuck somewhere in there, I found this very interesting air agreement. So when the DCM came back and said, "Where the hell...who knows what...I've just been called by the foreign minister, he wants to invoke the air agreement... what's he talking about?", I smiled and I said, "Here it is."

Q: So much for institutional memory.

VELIOTES: Yeah. And so, at that time, there was that concern. And, of course, people were wondering, well, geez, if the Chinese come in, and we clobber the Chinese, what'll the Russians do?

This friend of mine, who was a journalist, called me up and said, "I've got to see you right away. My Polish friend has given me a message. He knows we're friends, and he knows I'm going to tell you." And he said, "The Russians are not going to do anything if the Chinese do attack and you feel you have to help the Indians, just as long as you don't do anything stupid like try to overturn the Chinese government, unleash Chiang Kai-shek, and things like that."

Well, that led a lot of us to breathe a little easier, and we got that into the hopper. Things calmed down.

Q: This was the beginning of the great rift between China and the Soviet Union.

VELIOTES: As a matter of fact, it was not the beginning, it was the verification. See, there were some people who had seen it. Lindsay Grant, who's fascinating on this subject...

Q: I'm going to interview him next week.

VELIOTES: Well, he wrote a speech for Roger Hilsman, I think it was in '62.

Q: He was the director of INR at the time.

VELIOTES: Roger Hilsman was. But Lindsay was the very young acting director of China Affairs, and it was a speech, I forget the details, which said, "Hey, we are not silly, let's try to rebuild some bridges with these people," for which Lindsay was exiled to India. (That's me saying this, not him.)

There were people who had seen the rift. And I guess the reason why we didn't see it, in part, was because of Dean Rusk's own experiences. It was before the Khrushchev memoirs. Dean Rusk was assistant secretary for East Asia and the Far East at that time, during the Korean War. He always believed the Chinese started the Korean War. And he saw the Chinese also in Vietnam. It wasn't until we got Khrushchev's memoirs that we had the confirmation that the Russians started it, with the North Koreans. And, of course, the Chinese were not intervening on the side of the North Vietnamese. They were allowing their territory to be used, but they weren't the problem in Vietnam.

So that episode ended. But because the Indians and the Paks went to war, and both sides used American weapons, and because Lyndon Johnson believed that he had not been well served by his ambassadors out there, he cut all aid to both sides. That started a change in the American-Indian relationship and a change in the American-Pakistani relationship.

The change in the American-Indian relationship was confirmed during the Indo-Pak War of '72, when Henry Kissinger, in a very ill-advised move, sent our fleet into the Bay of Bengal.

Q: Sent the aircraft carrier "Enterprise".

VELIOTES: Yeah, I was able to delay that for a couple of days in Washington, because I was back at that time. Then the Paks became increasingly close to the Chinese. The American-Pak relationship was healed when the Paks paved the way for Nixon's visit to China.

So let me explain, what you see is South Asia from the early sixties...after all, the first assistant secretary for the Near East and South Asia, for Kennedy, was Phil Talbot, who only had experience in India. You had the metamorphosis over that period of time from the South Asian focus of the administration to South Asia becoming a subsidiary point of interest.

Q: In the time you were there, how were your personal relations in dealing with the Indian officials and Indian officialdom?

VELIOTES: Well, it's an acquired taste. It took time. We ended up with some friends -- not many, but you don't have many friends, anyway.

Q: Not in the Foreign Service.

VELIOTES: Not in the Foreign Service. To many, these are your contacts, these are your business associates. I had the same frustrations that anyone has dealing with Indians, particularly at that time. They were highly moralistic, monomaniacal on the Pakistan issue, which was their only concern, only interest, and, in a very unattractive manner, would dismiss anything on your mind or your country's mind as a sign of mistaken immaturity or imperialism. It was hard to take, in dealing with them.

They were clearly uncomfortable at the degree to which they had come to depend upon us by '64, in the two years after the Chinese invaded. Clearly uncomfortable. That was clear, too, that we should be trying to find ways to cut back ourselves, because that was a very unnatural situation. We were too deeply involved; we had too high a profile. Despite Chester Bowles, they didn't want to be like us. They wanted to have a good relationship with us, but they didn't want to have us on top. We were too close. You could see them starting to move back towards the Russians (that was well before we cut aid), because they had to, for their own psyche. They couldn't be Indian... did not want to be that dependent on one side.

We ended up with several friends in the Indian community -- a couple of officials, an Army officer and his wife, a doctor, a journalist, as I recall -- and I thought that was quite successful. My wife got very interested in Indian culture, and I think that helped us get into the Indian community to the extent we did.

Q: Looking at it at that time, did you see a real thrust from the Soviet Union on India, either internally or externally?

VELIOTES: No, the Soviet Union clearly did not want to replace us as the guarantor that there would be no starvation in India. In the first place, it couldn't. I used to periodically meet with a group of embassy officers, one of them being Russian. Anytime you were around Russians, in those days, there used to be a lot of heavy drinking, and, in vino veritas, the Russians would make it very clear that they had no interest in this.

As a matter of fact, just before I left, there was quite a breakthrough. I was approached by a Russian embassy officer who said he wanted to talk to me about nuclear matters, because I used to handle nuclear matters, too. So we had the beginning of a dialogue with the Russians on nonproliferation. We realized they were worried about this. No, it was awfully hard to see, from a Russian point of view, and they were extremely cynical themselves, the Russians.

I remember one day, in one of these sessions, one of the Russian counselors looked at me and said, "What would happen if there was no government in Delhi?" We'd been talking about...

And I said, "I never thought of that."

He said, "You should. Nothing would happen, because this country is so strange. It would still run, and the same people would run it."

India is much too culturally diverse and too immersed with nonmaterial symbolism and religiosity to ever become a Marxist government. It just could never happen. That didn't mean that there were not pockets of Communism, but they came in one of the most literate parts of India, Kerala, and in the poorest part of India, Calcutta.

Q: So this was not an overriding fear as far as we were concerned at the embassy.

VELIOTES: Well, certainly I didn't see this as being a problem, that the Indians were somehow going to become Communists. What we worried about was Indian positions on international policy issues of concern to us. One of them, increasingly, was Vietnam. And one of the things that we had in common with the Indians at that time was our opposition to China. And as the Russians increasingly were becoming opposed to China, the Russians were seen as less of a threat but more of a counterbalance to China. That's how the Indians saw the Russians. And the Indians figured, we're far away, we had a lot of interests; the Russians were closer and the Russians were obsessed with China, so it was to their interest. We were worried about the Indian economic development and whether they could really progress if they had linked themselves into Russia's five-year plan. There was a lot of barter going on then, and we thought that was a dangerous thing for the Indians to do, but that didn't pose a threat to us.

One of the greatest concerns that we had was the attitude of the Indian bureaucrats with respect to the private sector, most particularly foreign aid. There just seemed to be something in that combination of high-caste Hindu and high-class British education which seemed to combine the worst of both. You would get a lot of supercilious arrogance, and, you know, a merchant in traditional Hindu life is a banya, and we were above these people and looked down on them. And a lot of very frustrated foreign businessmen, who were invited by the senior government officials... down below. That was a major concern that we had. I can't really think that we saw India going Communist.

WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK

Consul General Calcutta (1964-1968)

William K. Hitchcock was born in Wray, Colorado in 1919. He graduated with a bachelor's degree from Colorado University in 1941. He was interviewed by Steven Low in 1998.

Q: Yes, we'll go to India now.

HITCHCOCK: In many respects, India was the most interesting assignment of my career. I was truly fascinated with it, in large part because it was so different from anything I had known before. I did not understand eastern religions or the basic complexities of a society that large. I went to India in August 1964 on short notice and had virtually no time to prepare. (As you may now be gathering, this sort of characterizes my assignments one after the other.) As I said earlier, I was scheduled to go to Barcelona as Consul General, when Tom Hughes, a close associate of Chester Bowles, our ambassador-designate to India, discovered that Chet needed someone in Calcutta. He sold me to Chet who made the necessary arrangements within the Department to break my assignment to Spain.

My relationship with the Ambassador after my arrival in India began rather hesitantly but soon developed into a warm friendship. I certainly became an admirer of his, and I have no doubt that he liked me both personally and professionally. India isn't a place where you just arrive and gobble it up overnight. I read as extensively as I could before my arrival there particularly to begin developing an understanding of Indian philosophy and politics. Then I arrived in Calcutta after a quick tour of Delhi, Bombay and Madras. All in all it was a pretty modest preparation for the complicated tasks ahead of me.

The Calcutta consular district contained 140 million people. Calcutta itself was the locus of 20-30% of India's industrial output and the center of a lot of the Western (read British) history in India. Calcutta had been the capital of British India from the 18th century until 1914. When I was there it still had many of the trappings of empire. Eastern India was much more than that; it was the center of a great deal of India's own history. It was, for example, the place where Buddha attained his enlightenment in the state of Bihar. Our consular district also included Sikkim and Bhutan, then independent entities, plus the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), the Northeastern Indian territories bordering China where the 1962 border dispute had occurred. This conflict was still smoldering. There was also a great deal of tension between India and Pakistan. Indeed in 1965, less than a year after I had arrived, a war broke out with Pakistan, much of it centered in the area of West Bengal and East Pakistan.

Eastern India was big and diverse in many ways, and we in the Consulate General were involved in its problems, sometimes substantially, sometimes on the margins. Examples of a few of the region's problem areas would include the following:

- Calcutta itself contained the University of Calcutta: with over 200,000 students it was believed to be the largest if not the greatest university in the world;

-In Eastern India, the problem of development was at that time receiving urgent attention in which US aid was an active participant;

-The memories of India's colonialism were a deep and complicating feature of the landscape;

-Linguistic unity was totally lacking. English was the de facto link language, but a lot of it was not linking. People were trying to substitute Hindi for English as the most used language, but many parts of the country did not speak Hindi or understand it including the Bengal area where I was principally located. There were 16 major languages in India and about 225-230 dialects;

-The country also had a substantial tribal population and a large Muslim minority. Hindus were the overwhelming majority; and

-Residual cannibalism still existed in Nagaland.

All in all, there was a complexity about India that was interesting and important and sometimes perplexing. Shortly after I arrived, India experienced (1965 and 1966) successive famine years. This resulted from major crop failures in parts of the country where living was marginal at best. Suffering was great. The U.S., under Public Law 480, brought in over 11 million tons of food grains each year. One of the two centers of the famine was the state of Bihar, which was in my consular district. Obviously, it was basically an Indian responsibility to cope, but, given the suffering created by the crop failures, assistance of the type the U.S. provided was critical.

Throughout my tour, we were in the midst of a major attempt on the part of the Communist Party to take over West Bengal. And, in the year after I left India, they won a majority in the legislature and assumed the leadership of the state government. The communists were divided between the Chinese- and Russian-oriented approaches which was helpful in the sense that they often failed to achieve a cohesive approach in their revolutionary efforts.. There was, in this political ferment, recourse to a lot of extreme behavior. For example, they had a technique of bringing corporations to heel by locking in the management and turning off the electricity which meant turning off air conditioning. Production would become almost impossible in the oppressive heat.

We had frequent demonstrations against the United States, perhaps 30 or so per year. Most were small. But the ability of demonstrators to develop a crowd in a place like Calcutta is unbelievable, if you haven't seen it. Sometimes they would bring people in from the country by truck. But wherever the demonstrators came from they assembled in the Maidan, the big park in the center of Calcutta, which was two blocks from where the consulate general was located. We developed, in close partnership with the police, a technique whereby the marchers toward the consulate were thinned down as they proceeded. Let's say they would have a rally of 25,000 in the Maidan. The police would allow maybe 700 to march down the first block toward the Consulate and 150 or so to march down the second block. In thinned strength they would arrive at the locked gates to our office. We would almost always offer to meet with representatives to hear what their complaints were, and that usually was enough to diffuse the situation.

There was quite a lot of politically motivated violence throughout the state of West Bengal during the 1960s, though we were not involved in any of it so far as I can recall. I believe the

reason might be found in the close and congenial relations we maintained with both the Calcutta police and the Indian Army's Eastern command whose headquarters were in the city.

Calcutta was considered by many people as the city with more problems than any other city in the world. It then had a population of eight million and now I guess it's 10 plus million and maybe more. The Ford Foundation financed a group of people to advise the Indians on what might be done to make living in Calcutta more viable. They had something like 22 specialists from all over the world, all recognized experts on urban problems. What the consequences of their recommendations were, I can't say. They had not been released by the time I left, but the problem of financing the improvements they were likely to consider essential would have been a major one in Indian terms.

Q: My impression is that you had an extraordinarily able staff.

HITCHCOCK: That's true. I also had a great deputy you know well - Roy Atherton.

Q: Beyond that you had some young people: Dennis Kux, Howie Schaffer - all of whom did quite well in the Foreign Service. There were some others too, weren't there?

HITCHCOCK: Kux and Schaffer were not in Calcutta, they were in Delhi. In Calcutta, Don Gelber was our political officer, and Roy was the Deputy Principal Officer the first year of my tour. Our staff not only was good, it was also large - the total number, American and locally hired, being over 300, including our USIA operation. For any consulate general that is a large number of people.

Q: And that was AID (Agency for International Development), too?

HITCHCOCK: No, there was no AID staff there, they were in Delhi. But we had a lot of connection with AID projects in the Consular District. AID personnel also acquired a semi-staff status when they were in the area.

Q: How were relations? Did you report directly to Washington or did you have to go through the Embassy?

HITCHCOCK: Most of our reports were sent simultaneously to both places. We made sure, of course, that things we were reporting that might be of importance India-wide were routed through the Embassy. I don't think we'll get into the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) side of things, except to say they have a fair presence.

Sikkim, the tiny territory under India's protection and located on the Indo-Tibetan (i.e., China) border, requires special mention when recalling activities of the Calcutta Consulate General while I was there. The Indians were particularly sensitive about foreigners visiting the border areas. With respect to Sikkim that was less of a problem for me because the Maharaja of Sikkim was married to an American, Hope Cook, and they would invite us to Sikkim fairly often. We received our permits promptly, in part I believe because the Indians were not ready to take on a problem with the U.S. that refusing permits for our visits might cause.

Similar Indian security concerns existed with respect to Bhutan, an independent country located in the Himalayan mountains contiguous to Sikkim. Sikkim and Bhutan (plus Nepal) provided a buffer in the Himalayan mountains separating India from Chinese controlled Tibet. As I have already mentioned this area, and the Indian direct connection with China east of Bhutan (the Northeast Frontier Agency - NEFA) were of high sensitivity to the Indians because the Indo-China war at the end of 1962. The area had a long and interesting history during the British period, but it was the war in 1962 that prompted the Indian nervousness that I experienced. For our part, we were interested in developments on the Tibetan frontier and reported from time to time on the way certain groups-some of them were followers or under the leadership of American missionary groups-were escaping China through northern Burma.

Q: When you went to Sikkim and Bhutan, did you go by car?

HITCHCOCK: We went by helicopter. We'd fly to an airport in northern Bengal and then take a helicopter.

Q: These were Indian helicopters? Air Force?

HITCHCOCK: Yes, we used Indian Air Force choppers to go to Bhutan. In the case of Sikkim, we drove over wonderful mountain roads. Bhutan, a country of 850,000 and about 500 x 800 miles in size, did not have a road going into it until 1962. Bhutan was poor, in part because the lack of roads isolated people from each other, even within the country. I should add that this isolation was difficult to overcome also because of the height and precipitousness of the Himalayas.

Q: How about issues?

HITCHCOCK: Well, I've covered a lot of them.

Q: I meant policy issues that you got involved with?

HITCHCOCK: Many of our problems could be seen as policy issues or potentially so. We were dealing with a newly independent India whose colonial past raised all sorts of issues to which American representatives, among others, needed to be exceedingly sensitive. One example was the role India wanted to play in its relations with the rest of the world: as the leader of all non-aligned nations. This caused frequent frictions between the U.S. and India as, I dare say, it did between India and other countries, including the Soviet Union. India tried to hue an even line between us and the Soviet on Cold War issues, though its tilt toward the Russians was frequent and disturbing.

Maintaining a healthy U.S.- Indian relationship on other shared interests was also a challenge, often because of the newness of India's nationhood. The policy impact of such issues was, of course, of primary concern to the Embassy in Delhi but rarely did we escape them in the "outlying" cities. Indo-American problems didn't blossom into true crisis, but there were a series of constant strains. Those strains persisted to a degree, but I believe they were also slowly

changing with the passage of time. India was, as I said earlier, very resistant to approaches to the problems which would have been welcomed by a lot of people. They had an underpinning of class structures, caste structures, religion, extended family – a tradition of 3,500-4,000 years out of which these things developed. They didn't want to be too close to us.

Not all U.S.-Indian relations concerned problems of the foregoing type. Far from it. I think we were really rather popular with influential Indians and on a personal level it was easy to relate to them and even develop warm friendships. India contains large numbers of intelligent, interesting people and they are a major reason why a foreign diplomat's tour there is so agreeable. But officially they saw in us some similarities with the British past they were trying so hard to get rid of.

Q: And, are still hanging on to.

HITCHCOCK: Yes, this is a constant I think. On the other hand, many Indians recognize that British contributions to India over the years will add vitally to its future development.

Q: The Labor attaché would have been active and other people of that kind would have come up from Delhi? Was that Maury Weisz? Who was the Labor attaché at that time?

HITCHCOCK: I believe he was the Labor Attaché in Delhi at that time, though I can't remember his visits to Calcutta. There were AID teams that came, as well as lots of others. The Russians had a major program in our area.

Q: Tata?

HITCHCOCK: No, Tata is a privately owned Indian mill. The steel mill the Russians built was called Bukhara. It was in Bihar, one of the states in my district, and was said at the time to be the largest in the world. The Russians had, I think, 4,000 people there. It was a big operation. They perceived this, I'm sure, as a point around which they could hook a lot of other activities. We had helped India some in developing its steel production capacity and then we decided to stop. I can't remember why.

Earlier I mentioned that my relationship with Ambassador Bowles started off in a rather rocky fashion. The difficulty arose at the first meeting of the Consuls General he called after I had been in Calcutta a few months. When he asked me to report on developments in Calcutta, I gave what I thought was an honest analysis of the situation, emphasizing the many challenges that needed to be overcome, etc. He was absolutely furious and said, "I didn't bring you out here to be an agent of pessimism." (Laughter) That was one of the initial little frictions which we got over - not by my capitulation though. I thought it important to confront head on and discuss the unpleasant realities Calcutta faced at that moment. Chet may have feared I was bringing too negative or defeatist an attitude to my new job. That was not true, but Chet was a true optimistic, as indeed am I. We soon got on the same wavelength and our 4 years working together were great, even when we were dealing with the numerous controversial issues that arose.

My Calcutta tour ended in the summer of '68 and, not knowing what to do with me, the Department appointed me as Diplomat-in-Residence at the University of Pennsylvania. The fall of 1968 was a restive period in American education, but, perversely, I enjoyed my 4 months in Philadelphia. Little did I know it would be an abruptly shortened tour. To clarify this, I should mention that well before the Philadelphia assignment Ambassador Bunker in Saigon had indicated his desire to get me assigned to Vietnam as soon as he could find an appropriate position. This was back before Ellsworth Bunker and Carole Laise got married in Kathmandu (Being in Calcutta I went to the wedding, since I was an old acquaintance of both.) At that time I told him, in effect: that's the last place I want to go, but, I'm in the Foreign Service, and I'll go if I'm told to go. When I was in Calcutta, there were recurrent feelers coming at me from Bunker about possible assignments. Finally, around Christmas 1968, his intermediary, Jim Grant, called me in Philadelphia-

HARMON E. KIRBY
Political Officer
Madras (1964-1966)

India Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1966-1967)

Political Officer
New Delhi (1969-1972)

Harmon E. Kirby was born and raised in Hamilton, Ohio. He received a bachelor's degree in government from Harvard University in 1956 and entered the U.S. Army thereafter. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Switzerland, Belgium, Sudan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Togo, and Washington, DC. Mr. Kirby was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 31, 1995.

Q: Why don't we move on. You were assigned to Madras. Were you going to go somewhere else and then went to Madras?

KIRBY: I've forgotten what happened. Originally, I was to be assigned to Karachi. And then the Madras job opened, and they asked me whether despite the time I'd spent in Hindi-Urdu, I might like to go to Madras, where these languages were not spoken. I checked around with a couple of people who had been there and they were positive, so I said, "Yes, sure."

Q: You were there in Madras from when to when?

KIRBY: Summer of 1964 to summer of 1966.

Q: What was the situation first in India? When you arrived how did you see it? And then what was the situation in Southern India?

KIRBY: It was a very interesting time. Jawaharlal Nehru had just died...the great Pandit Nehru, independent India's first Prime Minister had died in May of 1964. He had been in decline for some time; upon his death he was replaced by Lal Bahadur Shastri. It was a time of testing for the Indian Union in a way. The old Gandhi-Nehru magic had held everything together for the first 17 years of Indian independence. Now Shastri, a member of the Indian National Congress Party hierarchy, but not part of that powerful, emotional Gandhi-Nehru tradition and line of succession, had been pushed forward by political party bosses who thought they would be able to dominate him, and push him around. That turned out not to be true, there were tremors and reverberations on the leadership front throughout 1964 and 1965. It was still an era during which people worried aloud regularly late at night about prospects for continued Indian unity. A few years before Selig Harrison had written his book India, the Dangerous Decades, and one of the questions it posed was whether or not India's fissiparous tendencies and the country's cultural, religious and political contradictions would not, in the end, drive the Union apart. 1964, to me, was not all that long ago. The importance of that year is that it fell only 17 years after Indian independence and the new India's unity was still being tested. Then, as now, India was a vibrant country. I always believed that the prospects for Indian unity for holding together, in pretty much the form we saw in 1964 were better than did some of other commentators. But, the prospects for India's continued unity, vitality, and economic and social development were perceived by perceptive Indian and foreigners alike to be important topics for discussion.

Q: If it were to split, what were sort of the conventional wisdom about how it might split up?

KIRBY: Oh, I think people had all sorts of partial, often not well thought out scenarios. They didn't necessarily sit around spinning precise blueprints. I think there was a feeling even then that the Sikhs would someday try to get either their own autonomous state or independence. Some felt that if certain elements in Kashmir, backed by certain elements in Pakistan, were successful, then maybe Kashmir would maybe become independent or parts of it would go with Pakistan. More generally, many people felt that these might eventuate a badly weakened central Indian government, with states nominally staying in the Indian Union but more or less going their own way on economic and social policy. Some thought that the Indian Union might sink into a rather loose, incoherent confederation. I would note again that I didn't particularly foresee that as the thing that was most likely to happen; I thought that the Indian Union and its institutions were strong enough, and deeply rooted enough, to survive. But some people that worried about it -- I'm not talking about people in the Embassy or in the American community particularly. Even local writers and newspaper editorials used to speculate along these lines. And certainly, when we arrived in Madras, the feeling of possible Tamil separatism was already in the air. In Madras, now called the state of Tamil Nadu, the Indian National Congress (the party of Ghent and Nehru) dominated the state government when we arrived. But indigenous Dravidian parties had begun to make serious inroads. There were several local parties. Some argued for Tamil Nadu's independence, although the mainline opposition Dravidian parties simply wanted a much broader measure of state autonomy than New Delhi wanted to grant. These were both practical and symbolic issues considered important in Tamil Nadu. We arrived in Madras in July, 1964, and in January, 1965, the state Madras broke out in serious anti-Hindi riots. (The language I had studied here in Washington.) The Indian constitution had said that English would be the country's "link language", but there was in the mid-1960's a strong move (I've forgotten all the details frankly) in New Delhi and among the northern states to make Hindi the sole official language. Indeed,

Hindi was slated to become the official language for all government communications and publications. This created rumbles of discontent throughout the south, but particularly in Madras state. First of all, the Dravidian political parties which wanted more state autonomy, which wanted to dislodge the Indian National Congress state government and replace it with one of their own, used the Hindi issue symbolically in their struggle for political power. But the issue's importance to the Tamil people was more than symbolic. Madras had one of the longest traditions of superior education and higher education in the country. Presidency College in Madras is the oldest university in India, for example. Historically, going well back into British times, the Madras had always provided many of the clerks and government civil servants to run the national administration. And even in 1965 it was extraordinary how many Madras occupied high government positions in Delhi. So the Tamils, who were being educated in both English and Tamil, in secondary schools and at the university level, felt very strongly that it would be an imposition for them to have to learn Hindi and to have to pass qualifying exams, in Hindi for government employment. They were not about to stand still for a law or constitutional amendment that said that hereafter they would have to qualify in Hindi. So, to repeat, the language controversy had both practical and political/cultural overtones. Stoked by the politicians, many young people throughout Madras state were out busy burning busses and attacking such symbols of central authority as police stations and railway stations in January 1965. It was a rather destructive period. A few people lost their lives, but not many.

Q: The Consulate General in Madras covered what states?

KIRBY: The four states of Madras, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Mysore. The Consulate General still covers those four states, although the names of two states have changed. Madras is now known as Tamil Nadu, and Mysore goes back to a historic name, Karnataka. They speak the Kannada language in Mysore.

Q: What about Kerala, it was sort of a thorn in our sides at that time, wasn't it?

KIRBY: Kerala was of concern for the Indian Government in New Delhi, as well as for the U.S. and some other western countries, because it was feared that a Communist state government might come to power there through the ballot box. This would be the only place in the free world that that had happened. Later, Kerala did indeed elect a Communist government. But in 1965 Kerala, symbolically for the Indians, and symbolically for Washington and the West -- indeed, for all those holding the line against a feared Communist advance in Asia -- Kerala loomed somewhat larger than the reality of hindsight would suggest to some people that it should have done. In any case, Kerala had, and has, a fantastically interesting mix of people. They have one of the highest educational levels in India, an extraordinarily interesting communal, religious, cultural mix. There are many Christians in Kerala, many Muslims and, of course, a Hindu majority. Politics in Kerala at that time was highly partisan. There were a great many political parties, seemingly dozens of political parties -- some of them quite small. The electoral combinations they would make prior to elections were quite creative and eclectic.

Q: You were the political officer?

KIRBY: Yes, I did two things at the Consulate General. As the political officer, I was reporting on the politics of the four southern states. I had four extraordinarily accomplished Foreign Service Nationals assisting me in that endeavor, one for each of the four states. In addition, I supervised the Consular section, which also had some very senior Foreign Service National employees. In Madras we had in all sections of the Consulate General many highly educated and very accomplished Indian employees. It was an excellent post. I am sure that is still the case today.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

KIRBY: When I was there it was Albert Franklin. My old friend, Bert Franklin, who, unfortunately, died a year or two ago.

Q: How did he operate? How did he have you operate when you were there?

KIRBY: Although it was an "old school" Foreign Service operation, the Consul General in a way, ruled with a relatively light rein. He had a deputy principal officer who coordinated day to day operations. In those days the Consulates in India were fairly large. And when you added the USIS presence, they were quite large indeed. It seems to me we had eight or ten Foreign Service officers in the Consulate General and five or six USIS officers. It was a large establishment. The Consul General made it clear he was in charge. He had studied Tamil and liked to give speeches in the Tamil language. He also liked to arrange cultural and representational events and meet Indian and American visitors. Beyond that, he left it to the staff to run their individual operations. So, I ran the consular section without much fuss. We had a lot of consular work. However, my bread and butter and major preoccupation was the political reporting. Fortunately, I liked to travel, and although the distances were fairly vast, I got around South India quite widely. I also accompanied the Consul General to the annual 2-3 day conferences in New Delhi that Ambassador Chester Bowles would hold with the three Consuls General and selected members of their staffs to discuss where India was going, politically and economically, and U.S.-Indian relations. I found it a very good working atmosphere.

Q: I want to come back to work in Madras, but you mentioned Chester Bowles. I never served in India but I've had the impression that when Bowles and Galbraith and other people go there they immediately fall in love with India and become "India-centric". They tend to want everything for India and, not being very realistic, get almost dismissed back in Washington. What was your impression at the time about how Bowles looked at things and what you were getting from his office?

KIRBY: This is something that I've thought a lot about, both at that time and more recently. I used to think about it when I was in Madras. The question had far more relevance to me personally later on when I was assigned to New Delhi during the India-Pakistan War. I think that is a danger which diplomats have to fight against constantly, of becoming overly identified with the country to which you are assigned. India (and Pakistan) are both very seductive in many ways, and, of course, there have been some U.S. representatives who tended to identify strongly with one or the other. I don't know the situation today, but I used to tell colleagues that perhaps (as you suggested) in certain environments political appointees were especially susceptible to

this. Foreign Service officers were not totally immune, of course. I think there was a tendency among many Americans assigned to India either to fall madly in love with the place or to be repelled by it and thus turned off. Striking a middle balance is often very hard, particularly for Americans. I always believed, nonetheless, that one has to make a daily effort to strike that balance. It's very important not to give Washington the feeling that the diplomatic mission in India or in Pakistan, or in country X, has become client-ridden -- the old charge of clientitis. It's not easy. It's an occupational hazard but you have to try. Sitting down in Madras, far removed from New Delhi, I formed a great respect and admiration for Ambassador Bowles and I mean that very sincerely. He was an excellent Ambassador. Although I did not see him all that often, occasionally in the south, and perhaps once or twice a year in Delhi, I felt that he tended to view India and Indian developments through rose colored glasses. I did not think his views were seriously off base, as some have said; indeed, most of what he foresaw as a vibrant Indian democracy continuing to advance economically, has turned out to be true. But he sometimes did not see the Indians as they really were and perhaps had a tendency to give them the benefit of the doubt on some issues of interest to the U.S. where they shouldn't have been given the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, to be fair about it, he really did have a big story to tell in Washington: India and its development as a democratic country is one of the exciting phenomena of the second half of this century, I think. And his views on the extent to which India might serve as a model of political and economic development in Asia had considerable merit. There was a lot going on in India and in Asia that American policy makers needed to know and think about, and Bowles insisted on bringing all that to their attention. But on the other hand, he could have pounded the table with the Indians a few times.

Q: Could we talk a bit about being the political officer? Here is a vast area, you have a lot of parties. Indians are known for wanting to talk and put forth their points of view of all hues. I would think working as a political officer would be a very trying and difficult thing to do. Could you talk about being...?

KIRBY: Sure. As you know, under the generic political officer position rubric there are subsumed many different specific functions. The political officer's position in Madras was very different from the political officer slot I filled in Delhi a few years later. In Madras the job primarily consisted of reporting on political developments in southern India to New Delhi and Washington. It was fascinating because there was a lot going on. We talked earlier about the vast scope of what was happening in India at the time -- i.e., the tension between the states and the central government and the latter's attempt to strengthen its position. India and Pakistan had a brief war in the autumn of 1965. And then in late 1965 or early 1966 Prime Minister Shastri died and was replaced by Indira Gandhi. So, there were many issues in play, both national and regional. You're quite right, the Indians -- and I am really enormously fond of India and the Indians -- not only talk a lot, but they speak well. It's delightful to engage in conversations with Indian politicians, intellectuals, and, indeed, the common people. And often one would be exposed to people of modest station. One was exposed to Indians of a wide variety of backgrounds and attainments. The local village chief would sometimes startle you with his comments, his range of interests. One day, I was asked to go somewhere in Andhra Pradesh to dedicate a school. (It was great fun, you'd get that type of assignment quite often.) After dedicating the school, and making a speech, I went out into some of the nearby villages and talked to local leadership about the issues of the day and to check in on a couple of small

development projects which the U.S. had financed. My assistants and I were received very courteously by the local leaders, the chief village elder, who was in his dhoti tucked up around his loins, with no shirt, but sporting a wonderful beard like yours, was a distinguished looking man. Sitting on the ground and speaking only Telugu, he offered me something to drink and courteously observed how nice it was that I had come and said how glad he was that relations between the U.S. and India were so good. He said he didn't get out of his village much but that he understood that the U.S. and India had a wide community of interests. I acknowledged that was so. And then his eyes flashed and his tongue sharpened, and he demanded, "When are you Americans going to wake up and do something to get the Pakistanis out of Kashmir?" And I laughed and said that Kashmir was very far away. He rejoined: "Not remote from my concerns, it's not, I'm a good Indian." This conversation occurred in a village deep in southern India. The chief said he had heard that America was providing certain types of jet aircraft to Pakistan and said if that was true, then they certainly should provide even more sophisticated aircraft to India. And went on at some length and with some passion. I responded to all this, obviously trying to round the conversation off and to put the issue in appropriate perspective. This exchange was the last thing in the world I would have expected when I entered this remote village. Perhaps regional officials had put the chief up to it. But it is important to recall that through the transistor radio these local people were following national affairs. And the chief couldn't resist the opportunity, and he was right. In front of other village elders and the common people of the village, he wanted to be sure that he had spoken up for India.

Q: You don't get much of an opportunity in any country to talk to a diplomat of a major power and he was making his point.

KIRBY: Absolutely. He was making his point, and by his lights, doing it very well. We had a lot of contact with the local people in towns and villages throughout South India during my tour. While I didn't have much time available to do it, USIS used to ask me to undertake the occasional speaking tour. I did that once or twice in the South and once or twice later when I served in Delhi. In Bangalore, the capital of Mysore state, there are many universities and training institutes. Every couple of years USIS would arrange a week of lectures on U.S. culture, politics, and history by lecturers from the U.S. or locally acquired. They asked me to lecture on constitutional theory and constitutional law, on comparative government, and on U.S. foreign policy. That work led to on-going friendly relationships with university professors in Mysore during the remainder of my time in South India. I would look in on them when I passed through, sometimes to take local political temperature and sometimes just to exchange ideas on world developments. I enjoyed steady and full employment, I must say.

Q: Did you find that the University faculty that you would be talking to, so often coming out...I guess it's true today...out of the British experience and the French, tended to be left of the ruling party? Was this natural or not?

KIRBY: I wouldn't say that was universally true. There was in fact a mixture of orientations. There were some British-trained leftist intellectuals, of course, but I think that what leftist influence there was in the universities came more from some of the younger teaching staff trained by Marxists around the world including in the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. This was particularly marked in the University of Calcutta and some of the other

universities of north India. It was less marked in the universities of south India at that time, except for Kerala.

Q: One of the big pushes of the Kennedy time and moved over into part of the Johnson Administration which you were working for at this time, was an emphasis on making contact with the youth leaders...those who would be the great leaders of tomorrow. Did you find yourself a sort of "youth officer" or that type of thing?

KIRBY: I was not so designated, but I did a lot of that kind of work, yes. I was very much involved in helping choosing people for USIA's International Visitor Programs and for the Young Leaders travel program to the U.S. We chose promising politicians and young leaders in other fields. In Madras and at one or two other posts, I also sat on the board and interviewed people and made decisions on some of the Fulbright grantees, too.

Q: Was sort of Marxism the thing of the youth, on the campuses where you were? Or was this just one of the many?

KIRBY: Again, we're now talking about my time in Madras. Marxist influence was strong in Kerala and some parts of Andhra Pradesh. Elsewhere, Marxism was not particularly strong. In Madras, up in Hyderabad, in the institutions in Mysore state, and in Bangalore, leftist influence was not especially strong.

Q: Were we concerned about what the Soviet Union was doing down in your area?

KIRBY: We were concerned about what the Soviets were doing generally as they tried to expand their influence throughout India. At the policy level, that was an abiding U.S. concern right through the Cold War. On the other hand, we were not especially preoccupied about what they were doing in the south, as such. The Soviets had a large consulate in Madras, and so did the East Germans. We were concerned about some of their links around the country, and we did what we reasonably could to follow their cultural, commercial, and other activities and report on them as appropriate.

Q: This was during the time of our build-up in Vietnam. Did the Vietnam War come in as an issue much when you were there, or did that come later?

KIRBY: My memories of how Vietnam figured in the U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship are stronger from the time I spent in New Delhi, 1969-72 because being in the Indian capital caused me to hear about the issue day in and day out. We heard about Vietnam in the South, but the South tended to be more moderate in its' American basting than the North. In most times, on most things, the south was relatively more reasonable from the American point of view. We were criticized for Vietnam, but it was not as virulent as in some of the newspapers and among some of the peace groups of the North. The North had more fora -- the World Peace Council and the organizations that you have floating around any large capital city. Calcutta had a strong leftist tinge; there was a lot of communist influence there. The Consulate General in Calcutta took its' lumps, being the target of regular demonstrations. But, we didn't have any of that in Madras.

They just weren't as concerned about Vietnam down there. The south was generally more pro-American than the North, particularly Madras.

Q: You mentioned the Pakistani War up in the Rann of Kutch and in Kashmir. Was the United States identified with one side or the other?

KIRBY: We, in our own minds and policy, certainly identified with neither side. That was a brief war. Indians of course believed, as they always did that U.S. policy favored Pakistan since, prior to the conflict, we had had a military supply relationship with Pakistan, which was much greater than what we had with India. Indeed, we had the CENTO alliance relationship, and relations were generally closer with that country. The war didn't last long enough for us to get caught in any real squeeze between India and Pakistan, however. In southern India, apart from black-outs and driving with your lights off and that sort of thing, the war didn't really have too much of an impact. We were pretty far away from the war theater. We were conscious of it, and Indians were talking about it and getting the news bulletins on the radio but the conflict didn't have a major impact upon our relations with South Indians. More broadly, it is worth noting that no Indian government, by definition, was ever happy for the U.S. to have any kind of relationship with Pakistan. To the extent that we gave the Pakistanis any kind of military or political and diplomatic support, the Indians would always claim that it was directed against them, even though that was not our intention. In any case, in the 1965 war, the U.S. did not provide additional military or other assistance to either side. Our diplomatic efforts were concentrated on trying to get the war stopped and toward the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan.

Q: Well then, you left there in 1966. Why don't we stop at this point? This is a good cutting off point. Summer of 1966 you went back to Washington.

KIRBY: Yes, I came back to Washington to the "India Desk?"

Q: Tell me what you covered.

KIRBY: I worked on the India Desk for about a year. It was a big operation. The office covered India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. I was one of three (we had larger staffing at that time) people who worked on India pretty much full time. I did a lot of the analysis of what was going on in India and in U.S.-India relations for the State Department's "seventh floor" and for the White House. I responded to many Congressional inquiries. I gave a few speeches, particularly in the Washington area, on South Asian affairs. I met with a lot of visitors to the State Department, both Indians and Americans. We had quite an out-reach program to the university community in the United States. We had a program which brought university professors to the Department from time to time to examine salient issues in U.S.-Indian relations. Along with INR, I was very active in helping to put that together and to sustain it. I wrote a speech which Vice President Hubert Humphrey gave publicly commemorating Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, which the Vice President warmly praised. I recall drafting responses from President Johnson to letters sent to him by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Thus, it was a full range of relatively junior desk-officer duties.

Q: As a junior desk-officer dealing with India, can you give a little bit of the hierarchy?

KIRBY: Yes. This was the era when the Country-Directorate concept was being introduced. Prior to that for years and years and years, it had been the Office of South Asian Affairs which handled not only the countries I mentioned above but, also Pakistan and Afghanistan. Well, when the country directorates were formed in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, which is where we were all located, the South Asian office was split into two. One office, the one I was in, covered India, Nepal and Cyprus, as the latter country was still known at the time. (At least, I think it was still Cyprus in 1966- 67.) The country director was Doug Heck, a senior officer who had been Political Counselor in New Delhi and Deputy Chief of Mission in Cyprus before becoming country director. He had a deputy, Mary Olmsted, who was senior economic officer for the country directorate and also the deputy to the country director. She had one economic officer who worked for her. On the political side, the senior man was Carlton Coon, who dealt primarily with India, but had some responsibilities, I recall, for Nepal as well. There were two India desk officers with him. At first they were Herb Haggerty and I. Then Herb left the office, to be replaced by Howie Schaffer. And then we had a desk officer, Gil Wing, for Nepal and Bhutan, and a desk officer, George Griffin, for Cyprus. We worked as a team, a team with extensive South Asia experience. Everybody there had had a very, very good grounding in South Asian affairs, a mix of academia, the Department of State and/or field experience.

Q: Were you there when they introduced the Country Director concept or had that just arrived?

KIRBY: I think it had been introduced just a few months before I came on board in September 1966. I seem to recall that the reorganization had occurred earlier that year.

Q: I've heard criticism that during Rusk's time as Secretary of State he put in the Country Director system which added another layer and in a way took away power from the younger desk officers who had little...and added a more senior...but also added another layer. Was there any talk about this at the time?

KIRBY: I don't think there was much comment of that kind at that time. I think the talk, the theory, cut the other way in 1966. The whole idea of creating a Country Directorate, as it was advertised and explained to us, was to give more authority, not necessarily to the desk officer, but to the Country Director, and to get him/her and his staff more involved in policy making than apparently had been possible in the old office concept. The idea was to give more structure and intensity to the policy on Department's 4th and 5th floors where the country directorates were located, and to take a little bit away of the involvement in details of the 6th floor. Perhaps I'm anticipating you, but if we could look forward a bit, I might comment on how I think the Country Director concept has fared over the last 30 years. I speak as one who later was a country director, not for India-Nepal-Sri Lanka, but rather next door for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh (PAB), and I felt very good about that experience, which occurred 1982-84. The NEA Bureau, where PAB was then located, permitted country directors and their staffs to operate pretty much in accordance with the original concept of making the country directorate the arena for hammering out the outline and details of policy in the country directorate and not make final policy, but it made the essential recommendations leading to policy decisions, and thus was intimately, and productively, involved in the policy process. In those bureaus where the country directorate concept has been allowed to work, I think it has worked very well. I'm not sure

whether I had that perception as clearly as I do today, when I was a junior desk officer. But, I had no quarrel with the set-up as a desk officer. In those days, to the extent that there was any kind of layering or lack of room for maneuver by a junior desk officer, it had more to do with some slight over-staffing than it did with the organizational structure as such. Some of the Department's forced slenderizing over the years, driven initially by budgetary considerations, has validated the leaner staffing concept.

Q: You had that job from when to when?

KIRBY: I was in NEA/INS from September, 1966, to sometime in the summer or early fall of 1967. I liked the job greatly and admired and liked my colleagues; it was a tremendous group of people. Even after I left the office, we continued to see each other and do a lot of things together over the years. My game plan was to try to return to India after my Washington tour. As we have already discussed, I came onto the desk from India, and my plan was to try to go back to India. Moreover, I was encouraged by my superiors to do that. As happy as I was on the India desk, I wanted a slight break from South Asian affairs before going back to India, and I also wanted to get a view of a different side of the Department of State's business before I went overseas again. A job came open in the NEA Bureau's Personnel Assignment Office and I asked whether I could be considered for that, and I was accepted in mid-1967. For the last two years of my Washington tour, I was one of two NEA Personnel Assignments Officers. If memory holds on that, Stu, that was when I had the great pleasure of meeting you.

Q: During approximately this year, 1966-1967, were there any sort of issues you got a good bit of dealing with our relations with India?

KIRBY: It's a good question. In every other job I had later on, and I know we'll explore these later, I would be able to give you an unhesitating response. For the Asian desk job I can't think of any particular highlights. For reasons I won't bore you with here, U.S.-Indian relations were in one of many troughs during that period. As we discussed earlier, the India-Pakistan War of 1965 had once again reasserted the continuing salience and primacy of the Kashmir problem, and when I was on the desk, I did work on Kashmir issues among others. Intellectually, I found that fascinating. But there were no special high points. It was a period when we were at a relatively simple maintenance level in our bilateral relations. Indira Gandhi was the still relatively new Prime Minister and she was trying to consolidate her power. She was under attack from the "old guard" of the Indian National Congress, which was trying to wrest power from her. She was, as always, and not for very good reasons this time, suspicious of the United States which, she thought, could be in league with her political enemies. She was also against the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. So, our relations were at maintenance level. We had a lot of economic assistance and cultural programs going forward in India, but there were no truly compelling war and peace, or major political issues, that really stand out for me during that period.

Q: This was your first time on a political desk sort of area, wasn't it?

KIRBY: It was the first time, and even though I haven't been able to identify major undertakings at the time, it was actually a critical period in my own formation. The experience on the desk certainly made me a different kind of Foreign Service officer when I went overseas again, or, at

least, it made a vast difference in my political reporting. Being on the desk, being in the busy Country Directorate, and having daily association with the 6th and 7th floor of the State Department, I gained from experience a more acute sense of the policy relevance of the work we did in the field. It changed substantially my approach to reporting political developments abroad.

Q: It's almost essential. Did you get a different feel for the government's -- the State Department's attitude toward India during that time, obviously looking around there's Pakistan and India. Did you get a feel for where it stood. Was it a "plague on both your houses" or well, this is Jacqueline Kennedy who was interested in India and India was a little more glamorous than Pakistan. Was there any of that?

KIRBY: That's a very interesting question. I think I did pick up some impressions, but they cut in a somewhat different direction from the way the question was put. The interesting and even extraordinary thing is that the talented group of people working in the two country directorates heading South Asia, and many of their superiors on the State Department's 6th and 7th floors, strongly believed that South Asia was important and that what happened in India, Pakistan, and some of the smaller regional countries might have a lot to do with how the third world developed generally. They thought this could have implications for U.S. security interests, as well as for democratic and economic development, and these were important in the making of the modern world. These sentiments were shared, incidentally, in the Kennedy and Johnson White House. I think that it was largely the people in the two NEA country directorates who kept South Asia front and center in our bureaucracy and in our policy process. This was as true of those who worked on Pakistan as of those who worked on India. If you worked on India or on Pakistan, you might differ about which of those two countries was at fault in a given skirmish, but there was a broad agreement among the people who worked in both areas that that part of the world was important. We all thought so. I think, had there not been that kind of dedication and commitment of the people who worked on these matters daily, at the working level in the Department, U.S. relations with those countries would not have gotten the kind of high-level attention salience that they did regularly in our government. Because the American people, by and large, were not that interested in South Asia. And in successive White House Administrations, interest waxed and waned. President Kennedy was very, very interested in India and his advisors were, too. As part of his inheritance of issues and advisers from Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson became interested in South Asia, too, but not every administration over later years was as interested. Many later argued that the State Department was putting more emphasis on India, particularly, than U.S. interests really required.

Q: So, where did you go?

KIRBY: In the summer of 1969, I went to New Delhi and was there until the autumn of 1972.

Q: What was your job there?

KIRBY: I was a political officer on the external affairs side of the Embassy's political section. Because of my growing background in South Asian affairs, I had asked to have the job which would cover relations between India and its near neighbors, except for China. We had a China hand handling Sino-Indian relations. My position was multi-faceted. I handled India's relations

with all its near neighbors in South Asia -- Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, I also had Bhutan and Sikkim. In addition, I followed developments in Kashmir. I also covered political-military affairs and, as a subset of that, military-scientific affairs. Regarding the latter, we had a science attaché, but he wasn't interested in or terribly oriented toward Indian nuclear policy or Indian missile technology. Thus, the little bit of reporting we did in those fields, I did myself. We were terribly interested in trying to get some sense of what India was doing in missilery and whether they were going to develop a nuclear weapons program. So, to the limited extent then possible I tried to follow those matters, although it wasn't easy for an Embassy political officer to do that. I also handled some Indo-U.S. related issues, particularly those that impinged on the India-Pakistan nexus. If a middle grade officer was assigned to take to the Foreign Office a message on such issues, I was often the one to handle it. So, I did get into some of the strictly Indo-U.S. matters as well.

Q: What was your impression of the role of India? Was she a colossus over the neighboring countries, including Pakistan?

KIRBY: Whatever the facts, and whatever India's actual intentions, India was so perceived by some neighboring countries, especially the two smaller ones, Nepal and Sri Lanka. I think they spent their days worrying about what they perceived as the Indian colossus. My own perception at the time was that India did fairly regularly put the squeeze on Nepal, largely through its trade and transit policy. India was concerned about the defense of its northern borders with China and wanted the smaller Himalayan states to be oriented toward New Delhi. The China-India War of 1962 had occurred not very long ago and security concerns relating to China was not a central focus of Indian policy. The Nepalese had to bring everything up through Calcutta port and the Indians used their trade and transit policy to try to keep the Nepalese in line on other matters. This was similar to Pakistan's use of the trade and transit card to try to keep Afghanistan in line, to the extent possible. I think India's sheer size and weight worried its neighbors. As a general proposition, I don't think India was unduly aggressive during most of the period I was in New Delhi, although once overt rebellion erupted in East Pakistan, India vigorously supported the Bengalis in their successful effort to break away from West Pakistan. India was not shy about using its diplomatic and economic muscle where it could effectively do so in the region, but, I think maybe the perception of an active, overbearing colossus outran the everyday reality.

Q: Before we move into the India-Pak War, which was the war really because that really changed the face of the 1971 one. A little about India's role. On the political-military side did you have anything to do with India as part of the tripartite group that was supposedly policing in Vietnam?

KIRBY: I didn't have anything to do with that. My colleague who handled Asia generally during most of my time there, Don Anderson, had that as part of his area of responsibility. Moreover, by the time I arrived in Delhi in 1969, the war in Vietnam was pretty well advanced, and the Tri-Tripartite Commission in Vietnam loomed less large on the political and diplomatic horizon than it had earlier in the 1960's.

Q: It really wasn't very much. I was in Saigon in '69-70. It was just the Indians were not seen as being very friendly toward the United States.

KIRBY: They weren't helpful at all. During my time in Delhi both their private diplomacy and their frequent public statements on Vietnam were quite unhelpful. I remember that our Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission spent a lot of time trying to counter some of the things Indian officialdom were saying about Vietnam and the things that were appearing in their press, much of that inspired by the Indian Government. The Indian Government's press spokesman at the time regularly put out a lot of stuff on Vietnam that the United States Government and we in the Embassy found very unhelpful.

Q: Looking at this and you're dealing with the Indians at this particular time, what did you feel was the motivating force behind this antipathy towards the United States and Vietnam? I mean it seemed to run throughout the whole Indian thing.

KIRBY: I think there were two or three inter-related aspects to the Indian position. First, was India's self-assumed role of being a spokesman within the non-aligned movement, for the down-trodden, for the erstwhile colonial world and what have you. They saw Vietnam in that context. The U.S. saw one independent country, South Vietnam, as, essentially, being infiltrated, and ultimately invaded by its neighbor from the north. The Indians, however, chose to interpret the issue as being one of a small Asian country that had been dominated by, first the French, and now the Americans, which was trying to throw off the last vestiges of colonialism and bring about national unification. It wasn't that way in our case. Whether Indian officials genuinely perceived the issue that way, or whether they simply chose to see it that way for policy reasons because it suited their role in the UN and in the non-aligned movement of speaking up against great power pressure may be open to question, of course. One may continue the discussion by asking the Indians. They never found a way to speak out against Soviet pressure on other countries. That brings me to the second point I wanted to make about the strands of Indian policy. Another motivation for the Indians, was something we referred to earlier -- i.e., their security concerns about China. As the Indians perceived it, then and now, the overwhelming security threat is from China. Indian policy and diplomacy have always been designed to keep the Chinese at bay. And central to that was staying friendly with the Soviets and looking for Soviet diplomatic and other kinds of support where they could get it. Because of the perception of China they never wanted to be out of sync with the Soviets on Vietnam or anything else.

Q: They had the Soviet card to play.

KIRBY: Yes. They would never get too far out of step with the Soviets on Vietnam. In general, if you look back at what the Indians were saying about Vietnam, it was usually consistent with the line the Soviets were taking on Vietnam. And I think that the third element in Indian Vietnam policy -- and maybe this is a subset of the first element -- India then and now perceived itself as a big Asian country that should speak up for the rights of other, selected Asian countries when the latter are engaged in conflicts with the West. And, so it follows from all that, that India spoke for Vietnam against the American power, located so far away from Asia that, from the Indian viewpoint, it should not have involved itself in Asian affairs. I don't defend any of that and used to vigorously contest it with my Indian friends, as you can expect. However, I think those are the three elements that were driving Indian policy on Vietnam.

Q: Was there also an element that the Indians had caught...I don't know what to call it...the British "upper class virus" or something from their educational system and their leadership that the Americans are upstarts and uncouth, uncultured and over here sort of anything like that?

KIRBY: There may have been some aspect of that but I think, interestingly, and this may be a fourth element in the Indian attitude toward the U.S., it worked slightly differently, as Indian officials sought to "play" the U.S. to India's advantage. Nehru profoundly believed, and used to tell his close associates, that the way to get the attention of the Americans and to get things out of them is by calling on them and their country to live up to their better selves. He suggested that when Americans can be brought to feel that they are betraying their own principles or mankind's principles, then if you scream at them loudly enough and kick them in the shins, they will apologize and make up for it by doing what it is you want them to do. He tended to believe that was the way you dealt with Americans. That may have been naive on his part, but there were times when we gave Nehru and others reason to think so. I think we ourselves have matured greatly as a people. I think that a long time ago we began to get out the word that you don't get to be friends with the U.S. by kicking us in the shins or otherwise defaming us. There are those who say we should have done it earlier. I think there was that aspect to Indian attitudes toward the U.S., and that it took too many years for that to die among certain elements of Indian leadership. India doesn't believe that today, incidentally. By the way, I should interject here that I was a great friend of India when I was in India and that I remain one now. In saying the foregoing things bluntly, I would not wish to detract from my great interest in and friendship for India. It is one of the countries and one of the peoples for which I have the highest regard. I don't think my wife and I have ever been happier than during our two tours in India. But we always believed that where we agreed with Indian policy, we should be quick to say so, and that where we thought that Indian policy was misplaced or misdirected, we should say that, too. Friends have to be able to argue out their differences. We were considered, while we were there, to be genuine friends of India. I don't want to presume too much here, but people, both Indians and Americans, were good enough to say that they thought we struck a good balance. We were always quite clear that we were American spokesmen, that while our empathy for India was obvious, where differences arose, we should be quick to speak up vigorously, and repeatedly, for U.S. interests. That is what I think you have to do.

Q: As a political officer at the Embassy, how did you operate? Maybe not a typical day, but what did you do?

KIRBY: That's a very good question. First of all, I regularly saw a tremendous number of people. I made quite a point of cultivating all the people in the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who dealt with the areas in which I had some interest and responsibility. There was a division of the foreign office that dealt uniquely with Pakistan. The Northern Division dealt with India's northern border, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and some other areas to the east. And then there was the division that dealt with Sri Lanka, Burma and the Indian Ocean. I really got to know people from junior desk officers up to their directors who were our Assistant Secretary equivalent. I saw a lot of those people. I would schedule office appointments fairly frequently, I would invite them to my home. They were very nice; as they got to know us, many of them invited us to their homes. The Indian officials are not only very accomplished diplomats, but like the Indian people generally, they are generous and warm-hearted. So, one got around and saw a lot of people.

Sometimes it was just chatting to "cultivate the garden," sometimes to explore specific things that Washington wanted to know about, or that I thought they ought to know about as to where Indian policy was going regarding Pakistan or how they were reacting to a given policy move in Nepal, let's say. I also got around -- I cultivated widespread contacts in other Embassies. And, again, this was from Third Secretary to Ambassador, most of whom were always good enough to give me some time. I especially got to know the people in the embassies and the high commissions of the countries that I was working on -- Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Afghanistan. I spent a lot of time with people in those embassies to get their perception of how their bilateral relations were with New Delhi. But I also found in New Delhi, as I had elsewhere, that the British, Australian, and Canadian High Commissions, and the French Embassy were all very good value. They all were very ably staffed, with very gregarious and nice people. In general terms, they were all interested in some of the same things that the U.S. was interested in in that part of the world. (Apart from India and its near neighbors, I was also covering Kashmir and Indian nuclear policy.) So, that was another part of the "network" if you will. I became particularly busy during the prolonged India-Pakistan crisis of 1971. It began roughly in January of 1971 and then, in some ways, reached its culmination on December 3, 1971, when war broke out between India and Pakistan over the question of whether what was then East Pakistan would become independent Bangladesh. The result of that war was that Bangladesh emerged as a new nation. During that year of prolonged crisis, I spent at least half my day (and these were very long days stretching into the evenings most times) given over to reporting and analysis, writing telegrams to Washington about what seemed to be going on in the India-Pakistan nexus. I repeatedly commented on the prospects for war and how the East Pakistan thing was likely to play itself out. I tried to predict (a) what would actually happen and (b), to lay out some of the markers as we saw them in New Delhi with respect to some of the pitfalls and challenges for American policy as the crisis unfolded. So, 1971 was a non-stop year.

Q: Why don't we talk about how 1971 developed. Bearing in mind we are talking about people who will not be as familiar with these transcripts -- there will be many other events around the world and this was one of them. How this played out and how you saw your role and what the Embassy was doing at this time?

KIRBY: Briefly put, there had been dissidence in what is today Bangladesh and then was East Pakistan, ever since Pakistan was created in 1947 when the British left the subcontinent. The two wings of Pakistan were separated by the land mass in India. The Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan had the same religion as their West Pakistan counterparts, but their culture and lifestyle were very different. By 1971, there had long been a dissident movement. Without going into more detail than you want, I would note that long-time Pakistani President Ayub Khan, who had been a fairly firm leader, had recently been replaced by another general, Yahya Khan. There began to be in 1969-1970 and early 1971 frequent and publicly audible questions about just how long Pakistan would be able to hold on to its eastern wing. That was one of the irritants in India-Pakistan relations, but there were many others, as well. The perennial Kashmir question continued to boil and problems between India and Pakistan on India's western border often produced tension. In January 1971 there was an airplane hijacking in Kashmir which caused India-Pakistan relations to plummet further. We did a lot of reporting and analysis on that. I remember telling my superiors in Delhi and in Washington that that incident would prove to be

far more important in terms of the way the subcontinent would develop in the period ahead than the simple fact of the hijacking itself. It was bound to add considerably to bilateral tensions.

Q: Why did you feel this? Hijacking are hijacking...

KIRBY: One thing I mentioned earlier only in passing was that reporting on Kashmir was one of my responsibilities. Each of the embassy officers working on external affairs also had a domestic component to his portfolio. And my domestic reporting responsibilities were two-fold. One was Kashmir politics because although it was domestic, it was also part of the India-Pakistan imbroglio. (Because I had served in Madras earlier, I reported on South India matters as seen from the New Delhi perspective.) Kashmir was an active part of my dossier, and I had been to Kashmir a number of times. In both Pakistan and India the top leaders were still feeling their way. Prime Minister Gandhi had been in power for a while, but as I said earlier, she was in the middle of a leadership challenge from the "old guard" leaders in India. Yahya Khan, a less strong leader than the man he had replaced, Ayub Khan, was already being criticized for having less moxie, less control in Pakistan. It was apparent to me that each of these somewhat weakened leaders was going to have to "hang-tough" on anything that happened vis-a-vis each other. To make a long story short, that is what happened. The posturing over the hijacking on both sides further clouded the air in India-Pakistan bilateral relations and deepened the mood of pessimism in the subcontinent. However, if things had not begun to bubble in East Pakistan at the time, I think the hijacking incident might have just passed into history and never been heard of again. As it was, it was just one of the elements in the gathering storm.

Q: Just a mind-set as an Indian hand, had you and maybe your other Indian hands a long time ago taken a look at the map and the demographics and written East Pakistan off as something that eventually would go, and where did you think it might go?

KIRBY: I was privileged to be able to make an official trip around East Pakistan in March of 1970 from New Delhi. One of the things people in my job did was to visit the territory in neighboring countries for orientation. Similarly, the India watchers in our embassy in Pakistan used to visit us. Dennis Kux and Steve Palmer used to come over and consult on India. So, at the invitation of the Consul General and his staff in Dhaka and with the concurrence of Ambassador McFarlane in Rawalpindi; I went over for a fairly lengthy trip to East Pakistan in March of 1970. The Consulate General couldn't have been nicer in showing me around. I shared my perceptions with our diplomats in Dhaka and went back to Delhi and told Ambassador Keating and his staff that over the long haul the Pakistani government would not be able to hold the eastern wing. I said I didn't know how long it would take, but that cauldron was bubbling. The Consulate General in Dhaka had perceived this too, of course. I said that it was just a matter of time. I don't want to mislead you, I didn't say it was going to happen during my watch in Delhi or that it was going to happen within the next year. I do remember saying I could not put a time on it, but that the dissidence was farther advanced than some might think. I speculated that the developing tension would pose important policy questions for Washington. I said I thought the U.S. should reflect on how we would relate to the crisis when the balloon finally went up. I wasn't predicting that it would go up in 1970 or '71, but I did say I thought it would go up relatively soon. As a matter of fact, as it turned out, it was almost a year to the day that I said that in Delhi that the crisis actually exploded on the 25th or 26th of March 1971, when the riots started in Dhaka and

the Pakistani army responded. From the Pakistan government's point of view, it was all down hill from that point on. Those who were trying to bring independence to Bangladesh saw it in very different terms, of course.

Q: From your point of view, was independence of Bangladesh the only real option or did you see India maybe making a move to take it over?

KIRBY: Of India wanting to incorporate East Pakistan into India? I saw no move in that direction at all, although it is a good question. I saw no move in that direction, and I am absolutely persuaded that that was the last thing that would be on any sane Indian policy maker's mind. Rhetorically, there may have been some Bengalis in India's predominantly Hindu West Bengal who argued that East and West Bengal should be reunited in the Indian Union. There were doubtless some Bengalis who thought it would be nice to get the old historic Bengali cultural entity back together. I don't know what the Indian archives will show, and I may be proved wrong some day, but I can't believe serious Indian policy makers would have considered taking East Bengal on for two reasons. One of the greatest problems of governance for New Delhi at the time was West Bengal and Communist influence in West Bengal. Delhi had great problems with that. Mrs. Gandhi's party, the Indian National Congress, was not able to form a government in Calcutta during part of that period. They would not have wanted to add that impoverished East Bengal, which had some leftist effervescence of its own, to the Indian Union. The other, and perhaps more important, thing was that the Indian Government would not have wanted to add 100 plus million Muslims to the Indian Union at that time. Bluntly put, I'm absolutely convinced of that.

Q: How did this thing play out? You had your hijacking, you were seeing the atmospherics, there were riots in the beginning of 1971.

KIRBY: And the Pakistani army cracked down rather firmly in East Pakistan. That then led to an enormous number of refugees from East Pakistan into India. I'm still calling it East Pakistan at this stage, because that's what it was up until late 1971. In the refugee numbers game it's very hard to know exactly where truth lies. We were hearing upwards of 11-12 million refugees from East Pakistan flooding into India by mid-1971. The UN system and USAID got engaged in feeding many of these refugees. I'd say there were a very large number of refugees. The Indians - I don't know whether they still deny it, although they denied it at the time -- got involved in the very early stages of supplying the Mujahideen, the "freedom fighters" in East Pakistan. They supplied them weaponry and other types of support, and although Indian policy makers denied it for a long time, the Indian army itself supported the Mujahideen along the frontier and perhaps across the frontier from time to time. The thing that validated such support in Indian eyes was the flow of refugees into India. My own belief is that the Indians, convinced that the Pakistanis couldn't hold it and shouldn't hold East Bengal probably would have assisted the process once dissidence broke out even without the refugees. In their own eyes, however, the Indians were morally justified doing it once the refugee flow started. In the Indian Government's view, the conflict in East Pakistan had to be brought to an end quickly and successfully, i.e., with the emergence of a new, independent political entity in East Pakistan.

Q: While this was happening...here we have a series of Foreign Service posts that are involved. One is our Consulate General in Dhaka, our Consulate General in Calcutta which was in the receiving area also in the Bengali area of India, the Embassy where you were and our Embassy in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. Within our business, how did you see the various actors, our people, looking at this thing?

KIRBY: Number one, all things considered, I think there was pretty good coordination during that year among the U.S. Foreign Service posts in the region. There was a fair amount of travel back and forth so that we could, to the extent possible, share information, be on the "same sheet of music," etc. I used to go to Pakistan fairly frequently during that period to brief on the view from Delhi. Ambassador Carol Laise, in land-locked Nepal, had a very real reason to worry about overland her life-line from the port of Calcutta up to Kathmandu. She asked me to come up to Kathmandu fairly frequently during that year of 1971 to talk about war/peace prospects. Some from our Embassy in Pakistan came over to see us in Delhi. There was good coordination in the field, I think. But you're wondering how did the various American officials in South Asia see the developing crisis, is that it?

Q: But you are pointing out something that is very important. One can get the impression, when one is not an India-Pak "hand" that these two embassies would sit and glare at each other, XXX this is not what you're telling me.

KIRBY: This is important. I think historically, that's the way it often was, alas, between our embassies in New Delhi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Although that 1965 war was a short-lived conflict, sitting down in Madras, looking at the telegrams from our embassies in the two countries, I sometimes had the impression they were talking about two different wars. You did very much sense a "we-they" kind of orientation. I will not say to you there weren't sometimes differing perceptions during the 1971 war, because there were. (I'd like to come back to that later.) Nor am I going to say that, during our time it was perfect, not like the "bad old says" -- it wasn't. I do believe, however, that during this period we're talking about, to the extent possible embassies New Delhi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad made an effort to be objective, i.e., not to be driven by clientitis. I did say to my Deputy Chief of Mission, Galen Stone, to Lee Stull the political counselor, and to Ambassador Keating, that I thought we should be especially careful with Washington, not to be perceived to be falling into Indian Government traps, if you will, and becoming spokesmen for the Indian point of view. In Delhi the embassy team agreed that we were all working for the American government and that to the extent possible our two embassies should avoid taking pot shots at each other, as had sometimes been done in the past. Although I'd have to go back and look at the files to be absolutely sure, I do believe during that prolonged crisis the two embassies were not taking nasty cracks at each other in telegrams. I don't know what people said to each other on the telephone to Washington, but we didn't telephone that much in those days, in any case.

Q: Particularly we had in the earlier period people of high caliber, high powered people -- Chester Bowles, George Ball in Washington, Galbraith -- a lot of ego was involved.

KIRBY: A lot of ego was involved in the 1960's. I think that was mercifully played down in the 1971 crisis. In retrospect I think that Embassy New Delhi, and Embassy Rawalpindi conducted

themselves very well. Part of the proof of this is that not only did the two embassies engage directly all during the crisis by traveling back and forth and so on, but that once the crisis was over and U.S. relations plummeted with both sides, Pakistan and India, relations between the two embassy teams continued to be very, very good in 1972 and beyond. We continued to visit Rawalpindi and they continued to visit us in New Delhi. We continued to try, as much as possible, to arrive at common perceptions etc., to the extent possible. Now, did perceptions differ? Well, they did to some extent, of course. Each embassy, I think in a very professional way, put forward its point of view. As you would expect, there were some differences. By and large our Embassy in Pakistan was, understandably, reporting what the Pakistanis were saying to the effect that, "you Americans are our allies and you must recognize that the Indian colossus is aiding some dissidents to pinch off half our country." As a general proposition, Embassy Islamabad didn't fall into that trap of seeing the crisis in East Pakistan as largely Indian-inspired. But still, the voice of our Embassy in Pakistan would have been on the side of trying to get the Indians to stand down and cease their assistance to the East Pakistan dissidents. From Delhi, we too argued with the Indian Government that it shouldn't be involved militarily, etc. The U.S. Government said that to them in Washington, and we said that to them in Delhi. But, we also reported to Washington from Delhi our view that the die was cast, that inexorable process was in train with the certain result that East Pakistan would become independent. While our Embassy couldn't say exactly when the denouement would come, when the crisis began to unfurl we said, "There is going to be an independent Bangladesh." This was not a value judgment on Embassy New Delhi's part -- that's simply the way we were convinced it was going to turn out. We said that it probably was going to come about by war, but that one way or another it was happening. And, then we offered our views on how the U.S. should relate to the crisis. I think the view from our embassy in Pakistan was that maybe it wasn't inexorable, if the Indians didn't push things too far. These were honest and reasonable perceptions, it seems to me. I think they both were highly professional perceptions and judgments.

Q: Now this was the high Kissinger period. What were you getting from there? Because Kissinger was always looking at things in a completely different light than say maybe our embassies. He was thinking in terms of bi-products of American, Soviet, Chinese relationships. Were you getting anything, cold water saying you guys are off the track?

KIRBY: What we were getting from Washington was, in the vernacular, "tell those Indians to behave!" You've doubtless read Kissinger's memoirs where he writes about the "tilt" toward Pakistan and the reasons for it. I can't speak to private communications that the Ambassador might have had with Washington that I didn't see, but in the normal cable traffic, I really think it was simply, "tell those Indians not to get involved militarily, not to make things more difficult for Pakistan" -- a fairly reasonable approach on the whole. Which is what we in Embassy Delhi believed we should be saying too. We believed that the U.S. should be trying to prevent war. We didn't think it would work necessarily, but we did it with stout heart -- trying to talk the Indians out of complicating Pakistan's crisis. Our view was that if the Indians thought it was an inexorable process, then they should let the inexorable process run its course without getting aggressively involved or otherwise roiling the waters. That was the general policy line from Washington -- to do what we could to prevent conflict in the subcontinent. With a possibly different view of the likely outcome, we in Delhi believed this to be in general the right policy

line. Our major differences with Washington came later when war finally broke out. At that point we in Delhi wouldn't have wanted the U.S. to tilt as openly towards Pakistan as was done.

Q: How did you find Ambassador Keating from your perspective? I know later when he went to Israel, he was getting quite old and he wasn't as engaged. Or was this when he was in Israel?

KIRBY: No. He went to Israel after India. He was in India from 1969-1972.

Q: We're really talking about a man with an honorable career but who was just getting too old. How did you find him at that time? Was he a personage of some figure taking control or was this pretty much in the hands of professionals?

KIRBY: I was, and am, extremely fond of Ambassador Keating. I had not known him before we went out there. My wife and I got to know him very well in Delhi and traveled with him on one occasion to Kashmir, and on another to South India. We found him to be genial and warm and a very honorable gentleman. I don't think it was so much a question of advanced age -- he was 69 when he went to New Delhi, and he stayed there three years, so he must have been close to 72 when he left. I had never previously seen him except in photos and on television when he was in the Senate, so I can't compare the pre-New Delhi person with the man we knew in Delhi. I suspect that his personality was always that of being a rather genial presiding figure, presiding deity, rather than a nuts and bolts policy figure, if you will. And that's the role he played in the Embassy. He was engaged. Ambassador Keating came to the office every day, he held country team meetings, and senior staff meetings, he received visitors, and within the parameters he and the DCM had worked out, he would sign off as authorizing officer on telegrams to Washington which addressed major issues. But the embassy was run essentially by the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Embassy counselors and agency heads. They were a very senior and very powerful group in India, but a very collegial group on the whole. I'm not implying they took anything away from the Ambassador; that appeared to be how he wished to operate. He saw himself as the front man, meeting and greeting visitors, going to see the Prime Minister, and sometimes meeting other senior ministers in the Indian government like the Foreign Minister. If he was not a vigorous "hands-on" type, which he was not, it always struck me that he was always a genial presiding officer, a genial "Chairman of the Board". It always seemed to me and my wife that it was a pity that Ambassador Keating, if he was to be Ambassador to India, was not there in better days, that he was not there during a non-war situation when U.S.-Indian relations were good, where he could sort of go with the flow and enjoy the place. He had an immense liking for India, always claiming that he had asked President Nixon, who had earlier lost out on his Senate race to Bobby Kennedy, to send him to India because Keating, a lawyer, had been a mid-fortyish Brigadier General who had served in India in the China-Burma-India theater in World War II. And he had formed a great liking for India at that time. So, he had a genuine liking for India. It was just not in the cards that he and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would get along well in the then prevailing political circumstances. There was not particularly good chemistry between this particular female Prime Minister and an older American ambassador. I just always wished that he had been there during easier and better days. But, he didn't do a bad job.

Q: Did you find during this crisis and the war that your Indian sources either dried up on you or turned sour?

KIRBY: Dramatically to the contrary. It was extraordinary the extent to which my working and social relationships held up through the war. I'm not saying, "hey, look at me," but there may be a lesson for all of us in this. Sources didn't dry up; I had worked at cultivating them. I just want to give one or two examples to illustrate this. The first occurred a month or two before the outbreak of direct India-Pakistan conflict. Without going into all the details, some rather dramatic armed incident occurred in East Pakistan which caused the Pakistani Government to argue that common sense suggested that elements of the Indian Army had to have gone across the border into East Pakistan to bring the incident about. It could not have happened any other way, they charged and, indeed, I privately thought that was probably the case. The previous day on instructions from Washington, the Ambassador had been in to discuss that incident with the Indian Foreign Minister. The event had happened three or four days before. The incident occurred, and Embassy Delhi was reasonably certain, and Washington was reasonably certain, that the Indians had brought about whatever that development was. Under instructions, the Ambassador went in to see the Foreign Minister who looked him in the eye and said, "No, we were not involved...we could not have been involved...for the following reason," etc. I pondered the matter long and hard and put together some pieces of the puzzle that were available to me. I concluded once again, that it couldn't have happened any other way but through Indian involvement. So I picked up the telephone that day after the Ambassador had appropriately done his job, by discussing the matter with the Foreign Minister at some length. And I called somebody in the Foreign Office and asked to see him that afternoon: "I know you're a busy man, but..." And he said, "Yes, do come at about 5:00, although I am busy." I went in late in the day and I sort of sank down in the chair, looked him in the eye, called him by his nickname, and said, "I don't care what your government is saying, I don't care what you tell me here...I know that the following happened in the following way." And then I laid out my speculation while saying, "I know," and it was a wonderful moment. This person looked me in the eye and said, "I am not going to lie to you. You are absolutely right except for two small details." And then he clarified those details. He didn't want to lie. This man was fiercely protective of Indian policy, but he didn't want a fib on our particular personal record. He knew how things were going to go in East Pakistan; he was very much an Indian spokesman, but with a diplomat whom he respected and a friend for whom I believe he had some affection, he didn't want to prevaricate, so he confirmed what I already knew. And, to his credit, by the way, because he deserved it, he later went on to the very highest diplomatic posts that India has to offer. To repeat, he deserved to; he's that kind of man -- a good professional. And when the chips were down, people like that knew the limits of what they could tell me. Maybe some would say that he went over the line, although I don't think so. He knew I had the essence of the matter and was reporting it to Washington anyway, and he presumably wanted me to get it just right. His reading of me and our relationship was such that he did not want to prevaricate under these circumstances. In my mind, that was a highly professional judgment on his part. No, sources didn't dry up, i.e., good professional sources. Of course, there were things that people couldn't and wouldn't tell you, but on the other hand, if you'd spent two years laying the groundwork, you'd probably go away from most conversations knowing as much as you needed to to have a reasonably accurate picture.

The other illustrative incident I might recall was perhaps a little more showy and dramatic. Many of the American Embassy staff were not then getting invitations from Indians, but my wife and I were invited to a fairly high, senior Indian official's house during that period for dinner. And I was very surprised because this was someone whom I had found rather contentious at times. I liked to talk with him and engage him. He and I used to bicker over policy, then shake hands and have a drink. But, we'd argue fiercely. Anyway, he invited us to dinner. And I asked my wife, "What's that about?" And she said, "Well, he's inviting us to dinner." I said, "Yeah, but why right now?" It was either during the war or perhaps the week after the war. We arrived and found that the guests were mostly Indian officials and politicians; we were the only foreigners there. Our host came to the door and quite deliberately, threw one arm around each of us as he led us in and said, in a booming voice that everyone could hear, "I've been worried about you. I wonder how these Indians are treating you during this time of crisis." This was a very senior Indian official. That was his way of saying: OK, this is a middle grade officer from an embassy which represents a serious power in the world. We may not like U.S. Government policy, but the U.S. is a serious power, and this is an officer who has always dealt with us fairly and told us exactly where his government stood. All the Indians at the dinner then relaxed and we were immediately drawn into a typical spirited, though friendly, discussion. I was very fond of India but decided early on that as an American representative I would not mix friendship with policy. When you disagreed, you said so. And if you disagreed, you fought like hell, openly. Put the agenda right there out on the table. My wife and I took great pains to do that every place we'd been. I think it works every place. We have never pretended something we didn't believe. If we didn't agree with a given Indian policy, we would say so. We always defended American policy. The Indians knew exactly where we stood. And I think this was a dramatic example of how you can get through difficult times. We were circulating all during the crisis and after the crisis was over when the guns were stilled, i.e., when U.S.-India relations went into decline because of an Indian perception that America had tilted toward Pakistan during the conflict.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point and I'll add a few things. We'll basically start immediately before the guns started going off. What we did when the war went on, follow through with the aftermath. I have a couple of questions I'd like to ask. Did you have any connection or revive anything from the Station Chief, the CIA or anything like that? Did they play any role for information gathering and then did the tone from Washington change? We're thinking about the Enterprise and the tilt and all that. And the post-war period. And then something I'd like to take up before we leave India, would be about how you saw on your side, India and nuclear activities. We'll pick that up then. OK?

KIRBY: Very good.

Q: As you mentioned before, the war was about to start. How did it hit the Embassy? Just prior to this were you all kind of knowing it was going to happen? Was it just a matter of time?

KIRBY: I think that those who followed these things closely believed from about April-May of 1971 on, that a clash between India and Pakistan over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was inevitable. The political counselor and one or two others and I in our private conversations and in the telegrams we sent to Washington said, "In our best judgment, it will happen." The only question was when. As I said in our earlier conversation, our feeling in Delhi at the Embassy, and it

certainly was the feeling of our authorities in Washington and, I think, that of other friendly governments as well, that whether or not we thought a conflict was inevitable, the thrust of our diplomacy should be to do everything we could to try to assist our two friends in the subcontinent to avoid conflict if it were at all possible. There was never any doubt in my mind that war was just about inevitable. The reason I kept using "well-nigh inevitable" is that one can always hope for a miracle. I did not think that miracle would be forthcoming. I was not surprised when war broke out on the third of December, 1971.

Q: Did you sense, through your visits and all, that there was a difference in attitudes between our Consul General in Dhaka (Arch Blood was the Consul General at the time) but on the ground watching the Pakistanis in what was a fairly brutal repression of dissident forces, what the Embassy in Rawalpindi/Islamabad was reporting?

KIRBY: You're asking whether there was any difference between the two? You know, I haven't gone back and looked at telegraphic traffic for that period. And I would have to do that before I could answer that with any real sense of confidence. I don't remember any sharp differences, but of course Dhaka was reporting the firm Pakistani Army crackdown.

Q: It's not really the reporting from the cables. What I'm think about that you were talking to everybody and I guess everybody was talking to everybody else?

KIRBY: As I had mentioned last time, I had myself gone to what was then East Pakistan, in March of 1970 and had had a nice trip there. That was approximately one year before the conflict broke out. After that I was privy to the analysis, the telegraphic reporting the things that all Foreign Service posts in the region were sending to Washington. But I didn't make any trips myself to Dhaka and East Pakistan after March, 1970. My memory of it is -- and again I underline memory because I haven't re-read the telegraphic traffic -- I don't recall any sharp differences between Dhaka and Rawalpindi. I do recall that our people in Dhaka shared the view that East Pakistani, or Bengali dissidence would continue, and that in the fullness of time it would be difficult for Pakistan, i.e., the government in West Pakistan, to hold onto the East. I think that was their bottom line view. Over in Rawalpindi -- but again, to get a firm view of this, you would have to talk to people who were over in the Embassy in Rawalpindi at the time -- my memory is that our embassy recognized that it would be a difficult task, but that it was perhaps understandable if a sovereign state like Pakistan tried to hold itself together and hold the constituent parts together. That would have been the embassy's analysis, that the Pakistani Government had the legal right to try to maintain the country's integrity.

Q: It was our obvious policy to try to stop everyone from fighting. What were you tasked with? I mean you at the Embassy, what were you tasked with doing?

KIRBY: As I recall it, the Embassy in New Delhi got fairly steady instructions from Washington, i.e., the State Department and the White House, to weigh in with the Indians, to try to persuade the Indian government not to do anything that might exacerbate the situation, not to cause the situation in the region to deteriorate. And so in that regard, the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, operating under those instructions went in very frequently to see the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Secretary to argue against adventurism if you will. I believe they also saw the

Prime Minister during that period. Certainly, at my level, I was doing the same thing. I was seeing what would equate with our Assistant Secretary level and Director level in the Foreign Ministry, making the same points. I also accompanied the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission on calls on the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister.

Q: What were you getting in response?

KIRBY: What we were getting in response was that it was not at all an Indian affair. They said that India had nothing to do with this. It was purely indigenous, bubbling up spontaneously out of the hearts and desires of the East Bengalis (the people of East Pakistan) Of course, India was doing nothing to affect the situation one way or the other, they said. The Indian government privately offered the observation, as I recall, that they thought that sentiment in East Pakistan was so strong that over time the government in West Pakistan would not be able to prevail and would not be able to keep East Pakistan within an united Pakistan.

Q: You were being told this. What was your feeling as far as Indian influence within East Pakistan?

KIRBY: It was quite clear from the beginning that India was not playing a passive role.

Q: What about the Central Intelligence Agency? This is exactly the sort of time when it's supposed to play a major role, I think. You know you're trying to find out what our intentions are. Was there cooperation? What were you getting out of this source?

KIRBY: I frankly don't know what the ground rules are for responding to or commenting on a question like that even in this kind of interview. I'm struck by the fact in successive U.S. Administrations extending pretty much over my professional lifetime, when the government spokesman is asked this kind of question, his response is always, "We don't comment on these matters."

Q: We're out of the business and it is unclassified. We're not trying to expose sources but at the same time, I think it's perfectly fair to make a judgment about this as an instrument.

KIRBY: Sure. I think maybe the question is particularly relevant in this case. You indicated at one stage that you want to go on later and touch briefly on the "U.S. Enterprise" in the Bay of Bengal. I am reasonably certain that Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that one of the reasons for the "Enterprise" episode was that we felt we had to make a gesture to warn the Indians about our concern that they were prepared, not only to see an independent Bangladesh emerge from the war, but perhaps also to attack West Pakistan frontally in an effort to break up Pakistan. And he says, either in his memoirs or elsewhere, that it was in information gathered by the CIA that triggered our concern. I want to come back to the matter of the war in the west in a minute because I think U.S. perceptions of what might happen in that sector were critical to how the U.S. addressed the overall war. But my point here is that since the former Secretary of State introduced this whole question of intelligence reports in public examination of U.S. policy toward the war, maybe your question is in fact relevant to our discussion. I don't have...my memory of it is...and I'm notably not "goody-goody", I believe in being precise in my judgments.

My memory of the war and of the events preceding it is that all elements of the Embassy in New Delhi where I was serving along with the constituent posts at the Consulates General in India, were working in pretty close harmony. There was a very good meshing of all elements of the mission and a very good exchange of information. There was good debate on points where we were uncertain. It was a cooperative and rather seamless undertaking among the various elements of the mission. My own feeling, all during my time in India, and perhaps this arose because I had dedicated so much time to the subcontinent, my own feeling was that there was a lot out in the open there for any diplomatic establishment to find if you just dug and looked for it. If you actively looked around, sniffed the air, talked to people, and put the pieces together that you could get the story or the major elements of what was going on without recourse to unusual means of obtaining information, if you follow me. So, as a South Asian hand, I felt, if I may say so, that I pretty much knew what was going on. We talked earlier in these sessions about what an Embassy officer does, what his daily fare is like. I found that by using our normal resources, our normal contacts, we were able to follow the story, including its all-important policy aspects, pretty well. But having said that, I will go back and repeat that it was a very competent mission, very well staffed, at every level, and I think it meshed unusually well.

Q: In your contacts with the military attachés and all, did you feel that the Indian military had almost its own agenda as regards what was happening there as opposed to the politicians? I mean, I won't say a great discrepancy, but the military really wanted...this was a chance to have at the Pakistanis, whereas the government may have had a different aim. How did you see that?

KIRBY: The short answer is no. I did not feel that the Indian military in its corporate self had a separate agenda, one separate from the politicians. Incidentally, I assume that is still the case today, although I'm not familiar with the Indian army today -- I haven't followed it in recent years. During the period we're talking about, however, the Indian army always struck me as being a very professional organization which was professionally well led. It was an army that had a pretty sophisticated view of the Indian constitution and was willing to stick by it. While I don't have any specific memory of such a case, I suppose you could have found individual military officers, just like you find individual politicians in any country at any time, who perhaps are a little bit out of the main stream of their government's policy line and want to go for the jugular, or want to go for broke toward a "final solution" of one kind or another. But, the leadership of the Indian military appeared faithfully to carry out government policy. I didn't get a sense of a separate military agenda. I remember talking with General Manekshaw, who was the Indian Chief of Staff in 1970 and 1971. I used to see him informally occasionally. I don't remember if the war clouds were actually gathering at the time of the particular conversation that now I refer to although relations with Pakistan were tense all during my time in India. General Manekshaw said, "Look, I've always said to my senior officers, 'We're soldiers. We have certain skills that we are very proud of. As long as we stick to our assigned tasks, we will continue to do well and to merit the nation's applause. But if we somehow step out of our role and get involved in politics, and try to do some of the things our neighbor's army is doing, we'd make a hash of running the government just as they have.'" So, his line was that India's civilian leadership ran the government and should make the final decisions on war and peace. As I say, there may possibly have been individual officers who were more militant than the leadership, but overall I found a responsible group which was willing to do whatever the civilian leadership decided to do.

I would suppose, however, that the Chief of Staff and other military people must have given advice to the politicians in the councils on war and peace.

Q: Well, how did this play out? The war clouds are gathering. The Pakistanis sent their army in. How did they send in their army? Did they have to go over Indian territory or how did they work?

KIRBY: They had a sizeable force there in East Pakistan already. Supply, re-supply and re-positioning was a terrible problem for them because East Pakistan was far away from the West Pakistani heartland. Looking at the map, it's a long distance between the old West Pakistan and the Eastern wing. I don't recall with total clarity how the re-supply problem was resolved in normal times, in peacetime, Pakistan had fairly automatic over-flights over India. They had to notify the Indian authorities any time they were overflying India, but it was a fairly automatically granted right. I remember that as the pre-war crisis deepened, there was discussion in the Indian government about whether they should withdraw near-automatic overflight rights. I don't remember how that worked out in the pre-war period. I do remember that Pakistan had a major problem because, among other things, it didn't have available all the air transport necessary to do all the re-provisioning they would have liked to do. Then, too, there were divided councils in the Pakistan Government about how heavily they should crack down in the East.

Q: How did the actual war come about? As seen by the Embassy.

KIRBY: As the subcontinent slipped toward war in the summer and fall, an eventual war appeared inevitable, as I commented earlier. You might recall the visit to India and Pakistan in July 1971 of Henry Kissinger, who was then National Security Advisor to the President. He came to both countries. We didn't know it at the time although we learned it during his trip, this itinerary was part of his first trip to China. But first he stopped off in India for a day, maybe a day and a half, and then went on to Pakistan for a similar period. Like other levels of U.S. officialdom throughout the subcontinent's crisis, Kissinger went to India and Pakistan to argue for a stand-down and peace on the subcontinent. I remember our internal talks in the Embassy conference room in New Delhi, where I was asked to make a presentation. I remember very vividly saying, "Mr. Kissinger, unless a miracle occurs there will be a war in the subcontinent by the end of 1971 and I for one, do not foresee that miracle." That is very vivid in my mind. And then, all through the autumn you could see the two countries edging toward war. Without going into great detail, I remember the step up in propaganda on both sides, the re-positioning of troops, the flow of refugees from East Pakistan into Eastern India which put further pressures on India, and then some evidence of skirmishing on or near the eastern border. Then in November there was an incident in East Pakistan which involved the Indians. The Indian Prime Minister went before Parliament and said that the Indian military was not involved, but it was clear that they were because that event could not have happened in that way if they weren't directly involved. I think an Indian plane was shot down, but I have forgotten the precise details. So you could see India and Pakistan steadily moving toward war. Mrs. Gandhi, in October, had taken her so-called "last trip for peace" where she went to Bonn, London and Washington to plead India's case. Back in August, the Indians had shocked the West -- although it wasn't too great a surprise -- by concluding a new agreement with the Soviet Union for aid and support. So all of these factors were clearly moving the region toward war. In the end, Pakistan decided to attack. They did, on the evening of December 3, 1971 by trying to take out India's air defense system in west and

north-central India. It was a fairly halfhearted effort to take out some of the air potential of the Indians in Western India. They bombed some Indian air bases and a couple of big radar centers. That's the way the war began. One can still speculate on what the Pakistanis, by attacking, thought they were going to get out of all this. My view at the time, and my view today is that since it was so clear by December 1971, that East Pakistan could not be held, the Pakistani leadership decided to make a gesture in the West to try to save national honor, but not with a serious intent of wanting to provoke a major and problematical conflict with India in the West, if it could be avoided.

Q: Was there any change in how the Embassy operated? Because I take it war was declared.

KIRBY: Whether there was an actual declaration or not, I do not recall, it was certainly a war, even if only a brief one. War came. The Pakistanis attacked and Mrs. Gandhi spoke to the nation on the radio about midnight, saying, in effect, that the war was on. She then made a formal statement in Parliament the next day, a very important statement which alleged that war had been thrust on India, and said that India would protect itself. The statement indicated, as I recall, that a free and independent entity would emerge from East Pakistan, but then, very importantly, asked that, "We (India) seek no wider war."

Q: The war started by a Pakistani attack although much led up to this. What did we do then, after this?

KIRBY: When you're in a war-time situation, an Embassy does a lot of things simultaneously. The consular section was busy looking after the American community in India -- e.g., sending out warden notices, telling people to stand in place or take shelter because we didn't know how extensive the war was going to be. That's on one side of the embassy's business. All of us in the political section were trying to analyze what was going on and reporting developments to Washington. Once war came, the critical question we focused on was not whether Pakistan could hold East Pakistan, because it was clear they could not, but, rather, whether India would use the Pakistani attack as an excuse to make major war on Pakistan in the West. The central question was whether India would use the Pakistani attack as an excuse to try to scatter Pakistan to the four winds. Once war came, the central thrust of American diplomacy and that of the rest of the world was to try to prevent that from happening -- to keep India from using the war as an excuse to break up West Pakistan. It was Indian intent on this matter we were looking and listening for. When Mrs. Gandhi spoke to the nation around midnight, we were all seeking some hint as to what India intended to do in the West. My memory of it is that we didn't get anything on that in the radio broadcast that night, however. Obviously we were scrambling around seeing every Indian official we could to pose the question: "How's India going to respond in the West?" The next big public opportunity to get some clue on that was when the Prime Minister was scheduled to speak in the Lower House of the Parliament at about noon on Saturday. The war broke out on Friday, the third of December and she was to speak, it was announced, on Saturday morning to give a policy statement. I was in the diplomatic gallery, filled to overflowing as you would expect, when the Prime Minister spoke at noon on Saturday. She said that Bangladesh would be free and made the case that it was an indigenous struggle. She insisted that Bangladesh would be free -- there was to be no doubt of that. The key phrase, however, was, "We seek no wider war", I reported to my Embassy, and we reported to Washington, that assuming that the Prime Minister

was sincere -- and we said we thought that it might well be for a variety of reasons -- then India would be prepared (we thought) to undertake a holding action in the West to see what Pakistan did in that sector. If Pakistan were so incautious as to engage the main Indian forces in the West then that would be a different story, and a major war would ensue. We in the Embassy thought that, "We seek no wider war" should be taken very seriously and that we should push the Indians to live up to it. That same Saturday afternoon the Indian Foreign Secretary, T.K. Kaul held a number of meetings with the Ambassadors of the major powers. When he met with our Ambassador that afternoon, Kaul drew particular attention to Mrs. Gandhi's statement, "We seek no wider war". The American Ambassador who had not always received 100% truthful information from his Indian interlocutors that year, if one can be fair about it, pressed and said, "Do you mean it?" The answer was, "Yes, we do, it depends upon what the Pakistanis do." So we were urging from New Delhi to Washington and to our Embassy in Rawalpindi that the Pakistanis should be persuaded not to give the Indians an excuse to enlarge the war. We didn't think the Indians saw it in their interest to try to break up Pakistan. I never believed, then or now, that Mrs. Gandhi thought it in India's interest to break up Pakistan. I never thought that predominant Indian opinion favored breaking up Pakistan, although there were times when Mrs. Gandhi and other Indians were so irritated with Pakistan they might well have had emotional tugs in the opposite direction. But I didn't feel in 1971 that India saw it as truly in its interest to try to break up Pakistan. Thus things developed about the way I expected them to on that front. There were some skirmishes with Pakistan in the West, and in Jammu and Kashmir. In the end, the Pakistanis, interestingly enough, once "honor was served" (my phrase, not theirs) did not commit to battle their newest military equipment or their most elite troops. In effect, they didn't engage the Indians seriously in the West, and the Indians didn't try to go in and open up the war further. But, during those two weeks of the formal war, the thrust of our diplomacy was to try to ensure that there would be "no wider war".

Q: Did you have any feeling in New Delhi, the White House -- Nixon, Kissinger, were coming down a little heavy on the Pakistani side, or were you pretty much left to do your traditional role of both trying to get everybody to come to the peace agreement?

KIRBY: I'd have to go back and read all the documents of the period to be able to give you a full answer to that, which I haven't done. I think we were in Delhi largely allowed to get on with our task. Certainly the White House had been irritated with what it believed to have been India's facilitative role in the Bangladesh imbroglio all through the summer and fall. But, there was not a daily hammering from Washington. When war came, our instructions were to try to persuade the Indian Government not to make it a "wider war," as I said earlier. Kissinger himself writes of Washington's "tilt" toward Pakistan. I think that refers largely to the gesture -- and it wasn't more than a gesture -- of sending the "Enterprise" into the Bay of Bengal.

Q: This was a one-carrier task force?

KIRBY: Yes. This was not a serious gesture, but it damaged our future relations with India.

Q: It was just enough to annoy and not enough to be effective, was it?

KIRBY: I think that's accurate, yes. And it was addressed at something that wasn't happening, the "wider war" in the West. It was a warning to India not to break up West Pakistan after the Indian leadership had already declared themselves publicly against a "wider war." By extrapolating from what Mr. Kissinger and others have said, it would appear that in the "Enterprise" episode, the audiences for that gesture were China, in the first instance, and the Soviet Union, in the second.

Q: India had just signed an agreement with the Soviet Union which was more military materials and all that. What was the role of the Soviet Union or Soviet Embassy during this war?

KIRBY: Nobody quite knew from the rather anodyne language of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union of August, 1971, what its actual content might be. Nobody quite knew what the full dimensions of the agreement were, exactly what it committed the Soviet to. The assumption was that it certainly committed them to providing military equipment (no doubt about that) and various types of unspecified diplomatic support, we supposed. Whether if the Indians had gotten into a tight corner with the Pakistanis -- which, in my view, could not have happened given the preponderance of forces on the Indian side -- in the very unlikely event that China would have intervened directly in the conflict -- whether that might have brought the Soviets more actively into play no one knows. That was always a question hanging in the air. Perhaps one of the reasons the Indians signed the agreement was to deter others from entering the fray. What did the Soviets do? Not very much that I recall. The Soviet Embassy was very, very large at that time, very elephantine in its work patterns and so on. They got "around town" but not very effectively or not very imaginatively. While they were at least visible on the Delhi scene, the Soviet Embassy and its personnel were not much of a factor in this short war. If the war had gone on longer, maybe that would have changed. As I said, it was about a two-week war. The fighting lasted for a week or ten days, and then it was over. And so the Indians really didn't have to call in all of their diplomatic chips. But the signing of that agreement with the Soviets in August -- going back to something you asked earlier -- was another of the irritants to the West. It was another irritant which further persuaded the White House that the Indians were friendlier to the Soviets than they were to the West and that they were up to something they shouldn't be.

Q: When the war petered out, did we have any role in the final terms, the refugees, any of the other fall-out consequences?

KIRBY: Well, we'd had a lot to do with the refugees all during that year as they were pouring into India in the spring, summer and fall. We had our AID people working on food and other refugee assistance, we assisted UNDP, Senator Kennedy, in his capacity as chairman of the Senate's Subcommittee on Refugees, came to India to see how the U.S. could best focus its refugee assistance.

Q: You were saying you were providing food to the refugees?

KIRBY: Yes. Food and various kinds of assistance to the refugees. The U.S. put in a lot of support at that time. In the aftermath of the war in late 1971 and through most of 1972 The U.S. tried to work with India and Pakistan to ameliorate the effects of the war. The U.S., and others too, tried to be helpful to New Delhi and Rawalpindi as we advanced thoughts for peaceful

accommodation that the two sides later tried to put the Simla Accord to serve as a framework for their relations. We offered ideas on how they could relax tensions. One subject was repatriation of prisoners of war, so that all the prisoners of war in Bangladesh could be repatriated to Pakistan, and so on. We played an active diplomatic role in trying to bring the two sides together on such practical matters.

Q: Did you find any change in attitudes in connections in dealing with the Indian government after the war as opposed to before the war?

KIRBY: Certainly, bilateral relations went into a deep freeze by mid-1972. Indian-U.S. relations suffered all through 1971 as war was pending and then given the Indian perception of Washington's tilt towards Pakistan, yes, bilateral relations began to be cut back in several spheres, affecting many programs and policies. My wife and I didn't notice any great change in our own contacts with Indians, however. We had been in India a long time. We knew a lot of Indians, both official and non-official, whom we knew on a friendly and personal basis as I said in an earlier segment of this interview. They always knew that we represented the United States. We were always very, very clear about that. We were very, very direct in speaking out to them when we saw things that we didn't agree with in Indian policy. But, no, relations were friendly right up until we left in September, 1972 -- the personal relations were still just terrific. People continued to have us to their house for dinner. The son of a very senior diplomat -- the son himself was a distinguished diplomat and became India's Foreign Secretary in later years -- and his wife did the generous, hospitable, traditional Indian thing the day we left of spending our last hours in Delhi with us at our house. They weren't the only ones. There were others there, too, staying with us until it was time to go to the airport. This was their way of showing that these ties of friendship were sacred and had not been touched by any of this.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian government after the creation of Bangladesh? Was it a stronger basis, I mean, did this change things at all?

KIRBY: Mrs. Gandhi's government stayed pretty much what it had been, although it was somewhat, if only temporarily, strengthened by the experience. Coming through the war with Pakistan successfully (from the Indian point of view), and helping with the emergence of Bangladesh, Mrs. Gandhi was perceived in India as being the victor, as being a successful leader. While that image would fade somewhat later, for the immediate 1972-1973 period the successful war strengthened her hand in intra-mural Indian politics. As I mentioned in earlier segments, prior to the 1971 crisis she had been hard pressed by the conservative old-timers in her party. Some called them the "old guard", some called them the "barons...the king makers" in the Indian National Congress Party. They had presented a real challenge to her in 1969-1970 as they sought to get her out of power. As I say, the events of late 1971 strengthened her hand within the Indian National Congress Party and within the country for the short term. A couple of years later, she would face a different kind of political challenge, and a major one. But for that period just after the war, I think that she was more self-confident, as were the people around her.

Q: What was the impression at the Embassy of the future of Bangladesh? Was that going to change the equation in the area or not?

KIRBY: I don't think that we thought it was going to change the power equation in any significant way. In fact there were many among us who argued that if Pakistan could get over its chagrin, swallow its pride, move forward from the loss of East Pakistan, a slenderized West Pakistan could be a more coherent purposeful country than it had been able to be while trying to manage different culture and people, the East Bengalis, who lay several hundred miles away. We thought that during its early years, a newly independent Bangladesh, by definition, would require a lot of diplomatic, economic, and financial support to get going in the world. We thought it would particularly need India's strong support. We also thought that the time would come, sooner than the Indians believed, when they and Bangladesh would begin quarreling over the apportionment of eastern waters, and other such noisome matters.

DAVID BLAKEMORE
Rotation Officer
Calcutta (1965-1966)

David Blakemore was born in 1941 in New York State. He graduated from Valparaiso in 1962 and joined the Foreign Service in 1965. He served overseas in Saudi Arabia, India, Korea, Bangladesh and Nigeria, as well as the staff director of the Board of Examiners and Deputy Team Leader in the Inspection Corps in Washington DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in the winter of 1997.

BLAKEMORE: I was assigned to Calcutta. Then in good State Department fashion, to get off language probation, I studied French. My years of literary French from high school and college, after about five months, were transformed into the ability to speak French reasonably well. Then they sent me to Calcutta and I never have been in a French speaking country except as a tourist. The accomplishment of actually being able to think and deal in a foreign language was something I was quite proud of, but now it's gone. All I can tell you is that it is almost entirely gone.

Q: *You were in Calcutta from when to when just by years?*

BLAKEMORE: My wife and I arrived in Calcutta in November 1965 and left there in November 1966, one year.

Q: *How did Calcutta strike you when you arrived there?*

BLAKEMORE: We were appalled. Neither one of us had been out of the United States except to Canada. We had no awareness at an emotional level, perhaps at an intellectual level, but not at an emotional level of how serious poverty can be. The oppressive poverty and the heat, humidity and the dirt of India really was something that we were not prepared for and we both went into kind of an emotional tail spin for a while. As we were coming out of that, after a year of getting our feet on the ground and adjusting, we were transferred. Which is too bad.

Q: When you were in Calcutta during this year, what were the political currents in India at that particular time.

BLAKEMORE: It was an interesting time, I guess everybody says that. Domestically this was the year in which Prime Minister Shastri died at a summit meeting in Tashkent with the Soviet leadership. Indira Gandhi came from nowhere and was elected as Prime Minister of India. It was exciting to watch happen. On the international side the Indian moral superiority established by Nehru was still in full swing. The Vietnam war and our participation in it was extremely unpopular in India and there were regular demonstrations in front of the consulate general in Calcutta and I'm sure elsewhere in India against U.S. involvement in that war. Those were a little frightening too although they would not be to me now having seen demonstrations elsewhere, but again I had never seen that sort of thing. We lived near the consulate, right next door. It was kind of scary at first. You got used to it as it was something that happened fairly regularly.

Q: Did you have much contact with Indians? You were there such a short time.

BLAKEMORE: Not as much as I would have liked to have. Because the experience of living overseas and interacting with foreigners was so new, the really useful contact with Indians came in the consulate general with the Indian staff. Of course they are in a sense "tame" Indians. They were experienced American handlers but I developed a great fondness for several Indian employees at the consulate.

I was on a rotational assignment meaning that I was supposed to spend my two years in Calcutta moving around from one section to the other: consular, economic, political and admin. I started in consular and I was the only consular officer. Calcutta was still a fairly active port at that time and the United States still had a merchant marine. There were some challenging seamen in trouble cases.

Q: Can you give an example or do any cases stick in mind?

BLAKEMORE: I don't really remember a lot of detail. Nothing really romantic or anything. The seamen cases were all new to me and also there were a lot of young Americans wandering aimlessly around South Asia.

Q: It was part of the life in those days. They could get out and go out to smoke pot and have a good time for a year.

BLAKEMORE: The hippie-type people. They were interested in Indian religions, fascinated by them. The Indians were extremely tolerant as long as the young people stayed out of trouble, stayed away from criminal activity.

The senior Indian consular employee was a real life saver for me because despite what I thought was a very well done consular course here in the training in Washington, I didn't know what I was doing in interpreting consular regulations. If it had been Manila and I had been doing non-immigrant visas then there would have been a boring sameness to it but I would have gotten

familiar with a relatively small body of regulations that applied. But I was doing immigrant visas, non-immigrant visas, welfare and whereabouts, protection of American citizens, seamen and shipping. All that was on my plate ostensibly. I would make ad hoc decisions: here is what we are going to do. The senior FSN would say okay, nodding his head from side to side and walk off. He would come back a few minutes later and say “you know, you might want to look at what it says in the regulations.” He would draw me back from the brink yet again. He was a wonderful guy. That was kind of a scary experience, but it was a good experience and there were no major catastrophes.

Q: *Who was consul general?*

BLAKEMORE: Bill Hitchcock.

Q: *How did he operate?*

BLAKEMORE: He was very democratic I would say. He and his wife were interested in our welfare as young people in the Service. As I think about it, he maintained a pretty good balance between a certain aloofness required for good leadership and a lot of interaction with everybody. His deputy, Bernie Korgan, whom my wife worked for as a secretary, was terrific and had very much a mentor mentality. He and his wife took us under their wing and took very good care of us socially and in helping us understand what we were dealing with. They helped us deal with the culture shock and depression that went with it. It was a very nice feeling in the office.

Q: *How does one operate in a place? I am talking about you are now in sort of the mental health field anyway, but looking back on that (I have never served in a Calcutta-type place) I would think that ones reaction would be to almost reject it and go to the polo playing set or the other one would be to go into acute depression. For an American this must be very difficult.*

BLAKEMORE: We thought it was difficult, and there is no question we were both depressed. One of my reactions was to drink more than I normally did and more than I should have. My wife spent a lot of time shut up in the apartment for the first few months, not really venturing out to do much. It was a tricky time and, as I say, we were beginning to come out of it. We traveled some in northern India and we made some friends who worked for USIA in Delhi. We took the train across northern India to Delhi and met them and then drove with them to Srinagar in Kashmir. It was a wonderful trip and we began to see beyond the poverty and the dirt to the fabulous richness in this culture and to get in touch with some of that: to visit temples and to appreciate some Indian art, both modern and not so modern, even Indian music. We ran out of time.

Q: *Why were you moved so quickly?*

BLAKEMORE: Let me just finish what I did while I was there. The consular section took up seven months of the year then a permanent replacement came and I moved on to the political section during the election and covered four states in northeastern India during the election. I never got to the area. It's odd, it is sort of a blank in my memory, how little interaction I had with Indian politicians and Indian people at least during the consular phase of my work. It was pretty

much an in-the-office job which is very puzzling to me now. How do you do political work in the office?

All the people in my class who were on rotational assignments were what was called central complement. That meant that they were extra gift employees for the post. The post didn't have to pay for us. We were paid for out of a Washington pool of money which dried up after about a year and nearly all of us were moved. It is a great example of the idiocy of government budgeting. Just because there is no more money in this pocket, you spend a tremendous amount of money from another pocket to move everybody. The expense of moving is so great. Anyway, that is what happened. Most of us were moved within the geographic bureau. I was in the Near East and South Asian bureau and we were moved from Calcutta to Jeddah.

When we arrived at the airport, there on the tarmac was my friend from the A100 course who had earned 17 dollars, or something, for having one of the worst posts. He was greatly amused that I had now joined him in Jeddah. At the time, and we are now talking about November 1966, it was the capital of Saudi Arabia and it was the city that tolerated and dealt with foreigners within Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, it presented us with a new and interesting form of culture shock in the form of restrictions on our personal activity at post by the fundamentalist conservative monarch regime. For example, my wife could not drive. She could not go downtown in clothing that did not cover her arms entirely. Jeddah, if anything, was hotter than Calcutta and equally humid, which always surprises people, but it is right on the Red Sea. No alcohol. Of course, we had plenty of it but it wasn't publicly available. Christian services were conducted on the embassy grounds in a way that made us feel that we were participating in some evil clandestine activity. So as I say, it was another form of culture shock.

PHILIP MERRILL
USAID
New Delhi (1965-1966)

Phillip Merrill was born in Baltimore in 1934. He went to Cornell University, where he majored in government. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: The quantifiers often make this mistake. Well, you then left in what, '65?

MERRILL: Yes, we spent 1965 in India. Ellie had been Senator Ken Keating's press secretary and he was defeated by Bobby Kennedy in 1964. It is worth noting that Keating ran a million votes ahead of Barry Goldwater in New York State and Kennedy ran a million votes ahead of Keating.

She went to work for the National Committee for an Effective Congress, a public interest and also very effective private lobbying operation on Capital Hill run out of a town house at 421 New Jersey Avenue.

The principal, Maurice Rosenblatt, can not be easily captured in words. Every pretty girl or attractive woman in Washington seemed to have worked for him at one time or another. He had not only immense personal charm but perhaps the best political insight of any person I have ever met. He knew everyone on Capital Hill. The house was always full of Senators. We have remained permanent personal friends.

Ellie and I were trying to have a child and not succeeding. Essentially the idea of going to India for a year or two appealed to us. There was an adventurous context to it. I did not want to work for Bowles again, but an offer had surfaced from the new AID director there, John P. Lewis, to work for him. We decided to accept for the sheer fun of it. It turned out to be a fascinating experience which we have never regretted.

I ought to insert here that just before the Crockett period I was asked to develop an answer for the State Department to a thoroughly vicious book called "None Dare Call It Treason" by right wing activist Phyllis Schlafly.

The book was a totally unfounded McCarthy type assault on the patriotism and integrity of the entire Department with the general idea that we were all traitors helping the Communists advance around the world.

It was easy enough to demolish. I simply took it apart charge by charge and replaced each one with the facts. I got some help from James Greenfield, subsequently the managing editor of the New York Times, who was then Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and the result was quite satisfactory.

Mrs. Schlafly was a right wing kook then and I suppose she hasn't changed much since. I found particularly interesting the demagogic basis which provided her book with credibility.

What she did was cite as factual evidence every kind of crazy charge made by anyone in the Congressional Record, but in such a way that it appeared to be demonstrated proof by a Congressional committee. Of course anyone can testify before Congress, and Congressmen themselves insert all kinds of material into the record simply as favors to supporters. The technique still occasionally works.

We spent a month traveling in Asia on the way out to India. I learned to surf in Hawaii and we stopped in Vietnam which was just heating up. We traveled by land, that is, riding the local buses across Cambodia. We visited Angkor Wat, the 13th century Khmer civilization ruins that are one of the great wonders of the world. We crossed the Thai border at Aranyaprathet, subsequently the site of so much bloodshed, and took the train to Bangkok.

We thought Cambodia was a perfectly peaceful place where the bananas and the breadfruit hung from trees and most people were happy and well-fed. The kind of sheer terror and genocide that eventually developed there never crossed our minds as even a remote possibility.

I remember at one point literally counting 21 people and innumerable baskets of fish in a Volkswagen micro-van. Two of the 21 were us.

We stopped in Burma, which even then was a closed society, and got a good briefing from the ambassador, who had plenty of time to spare. He spent most of it putting together and taking apart a Rolls-Royce in his front yard.

The Burmese had simply turned completely inward. After World War II Burma was the most advanced of the British east Asian colonies. Who would have thought that war torn Malaysia, with its ethnic rivalries, would have prospered as a free society while Burma simply went back in time as a socialist one.

Anyway, we traveled on through Bangladesh and entered India via the extremely colorful road in to Calcutta from Dum-Dum airport. And we stopped for a day in Chittagong, still the end of the earth, because I liked the sound of the name and got off the plane when it landed there.

The year in India was dominated by the fact of the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965. We loved living in India and traveled the length and breadth of it, sometimes on business, sometimes by Volkswagen, visiting game parks, fording rivers, and seeing the country.

We became close friends with Ken and Gloria Bailey, then the U.S. Army attaché, and took a trip with them into the Himalayas above the Kulu Valley in North Central India. The four of us, on horseback, were turned back by Chinese border guards at 13,000 feet. The only reason I am doing this history is because these border guards evidently didn't want anything to do with the United States in 1965. Otherwise we would all still be in a Chinese prison.

I also flew for a while. I used to be a private pilot and the Royal Indian Air Force let me fly with one of their training squadrons in Tiger Moths. That was kind of fun because it is an open cockpit biplane, and you can hang upside down Red Baron style.

India was still part of the British Empire then and we used to toast the Queen in the Officers Mess after flights. I still think To the Queen is the only proper toast. The AID job did not really work out as well as I had hoped for a number of reasons, the principal one being the change in atmosphere due to the war.

Q: This was in India?

MERRILL: AID had a staff of several hundred people. It was literally larger than the entire rest of the embassy. It even had its own building. I thought the staff should be orders of magnitude smaller. I recall exactly that there were 89 professional technical people on the payroll to supervise various contracts. These were government employees in various engineering disciplines.

All of this should have been contracted out to Bechtel or Halliburton, with perhaps two or three coordinators or checkers on the Mission staff.

The government has no business hiring directly experts on building dams. It is a waste of money. They do not get the best engineers. There are not enough of them to supervise or build anything, and their cost ought to be carried by the Indians themselves.

If the host country is not willing to pay for the technical assistance part, that is for the people, then the assistance will be close to worthless, because they will not place a high value on it. I don't want to take that to incorporate the very poorest basket cases in the world where there may be issues of charity.

Q: Bangladesh or something like that.

MERRILL: My cousin is currently ambassador in Bangladesh and I had been there before. There are 120 million people in Bangladesh, and they are more capable than many realize. For example, the Soviet Union, which at one point was the largest producer of ball bearings in the world, mostly for the military, bought for their most advanced systems bearings from Bangladesh. The quality was better. I was really thinking more of the Central African countries. Bangladesh is more like India. Too many people but a great deal of talent.

Q: Essentially what was your job at AID? Were you considered sort of a management expert having gone through this Crockett period?

MERRILL: I was considered a bright young guy who could help get control of the AID program. In the context of the time, the war took precedence over everything else. AID got put on the back burner.

I recall spending a fascinating week in Calcutta with Robert Nathan, then a very well respected world class economist, who headed his own consulting firm and who, like John Lewis, was a development expert. The idea was to help the Indians create a modern development program for Calcutta. Some things just can not be done.

Calcutta was not subject to the influence of modern American foreign assistance. It needed everything. That does not mean the Indians could not do something for Calcutta. I am an optimist, not a pessimist.

But when you have tens of thousands of people sleeping on the streets, the management tools of a Western civilized society, no matter how well intentioned, are not particularly relevant. We can not even deal with our homeless here in our own country, not that they stem from the same reasons.

In any case I did some AID type work. I did some military analysis work. At the end of a year the situation on the ground had changed.

Q: This is foreign policy. Whatever you are doing some of these programs don't work, because what you plan is changed by events. I mean all these developing countries are difficult places.

MERRILL: I agree but with a slight nuance of difference. We still have long term interests, such as helping representative government thrive in India.

Q: We don't have permanent friends but we have permanent interests.

MERRILL: That was said by Lord Palmerston about British policy. We do have ongoing interests in most countries in most areas of the world, although there can be radical shifts.

There is going to be a radical shift after the unification of North and South Korea, particularly if Korea maintains itself as a nuclear power. The current thinking in the State Department is they won't. Personally I do not believe that. And with a unified South Korea with nuclear capacity the relationships among China, Russia, and Japan are sure to be very different.

Look at our relationship to Germany and Japan between 1941 and 1951. Who in 1941 would have believed that 10 years later both would be allies and NATO would be two years old?

The skill of a good Foreign Service officer is in taking what is central out of a complex situation and expressing it in terms that can be implemented.

So I came back from India after a year. The war had ended and the AID program was in a different mode. I could spend another year because it was a two year contract. Or I could look on it as a wonderful year, but a second would have been repetitive and very bureaucratic. John Lewis also left.

Of course I took advantage of Chet's position as ambassador there and talked it over with him. We had the same view of the AID program as being necessary and desirable but excessively top heavy in administration, and not subject to easy change. So I arranged to come back to the State Department proper in INR, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Then I had a wonderful conversation with some bureaucrat six levels down in the administrative section who insisted that I had signed a contract to stay for two years and couldn't go, regardless of what made sense. I suggested he look at the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.

Q: Involuntary servitude.

MERRILL: Exactly. He refused to sign off on the last piece of paper. I pointed to all the paperwork that was already completed. I told him that Ellie and I had had an extraordinarily happy year in India and I would not let him spoil it. I said I had a plane ticket back to the United States, and another job.

Somebody else was already moving into our house there and I was leaving on a date certain. If you don't want me to leave, you can call the FBI, send the United States Marines, send the Indian National Guard, or don't approve the ticket. I'll pay for it myself. You worry about the paperwork. Of course they ended up paying for the ticket.

We spent a great month en route home traveling through Afghanistan, where everybody carried a rifle, and through the Southern republics of what was then the Soviet Union, including stops in Tashkent and Samarkand which I had always wanted to visit. We also stopped in other parts of Russia, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, and then visited a number of the satellites behind the Iron Curtain.

I particularly remember New Year's eve in a private home in Budapest. We were taken out on the town to a night club. There were a number of Russian officers also present. The management brought out an old 48 star American flag, placed it on our table, and the band kept playing the Star Spangled Banner. There were, needless to say, no Russian flags presented.

I came back as what was then called, the actual title, Senior Intelligence Analyst for South Asia. This meant that I was not quite the senior intelligence analyst for south Asia, but the second in INR handling the area.

My boss was an extremely bright person named Tom Thornton, a first class academic intellect, who had a position in the civil service and thus was not subject to transfer. He was the Near East and South Asia director in INR, reflecting the Department's organization which combined for administrative purposes the Near East and South Asia under one Assistant Secretary.

Fortunately for me Tom's academic expertise was on South Asia, not the Middle East, although he was responsible for both. I say fortunately because it was helpful to have an immediate superior with academic depth where I had only practical experience.

Q: I want to go back to India, not in detail. You had gone through the Foreign Service looking at Argentina, Mexico and other countries. You had been around and here you were essentially in an AID environment. Did you note anything different about the way AID management or the AID bureaucracy was different from what you'd observed in other parts of the Foreign Service?

MERRILL: What a wonderful question. It was not different but exaggerated. The size of the program was so large in India, so much greater than the programs in Mexico and Argentina and most other countries, that it had a character of its own

Other programs were smaller and more narrowly political or humanitarian. The program in India was the largest part of a worldwide effort to counter Soviet power projection in the third world, and to develop a competitor to China.

It was the largest AID program we had in the world. With the advantage of hindsight, it was the most successful one, meaning India, with all its strengths and weaknesses, is still a democratic country. Indeed, it is the only other country in the world besides the United States that has 200,000,000 middle class people living in the first world; this despite 700 million living in the 7th century.

Given the frozen attitude towards China, the fact that Japan had dropped as kind of an unanticipated WW II bonus baby onto our side of the seemingly monolithic Communist world, and the adverse circumstances developing in Indonesia, there was a significance to the AID program in India that transcended all others.

One thought not only in terms of doing good through standard economic development assistance. One thought in terms of a world wide challenge which the totalitarian states appeared to be winning.

They were even or ahead of us in space and Khrushchev really thought they were going to beat us in the ability to deliver real services to real people. This was the spirit of that age. The AID program in India was thus the largest and most representative of the ideological battle for Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- all part of the same ongoing competition in the Toynbee sense of challenge and response.

At the time I was somewhere between appalled and disappointed. I think Chet expected me, even though I wasn't working directly for him, to be able to do more than I could. I referred earlier to the 89 full time engineers. There were also a bunch of program officers. There was an immense amount of paperwork. All the program officers were bureaucrats in the sense that they wanted to make sure that all the and "t's" were properly crossed.

What they met were comrades in arms in India. Here was the legacy of the British civil service. They both loved paperwork. They both wanted to make certain the forms were filled out exactly right.

Let me provide some flavor for Indian paper work. You could stand by an Indian Airlines plane with a capacity of 100 people. There could be two people on board. You had a valid ticket. The plane would take off without you, because the manifest said it was full. I am not joking. This has actually happened to Ellie and me.

Why did the plane take off? Because the clerk standing there with the manifest is a minor civil servant. He has a career. He loses that job and he is a dead man. He literally starves. Does he care whether the plane is full? No! He cares what's on the manifest. If the manifest says the plane is full, the plane is full.

What is the risk to the clerk of changing the manifest or letting people go aboard who are not on the manifest? The risk to him is his whole life. He's not going to take that risk. This is a country in which a whole village will celebrate because one of its youths was accepted into the Army. It is a country where job seekers have cards that say high school fail which means they had some high school but failed. Now when this culture and AID's huge bureaucratic culture met, it was a take.

Q: A love match.

MERRILL: So the rigidity of the bureaucracy was extremely troublesome. I do not want to sit behind a desk filling out forms. Time behind a desk is wasted time. The AID culture is to make certain all the forms are exactly right. It's what happens when you keep picking at and beating up on a bureaucracy. What is eventually left is a kind of a sludge.

But the worst part was that the fundamental thing they were doing was off target. There was too much government to government assistance and not enough government to private industry assistance. We are in the business of developing free institutions, private enterprises, free markets. That's what we were trying to make work in India. In fact we-- actually they-- succeeded. The fact that American policy over several decades helped India to maintain

independence, territorial integrity, and democracy is among our great Cold War victories. That doesn't alter, however, the issue of AID bureaucracy.

The electrical engineer on the AID payroll had the self-protective interest of filling out the paperwork, living well in India with a bunch of servants, and above all not screwing up. If a particular project is finished he gets a share of the credit. If not it is the fault of what the British used to call the bloody wogs. Does he report to someone whose job it is to get this dam built, to get this electric system operating, to get this bunch of wells completed? No!

Q: I think this is a tendency to transpose the large bureaucracy which exists to countries rather than to be more project oriented.

MERRILL: The whole AID mission way of operating was wrong. But we still had a wonderful year in India, made even more interesting because of the war. We bought a Volkswagen and drove the length and breadth of India. We forded rivers. We visited the Kulu Valley in North central India. We were up in Kashmir.

Ellie and I followed the Ganges to its headwaters camping out all the way on beaches in the canyons with a 22 for protection. What that would have done in what is classic tiger country I hate to think about. The Ganges starts at a little town called Devraprayag at about 10,000 feet in a small vale. It's like following the Colorado to the headwaters. We went to Indian game parks. We explored the width, length and breadth of India visiting ruins and temples, great game parks, and marvelous ancient carved cities such as Kajaharo. It was a marvelous year.

GALEN L. STONE
Counselor for Political Economic Affairs
New Delhi (1965-1968)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Cyprus. He was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

Q: I notice from the Biographical Register that subsequent to this in the early sixties you were in New Delhi. Would you care to comment on that assignment, on that tour of duty?

STONE: Yes indeed. I was fortunate enough to be assigned to the British Imperial Defense College on the 1964 course. This was run on a calendar year basis and the student body was made up of forty British, ten from each military service and ten government civilians; twenty from the Commonwealth, there were two Indian officers and three Pakistanis, headed by a Lieutenant General, and four from the U.S.: one from each military service and I from the Foreign Service. It just so happened that one of the closest friends on the course that I made was

an Indian Brigadier, and subsequently, on being assigned to India, this friendship proved invaluable, because it gave me an entrée into the Indian Army.

The Indian Army is the element in India that really holds the country together. The Indian military have had a remarkably apolitical record, serving the civilian government of the day; but not, as in Pakistan, assuming a direct responsibility for Government. My time there initially was involved with the Indian military. We had our own military mission to India at the time which had the strange acronym of USMSMI, the United States Military Supply Mission to India. In every other country, we had a MAAG, a Military Assistance Advisory Group, but the Indians made it very clear that they didn't want our advice. They thought that they knew what they wanted to do, so they insisted that the name of the organization be different.

Would you like me to talk about both phases of my assignment there? My first assignment there was as Counselor for Political Economic Affairs External. This was the result of Ambassador Chester Bowles' effort to try and apply in India a different embassy organizational structure in the belief that it was more appropriate to that country. I think in many respects he was right. The decisions, for example, on the location of a new steel mill, and in what site in India it would be placed, etcetera, had many political as well as economic considerations involved.

In my capacity in charge of the external side, I was involved with India's relations with the rest of the world - both economic and political. This made me the principal embassy with working level contact with the Ministry of External Affairs; the Indian governments' equivalent of the State Department. This became of particular importance during the Indian war with Pakistan in 1965. At that time the Indian army attacked across the borders of Punjab toward Lahore, there were some six-hundred Americans there. I was dealing with the Indian government and trying to persuade them to hold their fire on Lahore airport, in order to permit our planes to land and evacuate American citizens. My principal contact in the Ministry of External Affairs, Suvendra Alirajpur, called me late one night. He said that he had done his best to get in touch with the Indian Chief of Staff, but he was very sorry to say that he had just not been able to do it and so there was nothing that could be done.

I went back and drafted a telegram to inform everyone that we just simply couldn't do it. In the meantime, of course, we had pre-positioned air craft in Tehran to perform the evacuation. I had delivered my telegram to the code room, went back to my office, and the phone was ringing. Alirajpur told me he had just spoken to the Chief of Staff and they would hold their fire on Lahore airport for one hour the following morning. So, I rushed down, stopped the earlier telegram and got off another one, and American planes landed at ten minute intervals. We evacuated six hundred Americans from Lahore that following morning and the operation went off without a hitch.

Q: Refresh my memory, was this prior to the Indian War with China?

STONE: This was after the Indian war with China. The Indian war with China was in September of 1961. There were several Indo-Pakistan wars, the first one in 1965 was The Rann of Kutch. The war that I am speaking of now was in September of 1966. This was a period of further and increased difficulties between India and Pakistan over Kashmir which were made all the more

poignant by the fact that we had substantially assisted in the military equipping of the Pakistani army. We were embarrassed to find an American tank captured from the Pakistanis on display at Connaught Circus in New Delhi. It took us awhile to get that removed, but it did not help our image in India one whit. In May 1968, I had been pulled out of India and sent to Saigon as Chief of the Political section. I thought at the time that this was a bit of madness on the part of the personnel authorities, but the Counselor for Political Affairs was a man with whom I had worked with before in Germany, Arch Calhoun, and he asked for me particularly to be his number two in the Political section. I therefore was immersed in Vietnamese affairs with no prior experience in that area whatsoever.

I served there for eighteen months when a new political appointee was named to go as Ambassador to India, Senator Kenneth Keating, who had been defeated for reelection to the Senate by Robert Kennedy. They wanted to have in India an officer who had had recent India experience, so I was ordered, on return from a very brief leave in the United States to see my family to go back to Saigon by way of New Delhi to be vetted by the new Ambassador. Subsequently a month or so later I was transferred to New Delhi as the Deputy Chief of Mission. In 1971, relations between India and Pakistan further worsened and you had the second major Indo-Pakistan war with the focus on East Pakistan, or what later became the newly independent country of Bangladesh.

The American embassy played a very critical role during this period. As events unfolded, we were the only country that had excellent communications between New Delhi and Dacca and so the message calling for the surrender of the Pakistan army was in fact transmitted over our lines to the Consulate General in Dacca, and then delivered to General Niazi, the Senior Pakistani Commander in East Pakistan.

This was a very difficult period and during much of this time I was chargé d'affaires. I recall in particular addressing the Indian Defense College at a time when we were severely criticized for tilting toward Pakistan. It was a difficult job to defend American interest at that point. In fact, I understand that one of the questions that you were going to ask me later on was my greatest frustrations in my career. My greatest frustration occurred during this period. I was on the verge of resigning from the Foreign Service because I was so upset with the decision to send the Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal as an overt threat to the government of India.

Q: I had a question that I wanted to ask you about Ambassador Bowles. I happened to be in the Department in personnel during the period when Bowles was being prepared to go out to New Delhi; and I believe this was the second time in the early sixties when he had been Under Secretary in the Kennedy administration. The rumor around Washington was that he had fallen out with the President and the inner circle and so they said "Well let's send Chester back to New Delhi." He was quite happy to go there I presume. He caused quite a furor in personnel because he picked up several additional people that he wanted on his staff, for which there was no position. The Executive Director for the Middle East was very outraged at the fact that he had to find money to finance these people. I was put in the position of going up and trying to persuade the individual who was working on Bowles' staff that these people were not necessary, and being told that the Ambassador wanted them and that positions were to be found for them. I wonder how they worked out? One was a retired Army Colonel who was to be his political - military

advisor, and that upset the Pentagon greatly because they had a whole staff of Generals and Colonels out there already.

STONE: They did decide that they wanted Chester Bowles out of the State Department; although I think he deserves great credit as the individual principally responsible for the appointment of Ambassadors in the early stages of the Kennedy administration. I mean people like Reischauer who went to Japan and Badeau who went to Egypt, people outside of the Foreign Service in many cases, but also people who the Foreign Service thoroughly respected for their professionalism and their knowledge of the area to which they were assigned. In addition working with the President, he finally got the Congressman from Brooklyn, John J. Rooney to agree to place some career officers in the major Embassies. It was during that period that Chip Bohlen was assigned to Paris, and Fred Reinhardt to Italy as Ambassador. Bowles was asked what job he would accept and he said the one job he would take would be to go back to India.

Now in terms of the people you are asking about, the Colonel that he took was named Grant Williams. He was a very fine military officer and very effective, he also had two staff aides that he brought in from outside the service. One was a man named Douglas Bennet whose father had been a close colleague of Bowles at Yale University, and had been his principal associate when Bowles was running the Office of Price Administration during the Second World War. Doug Bennet did extremely well, he was rather low-keyed, but he was an excellent staff aide and he later went on to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. The other one was a young man named Dick Celeste. Celeste is today the Governor of the State of Ohio.

Q: Very interesting, as you know it has always been a problem with Ambassadors who choose to take people outside of the normal Foreign Service staffing pattern and generally arrange to do so. This naturally causes some problems in the Department. Would you care to comment any further on your tour in Saigon? How were things looking then? Was there light at the end of the tunnel?

STONE: Well, when I arrived there, it was just after what was known as "mini-Tet." The Tet Offensive had occurred in late February of 1968, the mini-tet came in May. I arrived just after that. I had only been there about ten days having had no prior involvement with that area at all.

In fact every other person who was assigned to the country was required to take as a minimum a three weeks orientation course before taking up their assignment. I was told that I didn't need to have that course, that they wanted me out there immediately and I could learn on the job. Well, within ten days of my arrival I was told I was in charge of the visit of the Secretary of Defense, the preparation of briefing papers and everything else, and it was very much a case of being thrown into the water and having to do your best to keep your head above it. Fortunately that visit came off well. One's existence in those days in Saigon with no families for distraction was pretty intense. We worked probably fourteen hours a day, seven days a week. There was just no break at all. The only break that I took was during the lunch hour, when I would go to Circle Sportif, which had a magnificent Olympic-sized swimming pool, and swim laps and work out my frustrations in the water. I was responsible for twenty-four junior Foreign Service officers, eighteen of whom were trained in the Vietnamese language, and these young fellows were going out in the countryside in jeeps with pistols on their hips to talk to the local headman and

provincial officials, to do our best to keep a finger on the pulse of what was happening in Vietnam. We were really in competition with the wire services, because Washington did not want to be surprised by and story that came out of Vietnam. We just worked flat-out and filed a tremendous number of telegrams and reports to keep Washington fully abreast of the situation. There wasn't much light at the end of the tunnel, really.

Q: Was this during the period of Ambassador Lodge or Ellsworth Bunker?

STONE: Ellsworth Bunker was the Ambassador, and Sam Berger was the Deputy Ambassador. They had two Ambassadorial positions there at the time.

Q: This followed then the overthrow of Diem?

STONE: Oh yes! This was long after the overthrow of Diem. This was President Thieu's time, and to me the most satisfactory part of my assignment there was a result of trying to fix appointments with President Thieu and other top officials of the Vietnamese government. For this purpose, I was expected to deal with the Protocol Officer of the Palace. I soon found out that this man was totally ineffectual and I could never be sure which end was up.

By chance I met a distant relative of the President who worked in his inner office, and a fellow with whom I felt very much on the same wavelength. I arranged with the Signal Corps to have a direct telephone line installed between his office and mine, so we could do business over the telephone, which saved an immense amount of time. This man has remained a close friend and at the present time is a senior officer in one of our largest corporations, living outside Chicago and making a great success as a businessman.

Q: Was General Westmoreland in charge, or was it still General Taylor?

STONE: No, Westmoreland had just left and General Clayton Abrams was the new commander. He would regularly attend the embassy country team meetings. I had the pleasure of accompanying him on Christmas day of 1968. We flew to Tay Ninh which was very close to the Cambodian border because we had an indication that the Viet Cong might release three American prisoners. We wanted to arrange this release without any political implications, so I was asked to accompany him. We flew to Tay Ninh and we stayed there on the ground until these three soldiers eventually were released and got back to our lines.

Q: With the changing Generals from say Westmoreland to Abrams, did you notice - or was there a marked difference in the relationships between the army and the embassy, or was it more or less smooth?

STONE: I wasn't there during the Westmoreland period so I can't speak to that situation. The relationships when I was there between the civilians and the military were excellent; very close working relationships between Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. I chaired one of the committees which was involved in joint military - civilian operations. We had very close working relationships with the military, and by and large they went along very well.

Q: Very good, anything else that you would like to talk about in hindsight about your year in Vietnam? Was there anything that looking back on you wish that you had done differently, or wish that you would have seen the embassy handle differently?

STONE: I wish that I could have had a certain period of time to prepare for that assignment, I had none at all. I really felt like a bit of an ignoramus as far as that part of the world was concerned. I had read and studied almost nothing about it during my earlier career of even in college, so that it was all relatively new. I found it a very fascinating and interesting part of the world and I can well understand why a number of our officers have made it their area of specialization.

I quite enjoyed the Vietnamese as people. They are a dynamic people, hard working. At that time, I had very close relations with the U.S. military. A field force commander used to come and pick me up with his helicopter on the roof of the embassy and I joined him in making his rounds of various divisional and other unit headquarters, getting briefings on what was going on and this was a very stimulating experience.

Q: It's been said that many of our top ranking officers in the policy making positions had, like yourself, very little experience in Southeast Asia and particularly in Vietnam. That may be one of the reasons that perhaps our policies did not work out; that you were not alone in your lack of basic training and understanding of the area. Do you think that is a fair comment?

STONE: Well, I think there is some truth to that, but after all, the policy is set not by the embassy but by Washington. The mistake in Vietnam was partly that we allowed ourselves to get out in front of the South Vietnamese. We were really taking over and fighting the South Vietnamese's war for them, rather than supporting them from behind to the extent I think we should have. It was certainly a great tragedy and the thing that upsets me the most when I look back on it is the criticism of the U.S. military. Today you have films like Platoon which in my mind depict the seamiest side of the U.S. military in Vietnam and are not a true reflection of the caliber of the army that we fielded at that time.

I personally believe from what I saw that we had an excellent and well run army that was functioning in the field. Of course we did not turn loose the ability that we had to fight the enemy and, as you may have heard, the other night, Mr. Nixon was saying that the thing that he felt was the greatest mistake during his Presidency was not bombing Hanoi and Haiphong which he thought would have brought the war to a much more rapid end.

Q: Do you think it's fair to say that the objectives were ever clearly delineated so that the military was really put in an impossible position?

STONE: Yes I would. After that I went back to India and that was the period which was to me, the most frustrating of my Foreign Service career as I mentioned earlier. When the word came that we were sending the aircraft carrier Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal, I really felt that all I had been working for in terms of improving relationships between the United States and India was being totally jeopardized almost overnight. I seriously considered resigning from the Foreign Service at that point. I discussed the matter with Ambassador Keating. I recalled a

colleague who had preceded me at the Imperial Defense College in London, David Ness, who resigned from the Foreign Service because of a policy difference relation to Egypt when he was the Chargé d'affaires there. I remember that the day after he resigned, there was a front page story in the New York Times, and after that Mr. Ness was never heard from again! I finally concluded that I could be more effective by remaining in the service and doing my best to do what I felt was right, rather than submitting my resignation.

Q: That raises an interesting question that I was going to ask you about later, but we might as well touch on it now. What can an officer do when he does disagree with the governments' policy? In this case, what actions were you able to take - if any - to express your dissatisfaction with the policy that you were supposed to carry out?

STONE: Well, I made my feelings very clear in my messages to Washington, but I was overruled. At that point, once the decision is made, if you are a good Foreign Service Officer you simply carry out your instructions as best you can. If it becomes a matter of such conscience for you that you simply can't do it, then you have no choice but to resign. I think that many career officers have been in that position. While you may not like it, you have to do the very best you can to defend your government's interest as reflected by those in responsibility at the time.

Q: I thoroughly agree, but I think that today it must be very difficult for officers in controversial areas such as Central America and the Middle East to live with that problem?

STONE: My son was a member of a congressional staff group that was sent to El Salvador to observe the recent parliamentary elections. The main reaction he returned with was astonishment at the extent to which events in El Salvador are being run out of the U.S. Embassy. So sometimes, as we all know happened during the period that I was in Southeast Asia, our embassies do play a remarkably involved role in the events of other countries.

CHAS W. FREEMAN, JR.
Vice Consul
Madras (1965-1968)

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. was born in Washington, DC in 1943. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1963 and joined the Foreign Service in 1965. His career included positions in India, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Freeman was interviewed in 1995 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: I agree. Your first assignment was to Madras. You were in Madras from when to when?

FREEMAN: I entered the Foreign Service in December of 1965. Sometime around March of 1966, I departed for Madras, and I was there until September of 1968. I had a variety of assignments there. That was the period when junior officers were rotated between sections, so that much of the first period there was spent in three- to four-week stints, rotating around what

was then a very large consulate general. I did consular work throughout, but after a period of doing it full time at the outset, I rotated to the economic section, then to the political section, the administrative section, and to USIS.

There were several things that happened that convinced Ambassador Bowles that I was a very poor consular officer, but had other talents. So this resulted eventually in my being thrown out of the State Department and given to USIS. And I'll describe those incidents.

Q: Before we get to that, could you talk a little about your impression of India, from the southern point of view. What was the situation in Madras within the consular district, and how did you all deal with it?

FREEMAN: Well, that's an interesting question. Madras (then the State of Madras, later renamed Tamil Nadu to take account of Tamil linguistic self-expression) was very much at odds with the north, on many fronts. Specifically, the issue of adoption of Hindi as a national language, in part to overcome what was perceived as the unfair advantage of Tamils in the Indian administrative service and Indian foreign service because of their superior English, was stoutly resisted by people in Tamil Nadu. Just before I arrived, there had been riots on that subject.

Every time there were polls done in India at that time on matters related to the West and the United States and American viewpoints, there was a clear pattern. The most virulent anti-Western sentiment was in the Calcutta consular district, in the eastern part of India. In Delhi and the central region, there was a somewhat more favorable, but still strongly anti-Western, feeling. In Bombay, there was more neutrality, a split 50-50 between the anti-Western, pro-Western side of it. In Madras, sentiment was overwhelmingly pro-Western.

For some reason, southerners have traditionally been outward looking. And I think the reasons for that probably have to do with history. Most of the South was never subjugated by the Mughals, and not subject to the forced imposition of Islam. There are very large Christian communities, some of them dating from the earliest days of the apostles. Saint Thomas was supposedly martyred just outside Madras. And there were colonies of Nestorian Christians established, with subsequent connections to the Syrian Maronites, in Kerala. Later, during the Portuguese and British and, to some extent, French periods of influence in the South, very large numbers of Harijans (untouchables) converted to Christianity. Others converted to Islam, but they did so voluntarily, for the same reason they converted to Christianity, either out of crass motives of wishing to do business with Arab traders, or, more likely, because of the attractions of the nominally egalitarian spirit of Islam and its emphasis on communal prayer and solidarity.

So the South was, at once, more authentically Hindu, since Hinduism had not been subject to foreign (meaning Islamic) influences, less virulently torn by what the Indians call communal tensions (meaning sectarian tensions), and more comfortable with India's past and then relationships with a world still dominated by European powers and North America.

And so it was a congenial environment in which to work, which, however, had its shocking element for someone from a Puritan background in the United States. Indian society is fiercely hierarchical and greatly divided by caste. And while Islam and Christianity abjure the idea of

caste, both, in the Indian context, end up respecting it and, to some extent, practicing it within their own ranks. It is a society in which one can feel comfortable talking with local people, but at the same time, one is never far away from the recognition of difference.

One example. In the district of the city called Adyar, which was at that time very much a Brahmin concentration, I developed a number of friends, just ordinary Indians. And they did me the great honor, on several occasions, of inviting me over to their house to dinner. A Brahmin may serve food to anyone, whereas he may not receive food from anyone but a Brahmin. And in the South, Brahmins can be polluted merely by contact with the shadow of someone of no caste. Well, obviously, Westerners have no caste, so to be invited to a home for a traditional meal, in a very traditional Hindu household, was quite an honor. The second time that I went to dinner with Mr. Ramanathan and his family, I had forgotten to recover some books that I had loaned to him. So on the way home, I turned the car around, and my wife and I went back to his house to collect the books, only to discover a Brahmin priest spreading cow dung and cow urine over all the places in which we had been, and chanting various incantations to purify the household we had polluted.

So one had friendships and contacts, and Indians were people with whom I developed a great rapport and for whom I developed a great affection, but at the same time, one was always conscious of the barrier of caste and nationality.

The South, however, I would say, was, at that time at any rate, for someone who arrived knowing no Tamil (although I did manage to learn a fair amount, enough so I could get up and introduce a speech in it). I was very careful never to test in it, because I had no desire to spend the rest of my career floating between Colombo and the Deccan, but for someone who didn't know an Indian language, it was probably the most congenial of all environments.

Q: What about, at that time, '66-'68, the problem, as we saw it, or did we see it then, of Kerala?

FREEMAN: Kerala had a Communist government that was very unfriendly to the United States. Politics in south India, as elsewhere, and I actually demonstrated this very convincingly in the 1967 election, is largely caste based. In Kerala, the Communist leadership was essentially Brahmin. On a working level, we had a satisfactory relationship with them. They didn't cause us the sorts of problems that were caused by the Communists in West Bengal, for example.

The issue of caste. Let me just digress for a minute. The '67 election was coming along, I think it was in the spring, and I decided to do something that you never could do these days and that was probably quite improper, which was to use my visa interviews for a random sample of educated Indians, with a view to ascertaining the political and economic conditions of various camps. I developed a twenty-question little form that I could, I thought, quite discreetly run through with every fifth visa applicant and then file. I tabulated the whole thing and cross referenced and whatnot, and I built what was in effect an electoral model based on caste.

In '67, Howie Schaffer was then the political counselor for internal affairs, or perhaps he was first secretary dealing with internal affairs. Tony Quainton was then dealing with external affairs in Delhi. The embassy and the consulate general in Madras, which was headed by a man named

Albert Franklin, who had learned Tamil and later became quite a scholar of things Tamil after his Foreign Service career, had reached a series of predictions based essentially on the normal Foreign Service reporting style, which was a combination of interviews with eminent people and reading the press, with which my results did not agree, because I thought there was a real sea change going on.

A party named Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which was a Tamil nationalist group, I thought was going to win the election in Madras. I thought that there would be quite different results in Kerala than were predicted. And I thought they weren't far off in what is now called Karnataka, what was then called Mysore. In Andhra Pradesh, I thought they were off, too. These were the four provinces we dealt with. Pondicherry was then a separate entity as well.

So I wrote, not knowing the term because it hadn't been invented, through what was in effect the dissent channel, an airgram, taking issue with the embassy and my own consulate general's political section's estimates of the forthcoming election.

I made a mistake in the airgram; I didn't put a summary in, which was duly noted by the inspectors later.

But other than that, I had the pleasure of being entirely right, and also suffered the pain of it, since my consul general had introduced this airgram by saying, "Here's this piece that some young man on my staff has done, with which I totally disagree, but nevertheless it may be of interest, and so I'm allowing him to submit it." He was quite embarrassed when I turned out to be right and he turned out to be wrong.

So, on that basis, probably incorrectly, I gained some minor reputation in the embassy as an expert on south Indian politics, which stood me in good stead when Ambassador Bowles found me wanting as a consular officer.

Q: How'd they find you wanting as a consular officer?

FREEMAN: Well, let me say, first of all, that I greatly enjoyed consular work. I enjoyed it for many reasons. It gives you access to elements of society and the authority structure that you don't gain any other way -- visits to prisons, dealings with the police, dealings with the court authorities, ship captains and the like.

Q: Hospitals.

FREEMAN: Hospitals, hotel management, all of these really rather essential, real elements of a society that most of the Foreign Service doesn't come in contact with. And so I enjoyed it greatly. The visa-interview business frankly paled after a while, but I did find, as I said, a way to put that to some use.

Let me talk a little bit about the consular experience, a couple of anecdotes, since those are always fun, before I get into the question of why Ambassador Bowles took a dislike to me as a consular officer, correctly.

I had been in Madras about three or four weeks, and I was made the duty officer for the consulate general. In the middle of the night, around one o'clock, I got a call from the captain of the *USS Manhattan*, which was a supertanker engaged in the grainlift to India. At that time, we were supplying enormous quantities of surplus grain to India. And he said that his cook on the ship had died. He had chugged two bottles of vodka, on a bet, and had died of alcohol poisoning. The captain wanted me to come down and pick up the body. And so I asked him where he was. Was he anchored within the harbor or within the harbor jurisdiction?

He said, "Yes."

And I said, "Well, in that case, I'm afraid you'll have to report this matter to the harbor authorities, because there'll have to be an investigation. Furthermore, I don't have at home any facilities for storing a dead body, even if I could gain access to it. And, finally, the consulate does not have any cold storage."

So he said, "What should I do?"

I said, "Well, stick him in the meat locker overnight, if you can't get the harbor authorities to come out."

So he did.

The Indian medical profession, which did an autopsy on this poor fellow, was just thrilled. Madras was a dry state. Chronic alcoholism probably existed, but was seldom seen. So they called doctors from all over south India to observe the advanced effects of alcoholism in this corpse.

This delayed the autopsy for some time. Finally, the *Manhattan* was allowed to sail, even though the autopsy hadn't been officially completed.

In the meantime, I was in touch with this man's estranged wife in Baton Rouge, through the Department of State, and ascertained that he had always wanted to be buried at sea. Well, that posed a bit of a problem, because the *Manhattan* had left, and he hadn't yet been released by the Indian authorities.

So I investigated and found that I could hire a tug boat for this purpose, if his estate were willing to pay. And that was agreed.

So, one afternoon, I arrived with my Brahmin consular assistant (and you have to realize that touching corpses is deeply polluting) down at the dock, where the Indian police promised to deliver this corpse, suitably fixed up for burial at sea. We waited and waited. Half an hour after the police were supposed to turn up, up came a taxi with a police officer in the front seat next to the driver, and sticking out of the back window were two bloody white feet. I opened up the back, and there was this man, wrapped in a sheet, but much the worse for having been autopsied all over the place. I had hired some coolies to carry the body aboard and provide the due ceremony.

They took one look at this and ran away. My consular assistant, of course, would not touch the body. I took it out of the taxi and laid it on the sidewalk, and sent my consular assistant to buy some iron rods and rope. I had with me an American flag and a Bible. And I carried the thing myself onto the tugboat. The tugboat captain was none too pleased. I put it on the transom of the boat, put the bars in the sheet, with the body, and then tied the whole thing up with rope. And we set sail.

Well, I had read the regulations, and as they then read, I realized that when you do a burial at sea, you're supposed to provide the exact latitude and longitude, taken from a real sighting. You have to do it with a sextant. The captain assured me that he had done that at the Merchant Marine Academy, thirty years before, in Bombay.

So we got underway. And the whole experience was too unnerving for the captain. I discovered then that, whereas you cannot drink in Madras Harbor, because it's under the jurisdiction of the state authorities, once you passed the then three-mile limit, you were on the high seas and you could drink. And the captain proceeded to get absolutely smashing drunk.

In the end, my Brahmin assistant wouldn't touch the corpse. I laid the flag over it, read the ceremony, and gave it a good, solid kick with my foot. It went tumbling overboard, and I watched it sink into the depths.

The captain then took a sighting, which turned out later to be somewhere in downtown Singapore, about 1,500 miles away. But I went home and recorded the moral equivalent of our position.

And of such things was consular life made.

However, in the Madras jail was a notorious smuggler, a man of some distinction, a University of Virginia graduate, a Korean War ace, who had been arrested before in India. This was his second arrest. The first one was when he was operating a B-24 out of Abu Dhabi.

Q: Which was the Liberator, a large, four-engine bomber.

FREEMAN: He used this to bomb the beach south of Bombay with gold ingots, which his confederates in India would then pick up. Gold in India at that time was twice the international price.

Q: And Abu Dhabi was one of the crucial states, a smuggler's paradise. They used to watch the people loading dhows, you know, small box, bent over, as they shuffled off to the...

FREEMAN: Exactly. So he did this successfully for quite a while, and then one day was spotted by Indian radar. MiGs scrambled, and he was forced south, in the direction of Goa. And as he went, he bombed the beach with these ingots, the evidence. He made a lot of villagers very happy, I'm sure. But he was forced down in Goa, arrested for various charges: illegal entry, illegal use of airspace, illegal operation of aircraft. It turned out that the aircraft somehow had a lien on it, or was owned perhaps by the Tata group. So that became an exhibit in yet another series of suits.

Q: Tata being a big shoe...

FREEMAN: No, Tata being a great Indian industrial steel and iron combine.

This was long before I was around, '64, '65. He was taken to New Delhi and put in a minimum-security prison. He managed to persuade the authorities that the engines of this aircraft had to be turned over, due to its age, every day, or they would freeze up. He disconnected the gas gauge in the aircraft, which was in a hangar. He would turn the motors over, adding a little bit more gas each day, until he had a full tank. And then he simply took off, right across Palam Airfield, and flew to Pakistan, hugging the ground in such a way that the much faster MiGs were unable to get him.

This was ten days before the outbreak of the '65 Indo-Pak War. And it became a cause celebre in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament. It was charged that he was definitely a CIA agent and that he had taken the Indian war plans to Pakistan, which was why the Indians got a drubbing. So he was quite something.

He was arrested in Bombay sometime in 1965, again, having entered with a false passport from Ceylon (Sri Lanka now), with jewels taped between his toes.

Since his port of entry was Madras, he was eventually sent to Madras. He was in the central government prison. And he was very badly abused, partly because of the political controversy surrounding him, I am sure. In any event, he was beaten frequently. He wasn't given a good diet. And, of course, I assumed the duty of visiting him and getting him some food, which I paid for myself, and lending him books, since he was a voracious reader, and got to know him a bit.

I was deeply disturbed by the discriminatory treatment he was being subjected to, since I think national treatment is a basic principle of consular affairs. So, after going to see the local authorities in the central prison system, I wrote to the embassy an OM (operations memorandum, a form which doesn't exist any more, I think), detailing this and asking for intervention by the embassy, preferably the ambassador, at a sufficiently high level to gain appropriate treatment for him and end the abuse.

I got back a very nice note from Ambassador Bowles, which said something to the effect that he couldn't believe that his beloved liberal, democratic, constitution-minded Indian friends could really be doing any such thing, and that he didn't propose to do anything about it.

Being a hot-headed young man with a legal background, although not yet a law degree, I took issue with this. So I slapped another OM on top of that, detailing further abuse, referring to Bowles' note and enclosing it, and sent it to the Department. It went up to Dean Rusk.

And then I went on R & R in Hong Kong. While I was in Hong Kong, Dean Rusk reprimanded Bowles and insisted that he go in and see the prime minister on this subject, which clearly didn't make him very happy.

That was one transgression.

A second was the niece of the Dalai Lama, who had been issued with something short of a passport, and obviously there was high political interest.

Q: A Dalai Lama, I might say, who had escaped from Tibet when the Chinese came in and took over Tibet. And so he was a major political figure as well as a religious figure at that time.

FREEMAN: That's right. In the 1950s, the United States, through the CIA, had played some role in fomenting insurrection in Tibet, which led to the events, since the Dalai Lama actually was in Tibet for some time after the Chinese recovery of Tibet. This series of events, revolt in Tibet, led to his fleeing to Dharmasala, and that was where he was in residence. But he was of great political interest in a Cold War, anti-China context.

His niece turned up at the consulate with a travel document issued by the Indian authorities, which described her as a stateless person of Tibetan origin.

I went to the local passport authorities and asked some questions, obviously looking for a way to give her a visa to the United States, but doubting that this document met the definition of a passport, since a passport must give you a right of reentry into the country where it is issued, or to somewhere, or it is not valid. And I was told that no such right was conferred by this document. Obviously, as a matter of practice, she would be readmitted, given the nasty state of relations between China and India at that time, since they'd fought a war in 1962. But I could not, in good conscience, rule that this was a passport, within the meaning of U.S. law and regulations, and I ruled that it was not.

I was then asked by Bowles to reconsider that and reverse it. And I declined to do so, which did not endear me to him, either.

Finally, on the plus side, I had been involved in Madras with various youth groups, students and the like, and got involved with the All-India Youth Congress local branch. This resulted in my being the co-keynote speaker, the first foreigner, certainly the first foreign diplomat and American, along with the Indian vice president, V. V. Ghiri, at a mass meeting of the All-India Youth Congress in Madras.

So Bowles looked at this and decided that I was an absolute disaster as a consular officer, from his perspective, but I was all right at public relations and political reporting. While I was in Hong Kong, he reassigned me to USIS, which turned out to be one of the kindest things that anyone has ever done for me, because I enjoyed that experience enormously.

In fact, I think one of the things that has gone wrong with the Foreign Service is greater separation of USIS from State over the years. USIS offers opportunities, at very young ages, for officers to run programs, manage things. And this is something at which many in the Foreign Service don't get a chance to try themselves until they are in a very senior position, and often they're catastrophically incompetent as managers. It's particularly true with political and economic officers.

At any rate, I became the university programs officer. We had a very active program of outreach and use of American Fulbrighters, visiting scholars, and Indians with university degrees from the United States. I helped to perfect something called an Interdisciplinary Seminar on American Civilization, which was a four-day program for Indian graduate students and faculty on that subject, which also included in it a segment on the Vietnam War. And I'm remiss in not mentioning that.

In 1966, the first year I was in Madras, someone in one of the youth groups that I was involved with told some friends that I was very interested in China. This led to an invitation to address the university at Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, on the Vietnam War, in defense of U.S. policy.

Before I entered the Foreign Service, when I was in law school, I was a minor, somewhat active, but not terribly prominent, participant in what became the teach-in movement against the Vietnam War. I thought the war was a mistake. (I believe that we entered the war for the wrong reasons, stayed there for the wrong reasons and got out for the wrong reasons. So I find nothing ennobling about the experience.)

Suddenly, I was confronted with the question of how far I was committed to the advocacy role of the Foreign Service. I thought there were three ethical choices. One, I could duck the invitation to speak, by saying that I was unavailable, sick, or something, but I felt that would be both morally incorrect and fruitless, because sooner or later, someone else would invite me. Two, I could refuse it, in which case, having taken Uncle Sam's nickel, I would be untrue to the role that I was embarked on professionally, and really should resign from the Foreign Service. Three, I could accept it and be, like a lawyer in a courtroom, an advocate for a client whose moral and political judgment I privately questioned. In the end, I decided that the only proper course, consistent with remaining in the Foreign Service, was to accept. And I did.

I used maps, drawing from the INR Latin American director's inspiration and my own legal training, to draw up a pretty powerful presentation, which, without saying so, left the audience with the impression that the only reason we were in Vietnam was to defend Mother India against godless Chinese communism.

And this was a resounding success. Indian views and knowledge of Southeast Asia were so narrow and shallow that this presentation shifted campus opinion, overnight, from ninety percent against the war to ninety percent in favor.

So Ambassador Bowles, when he assigned me to USIS, also had this in mind.

Q: I think we might point out for the record, Ambassador Bowles was one of the preeminent public-relations types. That was his background, so this was an important factor for him.

FREEMAN: I think he was an extremely fine man. I don't blame him at all for getting rid of me. I think I probably would have done the same thing as ambassador. And I consider it a stroke of good fortune that he thought of USIS, rather than exile to some less relevant place.

But at any rate, as a young man now of twenty-three or twenty-four, I suddenly found myself with dozens of Foreign Service nationals to supervise, a large budget, programs to run, recruitment of speakers to do, and my own speaking program, under circumstances in which I was essentially left alone to do what I wanted to do.

There was, in fact, a political appointee, oddly, as cultural affairs officer in Madras at that time, someone who had been a museum director, who, for one reason or another, he just never really took hold and ended up getting a doctor's certificate that stated that, for his health, he had to spend at least half a day at the beach, resting each day. He would occasionally call in and ask me whether anything was going on of note. And I would tell him no, I had everything under control. So, in effect, I ended up running a good deal of the cultural operation, which was much larger than the university outreach program.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian educational system, at the university level, of knowledge of the United States? Were there courses?

FREEMAN: The Indian educational system, at that time, was running on fossil knowledge from the British era. Professors tended not to do independent research of any consequence, and would often use the same lecture notes for thirty years without significant change. The Indian educational system put tremendous emphasis on knowledge of British literature, British history. The whole English prism through which India saw the outside world was reinforced by the educational system. Knowledge of the United States was poor. Attitudes toward the United States reflected British condescension. And while there was, thanks to USIS, the Ford Foundation, and others, some effort being made, which I think later bore fruit, to introduce American studies more widely into the Indian university system, they were essentially nonexistent, except at a few places. There were two centers: one at Poona, in Maharashtra, which was in the Bombay consular district; and the other, Osmania University, in Hyderabad, in Andhra Pradesh, which was under the Madras consulate general. The Osmania University Center was a library of American studies, in which USIS was involved. But basically Indian education was not even really directed very much at India, certainly not at Southeast Asia, or Asia more broadly. It was, to a good extent, a relic of the British Empire, with all of the narrowness of focus that implies.

Let me digress here. When the British took over India (the British East India Company, initially), in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century, they were faced with the question of how one should administer such a vast domain. And to do this they invented the idea of the modern civil service by drawing on the writings of the French philosophers, who had drawn in turn on the Jesuit Matteo Ricci and other reporting on the Chinese system, including the civil service system in China. That is a system that, for millennia, has been based on a written examination, of some difficulty, in the classics, and which has ranks and grades through which one progresses, on merit and by further examination. The British decided to adopt a variant of this system. They looked around for the classics that might be the subject of the examination process they were initiating. Clearly, Latin and Greek, which were the classics in Europe, were not relevant to the Indian situation. They didn't wish to adopt the Sanskrit classics, for obvious reasons. Therefore they decided they would have to find English classics. Well, no one thought, at that time, that there were any classics in English. It was a vernacular, spoken on a small island that had become

prominent through trade and conquest, but it didn't have classics. The anointment of Shakespeare as *the* classic playwright and poet, along with others like Donne and so forth, and the recognition of the British novel as a classic were really done for the invention of what became the Indian civil service.

Q: That's very interesting.

FREEMAN: So the Indian civil service examination was very heavy on Shakespeare and British quotations, Dr. Johnson and the like. The university system was directed at training people to pass this examination. So all Indians came out of university able to quote prodigious quantities of Shakespeare. The educational system emphasized rote memorization, which is actually quite a useful thing, although our system doesn't appreciate it. And so the whole focus was British India and consistent with the imperial tradition.

So I tried to introduce the thought that the United States was not just a wayward group of British colonists, but something different and new. That the American Constitution was not the atrocity that they had thought. That there was a war of independence, rather than a rebellion. That this rather strange country, which had emerged after World War II as the dominant power in the world, had its own interesting history and cultural characteristics, including some which were quite opposite to the Indian common view of them.

For example, Indians believed firmly that the United States was an irreligious country, when one of the most notable things about America is the extraordinary practice of religion (I won't say adherence to religious principles).

Q: But compared to others...

FREEMAN: Compared to others, we are churchgoers. And we are very much influenced, even American Catholics, by the Puritan heritage.

So it was possible to present these seminars and have quite an effect. Since the base of knowledge was so low and the presuppositions were so demonstrably false, one could make quite an impact.

I think probably the seminars were fairly superficial. But then a wise man from the East, somewhere in Massachusetts, I think, said once that if something's worth doing, it's worth doing superficially. So that was the approach we took.

Q: Did you feel the hand of the Soviets down there, as far as their program there, what they were pushing? Was there much soil in which to flourish?

FREEMAN: The Soviets were very much a presence in Madras, with a large consulate general, a KGB resident, who was nominally the cultural attaché, funneling money to the Communist Party and quite effectively infiltrating the educational system. India's economy, beginning in the '50s, began to be tied more and more closely to the Soviet economy. There were ruble-rupee trade arrangements, which tended to skew Indian trade in the direction of the Russians. The Indian

government was Socialist by inclination, inclined to central planning, and followed many Russian models. I say the Indian leadership was Socialist by inclination; their socialism was British Fabian socialism. But since the Fabians had never managed to produce anything practical, the only model they could see was the Russian one, and that was the one they followed.

But, yes, the Russians were there and active, politically, culturally, and economically. They were the major source of military technology for the Indians, for example. In the south, because of the fact that the south was out of strike range from Pakistan or China, at that time, the Indians have concentrated many of their munitions plants, a major tank factory, for example, at Avadi, outside of Madras, and at Aradi Bangalore.

Q: Did you find yourselves going head-to-head with the Soviets on things, with the students or with other groups? Or did you do your thing and they did their thing?

FREEMAN: We did our thing; they did theirs. They actually had most of the cards, I would say, given the favorable disposition of the central government toward them. But we didn't cross swords with them very often.

Q: Was the Indian bureaucracy difficult to deal with? I've never served in India, but Indians I've met, I think, could be absolutely insufferable in bureaucratic things. But maybe it's a different...

FREEMAN: The Indian bureaucracy is a rigidly stratified one, very rule bound. I remember that, for example, to gain customs clearance and admission of goods through the port required fifty-seven signatures. I discovered this because the expediter, whose name was Hamid, a South Indian Muslim, appeared to be taking a terribly long time carrying things through the port. So I decided to walk through the process with him, and at this point found out why things did take a long time.

Attitudinally, however, the Indian administrative service, as a service, is an elite civil service, with terribly bright people, who, if you are able to deal with them as intellectual equals, respond.

So I found them, yes, a bit preachy and self-righteous and sanctimonious, but then this was the era of Lyndon Johnson in the United States, so they had no monopoly on sanctimony.

LINDSEY GRANT
Political/Economic Officer
New Delhi (1965-1968)

After graduating from Cornell University, Lindsey Grant served in the Navy until he joined the Foreign Service in 1949. His foreign posts included Hong Kong, Taipei, New Delhi, and Cyprus. This interview was conducted on January 31, 1990.

Q: Then should we move on to India for a while and then get back?

GRANT: Sure. I don't have much to say about India, but I'd be delighted to discuss it.

Q: Just say what you did there in India, your major concerns, and we'll move on. We'll come back to the rest.

GRANT: I went to India in a swap with Jake Jacobson as the guy in the Embassy who was supposed to be dealing with the Indians about everything in the east: China, Vietnam, and so on. For part of the time, I had the whole communist world. This was sort of a technical assignment. It was not a terribly demanding assignment. It was nothing like the Asian Communist Affairs assignment. (I think Bill Bundy was delighted to see me go, since I'd been sort of a thorn in the flesh. I kept saying, "We're on the wrong course in Vietnam.") I didn't do much and had a thoroughly good time. It was an extraordinary civilization to get three years of exposure to.

Q: How about your Indian counterparts? They had their own rhetoric about Vietnam and opposed to the United States there. Their membership in the International Control Commission was not a very positive one from at least our point of view. But how about your contacts within the Indian bureaucracy? How did they feel about what we were doing in Vietnam?

GRANT: I went in and spoke my piece, which was the U.S. official position, and they spoke their piece. We didn't bloody our swords too much. I mean, we both just reiterated positions. They obviously didn't convince the United States, nor we them.

Interestingly enough, I had some very close friendships there, some of whom I kept with until very recently, even though we did disagree in many ways. On the perception of China, I think that they recognized in some degree that we had something for them to learn. One of the people, V.R. Narayan, who was later ambassador here, was ambassador in China for a while. He was the director of that part of the foreign office most of the time I was there. We had really fairly frank and profitable exchanges about China. They would actually call me up and say, "We've got something here that we'd like your reaction on." For instance, there would be an occasional shooting at the passes and border points. I can recall their actually asking me if I'd come by and discuss it, to get our reading as to whether this presaged anything bigger. They knew that we had some capabilities to tell whether the Chinese had moved up some military capabilities that they should know about.

And on an even more personal basis, I got a call once in some real agitation. They had their equivalent of FBIS, Foreign Broadcasting Service.

Q: This is an outfit that overtly monitors broadcasts, translates it, and distributes it.

GRANT: Right. They had their own version, their own operation of the same sort, and they had a message from Peking that was taking the Pakistan side in spades, wild language, right during a very tense period with Pakistan. I think it was just after the brief war in 1966, I guess that was -- '65?

They called me in and said, "What do you make of this? What are the Chinese doing?" I remember looking at it and being totally incredulous, and saying, "I think you've got the wrong dateline on this. Why don't you call your office up in Simla and see if that thing didn't come out of Pakistan, rather than Peking?" And it had. And they were rather appreciative. So there was actually a rather close relationship. But that doesn't mean anything in foreign affairs terms.

Q: How did they see the role of China in Vietnam?

GRANT: They did not consider this to be a Chinese initiative or thing. In this sense, although obviously I didn't say as much, they shared my evaluation of it. The Chinese were doing this with the Vietnamese because they didn't dare not to, did not want the Russians to upstage them -- which the Russians did, anyway. There was a lot of tension between Vietnam and China. I knew it, and they did, and I think that they perceived this as being basically an intra-Vietnamese hassle that we shouldn't be in.

Q: It's a doctrine that is now discarded, but every once in a while crops up, and that is the domino theory, which was to the effect that if the North Vietnamese win here, particularly early on, this means that obviously Cambodia and Laos will come under their suzerainty, which it has up to a point, and that means that there will be increased pressure on Thailand and Malaysia and Singapore and all. Was there any feeling of this? And this could be a threat to India itself, because they're a democracy. Did they feel that there was anything to this?

GRANT: If they did, they didn't say it. They didn't admit it. Yes, the domino theory, of course, was perhaps the most important part of the rationale we used, and we'll never know if in Thailand the people had begun to perceive that you couldn't stop this wave, if they would have collapsed. The Thai don't like the Vietnamese and don't particularly want to give up. So I'm not sure they would have caved at all. After all, if this had happened in the 1950s, it might have been even more of a threat, but the lines were fairly well drawn, and I think the perception of China as not being just part of a monolith that was going to engulf them, and the perception of the North Vietnamese as being Vietnamese was pretty well advanced.

The Indians would simply say they didn't believe it. They didn't worry if the countries wanted to go communist. They didn't worry about it, and they didn't think that this was a threat to them. What they may have felt internally is somewhat different, because, after all, the Chinese example led to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist/Leninist). From the Congress Party's perspective, that had a good result and a bad result. The good result was that it split the Communist Party. The bad result was that it created a much more virulently struggle-prone party in East India, a Communist Party. So they had some evidence that there could be spin-off effects like this, but they never admitted it.

JOHN W. SHIRLEY
Press Attaché, USIS
New Delhi (1965-1969)

John W. Shirley was born in England to American parents in 1931. He graduated from Georgetown University in 1957 and served in the U.S. Air Force overseas from 1954 to 1956. After entry into USIA his postings abroad have included Yugoslavia, Trieste, Rome, New Delhi, and Poland, with an ambassadorship to Tanzania. Mr. Shirley was interviewed in 1989 by G. Lewis Schmidt.

SHIRLEY: I apparently passed the test and was told to get to Delhi as quickly as I could. I arrived in Delhi, and I remember being met by my colleague, Merrill Miller. Merrill took us to our hotel, which was the Delhi Claridge, not London Claridge, I'm sorry to say. I went to bed at about 4:00 in the morning -- planes in Delhi always arrive at that time. Two hours later, I got a call to report to the Embassy. A car fetched me, and off I went. When I arrived, I was told to report to the Ambassador's office where we learned that Indian and Pakistani forces had clashed in the Punjab and that there was a war on. Would I please get to work?

I had a glimmering of where the Punjab was, and I knew that Indians and Pakistanis did not get on particularly well. Happily, my grandfather -- I have an English mother and her father was a career officer in the British Army -- had spent 20 years in India, and I had been brought up by him until I was six. I was steeped in the lore of British India, but it was Mr. Kipling's India, not Mr. Nehru's. Still it got me by the first weeks, and I did know quite a lot about the military situation which fascinated me.

Within 24 hours we had 50 American correspondents on the ground, and within 48 hours perhaps 75 or 80. I did a morning briefing and afternoon briefing, always after consulting with the Defense Attaché, with the Ambassador, with the DCM, and with the Political Counselor, trying quickly to learn what was going on and working out how to say it without getting the Embassy creamed by the Indians who weren't telling anyone anything. I worked harder and with greater pleasure and more enthusiasm than I ever had in my life before. It was a glorious week or ten days of really being engaged and very quickly getting to know my way around.

If you should ask me--which you haven't--which tour I considered my best tour professionally, at which stage I performed the most efficiently, at which stage I found my work the most satisfying, and at which stage in my life I had the greatest chief, I would pick those three years in India with Chester Bowles.

It's curious in life how one sometimes has chemistry with a person, even if one has very different views of the world. Chester Bowles was a liberal's liberal, and I was a prototypical Tory, but we got on famously.

There were some interesting people on Ambassador Bowles' personal staff. Dick Celeste, who is now Governor of Ohio, was his aide. Doug Bennet, who is now president of National Public Radio, formerly Director of AID, formerly Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, was his principal speechwriter, although Doug left shortly after I arrived when I took on that responsibility.

You know, press attachés do not, as a rule, make their careers by disagreeing with the chief of mission, or by arguing in a senior staff meeting, arguing against something which an ambassador

proposes. But Chester Bowles always encouraged me to do just that, and always listened, even when I was speaking nonsense. He also taught me whatever I know about writing. You'll remember that Chester Bowles and Bill Benton were the founders of Benton and Bowles, and that they practically invented market research. And Ambassador Bowles knew how to write. Initially, it was a terrifying experience to write for him, but I learned how to let myself into his mind. By the middle of my three-year tour, I was able to write for him things which he changed very little. What he changed always made it more felicitous, but in the main he let stand what I put before him. I also had the opportunity in Delhi to be Staff Aide for quite long periods when I would be both Staff Aide and Press Attaché. It was a fine opportunity to get an overview of the work of an embassy, to understand the responsibilities of an ambassador, and to learn what a diplomatic mission could and could not do. The experience served me extremely well in later years.

When I was a chief of mission myself, I thought back on those early years in the Foreign Service and on the lessons learned from Chester Bowles. We became close personal friends. Our house in Connecticut is only a 20-minute drive from his, so I continued to see him after he retired. When he retired, he asked me to leave the Service and do a column with him, but I couldn't afford it. I'm sorry we didn't have that experience together. There was so much more that I could have learned from him, but he was already in bad health and perhaps it would not have worked.

I might add about my Delhi experience that Bill Miller was PAO. There are so many Bill Millers, but I refer to Delhi Bill Miller.

Q: One of them has died. Bombay Bill Miller died.

SHIRLEY: Yes, I heard that. Delhi Bill Miller was a good PAO. He understood that it was valuable for him to have a press attaché who was close to the ambassador, as I think I was. I kept him abreast of everything that went on in the chancery, and we saw each other at least once a day. A lesser man might not have enjoyed the fact that one of his subordinates spent more time with the ambassador than he did.

Q: At this time, of course, Henry Kissinger made his famous statement that, "I guess we're leaning toward Pakistan." Did that happen while you were there, and did you have to put up with the reaction to that statement?

SHIRLEY: I don't remember that Kissinger said it, but there was a general feeling in India that we had a pro-Pakistani bias. I think it was probably right that we did, and I think we had a pro-Pakistani bias for good reasons, the most public of which was that the Indians constantly gave us a bad time.

Indians have a tendency to moralize, which at best is irritating and, at worst, maddening. I remember an incident, and I was very much involved in this, which illustrates the point.

In 1967, the crop had been catastrophic and about 40 million people in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were threatened with famine. A congressional delegation came: Congressman Pogue, who was then Chairman of the House Agricultural Committee; Congressman--now Senator--Dole; and

then-Senator Miller of Iowa. Ambassador Bowles sent Herb Spivack, the Political Counselor, and me with the delegation to tour the famine-struck areas. The group returned to the U.S. persuaded that help was needed.

After a long travail, Lyndon Johnson signed off on an agreement to give India ten million tons of grain. And on that day Indira Gandhi sent a birthday cable to Ho Chi Minh. Lyndon hit the roof, and justifiably so. Ambassador Bowles had to use every bit of his considerable political influence in Washington not to have us go back on the agreement.

But it was that kind of thing which made Indians difficult to deal with and which no doubt contributed to our pro-Pakistan "tilt."

Q: Yes. I must confess that my own contact with the Indians has been very limited, and yet it's been enough so that I have almost automatically been irritated with Indian contacts. I've had a few very good Indian friends, but of all the people's I've encountered, they probably irritate me more than any other foreign people I know. Do you have any other observations about your tour in India, or any observations on the general efficacy of the USIA program there?

SHIRLEY: Yes, much more so than in Italy. Virtually everything the post did in India was worthwhile.

Q: "Span".

SHIRLEY: Yes. "Span," for instance, was an excellent, widely read magazine. We also had a good twice-monthly news- paper. The cultural program, at least exhibits and cultural presentations, that sort of thing, was rather less important, and money spent on such things was probably wasted. On the other hand, funds for the exchange program were well handled and yielded good returns.

The USIS post in India had an impact in both the long and short term. We certainly did everything we could to make known our views through the press, tried to insure that our views were accurately reflected, and spent a good deal of time working with the Indian intellectual community.

Q: Well, of course, first of all, the program in India cannot be a mass program in the usual sense of the word because there is such a vast difference in educational opportunities for the very low classes in India and the poor, as compared with the more or less elite. But you really feel that the program that USIS carried out in India did, then, have a substantial effect upon those people who were in the educated and knowledgeable class?

SHIRLEY: Yes. I think that it had the effect of bringing to a limited number of people information and views they otherwise would not have had, or would not have considered. The role of Ambassador Bowles in the USIS context was critical, of course. He was an excellent PAO. The combination of the USIS program, bolstered by the work of an exceptional ambassador, made a difference.

I might tell you an anecdote.

One evening I was at the German Embassy at a dinner. One of the house servants came and called me to the phone. Dick Celeste was on the line and he said that I was to drop my knife and fork and come to the Embassy. I made my excuses and left. I walked into the Ambassador's office and was told that we had "a walk-in," which was the term we used to describe a defector. I asked who it was, and was told: "Stalin's daughter."

That was the evening that Svetlana Alliluyeva walked into the Embassy and made a little bit of history.

We managed to get her out of India the same night, on a Qantas flight to Rome. There the story broke. I started getting telephone calls from every news organization in the United States, but I couldn't say anything as we were deep in talks with the Swiss about obtaining asylum for her there. I could not even say, "no comment," or "I really don't have anything for you on that," since that would have been tantamount to an admission. For hours I just had to fake it. I couldn't lie to the press, but I could dissimulate: "What? Can't hear you. Bad connection," and so on.

Q: I had forgotten. When the story finally broke, was the Swiss connection then disconnected? Did she go immediately to the United States?

SHIRLEY: No. She stayed in Rome only a few hours, after about twelve hours in the air from Delhi to Rome. The USG used those hours to negotiate with the Swiss.

A small parenthesis here about good diplomacy. Bowles did not want to put Secretary Rusk in the position of having to decide what to do with her, so he made the decision for him. He sent a flash cable to Rusk, but timed it so that he would receive it when Svetlana was already on the way from the Embassy to the airport. We knew, of course, that from the arrival of the cable in the Operations Center until the time somebody with sufficient authority to wake up the Secretary of State could be found, it would be too late for Rusk to involve himself in the decision. Bowles gave Rusk deniability which he needed since he was involved at the time in a sensitive negotiation with the Soviets.

Q: How long was she in Switzerland?

SHIRLEY: Six or seven weeks. Then she came to the United States. Since then, she's been bouncing around.

Q: Well, do you think that pretty well covers your experience in Delhi, then? Do you want to go on to subsequent activities?

SHIRLEY: I think exhaustively for the unfortunate person who has to listen to this tape.

WILLIAM D. MILLER

**Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1965-1970)**

William D. Miller served with the Central Intelligence Agency before he transferred to the U.S. Information Agency (USIS) in 1962. He served in India and Japan. This interview was conducted in 1989.

MILLER: In the subcontinent, India and Pakistan were at each others throats, and for some period of time India and China were also at loggerheads or even at war. And we had the same sorts of problems in that area as in the Near East but the dimensions were quite different.

Q: The time that China attacked India was that while you were there or before you went out there?

MILLER: No, that was before. I think it was 1962.

Q: My memory gets hazy too when I try to remember just when these different things occurred.

MILLER: The United States did come to India's aid for a period during that time and our prestige increased. But it wasn't a lasting thing in India.

They also had a tremendous problem in the subcontinent in particular tied to poverty, population growth, food supply, and that sort of thing. You may remember there were dire predictions of world famine at that time. The overriding U.S. objective at that time was to protect and preserve the Indian experiment in democracy. During the latter half of the Sixties the United States was pouring tremendous resources into India in an attempt to alleviate some of her more pressing problems, such as those listed above, without which democracy could not survive.

The primary USIS role was to alter Indian attitudes which might impede the tremendous effort being made by the United States and, to a lesser degree, other western governments to help India to cope with its massive problems. A lesser, but still important, USIS objective was to ensure that the tremendous and costly U.S. effort was understood within India.

Q: At the time you were in IAN and later in India, USIS had access to large amounts of -- I guess they didn't call it Garicoa anymore -- local currency at the disposal of the U.S. government.

MILLER: PL 480. Excess rupees. All through the '60s and into the '70s, the amount of PL 480 aid that we were giving to India was such that we were generating tremendous amounts of Indian currency owned by us. And it became apparent fairly early in the game that we were never going to use these currencies to any extensive degree, because to do so would absolutely bankrupt the economy of the country that we were trying to help. This was true not only in India but to a lesser extent in Pakistan and Ceylon and even Afghanistan. During my tenure in India this became a very important problem. It also provided us with some opportunities that any other USIS post in the world would love to have had. In other words, we had more money than we could spend so long as we could spend it in rupees.

Q: *Were you paying the Indian employees out of that fund?*

MILLER: Yes, and ourselves to the extent that we spent money in India.

I was transferred to India in 1965 and stayed there for five years. And throughout that period I was constantly bombarded by Washington and visitors from Washington -- visitors from the White House, Cabinet members, Congressmen, other important political figures. And they always wanted to see the PAO to find out how we could spend more of these Indian rupees.

It was a crazy situation because the budget we received in Washington was in dollars. And so to the extent that we spent more money in India, it inflated the agency's budget even though what we were spending was blocked funds which could not be used in any other manner. And as you remember the Agency was having a very hard time getting a budget of any kind out of Congress during that period. So we had to be careful on the one hand, but we had all kinds of pressures on the other hand to spend more.

All of the expenses of the Indian program with very few exceptions were paid in rupees, including our allowances, including the parts of our salary that we spent inside India and including a vast program that we had going out there.

We printed all of our own publications in India and we had a number of publications that no other post could afford to have because of the rupee situation. We had, for example, the American Reporter, a weekly tabloid type newspaper. We printed about 500,000 copies in, as I recall, 14 languages. We had SPAN, a monthly magazine which we printed in the 100,000 copies and on which we spared almost no effort as far as quality went, to the extent that throughout the period of the '60s SPAN won the top national award in India as the best produced magazine in India. And I think at some point after I left there they disqualified SPAN from the competition in that because it was clear that they were going to continue to win it. We made our own movies. We had a large exhibit program -- made all of our exhibits. We republished selected American books. In fact, we produced in India practically the entire media spectrum: print, electronic and visual. All of it paid for with blocked Indian rupees.

Q: *Did you have your own motion picture studios do the processing there too?*

MILLER: Most of it in Bombay, yes. We used Indian studios for the processing.

Q: *Who was your MOPIX officer at that time?*

MILLER: Oh, gee. I forget. That's a terrible thing to say. But I'll think of it and fill it in at a later time. We had several. They were all very good.

Q: *It wasn't Darryl Dance was it?*

MILLER: Yes, Darryl Dance. He was the main -- he was there through most of the period that I was there. He was very good. Allen Fisher was there for a time. At least one other. We made radio programs. Just about every form of communication we did locally.

Q: You say you produced radio programs too?

MILLER: Yes.

Q: Did you have any trouble getting those placed on Indian radio?

MILLER: Very little. Our relationships with All- India Radio were very good as were our relationships with practically all of the media in India. And I guess the thing was that India was so poor at that point that they were grasping for any information they could get. Communication in India was our biggest problem as it was for the government too. We did very little in the television field because we were -- in a country of 500 million people in which there were only 5,000 television sets. And they were almost entirely in the hands of people who were experimenting with what future programming might be and that sort of thing. So television didn't really reach opinion makers to any great extent. So we did provide their television service with programming. But we did very little else in that field.

But radio was a big field. But even there in India with 565,000 villages, towns and villages, there were about that many (565,000) radio sets in the whole country. So you figure an average of one per village and when you consider that probably half of those sets or more than half were in the major cities, Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi and Madras, most of the villages didn't have any radio.

Q: What were the particular themes or objectives that you were stressing in your regular programming?

MILLER: Development was one theme. There was some resistance as there always will be to the size of the American development effort, not on the part of the government but on the part of significant segments of the population. The communist party was quite substantial in India and leftist sentiments were fairly prevalent. The Soviets had a gigantic information cultural program. All of it trying to undercut the things that the United States was doing. So explaining the motives and the methods of our developmental effort were very important to us.

Our second major objective was political -- democracy. India at that time was the world's largest democracy. And we were the world's oldest. And we tried to keep drawing on that.

A third was investment, foreign investment. The Indians were very fearful of the amount and types of foreign investments going into India. One counter to this we used was to show how the United States in its formative days had accepted and encouraged a great deal of foreign investment and it had not affected the freedom of action in any major way.

Q: Did your motion pictures follow much the same kind of thing? Were you stressing development?

MILLER: Yes, very much so.

Q: *You weren't producing feature films I take it.*

MILLER: No, no.

Q: *Documentaries.*

MILLER: Documentaries mainly on the AID program. We had incidentally our own AID information officer there. We had a labor information officer. We had a variety of luxuries in the field of information that other posts couldn't afford although the number and types were decreasing during the whole period I was there. As I mentioned, the pressure to get rid of rupees was countered by another pressure to cut the Agency's budget and this adversely affected our Indian program. When I went there we had 70 Americans and 535 local employees. Year by year we were called upon to make one ten percent cut after another. So that in five years we ended up with 38 Americans and probably about 400 Indians even though all of the Indians were paid nothing but rupees and were really costing the American taxpayer nothing. Incidentally, on that score our books program and several other programs actually were providing dollar income to the United States. We had a massive program for reprinting significant American books which we did and sold for rupees in India, sold for a very minimal cost. But they did use up rupees and the royalties for these books were paid in the United States in dollars. So a significant amount of dollars were repatriated in that fashion. There were some other dollars repatriated in other ways. For example, allowances which were budgeted in dollars were paid in rupees out there. So it cost nothing and the dollars were kept in the United States.

We had programs in all the major cities in India. We had branch posts in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and also a branch post for Northern India in New Delhi. And then we had a number of sub-posts which were really cultural centers in the smaller cities like Hyderabad, Bangalore, Trivandrum, Patna and Lucknow. And while I was there, however, the sub-posts came under fire because after they had been in place, India had passed a law saying there could be no new cultural centers put in any cities that did not have a consulate.

And the Russians in violation of that law were building a gigantic cultural center in Trivandrum which collapsed, the building collapsed, before it was completed killing a number of workmen. This called attention to the fact that they were doing this in contravention of law. Mrs. Gandhi's reaction to that was to not only say the Soviets could not continue to build this, but that all of our centers had to be closed if they were not in an area that had a consulate. So we ended up closing six which had been in existence for some period of time. It was a very unfair thing because Russian information cultural effort was not limited or even primarily devoted to their specific Russian centers. They had more than 500 Indo-Russian cultural societies around the country which were completely dominated by the Soviets, and were operating outside the law.

I think we did fairly well in India in explaining the AID effort. We were there during the period called the Green Revolution during which time the AID effort in the agricultural field was extremely successful. And I think the success was in part at least due to our efforts in publicizing what they were doing and in changing Indian attitudes toward more modern methods of agriculture.

Q: You had your AID information officers; they didn't have their own information officer on their staff?

MILLER: No, we handled their information.

Q: In some countries it was the other way around. They had their own information officers and sections.

MILLER: We handled it and I think they were very pleased with what we did. And the AID information effort survived, at least during my tenure there, all of the cuts that we had to make. The labor information program did not. The program remained but the American information officer did not.

Q: You mentioned earlier that there was a lot of antipathy towards the United States, not the government so much but among the populace. Or was it the other way around?

MILLER: Well, among parts of the populace. I would say by and large the entire populace was -- well, if you took 90 percent of the Indian population was apathetic about any of this because they don't know anything about it. I mentioned the difficulties of getting information out. You're just not going to reach 90 percent of the population. Their main objective in life is survival. And they're apolitical really. Of the other ten percent I would say maybe one percent or one-tenth of that, ten percent of the ten percent, was anti-western, anti-American. And about probably half of the others had values similar to our own and were fairly sympathetic to things we were doing although almost all of them were suspicious of gigantic America and all of its resources. They didn't want us to bring overbearing influence on India. We did not.

Q: Were you there at the time that India exploded its atomic device?

MILLER: No, that was after my --

Q: That was after your time.

MILLER: Yeah, there were indications when we were there that India was working on it. I'm glad you brought that up because that was a major problem. The efforts on our part to limit nuclear proliferation were resented by most thinking Indians. Frank Moraes was one of India's top journalists at the time. Once in my home Joe Kraft the American columnist was visiting from the United States. I had Joe over to the house to meet with several Indian newsmen including Frank. They got onto the nuclear question and Frank Moraes who was a dove in everything you could imagine got very worked up about this in the course of the evening over quite a few drinks which he managed to imbibe at that period in his life. By nine o'clock in the evening he was just --

Q: Sloshed.

MILLER: Yeah. But Frank became very upset about the fact that it was the white vest that was trying to impose a nuclear bomb moratorium on little brown brother. It was the first time that

Frank had really gotten this idea, i.e., that India must build a nuclear device as a matter of national pride, across to me. I tested this proposition over and over again in subsequent conversations with others and found there was this sort of feeling throughout the country, not only on the bomb but on other things. They felt that we sort of were treating them as not quite up to our standards and so forth. It's something we hadn't --

Q: He must have been of Portuguese extraction, partly, at least.

MILLER: Yes, he was.

Q: His name, was it pure Portuguese or was it part Indian?

MILLER: Oh, he was Indian. He was Indian. But there was some Portuguese in his blood. He was of Goan extraction.

Q: Psychological.

MILLER: Not only that, in appearance and so on. He was living with an American woman, an American newspaper woman out there, a very fine person. He didn't get married to her. Frank was a Catholic. So that's the Portuguese influence. His wife had gone insane and she was still alive and being treated in some institution. But she was absolutely hopeless. But because she was alive he did not divorce and marry the American woman. He also has a son Dom Moraes. Frank is dead now. But Dom the last I hear was living in England married to an English woman and is a very fine writer on his own and a poet. It was really largely through a book that Don wrote that I learned about Frank's wife and all the troubles that they had had. Let's see, do you want to lead me on to something? I'm rambling here.

Q: Well, that's all right.

MILLER: Well, one thing we did manage to do somewhat towards the end of my stay there, in the last couple of years: we were able to convert some of the rupees into general resources for the agency program in the area. The PAO from Afghanistan came down at one point and said he was very hard put for any materials, particularly exhibit materials. And so we became a resource for him. By agreement with India on the use of these rupees we couldn't make things and export them. But we could if we made exhibits in India, once we were finished with them we could send them off so long as they eventually returned to India.

Q: I see. Another post could use them.

MILLER: Another post could use them. And so we after that, we were very conscious of the needs of Afghanistan and later Nepal. And then during the NASA moon landing, the subcontinent was pretty well left out of the direct participation because of the lack of television. They didn't see the moon landing there on television. We did bring it in on the Voice of America and rebroadcast the Voice signal such as it was. But we decided that in order to fill this void we would have a major exhibits program trying to show India just what was happening. One of our

Indian employees in the Exhibits section suggested that we make a full scale model of the lunar LEM.

Q: *The Landing something --*

MILLER: Module.

Q: *Module.*

MILLER: All right. Whatever it was. But the LEM. And we made -- well, we tried and tried to get from NASA the dimensions and all that sort of thing. For some reason they wouldn't give them to us. We did have a model about five or six inches high that was billed as a -- I think it was 1/49th scale. So our boys laboriously measured everything on that and multiplied by 49 and we built a model out of plywood. But it looked just like the real thing. And we put it up in the backyard of the USIS building there, Bahawalpur House which had very sizeable grounds around it. We attracted more than the million Indian visitors over a very short period of time including all the important Indians, the entire diplomatic corps there, which also, by the way, included the Soviet Ambassador who when he looked at it turned to me and said, is the real module that big? He couldn't believe that we had landed something that size on the moon. But we also had motion pictures showing various space feats that we put on pseudo television screens so that they could pretend that they were looking at space activity. Some of them really thought they were watching the real thing. But after we had that in New Delhi the other posts wanted it. So we built copies of it and sent it to major posts throughout India. Then there was a demand from other posts in the area and we ended up building quite a few copies of that and really somewhat in contravention of the spirit of the agreement, sending them to various places around the world. Several of the astronauts came to India after the landing. We have pictures of them climbing our plastic model. They were very impressed with this thing.

Q: *They were?*

MILLER: Yes.

Q: *That was probably -- I think Armstrong was one who came.*

MILLER: Yeah.

Q: *Because he also came to Thailand while I was there.*

MILLER: I believe that's right, yeah.

Q: *I've forgotten who the other two or three were. In Thailand quite an incident occurred because the leading television correspondent for the Thais who was sort of the Edward R. Murrow of Thailand had been devoting a great deal of his time to space activities. He was considered among the Thais the leading expert in the field other than the scientists. He tried to go up and approach Armstrong to ask a question, and the security people just elbowed him aside as if he were any old peon. He became completely disillusioned, and it cost us a lot of good will*

in Thailand. The security people just threw him aside. He never got a chance. Therefore, he said I'm not going to do anything about promoting this activity in Thailand. I'm not even going to cover the astronauts from this point on.

MILLER: Oh, for heavens sake.

Q: So we had a little trouble. Actually, we got a little footage in Thailand but most of it we covered ourselves. They wouldn't take it on the Thai TV.

MILLER: John Glenn was with us a couple of times. Did he come to Thailand?

Q: He didn't come while I was there. He may have before or later.

MILLER: He was in Burma at one point at some astronauts conference they had in Burma, and he stopped by India on the way home. We met him at the airport, my wife and I about, I guess it was seven o'clock in the evening, and he left New Delhi at roughly five the next morning. And during the period of time he was there we had a press conference. We had him on the radio. We had several other interviews. And I've forgotten what else. But he was busy all of the time that he was there practically, very cooperative, very helpful. I finally took him out to the airport at about four o'clock in the morning. And we sat in this empty airport and he was wondering what he could get to take home to his wife. Everything was closed. The Indian people at the airport opened up all the shops and he went around buying presents for his wife. He had a great time. He was a very interesting and as I said cooperative fellow. He came back a couple of years later when he was Vice President of R.C. Cola. And he brought his wife with him this time. Once again they were very cooperative with our program.

RICHARD N. VIETS
Commercial Officer
Madras (1965-1967)

Science Officer/Political/Economic Officer
New Delhi (1967-1972)

Ambassador Richard N. Viets was born in 1930 in Vermont. He served in the U.S. Army and attended Georgetown University and Harvard University. He joined USIA in 1955 and served in Afghanistan, Tunisia and after a break reentered the Foreign Service in 1962 serving in Japan, India, Romania, Israel, and was ambassador to Tanzania and Jordan. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy 1990-1992.

Q: To move on, you then were assigned...you were going to spend quite a bit of time in India. First in Madras (1965-67) and New Delhi (1967-72). What were you doing in Madras?

VIETS: Again, I was assigned there as a commercial officer. It took me a little more than five minutes to realize that the potential for American exports in South India during that period was so limited as to perhaps occupy an American officer's activities about five or ten percent of the time. Fortunately, several months after my arrival, a State Department inspection team blew into town as part of their overall India inspection tour, and I was able to prevail on their good sense that this position should be abolished.

Our Consulate General in Madras covers a territory about the size of West Germany, four southern states of India, with, I think, a population of about 400 million people. That meant a great deal of travel. Again, I happened to be fortunate enough to be working with a group of people who didn't like to be away from their homes too frequently, so I spent a lot of time moving around south India, which is a fascinating part of the world. In consequence, I did a lot of both political and economic reporting.

Q: What were our interests in that area?

VIETS: Again, and this is always hard for anyone today to understand the passions which drove so much of American policy and preoccupied and dominated the activities of so many American posts abroad, one of the major preoccupations was our concern about Soviet influence in India. It was certainly a legitimate concern, but should never have become a dominant concern. We had a huge intelligence representation in India at that point. We spent an awful lot of time monitoring what the Soviets were doing, and they spent an awful lot of time monitoring what we were doing.

Q: Was India sort of going on despite it all like Old Man River?

VIETS: Yes. But you will recall this was also an important era of India's own political history. Nehru had just passed from the scene. Prime Minister Shastri had succeeded him. Shastri was a rather weak figure who, you may recall, died of a heart attack while on a trip to Tashkent. To many people's surprise, within the US establishment at least, a lady named Indira Gandhi succeeded him.

She was clearly the candidate of the political bosses in India at that point. They thought they were going to be able to dominate her and manipulate events as they desired. So we also devoted quite a lot of time trying to figure out whether India in political, economic and philosophical terms. We were still hoping that we could influence the Indians to embrace the so-called market economy, which we called private enterprise in those days. So a lot of time was spent working with American businessmen and Indian politicians who were favorably disposed to freeing up the economy from its layers and layers of British inspired bureaucracy and Indian refinements thereof.

There was also a major presence throughout India of USIS. We had library operations in those days in Trivandrum down in Kerala State...in each of the capitals of the four southern Indian states that our consular district embraced.

Q: You mention Kerala State. This was one of those red blotches on the map.

VIETS: Kerala had a "Communist" government. That was a period in which there had been a major split in the Communist Party between a faction of the party that supported Moscow and a faction which supported Beijing. So you had this wonderful CPI, Communist Party of India, divided into two groups. One was what we called "Right" and one was "Left," "Right" being Moscow. We wasted a lot of time on that.

Q: I'm sure there were other things we could have been doing, but in those days the word "communism" would suck us into paying too much attention to it at the expense of other issues.

VIETS: We did have some major American economic projects going on. I should have said at the outset that another big preoccupation, certainly mine, was our AID program, economic assistance program, in India which at that point was of a value of hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars. Much of it was in the form of food aid. In 1966-67, India went through a very severe famine and the United States came to India's rescue in a stupendously generous fashion. I can remember going down to the port in Madras and looking out and seeing 70, 80 American ships sitting at anchor filled with grain waiting to come into the port.

Q: How was the delivery system? Often getting grain to the right place is crucial.

VIETS: Compared to other parts of the world that I lived in I think it was relatively efficient. The Indians had, thanks to the British, an extremely good rail network which covered all of south India. And their road system also was still in relatively good shape. The grain losses in India were in the storage of it where rats and weevils get to it. Often, as you know, it would just be stored outside. There were inadequate covered storage facilities. But in terms of transporting and distributing those food grains to feed hungry people and their hungry live stock, I think one has to give very high marks to the Indians for the way they handled the crisis.

Q: When you were in Madras what was the officers you worked with and your own attitude towards the Indians? Was it positive or sort of "Oh my God, these are difficult people"?

VIETS: I think both of the above. I had a life long love affair with India, less so with Indians, but certainly with the country. It is such a fascinating series of cultures and civilizations. The topography is magnificent, of course, from the Himalayas to the coast lines. All those wonderful hill stations, tea plantations, etc.

I think that no American who has served in India has not left considerably older because of the need to find secret reservoirs of patience and understanding which he might not have had when he came. But also I doubt if any American who really made the effort to get out and know something about India hasn't left much the richer for it. It is a remarkable civilization.

Q: Was there a difference between when you were in Madras and moving around attitude towards Americans and all than there was when you got up to New Delhi which is much more a capital which often reflects the central party, etc.?

VIETS: Yes. To begin with south Indians...there are major Christian communities in south India, especially in Kerala, so there exists a different ethic towards such things as private enterprise in

south India than in north India. South Indians are a more sophisticated, in a sense more worldly group of people than the north Indians are. These are terrible generalizations but there is some validity to them, I think.

But you put your finger on, I think, the principal differences...in New Delhi you were in a capital with layers of bureaucrats and politicians many of whom were not very competent and were driven by the most confused and confusing economic and political philosophies. We were all, ourselves, under the spell of Chester Bowles.

Q: He was Ambassador there from 1963-69.

VIETS: Well, he was Ambassador there twice. I got him the second time around. He had amassed...it was a very large mission in those days in New Delhi...and he had amassed without question the most capable group of people I ever worked with anywhere during my Foreign Service career, which certainly includes the city of Washington! He had an eye for talent.

Q: How old were some of those people?

VIETS: Well, for example, the current head of National Public Radio was one of his people; the current head of AIPA, Tom Dine was one of his people; the current head of the Foreign Service Institute was one of his people; there must have been 30 or 40 future ambassadors who were on his staff; the Governor of Ohio, Dick Celeste, was one of his people. The Foreign Service today, at least my generation, is just studded with Bowles graduates.

Q: What was his method of operation and how did you view him in his relations with the Indians?

VIETS: It is a complicated question and a complicated answer and I will try to simplify it by saying that he was impassioned to imbue American principles and ideals into the Indian political consciousness and mainstream. He was a great democrat, as you know, both in terms of being a great member of the Democratic Party, and a democrat in the political philosophical sense of the word as well.

A man of formidable intellect and energy and that combination always, of course, is nothing to trifle with. So he worked seven days a week, eighteen or twenty hours a day, coming up with idea, after idea, after idea, on how to knit US institutions with Indian institutions.

He always said that he got much of his inspiration from his pattern of surrounding himself with fairly young, energetic people. We were all in our 30s or early 40s at that point. Once or twice a week he would have eight or ten of us to his home for dinner and we would sit out there in that lovely back garden of his and argue far into the night with him. I had two wonderful years with him in that garden listening to argument, debate and dissent on everything under the sun that was going on, both in India and elsewhere.

As a consequence, he missed very few tricks and we, as a consequence, were the beneficiaries of a lot of practical political wisdom on his part. He was one of the most open ambassadors I have ever known. If he had just come from spending a couple of hours with the Prime Minister, we

would hear about the most privileged elements of that conversation. This was not always true in other embassies in which I served. But his influence led me to try to emulate him in many ways when I became an Ambassador.

Q: How do you think your work related to the Indians?

VIETS: They were devoted to him. Partly because they felt they had co-opted him, and certainly much of the bureaucracy in Washington was convinced of this fact, and it was probably true. It was a mutual co-option I would say. But India, for him, became an important center of the universe and he managed to divert huge amounts of American resource to that country. For example, at one point, we had a rupee account amounting to a couple of billion dollars stashed in the coffers of the Indian Central Bank.

Q: We are still living off them.

VIETS: Yes. Senator Moynihan, while he was Ambassador, finally had the good sense to negotiate a framework of agreements that led to this huge rupee debt owed to the US to be channeled into productive things that finally got rid of the bulk of it. But we were an enormously important player in India in those days.

Q: There is the saying that when the Democratic Party is in, India gets the tip, and when the Republicans are in, it seems to go to Pakistan. Did you have any feeling towards this?

VIETS: No, I think that is not a particularly thoughtful comment. There are many factors at play here. I think that various administrations, going back to the Nehru era and perhaps up to and including the present...although I am less certain of myself now because I keep an eye only occasionally on US-Indian relations, I am not intimately involved with it anymore...but I think that every administration had its frustrations in dealing with the Indians, who are, as I said earlier, inordinately frustrating human beings.

The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have a somewhat crisper approach to their relationship with the US. They know what they want and they are prepared to make the necessary accommodations to get it. In consequence, over years I think that the Pakistanis have done rather better in managing their relationships with the United States than the Indians have. But it is a hell of a complicated subject to open up on.

While I was in India, of course, we had two Indo-Pak wars. One in 1969 and one in 1971. During the second one there was a major American bias toward support of the Pakistanis. Henry Kissinger was, more than any other person, responsible for this. I can recall Kissinger, who at that time was National Security Adviser for Nixon, coming out to India. I was the control officer for his visit. At that time I was working in the Ambassador's office. I had stayed on in India because when Bowles left and a new Ambassador had arrived, Senator Kenneth B. Keating, he had pinned my arms behind my back and knocked me against the wall and said that I was going to stay and be his principal assistant. I agreed to do it for a year and ended up doing it for three. That is why I was in India for so long.

In the summer of 1981 Kissinger visited India on his way to China, via Pakistan. This was the famous secret first trip to China. As I said, I was appointed his control officer for the visit. We had come up with the idea that he meet with a group of Indians who had been his students at Harvard, in his celebrated Harvard seminar. So we pulled in 20, 25 Indians from around the country who had studied under him. We were very frustrated at that point because we had been sending message after message to Washington saying that the Indians and Pakistanis were on the way to war and Washington wasn't listening and didn't believe us. The Washington policy mandarins thought we were reflecting Indian attitudes and not our own best estimates.

In any case I remember vividly getting these guys for breakfast around a huge table in the Ashoka Hotel, and Kissinger showed up and remembered most of them. He sat down and went around the room in his professorial fashion asking each of them to make a forecast of what was going to happen in the next four months. Every single one of them came up with a four or five minute analysis of why war was inevitable.

Q: The war was over what issue?

VIETS: The war resulted in the fragmentation of East Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh. Its causes are complicated and some are still murky, but in sum the Indians were dabbling around in East Pakistani politics and the Pakistanis were dabbling around in Punjab things. A long story.

In any case I was sitting beside Kissinger and could palpably feel his anger rising because he didn't want to hear any of this. When we finally completed the circle he just preemptively stood up and said in so many words that he was ashamed that he had made so little impact in their capacity to analyze situations rationally and none of them knew what he was talking about. There wasn't going to be any war, and if there was, it was all India's fault, etc. It was quite a performance by this man and he stalked out leaving these poor fellows all looking at one another and wondering...

Q: In interviews in general what I have absorbed is that Kissinger tends to make up his mind, and also there was a bigger plan as far as he was concerned. He was in Pakistan and this was going to screw things up.

VIETS: That is right. We, of course, were not aware of his maneuverings at that point.

Q: When he came was he asking you and others what was going to happen?

VIETS: Oh, sure. But as I said, there was hardly a day that a very thoughtful cable didn't go out of our mission forecasting what was going to happen. It didn't fit in with his scheme of things. I must say that I doubt very much if Henry Kissinger spent a hell of a lot of time learning the intricacies of South Asian politics. He did not have any particular love for the Indians to begin with. He had had various encounters with them and apparently felt they were a hopeless species.

In this type of interview I don't want to get too deeply into analyzing Mr. Kissinger. I subsequently worked for him as the head of the so-called S/S-S, Executive Secretariat, in the

Department when he came over from the White House to be Secretary of State. I spent a year there, so I had a ring side seat observing how he worked and operated. He certainly was one of the most fascinating figures in post-war American political history. He is a person of exceptional talent and knowledge, but also a man who was not nearly as wise, I think this is the word I want to use, as he managed to make the world believe. US policy, as a consequence, enjoyed both the benefits and the downside of that man's power.

Q: As the war clouds gathered how did you see the other side of the moon...our Embassy in Islamabad, and how were they reporting?

VIETS: Well, both Embassies made major efforts to keep our lines open without necessarily including Washington. We visited one another very frequently. We worked out some elements of our disagreements without spilling any blood on the floor. But there remained some basic policy differences which led to opposing policy analyses and recommendations from the two missions. I am not sure, as I look back on it...and I would need to refresh my memory by going back and reading some of the telegrams of the period from both missions...but I am not sure how good a job either of us really did in seeing these issues through the optic of our own national interests as opposed to perhaps doing a splendid job of articulating the views of the governments to which we were accredited. I would like to think that we did a reasonable job in interpreting these events and analyzing them and recommending courses of actions that served American interests. But we will leave that judgement to the diplomatic historians!

Q: Wasn't there also some emotion as to how the West Pakistanis were putting down their colleagues in what we now call Bangladesh?

VIETS: Yes, there was a lot of butchery going on.

Q: Including reports from our Consul General, Richard Blood and others. This was a pretty emotional thing.

VIETS: Indeed it was. Since we were bankers to both parties, we had some responsibility.

Q: Here was a Senator, Kenneth Keating, coming who was not a great intellect as others had been and didn't come from having a significant role in foreign policy formulation in the Senate. In fact, if I recall, he was a defeated senator, wasn't he?

VIETS: Yes, by Bobby Kennedy.

Q: This was his first ambassadorial assignment. How was he received and how did he operate and what was his role?

VIETS: To begin with, his appointment flowed from the fact that he and Richard Nixon had entered the House of Representatives together and were founding members of the Marching and Chowder Society and were very close friends. Keating, by the time he got to India, had clearly begun to have some major reservations about aspects of President Nixon's behavior, etc. However, he still remained a loyal and close friend. That was the genesis of his appointment.

The Indians, I think, were ambivalent about the appointment. In the first instance they always wanted to think they were getting an ambassador, as most countries do, who could pick up the phone and get the President on the other end. Keating certainly could do this, although he wisely, because of his political background, was aware of the fact that if you excessively used this entree those who guard the portals of power will insure your access over time is eroded, especially when you are 7 or 8 thousand miles away.

The quality of persons with whom he was dealing with, for example, the top echelon of the Foreign Ministry were all Oxford, Cambridge educated men, very intelligent, worldly, suave, urbane, sophisticated, experienced men in the world of politics and economics and it didn't take them very long to figure out that Keating was not an intellectual heavyweight. But he had some damn strong people standing behind him. So he was made to look much better, I think, than he was.

He was an enormously personable fellow, an Irish politician who really knew how to press the flesh very well. He loved the social side of his job.

He used his Senate method of operation by appointing a chief of staff who was responsible for everything. I had both the great fortune and the misfortune of being anointed by him to this position. Keating refused for a long, long time to adhere to the traditional patterns of managing an embassy, and I as a fairly young and junior officer found myself effectively running the place. The good Ambassador used to devote a couple of hours in the morning to the office, then retire to his swimming pool until late afternoon, followed by a siesta for a couple of hours. He would then start his social rounds, the high point of his day. I am afraid he did not work very hard, which meant that the rest of us put in some mighty long hours. Fortunately, after several months of 20 hour days a very professional DCM, Galen Stone, arrived in New Delhi and picked up the reins as the traditional deputy Ambassador.

Q: Did he have any opinions of how things were going? Did he listen to others?

VIETS: He would listen very carefully. I am hearing my voice echo here and realize I am perhaps drawing a picture of something of a fool. He was not by any stretch of the imagination. He was shrewd. He had a lot of experience in the political world and in Washington. He had an enormous range of contacts in this country. In every part of our society Ken Keating knew people who counted. He was perfectly happy to use those contacts whenever they could be helpful.

To his credit he recognized that, as politicians who survive do, I think, he had some bright people working for him and he listened to them and took their advice. I respect him for that.

Q: How did he feel about this coming war? This is one of those times when there was a lot of emotion at home over India and Bangladesh.

VIETS: He had no trouble understanding what was coming down the pike and supported fully those officers on his staff who were writing the telegrams that made these forecasts and policy

recommendations. He backed them to the hilt and was back in Washington very frequently to argue the case in his own fashion. But I fear that he was written down by the policy level people in Washington as being a little fey and growing old and a bit forgetful. People in this city were concerned because they knew he was a close friend of the President and thus he was accorded respect due to his position and his age, but I don't think he made any great impact in a personal sense either here or in India.

Q: Looking at policy situations, here you have a nice test case. You have two countries with which we have considerable interest in -- Pakistan and India -- and they are heading towards war. What can we do and all that. We have a National Security Adviser who has his eyes fixed on China and almost anything else is passed over. It is often said that you don't really need a powerful ambassador because other things happen, but really in the Washington sense, had this been somebody else who had not only political clout but who was at the peak of his or her powers, that could have made some difference.

VIETS: Well, I agree with you. As you were posing this I was quickly thinking of people I had worked with who could have made more of a difference. Sam Lewis, for example. I was his DCM in Tel Aviv for a couple of years. There is a man who had intellect, energy and the forcefulness of personality and the respect of his audience in Washington at the policy level who would have made a difference had he been in India. I am certain of it. I could name other people. You are right. I do not subscribe to the prevailing theory that ambassadors are an anachronism and are the personification of the irrelevancy of the Foreign Service institution as it has developed. I agree that ambassadors are in some respects a useless institution, but there are certain moments when they really earn their keep and can make an enormous difference in the formation of policy and perhaps even more importantly to the implementation and conduct of that policy. But they have to have that combination of intellect and experience and the capacity to come back to this city and make people listen to them. Otherwise the bureaucracy in this city is so huge and so divisive and fractionated and self-important and arrogant that it will just get its own way. I have always thought that this was a capital waiting to be told what to do. Ambassadors, like certain generals and admirals, still have that potential to represent the difference between stupidity in policy and policy that is acute and germane to US national interests. Unfortunately, I am not sure there are too many people about these days who meet my criteria for this, but the potential role is there for the person with the right mix of qualifications.

Q: It does also point up a problem. There is nothing worse in Washington as far as clout goes than to have lost an election.

VIETS: Well, you get what you deserve. I think the myopia of the political wisdom of using defeated political candidates as an Ambassadorial resource was even more sharply drawn when Keating decided that he wanted to go to Israel. He had wanted to come out to India because he had served there as an officer in World War II and had enjoyed it very much. He knew it could be a great life and indeed for him it was. He had a huge staff in his residence, a beautiful residence and a couple of swimming pools, airplanes at his disposal, etc. After 3 years he decided he wanted to go to Israel, primarily I think because of the warm and fuzzy feelings he had generated with his New York Jewish constituency. He mistakenly calculated this popularity

could be transferred and re-packaged in Israel. Alas for him, it couldn't be, and he died an unhappy and frustrated man.

Q: India must have been as viceregal as one could get.

VIETS: That is right, and he enjoyed it. But as I say he decided that he wanted to go to Israel and the President thought that was fine. Well, that killed him, quite literally. If you can think of any more stupid thing to do then send a man in failing health, elderly, unable to muster much energy and toss him into the vortex of the Middle East and make sure he is there during a major war, that is pretty smart.

Q: Was this the 1973 war?

VIETS: Yes.

Q: How did the Embassy react, particularly thinking of the political officers? This was the time we were going through the tilt towards Pakistan. Was there sort of a revolt of allegiance on the line or something of this nature?

VIETS: No, no, no. If you are asking about the Indo-Pak war, our energies over night refocused into trying to end the war. It was essentially US good offices that brought that conflict to a relatively rapid end. It is a shining hour in American diplomacy and I hope you don't ask me for too many details about how we did it because my memory is fading!

Q: Could you describe what you and others were doing?

VIETS: To begin with, we were the main communications link between Islamabad; Dacca, the provincial capital of East Pakistan and now the capital of Bangladesh; and New Delhi. We got right into the middle of it by trying to quickly defuse the situation. We arranged cease-fires, we were even the communicators of "don't bomb during this period because red cross people are going to be moving in and evacuating patients from hospitals," etc. We did everything you could dream of that a negotiator could do who had the best communication system of anybody in the world at that point...not what it is today, but still so much better than either one of the adversaries had.

I think we were essentially trusted by both sides. Better said, I think the people on the scene were trusted. I don't think Washington was particularly trusted by either capital, but the force of personality of the people we had in New Delhi and Islamabad and our bona fides had been amply demonstrated to our respective host governments. And personal trust as always, even in issues of war, become terribly, terribly important.

Q: The Soviets, I take it, played no real role in the war.

VIETS: No. There may have been some rumblings and threats, but I don't recall any major Soviet role.

Q: But you found dealing with the Indians that they didn't feel we were on the side of the Pakistanis because of this? How did our role in ceasing the hostilities play out?

VIETS: As in all wars, there comes a point when the advice of the military to their civilian political masters becomes the dominant element in decision making. Our Deputy Chief of Mission in New Delhi, Galen Stone, had established exceptional rapport with the military chiefs in India during that period. Also our CIA liaison with the Indians was of the highest order at that point. The combination of these two factors, I think played a critical role in ending the war. Galen could sit down with the military chiefs individually and go through things. Our Station chief could do that with his intelligence opposite numbers at the top and they in turn could go to their political masters. They wanted to end the war. They had no ambitions to become occupiers of East Pakistan. They were taking casualties and were concerned about a potential long term guerilla activity that could go on along the frontier. No soldier wants to continue a war. It is the politicians who were the...

Q: I know you have to quit at this point.

VIETS: I am getting ready to make a trip to Romania and promised to go over to the Department to meet with some people and had better do so.

Q: Well, then come on back.

Today is July 6, 1990 and this is a second interview with Ambassador Richard N. Viets. Picking up where we left off before, I wonder if you could tell me your impression at the time of how we treated India as regards to Vietnam? You were there at the time and India was sort of the burr under everybody's saddle, at least from our point of view. How did we look at it and how did we deal with this?

VIETS: We swallowed hard. I think that both the Washington foreign policy bureaucracy, as well as certainly our Embassy in New Delhi, accepted the fact that we could not in any foreseeable conditions modify Indian views regarding our role in Vietnam. But as in all conditions of this sort, there are always anomalies and aberrations. One that immediately comes to mind is the fact that the Indians made available to us, certainly during the seven years I was there and I left in 1972, facilities at their naval bases in Cochin and Bombay, for flotillas of US warships that had been on patrol off Vietnam and were on their way back to Europe or the US and they would put into Cochin or Bombay for several days of R&R, refueling, etc. We made no effort to hide the fact that these ships were coming from combat patrols in Vietnamese waters.

Q: I assume there was a general feeling of "let's cool it" as far as talking about this anywhere. If you were faced with criticism about doing more with India this was not something one would drag up to show Indian support in Congress or the press.

VIETS: Your point is well taken. The Indians were of some value to us in the ICC operation in Vientiane and certainly there were individual Indian diplomats who I think understood with greater clarity than perhaps their political masters did, what was going on and quietly were helpful to us. But over all, as I said a minute ago, I think we just gritted our teeth and muddled on.

Q: In a way this gives a certain feeling that there was some sophistication in what we were doing because there is the tendency, either the new people coming in or because of Congressional pressure, to go charging around and try to do what you can't do. But you felt things were well enough under control so that you didn't have to deal with people who wanted to convert the heathen?

VIETS: I think it was, to borrow the cliché, more of a damage control operation. What we were spending more time doing was insuring that the Indians didn't publicly take us on in various arenas around the world on Vietnam, as opposed to trying to proselytize and swing them around to our point of view.

Q: I would like to ask a couple of questions. You mentioned that you had this position where you were moved up and at your rank dealing at a much higher level. One of the things I am interested in is how the Foreign Service operates. How did this sit with your fellow officers at the Embassy over a period of time?

VIETS: That is always a question better put to others, not the individual.

Q: How did you feel about it?

VIETS: It wasn't easy for anyone. I think in the circumstances, people in that mission...and as mentioned earlier it was a huge operation. My recollection is that there was something like 800 Americans throughout the whole country at that point. Certainly one of the biggest missions we had anywhere in the world. Many of those people, of course, were AID folks out in the countryside, but still the Embassy, itself, was enormous with 20 odd agencies represented there.

People, I think, in general...those who showed up for work every day...understood pretty well that what we were dealing with was (a) an ambassador who had no background at all for the task that confronted him, (b) was beginning to show signs of failing health and certainly did not have a great deal of energy and (c) like many political appointees was rather more interested in the ceremonial aspects of the job and the perquisites than he was in most of the substance. I don't want to completely diminish Ambassador Keating. He had, I think, the good sense, which I can't say for every political ambassador, to listen very carefully to sound advice that was given to him by his professional subordinates. Rarely would he override them. And he was prepared to stick his neck out on policy issues when one could have easily seen it would be better for him to remain quiet. In any case, people understood I think quite well the nature of his role and personality and knew that somebody had to be there to borrow Donald Regan's famous phrase, "to sweep up after him." Certainly that was one of my jobs.

He also had made very clear from his day of arrival that he wanted to run that mission as he had run his Senate office. He wanted to work through one person and what happened after that didn't bother him much as long as it was done. It was only after being there quite a few months that he became more sensitive to the fact that one person really had to be the DCM, and not this young personal assistant staff aide. But still behind closed doors more often than not he would use me as his transmission belt to the DCM on many, many issues.

I was very fortunate to be working with Galen Stone, under whom I had served a couple of years earlier in New Delhi when he had been political counselor and I was one of the political officers on his staff. We had developed a very close personal relationship in addition to a professional relationship. When Keating began to look for a new DCM, he was the person who I pushed hardest with Keating. Ultimately Keating hired him. So here were two men who both had some professional standards and who were also close personal friends. I think by in large it worked very well.

Q: It works sometimes when this sort of situation happens when a political appointee brings his own staff aide from outside. Then there is an immediate cutoff from the professional ranks.

VIETS: Well there I have to give Keating great credit. He could have done the same thing. He didn't. He knew he would be better served to use people within the system. And I think he was. His successor arrived with an outside fellow who took over the job I was doing and I think it was very, very hard for everybody for a long time.

EDDIE DEERFIELD
Information Officer, USIS
Madras (1966-1969)

Mr. Deerfield was born in Nebraska and raised in Nebraska and Illinois. He was educated at the University of Illinois and Northwestern University. After service in the US Army Air Corps in WWII and work with a Chicago TV station, Mr. Deerfield joined the USIA Foreign Service in 1966 serving abroad in Madras, Islamabad, Blantyre, Vancouver, Kampala, Lagos and Calcutta. Mr. Deerfield submitted his personal memoir in 2012.

DEERFIELD: I was forty-two years old when I arrived at the American Consulate in Madras in 1966 with the title Information Officer to begin my first overseas assignment. As I looked back on my years as a Chicago Times reporter, WGN-TV news editor, and corporate public relations executive, I wasn't sure if I had made the right career decision. Ted Sills, president of the PR firm, had declined my letter of resignation and granted me two years leave of absence, fully expecting me to return. Our first home overseas was called "Mayfair," built large and gracious in the British Colonial style, although it wasn't long before we were introduced to floods caused each year by cyclones. My first speaking engagement in Madras was to address a crowd attending the inauguration of an American space exploration exhibit. Chief Minister Annadurai (the position of chief minister in India is equivalent to that of governor in the U.S.) was guest of honor.

I traveled through the four states of southern India to meet with the media and a wide variety of audiences. I made book presentations, spoke to Rotary and Lions Club members, cut ribbons at dedications, inaugurated a basketball team tournament, moderated a discussion on the role of small business in India, and even presented a typewriter to an association of journalists. I met

with and exchanged views with the vice president of India and the chief minister of Maharashtra when they visited Madras for a ceremonial function. I lectured extensively at colleges in Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Trivandrum and smaller communities. I worked in harmony with scores of editors of Indian newspapers to tell America's story. My intent was not to defend our role in the Vietnam War but to explain the events leading up to our involvement and our rationale for being there. I arranged a grant for the editor of an Indian pro-communist newspaper in Madras to visit the United States. On his return, that paper's editorials were far more reasonable and less critical of the U.S. than they had been. An event that gained considerable favorable publicity was the presentation of the American annual Helms Trophy to India's Krishnan, recognized as the year's most outstanding international tennis player. It was covered in English language journals, as well as in the local language press. In another project, I escorted a group of journalists from Calcutta on a visit to a NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Agency) flight center in South India and briefed Ambassador Chester Bowles when he brought a delegation from New Delhi to Madras.

It's difficult to gauge the effects of public diplomacy. It's as much an art as it is a science. The Communist Party was strong in parts of South India, particularly in the state of Kerala. There were frequent protest marches ending at our American Cultural Center in Trivandrum. Recognition that I was making an impact came about in a very unusual way. About a year after I arrived in Madras, the Soviet Union's news agency TASS sent a story to the Indian media accusing me of being the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) chief for south India. Disinformation was one of the USSR's (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Cold War weapons. The tactic of naming me as a master spy didn't work because I had earned the trust of my Indian contacts.

Mary Lee was often at the microphone as chief guest at various charitable and social events. We found time to visit the Taj Mahal under the light of a full moon, and, on another holiday, spent a memorable week at an island palace in Jaipur in a suite with dazzling stained glass windows. It was time to move on to another country. Our son, Scott, was now three years old. Much of his education in the ensuing years as we served in hardship posts was at boarding schools in Europe and the U.S.

ROBERT J. KOTT
Peace Corps Volunteer
Deccan Plateau (1966-1969)

Mr. Kott was born and raised in New York City. He earned degrees from St. John's University in New York City and from the University of Oregon. After service with the Peace Corps in India, Mr. Kott joined the Foreign Service in 1971. An African specialist, Mr. Kott served in, Togo and Cameroon as Economic and Political Officer and in Malawi and Senegal as Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in Indonesia and Canada. Mr. Kott was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Why don't you say a little bit more about your Peace Corps experience? You were in a village in India?

KOTT: Indeed. Yes. It was eye opening, life-changing one might say. It was basically a general community development program, in those days Peace Corps programs were less focused and more general than they eventually grown into. We were specifically supposed to be working in agricultural development, right out of New York City. Had to learn what a cow and a tree was, before I could do that. But anyway, basically, we were there to be change agents, working with government counterparts in areas that were newly brought under irrigation. The Indian government was irrigating at a furious rate back in those days, in the early stages of the "green revolution," so called. They were introducing the miracle crops: miracle wheat, hybrid corn, hybrid sorghum. I was on the Deccan Plateau in southern India, a sorghum producing area. And they wanted us to help the government efforts to introduce to the farmers the hybrid crops, so as to take better advantage of the newly irrigated fields that were being brought into production, at the great expense to the Indian government of course.

Q: You refer to it as "we." Were there several Peace Corps volunteers working in the same village, doing this kind of work, or were you pretty much by yourself?

KOTT: Both. Generally, we were assigned individually to the village, but the group that I came in with; we were trained as a group and was divided into two areas in the state, so that there might have been 12 of us within a 20 mile radius in one part of the state and 12 of us in another similar situation. As it turned out, I had been assigned to a city, rather than to a village, and that proved not to be so very productive for a number of reasons, but largely a Peace Corps experience really is one of a village experience, and so after about a year in the city, I wasn't very happy, don't forget I was not being terribly productive there, I moved out to a village where there was another Peace Corps volunteer from my group and a good friend of mine, and worked with him, doing what I earlier described plus other general community development-type projects. He helped start a cooperative through a grant from the CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere). That proved to be very productive and lasted a number of years and may still be in existence as far as I know. Introducing things as hybrid chicken and that sort of thing, the usual Peace Corps experience. He left earlier and I stayed behind and remained in the village by myself.

Q: India must have had quite an impact on you if you decided to do South Asia graduate work at the University of Oregon. Was it that experience...?

KOTT: Yes, absolutely. India is the kind of place, I think most people would agree, you either hate it or you love it. If you can last more than a week in India, you probably love it and fall in love with it. Upon arrival, my only culture shock that I can remember in my whole life, of course it was my first real overseas experience other than student trips to Europe, after about three days got over culture shock and on we went. India is a way of life, it's an existence, Hinduism, even though it is not a completely Hindu country of course, is so over-compassing, it's not just a religion, it's a way of being. Obviously if you are with and amongst the people and in a rural setting and participate as most Peace Corps volunteers do, speak a little of the local language, it

grows on you. To this day, it still is my first love, even though I never got reassigned back there as a Foreign Service officer, I always wanted to but I didn't.

Q: What years were you in India?

KOTT: The end of 1966 until the beginning of 1969. Effectively just over two years, it sounds like four years but it was just over two years.

Q: Because I was in Pakistan in 1965, when there was a war between Pakistan and India, but that war didn't last very long and the next wars did not clear until 1971, which resolved in Bangladesh. So India must have been, it was peaceful time...

KOTT: Yes it was relative peace, it was going through, it was just coming out of a great drought and famine that occurred in the mid '60s. After the fact, I learned in the chartered India aircraft, that took our Peace Corps group and another Peace Corps group to India from JFK in New York, was sitting, in the first class compartment, Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister of India of the day, who was returning after visiting Lyndon Johnson in Washington, asking for American wheat. And apocryphally Lyndon grabbed the lady by the sari and said, "If you want my wheat you take my Peace Corps volunteers." That is how we got up to something like 1,400-1,500 Peace Corps volunteers in India when I was there. It was certainly the largest Peace Corps program in the world. Of course I found out later that Mrs. Lillian Carter was in India as a volunteer, the mother of the would-be President, in Maharashtra state, not terribly far from where I was. I didn't know her at the time, of course. There were huge numbers of volunteers there. We had four Peace Corps administrative offices around the country: New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Bangalore. My group and others were assigned to Bangalore region, that is how big it was.

ANTHONY QUAINTON
External Relations Officer
New Delhi (1966-1969)

India, Nepal, Ceylon Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1969-1972)

Ambassador Anthony Quainton was born in Washington state in 1934. He graduated from Princeton University in 1955, Oxford University in 1958 and joined the Foreign Service in 1959. He served at overseas posts in Australia, Pakistan, India, France, Nepal and as ambassador to the Central African Republic, Nicaragua, Kuwait and Peru. Ambassador Quainton has also served as the Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and the Director General of the Foreign Service. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You were in India from 1966 until when?

QUAINTON: Until the summer of 1969.

Q: Since these two posts have been a little like cats and dogs, could you tell me what your impression was of the embassy when you first got there?

QUAINTON: Chester Bowles abolished the political and economic sections in his embassy and redealt the cards to create an external section and an internal section. There was a counselor external and a counselor internal and a minister political/economic who was beneath the DCM but above the counselors. I was assigned to a position in the external section covering India's relationship with its neighbors. Now, this was essentially India's relationship with Pakistan, about which I knew something from my previous assignment, but also India's relationship with Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc. I covered not only India's political relationships but also economic relationships. Everybody in the external section did both political and economic work just as everyone in the internal section, whether they were previously economic officers or political officers, were expected to do both. So every economic officer had to do political reporting on at least one state of the Indian union and every political officer had to report on at least one industry or sector. An interesting way to divide up the embassy. It had many, many beneficial effects in terms of people breaking out of some rather narrow boxes. In any case, I arrived as the Pakistan expert and consequently was regarded with some suspicion by Chester Bowles.

Q: Okay, let's talk about the job a bit more before we move on to other things. What was the general feeling within the embassy?

QUAINTON: The embassy was made up of the most talented group of officers that I served with over my entire 38 year career. It is not clear to me how they were all assembled, but both in the external and internal sections and in the CIA station there were a series of officers almost all of whom went on to quite remarkable careers. Many of the Foreign Service officers became ambassadors. They had remarkable careers and they were a very dynamic team of individuals. Indeed, one of them is now returning to India as ambassador, Dick Celeste, who went on to be governor of Ohio. He was one of the special assistants that Chester Bowles brought out. Bowles brought out some young non-career men whom he had heard about or knew, and he also surrounded himself with a very talented group of Foreign Service officers. I was never part of Bowles' inner circle. I think he regarded me with some suspicion as having come from the enemy. In the course of almost three years, I only set foot into his office twice, which is not very often for a third tour officer.

Q: For a third tour officer dealing with political matters you would expect to have a few more encounters I would think.

QUAINTON: He was very open, however, at the personal level. He cared about junior officers a great deal and had a series of small dinners at his house for junior officers and their wives where they got a chance to talk. He, of course, had such an extraordinary political career, himself, coming to New Delhi for the second time after having been under secretary of state. He was a man of extraordinary vision who passionately loved India. He genuinely believed that India was the hope for democracy in Asia and in contrast to the communist Chinese. He felt India was a country on which we should put all of our chips and he never could understand why Washington

would want to put any chips on a military dictatorship such as that across the border in Pakistan. He inspired the embassy with his enthusiasm for India. It was not just a political enthusiasm but also a cultural enthusiasm. Mrs. Bowles wore a sari almost all the time, and quite a lot of the wives in the embassy also wore saris. The identification with India was extraordinary.

We were all encouraged to travel. There were a fair number of good language officers in both the external and internal sections who spoke Hindi and/or Urdu. The Bowles' were plugged into the cultural life of the country. There were Indian cultural events at the residence or Indian public monuments around New Delhi to which guests were invited. There was a real sense of excitement about India. Every new arrival in the embassy was to attend a week-long orientation course which promoted India, Indian culture and religion. It was far better than anything FSI did in terms of giving one an understanding for the culture. The result was that people with very few exceptions loved India, loved working in the embassy, and felt that they were making a difference. This was almost entirely a result Bowles' leadership.

Unfortunately, I think, he did not have a lot of credibility in Washington or in the Indian foreign ministry. He was perceived as being a useful tool by the Indian government: their ambassador to Washington as much as our ambassador to them. Washington, I think, had the same perception. I can still remember at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Bowles immediately went to see the prime minister, Indira Gandhi, to lecture her on the importance of India's speaking out against the invasion. Shortly after, the ambassador returned from her office, the Indian foreign secretary called the DCM and wanted to know if the ambassador was speaking under instructions or not. Well, if they call up to find out, you know that they don't know when their "great friend" is speaking and when the United States government is speaking. I think there was always that question. Bowles could be quite tough with the Indians because he believed so much that they must take the right course in order to give the leadership of which their democracy was capable. The Indians were smart enough to know that he had been sent to India to get him out of Washington...

Q: This is very much the feeling that he represented a burr under the Johnson saddle.

QUAINTON: That's right, so he was moved out. He was already beginning to raise questions about the Vietnam war, etc. There was, I think, a sense within the embassy among some officers that he would go too far in pushing his views. We were inspected in New Delhi, and I was asked to give a dinner for the inspectors with mid-level officers invited. So, we invited eight or 10 mid-level officers from the external and internal sections. The inspectors asked, as they usually do, about morale and other things. At one point they asked what were the officers' impressions of Chester Bowles. One of the internal officers said, "Well, he is a wonderful man, but he is cooking the books." The inspector asked him to explain that. "Well, let me give you an example. We are trying to promote the green revolution..."

Q: Explain what the green revolution was.

QUAINTON: The major effort that AID was making at this time was to promote an agricultural revolution in major third world countries by the introduction of new grains and the encouragement of the use of inputs, fertilizer, water, advanced seeds. The goal was to raise

production so that countries like India and Pakistan would be self-sufficient and not dependent on the outside world for food. In any event, the criticism of this particular officer was that in order to get USAID resources, the Indians were required to commit to massive development of their fertilizing industry. This officer said the Indian commitment was completely spurious. The Indians promised to produce by 1972, or whatever the date was, an enormous quantities of urea, and there was no possibility of that happening, in this officer's view. But, he asserted, the ambassador knew that what the Indians were promising was unachievable, but nonetheless told Washington the targets would (be met). His goal was insure the continued flow of AID resources. Well, that kind of mistrust, the overstating of the case, was the darker side of Bowles' enormous enthusiasm for India.

Q: What about you? You have been in the Foreign Service long enough to have some feel for things, what was your feeling?

QUAINTON: I was quite captivated by India. Having been in Pakistan helped because I was already accustomed to much of the culture, much of the way of organizing one's life with servants, etc. and the language was familiar. Many of the problems were also familiar, as I had worked on them from the other side. So, it was an easy transition into a country which we found endlessly fascinating culturally, politically, historically. The history of the Raj had always captivated my imagination. The culture of the country went back 5,000 years. One was surrounded by Mogul India, British India, Independent India.

My wife and I traveled to all corners of India while we were there. We found middle class Indians, with whom we interacted, fascinating and wonderful people to know, and we have retained a number of close friends over the years. We had our fourth child while in India (One of our children died in Pakistan while we were there in a tragic domestic accident.), so my wife was much engaged with our youngest daughter. But, she also wrote a literary column for a magazine called *The Weekend Review*, edited by a young journalist, Sarwar Lateef. There was a very much more open intellectual environment than in Pakistan. The Pakistanis were open in a social sense, but there wasn't nearly the same dynamism that you found in Indian intellectual circles. In New Delhi, there was an enormous range of newspapers, magazines, artistic programs, etc. which made Delhi a fascinating place in which to live and work. We had almost three years there before coming back to the India desk in the Department.

Q: How did you find dealing with Indian officials as opposed to say dealing with Pakistani officials? Did you find a different breed of cat?

QUAINTON: Indians officials were always less direct. At least for me, they were always pretty accessible. We rarely got a straight yes or no answer on things about which we were seeking their support. The whole stance of their foreign policy was critical of America: critical of our support for Pakistan and of our arming of the Pakistanis, of our policy in Vietnam, and of the Cold War stance adopted by the United States. So, there was always an edge to any dialogue with an Indian official because of their perception of the wrong headedness of American policy. It was not as easy, therefore, to deal with Indian officials as it was with the Pakistanis. Officials of the foreign ministry are a very self-conscious elite, very impressive people, but very status conscious. There was an occasion when we were invited to a dinner given by the external

counselor, Galen Stone, who subsequently became our ambassador to Cyprus, at which a group of senior officials were invited with their wives. The most senior official, who eventually became foreign secretary of India some 15 years later, went around the table to see how the place cards had been distributed and moved himself to the right hand of the hostess because he had not been appropriately placed. He was by some months senior in service to one of the other joint secretaries that had been invited. It was quite clear that he was not going to let the hostess make a mistake about seniority. I think this attitude, this enormous sense they had of where they stood in their hierarchal system, was always a frustration in dealing with the Indians.

Q: What about the attitude of those Indians you were dealing with towards the Soviet Union? The Indians often seemed to take a much more benevolent and tolerant view of the Soviets than we did.

QUAINTON: India's relations with the Soviet Union had many facets. The Soviets were prepared to provide India weapons systems which we were not. They were able to demonstrate their friendship in tangible ways which were important to the Indians. I think a lot of Indians thought that the Soviets were being constantly provoked by the Americans in the context of the Cold War. The Indians never thought much of communism but they certainly had a strong view about decolonization, and the Soviet Union was on their side. We were always much less strident in speaking out against colonialism and imperialism. The Indians had lived through both and this fact was absolutely central to their sense of who they were. They saw themselves as the leader of the process of change in the third world. The Soviet Union spoke the same language for their own reasons and that made for a relationship with Moscow which had an emotional dimension that could never be achieved with the United States, even though we, in other respects, shared many of the same objectives. We were always more nuanced in how we expressed our objectives, and, of course, we were supporting Pakistan.

Q: Did Vietnam intrude much as far as your work went?

QUAINTON: It didn't intrude at all. There was another officer in the embassy who handled Asia and it certainly wasn't a subject on which I spent any time at all. I really focused on India's relations with Pakistan and Nepal. I did have an opportunity to go on the first official delegation to Timphu, the capital of Bhutan. It was part of my reporting responsibilities and it was decided in 1967 that we should make an official visit. Ambassador Galbraith had crossed the border into Bhutanese territory but had not gone to any cities. The external counselor (Galen Stone) and I and the consul from Calcutta all traveled to Bhutan in 1967 and again in 1969. It was a small moment in history, the opening of U.S. relations with this very, very isolated little country. I still remember the counselor cashing the first traveler's cheque in the history of Bhutan. Calling on the finance minister in his office in a palace in the center of Timphu, the counselor asked how he could cash a traveler's cheque. The finance minister got a tin box the size of your tape recorder out of his desk and asked, "How much do you want?" It was a country with no banks. It was a historic moment. It was a lovely country with wonderful people, but very much under the influence of India. The Indian rupee was the legal currency at the time and everything operated within parameters set by the Indians.

Q: In this period of time, 1966-69, you were watching Indo-Pak relations. Were there any developments? Were we trying to play any role?

QUAINTON: I don't remember major negotiating issues. Kashmir, of course, was the central issue, always the central issue. Kashmir and the arms relationship were the subjects most frequently discussed. We never made any significant effort to resolve the Kashmir dispute. I think the embassy in New Delhi accepted the Indian position that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that it should stay so because to have further partition along religious lines would be divisive of the secular democracy which the Indians stood for. So, we were not well placed to be intermediaries between India and Pakistan concerning Kashmir.

Q: Well, having visited Kashmir from the other side, what was your feeling towards the rights and wrongs of what is known as the Kashmir dispute?

QUAINTON: Fundamentally, I believed that the Indians were in the wrong on this. It was evident that Kashmir was largely Muslim and if given a choice would choose either independence or accession to Pakistan, and in the 1960s, probably the latter. The Kashmiris felt no great loyalty to either secular or Hindu India as represented by New Delhi. I accepted the Indian view that it was by sleight of hand that the Indians arranged the accession of Kashmir to the Indian union shortly after independence. In any event, the reality was that the Indians were there and clearly had no intention of leaving. The whole rationale of their modern secular state rested on their ability to demonstrate that Hindus, Muslims and others could live together within a common framework. That was not a subject on which there was then or now any possibility of compromise on the Indian side.

Q: Did you think that Bowles bought the Indian position?

QUAINTON: Most people in the embassy saw the injustice of India's trying to hang on to the Muslim population of Kashmir even though they would have liked to have gone elsewhere. On the other hand, we saw the force of the Indian argument for the preservation of the Indian union. Most people in the embassy were not directly engaged on this subject. It was a compartmentalized kind of embassy and everyone had a great deal of positive work to do. Kashmir was entirely secondary. Remember, in 1965-66, U.S. aid to India was over a billion dollars. Our programs were so big and our engagement with India so extensive that as long as they weren't fighting the Pakistanis, we were content to get on with our business.

Q: You were on the India desk from when to when?

QUAINTON: I began on the India desk in late 1969 and stayed there for three years until going to Paris in the summer of 1972. The first year I spent as the junior political officer responsible for Indian affairs. After a year, I moved up to be the senior of two political officers in the office of India, Nepal, and Ceylonese Affairs.

Q: What were your responsibilities when you first arrived?

QUAINTON: The office actually had four India desk officers, two economic and two political, as well as officers who handled Nepal and Sri Lanka. So it was quite a sizeable staff. Having just come from New Delhi I spent a good deal of time on India-Pakistan relations. There was always a constant need for briefing papers to go up to the deputy assistant secretary and the assistant secretary, Joe Sisco at the time. There was the notetaking at meetings when the Indian ambassador would come or be summoned for a demarche of some kind. The ambassador or Indian DCM were the only two senior Indian officials who regularly came into the Department. I was a notetaker at a variety of levels, right up to the Secretary, although more typically it was with Mr. Sisco or the deputy assistant secretary.

Q: Coming from New Delhi where your universe revolved around India and Pakistan, where did you find interest in India in the Department? Did you see a difference?

QUAINTON: Well, in Washington it was fairly clear that India was not terribly popular. Notwithstanding the efforts that Chester Bowles had made to portray India to a Washington audience as the great democracy of Asia that deserved almost unreserved U.S. support, the India-Soviet relationship constantly reared its ugly head. Since our foreign policy was largely a zero sum foreign policy at the time and remained so for years thereafter, to the degree the Soviets were perceived as having an important foothold in India, we were perceived to have thereby lost in some significant degree. So there was a constant battle within the Washington community about the extent to which we should sustain our support for India, our extensive economic and our limited military assistance. There was always a strong Pakistan lobby because of the close Pakistan-U.S. relationship that lasted right through the entire time that I was on the India desk.

Clearly the three years that I spent there became increasingly difficult in political terms. The Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1971, which resulted in the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, was a traumatic event, as was the tilt of Dr. Kissinger towards Pakistan, and the behind scenes efforts to establish a relationship with China through Pakistan. This negotiation with China was entirely unknown to us on the India desk throughout the crisis period, or at least until the time of Dr. Kissinger's actual visit to Beijing passing through Pakistan. On the India desk, we just couldn't understand why the U.S. was not speaking out against Pakistani actions in East Pakistan.

The 1971 crisis had been building throughout 1970 with the Pakistan elections, which Bhutto did not allow to be won by the Bangladesh leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman. We were constantly surprised at the lack of criticism of Pakistan for the suppression of the results of the elections, particularly given our commitment to democracy, our interests in the area, and our support for Indian democracy. Instead, criticism of India became increasingly strident throughout the course of 1971 and on into 1972 for what India was seen to have done to bring about the dismemberment of an ally of the United States. Pakistan, as you will remember, was still a member of CENTO at the time. Indian policy played very badly in the Washington environment of the time and when Mrs. Gandhi came to the White House in the summer of 1971, she was received very coolly, even though she appealed for American understanding of the enormous burden India was carrying as a result of Bengali refugees into India.

Q: You mention the Pakistan lobby. The Indian leadership are very sophisticated people and I would think that they would know how to play the Washington lobby game.

QUAINTON: The Indians were never successful in playing our political system well. Nor were they successful in playing the American public very well. They fretted, chafed enormously under the constant bad publicity which they received focused on the poverty of the Indian masses, the alleged abuses of the Indian maharaja class, the complaints about the India-Soviet relationship, and their willingness to acquire advanced weapons systems, mainly MIGs and other advanced aircraft from the Soviet Union, and the constant drum beat of criticism of non-alignment. The Indians were inordinately proud of non-alignment. It had been Nehru's vision of the world which Mrs. Gandhi continued throughout her tenure as prime minister. India wanted to stand above the Cold War and in so doing tried to maintain a balanced relationship with the two super powers. But, in fact, we saw this attempt at balance as a tilt towards the Soviet Union. We didn't accept the concept of parity between the superpowers. The White House, i.e., Kissinger, believed those who were not with us were almost by definition against us. Kissinger saw India as a Soviet surrogate over which we could have very little influence. So, although the Indians tried very hard with a small section of the Congress to build a pro-Indian constituency, they were never successful. They made their case worse because of their constantly complaining about our relationship with Pakistan. Nothing we could do in Pakistan suited the Indians. Every weapon system, every spare part we provided was seen as aimed at them, and they constantly berated us for a policy of supporting an authoritarian military regime, which was hostile to India, when in New Delhi's view, we ought to be supporting a democratic regime in India.

Q: Did you find in India's non-aligned stance in this period a lot of criticism of the United States but not of the Soviet Union, which when you get right down to it was a rather nasty, brutish empire?

QUAINTON: There is no doubt that India's criticism of the Soviet Union was always extremely nuanced. They took it for granted that we would appreciate their democracy, since they were a democracy and we were a democracy we were on the same side, and consequently they didn't need to posture and play up to us. They never saw it as being in their interest to criticize the authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union. We were never comfortable with that posture. We always wanted to hear words of support, praise and encouragement for ourselves, and the Indians were reluctant to praise us. Rather, they were quick to criticize faults in our society, but not in that of the Soviet Union, as they eventually found faults in our foreign policy, particularly our policy in Vietnam, which they saw as a legitimate struggle for national liberation by the Vietnamese people, which we in the eyes of many Indians were brutally trying to suppress. So, they always gave the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt, although Mrs. Gandhi did speak out strongly at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Q: In your contacts with people in the Indian embassy did they seem concerned about the fact that our two nations weren't really able to reach common understandings?

QUAINTON: Well, they were concerned because they saw the lack of rapport leading to a tilt towards Pakistan. They never understood our relationship with Pakistan. They refused willfully to understand it. They had already fought a couple of wars with Pakistan. It was not surprising that there was a certain level of paranoia, and they had fought a war with the Chinese, who were closely allied with the Pakistanis, so from an Indian point of view, American policy seemed quite

hostile. We were never willing to help them in substantial military ways, although we continued throughout this period to provide enormous amounts of food aid and economic assistance, but that aid never in their minds balanced out our failure to support their strategic interests. Dr. Kissinger's view, reenforced by the Bangladesh war in 1971-72, that India had hegemonic desires in the region that the United States ought to oppose Indian strategic interests at the same time we praised India for its democracy. We also found the Indian economic system much more like the Soviet system and constantly criticized it. Of course, there were enormous differences between India and the Soviet Union, but there was a strong statist tradition in India, major industries were in the hands of the state, and the rhetoric of the Congress Party was socialistic. All of this we found objectionable. So there were all sorts of grounds for our concerns about India, as they had found grounds for their concerns about us. It was, in short, a very unhappy time.

The most unhappy moment during this time was Mrs. Gandhi's official visit to Washington in the late summer of 1971 as we strove to pull the Indians back from their confrontation with Pakistan which had been building up over the summer as a result of the flood of Pakistani refugees into India. We believed that the Indians were stimulating the flow of refugees in order to create a pretext for an invasion. That view, I think, was the view of Dr. Kissinger, but it was not the view of the India desk, which took much more seriously the legitimacy of the problems that India faced from more than 100,000 refugees. India had a real interest of stanching the flow of refugees. But that was not the view seen at the top of the national security system. Indeed, there were serious divisions of view throughout 1971 about Indian policy and the extent to which we should acknowledge the legitimacy of the Indian problems. We at the State Department did not know that Dr. Kissinger was engaged throughout much of this period in building a secret relationship with the Chinese relying on the Pakistanis. He regarded that initiative as a transcendent U.S. national interest, much more important than any short term relationship with India. I believed very passionately that our policy was wrong and wrote a number of dissent channel memos at the time criticizing the thrust of our policy towards the subcontinent and the tilt towards Pakistan, particularly at the time of war between India and Pakistan.

Q: Did you feel at the time that you were on the desk that our relationship with India and Pakistan was being orchestrated from the national security council and Dr. Kissinger?

QUAINTON: To a considerable extent in the Indo-Pakistan crisis, Dr. Kissinger called the shots from the White House. I think it is also fair to say that although the State Department had a more nuanced view of what was going on, Joe Sisco disliked the Indians intensely. He was a man who could not stand to be patronized and the Indians were marvelous patronizers of American officials, always treating them as though they were slightly dim-witted when it came to understanding the true realities of the world in which we lived. This was a constant underlying irritant in conversations with the Indians. The tendency that they had, and still have to some degree, of preaching about the tradition of Indian civilization, 5000 years against our cheeky 200. This constant Indian desire to put us down, perhaps arising from their own insecurity, cultural and otherwise, always made any dialogue with the Indians extremely difficult. We always saw them as posturing in ways that were not very agreeable.

In the Department there was not nearly the same enthusiasm for the Pakistani regime of Yahya Khan that was found in the White House. But, then the State Department was cut out, except at the very highest levels, from Dr. Kissinger's clandestine diplomatic efforts.

Q: What was causing the influx of refugees coming from what was then East Pakistan into Bengal?

QUAINTON: I think there was no question that a substantial part was the direct product of a very brutal regime of the East Pakistan military governor. Indian propaganda efforts may have encouraged that flow or at least made people more fearful of their lives and more disposed to flee. The migrants were almost exclusively Hindus. But the conditions in East Pakistan were really pretty difficult. There was a lot of internal fighting and reprisals against the Hindu population which led them to flee a truly oppressive and abusive Pakistani military government. This all has to be put against the background of the extraordinary migrations of only 25 years before in which millions of Indian Muslims and Hindus fled across the border mainly in the Punjab in the west but also across the border in Bengal.

Q: You were saying that elements in our government thought that the Indians were encouraging this refugee flow. Where was that coming from?

QUAINTON: I am not sure I can tell you the answer to that. Intelligence played an important role throughout the crisis. I think embassy reporting, our reading of the Indian press, and what we learned through our intelligence sources suggested that the Indians were not entirely unhappy that there was such a large refugee flow. Certainly at the time of the actual war and the despatch by us of the *Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal it was Dr. Kissinger's very strong belief on the basis of the intelligence that he had seen that India was prepared to march into West Pakistan with a view of breaking up the West Pakistan state as it had already succeeded in breaking up a united Pakistan. I think those of us who saw the same intelligence felt it could be read in different ways, that contingency planning did not necessarily indicate intent, but that was a debate which was not joined until the United States was already committed to a particular policy with regard to the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

Q: So, the Dr. Kissinger school felt from its intelligence readings that India was planning to absorb East Pakistan, is that right?

QUAINTON: No, we were fearful that India was going to dismember West Pakistan. Certainly the Pakistanis fed us a great deal of information to that effect. There was close intelligence cooperation with the Pakistanis, and they were quick to report the machinations of Indian embassy officers. There was a large new Indian consulate general in Dacca, and this fanned the fears in Washington that the Indians had entirely nefarious intentions when it came to the existence of Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger and other believed that it was their desire to disable the Pakistani state permanently so that it would not pose any future threat. I don't think the Indians had such grandiose plans, but the Pakistanis certainly feared the Indians and used those fears to play on our own dislike of Indian policies in other areas.

Q: Was this a policy issue that was being fought within the Near Eastern bureau by various people within the bureau?

QUAINTON: There were differences of view in the Near Eastern bureau, particularly in the South Asian part which was composed of the two offices of Indian affairs and Pakistan affairs. There only other players were the assistant secretary, Joe Sisco, and the deputy assistant secretary, Chris Van Hollen. There was certainly a fair amount of difference of view between the two office directors and their staffs, although less than in the field where the two embassies became very passionate defenders of their respective governments throughout this crisis. The ambassador in Pakistan, Joseph Farland, a political appointee, was a strong believer in the good intentions, in the word of honor of Yahya Khan.

Q: Was it at that point that Arch Blood, who was the consul general in Dacca, was taking a different approach?

QUAINTON: That's right. He certainly described to Washington the brutality of the West Pakistani military in East Pakistan, and he documented it well. He urged on Washington a strong policy critical of the Islamabad regime, a policy which was not at all popular at the time.

Q: How did this play? Within the Department of State, if you have a professional consul general who is making a case which was not fabricated, there was a nasty Pakistan government regime there, and you have a political ambassador in Islamabad which would tend to make him somewhat suspect as an objective reporter, I would think that the professional ranks would tilt in the favor of India.

QUAINTON: I think the professional ranks did tilt in favor of India. Even so, Blood was perceived as being too emotionally engaged, and the image of dispassionate analysis, which the Foreign Service cultivates was not served by his strongly expressed views. I think he was conveying accurately the reality that we were dealing with, but his passion reached a level which led Dr. Kissinger to discount the reporting from East Pakistan as an extreme case of localitis and Arch Blood as somebody who couldn't see the larger picture, the totality of U.S. security interests. Of course, the China dimension was just as unknown to Arch Blood as it was to us on the desk.

Q: How did Mrs. Gandhi's visit turn out?

QUAINTON: The visit went extremely badly in substantive terms. Mrs. Gandhi was very feisty, very critical of the United States' tacit support for Pakistan. She denied any intention of using military action against West Pakistan but certainly didn't rule out the use of force in East Pakistan, notwithstanding our strong urging that she exercise restraint. She did not see us as willing to play a constructive role with Pakistan in stopping the flow of refugees or doing things that met India's immediate economic or political interests. We saw her as someone who had made up her mind to go after Pakistan. There really wasn't a very effective dialogue between the two governments at the time, although on the surface the visit seemed to have gone quite well, culminating in a formal state dinner at the White House.

Q: Was this a full state dinner?

QUAINTON: No, this was an official visit. But it was done with some style and the President gave a dinner in her honor.

Q: But, this was set up especially to try to work on this problem?

QUAINTON: Yes, she was invited to come.

Q: Did you get involved in the visit?

QUAINTON: Oh, we were deeply involved in the preparation of papers for the visit. Whether they were used or not one never knew. Certainly no one at the desk level sat in on the meetings. I think the country director was involved, Dave Schneider.

Q: On the India side of things did you find yourself having trouble dealing with Joe Sisco?

QUAINTON: No, actually Sisco was an officer who liked plain talk. He certainly was capable of it himself. He didn't try to suppress dissenting views within his own bureau. How far he reflected them above him I can't say. He did not, himself, have an entirely happy relationship with Dr. Kissinger. I think Dr. Kissinger saw him as one of the few State Department officers capable of independently managing an area of foreign policy. Joe Sisco didn't ask for a whole lot of advice from those above him. I still remember a meeting in the Situation Room at the White House called to discuss the Pakistan crisis. I was there as a Department notetaker. The meeting began not discussing South Asia but a problem of which I had no knowledge, dealing with the Egyptians. Sisco on his own authority had cabled the ambassador instructing him to see the president of Egypt on some matter or other. Dr. Kissinger came into the meeting and said, "Before we start talking about South Asia, I would like to comment on Egypt. Joe, I saw your cable which unfortunately was not cleared by the White House. I want to remind you of one thing. In this government we sing as a chorus, there are no solo voices." The great solo voice, himself, speaking. So, there was a fair amount of stress between Kissinger and Sisco, more in personal terms than in policy terms, but it ultimately spilled over, I think, into the policy arena.

Q: The Indians sent troops into East Pakistan?

QUAINTON: They did indeed.

Q: How did we react to this?

QUAINTON: We put tremendous pressure on the Indians to stop their advances. It was all over within a matter of days. East Pakistan fell, Bangladesh was proclaimed and then our efforts were to get the Indians out as quickly as possible. It was clear to us that there was no possibility of recreating a united Pakistan, although we didn't recognize Bangladesh for some time. I forget the exact timing. Our primary goal then was to get the Indians out as quickly as possible.

Q: Did we see Mrs. Gandhi, the prime minister, as somebody who was going to be around for a long time? Were we looking for more friendly people?

QUAINTON: Historically, we had always looked for sympathetic voices in the Congress Party. We assumed Mrs. Gandhi was firmly rooted, but it had been a constant effort, I believe, of some elements of the U.S. government to try to support less radical elements in the Congress Party than those represented by Nehru and then by Mrs. Gandhi. One of the great shadows over her visit was the fact that she had learned some time before the visit of covert operations against her father during the 1950s and felt that this was indicative of the real intentions of the United States government towards her and the Congress Party of which she was the leader.

Q: How did this come out that we were doing something against her father?

QUAINTON: Well, I think she learned of politicians who had been his opponents had been helped by the United States government in a variety of ways, financial and otherwise, which she thought was entirely improper. I never knew the details. Clearly these were not things publicly discussed. She certainly believed we had acted in this way, but whether or not we did is not a matter of public record.

ROBERT BAUER
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1967)

Mr. Bauer was born in Austria. During the Nazi period he was a devout anti-Nazi, and worked with the French in providing anti-German broadcasts to the world. He came to the United States in 1939, working initially in Cincinnati broadcasting to Europe, and subsequently with the USIA and Voice of America. During his career with USIA Mr. Bauer served in Vienna, Teheran, and Paris, and in Cairo and New Delhi he served as Cultural Affairs Officer. In Washington, he was the first Director of USIA's Foreign Press Center. Mr. Bauer was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1989.

BAUER: No, that was done; that was the end of Egypt altogether. That was '67, and then I came back to the States, back to USIA. At the last minute I was asked to go to India. Dan Oleksiw had created new jobs there in which he appointed cultural affairs officers—to deal with foreign affairs. My job was to travel all over India to give lectures and talks about American foreign policy.

Q: As a cultural affairs officer?

BAUER: Yeah.

Q: It doesn't sound logical, but –

BAUER: There was another one who appointed to do economics, a third one to do art, and so forth. The problem I had is, I got in the midst of the Indo-Pakistan war, in which of course we sided with Pakistan official, and I had to defend the policy in India. Somebody said, "Why don't you go to Rome and tell the Pope that Martin Luther was right?" (Laughter) I said, "Give me a plane ticket and I'll go!" (Laughter) That would be easier.

Q: That's impossible!

BAUER: Oh, it was fascinating! It was fascinating. My wife traveled with me quite a bit, and we had very interesting moments.

Q: How did they receive these lectures? Did they even attend?

BAUER: Oh, yes, they did attend. I found a formula, a basic one. I came in, and after I was introduced I said to them, "Let me tell you this. I was once a lawyer, and a lawyer is used to being told, 'You hear both cases before you make your judgment.' So I am here today to give you the view of the United States government on the basic crisis. You will probably disagree with me, but what I have to tell you is the basic tenets of American foreign policy and how we view the crisis on the subcontinent." That usually did it.

Q: That disarmed them.

BAUER: What could they do—shoot me? I remember I spoke to all the members of the High Court in Nagpur, and they were all in their black robes, and the CAO who came with me said, "They'll probably hang you right now!" (Laughter) At the end, the presiding judge got up, and said, "Sir, we want to tell you that we of course all disagree with you, but as professionals we'd say you didn't make a bad case. Now let's go and have tea." (Laughter) So you could do it that way. On one or two occasions it got rougher, when they tried to show their anger. And in fact once the chairman said, "You don't have the floor now. We don't want to hear what you have to say." I said, "All right, goodbye. I'm leaving." That happened, too. It was a tough assignment but it was very interesting—all over India, into various universities all over the place.

LARRY LESSER
Consular Officer
New Delhi (1967-1969)

Lawrence Lesser was born in New York in 1940. He received his BA from Cornell University and his MA from the University of Minnesota. He was in the Peace Corps in Enugu, Nigeria in 1964 and 1965. His foreign assignments included New Delhi, Ouagadougou, Brussels, Kigali, and Dhaka. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 12, 2002.

Q: You went to India, where in India?

LESSER: New Delhi.

Q: You were there from when to when?

LESSER: I was there from early '67 to early '69.

Q: What was your impression of India from your vantage point when you got there?

LESSER: Well, my vantage point was the embassy and it was almost only the embassy for reasons which are easy to explain. I was supposed to be going into a two-year rotational program where you'd be in four different sections of the embassy. That program didn't remain in force for very long and the embassy couldn't easily accommodate me in that program because there was a staffing crisis in the consular section. As a result, I went into the consular section less than two months after I got there and I stayed there the whole time. It was just a two-officer section, hard to believe now. Only two American officers in consular affairs and with one of them, the senior one, rotating very rapidly I couldn't go out, couldn't travel around, couldn't take much leave. We didn't have much money anyway, so it may have been for the best. So, I saw India primarily from the vantage point of people who came to the embassy and most of them of course were coming trying to get visas to go to the United States. In my travels, well, India was coming out of a very serious drought and famine disaster not specifically in the New Delhi area, but further east especially in Bihar state. It was a country that was definitely struggling. Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister. I wasn't involved in political or economic reporting, you know, and I never became an expert. The fact that Indira was the Prime Minister meant that relations at the very top were uneasy. She was very suspicious of the U.S. government, and there were a few incidents during that two-year period which exacerbated it. One was the defection of Stalin's daughter in New Delhi which happened just before I started working in the consular section. A few weeks later and I might have been the consular officer who issued her a visa. Another incident was the head of the Smithsonian who was a birdwatcher in the Himalayas in India and Nepal and became suspected of being really a spy because of the stories in the late '60s about CIA money going into otherwise innocent organizations to help finance their being able to see whatever they saw and write reports on whatever they wrote. But in India it was interpreted as hostile activity. The Israeli six-day war, India took a position that was more pro-Arab than the Arab countries and Indira was criticized for that in the Indian parliament, but once again, it was an uneasy thing. Shortly after my tour there, the AID mission, which actually was responsible for something like 1,000 staff and contract employees, was radically cut and U.S. relations became much less close. We also had at that time a very serious question of what to do with the extremely large rupee accounts the U.S. government had accumulated through the PL-480 food program. They couldn't be spent by the U.S. government as fast as they were accumulating and it gave the U.S. government an inordinate influence over the stability of the Indian economy. That issue wasn't resolved until some years later.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LESSER: Chester Bowles. A man in history and a great man I think.

Q: Did you run across him at all?

LESSER: Yes, I did. He was very accessible to everybody and most of his country team meetings were rather large affairs, not just limited to agency and section chiefs. Anyway, I was de facto section chief for consular affairs a lot of the time because as I said we had a vacancy in the senior position so I represented the consular section. One small footnote-to-history anecdote, I mentioned that the Indian government took a position that was more anti-Israeli than the Arab countries in the '67 war and Ambassador Bowles was concerned about that because he loved India and Mrs. Bowles loved India and they were beloved by enormous numbers of Indians, including the cosmopolitan ones at the top and including regular folks. So, he said he was going back to the States to do a little lobbying and he says essentially what I'm going to do is, the Indians will have been there and I'm going to come in after them and say, don't pay attention to what the Indians just told you. They don't really know sometimes how to advance their own interests. The Indians will sound very hawkish and anti-Israel, which may be problematical for the U.S. government, but when push comes to shove, the Indians aren't going to make a lot of trouble on these things. Don't take what they say, their public statements, too seriously. Don't let their foolish statements affect our assistance programs because India is in desperate need and the programs are working. Family planning is working; food production programs are working. The small business financing is working. That was a kind of a visionary view. Even at my tender age of late '20s I thought, at some point somebody's got to take what the Indians say at face value. They have to make their own case and they have to be accountable for what they say. Of course we did go through a lot of years of uneasy relations with India.

Q: I mean it's always been one of the peculiar things, that, here you have this major democracy, really major democracy and the United States and yet they were essentially estranged for a very long time.

LESSER: Yes, indeed. Bowles used to say frequently and it still appears in rhetoric that we are the world's two largest democracies.

Q: Yes. There also has been an underlying theme of the relationship that a number of our ambassadors have sort of fallen in love with India and have you might say given India essentially a free ride as far as we're concerned, well, don't pay any attention to what they say, let's keep, you know, supporting India and all rather than, play it cool both as far as assistance and all that. There were times when Indira and her father turned to the Soviet Union.

LESSER: Well, let me tell you a story about that although it's not from my personal experience but it is reflected in Bowles's writings. I haven't read his version of it, so let me just give my recollection of what he said to the country team. Bowles had two tours of duty as ambassador to India. I was there during his second one. He was suffering from Parkinson's disease and he was beginning to show some effects in terms of not being able to go for long meetings. He was an excellent golfer, for example, but he only would play a few holes because it was as much as his constitution would permit. A few years earlier, Nehru was the prime minister and Kennedy was the president and Bowles's great plan was to address exactly what you're talking about, Stu, and try to get a much better relationship between India and the United States as the world's two great democracies. He put together a package and it was going to involve military assistance as well as economic assistance and he got approval from the highest level of the Indian government to

discuss it with President Kennedy. He arranged a trip to Washington in order to bring the matter up. He was scheduled to meet with Kennedy on November 23, 1963, but Kennedy was shot in Dallas the day before. So, Bowles came back to India. He didn't have a personal relationship with LBJ, but even so, he put the agenda back together again after several months and he scheduled a trip to go and talk to LBJ about an historic shift by which India would reduce its closeness to the Soviet Union and come closer to us. The week before he was to go Nehru died, and Shastri became the interim prime minister, but he didn't have anything like Nehru's power and it was out of the question that he could carry the Indian government into a historic shift of alliances. So, the opportunity was lost once and for all. Bowles told the embassy staff that in addition to the bad luck that made this proposal not happen, he really believed also, and I think he was right, that to make really historic shifts you probably need a crisis. You need everybody to know that the old system is intolerable, that it's broken down irrevocably. You couldn't have made that case on relations with India because India was too remote from the United States and not strategically at the very forefront of our interests. It would be hard to get the attention of people who are very busy worrying about putting out fires or addressing crises around the world when India wasn't one. Still, Bowles thought he got close and that he might just have been able to carry it off if it hadn't been for those accidents of history - the untimely deaths of JFK and Nehru.

Q: We had a Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who was consumed by Vietnam.

LESSER: Yes, that's true and he was also really no particular friend of Chester Bowles. Bowles had been exiled to India by the Kennedy administration. There you are.

Q: Now, in the visa section, in the first place, in the consular function, let's take the visa side first. Who was coming, there is a considerable Indian population in the United States today, but that came later on.

LESSER: Well, when you see the people with Indian names who are the heads of cutting edge corporations, dot-coms particularly, but technologically advanced companies, most of those guys got their visas in the late '60s.

Q: Was it mainly students?

LESSER: Yes, more yes than no. We had a very high demand and the largest number were for students. We also had exchange visitors who were sort of the same thing as students, except their sponsorship is different. There was a trickle of tourists and a trickle of business people and of course we had immigrants. The Immigration and Naturalization Act was seriously amended - the end of national quotas occurred during the period I was there and the changeover occurred so that instead of having the largest number of immigrant visas available to people of European origin, it was evenly spread across the entire world according to demand with a maximum of 25,000 from any one country. I don't remember what the world total was, but something like 170,000. There was going to be a mad rush for visas from countries like India where many people could qualify and would want to go for the opportunities. I actually experienced a big wave of applications from Indians at the beginning of the big updraft so that of course gets to

what you were saying, that the largest number occurred later. It was more or less directly as a result of the change in the act.

Q: Were you finding any problems with the people who came to you for visas?

LESSER: Every consular officer has this statutory problem that a person applying for a non-immigrant visa, including student visas of course, is presumed to be an intending immigrant unless they can establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the time of application that they're going for a legitimate short-term purpose. Well, that can be tricky. If you have a young, bright Indian student who is a recent graduate from the Indian Technological Institute in Kanpur, and he now wants to go for graduate study and you ask him, what do you want to do with your life after that. He hasn't been coached and he might say, gee I don't know, but it sure would be nice to work for one of the technologically advanced companies - for IBM or Dupont or a pharmaceutical company, and you would have to tell him, well, I'm very sorry in that case you can't get a non-immigrant visa, you can't get a student visa, you'll have to get an immigrant visa. He might say, well, fine, then give me one. You say, not so fast, we don't have them to give because the process, we're backed up. We've got several years wait of people who are already qualified and you haven't prequalified yet. Of course, every Indian student worth his salt already knows that and they would never be so foolish to answer a question like that. It's a little foolish of a consular officer to ask it also, because what are we trying to do here? A young person's life is all before him. It seems to me you don't want to ask him to make a silly commitment.

Q: Well, I think this is one of the things when one tries to be as relaxed, well, it depends where you are. But it's a highly qualified; I was in Korea in the '70s and we had a lot of people, you didn't know what they're going to do, but you never know where a student is really going to end up. As long as they weren't going to some fly-by-night school in order to bypass the immigration regulations, but it depends on the consular officer.

LESSER: Yes, it depends on a lot of things. During the time I was there a fellow with an Indian surname won the Nobel Prize in chemistry. He was a researcher at the University of Michigan or Michigan State (to the best of my recollection) and he was an American citizen. He had been in earlier years a student visa applicant and had changed status and had become a Nobel Prize winning scientist in the United States. The Indian newspapers had banner headlines saying "Indian wins Nobel Prize for chemistry." They said, he's an Indian and he won it and it's a pity that the brain drain, which was a popular term at the time, had occurred and we had lost his brain to America. A day or two later one of the Indian papers had an editorial comment which said, we didn't lose his brain, he's got an American brain. If he had stayed in India, who are you kidding, he never could have done the work that produced the Nobel Prize because our labs aren't equipped and our culture doesn't encourage people to that level of excellence. So, the world is a better place because he went to America where he could do what he was so well equipped to do. We should take pride in it, too, but it's not an issue, it's not something that we should say, shows that we shouldn't let fellows like him get away. I thought, there's an awful lot of common sense there.

Q: Absolutely. Did you have problems with brides going over and that sort of thing?

LESSER: You mean?

Q: Indian young women who are being sent to get married and that sort of thing?

LESSER: You know, I don't recall it as a problem. I understand that it could have been a question. I had a couple of amusing incidents with American men who came over to India to find a bride and bring her back over.

Q: How did that work?

LESSER: One fellow in particular said he had tried American wives and they talk back too much and they just don't mind. He had now studied the matter and he was going to get an Asian bride, and India looked like a very good place for it. He was enough self-conscious to ask me if I was married and I said I was. He said, "Is your wife American?" I said, "She is." He said, "Well, your wife may not be like that, but the law of averages or the statistical average says that American women don't make good wives and Asian women do. I wish you well in your marriage, Mr. Lesser, but I tried it and it didn't work and I want an Asian bride now." So, he came back a couple of months later with a young woman from South India who had been at an orphanage. She was, I guess she must have been 16 or 17, but she looked younger. She didn't speak a word of English. She only spoke Malayalam and believe me this fellow didn't speak any Malayalam. But he had selected her. She was very pretty and she looked very alert and it looked to me like given his terms of reference, he'd probably done very well, but now what about her. I thought she's probably doing well, too, because she's an orphan. She has no real future in India and she looks like she's bright and capable and all she needs is a chance. Now I thought he was deluded if he thought he could bring her to the States and have her wait on him hand and foot and be undyingly grateful that he had brought her to America. It seemed to me that it wouldn't take but a few years before she would learn to drive, learn to watch TV, learn to go to the supermarket, learn to make friends, and figure out what her rights were. If he wasn't a good husband, then he would be an ex-husband and she would have her green card and eventually become a citizen. So, I didn't have any great compunctions about it. There were incidences like that.

I'm very proud to be an American and to have represented the U.S. government, but we're individuals first. We're human beings and we have to think about how best to conduct our own lives. I'm satisfied that I found a good way to conduct mine and I want to be respectful of people I encounter along the way and give them every opportunity to fulfill their own potential.

Q: Did you find this in conflict with your duties as a consular officer?

LESSER: It could be. It could be if you took a very literal and very non-flexible view that your duties were you could be denying people things that a closer analysis would show it would be to everyone's advantage - not just to that individual's advantage, but to everyone's advantage - to have ruled a different way. Certainly the Indian, one time Indian, now American, who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry, the world's a better place because he did that work. A very inflexible consular officer might have said I don't think you're coming back to India and I'm not going to let you go to America. Who would have benefitted? Nobody at all.

Q: During the late '60s and all was the time of the hippie Americans and you know one of the things that inspires them to get out there with the backpacks with hashish and drugs and all this. As a consular officer, did you get involved in the protection and welfare of these?

LESSER: Yes, Mr. Stu Kennedy, I did. Around the embassy I was nicknamed the "hippie control officer." We didn't have a great many hippies in New Delhi, and the Indian authorities were pretty reasonable. They didn't want to load up their jails with scruffy looking Americans, but from time to time an American would get arrested because he was troublesome to a landlord or misbehaved or lost his mind.

One little anecdote about hippies. I got interviewed one time by the AP correspondent. He might have been a stringer. He asked me about hippies and I told him a little bit about hippies. He was referred to me because I was the consular officer. I said, "I don't actually see very many hippies because they don't like to come to the embassy." Then it occurred to me to mention to him, "By the way, not all the hippies are Americans anyway." He said, "Oh, that's an interesting angle. What percentage are Americans?" I said, "Look, for beginners I don't know how many Americans there are because as I already told you they don't check in with the embassy, and I certainly don't know how many are not American." He said, "Well, you'd be in the best position to make an estimate." He kind of badgered me and I was a young guy and kind of naive. I said I don't know, I don't know. I said finally, "If I had to pick a number out of the air or out of my ear I would say maybe 30% to 40% are American and not more." He said, "Okay, thanks." He wrote an article in which he said blah, blah, less than 40% of the hippies are Americans. Fortunately, he didn't say that that was an official figure given to him by an embassy representative. So, I figured I was out of the woods on that one, but he did say it as though it was the definitive truth. End of story.

Some months later we had some hippie problems that brought a senior police officer to my office, saying they needed a little more cooperation, a little better: "We want to coordinate with you on how to deal with an influx of hippies who are breaking laws." I received him and we talked and I said at one point, "By the way, you know, I hope you're going to other embassies, too because not all of the hippies are Americans." He said, "Oh, we know that. Less than 40% are Americans." I said, "Where did you find that out?" He said, "What do you mean?" I told him the story and I said I'd be very interested if it turned out I was right and somebody had done a study and confirmed it. But, I said, I have my suspicions. He said, "Oh, yes, we did do a study and it is right." I didn't think he was sincere and I think he was embarrassed. I don't think anybody ever did a study because it's hard to study, and who cares?

Q: Was there, did you have any problems with American born women marrying Indian students coming back and then having children and having problems leaving the country and not getting along with the family and that sort of thing?

LESSER: I can't say we didn't, but I don't remember any. That seems to me to be something that happened later for the most part. There must have been isolated cases, but I don't remember any.

Q: Often I think particularly you have a society such as India where the family is very close. If sonny boy goes off and marries a foreign wife and comes back and she finds that she's supposed to wait on her mother-in-law and all this and American women don't cotton to this.

LESSER: Yes, indeed. Well, you see, my American visitor who wanted an Indian wife understood that. Yes, I know it happened, it happened, a version of that happened with some good friends of ours there, but it wasn't a consular case.

Q: Were there any provocations problems while you were there?

LESSER: I don't think so. It was a very peaceful time really, even though at the level of the highest politics there were tensions between the United States and India. Not much happened at ground level. We did have what turned into a public order problem on the day that the new immigration law went into effect because Indian visa marketers, visa fixers, had been drumming up business and saying that the United States was going to be recruiting laborers to come. We knew we were going to get a lot of inquiries, but we underestimated just how large the crowd was going to be and we had more than 1,000 people at the door clamoring to get in. We only had a small office really. We hadn't even printed up enough copies of the information, but most of those people, that wouldn't have done much except I guess you could have gotten them to leave if you said, here take this and come back when you're ready. We did actually have to call in the marine security guards to close down the building and get help from the Indian police to disperse the crowd. Of course it wasn't a hostile crowd; these were people who wanted to be Americans.

Q: Under the old immigration law, I used to, you know I was in Dhahran in the '50s and we had people working for airlines on Bahrain where I used to go and these Indians would come up to me and ask were their immigration applications coming along. I dutifully looked over and said, well, it's moved up. Instead of having to wait 112 years, you only have to wait 110 years and they'd smile, you know, progress was being made.

LESSER: Good one.

Q: Did you and your wife, were you able to have any Indian friends or not?

LESSER: Yes, I would say in India it's not difficult to get around in the kind of cosmopolitan level of Indian society. People like to have American friends. I guess I should say liked, but I think it's probably still true and so we did some entertaining, although I was in a nonrepresentational position. It wasn't part of my job. We got a lot of invitations. Indians also, the wealthy class of Indians, can entertain lavishly, so it's not like a couple of my posts in Africa where your African friends really could not invite you to their homes, they just weren't set up that way. In India you had people who were like pashas and they were also well traveled. There's a kind of an international class. I'm sure you hear this in a lot of the interviews. International people are more like each other than they are like the man in the street in their country of origin.

Q: Now, we're moving up to 1969. Did our involvement in Vietnam cause any problems?

LESSER: It was pretty distant in my official life. Again as a consular officer, I'm sure Vietnam figured importantly in our bilateral relations with India, but none of that filtered down to me. Now, that was also the period when Robert Kennedy and then Martin Luther King, Jr. were assassinated. So we, 1968 was a seminal year in America and I wasn't home in the US for a single day of that year and I feel as though that's a hole in my life. I didn't, for that matter know much about the '68 democratic convention where Mayor Daley's minions beat up the demonstrators. I was very distant from that. We were of course generally aware of it, but we didn't have CNN then and so for the most part we got just bulletins on a current basis and the fuller story you didn't get until several days later. If I can get back to the question that triggered all of those reflections, Vietnam was also pretty distant. There was a little pressure on Foreign Service people to volunteer to go to Vietnam. We would get circulars from the Department saying that we're going to give you some career advantages if you volunteer, and I went home to my wife one day and said, you know, I really feel as though I have to consider volunteering to go there. Even though I had very serious reservations about the war, and was very dubious about the kinds of statements - the body counts and McNamara types of things that justified our continued involvement there and said that we were winning and there was light at the end of the tunnel. Even so, I thought well, if people like me don't volunteer to go there, then we're leaving it to the people who I think have poor judgment, so I should volunteer, shouldn't I? My wife said, "Well, if you feel that way, then go ahead and do it, but when you come back you'll have to find a different wife." By this time I had two children; my daughter was born in India. My son had been born in Nigeria. I had very strong family feelings. I thought, okay, I read you loud and clear and I didn't volunteer and the Department didn't twist my arm to go.

Q: Well, then 1969, whither? Where did you go then?

RICHARD PODOL
Program Officer, USAID
New Delhi (1967-1970)

Richard Podol was born in Chicago in 1928. He attended the University of Iowa, where he received his B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. He became involved in the Foreign Service in 1954. Mr. Podol has worked in India, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Zaire, and Uganda. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in September 1996.

PODOL: I just moved down the road to India.

Q: To do what? What was your position?

PODOL: I was the Chief of the Program Office.

Q: You left the technical area and moved into Mission management, right?

PODOL: Right. To show you sometimes how recruiting was done, when I was in Nepal still, Ernie Stern, whom I had known from Turkey days and was the Deputy in India, came up to

Nepal on a visit. We got to talking and he said, "We're looking for a Program Officer. How would you like to try it?" I said, "Sure." Over the objections of AID Washington, who didn't think I was qualified, the Mission Director - who was very well-known: John Lewis - agreed and I came down. This was the time when India was the largest AID program, other than, of course, Vietnam.

Q: It was a very exciting time, with those people to work for, the stars in the development business?

PODOL: Absolutely. It was a very high-powered Mission.

Q: Tell us about your work there.

PODOL: Mostly, working with the Indians was a very different experience from anything that I had had before. The Indians had a very superior attitude toward foreigners. In fact, they could be very arrogant, until you got to know them well. They are the most philosophical and intellectually-minded people that I have ever known. This is the way they approached any kind of situation: from an intellectual, philosophical point of view. Their knowledge base is far superior to that of we Americans, in their fields: philosophy, for example. But their hands-on experience was minimal.

Let me give you an example. We had a Minerals Advisor. This was a huge Mission. We had a Minerals Advisor. His grandfather had been a very well-known American philosopher. In fact, there's a building at the University of California named after him. The first time he met his new counterpart, he was asked, "Are you related to so and so?" He said, "Yes, he was my grandfather." The man said, "Well, I've read all his books" and he started quoting chapters of verse from his grandfather's works. And the guy said, "Gee, what have I gotten myself into?" This was a geologist. They went out in the field and our guy started pointing out certain rock formations and the Indian was lost. He had not done field work. His academic work was in the university, in the classroom, not the field work. This turned out to be very typical of India at that time. The Indians in the laboratory did excellent work, but they would not go out on the field and get their shoes dirty, or their hands muddied. You had to drag them out of the laboratory into the fields on the research side. It's the same mentality I mentioned earlier: we've got peons that can go out and do that kind of work; we don't have to do it. I found that, if you wanted to work with Indians on something like economics, you couldn't have a more skilled group of people. Today, you want software engineers? Get Indians. Their mentality is such that they do brilliant work in this field. But you want people to go out and survey the field? That's where they're lagging. That's changing today.

Q: Let's look at the larger picture of why we had such a major program in India. You were in the Program Office, so you were writing the strategic plans.

PODOL: Actually, I don't know that there was such a thing at that time. In fact, this was the time we set up the first Evaluation Officer positions. We didn't have that either. Why were we in India? Because India was of political importance. I'd come there just after the border war they had with China, so this increased our AID efforts there. We were trying to move India over to the

Western side from their generally neutral position, and sometimes their anti-American position. So we had this enormous program - PL 480 as well as dollar programs.

Q: What was the strategy or the concept behind what you decided to do or not to do?

PODOL: This was here in the days when AID did everything and, you name the field, we were into it in India.

Q: Such as?

PODOL: Labor Unions.

Q: What other areas?

PODOL: We were into developing - this was one of our special efforts - an Indian university of technology. We were trying to develop six agriculture universities.

Q: You mentioned mining.

PODOL: Yes, and science. We were developing curriculum for high school science programs. The National Science Foundation was involved in training teachers. You did much of it in India. You brought people out because the payoff was so much greater.

Q: You were heavily in the macroeconomic aspect of it.

PODOL: Oh, yes. And trying to get India to adopt certain macroeconomic policies.

Q: Were you involved in those discussions?

PODOL: No. This was John Lewis, the Mission Director. This was his field. Getting India to devalue, for example. Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister and she wasn't exactly pro-American in any shape or form, so it was difficult to work with her.

Q: What kind of program were you trying to cover or promote? What did you think were important?

PODOL: We had a major export promotion project, too. My interest personally was in institution building. The Indians are very good at setting up organizations. If you go to India, you will find a society or an organization for every subject imaginable and they function. So, to get the Indians to organize, to set up institutions, was a norm in that country. Also, the Indian university system, unlike other developing countries, was close to 100 years old. So you had second or third generation people who had graduated from a British-style university, that kind of a background. So you had a tremendous pool of basic manpower. Participant training and institutions were, I think, the best thing we could do. Our influence over Indian macroeconomic policy was very limited. That was an interference in their sovereignty. We had a Participant Training Branch that was part of the Program Office, with two Americans and 12 Indians in it. We published a

monthly journal that was distributed all over the country. We held return participant seminars and surprised everybody. We'd have a return participant seminar with an industrial topic and get 75 or 80 people in attendance.

Q: Do you remember any figures about how many participants you had?

PODOL: I don't.

Q: But it was very large?

PODOL: Very large. The two most successful institutions - and I was back in India in '92 and '93 and they functioned - we developed and trained the staff of one of the Indian Institutes of Technology. They had set these up in different parts of the country. It's now the leading MIT of India. A major program was trying to establish agriculture universities. Now you got into a real political hassle. India has a federal system, as does the United States. When you talk about agriculture universities, they are state institutions. The states had an Agriculture Extension Service and an Agriculture Research Service. As you set up a university on an American model, Extension Research would go to that university and out of the hands of your traditional civil servants. So you ran into enormous resistance in trying to organize agriculture through the agriculture university. In some states, it worked very well and, in others, it never got much off the ground because of the resistance.

Q: What were the specifics? You mean bringing the three elements together?

PODOL: Bringing education and extension and research together in one institution or organization, merging them under the university, as we do in the United States.

Q: Where did this work?

PODOL: It worked best in the Punjab. Why, and I think this is important, the Punjab in the '60s was very unsettled and refugee-centered. In the 1947 partition of India, the Muslims who had lived in the Punjab picked themselves up and went to Pakistan. The Sikhs that were living across the new border, in what was now Pakistan, came into India's Punjab. So, you had a refugee type situation, which in effect upset the stability of the old system, the old way of thinking, and which made people, in my mind, very much more receptive to change. I've seen this elsewhere also. So, it worked very well in the Punjab.

Q: Were there other places it worked?

PODOL: It worked moderately well in other places, too, in India. Punjab was the ideal situation. They did excellent research, which was put in the farmer's fields and used.

Q: What did you feel about the effectiveness of the university program in general?

PODOL: I thought it was very effective. If you look at what's happened in the last 30 years, India is now self-sufficient in food grains.

Q: Do you attribute that in large measure to the university program?

PODOL: Well, how can you say? But they did have a significant impact on it, but there are a lot of factors that geared up - there were a lot of other things that were done, too.

Q: Do you remember how many universities you were working with?

PODOL: I think we tried five or six. The Punjab, when I left, was the one that was successful further on. Some of the others are still in existence and are working, but not at as high a level of effectiveness.

Q: What other institutions were you associated with? Science and Technology-

PODOL: Those are the two that stand out.

Q: Were there others in other fields?

PODOL: We worked in the labor movement.

Q: What about Public Administration, your specialty? Were there any programs in that area?

PODOL: We had a Public Administration Advisor. We were working with the Public Administration Institute, but I can't really recall any significant results.

Q: What other aspects of the program stand out in your mind? You talked about the problem of institutional development as being your interest. What were you trying to do? How do you view that subject in that context?

PODOL: In the first year, I was trying to learn the job, so it took me a while to settle in on this. My interest is in what I just mentioned: trying to see that we could have the resources to do the research program and the Indian Institute of Technology program. By 1968, the cutbacks in personnel had started. My function then was implementing "BALPA," to come up with a new plan, a staffing pattern for the Mission, based on the cutbacks that were required. I think we had something like 125 direct hire and I don't know how many contract people. The other unique element was local currency. Because of the PL 480 program, which I'll get to in a minute, we had unlimited local currency to use in our program. My counterpart in the Ministry of Finance would go to the Parliament and say, "This is American money, so we can't deny it to them." We would tell Washington, "This is Government of India money, so they can do as they wish." It worked out very well. In fact, in dollar terms, we had more Indian rupees than we did dollars to carry out our Technical Assistance Program. We could do all kinds of studies, hire competent Indian personnel because of these rupees. The Mission Director at the time asked me, "How many Indians are we paying the salary for?" When I told him, he said, "Bury it." There were hundreds, including contract people. All our contractors had Indian staffs. One thing that I didn't mention was that family planning was one of our largest programs. This was the time when it was just getting started, family planning.

Q: Was it making an impact at that time?

PODOL: Yes, it was just beginning to do so. We got into the usual arguments. All you had to do was distribute contraceptives. No, you had a social problem and you had to work on the social side of changing attitudes. We had that big debate going on with Washington.

Q: What was the Indian reaction to all this debate? What was their view?

PODOL: They thought, given the Indian way of thinking, that it was a social problem, which it was. How do you get people to limit their family size? And Washington was pushing all their colored condoms. The big Indian program was the vasectomies in railroad stations.

Q: Were we involved in that?

PODOL: No. We weren't involved-

Q: Not even with the local currency?

PODOL: Well, our local currency was going everywhere, so, indirectly, I suppose we were.

Q: Also, India was the pioneer in the whole community development area. Was any of that going on while you were there?

PODOL: No.

Q: It had come to an end?

PODOL: Right.

Q: Do you have any recollection of the results of that effort or why it collapsed?

PODOL: Not any strong ones. People felt it was a failure. I don't recall why they felt it had failed.

Q: But we were not involved in anything like that?

PODOL: No, not at that time. In the villages, you had a power structure that made change very difficult. The caste system relegated large numbers of villagers to serve in menial activities. Back on PL 480, we were generating the bulk of these rupees through imports of wheat, primarily, because India was deficient and had back to back droughts in, I think, '64-'65. So, we might bring in \$300-400 million in grain. At one time, we owned a very substantial portion of the Indian rupee, at least on paper. We gave them back eventually. The other program was PL 480 Title II. We had the largest Title II program anywhere - I don't know about Vietnam. We were feeding, at one time, over 20 million Indians under Title II, all being carried out under organizations like CARE. I remember two people coming out from OMB and saying, "How can you do this? We

can't afford to do this. We're going to get out of this activity." Of course, we never did. We still have a Title II program in India.

Q: This was for schoolchildren mostly?

PODOL: You name it, but, yes, there were more in school feeding than anything else, but you name it. It was effective. We were feeding 20 million people. Not all of them were needy. I remember going into one industrial conclave and we were feeding the families of the workers. These were people fully employed. These weren't the poor. With 20 million people to feed.

Q: Do you know how much the budget was for this?

PODOL: No, I don't remember the dollar figures.

Q: Why was it so hard to get out of?

PODOL: Politics, both on the U.S. and the Indian side. If we got out, the Indians would think we were abandoning them. And then the power of the voluntary agencies, lobbying back here for continuation of their programs.

Q: This was your first experience with Program Office work? What was your experience doing that kind of work, compared to being an expert on public administration?

PODOL: Let's say I really liked both but from a different standpoint. Being a field person working with people 100 percent, that was great. Great experience, you made a lot of friends, had a lot of freedom to do what you wanted to do, if you had the right boss. That was great. You could see things happening. You could see that you had accomplished something. When you move into Mission management, you're one step removed and you can't say that you've done it. You could step back and look at the larger picture of what you're doing and see a total program and how it's impacting and maybe say that you've had some influence on that total program and the direction in which it's going. And I liked management.

Q: Is that a big step, I guess?

PODOL: We had, I think, three or four Americans and a dozen or so Indians.

Q: How have you thought of them as staff?

PODOL: Excellent. They provided all the number crunching. They did an excellent job. I was back there in '93 and '94 and one former employee of mine was still working for the AID Mission as the Budget Officer. They're good, really good. This is the kind of thing they really do well.

Q: At that time, you say, we could do almost anything. What was the development philosophy that you were getting out of the Washington guidance, or wasn't there any?

PODOL: I don't remember anything special.

Q: This was prior to the New Directions?

PODOL: Yes.

Q: But you don't recall any particular-

PODOL: No, this was still in the days when we recruited Mission Directors from outside. We had very powerful individuals in their own right, very respected. John Lewis had been on the Council of Economic Advisors, he'd written a book on Indian development. Who was going to challenge him? Nobody in Washington was going to challenge him.

Q: How did you find him to work for?

PODOL: He was fine, a fine person to work for.

Q: What was his particular passion or drive in terms of working in India, do you know at all?

PODOL: One, because of his background: macroeconomic policy. And second, working with the poor. He had a feel for both and he was interested in both.

Q: Could you elaborate on those two, what he was trying to do?

PODOL: With India, there were two issues. One was loosening up the restrictions on imports. The Indians were preaching self-sufficiency. So, one of the policy aims we had was to loosen up and try and get them to stop building inefficient industries that couldn't stand on their own feet, and allow imports, instead of import substitution, which was their policy. The other was the devaluation of the Indian rupee, which tied in with imports and exports.

Q: What was he trying to do?

PODOL: This is why he was supporting family planning programs, Title II programs, working with labor unions, and agriculture programs that would reach the small farmer. Most farms, they were small farms. So agriculture, because it was geared to the small farm, agriculture research-

Q: That went beyond university projects and-?

PODOL: In the states in which there was no university, we worked with the agriculture extension system and agriculture credit.

Q: But otherwise, you were working through the university?

PODOL: That was the thrust where the Mission was going, though it hadn't abandoned the old approach because the Indians hadn't abandoned it yet.

Q: You were working with extension services in each of these areas as well?

PODOL: Not in all the states, no. That was beyond our capability.

Q: Were there any particular regions of India, apart from the Punjab, where you thought things were working better?

PODOL: Maharashtra, the Western part of India.

Q: Were there factors that could explain that?

PODOL: No, I can't say that there were, except the sea coasts had been involved with foreign trade and foreigners for centuries--so much more exposed to outside ideas than Bihar and U.P.

Q: Okay. You were in India for two years?

PODOL: Until 1970 - April '67 until June 1970, three years.

Q: Let's move on from India. What was the next assignment?

HERBERT G. HAGERTY
Political Officer
New Delhi (1967-1970)

Herbert G. Hagerty was born in New Jersey in 1932. He graduated from Columbia University in 1954 and from the University of Pennsylvania with a MA in 1956 before joining the US Navy. After joining the Foreign Service, Hagerty served overseas in India, Norway, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In Washington DC, he served as the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs and as the Director of the Office of Intelligence Liaison. Hagerty was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Which is about lieutenant colonel? Did you have any idea after two years you were getting ready to go?

HAGERTY: FSR-4 was more the equivalent of major or lieutenant commander in the military. And yes, I was ready to go. Early in 1967, Carol asked me one day if I would like to go to the domestic politics job opening up soon in Delhi. She thought I would be the ideal person for it, and I agreed!

Q: Sounds great. How did your wife feel about this?

HAGERTY: She seemed excited about the opportunity it afforded me it, but her own transition to not having her own job and to Foreign Service life in India went badly. Sadly, our marriage broke up there a year later.

Q: In Washington?

HAGERTY: No, in New Delhi.

Q: Well, then you went out when?

HAGERTY: Went out in June '67, right in the middle of the Six-Day War in the Middle East.

Q: Okay, we're going to pick this up in 1967 when you're off to New Delhi as political officer. Great.

This is August 3, 2001. Herb, you were in India from '67 to when?

HAGERTY: Until June '70.

Q: Okay, let's talk a bit about what were sort of the India-American relations at the time you went out there in '67?

HAGERTY: Well, Mrs. Gandhi had just visited from Washington while I was Desk Officer. Lyndon Johnson was making an effort to have a decent relationship with India, but India was going through some difficult times. There had been monsoon failure a couple of years before resulting in serious food problems, which the PL480 program was helping meet. PL480 wheat going into Calcutta, for instance, was keeping Calcutta from draining the countryside of food. And India needed massive foreign assistance to support its ambitious development plans. The relationship we had with Pakistan, of course, was a factor in our limited relationship with India. I heard Carol Laise once muse that the U.S. relationship with India and Pakistan was like a man's relationship with a wife and a mistress: India, "the mistress," and Pakistan, "the wife."

Ambassador Bowles at the time had decided that his political officers didn't know enough economics and his economic officers didn't know enough politics, so he created two political-economic sections, one dealing with India's internal affairs and the with, India's external policies. He expected us to be able to talk about economics as well as our political work. We referred to them jokingly as "gynecology" and "dermatology wings." My responsibilities were for Indian domestic politics, as well as the internal politics of Indian-held Kashmir.

Q: Okay, before we move on to what you were seeing and working there, how did you view Bowles as an ambassador?

HAGERTY: He was well motivated with regard to India, but his vision of India was one that India kept failing to meet. He wanted India to be more open to free enterprise, less caught up in a socialistic planned economy, more focused on what he regarded as the real world, rather than

being blinded by Soviet largesse and continuing to be caught up in anti-imperialist struggles. At that stage of his career, however he was really without much influence in Washington. He had held a senior position in the Kennedy administration; he and FDR Junior had been instrumental in Kennedy's West Virginia primary victory. He expected more as a reward -- the UN job, for instance. When the jobs finally got passed out, he didn't get Secretary of State, and he didn't get the UN job, but he got the Deputy Secretary position under Rusk, and then found himself frequently out of the loop and isolated. When the ambassadorship to India opened again -- he had served in that position once before -- he decided that's where he wanted to go because he really didn't have any other place to go. But he didn't have much influence from there either.

Q: Well, let's talk about your job. I mean, both politically and economically, why don't we talk about the economics first. How much of a planned economy was it and how was it producing?

HAGERTY: Well, the conventional wisdom at the time may have proven to be correct, which is that the Indian planners knew where they had been, and where they wanted to go. But their problem was that between where they had been and where they wanted to go was the space of from five to ten years during which they never quite knew where they were. So the planning process would sometimes go askew. They would have resources aimed at a particular target, but their record-keeping, their database was such that they could end up, for instance, in some years having a glut of engineers having started out on the assumption that they could never have too many engineers. But at that stages, they couldn't get the resources shifted in time, and the real cost to produce a widget was never quite understood in the State sector. All of the problems of the Soviet economy (less the authoritarian style) were present in this kind of economy where a market place didn't establish what you had to pay and what it cost you to produce. Nonetheless, with the help of foreign assistance, they were doing remarkable things;

Q: Well, were you observing again on the economic side, was there appreciation among the economic movers and shakers that the Soviet economy really stunk. I mean no doubt about I. Outside of producing military weapons, the USSR just wasn't delivering to its people. I mean did they as they were looking at what they were doing, did they really have a cold objective eye on what was happening in these other countries' economies?

HAGERTY: You know, I think so, but I also had the feeling that the Indians were locked into their suspicion of free market forces. It had been free market forces as far as they were concerned that had driven the period of imperialism that imposed Westerner rule on them and so forth. It was Nehru's perception that the whole industrial revolution, which India was in the process of attempting for itself, had resulted in a squeeze of the lower classes in the West while resources were being mobilized. India couldn't afford that and have a democratic government as well, so the only way to deal with it was to do it with a planned economy.

Q: The politics of the thing. Can you give sort of a broad-brush treatment of how you saw Indian politics in '67 to '70 period?

HAGERTY: Well, these were Mrs. Gandhi's first years in power. She had come to power and then won an election in which she really lost her large parliamentary majority, so she headed essentially a minority government dependent on certain independents and on occasional

temporary alliances across the party lines. So, her efforts to consolidate her power were badly undermined by the fact that she hadn't done well in the elections. It was the first time that the Congress Party had lost its overwhelming majority in the Parliament. In India's multi-national system, a plurality of the vote usually delivered a seat in the Lok Sabha. Congress had always pulled 42% or 43% of the popular vote, and in that kind of a shootout, that guaranteed the seat. But in '67, there was much more cooperation among the opposition parties to put up the strongest candidate; the result was that in many instances, the vote for the Congress Party candidate was not large enough to take the seat. The party was also weakened because of Mrs. Gandhi's own failures as a domestic politician to keep the party a vital force in national affairs.

Q: How at this point did you see Mrs. Gandhi as an Indian politician, not on the international scene, but in India?

HAGERTY: She was a crafty, single-minded politician. But, she effectively destroyed the party she had inherited from her father and from his generation her failure to keep the Congress Party itself revitalized within. Her often high-handed activities eventually cost her power, and then eventually cost even more – her life. The period known as “The Emergency,” which followed her conviction of electoral irregularities and eventual suspension of democracy for partisan advantage, resulted in a brief period of totalitarian government in India.

Q: Well, did you see her as someone who really didn't have much of a common touch, sort of the daughter of a high class family who lived in sort of an imperial cocoon or something of this nature?

HAGERTY: Not quite, not quite, because she was cutthroat in her politics. For instance, she was chosen by a group of senior party elders who were referred to as “the syndicate” and included four major figures in the party, each strong regional bases, south, west, east and north. They assumed that she would be malleable. In the end, by playing them off against each other, she undercut each one of them, not denying them their power bases, but reducing their influence at the center. In the process, she suspended intra-party elections, locking in the then-party leaders but denying access to a younger generation for what became years.

It was an interesting time to be there because my job was following parliament and national politics. I was in the visitor's gallery for Question Hour almost every day when it was in session. I wrote about the parliament and talked incessantly with MPs. I used to describe my job as a reasonably well-paid gossip. I would very often begin the day by having have tea with two or three MPs before parliament convened at 11 A.M. They were great talkers. My predecessors in the job had established a pattern of this kind of working level contact with MPs, and I fit right into their gossip network. I knew what was going on well enough that I could be a good sounding board for them, as they would talk to me about domestic politics. I was discreet, so I didn't reveal what “A” told me to “B,” respecting their confidences. Then I traded gossip with the parliamentary correspondents of the Delhi press, pooling info with them about the political situation.

Q: You know, how would you describe the dynamics of parliament during this period of time?

HAGERTY: Well, even with the vast majority shattered, in the parliamentary system, everything depends upon the “whip,” that is, governing depends upon the majority holding, so that for minority parties, particularly when they began to feel that some of their own strength, get close to being a force on the floor of parliament, they continued to be frustrated by their exclusion from the policy process. All they could do was raise ugly questions during “Question Hour,” occasionally launch protests, walk out of the parliament, protest outside, and get their members arrested.

Q: You say, Indira Gandhi destroyed the Congress Party. How did that come about?

HAGERTY: The Congress Party, like lots of parties in India and throughout the ‘Third World,’ was organized on the concept of democratic centralism. Each level of the party, from the bottom to the top, elected members of the next higher group in a pyramid shape. It cost ‘eight annas’ (half of one Rupee) to be a member and to be eligible to vote within the party for the next echelon in the party’s *pradesh* or state committee, and so forth up the line. Before Mrs. Gandhi’s ‘reign,’ intra-party elections were held regularly, each time rejuvenating its various echelons and enabling the party to keep in touch with political reality in India. But from the time Mrs. Gandhi came to power, the party stopped doing that. Intra-party elections stopped being held, and tended to atrophy with all the same face at the top and at all other levels. There was virtually no popular input from the district level up through to the All-India Congress Committee and its smaller, all-powerful, executive, the Congress Working Committee.

Q: Well, what was in her calculation in doing this?

HAGERTY: I never quite understood that except that she wanted to control the existing system. I think she didn’t trust her own ability to manage an evolving system in which she would have to deal infusions of with new blood. She had control of the people with whom she worked, and she had in fact destroyed the so-called “syndicate” of older party leaders who had put her in power and then had attempted to control her, essentially cutting them off at the knees, one after another -- S. K. Patil from Bombay, Atulya Ghosh from Calcutta, K. Kamaraj Nadar from Madras, and Sanjiva Reddy from Andhra, I knew them all. They remained as elder statesmen with regional power but with limited influence on national affairs, as she went her own way, taking the party with her. She was Nehru’s daughter, and India is a society in which even today, maharajas or others powerful families exercise a lot of influence. For instance, when I served later in Pakistan, the Maharaja of Baroda, whom I knew as a Member of the Indian Parliament, visited a spokesman and sponsor of the Indian cricket then touring Pakistan. At my house, my servants treated him as if he were the maharaja in “old” India, and most of them were born after ‘Partition.’ Nonetheless, they virtually prostrated themselves in his presence.

Indira Gandhi’s position as her father’s daughter (and only offspring) was part of her mystique. She was also ruthless in the way she played politics. She abided no innovation, and substantive policy was not her game. Rather, maneuver and manipulation were her game. Ambassador Bowles had no dialogue with her at all.

Q: While you were there during part of the, did Kissinger come out?

HAGERTY: Yes, I was the Embassy Control Officer for the Nixon visit in 1969, and Kissinger was along on that visit, not as Secretary of State but rather as NSC advisor. That was a monster visit. Nixon was coming from the splashdown of the lunar landing in the Pacific, stopping on the way in Thailand and Vietnam on the way to Delhi. He went on thereafter to a few hours in Lahore, Pakistan and a visit to Romania. The visit to Delhi lasted 23 hours. Five Boeings came in serially, three of them filled with journalists, one the backup plane, and one - Air Force One - with the first-term Nixon White House on board -- Erhlichman, Haldemann, you name them, plus two Assistant Secretaries of State, Joe Sisco and Marty Hillenbrand, plus a lot of other NSC people, Hal Saunders, and others. While Kissinger was going to participate in the main talks, of course, his interest beyond that was in meeting with former students. So, he avoided lots of the ceremonial parts of the visit.

Q: How did the Nixon visit go with Indira Gandhi?

HAGERTY: It went reasonably well. We didn't expect much from the visit, and I don't think Nixon expected much more than his hopes that he would draw bigger crowds than Eisenhower drew during his 1959 visit. At this point, former Senator Keating had become ambassador in India, a Nixon appointee, having lost his seat as senator from New York. The visit ended was essentially a *pro forma* stop, without much serious content.

An interesting sidelight on the visit: we'd had a difficult time as we were dealing with Indian protocol people getting Indian permission to use the Nixon Presidential limo, which was one of two leapfrogging from post to post while the president was traveling. The Indian side took umbrage, insisting that Nixon would be safe in the Indian President's Rolls Royce Silver Cloud. At my suggestion, our White House negotiator denied that security was our reason for preferring our own car. It was communications, i.e., the President's need to be in touch with US military forces around the world. Only his car would do for that. He then said the President could not have his own car, he would decline to stay as a guest at the Indian President's official residence.

That led them to refer the issue to Mrs. Gandhi. When they came back, they agreed to our request; the communications argument carried the day, they said. But later, via a Member of Parliament, I learned that when Indira Gandhi learned of our position, she simply said, "Okay, let him have his car. If he gets killed here, it's his car, not ours!"

Q: Did you find that the parliamentarians played much of a role in the thrust of India or not?

HAGERTY: Not really; individual MPs did play much of a role, and those in the opposition had virtually no influence. Indian Parliament, like the mother of Parliaments in London, doesn't have the kind of committees in which you have minority and majority members and so forth. There would be an *ad hoc* committee established to deal with a specific piece of legislation, but it was dominated by the Congress Party. And the Congress Party had usually been able to ram through everything the leadership wanted. There was very little effort to persuade, to do the kind of coalition stuff that George H. Bush has to do everyday on everything he wants to get through the US Congress. That just is not the Indian (or British) system. For the opposition parties, it was very frustrating thing; their leaders resorted demagoguery, creating uproars in parliament and pitching for headlines the next day to embarrass or criticize the government. And through it all,

the government majority just rolled on. During the 1100 AM “Question Hour,” ministers often answered members’ questions with a fair amount of information. The government rotated ministries to respond to questions on a daily basis, as in the British system. Certain subjects were up for certain days. And at noon, at the end of “Question Hour,” there would be a time – called “Zero Hour” in the local parlance -- for tabling special motions, before moving on to the day’s legislative agenda. “Zero Hour” was often tumultuous, as the opposition used it to call for setting aside time for special debates on subjects of interest aimed at embarrassing Government or influencing public opinion. Such debates, which the Speaker could grant or not grant, gave all of the players a sense of participating in this drama that went on and on and on and was widely reported in the newspapers and in the press and on the Indian TV. But, mostly, the Government steamrolled its way into its legislative agenda. With little effort given to coalition building or attempting in terms of attempting to produce national consensus.

Q: Well, what was in it for the people out of power?

HAGERTY: Well, all MPs had a public role to play. They had a sense of being important and were able to help constituents seeking access to Government; many of their living expenses were covered, including free postal services and Delhi housing at government expense. And they received a modest income. What you should understand also is that most of the people who were on opposition benches had, at one time or another, been part of the Congress Party -- other than the communists or right-wing Hindu nationalists, that is. Most of those in parties to the immediate left of the Congress Party – members of the several socialist parties and those representing regional parties -- had been in the Indian National Congress prior to Independence. Those socialists who left Congress found that Nehru in power wasn’t socialist enough for them. They felt that he’d sold out that side of his ideology for power. They had worn homespun *khadi* cloth and been politicians all their lives, and that’s what they saw as their “*karma*.”

While it was expensive to run for office, MP were in a position to hope to be ministers, in time, at the state or federal level, to live reasonably well until then, and – still only 20 years after independence had been attained -- to be part of the effort to create a new and proud nation. The bulk of the private sector required government permits to get anything done, and money could deliver permits. What was remarkable to me was that, yes, there was corruption, but its incidence was remarkably low considering the stakes. They were still operating in the pre-independence mode, but government had become a “*Permit Raj*.”

Q: Did we have any issues while we were trying to get votes you know I mean were we just reporting or were we saying it would be kind of nice if you voted on this bill or that bill?

HAGERTY: The Embassy did not lobby MP’s *per se* but counted on our ability to ensure that they were aware of our views and of the reasons for our policies. For instance, a member of the upper house whom I knew well was clearly being lobbied by foreign drug companies, with his foreign travel being paid by them because he was on the committee dealing with a patent reform bill that was before the Parliament. A very substantial part of the world’s pharmaceuticals are derived from natural products produced in India. I wouldn’t have urged him how to vote, but I certainly made sure he was aware of how important patents are to the US drug industry. In respect to this side of my job, my role was to explain U.S. policies, often in answer to their

questions. So I would explain why we were doing something, what its background was, and what our aims were. I could provide USIA books, excerpts from the Wireless File, and Unclassified USG publications; I could make arrangement for them to meet the Ambassador or other colleagues, and will as US officials and Congressman visiting India.

But the main point of my job was to stay on top of what the Indian Parliament and the Indian Government were doing and how the political system was operating. Many of them, of course, were aware that the person in my position could recommend politicians for so-called "Leader Grants" to the U.S. to visit and travel around the US; every year we'd send at least one and sometimes two parliamentarians on those grants. But that was 'peanuts.' The lower house had 538 members, upper house, 238. I may have come to know 60-70, from both houses, including a handful of lesser ministers but none of the full Ministers or Ministers of State (totaling another 60 or so), since they would be the Ambassador's preserve. I also knew and met with party and regional figures not in Parliament.

Q: How did you find the sort of dealing and conversing with Indians? Indians tend to, they're worse than we are at least in my opinion as far as being both moralistic and talking a lot?

HAGERTY: They're politicians, and I think Indian politicians are a bit different in their own turf. Yes, they are preachy when they get outside India, as preachy as our politicians can be. But on a one-to-one basis, when I'd call on them and spend 25 or 40 minutes over tea talking about the news of the day, they enjoyed talking. They especially liked talking to somebody who understood their system and who could understand their questions and feedback. And, as I have said, they often used me as a sounding board, since they rarely talked across party lines (and I did). I had an interesting kind of relationship with many of them and saw them often.

Q: Were you I think you'd have to be careful that you didn't overwhelm our India desk back in the States with too much information. I imagine you'd sort of have to.

HAGERTY: Yes, David Schneider, but an early boss of mine in the Foreign Service and later Ambassador to Bangladesh, had also done this job in Delhi several years ahead of me. His key word of advice was, "You have to know everything that is going on in Delhi, but Washington doesn't. It's up to you to distill and interpret it." And that's what I did, reporting by Telegram when timeliness warranted, otherwise by pouched Airgrams. These reports circulated among people in the Department and other Executive Branch agencies who were interested or specializing in India -- some more voraciously than others. For every telegram I wrote, I must have written ten airgrams. I also kept in touch with the India "desk" in Washington by pouched "Official-Informal" letters (long before the advent of 'Official-Informal' cables, secure phone links with Washington, and before e-mail.

Q: Was anybody else I'm talking about other embassies, the Soviets or the Brits doing this or were you pretty much alone?

HAGERTY: There were maybe six what I called "serious" missions in Delhi, that is, embassies keeping close tabs on Indian politics as we were doing. I traded information and political 'gossip' all the time with four of them, i.e., my British, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand

counterparts (even though the last two, from smaller embassies, were spread very thin, with more rank and wider areas of responsibility. Also occasionally the French, more often the Yugoslavs, who were very well plugged in Nonaligned matters and who were more than happy to be trading political gossip. To these I would add the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Soviets, but I had little opportunity do any trading with them. Representatives from these “serious” embassies were invited, with me, as “foreign guests” to periodic and well-publicized All-India Congress Committee meetings, held in various places in India. So I would go off to Jabalpur or Goa or someplace else in India for one of these gatherings where I’d spend a week on the edge of a large Congress Party gathering and trading impressions and information with my Commonwealth and Yugoslav counterparts. Usually there were Russians in attendance also, but we tended to ignore each other. My British counterpart, by the way, was much later to serve as HMG’s ambassador in Paris, then in Washington.

Q: While you were working on domestic politics did you get hit with, I mean we were going right out to Vietnam at that time.

HAGERTY: Oh sure. Whenever my colleagues and I talked with Indian officials, including MPs, we were called upon to defend US policies and actions in Vietnam and elsewhere. You may remember that it was during this period that India closed down our USIA libraries in various places in-country largely in response to US criticism of remarks by the Indian deputy foreign minister made on a visit to Hanoi. An interesting sidelight to this was that when we checked our files, we had virtually no documents signed by the Indian government ever authorizing us to establish those libraries; all we found was a report that Pandit Nehru “nodded” when informed by an earlier US Ambassador of our intent to establish these centers.

Q: Did you feel that you were in semi hostile territory, what was sort of your gut impression?

HAGERTY: No, I don’t think so. I always felt that Indians had a great deal of respect for the United States. In those early years of the Indian Republic, knowledge that the United States had supported Indian independence, even to the annoyance of His Majesty’s Government, was widely known among Indians with whom we were dealing. On the far left, there were those who were hostile to us, like with Communist Party MPs with whom I would never meet and who doubtless would not have welcomed my attention. But I knew who they were so that when they would demonstrate in front of the American embassy, I’d be the embassy officer who would be sent to greet them by name. I’d say, “Hello, Mr. Gupta, how are you? Do you have a petition for us? I’ll make sure that the petition goes to Washington so that the President is aware of it” -- that sort of thing. Sometimes they would appear a little embarrassed by my greeting, perhaps fearful that their colleagues would sense they had a prior relationship with me. So be it; their comfort was not my concern. But I didn’t feel there was much hate.

It was a golden time in lots of ways. The post-Kennedy period had sort of revolutionized a sense of the American image. We really thought we were out there on the front lines of the ‘Cold War’ and on the ‘war on poverty.’ The AID mission was huge, and we were part of a World Bank consortium providing billions to Indian development efforts. We had helped to sponsor the “green revolution” and were moving in other areas, such as public health and PL-480 food aid. We had more than 1,200 Peace Corps Volunteers in country; the largest single Peace Corps

program at the time, prompting Indians widely to refer to healthy chickens in India as 'Peace Corps chickens.' At the time, I used to remind Indians that while one out of every seven human beings was an Indian, one out of every six Peace Corps Volunteers was in India. It was an exciting and pleasant place to live and work.

Q: What about down south, in Kerala?

HAGERTY: Yes, Kerala had elected a communist government in 1959, as I said before, and Indira Gandhi, as President of the Congress Party, had persuaded her father to oust that government when demonstrations threatened its hold on government, exercising a provision in the 1950 Indian constitution to impose six-month periods of central rule and Parliamentary control of its finances in such circumstances. But years later, when Kerala again elected the Communist Party to power, Communist rule there it became the norm; the state has communist governments to this day.

Q: They were just another one of the opposition.

HAGERTY: Yes, they were just another of the many opposition parties at the center. In fact, of the opposition parties, that party -- the more militant, originally Maoist-influenced Communist Party Marxist (CPM) -- has for a long time governed in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, as I have said before. Many have suggested they are the best administered governments at the state level in India. And as you know, the Communist Party had earlier split; with the other wing under more direct Moscow influence. But even they were hardly Bolsheviks. The terminology, as indeed their platform, was outdated.

Q: Were you looking at the, I don't know what you want to call them, the divisions or do you want to call them tribal, caste, and you know, I mean the whole hodge podge of mixed up India? Were these?

HAGERTY: Well, these identities help to explain the workings of Indian politics in the way that ethnic and racial considerations play out in urban politics in much of the US. You know, the electoral tickets are balanced in India in caste, ethnic, and sub-regional terms. One additional factor is that the Indian constitution reserves legislative seats for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, former "Untouchables," who made up the 23% of Indian society at the very bottom of the social scale. That percentage applies also to places reserved for university admissions, government jobs, etc. But because twenty-three percent of the Lower House of parliament is also reserved for them, it also meant -- and continues to mean -- that these lower caste office-seekers run against each other for those reserved seats; they would be unlikely to win any non-reserved seats. This has kept the lower castes divided politically. And when elected, then they have been often been up for 'grabs,' suborned, bribed, and that sort of thing, for their votes in Parliament and in state assemblies.

Q: We had the one visit of Nixon and that was about it, or did you have a lot of congressional delegations and that sort of thing?

HAGERTY: Not a lot, but some. Senator Javits and Foreign Relations Committee people came, I remember. I looked after them. There were others more concerned about the aid program and economic matters (of policy), but I didn't get to deal with them. Ambassador Bowles, a former Congressman, and later Ambassador Keating, a former senator, attempted – often in vain -- to encourage more Congressional visitors.

Q: You were dealing obviously with domestic politics, but was there a war going on over the cables between our embassy, I guess, in Karachi in those days, I mean between our embassy in Pakistan and our embassy in India?

HAGERTY: Yes, well, the U.S. Ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad inevitably were in competition with each other for Washington's attention. Later, when I was the Pakistan Director in Washington, I was at the other end of that, and I'll talk about that at another time perhaps. But each embassy, in its advocacy of policy options tended to look at them from the prism of that originating capital, recommending what the Ambassador perceived was the best thing for US relations with that country. Also, you should never forget that ambassadors are also interested in their own records of achievement during their time as chief of mission, so that they were looking out for that, too. It's clear when countries are as antithetical as India and Pakistan can be, the perceptions of the two embassies are going to be almost as different as the perceived interests of those two countries. That requires the sorting out in Washington of what is in the U.S. interest in the region, whether or not it is in the US best interests with one or the other country. I should also add that while Embassy and Consulate political reporting doubtless influenced Washington perceptions, the Embassy's advocacy on policy was essentially separate from our day-to-day reporting of Indian political and economic affairs.

Q: I don't know if it really pertains, again I speak of somebody whose been off to one side on this, but in a way I always had the feeling that the Republicans were particularly interested in and more amenable to Pakistan and the often military government whereas the Democrats got more entranced with India. I mean, did you have any feeling of that?

HAGERTY: I think there had been a popular impression that Democratic administrations in Washington tended to favor India, and Republican administrations, Pakistan. But I think that folklore died. The Roosevelts were vocal advocates of Indian independence, but I don't see that a consistent partisan favoritism has existed at all in recent years. During the early Cold War years, for instance, John Foster Dulles and his alliances (with Pakistan among others) were looked upon with scorn in India, but Eisenhower wasn't. He had a fantastic visit to India in 1959, was well thought of and in many ways was highly revered. When Kennedy came into office, the perception was that relations with India would get a boost, and then John Galbraith made sure that lots of people believed that because he was involved, too. But Johnson seemed to have a soft spot for Pakistan, in part the result of his personal relationship with Ayub Khan. But this alleged partisan favoritism was riddled with so many exceptions that over time it didn't seem to hold water.

Q: Okay, well, then why don't we move on.

HAGERTY: I can remember the effect in India, the assassination of Martin Luther King.

Q: Oh, yes, well, talk about that.

HAGERTY: That was quite moving. It was understood in India that King quoted so much from Mohandas Gandhi and organized nonviolent protest. I think Indians did feel that there was a loss in his death. I looked after Mrs. King when she came out to accept the Nehru Medal, an annual award that the Indian government introduced after King's death for an outstanding foreigner I think she was rather remarkably moved, and this was some months later, at the outpouring of sorrow and affection in India at the time.

Q: Well, this does bring up a subject. You were there at the height of our, the racial situation in the United States.

HAGERTY: The civil rights movement, yes.

Q: Yes, the whole civil rights movement. How did that play in India because I mean, for one, they probably have a worse caste system than we have in some ways, but, two, would they identify with people of color? I mean, how did this work in the circles that you moved in?

HAGERTY: Yes, they did identify with people of color and kept from exercising their rights in any country abroad. As newly independent, they had quite explicitly drawn on constitutional provisions in effect in other liberal democracies, including our own, in drafting their own 1950 constitution. For instance, following Gandhi's example, they had declared "Untouchability" unenforceable. No doubt that discrimination based on caste still enjoys the force of tradition in small rural villages where there are separate for those with caste and those without. Ordinary people in those areas have to live and survive, and so it exists even though no court or police force can enforce it. But with world news available by radio everywhere in India, informed Indians were sympathetic that the Administration and the US courts were trying to do the right thing. I think that went a long way. (The anti-US "left" was something else!)

India has a federal system, in some ways similar to ours. State leaders do things that the national government doesn't necessarily approve of, and we're seeing more and more of that as time goes by. Indians understood something about how federal systems operate, even if there are differences between ours and theirs in terms of residual powers. In India, all powers unspecified in the constitution reside with the central government, unlike our system where the reverse is true.

Q: A question that I forgot to ask. In the parliamentary system, was there an upper house?

HAGERTY: Yes. The upper house (Rajya Sabha or House of the States) is elected the way the US Senate was elected before 1912, that is by the state legislatures for six-year terms, with one-third expiring every two years -- like the US Senate. Thus the upper house -- with about 240 members -- reflects the composite political balance of the state assemblies. In the days when the Congress Party had majorities in every state assembly, the upper house also reflected that Congress dominance. Increasingly in the '60s and into the '70s, as more and more state legislatures have come under the control of opposition or purely regional parties, this has changed the balance in the Rajya Sabha. Today, nearly all Indian states have coalition

governments, and the Congress Party – even in control of some states – has lost its national dominance. The national government in Delhi is now a coalition of seventeen essentially regional parties represented in the lower house (Lok Sabha, or House of the People), the upper house, and in those assemblies.

Q: Did you find that you spent much time with members of the upper house?

HAGERTY: Yes and no. Upper house members often gave me a different perspective. There were times when their party positions made them a better source of information, more authentic. They lived a more relaxed pace, since all real power was vested in the lower house. I had good contacts in both houses, but I spent most of my time with the more numerous members of the Lok Sabha, a number of them I came to regard as friends. I got on very well with Atal Behari Vajpayee, then an opposition leader but now prime minister. In 1971, when he was visiting Copenhagen, he arranged to come to Oslo, where I was then posted, and to have lunch with me. And I saw him in later years whenever I visited India from Pakistan.

LEONARD H. ROBINSON, JR.
Associate Peace Corps Director
Bangalore (1967-1970)

Mr. Robinson was born and raised in North Carolina. After graduating from Ohio State University he joined the Peace Corp, serving first in India and later at Peace Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C. His varied career took him to Capitol Hill, to AID and to the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Mr. Robinson was also active in a number of private organizations having to do with African Development and with Population Programs. Mr. Robinson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

ROBINSON: I was in Washington during spring break of 1967. In March of 1967 I had come to Washington to see some friends, in particular a white guy named Fred Madison who worked for the Peace Corps in Washington and his wife. Fred had come to India two or three times on Peace Corps assignments, and he was a really neat, cool guy. He loved Jazz, and he, Artie and I developed a great relationship. He invited me to come down and spend spring break with him. One very cold day in March 1967 he said “Let’s go down to Peace Corps headquarters. I want to introduce you to some people.” He wanted to introduce me to Sepoy Lewis, the founder of Africare, who was a legend in the Peace Corps at the time. I was 22 years old. I turned 23 that April. So he took me down to the Peace Corps office. I ran into all these people whom I had known in India in the Peace Corps who were now officers in the Peace Corps in Washington. “Great to see you, Lenny. We need people like you to go back overseas and be associate directors or directors.” I said, “I am in graduate school.” But then it came to me: if I were selected to go back overseas, Peace Corps was an automatic deferment during your tour in the agency. It did not mean that you could not be drafted after you got back from your experience either as a volunteer or a Peace Corps professional. But it would provide a deferment during your service with the Peace Corps; it would have bought me some time. I did a quick calculation. If I

took a position as a Peace Corps professional, by the time I got back -- it would have been a three or four year assignment- I would be 26. Once you turned 26, you were no longer of draftable age. I couldn't be conscripted. So I went through a series of interviews that week. I had opportunities to go to South Korea, Micronesia, or back to India as an associate Peace Corps director. I said, "This is pretty neat."

In those days, the final staffing decisions were made by the deputy Peace Corps director. At this time, the deputy Peace Corps director was a guy named Brent Ashenbrenner who had been my director in India when I was a volunteer. He and I worked closely together, particularly during the time when I was trying to get President Johnson to shift special PL-480 food grains to maize, in order to help me out with my poultry farming demonstrations. Brent and I had become close. I had established a rapport with him.

I walked into his office Friday evening at 6:30 in March of 1967. Brent said, "Lenny, it is good to see you again. You have gone through this Washington headquarters here and everybody wants you. But the decision I have made is that if you want to come back to the Peace Corps, we want you to go back to India." It was a miracle. A dream come true.

Q: Back in the brier patch in a way.

ROBINSON: It did put me back in the brier patch, but I was going back as a Peace Corps professional. More importantly it was my ticket out of Vietnam. Yes, I had to go back to SUNY Binghamton and negotiate a leave of absence from graduate school. What I did there was to say, "Look, I am going to work on my master's thesis," because it was on an aspect of the Indian caste system. So the India assignment fit very neatly. SUNY Binghamton gave me a three or four year leave of absence.

So I accepted the Peace Corps position as associate program director for India, for South India. I was 23 years old at the time. I went back to SUNY Binghamton, negotiated the leave of absence and my academic work towards my credentials. I came back to Washington in June, 1967 to undergo Peace Corps training for a three month period before going to India. That is how I dealt with Vietnam and the draft situation. As I said, it changed my life.

Q: You are off to India. Tell us about the program in 1967?

ROBINSON: The Peace Corps had been growing exponentially by this point. There were a little over a thousand Peace Corps volunteers in India in 1967 and it peaked to about 2500 during my time. I had 600 volunteers in my region alone.

Q: Were you married in 1967?

ROBINSON: I was married on October 31, 1966, to someone I had known in college. What we both hadn't realized was that I had changed -- dramatically. In retrospect, I think my marriage in part was due to a feeling of being lonely and distanced from American society. When I got back from India, I mentioned that it was difficult for me to speak English without thinking about what I wanted to say because I had become so immersed in India and its language style. I felt out of

touch socially. My wife-to-be was someone that I could communicate with, that I could relate to. I think that I unconsciously clung to her for emotional and psychological support during this difficult period of re-adjustment. She was a familiar person, a familiar voice. We married in October of 1966. But shortly after we got to Binghamton it became very clear that I wasn't the same Leonard Robinson that either of us had known before my stay in India. We had difficulty relating to each other and so that marriage ended rather quickly.

Q: When you returned to India, how were U.S.-India relations?

ROBINSON: As I said earlier, during the time of the Johnson administration, there were great ideological struggles between India and the United States, primarily because of the Cold War. "Games" were being played between India, the Soviet Union and the United States. For example the PL-480 "food for peace" program was highly controversial, despite the fact that there had been a drought-created famine in India in 1965-1966. Indira Gandhi was the prime minister. She and Lyndon Johnson had their issues. So there were some degrees of tension between the United States and India. The Peace Corps was more often than not criticized by various elements in Indian society as being a spy network for the CIA. We were not welcomed in all strata of Indian society. Yet at the same time the Peace Corps was growing in India by leaps and bounds. In fact, in retrospect, I think we got too big.

Q: Was there an attempt at Peace Corps headquarters before you went out to India, to keep a distance from the State Department? Did you talk to people at the State Department or was this sort of a no-no?

ROBINSON: There was a veil that came from the Foreign Service side, not from the Peace Corps side. We had been oriented by the Peace Corps -- first during my training as a volunteer, and then a staff member when I went back the second time -- to believe that the Peace Corps was different. The Peace Corps openly, consciously embraced the people in the society where we worked. It was a people-to-people program. The Foreign Service was portrayed as elitist, standoffish. They lived in their own enclaves and compounds behind mud walls, so to speak. Very few of them could speak the native language. So there were cultural and stylistic difference in mode of operation between the Foreign Service officers and the Peace Corps members.

AID officials or AID *per se* were viewed differently. We looked upon the embassy as being THE Foreign Service. AID officials were American Government officials working on an international basis. There was an affinity as well, because AID officials cast themselves as being expert technicians as opposed to new Peace Corps volunteers who were lay people with three months' training. We really didn't know that much. Peace Corps volunteers in India and elsewhere around the world felt a little like second class American citizens. In India, Chester Bowles was just leaving as ambassador when I got there to be followed by Kenneth Galbraith.

Chester Bowles and his wife, Sally Bowles, broke the mold. They were infinitely famous. They were famous in New Delhi and India because they reached out to the Indian community. Sally was responsible for helping sweeper women. These were people who kept the streets and alleyways clean all around Indian communities. They were the lower caste people. Because of being bent over all their lives sweeping, a lot of them developed serious chronic back problems.

Sally introduced the long handled broom in and around Old Delhi, and got these women to change from the small broom that forced them to stoop over to a “stand up” broom. That was a small but very significant innovation on her part. She wore a Sari.

Chester Bowles encouraged Foreign Service officers to learn Hindi or Urdu, and to reach out to the community after working hours. “Get out from behind the desk; get out from the embassy compound. “ Chester Bowles refused to live in the official ambassador’s residence in New Delhi, but he did give permission to the Peace Corps to allow volunteers to use the swimming pool which was behind the ambassador’s residence. When I went to New Delhi, that was one of the places where we could go and have some fun. So we could use the ambassador’s pool, but the commissary and its swimming pool were off limits.

During my first tour, there was an American consulate in Calcutta. Both in Delhi and sometimes in Calcutta there were movies shown one or twice a week, I think, at one of the U.S. government buildings. In Delhi, it might have been at the old USIS (United States Information Service Agency) building. But the movies were only for Foreign Service officers and their wives and dependents. If you had your identification card as a Peace Corps volunteer, you could also attend. We took advantage of that. That was the one little perks that we did have. Otherwise we had to go see Hindi movies. Sometimes they had subtitles, but most of the time they did not. It that was a great way to learn Hindi.

By the time I returned in July of 1967, the relationship between the Peace Corps and the embassy had evolved. It was a more mature relationship. There was interaction at the professional level between Peace Corps directors, associate Peace Corps directors and their families and Foreign Service officers. From the ambassador on down, there was interaction. By policy, Peace Corps still did not use the commissary. We were encouraged to purchase on the local market. You could order, in the case of India, goods from Singapore, or from Kuala Lumpur. A lot of us did that.

Initially I was based in Bangalore. Bangalore was the regional headquarters for the Peace Corps in southern India. After a year we got so big that I moved my office to Madras to really concentrate on the states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. We had an American consulate in Madras. I developed a very close relationship with all of the officials from the consul general on down as well as with the Public Affairs officer (PAO).

Q: The Public Affairs officer was the head of the USIA at the post.

ROBINSON: That’s right. In Madras, I played tennis with consulate officials. We socialized a lot with American officials and businessmen, such as the Bank of America people who had an office in Madras. We socialized with Indians; we socialized with everybody.

I had a membership in the Madras Club which was an old British club, that had admitted Americans over the years. My membership in the Madras Club was sponsored by two consulate officials. I remember one of them in particular whose name was Bill Keough. Bill Keough was the executive officer of the American consulate. He and his family were extremely nice to me. I think he may have even helped me identify the house and office when we set up our Peace Corps

operation in Madras. The American consulate was in a brand new consulate building, built in a prominent spot right in downtown Madras -- Mount Road to be exact. One afternoon, I think this was probably mid-1968, I was having a conversation one afternoon with the political officer who was my tennis partner. We were sitting in his office. I remember very vividly that he had his blinds almost closed, but there were rays of sun coming in. Out of the blue he said, "You know, Lenny, we could use people like you." I did a double take, and I leaned forward in my seat and I said,

"What did you say?"

"We could use people like you. You know I work for the agency, and we could really use people like you." In fact, that is when I learned that he was the station chief for the consulate in Madras. Even though I had some sense of the agency while I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Bahawalpur, I had not focused on learning about intelligence gathering when I was a Peace Corps director in south India. So this exchange shocked me for several reasons. For one, the Peace Corps, as written in its basic authorizing legislation, could not have any contact whatsoever with intelligence organizations. There was a strict rule about that. As I mentioned earlier, there was a newspaper that was published every two weeks in Bombay which incessantly criticized and castigated the Peace Corps for being a spy ring of the United States government. I did know that our intelligence officers had an Indian counterpart who shadowed them. They knew who were our intelligence officers and we knew who they were. That was by agreement.

So I became a little concerned because he was a tennis partner of mine, and we spent a lot of time together during my first year and a half in Madras. I was concerned that the Indian intelligence apparatus might come to the conclusion that Leonard Robinson, the Peace Corps director, was passing on information to somebody inside the consulate general's office in Madras. So I stood up and said, "I think you have compromised me, and I won't have anything else to do with you. I did not know that you were who you now have revealed that you are." So with that I walked out of his office, and I never saw him socially again. I didn't play tennis with him. I wanted the break to be abrupt because I did not want whoever might be watching from the other side to continue to have an impression that I was in bed with American intelligence agents.

That did not stop me, however, from socializing with other officers from the consulate. We had very good relationships. The Peace Corps had an excellent relationship in south India not only with the American Consulate but also with all Indian government officials. I also had a very good relationship with the PAO, which I developed over the 1968-1970 period. He is the one who encouraged me to take the Foreign Service exam and to join the Foreign Service.

During this period, Peace Corps executives did carry an official passport, and were classified as Foreign Service Reserve officers. So I already had one foot in the Foreign Service. One day, the PAO said, "We would really like to have someone of your talent working for the United States Information Agency." When I returned to Washington in 1970 to be the Peace Corps director for minority recruiting under Joseph Blatchford, who was the Peace Corps director then, I had the option at the time of joining USIS because of the PAO in Madras, and I'll get to that in a few moments.

Q: I would like to talk a little bit about what the Peace Corps was doing in southern India. What were the activities and where did you fit in?

ROBINSON: The Peace Corps in south India was innovative. It was dynamic. We had a group of professionals who were committed to the Peace Corps. Paul Zimmerman was the regional director. Paul Zimmerman was really my first professional supervisor. He and his wife, Margo, were terrific. He was very innovative. His managerial style was good. I think he was an attorney by training. On the staff, we had a guy named Tom Carter who is now with AID, and Tom Ariens, John Croney and myself. As I said, Paul Zimmerman was the regional director and he had four associate directors. They were experts in one field or another. Our Peace Corps volunteers were involved in community development and intensive agricultural production, particularly in rice and maize cultivation. We had volunteers in poultry farming, which was my field of expertise. We had Peace Corps volunteers who were working in commercial markets, particularly in "supermarkets". That was one of the projects that Tom and I supervised. We had Peace Corps volunteers working in well construction which was very important in terms of having sufficient water for human consumption as well as for irrigation of agricultural fields. Southern India produced a lot of food for the entire subcontinent.

We had Peace Corps volunteers in teacher training. We had Peace Corps volunteers who were teaching English as a second language.

I said that the Peace Corps in south India was innovative; I think we were probably the first program anywhere in the world to conduct a training program totally in country. Usually Peace Corps volunteers were trained somewhere in and around the United States or in Hawaii and then brought to the country. I first proposed this to a Peace Corps meeting for all Peace Corps directors when it was held in New Delhi, "You know, we need to establish a Peace Corps training capability in India, because India is a tough country to understand from far away." India was culturally so different from the United States. A lot of our volunteers had a tough time adjusting. We also decided to assign volunteers to towns and villages in clusters, so that they could learn the language. We had come to recognize that when we had more than two volunteers stationed in the town, or in close same proximity, they tended to gravitate towards each other and they wouldn't learn the local language. They didn't feel comfortable integrating into local society.

So we set up a Peace Corps training program whereby trainees were brought to south India. They had been trained in a large city like Madras or Bangalore in groups. But we changed that so that rather than staying in a hotel, we assigned each trainee to an Indian family for the entire three month training period. We believed that with an immediate immersion through living with an Indian family right from the beginning, the volunteers would get through the initial cultural shock successfully. The immersion also made acclimation to village living easier. They would learn the language faster. They would learn the cultural mores and folkways and the nuances and idiosyncrasies quicker. They would adjust and adapt quicker. So that is what we did in south India, and it worked.

That is not to say we didn't have any problems. We did assign volunteers to work on their own in various locations, but we put them within the proximity of probably six miles of each other. We

would concentrate volunteers in an area so that we could have an impact particularly in terms of agricultural projects. We wanted to see an early impact. We also assigned a counterpart to each of our volunteers, so that they could work together as a pair. So we did a lot of innovative things that made the Peace Corps more popular and more acceptable.

If a volunteer decided to leave for whatever reason, it created a problem because we had worked so hard to make sure that the Peace Corps was understood prior to a volunteer's assignment. When my volunteer partners and I got to India during my first assignment, the local people didn't quite understand what this Peace Corps concept was all about. The concept of volunteerism simply did not exist in Indian society. The Indians didn't reach out and help each other because of the caste system. So they didn't understand what the Peace Corps' basic philosophy was all about. They were suspicious of us. "You will come and help us? What do you mean you will come and help us? You know, we don't have people in our own society to do that for the most part; so why would you come from 12,000 miles away to help total stranger?"

But in south India, we made sure that there was a demand for the Peace Corps volunteers. We said that "He or she is coming to work with you, to help you get some problems solved, to move in a certain direction in terms of technology and expertise, etc." We did such a good job of that, that when a Peace Corps volunteer decided to terminate his or her tour early, an Indian official would usually call me or send me a letter or telegram and ask, "So and so is leaving, what are we going to do? We need to have somebody come and replace this Peace Corps volunteer." That was the kind of problem to have.

We also tried to initiate a domestic Indian Peace Corps by encouraging government officials to develop Peace Corps-like programs that would be staffed by Indians themselves utilizing the American model. We did have some volunteers, both male and female, who could not handle the loneliness. It was a small number, but in two or three cases we did get to the point where we had to make the decision to send them back to the United States because they were not adjusting well; they were not coping well with their circumstances.

Q: Could you have brought them back to a city and let them work in a city where they would have more companionship?

ROBINSON: It would have been difficult because no jobs had been identified for them. The assignment of Peace Corps volunteers was really tied to the identification of a very specific task or series of tasks which required the training they had received. When someone decided abruptly to leave, because they were lonely or whatever, it was difficult to get them transferred to another town or a city or even in Madras where Peace Corps headquarters is located.

I had one Peace Corps volunteer who came from Seattle. Stuart was his name. He came to me out of the blue one Friday and said, "I have gotten this telegram from my girlfriend, and she is feeling lonely. She says she has found somebody else. If I can just get on a plane and fly back to Seattle for the weekend, I am sure I can fix this up and I will come back." I said, "Stuart, you can't get to Seattle in a weekend, and come back to south India." He clearly had flipped out. So we send him back permanently.

I had a very attractive woman from Akron, Ohio. It is amazing how you can remember some people's names. Her name was Adrian. She was just lonely. She just couldn't adjust. I had her based in Mudhol which is a big city in the middle of Karnataka. It was culturally very rich, but she couldn't make it there. She asked to go home, so we sent her back to the States. I think that the Peace Corps in India had impact in general, but in south India, we had a tremendous impact. The issues and problems that we encountered were not insurmountable.

Q: How did you deal with the local politicians? Did your program appear to be like patronage for the local bosses and that in a way involve you in the political process. How did this work?

ROBINSON: That is a very astute question. My answer will draw both on my experiences as a volunteer and as a director. Peace Corps volunteers became status symbols. We were invited to all the weddings. Everybody wanted to have an American in their social settings. Since we were outsiders to a very structured society based on an interpretation of Hinduism including the caste system, we had access to all levels of that society. We consciously encouraged that opportunity by reaching out as Peace Corps volunteers to all the people across the spectrum of Indian society. The idea of having an Indian counterpart assigned to each volunteer was designed to cushion the potential political impact of having a foreigner in their midst. If the Peace Corps volunteer was successful in establishing a good working relationship with his or her Indian counterpart, a lot of the potential political tension dissipated over time. Yes, we were agents of change. We were agents of action. We were agents of information. Change obviously connotes bringing new ideas to the table. "What do you mean the block development officer won't bring in the seeds and fertilizers and pesticides that he promised you? Let's get on our bike and ride into town and see what the hell is going on." Without the Peace Corps volunteer's presence, the Indian farmers or the Indian Ag extension officers stationed in that village wouldn't have gone to town to raise those questions. So the volunteer brought an element of activism. Sometimes that backfired. I think I mentioned to you that my block development officer, Mr. Yardov, was perfectly content to let me and my first partner in the Peace Corps just sit there and vegetate for weeks until we jumped on our bikes and ran into town and said, "We came here to help, not to sit here and eat all day and sip tea." We had to confront him. That was unheard of in Indian society. "The Americans have confronted the block development officer." He was a power at that level, but we were able to penetrate that aura. The Peace Corps volunteers did help to stir the pot. There may have been a number, but I cannot recall any instance where we had to pull a Peace Corps volunteer out of a village because he or she raised so much hell politically in terms of trying to get things done that it caused the local authorities to want to expel them from the community. Because of the sensitivities conveyed to Peace Corps trainees during their training programs, most volunteers had some sense of how to handle these situations without causing undue damage. They knew that they were outsiders, visitors, guests. They understood that they could not go in and change things immediately.

We did have an instance in Patna, the capital of Bihar, in a Peace Corps program to train mechanics who worked in the maintenance garages of UNICEF and UNESCO vehicles. We trained Indian mechanics on how to do maintain that fleet differently or more efficiently. We had one volunteer, from Utah, who did not adjust very well to his new cultural environment. He was so frustrated by his inability to persuade, to influence his Indian coworkers to adopt certain measures that he started kicking them. The word got back to us. I was a Peace Corps volunteer

leader at this point—not a Peace Corps director. But there were quite a large number of Peace Corps volunteers living around Patna -- almost ten of us and we heard about this incident. We were the older group. We heard about what was going on, and so we talked to this guy. “You can’t kick them to try to get them to do what you want to do. That is ridiculous. Work with them.” But we eventually had to recommend to the Peace Corps office in Calcutta to get him out of the country. He was almost taken out in a strait jacket. He had just flipped out.

I think that we were successful in India. We generally succeeded in having Peace Corps volunteers who worked well with their co-workers and their counterparts which allowed them, when they left, not to create a vacuum in terms of their expertise. They were able to influence subtly that intangible that we all strive for—e.g. the ability and willingness to adopt certain traits that the Peace Corps volunteer had brought with him or her, so that once he or she departed the scene, the Indians would continue to conduct themselves in a way that was a little bit better because of their expertise they had acquired from the volunteer. We always asked the Peace Corps volunteers to look at the intrinsic. You can’t measure it. You might see it, but you might also not see it. But it was part of the subtle evaluation of the influence that a Peace Corps volunteer might have had over two years. But we also used to tell them, “If you come back a year from now, will you see that some of the things you did as a Peace Corps volunteer that really rubbed off on the local people? If you are not able to do that, then that means you worked in a vacuum. You spent two years in India; you spent two years in a village; you did your thing, but what did you leave behind in terms of physical evidence that if you return in a year or two you can say that you helped initiate that?”

Q: Of course, this Peace Corps international volunteerism was a new thing for us. It was part of the 1960s and its youth activism. Did you find that while you were in India, that a counterpart action was developing within the educated class in India. In other words were Indian young people taking a look at your program and saying that they didn’t want to do things the same old way; they wanted to get involved.

ROBINSON: Some, but minimally. As a volunteer I met perhaps maybe eight Indian men that might have taken on some of our attitudes. There were no women in my group. In Indian society you just did not have much contact with single women. But we did have these eight guys who hung around us. Victor Benny who was an Anglo-Indian; he was a hotel manager—well educated, very smart. Another Indian worked for USIS. He was probably the highest ranking Indian in USIS, Patna. Then there were a group of guys who came from the upper class, or upper middle class. Tharseen was one of them, and there were others. They watched us and observed. Relationships with them evolved beyond just a status symbol. They were seen as hanging out with the Americans. They could claim that they knew us. We became friends with their families. My partner Arnie and I knew an Indian family in Lucknow quite well; we used to spend much time with them, as well as another two or three Indian families in the Dargeen area. In Calcutta, we became friendly with some middle class Indian families. So, I would say that we did have a positive influence on certain Indians in terms of their attitude towards their own society. We used to have great intellectual conversations all the time, about Indian culture and mores, especially the caste system, and Hinduism and how people were treated etc.

Q: Were you getting any commentaries from you volunteers in south India? The Vietnam war was at its height and protests were at their height. Just by definition Peace Corps volunteers were not enthusiastic supporters of the war, to say the least. Did you have problems keeping your group under control?

ROBINSON: We didn't have any protests among the Peace Corps volunteers. That is a very interesting question because I have a number of reactions. One, the "domino" effect was a theory that was espoused a great deal among our politicians in the 1960s; it was their rationale about why we needed to be in Vietnam; e.g. to check the spread of communism. Bihar is not too far from China and the Soviet Union. You could sort of see the possibility of "dominos" falling right in front of your face. So being in South-East Asia generated a different kind of feeling about Vietnam than when I was back in the United States. We knew that Peace Corps volunteers were completing their tours as volunteers, returning to the States and being drafted and in many cases being killed on active duty; that was a reality that impacted all of us. When we flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong in August of 1966, we flew over Da Nang. I remember that clearly. We flew on a Pan Am flight on a clear day with some puffy white clouds. The captain came on the broadcasting system and said, "We are flying over Da Nang, and we are at 35,000 feet." We all said, "God, we don't want to come back to this place. We don't want to be down on the ground there." There was a clear dichotomy between those men who served in the Peace Corps in the early to mid-1960s as opposed to those who served in the late 1960s.

In the early 1960s, people joined the Peace Corps because they were committed to a spirit exemplified by the Peace Corps. Vietnam was not an issue at the time. But in the late 1960s, men were coming to the Peace Corps who were not as committed to its idealism as was my generation. They were in the Peace Corps because it was a way to escape the draft that would most likely have them end in Vietnam. So there was a different attitude that we had to deal with. The volunteers were smart, savvy. They were concerned about the war.

As I said, we didn't have problems in India with Peace Corps volunteers demonstrating in front of consulates or the embassy in Delhi. Quite frankly, outside of my social interactions with Indians and Americans in and around Bangalore and Madras, there wasn't a lot of intense discussion about Vietnam. I don't ever recall the threat of volunteers protesting or anything like that. The real problem that we had, relative to Vietnam, was the fact that the male volunteers were hard to keep engaged in their jobs. A lot of them were biding their time. Just hanging out killing time. I would say that once every six weeks, I was in my Jeep Cherokee riding all over south India, checking on the Peace Corps volunteers; I would guess that maybe 20% of the male volunteers were not pulling their weight. They were not as engaged as Peace Corps volunteers as their predecessors had been during my time, because, as I said, they didn't have that intensive commitment and loyalty to the Peace Corps precepts. That was due to Vietnam. The volunteers of the late 1960s were overseas just biding their time.

Q: Your area of southern India included Kerala? It was a Marxist state that everybody in the Foreign Service knew because it was the one Marxist state in India, and we all sort of looked at that crosswise. Did we do anything there? How did that work out?

ROBINSON: We had Peace Corps volunteers in Kerala. I remember a trip that Tom Carter and I took to Kerala to check on the Peace Corps volunteers throughout the state. There was an Indian official in Kerala who was very well educated, very intelligent, with tremendous vision. He and Tom Carter had an incredible relationship which continues to this day. He understood Americans and their zest for volunteerism. He was the champion supporter for the Peace Corps in Kerala. We didn't have any political problems because the Peace Corps was apolitical and so recognized. We were not tied to U.S. foreign policy per-se, not to the U.S. intelligence apparatus. At our headquarters in Bangalore, we made sure that we maintained philosophically and in terms of our operating policy that separation between U.S. foreign policy and the Peace Corps. We tenaciously clung to our Congressional mandate to put Peace Corps volunteers in India without regard to ideology. So I think that this Indian official saw this commitment and staked his political reputation and obviously his career on encouraging Peace Corps volunteers to serve in Kerala. Because of his trusted relationship with Tom Carter we got along well in Kerala. We didn't have any political problems.

Q: When you left south India in 1970, what was the state of the Peace Corps operation?

ROBINSON: The state of the Peace Corps operation in southern India in 1970 was excellent. Joe Blatchford and his wife, Winnie, visited southern India in the early 1970s. He and his wife stayed with me in Madras. We toured a number of Peace Corps volunteer sites together. The whole program in south India was deemed successful for all the reasons I have conveyed to you. When I left south India in May of 1970, I think my primary concern was that the Peace Corps program had gotten too big. I could routinely get on a plane to fly from Madras to Bangalore or from Bangalore to Delhi or elsewhere, and I would see a Peace Corps volunteer on the same plane. Same on any train; I would run into a Peace Corps volunteer. We went from less than a hundred volunteers when I was a Peace Corps volunteer in 1964-1965, to about 400 volunteers when I left my first tour in India. By the time I left India in 1970 we had an estimated 2500 volunteers throughout India. That was too many volunteers, too many Americans. Many of the volunteers were mistaken for what we used to call "world travelers" as opposed to hippies. As I mentioned earlier, a lot of hippies came to India in the 1960s. Peace Corps volunteers were by and large clean cut, well mannered, but there were a lot of Americans who were traveling through India who were hippies, but became identified as Peace Corps volunteers. Who were these scruffy Americans showing up all over our country? That became a major public relations problem for us and may well have contributed to the government of India asking the Peace Corps to leave India in the mid-1970s. "We no longer need you; we have grown out of the need for the Peace Corps." I think in part that view was reinforced because we had become too visible.

Q: Then when you left in 1970, where did you go?

ROBINSON: I came back to Washington. Joe Blatchford, when he visited south India, said to me, "Lenny, I would like for you to come back to the States when your tour is over here and head up our minority recruitment division at headquarters. We don't have enough Peace Corps volunteers who represent the mosaic of America. We need to be more diversified. I think that you can come back and lead the effort to have the Peace Corps revitalized, re-energized by recruiting more African-Americans, Hispanics and native Americans etc."

So that is what I did. I came back and headed up the minority recruitment effort of the Peace Corps. I was 26 years old when I arrived back in the United States in May of 1970. As I said, Joe Blatchford had offered me the position of director of minority recruitment; he made lots of promises about new resources. I had some definite ideas about how to go about diversifying. I really thought it was important for the Peace Corps to look like America.

Bill Dial was the Peace Corps' regional director for North Africa, the Near East and Southeast Asia; he became my mentor. Bill Dial said, "John Howser who is the deputy Peace Corps director thinks that you are too young to be director of minority recruitment. So he is trying to negate Joe Blatchford's promise to you to make you the director." He said, "Now I have told John Howser that he is wrong, that you are very mature, very bright, etc., etc.. So Howser has agreed to see you before making the final decision about whether or not you are going to get this Peace Corps position." I was sitting in Bill Dial's office and he picked up the telephone and he called John Howser and said, "John, Lenny Robinson is sitting right here. I am going to send him upstairs to you." So I went right upstairs and sat down with John Howser. I said, "Mr. Howser, I understand that you think I am too young to be the director for minority recruitment. I'm here to try to dispel all of your misgivings." That is the way I opened up the conversation. After ten minutes John Howser looked at me and said, "I was wrong. I am approving you as the Peace Corps director for minority recruitment." I accepted the position and got settled in Washington DC.

I became the director of minority recruiting for the Peace Corps. I had lots of ideas and a tremendous amount of energy. I felt a tremendous amount of pressure. I was just 26 when I had my first encounter with an ulcer. I felt a tremendous amount of pressure to succeed in the Washington milieu. I did not have the pressure of Vietnam service because I was 26 and therefore no longer eligible for the draft. I could not be drafted. But I was always a hard charging guy who wanted to succeed and to make a difference.

I inherited a minority recruiting operation that was in a state of inaction -- not disarray, but inaction. I had a wonderful staff of recruiters around the country and I had a wonderful staff in Washington. I wanted to have what I call an immediate impact. That drive took its toll on me in terms of the ulcer.

Ultimately we came up with some creative programs to strengthen minority recruitment. But I was frustrated by the lack of support that I got from Joe Blatchford, which was reflected in the lack of resources, despite his promises. So after being in that position for a year and a half I resigned as director of minority recruitment in late 1971. I walked in to Joe Blatchford's office and I said, "Joe, you have not lived up to your promises." I was cocky, admittedly. By this time I was 27. I said to Joe in sort of a flip way, "Look, you have not given me any of the resources or any of the political support that you promised me when you offered me this job. Quite frankly, I have other things to do. I want to join the Foreign Service and therefore I resign from the Peace Corps" He was shocked. He said, "I know that you want to be in the Foreign Service. I will pick up the telephone and call Secretary of State Rogers, and make sure that you get into the Foreign Service." I said, "No, don't make any more promises because I know you won't follow through." I turned around and I picked up my briefcase and I walked out. Now I walked out in part because I had two other job offers, one of which was to be director of minority affairs for USIA. That

came about thanks to the PAO in Madras with whom I had become friends while serving in south India.

Q: Before we end the discussion about your Peace Corps service, let me ask what were some of the challenges you encountered in getting minority recruitment. I would think this would be a big problem because particularly at that time, most of the minorities were focused on domestic issues and not on overseas service to help others.

ROBINSON: There are a lot of things I could say about that. First of all, you recall in the 1960s there was a great deal of political change in America from John F. Kennedy's assassination to Martin Luther King's to Robert Kennedy's. The whole civil rights movement really took off in the mid to late 1960s. There was tremendous volatility in American society. All of that impacted people of color and African-Americans in particular. So I think that there was clearly a suspicion about being in any international program or in any program administered by the U.S. government. Secondly, a lot of African-Americans were more interested in getting an education as opposed to volunteering for two years. Peace Corps paid almost nothing. When I returned from India as a Peace Corps volunteer, I collected a check for about \$2000; after I paid taxes on it, it was probably about \$1800, leaving maybe \$1600 to buy my first car. There were no immediate incentives. You could gain a modicum of vision if you could look positively to the potential multiplier effect of having served as a Peace Corps volunteer. But what did that mean to your career, for your earning power? What did it mean for your ability to understand how people live in cultures other than your own? When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in India in 1965, I was the only African-American in my program. There had been one before me in 1962-1963 whose name was Nominy Robinson. Then there was one other who joined the Peace Corps whom I met behind the American embassy at the swimming pool in early 1966. I recall when we met each other. He said, "Oh you must be the one in the south," and I said, "Oh, you must be the one in the north."

During the time that I was a Peace Corps director, I had maybe three working on my projects; maybe in the entire country there were no more than four or five. So in India we had very few African-Americans or people of color serving in the Peace Corps. There is no question that the Peace Corps was bereft of people of color. The idea of living overseas, the pressures to get an education, to begin to earn money and to help out their parents economically, all of these factors were of tremendous cultural, political importance in the United States at the time.

Just from the advertising, one could have easily reached the conclusion that the Peace Corps was for whites only. I took a look at that in 1970. One of the first things I did was to look at all of the Peace Corps advertising, the brochures, the commercials we had on television. There was one subject on color among all of that media stuff we had, so the perception was, the image was the Peace Corps was lily white. We changed all of that. We developed ads and commercials and brochures that reflected more of the diversity, more of the mosaic of America in the Peace Corps. My father and mother and my parent's best friend who was the president of A&T University. said to me in unison, "Oh, man, you are interested in joining the Peace Corps and going to India. That is worth two Ph.D.s. That kind of exposure, that sort of immersion." So I had encouragement to join the Peace Corps. I had this tremendous family support to join the Peace Corps. They clearly understood the potential impact of such a move. Interestingly enough, during

the time Sergeant Shriver was the first Peace Corps director, we had a large number of prominent, well-educated African-Americans like C. Payne Lucas and Joseph Kennedy, Ambassador Williams who had been our ambassador to Ghana, all had been Peace Corps directors. Samuel DeWitt Proctor was the president of A&T University where my father taught. He later became the Peace Corps director in Nigeria. So there were lots of very prominent African-Americans in the Peace Corps at the administrative level.

That didn't necessarily help to bring volunteers in. We had a few, but not nearly as many as I would have hoped for. The Peace Corps today is still struggling today with this diversity issue. Obviously more people of color have joined in the past ten or fifteen years. One of the things we did was to clearly try to tie service in the Peace Corps with furthering the volunteer's education. I initiated a master's degree program with Texas Southern University in Texas and with Atlanta University in Atlanta. We created a master's degree program in international affairs in order to allow the Peace Corps volunteers to get not only a master's degree, but also two years of Peace Corps service. That worked very well in terms of increasing the numbers for Peace Corps volunteers. But with all the things happening in our society, plus the economic pressures that so many African-Americans and people of color faced, there was a lot of competition for volunteers. A lot of them went to college on scholarships or student loans, and they felt tremendous pressure to make money after graduating. Because of the impact of the civil rights movement, a lot of the corporations were reaching out to African-Americans, and they were being recruited. So the graduating minority student was being offered lots of opportunities to make money in corporate America as opposed to volunteerism in the Peace Corps; most of them went with corporate America.

EUGENE H. BIRD
Economic Officer
Bombay (1967-1970)

Commercial Attaché
New Delhi (1970-1972)

Eugene H. Bird was born in Spokane, Washington, in 1925. He received a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Washington. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy as a mechanical engineer. Following the war, Mr. Bird attended journalism school at the University of Oregon. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 2, 1994.

Q: Today is June 2, 1994. Gene, I just got you out of Cairo when you were evacuated from there. So we then move to Bombay, where we have you serving from 1967 to 1970. What was the situation in Bombay and in India in 1967?

BIRD: India was not a popular place for American policymakers at that point. It had been neutral for so long in the Cold War. This was a very deliberate neutrality, heavily slanted toward

relations with the Soviet Union. At the time I arrived, the East Germans had the most pretentious Consulate General in Bombay. We'd been there a long, long time, of course. Bombay was an old post [for us]. The British colonial structure was still very much in place. The Breech-Kandy Club was founded by the people who had built the Suez Canal in the 1860's and 1870's. They had come to Bombay to continue what you might say was the "aid" program from Britain to rebuild the structure of imperial India. They had built the great gateway where Queen Victoria arrived. It was still a post that had overwhelming problems in terms of trying to relate to what was happening politically in Western India.

The Maharashtra, the Marathas, had ruled India, as they kept reminding us at every party, before the British came to power. So they were the last of the Indians to rule India. When independence came, they tried to assert themselves as true Hindus, so the RSS, the Maharat-Singh party, was very strongly in evidence in the Bombay and Poona areas. We tried to work the economic and commercial side. They were natural traders. They wanted relations with the United States. I had a very close friend who had gone to school with me back here in the United States. He had been a newspaper reporter for "The Hindu," which was [the major paper]. V. S. Vencataramani, or "Ram," as he was known, had become a Carnegie Fellow here in the United States. He had taught at Duke University and later on got the chair in American history at New Delhi University. He was, of course, a very interesting person to our Embassy and to ourselves, because he understood America and the politics of India very well, although he was from Southern India, which put him in a different class than Northern Indians, as such, who are the real rulers of India.

It was a fascinating time because we had Chester Bowles [as Ambassador]. He had been appointed to come out here by President Kennedy. I had a lot of Indian friends back here in the United States. So my assignment to Bombay was a natural appointment in some ways. I quickly gravitated toward doing quite a lot of reporting on what was really "happening."

Q: What was your position at the Consulate General?

BIRD: I was the Economic Officer -- the number three man at the Consulate General.

Q: Who was Consul General [at the time]?

BIRD: I was going to say Dan Ford, but I can fill this in later. Edward Cheney was my immediate boss. Later on, he died in the Philippines in an airplane crash while working for the Embassy there as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. Cheney let me roam all over Western India. We used to say that we had the largest Consulate General in the world, and I think that that's probably true in terms of population. I don't remember the exact figures, but it was close to 200 million people in the consular district. It extended to the far South, far East, and far North of India. It was a part of India which was modernizing very, very rapidly. The center or "spark plug" for the Indian emergence into the 20th century was really in Bombay more than in Calcutta or Madras, which were pretty sleepy towns in comparison to Bombay, which was building skyscrapers and so on.

I got to know [people in] the J. R. V. Tata Group very well. Of course, one of the great issues was [nuclear] proliferation, even in those days. I arrived there in October, 1967. Already it was

clear that India was on the path of building her first atomic weapon. We had on the staff [of the Consulate General] an officer of the [U. S.] Atomic Energy Commission. He tried to maintain contact with the Indians. Westinghouse was building the Tarapur civilian nuclear reactor.

The important thing was to try and get India aboard as far as inspection of that reactor was concerned. India had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They had every reason to respect [the treaty], I suppose, but it was very clear, from the very large resources that they were putting into the atomic energy area that they had not just power in mind but they also intended to use it to make themselves into an atomic power like China. Whenever you'd get into a discussion with the Tata's or others, they would usually turn you off and say, "No, no, we're just on the civilian side." There were indications from all kinds of scientists that they were doing work that would lead directly to a bomb. So containing [that effort] was one of the issues that came up politically between the United States and India. Of course, the Indians would point across the Himalaya Mountains and say, "China already has the bomb. We have already fought one war with her and are likely to fight another. We don't want to be naked."

That was the bottom line, even though everyone knew that they really felt, back in those days, that Pakistan -- this was before the independence of Bangladesh -- was going to disappear. They felt that Pakistan could not be sustained and the Kashmir issue was constantly erupting, even as it does today. It's strange how these things keep coming back.

All of these political factors, coupled with the drive for India to find oil offshore -- the best place that India had to search for oil -- were included in the work of the Consulate General.

We had an enormous group of AID [Agency for International Development] people in the country and a very large Peace Corps. I think that there were 700 Peace Corps people [in India], and a lot of them were in our consular district. Mrs. Carter [President Carter's mother] was with the Peace Corps in India for a time. All of these matters introduced me to a whole new stretch of territory as far as the Foreign Service was concerned. We hadn't had Peace Corps people in the Middle East in general. We had [the nuclear] proliferation issue [in India] but we didn't really deal with it directly. We had an atomic energy person who could tell you in minute detail exactly how the Indians were going about [their atomic energy program], probably not directly using American technology, but they had an enormous number of people coming back from universities here in the United States and in the Soviet Union who had specialized in various aspects of nuclear physics and so on.

[The Bombay assignment] was a very interesting break from the Middle East, from the Arab-Israeli dispute itself, and from developments in the oil sector in the Middle East. India is a country, as was expressed by the director of the Census in India, of 650-750 million people. If 1% of us are geniuses, he said, this means six million geniuses. What other country has six million geniuses, he asked. This is an example of the rather bumptious attitude of some Indians, which is one of the reasons why many Foreign Service Officers and others were somewhat turned off by India.

Q: Were you "turned off" or not?

BIRD: No. I thoroughly enjoyed the culture. When we arrived [in 1967], there were no facilities for our children to go to school in Bombay. Here was a city of one million people that had no American "College." Every place else in the world with a large population has an American College in the country somewhere. We had the International School in New Delhi, but we chose instead to send both of our children to southern India, three days away by train, to a place called Koticanal. I guess that my attitude was reflected in the attitude of my children as they grew up. They both graduated from Koticanal and both went to Carleton College. Both chose to go back to India for their "junior year abroad" or their post-graduate period, although my son also went to AUB [American University of Beirut] to a college. So there was an attachment by the whole family to India. That is representative, I think, of a lot of people who got involved in India and the Indian culture as such.

Of course, Indian politics to me were absolutely fascinating because the Congress Party was in the course of breaking up. I had the opportunity, even as the number three officer in the Consulate General in Bombay, to meet the son of Mrs. Gandhi [She was then Prime Minister] and to talk to one or two of the cabinet ministers who were especially interesting to the Economic and Agricultural Section. The Indian elite, or literati, and the huge movie industry there were of special interest. India produced, and probably still does, more feature films than any other country in the world.

Indian movies were extremely long and used an enormous amount of Kodak film. Kodak was very important in India. The Kodak representatives would come in and rub their hands in glee over how much they were selling in India.

It looked to me as if India was at a "turning point" where it was going to make a "great leap forward." The steel industry was in place at that time. There was an aircraft industry of sorts, and they were still trying to maintain independence of the West, so far as computers were concerned. Indians had won two Nobel prizes in physics and mathematics already, and they had a great capability as computer programmers. They were just starting in this area. IBM [International Business Machines] was trying to maintain its presence in India. Later on, they had to sell out to their employees but continued to sell to India indirectly. However, they were giving India very low cost computers which were obsolete in the West, so they would "remanufacture" them. It was a perfect way for the Indians to learn exactly how to manufacture their own computers.

One of the personalities whom I remember who came in at that time was a rather well known entrepreneur from California who had decided to move to [the Republic of] Korea and build a lot of his high tech equipment in Korea at that early stage. He was checking out [other places] and he'd come to Hong Kong, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and then to Bombay, where he spent two or three weeks recruiting various industries to make exactly what he needed, as he said, at "50 cents on the dollar." He said that India was the lowest cost place to produce high tech material in the world, at that point.

We knew that India was going to become a factor in international business and, therefore, in international politics, in some sense. Of course, we couldn't foresee that two years later the Indo-Pakistan War would occur. When I moved up to New Delhi in 1970, it looked like another series

of clashes between East and West Pakistan that would be solved by electing an East Pakistani president of East Pakistan, nominally, leaving the real power with the West Pakistanis.

Of course, it didn't work out that way at all. The military in [West] Pakistan moved against the East Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis declared their independence, and we went through the war...

Q: I'd like to get back to that later, but let's go back to Bombay. You were in the commercial capital of India. Am I right in saying that the commercial [people in Bombay] were quite different from the "politicians"?

BIRD: Yes. They didn't like the politics of Mrs. Gandhi at all. They didn't like the politics of the Congress Party, the "Laski" socialism that underlay everything that the Congress Party did. Of course, the Congress Party broke up while I was there in Bombay. We literally had a ringside seat at the breakup, with Mrs. Gandhi sitting two rows in front of me at a three-day conference of the Congress Party. That was when the Congress Party split and became the Congress Party (I) [for Indira Gandhi] and the old Congress Party headed by some of the high "pooba's" of the period under Nehru.

Mrs. Gandhi was opposed by people like Tata and others, but they always bet on both sides, just as many Americans, especially Texans, do. They'll put money into both the Democratic and Republican Parties. She knew how to do that. So it wasn't difficult for her. She was a great politician. She knew how to count, as Tip O'Neill used to say. She knew how to count how many people she had on her side and she was a very rough politician with anyone who opposed her. She was very effective. After all, she'd been raised by Nehru as his political daughter. It was a very fascinating moment for India, but it was also a fascinating moment for U. S.-Indian relations. Ambassador Chester Bowles made a practice of sending telegrams to Washington, explaining away the more obstreperous efforts of Indian politicians to show how "anti-colonial" they were by being anti-American or by being close to Moscow.

The "Moscow connection" between India and the Soviet Union was very, very close. There was a favorite story that was told at the time. It was apocryphal, of course, but it represented pretty well the feelings there. The story is that an attempt was made at Tashkent [in the Soviet Union] to bring India and China together on Russian ground and settle their conflict. The President [Prime Minister?] of India went to Tashkent, where he reportedly had what appeared to be a fatal heart attack. The story which went the rounds was that the Russians went to the head of the Indian delegation [in Tashkent] and said, "We have a Russian volunteer who is willing to give up his heart. He has the right blood type and so forth, if you can't find another candidate elsewhere. But this one fits, and he's willing to die so that your President [Prime Minister?] may live." The Indians went into a huddle and came back out and said, "No, no. What would happen to American aid [to India] if we had a President [Prime Minister?] with a Russian heart?" The Indians loved to tell that story.

Q: Did you have the feeling when you were in Bombay -- and I'll ask the same question when we move to your time in New Delhi -- that Ambassador Bowles was a "bleeding heart" liberal who developed "localitis" [in India] and got so involved with the local cause that he didn't see that, in a way, he was "selling out the store" by always trying to explain why the Indians were trying to

"stick their finger in our eye." I know that he was not regarded very highly in Washington. People laughed at him.

BIRD: On the professional level, I think that you're right. He, of course, came from that category of liberals from the Northeast [of the U. S.] who do have a bleeding heart regarding the Third World. I remember that when he was appointed, there was a real struggle within the Kennedy administration. He had been brought into the [Department of State] as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, as I remember it -- I don't recall exactly. He was quite high ranking. I had a friend who was being considered for appointment as Ambassador, Gale Jiryu. He came back from meetings with Bowles on several occasions, puzzled as hell because Bowles would call him over and they would have a wonderful discussion of the whole world situation. My friend was waiting for appointment. There were rumors that he was going to be appointed as Ambassador to Algeria, but Under Secretary Bowles would never tell him. He would come back and say he was puzzled, as he thought that Bowles was going to tell him that time. I suppose that Bowles was a typical political appointee in many ways. He brought a lot of [intellectual] baggage with him. That baggage initially caused him a lot of problems with Congress regarding his confirmation as Ambassador to India, as a lot of people probably recognized that he would do just that -- be a "bleeding heart." I think that maybe people like that are sometimes like Latin American politicians who are sent out to be ambassadors somewhere simply to get them out of the country. In a way I suppose that [President] Kennedy felt that Bowles "fit" India very well and that he would, perhaps, repair relations with India. However, once he [Bowles] got to India, it was pretty obvious that he was India's representative in Washington, rather than America's representative in New Delhi.

Q: *Did this bother you?*

BIRD: I suppose not as much as it would have, before I served under him. I don't think that any [American] Ambassador to India at that time would have been very effective, with all of the issues before us, including nuclear proliferation, anti-Americanism, and the attempt to destabilize Pakistan, which was a great concern of ours. The Pakistanis helped that along to a considerable extent, of course, when they fell into that trap. I don't think that any Ambassador would have been very effective in opposing the direction in which India was going.

[In a situation like that] you have two choices: you can attempt to [exert] influence, which is what we're attempting to do with China at the present time, for example. Or you can "confront" [the other country] and let it go to a "cold war" type situation and hope that things will improve some day. At this time India was still a very new country [as an independent state]. It was a big country and was very important to us from the standpoint of opposing China. There wasn't any doubt about that. We forget how we were concerned about the possibility that China would not stop with Tibet but would continue into India. This was a little bit silly in a way because, looking not just at the geography but at the demography of the whole area, the Indian Communist Party was pretty powerful, or seemed to be.

I suppose it was worth playing this card -- sending a person like Bowles -- and letting him be a "soft" Ambassador. You don't have to take him seriously back in Washington. He wasn't taken that seriously, even by President Kennedy, over the long run. I think that one of the problems is

that here was a country [India] which is very important to us, alongside a country that we didn't want to see them take over [Pakistan]. It was a Kuwait-type situation. We didn't want India to succeed in her attempts to destabilize and take over or break up Pakistan. That was really her aim, strategically.

When the break came, when the civil war [in Pakistan] started, everyone knew what was going to happen. Essentially, the Bangladeshis were not going to stay with Pakistan. In many ways they were closer to India than they were to West Pakistan. They are today. Strategically, it made sense for us to attempt to stand back and let things happen as they probably would.

By that time, of course, Ken Keating had been appointed Ambassador [to India]. He was another politician but a very different personality. He never really related to the Indians or, more precisely, the Indians never really related to him. He was a very interesting man to work for, and I worked very closely with him.

Q: You served in [the Embassy] in New Delhi from 1970 to 1972? What was your assignment there?

BIRD: I was Commercial Counselor for a while and then, when they [Washington] sent a new Commercial Counselor, I became the Commercial Attaché. I had, I suppose, a minor role [to play] in terms of many things on the political side. However, in other ways the "Birla's" and the "Big Banya's," as they call them, the large entrepreneurs in India, were very important in terms of the politics of Mrs. Gandhi.

I remember that one Saturday Ambassador Keating called me in and said, "G. D. Birla is coming in. I want you to stand by." Birla made a pitch that the Indian Air Force wanted to buy Phantoms [F-4 fighter aircraft]. He said that they wanted to stop being so dependent on the Russians.

Q: At that time the Phantom was the top of the line.

BIRD: The Vietnam War was under way and they [the U. S. Air Force and Navy] were using a lot of them there. They were very well-known as high quality aircraft. The Israelis had gotten some and so on. Ambassador Keating said afterwards, "Do you think that he's as well-connected as he pretends? Is he bringing us a message from Mrs. Gandhi?" This was just before the war with Pakistan. We wouldn't have been able to discuss it then, after the war began, because relations [with India] went sour. I replied to the Ambassador, "Yes. I think that he's probably down there, talking with Mrs. Gandhi's people or perhaps with her right now as to your reaction to this." Of course, nothing ever came of it, the point being that even Ambassador Keating was probably not taken all that seriously in Washington, any more than Ambassador Bowles was, in terms of recommendations that [either of them] made on our strategic relationship with India, which was the real issue.

Q: Of course, most of the time that you were in India, Nixon was President, and Kissinger was sitting at his right hand. Both of them really had a certain disdain for India, didn't they?

BIRD: Oh, yes, and didn't really understand it. They appointed people with equal disdain. I remember [William H.] Sullivan, who was then one of the [Deputy] Assistant Secretaries for East Asian Affairs.

Q: *William H. Sullivan.*

BIRD: Yes. He came to India when we were trying to coordinate policy. The Vietnam War was at its height. I remember walking up to him afterwards and saying, "You know, I've been in NEA [Bureau of Near East Affairs] for a long time. I've seen the breakoff of the Bureau of African Affairs. We wonder if India really doesn't belong in Southeast Asia, rather than with NEA." This issue has come up recently when the Department was forced to create a Bureau of South Asian Affairs, as you know. Sullivan looked at me and said, "We don't want 'em [India]." I'll never forget the look on his face. He's a very abrupt personality.

The attitude toward India and Indian politicians was that they were essentially anti-American and devious. Down in Southeast Asia they had a name for anyone who was of Indian background or even anyone who was devious at all and not to be trusted. They call them a "Malabari."

This consciousness of not being able to make the Indians hew to a particular line came through with [Secretary of State] Kissinger when he came to India and we had a chance to talk to him. One of the nice things about political ambassadors, I think, is that they feel like reaching out to their staff and making use of them in the same way that a CEO [Chief Executive Officer] would in a company -- I mean a good one. Both Bowles and Keating used to have visitors like William Buckley or Kissinger or others who came through talk to a staff meeting of the section heads in the Embassy. There would be 20 or 25 people there because we had something like 700 American employees in the Embassy at that time, including all of the different agencies. I remember that there were 47 [U. S. Government agencies] with more than 700 people -- an incredible number.

Within a few years one-third of all of the currency in India was going to be in the hands of the U. S. Government. This was ridiculous. We were pouring wheat into India and had been since 1954 [1951?]. However, we really didn't have a strategic policy toward India. We struggled with this [issue] over the years. I think that Ambassador Bowles' appointment, in a sense, was an attempt to develop a new policy toward India.

Ambassador Keating's appointment was a step backward. I think that he was simply a failed politician who was sent out by Nixon and Kissinger, neither one of whom really had much regard for him. I heard a lot of stories about the attitude of Kissinger toward Keating. Later on, when Keating became Ambassador to Israel, Kissinger made fun of Keating, as he made fun of a lot of people. [Kissinger] made a lot of enemies, in many ways.

Did I tell you this story about when Kissinger came to New Delhi? We had a meeting with all of the heads of section [in the Embassy] in the "safe" conference room upstairs in the Embassy. We were given an hour and each of us was allowed only one question. Kissinger was accompanied by Bill Quandt, who was his bag carrier. My question to him was: "Mr. Secretary, do you think that a Tashkent [type meeting] is going to be necessary in the Middle East?" I meant, of course,

that you had to bring the Russians in. Kissinger understood the question right away and didn't ask for any explanation at all. He replied, "Well, you have to understand that because of my ethnic background I have deliberately stayed away from anything having to do with the Middle East." What a change from [then to] now when we have so many people who are very closely connected with Israel in one way or another or are very closely bound to Zionism, who are in charge of our policy. I face them every day now.

Kissinger went on and spent 12 minutes out of the whole hour on this one question. Of course we couldn't record [his remarks] and weren't supposed to take notes in these sessions. Nevertheless, I made a few notes afterwards. In typical Kissinger fashion he started out by saying no, that he didn't think that a Tashkent type of conference was necessary or desirable in the Middle East to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute. But by the end of his comments he was saying, in effect, "Yes." He had argued himself around to the point where he was saying that it might, of course, be useful to bring the Russians [into the negotiations], as they have been brought in during the post Cold War period.

Many of us had felt for a decade or more that our contacts with the Russians -- and I had some in India and had had some contacts with them in Cairo which indicated very much that they'd like to be invited to the negotiating table, that they could be very useful, and that we could start to reduce the competition in terms of munitions shipments to the area if we'd only do the same.

Kissinger, of course, came from a tradition of confronting the Russians on every occasion and "doing them in" whenever possible and not cooperating with them on anything. You can say that that was necessary in that period but, looking back, I think that the Cold War might have been ended earlier by using some of these regional areas where we had similar or parallel interests.

Q: When you were in New Delhi, you were then up against the political class of Indians. Did you have the feeling -- and this was the time when India had very close relations with the Soviets -- that the Indians you talked to, for example, the people in the Congress Party and so forth, felt comfortable with this [relationship with the Soviet Union]? Did they realize the enormity of the Soviet problem, how they dealt with their minorities, how their economy [functioned] and all that?

BIRD: Well, if I can jump back to Bombay for just a moment, one of the people there in the film industry used to show [privately] films that were rejected for [general] showing in India. Usually, they were a little too "R"-rated, shall we say. He would invite small groups in to see these films. As a result, I got on a list of people interested in films and so on in the film industry.

One night we were invited, not to his small, but to his large theater. It turned out that it was the 50th anniversary of something in Russia [possibly 1967, the 50th anniversary of the Communist Revolution of 1917]. The Russians had a celebration of Lenin. They had spent a lot of money turning out these films in English. They were absolutely horrible. It was kind of a disaster because they got some of the Indian film stars there. The Indian film stars told stories that were somewhat anti-Russian. In front of a [Soviet cabinet] minister from Moscow, who had been sent down to tour with this film. They'd invited all kinds of people there, but the theater wasn't full. A lot of people just didn't come. One of the Indian film stars told this story about Tashkent and the Soviet part in it, with the Soviet cabinet minister on stage. I think that in New Delhi [Indian

political figures] certainly realized, even people from the Congress Party and people around Indira Gandhi, that they were essentially oriented toward the West. I got to know her son...

Q: *Which one -- Sanjay or Rajiv?*

BIRD: Rajiv. I got to know both of them, but not that well. Right in the center of New Delhi there was a place where you could go and fly in gliders. We'd go over there. I had had a private pilot's license at one time but didn't keep it up. We would just take rides. Rajiv would be around, on occasion. I think that people [like him] were very oriented toward Western tastes and Western ideas. However, they recognized a certain, native nationalism. I came to the conclusion that they were escaping from the colonial heritage, really. I think that, in terms of that, India has come a long way over the past 25 years. The Indian Army and Air Force wanted the best [equipment available]. They would probably have preferred British equipment to anything else, reflecting typical, post-colonial ideas. However, when it came time to buying [civil] aircraft, they bought Boeing [jets]. They didn't buy Ilyushins or anything like that. Of course, that was [a reflection of the influence of] J. R. D. Tata, I suppose. The point is that there was a lot of Western -- and especially American -- orientation in Indian society.

Q: *You're talking, obviously, about the Indians who found it very hard to reject the colonial heritage. At the same time, as was the case with lots of countries in Africa, far more dangerous to their economy than the Soviet system was following the English Socialist/Fabian/Laski system. To me it sounds as if this was a far more pernicious influence in the post-colonial world than the threat of Communism. There was a very poor distribution of goods and all that. Was this your feeling?*

BIRD: Oh, yes. They would make [certain] decisions. I got to know the head of the State Trading Company, who was an entrepreneur par excellence in many ways. He had come from the old Indian Civil Service [ICS].

At the time that India became independent, I remember M. S. Vankaramani telling me, "You know that the great strength of India is in her 850 members of the ICS. They really run India." That was probably still true [when I was in India]. Even in those days there were still probably 50 to 100 of them from the original ICS. The new [post independence] ICS was not viewed with the same, high regard. However, the old ICS was the equivalent for all of India, I suppose, of the American Foreign Service in terms of American foreign affairs. It [the old ICS] was an elite.

Q: *We've already referred to it, but can we talk a little more about the war between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh or East Pakistan? Were you there at the time? How was this building up and what were the contacts with our Embassy in Rawalpindi [now Islamabad, in West Pakistan] and all of that?*

BIRD: Yes, I was there. Sidney Sober was one of the key people in the [American] Embassy in Rawalpindi at that point. He made two or three trips when the crisis erupted. At first we didn't take it too seriously. I went down to Calcutta a couple of times and talked with Herb Gordon, who was down there as Consul General, as I recall. We felt that there were very close relations between the two Bengals -- East Pakistan and the State of Bengal [in India], whose capital was in

Calcutta. They were the same people. In many ways they shared the same kind of geography -- low-lying, rice-growing peoples of the river deltas and estuaries. They had the same disregard for both Delhi -- on the part of [the Bengalis] in Calcutta -- and on the part of the [leaders of] East Pakistan for their Muslim brothers in West Pakistan. I suppose that what was kind of shocking to me was that we did a lot in trying to stop the separation of the two states, East and West Pakistan. However, I think that we recognized -- right from the start -- that it was inevitable. It is these inevitable situations which we face in Bosnia and Serbia. We probably didn't want to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina quite as rapidly as we did. And we certainly didn't recognize Bangladesh as rapidly as we might have.

Of course, the breakup of a country is always very difficult for outside powers. However, seeing this [situation] develop, we essentially wrung our hands and stuck with our West Pakistan friends, who were all generals. We had given Pakistan a lot of things, including a submarine which, of course, they should have returned the year before but didn't do. It was discovered on the morning that war broke out between India and Pakistan, lying off the major Indian naval base of Vyzak. It was sunk immediately by the Indians. It was the equivalent, I suppose, of the United States becoming involved in the war. That's the way the Indians played it.

Leading up to it [the war], I think that it was like leading up to the 1967 War [in the Middle East] which I had witnessed and which [resulted in my coming] to India. We didn't do nearly enough. Whether that's because we didn't have a president who was willing to get involved in a situation of this kind, [I don't know]. We didn't do nearly enough to try for a peaceful resolution of it. Maybe there was no peaceful resolution possible. The West Pakistani generals were our friends. Essentially, we warned India, "Don't try to take over all of West Pakistan." It would have been a great mistake for India to do that, of course. However, the fact was that everyone knew that there was going to be a war and that things were on the slippery slope for several weeks if not months before.

Q: Were you getting anything from Washington?

BIRD: From the desk officer, yes. But from the White House, no, I don't think that there were any warnings to the Indians not to encourage civil war [in East Pakistan].

Q: What were our feelings prior to the collapse of East Pakistan and to the reports of atrocities? Were they dismissed, believed, or how did we feel?

BIRD: I think that they [the atrocity reports] were dismissed in Washington. I didn't see any change at all as a result of this. We knew that that sort of thing was going to happen. It was inevitable when you have a small group of military, trying to maintain power with a very large, demographic imbalance against them. The fact was that we allowed American-made planes to be used to reinforce East Pakistan. We allowed the use of a lot of American technology in that war, even though there had been these reports of human rights violations.

Q: Was our Embassy in New Delhi playing a role, asking what about these reports?

BIRD: Ambassador Keating was a political appointee, of course, but he had Galen Stone as his DCM, and he had a pretty strong Political Section. They reported honestly what was being told to our "scouts," shall I say, people who were reporting to us on what was happening in Dacca. Part of [this information] came from Indian Intelligence, I'm sure, but as far as recommendations were concerned, by the time the killings started, there was very little that one could do. We went out to the airport after the war was over, and Mujib was released. He was flown to London first. He had been in West Pakistani hands for a time. The Indians sent a plane to pick him up, and he came in on an Indian aircraft to the airport in New Delhi.

My son and I went out to the airport, curious to see this figure, Mujib. Later on my son and another person wrote a book, called, "The Unfinished Revolution in East Pakistan," because he went in there right after the war was over. He was 18 then, maybe closer to 19. He went in with a CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] camera crew. He became a "gaffer," holding cameras and that sort of thing for several weeks. The Indian Army helped them cross the border. They had to wait for some time for visas to get out of India and into East Pakistan or Bangladesh.

They got to Dacca. He didn't interview Mujib, but he later on wrote this book on East Pakistan.

I suppose that we could have done more, earlier, but there was very little that could be done to prevent the breakup of Pakistan. A lot of our Pakistani friends said, later on, "You know, we're stronger now because..."

Q: How about this famous "tilt" toward Pakistan and sending the USS ENTERPRISE, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, to the Bay of Bengal? How did that play in New Delhi and at our Embassy?

BIRD: I blame that a little on the professional [diplomats] back here [in Washington] because it seems to me that ideas like that occur at the NSC [National Security Council] level -- maybe at the level of Sid Sober and others -- but essentially this was a warning to India not to interfere too much in this situation. Obviously, they were at war. We would sit there in New Delhi and watch the Indian aircraft and an occasional Pakistani aircraft come flying over, but they didn't venture out very much after the first few days. We had a blackout. It was a time when events had overtaken the policymakers, quite frankly, and nobody was in control.

In the Embassy we never really understood why a carrier was sent into the area.

Q: It just sounds like...

BIRD: It was action.

Q: "Don't just stand there, do something." Was there a problem explaining what the [deployment of the carrier meant] and was this trying to put the best face on this?

BIRD: Thank God I didn't have the responsibility for explaining it to the Indians. I suppose you could have said that [this was done] for the protection of American interests and so forth. I don't

think that we would ever have threatened the Indians with using the carrier. It would have been a useless thing in the first place.

Q: Absolutely. Well, one last thing I'd like to talk about before we move on to your last post. What about Vietnam? Was this something that always was there -- I mean, our actions in Vietnam?

BIRD: Well, Bill Sullivan had come over [to New Delhi] primarily in hopes of finding a useful way to get the Indians to help in the negotiation of a solution to the Vietnam War. There had been a proposal -- nothing formal, I suppose, nothing contained in one despatch. The Embassy [in New Delhi] had always sought Indian help in terms of Vietnam. India is a big country, and it had a lot of interests there [in Vietnam]. It turned out that they made a lot of money out of Vietnam. A lot of the Malabaris, a lot of the Indians in Southeast Asia went to Saigon and took the United States for a lot of money.

Q: I was Consul General in Saigon during part of this. We used to refer to the Black Market as the Bank of India, meaning Indian tailors engaged in running all kinds of illegal activities.

BIRD: They were probably helping the Viet Cong in the long run. So India was involved. You could go to Eastern India -- I never did this -- and, on occasion, you could see the B-52 raids, the flashes on the horizon. It was that close to Northern Laos and North Vietnam.

I think that India was probably trying to help us. I think that it was a situation in which Mrs. Gandhi saw an opportunity. She didn't have much opportunity, however, because I don't think that the Vietnamese would listen to India any more than we would. Frankly, that's a sad thing in terms of her efforts in the field of foreign relations. Her efforts hadn't been very successful or consistent over the years. I think that she tended to move toward Moscow because she didn't want to be too close to the West. She was a neutral leader and saw herself as a great neutral leader. And, of course, when that effort failed for many, many reasons, it became an obsession with her to become a leader in some fashion or other in the "Third Force."

Where is India now, you have to say? I don't think that India has made great advances in economic terms but in terms of world politics India is less important today than she was.

CLARENCE SWIFT GULICK
Assistant Director for Development Policy, USAID
New Delhi (1967-1972)

Clarence Swift Gulick was born in Brooklyn, New York, and raised in Milburn and Maplewood, New Jersey. He received a bachelor's degree in economics and political science from Swarthmore University and attended graduate school at Harvard University. In January of 1943, he began active duty in the U.S. Navy. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Ireland, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Mr. Gulick was interviewed by W. Haven North on February 1, 1996.

Q: *What was your assignment then?*

GULICK: The same assignment; Assistant Director for Development Policy.

Q: *So you went from Nigeria directly to India?*

GULICK: Yes. In India the office consisted of the program office proper, which mostly worked on the technical assistance program, and an economic office which was fairly large as those went. I think we had four: say one and a half American economists and three or four Indian, quite good, economists in the economic office, and the little unit that ran the non-project loan commodity aid.

Q: *And that was part of that office too?*

GULICK: Yes, three pieces.

Q: *You were in India how long?*

GULICK: Oh, over five years; from '67 to '72.

Q: *What was the main line of your efforts in India? What was the effort there, the policy? What were you trying to accomplish?*

GULICK: We were generally pushing for - we were still functioning in the context of the consortium for aid to India. I should have mentioned that earlier, because I was very much involved in starting the consortium the '58/'59 period. We were following along with substantial DLF projects and commodity aid, fairly substantial amounts of commodity aid. Of course PL 480 particularly, actually the couple of years before I got there was extremely large. The Indians had a severe drought for two years, I think '64/'65 and we had provided them with a great deal of grain enabling them to fend off a famine. Most of our 300 plus people were involved in the technical assistance program which again was pretty largely continuing with the emphasis was pretty well established before I got there. The biggest single activity was in agriculture; especially the agricultural universities. We helped set up by providing university teams to five new agricultural universities in India, which were a new phenomenon for them. We had a substantial team from five US universities working each one of them. Also in education we were helping, along with other people, with the establishment of one of the Indian technical universities. We had some agricultural teams working on research and training and demonstrations of improved practices in several areas. We also had a substantial non-project commodity import loan and a number of DLF capital projects, e.g., a cooperative fertilizer factory.

Q: *When was the period of the new rice and Green Revolution?*

GULICK: This was in process then, it had started before. The Ford Foundation had always had a very large agricultural technical assistance program there and we were working closely with that,

actually supporting them. They had helped the Indians develop the program for rapid adoption of the new rice varieties.

Q: *Were you involved in that?*

GULICK: No, not directly very much, but, of course, the agricultural universities were supporting it, and the extension services and demonstration teams that we had fit right in with that.

Q: *Was there any particular Mission view about the Green Revolution and its potential or problems or issues?*

GULICK: No, no, everybody was very enthusiastic about it. We were a little concerned that, some others were, about the equity and the small farmers and so forth; but it proved to be almost as quickly adopted by them as by the bigger farmers and was equally successful. We had a big capital projects program there, which was ongoing. There were a few major projects: we had a major fertilizer project which was, I guess, the first major fertilizer project done outside the public sector. It was in the cooperative sector.

Q: *How did it work?*

GULICK: Pretty well, as far as I know. I think it's still working. We got the American cooperatives to support it and an American company, which was very well regarded by all our technical people, who did the design and supervision and another American company to provide the major equipment. So it was very carefully planned and was effective. The nuclear power station that we helped finance was already functioning by the time I got there, but there were some continuing issues.

Q: *That was working satisfactory?*

GULICK: Reasonably well, Yes.

Q: *You were there during the Johnson administration?*

GULICK: Yes, the end of it.

Q: *I raise this point, because I gather there was some issue of President Johnson and Indira Gandhi over PL 480 assistance that he held up.*

GULICK: Yes, the issues on that were before my time.

Q: *What were the issues on that?*

GULICK: Well, it was also part of this whole business with the Bell-Mehta agreement, the World Bank led consortium, and the major commitment of continuous substantial aid to the current 5 year plan. It included: mainly the liberalization and raising the farmer's price of grain

and reduction of the compulsory grain sales to the state and so on. And perhaps most important, the fertilizer: making available fertilizer, encouraging private distribution of fertilizer and encouraging private sector production of fertilizer. Also pushing hard on the small irrigation programs particularly in the Punjab and other areas. There were quite a lot of rather specific measures, but the ones that were controversial were the liberalization type ones. Johnson, really Orvill Freeman, who was Secretary of Agriculture at that time, got Johnson excited about insisting on Indian performance on these things sort of month by month and releasing the food that they needed gradually in view of adequate performance in these various respects. It was probably pretty much resented by all of the Indians. Some mixed feelings though, because most of the people, the people above the purely bureaucratic level, agreed that these things should be done.

Q: I understand that Johnson held up the PL 480 agreement, which infuriated Indira Gandhi.

GULICK: I'm sure that's true. I don't know the details on that.

Q: And the consequence she then determined that she would never be dependent on US food assistance. Did you ever hear that story?

GULICK: Well, there were certainly desires to become less dependent announced periodically.

Q: Was that happening while you were there?

GULICK: The dependence decreasing? No,...well, the dependence on PL 480 was decreasing, because the food production was rapidly increasing. Of course that was the whole point.

Q: But there was a big distribution problem wasn't there ?

GULICK: Just before I got there, the end of this drought, there was a major public distribution relief program, which was very well done. No one really starved even though the crop failure was very widespread and very severe. That was really just about over by the time I got there, and by then there was a lot of mutual congratulation about how well it had been handled.

Q: Who was the Director then?

GULICK: John Lewis. I think he had been there for about a year, actually quite a bit more. He had gone there fairly early in Bell's administration. He came over from the Budget Bureau or the Council of Economic Advisors and was sent out there. He had indicated he might like me to come out there before I went to Nigeria.

Q: What was his main interest?

GULICK: He was very much involved in all this Bell-Mehta agreement, and Chester Bowles was ambassador at the time. He and Bowles had known each other before and were very close. He wasn't there yet when Hollis and I went out, I don't think.

Q: Were there any other major issues that you had to deal with in that five year period?

GULICK: Well, family planning became an issue. The whole health program had been developed: a fairly substantial health education and health program planning, rural health planning and so forth. The program had been developed and then one of our all too frequent wind shifts happened in Washington and the whole rug was pulled out from under that. Sort of like the steel mill again - when it was pretty far down the track. All we wanted to do was family planning. John had to handle that, but it was a bad show. Our public health man, who had been working on the health program really, in effect, quit after that.

Q: And this was in the year of the Basic Human Needs emphasis?

GULICK: Yes I guess so.

Q: What was the government's attitude towards the thrust of family planning?

GULICK: They were very annoyed by having the program, which had been carefully planned, all of a sudden jerked out. They were interested in family planning. The Ford Foundation had been working with family planning but they didn't want anything to do with us in health anymore after that. We got involved in an attempt to support a substantial stepping up their family planning program. We continued with sort of modest technical assistance activities to the extent they wanted it, but they didn't really want it.

Q: You say they wanted out of the health program?

GULICK: The health people in the Indian government felt really betrayed by this business and they didn't trust us. They didn't want to count on us for anything.

Q: They were discouraged with our shift away from health to the Indian family planning.

GULICK: Yes!

Q: We were dropping health ourselves?

GULICK: Yes, they had been just been working up with us quite a major program in health education and rural health and so on, and all of a sudden it was pulled out after really we had pretty much committed ourselves to it. So we had people there trying to develop interest in family planning, and they did to some extent; but it was a rather awkward period for several years there. Then we got involved in an effort to encourage a substantial increase in their budget for family planning. Maury Williams was the Assistant Administrator by then. He arranged, at some international meeting to offer up to \$20,000,000 to support an increase in the budget for the family planning program. So for the last year '71/'72, we were developing a program to try to take advantage of that offer, and it was eventually successful.

Q: Were you dealing with a separate agency in the Indian government, not with the health people?

GULICK: No no, it was the health people.

Q: *I see. Were you joining the health and family planning as a common program, or was it just pure family planning.*

GULICK: Yes.

Q: *And there wasn't a concept of integrated...*

GULICK: The Indians did, but we didn't.

Q: *I see. So our policy was not to relate the two?*

GULICK: Well, I'm sure we were in favor of relating them, but we weren't supporting the health program, only family planning.

Q: *I see. Were there other shifts at that time?*

GULICK: No. There were three main things that we didn't do, that the Indians felt we welshed on: the steel mill in the first place, and then the commitment to provide non-project aid in support of this Bell-Mehta agreement. We made the first year's level; but we never made the level we were supposed to after that.

Q: *We continued, but with a reduced amount?*

GULICK: Yes, and then the health program.

Q: *So we backed off and they thought we had reneged on our original understandings?*

GULICK: Yes.

Q: *I see.*

GULICK: I don't know, I've never been sure how much that really surprised anybody but they always cited this at anytime...

Q: *Did we have anything to do with the community development at that time, or did that pretty much pass by?*

GULICK: We never did have much to do with that directly. The Ford Foundation was very much involved in early stages of that and went right along. I remember I went out there in 1957, January, for my first visit. We had one person on mission staff who was following it and that was it.

Q: *Were we still working with agricultural colleges? That was still a major activity?*

GULICK: Oh, yes. That was the major activity in the agricultural sector.

Q: *How was that working out?*

GULICK: On the whole very well. Better some places than other places, but generally well. Punjab was very successful.

Q: *We had five university contracts?*

GULICK: Five contracts.

Q: *Which one did you think was most impressive?*

GULICK: I think the Punjab project. They had a very dynamic and aggressive Vice Chancellor there, but they were all pretty good. I'm trying to remember there was one that was not going quite so smoothly, maybe that was Orissa. Of course, there were always from time to time problems on staffing and there were others things that didn't go to well.

Q: *Any sense of what the contribution of those programs were to agricultural involvement in the country?*

GULICK: Oh, they were very considerable. Everyone agreed that they were very successful, I think. The Indians were very enthusiastic. In detail, I think, through the staffing of the extension service, the research programs and so on. The universities had important research functions too, although the Indian Council of Agricultural Research has it's own major program. We helped a little, I guess, setting up the Indian Center for Research in the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT) which was an activity of the global agricultural research program. That became a very good institution. We didn't directly have much to do with it. I don't think we provided any technical people for it, but a number of our agriculture university teams were cooperating with it, and did some very good work apparently.

Q: *Apart from the family planning and the agricultural institutional involvements, were there any other main lines of technical assistance and commodity import programs?*

GULICK: There were some capital projects: the main one that I remember, the big one that was going on that was being negotiated when I was there, was the fertilizer factory.

Q: *What was your experience working with the Indian government? How did you find that?*

GULICK: Well, there were a great many very good people, both technically competent and able to take initiative and terribly dedicated. Two people I knew pretty well killed themselves by overworking: one was the Planning Commission chap-P. Pant, and the other was the chap who was the first Indian I met when I started working on India in Washington here. He was the Indian Economic Minister here- Govindan Nair. He later became the Finance Secretary of the Government of India. That's where he was when I was in India. He died very young, both of

them died very young from, at least, partly overwork. And quite a few other people I knew in the Finance Ministry and the Economy Industry Ministry were very good. There were a lot of very good people.

Q: What about the bureaucracy?

GULICK: Well, that was the bureaucracy, but they were the top of course. The bureaucracy in India is pretty bureaucratic. And certainly a lot of the bureaucrats in the ministries that had responsibility for running public sector industries and so on, had an interest in public sector industries. Surprisingly a lot of the people with professional training were pretty liberal and welcomed many of the liberalization measures that were being encouraged by the foreigners.

Q: What was your sense of the Indian attitude towards the United States or the Americans?

GULICK: It was pretty good. I guess, the Peace Corps got started fairly early on there. I remember seeing Peace Corps people in '56. They were generally quite well received. It depended a lot on where we were at with India/Pakistan relations. When they were fighting we were generally not very sympathetic to the Indians, and as I say we never did have a substantial military program there. We kept leaning on them somewhat on Kashmir with some justification. So from the overall political standpoint, and then, of course, the end was really the reason why I left there, when Bangladesh split off from Pakistan. The Indians sympathized with the Bangladeshis and we "tilted", according to Nixon's term, toward the Pakistanis. The Indians, I think, really resented pretty much our attitude on that and didn't believe it was well founded.

Q: Why did we tilt towards Pakistan?

GULICK: Well, just because the Pakistanis were our boys weakening Afghanistan and so forth. We had substantial bases in Pakistan and a military assistance program. When did the Russians move into Afghanistan? So we made gestures even sending a fleet, ships out to roam around the Indian ocean as sort of an implication that we might actually help the Pakistani try to suppress Bangladesh. Meanwhile the Indians weren't actually participating at all, but a whole flock of refugees, 10,000,000 of them, came across the border from Bangladesh to India and they had to put them all in camps and feed them, and they were scared stiff that they would stay, that they wouldn't go back.

Q: Were you involved in any emergency...

GULICK: No, no. We weren't sympathetic and sort of kept treating the Indians as though they were kind of responsible for this insurrection in Bangladesh, not quite that, but our official line was quite hostile to India at that time, and we cut off all aid.

Q: We cut off all aid?

GULICK: All financial aid, not existing technical assistance projects, but everything else. Not food, at least not voluntary agency food; but all the capital aid we cut off.

Q: *And the commodity import program?*

GULICK: Yes.

Q: *This was at the end of your period?*

GULICK: Yes, in '72. I always thought that the intelligence that the administration based its decisions on in that respect was very bad. I saw some things suggesting that we thought that the Indians were actually about to attack Pakistan or get involved in military actions against Pakistan in connection with that, and I just don't believe there was anything to that at all.

Q: *Anything else on the India experience that stands out at this point? You traveled around the country I guess. How did you find the conditions generally? How would you characterize what you saw?*

GULICK: Well, pretty much the way it is. Our attitudes towards India on what's going on economically in India and even politically to some extent seemed to go through cycles. Sometimes everything is great and other times you would think everything is going to hell in the hand basket. The Indians sometimes would allow it themselves, but they always exaggerate it one way or both ways. Generally, I thought they were making pretty good progress, needed to liberalize more; but there were still as many or more poor people as there ever were. The population has more than doubled, since I've been working on India. Much more, almost tripled! There is the top half maybe, or more, doing pretty well, and there's a much bigger middle class and well to do class than there was; but there's still a very large number of people who are at the bottom of nowhere. Politically certainly the trend over this whole period had been that the Congress party has weakened various other parties that have come along. The present Congress government is really a minority government. It depends on the tolerance of a number of minority parties; it may well not form the next government after the next elections, if things go the way they look like they might. I keep running into people who think India is going to break apart; but I've never really thought any particular break that I could think of was very likely in India. People talk about Bengal breaking away, but Bengal has more interest in a united India than any other region probably. Communal difficulties seem now to be certainly worse than they seemed to be some years ago.

Q: *One of the earlier projections about India's population growth was such that it was going to double and triple and so on as you suggested, but that it was never going to be able to feed this number of people, in other words that it was going to be a real disaster case.*

GULICK: I remember fairly early on we got a few people from the University of Illinois, I think, regarded as experts on overall economic and agricultural potential, to come out and make a very careful estimate of the potential with current or immediately imminent technology of how many people India could feed. At that time the population of India was about 400 million. Now it's about one billion. At that time they estimated that it could with, like I say, current and maybe available technology and reasonable investment and so forth, support eight times that population. So that would double a few times.

Q: But that is contradictory of what other people were implying at that time, that there was no chance that they could feed themselves.

GULICK: It may have been less than 400 million at the time. But anyway it involved fully exploiting the water potential, the water resources and high yielding varieties and optimum fertilizing and so on. It was probably optimistic, but it was based on the types of land and how much land, and the potential of water and so on. I think it wasn't probably totally out of the ballpark. Anyway, so far they have been keeping up; in fact they are exporting grain now.

Q: What would you say were the major factors in being able to keep up?

GULICK: Well, better use of the water and high yielding varieties. Those were the main things. Fertilizer was important too.

Q: You think that the US assistance program contributed anything?

GULICK: Yes, we and the Ford Foundation together certainly did.

Q: The Ford Foundation and the US together.

GULICK: Yes.

Q: Mostly in which areas, you say?

GULICK: Aside from the policy areas, which were very important, which they might have done anyway. They certainly got some strong pushes from both the Ford Foundation and us and the World Bank. The improved varieties, more and better use of fertilizer, and we helped with some of the irrigation programs. I'm sure the continuing research is important and gets more important as time goes on. I would be skeptical whether they could really get to eight times as much without some really difficult periods. So far the population growth hasn't really slowed down; the death rate is going down as fast as the birth rate, and the birth rate hasn't gone down anywhere near what we would hope that it would. But they are getting more active again now. They had that big reverse on the family planning. It sort of backfired contributing to Indira's loss of power. They really were getting pretty close to compulsory vasectomization.

Q: Was that during your time?

GULICK: Just after it. We had gotten some indications that there were dangerous tendencies before I left.

Q: Had we taken a position on that?

GULICK: No, well, our position was that family planning should be voluntary. That was their policy too, but particularly under Sanjay Gandhi's influence, it got to be so that pressure for performance on the local authorities was extreme - and probably resulted in a certain amount of winking at coercion of various sorts.

Q: *Anything more on the India thing?*

GULICK: I guess not.

RICHARD T. DAVIES
Consul General
Calcutta (1968-1969)

After graduating from Columbia College in 1942, Ambassador Richard T. Davies served in the U.S. Army in World War II. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1947, Ambassador Davies has held positions in Moscow, Paris, Kabul, Calcutta and Warsaw. He was interviewed by Peter Jessup on November 9 1979.

DAVIES: Yes, I was there from the beginning of 1965 to the middle of 1968. Actually the terms were two years. Near the end of the second year I told the Department...

Well, Marks was there by then, and I spoke with him. I said I'd like to stay. He agreed, so I told the Department and I stayed for the third year, but then I really had to go back. I was trying to find a job, and finally they said, how about Calcutta? I had never been in Calcutta. We'd been in Delhi, Madras, Bombay and several other places during the tour in Afghanistan, but I had never gotten that far East.

It sounded pretty interesting, and Calcutta is a great city, a large city.

So we went off to Calcutta in the summer of 1968, in August, and my gosh, when we got there Pam Am was still landing in Calcutta - Pan Am One, around-the-world flights - and we came in, and we came in in the midst of one of the worst monsoon storms they had had there in years. The airport was awash, and the water was coming down in sheets, and they had to bring a van out to the plane, and we managed to get into that, my wife and I, and I guess we had all four kids with us then.

The residence was ankle deep in water.

Of course the problem with Calcutta is that the drains, which were put in at the end of the last century or the beginning of this century, have been stopped up for years, and the Hooghly River...

Well, in the first place it was all swamp - bamboo swamp - to begin with, mango trees, that kind of thing, a very swampy ground. And they built up the river bank to keep it from flooding so badly, but then the harbor has silted up, covering up the outlets of most of the drains, so the drainage system is practically nonexistent. And nothing has happened since the British left, and they didn't do much, because the capital was moved up to Delhi from Calcutta in the early years of this century, and after they left Calcutta they weren't keeping it up, they were working on Delhi, not on Calcutta.

So whenever we had these bad monsoon rains the water was up to your ankles or knees in the street, and we came right in the middle of that.

Well, but it was all right. We managed to get into the Consulate. Our office in Calcutta is one of the two or three oldest in our service. We set up an office there shortly after we achieved our independence.

There was a great triangular trade - shipping ice from New England to Calcutta, and picking up hemp there, I suppose, and tea and taking it to the spice islands, taking it to Indonesia, and picking up spices from there and bringing them back to New England.

Unless I am mistaken - maybe my memory is no longer quite so accurate on this - maybe the first consular officer who was appointed by the United States was supposed to go to Calcutta and he died at sea before he got there. In those years you know it took you several months to get there.

So this is a very old office, and the situation in Bengal then was fascinating, because they had President's rule. In India, when one of the states proves to be ungovernable, the Prime Minister recommends President's rule.

They had that in Bengal; they hadn't been able to elect a government, and Bengal of course is the turbulent part of India. But a new election was set - I guess it was set for January, and indeed in January they had the election, and the communists were elected there. There are three communist parties: there is the Moscow Communist Party, the Communist Party Marxist, which is the one that was elected in Bengal, which had had some ties with China before the Chinese invasion, and they were broken after that. But it is independent of Moscow, it has nothing to do with Moscow. Then there is the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist, the so-called Naxalites, who were violent, a violent group.

This of course was in the middle of the Vietnam War, and every Saturday and Sunday there was a demonstration outside the Consulate, where crowds gathered.

Everybody knew the rules of the game; as long as we had somebody there to receive a petition they'd come and give a petition, and stand and shout outside. But it was all right, there was never any violence.

Q: Not the type of danger of today.

DAVIES: No. There were dangers in the city, and there could be riots.

Q: But I mean they weren't likely to burn down the...

DAVIES: No, it was a safety valve, and the police were good, they would give us warning ahead of time, up until the communist takeover that is. But then they took over, and they were a good, strong party. This young fellow - well, not so young - Jhota Basu, was the head of the party, and

he is now Chief Minister in Bengal. He won the election there fair and square. At that time they were in a coalition with other parties.

We were on a street called Harrington Street. Of course most of the streets in Calcutta, which is fundamentally a British city, were named after Englishmen. The Consulate and the British High Commission were located on Harrington Street. Who Harrington was I don't know. But when the communists won they changed the name of the street to Ho Chi Minh Street - Ho Chi Minh Sarani - and we didn't know what to do, but finally we had to print that on our letterhead. I mean what the heck, what do you do?

So, Ho Chih Minh Street it was.

We had an annex on another street nearby with a different name, and we were thinking of making that the chief address, but it would be silly. What can you do? They had us.

It was a fascinating place. India of course is just a world apart, a delightful place to serve, I think in many ways, very discouraging in many ways too. But you have to understand that this civilization has been going on there for 6000 years, and there is a great deal of misery. Actually of course it's a very mixed thing, because the population is so much larger than it ever was. It has become exponentially larger. So many more people are alive today, subsisting in that same territory, than there ever were in any previous historical epoch.

Q: Was Sister Teresa working there?

DAVIES: Oh, yes indeed. My wife and a lot of the women in the consulate corps went and helped her, whether they were Catholic or not, it didn't make any difference. She was very active there, and Malcolm Muggeridge was in the process at that point of making a BBC documentary about her, which was the way she first came to world attention. Well, she was known, but she was known primarily through the Kennedy's. She came here several times under the auspices of the Ethel and Joseph Kennedy Foundation for Retarded Children. She may have started a house in Boston, I don't know. But she's got several in this hemisphere, in Latin America primarily. But she is a remarkable woman, she is just absolutely fantastic.

Q: Who was the Ambassador in Delhi then?

DAVIES: When we got there it was Chester Bowles.

Q: Oh, he was still there.

DAVIES: He was there on his second tour. He'd been Undersecretary in the State Department.

Q: Kennedy...

DAVIES: He was shoved out of there and went back to Delhi. Wonderful man - he and his wife were just great people. He had - what do you call it?

Q: *Parkinson's disease.*

DAVIES: Yes, Parkinson's.

Q: *The beginning of it?*

DAVIES: He had the beginning of it, and he was one of the first people who were getting this L-Dopa drug, which kept it very much under control. He is still alive.

Q: *Yes, lives in Essex, Connecticut.*

DAVIES: But he can't speak now. I think he can take anything in, but he can't control any longer his nervous system now. But he was still playing golf, he was very active and doing a lot of things - a wonderful man.

At the end of that year the election came along, and when Nixon was elected Ken (Kenneth B.) Keating was sent there, and he was very nice. He was a widower at that point, and he was married while he was there, but after we left. Very nice man.

Q: *Yes, I served under him in Israel.*

DAVIES: Right, yes.

Q: *He died.*

DAVIES: Yes. I quite liked him, what little I saw of him. I only saw him two or three times. He came down there once, and we went up to Delhi for a couple meetings. He had been there during the war, and he knew something about India. He had been a pilot in the Air Force, or a staff officer. So he knew something about the place.

So that was good. And for children in particular India is a wonderful place.

Q: *Really?*

DAVIES: Oh, my goodness, just terrific, just terrific. Afghanistan had been great, and India was the same; for kids up to I would say 15 years of age it's just wonderful, because the servants are very good with children, they like children, and they are childlike themselves in a way I suppose, and there is so much to do.

Q: *What was the gap between service in Kabul and service in Calcutta? I mean how many years had elapsed? Had all the children been born?*

DAVIES: Oh, all except one had been born. The third was born in Kabul, but he didn't remember it at all, and actually the second one didn't remember it too well. John, the oldest boy, remembered. Well, the second one remembered too, he was just a baby when we got there. We had left Kabul in 1958.

Q: *So it was ten years later.*

DAVIES: Yes, ten years later. And we went back there. At Christmas or New Year's we went up to Kashmir, and spent a week in a houseboat there in the middle of Dal Lake, wonderful. And then from there we went to Kabul, because this third boy who had been born there always wanted to know, where is this place?

Q: *"Where was I born?"*

DAVIES: Right, so we took him back up there and showed him actually the building and the room where he was born. He was born in the doctor's office in the compound there, so we showed him that.

Bruce Laingen, who is now in the Foreign Ministry in Teheran, was DCM there at that time. I had known him before.

But for kids it's just great, they really enjoyed themselves. The oldest two were in school here, and they came out during the summer and for Christmas vacation, and then they were there in the summer again, in the summer of 1969, when I was asked to come back here. So the two older ones spent a fair amount of time (there). The two younger ones were there all year and they went to school, the Anglo-American School there in Calcutta, and they just loved it, it was great.

Well, in the summer of 1969, I got a telegram from Elliot Richardson asking me to come back. He was changing the policy planning staff to what he called the planning and coordination staff, and he wanted me to...

First he asked me to come back to be interviewed, so I did, and then he said he'd like to have me come back and work on Soviet...

So I didn't know what to do. We were planning to stay in Calcutta. We would like to have stayed there.

Q: *You had been there how long, a year?*

DAVIES: Just a year. Actually by the time I left it was 13 months. I didn't know what to do, as I say the family was quite happy there, we were settled, and you know you hate to move more often than you have to. But Elliot was very persuasive, so I said okay, I'll come back.

So we moved back here again, and I went to work in this planning and coordination staff, which was...

WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN
Political/Economic Officer

New Delhi (1968-1970)

Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the "Holloway Program" which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.

Q: I'd just like to get one thing clear. You were in the embassy in New Delhi from 1968 until when?

BROWN: From 1968 to 1970. At this time, let's review what was happening. President Nixon had written an article in the quarterly publication, "Foreign Affairs." For someone like myself, who was reading the tea leaves at the time, this was a very important article. It contained a clear hint of a possible breakthrough in U.S.-China relations. Nixon had in his pocket, as it were, President Ceausescu of Romania, an enemy of the Soviet Union and fairly well disposed to the Chinese communists, in terms of the tactics of the time. Nixon probably had very little use for Ceausescu otherwise, but anything that played all right was acceptable.

We had a burgeoning war in Vietnam. Our casualties were getting dramatically higher, and the anti-war movement was growing in the United States. We could observe a growing Indian-Soviet relationship which was really getting close now. It was increasingly clear that this relationship was gaining momentum. Tension between India and Pakistan was rising. The Indians had an embassy in China, but the Sino-Indian relationship was also becoming more tense. The Chinese and the Indians had an outstanding border controversy, featuring conflicting claims to territory along the frontier. A few, short years before, in fact six years previously, there had been a Sino-Indian War [1962]. The Indians had rearmed with our help and had deployed armies up in the Himalayas. This was all serious stuff.

As I said, I found myself in a fascinating position. Here we had been stonewalled, politely stonewalled, but nonetheless stonewalled by the Soviet desk of the Indian Foreign Ministry and welcomed by the Chinese desk. We were getting good information. I was reporting on Tibetan refugee affairs, which brought me to strange places in India, including Buddhist areas. Ambassador Keating dearly loved to travel. One of the key places that he wanted to visit was the forbidden Shangri-la of Bhutan.

"Tiki" Kaul, an experienced, high level Indian diplomat and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was, by now, the Foreign Secretary [most senior civil servant] in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. India had a Foreign Minister, who was pro-Soviet. I don't recall his name. Tiki was referred to by the British Ambassador to Moscow at the time as "that snake in the grass." [Laughter] I'll never forget that Tiki Kaul invited Ambassador Keating to call at the Foreign Ministry, and I went along as note-taker. Tiki was gracious and well-spoken. He said to

Ambassador Keating: "I understand that you're getting around the country and are getting to see places." Ambassador Keating said, "Oh, yes, it's wonderful to see your country," and so forth. Tiki said, "I have something that you possibly might be interested in. How would you like to go to Bhutan?" Nominally Bhutan was an independent country, but you couldn't get there except with the help of the Indians. They kept an iron grip on travel to that restricted area.

Ambassador Keating's face lighted up. He was just delighted at this prospect. Tiki said, "It's difficult to get you in, but we could provide you with a helicopter. If the weather's all right..." By this time Ambassador Keating was on Cloud Nine. The hook came later in the conversation. Tiki said, "You know, you have an awful lot of USIS branches around India. They're nice people. However, we've been thinking that the Soviets are fairly restricted, as things stand now. You'll probably be seeing more Soviet information offices in the future." In other words, he was saying: "Grin and bear it. The Soviets want to expand, and we're going to let them expand." That was the real purpose of the invitation to Ambassador Keating to call on Tiki Kaul.

Off I went with Ambassador Keating and Len Lefkow in an Indian helicopter to Bhutan. This was later on in my tour in India, after I'd been there for a while. By this time APOLLO IX had landed on the Moon. So we carried with us a speck of Moon dust, a fragment of the surface of the Moon. Having learned some Himalayan ways myself, I drilled Ambassador Keating on how to greet the King of Bhutan. I was first coached by the Chief of Protocol of Bhutan on what to do. Then I got a white, silk scarf and took Ambassador Keating into a side room to practice handling it. Remember, Keating was a man in his 70s. He was expected to toss this scarf and spread it with his hands. He was having difficulty doing this. So I said to Ambassador Keating: "Imagine that it's opening day at Yankee Stadium and you're tossing out the first baseball. Toss the scarf like this and spread it," which he finally did.

On the side we got an earful, from the Bhutanese, about Indian imperialism, colonialism, and domination. The Bhutanese were the recipients of Indian money, defense assistance, and so on, but the Indians kept them under very tight control. The younger, nationalistic Bhutanese resented the way they were treated.

The King and Queen of Bhutan were estranged. They had separate palaces and we stayed at the Queen's palace I remember that there was a beautiful, full moon that night. We had the film of the APOLLO moon landing with us, which we projected for a group of Bhutanese monks, using a projector owned by a Japanese agronomist. The monks would look at the film and then at the full, bright moon. They had trouble believing that astronauts had landed on the moon. It was truly a magic setting for the projection of the film.

We then flew from Bhutan to Sikkim [another kingdom North of India]. We were wined and dined by the ruler of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal and his American wife, Hope Cooke, a graduate of Sarah Lawrence College.

I soon realized that we were in a setup to some extent. She had arranged a program, which they reviewed for us in a cursory manner. Ambassador Keating was nodding politely. However, I was uneasy to learn that there was to be a side meeting to meet Sikkim civil servants, at the Palace but without the royal presence. I knew, from what I had read, that there was a certain amount of

anti-Indian agitation in Sikkim. I was very concerned about this, but the program had been laid on, and we had to go through with it.

From the palace we went to a function hosted by the Indian High Commissioner. I went straight to him and said, "Something bad has happened, and I want you to know about it." I knew that he was aware of it. I said, "We here to make courtesy calls. We don't wish to become involved in domestic politics. The American Ambassador has no knowledge of local politics, and we don't want to become involved in it." The Indian High Commissioner said, "Thank you very much. I'm aware of what you're talking about. You have to realize, Mr. Brown, and please tell your Government, that a half hour's flight away, as the crow flies, are 50,000, heavily armed, Chinese troops. This is strategic territory for us, and that's why we are here. We suffered what we did in 1962, and we're not about to let that happen again. If His Majesty (as he sarcastically called the King) wants to have democracy (which the ruler had said that he wanted) he can have one man, one vote." From this I inferred that the High Commissioner was hinting that India could easily put enough Hindus in Sikkim to throw out the ruler in an election.

That night there was a celebration. His Majesty got drunk and made some inappropriate remarks. In her own way Queen Hope Cooke was always sarcastically knifing the Indians in our presence. These remarks were duly related to the Indians. So, some years later [1975], I was not surprised but I was saddened to hear that both the King and Queen were tossed out of Sikkim and Sikkim was annexed by India.

Those trips gave me the visual, hands on feel for what China looked like, from an Indian strategic point of view. The Indians considered this a very serious matter. That was part of the explanation for the kind of relatively open exchanges on China I had with the Indians.

In this regard, by 1969 or 1970 Paul Kreisberg, the outgoing Director of Asian Communist Affairs in the Department, which is a different name for the non-Taiwan China desk in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, came to see me in the course of travel elsewhere. In a very secretive manner he called me aside and said, "Bill, the Warsaw Talks between ourselves and the Chinese have reached a stage where, I believe, a breakthrough can take place if American leadership is strong enough and courageous enough. We're going to bring you back to the Department to be Deputy Director of that office. So bear that in mind."

Meanwhile, all kinds of things were happening in India. For instance, through another channel I heard that the Dalai Lama wanted to make a visit to the United States. I said to those who told me this: "I don't think that this is going to work out." They said, "What do you mean? We have a very special relationship with the Tibetans," which they did. I said, "Well, I don't know about that. I haven't been involved in political relationships with the Dalai Lama, if you will. I have been in contact with him on refugee rehabilitation matters. I can tell you that I don't think that Washington is going to be in the mood to receive him in the United States." However, I dutifully cabled back to the Department of State that the Dalai Lama was interested in visiting the U.S. Shortly before I left India, I received an instruction saying that I should go to the Dalai Lama's brother, who was then up in Darjeeling, India, and tell him that it would not be opportune at this time for the Dalai Lama to come to the U.S. The brother was the eminence grise of the Tibetan cabinet.

So I flew from New Delhi to Calcutta and took the train up to Darjeeling. I was given a sumptuous feast by the Dalai Lama's brother and then, as diplomatically as I could, had to break the news that now was not the time for such a visit. The brother took it with a wooden face, as he was my host. He said that he understood. I got on the train and came back down to Calcutta. I felt very sad because I had great affection for the Dalai Lama. However, I sensed that something was afoot in U.S.-PRC relations. And it was.

Q: Would you explain for the historian why, from the Washington point of view, this proposed visit by the Dalai Lama to the United States was not considered opportune?

BROWN: The Dalai Lama was and is the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. He fled from Tibet to India in 1959 and has lived in exile since then. U.S. support for the Dalai Lama and his movement was one of the many bones of contention between ourselves and Beijing. For its part Beijing had crushed the efforts by the Tibetan people to achieve independence or resist Chinese domination. The Chinese communists brutally overwhelmed the country, had the territory firmly in hand, and were going through the process of destroying Buddhist monasteries, subjecting the Tibetan people to Chinese rule, and stationing Chinese cadres in the country. Now, on top of it all, in the mid-late nineteen-sixties they applied the Cultural Revolution to Tibet, so that the destructive and vindictive aspect of the Cultural Revolution was in full force there.

However, much as I sympathized with the Dalai Lama and Tibetans more generally, I felt that Washington would not be in a mood to receive him in the United States at that time. And Washington wasn't in the mood to receive him because President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were looking for a breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations [Addendum: For a perspective of U.S. covert operations - some of which involved cooperation with Chiang Ching-kuo's security apparatus on Taiwan - to assist Tibetan resistance to the Chinese Communist takeover of Tibet, see Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son, Harvard University Press, 2000. See also Thomas Laird, Into Tibet: the CIA's First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa, Grove Press 2002 which is about Douglas S. Mackiernan, who had been stationed under cover as a Vice Consul in Urumchi, Xinjiang, aided a Kazak rebellion against the invading People's Liberation Army, escaped to Tibet and was mistakenly killed by Tibetan border guards in 1950 while attempting to cross into India. In this latter connection, while in New Delhi I was contacted by a Kazak who described himself as the "Dalai Khan," leader of some 600 Kazaks who had fled to India in 1950 and a colleague of Mackiernan. I helped arrange the transfer of these Kazaks for resettlement in Turkey.]

I sensed an ongoing tension between India and Pakistan. I am no expert on Pakistan but I sensed that another Indo-Pakistani War would come. The situation between the two countries was getting that tense.

While I was in India, some other things happened. We developed a very close friendship with the Polish Ambassador to India, Romuald Spakowski, whose son was in the graduating class at the American International School in New Delhi. As fate would have it, the young man fell in love with our eldest daughter. She didn't really reciprocate this feeling. She was willing to be good friends, but no more. The young man, who was called "Kay," committed suicide just before we

left India. Literally, a day or two before our departure from India we went over to his parents' home, and there was Kay's dead body resting on a block of ice. His parents were almost beside themselves. We had to bid them farewell. It was one of the most emotional, traumatic occasions in my diplomatic career. Kay's father was a professional diplomat who had been Polish Ambassador to the United States. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party.

The Ambassador's son hated the Gomulka regime. He was now 21 and was of an age to be drafted into the Polish Army. He didn't want to go back to Poland and was doing increasingly strange things, to the point that his parents had us over to dinner "en famille" because Kay was beginning to dispose of his personal possessions. He was beginning to express himself in strange ways. This was disturbing, but it didn't occur to us that he was about to commit suicide. However, Kay's death happened shortly thereafter.

So, on a personal basis, we left India very, very distraught. Ambassador Spasowski was later assigned Ambassador to the United States for a second time. He defected in Washington in 1981, saying, in effect: "Let Poland be Poland." [See Romuald Spasowski, The Liberation of One, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986]

All in all, it was a very exciting tour in India. I got to see parts of India, thanks to the Tibetan refugee job, and travels by Ambassador Keating, which no American diplomat ever saw. Although I had a specialty area, that is, Sino-Soviet affairs, I had a much broader education in so many ways.

Q: I have a couple of questions. From what you said, I gather that Ambassador Kenneth Keating, in a way, was all right. Here was an Ambassador who really wasn't involved in political affairs. Your job was to keep him happy. He wanted to travel. So it was almost as if he was out in his own playground or something like that.

BROWN: Not really...

Q: I've used the wrong term. The point is that he really wasn't very much engaged in India.

BROWN: If Ambassador Keating were here, he would say that he visited so many of the Indian states and so many Governors, he gave so many speeches, and he got around a lot. He would say that he went to see Madame Gandhi when the occasion arose, and so forth. However, the fact of it was that we had a big, well-functioning embassy. He was an older man. He was to go on to Israel as Ambassador, after he had completed his tour as Ambassador to India. I think that he was wise enough to realize: "My goodness, I have this finely honed staff here in the embassy in New Delhi. They know India and will do the right thing by me and will 'program me' in the right way. So why not?"

Q: I wonder if you could do a little comparison here. You went from a highly professional embassy in Moscow, which has always been considered a place, even before World War II, for real professionals. Did you find the situation comparable in any way in India? India is a big power. There are Americans who feel strongly about India, and yet, much to India's dismay,

Indian relations with the United States have remained on the back burner. What about the staff of the embassy in New Delhi and how they handled things?

BROWN: The staff of the embassy in New Delhi was top level at the State Department professional level and at the AID [Agency for International Development] level. We had top notch people there. It was a very large Mission. AID had a budget worth hundreds of millions of dollars. It had a very large staff, branches, and so forth. USIS [United States Information Service] had a large operation. Ambassador Bowles had his own newspaper, a bi-weekly or monthly. It was incredible. This publication had a readership estimated at over 500,000. We could take on the Soviet Union in the Ambassador's corner or column.

Ambassador Bowles was a political appointee, riding a great wave of his past accomplishments, including friendship with India. India was a democracy. India's leadership at the time was increasingly characterized by having a chip on its shoulder, in terms of the United States. In a sense, this was understandable in the sense that Indians both took and resented our aid. However, India had a free press, to which we had access. We traveled the length and breadth of the land and invested a lot of money in India. We had specialists there, including a Science Attache who was busily engaged with the Indians on scientific business. In that connection, I began to feel a bit disturbed when I saw that we were cooperating, in fact, with the Indians on a small weather satellite missile program. Pretty soon the Indians were asking for access to the Lincoln Laboratory and its missile gyroscope facility in Massachusetts.

We were also a bit concerned about the workings of our nuclear agreement with the Indians for peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Indians had a CANDU nuclear reactor, a Canadian reactor. There were increasingly troublesome signs that spot inspections were not doing so well. Somehow, it seemed that our inspectors did not quite get there in time to carry on truly spot inspections and were made to feel not very welcome. They were asked if they could postpone their inspections for a couple of days, and there was that secret aspect of the Indians' nuclear and missile work in connection with weather satellites and related missiles. This attitude was disturbing. However, the momentum of such cooperation continued. So it was a mix of attitudes.

We had a Consulate General in Calcutta which was dealing with a popularly elected, communist-controlled state government, which promptly named the street in which our Consulate General was located, "Ho Chi Minh Street." We had a flourishing Consulate General in Bombay. We ran into the phenomenon to which you alluded. Some people who visited India came away with less than favorable impressions, shall we say.

I was to run into that attitude when I returned to the U.S. and called on the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Winthrop Brown. In the past he had been DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] in New Delhi. When I mentioned India, he launched on to a very negative monolog.

Q: Well, despite the fact that India is a democracy and all that, I think that Dennis Kux wrote a book called, "The Strange Democracy." Some people fell in love with India, but I would say that there was not much warmth in the attitudes of other Americans toward India, back in Washington.

BROWN: As you said, some Americans fell in love with India. This was during the Vietnam War and the period of the flower children. Some of the graduates of the American School in India went into their experimental stages, and so forth. There were Americans who were living in "Ashrams" [student dormitories], dressing like Indians, and seeking the guidance of Indian gurus. India was often described as the world's largest, parliamentary democracy.

The fact was, and is, that India had a sense of its manifest destiny. Indians felt frustrated. They felt that they were THE power in the area and that they ought to be respected and dominant and treated as such. Instead, we were balancing an India-Pakistan relationship. We were selling arms to Pakistan. Later on, there was the feeling in the U.S. that Pakistan was accommodating us, first in SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization], and later in the breakthrough to communist China. You may remember that it was from Pakistan that Dr. Henry Kissinger flew into China, using a Pakistani aircraft. The Pakistanis helped in all of this. During the Indo-Pakistani War in the fall of 1971 we saw Madame Indira Gandhi fabricate the further dismemberment of Pakistan. This very significantly contributed to the breaking away of the Eastern portion of Pakistan, which became Bangladesh.

Q: What impression did you get from the people who were dealing with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at this time?

BROWN: The American Government was very upset with her.

Q: Both President Nixon and President Johnson before him.

BROWN: They were very upset with her, but she was upset with us. I'll give you an example. President Nixon had come to India in the summer of 1969 and then went on to Romania. It was his first, worldwide trip as a president. I know that he visited Southeast Asia and India. I've forgotten whether he went on to Pakistan but I think that his next stop was Romania. Not too long thereafter, during the autumn of 1969, we had the trip by the APOLLO Astronauts to India. They visited Bombay.

By now I had been the Motorcade Officer for the President Nixon visit, and I was to be Control Officer for the visit of the APOLLO Astronauts. I went to the Indian Foreign Ministry to notify them that a major visit was coming up. We would bring the Astronauts to India to visit Bombay. We found that Indian noses were out of joint. They asked why the Astronauts weren't visiting New Delhi and why hadn't the Indians been consulted on this. New Delhi was the capital of India. How about the Astronauts coming to New Delhi? I had to shift around and say that Bombay had been selected. I got an earful. In fact, Mrs. Gandhi's nose was out of joint. She objected to the way this visit came across. We told her government that there was going to be a visit by the Astronauts, and this is the city that they are going to come to.

I had quite a time dealing with these objections. As an embassy staff officer, I had to work my Ambassador into the program. I went down to Bombay and called on the authorities there, having first called on the Chief of Protocol, who was a very supercilious, senior Brahmin [high caste] diplomat, an ex-Ambassador. In Bombay I also called on the Police Commissioner, who promptly informed me that he was well aware of the details of President Nixon's visit to New

Delhi, but this was Bombay, and the visit of the Astronauts was not going to be handled in the way the Presidential visit had been handled. He said that he, the Police Commissioner, would be in control. We were most welcome, but the communications arrangements would be under his control. He would also control the motorcade and the whole thing. I had to inform him, as diplomatically as I could, that we were looking into all of this, but there was an American capsule around the astronauts including our own communications and our own security. I said that in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, even as we spoke, enthusiastic crowds were breaking the lines. Enthusiastic crowds had broken the lines in Kinshasa, [Zaire, at the time; now Congo]. We had real, security concerns.

Twirling his British-type moustache, he lectured me. He said, "I've handled the Pope and other dignitaries here. I have over 10,000 Police officers, and this will be done my way." I said, "Thank you very much, but it will also be done THIS way." The negotiations on arrangements went right down to the wire.

We have a very peculiar, American style. Later, as an American ambassador I was to get an earful on how high-level visits are handled. The trip to India by the Astronauts turned out to be a fabulous visit in terms of crowd turn-out. There were half a million people on the great public park in Bombay and the streets and sidewalks along the astronauts' routes were jammed. However, I went right down to the wire on program details.

Half an hour before the Astronauts landed, the Indian Chief of Protocol informed me that it would be inappropriate for the American Ambassador to speak, as he was scheduled to do, in introducing the Astronauts at this great gathering. I said, "Look, he's the American Ambassador. It's only proper that he introduce" the astronauts. The Chief of Protocol said, "It's all a political show. You set this visit for Bombay, where Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's political opposition is located. This is a political, trumped-up show." I said, "Sir, if that's the case, I'll use my short wave radio and call off the whole visit. We are not involving ourselves in any political show whatsoever. If you consider this a political show, I'll scrap this visit right now, and the Astronauts can fly to Dacca," which was then in East Pakistan.

He said, "No, no." I said, "I want to get it very straight from you, sir. This is not being handled as a 'political show' visit." He said, "That's right." I said, "Therefore, the American Ambassador can introduce the Astronauts," and that's the way it worked out. But we got into real hardball with the Indians in this respect.

I learned from both visits by President Nixon and by the Astronauts of the special atmosphere that pervades, when you get a really high level visit. I'll never forget how we learned of the Nixon visit. The then Charge d'Affaires (Ambassador Keating either hadn't arrived in India or was out of town.) called a whole bunch of us into a room. He said, "I want to introduce Mr. Ron Walker from the White House staff. We're going to have a visit by President Nixon. This matter is still SECRET right now, but Ron Walker is the advance man. Walker, in his southern accent, said, "You all have been chosen to work on the preparations. I don't care about your rank or anything else. You're considered the best in this embassy. You're going to be my team. Our mission, ladies and gentlemen, is quite simple. We're going to turn this town on for Richard Nixon, the President of the United States." And that's how it went.

That was the occasion for my second meeting with Henry Kissinger [at the time, President Nixon's National Security Adviser] at the airport. The temperature was 110 or 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Some of my officers were fainting from heat exhaustion. I sprinted across the field and called out: "Dr. Kissinger! Do you remember that I handled you in Moscow? Here, sir, is your limo. Please get in." He said, "Yes. Maybe the next time it will be a visit to the Antarctic."

I watched how that visit was handled from the inside. It was a model for a Presidential or other high level visit. It was awesome to behold. A key player from the Embassy was Herb Hagerty.

Q: From your recollections and those of your colleagues, what was the chemistry between President Nixon and Prime Minister Gandhi?

BROWN: It was cool. Nobody ever made a state visit to New Delhi in July. It just wasn't done. The temperature is scorching. Everybody goes to the mountains. However, India was on President Nixon's route, and the Indians went through the motions of civility. Madame Gandhi was civil. I doubt whether they conducted any serious business. The Indians were pretty sharp. They saw this visit for what it was. It was a stop en route elsewhere.

Q: What was the real concern about the Indian-Soviet alliance that was developing? Did we see it as likely to go anywhere in particular?

BROWN: We saw it as against our interests. Of course, India was a significant, regional power, appearing to line up with the hated, Soviet empire. There was the question of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Were we going to have access visits to Indian ports by U.S. Navy ships, as opposed to visits by Soviet Navy ships? Would the Indian Ocean become what the Indians wanted, an Indian lake? Or perhaps an Indo-Soviet lake? There was the question of the status of Diego Garcia, a British base established especially for the convenience of U.S. Navy visits to the Indian Ocean (later, a staging bases for B-52 missions against Iraq). We were concerned that one result of this possible, Indian-Soviet alliance might be the dismemberment of Pakistan. That would not necessarily be in our interest. We were concerned about the impact of an Indian-Soviet alliance might have on the Non-Aligned Movement, of which India was still one of the three co-founders. You may recall, the Non-Aligned Movement was established by India, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia. A further slide of the Non-Aligned Movement toward the Soviets would be deleterious to our interests.

We were very unhappy about the trend of events. Remember that we considered India quite a prize.

Q: Well, India was and is the largest democracy in the world.

BROWN: Yes, and India had a potential impact on its smaller, weaker neighbors. Quite clearly, India had larger ambitions in the area of the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean. India had a significant military establishment, which one could not dismiss. It was weak in many ways but strong in others.

In the emerging scenario, which I sensed was coming, that is, a breakthrough in U.S.-China relations, where would India fit in such a situation? First of all, what would be the result of a war between India and Pakistan? Secondly, if Pakistan were defeated, and China were to go to war with India, where would that put the U.S.? Thirdly, where would all of this fit within the big game, the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle? Where would India fit in such a case? So this was an area of considerable concern.

Q: What were you getting from your Indian colleagues about events in China at this time?

BROWN: I was getting a professional assessment of the situation there, and the Indians were open to questions. In other words, if we had a question, we could pose it to them, and they would do their best to answer it. Like everybody else, they were terribly restricted in their embassy in Beijing. (Remember, at this time we had no mission in Beijing.) However, they were considering, as we were, what the effect of the Cultural Revolution would be. What power cliques were emerging in the Cultural Revolution? Where was the Cultural Revolution taking China? What did this mean in terms of Chinese military strength?

Here, now, we were getting into a sensitive area. Sensitive for both sides. What would the Cultural Revolution mean in the Sino-Soviet context? One had to be very careful there, because we knew that our Indian contacts were professional analysts and that their colleagues were very interested in developing, at the request of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, deeper relations, including military relations, between India and the Soviet Union. And this would be done, at our expense.

Q: Were we at all considering the idea at this time that maybe China was interested in normalizing relations with the United States? This might happen, and what would be the effect on India? Or was this pretty far-fetched?

BROWN: When the new, Nixon administration entered office, and even during the dying days of the previous, Johnson administration, there were these periodic meetings called the Warsaw Talks between the U.S. and China. As Paul Kreisberg confided to me in great secrecy at the time, the Chinese communist representatives at those talks were beginning to use language for the professional readers of Chinese tea leaves which gave people like Kreisberg a sense that an evolution of U.S.-China relations was a possibility.

Whether the State Department, at a higher level, fully understood this was something else again. Maybe in the next session we'll consider that. I doubt that William Rogers, the new Secretary of State, had any feel for this or any inkling of this. Even at the level of Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and his principal advisers, as well as others in between, such as the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and so forth, this remains to be examined. However, in the view of Paul Kreisberg, the Director of an office in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, or Don Anderson, an officer like myself who had been China-trained and Chinese language-trained, the material for progress in U.S.-Chinese relations was there. By now Don Anderson had reached the level of an interpreter at the Warsaw Talks. Don replaced me as the Sino-Soviet specialist in New Delhi. Kreisberg, Anderson, and I felt that this material ought to be examined.

At the time I left the embassy in New Delhi, the Third Indo-Pakistani War had not yet taken place. However, a renewal of hostilities was looming, and we were thinking about it. As soon as I got back to Washington, I was among those who argued that we had to think, in very real terms, about what would happen if another Indo-Pakistani War broke out? The professional estimate was that India would defeat Pakistan, as it had before, by virtue of India's military might and the strange configuration of Pakistan between East and West Pakistan, with India in between the two sections. So we thought that the Indians would defeat the Pakistanis. The question then was: would the Chinese communists join in the fight to save the Pakistanis? If they did, would this precipitate an armed confrontation between India and China? If so, where did the U.S. stand?

Remember, that in the 1962 Indo-Pakistani War, J. Kenneth Galbraith was then U.S. Ambassador to India. The U.S. rushed to India's aid.

Q: Oh, yes.

BROWN: We armed the newly-formed Indian divisions up in the Himalayan Mountains. Commitments were made by the U.S., and so forth.

Q: We moved a lot of equipment up there.

BROWN: Yes. However, already the memory of that support was fading, and India was looking elsewhere for assistance, in the wake of the meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin in Tashkent. I have already alluded to the development of this relationship between India and the Soviet Union.

The China aspect was very much a dynamic factor in India's moves. The situation was moving, and for a reason. It wasn't just a casual move. It related to India's fear and loathing of the Chinese communists.

Q: Did you sense, from where you were sitting in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, any disquiet or unhappiness with this relationship between India, Pakistan, and China might be orphaned by developments in the Palestine area? Did you perceive anything of that nature?

BROWN: Do you mean while I was there in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs?

Q: Did some of your colleagues express disquiet or concern about the prospect that the Department of State might lose sight of the relationship between India, Pakistan, and China because of developments in Palestine?

BROWN: There was a whole cadre of Middle Eastern specialists. Developments in India and Pakistan came under the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs [NEA]. There were people such as Haggerty and others who were trained in Hindi or in Urdu, such as Tony Quainton. They had made a significant investment of their time in learning the language and were significantly respected in this regard. They were professionals in their field.

As long as I served in India, I was nominally under NEA, as an embassy officer in New Delhi. However, I had this special field of concentration. I was working for somebody else, as well. They weren't rating me on this, as least as far as Officers Efficiency Reports [OERs] were concerned, but that's where I was heading. That's where I saw the future and that's what I was looking forward to. I had some special lines into that field.

Q: That's your own interest. However, were your fellow officers saying: "Those guys in NEA are so focused on Arab-Israeli affairs that we're not getting answers or information..."

BROWN: No, I don't remember that. At the time I remember that the Desk Officer for India was Howie Schaefer. Howie would give you an instant answer...

Q: He is being interviewed right now by Tom Stern.

BROWN: Well, give him my regards. Here was a guy who was on top of the situation and who served in both Pakistan and India. He was very much involved in it. He may have been frustrated about attitudes above him in NEA. However, at my level, as far as attention to India and Pakistan was concerned, I can't remember hearing any complaint about getting attention from Joe Sisco [Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] because Joe Sisco had his attention directed elsewhere.

Q: Well, I thought that we might stop at this point. We're now up to 1970, and you were going back to Washington.

BROWN: I went back to the Department of State to be Deputy Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs (ACA) in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. Because the China desk handled Taiwan affairs, it was a separate entity from the Office of Asian Communist Affairs. The ACA desk handled what we now call the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Mongolia, as a separate area.

LEONARDO M. WILLIAMS
Junior Officer Trainee, USIS
New Delhi (1969-1970)

Leonardo Williams was born in Alabama. He was raised in Alabama, Washington, D.C and Minnesota and was educated at St. John's College (MN), University of Wisconsin and Georgetown University. After joining the Foreign Service in 1968, he served as USIA Public Affairs and Information Officer in India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. His Washington assignments dealt primarily with operations of USIA. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: You went to New Delhi from when to when?

WILLIAMS: I got there summer of '69 and stayed until summer of '70. I was there only a year.

Q: How did you find Delhi? First on the job side and then on the Indian side.

WILLIAMS: For the first three months I was in shock. I had never been out of the country before and so I was just trying to cope with all these new things that were coming at me. The work was interesting. I got involved in a lot of different things. It was much different from what I had been told to anticipate. I spent about three months of that time in other parts of India than Delhi. I spent a month down in Madras and went on a tour with an American high school rock band through south India. It was really interesting and fun. I went to Jaipur and Jodhpur and gave lectures on American literature and life.

Q: How did you find the Indian reception of what we were having to say? The Vietnam War was at its apogee at this point.

WILLIAMS: Yes. And there was a fair amount of criticism about that. But audiences were generally receptive and interested in America. They didn't rule out interacting with me. Given my age, I was the youngest member of the USIS mission and so I got a lot of questions. They were critical of American imperialism and involvement. But I didn't find it an environment that was particularly... It wasn't difficult to the point of being dangerous or anything like that. It was more a gentleman's disagreement. The thing that caused the biggest flap while I was there was a speech that the ambassador gave in which he made reference to India not being covered by the American nuclear umbrella, which led to bouts of outrage that I don't think he anticipated given the kind of neutral stance that the Indians had adopted. But I didn't have anything to do with that.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

WILLIAMS: Kenneth Keating. He had been a senator from New York. He was the ambassador the whole time I was there.

Q: I always think of an Indian audience as being rather disputatious, arguing. Did you find that your arguing skills were honed? Or did this come into play?

WILLIAMS: It did on occasion, but I found that it wasn't always that way. Sometimes they were passive. Then you didn't know how much they understood of what I said. The audiences that I had were mostly outside of Delhi in the smaller cities in the hinterlands. The racial situation in the United States generated more interest and engagement often than foreign policy. I think that's in part because of their caste system. They're coming at it from a caste mentality and we're coming at it from a class/racial... But we're all talking about color. So, there was always this effort to get on the same wavelength.

Q: How did you handle this? Could one sort of say, "Well, you've got the same problem we have and we're working on it and you're not?"

WILLIAMS: I would never say they're not. One time, a guy criticized me for talking about the racial situation in the U.S. He got up and said, "You're American and you come here and you

talk to us about the racial problems of the black people in America. But you're white." Obviously, it was strictly a color thing in his mind. I said, "No, I'm not white. I'm black." The house came down. But the only thing we could do is... I wasn't really there to try to get them to change their system but to make them understand how ours worked. To the extent that they found what we were trying to do and their understanding of it was distorted and they were basing their criticism on lack of understanding of what it's really like and what we were trying to do about it at the time. As far as their caste system, you can make the point about fairness and all people in every society should be treated equally but I wasn't going to harangue them on their caste system specifically.

Q: How did you feel after your year in Delhi? Was this a good career?

WILLIAMS: I was still in the holding mode on that. I began to enjoy Delhi after I had been there about six months. I was used to it and started to enjoy it a little bit more when I realized that you really can survive in this environment and do all kinds of intriguing things.

Q: One year is a pretty short time. It strikes me as being a little too short to plunk you in and then yank you out again.

WILLIAMS: Yes. But it was only a training assignment. They had a vacancy for a regular job... They didn't have any for me to go into in Delhi. So, I was sent to Karachi after that.

SLATOR CLAY BLACKISTON, JR.
Deputy Principal Officer
Calcutta (1969-1971)

Slator Clay Blackiston, Jr. was born in Virginia on September 19, 1918 and raised in New York. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Virginia and served as a U.S. Navy pilot during World War II. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. Mr. Blackiston's career included positions in Stuttgart, Amsterdam, Port-au-Prince, Jerusalem, Beirut, Tunis, Jeddah, Cairo, Amman, Calcutta, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted in September of 1992.

Q: You left there about 1969 and then went to Calcutta. What were you doing in Calcutta? You were there for sixteen months.

BLACKISTON: I was the Deputy Principal Officer and for a long period of time, one six months and one some other length, I was acting head there. Everything you have ever heard about Calcutta is true. It has a certain charm in a sort of macabre way. It is really human degradation at its utmost but on the other hand they have a racetrack, all sorts of clubs and social life. This is all going on in the midst of hundreds of thousands of people sleeping on the streets. Interestingly enough, contrary to our street people here, many of these people have some sort of job; they are collecting rags, collecting this or that, they are doing something.

Q: What were the main purposes of our Consul General?

BLACKISTON: Calcutta has gone down since then, but it was a large consulate. Our consular district comprised the states of West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, and Assam, and Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland, and states like that. It was well over 100 million people. Calcutta, and our consular district, was a center of the iron and steel industry; not in Calcutta, but in our district, in Bihar. Calcutta is the center of the jute industry; also there is a lot of manufacturing. We had American firms there; for instance, Union Carbide made batteries and carbon black and things like that, Remington made typewriters there. There were all sorts of things produced there. Of course it was a port and had been the capital of India until 1912; it had a lot of manifestations of the Raj still around -- stately mansions that had deteriorated with a lot of people living in them, maharajahs' palaces and such. So in a way it was quite interesting and I had the opportunity to travel around India a great deal. We were the principle post reporting on the iron and steel industry, jute, and tea grown up in Assam. There were a number of other products for which our district was important.

Also it was a listening post for developments in Bhutan, which later was admitted to the United Nations, and Sikkim, which was nominally independent but which ultimately India occupied. As you probably know the Gyalmo of Sikkim was Hope Cooke who was the adopted daughter of Ambassador Seldom Chapin. We knew her, she came to Calcutta -- a lot of these people including the Bhutanese royal family would come down, people from Nepal, they all have houses down there. They come down for the horse racing season because there was this big race track, so we did have contact with them. Sir Edmund Hillary would come through there, we met him. A lot of fairly interesting people.

Q: What were our relations with the Bengali government? This was the time when the Vietnam was going strong and we were pretty cool toward the Indian government.

BLACKISTON: We were having trouble all the time. We were having demonstrations literally daily. There would be a big mob at the *maidan*, which is sort of like Central Park. There was a joke from Dick Davies, who was the first consul general when I was there -- we had a baseball team my son played on, down at one end of the *maidan* there would be a big demonstration and people up here would be playing baseball -- the joke was "well that's down there." India has three communist parties; there is the Communist Party of India, which was the initial party and founded by British communists, then there is the CPI-M, Marxist, and then the CPI Marxist-Leninist. That last group are Maoists and they had conducted some assassinations of landowners in a certain district of West Bengal, up in the north, from which initially they took the name Naxalites. They cut off the heads of these people. There was tremendous turbulence in West Bengal. The head of the CPI-M was a guy named Jyoti Basu who now is the Chief Minister of West Bengal; he's a communist. His father, he told me once, studied in the United States. He was not an unpleasant guy. The Bengalis -- there were a lot of fairly wealthy, social, people who didn't seem to feel horrified that they could have a communist government. They seem to be able to work around it, live and let live. That was the situation. After I retired, for some years I escorted leader grantees around, and I escorted the Mayor of Calcutta and his wife, it was just

three days that he was here, and he is a communist too. And his name is also Basu; same name, a common one in Bengal, he is undoubtedly Bengali, that was murdered here by the carjacker.

We had to get permission from the Indian government to go to Assam; they never let us go to Nagaland. I was with Ambassador Keating and Dick Viets in Shillong at a dinner party at the governor's residence with the former Indian Ambassador to the United States, his name was Nehru. I don't think he was related to the Nehrus but the same name. He had a Romanian-Jewish wife as I remember; he was then the Governor of Assam. Ambassador Keating said that he would like to go to Nagaland. The Governor said, "You will never get to go to there." The situation in India is that there is a Governor of each state who is a figurehead except when the local legislature can't form a government and then they have what is known as "President's rule" and he names a person to take over. It may have been that at that time that was the situation in Assam and he was Governor. Keating was taken back by this and tried to get an indication of the reason. The Nagas were originally headhunters but most of them had been converted by American missionaries, Methodists, and they were favorably disposed to the United States. But the Indians, including Mrs. Nehru's P.P., had it in their brain that somehow we were working with the Nagas to get them to separate from India. And this happened time after time after time in one form or another; we were always being charged with working for a breakup of India.

It happened in another instance. In Madras, which is another consular district -- incidentally, Tom Recknagel was the Consul General down there; we work together in the Smithsonian, in Armed Forces History -- we built a very large consulate general with a USIS Library in the same building. I personally would never put a library in...

Q: Because they tend to burn them down.

BLACKISTON: You have got it. I would never...and I played a role when I was in charge and they talked about putting the USIS library in the consulate general in Calcutta. I said, "No way, we are going to turn this place into a fortress and we are not going to have the USIS library." You see when I was in charge there we had two bombs, one in the visa section and one in the library. They had used batteries and an explosive charge with an alarm clock and put it up behind a couch and set fire to the room; it didn't do too much damage. This consulate general was quite a large building. Madras is the capital of Tamil Nadu, the state of the Tamils. The Tamils do have something of a separatist tendency in India, but they are also the ones that revolted in Sri Lanka and from Tamil Nadu they had been given support. It was said that the reason we built this building was that when Tamil Nadu separates it will be our Embassy. What I am trying to convey here is this high suspicion of the Indians that makes it very difficult to deal with them.

I can go on about this because I think that this is fairly important. You could get on quite well with the Indian people, the businessmen and everything, but particularly in the central government -- it must be a legacy of this guy named Krishna Menon who hated our guts and who must have stashed that Foreign Ministry and other things with all sorts of crypto-communists and left-leaning, difficult types -- so I found that many Indian government officials were not very pleasant to deal with. I traveled a lot in India -- it was said that in the partition India got the civil service and Pakistan got the army. I have talked with Indian civil servants -- the Indian civil

service was considered a really elite group but I have had current Indian civil servants tell me, I think one in Manipur, that the standard had gone down.

Q: Well I am sure it has, it is inevitable.

BLACKISTON: The interesting thing is that they inherited a system from the British and they continued it. It is a system whereby the district commissioner is a sort of local king. He does everything; he is a magistrate, he is head of the police, he is the development officer, he is everything.

LEONARD J. SACCIO
Director, USAID
New Delhi (1969-1972)

Ambassador Leonard J. Saccio began his career in the Foreign Service as deputy general counsel for the Foreign Aid Program in the mid-1950s. He went on to serve in Brazil, San Salvador, and India. Ambassador Saccio was interviewed by Mel Spector on September 30, 1990.

Q: Oh, yes. He's a career Foreign Service officer -- was until he became Secretary of Defense.

SACCIO: I don't know that there's much to say different as far as the operation of embassies in any of these places. India was, here again, a sad matter, because they appointed Senator Keating. He was senator and he was the man who claimed that he had the pictures of the missiles in Cuba, and then he ran as chief justice of New York Court of Appeals. Of course, he claimed he got more votes than anybody else in any office that ever ran in New York state, because he was the only one running. And, of course, they had to vote for him, no matter whether they voted for the Democrat or the Republican.

I don't know why they sent him to India, except that you had Nixon there who gave him that job. Let me see, I got to Delhi, India in '69 or '70. No, who would have sent him there? I was appointed to Colombia in Nixon's Administration. Wasn't he elected in '68?

Q: Yes.

SACCIO: Well, they sent Keating to India, and he had no know-how or understanding of India. He was following Bowles, who was very close and sympathetic and empathetic of the whole Indian operation, and his wife went around in saris and sandals and rode around on bicycles. And when Keating came in, he said, "I want you people to get dressed as Americans. None of this stuff; no sandals. And I don't like beards." Some of our AID people . . .

Q: But you had that nice AID building by the time you got there.

SACCIO: Right next door. And we had enough trouble with that, because everything had to be secure about the embassy. But people who wanted to come to see me as the AID director, they would go into the AID building without any trouble. The man in charge of security would shake his head, "How did this guy get in? You keep controls with the embassy." But they were joined, you see. What could we do? You could go down the basement and come up from the other side.

Q: *Yes, we had that underground passage.*

SACCIO: But he was a sad case for an ambassador if he was to have any influence. But aside from that, our policy was pretty poor stuff, because we never made up our mind whether we were going to be with Pakistan to support their prejudices against India and building up their armaments, or be on the Indian side, or be on both sides, or try not to be involved, and Mrs. Gandhi was against the Americans, anyway, just culturally. She was brought up in London School of Economics, and palsy-walsy with the Russians and had a whole combination of military assistance and plants and all that kind. There was no way that Keating responded to any of that, because he didn't know, and he wasn't helped by Washington in any way. Anytime we sent something to Pakistan, we had a crisis.

When Churchill and I first got there in 1969, we were invited by the minister, who was my counterpart on the economic side. His daughter was getting married, and they had these cottages, as you well know, with the gardens all around. I think it was the first day we were there, the second evening. We went there dressed up to the garden, and there was Mrs. Gandhi seated on one of those awful stuffed chairs that they have in all these Latin American or less-developed places. I don't know why.

Q: *Yes, a symbol of affluence.*

SACCIO: Yes. Nothing clean, no nice stuff. Just big, fat furniture.

Q: *Which, in that climate, is the worst thing; it's so hot. The big stuffed, served you out in the garden.*

SACCIO: Yes. And rugs on the lawn. And we passed the reception line, the bride and groom. The minister took us and introduced us to Mrs. Gandhi, and she smiled and he left. Apparently, people were doing that. They were going first to the reception line and stopping and chatting with her. And we were all alone at that point, nobody with us, and she wanted to know who we were.

And I said, "I'm the new minister in charge of the AID program." She froze, looked the other way, and there we stood, both of us. We didn't know what the hell to do. We were saved, but not too soon, by somebody coming along. We sat down in front of her, not knowing what to do, and then somebody came along, and we decided to move on.

Q: *Why do you think she acted quite like that?*

SACCIO: Because she was definitely against the U.S.

Q: Against the U.S. or against the AID program?

SACCIO: Against the U.S. and the AID program. She didn't mind the money. She didn't refuse our aid. She didn't refuse the food. It was on the aftermath of President Johnson putting the screws on India in one of the successive monsoon failures in which he laid down the law, "You either do something about your agriculture, or we're not giving you any food."

There were freighters coming in every day in the ports of Calcutta and Bombay with food, and he imposed this on them. Obviously, he had to do it, because he was talking to the head of the state. And the stuff came in. PL 480 poured in and created the billions of rupees and the funds that nobody knew what to do with, because all we needed was \$50,000 to take care of the embassy needs at that point.

There was still a grudge, except there were some knowledgeable Indians who said "President Johnson did the right thing. Now we have a growing agriculture. We're doing rice, we're doing this, we're doing that, and we're doing malaria." But she was against us, just like any Latin American leftist would be, prejudiced against the capitalist nation. Because she was brought up as a socialist, educationally, as well, and that was it.

Well, the aftermath of that was that I told the people in the embassy, "We know that; we expected that." Nobody warned me about it. Why would they warn me? They didn't know we were going to the reception or I didn't ask.

The man who they put as my counterpart was the top-level civil service. You know, they talk about the steel structure. He was very close to Mrs. Gandhi; a great economist. One of the better Indians who didn't go into politics for money. He eventually moved over to the United Nations and became one of their officers. Either that or the Bank. I think it was probably the World Bank.

I would sit down and review the week with him, and we'd describe what's going on, what had to be done, running through all the programs. And he appointed a secondary man from his office and said that, on the day-to-day matters, you can work with one of his aides, which I understood perfectly. He had other things to do. And we worked on the population program all up and down, and some of the boys in the embassy said -- oh, Funari, who became my deputy, was there when we arrived. He told the Indian native help in an assembly hall, introducing me as the new director, he said, "His name is Saccio, my name is Funari, but you're not going to have spaghetti every day." They laughed. [Laughter]

He told me that Mrs. Gandhi had a secretarial aide who took notes on every meeting and was her calendar scheduler. He identified the man so I knew what he looked like, so when the AID director, the former head of Michigan State...

Q: Hannah.

SACCIO: John Hannah came on a visit. We made a call on Mrs. Gandhi with the ambassador, and they sat right in front of her and I sat on the side. I was supposed to go with them. And she

talked, and she turned around to me and smiled. Oh, there goes my good friend; he must have said something. [Laughter] Because, you know, we were working entirely on a non- political basis.

There were two crises. One, Keating's alarm clock did not work, so he didn't get to the airport to see her off to the United States. He blamed his Foreign Service officer, who was a gal, who was his immediate aide, and who he tried to screw at any chance. You know, he was 79 or something, but he wanted his women, just like Gandhi, as a matter of fact. And he blamed her, you see, because she had not awakened him or something, as if she were living with him, which, of course, was not so. She hated him.

Q: Was he living then in Roosevelt House, in the main residence, or was he where Bowles used to live?

SACCIO: Not where Bowles used to live, because he was in the mansion.

Q: Oh, that's right, because he wouldn't do that. I see.

SACCIO: The other small crisis came when she made a speech down in the southern part of India and "all these Peace Corps people and all the CIA spies" and all that.

Q: She said that?

SACCIO: In a speech.

Q: Oh, my lord.

SACCIO: And Keating was unable to handle it, because, being brought up the way he was, he would not even admit there were CIA people in the country. In a staff meeting, he asked the CIA guy, or anybody else who was in there, "What do I say if they say we have CIA?" And there was dumb silence, even from the station chief. He was adrift, you see. Nobody had briefed him, and he didn't have sense enough to realize everybody knows that we have agents all over the place. But in those days, you would cover here, cover there. It was a lot of nonsense. But any rate, he had a real rough time. But the program was a good one, but an almost impossible one, because back in 1920, the population was 150 million. When we were there, it was 500 million, and it is now 850 million. The international conference just the other day of aid-giving people, the industrialist stated, "The developed countries ought to do something about this. Give aid to the less-developed countries."

Q: In the field of population, is that correct?

SACCIO: No, everything. But the whole point was, they said in that -- whether explicitly or otherwise -- they said the population is just taking over. When you have a situation like in Indonesia, India, China, what have you, the Chinese do something about it. The Indians try to do something, and one of the reasons Mrs. Gandhi was considered a tyrant was because she went around with vasectomies and all that all over the place and was very brutal, at least according to

critics, of pushing people out of Bombay and out of Calcutta. It was, "Get back in the countryside."

They wanted to build an atomic bomb and nuclear capability, and they wouldn't take any advice or guidance of the United States. And when they opened their first atomic nuclear plant outside of Bombay, the ambassador wasn't even invited. I mean, this was a national operation and the Diplomatic Corps was all invited, and we had helped with some of the materials and so forth. And Stone, who was the DCM -- what was his name, Galen Stone?

Q: *Galen.*

SACCIO: Galen Stone moved heaven and earth and said, "He should be up on the platform, not sitting on the first row or the second row of the audience." So it was an impossible case of nobody liking anybody, and only the people at the technical level, let us say, had contacts that meant anything, some of the political officers and so forth.

The CIA would never open its mouth in a meeting. The guy would sit there and listen to us. Once I burst out, and Galen Stone said, "Keep quiet, Len. Keep quiet." I said, "What the hell are you fellows sitting in here listening to us, and you won't say a damn word or what's going on? I mean, why the hell are you here, spying on us?" I told them so. When the ambassador was away, and I was in charge, I made it quite clear in the open meeting. I said, "You got anything to report on?"

Well, we were doing some quite good work. But I tried to find out what projects had been in operation in India over a period of years to see what had happened when somebody was talking about a milking operation, a dairy operation. Going back to Washington, it's impossible to get the archives.

Q: *Really. There weren't good records right there in New Delhi nor in Washington.*

SACCIO: If there was, they said that it's too difficult to get at that sort of stuff and dig it out.

Q: *Well, I think it's notorious that the institutional memories of both State and AID are some of the worst in Washington -- I mean, the worst in the U.S. Government.*

SACCIO: Well, there was no permanence of responsibility. They put out, four years later, the book on diplomatic correspondence.

Q: *And even that is badly censored. That isn't a good record.*

SACCIO: It's criticized all over the place.

Q: *Have we left India?*

SACCIO: Well, India, I think, is pretty much here our inability to work with socialist countries shows up, as elsewhere. You just recall the word "socialist," and then you close your mind. The

fact is that we're just as socialist as any of them, because we have all kinds of safety nets, economic safety nets.

Of course, this is 20-20 hindsight, because I've been reading much more about all these things since I retired, having to teach international law. We have no concept that we can work with these people, even though they are socialists, in theory and in theology. Leave out the communists. We have government-owned operations all over the place. The S&L, of course, is an example.

That's what I considered one of our failures, and that's because domestic rhetoric is always against us. We cannot say anything good because we have to base it on freedom, freedom of the individual, the open market, things of this kind. Again, I say this after the fact, but this is what became very difficult to deal with in these countries. Now, I understand AID has gone for attempting to develop entrepreneurship in business, which is very important, and that would be the way, I imagine, to resolve some of these problems. And poor old Gorbachev is now faced with it, because how do you create a body of people like that right off in 500 days? [Tape recorder turned off]

We had a debate between AID and State about assistance to Africa, and we were bound up by the European policy not to interfere with the colonies of Western Europe.

On university contracts, I can go back to India, if we have a little time. I found that some of these contracts were just shells. We had a man there. In some cases, we had three or four professors, and they were teaching some course or something. But they were not integrated. They were not in management positions and they were not in administrative positions.

On the basic top-level university which devoted to agriculture, we had a professor there. He and his wife, nicely settled, retired from some state university. We went up there and he had breakfast for us, and I asked him what he did. He said, "Well, I'm looking into the development of peas."

I said, "Do you sit with the faculty or the board?"

"Well, once in a while they call me in."

I said, "For Christmas sake. What the hell are you . . ." Here we have a contract with the university, and we have one man who could just be one of the professors, but nothing more. Maybe one of the research men, but nothing having to do with the whole plan of the university, the education, the effect on development, all that sort of thing. And I said to the very nice guy who was the agricultural chief at the AID program, "What's this guy doing?"

"Well, you know, you can't . . ."

"My gosh."

Q: Well, whose fault do you think that was? Was it that it wasn't planned well by the AID mission, or the person wasn't adequate for the job that was chosen?

SACCIO: No, no. Apparently, at this point, whatever they did for the university had...

I can't say of anything before, because I don't recall getting in any deeper. But I said, "This man has to leave, because he has no purpose here."

And they said, "Well, look. His wife is here, and the situation at home." You know, personal things like that.

I said, "Well, I'm sorry. He stays to the end of the whatever term there is, and nobody goes in."

One fellow, who was the contract man for the university -- I forget whether it was Illinois -- with Orissa, a state of India off on the Bengal side. I had an interview with him when I first came. I said, "How is it going."

"Well, we're having problems."

I said, "Well, what are they?"

"Well, we recommend that the faculty be permanent and not part time or slipshod, that they be given salaries, that they have a fixed curriculum, and that they have to follow it."

I said, "Would you kindly write those down on a piece of paper?"

"Sure, I'd be delighted."

I said, "Now, you go back and tell them if they don't do this, you're going to cut out the contract. Because we're not staying here just for you to be frustrated and not doing anything."

"Well, you know, they have problems with money."

I said, "I know they have problems. And if you're going to do anything for them, you have to tell them that this is what we suggest. And if they don't do it, there's no point in your being there or saying we have an AID program." Incidentally, it worked.

Another instance in the AID program, we had a very good guy on economics and statistics. He was the brother of the opera conductor, Rudel. His name was Rudel, too.

Q: Oh, yeah. I knew him. Rudel. I see him every now and then. He and I live about ten blocks apart. Julius Rudel is his brother.

SACCIO: He told me how it was set up, and he had about 15 Indians working in his office maintaining statistics showing where the possibilities for shrimp development for small business,

for export to make dollars. And they kept books over the period of months and years and so forth, showing how things would be developed and how they were going. I said, "Well, what do you do now?"

He said, "Well, we continue to do this."

I said, "Well, what about the Indian government? What are they going to do?"

"Well, we're going to try to get them to do the same." I said, "You could advertise that you have this. If they're going to do it, I want you to transfer the whole bunch of Indians over to the ministry and put them over there."

"Oh, that would be catastrophic, because they won't get paid." [Laughter]

I said, "I don't care. You can't have these guys here. They're beautiful, they're lovely, they're having a great time, and they obviously want to continue to work for the United States embassy. What greater prestige and what greater pay would they get?" And, of course, we were paying out rupees, of which we had millions.

Q: Hundreds of millions.

SACCIO: That professor from Columbia came down to report what we had there. So Rudel said, "No, that's impossible."

So I said, "Well, I have to see the economic minister, and I'll just tell him. Would you kindly arrange for my appointment?"

So we had an appointment for a fixed time, and we went in there and he made us wait literally three-quarters of an hour in the small anteroom. Whether it was small or big, didn't make any difference, but there we sat. They sent out a messenger, "Pretty soon," and so forth.

Finally, he had me come in. I think I had somebody with me, one of the officers -- maybe Rudel. I told the Minister this work had been going on very nicely, it's very important, and I thought it's at a stage that we ought to transfer it over to him."

He looked at me and finally got around to apologizing for making me wait out there, because he had to be briefed. "You know, here in India, we're slow. We're not as fast as you people are."

I said, "Oh, I can understand that. But we would like to make this transfer and put these people in your ministry and make them continue to work and make it useful to your people."

He said, "We can't do that." And this went on.

So I laid down the law. I said, "If you don't, we'll dispense with the whole operation. Do you want it or you don't?"

We became great friends, because he was one of the top civil servants who went from the head of one agency to another. He went from agriculture to be the civil servant of defense, which is no small job in the way of prestige. He wasn't very happy, but we did become friends after he became secretary of defense, because we weren't transferring our soldiers to him. [Laughter] But the difficult of moving this sort of stuff on is...

Q: Do you feel that we aren't tough enough on this, that we keep things going too long?

SACCIO: It's hard, because, obviously, it was a very difficult problem to switch 15 people and put them in an Indian ministry, pay them the same as they've been paid, considering what the rest of the guys in that ministry were getting.

GEORGE G.B. GRIFFIN
Political Officer
Calcutta (1969-1972)

George G.B. Griffin was born in Turkey in 1934. He graduated with a BA from the University of South Carolina in 1957, and served in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant overseas from 1957 to 1959. After entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings abroad have included Naples, Colombo, Calcutta, Islamabad, Lahore, Kathmandu, Kabul, Lagos, Seoul, Nairobi and Milan. Mr. Griffin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Excuse me. You were in Calcutta from when to when?

GRIFFIN: I got there in September of 1969, and left in August of '72, so I was there for three years. I'll talk about the Bangladesh war later, but now want to get into what preceded it. In 1969, there was lots of ferment in India, especially in the northeast, which was my territory. There was the rise of the so-called Naxalites. They were extreme communists, supposedly faithful to Beijing, as opposed to Moscow – much more extreme than the Trotskyites. Murder was their program of choice. If they could get to Indian officials, they would kill them. And they certainly didn't like American officials. It was essentially terrorism, but they had a fair amount of support in the countryside among poor people. They were a huge movement, and got along with the communist parties.

Bengal was the headquarters of the Communist Party of India-Marxist, as opposed to the Communist Party of India. There were at least five communist parties in West Bengal. So I decided to make a study in depth. I used to go see the head of the CPI-M, Jyoti Basu, who wouldn't talk much to other Westerners. I would go to his house at about five o'clock in the morning as he was having what they call "bed tea." It was the only time he would see me; maybe he didn't want anybody else to see me with him. He eventually became Chief Minister of West Bengal, as I predicted. Everybody else had doubts because he is a Communist.

Anyway, the Naxalites became such a huge problem that Mrs. Gandhi finally sent in the Indian army. Sam Manikshaw was Chief of Staff of the Indian Army at the time – a four star general – and was given a fifth star during the Bangladesh war. He is a Parsi, and a really interesting guy. I saw him often during his visits to Calcutta, as I had made good contacts with the head of the Eastern Army Command, his deputy, and other Indians who were friends of his. He taught me a lot, taught Mrs. Gandhi a lot, taught many people a lot about how an army does security work on its own soil. He made a speech to a big crowd in Calcutta warning people that he was coming with force. He said we are the Army. We don't know how to do police work. We won't arrest you; we will shoot you. If you get in our way, you are going to be dead. Make no mistake, it is not going to be pretty. We will not waste time arresting people. If you stand up against us, we will shoot you with whatever firepower we can muster. He marched the army through Calcutta, which is a hard place to march because it's so crowded, but he did it. Literally, in two months he broke the back of the Naxalite movement. It still exists. It still exists in the countryside, but is being handled mostly by police now.

Manikshaw was clever, and he mounted an effective campaign. There may be some lessons in that for us today. Several human rights people complained. Some democrats in India were upset about martial law. Mrs. Gandhi's response was that it certainly was martial law, and that the army was put in charge because the police couldn't hack it. But the Naxalites still exist in both India and in Nepal, so they are not totally under control.

In the period leading up to the 1971 Bangladesh war, we got to know the Chogyal and Gyalmo of Sikkim. The Gyalmo was an American named Hope Cooke from New York, who happened to be an acquaintance of my wife. We used that tie to wangle an invitation up for...

Q: You are remarried by this time.

GRIFFIN: Yes, I should have mentioned that. I did remarry. A lovely young lady from Washington came to see me in Calcutta, and stayed. We were married in Kathmandu.

Anyway we were invited to Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, for a New Years' celebration in January. We were personal guests of Chogyal and his wife. The price of admission was an American turkey for their family New Years' dinner, which I managed to import from Denmark or someplace. The traditional ceremonies in the celebrations were very colorful, moving, and fascinating in a sort of Himalayan way. Unfortunately, the Chogyal was a nice guy who was beginning to fail. Hope Cooke wasn't much help to him. I don't know if you ever met her, but she leads tours of New York these days. She had learned a tradition that says one may not speak loudly in the presence of the king, so she whispered. I couldn't hear her very well, and had the worst time trying to figure out what she was talking about. It was made worse by the fact that she would whisper behind her hand. But the Chogyal was into the sauce. He would start with brandy at ten in the morning and, never quit. He eventually was thrown out. The Indians essentially marched in and took over the country. They said the Chogyal was a dictator, and that Sikkim couldn't be run by Sikkimese. Now, he's dead. It was a sad story. It was a beautiful little spot.

I also worked on Bhutan. Ambassador Keating had been to Bhutan a year before I got to Calcutta. He had been flown up in an Indian Army helicopter. The capital of Bhutan moves, according to

where the king is. Thimpu seemed to be used most. The next year – the year I got there – Keating asked for the same facilities to go back to Bhutan. The Indians replied that they would assign another helicopter to take him, but that it would not be free. They said it would cost \$7,000. The Ambassador didn't have that much in his travel budget and couldn't get it out of Washington, so he decided not to go, hoping to shame them into offering it free. It didn't work. So the Embassy decided to send three of us by the cheapest means available. Political Counselor Lee Stull, Harmon Kirby, a second secretary in the Political Section, and I went by USG car. Actually we flew to Siliguri, where we were met by a Consulate vehicle that took us the rest of the way.

At that time, there were no tourist facilities in Bhutan – no hotels, no inns, nothing. The only way to go was by royal invitation, which meant staying in a royal guest house. They were quite charming to look at from the outside but they had no heat. It was cold. I think it was in the spring or fall, but we are talking 6-8,000 feet. They did have running water, and servants to build a fire under the boiler. The best way to get warm was to take a shower and leap into bed under a big quilt. It is a friendly, beautiful country, totally unspoiled, rather like 16th century Switzerland.

The first night, we got only as far as the border village of Phuntsholing, where there was a royal guest house, with four Swiss men already there. They were all entomologists – bug chasers. They explained that nobody had ever catalogued the bugs in Bhutan. They were invited under the special relationship between Switzerland and Bhutan. It is called the Switzerland of the East for very good reasons, including high mountains. They had special permission to catalogue Bhutan's insects.

Phuntsholing is down in the lowlands, in the terai part of Bhutan. After supper, the Swiss asked us to let them turn on all the lights, open all the windows, take down all the screens and see what they could catch. We were invaded big time. Stuff whizzing around. They were the happiest Swiss I have ever seen. They had big barrels of cotton wool and gallons of formaldehyde. Ever bug they caught was thrown into a barrel. They filled up four the first night. We crossed paths with them for the next week all over Bhutan. Everywhere that we went, they went.

Q: Was there any political concern about Bhutan? Were we looking at any relationship?

GRIFFIN: Yes. We wanted the Bhutanese to vote favorably on issues of concern to the United States at the United Nations. We were there in 1969 or maybe '70. Memories were still very fresh of the Chinese invasion of northeast India in 1962. We were guests of the King, though the Queen was the one whom we met, and who organized our itinerary. The King never made himself available to us, perhaps because we weren't the Ambassador. We stayed in her guest house in Paro, and in his in Thimpu. Our escort officer was a young foreign service officer. He took us to an isolated village to show us some old stone fortifications, rather like Rumeli Hisar in Istanbul. There was a wall that went down to a river bed. He said this was where the Bhutanese had stopped the last Tibetan invasion. We looked rather surprised, so he went on to describe the invasion, and to stress that the Bhutanese were tougher and stronger than the awful Tibetans, who were egged on by the Chinese, of course. He said the Tibetans had guns, but the Bhutanese only had bows and arrows. Now the Bhutanese at that time were world famous archers – and still are. Anyway, he claimed that their bows and arrows in this fort had stopped the Tibetans, though they did torch the village. He showed us some of the damage. I asked him for the date of this

battle, assuming it was a couple of hundred years ago. He replied that it was only ten years before the Chinese incursion in 1962. Nonetheless, the Indians were concerned that the Chinese might march through Bhutan, though they know that marching through Bhutan is a whole lot easier said than done. It is really almost impossible because of the Himalayan terrain.

One morning we watched some archery contests. The contestants were hitting bulls eyes literally a hundred yards away. I don't know how they did it. We called on several ministers, including the Minister of Tourism. He asked us for advice, noting that the only foreign exchange Bhutan was earning was from the sale of postage stamps. The postage stamps were all made in Philadelphia, which cost foreign exchange, so the net gain was not very much. He said the King wanted to bring in tourists. I jumped in to advise him to study the different experiences of Nepal and Sikkim. I argued that Bhutan should not follow the Nepal model. That would bring in nothing but very low-rent tourists. I said, "You don't want that." Secondly, I advised against Sikkim's example in road building, in which the Indians used too much dynamite, causing massive rock slides and killing hundreds of workers. I urged him to charge their tourists lots of money. That way, they could afford to build hotels. I said Bhutan is a beautiful country, which could attract plenty of tourists, but they should make sure that the quality of those tourists is high and that they are people who will spend lots of money. He said, "Good point." So, instead of having a free stay at the royal guest house, we were socked with a steep bill as we were leaving. He took my advice to heart, and Bhutan's tourism has done exactly what I proposed. You can't spend less than \$2,000 in the country, even for two days. And they have preserved the quite spectacular natural beauty of the place.

One evening, we were invited to the home of the Indian Political Officer – the equivalent of an ambassador – for dinner. One of the guests was an Indian mountain climber. He was an Army colonel, who commanded the Indian Army Mountain Warfare School in Kashmir. He bragged that he had just climbed Kanchenjunga, the third highest peak in the world, east of Everest, on the China border. He showed us some slides of the climb, which was supposed to be secret. The mountain is considered sacred by the Bhutanese, and the official line remains that no one has ever climbed it. Moreover, the Chinese didn't want Indians climbing it because it overlooked Tibet. The mountain has a cliff face on the north side, which is considered unclimbable. The Chinese wanted to climb it themselves, but that is possible only through Sikkim or Bhutan, and the Indians wouldn't let them. The colonel said that, if the Chinese had learned about his expedition, they would have considered it a spy mission. Two Chinese military bases – an airbase and an army base – can be seen from the peak. We decided not to publicize it.

Just west of Bhutan in Sikkim is the Natu La Pass, a place that General Westmoreland visited when he was in Vietnam. He was trying to develop programs with the Indians to spy on China. He was driven up to Natu La, which is at 14,000 feet, because helicopters can barely make it and the weather was bad. Westmoreland was worried about the narrow roads where, when two vehicles met, they had to stop and inch by each other, with a cliff on one side and a long drop on the other. He asked his host if they ever lost vehicles. The Indian general slapped him on the knee and said, "You ought to see it! Bloom, bloom, bloom! Trucks make a bigger noise than jeeps. Every day we lose some!" He said that part of it was altitude acclimation. At 14,000 feet, some troops can't function.

Before the Bangladesh war, our Consulate General was already watching over the border into then-East Pakistan. Archer Blood was our Consul General in Dacca, and his political officer was Scott Butcher. We made jokes about Blood and Butcher as things began going badly wrong there. In 1971, the East Bengalis were up in arms because they had been robbed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the elections. Their man Sheikh Mujib had won the election nationwide by the numbers, but Bhutto convinced Ayub Khan and other West Pakistanis not to give Mujib a chance to run Pakistan. The idea of a Bengali as head of the Government of Pakistan was something they really couldn't tolerate. They are really rather racist about Bengalis in West Pakistan. So things were in ferment, to put it mildly, and the Pakistan Army was rather stupidly cracking down. In mid-1971 we started getting waves of refugees into northeastern India. At one point it reached a figure of ten million, according to the Indians. We tried to check that figure several ways, and I must say I couldn't argue with it. Huge numbers of people. I went many times to the border area, where there were enormous refugee camps. I took several American politicians there, including Senator Ted Kennedy. He and Republican Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen from New Jersey were the most interested and involved at the time.

When things really got bad, we began to see American refugees as well. They realized it was unsafe for them as well, especially the missionaries. Some had been there so long that their teenaged kids had never been outside of East Pakistan in their lives. They weren't sure what to do, but Arch Blood and his staff advised them to get out because the way things were going it looked like there was going to be blood everywhere, so they agreed to leave. We had our hands full helping refugees, but I still had to report on the situation. As the crisis grew, a lot of American reporters began to arrive. By the time the war broke out, there were well over 400 of them in Calcutta. My boss assigned me as the chief Consulate briefer for them. That was quite useful to me, because we shared information. Some of them remain friends today.

I should mention that my Consul General at the time was Herb Gordon. He had been Political Counselor in New Delhi, and then was transferred directly to Calcutta. My first Deputy Principal Officer was Slator Blackiston, an Arabist who had transferred from Qatar. He came to India because several posts in the Arab world were closed after the '67 war, leaving less assignments available for officers who had spent most of their time in that area. Slator was not a happy camper, and his first efficiency report on me was not a good one. I complained because I watched the Consul General sign it without reading it. He was getting into a car to go to the airport on home leave and didn't read it before he signed it. So I filed an official grievance. I was advised by a friend in Washington who worked in that office not to do that because it would identify me as a trouble maker. Maybe; but I was right, and the result was a special inspection team from the Inspector General's office. By the time they arrived, the war was getting hot. I was up to my eyeballs in alligators, as they say, trying to cope with frantic reporting and briefing. One day an inspector stuck his head in my office and said, "Mr. Griffin, we've been trying for four days to interview you." I said, "I'm busy. I have to get out a Flash message." He insisted, telling me that their whole purpose was me. He said if I didn't talk to him, I would soon be out of a job. I got the message. I not only stayed and was promoted repeatedly, but the CG lost his career. So I was vindicated, and it was good for me. But not for him, I fear.

Q: Did we talk about Bengal, I mean the consular district of Calcutta. You mentioned your contacts. I was wondering because I would think that as overwhelming poverty is around you, it has to gnaw at your soul.

GRIFFIN: It does. And yet, let me make a broad observation. India gets two kinds of visitors, including us foreigners who live there for a few years. One type is people who are so put off by poverty that they really get ill and can't stand it, and want to run away from it as fast as they can. The other is those who see it, but say well, maybe something can be done about it. They see the other side of that coin – the more colorful India, the hospitable India, the friendly India. I fall into the second category. We have many Indian friends. Indians and Americans have almost the same image abroad – that is, arrogant and not very nice, until you get to know them. Anybody who comes to America and spends time, especially in the middle of the country, will say, "Oh, Americans are so friendly. Everybody says hello to you. Everywhere you go, people are friendly and say hi." It's rather similar in India.

Before I forget, I should say here that our daughter Schuyler was born at a very nice hospital in Calcutta during the lead-up to the Bangladesh war. She has returned to India a few times over the years, and enjoys it as much as Chrissie and I do.

Now, about the poverty there. What do you do about it? Well, for one thing, we have official programs trying to do something about it. We did make a huge difference a couple of times in India. There was a famine in 1966 in eastern India, especially in Bihar, the state just west of Bengal, and in Orissa, just south of there – both grain growing areas. They had a long drought, and people were starving by the hundreds of thousands, if not millions. We mounted a huge PL-480 grain shipment program, which saved lots of lives. People were still grateful for it when I got there in 1969. There were many other programs. But things got reversed during the Bangladesh war when Mrs. Gandhi shut down our USIS libraries and said she didn't need any more PL-480 aid, thank you very much. That situation was eventually cleared up by Ken Galbraith when he was Ambassador. He managed to strike an agreement which absolved the Indian debt of nine billion dollars to the U.S. That turned attitudes around. So we have done a lot for India over time. The USIS libraries didn't come back, but I think you can see that in today's India, it hasn't stopped Indians from finding out about American culture.

Q: What about sort of the standard parties, the congress parties and the other parties?

GRIFFIN: Well, as I said, Calcutta was a hotbed of communism. If you lived in Calcutta – that goes back to your question about poverty – you would know why. Most people are very poor. Estimates of the number of people sleeping on the streets varies from three to seven hundred thousand every night. Some of them have another place they could sleep, so they are there by choice. But the choice may be a hot-as-hell little room, or the much cooler street. This means that they also do what you would call toilet functions on the street, with no privacy. Yes that gets to you. But, on the other hand, we knew that begging was a racket in Calcutta – a huge racket, and some of the beggars live very well. I wouldn't call them wealthy, but they certainly have homes off the street. There was a guy with no legs and no arms on a little cart every day at the main intersection in Calcutta. He went home to a nice house and family every night. He spent his days

on the street begging, and collected a fair amount of money. So there is that, but after awhile you start to ignore that part of it.

Yes, we had what my wife thought was an inordinate number of servants. But when you stop to think about it, we had two full time servants, and then when she had a baby, we got a third. When you figure how many others those people were supporting, we were the sole income for 36 people. The sweeper, who was from Orissa, didn't have his family in Calcutta. He sent money home, rather like Hispanic immigrants do here today. We led the charge in raising salaries, to the consternation of some people in the Consulate who thought we were already paying too much.

Of course, poverty led to some of the politics. But the Communist Party was also strong in southern and western India. As was the Congress party, which lost Bengal to the CPI-M. They thought it would come back, but they lost in Bihar and the next state west, Uttar Pradesh, which are the biggest Hindi-speaking states. They were the core of the Congress Party for years and years. That has changed. They have become BJP supporters. The Communist Party may have won because one of its tenets is secularism. The BJP is promoting Hinduism. That won't fly with most Indians. They don't want their politics to be religious. They have watched Pakistan, and say they don't want to be like it. There are many Muslims in Calcutta. Some of them are people who didn't want to live in East Pakistan. They may be on the low end of the economic scale, but they are there nonetheless.

Q: So what was going on in East Pakistan?

GRIFFIN: Archer Blood, the Consul General in Dhaka, got in trouble for honest reporting. We heard that he ran afoul of Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad, a political appointee and former Coca Cola Company executive. Arch was accused of going native and siding too much with the Bengalis. But then things began to snowball. Refugees started coming across into India, fleeing from the fighting. In the monsoon season, which would have been in June, July, and maybe August of 1971, hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into West Bengal and Assam, as well as further north and east into Tripura and Burma. I went out to the West Bengal border one day, and found the land flooded as far as the eye could see. On the water were hundreds of rowboats loaded with people and their belongings, piled as high as they could without sinking, all looking for dry ground. At about the same time, resident Americans began to leave East Pakistan. The families of Consulate General personnel in Dacca were evacuated. Political Officer Scott Butcher pouched me all his biographic files for safekeeping.

At some point, it was evident that the Indians were planning a military move into East Pakistan. They closed air corridors between East and West Pakistan, so the Pakistanis had to fly around the southern tip of India to get from one side to the other. Tensions kept building up. A large group of American missionaries was evacuated by ship from Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong to Calcutta, where we helped them find temporary lodging and onward transportation. Then the American press began to appear. The first one was a journalist with whom I'm still in touch – Barrie Dunsmore. He was an ABC TV News correspondent stationed in Rome, and came out to see how big a story was developing. His trip led to others and, eventually, at the height of the war, there were something like 800 American correspondents in Calcutta. So as these events mounted, I dropped my scheduled tasks and focused entirely on the East Pakistan crisis.

The outflow of refugees increased steadily in the Fall of 1971, climbing to an estimated total of ten million people at one point. Several Senators and Congressmen came out to check on the situation. One was Republican Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who was Chairman of the Near East/South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Another was Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts. I took them out to refugee camps, as far as we were allowed to go. We weren't allowed into Assam or Tripura, so they only saw what was in West Bengal. More journalists came, and started getting in trouble. And then things got even more interesting for me.

Among the refugees was a group of politicians...

Q: Who would be Bengali politicians?

GRIFFIN: That's right. East Bengali politicians. They got together in Calcutta and formed a Bangladesh government in exile. In the midst of this, in early July 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret trip to China to prepare the way for President Nixon. He came first to India and then to West Pakistan, where he disappeared for several days. We heard that he had fallen ill, but thought he was trying to talk sense to General Yahya and address other urgent problems of South Asia. Later we learned that he had other things on his mind.

In any case, it was decided in Washington (after a proposal by the Indian Ambassador there, and with the concurrence of Ambassador Farland in Islamabad) to respond positively to a feeler from the East Pakistanis in Calcutta. The Department instructed the post to give them a message, and I was selected to do it in secret meetings with a representative of the Bangladesh government in exile. The Department said it would be too official if the Consul General did so. This caused me instant problems with the Indian police tasked with keeping an eye on us. They may not have been fully briefed by New Delhi, and began to track my every movement. I almost couldn't go to the bathroom without being followed, which got to be very irritating. I found a way to evade them and meet the Bangladeshi the first time, which they didn't like. At the same time, I was building better access to senior Indian officials. That included all the military commanders – from Indian Army chief General Sam Manikshaw, to Eastern Commander General Arora, to his deputy Lieutenant General Jackie Jacob – and the governors and chief ministers of West Bengal and the other states, plus Calcutta Police Chief Ranjit Gupta, whose men were assigned to follow me.

Q: Did New Delhi have a problem?

GRIFFIN: I have never tracked this down fully, but the East Pakistanis in exile – they thought up the name Bangladesh – were probably, if not put together by, at least facilitated by New Delhi – the Government of India – which didn't want an American diplomat nosing around their handiwork. I wasn't authorized to negotiate with anybody; I was essentially a messenger. I carried messages to and from the Bangladesh exiles. Henry Kissinger wrote about all this in his book "White House Years." Years later, he autographed my copy and wrote "Thanks for your help, George" in the margin.

Meanwhile, the war drums kept pounding. The Indians were playing a cat-and-mouse game with us. They wanted us to know certain things, but not others, so we played along while trying to find out what we were missing. The journalists were all over me too, realizing that I knew some things they didn't know. I encouraged them, because they knew other things I wanted to know. For example, they would sneak across the border during or after Indian military activities, and then come back and tell me about it. So I had a fair exchange of information with some top American and British reporters that you know or have heard of. It got to be quite a mob scene. My office wouldn't hold them all. I had to give them appointments to see me in small groups. It was the only way I could get my other work done.

Q: As you were doing this and acting, as you say, as reporter and as messenger, were you getting any feel for what the State Department was doing? It had this kind of opening which was the apple of the National Security Advisor's, Henry Kissinger's, eye.

GRIFFIN: Well, there are several ways to say it. We were at the end of the food chain. From our perspective, the Department, Embassy New Delhi, and Embassy Islamabad were squabbling about what our stance should be. In particular, Ambassadors Farland (in Islamabad) and ex-Senator Kenneth Keating (in New Delhi) seemed to us to be snarling at each other. We kept adding free advice to our reports that we should all cooperate, as we're on the same team. But differing views has been a problem between those two embassies ever since Pakistan was created. Embassy New Delhi finally arranged a meeting, asking Islamabad to send its political counselor. He didn't come, but his deputy did – my friend Bill Simmons. I was invited too, so I went to Delhi and sat in a series of meetings mostly chaired by Lee Stull, the Political Counselor. Dick Viets was the Ambassador's staff aide at the time, and Galen Stone was the DCM. They and lots of others, including the CIA station chief, got involved. But we ran into a buzz saw. Bill Simmons said Ambassador Farland was upset because we didn't grasp that East Pakistan was internal Pakistani business. He suggested that we shut up and do our jobs tracking India, which seemed primed to attack our CENTO ally Pakistan. We said, "Wait a minute!" I'm still a friend of Bill's.

Frustrated, I went back to Calcutta and kept doing my job. One evening my wife and I were invited to supper *a trois* by the deputy commandant of Eastern Command, a fascinating gentleman named Major General J. F. R. Jacob. After the war, he was promoted, and became the highest ranking Jew ever in the Indian Army – something he is rightly proud of. He's from Bombay and is now a senior member of the ruling BJP. Jackie and I got to be pretty thick after a couple of false starts. At supper that night he showed us some of his prized Chinese artifacts, and we talked a lot about art. Finally, he said, "Don't you have to go to the bathroom? Go through the bedroom." It took me a few moments to understand, but once in his bedroom I found a huge map of the region on his wall...

Q: A large map, yes.

GRIFFIN: ...on which all of the Indian military formations were carefully plotted – all of them. I didn't have a camera, but I had a pretty good memory. I studied the map for as long as I dared, then raced to the Consulate and filed the news that there were troops where we didn't know there were troops, and many more than we had thought. Jacob was a disciple of the storied German

General Heinz Guderian, who revolutionized armored warfare in World War II, and what the Indians did was rather remarkable. They took over East Pakistan almost without firing a shot. They did it by transporting an entire division across the Brahmaputra River by tank. Tanks that could swim. Soviet tanks. They did it covertly. Nobody tracked them. I guess we didn't have good real-time satellite imagery in those days, and didn't pick it up until I saw his map. It showed a whole division east of the Brahmaputra River that we didn't know about. They just rolled into Dacca one day, and that was it. The Pakistanis surrendered or fled in various ways. The Indians let some of them go without shooting them, but most were sent back to the West Wing, as it had been called before, by ship and plane.

Q: Was there concern on our part about the brutality of the West Pakistani troops in the East?

GRIFFIN: Quite a bit, and every time Embassy Islamabad said it was an internal Pakistani affair we sent in a report showing how those "internal" problems had spilled over into India. People were fleeing in all directions from the nastiness, including several million refugees who came in India and into our consular district. We couldn't count them, but we certainly saw refugees as far as the eye could see on the many occasions we went to the border in West Bengal. There were many Americans and other foreigners who came out of East Pakistan to Calcutta and spoke to us. There were lots of photographs and enough other evidence to document the brutality of the West Pakistanis. Later, when I was transferred to Islamabad, I met some East Bengalis who had been in the government in West Pakistan. They were locked up during the war and eventually repatriated, but they had some horror tales of their own to tell.

Q: The whole time you were there was a time of great concern about Vietnam. How was this playing in Calcutta and with the Indians?

GRIFFIN: The Indians didn't like our involvement in Vietnam. One of their top diplomats was a representative on the international observer group.

Q: ICC or something.

GRIFFIN: Yes, so they were paying close attention. Now, as an aside – remind me to come back to the USS Enterprise – my second marriage took place in Kathmandu.

Q: I don't want to go into details obviously about the separation from your first wife...

GRIFFIN: Yes, and divorce.

Q: So were you in Calcutta by yourself?

GRIFFIN: Initially.

Q: That allowed you time to go out and do all this.

GRIFFIN: That's right.

Q: In times of crises, this is very handy.

GRIFFIN: Until a very pretty American girl showed up several months after I arrived and decided to stay. I won't get into all that, although it's quite a funny story. After a couple of months, we agreed to get married, but that proved not to be feasible in Calcutta, so she took off. She went first to Kathmandu, where I gave her an introduction to my old boss in NEA, Ambassador Carol Laise. When she told Carol that we wanted to get married, which seemed impossible in Calcutta, she said, "You can get married here. Tell George to come up." So I did, and we tied the knot in Carol's living room, where she and Ellsworth Bunker were married. The reason I mention this is because you asked about Vietnam. You may recall that, as a wedding present, President Johnson gave them an Air Force plane to visit each other, which they did with some frequency. The Government of India insisted that every flight stop in Calcutta on the way to and from Kathmandu and Saigon. So, partly because they had been so helpful to us, I made sure I was at Dum Dum Airport each time the plane landed. So I saw quite a bit of both Ambassadors Bunker and Laise in Calcutta. He had been Ambassador to India in the 1950s, and was well known in New Delhi. The Indians often wanted to talk to him officially, and sometimes sent a minister from New Delhi to meet with him at Dum Dum. So sometimes the extent of my conversation with him was, "Hello, Mr. Ambassador. The Minister here wants to talk to you." So yes, New Delhi was paying attention. Moreover, there was speculation that, if the Indians invaded East Pakistan, it would become their Vietnam because there was no way they could control it. But they were clever enough to go in, throw out the West Pakistanis, and then get out themselves.

Q: As you were seeing this develop, was this a scenario that India may annex the whole thing?

GRIFFIN: Yes, some people expected that would happen. But to me, it was clear that the Indian military did not want to do that, and was advising its political leadership that it wouldn't work. It would be far too difficult to control the East Bengalis. One Indian general, probably the head of Eastern Command, General Arora, who is a Sikh, told me, "If the West Pakistanis, who are also Muslims, can't control those people, we surely cannot, and we shouldn't try." There were no Bengalis at the top of the Indian military; the generals were all from other parts of India. But even the West Bengalis were saying, with some dismay, "Well, you know, they're Bengalis like us. So they're hard to control."

Q: Bengalis within the state of India were sort of a difficult lump to digest?

GRIFFIN: And proud of it. Calcutta was the capital of British India until 1911, and some Bengalis think it still is. I was given a crash course in Hindi a few weeks before I went to Calcutta. Once there, I was accorded a teacher to continue lessons. I quickly discovered that it was useless, because the only state in our consular district where Hindi was spoken was Bihar. Even there, they preferred Bihari. And Bengalis absolutely refused to speak it. English was fine, but not Hindi; no. So I saw no reason to keep learning it while living in Bengal, and dropped the Hindi lessons. After awhile I didn't have time anyway.

At the time, the population of West Bengal was somewhere around 46 million. Now, it is probably close to 90 million. The population of East Pakistan was close to 80 million at that time, so the Hindus would have been outnumbered by Muslims, something they certainly didn't want.

In any case, the war was over and done with very quickly. It began on the 16th of December 1971, and was over by Christmas Eve. Christina and I had invited some of the American journalists over for Christmas, trying to make them feel at home, but they realized the war was over, and they were gone. Only a handful stayed around to report on the mopping up.

Q: Was there fighting along any of the other borders of India and Pakistan, or was it pretty well...?

GRIFFIN: Yes, in the West there was some reciprocal bombing, and a few tank and artillery battles, especially in Punjab, in the southern deserts, and some in Kashmir. But most of the activity was in the East. The Pakistanis could not fight a two-front war, as their supply lines were too extended to reach their troops in the East Wing.

Q: It's an impossible situation.

GRIFFIN: The Pakistanis sent all their warplanes to Iran when things got hot because they didn't want them destroyed by the Indian Air Force. They were far outnumbered and, while they consider themselves better pilots and dogfighters than the Indians, they knew the Indian equipment was more massive, some of it was newer, and they couldn't afford to lose their best equipment. Basically, the Pakistanis were armed by us, and the Indians by the Soviets. When we suspended our military assistance program, the Pakistanis turned to China.

Q: When this was started, did the Indians make their intentions known that they were going to help create a state, or was this sort of up in the air?

GRIFFIN: It was certainly not clear to me at first. But evidently someone in Washington thought it was in the cards. In the midst of the war, I got a call from one of the generals at Eastern Command asking why we were sending an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. I asked Embassy New Delhi what was going on. Ambassador Keating in turn called the State Department and, in much more colorful language, asked if it were true. It turned that the USS Enterprise had been ordered into the Bay of Bengal without informing the Ambassador. He was livid.

Q: This was, of course, Henry Kissinger trying to send a signal. It's one of those stupid diplomatic moves that didn't do anything, but it sounded like a guy who was trying to manipulate things.

GRIFFIN: It was supposed to be a show of force. To warn the Indians that if they invaded we would do something. Well, we didn't do anything. The ship went a short way into the Bay of Bengal, then turned around and left. That was it. They didn't fly a plane off it, as far as I know. But nobody told us about it until it was almost over with.

Q: Did that tilt towards Pakistan that came out later, did that hit you while you were there?

GRIFFIN: Yes, and Kissinger argues that that was the only thing that saved all of Pakistan from being invaded by India. There certainly was talk at that time that the Indians would go all the way, just as there is right this minute, with the Indians growling again at the Pakistanis for the latest shoot-'em-up in Kashmir. It always comes up. They have fought two and a half wars, so it's not unusual for the idea to come up. But most of my Indian contacts would argue what I said earlier – that Pakistan is indigestible. India is already the world's second largest Muslim country and has a big enough problem with it. Do they want to absorb more? No.

Q: It doesn't make any sense. While you were there, because it's still hanging around, what was your feeling, and your colleagues' who were sort of Indian hands and South Asian hands, about Kashmir, the equity of this? How did you feel about this?

GRIFFIN: In Calcutta I was paying little attention to Kashmir, except in the context of the eastern mini-states in my territory. That is, Nagaland Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, and the other small, money-poor states up there. Some of them had a status similar to Kashmir, though Kashmir is an entirely different case. But no, I didn't get into that issue until I was transferred to Pakistan, where it was almost topic number one.

At a Congress Party meeting in Patna, the capital of Bihar, I was brought over to meet Prime Minister Gandhi. I asked her about the status of those northeastern territories. The subject was fresh to me because we were dealing with a request from Billy Graham, the evangelist, to go to Assam to preach. I knew that, in Mrs. Gandhi's eyes, American missionaries were responsible for a lot of the troubles in those parts, pushing people to agitate for independence, or at least self-governing status within the Indian Republic. Some of our contacts were bemoaning the fact that some of the tribal languages, costumes, and customs were disappearing. I asked her what she thought about that. She said, "It is part of India, and must be fully integrated. Everybody there is an Indian; not a Naga; not an Assamese. They must have loyalty to the nation first." She didn't tell me that that should include learning Hindi, but she certainly talked that way in public speeches.

However, she did add, "If you are arguing for keeping these people clean or pure tribals, then why should an American missionary go there?" She said he would be doing the same thing that any Indian political officer would do. She meant that both would try to change the tribals, something I couldn't argue with. During the same period, there were some incidents in Orissa, which have been reflected in recent news. Do you remember last year when an American missionary and his son were killed along a road in Orissa?

Q. Yes, I do.

GRIFFIN: Well, we had some similar problems there. I remember Consul General Herb Gordon lecturing one of the missionaries who came to see him. The missionary said the lives of his group were in danger, and asked my boss to send officers there to check on the situation and protect them. The CG asked exactly what they were doing, saying he presumed they were proselytizing. The missionary said, no, they were helping the poor, and sometimes told people a bit about the

Bible and about what God can do. The CG said that proved his point. They were proselytizing, which they knew was prohibited in India. He said there was not much we could do to help them. The man was furious. He wrote back to his headquarters in the U.S., and his church complained to the Department, but nobody ordered us to do anything, and I don't think they should have. This is something that will come up again and again, given the beliefs of some of our major politicians today. Moreover, the Department now has people working on these issues.

Q: How did you find dealing with the people in Calcutta, the officials and all? Were they a different breed of cat from what you, I guess, experienced later on? The New Delhi bureaucrats who were sort of superior? American and the Indian officials don't seem to mix very well.

GRIFFIN: At a personal level, all over India, we still have lots of friends. Most Indians are very hospitable and warm, and we still stay in touch with many of them. Indians in general, and especially Indians abroad, are like Americans. They appear arrogant, they know everything, they are not always very nice people, so you don't think you want to know them. But if you do get to know them – the same with Americans – you can find good friends. Of the officials and politicians that I encountered, I found the Bengalis the easiest to deal with. For example, Jyoti Basu, the leader of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), a supposed Maoist offshoot of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India. He eventually was elected Chief Minister of West Bengal, a job he kept for 20-odd years. As Country Director for India, I went back to see him a couple of times. He was a typical Bengali politician. Okay, he had a Communist label, but he was a politician in the same way that any of his counterparts, the governors of American states, is. I may have made a mistake in arguing that he was a nationalist *a la* Ho Chi Minh. He knew his people, came from there, and dealt with them accordingly. I said we should almost forget the party label in the case of someone who knew what was best for the people of Bengal. He certainly did. He cleaned up much of the mess in the state – a mess left to him by the Congress Party, which had gotten old and tired and corrupt. I wrote a long airgram – a useful format that no longer exists, thanks to computers – describing the underlying causes of the rise of the communists and the decline of the Congress Party, that Tony Quainton, then India Desk Officer, tried to help me publish in a scholarly journal.

Q: Were we sort of observing the atrophy of the Congress Party?

GRIFFIN: I think so. They have kept going. The Congress Party still exists. But when you have to turn to an Italian stewardess to head the Party, something's wrong, it seems to me.

Q: This is Rajiv Gandhi's wife, Sonia.

GRIFFIN: Yes, Sonia Gandhi. While she has not become Prime Minister, she has become head of the Congress Party. I still don't think she will be elected Prime Minister. Back to Calcutta: of course I knew the local Congress Party leadership too. One of them, Siddhartha Shankar Ray, eventually came here as Ambassador when I was Country Director in the early 1990's. While at first he wasn't happy to see me, we became decent friends and got along fine. Yes, the Party had gone to sleep, and was getting ossified.

Q: Did you feel you were a different breed of cat in Calcutta than our political officers in Delhi?

GRIFFIN: I guess I always behaved a bit differently from some of my colleagues. Maybe that's what got me in trouble and got me the CIA label. I can be a bit pushy when I try to meet people and get information. For years, I prided myself on the number of people I knew, and among them the relatively large number with whom I could have fruitful conversations. That said, there were excellent political officers in New Delhi. I knew and dealt with them all, and some I still see. Harman Kirby, for example, came to lunch last Sunday. In 1970, he had the eastern India bailiwick, and some external affairs, such as Pakistan. That is why he was in that meeting in New Delhi, along with his boss, Lee Stull, the political counselor. That's why I went with both of them to Bhutan. I haven't mentioned those sidebars.

Q: Well, why don't you mention Bhutan.

GRIFFIN: Ambassador Keating was accredited to Bhutan as well as India. He had made annual visits to the mountain kingdom by Indian Army helicopter. The Consulate had a watching brief for Bhutan and Sikkim, so I knew the Bhutanese and the Sikkimese official representatives in Calcutta. They both had offices there, as each Indian state, for example, has an office in New Delhi and a guest house where the chief minister stays when he goes to the capital. The Ambassador was planning to go to Bhutan again in 1970 until the Indians, who flew him there before *gratis*, told the Embassy it would cost \$7,000, or something like that. Apparently there wasn't that much in the Ambassador's travel budget. He didn't want to go by road, and asked the Bhutanese for help, but they didn't have a helicopter. When he decided that somebody needed to go, Lee Stull volunteered, and asked Harman Kirby and me to go with him. We flew to Siliguri, where we were picked up by a car from the Consulate and drove the rest of the way. It was hysterical. The first night we stayed in a government guest house just inside the Bhutanese border in the *terai*, the lowland part of Bhutan. There were the three of us and four Swiss entomologists. Bhutan was called the Switzerland of the East by some, but this was the first time to anybody's recollection that serious entomologists had been allowed into the country, and they were happy as pigs in mud. They turned on all the lights in the guest house and insisted that we leave all the windows wide open. There were no screens. They hung netting all over the place, and readied big 100-gallon barrels to be stuffed with insects, formaldehyde, and cotton wool. When the bugs started flying in, there were repeated shouts of "I've never seen one of those!" We had to dodge beetles as big as your hand half the night until they filled up one of the barrels. We crossed paths with them throughout our stay in Bhutan. They were everywhere catching bugs.

Q: What was the status of Bhutan at that time?

GRIFFIN: As it still is. It's an independent kingdom, considered to be under the hegemony of India. The Chinese thought about seizing Bhutan when they invaded India in 1962, but chose not to. It is on the border of Tibet, which is very sensitive to the Chinese, so they pay close attention to it. We were taken to see a sacked mountain village, said to be the result of the last Chinese invasion. When I asked if that was 100 years ago, I was told it was in 1963, or something like that. Our guide, a young officer from the Foreign Ministry said, "We fought them off with bows and arrows." Obviously it was not the main Chinese army, but the Bhutanese are quite proud of their archery skills. I used to be a pretty good archer myself, but I couldn't compete with them. Since our trip, they have moved to high-tech like everybody else, but in those days we saw

things that would have been at home in medieval Europe. They had short ones and long ones, including a five-foot bow with probably close to a 200-pound pull. They could send an arrow what seemed half a mile with incredible accuracy.

Part of the purpose of our trip was to seek Bhutanese support at the UN, which meant trying to distance them from the Indians. We weren't very successful, but we tried. We also wanted to see as much of that very exotic country as we could. There are not very many shops in the country. Most were on the main street – a dirt road – of Paro. It is one of the capital cities; there are multiple capitals, depending on where the king is, or was. I almost bought a bedspread for my wife until I found out the price – \$6,000 – so I said they could keep it. The shopkeeper said, "Senator Percy bought three of them last year." I replied that the Senator was a bit better off than I was.

When we went to see the Minister of Tourism, who was looking for help in developing that industry, I offered to put him in touch with some experts. They were no hotels in the country, so we stayed in royal guest houses everywhere. Bhutan's primary foreign exchange income then was (and may still be) postage stamps, most of which were printed in Philadelphia. I suggested that they could do much better. I was amazed by one stamp with a 3D picture of American astronauts, until I learned that they were made in Philadelphia. I cautioned the Minister about two things: (1) to avoid the example of Nepal, which just invited the world in, and was overwhelmed by hippies and so-called world travelers; and (2) to prohibit large-scale dynamiting in building roads, which killed too many workers and caused landslides. I said, "Charge an arm and a leg." Well, my God, they moved quickly. They immediately sent over a rather pricey bill for our stay in the royal guest houses. Their prices are still very high, but it's kept most non-spenders out.

Bhutan now has other problems which were not so evident in those days, though you could see it happening next door in Darjeeling and in Sikkim. That is the large numbers of Nepalese who have moved in. According to our guide, slavery was abolished in Bhutan around 1960; one of the last places on earth where it was officially abolished. Many of the slaves were Nepalese, which has caused some bilateral problems, though the issue has quieted recently.

The other interesting place was Sikkim. My wife had known Hope Cooke, the *Chogyal's* wife, when she was a teenager. They invited us up for their New Year's celebrations one year. The price of admission was an American frozen turkey. That was just before the *Chogyal* went into a physical decline. He was eventually removed by the Indians and died, and she moved back to New York. It was an idyllic little existence, but he was probably not cut out to be a king. Certainly he was not able to deal effectively with the Byzantine political moves of the Indians and the Chinese. He talked a good line and tried to walk a fine line, but he drank too much, which made him fuzzy-headed. He was a nice guy – not a take charge type. After I left Calcutta, the Indians de-throned him, creating a bit of a stir, which died down pretty quickly. It was a bit like Goa and the other small territories India took over, and the Chinese didn't react.

Q: While you were in Calcutta, did you have any dealings with the students? Universities are often difficult places to penetrate.

GRIFFIN: They are. I was a little long in the tooth for hanging around campuses, but I did make contact with a few professors and secondary school teachers. Most of the students I met were crypto-Naxalites or real Communists, who were writing newspapers and pamphlets, some of which eventually became official party organs. I had “discussions” with some of them. They tended to yell at me that I was a representative of murderers and butchers, so I would call them muddle-headed and other names. We didn’t much see eye to eye. Many of them had left school and gone into street politics to become known and effective. So, it wasn’t so much on the campus as it was away from the campus.

Q: What about Mother Theresa?

GRIFFIN: Mother Theresa mounted a refugee relief effort during the Bangladesh war. She had Indian and expatriate ladies making bandages and putting together packages of things, especially for babies – milk and other things. My wife was involved in that effort during the war, and stayed on to help in Mother Theresa’s work with abandoned babies and the dying poor afterward. During the war, she found that the way many Americans and Europeans “helped” the refugee effort was to empty their medicine cabinets and donate mostly expired medicines, or diet and birth control pills! There were literally shiploads of things like that to be sorted out. Some of it was extremely dangerous. People had literally just dumped...

Q: I know. They did this with medicines and everything else.

GRIFFIN: So that took a lot of our time. Then the Indians made things more difficult by slapping import duties on shiploads of blankets and tents. These were brand new and well packaged, so we went screaming in to complain, pointing out that it was not commerce, but a donated relief effort. It didn’t get sorted out until the whole thing was over. Meanwhile some of our USAID people were upset when refugees came into town and sold donated blankets and tents on the street. My argument to them – and I remember that Senator Kennedy and Congressman Frelinghuysen agreed with me – was, “Look, if that’s a way they can get money to buy something they really need, what’s the matter with it?”

I took an American automobile to Calcutta, which was not the cleverest thing to do, but I was relatively broke and didn’t know what else to do. Eventually I sold it for a fairly decent profit to a young fellow who fancied himself a race car driver. Since I wasn’t allowed to keep the profit, I decided to donate it to Mother Theresa, as the rules allowed. Chrissie took me to see her, and she gave us a personal tour of her establishment. She explained how her nuns took in people off the street in their last throes. She added that she was trying to ensure that such populations would not increase, by promoting the so-called “rhythm method.” Years later she disavowed that position, and became just as insistent as the current Pope about doing nothing to interfere with the reproduction process. But at that time she showed us in detail how it worked, so I thought my money was going to the right place.

Q: Both with your family and others at the Consulate General, the extreme poverty that surrounded one in Calcutta must have had an effect.

GRIFFIN: It does. It is everywhere. I guess you develop kind of a blind eye to it. Since I grew up in Turkey, I was not unaccustomed to poverty, and it certainly exists in America in Washington and elsewhere. So, it wasn't really new to me. In Turkey, my father would hand out a few coins here and there to outstretched hands on his way to his office. Many Indians do the same. For awhile I did too, but then decided to give to recognized charities, and stop handing out money to people on the street, unless it was a kid to "guard your car." Basically a bribe to keep him and other kids from ripping off your...

Q: And keeping him from ripping you off.

GRIFFIN: Right. So a few *paisa* there would do. Then there were the rackets. The main drag in Calcutta is called Chowringhe. It is a street lined with big hotels, restaurants, and so forth, and also full of beggars who know where the money is. Especially those who mutilate children to induce you to give them money. I learned to close my eyes to that and ignore it. I was proud of the fact that we had official programs to try to help poor people. I knew that on my pitiful salary I couldn't do that much by myself, so I was proud to work for a government that was trying to help people. That was my attitude, but as far as Americans in general go, there are two attitudes when faced with India. One is "Oh, my God, this awful! I can't stand it. Get me out of here." The other is "I love it! It's so colorful! Life is vibrant." I tend to be in the second category. I found India a wondrous place and enjoyed most of it. Now, the population of India has trebled in my official lifetime, which is saying something. When I first went to Colombo in 1962, the population of India was less than 400 million. It is over a billion now, and you can see it everywhere. It's not only the crowds on the streets everywhere, but the pollution, which is getting seriously worse. It's amazing how close people can live and survive in all that, but India needs to do something about its population growth rate. The Chinese did. Many people have complained, but it has worked fairly well. The Japanese did. The Indians have not, and they're paying a price for it, and will continue to pay a price. In Pakistan and Bangladesh the populations are increasing at an even more rapid rate than in India. Some people say so they can be of equal size some day, able to stand up to India, but that's a sad attitude.

Q: Then you left there in 1972?

GRIFFIN: I left Calcutta in '72, yes.

WALTER A. LUNDY
Political/Economic Officer
New Delhi (1969-1973)

Walter A. Lundy, Jr. was born in Georgia in 1933. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Georgia in 1954 and serving in the US Air Force from 1954-1958, he received his master's degree from Georgetown University in 1961. His career has included positions in Colombo, Saigon, Hue, New Delhi, Teheran, and Seoul. Mr. Lundy was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in September 2005.

Q: I see that your next assignment was to the embassy in New Delhi so maybe we ought to move ahead to that unless you have something else you'd like to say about your assignment to the desk? How long were you there, on the desk?

LUNDY: I was on the desk for a year and a half, and then I was in India for three and a half years. The job became vacant in New Delhi in September. There was not another candidate for the job. I did not want to go out that soon. My wife had just given birth to our younger daughter, our third child, and we were not really ready to go back overseas. And there was no one to replace me on the desk. A compromise was worked out; we went out in December.

Q: Of '69?

LUNDY: Yes.

Q: OK and stayed until the summer of '73?

LUNDY: Until August of '73, to be more precise..

Q: OK, well why don't you talk a little bit about...unless there is something else that should be said about your time in NEA on the...?

LUNDY: No, I don't think so.

Q: What was your job in New Delhi and...?

LUNDY: Perhaps I should start off by saying that I'm not sure I had one. Given my experience on the desk, if ever any assignment should have worked out for me, that one should have. Instead, New Delhi was my worst assignment. Undoubtedly I was a bit cocky thinking I could put to good use my experience on the desk, but I learned soon after arriving there was very little for me to do. The AID mission was enormous; there was a very active and highly competent Treasury attaché, Larry Viet, who became one of my best friends. He very much fit the pattern of talented Treasury officials we discussed earlier. There was an agricultural attaché and an assistant attaché. The AID mission had an office of some seven or eight program economists. It was one of our biggest AID establishments overseas, surpassed only by Vietnam. There just wasn't much left for the economic section to do. We also had a commercial section headed by a counselor with two, and sometimes three, commercial officers under him.

Q: So the economic section aside from all these other people consisted of you and..?

LUNDY: A counselor and two other officers.

Q: Two other officers and you, so the economic section was left with transportation...?

LUNDY: Civil air.

Q: Civil Air. Not much reporting.

LUNDY: Not really, maritime reporting for whatever it was worth. There just was not much to do. We did some state by state reporting which I...

Q: Indian states?

LUNDY: Indian states, which I guess as much as anyone I inspired, having borrowed the idea from the provincial reporting that we had done in Vietnam. We suggested this type of reporting when I was on the desk, and I suppose it was my idea more than anyone else's. We also had economic and commercial officers at each of the three consulates, in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. State by state reporting at least encouraged the economic officers to get out into the countryside. This educated us all about economic conditions outside the largest cities, but I can't say this kind of reporting ever attracted much attention in Washington. When I arrived in Delhi, only one of the reports from the Embassy's consular district had been completed. I did reports on all the states in the region.

Q: Did you sort of coordinate that at the embassy in New Delhi to the extent that there were inputs from the consulates?

LUNDY: No, the consulates in those days had editorial freedom; they reported directly to Washington. That was changed while I was there. Most of their substantive reporting was funneled through New Delhi starting in either 1971 or '72.

Q: And this was the period from late '69 to '73, which included the Bangladesh War?

LUNDY: Yes, the Bangladesh War occurred, but it did not much affect the work of the economic section. I only remember doing some of the political/military reporting during the war to help out our over worked colleagues. I attended some of the Indian military briefings just because the political section was spread out very thin during that crisis period.

Q: Who was the U.S. ambassador during this period?

LUNDY: Kenneth Keating most of the time.

Q: Former congressman from New York and later senator.

LUNDY: A very admirable individual but not an on hands manager by any means.

Q: So the DCM was responsible for coordination.

LUNDY: The DCM did the coordination, such as it was. Morale was very low in New Delhi; relationships between the various sections were not very friendly. At the grunt level we certainly communicated with the Treasury and Agricultural Department representatives and with the AID economists, but there were just too many people and not enough meaningful work to go around. One of my great weaknesses is when I don't have enough to do I get in trouble.

Q: So you got in trouble then?

LUNDY: I made a lot of people made, yes.

Q: You made suggestions?

LUNDY: Such as pointing out that my job really ought to be abolished, but that is bureaucratically never a very popular stand.

Q: Were you able to travel?

LUNDY: Yes, because of the surplus rupees, there was enough travel money.

Q: India is such an enormous country and diverse in many ways.

LUNDY: Yes, very much so, extremely interesting.

Q: It makes sense to travel. New Delhi, like Washington, is not America. I don't think New Delhi is Indian, it might be the Punjab but...

LUNDY: No, I traveled quite a bit. That part of the job I certainly enjoyed. New Delhi is as Indian as any of the big cities. It is in the heart of Hindustan. There are vast cultural and linguistic differences within India. English is surviving in the Indian subcontinent because the educated elites from various regions need it to communicate with each other.

Q: You were not really involved in India's external economic or other relations?

LUNDY: To some extent; we certainly reported on trade. Our own trade problems with India, however, particularly textiles on which we had placed import quotas, were handled mostly in Washington.

Q: Trade policy issues, you really didn't get into that?

LUNDY: I didn't really get much into that, but I probably should have tried harder than I did to become involved in trade policies, in retrospect. India wasn't very important in international trade back then. The idea of export led growth, which already was showing considerable success in East Asia, had not penetrated Indian economic development planning. Indian policy makers thought the potential internal market was so vast that the country could activate its own economic growth engine. Indo-U.S. economic relations were based more than anything on surplus rupees and U.S. assistance levels. Our surplus rupee problem was the turf of the Treasury attaché. The large AID mission, of course dominated our aid policy. I was involved, but only in a subordinate role. I can't say I didn't learn a fair amount during those years in Delhi, however. I was the Treasury Attaché's backup and put in quite a bit of time in the commercial section when they were shorthanded.

I did pick up some more interesting work my final year in Delhi when I took over narcotics reporting. India was a major producer of opium poppies, supplying a large chunk of the world export market for legal opium. The Indians kept opium production under tight control. As far as we could determine, the country was not a major supplier of opium for illicit heroin production. Washington was very interested in opium production and export everywhere because of the growing worldwide heroin addiction problem. American pharmaceutical companies were concerned that their source of legal opium imports from India be preserved.

Q: The green revolution was under way and things...

LUNDY: The green revolution was underway, and it was succeeding, but the agricultural attaché was responsible for the reporting and analysis of the “green revolution”.

Q: To what extent was there an effort to integrate all of these different economic activities of the U.S. government? Was there a minister for economic and commercial affairs that supervised everything?

LUNDY: Just an economic counselor.

Q: Who reported to the DCM, and who did the Treasury attaché report to?

LUNDY: The DCM.

Q: The same for the Agricultural attaché and the Commercial counselor?

LUNDY: The commercial counselor’s position was a bit more prestigious but while I was there much of the time the commercial counselor was a Department of Commerce employee. His relationship to the economic counselor was ambiguous. The Treasury and Department of Agriculture attaches, as well as the Commercial counselor and his assistants, attended our staff meetings, but they carefully guarded their turf and considered themselves independent. The whole economic/commercial reporting effort was supposed to be coordinated by the economic counselor, but he had little muscle.

Q: And the AID mission was pretty much out on its own?

LUNDY: Yes, very much out on its own. In the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, however, our aid to India was drastically lowered. Most of the AID staff departed. Our aid effort in India was reduced to almost nothing more than humanitarian assistance. We were unhappy over the Indian invasion of East Bengal.

Q: Or East Pakistan.

LUNDY: East Pakistan, sorry that is what I meant to say. .

Q: OK. I served in Pakistan a little bit before this at the time of the '65 war. OK, well it sounds like that was not a great assignment for you.

LUNDY: It was not a great assignment. The opportunity came up for assignment to Tehran. I had come back to India after home leave in 1972 supposedly for another two years. Then the NEA Bureau asked me if I would be interested in the number two economic job in Iran, and I jumped at the opportunity.

Q: So that was a direct transfer?

LUNDY: Yes, a direct transfer.

Q: In '73?

LUNDY: In August, '73.

Q: OK, so anything else we ought to say about India. Between Washington and New Delhi, you devoted about five years to Indian affairs.

LUNDY: Five years, a large chunk of my career spent on India. The year and a half in Washington I enjoyed, but probably the less said the better about the larger portion spent in India. To add more would mean getting into problems involving personalities, and that is never productive.

RICHARD McKEE
Staff Aide
New Delhi (1969-1974)

Richard McKee was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He attended Cornell University for a BA, the University of Virginia for a MA and then joined the Foreign Service in 1965. McKee served overseas in Bolivia, India, Pakistan, Tunis, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. McKee also served as the Office Director for the Arab Peninsula and on the Board of Examiners. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Well where'd you go, your first post?

MCKEE: It was all New Delhi, I was in New Delhi for five years, '69 to '74.

Q: Well I think this might be a good place to stop, we'll stop at this point and we'll pick it up next time, you're going out in what year now? '60...

MCKEE: '69, summer of '69.

Q: '69, good. And we'll talk about New Delhi, and we'll mention, if you were picking up, while you were there, taking Urdu and all, were you picking up, well I can ask you now, were you picking up any emanations of the Vietnam war, I mean things, you'd been away, did that?

MCKEE: Oh, yes, it was a hell of a year, '68, '69 was a hell of a year in Washington. There were demonstrations practically every day, and clearly opposition to the war had come front and center.

Q: What, did you get involved in any of this, or were you sort of a political observer on the side, or busy doing other things?

MCKEE: Well, you know, I took my responsibilities very seriously. Later, when I became a supervisor, more than once had to remind subordinates that when you're working for the U.S. government, privately you can voice your doubts, but you had to be very careful about who you voice those doubts to. Publicly you support the policy.

Q: Okay. So we'll pick this up in 1969, you're off to New Delhi. Great.

Today is the 28th of May, 2002. We're off to New Delhi in 1969. How long were you in New Delhi?

MCKEE: Five years.

Q: Good God! To '74? I don't know, maybe we'll come here, but how did this assignment come about?

MCKEE: I had mentioned earlier to you that I got very good advice from my boss in Latin America about marrying a Latin American woman, which was to get the hell out of Latin America. Wanting to do so, I remember very distinctly putting in to study a hard language, Arabic, Farsi, or Turkish. As the roll of the dice would have it, it was Hindi, and also Urdu, so I did that for a year in the old, unventilated, ill-lit buildings rented by FSI in Rosslyn.

Q: In the garage.

MCKEE: No, this was actually above the garage. I remember that I was up, several floors up, still pretty grim surroundings. But then after that year, I qualified in Hindi and Urdu actually, at a low level. I think the Hindi was 3/3, and the Urdu was 2/2. The assignment was for four years to New Delhi. As things worked out, I stayed an extra year because Daniel Patrick Moynihan came and I was having a lot of fun. So I stayed, all told, five years.

Q: Okay. Well let's see, 1969, what was the situation, let's talk about India when you went there, both vis a vis relations with the United States and India in the world and internally.

MCKEE: Well, India at that point, politically, was still recovering from the death of Nehru and then the death of Prime Minister Shastri, who had succeeded him and lasted only about fifteen months before dying in Tashkent. Mrs. Gandhi had been chosen by the Congress Party barons to lead the party. They were thinking that she was some malleable young lady, and she turned out to be indeed far from that. But when I was there she was asserting herself. For example, soon after I got there she decreed that the Congress Party government would end the privy purses that were given out to the princes. This was seen as a sharp move to the left. She had never been fond of the United States. She in many ways had both rightist disdain for our sort of humble-jumble society, and of course she had a leftist disdain, maybe a socialist disdain for our economic system. But nonetheless, relations at that point were very good. Chester Bowles was still Ambassador. He was very popular. The Peace Corps had over seven hundred volunteers in India. The AID mission was all over, including in about a half a dozen state agricultural universities with teams from some of our state agriculture universities. There was a program between the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur, which was going very well. All of this in the context of a contest with the Soviets for the affections of the Indians. However, as the situation went from bad to worse in East Pakistan, culminating in essentially the disenfranchisement of the East Pakistanis before Bhutto became Prime Minister, when Yahya Khan was still there. Hundreds of thousands of refugees poured into India. And we, in that famous phrase, tilted toward Pakistan in that conflict.

Q: Well I'd like to go back earlier, before the '69, what, when you went out there, what was your job?

MCKEE: That was actually curious. I was supposed to be an economic officer, but I was hauled into the front office to be the Staff Aide to the Staff Aide to the Ambassador. The Staff Aide was Richard Viets, and the Ambassador was Chester Bowles. And that's what I did. Bowles left and Ken Keating came, but I stayed in that position for about six months. I was not really very successful in it, and shifted over to the economic section, the section where I spent about a year and a half.

Q: What, when you arrived in '69, what was the perception of Indira Gandhi, from our perspective?

MCKEE: I don't think Americans had a very clear view of Indira Gandhi at that point. Nixon made a visit, he came to India, soon after he was elected he came to India in '69, but it was pretty clear that he and Mrs. Gandhi did not get along well. I think the U.S. government saw her as a possibly transitory figure on the left and not well disposed to the United States.

Q: Did the Vietnam war, this is at the very height of the anti-Vietnam business, did that, how did that play out when you arrived?

MCKEE: Well, it was a very negative factor. I mean the Indians thought that we were dead wrong and had no compunctions about telling us so. That certainly didn't go down well in Washington.

Q: Did, how did, what was your impression of Chester Bowles and how he dealt and perceived the Indian government at that time?

MCKEE: I was there only at the very end, and I don't think our tours overlapped by more than six or eight weeks, so I'm really hesitant to say anything. He was an iconic figure. He'd been Ambassador before, certainly loved it. He was a controversial figure, as was Steb, his wife, in the American community. Steb always dressed in a sari and there was a sort of going native feeling about them, and it went down badly with an awful lot of Foreign Service Officers.

Q: It's almost a tradition of our Ambassadors very much of serving the Indian side of things and all. Was that something that we were seeing, do you think?

MCKEE: Oh, I think that that was perceived in Washington, yes. I think that our reporting, our political and economic reporting was seen as being unduly generous to the Indians. We had a huge AID mission there, there were a lot of jobs on the line. So it did color the quality of the reporting.

Q: I might add that I saw reports that, there was a feeling today where tensions were extremely high between India and Pakistan that our embassies seemed to be dueling with each other, the one in Islamabad and the one in New Delhi. Was there all that feeling when you got there?

MCKEE: Absolutely. One was seen as either an Indian partisan or a Pakistani partisan, and that played out between the two embassies. As the conditions in East Pakistan deteriorated, that became stronger and stronger. You had the Embassy in Delhi reporting that the Indians were being forced by the influx of refugees and by the need to secure their eastern border to take steps which would effectively assist the rebels. Our Ambassador, Joe Farland in Islamabad at that time, was very close to the Yahya Kahn, who was telling him that it would all be over shortly and it was just a bunch of disgruntled malcontents.

Q: How did you find, as a Staff Assistant to the Staff Assistant, how did you find dealing with the, did you get involved with the Indian Foreign Ministry or the bureaucracy down there?

MCKEE: Not at that time, I did later on when I was in the political section, and the economic section, but I didn't as a Staff Aide.

Q: By the way, you mentioned MIT and the Indian...

MCKEE: Institute of Technology at Kanpur.

Q: Were we seeing at that time India as being one of the world's great repositories of sort of engineering minds and scientific minds or not?

MCKEE: No, no, I think that was a much later perception. I think at that time India was seen as, and this is very much a fallacy, as democratic India that was the response to Communist China. By assisting India we were showing that a democracy could also deliver the goods.

Q: How did we see, the sort of marriage between the Soviet Union and India was seen to be, not a marriage made in heaven, they seem to be on different sides, it almost seems like they were, the relations between the two seem to be more designed as against the United States than you know a natural liking for each other.

MCKEE: Well I think that's true, the linkage between the two was very much an elite thing. It goes back to Nehru, who visited the Soviet Union in the '20s or in the '30s. There was this sort of romantic Fabian leftism, anti-imperialist rhetoric and what have you. And then after the '60-'62 war between India and China, Russia, the Soviet Union, was very much seen in New Delhi as the counterbalance to China, and later also to Pakistan. One of my jobs was to put together this massive report on East Bloc economic and technical assistance to India every year. No question in my mind that the Russian technicians and their families, Russian diplomats, were seen as racist and cheap and were generally quite unpopular. The more sophisticated Indians realized that they were getting second rate technology, that they could get better technology from the United States. But we had declined after a long almost theological fight to permit one of our steel companies to transfer technology for a steel mill to India, and that still rankled. The decision that had been made in the mid-'60s then, but the bitter residue certainly was still there. The Russians built two steel mills for the Indians.

Q: In those days steel mills were considered to be the crown jewels or whatever, they were a great project, they looked big, and they employed a lot of people.

MCKEE: Exactly. Even if, as in the case of India, it was cheaper to import the coal from Poland than it was to use Indian coal, and the economics of it didn't really make much sense.

Q: Did you, when you arrived at the embassy, was there a strong cadre of what you would call Indian hands or was there a cadre of subcontinent hands?

MCKEE: Subcontinent hands, but there were some very impressive people there. Herb Hagerty was in his second or third tour there, Grant Smith had been raised there. His father was an AID officer. A very distinguished guy, his name has escaped me now, had the burdensome title of Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs. Later went on to be Consul General in Munich.

Q: Well the sort of the love affair was more at the Ambassadorial level than within the ranks or not? Was the Ambassador kind of set the tone?

MCKEE: Well Bowles certainly was a romantic about India, I think. And then he left, and of course Ken Keating came. Ken was a very different kind of figure, but there were certainly people in the AID mission and in the embassy who were emotionally committed to the success of India, and economic development.

Q: You moved there for about a year to the economic section?

MCKEE: A year, year and a half.

Q: When was that?

MCKEE: Well let's see, I arrived in the summer of '69, it would have been in early '70, and I probably stayed for the summer of '71, so about a year and a half.

Q: What was your impression of the economics that were driving India?

MCKEE: Well I think I, I think I shared the general appreciation that, as Patrick Moynihan who later became Ambassador, said, socialism is a luxury that only rich countries could afford. India really couldn't afford this sort of state socialist autarkic system that was prevalent there. There is a very strong memory in my mind. There was a Sikh entrepreneur, Manmohan Singh. Not the very well known Manmohan Singh, but another Manmohan Singh. But he was a Carrier, air conditioning, refrigeration representative in India, and was once called upon to testify before a committee of the Loksabha, which was my main beat. I covered domestic politics.

Q: The Loksabha being...

MCKEE: Being the lower house of the Indian Parliament, the House of the People. And about joint ventures and partnership and things like that. And I actually got to sit in on the session as an observer committee, I thought it was really fascinating, because here was this very sharp entrepreneur-capitalist, very much at home in the West, explaining to fairly ignorant Members of Parliament, but also others who were quite committed ideologically that just because you put in fifty-one percent of a venture didn't mean that you ran it, ran roughshod over the representatives of forty-nine percent. It wasn't like a democratic system where fifty-one percent gives you total control. Then there was the whole question about technology transfer, which these parliamentarians clearly envisioned as, "You pay some money and then somebody gives you a whole bunch of documents and then you go out and do stuff." They really didn't have a clue about how dynamic a process it was. Manmohan Singh kept it up, and it was clearly missionary work, because except for very small minority communities like the Parsis, most didn't have a clue when it came to the larger market-oriented world.

Q: In a way, almost somewhat unlike the Chinese, who seem to have this sort of thing at their finger, many of them have it at their fingertips.

MCKEE: Part of it may be that the way the caste system works, very gruesome. Some groups do one thing and some groups do another, those who do politics, some do economics. Those who do export-import trade in Bombay or in the ports don't do agriculture production. I don't know, but certainly there were, because there were very sophisticated people in terms of the Indian merchant community, and like the Chinese there were diaspora Indians with whom you could set up relationships. Actually the foreign trade of both countries considered as a percentage of GNP was a joke.

Q: Well this is deliberate, wasn't it? It was self-production and self internal-selling and that sort of thing.

MCKEE: Import substitution was a huge theme when I was there. I often thought that precious foreign exchange was always one word in Indian-English, because you never saw foreign exchange without the adjective “precious.” The idea that we should be self-sufficient and not depend on the west for anything.

Q: Were you seeing India as having something that if they were to take sort of government controls off they could take off, or at that point was the economy such that, they weren't ready for that?

MCKEE: I think that the feeling was very strongly that if they took off the controls, the economy would take off. There were some true success stories, but not so much in the industrial-commercial field. The introduction of triple-dwarf wheat by American AID experts in Punjab meant that every year the harvest was up by fifteen to twenty percent from what it had been. But one of the underlying reasons for that was land reform. In East Punjab, as opposed to Pakistani Punjab, there were very few farms that were larger than forty acres, and they were intensively farmed. Land reform, particularly in Punjab and then in western Uttar Pradesh, was carried out in a way that ensured that those who received the land also received capital and fertilizer and technical assistance. It was not just enough to give a peasant a piece of land, they'd lose it in no time. You've got to give them all these other things as well, make them available.

Q: Well, were you there when there was the shift from being a food deficit country to a food surplus country?

MCKEE: Yes, yes. In the mid-'60s, we had shipped massive amounts of grain to both India and Pakistan because the monsoon failed two years in a row, and certainly by the early '70s, '71, India was self-sufficient in grain.

Q: Did, was this the beginning of that monumental surplus of counterpart money and all?

MCKEE: Well the counterpart money was really built up in the '60s by the shipments of grain. I think I may have mentioned the great accomplishment of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as Ambassador was to reach an agreement whereby those funds were dissipated over a relatively short period of time, about ten or twelve years.

Q: Was that, when you were dealing with sort of the economy of the relations, was that seen as sort of an indigestible problem?

MCKEE: Oh, absolutely, and especially after the Indo-Pakistan War, when of course our relations reached rock bottom. The Left and the Congress and the two-odd Communist Parties beat us over the head with the PL-480 rupees every day.

Q: Well now, when did you move to the political section?

MCKEE: I must have moved to the political section in summer of '72.

Q: Well then let's go back to the '71 war.

MCKEE: Maybe '71, my memory's not...

Q: Well let's talk about the '71 war, how did, was there a feeling within the Embassy and with yourself and all that eventually, I mean this thing can't last, India can't sit by and watch this and it was almost inevitable that they would get involved?

MCKEE: Oh, very much so. And we were privy to the reporting coming out of our Consulate General in Dacca. Who was there...?

Q: Arch Blood.

MCKEE: Arch Blood was there. And it was very clear that conditions in East Pakistan were going from bad to worse. To some extent I'm sure that RAW, the Indian intelligence agents, exacerbated the situation. In many ways they really didn't have to. The Pakistan Army was doing quite enough on its own to exacerbate it. And I think the sentiment in the Embassy was that the Indians were forced to intervene finally in December of '71.

Q: How, how did that, it was done rather quickly, wasn't it?

MCKEE: Once the Indian Army intervened, I think it was done in a manner of six weeks.

Q: Was there concern, did this spill into the other borders with West Pakistan?

MCKEE: Well I've never been quite sure how that would have happened. Certainly Henry Kissinger was quite concerned that the Indians would move across and would move into West Pakistan, but for whatever reason Indians decided not to do so. Possibly because we sent our aircraft carrier, I think it was the Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal.

Q: How did that tilt towards Pakistan affect, sort of the carrier came and all that. Was there sort of a freeze on contacts, did it have any real effect that you saw?

MCKEE: Social relations were occasionally bad. I remember one night that I drank too much and actually decked an Indian journalist who, I thought was getting obnoxious about Vietnam and Bengal and all of that. The Indians had a very professional Foreign Service. Obnoxious sometimes, and condescending, but professional, so there was every effort made to maintain a sort of civility.

Q: Did, was there any concern on behalf of the American community in the Embassy during the war that you...

MCKEE: Oh, absolutely. First of all, we all had to cover up our windows with black paper or black paint. Ditto with the headlights of our cars. The Australians were so afraid of being taken for Americans that they sort of had large Australian flag decals that they put on their cars. We were very unpopular.

Q: Did, was there, I don't want to say rebellion, but was there unhappiness in the Embassy because of that sort of pro-Pakistan on the part of Henry Kissinger and company?

MCKEE: I really don't recall. It's logical to infer that but I don't recall it.

Q: Part of the reason behind our siding with Pakistan was to show civility to China.

MCKEE: We know now.

Q: We know now. But you didn't know then.

MCKEE: It's really inconceivable. I mean it's not for nothing that "Nixon to China" has become a stock phrase in politics.

Q: What about as an economic officer, how did you find your Indian counterparts, do you remember...

MCKEE: My specialized, special area shows you how elaborate the Embassy staffing was and how large in those days. My special area was into two fields, one was the Soviet bloc economic assistance, and the other one was barter trade, what was called rupee trade. So many pairs of badly made Indian shoes for so many Russian tanks that didn't fire straight. I did a lot of writing on essentially non-monetized trade.

Q: Were you sort of able to, in some way or another get a feel about the shoddy goods that were being created?

MCKEE: Oh, yes, they were quite visible. At one point, the state trading agency, one of many, had cut a deal with the Bulgarians, and in return for some product that they sent to Bulgaria they got back all of this Bulgarian brandy which was undrinkable stuff. Whenever you went to the state hotel, that's what they tried to get you to take, because they had boxcars full of the stuff.

Q: How about, what sort of social relations did you find, were you able to make good contact or was it a time when you were kind of being frozen out socially?

MCKEE: No, my memory is that social contacts remained very strong. Yes, occasional sharp exchanges, but Indians quite willing to take refuge in that old line 'We like you, it's your government we can't stand.'

Q: Did you feel there was much understanding on the part of Indians into what made the United States tick, I mean the Indians who counted?

MCKEE: I think there wasn't much understanding. The great change in the Immigration Act took place only in '66, '67, and so the impact had not at all been felt.

Q: Prior to that I think there were a hundred...

MCKEE: Hundred a year.

Q: Hundred a year. In the whole Asia-Pacific triangle.

MCKEE: It was per country, but it was a hundred a year for India, a hundred a year for Pakistan. And of course the changes that took place in the '60s then opened the way. By '69, '70, '71 the brain drain had become a concern in India. It was more brain drain towards Europe, particularly England, than there was brain drain towards the United States.

Q: Well Indians with wealthy family were sending their sons to England for education.

MCKEE: Still. Yes. I think that was beginning to change even at that time. Again the impact of something like having Ohio State people at the state university. MIT, had a tremendous trickle-down effect on the way that Indians thought, but they were a typical post-colonial society in that sense, educationally.

Q: When you moved to the political section, what piece of the action did you have?

MCKEE: Domestic politics, almost everything except Kashmir, coordinating the reporting of the three consulates general. It was a marvelous job.

Q: Oh, I would think it would be.

MCKEE: Traveled a lot. I was myself responsible for reporting on state politics in the Delhi consular district, which was a big job. There were very bright officers in the consulates, Peter Burleigh in Calcutta, for example.

Q: Was Karelia, is that the way you pronounce it, or Karalla, was that a place we were looking at closely because it was communist?

MCKEE: Kerala was famous as the first governmental unit to vote in a Communist government a free election. It had much more to do with the case and communal character of the province than it had to do with Communism. Kerala was a particular concern. We had a library at Trivandrum. USIS had a library there, that was part of the Madras consular district. It was a place that did get a lot of attention.

Q: Did we see, were we concerned about a communist, increasing communist influence in India, or did we see it sort of as almost a self-sealed political system?

MCKEE: The latter, I think. For one thing, the Communist Party was split in two between the pro-Moscow and the pro-Chinese tendencies. And there certainly were any number of leftists in the congress. I remember meeting V. K. Krishna. There was a feeling that they would not prevail. For awhile, we got rather romantic about this Swatantra party, which was a right-wing party, not right-wing in the Hindu nationalist sense, but right-wing in terms of free enterprise. And they, they actually did reasonably well in a couple of elections.

Q: What was our impression at the time of the importance of religion as a political influence?

MCKEE: Oh, I laughed at this recent “Foreign Service Journal” piece where this guy argues that we should have religious attachés, religious affairs attachés, because I think we were acutely aware of the importance of religion. For one thing, we knew very well that Gandhi had very deftly manipulated religious symbols in order to mobilize the Hindu masses against the British. The spinning wheel, the technique of self-sacrifice and all of that. And then of course we were quite aware of Hindu-Muslim tensions. Not in Kashmir at that time, but very much in other parts of the country. I remember once I had to go down to the front office. I enjoyed sitting down with Patrick Moynihan and explaining that in Uttar Pradesh only maybe fifteen percent of the people were Muslims, but then they’re split between these two major groups. I was going on and on, getting mired very much in the details. But one of the great things about Moynihan, because of his own love for local politics in New York and Boston and elsewhere was that, he was quite willing to get down to the complexities in politics.

Q: How about Kashmir, was that playing much of a role when you were there?

MCKEE: Well it certainly was a bone of contention between the two countries, it was an area that first Harmon Kirby and then Grant Smith reported on, because it was a sort of a function of the Indian-Pakistani relationship. We kept an eye on politics in Kashmir. There wasn’t much violence, if any, at that time. For us Embassy staffers it was a great place to go on holiday. The Ambassador could not go, as I recall. The State Department held that if he were to go it would be seen as showing that we endorsed the Indian claim, which we didn’t. We didn’t endorse anybody’s claim.

Q: But you could all take, go get your houseboat on the Lake of Kashmir.

MCKEE: And did so.

Q: I guess India and Pakistan were so involved in East Pakistan and Kashmir, off the radar almost?

MCKEE: I guess, yes, certainly it was called a cease-fire line, there was a U.N. presence in Kashmir from ’47 onward, and even though the ’65 war had been essentially over Kashmir, in the early ’70s it was Bengal that was the focus of tensions.

Q: Was there any thought, or anybody talking about India maybe taking over east Bengal? I mean, East Pakistan?

MCKEE: Certainly there was, I think the Pakistanis played on that fear. We were always sort of skeptical in the Embassy, because essentially it would have meant adding forty or fifty million Muslim voters. What would be the point? Bengal was already a difficult problem; a united Bengal would be an even more difficult problem. And there was so much bad blood between the Hindu Bengalis who had left and the Muslims there.

Q: This is talk, but my analysis, it probably wasn’t going to happen.

MCKEE: It probably was not gonna happen.

Q: How did you find, when you were a political officer, getting around and talking to local politicians and all this?

MCKEE: Very easy. As I talk to young Foreign Service Officers setting out at the receptions that we give our A-100 classes, one of the few things I lament, but one of the things I do lament, is that it was so much more difficult everywhere to have that kind of fairly free and easy exchange with host country nationals, which was very much the rule thirty years ago.

Q: Part of it's travel money...

MCKEE: Part of it is travel money, but most of it is security. And to some extent, in particular parts of the world, the Muslim world for example, it is a really sharp increase in anti-Americanism.

Q: Did events in Vietnam, but you left before the collapse came.

MCKEE: That's right, the collapse was in '75.

Q: But the peace treaty, did that seem to, these accords, did that seem to help relations with India at the time?

MCKEE: Well, I think so, but, really, realistically we were in the doghouse for quite a long time after '71. And you remember the whole infrastructure was shot away, the Peace Corps left, the agriculture university people left, the AID mission became a shell of its former self, and by then our relations became very thin indeed.

Q: Was this basically Indira Gandhi, was this the economics, or what was driving this?

MCKEE: Nationalist sentiment very broadly. We had backed the wrong horse in 1971 and we should be made to pay for it. But Mrs. Gandhi had moved into her most autocratic stage at that point. Let's see, I think, I can't remember now whether her two-year emergency started or ended in '77, but she was moving towards this period of essentially declaring herself Empress of India.

Q: Well then, well you left there in '74. Did you consider yourself by that time a sub-continental hand or something?

MCKEE: Oh, one of my superiors wrote a very flattering efficiency report. He called me "Mr. India." And after five years I sort of did feel like Mr. India. Although there were other people whose knowledge was much greater than mine.

Q: Well where'd you go then?

DONALD M. ANDERSON
Political Officer
New Delhi (1970-1972)

Donald M. Anderson was born and raised in Sioux City, Iowa. He received a bachelor's degree in government from Louisiana State University and served in the U.S. Army in the 1950s. Mr. Anderson joined the Foreign Service in 1958. His career included positions in Hong Kong, New Delhi, Paris, Beijing, and Shanghai. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Then you went to New Delhi where you were for two years, '70 to '72. What were you doing?

ANDERSON: I was in the external section of the political section. Back in those days...in the bad old days...I think it was Galbraith back in the early '60s decided he needed a China specialist and a Soviet specialist in his political section. So there was a Chinese language officer position in the embassy in Delhi, and I went out as the China specialist, which would have kept me busy about 5% of my time. Actually, my bailiwick, as it turned out, was India's relations with Asia, and the communist world -- Soviet-India relations, Indian-Chinese, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe.

Q: This harks back to some time before because you are looking at India. How did we figure...was it '62 the war between China and India where the Chinese gave the Indians a bloody nose for a while and we stepped in and helped with supplies? As a China watcher, but let's say by the time you got to India, what was the feeling? Why did this war take place? It was relatively minor, but it was a little war.

ANDERSON: Oh, it was.

Q: Why did it take place? And what was behind it?

ANDERSON: It's a very complex subject, and it's also a very emotional subject. I mean, you could only have one view if you talk to Indians, and you could get in great trouble if you didn't. My own view is that India was basically...it's a very strategic area. It's a very high mountain area, and the British for many years used to probe up into that area. McMahan was up in that area. It's sort of the roof of the world where you are looking down into the other side. And I think the Indians were in a sense carrying on the British tradition of pushing forward into areas for strategic advantage, and the Chinese reacted. The Chinese were much better prepared, and the Indians were really badly prepared. They got a bloody nose and lost some territory -- the Aksai Chin. It was quite strategic to China. You have to look at a map, but it connects two parts of China. And they also lost some territory over in the eastern part as well.

Q: In the first place, Kenneth Keating was the ambassador at the time. What was your impression of him, and of the embassy?

ANDERSON: Keating was a nice fellow, a good New York...

Q: He'd been senator from New York.

ANDERSON: I would not rate him as a good ambassador. Like many political ambassadors, particularly an ex-Congressman who becomes ambassador, it's a very personal thing, and the relationship is a very personal relationship. But I mean, he didn't do any great harm, and as I say, he was a pleasant individual. I got along with him quite well. The embassy itself was huge, but it's a huge country. I must say, the two years I spent in Delhi were not among the two happiest years in my life.

Q: In dealing with the Indians, they in some ways mirror us. They get very moralistic, and preach. Was this a problem as far as dealing with them?

ANDERSON: Yes, it was. They are a very prickly people, and have a very strong sense of national dignity. They would get very huffy about what we would often times consider minor things. I found that frequently hard to deal with. I was denounced from the floor of parliament. I was sitting up in the diplomatic gallery at one of their parliament question and answer sessions, and was wearing white pants which is sort of traditional, but it was a very boring day and I was slumped down and the seats were rather small and I'm long-legged, so it appeared that I had my knees on the back of the chair in front of me. And whoever the parliamentarian was that was speaking turned around and pointed at me, and denounced me because the American had no sense of respect for the Indian parliament, etc., etc.

Q: Caused you to sit up anyway.

ANDERSON: I sat up a bit, but I didn't move because I did not have my knees on the back of the chair, and they sent someone around to remonstrate with me.

Q: In the first place, what was India's relations with the Asian world that you were dealing with? And also, how did you go about and collect information?

ANDERSON: It was a very difficult time for American diplomats at that time. The whole Bangladesh thing was developing, and the United States, particularly Henry Kissinger, was tilting very heavily toward Pakistan.

Q: The phrase, I don't know where it started, but that we were tilting toward Pakistan.

ANDERSON: The Indians were furious, and when the Indians are furious they can be in their own glorious pompous self. And Indira Gandhi was rising in power, so it was a very abrasive type of relationship. India was neutral but leaning quite heavily toward the north in the Vietnam situation. They had a Consulate General from North Vietnam, and a Consulate General from South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese consulate eventually became an embassy. I used to talk to the South Vietnamese about India's Vietnam policy, and they were trying to involve themselves in some sort of peace process. I used to fool around with the Russians just to try and...I mean they wanted to talk to me because they thought I was a China expert, and I wanted to talk to them just to see what they were doing with the Indians because they were very, very heavily

involved. It was interesting, I ascertained who their China specialist was, who, I think a legitimate Soviet Foreign Ministry type who had served in China, but dull as dishwater, and I was very quickly passed off to another, much livelier individual. He was not a China specialist, but he was with the KGB.

...and then with the Indo-Pak war, the Christmas War in December, I also was involved to a degree with Indo- Pakistani relations, and to a degree with Pakistan because curiously the Minister of the Pakistani High Commission was a friend of mine whom I had known in Washington.

Q: They kept their missions open, didn't they, during this war?

ANDERSON: Yes, they did. But the diplomats were under house arrest. Once or twice we went over and played bridge with the Pakistani Minister in his house. It wasn't a terribly strenuous job. A lot of social life, and a lot of exchanging scuttlebutt.

Q: Did you get any feel for the, I won't say tensions, but the varying points of view between our embassy in New Delhi, and our embassy in...where was it, in Rawalpindi at that time?

ANDERSON: Islamabad.

Q: There was also a political appointee in Pakistan, wasn't there at the time?

ANDERSON: I can't remember.

Q: Did you get a feel that New Delhi was sending in its thing, and Rawalpindi was sending in its thing to Washington and they're looking at the local, rather than you might say the American interests?

ANDERSON: Actually, serving in the embassy in Delhi you began to take on the color of India. Islamabad was writing back to an essentially receptive audience. They were objective in terms of what was happening, and there's no question Pakistan started the war. It was a very difficult time on both sides, and our relations with Pakistan in many respects were strained as well. But basically their support for an independent Bangladesh was viewed favorably...I mean not their support for India, but Bangladesh. Whereas India saw itself as supporting the independence of Bangladesh, and they were taking in literally millions of refugees from Bangladesh and trying to feed them. We did help. We did have C-130 flights come in with tents and stuff, but it was getting the Indian perspective on the whole conflict. It was very difficult to get much vibration back to Washington. They didn't want to hear much about India. And, of course at that time, the Indians were saying a lot of very nasty things about us.

Q: What about the very controversial move of putting the nuclear carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal, or something like that? How did that play at our embassy? Were we saying, go away, go away, or something like that?

ANDERSON: Yes, exactly. The unanimous embassy view in Delhi was it was really dumb.

Q: What's a carrier going to do, except to stir up emotions. This was Kissinger, wasn't it?

ANDERSON: Yes, Kissinger.

Q: Kissinger wasn't Secretary of State at that time, was he?

ANDERSON: I think he was still just NSC.

Q: Yes, but very much calling the shots as far as this one.

ANDERSON: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and the people there?

ANDERSON: The Indian Foreign Ministry is basically quite a good professional corps, and in many of the posts where I have served I've had a good contact, a good friend frequently, among Indian diplomats. They're generally quite professional.

It's rather interesting...I don't know, maybe this happens to Americans too, but I found that I frequently had very good relations and rather good personal relations with Indian diplomats in third country posts. If I met the same guy back in New Delhi when he was in the Foreign Ministry, he became a pain in the ass.

Q: Well, we all pick up the coloration of...

ANDERSON: But they're good.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Indian view of China? Were they still wary? How did they feel, because the Cultural Revolution was in full swing.

ANDERSON: The worst part of the violence had pretty well stopped. The Gang of Four was still very much in the saddle.

Q: Yes, little red books waving.

ANDERSON: The Indians, I think, view China with a mixture of awe, envy, and contempt. There are some very good China scholars in India, and obviously it's a country that's very poor. So they feel a sense of competition. These are the two huge land masses in Asia, the two great population bases. And I think I mentioned, there's a feeling that China gets treated better than India. That the West, and in particular the United States, doesn't recognize the importance of India and accept India's logical hegemonic position in South Asia, which doesn't make India very popular with its neighbors. The '62 war at that time in '72, still was a very sore point. For example, Taiwan used to launch propaganda balloons from Quemoy and Matsu off the China coast, and the propaganda balloons would sometimes get picked up in the upper air currents and would sail clear across China, and across the Himalayas, and drop in India. Some guy would find

one of these propaganda balloons and every time some Indian parliamentarian would get up and give a speech about, "these terrible Chinese are delivering these propaganda balloons to us, and what is the government going to do to stop this?" So it's just a very minor thing.

In the '62 war all the Chinese restaurants in New Delhi changed their names to Japanese. The first page of the menu would have about five Japanese dishes and the rest of the menu was all Chinese.

JAMES H. BAHTI
Political/Economic Officer
Bombay (1970-1972)

James H. Bahti was born and raised in Michigan. He received a bachelor's degree in engineering from the Michigan Tech in 1948. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955 and has served in Bonn, Hamburg, Cairo, Bombay, Dhahran, and Alexandria. This interview took place on March 26, 1990.

Q: *You were then sent to Bombay?*

BAHTI: I said, "Look, I would like to get out the Arab world for a while. I am too emotionally involved in it. I would like to stay in the Bureau but how about something else?" They said I could go to Karachi, Bombay or a third post, perhaps in Iran. So I said I would go to Bombay. I became the deputy to the consul general in Bombay from 1970 to 1972. It was a very rewarding experience. I learned early on to see the country, see it early because at the end of your tour you don't have time. We did a lot of traveling, most of it official, but not all of it. I say a great deal, not only of our consular district, but other parts of India. AID had an excellent program in Delhi which lasted a week covering cultural, social, history which my wife and I were encouraged to take. My boss Dan Braddock was on his last tour, a very fine gentleman.

I think the most fortunate part of this tour was that prior to my departure I had asked my college, Michigan Tech, to give me a list of the alumni living in India; several lived in the Bombay area, and one in particular I found almost by chance. He had the name Shah, which is a name held by perhaps ten million other Indians, and I was walking down the street one rainy monsoon day shortly after my arrival with my wife. I saw the name Shah and I said, "Oh, he is one of the Michigan Tech guys" and I walked to the door and said, "I am looking for an Arvind Shah who went to Michigan Tech". He said, "I'm Arvind Shah and I went to Michigan Tech". They were fairly well-to-do, they did not need us for anything, we just became good friends. We still see them, their kids are in school in the States. It was a delightful introduction. They would take us to their religious observances, if we wanted to go. They did not push anything on us, they were very relaxed. They loved to gamble with three card Indian poker, they did not drink, they did not eat meat, but did not care if we did. They would come to our house and we would serve meat but have plenty of vegetarian dishes too. It was one of the most rewarding tours I have had in getting to know the host country.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, after less than two years I was offered the principal officer job in Dhahran. My boss at that time was David Bane who had been ambassador to Gabon. He said, "Jim, it is always better to be number one than number two." That had been my conclusion after about thirty seconds. My wife said "Fine" so we bundled up our cats and our household effects and went off to Dhahran.

In Bombay I supervised both the small economic and small political sections and did some political reporting myself.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian officials with whom you dealt and the situation in that part of India at that time?

BAHTI: Generally competent. Some of them tended to be a little preachy, pious almost, but not many. That was a time that the troubles between India and Pakistan broke out again, the fall of 1971 and so there was a degree of unpleasantness, the officials got a little stiff. Some would refuse to accept invitations because of our policy. I reminded one of them that they had very short memories, that we had come to their help when the Chinese invaded India, but that was then, and this was now. The consul general's secretary was stoned, but not really hurt, she had stones thrown at her as a foreigner. When our friends, the Shahs gave a party, they would hustle around saying "Don't discuss the situation" meaning the political situation, they did not want us to be embarrassed. But a few people got, not nasty, but highly critical. The press vastly distorted what we were doing for Pakistan. The refugee program - the refugees from Bengal or from what became Bangladesh became quite a problem, so we were fairly active in tracking that, but obviously not as active as our people in Calcutta would have been. There was a lot of activity of support for the refugees from East Bengal. It was an interesting time to be there. It is a fascinating country -- you could spend your life there and just begin to scratch the surface.

GORDON W. EVANS
Program Development Officer, USAID
New Delhi (1970-1973)

Gordon W. Evans was born in New York State in 1932. Evans received a BS from Antioch College in 1955 and a MA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1957. Evans joined the Foreign Service working for USAID in 1958 as an Overseas Intern. Evans worked in the Near East/South Asia Bureau, Ghana, Nigeria, India and as liaison to the United Nations. Evans also oversaw operations in East and West Africa. This interview was conducted by Barbara S. Evans in 1998.

Q: What were your responsibilities when you arrived in India?

EVANS: We arrived in New Delhi in September 1970 to accept the post of Program Development Officer. This indeed was an eye-opener. India was a very substantial recipient of U.S. assistance. The program was in its third decade of implementation. Since the early 1950s, the U.S. had supported a growing Indian development effort. There were nearly 1,100 U.S. and

local employees of the USOM. USOM was used because India did not want to change it to USAID. Over \$400 million of U.S. assistance flowed to India's 15 states annually. USOM's program office employed over 20 Indian economists, programmers, and implementation officers. They had such a wide experience and competence that the Program Development Officer, my role, was largely that of supervision.

Side note: In 1960 upon returning from Kathmandu, Nepal to Karachi, Pakistan through New Delhi, India, I visited the Indian Institute of Public Administration. The Deputy there said, "Why don't you call upon Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru? He has open house each morning at his residence before Parliament." Presuming a cast of thousands the next morning, I was surprised when I found myself alone with him in his rose garden. He said, "Please tell Dr. Morgan that I still keep on my desk always the bust of Lincoln that he brought me in 1950. It gives me confidence when confronting the myriad of secessionist problems throughout our land."

Twenty-three years later, I brought the International House's World Council (alumni) for three days of meetings in New Delhi. Our scheduled 15 minute session with Nehru's daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, turned out to last for over an hour, because our first question turned her on. We asked, "What was Macaulay's impact in the 19th century on Indian education?" In summary, she said, "My dear friends, it was devastating! He led us away from our values and traditions. He was obsessed with industrialization, with wealth, with material progress. He was the arrogant justifier of the British Empire." Indira Gandhi was assassinated tragically by two of her Sikh guards one year later.

Q: Who was your Mission Director?

EVANS: We had Leonard Saccio, a fascinating Italian-American who had for a period of time been the former Acting Administrator of AID in Washington. He was the Director when we arrived and he was replaced by Korea's USAID Director, Howard Houston in 1971. Director Saccio used a very interesting proven technique before he signed any agreement, implementation order, or even official letter. He would call me in and with the document before him fire off three or four questions as to how the project was faring and how this new agreement would assist its development further. If all the answers were solid, he would sign it. If there was any uncertainty in my response, we would go back to the drawing board. Princeton's professor of economic development, John Lewis, personally had shaped U.S. assistance during his USOM directorship in the 1960s. India had been an effective member of the World Bank's consortium of donors since the late 1950s. USOM's policy dialogue with the GOI was focused on liberalization of import controls and foreign private investment. Most other donors (and there were literally, if you include the not-for-profits, hundreds) were in full support of this framework. GOI took steps toward liberalization. I'm convinced it never would have on its own. Senior Indian officials always did their homework. Negotiating sessions with them were formal and constructive, whether involving PL480, program lending, capital projects, or technical assistance. Since there were over 100 programs and projects in the early 1970s, I'll just touch on three.

Q: What three projects have you chosen?

EVANS: It was hard. There are at least 15 that were my favorites, but we're going to look at the agriculture universities, family planning, and U.S. owned local currency support for low cost housing throughout India. On the agriculture university front, as noted earlier, the American Arthur Ernest Morgan, who was the first Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a friend, had joined Dr. Radhakrishnan's (later President of India) Higher Education Task Force in 1950. Morgan was the only American on the task force. A central recommendation of this task force was the establishment of outstanding agricultural and engineering universities in each of what became India's 15 states. Over 20 years later, when we arrived in New Delhi, it was exciting to work on the advancement of this program, implemented by nearly 10 U.S. Land Grant Universities ranging from Kansas State University to the University of Tennessee. The majority of Indian faculty were trained in the States at one of these sister institutions. They returned with real insight into the power and resilience of American agriculture. Hence these Indian agriculture universities were very receptive to the Green Revolution sweeping the world in the latter part of the 1960s and certainly in the 1970s. The Revolution was based on solid crop research, the optimum use of irrigation water, and the maximization of the growing cycle. India tied in effectively with these western consortium supported research stations. I would mention especially ICRISAT, which concerned itself with semiarid agriculture research near Hyderabad, India, and IRRI, powerfully focused on rice, in Los Banyos, Philippines. We also supported hundreds of U.S. owned local currency research projects at each of these U.S. assisted agriculture universities. India, known as an empty rice bowl early in the 20th century, has only had to import grains once in the past 30 years to the best of my knowledge.

On the family planning front, John Cool and Alvin Roseman were two forceful leaders in support of a dynamic Indian population program. Perhaps less sensitive then than now, foreign assistance in support of population growth limitation had to be administered carefully. Urban India is as sophisticated as most societies on Earth, but how to reach the then 600 million rural Indians? Both program lending and U.S. local currency grants made contraception widely available. The policy was to never have a shortage of contraceptives - at least condoms. A more ambitious and hence controversial program was Indian's Health Ministry's support of the 333 clubs throughout the land. Though voluntary, fertile Indian couples were encouraged to limit their families to three children. If that number was exceeded, the men were encouraged to have a vasectomy when they reached 33 years of age. If one examines the policy and supply structure of our four decades of family planning assistance, it has been [recently] said that 15 million less Indians will have been born by the year 2000.

The third project is the low cost housing program. It used the millions of dollars of U.S. owned local currency. The researcher in the next century may not realize how we came by so much local currency, but in the period of the 1960s and 1970s, even the late 1950s, there was a plan for India to purchase our imports with local currency. We owned the local currency and we had limitations on how much of it we could sell or revert to the U.S. Treasury. So, we had literally millions of dollars of local currency in New Delhi in support of our development effort. This low cost housing program is just one example. The Delhi-based coordinator came out of the Bombay banking community. He was a dynamo. By streamlining the grant procedure, he was able to approve thousands of applications within three days of receipt at low or no interest. Each day he notified his approval to a cluster of pre-approved banks so that implementation could begin at once. Hundreds of thousands of simple homes were constructed while creating a repayment fund

for the Indian Housing Authority for relending in future decades. The typical Indian bureaucrat could learn a lot from this man. He had worked closely with the Tatas in the Tata steel industry in addition to his banking experience and was one of the most charismatic and galvanizing individuals that I've met in my AID career.

Q: What changed the program in India?

EVANS: At last, our honeymoon of assistance to India was over in early December 1971 when the GOI military actively supported the creation of an independent Bangladesh in what was up until then the former East Pakistan. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who I was later to work for, when he left State, announced at a news conference that the U.S. would tilt toward Pakistan. This was not well-received in New Delhi. The U.S. government terminated all PL480 and commodity import programs overnight. A tribute to the GOI's maturity, however, was not to ask all Americans to leave the country at once. Instead, they methodically phased out one or two technical assistance projects each month over a period of two years. I often said that destiny made me one of the most deprogramming officers in the AID ranks.

But the Evans family thoroughly enjoyed our nearly three years in India. Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating was from my hometown of Rochester, New York. He was very kind to us, as was his DCM, Galen Stone. USOM Director Howard Houston was a non-career political appointee with compassion, commitment, and quiet intelligence.

Q: What was your general feeling about assistance to India?

EVANS: In India, we had seen U.S. assistance received graciously. It was utilized effectively in massive programs and projects. The growth rate in India never has equaled that of the People's Republic of China, but it has been based on a relatively democratic experiment and has been people-oriented and consistent over the decades. We were there at the ending of an era with unilateral termination of our assistance. On my last three week tour through India of AID projects, Indian project directors were truly sad that U.S. assistance was ending. Although they too felt that perhaps they could run these institutions, programs and projects on their own. They expressed time and time again their appreciation for our constant support in the early decades after independence. We left India with a very solid feeling of what U.S. resources had done over a period of nearly 25 years.

In January 1973, I accepted the chiefship of AID's liaison with the United Nations in AID/W's PPC.

R. GRANT SMITH
India Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1970-1972)

Political Officer
New Delhi (1972-1975)

R. Grant Smith was born on Long Island in 1938. He graduated from Princeton University in 1960. He later earned a master's degree from Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1963 and held positions in Pakistan, Nepal, and India. In 1995 he began his ambassadorship in Tajikistan. Ambassador Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is April 29, 1999. Grant, you came back in 1970 to work in what, the India-

SMITH: The India Desk.

Q: India Desk. And you did that from when to when?

SMITH: Until the summer of 1972.

Q: What did the India Desk consist of? I mean, was it large?

SMITH: Well, then as now, it covers India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, as well as the Maldives and Bhutan. Then we had a director, a deputy director, two political officers (I was the junior of the two). The deputy director was also the senior economic officer, and there was a junior economic officer, plus there was a Desk officer for Sri Lanka and one for Nepal.

Q: This was an interesting time, wasn't it, for being on India? Kissinger was in the White House and was interested in the China via Pakistan connection, and India seemed to be getting sort of short shrift. Did you feel that, or was this a fair way of saying it, or how would you describe it?

SMITH: Well, the key event of the two years I was there was the December 1971 India-Pakistan War, and the key action that we took during that war that affected our relations with India for many years thereafter - if not still - was the dispatch of the carrier task force headed by the *Enterprise* to the Indian Ocean during the war. And it was something that, when it happened, we on the Desk didn't know about. We found out about it later. It was done by Kissinger, and he always made clear in the little book he wrote when he commented on this, that this had been done "in the context of the relationship with China." In other words, Pakistan was an ally of China, and because of our new opening to China and the relationship that Pakistan had in establishing that opening, he didn't think that we could stand by in the situation which *could* have occurred towards the end of that conflict, which was that India succeeded in liberating Bangladesh and would then turn to Pakistan.

Q: This was later. It didn't start in '70, did it?

SMITH: No, the events which led up to it started in March of 1971.

Q: What area were you dealing with in India?

SMITH: Particularly as we looked at political aspects of the cultural relationship, scientific relationship, Peace Corps, and things like that, all of which were... Well, it wasn't an easy a time

for any of those. Certainly the AID program was declining in size; the Peace Corps was declining in size; so there were political elements to all of this.

Q: Who was sort of "Mr. India" in the State Department at that time?

SMITH: Dave Schneider was the country director, and I guess you could say he was Mr. India. The deputy assistant secretary in the NEA front office was Chris Van Hollen, who of course covered all of South Asia.

Q: Well, just to get it into the picture, who was India's prime minister at that time?

SMITH: Well, that was Indira Gandhi.

Q: And who was our ambassador?

SMITH: Ken Keating.

Q: Ken Keating.

SMITH: Right.

Q: What was your impression? I mean, you had been in Belize, and all of a sudden you're dealing with India. What was your impression of what we were getting out of India, and also that always tricky relationship between India and Pakistan as far as within our own internal State Department? Were you feeling a sense of rivalry, or what were you picking up?

SMITH: Well, of course, this was a time in India-Pakistan relations... Well, our relations had gone through a number of cycles with Pakistan, and there was one particular cycle that lasted up until 1965, the 1965 India-Pakistan War. And of course I'd left the area, although not having worked specifically in India immediately before the India-Pakistan War - I left the area just at that time - and we did not support Pakistan in the 1965 war. We were always criticized by Pakistan for that. Of course, our relationship with India had been framed by the 1962 Sino-Indian War, where we did help India, but not as much as they wanted. So there were, as there have been always when I've worked on these issues in Washington, questions of sales of particular pieces of military equipment to Pakistan, resuming the sales or one-time sales - those were very much issues during that period in Washington. I must admit I don't remember all the details right now.

Q: What were you picking up as you sort of arrived on the Desk, as what did we really think about Indira Gandhi at that particular point?

SMITH: My recollection is that we were still learning about her. She'd come to power as a compromise candidate after the death of Shastri, and she was put on the throne by some of the old party bosses, expecting that they would be able to manipulate her, and turned out to be a very strong person in her own right. And this was a process that was going on while I was there. I don't remember the exact dates of specific events, and I believe it was during that period she nationalized the banks and also withdrew the privy purses from the princes, the former princely

rulers. So she was in the process, in that period, of establishing herself more firmly, taking these very populist actions that won her public support, didn't have that much effect in terms of long-term development of the country (although the banks had some effect, certainly), but were very clearly taken for populist reasons.

Q: And for you, I imagine they sliced the pie up in a certain way - what part of the Indian-American relations did you have?

SMITH: Well, as I say, being the junior political officer, I was doing a lot of the political aspects of the cultural relationship - Peace Corps, AID, things like that. I was fortunate in the first few months that I was there to be involved in the visit of an Indian parliamentary delegation headed by the speaker of Parliament, and both involved in planning the visit and actually went along also as an escort officer, which as far as I was concerned was a wonderful opportunity, because I got to arrange a schedule for them to see the midterm elections in the United States, which gave me, of course, an opportunity to do that, and did a lot of things that aren't necessarily the common way that things are done. For instance, as I recall, we pooled our resources in San Francisco and invited the head of the Field Poll to come and give a presentation on the polling there in San Francisco at a lunchtime presentation, which went very well. It also gave me the opportunity to get to know these members of the delegation, because I subsequently went to India, and of course, we were old buddies.

Q: How did you find it? I mean, I always had the impression that the upper class of the Indians had picked up a certain amount of disdain for the Barbarian American, picked up both internally and also from their British colleagues. Did you sense any with this delegation that came through, or were they a different breed of cat?

SMITH: Perhaps among some of them, but not among most of them, because the delegation was headed by the speaker, who was a Sikh from one of the main Sikh groups, and the other members were not, for the most part, ones that would fall into that category. I know very much what you mean, and I remember being convinced both on this occasion, later in India, and later other places, that to understand a recently independent view of the United States, you have to go back and look at the mother country's view of the United States. In the case of India, very much, the London School of Economics' view of the United States certainly affected Nehru and a generation of senior Congress Party officials and bureaucrats.

Q: I've often felt that the London School of Economics and its predecessors did more damage to the Third World than Lenin, Marx, and the whole group.

SMITH: Well, India is certainly an example of that, because unlike many Third World countries it was large enough to have a continental economy and to turn inward and try to do everything itself in a way that many other countries could not.

Q: Well, how did you and your colleagues see the situation before the Bangladesh thing, which at that time was East Pakistan? How did you see that situation developing?

SMITH: Well, of course it began, as I recall, in March of 1971 with the crackdown by the Pakistan military in East Pakistan, as it was then, which came after the election in Pakistan, which had actually resulted in a majority for the main politician from East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The crackdown by the Pakistan military immediately resulted in this massive flood of refugees, and we're talking about a magnitude that, looking at present-day situations, makes present day numbers, as bad as they are, seem small, because there were 10 million altogether that came into India from Bangladesh, including the poor peasants but also the Bengali leadership. And one of the things that I was very involved with was organizing the money to transfer, as I recall, to UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] to help these, although the Indians, I believe, did not want to call them refugees. They were "temporarily displaced persons," because the Indians did not want these people to stay; they wanted them to go home, and they did not want to give them full refugee status. The whole purpose of Indian policy was to create a situation in which they could go home. Pakistan has always accused India of masterminding this whole thing so that it would divide Pakistan, split off East Pakistan and become independent. My view was much more that the Pakistan army, the West Pakistanis, were responsible for the events that precipitated everything, but once those happened and the refugees began to flow, then India, yes, Indira Gandhi, made a very hard-nosed decision that India would do what was necessary to stop this problem, and what was necessary to stop this problem involved training, equipping the Bengalis to be fighters in East Pakistan, supporting them with the Indian Army, which before the war actually started was, as I recall, operating across the border into East Pakistan. So India, pressured by this massive flow of refugees, did everything to force that conflict in East Pakistan, and its whole objective then was to hold to the west and to liberate East Pakistan - which it did quite quickly.

Q: Did you have any feeling as the situation was developing, you and your colleagues, that we were giving too much support for the Pakistan position and too little for the Indian position on this?

SMITH: Very much a sense that we were not addressing the fundamental problem of this massive flow of refugees and what do you do about it - and the human rights violations which had occurred in East Pakistan, which were very fully covered by our team which was then in Dhaka, reported on. Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in November, 1971. I was there the day she was received at the White House. It was an unusually warm day, and people were quipping about Indian summer, and of course I reminded them about the real meaning of Indian summer, but she was coming as a last minute effort to try to get support so that this problem could be resolved diplomatically rather than as it ultimately was. And she spoke about the problems that India was facing, and Nixon, as I recall, really pretty much dodged that issue. There had been a cyclone in Orissa in Eastern India, and he spoke about concern about that. Well, you know, in absolute terms, yes, there was a lot of death and destruction from that cyclone in Orissa, but compared to the 10 million people that had flowed into India from Bangladesh, this was very small, and he pretty much ignored that. And I think that reflected the kind of policy that was going on. People were not really focusing on the bigger problem.

Q: Did you see the Bangladesh, still called East Pakistan, situation sort of coming out the way it did? Was there a thought that India might just plain annex this and have a greater Bengal or anything like that?

SMITH: I don't remember specifically considering that issue at that time. I remember in looking at it later and being convinced that India definitely did not want to have East Pakistan - Bangladesh - become part of India. India did want a relationship with East Pakistan, and the bottom line for India in that relationship would be that this kind of thing never happen again, that Bangladesh would never cause this kind of problem for India again, that there would never be a huge inflow. And of course, after Independence there still was a substantial Hindu population in Bangladesh, and there were a lot of problems left over from the war and before the war between the two. But no, I didn't have the impression that India wanted to annex Bangladesh. India wanted primacy in South Asia, wanted that to be recognized, although when you speak of India, there are a lot of different factions in India and different people wanted different things; but the majority position I don't think was that they wanted to take over the other countries of South Asia.

Q: How did the Gandhi trip go when she came here, outside of the fact that Nixon seemed to be dodging?

SMITH: She didn't get what she wanted, and she went home, and things progressed towards war.

Q: Did you get any feel for the tension between our embassy and - what was the capital of Pakistan then - Islamabad?

SMITH: Islamabad

Q: And in the consulate general in Dhaka with Archer Blood, did you get any feel for sort of that these two were not speaking the same language?

SMITH: My recollection is that that was a problem, but you should put Arch Blood on tape.

Q: We have Arch Blood on tape.

SMITH: Yes.

Q: I was wondering whether we were looking at... One of the major tensions in the world is between Pakistan and India, and to have Pakistan in the Near Eastern Bureau at that time (it's now changed) and India being in the-

SMITH: No, everything was in the Near East-South Asia Bureau, so there was no problem of a scene.

Q: Okay, it was the Near East -

SMITH: - South Asia Bureau, and there was no problem of a scene. Chris Van Hollen was the deputy assistant secretary for South Asia, the senior person working on South Asia.

Q: Did you find, being part of this bureau, that Palestine sort of seemed to absorb most of the tension - I mean the problems of Israel and the Arab world? Did that seem to pretty well absorb the energies and attention of the principals?

SMITH: Yes. There always has been that problem, and I think the only time that there was somebody heading the Near East-South Asia Bureau who was really interested in South Asia was actually before I joined the Foreign Service, was Phil Talbot, who was there early in the Kennedy Administration, who was a South Asianist. But after that, certainly, there was a problem getting attention for South Asia, and I was in the bureau later; I know that that was a problem.

Q: How about when the Enterprise was sent to... "Steam" isn't the right term, but it used nuclear power, but its task force to go into the Indian Ocean? How did that hit you all?

SMITH: It hit us pretty hard. And you should interview some of the people who got together and formed a particular group to protest. But it wasn't clear the exact purpose of it. One of the problems was, and I think often is in the question of ship movements, that ship movements are done and not explained - which is probably part of the idea. But certainly India saw this as a threat to India, and there was a lot of misinformation about exactly how far it went. Actually, it didn't go very far into the Indian Ocean. I don't remember; at one time I learned the exact level to which it went, but it wasn't very far up into the Indian Ocean at all. But they saw this as a direct threat to India, that the U.S. had sent a very powerful task force, presumed to have nuclear weapons, to threaten India in a situation where India believed itself to be completely in the right and where India - I don't remember the exact timing now, but it became very clear after India succeeded in Bangladesh, that it was not going to begin an all-out offensive against Pakistan; it was just going to hold as far as Pakistan went. It wanted a cease-fire then: hold in the west, win in the east, cease-fire. And the purpose of sending the *Enterprise* was, I believe, because we did not know that that was the Indian [intent] or were not convinced or sure that that was what India planned to do, and if India had planned to turn against Pakistan then all out, that would have concerned us.

Q: At the time, just sort of the personal feelings of those on the Indian Desk - did you feel that India was justified in what it was doing?

SMITH: Yes, in what it was doing in East Pakistan in a *Realpolitik* kind of way, India was playing a very hardheaded game and could get away with it and was justified.

Q: Did you find after this episode was over - you were there until '72 - did you feel a real lowering of relations or a hardening of relations?

SMITH: Yes, well I was not only there until 1972 but in 1972 went to New Delhi, so the answer is yes. I spent much of the three years I was in India, from '72 to '75, explaining the *Enterprise*. It produced a very difficult time in our relationship.

Q: Was there anything else that you were dealing with during the '70-72 period that you think we ought to talk about?

SMITH: One thing happened during that conflict that may have had an effect on down the line, and that was that, in looking at the flow of military equipment, we looked - I learned personally, not only at military sales but also at commercial sales of items on the munitions list. And I remember that Chris Van Hollen was very embarrassed at one point, went up to testify, and he knew about FMS [Foreign Military Sales], but he hadn't looked at commercial sales. And there were some commercial sales going on to Pakistan, so we had to cut those off, obviously, and we also looked at some things going on to India that were spare parts for, for instance, Super Constellations that we believed were being used for marine reconnaissance, which gets into a whole other area of commercial sales, cutoff of spare parts in times of tension, use of commercial items for military purposes. And I think that the Indians were probably already determined to, whenever possible, not be overly reliant on one supplier, probably for both military and commercial aircraft, for example. I don't know how much notice they took of what they did, but if they did, it probably confirmed their policy, which later meant, of course, that they always bought both Boeing and Airbus and on the military side probably a variety of weapons systems.

Q: How about relations with the Soviets during this time? Was this a little early, or were they making overtures to the Soviets?

SMITH: Well, they already had an established relationship with the Soviet Union. You need to look at the exact year. An Indo-Soviet treaty was signed. I believe it was in this period. I've always interpreted it as guaranteeing Soviet neutrality or better in times of conflict. Some people have put much more emphasis on the Soviet support than I think is warranted because I think India was fairly self-reliant, but I think it was very reassuring to India to have in the back pocket this treaty with the Soviet Union of neutrality or better in time of conflict. That was important and something that, when added to the Soviet military supply relationship with India, to the Soviet position on Kashmir (of vetoing things that India didn't like on Kashmir) was very useful. I don't remember the exact details of the Security Council consideration of the India-Pakistan War of 1971, but I do remember that the Soviets took the Indian side and prevented any resolution from being adopted in the Security Council which would have demanded cease-fire and withdrawal before India achieved its objectives.

Q: Were you on the Desk when we opened relations - Kissinger's secret mission and Nixon going to China? Was that while you were there?

SMITH: Yes.

Q: Did that seem, from your vantage point, did that one catch us by surprise and, two, did that have any effect on our relationship?

SMITH: Well, it certainly caught me by surprise on the Desk. And I think that it did have a long-term impact on our relationship, but the biggest single thing, again, was the *Enterprise*, and that was related to it all. Of course, our relationship with India about China had always been very complex, that we had supported India in the Sino-Indian War, provided India with some materiel, but not as much as they wanted, and had had some cooperative relationships in other areas with India vis-à-vis China which were quite significant.

Q: *Well, you left the Desk in '72 and off, what, to New Delhi?*

SMITH: To New Delhi.

Q: *To '75.*

SMITH: Right.

Q: *What was your job?*

SMITH: In the Political Section in New Delhi at that time, there was a position which I like to call India and her Neighbors: it was India's relationships with the countries of South Asia, which I managed to add a little bit on Kashmir to, but basically, it was India-Pakistan, and a little bit on India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka, and India-Bangladesh.

Q: *Was there any development while you were on the Desk with Sri Lanka or Nepal?*

SMITH: I don't remember anything in specific while I was on the Desk. I do have some impressions of India's relationships with those countries, but I don't remember anything specific on the Desk.

Q: *Well, what's your impression of relationship with...*

SMITH: Well, particularly with Nepal. It has been a very complex relationship over the years, and Nepal has a terrible inferiority complex as far as India is concerned, feels very... Well, India *has* been very heavy-handed with Nepal, and Nepal reacts - let's put it that way. I may have mentioned this earlier - when India put the king back on the throne in 1951, an Indian second secretary participated in Nepalese cabinet meetings. That Indian second secretary, I think he was, was Krishna Rasgotra, who, when I was on the India Desk in Washington, was their DCM - later was their foreign secretary, some years later - and was ambassador to Nepal, in fact, at one point. Just the idea of sending this person back to Nepal who had such a relationship there gives an idea of the nature of that dynamic between India and Nepal. India had very definite objectives with Nepal. Indian intervention in Sikkim in 1972-73-74 (I forget the exact year.), where India went into a country - it wasn't an independent country - to an entity whose status was uncertain and, essentially, deposed the ruler because of the Nepalese-speaking majority there. But Nepal always saw that as, you know, potentially threatening, the kind of thing that India could do elsewhere. One of the key issues in the India-Nepal relationship was water. There had been some very good books written about this. When I was in Nepal, 1965-65, we learned about a very large potential hydroelectric scheme, which involved taking a river which has a large S in it and drilling a tunnel across - huge hydroelectric potential. I was some years later - and in fact I think it was in the early '80s - told that that project alone was as much as the total installed electric generating capacity in north India. But of course that power had to be sold to India, and that produced a very complex negotiation, with the Nepalese not wanting to be totally reliant on India for market and India not wanting to be reliant on Nepal as the source of this - as a result of which the project has

never been done, although this is the one kind of project that could be tremendously beneficial for India *and* Nepal.

Q: *Sri Lanka - did that raise anything on our radar in those days?*

SMITH: No, Sri Lanka did not become... As far as India-Sri Lanka relations were concerned, there wasn't a great issue. That only began after 1983.

Q: *That was when the Tamil -*

SMITH: That was when that really began, but before that period, in '72-75, I went to Colombo and didn't see anything particular to comment on. There had been historic issues there. Indian Tamils - not just the Sri Lankan Tamils, but the Indian Tamils - historic issue, but nothing big.

Q: *When you were in New Delhi, was Keating still the ambassador?*

SMITH: Keating was the ambassador when I arrived. Moynihan came while I was there and left while I was there, and Saxbe arrived. So I served under three ambassadors while I was there.

Q: *Keating later went on to -*

SMITH: Israel.

Q: *- Israel, got there just in time, I guess, for the October War of '73, didn't he; but what was the feeling about Keating at that point? I've heard people say that he was getting to be an old man and really wasn't that plugged in, in a way - or not? Or did you have that feeling?*

SMITH: I've served under a lot of ambassadors in New Delhi, and I was only there briefly while Keating was there. I don't remember that he was terribly engaged, but with a few exceptions, a lot of the ambassadors there were not terribly engaged. He had had a difficult time during the India-Pakistan War. He had a very difficult last meeting with Mrs. Gandhi. She sort of fidgeted, answered the telephone, and gave very short answers, didn't really engage at all. I don't remember whether other people were walking in and out of the room, but it would have been consistent with what I remember hearing about the conversation. And that, of course, was after the *Enterprise* and the war, so you can understand maybe why it happened that way.

Q: *How was the embassy when you arrived there in '72? Were they feeling sort of at odds with Washington and all, would you say?*

SMITH: At odds with Washington and demoralized, and something else was going on, because of course we had had an enormous mission in India during the 1960s. You had the military buildup after the '62 war. We'd had a military mission there. Then you had the very large AID and U.S. agriculture activities there during the '60s, as we provided large amounts of aid, particularly food aid, PL-480 - very large AID mission - and all of this was winding down. I should get the figures for you. My wife tells of going to her first American women's club meeting when she was there and there being 200 people, and when she left there were 30. It's that

kind of enormously... Peace Corps was on the way out. In fact, as I mentioned before, it was declining before the India-Pakistan War, and that was sort of the final nail in the coffin. The reason it was declining before the war was explained to me by a retired Indian state official, the father of the wife of a colleague in the Indian Foreign Ministry. And this retired state official said to me, "You know, when the Peace Corps was bringing BA generalists with enthusiasm, that was fine; what we were getting was enthusiasm. When they started trying to send us technically trained people, you know, we have lots of technically trained people." So the Peace Corps was already declining for a variety of reasons, and the war stopped it.

AID was already declining, and dwindled to almost nothing after that period, that three-year period. The military mission was already much smaller and by the time I was there was down to one or two or three people. So the nature of our relationship had already begun to change, and the war just brought it down to a very different relationship from the kind it had been in the 1960s.

Q: You were watching India's relations with its near neighbors. With Pakistan by half and all, did you see a changed India as far as its attitudes toward neighbors, or was this of secondary interest to the Indian government?

SMITH: Well, certainly as far as Pakistan is concerned. Pakistan was and is the main issue for India, and there was, is, a hard line there in the Indian government, which I think after the 19- (end of tape)

Q: Yes, you were saying the main concern in India-

SMITH: - was Pakistan. It's always been true that the way ahead in the Indian Foreign Ministry is to be tough on Pakistan. You aren't going to get ahead by broaching compromises on Pakistan. And I think after the 1971 War that was reinforced. The Simla agreement at the end of the 1971 War, in July of 1972, was as far as India was concerned a tremendous step forward because it basically said India-Pakistan issues shall be resolved bilaterally. And in the negotiation of that, Bhutto had refused some language which would have even more firmly established the Indian point of view, but that much he accepted, and that pretty much did establish the Indian point of view on that. So it was a period where India had won a war, it felt, could be fairly firm with Pakistan. The '65 War had not gone nearly as well with India. It was fought to a stalemate. The '71 War had gone fairly well. The Indians were proud of their success, at their secularism. They would always point out that their Army chief during the time of the Bangladesh War was a Parsi. The Indian Air Force chief, as I recall, was a Christian. The handover was to a Sikh. There was quite a religious variety in the Indian military. However, there was a lot of focus internally, within India, in this period because Mrs. Gandhi had certainly won the 1971 election, which occurred just before the war. She'd had an overwhelming victory in the 1971 election. We always thought that those populist issues that she'd succeeded at before - the privy purses, the bank nationalization - had had a major effect. The Bangladesh War reinforced her position. But then she began to have trouble. And there's been a lot written recently, of course, about the 1973 nuclear explosion and how one reason for the timing of that may have been problems she had domestically.

Q: How were your contacts with the Indian Foreign Ministry?

SMITH: Yes, I had good relations with the Indian Foreign Ministry. We did a lot with them socially. We actually made fairly good friends there. There was a group in the Indian Foreign Ministry that were of similar age. Many of them come into the Indian Foreign Service together, so they all knew each other, and we got to know them quite well. We had good relations. They probably all thought I worked for the CIA because I was so active, but no, we had very good relations, relations that we've kept up over the years afterwards.

Q: So this almost... "anti-Americanism" is probably not the right term, but coldness towards America didn't particularly rub off in the officialdom.

SMITH: You had to work at it, but if you worked at it, it was okay. And my approach was always not only to work with those officials that I had to know but also people who were interested in these issues outside of the Foreign Ministry, which would include professors, newspaper columnists, people like that. And in many cases, they were of that same age group, perhaps had gone to the same universities as the people in the Foreign Ministry. It was a pleasant time in that sense. As I said, it took work, but it was possible. Sometimes, some things weren't possible. I was never able to visit Sikkim, and I was told basically that I wasn't going to be able to visit Sikkim because they were too suspicious of me.

Q: What about the other confrontational relationship that you probably had to deal with, and that is with our embassy in Islamabad. There must have been a counterpart who dealt with Pakistan-Indian relationships. How did that work?

SMITH: I don't remember that as being a particularly confrontational time. I visited Pakistan once or twice during that period, visited all of the neighboring countries, in fact - except China - during that period. I don't remember it being a particularly tense relationship. I was trying to think back about it, and I just don't remember it being that bad, although I'm sure that we did disagree about these key issues of, usually, arms supply.

Q: Did the hand of Henry Kissinger weigh pretty heavily, did you feel, on our relations, from your vantage point, or not?

SMITH: Yes, they did, and we never really recovered from the dispatch of the *Enterprise*. Of course, during two of the three years I was there, Moynihan was the ambassador, and Moynihan had an access in Washington which was very useful. And I think, you know, if anybody could get a point across in Washington, he probably could.

Q: How did you explain the Enterprise to your Indian colleagues?

SMITH: I explained it very much in the lines I mentioned earlier, that they should see this as part of our relationship with China. They should recognize that even though the Indian intent during this period may have been very clear to Indians, to deal with East Pakistan and call it finished, it wasn't necessarily clear to others on the outside - but also to explain, to get in some of the details of... The *Enterprise* really had just barely got into the Indian Ocean.

Q: And it wasn't that big a deal, either, in a way.

SMITH: That's right. But I do think that it... Well, and perhaps even today, it is still a factor in our relations.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Moynihan?

SMITH: Well, actually, for about three months, I was his staff assistant and was offered the job on a longer-term basis, and instead I really... The job in the Political Section had been one I had been after for a long time and would like to return to it. He was an ambassador who could deal with those Indian politicians and officials of the London School of Economics background and otherwise, could deal with them on an equal footing because of his own intellectual background. It was fascinating to watch him work the issues in Washington, in many cases, to write a telegram, then go back to Washington to negotiate the response. It was fascinating to watch him in his dealings with the press, because this was a period in which within India he had very low visibility. He only gave one press conference while he was there, and that was just before he left. And he was asked a question about Diego Garcia. This is probably in his book. He quipped that he didn't know why India was getting so worked up about the Indian Ocean. "It's only a chance of history that it was called the Indian Ocean. It could have been called the Madagascar Sea." But he did spend a lot of time with the American press. We noticed that... He wrote his own telegrams, I should back up and say. He was somebody who would... I remember learning as an undergraduate in college that Woodrow Wilson had a portable typewriter and used to sit there in the White House and type things. Well, Moynihan had a portable electric typewriter in his office, and he worked sort of ten to two and four to eight. He would sit there in the evening and write these long cables. Sometimes they'd be about a meeting he'd had. Sometimes they'd be about an issue. And sometimes they would appear in the *New York Times* within a couple of days.

Q: Well, I'm sure, with his background, if it was good enough for the State Department, it was good enough to go off to the-

SMITH: The one that I remember the most was one he did about the return of the South Building to the Indian government. The South Building had been constructed with PL-480 funds for the use of AID. AID was shrinking dramatically, had no use for this building, which was in the southern part of New Delhi, and had decided to turn it back to the Indian government as provided for in the original agreement on the use of PL-480 funds. And at the last minute AID Washington had second thoughts, and he sent back this blistering cable that talked about great empires building these enormous buildings in their period of decline, which he called an "edifice complex." But of course, he always says that his biggest achievement, the one for which he will always be remembered, is his ending the rupee problem.

Q: Yes, would you explain what it was?

SMITH: Yes, let me say that Moynihan was somebody who would jump into an issue and work on it. Sometimes he would only work on it briefly. In fact, we often thought that he was ideally suited to be a senator. But in this case, he worked the issue thoroughly through to the end. The

issue concerned this enormous quantity of Indian rupees we'd accumulated by selling wheat during the 1960s to India for rupees in those two years of drought. The rupees, a very small percentage we could use for our administration, but most of them could only be used by joint agreement and, in fact, were piling up faster than we were spending them - the interest on them was piling up faster than we were spending - and the amount was enormous. I think it was something like more than the total amount of money in circulation in India. The Indian press and public opinion saw this as a threat to economic stability in India, although in fact it couldn't be used without the approval of the government of India. In economic terms it didn't mean anything, but in political terms it meant a great deal. So Moynihan negotiated an agreement under which we turned back two-thirds of the rupees, and he handed over a check of that amount to the Indian government, the largest check ever written. At the time, he thought that we had saved enough to continue our educational and cultural programs, our scientific research programs (which were funded with rupees), through the end of the century. He was a few years off. The money ran out sooner than that, but the concept was to take a major political problem the heart of which was this infinite amount of rupees and turn it into a finite issue that would end in a certain amount of years, which he succeeded in doing.

I sometimes had an impression that after that and after the Kissinger visit (the details of which I don't remember much of now but that would have been in 1974), he sort of lost interest. So he left and was replaced by Saxbe.

Q: I take it then that Moynihan did not fall into... I won't call it "the trap," but certainly the pattern that a number of our ambassadors have, of coming to India and becoming so entranced with it that their objectivity is at least seriously in question as far as people who deal with Indian affairs back in Washington or even on their own staff are concerned.

SMITH: I certainly don't think he was perceived in Washington the way Chester Bowles was seen. Chester Bowles was seen as a total apologist for India, and Moynihan was not that. He was on occasion -

Q: Galbraith a bit, too.

SMITH: Yes, but Moynihan was certainly critical of individual Indians. I can remember some very, very critical cables that he wrote. I think to get a full impression of this you need to go back and review the telegrams of the time, which now should be available.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Moynihan-Indira Gandhi relationship?

SMITH: I don't recall. I probably did, but I don't recall. It was better than the Keating relationship, definitely, but I don't recall that it was particularly warm. I could be wrong.

Q: I can't think of anything; I'm just thinking that Mrs. Gandhi didn't take fools lightly, and I don't think Moynihan did either. They may have sat there and had self-satisfied smirks on their face in each other's company, but-

SMITH: If you've done one of these with Dave Schneider - he was DCM - he would have a much better recollection.

Q: Oh, the nuclear explosion - did that sort of change things as far as the relationships, how we viewed India at the time?

SMITH: I think it definitely did. I must admit, I've recently been reading articles about this, so I'm not sure what I remember myself and what I read in the articles, but before that we had had a relationship with the Indian atomic energy establishment, which ended abruptly with that. We cut off all contacts - as to the Canadians, from whose heavy water reactor the plutonium raw material may have come. I think the Indians were surprised, probably, by our reaction. The Indian explanation of this as a peaceful nuclear explosion was seen widely as an example of typical Indian posturing. Indians, Indian diplomats, have always had a troubled relationship with Americans and many Westerners, and this was an area which was a particular issue, I think, because it was just so transparent.

Q: Yes, were there any other problems or issues during this '72 to '75 period?

SMITH: There probably were, but I'm not sure that I remember them. I did manage to get up to Kashmir a couple of times. We were still a bit careful about how we traveled to Kashmir, but I did get up there a couple of times on vacations and managed to call on the governor and other officials whom I knew - from Washington, in fact. I also managed to travel around the southern part of the country a fair amount, doing speaking for USIS. And the latter was during the Watergate period. The Indian interest in Watergate was considerable. It was not like the situation in Europe, where they didn't really understand it - France, "*affaire des plombiers*." The Indians related to it in an interesting way, because here is a president who is being accused of abusing his office, of elements of "imperial presidency," and ultimately has to resign. And in India they have a leader who is being accused of abusing power, later more than at that time but already at that time, being challenged in the court about various things involving election practices, is removing chief ministers around the country; so the Indians followed it very closely, and I often thought that they related to it in the sense that, Gee, they can do that in the United States, maybe we can do that here.

Q: It's interesting, isn't it, because I know the European - I was in Greece at the time, and there was no real understanding of this. I mean, "Everybody does this, and what's the big deal?"

SMITH: It was always difficult in India, because with the parliamentary system, they didn't understand our system, so in talking about it, you had to do some basic Civics 101 to explain the American system. But they were very interested in it. And of course the Indians have always had journalists in Washington. There has been a group of Indian correspondents in Washington, so they were getting a lot of reporting about it. There's a considerable amount of reporting in the Indian press on international things, and a fair amount on the United States.

Q: How do we view the Kashmir problem? It really goes back to '48, doesn't it? I mean, essentially a done deal, with a lot of squabbling but probably little is going to change there?

SMITH: Well, I think that after the 1971 War, we did, that the 1971 War brought an end to a U.S. policy which had initially been one of supporting a plebiscite and later had been one of trying to work out agreements. In 1963, after the Sino-Indian War in particular, we tried to broker an agreement between India and Pakistan, even suggesting dividing Kashmir - deals there. But in 1971, with the Simla agreement, which says "issues between the two countries shall be resolved bilaterally," I was one who advocated, no, let them do it. Third parties can be available, but they said they're going to do it bilaterally, and the easy way for the United States to handle the problem in both countries is to say Simla. And later on, in 1982, I advocated that line as well.

Q: *Were we still trying to get in there, felt we could make our good offices?*

SMITH: In Kashmir?

Q: *Yes.*

SMITH: Not after '71. Up until '71, yes, but after '71, we backed off. I certainly favored our backing off, and I think we did back off.

Q: *Well, then, in '75, where did you go?*

SMITH: I spent a year at the Council on Foreign Relations.

SALLY GROOMS COWAL
Special Assistant, USIS
New Delhi (1971-1973)

Ambassador Sally Grooms Cowal was born in Oak Park, Illinois in 1944. After graduating from DePauw University she joined the United States Information Service as Foreign Service Officer. Her service included assignments as Cultural and Public Affairs Officer at US Embassies in India, Colombia, Mexico and Israel. She subsequently held a number of senior positions in the Department of State, including Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs and Deputy Political Counselor to The American Ambassador to the United Nations. In 1991 she was appointed Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. Ambassador Cowal was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy August 9, 2001.

Q: *Then you were in India from when to when?*

COWAL: I was in India from 1971 to 1973.

Q: *Who was our ambassador in India?*

COWAL: Well, our ambassador was Kenneth Keating, and then Keating was – before the end of my tour, Keating was replaced by Moynihan, and Moynihan fired the PAO, and that was my

boss. So that was kind of the end of my assignment, also. I was coming to the end of my assignment in any case, but after all of this happened, we decided to speed that up a little bit. Of course, by then, I was absolutely gung ho, going to be a Foreign Service officer.

Q: Well, this is fun of it. So many people enter this flytrap. They think they'll come in and try it for a little while.

COWAL: Right, right.

Q: And very few really leave, I mean.

COWAL: Right.

Q: Well, okay, how did you see the state of relations between India and the United States, 1971? The Vietnam War was kind of running down.

COWAL: Oh, no, it was extremely difficult, because if you'll recall, Henry Kissinger was the secretary of state, and Kissinger – in fact, some I think secret dispatches came out indicating that Kissinger had instructed ambassadors at the State Department, or whoever he had instructed, that our policy should be one of tilting toward Pakistan.

Q: This is over the Bangladesh peace ...

COWAL: Bangladesh, but it really had to deal with larger issues in the world ...

Q: Opening to China.

COWAL: ... and the opening to China. The Soviet Union and India had become quite closely affiliated, and so this was more than just Bangladesh, but the Bangladesh war really made that even more difficult. I had a fascinating time in India. One of the things that – I had, obviously, a multiplicity of jobs as sort of a catch-all ...

Q: Who was your PAO?

COWAL: A wonderful man named Dan Alexi, who was a sort of larger-than-life figure, huge Ukrainian American, six-foot-five-inches tall, and had been for 10 years the USIA area director for East Asia, meaning the whole Vietnam buildup. Then, after 10 years, he and the assistant director for the Near East, whose name was Alan Carter, sort of changed areas. And Alan went and became PAO in Vietnam, which had been the largest post in Dan's area, and Dan became PAO in India, which was the largest post in Alan's area, so these were the two giants of the agency, around which whole satellites sort of revolved.

So it was wonderful to work for him because it was not only focused on this huge post in India, but also at that point he was around 50, I guess. He had been in the Foreign Service maybe 20 years, maybe 25 years. He had risen, obviously, to the pinnacle of what you could do in USIA. He must have been a minister counselor or whatever he was at that point, had all of the intrigue

and politics and power that within this rather small – but for us it was our whole world at USIA. Being able to sort of be mentored by somebody like this and following somebody like this around, two steps behind.

Q: ... I'm doing this because ...

COWAL: Absolutely, absolutely, so it was a chance to learn from a real master, and he had lots of enemies. He had as many enemies as he had friends, but it was fascinating. The first, I guess they had put a little – he hadn't had a special assistant, but the whole post, clearly, in this huge operation, and he had eliminated branch PAOs who had run their own little empires, because he thought the whole thing ought to run more centrally, out of one philosophy, and a country team, and so on and so forth. So the special assistant job was really supposed to make sure that these now four branch posts, which had no PAOs, which had cultural affairs offices and information officers, were nonetheless part of the central team. So I traveled to each of those posts every month.

So I saw, of course, the whole country, which was wonderful, because out of every month I would spend three days in Madras, three days in Bombay, three days in Calcutta, or so. So I made the circuit, and of course I would use the opportunity to see what was around those places, so I really think I was in all of the Indian states. That was a fascinating experience.

Q: How were you received? Usually, somebody who comes from the head office is considered a son of a bitch from outside.

COWAL: Right, well, it was rough, and the fact that I worked for Dan, who was not everybody's cup of tea, in a way made it rougher. But in other ways, I think being a young female made it easier, because I wasn't perceived as a heavy or a threat, and so I would hear things. And, of course, I was good eyes and ears. I mean, he also wanted to know what they were thinking and what they were doing and whether they were onboard with his program or they weren't, so I guess I was a little spy in some ways.

But when I wasn't out traveling in these places, one of my jobs was to work with the information officer every day, or the press officer, to do a media reaction summary of the Indian press, which if you know anything about it, was a very lively press. I think there were seven dailies in English and countless numbers in Indian languages, which I didn't read but which we had people who read and analyzed and so on. So each day, we were responsible for preparing a telegram to the department about what the media reaction in India was to important events, whether that was Vietnam or the conflict in South Asia or whatever it was. I guess there were certain themes that we covered every day.

Because the Ambassador was a former senator from New York, Keating, who was not in agreement with Henry Kissinger and with American policy, because he thought it was the wrong policy in terms of India, being a politician he thought – well, they didn't have – they, meaning Kissinger and Nixon – didn't have to pay any attention to him. But they would have to pay attention, in a democracy, to the media – what was the free press saying? – because he was a politician.

So this was a cable that he cared more about than he cared about the cables that his political section was preparing about their conversations with Indian government officials or whatever. This was the most important thing for him every day, and so he wanted to see it, personally. One of my jobs, then, was to go every afternoon – we were in a separate building. USIS was across town from the embassy. But I would have to get in the car every afternoon and ride over to the ambassador's residence, which was next to the chancellery. And the ambassador would be at his swimming pool, this being his after-lunch little break from the workday, and I would go out to the swimming pool and sit there with him while he read through this cable. He would have the newspapers piled up next to him. He would have been reading them on his sort of lunch break, and he would often want us to throw things into this cable that weren't already in it.

So it was a very nice also exposure to much more than a junior officer would normally have to the ambassador, and to someone whom I watched being a loyal servant who nonetheless disagreed in many ways with his government's policy, and that was a very, very, very interesting experience.

Q: Well, you're giving me a view of Ambassador Keating that I haven't gotten from others, because most people talk about him as sort of, well, a nice man but out of his element and getting on in years.

COWAL: Well, I say, in some ways, that was the case. The very fact that he wasn't in his office at 2:30 in the afternoon, but in his swimming pool. But he was very sharp. I mean, he was quite sharp, and he was quite disturbed about some aspects, and of course we were running into this war. I had a very interesting experience, also, of meeting Mrs. Gandhi, who at that point, they knew we were tilting toward Pakistan, and there was absolutely no love lost.

We had full diplomatic relations, but the Indians had always thought of the Americans as their best friends. I mean, every place that you went as an American diplomat, people would say to you – and I'd get a lot of lecturing and stuff, too. I mean, I would be out there working with women's groups or university groups or something, and people would always say to you, "Oh, you're not like the British," because of course they didn't like the British. "You're so friendly, Americans are so accessible."

But they would hark back to these days when Chester Bowles was the ambassador, and Chester Bowles' wife's name was Sally, so being named Sally was always helpful. Nice Americans like Sally Bowles were named Sally and were very sympathetic to India, and we were in clearly a different policy environment, but despite the fact that there was a lot of love and respect for the United States, we were clearly at a very different point, politically. And that made it difficult for embassy officials – I mean, particularly higher-up officials like Keating – to have I think a real dialog or a real impact. We were kind of shut out.

But I got a chance to meet Mrs. Gandhi in a very interesting way. It was one of these trips around the country, coming back from one of these trips, and I was on a puddle-jumping plane. I couldn't get the direct flight from I think it was Bombay to Delhi. So I had to get a plane that went from Bombay to Ahmedabad, Pune to wherever. It was a puddle jumper, and it was a DC-3,

and everybody describes to you their days of flying around in the third world in the early '70s, and it was a plane that was loaded with peasants and chickens and munitions, I actually remember. So every time this plane landed, and I think it was like three stops between Bombay and New Delhi, they would get all the passengers off the plane, and then they would unload whatever cargo was being taken to this place. And while you were off the plane, you had to stand under a tin roof.

You can imagine the tarmac in a little provincial airport in India and it's 45 degrees centigrade and you're under the roof, waiting for them to tell you that you can get back on the plane. So as we were standing there, and I was probably the only foreign passenger on the plane. So we're standing there under the roof, and the pilot, the cockpit window was open, and the pilot is sort of hanging out the window, kind of waiting for them to do whatever they're doing to his airplane, and so I waved, and the pilot waved back.

So we got back on the plane and we took off, and the stewardess came back and she said, "Well, the pilot would like to know if you'd like to come up to the cockpit." So I said, "Sure, I'd like to come up to the cockpit." So I spent the rest of the trip riding between the pilot and the copilot, I'm sure against absolutely every civil aviation regulation in the world. The pilot was Rajiv Gandhi's best friend. The pilot was not Rajiv, but if you remember, Rajiv was an Indian Airlines pilot. So that put me into the social circle of this group of young Indians, many of whom were married to foreigners, as was Rajiv Gandhi, of course, married to Sonia, to an Italian woman.

So I came to know people outside of the embassy circuit by having met the pilot on this Indian airlines plane and having met Rajiv and having Rajiv take me one day to meet his mother. She revealed no great foreign policy secrets to me, but we had tea or something. Those are the kinds of things that if you talk about career-enhancing moves, at a point when Mrs. Gandhi wasn't seeing anybody, the fact that I had been invited to tea at Mrs. Gandhi's house I suppose gave me a certain notoriety, if nothing else.

I also think that being a woman worked greatly to my advantage, because it was at a time when there were very few women out there. It was very much ahead of the curve. After all, we admitted very few women to begin with. Very few women wanted this career, number two, and then we hadn't admitted any married women. There was – in a Foreign Service class of 100, there would be two or three women, very, very few. And those, the minute they got married, had to get out. So the number who stuck with it more than five years was minuscule.

So I don't know that I understood it then, but I would say almost from that point on, if you were a woman and you were good and you were somewhat gutsy, or you had a certain amount of panache or something, you were on a very fast track, I would say. I'm sure there were lots of roadblocks, but I'm also sure that for every one of those roadblocks, there was a push that a man would not have had. So I think it was helpful to me.

Q: I interviewed Frances Cook, very much that experience. When you went around to these various parts, was USIS able to sort of key our message to the Tamil-speaking area or to the Sikh area. In other words, it's such a diverse country. Could we fine-tune our message?

COWAL: Well, yes and no. One of the reasons why Dan, my boss, had eliminated the branch PAO position was that he was trying to save positions. Although he had 45 officers, he felt that there was a need to get beyond the bureaucracy and get beyond these whole little establishments in each of these places, where you replicated what was already going on in New Delhi, and you had exactly the same thing working around the consul general, in the same way that they all worked around the ambassador. And that what we desperately needed was to get out into the sticks more – not to the sticks. We were under no illusion – it was already 500 million Indians – that we were reaching everybody. but we had a very, I think it was early for the agency, very strict look at what our objectives were and who our audiences were, and how we would convince those audiences of those objectives, of those messages.

One of the ways that we would do that is we would target universities and university students and university professors and university faculty. Therefore, he took the four positions, which had been these bureaucratic let's-run-these-little-posts positions, and he made them what he called resident specialists. The Indians respond very well to intellectual things and academic things. They're very learned people, and so we had an expert on history and an expert in economy and an expert in foreign policy and another – literature, maybe. They were Foreign Service officers, but who had PhDs in these respective subjects so that they could get easy access to university classes and classrooms and faculty.

Again, Dan made lots of friends and lots of enemies because he would say, very openly, "Well, these are second-raters for second-rate audiences." But he was recognizing that every once in a year you would get John Kenneth Galbraith out to lecture and you wouldn't get him to the university in Bangalore, because he'd do one lecture and it would be at Delhi University or something. So the fact that we would have an economist on our staff who could respond to these thousands of requests of, "Please come and talk to us about the American economy."

Those were the days when we were doing the first currency convertibilities, and there was a whole lot of discussion about where was America's economy going, and it was ...

Q: One of the Nixon shocks.

COWAL: It was one of the Nixon shocks, and so there was probably 100 requests a week for a speaker, and, again, the speakers were just a vehicle. The vehicle was to get Americans into these university settings so that we could, yes, talk about the American economy, but also, knowing that traveling Americans do exemplify American values and you do understand more about us if you come to know us. In this huge country, I think what we were trying to do was sort of paint a pointillist portrait, sort of put color dots on people's maps of what the United States was all about. Because for all that we might have been tilting toward Pakistan, India was tilting toward the Soviet Union, no question about it, and shutting out America. So that was the battle that we saw.

Q: Well, I would have thought that there would be almost a natural disconnect between the Soviets and the Indians, and the way of thinking, culture, style, everything else. I mean, the politicians could make the calculation, but I would think that – and this would be a real nice wedge that we could hammer away at all of the ...

COWAL: Yes, and to a certain extent, that was true, and one of the things that we did to exacerbate that wedge was we had a lot of what we originally called Leader Grants, which came to be called the International Visitor Program grants, and of course those were to send people from India to the United States – leaders, and those might be government people. But they might also be academics or businesspeople or scientists or scholars, or whatever.

We came up with this notion that we would send as many of them as we could to the United States via a short stay in Russia. Everybody said, “Well, why are you doing that?” Well, we were doing that precisely because somebody would have a couple of not very interesting and positive days in Russia and then go to the United States.

Q: How could you both justify and get the Soviets to agree to let these people through?

COWAL: Well, in many cases – we didn’t do this with all our grantees, but we did it with a number of them, and they were people who had contacts and links and whatever in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets were working very hard on this. We had a big information center, I think they had a bigger one. I mean, it was a real battle for the minds of men, in those days, and they were trying to address the Indian society with the fact that Communism was the answer to the economic woes of India, and I think they were making certain inroads.

I don’t think there was a whole lot – I mean, we had so many advantages. We had the English language. We had the natural tendency of Indians, I think, to be pro-American, the two world’s largest democracies, and all these kinds of things. But we had a real battle. So we sent some people to make the point fairly clearly that they were very different kinds of society and we were very different kinds of people.

I don’t think there was any particular love lost between the Russians and the Indians, but it was also very convenient. If you wanted to get more from the United States, couldn’t you do that by indicating that you were really about to go sleep with the Russians, and so it was a gain. I mean, after all, Nehru was one of the founders of non-alignment, and they saw that as their only salvation, along with some other great leaders – Tito and Nasser and Sukarno and Nkrumah was the five, and the Bandung was the morning of the world, and that was, what, in ‘68 or so? And so this was very shortly into the beginnings of the non-aligned movement, and that’s where India really saw itself, and it was trying to balance these two forces so as to get taken in by neither, or to get involved in neither’s battles in Asia or anywhere else.

Q: What about the universities? One of the legacies of the British rule was that a lot of the Indian professors and leaders and all went through the London School of Economics and were tainted with Fabian Marxist – my personal prejudice is this is much worse than Communism to Africa and all over. It loused a lot of these societies up for decades. But I would think that India, you would have your professors talking Marxist or extreme socialist talk to their students.

COWAL: You’re thinking right. And there were certainly parts of India and some universities that were much more of that tendency than others. There were places where we couldn’t go and where we weren’t welcome and where we weren’t invited, and lots of places where we were. It was a battleground.

Q: Well, what were the elite universities, as we saw them, at that time?

COWAL: Oh, gosh, my memory sort of fades.

Q: You mentioned Delhi University.

COWAL: Delhi University was certainly one of them. I can't any longer remember. If you put a list of them in front of me I suppose I could. Benares was good. I mean, the technical institutes, the Indian institutes of technology were super, and I think they had five campuses, or so. They, of course, eschewed Marxist rhetoric to teach technical skills, and when you think about it and you think about how important Indians have been in this country in terms of our high-tech revolution, how many Indians are today in the United States either working at Microsoft or teaching.

I think I heard something not so long ago about the professors of engineering at U.S. universities, there's a huge percentage of them who are Indian born and Indian trained. Those come out of these very, very, very good technical universities. One of the things that I've always been very lucky at in my Foreign Service career has been basically to be in places which counted, to be in places which were important, and where in some ways the history of the world was going to be written, and where there was a decidedly strong culture and the country had an idea of what it was and where it had come from and what its history was. Certainly, India was my first and extremely powerful experience in that regard.

Q: How did the East Pakistan – it happened on your watch.

COWAL: Yes, it did.

Q: Can you tell me how that hit us, how we responded, how the people in the embassy, the policy from Washington and how you all felt about it?

COWAL: I recall that the ambassador saw this coming and was kind of ineffective in doing anything about it, basically. I think that affected the whole staff. I don't remember there being great morale. What I remember, interestingly, and I've gotten to know – I mean, I somehow, again being a pretty junior officer, nonetheless I swam every day at lunch time. I would swim with the DCM (deputy chief of mission), the political counselor and the econ counselor. They had a big swimming pool at the embassy, and I would go over there and swim.

So these guys became my friends, or at least somebody that I knew more than a junior officer would have known anyone like that in this enormous embassy, but somehow, Galen Stone was the DCM, Dick Viets was the ambassador's special assistant. All of these people of course went on to their own formidable careers, I would say, in the Foreign Service. So I had a tremendous experience in meeting all of these people.

I would say that people in India, the American officers in India, kind of sometimes fell too much into three categories. I mean, the ones were those who were still living with this notion of the

'50s and '60s, the romanticized India, that we're best friends, we'll be best friends forever, they look to us, we must support our little Indian brothers. We'll wear saris and try to be as Indian as anyone else.

Then there was the whole category of people who really wanted to bash the Indians, who really didn't understand why Mrs. Gandhi was not Nehru, although he had been difficult enough for us, but why she was this particularly difficult woman who seemed to be particularly interested in going her own way. So that was a second category. Then the third category were those who were there for the good time, and a very good time could be had.

One of the things, and this gets into Moynihan and actually the firing of my boss and all the rest of it, but we lived on these rupees. I mean, at one point, I think the United States owned 10 percent of all the rupees in the world because of the PL-480 programs, where we had sold India large amounts of food in the '60s and they had paid us in rupees, which we kept in accounts in New Delhi. That's one of the reasons why we had such an enormous presence in India, because we had no other way to spend all these blocked rupees. So not only did we have 500 people working for USIS, but probably 5,000 working for USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and of course an enormous Peace Corps and an enormous everything else. You could imagine. It was all running on this funny money. It was all running on rupees.

So AID not only ran its AID projects, but AID had a staff house for its staff to live in in New Delhi, which rivaled the Ritz Carlton hotel next to me. Here we were in the middle of extreme poverty, and AID officers who lived on a compound, associated only with one another, had their own swimming pools and bowling alleys and restaurants and commissaries and all this kind of middle class America, but upper middle class America, sort of writ large. I think there were a certain number of people who were out there for that.

I should be more generous than that. I mean, it sounds like everybody fit into one of these three categories, but there was an awful lot of that, of the people who lamented what had been, the people who hated every day about where they were, because they hated this government, and then the people who were just kind of along for the ride. It was an extremely difficult time. I felt sorry for the ambassador and his country team in trying to really put this forward. Then, when you knew that the policy from Washington was to sort of side with the enemy of the country where you were, and the country knew that, too, made it a very difficult situation.

Q: Galen Stone was a DCM?

COWAL: Yes.

Q: Now, I've known Galen close to the time – I was consul general in Saigon, '69, '70, and he was the political officer, the head of the political section there. I would have thought he would have brought over some of this real resentment about Mrs. Gandhi and of her considerable spanking of what we were doing in Vietnam.

COWAL: Yes, well, I think he was one of those. But I think what Galen was, you also saw in folks like that the sort of Foreign Service aristocracy, in a way. Galen came from an enormously

wealthy, patrician, New England family. So you also saw – part of the good parts of this, in some ways, were as we got onto sort of a war footing, which we did, there was a rallying around the American community to support one another. Keating didn't have a wife. Galen had a lovely wife, and they became kind of like George and Laura Bush these days, to us there. After all, this went on for weeks, this discussion about whether there would be a war, wouldn't there be a war, how it would come, whether it would involve Americans, whether we would be targeted, whether we should evacuate. We never evacuated, but we would talk about that.

That was very interesting, too, being there with the first male spouse in the Foreign Service, because they would have community meetings and so on, and they would say things like, "Well, we're evacuating dependents." And then they would, in the next breath, say, "The women and children will be evacuated." Of course, irony of ironies, the place where we were to be evacuated was Iran, because that was then our anchor and our friend.

My husband was extremely interested in going to Iran. It was a place that he wanted to visit. In fact, he's no longer a lawyer. He works in design and architecture and so on, all of which came out of this experience of being sort of freed from what he had been expected to do, which was to be a lawyer and provide for a family. Women's liberation is also men's liberation, which is something that I learned. At any rate, he was very anxious to go to Iran, because he wanted to go to Isfahan and see all these beautiful mosques and all this kind of stuff. So he kept running around this meeting saying, "Now, what are we talking about here? Who are we evacuating, because I want to be on that plane."

It was kind of funny, and he did it with a certain lightheartedness, but we also sort of knew what we were doing, and that was we were stretching everybody's minds around a new concept of who was working and who wasn't working here, and who was the dependent and who was the officer. I think whenever you're in a crisis, like the one we're in right now in the United States, sometimes things rise to the surface that otherwise sort of stayed buried. That was the, I guess, leitmotif through those years, was the personal story of Tom and me meeting people and shaking them up about what the Foreign Service was about, and what the roles of men and women were about. It was interesting.

Q: Here's a lawyer, how did he fit in? I mean, he's young in this fascinating country, how did he make his way?

COWAL: Well, I think he did a terrific job at it, actually. I can remember some funny little anecdotes. We had been there a couple of months and he got sick, as a lot of people did in India. I mean, he didn't get real sick, but he picked up whatever it was that was going around and ate something or ...

Q: The food in a Delhi deli or something.

COWAL: Yes, whatever. So he one morning found himself at sick call, seeing an embassy nurse, one of those things about third world posts, where you line up sort of for sick call. The nurse said, "Okay, your name is Tom Grooms, and where do you work?" And he said, "Oh, I don't work, I'm a dependent." She looked at him and he had this sort of law school furrowed brow and was

already beginning to get a little gray hair, although he was in his mid 20s. She kind of looked at him and she looked at him again and she said, “Who is your father?” Because she couldn’t imagine that anybody was there as a dependent. He obviously wasn’t 15 years old, he was a grown man, and so what was he doing sponging off of some father at age – Tom must have been 25, 26 at that point.

Again, by heading straightforwardly into these conversations, rather than hiding from them, I think we provided a service. We had a role to play. Tom decided that he couldn’t find work as a lawyer, after trying for a couple of months, and that he wasn’t going to stay home everyday, and that something he had always been interested in, sort of avocationally was design. So he went out and got himself – well, first, he did our house. He needed to keep busy, so of course we were assigned an embassy flat like every other junior officer, and, of course, because it was India, it was the size of my house today, and that was probably the smallest house anybody had. But it was enormous. It was a two flat, and we had the downstairs and another Foreign Service officer lived upstairs from us.

So we were assigned all the embassy furniture like everybody else’s, and Tom got to know all of the markets in Delhi, because he decided that he would slipcover this furniture and paint these walls and put in these plants. So, for the first two or three months, I think that’s what he did. He made that his project. He needed something to do. He knew everything about where to find anything in Delhi. I mean, he had been there, and he didn’t speak any Indian languages, but there’s enough English spoken anywhere in Delhi that you can kind of make your way around.

Pretty soon, everybody was coming to see our house. A couple months after that, he went to work for a big interior design company in Delhi, which wanted to get as a slice of its business the American embassy business, or any embassy business, because a lot of people came and said, “Oh my God, why do I want red velvet chairs in the middle of this tropical country?” So he built it into a little specialty business, and then left after a year and went back to school at the Parsons School of Design in New York City. He got a degree in environmental design and today runs a federal design awards program. It sponsors competitions for the best new federal building and the best stamp and the best bridge, and the best this, that and the other thing. He has never practiced law one day since. It led him into a whole new turn and course in his life, but not without some controversy, I suppose. I don’t know, it was interesting.

Q: Well, going back now to the – could you explain for the listener what was the issue, and what were we doing? I mean, what were our concerns with these Pakistanis?

COWAL: Well, it was one of the many chapters in the long-running war between the Indians and Pakistanis. It starts, certainly, with the partition, and geographically, deciding that religion should rule over geography in terms of deciding how the subcontinent would get carved into two separate states. It left the province of East Bengal, which was Muslim dominated, was made part of Pakistan, which was 1,500 miles away to the west, with the whole of India in between. I mean, that was certainly what began this whole thing, and what I think remained at the core of it. The ethnicity and the religion cut different ways, also, because the Bengalis, whether they were East Bengalis or West Bengalis, also had certain things in common as Bengalis, being within the

Indian culture, very literate people, very cultured people. They're the poets and the writers and the artists.

The Bengalis in East Bengal became ever more dissatisfied to be ruled by people who were quite different than they were. I don't know about so much ideologically, but certainly culturally, and 1,000 miles a way. So there were constant attempts by the East Bengalis to get out of East Bengal and to go into West Bengal. I mean, I think it was a refugee issue as well, that they were then overrunning West Bengal, which didn't get along all that well with the central government of India either, because West Bengal had a Communist-dominated government.

I was way below the pay grade where the real issues were I dealt with on a daily basis, but I think the tensions just kept escalating and escalating. It was not anything that the United States was particularly a part of, except insofar as we were seen to be supporting Pakistan in this.

Q: Well, I mean, also our people out of the Consulate General in Calcutta were involved, but were Indians trying to make us support the separatism? Was this something we felt we were under pressure from the Indians to do?

COWAL: Yes, I think we were, and I think we were under pressure from the Pakistanis not to do that. Forgive me for not being all that involved in what was actually going on there. From our point of view, it was simply one of the many issues in which the Indians found a reason to criticize U.S. policy. At the end of the day, I think we were much more worried about a major conflagration in South Asia in which somehow we would be asked to take sides than we were about anything else. I think that we allowed the coming into being of Bangladesh, then, when it finally became sort of inevitable that this is what would happen. I think the United States responded sort of immediately to grant diplomatic recognition to this new country and to begin an aid program and to do all sorts of things. And we've had pretty good relationships with Bangladesh ever since, as far as I know.

Q: Did you observe or get involved with the perpetual tension between our embassy in Pakistan and in India? There's almost a tradition of these telegrams coming in from both places.

COWAL: Oh, yes. Right.

Q: And somebody up there is talking to somebody who is on the Indian desk who is also – or maybe the Pakistan desk. They had an interconnecting door, and what they would usually do is take these telegrams, coming from almost like two hostile powers, and sit down and try to resolve the thing so it didn't get any farther up in the ...

COWAL: In a way, it was a beleaguered embassy. A whole lot of people, I think, and starting with the ambassador, felt that we weren't listening enough to the Indians and to their genuine concerns about this refugee problem that they were experiencing. I think those of us who were on the Indian side of the border, I think most of us sympathized with the Indians.

I remember taking one trip to Pakistan during the time I was in India, and I had to go over and deliver something. Maybe I was a courier, I don't remember. It was not a big, high-level trip, but

I had two or three days I think in Karachi and Islamabad, and coming back and thinking that India was a much better place than Pakistan. For all that India could be difficult, both difficult just on the creature comfort level, and overwhelming. India is overwhelming in so many ways. It was kind of round and complex, whereas Pakistan seemed to me to be narrow and straight, and a single line, sort of motivated much more by Muslim fanaticism – or maybe it wasn't fanaticism in those days – but it seemed like a sharp edge, and India seemed like a round ball.

There was so much in India. There were even so many religions in India. I mean, after all, there were 60 million Muslims in India. It was not as if it was all Hindus, and the multiplicity of cultures in India, with the south Indians and the north Indians and the Bengalis and the Gujaratis, and it should not have been surprising. After all, it's 1,800 miles long and 1,200 miles wide. That's bigger than the European continent, so clearly there would be distinctions, but I came back saying, "Oh, I wouldn't want to serve in Pakistan at all."

Q: So you caught the disease ...

COWAL: Right, I caught the disease, to that point. I thought, "That's black and white. It's very sharp, and this is so much richer, and it's more complex, and it's got so many more strands." So I got caught up in it to that extent of thinking it was quite a wonderful place.

Q: Particularly during this difficult time when the United States was picking up some flak from the Indians because of Kissinger – he had a broader game that he was playing.

COWAL: Right.

Q: He could have played it better, but anyway, he was doing it. What were you getting from your young pilots' association, and how did that go?

COWAL: Well, I think by then I was pretty much – remember, this is before e-mail and cell phones, so our communication, I would occasionally get visitors from Washington who had been colleagues of mine. I think that during those years that I was in India, the antipathy to the policy in Vietnam deepened and became rather dominant, but I was out of that. I was away from that.

So I was more or less focused at home and doing what I was doing in India and not any longer particularly connected to the larger world with Young Officers'.

Q: What about the crowd around Rajiv Gandhi and all of that? Was this affecting your social relations at all? Contacts with the young Indians?

COWAL: Well, it was sort of my social life. I guess I determined I became one of those people early on in a Foreign Service career who said I'm not here to associate with Americans, simply because if that's what I wanted to do, the gene pool at home is larger. So if I want to associate with Americans, I think I'll live in Arlington, Virginia and have American friends. I'm here to know something about the rest of the world. Whether that's altogether India or – I had a lot of German friends, I had a lot of British friends, I had Australian friends.

I mean, we were all kind of a broader international community, and I also reacted unhappily to this. A big post like India or Mexico where I later served can really have its little Americana section, and I think the joy of being a USIS officer was probably you couldn't do that job unless you were out. I mean, an admin officer, by definition sort of needs to stick close to whatever the assignment is, and a consular officer I have great sympathy for, because I think they have to interact, more than anybody else, obviously with people from the country where they're representing, but also in extremely difficult ways. Whereas, basically, a USIS officer might get into ideological arguments with somebody, but is there bringing goodies, whether it's a film or a speaker or a chance to go abroad or a book for the library.

So you're out in quite the nicest way, really trying to win friends and influence people. I spent as much time as I could out of the office. My social friends were not at the American embassy, and my work colleagues were at the Indian Institute of International Relations in different universities around the country.

Q: Did you feel a divide with the people you knew in the political class who were following the pro-Soviet line, or anti-American line?

COWAL: I don't think I was that involved in it, other than being at dinners at embassy residence or dinners at the PAO's house. We were always trying to engage people who didn't necessarily agree with us, who were the editors of the newspapers or the Foreign Ministry people. I had friends who I still have, but they were mostly, I would say, nongovernmental friends in India. One of our best friends was a dentist and is still there. Obviously, he is still there, he's an Indian, and I see him and his wife whenever I go, and we remain friends. I suppose of any country, if you walk away and 30 years later you've still got a half a dozen people that you would call friends and care about and who care about you, that may come down to being what it's all about, what a lot of it is all about.

I think I was always one of these people who threw myself passionately into wherever I was. I watched Foreign Service officers who more or less came in and said, "Well, it's an inbox and an outbox. So today it's an inbox and an outbox in New Delhi, and tomorrow it will be an inbox and an outbox in Islamabad, and not really a whole lot of difference here. I know what I'm doing. I'm professional, I'm good, I know how to do it, but I'm not going to let it really affect me."

It was always the opposite for me. I always threw myself into it as if there were no tomorrow, as if I were always going to be there. I mean, this was my life, and it was as if I were never going to leave, although I knew of course in some part of my mind that I was going to leave. So I really made friends with people in the community, just the way you make friends with anybody in Arlington, Virginia. You went to a swimming pool and you made friends, and you went to dinner and you made friends, and you did what you would normally do, and you made friends.

Q: Well, how did this work when Daniel Moynihan came as ambassador?

COWAL: Well, that was very interesting, watching a power struggle, essentially. Moynihan came and he – well, first of all, his name was Daniel Moynihan and my boss's name was Dan Alexi, and they were both like six-foot, five-inches tall. I think it was clear who was going to

dominate, because I had the sense that my boss, among everybody on the country team, was the strongest person on that country team, in many ways. He was intellectually extremely bright, but he also had quite a forceful personality, and I wasn't a member of a country team until many years after that, so I was obviously never at a meeting. But I've been then, of course, a member of a lot of country teams and run some also, and it doesn't matter whether it's the military guy or the PAO or the ConGen (consulate general), there's usually somebody who emerges, maybe in opposition to the ambassador, maybe with the ambassador, but there's another power player there. And I think that was the head of USIS, which had its own operation and so on.

The first meeting that Moynihan had of this country team, which I suppose was the first or second day he was in Delhi, he immediately started on this idea that we should give back these rupees, because we had too many of them. It was sort of obscene, it was unseemly. We couldn't pretend that India was a sovereign country while we had all of these, and so on. So he expressed this as a point of view, and then he went around the table, because he wanted to know what every member of the country team thought about it.

When he got to my boss, my boss said he absolutely agreed with him, and that in fact he thought that given what U.S. policy was toward India, the fact that we had all of this money was misleading to the Indians in terms of how important they really were to us. It was clear that to Nixon and Kissinger they weren't very important, and yet the fact that we spent so much money in aid and we had a \$10 million USIS budget and we had these huge things that we were doing, it really was unfair to the Indians, because it mislead them about our real interest in this country, which was pretty little at this point.

So he said, "I completely agree with you, and, in fact, last week in my Washington consultation, I made the decision to cut 10 percent of our staff, and Moynihan said, "You're cutting my staff?" And Dan said, "Well, sir, it's my program responsibility," and that was it. The meeting ended, apparently, on that note, and the ambassador gave him 72 hours to pack up and get out.

I watched from a pretty close-up view what I can only assume was a power struggle. Whether it did so infuriate the ambassador or whether he figured that the way you get to be the top dog is to immediately make sure everyone knows who's boss, and you won't tolerate, especially, the guy who might be the power center being there. It was quite a lesson.

Q: It must have been a real cold shock or whatever you want to call it to the entire embassy to have this.

COWAL: Right, and I can remember, of course, the meeting ended, the ambassador didn't say anything. Dan came back to our office and he had a deputy PAO and he had me and he had a couple of other people who were close to him, senior staff close to him. He called us in and he said, "Well, I've just had my first brush-up with the ambassador here." He said, "I don't know, I'll have to go see the old man and work it out." I think within an hour he had a call from the DCM, giving him this message, and nobody was going to buck the ambassador, so that's what happened, and it was pretty amazing.

I guess that was April, and I was supposed to leave in June and then go to language school, and I just decided that I wanted to leave sooner rather than later, that I didn't want to wait around for a new PAO to come.

Q: You really wouldn't have had a chance to do anything.

COWAL: No.

Q: People must have been huddled in the halls.

COWAL: Yes, they must have been. We were all just in such shock. Dan – our Dan – was a giant guy. He was a real leader and I guess he immediately picked up the phone and called the head of USIA, who I think by then was Jim Keogh, I think, and told him what had happened, but never bucked it. I mean, didn't say, "So you have to convince them." In those days, we said, "The ambassador is the head of the country team, and if the ambassador wants you out, you're out, and what's the point in trying to stay."

He said, "It will ruin USIS if I try to stay. What I need to do is get out so we'll make the deputy the acting PAO and I'll come home and I hope you'll have a job for me."

Q: What did he do?

COWAL: He became the head of the inspection corps for USIA. He's alive and living in Florida, and we're still in touch, but I don't think he ever really did anything of great note after that. I mean, it pretty much finished him. Those were the days when there was really no integration in the Foreign Service. I mean, the highest thing that a USIA officer could aspire to be was the PAO, and if you were the PAO in the biggest place, you had no where else to go, I mean, really. That was, I think, one of the best things about the integration of State and USIA is that it should give a little bit more recognition to some of the really extraordinary people who chose to make their careers in USIA, and that didn't happen in the '70s.

So he would have been a wonderful DCM, he would have been a wonderful ambassador, but that was just never in the cards. He never expected it to be and it never was. I think he probably worked another five years or so and then retired.

Q: Could you talk a little about the Indian members of USIS?

COWAL: Oh, gosh, terrific people, terrific people. USIS has its strange and wonderful complexities, because it seemed to me that as the American officers, we should always be prepared to tell our local staffs what it was we were trying to do, period, and then we needed very much to count on our local staffs to tell us who we needed to get that message to and how we would get it to them.

So, if I tell you that my job is to convince Indians that the U.S. economy is strong and vibrant, and that's one of my messages, the U.S. is number one, I would expect the Indian staff to be able to say, "Okay, if you really want to get that message across in India, the people who carry the

economic message are the podiatrists,” or whatever it is, because when anybody goes to their foot doctors, that’s when they talk about economics – or the barbers, or whatever. But something that wouldn’t be obvious to you from the outside, necessarily – and you know that the one magazine that every podiatrist reads, or the one radio program that they all listen to is so and so. So this is your message, here’s who you have to get it to, and here’s how you’re going to get it to them.

I’ve always thought that, and it always worked extremely well for me, but I had the luxury of thinking that because we had in India a staff that was absolutely intellectually and educationally prepared to engage in that kind of a dialog. I think in many third world countries, one of the best things the American embassy has is its staff, because it’s usually regarded as a position of some prestige, and so in many countries, I thought our local staff was far better than our American staff, just because what are the alternatives to you as a middle-class person in India? Where do you go and work, for the Dodridge or for the American embassy? And an awful lot of people chose the American embassy, either because they idealistically believed in what we were trying to do, and I think many and most did, or because it was just a damn good place to work, competed very well with salaries and prestige offered anywhere else.

We had a number of spectacular people on the staff, and they were also your window on the world. To be a friend of Kamla Kapur’s, who was the librarian, and enormously savvy, had her master’s in library science from Cornell or something, but had been running this very prestigious American library for 25 years by the time I got there. There wasn’t a member of India’s intellectual elite who didn’t know who Kamla Kapur was, because she was their gateway to getting – before the Internet and stuff, people would call her routinely from the president’s office, or from the university or from the Foreign Ministry and say, “We absolutely need to get this speech that Henry Kissinger delivered. Kamla, can you help us?”

I mean, you could meet anybody you wanted through Kamla Kapur. One of the other things that I did was I was the PAO’s liaison to the senior Indian staff, and so I met with them I guess once a week or so, and we would have a dialog about what they thought about American policy, and how we could accomplish it, and how we could best get the message across, and what was good about the message, and what would never go over about the message. Again, that was a very important experience for me that carried me through my whole Foreign Service career, is where would I go for help and how would I learn. What was the crash course in learning what we were all about in Colombia or anywhere else – ah, it was the good people on your local staff. So we had spectacular people.

Q: Well, we’ll stop at this point and, next time, you’re leaving India in 1973 and you’re off to do what?

COWAL: To study Spanish and go to Colombia.

STEPHEN E. PALMER, JR.
Consul General

Madras (1971-1973)

Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., was born in Superior, Wisconsin. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1944. He immediately entered the U.S. Marine Corps, where he served as an education officer. He later received a master's degree from Columbia University. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Israel, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Switzerland. Mr. Palmer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 31, 1995.

Q: What was your impression during that time of the reporting of the outlook of our embassy in New Delhi?

PALMER: My recollection of it was that it was honest and fair, and they acknowledged that the Indians had utilized some stooges from East Pakistan. In fact, the bottom line for India was a weaker Pakistan, so that's what they were after, and that's what they got.

Q: Then you served in Madras from '71 to '73. Can you do a little compare and contrast what you noted up in the Pakistan capital. Here you were in a southern Indian major city. The attitudes of the people?

PALMER: First of all one has to differentiate between the north Indian's establishment which pretty much was reflected in their diplomats and their diplomacy, and the South Indians who were not as, if you will, nearly as nationalistic. Madras was an eye opener for me by virtue of its ethnic diversity and the innate friendliness of the people towards the United States. They were friendly towards everybody, they're a friendly people. And especially in the case of Madras and people from Kerala, striving for a high degree of education, competence in the arts, as well as in science. So it was a relatively, given my previous career, a quiet two years, a very different two years. My major responsibilities were public speaking and going all around south India calling on party leaders, prime ministers, chief secretaries, and cabinet officials of the four states in South India. A lot of time on the road. Very quiet, we never received any flash messages there. There were a lot of interesting things. It was a period of concentration on commercial expansion of the United States' concerns; there was quite a lot of emphasis on that and with some success.

I worked very closely with our able USIS people, who ran a successful press placement program, a thriving library, etc. We had just arrived in Madras -- having driven there from Islamabad via Delhi in our Volkswagen beetle -- when I was called up to greet Mahalia Jackson at the airport. The temperature and the humidity both were 100, and, tired from the trip, I half-fainted on the air strip. She gave a marvelous rendition of Christian gospel songs to a puzzled but appreciative Hindu audience.

There was interest, of course, in the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, some of whom we learned later were supported by the Indian government, the national government. My sources, including really close friends like the chief secretary of Tamil Nadu, were open about everything but that. If they knew, which is problematic, but that was really hard to get to. In any case, it wasn't as vividly a dangerous situation as it later became in Sri Lanka.

On the commercial promotion side, I well remember I was in Kerala calling on a whole bunch of ministers because there had been a cabinet reshuffle after a state election, including the Minister of Commerce who was one of the communist ministers. He was very friendly and we had a good general talk. I got some biographic information that we lacked on him. Then, he said, "Palmer, I want your help." I said, "What can we do?" "I want a razor blade factory, but I want American razor blade factory, I don't want any Russian, they're no good. We've got to have American razor blade factory." I put him in touch with Joe Gillette. I don't think they came to a deal, but what was significant was that this communist minister was reaching out for American investments.

Q: Kerala all that time was our concern because it had a communist government.

PALMER: Yes. Sometimes the chief minister was a communist, and sometimes he wasn't. There was a great deal of flux in their shifting among the various factions. There were at least two significant communist factions, one of which was deemed to be pro-Soviet, and the other was deemed to be pro-Chinese. At least we in the post in Madras, and New Delhi also, never regarded the Kerala communists as any seriously inimical to our interests.

Q: Were you there when, or maybe you were just coming, when there was the famous tilt towards Pakistan of sending the aircraft Enterprise into the Gulf of Bengal?

PALMER: It was not long after I arrived, and that was the occasion of the first, and only, demonstration against the consulate during my two years there. We were warned by I guess the chief secretary, or maybe the senior police official, probably the latter, that there would be a demonstration and that he would ensure proper protection. So we buttoned up the place -- it was during working hours -- and we didn't send people home, but we asked the public to leave the USIS library which was part of the same building complex. This demonstration approached, we could hear some shouting and I was looking down from a second story window. It was a straggly bunch, there may have been 15 people, they had a placard or two, and they were shouting about American imperialism. One of them came up to the steps and the embassy admin officer said, "If they want to talk we should receive them." And they wanted to talk. I didn't go down but the political officer went down, and they had a little friendly debate and the demonstrators wandered off. That was the big demonstration, in contrast to the sort of thing that happens in Delhi.

Q: What was your impression of our embassy in Delhi, and what they wanted out of you? Keating, was he the ambassador?

PALMER: He was, but then he was replaced not too long after I arrived by Moynihan. He was a very colorful chief of mission. He visited us in Madras, had quite substantive visits, stayed with us a couple of days and a couple of nights. He and I were mutual admirers, you might say, and we got along well. The embassy gave all of its consuls general a great deal of autonomy. I think for one thing, the distance was so great. And another thing as far as Madras was concerned, unless there were important state elections coming up, or a navy visit, or something like that, it was off the radar screen pretty much. The embassy was always very supportive. Galen Stone was the DCM, and he was very supportive and helpful. So we had a great relationship. Again, I

visited the other GCS, and my Calcutta colleague visited me, so we could all appreciate each other's problems a little better.

A footnote on Madras. Service in South India was not without health risks. I was afflicted by something which gave me considerable pain and discomfort in my right torso. Our local consulting physician diagnosed it as a muscle spasm. But while I was on a short field trip in Andhra Pradesh, I began to feel really rotten. My driver perceived that I was quite ill and took me to a hospital in Vellore, Tamil Nadu, which had been established by missionaries. There a bright doctor from Kerala diagnosed it as schistosomiasis, which had eaten away some of my insides. He prescribed the right drugs. While I was recovering at home in Madras, our temporary secretary -- the wife of the admin officer -- brought out classified materials. Much later, she told me that she found me to be very cranky. Years later, however, after unrelated divorces, she consented to marry me.

BETTY JANE JONES
Economic Officer
Calcutta (1971-1974)

Betty Jane Jones was born and raised in Wisconsin. She majored in government at Beloit College and entered the Foreign Service in 1954. Her career included positions in Italy, Germany, India, Israel, the United Kingdom (England), and assignments related to the United Nations in Washington, DC and New York. This interview was conducted on March 8, 1993.

Q: Well, let's get back to Calcutta. You were there during the period when East Pakistan peeled off from Pakistan proper. How did that play at the Consulate General level?

JONES: We were in a very interesting position because, of course, the Bengalis in West Bengal, where we were, were very sympathetic to East Bengal. We also had all of the thousands of refugees in our consular district. They poured over from the east mainly into West Bengal, and it was a tremendous job to deal with them, to house them and feed them. I rather admired the Indians, how they handled it. Because we would have felt that they had to have much more elaborate set ups for this, whereas the Indians were prepared to do it in such a way that provided the minimal, but did take care of them. In Calcutta, I was head of the Economic Section, and in that connection got involved in some of the aid that we provided during that period. We would meet with the Indian officer who was in charge of assessing the requirements. There were other consulates there who were involved also. We would report what the situation was. I went to the airport many times to meet shipments when they came in to be sure that they were received and dealt with adequately. I also toured the refugee camps with many visiting VIPs. The upheaval was tremendous. Of course, after the war, the Indians made no bones about it. They wanted these people to go back. Many of course wanted to go back, but there was no question that West Bengal, which still had refugees from the days of partition, didn't want any more. We were not very popular at the time, because the government supported Pakistan as an ally. The U.S. was quite supportive of Pakistan to the extent that the Indians felt that we were one-sided and

although our personal relations with people were OK, you did hear about it periodically. There were some demonstrations at the USIS library, but nothing that ever caused us any real difficulty.

Q: Were you given any instructions from our Embassy in New Delhi on this? You were doing your bit with the refugees...

JONES: Yes. We also had a window on the situation because there were many correspondents and journalists who came to cover this, and of course the border was a sieve. They would go over and we had no means...

Q: Our consulate had closed in Dacca at that point? We evacuated...

JONES: I know we evacuated some people because some of them came. I don't remember if it was closed entirely. It may have been. I think it was. Because we had two evacuations. One from Chittagong by ship, and one when they flew people out from Dacca to Calcutta. We took care of them before they moved on. These journalists would go over, and then they would come and talk to us, and we could then report on what they had to say on what the situation was. So that was an interesting aspect of it. But sympathies certainly were all with the Bengalis. It was felt that the Pakistanis had stolen the elections and that the right was all on the side of what became the Bangladeshis.

Q: You left Calcutta, and that war just in time to go to Jerusalem. People must have been thinking of you as Typhoid Mary?

JONES: Even funnier than that was the Ambassador in India was Ambassador Keating and he moved from there to Israel. In fact, he said to me one day: "Everywhere we go, they seem to have a war." Yes, I went on a direct transfer to Jerusalem.

HERBERT E. WEINER
Labor Counselor
New Delhi (1971-1975)

Herbert E. Weiner is from the Bronx, New York. He was a teacher in Brooklyn, New York before entering the U.S. Army. His career included positions in India, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Mr. Weiner was interviewed on June 18, 1991 by Robert Schrader.

Q: Okay, Herb, now that you have given us some indication of what was the role and the function in your earliest experience, how would you compare or contrast that with your assignments in later years as the labor function became a more established part of regular Foreign Service operations?

WEINER: Subsequently as the labor function became more established and better known, it started to run into some bureaucratic problems. In a subsequent assignment in Sydney for

example we had no real place for the Labor Attaché in either the Political or the Economic Section. So I still functioned largely on my own, and functioned relatively freely. But as the issues became better known other sections started to get involved. The Commercial Section would start to get involved; the Political Officer would start to get involved in issues; there was this overlapping, and sometimes there was friction over who did what; so the Labor Attaché had to establish a sort of unique relationship with the head of the particular mission if you will. In my case in Sydney it was with the Consul General. In subsequent years over a period of time the Labor Attaché became more and more oriented towards the political section. Sometimes for bureaucratic reasons and other times largely because the issues that were dominant in his field were political, he began to be moved into the Political Section. Some Labor Attachés saw this as an advantage because this gave them, they thought, more clout because the Political Sections were usually the more powerful sections in the Embassy. At the same time in subsequent years I found this restricting. For example in New Delhi I found that what happened was that as political officers tried to limit the Labor Attaché into specific labor-political issues the Labor Attaché's function was beginning to get a little bit squeezed. Labor-political issues were not clearly all party political, the more familiar framework to some political counselors. Labor issues frequently crossed all lines - economic, political, as well as technical lines. And so in many situations the labor function really did not fit, or fitted very uneasily, into an orthodox embassy Political Section. In my case in New Delhi the Ambassador really decided the scope and the implications of what the Labor Attaché did - in New Delhi called Labor Counselor - was just too broad for any one section. So the Labor Attaché was moved from the Political Section into the Ambassador's Section and was directly responsible to the DCM (Minister) and to the Ambassador with his own representational budget and his own bureaucratic responsibilities; and his own authority to act on somewhat the same level as the Political and Economic Counselor; but that was not generally the case in embassies.

Q: Now, Herb, you have talked about relations with other elements of the Foreign Service establishment in the embassy. Do you have anything to say about your own experience with other U.S. Government agencies that were a part of the U.S. mission operation in the countries in which you served?

WEINER: Well, in addition to the embassy there were the other agencies which had a labor interest. There was AID (Agency for International Development); there was the USIS (United States Information Service); and there was the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency); and there were also often other agencies beyond these when you got into places like India where we had vast assistance programs in the health field, and we got involved with HEW people, where you would get involved with some Treasury people who were concerned with monetary policy and so forth. In the technical assistance field, particularly as I recall it in India, we had very large labor programs. As a result the Labor Attaché or Labor Counselor, as he was known there, in a sense became an advisor to these and other AID programs, generally at the embassy policy level. These would be training programs such as sending people to the United States for training in technical skills, or bringing labor practitioners to India to run all sorts of training programs, say in labor education, labor-management cooperation, disputes settlement, productivity improvement, etc. The Labor Attaché was even involved as an advisor obtaining union-management cooperation in the AID programs for birth control and family planning. That came to be accepted because although you had labor officers in AID technical programs there were

often general political and economic implications in AID programs. Since the Labor Counselor was in the Ambassador's office he frequently had the ear of the Minister or the Ambassador on the broader implications of these issues. In the case of USIS, the Labor Counselor nominated people to come to the United States, particularly under the international visitor program as a way of building affinity between the United States and the host country; and also arranged for others traveling under other auspices, e.g. the ILO, to visit and establish relationships in the U.S. This would often come down to the question of selecting leading trade union figures, people interested in labor affairs in academia or in the government, as well as employers and managers, to visit the United States to look at American labor practice and get an understanding of American politics and history. In other words, the Labor Counselor was engaged in a multifaceted effort of trying to generally orient his host country labor community into the way the United States looked at the world, the way its democracy functions, the way labor-management relations were conducted, the attitudes of the United States to the host country and so forth. This became very important because it was hoped that people who visited the United States would, over time, become leaders in their communities with personal relationships in the U.S. and thereby develop a sympathetic understanding of the U.S. Yet, there was a rather delicate element the Labor Attaché faced. Because of the nature of the Cold War there was a tendency in other countries, particularly in less developed areas, well, even in Western Europe and in Britain, to see spies all over the place. This was sort of a general attitude. There was a tendency to see conspiracies, and to see the CIA behind everything; in India this included among some the failure of the monsoon. Together with this there was also a tendency to appear even-handed politically by equating the KGB and the CIA and the U.S. and the USSR as simple political competitors, rather than as protagonists of democracy vs. dictatorship.

Because the Labor Attaché was functioning in a non-governmental area and nobody was quite sure what his function was, there was a tendency to think of labor attachés as spies or CIA agents. Local communist parties would feed or generate these suspicions about labor attachés as part of a Cold War tactic. In my personal experience, I have never worked with the CIA; never had anything to do with it. I had enough on my plate to take care of what I saw as my own work. From time to time I might have known who the CIA station chief was. But I can honestly say that I never had a real working relationship with one, and we used to be very careful to keep to our own patches to avoid any semblance of working cooperatively, working in tandem, or being a working team of any sort.

ROBER SCHRADER
Labor Officer
New Delhi (1971-1975)

Roger Schrader has also served in New Zealand and The United Kingdom. He was interviewed on June 18, 1991 by Herbert Weiner.

Q: Roger, there were a couple of incidents which were extremely important, I think crucial, in which I was involved. One was our relationship with India while I was Labor Counselor in India in the early 70's. This was when the Nixon Administration implemented the U.S. opening to the

People's Republic of China and the period when the Indians, and Mrs. Gandhi in particular, who took it very personally, resented the American "tilt" toward Pakistan. Traditionally and historically the Indian role and the impact on its non-alignment policy had been related to its relationships to China and the Soviet Union. India saw itself as getting on with the Soviet Union as a counterpoise to its relationship with China. When Secretary Kissinger had developed with President Nixon the opening to China and preparations were underway for President Nixon and Kissinger to go to China and when they stopped off in Pakistan, India's bete noire, in the process as far as the Indians were concerned good relationships with the United States were practically at an end. AID programs began getting closed down, not on an American initiative, but rather by Mrs. Gandhi herself. As a matter of fact we kept the AID mission almost intact for almost a year after the Indo-Pak War of 1971. The Indian Government sharply began to cut back acceptance of U.S. aid or cooperative working relationships with U.S. officials. The interesting thing about this was that at that time the AFL-CIO took a position, which while not absolving Mrs. Gandhi for what her attitudes were toward the United States and the Soviet Union, was one that the Indians and Mrs. Gandhi saw as being somewhat understanding of India's bitter reaction to U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in the "opening to China". In the end as a result of this the only really effective link between the United States and India was at the trade union level. For example grants for other than trade unionists were not accepted by the Indian Government. The Indian authorities made it difficult for these people to get the exit permits to leave the country, but Indian officials used to say that, well, at least the American trade unionists understand them. So the labor link became one of the more essential links, and the only channel for expressing American views on issues in India. This was essentially done through the Indian National Trade Union Congress and the AFL-CIO.

Subsequently during my tour in London, which preceded Roger Schrader's, a different issue came up which persisted for a long time. As Roger has pointed out there was considerable left wing agitation in the British labor movement over cruise missiles and particularly nuclear testing and the CND (the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament) was quite active and quite vocal. This went hand in hand with a general decline in the influence of the Labour Party at the time. The Labour Party lost an election very badly in November 1979 after a long period in power, and there was a general feeling in the electorate that ran against the trade unions for a whole host of reasons. Mainly this popular feeling crystallized around the issue that trade union power had become excessive, and Mrs. Thatcher developed it effectively as a political issue in her election campaign. This raised a much larger issue that persisted for almost a dozen years afterwards, which actually involved the leadership of Neil Kinnock as leader of the Labor Party, who had been a unilateral nuclear disarmer. Feelings began to develop in the U.S., particularly those with a policy interest in the subject, that possibly the special relationship between Britain and the United States would be weakened significantly if a Labor Government were elected. This was a new development that had never existed before in my experience since World War II. Britain and the United States had been seen in both countries as the closest allies; and, now in the 1980's for the first time, one could say that there were feelings of serious concern in the United States, even among people even who were considered visceral friends of British labor, and had had long held feelings toward the British labor movement, over what would happen to the relationship with the United States under a Labour Government. This has been to a large extent since alleviated with the movement of the Labour Party and the trade union movement closer to the political center. But throughout this period from my arrival in August 1977 until I

left on October 26, 1980, the general focus of the Labor Attaché was the question of where Britain would stand if there were a Labour Government and where it would stand on the issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Although the AFL-CIO (and its predecessor AFL) and the British Trade Union Congress have had formal fraternal relations since 1895, there were serious strains between the two since World War II over East-West relations and labor contact. The AFL-CIO eschewed any dealings with Communist controlled labor fronts, while British unions leaned toward "contact" for a variety of reasons. However, by 1979 after some delicate minuets on both sides the TUC sent a high level economic delegation to the AFL-CIO breaking the ice. The idea was to discuss important economic issues which faced both of them and resume a useful dialogue between the world's two largest free trade union centers, while avoiding the strains generated by the politics of how to deal with the "Cold War" in the international labor arena.

SCHRADER: The development of this particular issue had a spin-off in terms of the relationship between the British trade union movement and the AFL-CIO in the United States. During this period many of the leaders and significant elements in the British trade union movement were adamantly opposed not only to the foreign policy and defense policy of the Thatcher Government, but of the United States and of the NATO countries. The AFL-CIO was seen by many of these elements as a strong and staunch supporter of these issues and that perception was which was real caused a considerable freeze in the relationships between the two organizations. During the time that I was there in the early years this began to thaw with the exchange of delegations which was instituted by the AFL-CIO and the TUC at the level of the respective economic committees of the two organizations. This was done principally because both sides, that was elements of both sides who wanted to continue the relationship and rebuild it realized that there were so many frictions on the political issues that there really would be no incentive for discussions to take place at that level simply because there would be so much disagreement on the basic issues. The wiser heads on both sides decided that the better choice would be to get together on economic issues and to discuss these. This was continued during the first year that I was in London with some success. The existence of an American trade union fraternal delegate at the annual TUC Conference persisted during this whole period. It was not shut off at least during my time there. However, there were some pretty uneasy situations where the AFL-CIO representative was confronted with either large blocks of delegates walking out of the conference hall or lack of applause and in some case boos about things that this person would say, so the relationship was a very uneasy one during these years caused in large part by the hard left's view or antagonism towards the views of the AFL-CIO on foreign policy and defense issues, with which both the United States Government and the British Government under Thatcher were in pretty solid agreement.

Q: This concludes the recollections of Roger Schrader and Herbert Weiner on the origins of the Labor Attaché Program, the significance it played in our diplomatic activities at posts where we were assigned and some of the major issues with which we were confronted of greater or lesser significance. We may add to this in the future but at this point we have run out of talk.

ARCHIE M. BOLSTER
Ambassador's Executive Assistant
New Delhi (1972-1974)

Archie M. Bolster was born in Iowa in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Virginia and served in the U.S. Navy from 1955 to 1958 as an overseas lieutenant. His foreign postings included Cambodia, Tabriz, Tehran, New Delhi and Antwerp. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 24, 1992.

Q: Then you went to New Delhi for two years. What were you doing there?

BOLSTER: I was the executive assistant to the Ambassador and then worked subsequently in the political section.

Q: Who was the Ambassador you were working for?

BOLSTER: I was actually working for the Chargé d'Affaires because just before I went out to India, Keating, who had been the Ambassador, resigned and came back to the States. So I worked for the Chargé who was Galen Stone. I found India just a fascinating place, again for some of the same things I had been studying...land reform, agricultural reform. The chance to learn a little bit about that was interesting.

Q: You arrived just after the last major Indo-Pak war. Wasn't that so?

BOLSTER: Yes.

Q: The one in 1971 fought over Bangladesh. How was that playing out when you were there?

BOLSTER: Well, there was a lot of criticism of the US because we had sent the carrier, Enterprise up into the...

Q: This was our tilt towards Pakistan as Kissinger put it.

BOLSTER: Yes, that was brought up all the time by the Indians. There was just a litany of complaints about that. It was a bit of a difficult time because everything that we did was scrutinized so carefully to see again if we were still tilting. No matter what we said there was something wrong with it.

Of course, if we were too friendly with the Indians we would get complaints at our Embassy in Islamabad that we were tilting towards India now. Any conversation you had in India seemed to eventually lead to the Indo-Pak differences in one way or another.

Q: It sounds sort of like Israel and the Arab world.

BOLSTER: Yes. It really is. I felt there was a tendency to consciously play off Americans against the Soviets. The Indians made such a show of being friendly to the Soviets during this period. The President of the Soviet Union came to visit. Mrs. Gandhi went to Moscow. There were quite a few visits and agreements back and forth. It seemed that the Indians were trying to tell us that despite all we had done for them don't think they are in our pocket.

Q: Developing a close relationship with the Soviet Union in a way looking at it even at the times basically was unnatural. I mean here is a democracy wrestling with the problems of a huge country all split up and all and yet trying to appear close to what was a totalitarian empire. A completely different system.

BOLSTER: True but the relationship was a counter weight to China too because there was the fighting on the border in 1962 with the Chinese. So that was still in the Indian mind too. They needed Soviet ties as a balance against China. If the Chinese again thought of doing anything along the border they would know the Soviets would help India. So it was part of the great power balancing game again.

But it was also a time when the US was winding down its AID program. I always loved the play on words that Ambassador Moynihan used when he came later...I, of course, was working for and under him. He called the fact that we had had this AID program which was now declining, but just at the time that we were declining. We had this enormous AID complex that was built out there away from the city that had apartments, offices, bowling alley, etc. He called this the "edifice complex"; when a program is declining it gets enormous buildings. Then we had to decide what to do with these buildings because they were only partly used and the program was winding down. So eventually we worked out a way to present it to the Indians to be used by them.

We also during his time handed back the largest amount of foreign exchange ever transmitted in one check which was surplus rupees that were turned back to the Indians. By giving them aid for which people...they used the aid to buy tractors and people paid for the tractors and all these rupees that paid for the tractor purchase with USAID was then put into a fund to be used in joint projects of the Indian and US governments. Particularly for developments in India but also for...we purchased all kinds of furniture and...

Q: Oh, I remember we were all told to try to buy tickets through our rupee fund.

BOLSTER: Yes, that is right. We tried every way we could possibly think to use the money. But there were billions of dollars in rupees that could never be used. So Moynihan worked out a way to hand back most of these rupees to the Indian government. In effect saying that you don't need to worry that we are going to demand dollars for these, you just have them back. This will erase one of the problems overhanging our relationship. So that was done when I was there.

Q: What was your impression...Moynihan was one of these, now a Senator, who had been Ambassador to the United Nations and had joined a host of other American Ambassadors who are basically political appointees who found India a delightful stage, or appeared to be, to

demonstrate their, among other things, their ego. How did you find Moynihan as an Ambassador?

BOLSTER: Well he thoroughly enjoyed his tour there, I think, because he is always provocative and has so many ideas. He is a really intellectual giant. He benefitted greatly from being in India, just absorbing information about this fascinating country and the surrounding area. He visited other countries. He went to Bhutan, Nepal. He did a lot of traveling and, I think, learned a tremendous amount while he was there.

I think he was a bit frustrated, particularly at the beginning because whatever he said might be picked apart by the local press, so he began to have a very low profile after his first few weeks and months there. He wanted to be in a learning mode and not rock the boat. But then he gradually became more influential.

But I think he found it a little bit tough to deal with Indians because they were so unpredictable as to how they would react to things and not necessarily open to a typical Irish warm embrace. They are very aloof in some ways and have their own way of doing things and don't want to be pressured or pushed into doing things our way.

So it was a bit of a trial for him in that sense, but he did learn a lot during the time he was there.

Q: Did we have any major issues or problems during this period of time when you were there?

BOLSTER: Yes, we certainly had one which was the explosion of a nuclear weapon by the Indians before I left. That was a major development. Aside from that I don't think there were any really serious problems. There was the constant reiteration of problems over relations with Pakistan. Every time something was going to be done for one country or the other, there was criticism in the other country. Every year when we had to make decisions about military assistance there were the debates of who was getting more, who was going to have the upper hand, etc. So there were constant problems like this, but it just became something you got used to because it was constantly there.

Q: There has been this saying that as far as India and Pakistan are concerned that when the Democrats are in they are more Indian and when the Republicans are in they are more Pakistani. Did you have any feel that there was more of an affinity of one of our Presidents from one Party or other for one or the other side?

BOLSTER: Not really. Of course, you would have to say that Moynihan is an example of someone who is going back and forth. He worked for Democratic and Republican Presidents.

Q: And now he is a Democratic Senator.

BOLSTER: Of course there were major developments back here in the domestic political scene that had their echoes out there. The Watergate scandal had occurred and this was debated everywhere, but particularly in India because as a democracy and with particular interest in Britain and the US, they analyzed every tiny detail.

Q: Did they understand the Watergate business? I was in Greece at the time and they really never understood what the fuss was about.

BOLSTER: Oh, I don't think most people understood it, no. Not really.

Q: I am not saying understood all the complications, but why the Americans should get so upset over a president lying and doing a little bit of political espionage.

BOLSTER: Yes, that was considered to be sort of a typical American overreaction. But it did have quite an effect on us in the Embassy because it was such a major issue coming up all the time.

Q: Had the recognition of China already happened before you arrived? The Kissinger trip and then the Nixon trip used Pakistan as sort of a channel.

BOLSTER: Yes, I think that had happened. There was a lot of eyebrow raising on that...

Q: Because you were pushing two buttons, China and Pakistan, on that one.

BOLSTER: Yes. But then again I think the Indians always felt it was unnatural for us not to have had relations with China anyway. They had their problems with China over this border issue, but I think they still thought that it was strange that we for so long had cut ourselves off from the Chinese.

Q: Sometimes there is a policy or view of the situation in Washington which is quite different from the view at the Embassy. Did you have any problem like that?

BOLSTER: No, I think if anything people in the Embassy were unhappy that so little was thought about India in Washington. India was such a big country and had been so important and we had big names as Ambassadors in the past, sent large Embassy staffs... There was gradually a sort of feeling that India was being ignored back in Washington no matter was being reported. It was sort of in one ear and out the other.

Q: I assume this still remains the case today?

BOLSTER: All these speeches about wonderful relations between the two main democracies, etc. were constant fixtures in speeches but in plain fact India was becoming less important to the US by the day. It affected relationships a great deal.

Also against the background of the Vietnam War...we have to look at that too because the Indians were very much opposed to our involvement in Vietnam. There was constant criticism of our fighting there. We had demonstrations at the Embassy.

Q: Did you find that a reporting cable would go out from Islamabad and then it would be almost necessary for New Delhi to send out its cable? In a way the Embassies really were almost like foreign powers instead of representing the same United States.

BOLSTER: Yes that is right. It was more than just India, Pakistan and the US because you would get Ambassadors in other countries weighing in. Tehran, for example, had views. Sri Lanka had views, although, of course, less important in the big picture. People in Moscow would come in with their analysis of the situation. You sometimes would get a dozen info addressees on cables and files were just filled with analyses from all these posts. But I think that is a typical problem in our Foreign Service. We tend to get too many different views from all over the place. Everyone wants to get into the act and you end up with a tremendous number of cables flying back and forth. People hardly have time to read it all there is so much material.

Q: Then you left from there and from 1974-76 went back to Tehran again.

BOLSTER: Yes.

CHARLES W. McCASKILL
Economic Commercial Officer
Bombay (1972-1976)

Consul General
Madras (1976-1979)

Charles W. McCaskill was born in Camden, South Carolina in 1923. After completing two years of study at the Citadel, he entered the U.S. Army, and returned to graduate in 1947. Mr. McCaskill then attended the University of South Carolina, where he received a master's degree in history and political science. He joined the Foreign Service in 1950, serving in Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, and India. Mr. McCaskill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 7, 1993.

Q: I must say I've never known anybody who really stuck to one area, Near Eastern Affairs, as you did the entire time. And you really covered it. You went to Bombay, 1972 to 1976. What about this assignment?

McCASKILL: I had completed four years in Iran, and the Department informed me that the Number Two job in the Consulate General there was open and asked if I would like to be assigned there. It was considered a pretty good job. This was before open assignments, when things were much easier I thought. I accepted and went there in July of 1972 on direct transfer from Iran.

While I went on direct transfer, the Department authorized some consultation in Washington which enabled me to visit my mother who died before I would have gotten home on leave the

next year. This was one of the reasons I loved NEA; we may have been in-bred and incestuous, but NEA looked out for its own. I think Howie Schaffer, who was NEA Personnel Officer at the time, was behind it. I have never discussed it with him, but I have always been grateful to him or whoever did it.

To get back to Bombay, the job turned out to be a good job, and we stayed there until March, 1976 when I went over to Madras as Consul General.

Q: What were you doing in Bombay?

McCASKILL: I was economic-commercial, but more economic than commercial, since we had a full-time commercial officer. It was a relatively big consulate general, and I backed up the Consul General in many ways. I helped supervise the consular section sometime, since we had lots of consular work there. The job was really a Deputy Principal Officer job, and I believe it was actually called that before I left.

Q: Who was Consul General most of the time?

McCASKILL: David Bane for about half of my tour. He was succeeded by Bill Courtney. David had been Ambassador in Gabon, and before that Consul General in Lahore. He told me he thought the Bombay job was underrated. Bombay was an exciting city in which to serve: big, dirty, crowded, filthy, but exciting and fascinating with lots of interesting people who were easily accessible.

Q: What was the situation in Western India at the time you were there?

McCASKILL: Things were not altogether easy for Americans then. Remember that this was just after the Indo-Pak War in 1971, when the U.S. tilted toward Pakistan.

Q: This was Kissinger's famous tilt toward Pakistan.

McCASKILL: Yes. You may remember that the Soviets rushed in in support of the Indians. There was considerable anti-Americanism all over India. Still we could get around and see people. The Indians had a way of giving us the needle whenever they could; they professed not to understand how we could support Pakistan over India, "the largest democracy in the world." They never let us forget that. And Soviet influence was strong.

Q: You say that Soviet influence was strong. Who was the Prime Minister?

McCASKILL: Indira Gandhi.

Q: I would have thought that the mating of India and the Soviet Union an unlikely one.

McCASKILL: It was an unlikely mating, but the Soviets were quick to exploit the situation. For example, India had been in the midst of a severe drought when I arrived. The monsoon had not been good, and the wheat and rice crops had both been off for a number of years. The so-called

"Green Revolution" had not yet taken hold and India needed wheat rather badly. Who provided this wheat? The Soviet Union. And at a time when the Soviets were buying wheat from us. A Greek merchant captain whose ship brought "Soviet" grain to India told me in Bombay that he was certain that the wheat being shipped to India from the Soviet Union was American wheat. We did not pursue this since but it is an interesting question. He told me he had seen American ships unloading American wheat into the same facility out of which he loaded wheat for India. Indira Gandhi publicly stated that the Soviets were always a friend in need for India. When India needed friends in 1971, she said, and the Soviets were there. By the time I got there, the Soviets were the principal arms supplier for India, whether by grant or on credit. The huge steel mill in eastern India was built by the Soviets. It served the Indians right, but I understood from some Indian business friends that India got old, outdated technology in the steel mill. You'd see Soviet missions of various kinds all over the country.

Q: Were the Indian intellectuals comfortable? Were the people you talked to comfortable with talking about their great brother, the Soviets?

McCASKILL: The people we socialized with did not see a lot of the Soviets. The Indian educated elite much preferred Americans to Soviets, there was no doubt of that. But journalists, for example, felt comfortable with Soviets and with the Indo-Soviet friendship. I will tell you an interesting anecdote that illustrates Indian thinking.

I was having lunch one day with the editor of an Indian paper in Bombay, a very nice, likeable man supposedly very close to Indira Gandhi. He said to me that we Americans had never understood nonalignment. Americans had always felt that nonalignment means being equidistant from the great powers, being, in fact, in the middle. Indians felt that nonalignment did not mean equal distance between the great powers and that, in fact, "you can be more equidistant or less equidistant." I know what he meant, but it struck me at the time as rather humorous and typical of the fuzzy wuzzy way Indians tended to think -- more equidistant or less equidistant!!

Q: Particularly in the upper classes the Indians enjoy talking. Was this a strain sometimes? As a consular officer did you find things got talked to death?

McCASKILL: No. Indians were really very good conversationalists, very good company, if more than a little self-righteous and insensitive at times. As I think I noted, upper class Indians felt much closer to the United States than to the Soviet Union and the Soviets. Upper class Indians liked good food, good conversation and good company. But, as I said, they could be insensitive and even rude.

One evening at a lovely dinner party, shortly after we had arrived in Bombay, a young Parsi doctor was telling me, in perfect English, how much he and his wife loved the U.S. They loved the U.S. and the American people he said, but "I don't like your President very much." I was so taken aback by this that I didn't defend my President adequately, and it bothered me. It never dawned on him that it was rude of him to say something like that to an American diplomat.

While I never had the occasion to use it, I decided that if another Indian ever said that to me, I would reply that I knew lots of Americans who loved India and the Indian people, but didn't like Indira Gandhi very much.

Still, we left more good, close friends in India than we did in any of our other posts, so I may be the one who is being insensitive here.

Q: You were there during the Watergate period. Was there understanding of what it was all about. I was in Greece at the time and the Greeks never understood what Watergate was about.

McCASKILL: The Indians did not understand Watergate. Most Indian politicians are corrupt, so they could not understand what Watergate was all about.

Q: Watergate was sort of small potatoes from most other countries' point of view.

McCASKILL: As big as India is, it could be terribly parochial in many ways. India bought some feed grains from us in late 1973 or thereabouts, and found that one shipment had Jimsonweed in it. Jimsonweed, known as "loco weed" in the American West, is poisonous to humans. Indians bought the grain for human consumption, so people receiving it had to pick out every grain of the Jimsonweed before they could eat it. This received a tremendous play in the press all over India, with the press implying if not stating openly that we had taken the Indians on this or that we had had some evil motive in selling India grain that was laced with Jimsonweed.

In fact, India had bought very cheap, inferior feed grains which were known to our grain people in the States to contain Jimsonweed. The GOI had cut corners and was then trying to blame us for what happened. It was a good example of getting what you pay for. That is the kind of thing that would get a tremendous press play in India, while Watergate received no attention.

Q: Did the ConGen staff adopt a wait-and-see, "this too shall pass" attitude at this time. These things come and go with Indo-American relations.

McCASKILL. I think we did, since things seemed to be improving. But Mrs. Gandhi never really liked us, and we had that to contend with.

Q: How did we view the Communist Party? Did we see the communists ever taking over India?

McCASKILL: No. The party was there and from time to time would lead demonstrations by the consulate protesting such things as the Allende ouster in Chile. We would always close the gates when demonstrations occurred and disregard the demonstrators. Once when I was in charge the young Political Officer suggested that we accept the demonstrators' petition. I think it was one of those "Allende" demonstrations. I refused to accept it on the ground that accepting it would imply involvement that we were not guilty of. The Embassy telephoned down to ask how I was handling it and agreed entirely with my approach.

There were actually two communist parties in India: the CPI, the Communist Party of India, the "usual" type party, and the Marxist party, the CPM.

*Q: Patrick Moynihan was the Ambassador for a while when you were there. Did you get any feel for how he operated?
Or was he too far away?*

McCASKILL: I need not say that Ambassador Moynihan was and is a great mind, admired far and near for his great intellect. But he was a difficult man to work for. I knew his staff aide rather well, and he told me just how unpredictable, how volatile Moynihan was. It was impossible for the staff aide to predict his reactions. I think his main goal when he went to India was to negotiate the Indian indebtedness to us off the books. I've forgotten the precise figure, but on the books, we had something like 2-3 billion dollars of PL 480 money. Moynihan felt that our relations with India would never improve as long as the Indians felt indebted to us. It was a tough negotiation, but it was a successful one and he and the economic staff of the Embassy deserved a lot of credit.

Indians liked him because they saw him as a real intellectual. But on the personal side, being in Bombay was about as close as I wanted to be to him, 3-4 hours away by air.

Q: We are continuing November 11, 1993. You were in Madras from 1976 to 1979. What were you doing there?

McCASKILL: I was Consul General in Madras. The previous incumbent, Jack Eaves, left rather suddenly to become DCM in Kathmandu. When Jack left, Ambassador Saxbe, who had replaced Moynihan, asked me to go to Madras as CG. I was ready to leave Bombay, and I felt that South India was sufficiently different from Western India that it would be like a new assignment. And of course there was the satisfaction of going from Number Two to Number One.

Q: How did you find your staff there?

McCASKILL: The American staff when I arrived there was adequate, with some strong points and some weak ones. The young administrative officer was quite good, the best member of the staff. The Indian national staff was outstanding, easily the best national staff of my career.

Q: We're talking about 1976 to 1979. Could you tell me in the first place what your consular district covered? And what was the situation, economic and political?

McCASKILL: The Madras Consular District consisted of four states: Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala. Each had its separate language. At the time of my transfer, Tamil Nadu was governed from Delhi, under what was called "President's Rule". The leader of the regional party in power in Tamil Nadu was at odds with Mrs. Gandhi and she summarily dismissed him and initiated rule of the state from Delhi.

This was during the period of the "Emergency", the suspension of parliamentary government in India and rule by Indira Gandhi. This authoritarian rule, for which "The Emergency" was a

euphemism, had been imposed in 1975 by Mrs. Gandhi, when she took the full rule of the country into her hands, really executing a bloodless coup. This was a very dark day for India. I should point out that "President's Rule", under which the government in Delhi could dismiss a state government, did not start with the Emergency; I do not know its history, but it is the kind of thing that could come from the Brits.

Anyway, when I arrived in Madras, Tamil Nadu was under President's Rule. There were two men from Delhi, very senior career civil servants, actually running the state. I established rather good contacts with one of them, an excellent man by the name of P. K. Dave, as I mentioned a senior career government official.

The consular district had a population of 150 million people. Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka were generally in Mrs. Gandhi's camp (Mrs. Gandhi's party was the Congress Party, the old party of her father); at the time I arrived, the Congress Party was in power in Kerala, but with a very slim majority. The communists were very strong in that state, as you may recall. When Mrs. Gandhi lifted President's Rule in Tamil Nadu, another regional party was elected and governed the state for a number of years. A regional party was elected in Andhra Pradesh a few years later. Interestingly, the leaders in both states were movie actors, said to derive their political power from their exposure throughout their states in movies.

We need not go into the details here, but the leader of Tamil Nadu had had a very long movie career in which he always played the good guy, and in his films, good always triumphed over evil. His movies were quite simple but the villagers reportedly loved them. Local Madras pundits told me that the villages tended to blur the movie man with the real man. Whatever the reason he was Chief Minister, which was the title of the leader of the state government, a good many years.

Q: As the Consul General, was there much interest in the American connection? How did you deal with these poor states?

McCASKILL: I like to think I was fairly well known and relatively popular. We had lots of travel money left over from the counterpart funds, and I tried to visit each state capital every six months for three or four days. I had three Indian national political employees: one for Andhra Pradesh, one for Karnataka, and one for Tamil Nadu and Kerala. They all were excellent, and knew whom I should see and whom I should not see. They would make appointments ahead of time, USIS would get my visit and maybe a picture, in the papers. It was a very good public relations operation, even if I do say so. We used to joke in the office that I was probably the best known foreigner in South India, which was something when you consider the size of the area.

On the personal side, I liked the South very much. It was a great tourist area, with lots to be seen, including some magnificent old Hindu temples. I set up a train trip for Ambassador Saxbe, on which we had several private railway cars which were dropped off in a tourist center, and later tacked on to the back of another train a day later. It was a wonderful way to travel, and sort of took us back to the days of the British Raj. Word of the trip got around, and a number of other people in the Embassy asked me to arrange one for them. It was a once-in-a-lifetime kind of

thing, something that could probably only be done in India. As a footnote, the Indian Railways were quite good, and the service provided for the VIP bogey was outstanding.

Q: Didn't Kerala have a communist government at one time, and wasn't that an irritant to us, a communist government in this big democracy during the Cold War. I recall that it was the focus of a lot of attention. Did you give Kerala more attention because of that, or had our concerns dissipated?

McCASKILL: Our concerns regarding that had largely dissipated by then. I don't remember specifically but it is my general recollection that my relations with those communists I met were fairly cordial. I don't recall meeting many of them, in fact.

The Soviets had a big consulate in Madras, and their CG and I became fairly good friends. He mentioned one time, I suppose at a party, that he was traveling over to Kerala. I kidded him that he went to Kerala a lot more than I did, and I asked what he did there; did he call on all those communist leaders over there? He responded quite openly that "of course" he did. You call on the Congress people, he said to me, and I call on the Communists. He went on good-naturedly, "What do you think I do?" This man and his wife were very decent, likable people, and we figured that he was probably a career foreign service type; his number two was a bull, however, as subtle as a 47-ton tank. We concluded that he was KGB.

To return to your original question, I don't recall that we were concerned about Kerala when I was there. I think we had learned to live with it. As you know, India took some getting used to, but it could also be a wonderful, fascinating place to serve. Obviously I was not a career subcontinent type, but I did learn to love India.

As a footnote, Krishna Menon, who succeeded in antagonizing nearly everybody at the UN in the late 1950s and early 1960s was a typical, fuzzy Keralan.

Q: Later, particularly today, the Tamil problem spills over to Sri Lanka. How did we look on the Tamil separatist movement at that time?

McCASKILL: We did not focus on it when I was there. There had been language riots in Tamil Nadu as recently as 1966-69, and resentment on the language issue continues below the surface to this day. But I don't recall any focus on the separatist movement. Once I asked a close friend, a London School of Economics graduate, if the language problem bothered him. I was surprised when he answered affirmatively and vigorously. But I don't remember seeing anything on the separatist movement then.

Q: Madras must have seemed far, far from Delhi in many ways. How did we look upon Indira Gandhi at that time? What was the general opinion of how she was governing?

McCASKILL: Mrs. Gandhi was the Congress Party. She was, surprisingly, fairly popular in Tamil Nadu. After she imposed the Emergency in 1975, when she would call elections was the burning question. I think I mentioned that the Congress was strong in Andhra and Karnataka, less so in Kerala. Intellectuals and educated Indians deeply resented the imposition of

authoritarian rule, and repudiated Indira Gandhi at the ballot box when she called elections for 1977. We concluded, I think, that she had so cut herself off from the electorate that she had no idea that she would be so soundly rejected. It was obviously a gross miscalculation on her part.

I personally went to India with no preconceived notions about her or the country, and I left loving the country and with a very low opinion of her. She was a very political animal, but I didn't think she was terribly smart. She certainly had no vision of where the country would go, or where it needed to go, except to keep her in power. I was always surprised that such a big country produced so few leaders; American Indiaologists could probably explain this, but I never could. In a country of 600 million then -- it's considerably bigger now -- there were very few political leaders. The Indian business community was an outstanding group, and I knew some very able businessmen in Bombay and Madras but they avoided politics.

Q: We obviously have all kinds of differences with the Indians. When you called on Congress Party leaders, what would you talk about? Was there anything special you were pitching? Or was it really just how things were going?

McCASKILL: Much of our discussions concerned the general situation in the states, or a particular situation between states. And a great deal of local stuff. I would not have dared, on an official call, to ask one of them what he thought of Mrs. Gandhi, for example. Overly-sensitive Indians would have been quick to consider that interfering. I would take my time, and sometimes some very interesting material would come out. I would sometimes get into state elections, but one had to be careful since they were so sensitive about what they considered interference in internal affairs. I think I actually generated some trust among some of my contacts. The Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, the movie actor to whom I referred, and I were fairly close. He had needed eye surgery, and I went out of my way to help his people arrange things for him and to give him a good reception, even though he was the equivalent of a state governor.

A word on the "prickly" relationship; It was prickly, but at the same time it was a sort of love-hate relationship between Indians and Americans. They seemed almost hurt that we didn't give them more attention. And they never forgot the tilt of 1971. They could never understand why the world's greatest democracy did not support the world's largest democracy.

Q: You mentioned the press. How did you deal with the press? Did it worry you that there were land mines everywhere you stepped as far as the press was concerned?

McCASKILL: Yes. I had to be very careful. I did not deal with the press any more than I had to, and I left that to our very good USIS office in Madras. I actually stayed away from the press fairly much. I did have one incident when I was on a speaking tour in an isolated provincial town and something I said was taken out of context and blown up in the press all over the country.

When Ambassador Saxbe arrived in India in early 1975, he let it be known that he was not really looking for Mrs. Gandhi to persuade her of anything or to offer her anything. He had not come to India bearing gifts, he let it be known, and he had no US assistance to be "forced" on India. He sort of put it out that if Mrs. Gandhi wanted him, he would be on the golf course playing golf or in Kashmir fishing. I thought his approach was just right for the time. The Indians were very

sensitive to what they perceived as our "forcing" aid on them, and I think Ambassador Saxbe played it just right.

Q: Over the years, Indians have perceived that the Republicans have tilted more to Pakistan and Democratic administrations are more inclined to support India. You were in Madras when the Carter Administration came in. In addition to the hoped-for tilt, Carter had a personal tie with India through his mother who had served in the Peace Corps there. In your area, did you see any positive or negatives about the Carter Administration?

McCASKILL: I think there was the feeling that you described, that the Democrats were more pro-India than the Republicans, and in general, our relations were better under Carter. Remember, too, that Mororji Desai had succeeded Mrs. Gandhi, and that was a definite plus as far as our relations were concerned. The most impressive thing Carter did was the appointment of Ambassador Goheen to Delhi. Ambassador Goheen was born in India, the son of a medical missionary. I think some of his grandparents had been missionaries. He had long, deep ties with India, and a deep affection for the country and the people. He said when he presented his credentials that he was deeply touched to be representing his country in the land of his birth.

I think he was tremendously effective, as word of his "Indian connection" was widespread. He and I went to Andhra Pradesh to what had been a TB sanitarium where his father had performed thoracic surgery many years before. Dr. Goheen's first patient was found and attended the program the sanitarium had set up. Ambassador Goheen told me that his family's long ties with India meant a great deal to him and he was indeed very proud of them.

To repeat for emphasis, he was a fine ambassador and a fine man, and I was glad I had the chance to work for him. Also as I noted, the Indians interpreted his appointment as an indication that we wanted to improve relations, and they welcomed him.

Q: Were relations pretty steady when you left in 1979?

McCASKILL: Yes, pretty steady. As I said, the Desai Government was much more favorably disposed toward us than Indira Gandhi had been. Carter made an official visit in 1979, and while there was one flap during his stay, things were in general upbeat.

ALBERT E. HEMSING
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1973-1976)

After working for the Economic Cooperation Administration in 1953, Albert E. Hemsing transferred to the United States Information Agency. His career included positions in Germany and India. This interview was conducted in 1989.

Q: Suddenly, while you were Chief Inspector, there was need for a public affairs officer in New Delhi, India. You were given that assignment. Tell me what were the circumstances.

HEMSING: Another weird turn of fate. I had only sporadically kept in touch with Irving Kristol since our college days. He was then editor of Commentary, now of Public Interest. On a trip to New York to see our daughter, I called Irving and we had lunch. Irving had always hated to go abroad, except to England. He questioned me about life overseas and I told him that I had enjoyed my assignments, but that I was bored now in Washington.

A few days later the Agency was abuzz with the news that Dan Oleksiw had been fired by Daniel Moynihan, the new Ambassador to India.

Next thing I knew, Kristol called me to say that Moynihan had called him, asking whether Irving knew anyone to head USIS India -- presumably someone from the outside. Was I interested, he asked me, and I said yes.

As a result, Moynihan requested me. The story went around that he and I were old pals, which was nonsense. We had both gone to the same East Harlem high school, but at different times, and to City College, a fact we only discovered at a reception earlier at Axel Springer's palatial suite in Berlin. Subsequently we met once more at a party at the George McGhees, in Bonn.

Moynihan, it turned out, had not only fired Dan, his Minister for Public Affairs, but also his DCM and Economic and Political Counselors. A clean sweep.

The Agency agreed to the assignment, it was at my level, and I was due out. So, suddenly, bang! There we were, Esther and I, in India. Once again my career conflicted with hers. When I first got word about India, on the very day, she too was bursting with news. For five years she had worked her way up to head of publications for the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. Now AACT had bought an NEA journal and asked Esther whether she would be interested in becoming its editor. But, we sold our house in Old Town and left for India. Our daughter was taken care of since she was at Sarah Lawrence College.

We arrived in New Delhi in June 1973 to horrible heat and dust, but to a wonderful old British "bungalow" at 10 Tilak Marg, in central Delhi, away from the Embassy compound.

Q: This was your first assignment in the so-called Third World.

HEMSING: That's right. It was a very exciting experience, both on the colorful streets of Delhi, and in the embassy itself. Moynihan had assembled a splendid staff of career people, with David Schneider as DCM. We were soon a team, and I was never to experience there any of the back-biting and internecine warfare I had come to take for granted in Bonn.

The USIS program was, of course, huge in American and Indian staff and facilities.

Q: The largest, I believe.

HEMSING: Yes. Remember that at about that time we made a gift to the Indian Government of \$2.5 billion dollars worth of rupees, 25 percent of the entire Indian currency in circulation. The sum was left over from our food aid to India, after the previous five years of famine.

Q: *The so-called Public 480 Law.*

HEMSING: Yes. But we kept enough rupees to run the embassy and USIS for years to come.

With those rupees, USIS ran a book publishing program and put out a glossy monthly magazine called SPAN. We ran a fine USIS library in New Delhi and in five other cities. Dan Oleksiw had carefully guarded these from the restructuring and weeding out that Alan Carter, the former area director, had demanded of his posts under his "Informat" scheme.

When Moynihan realized that I commanded lots of rupees in my budget, and that these would buy U.S.-India round trip air tickets, he prevailed on me -- it took little prevailing -- to invite his coterie of star-name intellectuals over to lecture. We put on a series under the title "Modern Society and Traditional Government," that was supposed to give Indian intellectuals food for thought about their own situation. I acted as moderator, and we filled the large auditorium of the USIS library in Delhi over a period of months.

Any PAO would be in seventh-heaven with such resources.

Q: *The post, in fact, was important enough -- still is, I'm sure -- so that it commanded the title not of public affairs officer, or counselor, but minister.*

HEMSING: Yes. In protocol terms I was number three at the embassy, second only to Dave Schneider, the Deputy Chief of Mission, or DCM.

Q: *We were talking about India and your rank there.*

HEMSING: Yes. India was a total immersion in the Third World for Esther and me, and until this day we're glad not to have left the Foreign Service without this correction of our Europe-centered experience.

I found that I liked the Indians, but almost in inverse proportion to their socio-economic status. Some of the people on top were pretty intolerable. But Esther and I soon came to appreciate the decency of the average Indian, a human quality that transcends the language barrier and social distance. Despite their history of colonialism, communal strife and poor government, I can never see them really knuckling under, deep inside, to a dictator.

And they didn't knuckle under when Indira Gandhi turned dictator with the "emergency laws." I experienced six months of that before we left in January 1976. In no time at all my morning breakfast chore, looking over ten Indian newspapers, became easy. Using the threat of withholding newsprint, entirely controlled by the state, the papers were soon "Gleichgeschaltet," put on the same track, as the Nazis called it. I spent part of that time on the trail of the Indian Press Chief, (his office had become the censor's office), pulling American journalists out of the

jug, e.g. Lewis Simon of the Washington Post. All of India turned to the BBC and VOA for news during that period.

Q: What about Moynihan?

HEMSING: Moynihan was great fun to work with, but not at his best as Ambassador. The robes of Senator fit him better.

Faced with an issue, Pat always went through a bedding-down process, throwing off ideas a-mile-a-minute, wise and foolish. Thank God he did not surround himself with yes-men. He needed and I suppose, still needs independent minds to do battle with. In the end, he would listen to reason, and do the necessary.

Even at the very end. As he was leaving Delhi to return to Harvard (Harvard had extended his tenure beyond the usual limits), he asked for a Sunday morning press meeting with the handful of American and foreign press there.

I arrived early and found him pounding away on his typewriter in the secluded pool-side house of his residence. He was not to be disturbed, he was making notes for his press conference. But his copy was being retyped by a secretary in the living room, where the meeting was to take place. Looking over his text, I was horrified. He attacked Indira Gandhi, he attacked Third World slavishness to the outworn ideas of British Socialism of the 30s, and he attacked the UN for being the sounding board of these ideas and the handmaiden of anti-Americanism. The UN, I remember, was described as a dead carcass of man's hope.

Soon Dave Schneider arrived and he was equally horrified. We marched into the pool house and remonstrated with Pat, saying he must wait until he got back home to say his piece. "All right, since you leave me nothing to say, I'll say nothing," was the reply.

My guess is that, had we not stopped him, he would probably never have been named as our Ambassador to the UN, the position he used as a stepping-stone to the Senate. But, as often happens in our business, I found no hint of memory of that occasion the one time I asked his help as Senator. That was in connection with the rumpus at Radio Free Europe.

Moynihan found it impossible to suffer fools, which is, also, part of any ambassador's job when it comes to maintaining necessary contacts with government officials and fellow diplomats. He scared Indira Gandhi off with his reputation as an intellect. She saw Moynihan only twice, I believe, during his entire stay.

William Saxbe was quite a contrast as Ambassador, with his love of country music and his spittoon, within easy aim of his stand-up desk in the embassy. Former governor of Ohio and U.S. Attorney General, Saxbe the politician proved to be the more effective Ambassador. Of course, for much of his time U.S.-Indian relations were "on hold" because of India's emergency rule. I regretted leaving his staff at that juncture, when I resigned from the Agency.

ROBERT C. HANEY
India Inspection Team, USIS
(1973-1974)

Information Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1974-1977)

Robert Haney was born in Iowa in 1921. After attending from the University of Iowa in 1943, he fought in World War II in the U.S. Army. After the end of the War, he worked in France with the Paris Herald. He later graduated from the University of Iowa with a Bachelor's in French. Since joining the foreign service in 1951, his career has included positions in Paris, Washington, Belgrade, Mali, Saigon and Warsaw. Mr. Haney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 21, 2001.

Q: You went on an inspection to India.

HANEY: Yes, in '73, I went with a USIA inspection team to India. The head of the team was a former USIA officer. He had been Agency policy chief and ended up as ambassador in Tegucigalpa. India is a big post, one of the biggest in the world. And the branch posts in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were larger than most USIS establishments anywhere. We were there for more than a month, as I recall. I visited all the posts. The ambassador heading the inspection had to return to Washington early, and I was put in charge. I wound up the inspection and sent off the report. Subsequently, I was asked to go back to India for six weeks as head of a two-man team to help the post come into compliance with some of the recommendations of the inspection report.

Q: During your inspection in '73, what was your impression of the USIA operation in India?

HANEY: Dan Oleksiw, the former area director for the Far East, had gone to the field by that time as PAO in India. Daniel Patrick Moynihan arrived as the new ambassador. By the time I got there, Moynihan and Oleksiw had arranged a divorce of convenience. Oleksiw was sitting in the PAO's residence, a well-appointed, large house on a big lot in downtown New Delhi, awaiting orders bringing him back to Washington. The new public affairs officer, Al Hemsing, hadn't arrived yet. It was a bit awkward to carry out an inspection where there was no public affairs officer; the deputy PAO was in charge.

Oleksiw had a large staff, both in New Delhi and in the branch posts. The inspectors felt that the outgoing PAO was given to micro-management, even of operations in the branches. The PAO in Calcutta told me that he and his staff felt that they ought to check with New Delhi before they visited the men's room, the control from New Delhi was so tight. The inspectors concluded that the branches should have a freer rein. India is a vast country, and the regional differences are relevant to carrying out an information and cultural program.

The local Indian staff was well educated, fluent in English as well as Hindi (and/or Urdu), well trained - the best I have ever seen in the many USIS posts where I have served or visited.

Educated Indians thought so highly of employment with USIS that we had some locals working in the USIS press section, for example, who were fully as competent, and just as highly regarded, as Indians in good positions in the media world.

Q: You were there from when to when?

HANEY: I was assigned to New Delhi in '74, first as information officer, subsequently as policy officer when the IO job was abolished following a reshuffling of the staffing as a result of the inspection. I left New Delhi in '77.

Q: How were relations between India and the United States?

HANEY: They were tolerable. There was at that time no big issue, as there is now regarding Kashmir and precarious Pakistani-Indian relations, a serious concern because both countries are now nuclear powers.

Q: How did you find the intellectual climate? Did the Indians in New Delhi have the equivalent of an intellectual class such as existed in France?

HANEY: Yes, but it wasn't really intellectual attainment that determined who belonged to the class. The caste system is still paramount.

Q: Brahmin, and so on.

HANEY: Yes. I've served in some very interesting countries. Mary and I both feel that our favorite post was Yugoslavia. We had good relations with ordinary Yugoslavs, it's a beautiful country, and we traveled extensively.

Q: My wife and I have the same feeling.

HANEY: On the other hand, I can't imagine any other country so complicated or so fascinating as India. It is mind-boggling. Many foreigners, and particularly Americans, are put off when they are exposed to India because it is a land of so many contradictions. Indians seem able to hold in their heads at the same time two notions that we would consider mutually exclusive. I think Americans are more methodical, more "rational," so this is hard to get used to when you first go out there. You also are put off by the scale of squalor on the one hand and awed by the natural and man-made beauty on the other. Just walking down the street in New Delhi or in Calcutta you may smell the open sewer one moment and the next moment you smell jasmine.

The failure in Indian society and culture to communicate from top to bottom and vice versa is a hindrance to the cohesion of the country. It's difficult to conceive of a land in which there are 22 languages used by the inhabitants for day-to-day communication, yet the link language is foreign: English. It is a challenge to try to understand a country where there are such vast differences in outlook, social and economic standing, religion and languages.

In Kerala (southwest India), the inhabitants use an alphabet (Malayalam) in which all of the characters are composed of curved lines. In New Delhi (Hindi), the characters incorporate both straight and curved lines. In Malayalam, written language was first cut on palm leaves. If you cut a straight line on a palm leaf, the leaf is going to split. So every mark has to be curved to preserve the record. There are many such anomalies in Indian culture.

When India became independent in 1947, statesmen of the new country had to write a constitution. It manages to embody some of the same contradictions that pop up in less formal aspects of life in India. Indian leaders who were fans of Abraham Lincoln opted for flexible means of dealing with threats to the state. Indians who wished to emulate their former British masters retained the colonial power's provisions for declaring a state of emergency. The result was that the constitution has sections that are like a car with the brake and the accelerator on the same pedal.

Q: Were you in USIA able to make significant contacts among the ruling class, or was America considered almost beneath them?

HANEY: Indians, whatever their class, take a great interest in the United States. Over the years, this interest was promoted by Americans and Indians alike after some nimble mind invented the phrase, "the world's two biggest democracies." It's got a ring to it that has seduced many a speech writer, not to speak of herds of newspaper correspondents. I was first faced with the dilemma it posed when I was asked to draft a speech at our embassy in New Delhi for an officer who shall remain nameless. He wanted that phrase stuck in the speech somewhere.

Our countries are both big - India big enough to account for most of a subcontinent; the United States three times as large. India comes out way on top in regard to population. So both countries are fairly described as "big democracies," if all you're concerned about is size and nominal form of government.

Q: How did our message fit? Were we getting whatever our message was across to the Indians? They had had a very close relationship with the Soviets.

HANEY: The relationship with the Soviets was more a matter of convenience at the time. There is—or was while I was there—among the upper class a great deal of admiration for the United States for human rights, for democracy, for its institutions, its education. A certain amount of British snobbery has persisted in the Indian whose family is able to send him to England for his higher education. There is an apocryphal story of the son in a well-to-do family that spoke English as well as Hindi. They sent this young man to England to be educated, and he didn't make it. But when he came back and entered Indian life again, he had calling cards made, with his name, of course, and the honorific, "Oxford, failed." Unfortunately, many at that level in Indian society became confused about where the sun rises - over the Bay of Bengal, or over the English Channel. Also, unfortunately, the successful upper class has little connection with the great mass of Indians at the lower economic and social levels.

The Indian government under Mrs. Gandhi teetered from democracy toward authoritarianism in 1975 when a judge in Mrs. Gandhi's home constituency found her landslide victory in the 1971 elections invalid because civil servants had illegally aided her campaign. She reacted to demands for her resignation as prime minister by persuading the president of India to declare a state of emergency. She ordered the arrest of her critics, including all opposition leaders except the communists. Opposition newspapers were shut down.

Early during the state of emergency, Mary and I attended a reception given by a well-to-do Sikh who had extensive connections in upper-level New Delhi society. The occasion was the visit to New Delhi of Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress. Guests included the editor of the daily *Hindustan Times*, closed down by Mrs. Gandhi, and other anti-government figures. Also present were a number of Mrs. Gandhi's staunch supporters. Views on both sides were strongly held, but the discussion of the state of emergency at that reception was civil, even cordial. It brought home to us how tightly bound and insulated were the members of the upper class in India.

Q: In our looking at this, where this stratum seems to run horizontally and not vertically, were we making attempts to penetrate down below what one might call the "chattering class," getting down to the businessman, the working class, and even farther down?

HANEY: Yes, we were. Our efforts were directed to representatives of what might be called "the middle class" - professionals, businessmen, educators - who were not at the top of the caste system, as well as to the upper class. In my view, this "middle class" is a more important audience, because that thin layer on top is not really going to determine where India goes.

During the emergency, things were pretty tight. Mrs. Gandhi's agents were harsh and cruel. Her son, Sanjay, was responsible for rooting out illegal residents and for carrying out sterilization in the poor "inner city" community of New Delhi where there were many Muslims. Not far from our house, his men came and bulldozed a small settlement on the edge of the city where people were living in what looked like large crates. This was in a section of "dense, mixed jungle" (as the map of New Delhi described it). The squatters had carved out a little site for themselves and were living there under desperate conditions.

It was summertime. Mary had gone home to Washington for a bit to see the kids, who were in school here. One evening, when I was reading a book in our house on Kotilya Marg, I heard some sort of cackling laughter in our little courtyard. The windows were shut because the air conditioning was on. I resumed reading, and I heard the noise again quite distinctly. I went out through the kitchen into the courtyard, and there was a completely naked woman who was obviously out of her mind. She was talking gibberish. I got the houseboy to come down from his quarters behind the house. He persuaded the woman to leave. I think she was from the squatters' settlement that had been razed by Sanjay's people.

By early 1977, Mrs. Gandhi believed that things had cooled down enough to remove restrictions, free political prisoners, and hold elections. In March, I was flying to Calcutta to consult with the USIS post there. During the flight, at just about the point where you can see Mount Everest on a clear day, I noticed that one passenger after another was buzzing for the stewardess. She would turn up at the passenger's seat, lean over to hear what the problem was, and then go forward to

the pilots' compartment and let herself in. In a minute or so, she would come out and return to say something to the passenger. By then, the "stewardess" light was on again, over another passenger's seat. This was a puzzling activity that continued as more passengers summoned the stewardess.

I finally figured out what was happening. Final results of the election that Mrs. Gandhi had at last allowed were coming in on the radio in the pilots' compartment. Passengers were asking the stewardesses for the latest results, and the stewardesses were relaying the news, one passenger at a time. The excitement was provoked by the election results - Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress Party were losing. Morarji R. Desai, the opposition leader, won in a landslide, unseating the Congress Party, which had been dominant since "freedom at midnight" on August 15, 1947, when the Indian Empire was dissolved and India became independent.

The unexpected results of the election (Mrs. Gandhi, for one, certainly failed to anticipate what would happen) caused me to think again about "the world's two biggest democracies." A lot of Indians, many of them illiterate and living in poverty, had taken to heart the promise of democracy and gone to the polls to vote for what they thought was best for them. The election, and the defeat of the Congress Party for the first time since Indian independence, showed that democracy had indeed taken root in the subcontinent. Maybe I won't hesitate to use that phrase if I'm ever asked again to write a speech about India.

Q: How about the professional classes, the business people? How was our rapport with them?

HANEY: I would say, "good." They were eager to take advantage of technical advances from the United States. As a result, there is now a "Silicon Valley" in Bangalore/Hyderabad in southern India. Many Indians skilled in computers have come to the United States to work, a "brain drain" that is of concern to the mother country. American "outsourcing" of such skills more often ends up in India than anywhere else.

Q: How about the universities? Were we able to make much of a dent or were the universities hotbeds of Marxism, as they are in so many parts of the world?

HANEY: I wouldn't say they were "hotbeds of Marxism." We did have contacts there. USIA managed a cultural-exchange program involving both Indian and American students and professors, as well as professional men and women in cultural or social organizations. We had no trouble at all making that kind of contact.

Q: I often think that these exchange programs are probably the best thing we do across the board on the whole diplomatic scale.

HANEY: I agree.

Q: You left there when?

HANEY: In October '77.

DENNIS KUX
Deputy Country Director for Nepal and India
Washington, DC (1972-1977)

Ambassador Dennis Kux was born in England in 1931 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1952. He entered the U.S. Army in 1952, where he worked as a prisoner of war interrogator. His Foreign Service career included positions in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast. Ambassador Kux was interviewed by Thomas Stern on January 13, 1995.

Q: In 1972 you were assigned as Deputy Country Director for India and Nepal. Was this an assignment that you were interested in?

KUX: Yes and no. Actually, I had been interested in doing something on a broader or global scale. One possibility was working with Claus Ruser. That would have been a "mixed bag." I questioned whether his program was going anywhere. I was asked whether I would be interested in working on the India desk. One consideration was the impact of a particular assignment on my career. The buzz phrase at the time was "program management." You had to be a boss supposedly to enter senior ranks. I was then at the top of the mid-level as an O-3. As it turned out, it didn't matter. I was promoted to FSO-2 in June, 1974 without having managed anything. In fact, the conventional wisdom about what gets you ahead is often wrong.

Anyway, I took the job on the India desk. It turned out to be a very interesting and challenging. About three or four days after I got there in mid-1972, I was given a task on a subject about which I knew nothing. This was to coordinate an interagency study for the White House on the Indian nuclear problem. This was before the Indians set off their first nuclear device. The study was commissioned by Kissinger, then the National Security Adviser. One of the ways that he kept the bureaucracy busy was having them do studies. This study was useful -- at least to the participants -- although I don't know that it led to anything.

So I spent the next couple of months in interagency meetings, learning about what the nuclear program was in India, what this meant to the non proliferation agreement, and what the U. S. could and should do about it, including predictions of whether India would proceed with its test program. I learned a lot about nuclear power and other uses by talking with experts of which there were plenty. I didn't try to become an expert. I would get somebody in to talk me through one aspect or another of the issue. The end product was called NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum) 202; it just sat in the NSC until the Indians tested two years later.

During the first year on the desk I was just a member of the team. The Country Director was Dave Schneider, whom I had worked for before and highly respected. The way he structured the office was that he didn't really have a deputy. Desk officers dealt with him on specific issues, as needed. That was the right approach because it cut out an unnecessary layer of supervision in what was a fairly small office. I think that there were six of us. I was the senior officer dealing

with India. Initially, that meant dealing with the nuclear problem. Then there were various other tasks. There was another fellow working on India who didn't work for me. We both worked for Dave [Schneider], who in 1973 went to India as DCM when Pat Moynihan went out as Ambassador. Bruce Laingen became the Country Director for a very brief period. Then there was a change "upstairs" [in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs], and Bruce became a Deputy Assistant Secretary. I became the Country Director from the summer of 1973 to 1977 -- four years.

The country director's role goes back to changes in the mid 1960s, when Dean Rusk assigned principal responsibility to country directors to lead the U. S. Government team, which dealt with a specific country or area. The intention was that the country director not just be the person who dealt with the country in the State Department. He or she was to be the interagency coordinator. The country directorate was to be the focal point for everything that went on between the United States and a specific country. The Country Director did not make policy, but did frame the issues for the policy makers and then was the person who carried out that policy in the day-to-day work involving that country. He or she was the "back stopper" for the Embassy and was to be very much the hub or focal point of the US government's dealings with the country.

He or she would have an unquestioned right to know what was going with the country of responsibility -- except for CIA matters which were handled a level higher. So, except for the Agency, the Country Director was supposed to be involved or aware of everything that was going on within the U. S. Government concerning a given country. This was generally accepted by the other agencies. Sometimes, you had to assert yourself, but the concept wasn't usually challenged.

That was the theory, and for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the three countries in the directorate, it was the reality. I was assertive about the responsibilities of the country director. Three things were very important in the case of India. One aspect was working very closely with the people who worked on Pakistan, because so much of U. S.-Indian relations were involved in the dispute with Pakistan. We really had to have a very close relationship. Our office was right next door to that of the Country Director for Pakistan and we made it a point to get along.

Secondly, there was the effort to define policies for the countries concerned. This really meant India, since relations with the two other countries, Sri Lanka and Nepal, more or less ran themselves, although we had desk officers. The idea was to use the Country Director position to work out policy approaches for India and to bring the whole community interested in India in the U. S. Government into this process. I think that we had a weekly interagency meeting, not just on India but for South Asia as a whole. We did India and Pakistan together deliberately. There had been an Office of South Asian Affairs previously, which was split in half.

Thirdly, I was in very close contact with the our Embassy in New Delhi. We had "political" Ambassadors there -- Pat Moynihan for the first couple of years that I was Country Director and Bill Saxbe for the last couple of years. Both were "high fliers," who dealt directly with National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Kissinger and the White House. This meant I dealt with the DCM, Dave Schneider for most of the time. We constantly kept in touch. At that time we didn't use "Official-Informal" cables. We wrote letters to each other every week. We figured

out the time table which the diplomatic pouch followed and timed our correspondence to make the pouch. That was very helpful in terms of keeping in touch and knowing what was going on. It worked pretty well.

I might at this stage just briefly comment on the informal communication system used by Department of State officials. In the State Department, an outgoing telegram always carries the signature of the Secretary of State. The "authorizing officer" is usually somebody down the line. But in effect, a telegram is an official order. It doesn't necessarily involve a policy directive or an instruction. However, sometimes you can't give the recipient the full background; the cable might never be "cleared." Often you can't tell the whole story and explain all the ramifications or bureaucratic politics in the background]. So a telegram doesn't convey the whole picture. To get around this limitation and keep the Embassy in India fully informed, in light of the poor telephone communication, we resorted to letters. We could have sent such a letter by telegram, but "Official-Informal" telegrams were frowned on at that time, because other people could read them. Letters, on the other hand, were strictly private. No one else saw them, and we could say whatever we wanted. If we knew the addressee well, as I did in the case of Schneider, we were totally frank. This was a very good way of keeping the Embassy well informed. In turn, we got from them similar correspondence, indicating what they were interested in. It was a useful system.

Today this exchange takes place on the telephone. What unfortunately happens is that the system can be misused. That was harder for India because communications were so bad. It was not like in Europe, where American diplomats just picked up the telephone. That has security risks because there is often "intercepts" of open conversations by the Soviets, or whoever. Then, classified phones were rare; today it is better. I remember seeing Warren Christopher -- then Deputy Secretary of State -- pick up a phone at the end of a negotiating session with the Turks when I was in Ankara in 1978-80. He called Peter Tarnoff, who was then the Executive Secretary of the Department of State in Washington. Christopher went over everything that happened during the day on the open line. He asked Tarnoff about what was going on in Washington. It was an appalling breach of security. People forget that their telephonic conversations are heard by many. Today, the situation is better, with "secure" telephones, as long as people remember to use them.

However, the important thing for historians is that with "Official-Informal" correspondence there is a record -- a copy is kept in the files where they can be found. I have learned this in my own research, going through Embassy files, which are retained in the National Archives. Most of the official-informal letters are kept either in the Embassy or Country Director files. Ambassadors Moynihan and Saxbe's relations with their counterparts, the U. S. Ambassadors to Pakistan, were in relative harmony, unlike earlier times. Ambassador Moynihan had gone out to New Delhi in 1972. Pakistan had just split into two countries. India was the big player in the region. Our relations with India were terrible because of the position we had taken during the 1971 war. But there were not any particular difficulties between our embassies. They were not vying for support from Washington. That made my relationship with the Country Director for Pakistan, Peter Constable, a whole lot easier. Furthermore, we were friends. That also made it easier. We basically saw the situation in the same way. We differed a bit on arms supplies for Pakistan, but it was a comfortable relationship.

Secretary of State Kissinger felt -- and he turned out to be correct -- that the "sirens of disaster" who said that we had "lost" India by tilting toward Pakistan in 1971 were wrong. He thought that India, in order to maintain its room for maneuver, would want to have a better relationship with the United States, and would not want to be totally tied to the Soviets. But that happened slowly.

Ambassador Moynihan said that in the past we had a relationship with India with sharp ups and downs. What we now wanted, he said, was a steady relationship on a plateau. He termed this a "mature relationship" at the time. Kissinger had time for India, especially when he became Secretary of State in 1973. He considered it a big country worthy of attention. Indeed, much to our surprise, when the Indians appointed as their Ambassador to the U. S. a man who was known for his closeness to the Soviet Union, T.K. or "Tiki" Kaul -- to whom we almost did not give agreement because of his pro-Russian leanings -- Kissinger received him often. I was new of the desk and I don't remember the details of agreeing to Kaul's appointment. It was the White House that raised some questions, presumably based on intelligence reports. In any case, Ambassador Kaul saw Kissinger at the State Department often, and went to Indian Embassy functions. There were only about half dozen Embassies that he showed this much interest in. He had time for India because, as he would mention at meetings, India was a big and important country.

By 1974 India's relationship with Pakistan was less of a problem for us. Pakistan was weak after the 1971 war. The Kashmir problem was quiescent. Pakistan seemed to accept India as the leading power in the subcontinent. So the situation was relatively calm during this four-year period.

When Kissinger went out to India, sometime in 1974, he made a major speech in New Delhi. He used these speeches as an important way of articulating policies. I think that Ambassador Moynihan prepared a draft along with Mark Palmer, who was a Kissinger speech writer. Mark had previously served in India and had a good sense for South Asia.

Basically, what Kissinger said, without expressing any regret for past U. S. policy, was that we accepted India as the major power in South Asia. This is what the Indians wanted to hear. However, as Indians are what they are, they chose not to hear it. Kissinger was in India about three days. And the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in her inimitable fashion left New Delhi after the first day. The Embassy in New Delhi was caught quite by surprise. She made a point of snubbing Kissinger. I am sure that Henry must have loved that. However, Ambassador Moynihan felt that Kissinger's going out to India and some of these other developments were his and President Nixon's way of trying to improve our relations with India, after our "tilt" toward Pakistan. And relations did improve to some extent. As I now look back on it, 20 years later, and after I have written a book on the U. S. and India, the situation seems quite different than it did at the time. We had achieved a low level of harmony. There wasn't much going on between India and the United States. We did not have an aid program. We had suspended aid, and India retaliated by kicking the AID people out. India cut back the Peace Corps program, and we closed it down entirely. There was very little U. S. investment in India. We had no military assistance program -- hadn't had since 1965. So there really wasn't much going on bilaterally.

My comment on the cessation of military assistance in 1965 needs a little amplification. In 1967 we permitted the sale of spare parts for previously acquired U. S. equipment, which really affected Pakistan, but did not resume aid as such. Then Nixon, as a favor to Pakistan, agreed to what was called a "one-time exception" in 1970 for what I recall were some aircraft and some APC's [Armored Personnel Carriers]. In 1975 he lifted the arms embargo but did not resume aid. He also agreed to finish a program with the Indians of providing radar equipment, which had been suspended back in 1965. We got caught up in this. We tried to have a certain amount of symmetry in our relations with India and Pakistan. However, basically, in the 1972-77 period, there wasn't anything going on.

There was a different situation regarding economic aid. There was the economic aid bureaucracy -- the AID bureaucracy -- which was eager to get back into India. It had been a big program for them. Ambassador Moynihan did not really want this to happen because he felt that U. S. assistance was too large, its mission too "bloated," and too arrogant. He called it the "age of the Demi-Raj." He saw this symbolized by the headquarters of the AID Mission in New Delhi, which was located in a big building on the outskirts of New Delhi. With much ceremony he handed over the keys of this building to the Indian Government. They turned it into a "Five Star" hotel. He wanted to make sure that it wouldn't be reopened again.

It was an interesting exercise. Under the terms of our arrangement with India, we had an enormous amount of foreign currency -- in Indian rupees and the Indians built the AID office building. It was put up with local currency [rupees], on the understanding that when we no longer had any use for it, the Government of India would take possession of it. So our returning the building to the Indians wasn't a "gift." Ambassador Moynihan concluded that we weren't going to have an aid program for the foreseeable future and announced that we were giving the former AID Headquarters building back to the Indians. At that point Senator Fulbright got wind of this. He wrote a letter expressing outrage that we were giving away this building and so forth and asked what was happening. At the time the Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia Affairs was Joe Sisco. Sisco was more concerned about the Congressional pressure than the Indians. So there was a great stirring around to see "How can we stop this?". Some people said: "This is a crazy thing that Moynihan is doing." Well, there wasn't much that we could do. We sent out a telegram -- a good, bureaucratic telegram -- asking him about his plans and whether he was sure about it. He came back with a wonderful telegram to the State Department. The telegram was called "The Edifice Complex." He gave a copy of it to the "New York Times" correspondent in New Delhi and a story appeared in the "New York Times" a few days later. He gave the keys to the building to the Indians with great flourish, and that was the end of it. To me it was an example of how the State Department, on the one hand, caved in to Congressional pressure and tried to stop something that made sense. On the other hand, there was a "political" Ambassador who could ignore the State Department, by going public on an issue.

I had a mixed mind about the resumption of an assistance program. While I thought that we should be helping the Indians, I believed the Indians should ask for aid -- and this was more or less a point of theology. What had happened in the past was that the Indians, with the somewhat curious psychology they have, had worked us into a situation where they appeared to be doing us a favor by accepting aid from the U. S. The Indian elite resented receiving U. S. aid because it put them in a relationship of dependency with us. After a long history of being a British colony,

they didn't want to renew that kind of relationship. And so, while the aid did good, and I think that it was helpful to India, it engendered bad feeling and became a political liability.

That problem did not exist in other places, for example, not in Pakistan. That country is relatively small, it knows it is dependent, and doesn't have any hang-ups about it. There was also no problem with having aid programs in Nepal and Sri Lanka because the psychology of the recipients was different from the psychology of the Indians. In the case of Nepal there was a situation where foreign aid from the United States and other countries supported the only development that was going on in the country. Whether it did any good -- and how much good it did -- is somewhat questionable. Economic aid was not useful to us as a political tool in Nepal. Every country looks at its own situation. In the case of Nepal it felt itself squeezed by India. It is almost totally dependent on India. It seeks to broaden its options and relieve this pressure by having as much of a relationship with China as it can get away with -- and as many other countries as possible. The United States is a major power. Nepal wanted as broad a relationship with us as possible. So the Nepalese were delighted at the U. S. presence, wanted us to be involved, and welcomed it as a way to offset the Indians.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was a bizarre or paradoxical case. It had a woman Prime Minister at the time, Mrs. Bandaranaike. She, like Mrs. Indira Gandhi, was a Leftist. Sri Lanka's voting record at the UN was about the same as India's. But Sri Lanka, unlike India, got along with the Nixon administration. Nixon and Kissinger both liked Mrs. Bandaranaike. The AID people also liked the Sri Lankans; so the U. S. put aid money into Sri Lanka. We were giving Sri Lanka quite a bit of economic assistance. I remember a dinner at the Sri Lankan Ambassador's house with Deputy Director of the AID Agency -- Johnny Murphy. He was quite conservative and was just bubbling over about Sri Lanka. Relatively speaking, Sri Lanka got a larger share of economic aid than one would think. However, the Sri Lankan Government played us right. They were a small country and needed the help. Of all the South Asian countries they had the highest standard of living, literacy, and so forth, and they made the best use of the assistance resources. AID could carry out projects there more effectively than in India and certainly than in Nepal. So Sri Lanka got a lot of aid and used it well. We had a surprisingly good relationship with a country that was not oriented towards us politically. Again, this was related to their situation. They felt isolated, because India was so big, but did not feel as isolated as Nepal did. The Sri Lankans also wanted a relationship with the U. S. We did not use the assistance program as a tool to achieve some political goal there.

With India we went through my whole tour without an aid program. We put some assistance allocation back into the AID budget and announced that we had done this. I think it was something like \$75 million. Then the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, would complain from time to time about U. S. interference in India. She would make a speech here or there, alleging that the CIA was interfering in Indian internal affairs. We would complain. The Indian Government would say that she was misquoted, that she had been speaking in Hindi and the translation was wrong. We would threaten not to restart the aid program. Finally, after Ambassador Moynihan had left India and Ambassador Saxbe was there, we had enough. This was in 1975 or 1976. After Mrs. Gandhi said something that really annoyed us, we announced that we were withdrawing money to support an aid program in India from the budget. And we actually did that. In other words, not giving aid became a message, but this applied only to India. We continued, as we do

to this day, to provide aid through voluntary agencies -- school lunch programs, and things like that. This amounts to about \$100 million a year.

We can talk about the surplus local currency available to us in India in terms of the policy issue. India stopped purchasing food from the U. S. under the PL 480 program during the crisis of 1971. India stopped it, we didn't. They told us that they didn't need food anymore. Then, in 1973, I believe, they had a poor harvest. India decided to spend its own money to purchase food, rather than ask us for any more PL 480 assistance. It was a policy decision on their part that they would never get into the position which they had been in during the 1960's, when they were heavily dependent on the United States and when, in their view, they had to beg us for food. In any case, it fortunately turned out that the poor Indian harvest of 1973 was a one-year exception, following which food production went up again.

Ambassador Moynihan's major achievement was to resolve the "rupee" problem. This dated back to the first food arrangement we had with India back in 1951. The Indians had worked out an arrangement so that the surplus food was not grant aid. But the Indians couldn't pay it back immediately. They undertook to pay us back in local currency [rupees]. Basically, this use of these funds was restricted to U. S. Embassy local currency expenses. By 1973 because of the large food shipments, especially in the 1960s, the situation was that we owned something like \$3.0 billion in Indian rupees, or 20 percent of India's outstanding currency. The money that we owned was in a bank account which drew interest. So we were earning more every year in interest than we were spending for Embassy purposes. I think that we were earning about \$100 million (in rupees) in interest and spending only \$70 million. This could have gone on forever.

We need to remember that our account was not real money; our rupees were an accounting charge and not real cash. It only became actual cash when we spent it. It was a debt on the Indian books, but the use of it was very limited. It wasn't as if we could really "pull the plug" on the rupee. However, they thought that we could. The Indians were very, very concerned about it, particularly since relations between the two countries were tense. Ambassador Moynihan was very concerned and, to his credit, worked hard to solve this issue. He was concerned that the next time things went wrong between the United States and India, the Indians would simply wipe out the debt in these accounts. After all, it was money held in Indian banks -- mostly in the Government Reserve Bank. They could have simply blocked these accounts totally, and this would have made our relations even worse.

Ambassador Moynihan obtained approval for negotiations with the Indian Government on this issue. He was very clever about the way he handled the negotiations. First, it was a negotiation with the U. S. Government, and then with the Indians. Within the U. S. Government it was a question of how much of the balance owed us we would keep and how much we would write off. The negotiating package which the U. S. Government approved was that we would keep \$2.0 billion and write off \$1.0 billion. Moynihan said nothing about this. He just let the bureaucracy in the Treasury and State Departments work its will. He didn't think that this package would be negotiable with the Indians. He thought that the balance would have to be the other way around.

Ambassador Moynihan played no role in the intra US Government negotiations. He intentionally decided not to do so. Tactically, he was clever. He let the U. S. bureaucracy come up with its

"negotiating" package. The NEA Assistant Secretary [of the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs] said that we would be guided by the position of the Treasury Department. So the argument within the U. S. Government was not very vigorous. However, Ambassador Moynihan returned to Washington, and this is where a political Ambassador can be effective, went out to San Clemente [the Nixon residence in California] and saw President Nixon. He had been head of domestic policy for Nixon and had access. He said that he talked to President Nixon for about 45 seconds and got him to agree to "turn the package around." Kissinger wasn't really involved.

The decision therefore was that we would keep \$1.0 billion [in rupees] and would "write off" \$2.0 billion. It was a "two to one" split the other way. We then negotiated that with the Indians. On the Embassy side was Ambassador Moynihan, the Economic Counselor, and a very good Economic Officer in Washington, Don Born, a good friend of mine. He was basically the "back stopper." I was involved, but he did the work. It got very, very complicated. There were a lot of details. Ambassador Moynihan had to deal with the political aspect of the negotiations.

The U. S. domestic politics of this issue were difficult because India was not popular, and there were people within the U. S. Government who would have liked to block the deal. And in the Congress. There was a very creative use of a target of opportunity on Ambassador Moynihan's part. A Catholic missionary named Robert Barrett walked into the Embassy in New Delhi one day and asked whether it would be possible to get an endowment for a Catholic Medical Center in Bangalore, India, which he wanted to set up and name for John McCormack, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was not the sort of thing that the Indians wanted to accept. They wanted the \$1.0 billion or any other money in this pool strictly limited for use by the Embassy and not for other uses, and particularly not this type of an endowment. However, Ambassador Moynihan, who is not only clever but savvy politically, found out that Barrett not only knew John McCormack but also Senator Ted Kennedy and George Meany of the AFL/CIO, the whole Irish Catholic American network. Moynihan was able to get the active support of these people for this memorial for John McCormack and because of this their support for the rupee deal. Moynihan persuaded the Indians to agree to make an exception, so that \$100 million worth of rupees would be used for the John W. McCormack Memorial Medical Center.

One day, in the country director's office, the phone rang, and John McCormack was on the phone. He had just retired as Speaker of the House of Representatives. He said: "What can I do to get the rupee deal through? Whom do you want me to speak to?" There was also a phone call from Senator Kennedy's office. There was another call from George Meany's son-in-law, asking: "What do you want the lobbyist of the AFL/CIO to do?" These phone calls turned out to be very helpful, because pretty soon we found ourselves with a big problem in Congress. The problem was that Senator Harry Byrd, from Virginia, tried to kill the whole agreement. He said that this was being handled as an executive agreement, which meant that Congress didn't have to approve it. Senator Byrd slipped through the Senate a motion that this agreement would have to be voted on. It was the "Byrd Amendment" to some piece of legislation, which was accepted by the Senate. Senator Byrd's position was that this was a U. S. "giveaway" even though the funds were really not available for general expenditures. Byrd was also anti-Indian and was unhappy that we would be giving away \$2.0 billion to "those people." This was the kind of argument that we had never really intended to make. We were keeping \$1.0 billion. It was something of a fluke that we

had this money. The local currency account was always hard to explain. If we didn't complete the agreement, we would always be running the risk of losing it all.

At least twice Senator Byrd got this amendment passed, and we then came back and worked very hard on Congress. We were able to get the situation turned around thanks in part to the Barrett project. We also had President Nixon's help, surprisingly, given the fact that Nixon was not regarded as a "friend" of India. By this time Nixon was on his way out, in the aftermath of "Watergate". We got active assistance from the White House congressional team. So this arrangement was eventually approved, and Ambassador Moynihan, with a typical flourish, gave the Indians what was then the world's largest check for \$2.0 billion worth of rupees. This made the Guinness "World Book of Records." It was Moynihan's main achievement while he was in India.

In terms of other noteworthy things, there were two main issues. One was the U. S. reaction to the Indian nuclear test. It could be considered poetic justice that I was the Country Director, since I had written a paper on this issue. I was around, two years later, when it actually happened. The Indian nuclear test took place in May, 1974. Ambassador Moynihan was still in India at the time.

Kissinger's reaction was that it had happened, and there wasn't not a hell of a lot that we could do about it. He said: "Let's not make the situation worse." This was reflected in his toning down the draft press statement which we had prepared regarding the Indian nuclear test. We learned of this about 4:00 AM [Washington time]. We worked up a strong draft statement condemning the test over the telephone with various people. The object was to make a statement in the next couple of hours. Kissinger was then on a "shuttle" trip in the Middle East. All major business in the Department was sent to him for his approval. A couple of hours after the draft statement was sent to him, we received back a "watered down" version of the statement, which was then made public as the U. S. Government's reaction to the Indian nuclear test.

My personal view of India's nuclear policy was that, although Mrs. Gandhi had come out of the 1971 crisis as the "Empress of India" and was at the peak of her power, she screwed up. By 1974 she had become unpopular and was in trouble politically. I felt that she regarded the Indian nuclear test as a way of boosting her power and improving her domestic political position by showing that India could be a world power. The nuclear capability was seen as a major symbol of power. In typical Indian fashion -- doing things differently than others -- that this was not a nuclear weapon. It was described as a "peaceful explosion." Indeed, all they did was to set off a peaceful nuclear device. It was an underground explosion. India had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was not authorized under the treaty to conduct an explosion in the atmosphere. It would have broken the treaty if they had done so. They set up a bomb in a hole in Rajasthan and exploded it there.

Just as Moynihan was leaving India, the Indian nuclear explosion took place. Within the U. S. Government this had strong repercussions. Until then, the liberals had been pro-Indian, and the conservatives had been anti-Indian. The liberals were mostly strong anti-nuclear proliferation people. While the conservatives weren't in favor of nuclear proliferation, it wasn't a key issue for them. The liberals who used to be pro-Indian and favored better relations with India turned sour

on India after the test. The people that had been anti-Indian weren't exactly for India, but they were not as negative on the Indians as the liberals became.

The Indian nuclear explosion set off alarm bells in the nuclear non-proliferation community. It felt that, if India could proceed with an explosion unchallenged, then other countries could as well. If India were not punished, others will want to do the same thing. The fact was that India hadn't violated any agreements with the U.S. The Canadians felt that the Indians had violated an agreement with them, since India had used a reactor which Canada had given them for research purposes to produce the uranium used in the nuclear test. The Indians said that they had not violated the agreement with the Canadians, and they were technically correct. The Canadian reactor had been given to India before the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] was negotiated. There were "peaceful use" requirements in the Indian-Canadian agreement, but the Indians said that this explosion was for "peaceful use." The fact that the NPT said that there was no difference between a peaceful test and a military test was irrelevant, legally speaking. The Indians had a reasonable, legal case, but the Canadians also had a strong case. Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau had warned the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, that if they proceeded with a nuclear test, using Canadian furnished supplies and equipment, Canada would react. Canada did, cutting off its nuclear help to India. There was pressure from the "non-proliferation people" that the U.S. do the same, because we had been giving India some technical assistance on nuclear matters. There was a close relationship with the AEC's [Atomic Energy Commissions] in the two countries.

A couple of days after the Indian explosion took place Secretary of State Kissinger -- incorrectly -- said that we were not like Canada and that we had not helped India. When the nuclear experts dug into the details, they discovered that the U. S. government in fact had provided India with some fairly limited help in the form of "heavy water." The U. S. Government had provided this assistance in the 1950's. We, like Canada, had warned the Indians that they should not use these materials for a nuclear explosion; we would regard such action as a breach of the agreement. This was a unilateral statement, because there wasn't any bilateral agreement. This is an action that we took 12 years after the fact. The Indians took our warning but didn't respond to it.

The State Department was asked by Senator Ribicoff whether there was any U. S. "heavy water" used by the Indians in generating the explosion. Through a screw-up we sent out an erroneous reply to him, which said, "No" because it had evaporated. In fact, the U. S. "heavy water" was used in the Indian preparations for the explosion, because the "heavy water" could not have evaporated by that time. The next thing we heard was a blast in "The New York Times," with Senator Ribicoff charging the Nixon administration with deceit and lying. With Watergate at high tide, this was a serious allegation.

We were not nuclear experts -- and this is typical of the way you operate as a Country Director -- but we worked very closely with the scientific people. In effect, the Ribicoff inquiry was joint action responsibility between the regional (NEA) and functional (Science) bureaus because it involved a highly technical question. I said: "What is Ribicoff doing," and DAS Myron Kratzer, the key man in the science bureau, said, "We have screwed up." I asked: "What do you mean?" He said, in effect, that our expert in OES had given an answer that was incorrect and had screwed it up. In layman's language we had in effect said that my Chevrolet" -- this is back in

1974 -- "can get the equivalent of 300 miles to the gallon." Kratzer said that what we wrote was nonsense -- it was wrong. The facts were way off. In fact, he said, anybody in the nuclear field -- any nuclear expert -- would know that this was nonsense.

What had happened -- and I think that people don't realize how often this happens in government -- was that in getting the information relayed from the Atomic Energy Commission through OES to our office, which prepared the draft letter answering Ribicoff's query on the Indian nuclear explosion, there was a garble on the numbers. The erroneous information was passed on by one secretary to another secretary. Our assumption in NEA was that we had obtained the correct information. The mistake in transmission involved how rapidly this "heavy water" evaporated. The people in OES who knew the situation hadn't reviewed the final reply and so the wrong information got into this letter. We, frankly, didn't pay enough attention to the details.

All hell broke loose. You have to remember the time. This happened during the "Watergate" affair -- the summer of 1974. This incident was then cited as another example of deceit by the Nixon administration. Matters were made worse because Secretary of State Kissinger misspoke and the Department misspoke about US involvement. This was what started the campaign to get the administration to tighten up its nuclear policy. Even more fundamentally, the Indian nuclear test triggered a whole new approach to our nuclear policy. I think that we were not concerned about reprocessing of nuclear waste at the time. The Indian action led to a change in our overall approach. We insisted that there be safeguards -- what are called "full scope safeguards" -- on all nuclear transactions. Up until this time the safeguards were limited to one aspect which was considered the "dangerous part." Indeed, at the time reprocessing of plutonium was not considered a dangerous process. Today, reprocessing is regarded as an enormous sin and strict limitations are applied to it. It was the Indian explosion which triggered a review of our non-proliferation policies; that led to a global policy that took effect during the Carter administration.

Various efforts were made to punish the Indians. We had very little leverage for doing this because we didn't have very much going on. Congress passed a measure that required the U. S. henceforth to vote against all international loans to India. That had no practical effect because we accounted for only 20 or 25 percent of the votes in the World Bank. The US was essentially left with symbolic actions because we had no assistance programs for India. The people in Washington who didn't like India had an opportunity to vent their spleens. I think the Indians made a monumental strategic blunder. Ambassador Moynihan told Mrs. Gandhi that -- this was not part of his instructions -- when he went in to give her the U.S. reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion in his personal view India had just made a strategic blunder. In effect he said: "It is certain that up until this point you had total dominance over Pakistan. By 'going nuclear' you will prompt them to 'go nuclear,' and they will be able to offset your advantage. Going nuclear is the only way they can equal you. Now you have given them the excuse to go nuclear themselves. And some day, some mad 'Mogul,' some mad general in Islamabad will pick up the phone and tell you, 'If you don't give me Kashmir, I'm going to obliterate New Delhi.'" Ambassador Moynihan reported, "Mrs. Gandhi sat there, looked out the window, and said nothing."

Although a bit exaggerated, Moynihan was right. This is, indeed, exactly what has happened. Pakistan has gone nuclear. The Indians, I think, were very ill advised to proceed with their explosion. They got the worst of all worlds. They let the world know that they were capable of

triggering an explosion, but in a military sense, they did not have a weapon or a delivery system. So they didn't really develop a military nuclear capability. They have gradually come around to that, some 20 years later. By insisting that the Indian nuclear explosion was a "peaceful" program they violated the spirit of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] which asserts that there is no such thing as a "peaceful" program. The Indians got everybody mad at them and they didn't get any of the benefits. They didn't acquire "Great Power" status, which they might have done, had they done what the Chinese Communists have done.

The explosion was not useful even for domestic political purposes. A year later the second major event during this period occurred. Mrs. Gandhi got into great political trouble. She started losing elections and then lost her own seat in Parliament on a technical challenge to her election. This was an allegation that she had used government-owned jeeps to campaign. It was a trivial charge. She was threatened with being pushed out of office. So, rather than accept this, she invoked a national emergency and imposed a quasi-dictatorship. This was in 1975. Ambassador Moynihan had left, and Ambassador Bill Saxbe had replaced him. Her action then finished the job of losing all of India's liberal supporters in the United States.

India had set off a nuclear device. It was no longer a democratic country. As Ambassador Moynihan said: "The only thing they have to offer now that they are no longer the world's largest democracy are communicable diseases." This infuriated the Indians, but it was true. So you had the liberals and "The New York Times" beating up on the Indians.

During the Ford administration, Secretary of State Kissinger consistently held the view that India's domestic policies were its own affair, unless they impinged on us. Therefore he took no exception to what happened. I sat in on a meeting after the Emergency was imposed during which he told Ambassador Kaul that: "We did not disapprove of your actions." The Ford administration was beaten up by the liberals for not condemning Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of a national emergency.

I stayed in the Country Director's job at the start of the Carter administration. I stayed on for the first four or five months -- until the summer of 1977. There was a turnaround in policy. When Carter came in, things looked really bad for US-India relations because he wanted to emphasize nuclear non proliferation -- and he criticized President Ford on that issue. And President Carter emphasized human rights and democracy.

Then, to people's surprise, Mrs. Gandhi decided to have an election. She proved that she wasn't anti-democratic because she lost the election in February, 1977. I don't think that she would have called the election had she known that she was going to lose it. She was thrown out of office. There was a new government in India. The opposition, which was cobbled together very quickly, was less "pro-Moscow. It was headed by an 81-year-old gentleman -- Morarji Desai -- who had been considered "pro-American." He was a moralist like President Carter. He was a supporter of Mahatma Gandhi. He disliked nuclear testing and said that there would never be another nuclear test while he was in office. He made that very clear, and it looked as if we were in for a period of better relations.

We wrote a paper for the transition team, but I don't think that India was much on their mind. It was assumed that relations between India and the United States would get better. President Carter's mother had served in India in the Peace Corps. Of course, it didn't happen immediately, but Mrs. Gandhi announced that there would be elections before Carter was inaugurated. That changed the atmosphere.

The one single event that happened during the first few months of the Carter administration, and I was involved in that, was that the President of India died. The President of India is a figurehead -- a ceremonial chief of state. The question came up of sending a delegation to attend the funeral. President Carter decided to send his mother, Mrs. Lillian Carter. I went along for the trip. That was clearly a sign of interest by President Carter in India. This was the first and only such trips that I ever went on. We traveled on "Air Force One" [the aircraft assigned to the President by the Air Force]. We left Washington at 10:00 AM. My boss was on the plane -- the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph ("Spike") Dubs, a very fine man who was unfortunately killed later in Kabul [Afghanistan]. Along was also Tom Thornton, the South Asia expert on the NSC [National Security Council] staff. On board were a Congressman from Nebraska, Senator Percy [Republican, Illinois], and the Assistant Press Spokesman for the White House. There were just four "official" members of the delegation: Mrs. Carter, Senator Percy, the Congressman, and "Spike" Dubs. Then there were three of us who were not members of the delegation: the Country Director and myself, and Tom Thornton, who was a friend of mine. We had a briefing for Ms. Lillian, who turned out to be pretty shrewd. I was much impressed with her. Senator Percy wanted to get into a big, substantive discussion with Mrs. Gandhi, still the Prime Minister of India. We argued with him and said that the best thing to do with Mrs. Gandhi was just to attend the funeral and not to engage in any substantive talks, which is what "Miss Lillian" did. We were in New Delhi for a day and then went down to Bombay. "Miss Lillian" went off -- I didn't go with her -- to visit the place where she had worked in the Peace Corps as a nurse. The whole trip went so fast. It was like a blur.

The appointment of Bob Goheen as Ambassador was also a sign of interest in India. Goheen was the former President of Princeton. More than that, he had been born in India, was the son of missionary parents, and felt very much attached to India. This was seen as a sign of interest in India on the part of the new administration. I sat in on his meeting with Secretary of State Vance whom he knew very well. I didn't sit in at his meeting with President Carter. According to Goheen, Carter said that all he wanted from India was a signal that India was not going to explode another nuclear device. When Ambassador Goheen called on Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister said: "You have my word that there will be no further nuclear tests." That set the relationship on what was seen to be a much better basis.

We also held a private meeting in London with the Indians in 1977 on the nuclear question between Joe Nye, the new top nuclear man at State, and Jagat Mehta, the Indian Foreign Secretary. I went along and attended. The main hope was to persuade the Indians to agree to put all of their nuclear facilities under international inspection, under a system of foolproof safeguards set up by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Administration]. This involved some presidential letters. The meeting in London was not successful, but we did express our concerns about nuclear explosions. Nevertheless, there was a feeling that we were on a better course in terms of our relations with India. The Indians said that they wanted, in their terms, a

"more balanced bilateralism," -- i.e. a more balanced kind of non alignment, which was less pro-Soviet.

Let me now just briefly discuss Nepal and Sri Lanka. During most of the time that I was on the desk, Carol Laise our Ambassador to Nepal. She was very much the "Queen Bee." She had been the Country Director and had been Ambassador about four years by the time I was assigned to South Asian Affairs. She had all the issues at her fingertips, although there weren't many. They were basically assistance issues and personnel matters. They were matters which could be handled at the Country Director level, unlike India, which went to the Secretary of State. There really wasn't much at issue in Nepal. That is pretty much what I meant when I said that Nepal "ran itself."

To illustrate the kinds of problems we had with Nepal, there was an issue about climbing Mt. Everest. Traditionally, the Nepalese do not decide which Americans would be approved to climb the mountain. They left that to the American Alpine or Mountaineering Club, which is a very "establishment" kind of organization.

Some fellow from Alaska, who turned out to be a kook, wanted to climb Mt. Everest. He didn't get the approval from the American Alpine Club; so he protested and got his Senator to approach the State Department to complain. The Nepalese Desk Officer in the State Department was "bamboozled" by this guy. I really didn't pay any attention to him. He passed the issue to the Nepalese Embassy in Washington and said, in effect: "We are taking no position on what the American Alpine Club says." The Nepalese Embassy took that to mean that we were endorsing this guy, this kook, who then went out to Nepal and started putting up crosses half way up Mt. Everest. These were 50 foot crosses, and they created a problem. I remember that our Nepalese Desk Officer and the Embassy in Kathmandu were all upset. As I said, until then I had not really gotten into how this matter had been handled.

Then the people in the American Alpine Club started writing letters and making phone calls to Secretary of State Vance to find out what was going on. They knew Vance. They said: "Why did you 'disenfranchise' the American Alpine Club?" So we said: "We made a mistake." This was the point. On matters like this the Country Director could decide things. We had made the mistake, so we could unmake the mistake. So we wrote a diplomatic note to the Nepalese Embassy in Washington, saying that we were canceling this proposed climb of Mt. Everest and that we were "re-recognizing" the American Alpine Club. We suggested that the Embassy follow their recommendations. The Nepalese Government promptly took the approval away from this kook, kicked him out of the country, and that was the end of the story. As Country Director, I could deal with matters like that.

In the case of Sri Lanka, Chris Van Hollen was the Ambassador. He had been the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs prior to that. There was more going on in Sri Lanka. Ambassador Van Hollen was very active. In this case he pretty much worked with the Desk Officer for Sri Lanka. I didn't have much direct contact with him, although I signed letters to him which were drafted by the Desk Officer. They worked very effectively as a team and there were few problems. I spent, I would say, 85-90% of my time as Country Director on India, and very little time, directly, on Sri Lanka and Nepal. It didn't mean that they weren't part of the office for

which I was responsible, but the relationship with Sri Lanka and Nepal took very little of my time unless there was a visit. As far as visits were concerned, I met Mrs. Bandaranaike [Prime Minister of Sri Lanka], up in New York. She was there in connection with the annual UN meetings. I sat in on a 30-minute "non conversation" between her and Kissinger. She hardly said anything other than "Yes" or "No."

The Deputy Assistant Secretary probably spent no time at all on Sri Lanka and Nepal, nor did the Assistant Secretary, except for an occasional situation. Still, they liked the Sri Lankan and Nepalese Ambassadors. But on a day-to-day, the fact is that our relations with Sri Lanka and Nepal were handled at the Desk officer level. We had very competent Desk Officers. I found that the more competent a subordinate, the less I had to do with these countries. In one or two cases the subordinate turned out to be weak, and I suddenly found myself spending a lot more time on the smaller countries, simply because I wasn't satisfied with the work that was being done.

We had a change in Assistant Secretaries while I was in NEA -- from Sisco to Roy Atherton. Sisco was someone who had been very much involved with the Indians during the crisis over the 1971 war. Sisco was also involved in everything that might involve the "Seventh Floor" [the Secretary of State and other, senior officers of the Department] and anything of major significance. He was directly involved in Indian issues. For example, he read such things as my nuclear paper.

Atherton was less involved, although he had served in India. He was much more involved in the Middle East and left issues more to the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the Country Directors. Sisco kept his fingers on everything. Roy Atherton was absorbed with the Middle East and the Middle East peace process. He was involved in "shuttle" trips to the area and spent a lot of time on the road. But I didn't think that it was a problem. If you needed to get to someone, you could always see Joe Sisco, who was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Kissinger was also available for Indian issues. So I never felt that we missed any opportunities because of a lack of access to senior officers of the Department. The process actually worked more informally than an organization chart would suggest. We didn't always have to go to a more senior level. If the desk officer for a small country is competent, he or she didn't need the Country Director. It's not as if there was a "void." If you needed higher authority, you got the help. If you didn't, you did your own work. Roy Atherton was available when he was around. If he wasn't, we usually went to someone on the "Seventh Floor".

My first Deputy Assistant Secretary was Sid Sober, who had come back to Washington from Pakistan. He was briefly a Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia and then moved up to be senior Deputy Assistant Secretary. Bruce Laingen then moved up to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia. He was there about a year. He never was confirmed in the job because Secretary Kissinger decided on a program called "GLOP," -- Global Perspectives. Kissinger felt that the people in the Department were too insular and that the regional bureaus were too inbred. He always wanted to have at least one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries come from another area. So Larry Eagleburger [Under Secretary of State for Management] refused to confirm Bruce Laingen in the job as Deputy Assistant Secretary, since he basically had only served in South Asia. Eventually, Eagleburger insisted on Bruce Laingen going to Europe. They

assigned "Spike" Dubs, who had been DCM and chargé d'affaires in Moscow, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs.

That made a big difference to me as Country Director for India. I forget when "Spike" Dubs came in -- maybe in 1975 or 1976 -- during the latter half of my time working on India. Until then I had been working for superiors who were very knowledgeable about South Asia. So my latitude for action was reduced.

There was a period when Armin Meyer was acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs. He had just come back from Japan, where he had been Ambassador. No one was in the job, so he handled it for a while. He had served in the region earlier. When "Spike" Dubs came in as Deputy Assistant Secretary in 1975, it made a big difference to me, because "Spike" didn't know much about South Asia. He was a good boss, who treated his subordinates well and gave us a lot of leeway. Not that he wasn't in charge. You talked things over with him, but you had an opportunity to express your views.

While commenting on the process during my tour in NEA, I should refer back to our Ambassadors in India. We had two Ambassadors who were very high powered [Galbraith and Moynihan]. It was very different with Ambassador Saxbe. I used to call him "a canny cornball." He had been a Senator from Ohio and Attorney General. He was put in at the end of the Watergate Affair because nobody could accuse him of being in President Nixon's "pocket." He knew India, having visited the country on several occasions. He liked India. He didn't know a lot about the normal processes of diplomacy. He believed in operating as an Ambassador the way he would as a Senator -- namely, by calling in the "New York Times" or "Washington Post" correspondent and making a point, rather than going to the Foreign Minister. He also didn't believe in "calling" on other ambassadors or Indian Government officials. His attitude was: "Well, if they need me, they know where I am." He was unique.

President Nixon, in fact, had told Ambassador Moynihan not to be "public." So Moynihan gave one press conference during his two years in India, and that was the day before he left. Moynihan had no press exposure in India, which is very unlike him. Ambassador Moynihan kept a low profile. He found it very frustrating, but he did it.

Ambassador Saxbe came in when Ford was President. Saxbe was politically more powerful than Moynihan. At that time Moynihan had not been elected Senator. He was an academic who had worked his way up to the White House and become a public personality. However, Ambassador Saxbe had been a Senator and an Attorney General. He didn't really owe anybody anything. President Ford asked him what he wanted to do. He said, "Go to India." He was delighted to go to India. He went and said publicly: "We are ready for whatever relationship the Indians are ready for."

After a while in Delhi, he became upset. He said that he had been reading the Indian papers and saw all of the official criticism of the United States. Yet the same officials would come to the Embassy and ask for help so their children can study in the United States. He called in the correspondent of the "New York Times." He said: "I don't understand this country. On Monday the President of India criticizes the United States in a speech. On Tuesday he is over at my house

for dinner, telling me what a wonderful country we have, and can I help him get his son into Harvard. What is it, what do they want?" Naturally, this made good copy and soon appeared as a NY Times story, stirring up a diplomatic fuss.

We finally had to tell Saxbe: "We appreciate your views and we agree with them. But don't give them to the 'New York Times.'" Actually, I think that Ambassador Saxbe was quite effective, because he made the policy point that the Indians were not all that important for us. For a variety of reasons the Indians had an exaggerated view of their importance to the US. Ambassador Saxbe helped to get bring them down to earth.

Saxbe was in India during a difficult time -- the "emergency". Since there wasn't much going on bilaterally, he traveled and played golf a lot -- and complained when the Indians criticized us. I remember one telegram that he sent in. He was pushing to get us to withdraw the offer of economic aid. It is an unusual ambassador who will take such a stand.

The embassy staff rather liked him. He basically had the same staff that Ambassador Moynihan had. Moynihan had a very good team in New Delhi. The staff found it quite different, working for Ambassador Saxbe. He let the Embassy run itself. He had the same DCM [David Schneider]. He brought out a couple of staff aides. Normally, a "political" ambassador is allowed one aide. In fact, Ambassador Saxbe had two. One of them had been his personal assistant for years and the other was a fellow who had been the head of management at the Department of Justice. There was great concern that this person, who was considered a "high powered", was going to try to run the embassy.

In fact, the staff did have some trouble with the former Justice man, at first, but then it worked out all right. John Reager was the administrative officer, and he was a fairly tough cookie.

Saxbe was Ambassador to India for a couple of years. He "did his own thing." When he wanted to listen to us, he did. When he didn't, he didn't. With both Moynihan and Saxbe as ambassadors, I got to see Secretary of State Kissinger quite a bit. Both would come back to Washington for consultations, more often than most career ambassadors. I remember that on one occasion Ambassador Saxbe was supposed to see Secretary Kissinger at 9:00 AM on a Saturday morning. So I came into the Department. At 8:50 AM I had a phone call from Kissinger's office, saying that he wasn't ready to receive Ambassador Saxbe. Kissinger's aide said: "As a matter of fact, he is "on hold." Saxbe said: "What does that mean?" So we waited about 10 minutes, and he said: "Look, I have an appointment at 10:00 AM. Call back and say that I will stay around until 9:30 AM and then I am leaving." So I called Kissinger's office. I was told: "Saxbe can't leave at 9:30. The Secretary has put him 'on hold,'" Saxbe was sitting there. I told him: "They say you can't leave." He said: "The hell I can't. Tell him that I'm leaving at 9:30," which was only a few minutes from then. I put the phone down. Five minutes later, I got another phone call: "Tell Saxbe that he should be up here in five minutes. The schedule has been rearranged." So, five minutes later, we were in Kissinger's office. Kissinger's first question was: "You were going to play golf, weren't you?" Saxbe said: "Yes, I have an appointment with Senator Fulbright at 10:00 AM."

I remember one thing about briefing both Moynihan and Saxbe. Papers were of no particular use. What mattered was your oral presentation during the minute and a half or two minutes on the way from the office to the office of whomever you were seeing. Both would ask: "What is the main point? What should I say about this or that?" This was particularly true of Saxbe.

The main issue that Saxbe took up with Kissinger was the arms sale to Pakistan. Kissinger was pushing for such assistance. It was the big issue at the time. Saxbe would walk right in and say to Kissinger: "What's all this about arms to Pakistan?" This put Kissinger on the defensive. When he started into his usual presentation on this matter, Saxbe said: "That's the most stupid thing I have ever heard of." Kissinger wasn't expecting this. Saxbe was unique!

Both Moynihan and Saxbe were pretty independent of Washington -- Saxbe, in particular. Moynihan was in the White House loop. I remember that we got him all excited about arms to Pakistan when he was departing from India, but he didn't raise the issue with President Ford. He probably wouldn't have raised it, anyway, because this was something that Secretary Kissinger wanted to do. Saxbe, on other hand, trod "where angels feared to walk." He couldn't have cared less. He used to say: "I can always go home."

One of the Kissinger innovations was the institution of "Joint Commissions" with different countries. He became interested in having a joint India-US commission. We first heard about it from the Indians who had wanted a joint commission. We had always said that it was not the American way of doing things. The Indians had a joint commission with the Soviets. That is the way the Soviets operated. The Indians wanted one with us.

They said: "Your Secretary has agreed to it." We said: "This is nonsense. We don't want this." Then we checked and found that Kissinger had indeed agreed to it.

We didn't want a joint commission because we didn't want to have all aspects of our relations with India controlled by the Indian Government. Our point was that there should be "people to people" contacts, and private businesses should be free to deal with Indian counterparts, instead of dealing with the government all the time. But Kissinger had already agreed so we had to work out an agreement. The reason he agreed, I assume, was that a commission cost us little and was a way to make the Indians a bit happier. So Eric Gonsalves -- the DCM at the Indian Embassy -- and I then set about negotiating an agreement on the joint commission. We developed a draft and talked our way through it. He said: "This is an advantage for you because, in fact, if an American does business in India today, at any level, the Indian government is going to become involved. So this way, if you get things done through the Joint Commission, you then have the government's blessing. If you don't do this, there's no system now for giving you the government's blessing. Today it is very hard for Americans to get anything done in India."

I accepted that but said: "Let us try to set up a rational structure that at least will do no harm or make things worse." He said: "That sounds reasonable." We decided to set up a system without a formal structure. The Joint Commission, as such, was the Secretary of State and the Indian Foreign Minister. We figured that since the Indian Foreign Minister always came to the UN every year, they would meet once every year. And once every two years the Secretary of State, we thought, was about right for the Secretary to go to New Delhi. The real work of the Joint

Commission, such as it was, would be done by Sub-Commissions. There would be no staff and no formal organization. Nothing. There would be three Sub-Commissions: one on science and technology, because we had a large "rupee financed" program of science projects in India, amounting to about \$20 million a year. It was handled by the Science Attaché in New Delhi. The Subcommission on Science and Technology would go over programs, assign priorities, and so forth.

The second Sub-Commission was to work in the field of education and culture. This was an area that in which we had some interest -- doing more on educational exchanges, getting Indian scholars to come to the US, etc. Each side could set up its part the way it wanted to. We didn't try to make it parallel. We then arranged to include various U. S. agencies on our side. We had one representative from USIS [United States Information Agency], one from the arts and museums, one from the publishing sector -- some private, some public.

Then there was a Sub-Commission on Economics and Trade, which was strictly governmental. The Indians wanted a mixed private-public Sub-Commission, but we did not agree with this, because a governmental sub-commission could only talk about policy issues and some general current problems. As a result, we set up a parallel, private sector Sub-Commission, called the Joint Business Council. I think that the U. S. side consisted of representatives from the Indian Subsection of the International Chamber of Commerce. Orville Freeman was the first head of that. The Indian Chamber of Commerce then set up a similar group.

So this Joint Commission got under way. Bob Goheen was the first head of the U. S. team of the Sub-Commission on Education and Culture. I think that the Assistant Secretary for OES [Bureau of Environmental and Scientific Affairs] was the head of the U. S. element of the Sub-Commission on Science and Technology. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was the head of the U. S. element of the Sub-Commission on Economics and Trade.

Before the first meeting of the Joint Commission, which was held during the visit to Washington of Chavan in 1976, the Indian Foreign Minister, Kissinger had the three chairmen of the U.S. elements of the three sub-commissions up to his office. He said: "I wish you well and good luck. But let me tell you one thing: don't come asking for any money. I am not going to give you any. You figure out how you are going to finance anything that you agree to." In fact, the sub-commissions are now 20 years old. They are still functioning. I think that they have achieved their goal. They have done no harm. They have done some good. The Indians feel that it has been a reasonable institution. I think that we did a reasonably good job of negotiating it in such a way that it has created no permanent bureaucracy.

These sub-commissions did things that might not have happened without them, particularly in the education and cultural fields. In the mid 1980s they decided on an "India Here" program in the United States, with big exhibits. It provided a venue which had not previously existed. They would consider from time to time, "What can we do" and "What should we do"? I think that was a good thing. In practical terms, as Gonsalves said, it provided a vehicle to get approval for some science projects. It provided a vehicle to get approval for anything that was decided on in the cultural area. The Sub-Commission on Economics and Trade faded out. The U S. private business sector never did very much with this. The structure still exists, but the wonderful thing

about it is that there is nothing to the structure. It is a mechanism which can be used or not used. Once or twice it was interesting.

DEAN RUST
Staff Assistant to Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, DC (1974-1976)

Mr. Rust was born and raised in Ohio, and was educated at Bowling Green University and Ohio State University. In 1970 he joined the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, D.C. and worked with that Agency until his retirement in 2005. An expert in nuclear and conventional disarmament issues, Mr. Rust was a major participant in the US government's international treaty negotiations during five Presidential Administrations.

Q: You did that for how long?

RUST: About 2 ½ years, until late '76.

Q: All right, let's talk a bit about Fred Iklé. How did he operate, and how did you see him?

RUST: Well, Fred was known as an intellectual, not necessarily somebody who was all that comfortable in the policy milieu of Washington. A brilliant guy who had been with Rand and had written about strategic nuclear issues. And of course the most important thing going on in arms control was negotiations with the Soviet Union. One of the reasons he became a favorite with me is because after the Indian nuclear test of May 1974, Fred was clearly the leader within the executive branch on nuclear non proliferation issues. While still engaged on U.S. Soviet stuff, Fred saw the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries as suddenly a very dominant issue. Kissinger, who was then the Secretary of State, yawned when the Indians conducted the nuclear test in 1974. But Fred saw this as a direct threat in terms of weapons spreading to other countries beyond the five then declared nuclear weapons states. So he took it on as a crusade. He was tough and wasn't afraid of Kissinger, and ACDA made a big difference in those years (1973-76) on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Iklé was particularly strong on questioning the role of plutonium in civil applications, fearing that its widespread use even in the U.S. would help foster its use overseas. A stockpile of plutonium, even if nominally for civil use, can also provide the basis for a nuclear weapons program. He feared that extensive use of plutonium for peaceful applications would seriously increase the risk of nuclear proliferation and supported efforts to weigh the pros and cons, along with strengthened controls to ensure the security and safety of plutonium where it was used.

In State, the Politico-Military (PM) Bureau handled nonproliferation. I believe George Vest was the head of PM. Vest and Iklé collaborated quite a little bit. ACDA had much more of the functional expertise that you needed in order to do this nuclear proliferation business. PM and ACDA teamed up pretty well, once Fred got the State Department's attention. As Iklé's Staff Assistant from 74-76, I was able to see a lot of the policy studies and memoranda that the ACDA

Director dealt with. Because of Iklé's interest in nuclear arms non proliferation, I learned a lot and started to interact with the ACDA policy people in this area.

Q: What was the state of nuclear non proliferation in '74 when you were there. I mean what did this mean and were there any underpinnings to this?

RUST: Well, between 1945 when the United States developed nuclear weapons and through 1970, that is 25 years, five countries had become nuclear weapons states. The Soviets followed the U.S. then the British, the French and then the Chinese in '64. The nuclear non proliferation treaty was negotiated in the mid 60's. It came into force in 1970; that treaty drew a line in the sand. It was based on the assumption that proliferation would contribute to instability and increase the risk of nuclear war. It said "let's stop proliferation where we are." Under the treaty, states that didn't have weapons pledged not to get them, and to accept international inspections. Countries that had nuclear weapons (the Five) pledged not to transfer the possession of nuclear weapons to others and not to assist others in the acquisition of nuclear weapons; they also agreed to try to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. So that is where we were when the Indians conducted a nuclear test in 1974. This test was kind of a rude awakening because people thought that by that time, i.e. after the NPT had entered into force. most countries had accepted the notion that it was not a good idea for proliferation not to go beyond the five.

Q: Was India a signatory to the NPT?

RUST: No. And the fact is that in 1970, when the treaty entered into force, not everybody embraced it initially. Fifty or sixty states joined. Many countries like the Indians said, "Hey, this is a discriminatory treaty... it allows some states to keep their weapons, but it requires others who join it to forswear their acquisition. We are not going to be party to that." Of course, the truth is many countries did join the treaty despite its discriminatory nature, while others wanted to keep the nuclear option open. The Chinese, a neighbor of India, had nuclear weapons. And of course India always followed a somewhat independent path in its foreign policy.

Q: How did we view the Chinese at that time?

RUST: The Chinese were a non-player during the negotiations. The U.S. of course had not recognized "mainland" China at this point and it wasn't even in the UN. The Chinese criticized the treaty as a condominium between the U.S. and the Soviets. The U.S. and Soviets were seen by the Chinese as two countries who were trying to deny other countries the right to get their own nuclear weapons. "The U.S. and Soviets want to rule the world." Chinese propaganda suggested that nuclear proliferation would be a positive development as it would break U.S.-Soviet hegemony. In reality, I suspect the Chinese were more cautious about proliferation after getting their own bomb in 1964. But you would never know that from their stated positions. In the long run, China joined the NPT (1991) and changed its position considerably, although it's generally accepted that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was aided by China during the 1980's.

Q: How did you deal, let's stick to this early period, Israel?

RUST: Well, a lot of countries didn't join the treaty at this early stage. The Israelis were not particularly unusual in that regard. There were a lot of states in the Middle East, Arab states included, that were not in the treaty.

Q: When did we realize the Israelis had a nuclear bomb?

RUST: The Israelis had acquired the Dimona reactor from the French in the 1950's, I believe. It was not under international safeguards and by some time in the 1970's it was pretty clear that it had operated long enough to produce sufficient plutonium for nuclear weapons. I don't recall the dates, but there was a leak out of the U.S. intelligence community in the late 1970's that Israel likely possessed X number of weapons, and of course the famous case of the Israeli nuclear technician Mordecai Vanunu who spilled his guts for the London Sunday Times in the 1980s. I don't know when the U.S. knew for sure. I didn't have the clearances to know that information and I couldn't reveal it even if I did. My own guess is it was sometime in the 70s they probably had some, but of course they have never admitted to having nuclear weapons and have said only that they won't be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

Q: Well I was just wondering. We have been preaching and yet we have taken one significant country and put it to one side, which is not only awkward, but hypocritical.

RUST: Well again, in the 60s and 70s we didn't put them aside. The double standard criticism of setting the Israelis to one side is more pertinent to the 80s, 90s and today. But the bottom line is that since around 1980 we have essentially just "gone through the motions" in encouraging NPT adherence for not only Israel, but also for India and Pakistan. They have always been the three hardest cases; they said from the beginning that they weren't going to give up the right to acquire their own weapons, and thus they weren't going to join the treaty. In principle, we continue to maintain U.S. support for universal NPT adherence, i.e. all states joining the Treaty -- while recognizing there is little near-term prospect of action by Israel, India and Pakistan. They are the only three that have never joined the treaty. Today, there are 188 parties to the NPT. North Korea had joined it but has withdrawn. As far as hypocrisy is concerned, U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy has labored under that charge from the beginning since we are encouraging others to forego something we believe remains essential to our own security. There's also a little truth to the charge in regards to Israel, but it's a fact of life under the regime generally for the U.S. Thankfully, there are many non-nuclear weapon state NPT parties who agree generally with the U.S. on the importance of the NPT and whose diplomacy is not hypocritical on these matters.

Q: While you were doing this staff assistant work, I take it you found it from your perspective a harmonious relationship between George Vest at PM and Fred Iklé at ACDA.

RUST: Yeah, pretty much. While ACDA was an independent agency, it was small and not Cabinet level. ACDA Directors could be influential only if they worked collegially with senior levels at State and NSC. They would exercise their independence only when the stakes appeared to be worth it. So there were times when Fred took different positions than George on some key issues, but by and large, particularly at the assistant secretary and assistant director levels, good working relationships were the norm.

Iklé did take a pretty strong stand on the importance of preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. The 1974 Indian test awakened people to this technology issue; enrichment and reprocessing are parts of the civil nuclear fuel cycle, but are also critical to producing fissile material for weapons. So there is that old dichotomy of nuclear energy. It can have peaceful applications but it can also have horrific military applications. Some of these far-reaching policies that Iklé was pushing occasionally ran into some problems with our European allies and with Japan. But PM hung in there with ACDA and Congress was also pushing for strong action. So the "clientitis" that generally pervades the regional bureaus of State was generally overcome. In general, the mid-1970s saw the beginning of the broadening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime beyond the NPT and IAEA. The latter was formed in 1957, but its responsibilities significantly expanded once the NPT entered into force as all non-nuclear parties were required by the NPT to negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

A couple other things happened during Iklé's tenure that were quite significant from a nonproliferation perspective. In July or August 1974, we negotiated agreements with Israel and Egypt to provide them nuclear power reactors. This happened just before Nixon resigned. These agreements contained strong nonproliferation controls, some of which are still discussed today, for example in the case of Russia's sale of a power reactor to Iran. That said, the sales never came to fruition, because the continued aftermath of the May 1974 Indian test caused U.S. policy to tighten beyond those conditions that were to apply to the sales to Egypt and Israel. The other major development was the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, known at that time as the London Club. Initially, there were 7 states; today there are 45 and it continues serving as an effective nonproliferation tool. The first 18 months of meetings were held in general secrecy, due to concern about criticism from developing countries about a suppliers cartel. The purpose of the group was to establish common rules so that recipients couldn't play one supplier off another, which had the effect of commercial considerations trumping nonproliferation when it comes to selling nuclear material and equipment.

Q: Did your office in ACDA look for aggressive sellers of nuclear producing equipment? I am thinking particularly of France and Germany and all. Were we looking out for the salesmen in the 1970's?

RUST: Yes. We would get reports that would indicate, for example, that a firm in Germany was talking to the Brazilians about selling them sensitive nuclear technology. Whenever that happened we would go to the German government and point out the risks of selling these guys reprocessing and enrichment technology. At that time Brazil was not in the NPT, nor was Argentina. We were tracking about 10-12 countries; we called them the "dirty dozen" at one time.

Q: We were quite concerned I think in later years about the nuclear policies of Brazil and Argentina. Nobody could figure out what the hell they wanted. It seemed as though they were in competition about who could acquire the biggest nuclear toys.

RUST: Well that is right. We always realized that technology control and denial of themselves were not going to solve this thing. But what you were buying was time. If you flip forward 10-15 years from the mid 70s to 1990, you find that the political leaders in both governments had

realized that competition among the two of them in the military applications of nuclear energy would not be good for the hemisphere, was not good for their security. So both states ultimately accepted comprehensive international safeguards and joined, first the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and then the NPT. So today they are highly respected members of the non proliferation community. We bought ourselves some time, because we were able to discourage a lot of transfers and sensitive technologies back in the 70s and early 80s -- at least in the case of Latin America.

Q: Even at that time we had commercial firms that could profit by stepping over the edge or getting very close to the edge.

RUST: Yes, absolutely. Remember this is in the aftermath of the energy crisis of '73, the oil crisis. People were looking more to nuclear reactors for generation of electricity. These sales were worth hundreds of millions of dollars and there was fierce commercial competition among countries that could manufacture reactors for export. For example, the West Germans might say, "Hey, if you buy our reactor, we will sweeten up the deal with a pilot enrichment or reprocessing plant." That's when the suppliers got together, at U.S. initiative, to agree on common rules such a halt in the export of facilities for enrichment and reprocessing. That way, Brazil was not able to use the appeal of a \$500 million power reactor sale to gain these extra technologies. You see power reactors are not directly applicable to proliferation. It is the special technologies that can produce fissile material for weapons, e.g. reprocessing of spent fuel to acquire plutonium and enrichment of uranium to high levels of the isotope U-235. We need to keep those technologies out of the hands of states whose nonproliferation bona fides are suspect. Recall that in the 1970's France hadn't even joined the NPT. So nobody knew if they were on board this non proliferation game or not. The French were among the original 7 members of the nuclear suppliers group, which began to meet in 1975. As of the mid 70s then there was pretty much agreement that nobody would be selling enrichment or reprocessing facilities or technology to anybody as part of a commercial deal.

Q: You mentioned the IAEA earlier. These are the inspectors. They got the Nobel Prize in 2005, but where did they stand in the 1970's?

RUST: Well, let me go back a little. The origins of the IAEA date to the 1950s. Dwight Eisenhower proposed in 1953 his atoms for peace program. The essence of this program was to encourage limited commerce among nations for peaceful nuclear applications, but only under international inspections. That was the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA statute was agreed upon in '57. It was given a dual responsibility - to promote the so-called peaceful nuclear atom as well as to verify its peaceful use. It slowly developed a safeguard system. By the time the NPT came along in 1970, the treaty negotiators decided to require all the non nuclear states that joined the NPT to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to help verify the NPT undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons. So by the mid 70s, the IAEA was negotiating safeguards agreements with every NPT party. The safeguard system was still in the rudimentary stage, but it was beginning to grow at that time. The United States was putting a lot of money into helping develop the technology that would provide a reasonable assurance that countries were using nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes, and not trying to divert these facilities for military operations.

Q: Were U.S. firms on board? Was there a problem of rogue operations or not?

RUST: No, in U.S. firms I would say not. They did resent the fact that U.S. national legislation often made it more difficult for them to sell than it would for French or German firms, so they did want a level playing field. That was part of the purpose of the nuclear suppliers group, i.e. to make sure all nations selling power reactors were doing so under the same conditions. U.S. firms knew that it was in their interest to have strong nonproliferation controls, because you don't want a peaceful sale to end up helping somebody with a nuclear bomb. That outcome would severely erode public confidence in nuclear commerce. So by and large over the years nuclear industry in the United States has been fairly supportive of strong export controls. They want to be able to compete and sell, but they understand that anything that has nuclear energy involved in it has the potential for misuse. So you have to have strong controls.

Q: How about Congress. You mentioned Scoop Jackson. I think Richard Perle was his man at one point. Did they have a different agenda than ACDA?

RUST: Not on proliferation. Scoop's interest was on strategic arms control. Those interested in proliferation in the Congress were John Glenn in the Senate, and Alan Cranston but less so. In the House you had a guy named Jonathan Bingaman from New York and a couple others. These Members got very involved after the India test of '74. There was concern that some U.S. supply to India had been used to produce the plutonium for its '74 peaceful nuclear explosion. So yes, Congress became involved in a big way in tightening U.S. nuclear export controls. The laws passed in the 1970's not only upgraded U.S. controls on nuclear exports, but they also called for certain punitive measures (e.g. cutoff of economic and security assistance) against other countries that engaged in proliferation acts such as a nuclear explosion or acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing equipment. Congress was an ally of ACDA; at that time it believed strongly in the importance of an independent Agency to promote arms control and nonproliferation. Like ACDA, the Congress was always pushing the rest of the Executive branch to take strong stands on these issues.

Q: There are always competing interests within the Executive branch.

RUST: Commercial pressures. You name it. And a little sub-Cabinet agency like ACDA could easily be overwhelmed much of the time. The Executive branch would rally in the immediate aftermath of a dramatic proliferation event like the 74 Indian test, but interest would wane over time. But if a Member of Congress persists, the Administration has to pay attention. So ACDA and certain Members of Congress often found themselves working in support of the same agenda. And ACDA staff would help reformulate Congressional initiatives into something that the Administration could actually support. Congress was very active in the '75, '76, '77, '78 time frame.

Q: What about the Pentagon at this point? Did they have sort of spies in your office or observers or not?

RUST: At this stage of the evolution of U.S. nuclear non proliferation policy, they weren't that

big a player.

Q: Did you get any feel for James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, and Fred Iklé, I see as sort of intellectuals. I was wondering if you had any feel for the chemistry. How did they interplay with each other?

RUST: I can't speak to their personal interaction. As to policy interaction between ACDA and DOD, it was almost exclusively in the strategic nuclear area. i.e. following up on the 1972 Nixon-era SALT and ABM treaties. DOD got involved in nuclear nonproliferation then only around the time of an NPT Review Conference, the first of which occurred in 1975, five years after the NPT entered into force. At Review Conferences you have to discuss implementation of the NPT, i.e. what each party is doing to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty. For the U.S. and the other nuclear weapon powers who were party at that time -- the UK and USSR -- that meant primarily describing their actions to limit and bring down their nuclear arsenals. So Defense became very much interested in laying out our record of compliance as well as defending ourselves against critics. So the diplomacy and policy development surrounding a Review Conference saw the Pentagon -- both OSD and the Joint Chiefs -- directly engaged. On other issues, e.g. Pakistan and India, ACDA and State occasionally butted heads, and in that context ACDA would try to court DOD, believing that DOD would be a natural ally when it came to taking tough positions on nuclear nonproliferation issues. If anyone should be concerned about others getting the bomb, it should be those responsible for the defense of the United States. But I don't think we were very successful over the years. They certainly started to play a bigger role when the rogue states began to emerge as proliferation threats, which wasn't until the late 1980's/early 1990'. But until this Administration, DOD was always helpful at the time of Review Conferences. This Administration came in with a bias against Treaties generally; and chafed at those provisions of the NPT that required the existing nuclear weapons to progress toward nuclear disarmament. Thus, they weren't all that cooperative in connection with the 2005 NPT Review Conference in showing flexibility and a sympathetic ear toward those who believed the nuclear weapon states should be doing more. Of course, the Administration's opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty were significant departures from traditional arms control and, right or wrong, made U.S. NPT diplomacy leading to the 2005 Conference very difficult.

Q: Had the Soviets pretty well joined the choir by this time? Had they realized that the nuclear weapon states were the big boys and we must not let these little guys screw things up?

RUST: Yeah, we often remarked during the cold war that, regardless of differences on other matters, the U.S. and the Soviets tended to agree on nonproliferation. It was not in either of their interest for other countries to get the bomb. We cooperated on nonproliferation even in those very tense times including the Soviet shootdown of the KAL commercial airliner. Reagan had Soviet leaders dying on him; there was a lot of instability in the relationship until Gorbachev. There is still a lot of cooperation and common ground, but as the nonproliferation regime evolved and the USSR collapsed you began see more tactical differences in how to deal with cases like Iran for example. It's almost always been the case frankly that the U.S., Canada, Australia take the hard line, the Europeans are in the middle, and the Soviets and now Russia and China take the weakest approach. Japan would go along with the evolving consensus and it

wasn't until the North Korean nuclear and missile threat escalated that Japan could be counted on to become more active. Of course, the current U.S. Administration has added a wrinkle by reversing 30 year old policies and seemingly to "accept" the nuclear programs of India, Israel, and Pakistan while focusing almost exclusively on rogue proliferation. The jury is still out on this shift, but I note that the Administration is not getting much of a push-back on this shift from other countries.

In the bureaucracies of the 1970's we found ourselves fighting often with the predecessors of today's Department of Energy. The Atomic Energy Commission dated to the 1950's I think. Well around 1973-74, the Congress decided the AEC should be split into a regulatory body -- the Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- and a promotional body -- first called the Energy Research and Development Administration which became the Department of Energy under President Carter. NRC regulated U.S. nuclear exports and ERDA later DOE promoted international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. So ACDA was often at odds with the nuclear energy promotion people, who were concerned that too strict export controls would lead to the loss of nuclear business to other countries and in the long run deal the U.S. out of any influence on international nuclear policies. State found itself in the middle of a lot of these disputes. The Department of Commerce would also get involved in so-called dual-use nuclear stuff that it licensed. I do recall, however, that cooperation was good when it came to trying to shut down illegal procurement from countries like Pakistan.

Q: I can see an average U.S. Citizen saying at the time: These arms control and nonproliferation types are just a bunch of liberal goody two shoes who are trying to get everyone to live in peace. When actually you are playing the nasty sons of bitches, or not?

RUST: Certainly when it came to nuclear proliferation ACDA played the nasty. That is the President of the United States said that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries undermines the security of the United States. It didn't matter to ACDA that taking a tough line might upset bilateral relations with a country or would cost the loss of commercial opportunities. That was our job. That's why ACDA was created in 1961 by President Kennedy, with strong support from the Congress. The State Department was conflicted; Energy and Commerce were pushing U.S. exports out the door. Of course, any effort to deny other countries their sovereign right to acquire what they believe is necessary for their defense is not an easy task. But nuclear weapons have a unique capacity to destroy and undermine U.S. security. If ACDA makes the case and senior policy-makers decided in favor of State or Energy -- so be it. But it was our statutory responsibility to make the nonproliferation argument.

Q: Having been a creature of the State Department I can see exactly why. There are so damn many reason why you can't do something because you have got other priorities. You needed somebody with a focus.

RUST: Certainly, State has functional responsibilities, but more than anything else it is an organization that is designed to promote U.S. interests through use of bilateral country channels. There was a proliferation and arms control responsibility in State/PM, but it was one of many responsibilities for the PM Assistant Secretary. For years, OES had nuclear nonproliferation along with promoting nuclear energy cooperation. They did a great job given this conflicted

functional responsibility, but the bottom line is they had to take an approach that met the approval of others in State such as the country desk. ACDA was independent and had the resources - physicists, engineers, chemists -- who knew the technical aspects of the business. Military officers and foreign service officers were detailed to the agency. International relations specialists swelled its civil service ranks. U.S. Administrations have viewed nuclear weapons as dangerous for a long time. President Eisenhower in the 1950's supported a comprehensive nuclear test ban. That concern evolved into support for a separate agency. Even Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State in 1961, was perfectly comfortable with the creation of a separate agency and giving Bill Foster who was its first director independent authority to negotiate with the Soviets on nuclear issues.

JOSEPH P. O'NEILL
Consular Officer
Calcutta (1974-1977)

Joseph P. O'Neill was born in New York in 1935. From 1953-1956 he served in the US Army. After joining the Foreign service in 1961 he served positions in Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Portugal, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Eritrea. Mr. O'Neill was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in May 1998.

O'NEILL: So, we decided to go out to Calcutta. When we said, "Josephine and I are going to Calcutta, 99% of the Department was happy for us. One percent (most of the people I was working for in the Visa Section) wasn't because I didn't finish the full two year tour." I was almost 40 years old. I knew how to do things. I didn't have to go and bother people. I went out to Calcutta.

Q: What did you go out as?

O'NEILL: I went out as a consular officer. At that time, we had a terrible problem in Calcutta. It was called the "Harcos-Fletcher" matter. Two guys trying to smuggle narcotics in Calcutta had been caught on the King George naval dock. They had not been arrested for smuggling, but had been arrested for trespassing on military property, spying, and held under the Official Secrets Act. The case received so much domestic political pressure that Henry Kissinger had to take it up personally with Indira Gandhi.

This case, I'd like to say, went on for almost two years. I had to visit them in the jail every day. While they were in jail, they went on a hunger strike. They had to be force fed, which I had to watch. The jails in Calcutta were terrible. Finally, we arranged for them to be under house arrest, which they had to pay for. My wife had to go out and buy all their food and bring it in. I had to attend High Court hearings and actually answer questions before My Lord, Justice Talukdar. I forget all the paraphernalia that I had to say, that I was only here to provide comfort to two American citizens, not in any way to observe the proceedings, which I was absolutely positive

were being conducted as if it were before the Supreme Court in Washington. Boy, I really put the grease on that one. I spent two years at Court and three years in Calcutta.

The consul general who was just leaving was a nice guy. The deputy consul general in Calcutta was not terribly industrious. I became the de facto number two. I was taking care of the Consular Section and the Harcos-Fletcher matter, which had Secretary of State's interest and Embassy Delhi's interest because everybody was afraid they would die in Indian custody. There was a time when they were really possibly going to die. We finally had them put under house arrest. That was what led to Josephine being the purveyor of all their foods and other necessities.

Then I started to travel on normal consular business. I went to Bihar, to Orissa, all over our consular district. Each place I went, I would sit down as I did in Cebu and I would write long bios on everybody I met. There was a bio form at that time. As time went on, down toward the end of our two years, they asked us to extend, and we did for a third year. So, we did three years in Calcutta. I received a Meritorious Honor Award out of that. But I found the Indians, if you approached them on an intellectual basis, and told them you weren't interested in propaganda, and you talked to them about what was going on that affected them and their relationship with us, you could get a decent dialogue - not a dialogue where you would [have a meeting of the minds] because we still had the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was going on. And they were very proud that the Vietnamese were beating us. Occasionally, when they would annoy me, I would say, "And I know how well you did against the Chinese." The Chinese had recently beaten them in a border fight. That would really get them. Sometimes I would say, "You know, Calcutta was very important in this fight against the Chinese because the Chinese had sent down scouts who got as far as Calcutta and went back and said, 'If we take Calcutta, we'll lose.'" After a while, they left me alone as it regards Vietnam.

I just want to go back for one thing: Vietnam and the Tet offensive. When the Tet offensive happened, I was in Chiang Mai, but they called me back because we had a number of officers in Hue. Some of our officers in Quang Tri had been under the gun for weeks and weeks, been shelled and the rest. That was Steve Ledogar and Dick Brown. They had to leave. There were others. So, I went back. They were still bringing Marines into Hue when I went in with them. A number of people, German doctors, innocent civilians, had been killed for no reason. I'm not talking about priests. I'm just talking about normal people who had been killed.

Q: They ran amuck.

O'NEILL: I don't know what they were doing. They seemed to have lost discipline. Of course, to retake the old city of Hue, which the Marines went in and took terrible casualties, but the other point is that the Vietnamese marines who went in with our Marines (not immediately, but following up) took great casualties. Of course, I think, psychologically, the United States lost the war when Robert Kennedy started saying that "Our boys are dying and no Vietnamese are dying" and then Cronkite went out and said, "There's a possibility we can't win this." We lost it.

But then they were back to Calcutta, the consul general and I did all the reporting. I did a lot more than he did. He did the analytical stuff. I did the grunt work primarily because as a consular officer, you get around to see everybody and nobody says to the American consul, "You can't

come in." They'll say that to the economic officer or the political officer, maybe even say that to the consul general, but somebody in that family is going to need a visa.

Q: How well do we understand that.

O'NEILL: I understand it and used it.

Q: Did the ambassador visit Calcutta very often?

O'NEILL: Yes. Fortunately, by that time, Galbraith (His son is now ambassador in the Balkans) used to come up on a regular basis, primarily to go to Orissa to go swimming. The other ambassadors came up to see us occasionally and the DCM came up to see us, too.

Q: You had a huge consular district.

O'NEILL: Yes. We couldn't visit most of it because the Indians wouldn't let us. The Department for some ungodly reason was very interested in knowing what was happening among the tribes up on the Burmese border.

Q: In the northeast there?

O'NEILL: Yes, up around Assam and Nagoland. I have no idea why. There were human rights violations out there. I had met a number of Italian priests who were up that way, and Irish Christian Brothers. My uncle was an Irish Christian Brother. So, I had a good entree to that level. The archbishop of Calcutta was made a cardinal while I was there and was a friend of the family and had been to the house, and had Josephine's cooking, as everybody else did in that town. It was just intellectually a very stimulating post. For the first time, we had a democratic communist takeover.

Q: I think Bengal was communist controlled.

O'NEILL: Yes. Well, it became communist controlled and never has left communist control. Jyoti Basu. But he was a communist who played golf. He was a communist who liked his Scotch and water. He was a man who loved the finer things in life.

Q: Did you have any personal security problems there in Calcutta?

O'NEILL: The Naxalites were still wandering around the area. The consul general had a bodyguard.

Q: Explain them a bit.

O'NEILL: Naxalites were really anarchists, very, very outside the realm of the communist, Marxist party. They were really beyond the pale. They really believed in killing their enemies. They had killed a lot of people. They were being fought by the West Bengal armed police, which were paramilitary. The fight was really run from the rank of sergeant to about captain by Anglo-

Indians. They were "mean mothers." I mean, they were really bad. They had no compunction. Naxalites never went to trial. They were always killed in fights. It was difficult for me to understand some of it because they were in a corner with their hands behind their back and they were still "allegedly fighting." It was very, very difficult fighting. Most of these officers eventually immigrated to England or to Australia or Canada. They had no future in India because they were "Anglo."

Q: Was there any effect of our Pakistan tilt in those days?

O'NEILL: They never could understand why we were pro-Pakistani. I said, "You mean because they support us in the United Nations, they buy our weapons, they engage in trade with us, etc. and you holler at us, you're against us every time, against us over this and that?" "We have a right to be like that. We're Indians, we're Bengalis." I said, "We have a right to make our own friends." "Oh, you only want people who like you?" "That's what friends are for." The Indian general in charge (interestingly, Jewish) of that area was another friend of mine who had been in charge of an armored division going across into Bangladesh. He now was in charge of all Indian troops in that area. We had some very interesting conversations. He only got annoyed at me once because I got to know many of his middle rank officers. He felt that I was pumping them for information, which I was. But we had a good professional relationship. It was not a personal relationship. But he understood exactly what I was doing. He had a very low opinion of politicians and especially Indian politicians. He knew they were all bribable. This was, by the way, during the time when Mrs. Gandhi took over the whole government. She and her son ran it: forced sterilization, etc.

Q: She declared a state of emergency.

O'NEILL: That's right. It again shows you the value of consulates. [At times], had better information [from Calcutta] about what was going on in Delhi than the people in Delhi. They had very fine officers there, but Indian politicians would return home to Calcutta. It was easier for us to see them and they to see us in my house. I remember having a man by the name of Kamal Nath, who I think has finally been caught by his own government for misappropriation of funds. He came and gave us great information on Thanksgiving Day about Indian atomic energy research. He didn't know he was giving it. We had talked about a number of things. Afterwards, I remember saying to David Korn, who was probably the best writer in the whole Foreign Service, absolutely without par, "Well, I'm not going to write this, am I? You're going to write it, aren't you?" He said, "Well, if you write it, I have to rewrite it, so let me do it." So, he did it. He left out this piece. He had sent it out without showing it to me. I forget what I was doing the next day. I came up and I said to him, "We're got to report this." He said, "Yes, I guess we have to." I said, "Why don't we just to report it EXDIS [exclusive distribution] since it's sensitive?" The result was a beautiful cable from the ambassador in New Delhi (a professor from Ohio or someplace), or I guess it was written by the DCM, saying how much they appreciated the first cable and how much they appreciate our sensitivity in sending this other cable separately and restricted. David Korn said, "You know, luck to the goddam Irish." The Agency was upset that we beat them on this. The chief of station tried to take some of my sources. He eventually did after I left.

But it was for me a very stimulating thing. The poverty was atrocious. We met Mother Theresa before she came in November.

Q: I was going to ask you whether you had met Mother Theresa.

O'NEILL: We did. We met her and her nuns. Again, the previous consular officer was just a real asshole, a jerk, and was making these poor nuns go through all the things that had to be done to get into the States. So, I gave them all B-1 visas and said, "Now, make sure you enter through New York." I put a little note: "Under the patronage of Francis Cardinal Spellman." Never had another bit of trouble, not legal, but correct

The Bengali is really a terribly interesting person. He loves poetry, politics, and is not terribly interested in a great deal of profitable or economic work. But in all this, he is a ferment for India. The old saying "What Bengal thinks today India thinks tomorrow" is or was at the time I was there very, very accurate. You could see the swings in mood, the beginning of Indira Gandhi and her son pushing too far, pushing the Bengali to do something which they hate to do: work. It was just that sort of ferment in the society which caught on. In that period under martial law, Mrs. Gandhi was able to do so many economic things. It has been forgotten, but there were useful things done. The Indian bureaucracy was and continues to be inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt. I think that will be an inhibiting factor in anything that happens for the foreseeable future.

Q: What was the religious situation like in the Calcutta region when you were there? Was it Hindu dominant? Was there much antipathy toward the Muslims? Were there any Muslims or others there?

O'NEILL: The Muslims were not a problem in Calcutta at the time I was there because they were so few. Their presence was barely noted. There was an Anglo-Indian community which was primarily Protestant-Catholic, but of no political influence, nor [were there Muslims] into Mizoland or into Assam or Nagoland. There were animists and Christians and they were a problem which was beginning at that time. I think David Korn pointed out to Delhi and Washington that the movement of Bengalis out of Bangladesh into that area was going to cause friction, which we see by today's paper does cause friction. I don't see religion in that area being a problem. I would not say the same for places like Bombay or in that particular area because they were adjacent to Pakistan. There is still a significant Muslim-

Q: Now, the Bengalis moving out of Bangladesh would be Muslim?

O'NEILL: Absolutely, but they were not moving into Bengali Hindu areas. They were moving into tribal areas to the north, where the land is rich and where there is work and, more importantly, where there is water.

Q: What was the position of the Soviets when you were there in Calcutta?

O'NEILL: It's amazing. It will always amaze me both in Calcutta and in Ethiopia how they have such a good intelligent system, many contacts with the people, and still don't know what the hell is going on. In every case when I was there, any time there was a political controversy, they were

always wrong. I knew the Soviet officer who was head of intelligence. He was a guest at my house. He was sent back to Moscow because he had so misreported the situation. I had a very excellent relationship with the number two at the Russian consulate general, which was big. [Calcutta] had Polish, Bulgarian, everybody was there. There was a big Eastern presence, plus an Iranian presence. Everybody was in Calcutta because at one time it was a stopover for all the planes going to and from Europe. Everybody refueled there. The next refueling place was in Bombay. I don't think the East Bloc was terribly effective. In fact, I think they were bad. They did not associate with the people. Anything they did was in a very formal or within a narrow parameter, but there was no personal interplay between-

Q: Even though Bengal was ruled by communists at the time?

O'NEILL: West Bengal at that time was not ruled by the communists, but was eventually ruled by the communists alone. Very, very bad relations. The other thing is, they had one token mixed marriage in their community. A Russian girl married somebody from Mongolia. In our community, which was much smaller, there were a number of mixed marriages: mine, a fellow who was married to an Indian girl. Somebody would come up and say, "Isn't it great that you have more mixed marriages in your community than the Russians?" We would say, "We really don't give a damn. We don't sleep for politics. We sleep for passion." Always shook them.

Q: What about the Chinese communist influence?

O'NEILL: They had a very difficult time. In fact, if I recall correctly, they had no representation in Calcutta. It was something that the Indians did not like to talk about. They knew that they were beaten by the Chinese. They felt aggrieved that after all the political support that they had given the Chinese during the Vietnam War, the Indians only sent a medical unit during the Korean War, they had always been a friend of China, voted for their entry into the United Nations, had tried to do all sorts of things for them, but when it came to a border dispute, they wouldn't acquiesce to India's point of view and then had beaten them badly. What hurt was that those units that did well against the Chinese were the Gurkhas, tribal units, not Hindu regiments. The Sikhs did well against them.

Q: Was there a Vietnamese presence in Calcutta?

O'NEILL: No, there wasn't a Vietnamese presence in Calcutta. There was one in Delhi, but it was a Saigon presence. I was going to be called back to go to Laos (1975) to help them evacuate in those final days, but I was involved in this Harcos-Fletcher matter. I was the only one who was accredited by the courts to attend these official secret trials. Delhi and Washington considered that more important than me going back to Laos.

Q: Did we have a Peace Corps presence there in that area?

O'NEILL: There was no Peace Corps.

Q: Because the Indians didn't want it.

O'NEILL: They didn't want it. They had left at some time. I can't remember when they had left, but we did not have a Peace Corps presence.

Q: Your tour in Calcutta ended in 1977, I believe?

O'NEILL: Yes.

VIRGINIA CARSON-YOUNG
Consular Officer
New Delhi (1974-1978)

Virginia Carson-Young was born in Pullman, Oregon. She received a bachelor's degree from the University of Washington in 1952. Her career as a Foreign Service officer included positions in India, Hong Kong, Mexico, Romania, and Peru. Ms. Carson-Young was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1991.

Q: So you worked in India from when to when?

CARSON-YOUNG: From 1974-78.

Q: What was the situation from your perspective in India when you got there?

CARSON-YOUNG: Well, it was a two-person consular section. My training had been sketchy. I actually was trained by the FSNs in New Delhi.

Q: Foreign Nationals in India.

CARSON-YOUNG: I had a staff of nine. My boss was a man named Dick White, who has long since retired. He was a man who paid very little attention to the work. He would slip out of the office and be gone much of the time. I was so anxious to succeed...I chose India actually. I fell into the assignment. I was having lunch with some old Foreign Service friends and someone, whom I didn't know, (he turned out to be Howie Schaffer, who was the Personnel person for NEA) said, "Ginny, now you are in the Foreign Service. What would you like to do?" I said, "Well, I would love to go to India some time. It has always been a place of fascination for me." I ran into him in the hall about a week later and he said, "I think that assignment is going to work out." So that is how it happened.

I am sure Dick White was very, very skeptical of the kind of help he was going to get from this 46-year-old inexperienced consular officer. But I got there and was very eager, energetic, and loved it. He came in to me after one or two days on the job and said, "We have an American citizen streaking in the Ashoka Hotel, would you go down and take care of her." I said, "Sure." Then I thought, "Streaking, that must mean drugs of some kind." I called the Indian doctor who was the consultant for the Embassy and someone that I had met. He was a Sikh in a pink turban,

a Harvard educated physician. I said, "Would you go with me to the Ashoka Hotel? I think I have a problem down there." So he did.

We went down and by then the woman was in her room. She was wearing a bikini, a sleeveless cardigan that came down below her knees, platform-soled shoes, a big hat, dark glasses and carried a cane. There were three men in the room. The place was blue with smoke. She fell in love with the pink turban. She would have followed the doctor anywhere. He said it was drugs. She had money and was from a very good New York family. The hotel was willing to keep her in the hotel if she would just keep her clothes on and behave herself. That, then, became my first American citizen services case.

From then on, Dick White would ask me to do a variety of things. I did non-immigrant visas in the morning, I did immigrant visas and petitions for immigration in the afternoon, and one of the local employees would thread his way up through the non-immigrant visa crowd to have me do notarials or take care of Americans. I was just swamped, but it was exciting.

Q: What was the visa situation in India from the American perspective at that time?

CARSON-YOUNG: Well, of course India is a very mixed society. There is a thin veneer, deeper now, but then rather thin, of educated, sophisticated, rather wealthy and middle class Indians. Then there is this huge population of people who are less well-off. So there is a lot of pressure to get that non-immigrant visa to get to the United States. And many of them never returned to India, or if they did, it was as an immigrant married to an American. So the NIV line was a challenge.

I must say, after being there for four years, the one thing that I realize now that I did was to develop a very rigid attitude towards students, particularly. I am more generous towards non-immigrant visa applicants now than I was then. I got to the point that I felt that I knew the Indians so well...and I had lots of Indian friends and we talked about how they were trying to get out, or trying to get their children out...so my student visa refusal rate just skyrocketed. I now think that that was wrong. If it is a bona fide person going to a bona fide school, I believe you should give them the benefit of the doubt.

Q: Just to go into this for a bit because what you are describing is a fairly typical reaction. An officer can go one of two ways. One is to continue to get tougher and tougher and take great pride in it and another is to develop more tolerance. Why, looking back on this, would a first time officer get so strict?

CARSON-YOUNG: Well, I think a lot of it was a certain amount of arrogance. I believed that I knew, and in fact, I think I did know, what their intent was. The law says you must deal with intent. And many of them did not intend to return. But as we know, our immigration laws as far as non-immigrants are concerned can be very legitimately interpreted strictly or loosely. It is really up to us. If I thought, as I did then, that they were not going to come back, they didn't get a student visa. I even turned down a fellow who had a scholarship to Yale. He had a U.S. resident brother who was his sponsor. I believed the family was grooming him to follow in his brother's footsteps. I was probably right. But, I now believe, also wrong.

In the beginning I would lose sleep over visas that I had denied. I later began to lose sleep over some that I had issued. For students, in particular, I would now give them the benefit of the doubt.

Q: Well, I am just wondering, I will just throw this out to you...I think part of the reaction, I notice this with new officers, there is a tendency when you first arrive there that these are the rules and you sort of take shelter behind them. You are so worried about making a mistake that refusing sometimes seems almost easier, or you can develop a righteousness...

CARSON-YOUNG: Yes, righteousness is a good word.

Q: ...and one of the factors I think is that most of us are not used to being lied to and this really gets to you.

CARSON-YOUNG: I was just going to say that one of my junior officers, a very bright young woman who worked with me in Mexico, said, "Oh, they are such liars, if they would just stop lying to me!" I said, "Helen, if they told you the truth, you absolutely wouldn't grant the visa." It is not correct, but it is understandable, why they misrepresent the facts to us.

Q: What were you seeing on the immigrant side?

CARSON-YOUNG: Oh, Stu, we had two fraud rings that developed in my first two years in India. One of them perpetrated by a local employee, (I think he may have been involved in both of them) but in any case, one was for non-immigrant visas and the other one for immigrant visas.

Part of the problem was my supervisor, Mr. White, who in the beginning was doing the immigrant visas in the afternoon. He was a very disinterested and lazy man. He would bring 15 to 20 immigrants into his office and have them all swear that this was the truth and then apparently just blindly sign their papers.

I am not sure who brought it to my attention, but it had to be one of the Indian employees. But there were obvious fraud indications, some quite blatant, such as white outs on the information section. We began to see duplications of sponsors and bank letters, similar to what you found in Korea. We could tell by the names. I remember one that caught my attention. It was a Hindu marrying a Muslim and that just didn't happen.

We also found that we were sending a lot of nurses to the United States under the old non-preference category which was current at that time. The Indian nursing degree was considered equivalent to U.S. training and there was no other exam they had to take. Actually, I queried the Department several different times about a possible way to refuse these young woman who were not nurses. They often came back to file a petition for a spouse, maybe a year or two later, when they had gotten their green card. They were not working as nurses, but as nurses' aides, because they couldn't pass the RN examination. At that time the Department's answer was no, if they have the degree, they qualify. Then we found out that a local employee was adding spouses' names to the records of these nurses. We found out when one of them came back to file a petition

for a new husband and we said, "But you are already married. We have already sent your husband to the United States to join you." She was unaware that another fellow had gone as her husband. The local employee who was involved in altering the records was allowed to resign. I am not sure...you know in those days, they really didn't want to fire people for fraud. I remember, I worked with the security officer and interviewed the employee, but we really didn't have any proof, so he resigned. The same thing happened to Mr. White, as a matter of fact.

Q: He had to resign?

CARSON-YOUNG: He was involved in the NIV fraud side. He had a girlfriend who worked, I think, with a travel agent. I first learned about it when...because I did all of the NIVs...I came in one morning and there was a stack of passports on the counter with visas in them. I asked the local employee, "What is all this?" He said, "Oh, Mr. White approved those." I looked at them, and they were all Gujaratis, out of our consulate district.

Q: A Gujarati is?

CARSON-YOUNG: From a province in India where they would have applied in Bombay. They would have had to be physically present and come in for an interview in our consular district. I sure didn't remember seeing them, and Mr. White wouldn't have normally done the interview. I went in to Mr. White and said, "What is all this." He said, "Oh, I know I shouldn't have, but I felt sorry for them and I think they are okay." They were supposedly going as cultural people-to-people ambassadors, when you could tell from the applications that they were farmers and peasants. And then similar things happened to people in the Punjabi area, which was in our consular district. Issuances that I didn't know anything about. So I tried to check up on them.

I often went off on fraud interviews at the request of the INS. I don't know if you ever had this sort of experience. We have a reciprocal agreement with INS that if they ask a consular officer to make an investigation of an individual who has applied for adjustment of status in the United States, we have an obligation to do that. Now, we can plead lack of staff, funds, etc., but my understanding is that we have to find a way to fit the investigation into our schedule. At least, in India that was the way it was handled.

So I would wait until I had maybe a dozen or more cases. They were almost all from a general area, the Punjab, where the people were bright, aggressive and jobless. They, quite understandably, were the ones who were making up stories about visiting a cousin, managed to get a visitor's visa and, in most cases, were either claiming work experience in India that would qualify them for resident status in the United States, or were marrying an American in order to stay in the United States, but were already married in India and had never divorced.

So I would go in an Embassy car, with a driver, and one of my local employees and my stack of files, and a cooler with drinks and sandwiches and spend sometimes a week or ten days on the road, stopping wherever we landed. My assistant was a born detective. He loved tracking a case, going from village to village, finding out the facts. I did not know in the beginning that the reports I sent back had to be made available to the attorney for the immigrant who was trying to adjust. So, at one point I remember I went to the Windsor Hotel in Ludhiana, which was one of

our bad areas. The man who was trying to adjust had claimed experience as a cook at the Windsor Hotel in Ludhiana. The Windsor Hotel sounds like a nice place. Well, it was a little hole in the wall, and it was dark. I went there about 11 o'clock in the morning. I had to go downstairs to speak with the manager. My assistant and I were holding hands, since I was a little bit frightened. I got back to what they called the kitchen, but it was really an area outside. Here was this little man, the present cook, wearing a dhoti, squatting over a pot and stirring it. I took a photograph of him, and wrote up the report. I said, "It is to Ajit Singh's credit that he never worked in a crummy place like this." They had no records of him ever working there. Well, of course, my language was made available to the attorney representing Mr. Singh.

But, back to my fraud cases, I checked up on the NIV applicants whose passports I'd found on the counter. It was in some cases almost a year after the visitor's visas had been issued by Mr. White. I would go to the home address and say, "Is your husband here?" The woman of the house would say, "Oh, no. He has a job in the United States."

So I came back to the Embassy and went to the Personnel Officer and said, "You know, Dick White signed all of these visas. He is on home leave and has been given an extension of his assignment in order to come back. I wondered how wise an idea that was, since I had been told that he had been involved in some kind of illegal activities, even before I arrived in India." And she said, "Well, is this McCarthy days? Is this guilt by co incidence? Have all of your visa applicants come back?" And I backed off. I didn't want to be the bell ringer. Mr. White had been very nice to me. I know now that I went to the wrong person.

Q: From a practical point of view, a personnel officer is the last person to be interested in anything else...

CARSON-YOUNG: In fact, when Mr. White's problems became known in Washington, the DCM then heard about them and called me. I said, "Yes, I have had some misgivings." He said, "Why didn't you come to me?" Well, I didn't know who to see.

In fact I sometimes wonder...I had it happen in another post where the Consul General, actually in Hong Kong, found out that one of my superiors was often drunk on the job and not really performing and said, "Why didn't you come to me?" Stu, I just don't know. When do you go rat on your boss?

Q: It is a major problem and there is no real answer because you are damned if you do and damned if you don't.

CARSON-YOUNG: Part of it makes me angry because I thought in both these cases, if you, Mr. DCM or supervisor, ever bothered to come down to the consular section, you would have perhaps known that this was going on. But it is so often the case that the Ambassador, the DCM, the person that I report to, really doesn't have any idea what is going on in my section.

Q: How did this non-immigrant problem sort itself out, or did it?

CARSON-YOUNG: Mr. White's girlfriend was an Anglo-Indian whom he lived with, on the U.S. compound. She was given a visa, but again, not by me. She went to the United States. She had a letter of recommendation as a housekeeper written on Embassy stationery and signed by Mr. White. She went to work for a woman in Maryland. This woman apparently knew something about immigration law, because she wrote the Department and said, "I don't really understand this. This woman was recommended by somebody in the Embassy, but she isn't really an experienced housekeeper. She doesn't work, makes long distance calls on my phone to Mr. White back in India. I am wondering what is going on."

This letter was received in the embassy mail room, and as a matter of routine, routed to Mr. White to answer. The Indian employee who opened the mail in our section brought it to me and said, "What do we do about this?" I said, "You give it to Mr. White. I am not going to intervene." But apparently someone in the Department had also contacted the front office, because I was later asked about the letter. As a result, I went through the previous visa applications for the period of time in question. I knew that the woman had gone to the United States, although I only heard about it after she left. I never did find an application. But after this inquiry, Mr. White produced an application form. I could tell that it was after the fact, because the photograph showed the woman with her hair cut short, which was after she went to the United States. So I am sure they had communicated and he said, "Look I have to get something in the file to show that the visa was properly issued." He had obviously come in and just stamped the visa, without any application. She then came back to India, I assumed at his request, but things were already on track. An inspection was imminent. The front office just decided that it was time for Mr. White to go, and he was allowed to resign.

So that was my first two years in the Foreign Service. Two fraud rings, the immigrant side and NIV side.

Q: What happened the second two years?

CARSON-YOUNG: The second two years was with a different supervisor, a woman who was well experienced in consular work. It was a much different scene, although extremely busy. I think if anybody asked me what the main problem is in consular work, it is being asked to do more with less. Not just due to the recent budget crunch, but for 20 years I have been told to "do more with less." I like to say I was replaced by two men when I left Delhi: they finally recognized the need for an additional officer to deal with increasing volume, and increasing fraud. Sadly, I have recently learned that the FSN whom I referred to as the "born detective" is now himself in jail for visa fraud in India.

Q: Looking at it in overall terms, something that I have noticed in the Virginia area is the growth of Indian population here. This was always a tremendous potential...India has lots of people who are poor. Were you feeling the multiplier effect of the ones who got into the United States...I am talking as someone who was in Korea. I was in Korea at the time that the multiplier effect started. GI wives went over, but all of a sudden the people were sending for relatives and it was just booming. Was this happening then?

CARSON-YOUNG: Have you heard the phrase "The motel Patels?"

Q: *No.*

CARSON-YOUNG: Patel is a very common, Gujarati, Indian family name and it is an example of how Indian society works. They work together, for their families, and their villages and extended family. The original Patel, I don't know who that was, but he managed to come to the United States, get together enough money and buy a motel. He then petitioned for a family member to come and manage the motel because he needed an assistant who spoke Gujarati, and he listed other required qualities that he knew his cousin had. Then he sold the motel to the cousin, and that began the chain. It had proliferated to the point that when my present husband and I were driving across the United States in 1984, stopping in motels wherever we ended up for the night, it quite often would be a person of Indian origin behind the desk. I would say, "Is your name Patel?" Quite often the response was affirmative.

I found that this sort of cooperation, or collusion, lacking in the case of Romanians. (My last actual assignment was in Romania.) The Romanians reflect years of suspicion and fear, not only under the communists but for centuries. They have not on the whole, been a cohesive sort of society. They don't help each other. With Indians it is almost always the case that if one "makes it," in the U.S., then they will try to bring the rest of the family and extended family and even village members to join them.

Q: *I found that Romanian experience reflected pretty much in my five years in Belgrade with the Yugoslavs. It would be within the family, but not much beyond that.*

The second two years would have been when to when?

CARSON-YOUNG: That was 1976-78.

Q: *How did you find as far as our immigrant laws dealing with Indians... sometimes you have these laws made up by American lawmakers and plunked down into a completely different society...did they mesh?*

CARSON-YOUNG: Actually the Indians had great advantages because there are many of them who are very well-educated. At that time we were processing doctors, scientists and teachers quite readily. And actually Fifth Preference under the old law, for brothers and sisters of citizens, was current. So the pattern of going as a student, becoming a scientist or an engineer, putting in your resident time and then petitioning for all of your siblings, was very common at that time. But they changed the U.S. immigration law during the time I was in India so that doctors had a more difficult time. We tried to process the many doctors who had already qualified, before the cut-off date.

In the waiting room in New Delhi, everyone was mashed in together, immigrant and non-immigrant. I remember I told one young man that he would not be receiving the student visa that he sought and he fainted at the window. I had 11 doctors waiting for immigrant visas, jump to take care of him.

Q: With this heavy work load and all, did you feel it was doing things to you?

CARSON-YOUNG: It is just terribly stressful. We are playing God. We are making decisions that affect people's lives. Before I went to India, they gave me a mace can to keep in my desk drawer, in case a visa applicant became violent.

Q: A mace can contains liquid which you squirt into somebody's eyes and it knocks him out, or something.

CARSON-YOUNG: Yes. In those days, we interviewed at desks in an office. In fact, the counter-type interview was mandated during the time I was in India, and I was just thunderstruck. I said that I was not a postal clerk and was not going to sit on a stool. But, of course, it is a more efficient way of conducting large numbers of interviews.

In any case, I had the mace can in my drawer for four years and never used it. I never had anyone become violent. But I had grown men cry. I had men bring in their fathers to testify for them, men in their forties. And you know, at that time Mrs. Gandhi was very important. The official Indian attitude was very anti-American, and they talked about the "brain drain." And it was quite true. We were processing a significant number of doctors and scientists as U.S. immigrants. But it seemed really ironic to me that when the phone would ring, I would be on the visa line and just grab the phone and be talking and reviewing documents at the same time, it would often be Mrs. Gandhi's office calling to say "What did you mean? The Minister's relative must be granted the visa."

Ambassador William Saxbe who was a former Attorney General, former Senator, was one of the three different Ambassadors that I served under, in India. He used to tell the story that whenever he called on a Cabinet member they inevitably stated quite proudly that they had sons, daughters, nieces, nephews, resident in the United States. When the President of India died, this was during the Carter Administration, and Ms. Lillian, the President's mother, was leader of the official delegation...

Q: She had been a Peace Corps volunteer in her sixties.

CARSON-YOUNG: Yes, for the funeral, two of the Indian President's three children came on Air Force One with Ms. Lillian. They were permanent residents of the United States. The third came from Britain, where he was a resident. So even the very important people in India will often have children who are permanent residents elsewhere. The opportunities abroad are often greater.

During this time that I feel I had gotten so righteous about visa applicants, I decided there were certainly some who had come back, however. I had friends who were doctors and scientists and educated people who had studied abroad and returned to India. So I decided that I would do a little informal survey myself and ask "Why did you come back?" I asked at parties, and other social occasions, so it wouldn't appear to be official (which it, of course, wasn't). Some of the reasons given, especially by the medical people, was that life was easier, you could live more comfortably in India, you could have servants, a big house, you didn't have the pressures of life

overseas. But the most common thread was, "My father would not permit me (to remain abroad)." So I decided the real question I ought to ask at the interview window was, "How heavy is your father? Will your father let you stay?"

ARTHUR MEAD
Foreign Agricultural Service
Washington, DC (1975)

Arthur Mead was born and raised in Wisconsin and educated at the University of Wisconsin and American University. After service in the U.S. Army in World War II, he joined the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was involved in its overseas relief and grain storage operations, including the administration of Title I, Public Law 480. During his career Mr. Mead dealt with many overseas programs, including those concerning India and Vietnam. Mr. Mead was interviewed by Ray Ioanes in 1994.

Q: Just like the auto manufacturers. Why are there only three of them? Now we should get into how the law is implemented.

MEAD: That's right. So the private trade channels were used and if Continental Grain sold a cargo of wheat to Japan for dollars on a strictly commercial basis, without use of Title I, and sold a cargo of wheat to India under the Title I program, the procedure was basically the same. They would make the sale with the specified class and quality of wheat, move it to port, have the proper inspections, arrange to have it loaded aboard ship, have the relevant documents, go to the bank and get paid under a letter of credit.

The terms and conditions of the sale, the documents, loading arrangements were the same. The financing was the difference. In the commercial sale, dollars were paid by the buyer. Under Title I, USDA paid the seller through the Federal Reserve and the foreign government paid the U.S. in the equivalent value in their local currencies upon delivery through U.S. ports. The sellers of the grain in their operations outlined above would be working with the recipient country in such operations and that will be woven in I'm sure as we discuss the details of the Title I program. This highly compressed version of a sale makes it appear simple, which it is not. Meanwhile, USDA was monitoring the Title I sale, as we no doubt we will mention from time to time.

Q: It seems to me that is one of the things we need to talk about because before anything could happen we had to have an agreement between us and the recipient country.

MEAD: That is correct.

Q: And who did that?

MEAD: When the program started obviously all the finer points and procedures were not in place in great detail. Therefore the early agreements, such as Turkey and Yugoslavia, were

conducted on a more ad hoc informal basis while basically getting to the point we later arrived at through more formal procedures. Fortunately, as you can attest to better than I, there was a consensus among the affected U.S. agencies to proceed promptly with the program without having come to agreement on all the details of operation. So your original architects went through with the early negotiations.

Q: At the request of the foreign government?

MEAD: Yes, there always had to be a request by the foreign government involved. That part of the procedures has not changed. If I think of it later on I might discuss this point when India returned to the program about 1975 after declaring itself to be self sufficient. You have indicated an interest to cite India's experience in the program so we will be getting to this.

Q: Always, as I remember, the initiative was dependent on the receiving country to make the request as opposed to our saying to them, "We are going to offer you a program."

MEAD: Typically, a proposal would be made by country X and it would be discussed with officials of the embassy. They would go back and forth, depending on the complexity of the commodity situation and the experience of the negotiating parties. When the request was put together it would be sent to Washington by the embassy by cable and distributed to the appropriate agencies. The Foreign Agricultural Service in USDA would take the responsibility for program formulation. Program coordinators would review it through the department in terms of commodity impact, effect on commercial trade etc. and deal with other agencies on matters that affected them, such as the use of the currencies. What I am saying is that the program coordinator took on all the necessary clearances and executive branch negotiation to structure a proposal suitable to be submitted to an interagency committee (which I'll talk about later), for review and approval. The in house negotiations often were more difficult than the negotiations with the foreign government, and I believe many people would understand this statement. Once approved, in a form that may resemble the original proposal, it was sent back to the embassy with specific negotiating instructions. The Embassy often would come back to us because of problems in the negotiations, but essentially it was negotiated at the host country by the U.S. team. If successful, it was signed. We had, remember, a government to government agreement which was published in the treaty series as an international agreement. USDA issued a press release on the commodity aspects of the agreement and there usually was some announcement or ceremony, or whatever, at the host country capital.

Once the agreement was signed, say for \$50 million worth of wheat, \$50 million of rice, etc., then the Foreign Agricultural Service operations people would, again with the foreign country, go into implementation with the private trade.

Before going into the implementation and movement of commodities through private trade, I must add that the formal agreement under Title I focused heavily on the commodity composition. But this was a sale for foreign currency, which meant that upon shipment the Indians, for example, would deposit rupees into a US account for the equivalent of the market value of those commodities. These could be used for a variety of purposes, both for the US and the host country.

The original law provided for currency use for agricultural market development, the purchase of strategic materials, procurement for common defense, which meant military assistance to countries seen as security countries in the U.S. view, the purchase of goods and services for friendly countries, the promotion of economic development (in the recipient country), payment of U.S. obligations abroad, and for financing Fulbright educational exchange programs. Over the years, at the time of legislative hearings and/or extensions of the program, many additional uses were authorized. In most cases, the bulk of the currencies were loaned or granted back to the host country for economic development.

Q: The bulk of the currencies?

MEAD: Yes. I emphasize that this was true in most cases. Obviously, there were exceptions, the most notable would be Vietnam where the currencies were used almost exclusively for military support.

Q: I believe the American Science foundation was getting funds out of this program.

MEAD: Yes, that was one of the many uses legislated over time.

Q: Okay, I think we are ready for the purchase authorization.

MEAD: Let's move a commodity. The commodity has to be bought; it has to be shipped. The country would use either its own buying mission like India and Israel chose to do, or in some cases, particularly the smaller countries, they would purchase commodities and book vessels through an agent. The country, itself, or an agent would apply to the USDA for a purchase authorization, which was a financing document that enabled the country to purchase and ship a certain value of a particular kind of commodity. While the value would govern, the authorization was keyed to a quantity. Depending on the country and commodities involved, the authorization may cover the entire amount in the agreement or could be issued in increments if the amounts warranted that approach.

We noted earlier and briefly how the agreements were negotiated. We should add here that they normally covered one year and would specify the amounts of each commodity with the approximate quantity. In any event, the purchase authorization also specified an approximate quantity and a specific value as indicated above. It would be very specific for the time period during which the commodity would be purchased and the time period during which it would be shipped (placed aboard ship). It dealt with quality factors, inspection arrangements and such pick and shovel work necessary to make delivery through the port.

The Foreign Agricultural Service had a monitoring function over these arrangements, including how the commodity and shipping space tenders were conducted, tenders meaning the document used by the country mission or agent to solicit bids for the services requested.

Q: Didn't we have a price review?

MEAD: That was one of the crucial elements in the monitoring function. This was particularly important both for commodity prices and for rates for shipping space so that the prices and rates were reasonable and within current price and rate structures. With the billions of dollars involved in the aggregate, it was imperative that there should not be any windfall for the parties to the transactions.

Q: How did we know the commodities got shipped, were unloaded and in correct amount to the foreign recipient?

MEAD: There were reporting requirements under the agreement. We had the agricultural attaché service overseas to work with the foreign government in seeing that we had proper accounting of the commodities. There were bills of lading, which we mentioned earlier, as the crucial documents among those that the commodity supplier presented to the bank for payment. It would indicate the kind and amount of the commodity loaded aboard the vessel. At the other end, the recipient country had reporting obligations on the unloading and disposition of the goods. Again, we had the agricultural attachés working with the foreign government; the attachés were Foreign Agricultural Service personnel.

And title passed to the foreign government at US ports, and that point is important later on when Vietnam fell, if we decide to discuss that episode.

Q: Checking on the arrivals was helpful in responding to inquiries from the Hill and the public was it not?

MEAD: Absolutely. We had our share of inquiries but the one we most often received was, "I know a first mate on the SS Marine Devil and he saw PL 480 grain being transferred in port to a Russian ship." In other words, the grain was intercepted and thus did not get discharged to the recipient country. We would check it time and time and time again and never could verify that first mate or the transfer of grain. But it was necessary that we respond to this kind of question. After quite some time I believe we stopped following up on the transfer of grain to Russian ships unless there appeared to be something new or different in the inquiry.

Q: The thing I do remember here was that we almost got into trouble because we had a unit tabulating the bills of lading and somehow or other they got crossed up in their work so they didn't tabulate for a while. GAO learned about this and we put hordes of people on it to tabulate those bills of lading in a hurry. Fortunately, everything balanced out. I think that is one of the things you and I are proud of. We handled those huge tonnages of commodities going all over the world and there never was a scandal about misuse of the commodities. I think, as you said before, this was due in large measure to the fact that they were not given away but were sold for foreign currency. So there was a self-policing action to it that helped us very much.

MEAD: A detail helpful to deal with this issue is the fact that under Title I the goods on the recipient end also used the normal distribution channels. The wholesaling in each country would vary but the commodities would be handled in the customary manner. There would be instances, like India, where some of the grains normally would be retailed through fair price, or ration, shops so that the poor could have access to basic foods at reduced prices. The point is that the

commodities were handled in the traditional manner and this was a plus in terms of keeping abreast of what was happening.

This preserved the normal trade channels emphasized in the legislation which had as part of its rationalization its positive effect on market development for American agricultural exports. But back to your main point, there were a lot of people helping out to see that things were handled properly and we must give credit to all those people.

Q: I think there were programs where commodities were distributed with a label on them, "Gift from the US Government" or similar information.

MEAD: That was true for donation programs (not Title I) where commodities were given directly to relief recipients who did the best they could with what they received. On occasion, they would sell or barter one commodity to get something they needed most. I do not know how often this happened but I can see how it could occur from time to time.

Q: That was a different program, but every once in a while some of those would turn up in a commercial market.

MEAD: This is not to say that we didn't have our own problems working out purchasing and shipping arrangements with some countries, especially some who had only modest commercial experience or had customs that were not consistent with our regulations. The Title I commodities did not have the gift information on the bags and containers and much was shipped in bulk, of course, but the recipient country was obligated under the agreement to publicize the nature of U.S. assistance.

Q: Yes, I do recall the two countries where that happened and we sat in on the purchase sessions to make sure they were handled right. Unfortunately all countries are not modeled on the same principles and the result is that their system of oversight is not as careful as it should be. But you are absolutely right. I think there were only two or three such cases.

MEAD: There was a lot of money involved; we are talking tens of billions of dollars; so we were fortunate.

Q: At the initiation of the program were the first programs fairly well scattered; were they mostly in Europe; where were they and when did the whole thing start?

MEAD: We mentioned surpluses after the war and that the Korean conflict got us out of trouble (supply wise) for a little while. Then we reverted into the same surplus situation with the American farmer geared up to produce and we had beaucoup commodities. The industrialized countries of Europe and Japan were still in the process of recovery on the one hand, and on the other hand we had India, African nations, Indonesia and many other developing countries which had rapidly increasing populations and insufficient production. They lacked the hard currency to make commercial purchases of food. There was hunger and while some countries were not directly affected by the war, they hadn't progressed economically.

Q: As I recall, because of the war and because of the shortage of foreign exchange, our first two programs, as I remember, were in Turkey and Yugoslavia.

MEAD: Turkey was the first one. I don't recall whether Yugoslavia was the second one.

Q: Yugoslavia was the second program. Were there other programs at that time in Europe?

MEAD: Sure. As we noted Europe was recovering. We had programs in Japan, and in Europe we had programs in the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, and Spain. Those, I believe were the major ones of those we now classify as industrialized nations. So we had programs in these countries which sounds rather strange, given their strong economies today.

On the other hand, the amounts programmed to these countries were not so large in relation to their populations and the capacity to absorb the goods.

Q: How about Egypt and Israel?

MEAD: Egypt and Israel early on were attractive political countries. They started right off and continued with very appreciable volume, although Egypt was out of the program for a number of years after the 1967 war. My understanding is that Israel was phased out of PL 480 some years after we left the scene and its overall assistance continued under general foreign aid authorizations. Egypt continued on as a PL 480 customer.

Q: How about Africa? It just seems to me except for Egypt, none of the programs were major in size.

MEAD: I guess technically Egypt is in Africa, but we tend to consider it Middle East, particularly for political purposes. If you set Egypt aside, you could find a complete blank for Africa under Title I until about 1961 I believe.

A major problem in Africa was that most countries had severe logistical problems; and they didn't have much of a trade system compatible with Title I which is geared to using existing trade channels that we have emphasized in our earlier discussions.

We should not give the impression, however, that Africa was sitting out in left field with all the action on other continents, including Latin America, which we have not mentioned in the process of indicating the nature of early programming. There were donations under PL 480 that suited Africa better and to jump a couple of decades or so, we have witnessed the droughts in Ethiopia and similar countries on TV and the huge response to these critical food shortages.

Q: To a certain extent they were in the stage of the European colonial government leaving, so some of them didn't gain their independence during this period or a little later.

MEAD: That was true. A number of African countries participated in Title I later on, especially the northern tier of countries and the remaining countries relied heavily on donations from the U.S. and other contributors.

Q: Incidentally, I really don't remember much of a controversy regarding the possibility of interference with the private markets in the range of countries you have mentioned.

MEAD: Countries like India, Indonesia and Egypt did not have a significant history of commercial trade. You had people undernourished and they were an outlet for food for extra consumption. Their inability to have monetary reserves to purchase commodities on a commercial basis also was a major factor.

Q: Art, why don't we try to get some feeling about the size of this program over the years? How about giving us a run down.

MEAD: The numbers will show that the program took off quickly given the task of shaping program procedures and working toward agreements which were formal international instruments. The law was enacted in mid 1954 and by 1956 the value of exports under Title I approached a half billion dollars and tonnage of nearly 4 million metric tons (mmt). You will recall in our description of the programs that you had to negotiate the agreement, then get the authorizations going to permit sales to be made and shipments to be placed on vessels, which also had to be booked. So there was a lead time involved before tonnages would be shipped and values could be calculated. And we are talking about export market values, not the larger costs usually designated as CCC cost or cost to the U.S. government. You started with Turkey and Yugoslavia and by 1956 some of the larger agreements such as with India and Brazil were signed to give further impetus to the magnitudes. In 1957, shipments totaled 8 million metric tons (mmt) and 900 million dollars.

Q: That's a pretty fast take off. Could I interject a few things. It is true that first agreement with Turkey was negotiated in the Sheraton Hotel. I can remember being a part of it and making the mistake of negotiating in tons of wheat instead of dollars. When I got back to the office, Pat O'Leary saw the mistake I had made and he just grinned and said, "That's okay, we can take care of it." But, thereafter the agreements were in dollar values.

MEAD: But the negotiations were discussed in terms of volume and then you just translated that into dollars. That is the only way you can control it because you have to issue a financial document and you can't exceed the amount noted in the document. Your caper was easily taken care of through the control of the purchase authorizations, especially at a time when the price of wheat was pretty stable and we were just starting to use the \$700 million authorization. To continue with magnitudes, Title I exports on an annual basis reached the 10 million metric tons (mmt) as we entered the 1960s and soon reached the \$1 billion level in export market value.

I should emphasize at this point that total U.S. agricultural exports (annually) reached only \$4 billion so Title I alone was at 25 per cent of the total. Jumping into the future and we will probably get to this later, total PL 480 exports, that is all Titles, were only about 10 per cent of exports in the 70s and about 5 per cent in the 80s. There were huge increases in ag exports in

those decades, as we know, but this would illustrate how important PL 480 was in the 50s and 60s.

Q: The origin of three-year agreements is interesting. It came about, as you know, primarily because we were specially interested in India. We were interested in taking this classic case of a country which could provide a subliminal outlet for grain and help build the nutrition of the country. In our conversations with them they pointed to the fact that our first agreement was a one year agreement. Once they had decided to try to give their people a better diet, they needed more assurance than one year to get it done. And that was the reason for the first three year agreement. I understand that we then added a four year agreement...

MEAD: In 1960.

Q: How big was that agreement?

MEAD: I believe it ran about 16 million tons. That's big time for an agreement, particularly when you are relatively early in the program. When we signed the agreement, we only formally committed ourselves to the first year's value because we had no where near enough money in the till; but with the commitment to sign for the value of the last three years when the PL 480 authorization was increased by the Congress.

Q: Over a four year period?

MEAD: Yes. The first year was signed in May, 1960 with a market value of nearly \$200 million and the remainder was formally signed in December for more than \$1 billion.

Q: Your commodities in that first 900 million dollars of the overall program for all countries; do you have tonnage figures on those?

MEAD: The \$900 million was the value of exports for 1957 with tonnage of 8 million metric tons. In terms of relative shares of the program, wheat started out as the major commodity and would dominate programming throughout the program. Next would come rice, feed grains, cotton, and vegetable oils. At that time I would estimate that for wheat we were accounting for more than 50 percent of total U.S. exports; cotton, probably a third; high in vegetable oils; and significant quantities of feed grains.

In this early period, we had non-price support commodities, like fruit and poultry, tallow, frozen beef, which later on were minimized because they had a direct and full impact on the PL 480 budget. The typical commodities like the grains did not result in full budget costs since there were storage and other costs that we would have to bear if we hadn't moved them out of stocks. So the non-price support commodities in later years were virtually eliminated when the program was placed on a budget ceiling within the Executive branch. And we may touch on that if we discuss how the program decreased in the late 1960s.

While we are in the commodity area we can mention that tobacco was regularly programmed and was defensible for some time as a means of budget support for recipient countries. For certain

countries, this commodity translated into revenue in a short period of time. It later became an emotional issue in the U.S. as you well know, and was legislated out of the program.

Q: Well, cotton and tobacco both share the concept of turning raw material into jobs as you move from the raw material to the finished product. But in a sense we did the same thing because you move from wheat to flour to bread. So your value adds there too, but not quite as much.

MEAD: Now that you mention flour, it reminds me that we didn't move nearly as much flour under Title I than we thought we should. India didn't take one bag of flour under Title I despite our efforts, Sen. Humphrey, and the flour millers among others. I recall also that we had one devil of a time to get Egypt to take a certain quantity of their requirements in the form of flour. And some of the lesser developed countries such as Indonesia had mills built and therefore in time phased out of flour to straight wheat.

Getting back to magnitudes, the early sixties saw large agreements with Egypt and Pakistan and a number of new countries. Those developments, along with the mid 60s India droughts, put the annual tonnage under Title I to 16 million metric tons (mmt), or three or four times the annual volume in most of the 80s. At this time the portion of wheat going under Title I was well over 50 per cent of U.S. exports which again emphasizes the importance of the program. My rough calculations for the decade 1959 through 1968 put Title I wheat exports at 50 per cent of total U.S. wheat exports for that entire period, and put India imports of wheat at 45 per cent of Title I for that decade. The portions are even more dramatic when you consider that total U.S. exports included both wheat and wheat flour and as I noted just above, India took wheat only and many of the countries were shifting from flour to wheat.

As we start getting through the sixties and into the 70s, mention is appropriate of the changes made in 1966 when a major legislative overhaul was enacted with the greater emphasis on revising Title I. The overhaul provided for the phase out of foreign currency sales during a five year period ending in 1971 and phasing into longer term dollar sales, (recognizing that 20 year dollar sales were legislated in the early sixties, but not implemented in magnitudes comparable to the foreign currency sales). The dollar sales under the new legislation were longer term, with longer grace periods and low interest rates, and the foreign currency sales as we knew it would disappear.

There were provisions for a limited number of the old type currency uses to be provided for under the dollar sales under particular circumstances. This allowed, for example, for the U.S. to continue military support for Vietnam. The new legislation also called for self help provisions and the deletion of the surplus concept in principle. In fact, the word surplus could not be found in the new text. Nonetheless, the procedure for determining PL 480 availability did not change in reality. This will be discussed as we get into the worldwide shortages in the early 70s (this also occurred in the mid sixties Indian droughts) when the Title I program was reduced sharply.

The Title I program dropped steadily from its high of 16 million tons in 1965 to an average of about 8 million tons in the early 70s. There were several reasons for this drop. In the case of India, the two successive droughts ended with fairly normal monsoons; India participated in the advances in production brought about by the so-called Green Revolution, along with other

countries; some Eastern European countries were legislated out of the program. Other donor countries came on the scene to share in the food aid business, helped by the birth of the World Food Program in the early 60s; and the creation of the Food Aid Convention negotiated during the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations as a new convention of the International Wheat Agreement; and the imposition by the Office of Budget and Management of budget limits for the PL 480 programs. We saw Title I drop to 5 million tons in 1973 and to less than 2 million tons in 1974 because of the commodity crisis world wide, with production trouble in Russia, again in India, and the anchovy supply difficulty among other commodity considerations.

Q: This is why we should get to how those requirements grew and how the requirements were met in terms of imports and increased domestic production. India was a classic case of whether we succeeded or failed in achieving the promise of increased consumption under the Title I program. We should look at this in some detail for our satisfaction and the satisfaction of others looking into the history of the India experience.

MEAD: Yes, we can examine India along those lines and it might be useful to recount how PL 480 was reduced in 73 and 74 and the decision making process at that time.

Q: Well, 1972-73 was the time of the huge Soviet purchases from everywhere, not just the United States.

MEAD: Yes. India declared itself self-sufficient at the end of the sixties. They were out of the Title I program for a few years, but came back in 1975 and for a brief time thereafter. As I recall, India was not very happy to get back into food aid after having being able to say it was self-sufficient. They came to see Secretary Butz several times, but were reluctant to make a request for the assistance. The Secretary and I would do a lot of listening and it became a bit awkward. But we had the rule of needing a request and we were not innovative enough to develop a way to offer them a program without acknowledgment of a request. My recollection was that they had something less than one million tons in mind for Title I. After they got over the problem of making a request they then asked that the agreement be negotiated in Washington. That was not what USDA wanted to do, given the history of New Delhi negotiations which could get prolonged and complicated; I can remember, for a particular agreement, sending a curt cable to the agricultural attaché to get the agreement signed and I'm sure he showed it to the Indians to get things moving.

State pressed strongly for the request of the Indians and we had to negotiate in Washington. We did this regularly with the Israelis but their negotiations were very informal, and obviously Israel was a special case. The negotiations with India in 1975 were formal; I was the Head of the U.S. delegation and we had other U.S. agencies represented and India had its several representatives. India wanted to make changes in the format of the agreement to emphasize that this was a dollar deal, which it was on a long term, low interest basis. But they wanted to make it look like a harder deal. We indicated that they could be a bit imaginative in the way they handled their announcement as long as they didn't go overboard, but we had to keep our agreements intact. They were not in a hurry to sign the agreement since they were buying wheat from us commercially and keeping their ships busy.

One tough issue dealt with was the fact that India had earlier borrowed wheat from Russia to be repaid in kind. We did not want them to repay wheat to Russia while they were importing concessional (soft sale) Title I wheat from us. After a lot of haggling back and forth, there was an unpublished side note developed that said that the issue would not arise. And the issue did not arise. Noting the commercial purchases of wheat by India, there was a specific UMR provided for in the agreement as one of the conditions for fulfilling the agreement. It may have been the first time in this final agreement but I am not positive about that point. It was not an issue with them as they had already taken the position that there would be times when commercial imports would be necessary. There were times, also, when they would export some wheat and I suspect this came when they had accumulated substantial stocks and were not in a position, in their view, to utilize such stocks for domestic consumption.

In any event, we were not more successful than New Delhi in crafting a prompt negotiation. In this case we could not send a cable to ourselves telling ourselves to get going.

Q: Art, in this discussion we should highlight India as a classic case of whether we succeeded or failed in achieving the promise of increased consumption. So I think we are going to want to trace that in some detail for our own satisfaction, if not for the satisfaction of others in history.

MEAD: I agree. In doing this I would hope we could make our point without a lengthy narrative but with a chart and some figures that would illustrate the point. From my experience and some reading over recent years, I don't believe the development economists have been able to be very precise in assessing the effects of PL 480. My own experience dealing with the various countries is that those countries that had the will to use the program as effectively as possible were able to do so. India was one of those countries.

The chart on the preceding page is pretty simple. It shows the trend of India's grain production from 1950 to 1990 as well as the ups and downs of imports for that period. The production line is essentially upward for the entire period. The peaks and valleys of imports correspond with the vagaries of the monsoons but we need to acknowledge some progress in the Green revolution.

Production dipped sharply in the mid sixties with the two successive droughts and the imports rose very dramatically as PL 480 came to the rescue.

This happened again in the mid seventies but the magnitudes were much smaller. During the earlier droughts USDA interceded into the development business as Secretary Freeman worked directly with the Indian Agriculture Minister, and sent USDA people like Martin Abel, Lester Brown, Sherman Johnson among others to India to assess the situation and cooperate in proposals. As an aside from development issues, the Department also sent logistical experts to India as well, arranging for special unloading equipment so that the huge increase in grain imports could be discharged efficiently in India ports. I also recall the Secretary lending his position in the effort to find alternative sources of protein to send overseas, especially in smaller packaging under the donation programs. He discussed this effort with an official of the New Orleans Experiment Station and later put him on his staff in Washington. Dr. Aaron Altshul was that official.

This might be the best time to deal with the subject of possible disincentives on recipient countries as a result of the Title I program. Over the years there would be, from time to time, a program that was engineered less than skillfully that may have had an adverse effect on local production. And there were cases when the U.S. and the recipient country could have managed the timing of the commodity movement better; and some of that might adversely affect our commodity situation. A fair amount of that kind of criticism came from academia, political scientists, some voluntary agencies among others. My own view was that much of this become sort of fashionable. We are talking about nearly one thousand agreements signed through 1975 covering about 17 billion dollars and 200 million metric tons with scores of countries. For the most part, the voluntary agencies were well administered and well meaning in their participation in the program, but there were a few (some based abroad) who may have felt that criticism of Title I would result in greater authorizations for their programs or specific contributions from private individuals and groups. On the other hand, I could name individuals from volunteer groups that were very helpful to PL 480, especially in terms of representation before the Congress.

Back to the main objective here; to augment the chart, a review of India's production over the years would demonstrate that country's accomplishments in grain production, including milled rice. These are mainly USDA figures covering all grain, including milled rice. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization uses the term cereals to include the same commodities. If one is researching figures on their own, sometimes rice will be reported in paddy form (instead of milled) which is a figure which would increase the quantity by approximately 30 per cent, depending on what the milling rate was. While the chart will suffice for some readers, others may like to see an array of numbers, which will follow. For 1949/1950, production was about 47 million metric tons (mmt) and 65 mmt a decade later; ten years later in 1969/1970 it was 86 mmt although during that decade it was only 65 mmt during the two years of the drought; increased to 105 mmt by 1979/1980, again having a decrease half way through the decade which led to the 1975 Title I program discussed above; 1989/1990 was 162 mmt; and 1994/1995 was 172 mmt. These are very substantial and steady increases, which percentage wise, were about the same during Title I activity and after it ceased. If one reviews PL 480 activity statistically for India, there will be imports every year since Title I ceased, those being donation and volunteer agency programs as well as project and emergency programs under the World Food Program. Another aspect of trade and aid that is relevant to this line of discussion relates to the imports of wheat on a commercial basis by India from the U.S., and to some extent other sources, when the food supply requirements were not secure. The records show that at the time of the renewal of Title I in 1975 the Indians bought several million tons for hard currency and they did that from time to time thereafter as conditions warranted that kind of response by the India government. The point here is that the Indians acted to take care of requirements and they were acting to sustain certain levels of consumption by the populace.

One further point is that while India may have declared itself self sufficient, the question to me becomes one of the definition of self-sufficiency. To a large degree, at least in my view, to India self-sufficiency meant that India would be able to sustain a particular level of consumption without further need of commercial imports or concessional imports such as Title I. It did not mean that the populace was eating so much better. Food surveys conducted by FAO show that tens of millions were considered malnourished in India, meaning that they could not perform in a

normal manner on the basis of the calories they were consuming. The percentage of malnourished, however, would be higher in a number of countries in Africa.

I recall, for example, that during the early years of the so-called self sufficiency India was holding reserve or buffer stocks of about 20 million tons of grain. One could speculate as to why India did not distribute some of this for increased consumption. The answer might be that it would be costly, as is normal in direct distribution programs, and it also might raise consumption expectations for the populace that the government would have to maintain. This is mentioned merely as possible motives and not to be construed as criticism. Overall, India would receive high marks for its efforts.

Q: We had been talking about India. I would ask you to for any comment you wanted to make on the use of the currency generated by Title I in India for economic development.

MEAD: I believe we mentioned earlier that the amounts of foreign currencies made available to India were very large given the enormity of the program. Most of them were loaned or granted to India for economic development with emphasis on agriculture. If I didn't say so earlier, the executive branch tried to maximize grants so as to mitigate the inevitable obligation to repay them. Some people could foresee a political problem in the accumulation of these obligations. Unfortunately, the word grant was a dirty word on the hill and therefore most of the currencies were on a loan basis.

The Agency for International Development had the responsibility for administering the currencies and that agency earmarked them for general development and the agriculture sector for new crop varieties, irrigation, credit facilities, storage, fertilizer programs, and on and on. I am sure much good was done but I have not run across a good definitive analysis of the effect of the currency use programs on development. It is far easier to find good analyses of the effect of currency use for education, scientific research etc.

But the lack of analysis on development in India by virtue of the currencies doesn't bother me, knowing how many lives were saved merely by managing the food aid export endeavors.

I read a publication prepared by AID that took account of the 40th anniversary of PL 480 and it did not give specifics on the currency aspects of the program. Let us just conclude that AID did its job. Also in some defense of academics and others, there was a lot going in countries like India, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and others where consortia were established to develop and monitor development strategies and to try to achieve some coordination or at least some consultation for maximum impact. Thus there were funds and projects and whatever injected and managed by the World Bank and other international financial institutions. It would be difficult to separate the various aid components and their relative effect. There were bilateral programs besides the U.S. and thus the creation of consortia. What I can report on was the problem of the great accumulation of Indian rupees in U.S. hands which some people in both governments felt was an embarrassment. It was finally agreed to give them back to India and get the so called embarrassment behind us. The agreement was framed so that certain U.S. uses such as

agricultural market development were protected. Senator Moynihan was Ambassador to India at that time and he took on the consultations on the Hill. I accompanied him on this mission and found him very flexible in his presentations. He got the job done with the truth of the matter being that influential people like the Chairmen of the Agriculture committees were less than enthusiastic. They did, however, refrain from open opposition to the proposal.

Q: The reason why I think the somewhat detailed discussion of India is important is that there is a body of thought out there that says you are kidding yourself if you think the program you ran helped India. Rather it gave them a disincentive to increase production on their own. I, for one, say that is not true. I think the increase in numbers that you gave tend to support that and your reference to the analysis of the effect of the currencies also falls in the favorable category. I also want to second what you said about the role Secretary Freeman had in helping India during the bad droughts. He was very active in sending the departmental people to India on the side of what I would call technical assistance to convince them that they had to raise returns to the Indian grain producer. They had to allocate their resources of input to the areas of land in the country that gave the greatest promise of increased yield per acre. That was done. I think Freeman really went out of his way to try to meet the charge that we were just stuffing them with things we couldn't use ourselves. Getting away from India would you tell me in your own judgment as we moved along, is PL 480 now a memory more than anything else in terms of those of us who worked on it during its heyday. I take it has about run its course. Would you agree?

MEAD: There is no question that the program is comparatively insignificant when you are talking numbers and relative effect of the food aid programming. I can remember when we would have to develop a rationale for continuing PL 480 each time we were preparing legislation to extend the program and increase its authorizations. It was easy because it seemed intolerable for us to do otherwise while producing great surpluses, there were great needs in many countries, and our commercial programs had not taken off as yet. So it was simple to rationalize that we should continue to support this program. It is true we were phasing out of countries like Brazil, Japan, Korea, Taiwan. But there were countries like Indonesia and India, where the additional commodities had minimal effect on commercial shipments.

But now the value of PL 480 exports is probably around 5 percent of total U.S agricultural exports at best, as against 25 or 30 per cent in our day; and in terms of wheat it probably is less than 10 percent of U.S. wheat exports against the 50 and 60 per cent or more that Title I accounted for in many years. So it doesn't have the impact that it had at the time you and I were heavily involved in this program. I can't comment on the character of the program now, Obviously it is quite small relatively, but there may be some advantages because of eastern Europe programming, for example.

I can't comment on USDA's rationale for the program since it has such large programs for export credit and other commercial type incentives. With the reduced AID appropriations and further cuts very likely, I can see AID's desire to have some assets to further its objectives; and I can see State's desire, possibly, to use the program for eastern Europe as I mentioned above.

Q: Art, unless you have something else to add, Jim Howard, who has been sitting here patiently reminds me that you probably have a comment on the role of the White House over the years in the food programs. I take it Jim is right and would you like to comment at this time?

MEAD: When I was approached on doing this interview, I did have the idea I would spend some time on the decision making process, but that idea has diminished in value after this session with you with the emphasis on India; and that suited me. In setting the scene for our discussion we did indicate the various objectives of the legislation.

Q: I have to agree with you. It seems to me during the period beginning when Johnson became president that there was a change in the direction of the White House towards approval of individual programs and perhaps even of individual shipments to countries, from time to time. Do you recall that?

MEAD: Yes, I do. The classic one, of course, was India where the President was not enamored of Indira Gandhi.

Q: Why wasn't he endeared?

MEAD: The Indians have always been a bit independent. I am not a student of the UN but India may have been a leader in the nonaligned countries and therefore comments made in places like the UN and others were not particularly pleasing to the United States. There was a special issue at this juncture.

Q: I think in this case it was the Vietnam War.

MEAD: Yes, that is true. We got to the point, which you probably know better than I, where individual shipments of grain to India under signed agreements had to be cleared by the White House. This was during the droughts and we were trying to keep the pipeline reasonably full. The approvals were hard to come by. I believe Secretary Freeman probably said to you and others of his inner circle something like "I just can't go to LBJ and ask him to resume shipments because he will throw me out of his office." People referring to this episode usually called it the short leash policy. Is that where self-help started?

So there was a heavy White House involvement then. Vietnam, of course, got special treatment during LBJ and continued through Nixon. There was not much difference because that was the high priority, and in terms of assistance, food aid was secondary only to bullets. You just had to maximize shipments to Vietnam.

If we can leave LBJ and go to Nixon, what the Nixon Administration did was to identify the 13 or 14 major aid recipients--Egypt, Israel, India, Indonesia, Korea etc. and decided to approach each country with an overall assistance package, including Title I. A Presidential memorandum on the total aid package was the procedure. On occasion, like with Israel, you could get a waiver, and that was White House involvement on the fast track. I referred to the reluctance of Secretary

Freeman to approach LBJ; I recall an Assistant Secretary in USDA in the Nixon administration being asked to expedite White House clearance of some issue. He said if he called Haldeman on the matter it would end up at the bottom of his basket.

DAVID A. KORN
Consul General
Calcutta (1975-1977)

Ambassador David A. Korn was born and raised in Missouri. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in France, Lebanon, Mauritania, Israel, and India, and ambassadorships to Ethiopia and Togo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You made not a complete geographical switch but you left your desk job to suddenly go to Calcutta as Consul General.

KORN: It was sort of a two year time out. I wanted to get away from the Arabs and Israelis and see another part of the world. And that was what I did. There wasn't much going on in Calcutta. Well, I was there during the time of the emergency and the cancellation of democracy by Indira Gandhi. She shut India's system of democracy down the week after I arrived and reopened it about a month before I left and then was thrown out of office.

Q: Did that effect your work at all?

KORN: Oh yes. The country was thrown into chaos and Indians were reluctant to talk to Americans. The United States was under suspicion. We had an AID program and all that. They would come to the Consulate for receptions, etc. but they wouldn't talk.

Q: You were feeling you were really in a repressive regime at the time.

KORN: Yes. It wasn't a blood thirsty type of regime, but people were arrested and kept in jail, etc. This certainly affected the whole atmosphere.

Q: So relations were almost at a standstill.

KORN: Yes.

Q: How was it dealing as Consul General and living with your staff in Calcutta which one always thinks of as being one of the most difficult places as far as seeing poverty, etc.

KORN: Very difficult psychologically, yes. The poverty that was there was overwhelming and the sights, sounds and smells were overwhelming as well. You couldn't go anywhere without seeing beggars, people mutilated, children with diseases, people living on the streets, and that sort of thing. Calcutta is a place that defies description really. It is an extraordinary city. There

are many very interesting, intelligent people there. There is a great culture there. But there is also the poverty there that leaves one absolutely speechless.

Q: Did you have a problem with morale at the post?

KORN: Most of the Westerners who lived there shielded themselves simply by trying to ignore the situation. You had to develop certain psychological defenses against it, otherwise you couldn't ... The Indians had their own cultural defenses against it--the philosophy that one is poor and miserable because of what one has done in a previous life so if you are a well-off Indian you obviously merited it. The situation does pose problems of adjustment for Westerners.

Q: You came back to Washington for a relatively short period in Policy Planning. Is that correct?

KORN: Yes. From '77 to '82, about five years.

Q: You were in Policy Planning for what, about two years?

KORN: A year. Actually I spent most of that year working with Roy Atherton when he was Assistant Secretary and then he became Ambassador-at-Large for the Middle East Peace negotiations, but I went with Roy on various trips. The Carter Administration had come in and launched the Middle East Peace effort.

Q: Did you look upon this as a professional having dealt with this before as a continuing of the Kissinger process or was this really a somewhat different approach?

KORN: This was something entirely different. Kissinger was step by step--you get a disengagement agreement, you go for another disengagement agreement. But Kissinger, if he had a vision of where this was going to end never shared it with any of his associates, much less the public. Kissinger never defined, he didn't really think that the Israelis were going to withdraw from all of Sinai and he wasn't going to press them to do so. In a way what Carter did was a continuation, but in another way it was not. Because Kissinger was not trying for an overall solution. He was trying to calm things down perhaps to prepare the ground. But if he was preparing the ground, it was ground for something not as far reaching as Carter.

Q: What was your impression as you were there? You had obviously been dealing with the affairs and served in many of the countries. Did you feel that this was going anywhere or was this a bit naive?.

KORN: For those of us who had worked on the Arab-Israeli problem before it was really hard to imagine that Carter was going to achieve this goal of peace; an overall settlement that he announced. There seemed to be a great element of unreality to the policy discussions we would have. After a meeting with Roy Atherton and later on with Hal Saunders, we had discussions on how the agreement was going to be structured and I think I was not the only one who felt that this was really a kind of day dreaming exercise. There was so little reality to back it up. And it would have remained that way had not Sadat broken with the other Arabs and decided to go to

Jerusalem and Carter was able to lead him little by little to accept the idea of a peace agreement now and not 20 years in the future. But if Sadat had not been willing to go all the way to break with the other Arabs this would not have occurred. The whole business of a Geneva Peace Conference was absolutely unrealistic. Carter for the first ten months of his presidency was going for just getting a conference to convene at Geneva. We were going to worry about what we do at Geneva after we got there. It was a desperate, unrealistic effort and would have collapsed right there if it had not been for Sadat.

Q: What was our analysis of why Sadat did this?

KORN: If you are asking me at the time, I would not be able to recall. I can give you an after the fact thought. Certainly Sadat had the view that Nasser had made a mistake in challenging the West and siding with the Soviet Union and that Nasser had brought great ruin on Egypt through the '67 war and through the war of attrition that followed it. He felt that the way to bring Egypt out of its difficulties was to reach an agreement with Israel and to re-establish good relations with the West--that was where the money was and there is where prosperity would come, it would not come from the Soviet Bloc.

Q: Do you remember how we reacted when he first did this? This certainly wasn't in our game plan. Were we wondering where this was going to go? Was there general rejoicing?

KORN: Some of the people in NEA were not particularly happy with this. I myself was concerned at a certain point that Sadat was going further than he could afford to go. That he would be overthrown. And that the Peace Treaty that we were sponsoring and pushing very hard for after Camp David could end up getting Sadat thrown out. That did not happen. It happened later that got him assassinated. So there was that concern.

Q: You moved in '78 to Director of Israeli Affairs. Was that sort of right in the middle of the process?

RAZVIGOR BAZALA
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1975-1978)

Mr. Bazala was born in Germany but immigrated to the United States while he was still young. He joined the Foreign Service in 1970 and served in Warsaw, South Vietnam, New Delhi, Belgrade, Jamaica, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Washington, DC including working as a special assistant to the White House for the Iran-Contra Affairs. Mr. Bazala was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July of 2011.

BAZALA: Although I ended up in Vietnam because I was bidding out of cycle, that worked to my advantage in seeking a transfer in the spring of 1975. USIA had just approved the establishment of a new position to the staff of USIS New Delhi's North India Branch.

Assignments for the summer had already been made, and few officers with appropriate backgrounds were still available. A good word from several senior colleagues resulted in my assignment to become the deputy PAO of the branch. We planned to arrive in New Delhi in August.

I knew very little about India prior to my assignment there, but very much looked forward to serving in New Delhi where the North India Branch was located in the new four-story USIS headquarters building. It had a staff of three FSIOs and more than 40 Indian employees who conducted programs in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and the Indian-government controlled area of Jammu and Kashmir. The branch housed the largest USIA library overseas and had a 200 seat auditorium with state of the art audio and visual equipment. Three percent of India's then 600 million people, or about 18 million spoke English. Many had higher educations. The libraries of USIS India's four branches were fully occupied every day. The number of our program activities was also among the largest in the world.

Indira Gandhi, the daughter of India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was prime minister when we arrived in August 1975. Several months earlier she had declared a national emergency, and almost overnight about a quarter of a million of her political 'opponents' were arrested, most without charges. Some schools were converted into prisons to create enough cells to jail them all. The key question was whether the world's largest democracy would transition to a one-party dictatorship. In the context of the cold war that divided the globe between East and West, the critical issue was whether Mrs. Gandhi's emergency would move India toward the Soviet camp.

Prior to transferring to New Delhi, I took 100 hours of Hindi language training; it wasn't much, but it served as a useful introduction to several key elements of Indian culture. USIA had contracts with several private language teaching firms to delink the timing of USIA personnel transfers from FSI's rigid language training schedule. Thus I was able to fit in some Hindi training between my assignments without regard to FSI's calendar.

My instructor at the private language school I attended near Dupont Circle in Washington was a young Indian graduate student at Georgetown University who taught part time. That she was not your run-of-the-mill foreign exchange student became abundantly clear one day after class when I saw her leave the building as I rounded the corner and drove by in front of it. As she moved toward a black Cadillac stretch limousine double-parked at the entrance, a liveried driver opened the rear passenger door and bowed as my instructor entered the vehicle.

The following morning I mentioned that I had witnessed her departure the previous day and was totally taken by surprise when she invited Sylvia and me to join her and her husband for dinner at their home where we would learn more about her background. Her address was in the heart of an area known as Embassy Row in Washington. She added that her father also lived there. When we arrived at the residence we learned that her father just happened to be the Indian Ambassador to the United States. After cocktails we were directed to the dining room where the four of us gathered at the end of a table that the following evening would be set for 32 guests. Language training rarely result in events as unusual as this one.

Over a wonderful Indian meal we learned much about what we could expect when we got to New Delhi, and our hosts offered candid observations on contemporary India. Some issues were brushed over lightly such as the emergency and India's relations with China, the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, my instructor summarized Indo-American relations as mutually beneficial. The dinner at the Indian Ambassador's residence helped me better understand India's growing strategic importance even though in the mid 1970s, many considered the subcontinent an economic basket case that had the potential to degenerate into a humanitarian disaster on an unprecedented scale.

The term 'failed state' had not yet been coined, but many observers, among them Lester Brown, an American ecological expert who gained global renown with his writing on India, projected massive starvation in the future as India's rapid population growth would soon outstrip the capacity of the nation's agriculture to meet its needs for food. Fortunately that scenario did not come to pass. By the late 1960s, India had already started importing high yield, disease resistant, rapidly maturing varieties of rice that yielded up to three harvests a year. It was also implementing policies to mechanize agriculture, expand irrigation and increase fertilizer and pesticide applications to crops. Consequently, despite the growth of its population by more than 400 million over the next four decades, India has experienced no large-scale starvation, although a sizeable proportion of the population continues to be significantly undernourished.

America also sold agricultural produce, primarily grains, to India under Public Law 480 (PL480) that was intended to promote sustained U.S. agricultural exports. Also known as "Food for Peace," the law, in the words of President Kennedy, provided for the sale of food "to help people around the world whose friendship and good will we want." PL 480 also provided a significant benefit to Americans serving in India who could buy the rupees the Indian government paid for American agricultural commodities at the U.S. embassy rate of 65 for one U.S. dollar, far higher than the official exchange rate. That enabled us all to become consumers of a broad range of India's fine handicrafts and art; the most sought were hand-woven silk and wool carpets. The extremely favorable exchange rate also made it possible for us to afford a domestic staff of five full and part time employees whose earnings supported a total of 37 including their dependents.

The declaration of emergency on June 26, 1975, however, generated concerns in Washington about whether India would continue to function as a democratic parliamentary government. The emergency restricted the extent to which Indians could voice their views on a great number of subjects. So while USIS was able to bring in a large number of guest speakers to address influential Indians on topics related to governance and economics, we had to warn them that what they said could be interpreted by Indian officials as interference in internal Indian affairs. Despite such concerns, we still had opportunities to conduct substantive programs and communicate with influential Indian audiences. USIS faced no real barriers to the conduct of its program activities during the emergency.

I think Mrs. Gandhi believed the emergency would enable her to overcome opposition to policies she wanted to pursue but was unable to gain the parliamentary majority required to make them the law of the land. Under the emergency, Mrs. Gandhi ruled by decree, but she did not want to take authoritarian governance to extremes. She was very conscious of the image of India as a democratic nation. Rather than attempting to establish a one party dictatorship, she called for

parliamentary elections in March 1977, less than two years after she declared her emergency. She did so under the misguided conviction that the result would serve to endorse her policies.

When her Minister of Agriculture Jagjivan Ram, the most prominent “untouchable” politician in the nation announced his break with the Congress party she headed, Indians across the nation concluded that Indira Gandhi had already lost the election. He aligned himself with the newly formed Janata coalition party that her political opponents pulled together from their jail cells. I was having dinner with Indian contacts in Jaipur, Rajasthan when news of his resignation broke on the radio. That set the entire neighborhood abuzz, and I could hear the exuberant reactions to it of people on the street below. Ram commanded the votes of the bulk of the nation’s 88 million untouchables (casteless Hindus). In following him, they contributed overwhelmingly to Gandhi’s ouster.

Imprisonment had galvanized Gandhi’s opposition. Politicians who did not communicate very well with each other in Parliament discovered behind bars they had enough in common to form an unprecedented coalition. Almost as soon as the opposition was released from jail to mount their election campaigns, however, the coalition they had formed began to fragment, and it did not survive much beyond the 1977 election that brought it briefly to power.

We experienced our second presidential visit when Jimmy Carter arrived in India on New Years Day 1978. It was less than a year after the election ended the emergency, and he welcomed India’s adherence to its democratic roots. The language of the official communiqué issued at the conclusion of his visit contained much boilerplate and little of substance. Its opening line, “The President and the Prime Minister held extensive and useful talks in the spirit of mutual confidence, candor and friendship,” bland as it was, indicated that U.S.-Indian relations were back on track, which was enough to make an otherwise uneventful and routine visit a U.S. foreign policy success.

While short on substance, arrangements for President Carter’s visit had the entire embassy jumping. There was major tension between a member of the White House advance team and an Indian government official over plans for the movement of vehicles in the presidential motorcade. That resulted in the embassy administrative officer barring the non-government advance team member from playing any role in arrangements for the visit. For all presidential travel overseas, many advance team members, all ardent supporters of the administration, volunteered their services to assist with arrangements for those trips to experience in some way something of their drama. I felt sorry for the ostracized guy, but he really had no clue how to get the job done without offending Indian officials whose cooperation the embassy needed to make the visit a success.

My task was to develop the First Lady’s public schedule and work with her staff to select an appropriate school to receive Mrs. Carter’s gift of a stereo record player and speakers following a speech she delivered about the welfare of children and refugees. My parents were visiting us at the time, and I was able to arrange for a photo of them with her when she stopped at a local market to get a hint of life on the streets of New Delhi. Later she was gracious enough to autograph it for them.

India's payment of its PL480 debt in rupees provided USIS New Delhi enough rupees to cover a wide range of in-country program costs. They included air fare and first-class accommodations in five-star hotels for Indian participants in the two- or three-day seminars we hosted in their conference facilities. During the U.S. bicentennial celebrations in 1976, for example, we conducted several seminars on American history and democracy. In support of those events, USIS India acquired the rights to such distinguished works as Daniel Boorstin's nicely boxed trilogy "The Americans: The Democratic Experience" and had several thousand copies reprinted in India for distribution to seminar participants and all Indian university and public libraries across the nation. We also reprinted a number of other academic works about the United States and its history, culture, arts and science in support of our country plan objectives. PL 480 rupees provided resources to develop programs far exceeding USIA's limited dollar budget for them and allowed us to mount activities on a scale simply unimaginable to USIS posts elsewhere.

Support for American Studies was a core element of USIS programming in India for years. The programs contributed significantly to an expansion of Indian interest in our society, and the American Studies experts we recruited to conduct them were among the most capable and competent in the U.S. It is important to recall that Mrs. Gandhi's emergency only lasted 18 months. After the elections of March 1977, the political situation in the country quickly returned to pre-emergency democratic norms, and once again India became a very fluid environment of intellectual give and take.

USIS India's budget allowed the North India Branch to schedule programs for between 60 to 70 American academic, professional, political, business, and cultural experts annually. We programmed in Delhi and in other major cities in North India including Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Lucknow, Allahabad, Varanasi, Srinagar, Chandigarh, Amritsar and Simla because we considered it important to establish a broad USIS presence in India to reach the ethnically, spiritually, economically and politically diverse leadership of all regions in North India.

There were always a few Indian participants in our seminar and lecture programs who displayed a certain intellectual arrogance. At the same time, there were clear-thinking Indians who understood the nature of the problems of their society and knew that ideological posturing was insufficient for solving them. I will never forget an education seminar in which a participant asserted that in order to attain literacy for the entire population the government would have to establish a school for 200 students every ten minutes through the end of the century. The enormous magnitude of that task highlighted dramatically the scope of the economic and social development challenges India faced. Thirty five years later, despite enormous progress toward that objective, universal literacy remains a distant goal although one or two states in India have actually achieved it recently.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose assignment as U.S. ambassador to India ended in 1975, noted that there was a subset of India's population about the size of the population of France that had the income and education levels of the French. He was convinced that there was significant potential for economic growth in India as long as that segment of the population had opportunities to apply their skills and resources to expanding the nation's productivity. In the years since Moynihan expressed that view, the nation's economic output has mushroomed. In spring 2011, I returned to India for the first time in 32 years with Sylvia who was a member of

the Office of Inspector General team that inspected embassy operations in India. We were both overwhelmed by the contrasts between the Indian economies of 1976 and 2011 and the enormous tangible growth that occurred over the intervening years, a strong echo of Moynihan's assertion.

William B. Saxbe who succeeded Moynihan was ambassador when we arrived in New Delhi. He was typical of political appointee ambassadors. A former Ohio Republican senator, he served as President Nixon's attorney general during the last days of the Watergate scandal and was named ambassador to India by President Ford after that. He held the post for little more than a year and a half. After the announcement of Gandhi's emergency he became frustrated by the deterioration in the U.S. relationship with India over trade and political issues. Saxbe said he particularly enjoyed hunting and trout fishing in Kashmir during his brief tour. He brought little more to the job than experience from a brief trip to India while he served in the Senate.

Robert Goheen, a political appointee nominated by President Carter to be ambassador to India succeeded Saxbe. He, however, was of a distinctly different order. Born in India, the son of American missionaries serving there, Goheen became a welcome figure across the country and a strong counter to the image many Indian intellectuals had of America as crassly materialistic. Indians generally regarded him as someone who had a deeper understanding of India than the non-Foreign Service officer that President Carter might otherwise have nominated to the post. Such an ambassador most likely would have been someone similar to Saxbe, or a politician who lost a recent election or was a major contributor to the president's election campaign. Goheen was a former president of Princeton University and he found several members of the Indian cabinet were Princeton alumni.

USIS programming in the late 1970s was largely targeted to the population Moynihan cited as the source of its economic advancement. We endeavored to implement a modified version of the two-step communication flow theory to reach as broad a segment of that population as possible. The theory posits that the impact of a message is amplified when it is delivered it to "message multipliers" who are opinion leaders regarded as influential by others. Our objective was to include Indian message multipliers as participants in USIS programs. We frequently saw the messages we communicated to program participants echoed more widely in newspaper and journal commentaries, media interviews, academic publications and briefing memoranda they prepared for their audiences whose numbers sometimes were incalculable multiples of the participants our programs reached directly. General disagreement with our messages could have the opposite effect of course, but at least that opened the door to us considering refinements to subsequent program activities touching on those subjects.

USIA was able to recruit fine speakers for all our programs because many of them had strong personal interest in India. A number of them placed travel to India among their top personal priorities and the invitations to become USIA speakers gave them the opportunity to fulfill that objective. Most were also aware that they could not talk condescendingly to Indians whose own academic and intellectual achievements were comparable to theirs in many cases. Generally, our speakers proved to be effective in communicating with Indians both through our programs and socially.

One event that facilitated greater communication with our Indian audiences was the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1975. It cleared the air for us to some extent. We no longer had to address that matter in every question and answer session following an American speaker's presentation, for example, or in the ambassador's meetings with the press. I think that applied to USIS operations around the globe. Justifying America's Vietnam policy was excess baggage that posts everywhere were glad to shed.

Our programs exposed leading government and academic economists to a range of development models that could help India achieve rapid growth. Economic speakers often cited Brazil as a relevant example of the country most likely to end its status in the third world. Even though Brazil did not achieve that goal much before the turn of this century, our programs underscored ways India could harness its potential more fully based on market economics, abandonment of import substitution, barring limits to the freedom of expression, and implementing programs to expand higher education.

During the cold war, a top global priority of USIA was to undermine the ideological appeal of communism. Centrally planned economies that abolished free enterprise and authoritarian governments that restricted political expression and violated basic human rights were anathemas. Communism and Indian democracy proved not to be a good fit, and the danger that the Soviets would score significant political gains in India did not materialize. To some extent, the Indians had a strategy of threatening to shift their foreign and economic policies toward the East as a way to foster changes in U.S. policies toward India.

It was India's Nehru, along with Nasser of Egypt, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nkrumah of Nigeria, and Sukarno of Indonesia who founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. Their objective was to provide developing nations leverage in negotiating their way between East and West. That sometimes involved playing the two sides against each other to avoid being lodged in either camp. Ultimately, however, the deck was stacked against the East. The Soviet Union really did not have much more to offer India and other third world countries than military equipment, and it was largely the export of U.S. agricultural commodities that kept India afloat during most the 1960s and 1970s. I don't know the extent to which India was then thinking about its future relationship with China, but after the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1960, it could anticipate it would no longer be dealing with a government that marched in lockstep with the Soviets on international affairs.

During the emergency, Indira Gandhi's younger son Sanjay found authoritarianism appealing. Some Indians claimed it was he who really called the shots during the emergency although he held no official or elected position. As his mother's advisor, however, he was able to exercise power arbitrarily. He called for the cleansing of New Delhi slums that led to the forced resettlement of a quarter of a million people. He also initiated a widespread family planning program to limit population growth. Forced vasectomies of impoverished illiterate unmarried men to meet arbitrary quotas generated extensive popular opposition to Indira Gandhi's Congress party. Some attributed her defeat in the 1977 election to men who 'voted with their balls' to sweep her out of office. Sanjay also proved inept as a businessman. He came up with the idea to manufacture a people's car, the widely heralded Maruti, but not one ever rolled off the assembly

line. He died in 1980 at the age of 33 when he lost control of the small aircraft he was piloting; it crashed over his mother's residence six months after she returned to power.

Sanjay's death turned the spotlight on his older brother Rajiv as his mother's successor. A pilot for Indian Airlines, the nation's domestic carrier, Rajiv remained aloof from politics until the death of his brother. He was the pilot of the turbo-prop Indian Airlines aircraft I was aboard several times on the Delhi-Jaipur-Jodhpur-Udaipur route to conduct USIS program events in those Rajasthan cities. Unless there was a plain-clothes air marshal on board, no security detail accompanied the son of India's most powerful woman. I was impressed by his lack of pretense as he entered the cockpit or walked through the terminal after landing, just another man in the crowd seemingly unconcerned about the people around him.

I met Rajiv once during the emergency at a gospel concert USIS programmed in New Delhi. A staffer at the West German embassy called my office to request permission to record the concert from backstage. I checked with the singers who had no objection and conveyed that back to the German embassy. I assumed it was the German I would encounter as the auditorium filled for the concert. He was there alright, but to my surprise sitting under headphones at the controls of a professional 12" reel-to-reel tape recorder was an Indian who had set up microphones and was testing their audio quality. The German introduced him as Rajiv Gandhi.

Rajiv spent the entire concert in front of the recorder playing the role of audio engineer. Once again, he was unaccompanied by security personnel. After the concert, he packed up his gear, thanked me for the opportunity to record it for his private use, climbed into the German's open jeep and drove off into the night with only the German as an escort. I found his modesty impressive indeed. After his mother was assassinated in 1984, he succeeded her until 1989. In 1991, he, too, was assassinated as he campaigned to be re-elected prime minister. Rajiv's wife Sonja, an Italian by birth, is now head of India's leading Congress party, and there is speculation that Rajiv and Sonja's son will eventually take a place on the nation's political stage.

Many of our Indian program participants held points of view that differed sharply from those expressed by our speakers, but a larger number, among them graduates of U.S. universities, shared their views. In fact, several speakers had been their professors. Consequently while there may have been sharp intellectual counterpoints to the positions our speakers articulated, their views often contributed to the opening of serious dialogue about the substantive issues of U.S.-Indian bilateral relations. India's relationship with Pakistan and U.S. attitudes toward and support for both countries during their 1971 war did come up regularly in question and answer sessions following our programs. I think Indians were well aware of the differences between American attitudes and approaches toward both countries, but that never became a focal issue in our programs while we were in India.

As far as Kashmir is concerned, there was a lull in tensions generated by overlapping Indian and Pakistani territorial claims in the region during our tours. The North India Branch of USIS exploited that lull to conduct programs in Srinagar, the heart of India's Jammu and Kashmir state. We also had some wonderful personal experiences there as well. Srinagar is a lovely city located a mile above sea level and a great place to escape to in the summer when daytime temperatures

in New Delhi reach 115F and drop to a 'cool' 92F at night. In Kashmir, pre-monsoon temperatures rarely rose above the mid 80s.

Arranging New Delhi's large number of programs required the assistance of a highly educated Indian staff that had strong linkages to the academic and government leadership of the nation. When I arrived at post, the program management staff was headed by Sohinder Singh Rana, who I consider the finest host-country USIS employee with whom I worked in my career. Assisting him were three other outstanding managers, Vinay Shukla, M.L. Kapoor, and K.K. Anand, all middle-aged men. Their classmates were among the most prominent people in Indian society, including current secretaries of government ministries and heads of university faculties. Such contacts enabled them to marshal appropriate audiences across Indian society to engage in discussions with our expert speakers.

Two newly hired program managers were university graduates in their early 20s. Tony Jesudasan was a laid back, personable ball of energy ready to set the world on fire. Prabhi Gupta was the first woman professional on the North India Branch staff. Branch PAO Ed Shulick hired them to help broaden the focus of USIS programming and to reach out to the successor generation that we believed was waiting for opportunities to move the nation in new directions. My job was also a new position that reflected the planned expansion of North India Branch operations. The senior program managers were most comfortable and effective in reaching out to influential senior and mid-career professionals in government and the private sector. Both Tony and Prabhi had the skills, energy and the outlook required to expand the reach of USIS programs to new and younger audiences.

We had the good fortune of meeting Prabhi several times after our tours in India, and I remember her telling us about her aspiration to become an FSO. We had no doubt she could achieve that goal given how effective she became as a USIS program manager and how well we worked together for three eventful years. She was a competent professional who moved comfortably between her society and ours. Prabhi met Howard Kavalier, a junior State Department FSO who arrived in New Delhi in 1978. They married in 1980, and after she became a U.S. citizen she passed the U.S. Foreign Service exams in 1990 and became an FSO. Following several overseas assignments as a tandem couple, Prabhi, Howard, and their two daughters arrived in Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998, just weeks before the terrorist bombing that destroyed the U.S. embassy there. Prabhi was one of the 11 Americans who lost their lives in that attack; her death was a great loss to the Foreign Service community.

Our family enjoyed our tour in India immensely. Everything about it contrasted with our experiences in the U.S. The sights, sounds, colors, smells, music, arts, and the vast array of handicrafts all proved eye-opening and heightened our awareness of the richness and variety of human expression. The food was out of this world. Our three years in India provided a range of unique experiences. For example, we saw the Taj Mahal a number of times, as monsoon rains fell, under a full moon at midnight and at various times of day when differing illumination revealed contrasts in the structure that we had not previously noticed.

We drove through the Rajasthan desert with embassy colleagues to attend the annual Pushkar Camel Fair in November. Ajmer, the city in which it is held, is also a major Hindu religious

pilgrimage site. We observed the trading of thousands of camels and were awakened by their haunting bleats during the night, as well as the sale and purchase of much other livestock. Parents, counseled by tribal elders, arranged the marriages of prepubescent girls. We consumed easy to chew slices of cane sugar chopped from canes longer than six feet. The streets of Ajmer were carpeted in white during the fair; sad to say, but after the thousands of visitors swallowed the sugar water in the inch-thick cane slices purchased as snacks, they expectorated the remaining fibers as they walked through the town. A number of embassy wives were cajoled into participating in a tug-of-war with local women who easily outmatched them. Driving back to New Delhi from Ajmer we passed clusters of vultures lurking in trees along the highway waiting to feast on the next road-kill or whatever else in the area was soon to expire. The anticipation of death and remains being ravenously devoured by those creatures made for a somewhat unsettling ride through the next 50 miles of isolated Rajasthan countryside.

Another interesting experience was our three-hour trip on the narrow-gauge railway from Kalka to Simla (now Shimla), the summer capital of the British Empire in the late 19th century. Most administrative agencies and the headquarters of the Empire's India Army relocated there to "find an agreeable refuge from the burning plain of Hindoostan" at an altitude of 7,200 ft. in the eastern Himalayas. The ride up the mountain offered grand views of landscape dominated by pine forests and rhododendron. The colonial city that replaced the small Indian village at the top boasted many buildings of the imperial era that are now a major tourist attraction. The neo-gothic Viceregal Lodge of the Indian Institute for Advanced Study was the venue for several USIS programs while I served in India. The town was cool in the blistering pre-monsoon heat and picturesque when covered by light snow in winter.

Early in January 1978 after President Carter left India, we along with my parents found ourselves on the beach in Goa, a former colony on the west coast near Bombay that the Indian army invaded in December 1961 to liberate it from Portuguese rule and annex it to India. It was favored by international winter tourists, among them nudists and marijuana smokers. With two kids and my parents in tow, we avoided them without having to go far out of our way to do so. Several five-star hotels had opened recently, and we enjoyed the luxury they offered on the beautiful beaches stretched out before them.

The Bombay newspapers we read over breakfast on a sunlit patio with temperatures in the mid-70s reported that a massive snowfall had covered the American northeast. Father was grateful that shoveling snow a foot deep in New Jersey would not be on his agenda for the next week. We basked in the pleasure of being in subtropical India while America was in the depth of winter.

One of our family's most pleasant experiences in India was spending a week on a houseboat on Srinagar's Dal Lake. The houseboat was 70 feet long and entirely made of wood. Boats in name only, they were actually floating homes docked along the lake shore away from the city with permanent links to plumbing and electricity. They could be accessed only by small taxi boats from the urban end of the lake, all of which bore names on plaques. I recall that one we used on several occasions was "The Happy Rose of Japan", which struck me as amusingly incongruous.

In 1976 our daughter was approaching five years of age and our son had just turned three. They loved being on the boat. Airfare was reasonable so we brought our ayah along to take care of

them while Sylvia and I ventured out and about. The Mughal Gardens were nearby and worth several visits. There were no public demonstrations or open hostilities and no gun fire anywhere in the region at that time, unlike in recent years. USIS held several seminars at Srinagar's Lake Palace Hotel and flew participants up to escape the insufferable heat of the lowlands in summer. We had no difficulty gathering participants for our activities in Kashmir between June and September.

One of the most important events of our lives was Sylvia's entry into the Foreign Service as a State Department consular officer in the middle of my tour in New Delhi. Fortunately, her first assignment was New Delhi. Without an available open position there, she would have been assigned elsewhere. That would have disrupted our lives in a major way and made us a "split tandem." Married FSOs both assigned to the same post are called a "tandem" couple. If both serve at different posts, they are a split tandem, a situation we hoped to avoid but could not several times later in our careers.

Sylvia flew back to Washington to take the six week A-100 course in June 1976. A few days before she departed a mosquito bit me on the top of my left foot as I lay on my back on the couch in the living room reading a book. When it started to itch, I rubbed it distractedly with the heel of my right foot opening a sore as I continued reading. Several days later it became infected, probably from something in the water of the embassy swimming pool. I went to the embassy nurse who gave me erythromycin tablets to counter it. After several days, the infection appeared to have cleared up and I did not take all the prescribed pills, a major mistake.

A few days later, I flew to Srinagar to manage a seminar we conducted there. The evening I arrived, I noted a black spot on my right calf. Looking in the mirror before I went to bed that night, I found some pus in the corners of my eyes. The following morning there were red blotches on both legs up to my hips. As I flew back to Delhi that day, a Sunday, I became apprehensive. The black spot on my calf had enlarged significantly. I arrived at our apartment in mid-afternoon and checked myself out. I also exposed my leg to our illiterate cook and asked him what he thought. He replied, "I think you ought to see a doctor, sahib," a conclusion I ought to have reached myself. I wondered, however, whether a doctor was available on a Sunday afternoon. I called the British embassy and its doctor, a Sikh physician married to an Irish woman, was in the office. He said I could come in and see him.

Unable to maintain a passive expression when he examined me, he told me to check into the British embassy dispensary immediately. Fortunately, we had an ayah to look after the children, or I don't know how I would have managed without Sylvia there. I entered the clinic within an hour and spent the following five waiting to see what effect triple doses of erythromycin would have on my condition. Fortunately I responded well and was discharged without any further complications at the end of the fifth day.

Just weeks later, the children and I flew to Washington for home leave and to reunite with Sylvia who after the A-100 course was completing consular training. We traveled on July 4, the bicentenary of American Independence, and with Washington ten hours behind time in New Delhi arrived early enough to have dinner with Sylvia at her sister's apartment in Georgetown before heading to the Mall to watch the massive fireworks display to mark the anniversary.

Sylvia knew nothing of my medical condition before I arrived, however. I was still recovering and the trip exhausted me. Regretfully I told her I was too tired to attend the display. Much to Sylvia's disappointment, our travel over almost 5,000 miles got us there in time to see it, but we missed out on a grand ceremony to mark 200 years of American independence.

Fortunately Sylvia did not have much competition for the only position available in New Delhi and began her Foreign Service career as a rotational officer at the embassy. State Department junior officers served several months of their first years at an embassy in the political, economic, consular and administrative sections of the embassy to give them a broad overview of embassy operations.

Our home leave that followed was a series of pleasant stays with Sylvia's parents in Athens, Georgia; a week on the beach in Pawleys Island, South Carolina; and a stay with my parents in Maplewood, New Jersey. Months later after returning to New Delhi I encountered the British embassy physician who treated my infected leg at a social function. We exchanged pleasantries for several moments and he then let me know that had I not responded as well as I did, he was two days away from recommending that my leg be amputated at the knee. That left me with my mouth hanging open; another guest extended him a greeting and he turned away to acknowledge it.

In addition to issuing visas, consular officers also deal with Americans abroad who may encounter a countless range of problems that require the services of the consulate while they are traveling. A certain segment of the American population was turned on by images of India generated by pop culture icons that may have visited the country but didn't really have much of a clue. A number of drug-tripping Americans sought enlightenment from Indian gurus, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi among them who English rock band, the Beatles, almost made a household name in the 1970s during their encounter with transcendental meditation. There were also adventure-seekers on magical, mystery tours that did things they thought they would be free to do in India that turned out to be against the law even there. The problems they got into took much of Sylvia's time during her assignment in New Delhi and made for some very interesting conversations over dinner.

As much as we enjoyed serving in India, things could be exasperating. The country is the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River and had a population of more than 600 million in 1975. You could say almost with certitude that there were only a few places in India at an altitude under 5,000 feet where you were not within sight of another human being. That was particularly annoying when you had to pull off the road after not encountering a gas station with a rest room anywhere along the previous 100 miles and sought privacy to respond to the call of nature. Within moments after you alighted from your vehicle, half a dozen or more people would pop into view just as you prepared to do the needful (a Indian English colloquialism). It was as surprising as it was inevitable.

Livestock on public arteries, primarily cattle on streets and roads anywhere in the country, was another bane of our existence. You simply do not mess around with sacred cows no matter where they are including at the bus stop in front of the USIS building in the heart of downtown New Delhi. The beasts paid absolutely no heed to anything, motorized vehicles included. At least they

made no effort to board buses as far as I know. Every time we drove out of town we had to be alert for cows that wandered around aimlessly and could almost be counted upon to step out onto the open road in front of us as we approached them at 50 mph or more.

But that was not all. As in England, Indians drive on the left side of the road, which made negotiating your way at “roundabouts” (traffic circles) challenging, as was crossing the street and having to look to the right rather than the left to see if anyone was bearing down on you. You also had to worry about motor scooters with families of five or six as passengers, motor scooter taxis and bicycle rickshaws (pedi-cabs). They would pull out into intersections with no thought of slowing down, let alone stopping or even looking right or left. Why bother? It’s a question of fate; either you make it or you don’t. We were just grateful not to be fated to take one out in a traffic accident while driving in India.

Moving through traffic with the inevitable three-wheeled scooters or pedi-cabs, of which there are still hundreds of thousands in India, was also challenging. The growth of traffic has been exponential over the past 30 years. There are now lane markers on major roads, but they have absolutely no bearing on the way Indian traffic moves. Traffic patterns resemble the flows of schools of fish in the sea. Vehicles not only tailgate each other, but they also ‘sidegate’, transforming a four-lane road into five or six. That everyone generally gets to where they are going without scrapes dents, or bodily injury may be considered nothing less than miraculous.

Heavy pollution in winter was largely generated by burning dried cow ‘patties’ or dung that was the common source of fuel for heat and cooking. They issued great quantities smoke and unpleasant odors and were for us one of the most unpleasant things about India. In March 2011 I got the impression that cow dung is no longer commonly burned for heating, at least not in major urban areas, although since the temperatures were already in the mid-80s I cannot say with certitude that is the case. Fortunately we were able to make the adjustments necessary to survive on-the-ground reality in New Delhi and elsewhere across north India in the mid 1970s.

As you can see, life in the Foreign Service overseas is a mixed bag and that makes this a good place to review some of the practical advantages of overseas assignments for Foreign Service officers that add to the variety and richness of professional and personal experiences life abroad can offer. First of all, embassies provide mission personnel furnished housing. Only one of the residences we occupied in our careers -- in Jamaica with a one-acre lot and swimming pool -- came close to matching the home we bought in McLean, Virginia in 1978, however. In general, a brick, two-story, four-bedroom, three-bathroom house with a two-car garage on a quarter acre lot in almost any suburb in the U.S. is more appealing than most quarters leased by the embassy General Services office in almost any country in the world.

At some posts, the availability of property approaching U.S. standards was limited; in others, costs for such housing far exceeded embassy funds available for housing. Officers could find their own housing at some posts if the properties met embassy-mandated security standards and did not exceed the post’s housing allowance. In communist Poland and Yugoslavia, the flats and houses embassy staffs occupied were acquired through negotiations between the embassy administrative sections and the Foreign Ministries.

Second, officers who own homes in the U.S. can rent them out while serving abroad. We did so with our Annandale condo while we were in India and our house in McLean during our later tours in Yugoslavia and Jamaica. We also rented out our house during Sylvia's tour as deputy chief of mission in Sarajevo, Bosnia while I served as regional PAO in USIA's European division.

Third, the Department covers the costs of secondary education of dependent children whose parents are posted in countries that do not have international schools or do not offer a secondary education curricula geared to prepare them for college education in the U.S. Our son Alex had just completed his high school sophomore year when Sylvia joined me in Jamaica a year after my tour there began. Because its British-based education system did not meet the college prep requirement, we enrolled him in a boarding school in Connecticut that was well regarded by Foreign Service families. Had we desired, we could have placed him in an international school abroad and covered out of pocket any expenses that exceeded the State Department's education allowance.

After Alex finished high school and entered Emory University in Atlanta he remarked that his prep school had filled its mission; he observed that it prepared him better for college than public schools did for many of his classmates, which compensated us somewhat for the unwelcome absences of our son spanning two of our years in Kingston. And we compensated him with flights to Kingston for every break in the school year especially at Christmas when temperatures in Jamaica were in the mid-80s and the surf in the Caribbean was just right.

Another practical advantage of Foreign Service life was the possible sale of personally owned vehicles prior to departing an overseas post. In our experience, depending on the country, you had the option of selling to other diplomats or third-country citizens in communist Poland and Yugoslavia and selling to any potential buyer at market price elsewhere. With far more cars available around the world today than 30 or 40 years ago, market prices for previously owned vehicles abroad may no longer differ significantly from those domestically. Back in the day, however, there were tales of used American cars going for several times their purchase price primarily because import duties were that high or other restrictions limited the availability of personally owned vehicles in the countries in which they were sold. Over the years during my career, however, Department regulations placed increasing limits on the sales of personally owned vehicles abroad at the end of overseas tours. We were satisfied to break even with the sales of three of our cars overseas.

ALBERT A. THIBAUT, JR.
Political Officer
New Delhi (1975-1978)

Albert A. Thibault, Jr. was born in Massachusetts on August 5, 1941. He received his BA from the University of Windsor in Canada in 1962, his MA from the University of Toronto in 1963, and another MA from the University of

Pennsylvania in 1964. He entered the Foreign Service in 1969. His career has included positions in Guinea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Saudi Arabia.

Q: Well then, you came back in '75.

THIBAULT: That's right, I came back in '75 and spent a few weeks on the Iran desk. The only thing I remember about that is Charlie Naas, who was the office director, called me in, welcomed me, and pointed to my desk. I was only there while they were scurrying around to place me elsewhere in NEA. And he immediately said, "Well, you'll be working on ...," I forget what it was. I said, "I know nothing about Iran." He paused and looked me in the eye, saying, "You're an FSO, aren't you?" I said, "Yes." He said, "End of discussion." He was right. That brief exchange told me instantly what being a U.S. Foreign Service officer is all about, including esprit de corps. I have never forgotten it.

After that then I went, as I mentioned before, to be desk officer for Sri Lanka in what was then and now is still known as INS, the Office of India, Nepal, Sri Lanka Affairs in the then NEA. Today it's in SA, the Bureau of South Asian Affairs.

Q: Were you it for

THIBAULT: For Sri Lanka and the Maldives. I should have mentioned the Maldives. I never made it to the Maldives when I was stationed there but the ambassador in Colombo was also accredited to the Maldives.

Q: Well then, you were doing this for how long?

THIBAULT: In INS? I was there for three years, 'til '78. I was two years desk officer for Sri Lanka, one year as political officer for India and then I went into Hindi language training for a year at FSI prior to being assigned to New Delhi.

NATALE H. BELLOCCHI
Economic Counselor
New Delhi (1976-1979)

Ambassador Natale H. Bellocchi was born in Little Falls, New York in 1926. He received a degree in industrial management from Georgia Tech in 1944 and was soon drafted into the U.S. Army to serve in a rifle platoon during the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, India, and an ambassadorship to Botswana. Ambassador Bellocchi was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 21, 1995.

Q: Then in '76, where to?

BELLOCCHI: India--Indja.

Q: You were in India from '76 to when?

BELLOCCHI: '79. That's when our three year cycle for overseas tours started. I was the economic counselor.

Q: How did you find India at that time? India is both a fascinating place, but for Americans I think Indians can be very difficult to deal with.

BELLOCCHI: Sure, but they can also be very good friends. You can make some good personal relationships. You can also meet many that have you crawling up the wall. But it's a big country, and they're not without their pride. I think that if you take that into account, you really can make some good friends. It is an open democratic country. I got there when Gandhi had declared an emergency. During much of the time I was there we were in this emergency period. Then she permitted open elections and got defeated. The Janata party won, and it was the first non-congress government that they had there, so all of that was very fascinating. Politically there was a lot of change taking place. Economically, still very difficult for American companies to do business there. And there was some animosity because there had been some rather unfriendly exchanges. India was considered to be too close to the Soviet Union as you remember in those days. They weren't really a friend even though they were a democracy. So there were these kinds of strains in the political relationship, but you still could do a lot of work there. I spent a lot of my time negotiating the reopening of our AID program.

Q: What was the situation in India? Why would we want an AID program at that point?

BELLOCCHI: Well, we'd had one. We had a very huge AID program there, and then we didn't get the right kind of treatment I guess. We thought they favored the Soviet Union, or whatever it was. We cut out most of our aid except for PL 480 humanitarian assistance. Our AID people were interested in getting back into the aid business in India, certainly a place that needed it. I think there were many also that wanted to reopen our participation in World Bank projects, for example, multilateral arrangements. Our AID people were more interested in the bilateral, but we at the embassy were more interested in staying away from the political problems that the AID program had had in the past, and that we join multilateral projects more than bilateral. It was about 50-50 actually when it finally came out. We joined some irrigation projects, but it was a long sticky process.

Q: Why would India...I mean it certainly had the intellectual know-how, why would it need AID projects?

BELLOCCHI: They needed capital. They didn't need the technical assistance. They're very capable in the scientific areas especially, but they needed the capital for things that had to be done, especially things out in the countryside, the irrigation projects for example, big infrastructure projects. They needed outside assistance, they needed capital, they needed some technical know-how. They didn't have the kind of companies that could do some of that kind of work. They relied mostly on multilateral AID so that they could maintain political control.

Q: Dealing with AID sometimes can almost be like a foreign power. I'm talking about the American AID program.

BELLOCCHI: You better believe it.

Q: Can you give your impressions? This is the first time you're really up against AID in a non-wartime situation. I mean, there you are, you're the economic counselor, and AID says, "We want to do some projects."

BELLOCCHI: That was by far the toughest task we had. Negotiating with the Indians was not easy. They're very good negotiators, and it took a long stretch of time. But quite frankly the differences between State and AID were far greater.

Q: What was our concern? I mean, what were the problems?

BELLOCCHI: Our objective was that AID didn't get back in the position they were in before, where they were so dominant in this whole area that it caused us political problems. The Indians do not want to have a foreign power telling them what to do. And AID was telling them what to do, and they had a lot of money to back them up. I think the concern of the embassy was that we restart the AID program in a gradual way, and we do it to the greatest extent possible through multilateral rather than bilateral means to avoid the political problems of the past. And the multilaterals did a good job in those days. World Bank irrigation projects, and dams, and all these other things were pretty good. AID didn't agree with that, of course. They preferred the bilateral, and they wanted direct control over projects themselves. So that was our biggest battle.

Number two was the amount. I think State in those days said, let's start small because we feel that the aid to India process has got to be developed, and its got to progress gradually, or it's going to become an even greater political problem, so let's not go overboard. But in those days AID was thinking in terms of a billion dollar AID program again in India. No way did we want that.

Q: In a way did you have the feeling that AID was looking for a place to play after it lost its big ____ in Vietnam?

BELLOCCHI: That's right, and thank goodness Egypt came up and drained some of their attention to take the pressure off India. I was in Laos in the '60s when our military contingent left after the Geneva Agreement. Our military people left, our AID people came back in, and the influx of aid was so fast, and so large, that it overshadowed the departure of the military by far. They can really take over a place in no time at all.

Q: I mean this was very much in the mind, a large bureaucracy, and large bureaucracies cause problems.

BELLOCCHI: They're very good at this. I remember them going to a fellow at Yale University to come up with a study on why there ought to be a very large AID program in India. They searched around the country and got the kind of study they wanted and they had him write it. So

we had to overcome that. My name was mud with the AID program in those days, but I think we succeeded. Bob Goheen was the ambassador who was born and raised in India. A former president of Princeton University. And he sided with us and helped us a great deal to keep the AID monster from taking over. As the economic counselor in the embassy, my office was in a little portion of the new embassy we had there. The ambassador's office, the DCM's office, the reception area, and the conference room on one side, and on the other side was what was built to be the AID director's office with a little kitchenette, and a shower, and all this business, and a place for the secretary. The economic counselor had always occupied that little suite of offices. Why? Because when it was built the AID director said he wasn't about to move into the embassy. He had a much better office. So it was the economic counselor's office, it was quite an office.

Q: How about commercial ties with India?

BELLOCCHI: We had a commercial attaché in the embassy. But in those days, no, not very much. Coca Cola had been bounced out because they had done what they should do, they'd appointed an Indian director for Coca Cola India and he promptly got involved in politics. When Gandhi lost the election, boom, out he went, and Coca Cola was finished for some years. I think they're back in now, but there were a lot of problems for our companies. It was very difficult to do business in India.

Q: Was it because it was essentially a socialist type government?

BELLOCCHI: No, very bureaucratic. It was very, very difficult to weave your way through the bureaucracy. And there wasn't any great incentive to take in the American and foreign companies. It was still that great feeling that the foreigners would try to control their economy. They had a lot of barriers against that happening. The barriers, of course, prevented our companies from operating the way they wanted to operate. The fellow that was the head of the economic department in the Ministry of Finance, and the one we had the most to do with, is now the Minister of Finance, Monmohan Singh. A very bright guy.

Q: How about Soviet penetration of the market?

BELLOCCHI: They had that special trade deal with the Soviets, the Rupee-Ruble Trade, and we devoted a lot of time trying to figure out what exchange rate was being used between the two so we could measure how much that was. The Indians took quite a beating on that, frankly, but they were paying off their military procurement salaries(?).

Q: Then after India, where?

BELLOCCHI: Hong Kong.

FRED CHARLES THOMAS, JR.
Commercial Attaché
New Delhi (1977-1978)

Fred Charles Thomas Jr. was born in Arizona in 1927. He served overseas with the Army for two years before graduating from Bucknell University in 1951. He has served at overseas posts in Korea, Pakistan, Germany, Vietnam, and India, as well as the Office of Strategic Research in Washington DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

Q: Then what did you do?

THOMAS: The Department, nobody wanted me back here. Nobody wanted any of us back here. When I got back, I went into the Department, and I was told to stay on leave, administrative leave, which meant you didn't pay for it. We couldn't keep staying with relatives. We decided get back into our own house. There were no jobs at the Department. The oil crisis was still brewing. It was the mid-'70s, late '70s, and they had all these research projects going, on petroleum and the shortage of oil. I was sent out to do that. It was just make-work. I ended up doing research on oil, going out to the Department of Energy. I had these clearances, and these clearances let me go to a lot of places and see a lot of documents. But it was no job, really.

I kicked around with nothing really to do. They talked about giving me some more Chinese to bring my Chinese back, there was no job in Beijing at the time.

I was a year in limbo with no real job. It was more than that. They ended up giving me a research INR type job, which was dullsville, sort of intelligence analysis, which I found not my thing.

Desai had taken over in India, and they thought there was a big break in India, with Desai in.

Q: Desai was the new president who replaced Indira Gandhi.

THOMAS: Not president but the prime minister.

Q: And it looked like a swing to more friendly with the United States.

THOMAS: They thought there would be more commercial opportunities that I could maybe get some American investments, do what I'd done in Germany. What I'd been able to accomplish in Germany preceded me. I said, "If that's what I've got to do to get out of the country and get a post." I agreed to go off to New Delhi into that job.

Right after I got there, Desai turned out to be even worse than Indira had been. He insisted that Coca-Cola turnover their formula. He wanted some things out of IBM that they weren't willing to give him. Both of them closed up shop and walked out. When they did it, nobody was interested in investing anything in India. I had the Delhi belly for months on end.

Q: Delhi belly being a term for sort of like a mild-grade dysentery.

THOMAS: The ambassador to India was a man named Goheen, a Greek scholar out of Princeton. We had a fellow named Wyles, I think, who was the administrative counselor who

was an ex-chief in the Navy. We had some type of foreigner, who had an American passport, who was running the commissary. The prices in the commissary were horrendous, with everybody up in arms about the costs and prices. We'd been there two weeks when I went to a meeting. Wyles was back in this country on TDY, arranging for another four-year tour (he'd been there four years), to stay on in India. Everybody was screaming about the costs at the commissary, etc. I got up and made a speech about what I'd found out about the commissaries in Germany and Karachi. According to law, the commissary really belonged to the membership. If you looked at the constitution of the commissary in India, it put all the real power in the hands of the ambassador's administrative counselor. That didn't mean that constitution had to stay that way, because the law stated that the membership had a right to change the constitution any way they wanted. The first thing you had to do was rewrite the constitution.

I got a big hand of applause from everybody when I made this little speech. Consequently I was elected to chair a committee to change the constitution of the commissary. I turned around and asked for volunteers to sit on the committee. No officers volunteered; only one officer's wife offered to be on the committee. Everybody else was a clerk, a code clerk or a clerk of some type, on this committee.

Within about three or four days after this thing was set up, I got a call from this young Princetonian who had the same job Moorefield had. He'd been brought out there (tennis anyone? good looking, handsome boy, with a young wife) as aide to Ambassador Goheen. He came in to tell me what the ambassador wanted in that constitution.

I looked at this young man and said, "I wasn't elected by the ambassador. I was elected by the membership of the club. Once we've decided on the constitution, I'll send a draft around for the ambassador to look at. If he doesn't like it, he can tell me so. But, until then, well, let's not worry about what the ambassador wants in it. Right now, I'm worried about what the people who're serving here want in it."

He went back and told the ambassador. That didn't make me very popular with the ambassador.

The constitution was rewritten. In the meantime, my job was nothing, really. I wasn't getting anybody to invest. My boss, Bryant, who was the senior commercial attaché...

Q: Edward Bryant.

THOMAS: He looked on me as trouble, in the commercial sense, because I had a fairly senior rank, and I was a third wheel there, and, you know, they really didn't need me. I was always coming up with new ideas, and who likes new ideas; they only cause problems.

I just said, "Well, what the hell. I don't like this post, anyway. I'm not getting along or going to get along very well with Goheen. So I'm going to get myself out of here, if I can. But, in the meantime, I'll do what I can."

So we rewrote the constitution. It put the power into the hands of an elected board. There was to be a chairman of the board who was to be elected by the membership. The ambassador put out

word that he wanted to make sure that I was not elected chairman of the board of that commissary. He got somebody to agree to run, who was head of the NSA unit there. He was a guy who got up and made a funny speech. At the meeting after he was elected, I was asked "Was there any job I preferred to have, because I'd arranged all this?"

I said, "Yes, I'd like to be chairman of the by-laws committee."

It's one thing to have a constitution, but the next thing, in terms of power, is the by-laws. I said, "I'd like volunteer to sit on the by-laws committee."

Well, by this time, all the officers in the place were coming around on the q.t. and saying, "Go to it. We're all for you." They didn't want to be openly for me, because the ambassador was backing Wyles, who was the guy fighting me.

In the meantime, I wasn't given a house to live in.

Q: You were in Delhi from when to when?

THOMAS: I arrived there in, let's say, October of '77, and departed in June of '78. I had the school year with my kids there.

Goheen had left on home leave; I went in to make my final call on Arch Blood; I apologized for not having accomplished anything, in terms of my job there. He said, "Oh, you've accomplished a lot. What you did for this commissary and the morale here has been worth, you know..."

I took off for Washington. There was no real job back here, really. They kept kicking me from pillar to post. Suddenly, at a Christmas party here, I met someone from a large corporation; he heard I was a China linguist and that I was looking around; I was sort of fed up with bureaucracy. He said he thought he could line up a job with his corporation, and a new big contract they had in China. This was the winter of '78, Christmas time, and I listened to him.

In the spring of '79, I just decided I'd had it. I retired in June, with no written commitment, but an oral commitment, that I would be hired by this company to go to China for them.

Just as I retired, the Chinese pulled the rug out from under this company and a lot of others. They got scared they were spending too much money, and they cancelled all these contracts. I'd retired, suddenly, into what I thought was going to be a job. It wasn't a job, because it disappeared.

I tried to start a consulting business on China. I was just getting started, when I was hit from the rear in a terrible automobile accident. It was two to three years before I came out of the shock from that, the trauma.

I said, "Well, what the hell. I'm going to enjoy my retirement." I became involved in local political affairs.

That was pretty much my State Department career.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much. Fred. This has been very illuminating.

TERESITA C. SCHAFFER
Office of the Science Advisor
New Delhi (1977-1979)

Ambassador Schaffer was born in New York and later educated in France. She received her undergraduate degree from Bryn Mawr College and joined the Foreign Service. Her Foreign Service career took her to Israel, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Ambassador Schaffer was interviewed by Thomas Stern in September 1998.

Q: In 1977, you moved with Delhi for reasons already described. Was there any curiosity in Delhi about your transfer?

SCHAFFER: There was a noticeable absence of inquiries on what happened in Pakistan, both from our colleagues and our Indian contacts. That was helpful.

As soon as I had arrived, I reported for duty to the Science Advisor's office. The Ambassador was Bob Goheen, former President of Princeton University. He had been educated in India because his parents had been missionaries there. His daughter had been a classmate of mine during high school and college.

The first DCM I worked for was David Schneider; he was followed by Arch Blood. My immediate boss was Tom Varevalobich. Tom was a rocket scientist; he had worked on the space program at a jet propulsion laboratory. He was the Counselor for Scientific Affairs, but reported to the Economic Counselor. He was eminently qualified for the position because he had spent two years at Indian Institute of Technology at Kamper at a time when the U.S. assistance was being provided that institution. A number of the donors selected a technological institute to support and the U.S. chose the Institute of Technology at Kamper. At the time I arrived, he was very friendly with Dhawan who was the head of the Indian space program; that friendship may indeed have first developed in graduate school.

I said that the Science Office was part of the Economic Section. It had been part of the Political Section, which had responsibility for following nuclear development in India. The change was made to accommodate the Schaffers, so that I would not be working even indirectly for Howie. I think that in either organizational structure, the supervision of the Science Counselor was very relaxed; neither the Political or Economic Counselors gave very close supervision to the Science Counselor. Certainly the Economic Counselor did not spend much time on scientific affairs.

The whole Embassy was somewhat different from organizational structures with which I was familiar. For example, technically I was working for the Department of Health and Human Services (HEW). My position had been filled by that Department as far back as anyone can recollect; my salary was paid by HEW. Tom's position on the other hand was part of the State Department's complement, but in the Delhi structure, I reported to him.

A lot of my responsibilities were related to projects in the scientific-technological area which had been originally funded by excess rupees generated by our PL-480 program -- which had been a huge resource. There were different local currency accounts; one of those was designated for funding of cooperative research between India and the U.S. India was not the only country which funded many projects through PL-480, but most of the innovative uses for the local currencies stemmed from India. Much of the research was done by the Indian health agencies. Most of my contacts were with the health bureaucracy.

The Indian bureaucratic system was and is cumbersome. That is true pretty much across the board. The project approval process is very long; they have a clearance process that makes ours look efficient. In the case of health research, there was special concern about the acceptability of the project to the Indian population. On several occasions, senior scientists supported a proposal whole-heartedly, but they had to clear it with the Ministry of Finance, the Foreign Office, the assistance agency and in some cases, the Home Ministry. They had tried to convince these bureaucrats not to object. So to get a new project approved tended to take a long time.

Actually, the most interesting example of this process was a project not in the health field. NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) -- a part of the Department of Commerce -- had a major project titled MONEX (Monsoon Experiment.) This was part of the first world-wide weather experiment -- global atmospheric research program (GARP). The NOAA people wanted to come to India during the monsoon season to conduct a number of experiments. They wanted to base an aircraft in Delhi which could take atmospheric soundings, to assign a TDYer to supervise the project, and to measure ocean temperatures -- although that part of the experiment did not require Indian participation since NOAA had its own ships well outside the territorial limits. The Embassy was requested to make the necessary arrangements. This involved us with a whole new part of the bureaucracy -- the Meteorological Office. That Department was fully supportive; they saw the benefits that might accrue to India from the American project. They hoped that the findings might improve their predictive capabilities. But the proposal included a number of unusual requests. We, as Americans are wont to do, proceeded in typical legal fashion. The State Department and NOAA were anxious to have a "Memorandum of Understanding" which would spell out the terms under which the project would operate. One of the more complicated requests related to the special aircraft, but technically, when it took off to take soundings, it was leaving India and when finished its experiments would have to re-enter India. That required at least multiple entry visas; preferably visa requirements might have been waived as well as a customs waiver for the aircraft, which was loaded with scientific equipment. The problem that we had anticipated -- access for Indian scientists to the data collected by NOAA -- was taken care of very early and never did raise its head. But there were many other agencies that had to put their fingers in the pie. Someone drafted the memorandum; as I recall it, it was very long, filled with "whereas's". This had to be

reviewed by the government's legal staff, especially the legal advisor to the Minister for External Affairs. The difference in time between Washington and Delhi was useful in this case. When I got to the office in the morning, I could expect a cable proposing some language changes. I would take those to the legal division, who would in turn give me their proposed changes. I would send those to Washington who would review them while I slept -- although I did have a couple of phone calls at unusual hours.

On one day -- an Indian holiday -- we got a zinger. There was a clause that seemed to be quite innocuous; it turned out to be quite the opposite. It was a liability clause and included a reference to applicability of U.S. law to this project. I took it to the Ministry, where the Legal Advisor happened to be in his office despite the holiday -- despite the fact that I was recovering from amoebas. The Legal Advisor read the proposed language and said he could not agree unless he had a memorandum from the Department's Legal Advisor spelling out what the pertinent section of U.S. law might be. He ended the conversation by asking that I query Washington to see whether that clause was really necessary -- in light of his threat to require additional information and a prolonged review period. Fortunately, our lawyers agreed to delete that clause.

Unlike my predecessor, who was a PhD scientist from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), my only science background was the inevitable course taken to fulfill the science requirement in college. I did not find my lack of background to be a major impediment. I was quite forthright about my lack of knowledge; people seemed to accept that I was a Foreign Service Officer who could provide good liaison between the two scientific groups -- Indian and American. Furthermore, by the end of my tour, I had become quite familiar with some issues -- including some that were important to our cooperative program and also of personal interest to me. For example, I became quite familiar with malaria and its eradication and contraceptive research. I think I achieved a level of familiarity with those programs which gave me considerable credibility. I could summarize accurately the status of research on those subjects, as well as others. I knew the issues involved, although I did not pretend to be scientifically qualified.

An interesting story about my not having a Ph.D. has to do with an American colleague. During an inspection of Embassy Delhi, one of the inspectors was Felix Bloch -- before he became well known. I first met Felix at a "meet the Inspectors" party -- probably at the DCM's or the Administrative Counselor's house. Felix was assigned to review the work of the Science Office, including an interview with me, since I was technically in an out-of-State assignment. I introduced myself to Felix. His immediate response was that he heard about me and some of the comments had been negative.

That was an inauspicious start. I decided to seek an early appointment with Felix. I got one and at the appointed time, I went to the office Bloch was using. The conversation had only begun when I reminded him of his comments at the party. I asked what the problem was. He told me that his information had come to him from his wife, who worked at the National Science Foundation -- or similar organization. She had told him that there was unhappiness in the NSF because I had been up front about my lack of a Ph.D. I told Felix that it was all true; I didn't have a Ph.D. and saw no reasons to hide the fact. Furthermore, I thought it important for my contacts to understand my background, especially since I was in contact with scientists that were on the

cutting edge. I could provide good administrative and liaison services; that seemed enough for my contacts. I thought it was important not to misrepresent myself.

Felix's comment was that some quarters in Washington felt that I should have been more discreet. In light of his subsequent history, that was an interesting suggestion. [Felix Bloch was accused of espionage in 1989. The case never went to trial.]

Our office made connections between Indian and American scientists, tried to shepherd projects through the Indian approval process, and tracked them and followed their reporting requirements once they were approved. We also supported visiting American scientists, when they came to explore the possibility of finding an Indian partner or to consult with their counterpart.

We also were the action office for the Indo-US Subcommission on Science and Technology. That commission met a couple of times during my Delhi tour. Its main function was to provide policy guidance to the various joint research efforts. As it so often happens, the policy guidance was broad enough to encompass almost all proposals.

I kept contact with senior officials in the Indian Health Ministry and the ministry that received the American assistance funds, as well as the leading researchers in the Indian Council for Medical Research and the All-Indian Institute for Medical Sciences. I traveled around the country, visiting many of the leading health institutions. Tom worried about other research activities, particularly those in the space program. If we had visitors who might have needed escorting or more assistance than my staff and I usually provided, we did provide that, even if some of the work could have been done by travel agencies.

The vast majority of people I was dealing with wanted projects to succeed. They were all senior level officials. That was an interesting feature of my unusual role in the Embassy. The Indian Foreign Office was very particular about what the rank of visitors might be. Relatively junior officers like me would never be received by senior officials of that Ministry. Its rule was the Joint Secretaries -- the rough equivalent of deputy assistant secretaries in our system -- would only receive people at the Counselor or higher level. In my case, I had no reason to work with the Foreign Ministry, but I had routine access to Secretaries -- the rough equivalent of our Under Secretaries -- of the Ministries which were of interest to me. They didn't care that I was only a First Secretary.

A couple of years ago, when my son was at Columbia University, he had a graduate assistant in one of his economic courses. That was an Indian who was the son of the Secretary of the Health Ministry when I was in Delhi. The assistant asked my son whether he was related to Teresita Schaffer; he said his father remembered her from her work of twenty-five years earlier. That was very rewarding.

Where we were helpful was not in the commentary we might have had on scientific issues -- American or Indian scientists obviously had a better background for that. We were most useful in finding ways to engage the Indian bureaucracy. That is a science in itself, although no advanced degrees are granted to experts in this field. There is a system -- a very elaborate system with some aspects of chaos -- which I finally learned. It was our responsibility to be able to follow a

paper trail and know who would have to “sign off” on proposals. We knew which officials were friendly and which were difficult; what each senior official was interested in; what sensitivities might exist on Indian-American scientific cooperation. During this time, it was not uncommon to have sudden eruptions of controversy over certain scientific endeavors. For example, in the 1960s and early 1970s, there had a couple of projects that became passionately controversial. It was alleged that we were giving yellow fever to some mosquitoes and then releasing those carriers on certain parts of India. That was a pure canard, but it was typical of the controversies that might arise at any time from some innocent project. It should be noted that these disturbances were always generated by political forces that were trying to blacken the U.S.’ reputation.

I was somewhat lucky in that during my tour, not many new controversies arose. I had inherited some old “chestnuts” that became active. There is one interesting one which did come up during my tour which concerned some work being done on monkeys. Manufacturing polio vaccine required rhesus monkeys, which could be found only in India and Nepal. So a supply of monkeys was needed by the National Institute of Health. The International Primate Protection League, an American organization, which was strongly opposed to the use of primates for research purposes, took up the cudgels on this issue. It got in touch with like-minded spirits in India and Nepal. This group created a sufficiently vocal outcry that the Nepalese Government banned the export of these monkeys. The Indians also considered restrictions. NIH of course became alarmed and sent a senior official -- Dr. Ben Blood (whose son subsequently joined the Foreign Service) -- to Delhi. He reached a somewhat vague understanding with the Indians which left many questions unanswered. The issue had extraordinary resonance in India. Not only was the issue ripe for those who wanted to smear US-Indo scientific relations, but more importantly monkeys represent spiritual and ritual values dear to Hindu hearts. In one tradition, one of the important deities appears as a monkey, in one of its manifestations. So monkeys appear in a classic epic which are so central to the Hindu religion. Monkeys had a level of Indian respect that was not accorded to other animals.

This monkey issue had been around for many years before my arrival -- ever since the polio vaccine was developed. So although the issue had been around for many years, it all of a sudden became a hot potato.

I came away from that assignment with a mixed feeling about the science programs. I felt that some useful research was done; there were undoubtedly some marginal projects in part because the U.S. agencies did not view available rupees as a scarce resource. It was a complicated process, because some of the rupees were actually appropriated by the U.S. Congress. Some of the projects required a dollar appropriation which, however, were spent in rupees. Dollar appropriations were hard to come by; the rupee appropriations were viewed quite differently by executive agencies and the Congress.

Some of the collaborative projects were quite fascinating. For example, we had some pharmacological research on traditional herbs; there was study -- I think at Benares Hindu University -- which attempted to use Western measuring techniques to assess the effectiveness of non-Western -- e.g., yoga -- therapeutic methods to cure stress-related diseases. The Indians were

trying to measure results in ways which would make their findings significant to Western scientists.

We were often subjected to criticism that we carried out research in India which could not have taken place in the U.S. I don't believe that during my time that was done at all. The Indians were very sensitive on this score. If I remember correctly, this accusation was made against one program which dealt with the prevention of cataracts. Cataracts are a frequent occurrence in India, with its very bright sunny days and the lack of adequate medical attention for many people. It was -- and is -- not unusual to have "eye camps" where people with cataracts came to have them removed. One of our projects called for the shipment of these removed cataracts to the U.S. for research. There were many questions concerning "why Indians and not Americans?" I was satisfied that the accusations had no merit. The removal of the cataracts was of benefit to the Indian patients and did not represent an imperialistic attitude. The main reason why the project was established in India was because so many Indians had cataract problems. I was not aware of any pressure having been applied to Indians to undertake unnecessary surgery; it would have been foolish to do so in light of the vast need for such surgery.

In essence, I had no problems with any of the projects we were undertaking. With the rare exception of some "boondoggles", I thought the projects with which I was familiar were worthwhile and designed to increase human knowledge. NIH sponsored research was based on protocols which demanded that the experiments in India use the same standards as if they were conducted in NIH. I am not sure that had always been the case, but it certainly was during my tour. As you can well imagine, the Indian government was very careful, given its population sensitivities about being treated as "guinea pigs." So it gladly accepted the NIH protocols.

I might just mention President Carter's visit in 1978. It was 47 hours, 45 minutes long! The Carters were programmed for every minute of that time. The program for a presidential visit indicates what is to be done in 3-5 minute increments. Every second is accounted for. I was in charge of Mrs. Carter's program. The stated reason I was given this assignment was her interest in social welfare issues; we had the best Embassy contacts with that community. I was also the only female member of the country team, which I think may have been the real reason for my selection.

My whole experience with a trip by a First Lady was fascinating. First came the pre-visit planning. I had never been involved in a presidential visit and the planning was an eye-opener. One member of the White House's advance team represented Mrs. Carter. The advance team was quite nice. I talked to one colleague who had been through the Nixon visit to Poland; he thought that the contrast between the two White House staffs could not have been greater. The Carter people could say "Please" and "Thank you" which apparently were foreign words to the Nixon crowd.

The Carters originally planned to come in November 1977, but sometime in October, the White House asked for a postponement and scheduled the visit for New Year's Day. We first had a pre-advance team, then an advance team and then the visit itself. The Embassy was asked to submit a schedule for the President, for the First Lady and for the Carters together. We did and proposed a

number of events. The events that we did propose for Mrs. Carter were approved and were built in her final schedule.

I particularly remember two events. One was a luncheon to be hosted by Mrs. Goheen. I wanted to include in the guest list people with considerable substance in Mrs. Carter's fields of interest, who all happened to be women. We also suggested to the advance team that Mrs. Carter visit a community center in Delhi which had a lot of interesting programs for young people. After we sent these suggestions to Washington, we didn't hear for week after week, despite our periodic reminders. Silence!

Entirely unrelated to the Carter visit we hosted Mary King, the Director of the Peace Corps. We had been told that she was a close friend Rosalynn Carter. I was the escort officer for Ms. King primarily because she wanted to see what was being done by the Indians in the health field. So I took the opportunity to discuss our problem with Ms. King. After a meeting, in the Embassy car that we were using, I told her the state of play and how much we needed help to move Mrs. Carter's program forward. I told her that we had not heard anything from Washington in months and wondered whether we had taken the right approach. I asked Ms. King whether our selection of possible events might be of interest to Mrs. Carter. I got a funny look from her. She said that Mrs. Carter would like our suggestions, but her staff would hate them. I then asked what could be done to bring this matter to a close. Ms. King volunteered to see what she could do about it.

Eventually, again after a prolonged period, the White House permitted us to proceed with the planning of the visit including the events that we had proposed. So we put together the guest list for the luncheon. It was an A-level list. For example, we had Ela Bhatt, who was internationally famous for having organized rag-pickers into a union in Bombay. There was one woman who had been one of Gandhi's collaborators; she was also a very interesting newspaper columnist. So all of the guests had serious credentials in one field or another.

Just before Mrs. Carter landed, the Prime Minister asked to have his daughter invited to the luncheon. We agreed. A few days earlier, I had heard from the traveling party that it wished press representatives -- one Indian and one American -- to be included. I suggested the Los Angeles Times correspondent -- Sharon Rosenhouse, who was Delhi based -- and Rami Chhabra, who was a prominent female columnist for a number of the Indian papers. Her main topics were social issues, which I thought that Mrs. Carter would be interested in. There followed a lot of communications between us and the White House; finally we were instructed to invite The New York Times correspondent -- Bill Borders -- and a representative of the India wire services. He turned out to be one of the "mousiest" guys I have ever met.

So at the table, there sixteen high powered women; the journalists, both men, got each end of the table. In the course of preparing this luncheon, I was told that I could not be included at the table, but that I could listen in on the conversation which was to take place after lunch. The purpose for inviting the reporters of course was to get good press coverage. Bill Borders, who was very congenial and a good reporter and who has risen in The New York Times ladder, told me ahead of time that he had never covered a lady's luncheon. I assured him that the women were experts in their fields and could answer any substantive questions that he might have. He called me in the evening after the luncheon -- he was a "pool" reporter for the luncheon who had to post for

public view his story. His only question was how one spelled “pomegranate” -- the juice of which had been served at the luncheon. So his story went into great depth about the yellow roses and silver elephants that he found on the table, spectacular saris and pomegranate juice. I thought that was outrageous!! I really resented the superficiality of the report since I had worked so hard to make the luncheon as substantive as possible; I thought that people would view the whole event as having backfired.

The same thing happened at another event -- a press interview which Mrs. Carter’s staff asked to be set up. They would screen the reporters who wished to attend. They selected five Indian journalists -- all very reputable. In briefing these journalists, the staff pointed out that Mrs. Carter was not a “Women’s Page” type. She was a “person of substance” prepared to discuss foreign policy as well as domestic issues. Unfortunately, that stimulated these journalists to ask questions about Latin American and the Middle East. She gave non-answers -- quite properly, I think. She realized that for her to express an opinion on these issues would have made headlines around the world, which would not have been very helpful to her husband and his administration. Toward the end of the interview, someone raised a question about care for the elderly. Then she expressed her views -- some of which were quite interesting. Those insights were very quotable - - interesting and “substantive.” But unfortunately, that discussion only lasted for about five minutes and was overshadowed by the other topics. I thought Mrs. Carter’s staff had missed a golden opportunity not only to “show case” Mrs. Carter, but also to have on the record her views on issues which were of great interest to the Indian audience.

Despite my comments about the Carter visit, I must say that I did not encounter in my tour many prejudices about women in foreign affairs. Of course, there are always individuals who for one reason or another have a closed mind on this question -- they think women’s minds are made of mush. There were some men I called on who were somewhat surprised by the visit of a woman FS officer. After the initial shock, they seemed to be able to figure out what to do with me. But in general, I did not notice much prejudice. In some respect, that reflects the nature of my contacts. Many were Indian women who were involved in interesting things. As a general statement, I would say that women professionals have to learn to compensate for some of these prejudices. I think it was somewhat easier for me to work in India than in Pakistan, partly because the Indians were accustomed to woman leadership -- i.e. Mrs. Gandhi -- but also because, in general, urban sophisticated Indian society is open-minded on this issue.

All in all, the Carters’ visit was useful. The impact was rather mixed. The visit became almost instantly a “cause” because of an unfortunate incident. A photo op was set up for the President and his principal advisors after they had finished their meeting with the Indian Prime Minister and his Cabinet. Unfortunately, the microphone sitting in front of Carter had not been turned off. So his confidential discussions with a member of his staff could be overheard by a audience. He said that he thought that “a very cold, firm letter should be sent to them.” That quote was blared in the press the next day, which was not at all helpful to the President’s purposes.

In other respects, the visit was a memorable and colorful event. Good Presidential visits can capture the imagination of the indigenous population. I should mention here another aspect of the visit which I found very interesting. There was at least one slip between the principals and the staff. We had been urging the staff to program the President to visit a village. Vajpayee tried to

dissuade the President, but in light of Carter's own background and his mother's service in India, we thought such a visit was a natural. The White House staff was very opposed; they were afraid that the village would be nothing but dust and dirt. Goheen, as a precaution, asked the Embassy staff to identify a number of villages that might be appropriate for a Presidential visit. The Agricultural Attaché was deeply involved; I think he had a village in mind before the question was even raised. Soon after the Carters landed, the President went for a walk in the gardens of the Prime Minister's residence. The Prime Minister was said to have told Mr. Carter that he just had to see a typical Indian village. Carter readily agreed. So the village visit became part of the program. At 5:30 a.m. the next morning, the advance team, which included my husband, went to a village near Delhi. They prepared the way for the visit. On the following morning, President Carter and his entourage showed up in this village. The White House could not have imagined the photo ops that this visit generated; the village was very colorful. The Carters were greeted like royalty; they had a red mark put on their foreheads; they were draped with garlands and bright red shawls. The mist was still rising over the village making for a very wonderful romantic background. The Carters got the grand tour of the village, which had been selected because it was not too much of a show-case, but nevertheless was interesting. The most interesting feature of this village was a bio-gas processor, which provided the village with a steady source of fuel. The good news was that, because the visit was not planned very much in advance, there was no attempt made to change the nature of the village. All the Indian government had time to do was to level off a field at the edge of the village for a parking area. Presidential attention to this village -- or any other -- pays considerable dividends in that it captures the imagination of both Indian and American publics.

Carter also gave a speech at the Ram Lila grounds, which is one of the premier public assembly places in Delhi. A huge crowd gathered there; I think I can fairly say, that with the exception of the open mike incident, the visit had a positive impact on US-India relations. Carter developed a personal bond with the Indian leaders which is always the hope on these trips. Unfortunately, the basic policy issue remained unresolved -- for a number of years after the visit.

As I said, my assignment as Mrs. Carter's "sherpa" provided me an opportunity to see the Ambassador frequently. I would brief on the status of our planning and he would make some very helpful suggestions. He wanted to make sure that the visit would go well. I also had meetings with Mrs. Goheen, who was the hostess at the lunch I described earlier. She was not involved in reviewing Mrs. Carter's every step, but she was always available if we needed her. Both Goheens are wonderful people -- very approachable, low key. So the Embassy staff never had any problems knocking on their doors for advice and ideas.

I always thought that during my tour, Bob Goheen's finest hour -- within the American community -- was when he was confronted by a suicide by a young Marine Guard. That event was deeply unsettling to the Embassy community and especially the other Marines. Allegedly, this Marine took the ultimate step because he had an altercation with his girl friend while he was standing watch; he then called another Marine to cover his post then went outside the Embassy and shot himself. We had a memorial service in the Embassy, presided by Goheen. Since the dead man was military, there was a certain amount of spit and polish to the ceremony, including the first row filled by the Marines and an empty chair. Goheen was the son of missionaries; he himself was a classics scholar who was also a professor and then President of Princeton

University. He was somewhat shy, but on the occasion of the memorial service, he spoke with tremendous dignity, using quotations from Greek and other classical sources, which created an atmosphere of respect and humanity. He also wrote a personal note to the parents of the Marine. The Ambassador was not a politician -- slapping backs and kissing babies -- but someone who rose to the occasion when the community needed to mend quickly.

I have been asked from time to time what special challenges a Foreign Service Officer meets when he or she is married to a Foreign Service Officer. In our case, this was not a problem. Both Howie and I had professional jobs which satisfied us. Mine, as I have mentioned earlier, was a little unusual for an FSO, but it was very educational because it got me involved in areas that a normal assignment would never have touched. That was fun. Indian household help was plentiful and competent. We lived ten minutes from the Embassy allowing me to go home for lunch to see the kids who were still quite young. We had a wonderful Indian nursing school within walking distance from the house. Howie had been in India for six years during an earlier period -- before we were married. That made it much easier to establish relations since many of our contacts had known Howie from his previous tour.

Of course, my workload was quite heavy, not only with my Embassy job, but also as the hostess of the Schaffer household and mother of two young boys. It was a very busy schedule. The kids were sent to an Indian nursery school, which used primarily English as the instruction language. There was a class for Hindi, which my oldest son attended and learned to read children's books - as well as the English texts. One of the most memorable recollections I had is their appearance in the school's Ramayana play. The school enrolled kids between the ages of 2 ½ and six. Ramayana is one of the great Indian epics. Every year the school put on this dramatic production. It was pantomime; the kids did not speak, but there was an oral narrative provided by a faculty member. It was a spectacular presentation. My younger boy, who at the time was 3 ½ was a town's person -- like most of the younger children. He was dressed in a white "Kurta pyjama" -- long embroidered shirt and slightly tight pants. My oldest son, then five, had a big part. He was Lakshman, the King's brother. He wore a series of elaborate costumes because the story is very complicated and involved. The old King dies and is succeeded by Ram who marries Sita, but then he has to go off to war, leaving his wife with his brother. The brother draws a magic circle around Sita's tent to protect her from evil spirits. Sita was of course elaborately dressed -- a five year old bedecked in a yellow sari. Sita is captured by the demon Ravana and rescued by monkey King Hanuman. It was one of the most wonderful kids' dramatic performances I have ever witnessed. It was performed at the school which was housed in a building with a roof, but no wall, on the grounds of a villa near us. The classrooms were essentially little alcoves which were protected from the rain, but open to the elements otherwise. Schools closed on heavy rainy days because the courtyard would be flooded and then very muddy -- one couldn't get easily to the classroom. I still have some great still shots from that play.

Delhi was and is a very busy city; there is always a lot going on. As we did in Pakistan, we frequently mixed guest lists; we would have some people who worked with Howie and some who worked with me. I think this process made for more interesting occasions since the conversation could, and did, range over a good number of subjects. As I suggested earlier, my role as hostess enabled me to establish contacts with people in such places as the Foreign

Ministry who would have deigned only to see Counselors or above, but socially they would engage in conversations with me. So the tandem-couple concept worked quite well for us.

I had some relationship with AID, although not as much as I had in Pakistan. I worked mainly with the population staff. We had just resumed assistance to India, after a six year hiatus which began in 1971 as a consequence of the war. It was a very small program; we did not have a family planning program as such -- to the best of my recollection -- but we did have on the AID staff an officer -- P. Balakrishnan -- who was a real authority on family planning in general and on Indian efforts in particular. He subsequently emigrated to the U.S. and became an American citizen; I believe he now works for AID as an American officer. He was a first-rate professional whom AID managed to retain even when it had no family planning program. There was still considerable interest in Washington on reports about the Indian efforts; that gave me an opportunity to delve into the subject in some depth. I was particularly interested because I had just observed a rather tumultuous period in the Pakistani family planning program. I remember especially a trip I took with Gladys Gilbert, the American officer responsible for family planning issues in AID. We visited a training program for traditional midwives. I will never forget the one sentence which was the essence of the program. The gentleman who was running the educational part of the program explained to us in great detail all the knowledge they were trying to impart to these midwives. They were sitting in the shade of a tree; they were probably around fifty years old, but looked many years older. They were dressed in ragged saris, all hunched over with heads covered by scarves, heavy silver bangles draped around their arms, huge silver earrings; many were toothless or had many teeth missing. The educator explained how they were teaching these women such things as anatomy and physiology and the progress of pregnancy, including fetal development. At one stage, he stopped and leaned back on his chair and said something along these lines: "But you know, the one thing we really want them to remember is that before the baby is delivered, take off your bangles and wash your hands."

I found my two years in Delhi highly rewarding. I would have stayed on had we had a chance. In fact, we were expecting to stay for a third year; I would have loved it. My tour was wonderful and I had a great experience. I think my acquaintance with science programs was useful to me in subsequent assignments, especially when I was a deputy assistant secretary for South Asia and was trying to resolve the controversy surrounding a U.S. – India agreement on scientific cooperation.

My experience in Delhi also made me quite skeptical of the idea that the Foreign Service can grow its own scientific specialists. This has been an issue for many years and has arisen again most recently. Conventional wisdom in some quarters is, that because science is becoming important in exponential leaps, it is important for the Foreign Service needs to have its own cadre of Foreign Service Science Officers. I accept the premise that science is the future, but draw the opposite conclusion. Even if the Department were able to recruit university graduates with degrees in one of the sciences, these officers would have trouble maintaining an up-to-date knowledge of what is going on in their field, much less in other scientific fields. Without that current knowledge, it is unlikely that the Foreign Service Officer could make much of a contribution. Raising your own scientists in the Foreign Service might well result in an officer unqualified to be either. The better model is to bring people into the Service for short tours. Tom Varevalobich may not have been best example, although he was quite knowledgeable having

been a research scientist himself. But he could speak with his Indian counterparts with a credibility that no Foreign Service science officer could have engendered. Unfortunately, Tom never figured out how the Foreign Service worked. That was a major gap because that knowledge is important to anyone who wishes to make a contribution. He had to use people like myself to bridge the gap; so we had a reciprocal relationship; he explained the scientific factors involved and I helped him to understand the Department and the Foreign Service. That made us a pretty good team, all things considered.

I do think that the practice of bringing experts into the Foreign Service -- for no more than five years -- is probably the better option than “growing your own” or other possibilities. This program would enable the Department to be much more selective in its recruitment -- i.e. find the “right” scientist for a particular position. For example, if the scientific area of interest in India was in physics, then you could recruit someone with a Ph.D. in that study. If there is an opening in Geneva concerned with the World Health Organization, then the Department might well seek someone with public health credentials. Or in Tokyo, perhaps a material scientist or an engineer might be more appropriate than a Ph.D. in chemistry. Of course, it is quite likely that the requirements of the job will vary from time to time, so that it will not always be filled by people with the same background. The short-term recruitment offers more flexibility in a fast moving subject area; bringing a scientist into the Foreign Service for a career will sooner or later turn him into a generalist thereby losing the great advantage of the flexibility necessary to follow a very active field. I have no doubt that some of the recruited scientists would turn out to be outstanding generalists with a plus based on their knowledge of a scientific area. But I suspect that those people were generalists at heart from the outset who brought that aspiration with them into the Foreign Service along with their scientific knowledge. We can always use generalists with an extra dimension. But if we need scientists, let’s get them for a short tour because that is precisely what the Department needs.

Just some final thoughts about my two years in Delhi. I did learn to speak Hindi; that gave me a lot of enjoyment. The spoken language is almost identical with every-day Urdu. The language used in newscasts, for example, includes extraordinary words which makes it quite different from Urdu. I learned to read even though it was a different alphabet. I used Hindi a lot during my field trips to north India; I practically never used it with my government contacts -- almost all of whom were from south India where an almost entirely different language is spoken. If there had been a useful vernacular, it would probably have been Tamil, which I did not learn.

HOWARD B. SCHAFFER
Political Officer
New Delhi (1977-1979)

Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer was born in New York in 1929. He graduated from Harvard University and then served overseas in the US Army before joining the Foreign Service in 1955. Overseas, Schaffer served in Malaysia, India, Korea, Pakistan, Cyprus, and as Ambassador to Bangladesh. In Washington DC, he served in the Office of Personnel, as the Country Director for Nepal, India, and

Sri Lanka, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia. Ambassador Schaffer was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.

SCHAFFER: The second change was a psychological one. I discussed at some length while reviewing my first tour in Delhi the sense of historical importance that my colleagues and I experienced. That feeling had much to do with the leadership and enthusiasm provided by Ambassadors Galbraith and Bowles. They made us--Bowles particularly-- feel that we were serving in an important enterprise and that in terms of broad U.S. interests, India was one the most significant nations. We felt part of an historical change in the U.S.-India relationship. Bowles made a serious and successful effort to gather a very talented staff.

That feeling of participation in something important had disappeared when I started my second tour in Delhi. For almost all personnel, Delhi was just another post--an assignment of a specific duration before proceeding to another post. The feeling of being part of something special had completely dissipated. The view that India was a very important country to U.S. interests had lost its edge. Goheen, obviously interested in India in light of his experience there as a youth, did not inspire the same sense of excitement and concern that Bowles had done. I thought that the morale of the staff was not low, but didn't have the spirit that prevailed in the Galbraith and Bowles eras. There was no sense of excitement.

I was probably more interested in India than most of my colleagues. I liked the country and I had visited much of India. Nevertheless, I felt some sense of disappointment with the embassy atmosphere existing in 1977, even though I was serving in my second tour in a position of greater responsibility than I had during the first one. I was also in general disappointed to some extent with Indian attitudes. I don't think I felt comfortable in this atmosphere and certainly I remembered the Galbraith and Bowles periods as being much more exciting and rewarding. I thought that I had learned something about India in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, fewer important issues were dealt with in government-to-government channels. There was no sense any longer that what happened in India was very important to the U.S. There were people who scoffed at Bowles for his stress on India's importance. Yet most of the embassy officers in the 1960s recognized that they were witnessing, even taking part in some very important developments. We may have been wrong, but we were convinced that the fate of India was very important to the U.S.

The political reporting, in my recollection, consisted in part of reports which would include contributions from our three constituent posts. These reports tended to be "think-pieces" longer-range points of view. We also sought to have occasional--at least annual--meetings with the political officers from constituent posts. These meetings would often go beyond issues of Indian domestic policies; we used to invite political officers from embassies in adjoining countries--particularly Pakistan. Embassy officers traveled around to the constituent posts and would occasionally draft joint reports with consulate officers to be sent to the embassy.

This was still the era when constituent posts could submit their political reports directly to the Department, with a copy to the embassy. If we had any comments, we would supplement the constituent post's report with an analysis of our own, usually after consultation with the consul general. This process was supported by the embassy because the alternative would have been to

send all reports to the embassy and have it forward them. That would have been very cumbersome and time consuming. I always considered the relationship between my section and the political officers in the consulate generals excellent. We did have some differences of views, which we discussed in a collegial manner; I don't recall any occasion when our views and those of a CG were so far apart that we felt "something had to be done."

The Desai government was a great improvement in many respects over the Gandhi regime both in its international and domestic policies. However, I and others felt that this new government was never in the same category with the regimes of the 1960s led by Nehru, Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi.

My other concern related to the embassy's staffing. By 1977, as I have suggested before, there were a good number of officers who were not committed to India, but viewed the assignment as just another posting. They were not as interested in India or their tasks as their predecessors had been in the 1960s. Also, I thought that the embassy staffing was less specialized and talented than I remembered it in the 1960s. That naturally had some impact on my attitude towards the embassy in 1977. I think it might be interesting to compare my views of the situation with those of some of my colleagues. However, I recognize that a second tour in a country will always recall the "good old times." The second tour is somewhat of an anti-climax, particularly in my case since I had served in the embassy headed by Chester Bowles. You can't go home again. This disappointment was not overcome by the fact that I was in a much more senior position in my second tour, although as I discussed earlier, in my first tour I had a very interesting and important portfolio. Second tours in the same city tend to disappoint.

You have asked me what my Pakistani experience did for my analysis of India. It was important in that in the eyes of my colleagues and some Indians I came to be regarded as a Pakistan expert. But I have to note that the Pakistan situation which I knew so well changed soon after my arrival in Delhi. It was only about seven weeks after my transfer that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq. After that, there was a prolonged period of martial law.

My wife, who had been a first secretary in the embassy's economic section--the number two position--was unable to accompany me to Delhi when I transferred. She was told that the needs of the post would have to take priority. The chief of the section was on leave so that my wife had to remain to submit the required economic reports. Therefore, this led me to make frequent trips to Islamabad from Delhi until mid-July (about 2 months) when Tezi was released and I was able to drive the whole family to Delhi. Eventually, she was assigned as science attaché.

I was in Islamabad for the famous--or infamous--4th of July party of 1977. That came only hours before the overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia. My wife and I may be the only people in the Foreign Service who simultaneously were included in both the Indian and Pakistani diplomatic lists--one as principal and the other as spouse.

I don't think that my tour in Pakistan changed my views of India. It may have given me a better appreciation of the general South Asia scene, but I don't believe that my general observations on Indian policies were very different after my Pakistan tour. I do believe that the Pakistan

experience gave me a better understanding of India-Pakistan relations. I have always thought that it was important for each embassy to be staffed by officers who had had experience in the other one sometime in their career. It is particularly true for political officers and the DCMs. When I served in PER, I did try to arrange for such assignments in the early 1970s. I was successful to some extent. There are in fact now a number of officers who have served in both India and Pakistan; efforts continue - although fitfully - to provide that dual experience to our officers. I was able to pursue this objective later as well when I served in NEA--especially after I became deputy assistant secretary. Then I tried very hard to encourage the system and the officers to accept the concept of assignments to both Pakistan and India.

I think that by the late 1970s, there was a cadre of South Asia experts, although it was rather thin. The main problem was that senior positions - from DCM to section chiefs - were often given to officers with very little experience in the area. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult to build a sturdy cadre of experts in South Asia--even if it is one of several specialties that an officer might have. Our officers are no fools; they see who is assigned to Delhi and Islamabad as DCM or political counselor or as chief of the economic section. They notice that, too often, the assignment is given to someone with European or East Asian or Middle East experience. That discouraged officers from undertaking expertise in the area since as they saw it they would not necessarily be assigned to leadership jobs following many years in the "vineyard."

Language capability is an important factor in this. It always seemed to me that a young officer who speaks Japanese can look forward to a satisfactory career specializing in at least East Asia and probably Japan. If he is any good, eventually he can aspire to be the DCM or the political or economic counselor or the consul general in one of the other Japanese cities, if he maintains his language skills. Unfortunately, in South Asia, we have a different situation. Language skills are not nearly as important as they are in Japan. On the other hand, South Asia has five embassies to Japan's one.

There is another issue that I have found interesting. There was a time during my PER tour when experienced Japan experts were given preferential treatment in assignments outside Japan. That policy was viewed as bringing Japanese experience to bear on the activities of some of our larger embassies--London, Paris and even New Delhi. My only experiences in seeking assignments for South Asian specialists outside the area were generally unsuccessful. I looked for countries with large Indian or Pakistani populations; it then was made clear to me that the last thing those embassies wanted was someone who had long experience in India or Pakistan. People were afraid that such an officer would identify himself or herself with the South Asian minority populations at the expense of his or her interest in the broader view that an embassy should take.

My Indian contacts seemed not to be adversely affected by my Pakistan assignment. Indeed, I was welcomed back very warmly. Several of my previous contacts had of course moved along during the ten years since my last tour in Delhi. Many had been promoted to very important positions--e.g. members of Parliament became Cabinet ministers. In no way did I ever sense on the part of anybody--members of Parliament, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers, journalists, academics--that my tour in Pakistan created any barrier between my interlocutors and myself. In fact, I believe the reverse was actually the case.

The Pakistanis would be more suspicious if an officer had served in Delhi. I think that was certainly true in my case, even though it had been many years since I had served in India before I reached Islamabad. I should also say that while in Pakistan and while the India desk officer, I visited India on many occasions, so that I was able to maintain contacts with Indian officials.

Let me turn to the political situation in Delhi when I arrived in 1977. I would characterize it as very disappointing because the Janata Party--the former opposition coalition which won the Parliamentary elections in 1977--was never able to get its act together properly. One of the problems was that it consisted of a variety of different parties that had coalesced around their shared opposition to Mrs. Gandhi and the state of emergency she declared in 1975. The party included right-wing Hindu components and radical socialists. It was very difficult for such a government to pull all of these disparate views together to support any meaningful program.

I think the political situation in India had gone through a transformation in the intervening ten years since my last tour. The Congress Party, severely weakened in the 1967 elections - just at the end of my first tour - had regained a strong position in the early 1970s under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and did again regain dominance a few years later after the steam had run out of the Janata coalition. I should note that Janata in 1977 included what is now the ruling party in India--the Bharatiya Janata Party, which had earlier been called the Jana Sangh. In 1977, it was part of the Janata coalition and campaigned as part of the coalition.

One would think that the emergence of a real multi-party system would make political analysis more interesting than it was in 1967 when the Congress Party was the dominant force in India. But in fact, I don't think that happened because the political situation under Congress Party dominance, and particularly after the death of Nehru, was fluid; it had several factions which had to be carefully followed. The fact that one party was so dominant did not mean that it was a monolithic institution.

The new situation in 1977 was analytically interesting, but not more challenging than that which existed in the mid-1960s. The embassy's political section followed events with the same care that it exhibited in the mid-1960s, even though by mid-1970s, it was smaller than it had been. I think it is fair to say that in the mid-1960s the Political Section staff was bloated; therefore it was not surprising that it was reduced in size. Even then, I can't say that in 1977 it was a lean or taut unit, but we had fewer officers dealing with the domestic political situation than was true ten years earlier.

During the 10 years I was away from India I think there was a growing disillusion that stemmed from the inability of the country to stage the economic break-through that many planners and economic commentators had believed possible. There was an upsurge of hope when a democratic government took power in 1977, but that proved to be short-lived. Basic problems had not been solved as the Indians had hoped in the 1950s and early 1960s. As far as domestic politics were concerned, there was considerable disarray. Mrs. Gandhi played her cards carefully in the hopes of returning to power. Originally that ambition seemed far fetched, but as time went on, her chances appeared to improve. Prime Minister Desai was viewed as a great disappointment. I certainly felt that way because I had been an Desai admirer. I thought that he was a strong man who, if given the opportunity to become prime minister, could give India the stronger lead that it

needed. But by the time Desai became prime minister, he was 81 years old--born in 1896. By that time, he just didn't have the forcefulness that he exhibited earlier in his life. He became very inflexible, which was a major drawback for someone who had to manage a coalition that included representation from the extreme right and the extreme left. Desai had built a good reputation as chief minister of Bombay and finance minister in the central government but did not live up to his billing when he became prime minister. He just could not provide the leadership that the country needed in the mid-1970s.

On the international scene, under Desai and Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (now the prime minister) India made an effort to implement a "good neighbor" policy toward other South Asia countries. The government put considerable emphasis on improving relations with Pakistan. India tends to be a bully in its relations with the smaller countries in the region. The Janata Party, in the short time it was in office, made a serious effort to focus on ways that would help improve relations in the area. These efforts were received well by all South Asian capitals, including Islamabad. We of course gave these efforts our warmest support and encouragement, even though the idea did not emanate from us. India did do its utmost to become the "regional influential" that we had hoped. By opening closer relations with its neighbors, India, in the 1977-79 period, was viewed by its neighbors, except Pakistan, as a friend and not as an antagonist. They therefore lent greater support to India in international forums.

We indeed were surprised by this good neighbor policy and the inclusion of Pakistan in it, as were many other observers. Desai, when in opposition, had publicly scourged Pakistan; he was considered by many Pakistanis to be a strong Hindu communalist; they did not expect that Desai would give much positive attention to India-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, the Indian foreign minister had been a leader in the Hindu communal party and was seen--and properly so--as a communalist who had never expressed any views in which Pakistan could find the slightest bit of comfort. His appointment as foreign minister was viewed with considerable dismay in Islamabad.

So it was very surprising when the new government began the "good neighbor" policy. We were surprised as were the other countries in the area and, I am sure, many Indians. It was probably the only important contribution that the Desai government made to Indian foreign policy. Unfortunately, when Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she overturned this positive policy.

I must say that I never got a very good explanation for the position taken by Desai. I suspect that every government wants to go down in history remembered for some bold initiative which would distinguish it from others. But why this government of all governments chose to go in this new direction has never been satisfactorily explained to me. But in fact, it was so preoccupied with its domestic concern, that it was never able to play as a significant role in that area as it had in mind.

I might add parenthetically that I had known Atal Behari Vajpayee very well from my first tour in Delhi. Then he was a leader of the Jana Sangh party and I used to see him regularly. As political counselor, I was able to carry on a dialogue with other members of Parliament who had become Cabinet officers; these were old friends who had been promoted. I just picked up where we had left the relationship ten years earlier. Other embassy staff members would see these Cabinet officers as part of their duties; I would see them to have political discussions. Unfortunately, due to protocol considerations, I was not able to do so with the foreign minister--

only an ambassador may see a foreign minister in the Indian scheme of things and in most other places as well. We would chat sometimes at large parties, but it was not possible for me to see Vajpayee officially.

There were some positive results from the Indian foreign policy initiatives. There was a considerable warming of India-Pakistan relations. Tensions were very much reduced and at times, the relations were actually amiable. As I recall, one of the more gratifying aspects of this new situation was that it became much easier for Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other. We were very much encouraged by these developments, as I said. They fitted well into the long-standing American policy of supporting efforts to improve India-Pakistan relations. The U.S. has been less concerned, except for certain occasions, about India's relations with other neighbors. It should be noted that the change in U.S. administrations, with Jimmy Carter becoming president, certainly had an impact on our Indian policy. The Carter administration viewed India in a more favorable manner than had previous administrations. There were several reasons for this which in some respects meshed with the advent of the Janata Party and the temporary downfall of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Washington was very interested in what National Security Advisor Brzezinski called "regional influentials." Under this concept, the U.S. focused its attention on leading countries in various regions of the world. In South Asia, that meant, to the Carter administration, India--not India and Pakistan, but solely India. This new policy was spelled out vigorously and vividly a few months after my arrival in Delhi. In January 1978, Jimmy Carter came to India. He avoided going to Pakistan. Instead he flew directly from Iran to India, passing right over Pakistan. Pakistan in addition to being governed at the time by a military dictatorship, didn't qualify as a "regional influential."

The Carter administration's position was very important because until then all important American visitors--such as Eisenhower and Nixon--included both countries. I was quite pleased with this new approach. I agreed that India was the most important country in the region--certainly more important for the United States than Pakistan, especially when the latter was governed by the authoritative regime of General Zia ul-Haq. Moreover, the Carter administration embraced a global agenda which for the first time paid considerable attention to the subject of human rights as a significant foreign policy issue. In India, it found a government that had just come to power having won an election over a briefly authoritarian regime headed by Mrs. Gandhi. So it was a wonderful nexus of the objectives of the two countries. Even before the leaders met in New Delhi, the President and the Prime Minister started a frequent correspondence. The visit in a way was a demonstration of this new connection as well as a gesture indicating how high India rated on our agenda--at the expense of Pakistan.

Carter's visit was unusual. It had been delayed by some domestic political problems in Washington. He arrived in fact on January 1, 1978. We had the rather dubious pleasure of having not one, but two White House advance teams--the first one having paved the way for the postponed visit. The major issue between the U.S. and India at the time concerned the delivery of fuel to Tarapur, a nuclear reactor. It was the Indian tail wagging the American dog. On the first day during a break, Carter was huddled with Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, then the Secretary of State. They were unaware that a microphone near them was open and transmitting their comments. I was in the room and heard Carter say something about sending a cold, hard note to the Indians about the fuel problem. The story subsequently got world headlines.

Aside from that, there was considerable rapport between the president and his team and the Indians. Carter came with a very large group; we got the usual static about the treatment of White House staff. This was my first experience with presidential visits. I thought it was a sight to be seen. The visit featured a major Carter speech which in part addressed the major issues. Before his departure, Carter signed what became known as the "Delhi Declaration" which lauded Indian democracy and underlined the importance of such a political structure. The Declaration was drafted to emphasize the special relationship between Washington and Delhi.

We were very busy in the period before Carter's arrival. I had my full share of those preparations - drafting briefing papers, etc. I also vividly remember being called on because I spoke Hindi and could find my way around. I was rushed to look over a nearby village which might become a venue for a presidential visit. The village was included in Carter's itinerary at the last minute--after Desai had persuaded him following his arrival in New Delhi that in order to understand India one had to get out of the major cities and observe village life. So I raced to this village, which was spruced up a little making it as presentable as possible for the president of the United States in the short time available.

I have another vivid memory of that trip. As I said, President and Mrs. Carter arrived on January 1. We had worked very hard throughout the holidays trying to prepare for the visit. Briefing books had been drafted including a schedule with appropriate comments about each event. These were sent to Teheran in time to be aboard Air Force 1 as it flew from Iran to India. I decided that I had worked hard enough in the preceding weeks and I went to bed early on the eve of the Carter arrival. Around 10:45, I got a call from DCM Arch Blood who was the control officer for the visit. He said that we had a real problem; the embassy had just received a message saying that the Presidential party wanted a description of the route that the President would be taking from the airport to the Presidential Palace where he would be staying. It turned out what they really needed was some kind of poop-sheet which would enable the staffers to answer any presidential question about where he was going and what he might see on the way. Blood said that I knew the area well; he asked that I come to the embassy right away and do something about the White House request. So I got dressed and went to the embassy. It must have been about 11:30 when I got there. I sat down with my typewriter, outlining a scenario for the motorcade trip from the airport. I have to say that my knowledge of all the neighborhoods that the motorcade would pass through was rather sketchy. So I made much of it up. As I was typing, I suddenly heard firecrackers and bells announcing the arrival of the New Year. I finally finished my message and gave it to Blood who sent it to Teheran.

A few days later, Arch called me into his office and said that he really had to compliment me. He had been told by members of the presidential party that of all the papers they had been given to read, my travelogue on the trip from the airport to the Palace was by far the best.

The visit was interesting and successful. One usually characterizes all presidential visits with those adjectives, but I do believe that the Delhi visit really merited that description. I have described the microphone incident, which was really the only flaw in the visit. We had some exciting incidents. One of the more disreputable Cabinet ministers somehow manage to slip by

the guards and entered the president's bedroom in the Palace. So he had an unscheduled meeting with Carter.

In those days, posts like Delhi were much more isolated than they are today--primarily because of the great improvement in recent years in communications and information dissemination. For us to have access to telephones--set up by the White House Communication Agency--which actually worked so that we could talk to Washington and if we wished, family and friends -- was great boon. And when Air Force One arrived, we felt that we were no longer isolated, but really at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. That made the visit exciting and gratifying even though as in all presidential visits there was considerable silliness.

Let me now turn to the political issues I dealt with while I was in Delhi. The Kashmir issue was pretty dormant. While I was still in Pakistan, an agreement had been reached between the government of India and the leadership of the Kashmiri group--Sheikh Abdullah-- which had represented the views of the political majority in Kashmir during the entire post-independence period. While Abdullah was alive, Kashmir was not on the government's agenda, either as a domestic issue or as a bone of contention between Pakistan and India.

I did visit Kashmir and found the state in the late 1970s far different from what it had been ten years earlier. By my second Indian tour, Kashmir had a government which had been popularly chosen, led by someone who had the confidence of the majority of the Valley people.

The other important difference was that those Kashmiris who had wished for an early settlement of the dispute either through Kashmir's independence or by accession to Pakistan had pretty much given up hope as the result of the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars. They became more reconciled to having a permanent connection with India. At the same time, under both Bhutto and Zia, the Pakistanis decided to put Kashmir on the back-burner, as provided for in the India-Pakistan agreement of 1972.

I always hoped, especially in the aftermath of the 1965 war, that the issue of Kashmir could be quietly set aside. I did not anticipate any permanent settlement which could be agreed to by both sides. That would have involved signing a piece of paper which would inevitably have been opposed by many in India and Pakistan. So the best we could have hoped for was quiet. For that it was important that the Indians manage Kashmir in a reasonable fashion. The need for a "kinder and gentler" state government was important because for so long Kashmir had been in the hands of instruments of New Delhi who had little popular support and governed the state in a corrupt and arbitrary way. So Kashmir was not a subject of particular attention in the late 1970s. It did not rate very high on the embassy's agenda during the two years I served a political counselor.

I mentioned earlier our difficulties with nuclear fuel for an Indian power plant. In 1974, India staged its first nuclear explosion--for "peaceful purposes." In those days many serious people thought that nuclear explosions could be used for civilian projects--we know better now. But in our view, the distinction that the Indians were trying to make was not acceptable; we saw all nuclear explosions as having proliferation dangers. The important part of this story was that the Indian explosion triggered a renewed interest in efforts to bring about an international non-proliferation regime. The Ford administration, when Kissinger was the secretary of State, was

obliged to take note of Congressional and American public concern about the Indian action and adjust its policies in light of this concern.

As I have mentioned, the issue of nuclear fuel arose because the United States had a contractual obligation to provide the fuel--low grade enriched uranium--to twin nuclear power plants in Tarapur, whose construction the U.S. had financed through its assistance programs in 1963. Under this agreement, India was obliged to buy its nuclear fuel from the U.S. which in turn was obliged to sell it to India. In the late 1970s following the Indian test, Congress passed legislation which required, after an 18-month grace period, that all nuclear fuel and technology deliveries cease to any country which was not a signatory to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country had not signed the NPT, it could still acquire American fuel if it allowed international inspection of all of its nuclear facilities. This policy for India became very complicated. The Indians took the position that we were obliged to honor an international agreement to provide the fuel. We said we were sorry, but the U.S. legislation would not allow us to do so. Efforts were made to convince the Indians to make enough concessions to allow the U.S. to resume its deliveries. We managed to get waivers through Congress, but the Indians did not move far enough to satisfy the requirements of the legislation and our deliveries eventually ceased. This dispute became a very sore point in U.S.-India relations.

I was certainly berated by my Indian contacts. Senior officials, like Joe Nye and Tom Pickering, came to Delhi to try to work out some kind of mutually agreeable arrangement. The Indians also sent delegations to Washington, but no agreement was ever reached. Finally, after my departure for the India country director position in the Department, a deal was struck--the French became India's supplier of nuclear fuel. My view was two-fold. I found it highly regrettable that this issue arose at a time when U.S.-India relationship had greatly improved and further collaboration seemed quite possible, especially as the U.S. was wedded to the doctrine of regional influentials. I was especially concerned that so much of the relationship--even at the presidential level--was devoted to this disagreement about nuclear fuel deliveries. The tail of Tarapur was indeed wagging the dog of U.S.-Indian ties. Secondly, I had to confess--to myself if not to my Indian contacts--that the Indians had a strong case. How could the U.S. retroactively apply domestic legislation which barred the delivery of fuels contracted for ten years earlier. It was of course a lost cause for the U.S.; we could not do anything about deterring the Indians from their path. Congress would not allow a waiver to exempt India from the legislation. I think the whole episode was regrettable, particularly since the administration did not make a major effort to revise the draft legislation. For example, the administration did not make a very strong case to exempt some of our activities under a grandfather clause which would have excluded from the legislation the signed obligation to provide fuel to Tarapur. We should not have been in a position to violate an international agreement. I don't know why a greater effort was not made; it may have been an oversight or a concern that Congress would be hard-nosed about exemptions. But I was not in Washington at the time the issue emerged, so I can't comment on what might have happened or not happened. I was in New Delhi when the legislation was enacted and it was only later that I found myself in the Department dealing with such difficulty with the consequences of our position.

I should comment on Sino-Indian relations because there was an important development during my second tour in Delhi. As I mentioned, Atal Behari Vajpayee was the foreign minister. He

sought an improvement in Sino-Indian relations, which had been pretty much in deep freeze following the 1962 war. That freeze was made icier by the Chinese attitude during the India-Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971. The PRC took Pakistan's side on both occasions and made some threatening noises. Fortunately, Beijing did not take any military actions against India, which would have been a great danger to the Indians. Vajpayee visited the PRC--I think that it was the first visit by a high-ranking Indian government official since 1962. The visit proved disastrous because just at the time Vajpayee landed, the Chinese launched an invasion of Vietnam. There was obviously no attention paid in Beijing to the fact that the Indian foreign minister was a guest at the time. Naturally for the Indians, this Chinese action raised the specter of the actions the PRC had taken against India in 1962. It also displayed, quite clearly, PRC indifference to Indian attitudes. Once the invasion started, the Indian foreign minister departed in haste before he could have any meaningful talks.

While I was in New Delhi, the United States established formal diplomatic ties with the PRC. Kissinger had famously visited the PRC in 1971, followed by Nixon in 1972. But it was not until 1978 that we opened an embassy in Beijing. We did have some lower level representation, but no ambassador and no formal diplomatic relationship until then. I visited Beijing when I was political counselor in Pakistan and met with George Bush, who was then head of our office there. Our decision to establish formal diplomatic ties came as a surprise to the Indians; most unwelcome surprise. They did not relish an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations. They still viewed both China and Pakistan as the principal challengers to Indian hegemony. They viewed the establishment of U.S.-PRC relations as a step which made the world more dangerous for them © part of what they called the Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis. The Indians were very serious about this analysis.

I think we erred in not advising the Indians about our move in advance. It came much sooner than expected in Delhi. We had informed them of the possibility in a very low key way, which probably led the Indians to believe that nothing was imminent. So the rapidity with which we established diplomatic relations caused anguish in Delhi. I think they felt they were misled. They berated us when we opened an embassy in Beijing, but I don't think the issue was paramount nor did it have any lasting influence. After all, there had been a period of several years during which, as I said, we did have representation in Beijing and the PRC had a comparable presence in Washington. There was I think much more Indian anguish in 1971 after the Kissinger visit to China particularly since he had taken off from Pakistan for the PRC--after stopping in Delhi a few days earlier without saying anything about his plans.

I stayed in Delhi long enough to witness the replacement of Prime Minister Desai, who was succeeded by a former deputy PM in the Janata government, Charan Singh. In fact, I was planning to transfer in early July, 1979 to take up my new assignment as country director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. When the Indian government began to show signs of serious internal dissension, I was asked by the Department and the Ambassador to remain in Delhi until the crisis was resolved. The last message I sent to the Department reported that the president of India had asked Charan Singh to form a new government. So Desai and I left at about the same time, just as we arrived at about the same time. I should note that earlier departures of mine had also coincided with the fall of governments in Korea and Pakistan.

On a different subject, I should note that we had a good numbers of CODELs [congressional delegations]. They were not particularly a burden, at least not on the political section, although there were some Congressmen who were quite demanding. Despite that, from my point of view, these visits were quite manageable, which was a plus because I must say that they were not particularly useful. I found that many visitors - congressmen and senators included - had a very limited interest in India. They had very little to say to us or to the Indians. They wasted a lot of time on trivial pursuits--e.g. shopping. My impression was that a visit to India was a status symbol for a congressman. On the other hand, Indian parliamentarians whom we put in contact with a U.S. member of Congress had a different impression. An Indian parliamentarian does not have an office; at best he or she might have a personal assistant. He or she was certainly not the beneficiary of the aura of power which American Members of Congress enjoy. The Indian Parliamentarian had a much more humble position, even though he was much more affluent than the average Indian. So sometimes it was rather awkward bringing the politicians of the two countries together.

I will not forget the visit of a Congressman from Long Island--Lester Wolff, the chairman of a subcommittee that was concerned with South Asian issues. He was especially difficult. He arrived in Delhi at the head of a rather large CODEL. He was very unhappy with the kind of treatment provided by the embassy--he didn't like the hotel we had arranged for him, among many other things. He claimed that he was awakened early every morning by the sound of pile drivers which were working on the construction of an annex to the hotel. At some stage, he came to the embassy with his large group--obviously determined to make life as difficult as possible for the embassy. Ambassador Goheen is a thorough gentleman--a mild mannered man who was highly regarded by the whole staff for his character if not for his leadership. He began the embassy's presentation to the CODEL, as is customary. He said in these remarks that he regretted having so few CODELs; he wished that more members of Congress would visit India. Chairman Wolff replied by declaring sourly that the poor treatment that he and his colleagues had received would explain why so few congressmen had come to India. At that point, I must admit that I felt real anger; I think my face really reddened. I was tempted to get up and throttle Wolff. I found his comments entirely unwarranted and certainly not a subject for discussion in a large meeting. Fortunately, Goheen accepted Wolff's outburst with good grace and apologized for any inconvenience that Wolff or other members of the delegation might have encountered. As I said, I don't think the CODELs were particularly helpful, in either providing members with a better appreciation of India or the parliamentarians a better understanding of U.S. policies, as seen by Congress, or of governmental processes.

I traveled around India frequently. I did address some audiences--the text was never cleared with anybody. In the Q & A time, I had to field some hostile questions, even during a period of relative good will between Washington and Delhi. The Vietnam war was over; so that removed an important problem from the agenda. So there were no particular points of friction, except on the issue of nuclear fuel supply. The Desai government sought what it called "genuine non-alignment," which from our point of view distanced India from the Soviet Union. In fact, it practiced "genuine non-alignment" in its relations with the two super-powers. Their version of non-alignment was certainly more balanced than the so-called non-alignment Mrs. Gandhi had practiced in the past and would practice again in the future.

We had a military supply relationship, which expanded Indian choice for weapons beyond the Soviet Union. But in the two years we are now discussing, there were no critical developments in the Cold War which would have required an Indian decision as to which bloc it would support. As a general rule, throughout the Cold War, whenever U.S.-Soviet animosities intensified, it led to some weakening of U.S.-Indian relations because in almost all cases, India tended to support the USSR position. When detente came along, it would generally be accompanied by better U.S.-India relations.

During those two years I had contacts with diplomats from various countries, including Soviets and Chinese. In the wake of the Nixon visit to China, we were allowed to develop a relationship with the PRC [People's Republic of China] embassy. At first, the contacts were exceedingly formal and stiff. You would visit the PRC embassy and be escorted to the office of the person you had come to see. There you would be served tea, but the conversation would be stilted and very guarded. The only satisfaction an American diplomat got was that he or she was doing something which only a few years earlier would have been inconceivable. It was particularly interesting because the PRC embassy was located just across the street from the U.S. embassy. What was once forbidden, if nearby, territory, became less mysterious and sinister.

Over an extended period, the atmosphere became much more conducive to normal contacts. I don't remember how often I met with PRC diplomats; it was not frequent, and never particularly useful, but it was an interesting break from the past.

We had some relationships with the Soviets, but that had been a practice of long-standing. While I served in Delhi, Afghanistan went through the "Great Saur Revolution"--in April 1978-- which brought a communist regime to power. The Indians were less concerned with developments in Afghanistan than we would have liked them to be. They viewed events in Kabul as an internal Afghan matter and they looked at the situation to an important extent through the prism of their relationship with Pakistan. We have to remember that after the revolution, a civil war broke out in Afghanistan leading eventually to the Soviet invasion. As I recall, the Indian position was to favor the Afghan government in power because they believed that a leftist government would be less inclined to favor Pakistan--certainly less than the Islamic forces that were then trying to oust the communists. But the issue was not very significant in U.S.-India relations--and did not become so until the Soviets made their move in December 1979. By that time I had left India.

We were in touch with other diplomats as well, particularly the British and the French. This was a relationship of long standing and we continued it during my stewardship as political counselor. We would exchange views periodically, at various levels, from the ambassador down.

As an embassy, we paid less attention to the various ramifications of Indian foreign policy than had been the case during my previous tour. Then Bowles was determined to use his embassy staff as a means to feed his much broader interest in international relations. He made sure that among the staff, there were experts on the PRC, the Soviet Union, etc. By the time I returned, those experts had left and were not replaced--as part of a general reduction in staffing that the Department had to undertake in response to budgetary cut-backs.

I look back on my second tour in India as, at least partially, a lost opportunity for the U.S. and for India. I believe that much could have been done to cement the relationship between the two countries had it not been for the nuclear fuel issue.

Also, it was somewhat frustrating to deal with an Indian government which just could not get its act together. The Desai government's program was never properly spelled out, let alone carried out. In fact, the failure of the Janata government was such that it set the stage for the return to power by Mrs. Gandhi, which took place a few months after my departure from Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi, during her second tour as prime minister, did seek to establish better relations with the U.S.--at least on the surface. She visited the U.S. in 1982. With her in power, one could not expect any fundamental improvement in U.S.-India ties, however. She carried too much anti-American baggage from her first term as PM and even earlier.

On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi was much more interested than was Janata in India's role on the world stage. What she did or tried to do was often damaging to U.S. interests. She supported the policy of establishing closer relations with non-aligned countries governed by leftist elements--including Cuba. India was still a factor in the UN, although perhaps not as active as it had been in the past. There used to be at least annual visits from a high level U.S. government official just prior to the convening of the General Assembly to discuss issue of mutual interests that might arise during the session. India was still a player with whom the world had to reckon.

AINSLIE EMBREE
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1977-1980)

Ainslie Embree was born in Nova Scotia, Canada. During World War II, he served as navigator in the Royal Canadian Air Force. He began his career in India immediately after the war as a missionary. Upon completion of this work, he studied at the graduate level at Columbia University and Duke University. Mr. Embree's career focused primarily on India, . He was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry on October 20, 1990.

Q: What then was the way you were recruited to go out to New Delhi for USIS?

EMBREE: During these years at Columbia and indeed at Duke, I'd become very involved in American academic life affecting India. I was president of the American Institute of Indian Studies. I was very much involved in promoting Indian studies in American colleges, not just at Columbia but elsewhere and I'd written on India. I think my first acquaintance, real acquaintance, with the embassy in Delhi came through Margaret Clapp who was the CAO in Delhi and I got to know Margaret well, partly because I was in New Delhi at that time as the Senior Scholar with the American Institute of India Studies. So I got to know her in a professional way. But then we got to know each other very well. In fact, having a Wellesley wife --

Q: I didn't realize Sue was Wellesley.

EMBREE: -- strengthened the ties. Then I knew the subsequent CAOs after that. So I got some sense of what they did, but I really didn't know very much. But what I did have involvement with in 1977-78 was the new American Ambassador to India, Robert Goheen. As you know, the Cultural Affairs Officer was regarded in some sense as the Ambassador's prerogative to have whom he wanted as a CAO. And since he knew me, he wrote and asked if I would be interested in being nominated for the job.

Q: So you were recruited by Goheen. He, of course, came out of Princeton and has his own missionary background.

EMBREE: And so we had very similar interests in many ways and he knew that I was greatly interested in India. This was a change, of course, having somebody go as CAO who was identified wholly as an Indian specialist. Margaret Clapp, for example, had been an American historian, and most CAOs I suppose, had been in American studies.

My immediate predecessor whom I knew very well, Jim Roach, had worked on India. So it was a little odd having somebody whose identification was completely with Indian studies going out as American CAO. I didn't know that at the time oddly enough. I thought it was a natural thing to get somebody who knew India.

Q: It makes sense.

EMBREE: It makes sense in some ways. I went out without any training at all in what a CAO was. I wasn't sure when I was going, but they called and said that there was an investigating team, I forget what it was called, from the State Department going out to look at what was happening in the educational cultural programs in India. And they wanted me to go out that week to be in Delhi before they arrived so that I would be able to meet them. It was somewhat of a peculiar decision. These two young men who arrived to investigate what was going on in the American Center knew nothing about its work in India and the person who was to talk to them was somebody who'd arrived exactly 24 hours before. In a way it was a good introduction to the way the State Department worked because the young men knew absolutely nothing about India.

They were traveling around in a car and they expressed strong disagreement that we were spending so much money teaching Indians to speak English. And I said, we don't spend a penny teaching Indians to speak English. And they said, how do they know English so well then if we don't teach them?

But indeed trying to explain to them the cultural relations with India was an interesting introduction for me. The point I was going to make was I went out as Cultural Affairs Officer knowing almost nothing about the office and what one was to do except what I had picked up from knowing Jim Roach and Margaret Clapp. I had been out a week once before that in which I had talked to people, but that was all the introduction I had. I guess where I differed was that I knew a great many people in India. I was not an unknown.

Q: You were not a novice of the community in which you were going to work.

EMBREE: No, not at all. I knew the Indian academic world very well.

Q: *Who was your Public Affairs Officer when you went out?*

EMBREE: Jay Gildner.

Q: *Yes.*

EMBREE: And I will tell the story again whether it's on the tape or not. When I mentioned to an old retired officer that I was going out to be the cultural counselor, he asked who the public affairs officer was. When I said, Gildner, whom I hadn't met at the time, he commented that he didn't think I would get on well in India. "You get along very well at a place like Columbia," he said, "because your superiors are even more inefficient and incompetent about business than you are, whereas Gildner has a reputation for being the most efficient Foreign Service officer in public affairs."

Well, it turned out I got along extremely well with Jay. Indeed, he was efficient, everything that people said, but he also appreciated my knowledge of India and that I had easy access to journalists and academics and lots of people in government and society, through purely personal contacts.

Q: *This was the heritage of all your previous years.*

EMBREE: It was the heritage of all my previous years that I knew all people like Mrs. Gandhi and so on. So it was a very different experience than other people have had.

Q: *So you arrived really obviously not a stranger in New Delhi, but a stranger within the Embassy framework of operation.*

EMBREE: A complete stranger within the framework of Embassy operations. I knew nothing at all, even what I was supposed to do. I was fortunate, of course, in having extremely good Indian assistants in the office. Shanta Chenoy was very well known and had worked there for many years. Shanta knew everybody in the Indian social and political world. Then Jay Gildner himself, of course. I realize now that he was very glad to have a Cultural Affairs officer who didn't want to manage things particularly, but who really wanted to be a --

Q: *A cultural officer.*

EMBREE: A cultural officer and to deal with people. So that really what I did was to meet with people, particularly academics, journalists and politicians. Those were the three groups I had most to do with, and with whom I had easy access. But I had very little involvement, oddly enough, with the management side of USIS.

Q: *They didn't insist that you become involved in that.*

EMBREE: No, I was involved in that sort of thing only when we had visitors or speakers and I entertained them, but I didn't have to get involved in day to day management. I'm sure other Cultural Affairs officers were much more involved.

The other thing, of course, that I was very involved in, from the very beginning, was USEFI, perhaps more than most other CAOs had been. Before I went out, there had been some very serious charges made against the director of the US Educational Foundation. As soon as I got there I was told by Jay Gildner, that the Ambassador wanted me to investigate the charges very carefully. And this again was part of the embarrassment of knowing people because, of course, I had known the Director for many years, as well as all the other people in USEFI. And this occupied a great deal of energy the first six months or so. I became deeply involved in all aspects of the USEFI program.

Q: What did they do?

EMBREE: You mean in terms of the investigation?

Q: No, no. First tell me, USEFI plays what role?

EMBREE: USEFI still plays an important role in India, but it used to be, perhaps next to Japan, the biggest US educational foundation anywhere. It used to have a large number of fellowships, both Fulbright scholars going to India, and Fulbright scholars coming here. In addition, it had many other programs funded through the Office of Education. This, of course, was all supposedly PL 480 money. There were also many summer groups of teachers in addition to the regular Fulbrights, and junior years abroad. It was an extremely active program.

I should have said I'd had one other personal involvement with USIS and USEFI before this. Back in the spring of 1977 I'd been asked to go out by CIES to visit all the Fulbright scholars in South Asia including Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. I had at that time a very interesting look at the Fulbright program. I don't think many other persons had had a chance of visiting all of them. I'd also at that same time visited the USIS centers in all the South Asian countries.

Q: Well, you really then had your training if not in that week before you went out to India after you were recruited, you had your training in this kind of --

EMBREE: That was an extraordinarily good training because indeed I had met all the public affairs officers and all the CAOs that were there in that time.

Q: And became an independent thinker about what was happening?

EMBREE: I made a long report on my trip which I suppose is in the files somewhere.

Q: Do you have a copy of that report? They would love to have it attached to this ultimately if you could ever find it.

EMBREE: If I can find it. I'm not sure they do have a report. But it must be somewhere in the files of CIES. Yes, I did look at it very carefully and made certain recommendations, a number of which were followed. The question that had interested me most when I was there was the particular role of American Fulbrighters as teachers.

I had grave doubts about the utility of Americans being actually teachers in Indian colleges. I obviously went at this from the point of view of having been one for so many years myself.

Q: I was going to say that's a contradiction, isn't it?

EMBREE: It was a contradiction except that I was aware, having been there for so many years, what the difficulties, perhaps the impossibilities, of going into the Indian or Pakistan situation and in a year doing anything effective. The best young scholars I met in Fulbright were very frustrated realizing that they were standing up in front of a class, but the students were not going to be examined on anything they were teaching. That they were really supernumeraries and not, as they had obviously assumed they would be, actively involved in the Indian educational program.

Q: Was this because they were Americans or foreigners? Or was this by nature of the system?

EMBREE: It's all three things. It's the nature of the system that South Asian university education is very much a matter of lecturing. What the instructor does is prepare the students for examination. And it's very difficult for American teachers to think of themselves as preparing people for examinations which they don't set and they're not involved in, in any way.

Q: Is this at the secondary level as well as at the university level, or are we really talking about the universities?

EMBREE: We're talking about the universities, colleges.

Q: With my background in Japan, certainly what I know of American teachers who go out to teach at universities is that they are equally frustrated because the students really do not have to perform. And they're really advised that they can never fail a student no matter how little or how badly anyone does. This is very frustrating for American professors.

EMBREE: It was very frustrating because most Indian universities are made up of many colleges with the university setting the curriculum and exams for the colleges. So you're teaching a curriculum that's been set by somebody else to take exams that will be set by somebody else.

Q: So that allows you no initiative and no freedom of action as an educator.

EMBREE: The other side of it is that many Indian students are very anxious in personal terms to meet the American professors and learn from them. Good students value this very highly, but it's an extra. It's not part of the system. It was that sort of thing that I was raising questions about on the Fulbright program, not the research part, but the teaching part.

Q: *That's fighting the local system.*

EMBREE: Yes. This was another great source of unhappiness. Many of the people, both old and young Americans, got the impression that they were going out to help change the Indian system and bring it to some new and better level.

Q: *Kind of an imperialist notion.*

EMBREE: It was indeed a kind of imperialist notion. I once stated in a report that the Ford Foundation and the Fulbright program became the successors of British imperialism and of missionaries. And again, since I had experience with having gone there to do good to the Indians, I understood this very well. And this was enormously frustrating when the young Americans realized that there was no conceivable opportunity of their bringing about any changes in the Indian system. It certainly needed changes but it would have to come from within. Foreigners were becoming increasingly irrelevant to the process which is of course what I had discovered in 1958, 20 years ago.

Q: *And why you left?*

EMBREE: Why I left. But I think most people still went out as late as '78 with this sense that they were going to bring about improvements and change.

Q: *Well, this is very difficult. Americans always like to do good don't they?*

EMBREE: I thought the process of sending out American scholars to teach was becoming counter productive at times.

Q: *But interestingly, the Indians still clamor to come to the United States to get an education.*

EMBREE: That's the other side of it, of course. Obviously, I had a great deal of involvement in scholars coming and going to India. Indians, in the late '60s, had come to resent American scholars for a whole variety of reasons and didn't want them involved in research or in the whole Indian education process. I'd run into this as President of the American Institute of Indian Studies.

Q: *Is this just Americans?*

EMBREE: All people, but Americans were obviously more than any other. But there was a fundamental difference between, say, the Russians, the Germans, the British and the French, because they all had country-to-country arrangements, whereas we were essentially free enterprise. Our scholars went out on their own. Even the Fulbrighters were essentially on their own. And the Indian government wanted more of an exchange controlled by the government. They especially grew disenchanted with the fact that American scholars were mostly in the social sciences. They were involved in Indian life, studying Indian life.

What the Indians wanted was reciprocity and control, and this led to the creation of the Indo-American Subcommission, of which I had been a member before I became cultural counselor. It

was set up in 1976, and it was to be the great breakthrough of government to government operations on the cultural level.

Q: It's the Indo-American Subcommittee on Education and Culture.

EMBREE: Yes. It didn't work out the way the Indian side hoped because while it was strictly government on their side, wholly controlled by the government, our side wasn't. Ours was a quasi-governmental institution which the Indians had difficulty understanding. The fact that the Indo-American Subcommittee got its money from the American government, had very close relations with the American Centers, but that it was from our point of view a private enterprise, Indians found baffling and this always leads to suspicion that we're not what we seem. An important aspect of the Subcommittee was that the Indians wanted to send scientists here and they wanted us to send scientists.

Q: Physical scientists.

EMBREE: Physical scientists, which many of us knew was not going to work. While Indian scientists want to come to the United States, not many American scientists want to go to India unless they have a special interest say in bugs or germs or some aspect of the flora and fauna.

Q: And this could be considered in some instances a negative interest, couldn't it? But you've now brought up the Indo-American Subcommittee. Explain a little bit about what went on with this. I think you were involved in the development of some exhibits and some other things during that period of time.

EMBREE: The Indo-American Subcommittee on Education and Culture was one of the half dozen commissions set up at the time. Technically, they were all under the Secretary of State from our side, but in fact involved various people. The Education and Cultural one, I think it's fair to say, is the one that was most active in India, and it had a number of aspects. One was sending Indians to the United States who were essentially selected by the Indian government. They emphasized training in science. Their counterparts on our side were selected not in any sense by the government, but by the CIES, the same group ultimately that ran the Fulbright. But it was strictly a private enterprise. Academics did the choosing and it was in no sense controlled by USIS, except that USIS supplied the money.

The other aspect of the cultural program that was very important was that it was to be mutual. Anything we did in India the Indians were to do with their counterparts here. And this became very much involved in museums, for example. It wasn't a matter of us sending our experts to India to do things for the Indians. It had to have reciprocity and their people coming not just to learn but to actually do something. This can be very difficult for obvious reasons. And out of this came a number of exhibits, one very interesting one on science-technology. But the big one, of course, was the festival in India which was run by the Indo-American Subcommittee but also by the cultural counselor's office. It was a very complicated operation and it worked remarkably well.

But again from the Indian side it brought up many of the difficulties inherent in our relationships that from our side it was essentially private groups, the National Gallery, the Metropolitan and so on, with the American [more or less private] side of the Subcommittee doing the negotiating, but always negotiating with government institutions in India. Ted Tanen was running the Subcommittee, he came essentially as a private individual, but was obviously supported by the American Center.

Q: And of course he came out of the American government.

EMBREE: He came out of the American government to add to the confusion -- to the Indians he was just one more government officer. Although in his own eyes, rightfully so, he was no longer a government official.

Q: The Festival of India I think was the first of the grand festivals which have followed so that it did set a very important pattern for cultural exchanges which are still going on in the United States.

EMBREE: It was enormously successful in terms of what it brought over. However, the question the Indians still ask me was what effect did it have on Indo-American relations. This strikes me as a question we can ask of a lot of our cultural exchanges.

Q: Well, now some very spectacular things went to India under these auspices. The New York Philharmonic went, did it not?

EMBREE: The New York Philharmonic went -- the biggest US program that went. There was a long and complicated story about the festival because we were supposed to have an American festival in India. We ran into great difficulties on this because the person most involved on the Indian side, who is now a curator of the National Museum in Delhi, insisted that just as our side had very largely determined what we wanted from the Indian museums, they should have equal claim from the American side which seemed all right on the surface. But of course what people like Stella Kramnisch and the others who were arranging it, Cory Welch and the others, wanted were Indian artifacts, great Indian sculpture, paintings.

When it came to the American festival in India, what Sahare and the others demanded were impressionist paintings from the Metropolitan. And some of us had the difficult and unsuccessful task of explaining that it's perfectly true that we sent our people to ask for things from the Indian museum but they were Indian things, it was Indian culture. It was very difficult to persuade our Senators and Representatives to pay for an exhibit of French impressionist paintings in India [when our exhibit in India was supposed to be of things American]. But furthermore, that it would be very hard indeed to get the museums to lend their very valuable paintings. We could, in fact, have gotten a very splendid display of American paintings, the great 19th century painters, but the Indian side rejected this.

Q: They didn't want those?

EMBREE: They didn't want American paintings. And they said it was inferior painting and it was insulting, and so on, that we were offering them second rate American materials when they were sending us the very greatest of Indian artifacts, which was true, but it made for difficult relations.

Q: Well, it was part of the negotiations rather than part of the --

EMBREE: Another thing that happened at the same time was that a well-known American critic Katherine Kuh got involved. (This discussion relates to the American attempt to select from Indian art what a U.S. art critic felt was best in Indian art, but the American felt that what Indians felt was best in their paintings was second rate in American judgment -- a situation similar to the disagreement of the Indians in being asked to accept 19th century American painters.) One of the things the Indians asked us to do was to have an exhibit of modern Indian painting and sculpture in America, which those of us involved readily agreed to. We thought it was a great idea. But it soon became apparent that we would have to have an American critic of some stature make the selection, that the American galleries would not agree to exhibiting materials that they hadn't been involved in selecting.

So Katherine Kuh came out. She was a very redoubtable woman. And she looked at all of the art that the Indians said was representative of their finest artists, all famous names, the names everyone knew. She looked at them and said they were second rate and derivative from American art. She went around the country and found what she said were wonderful stuff by unknown artists, and she refused to take any of the famous Indian artists. And of course this led to an impasse because the Indians wouldn't agree to her selection. Ms. Kuh is still annoyed with those of us who were involved and she claims that we didn't stand up for artistic principles.

Q: Well, modern art has long been a -- modern American art, modern art of any kind, has long been a very controversial issue. It hinges on what people consider art and what they do not consider art.

EMBREE: Her argument was that modern art has its own validity in the country of origin, but it doesn't have validity in another country that simply copies, unless you're willing to look very closely at creativity. It was a very interesting critique. Some of the people that she said then were the best people in India are now recognized as indeed outstanding.

Q: So she's been validated.

EMBREE: She was right, and I often wondered if she knows. But it was one of those interesting problems in cultural exchange that never gets the headlines or I don't think even gets written up in our accounts.

Q: There was also a problem as I remember it about the different facilities at museums in India, Americans are fussy about humidity and temperature controls and general protection of the art which they have. The facilities in most of the, if not all, of Indian museums is at a very different level.

EMBREE: This was a very delicate matter. We had to say that even if we could have persuaded the US government to pay for an exhibit of French impressionist paintings, the Metropolitan would never under any circumstances allow those paintings to be exhibited under Indian conditions, without humidity and temperature controls. They said, "we allow you to take our sculptures which are just as valuable as your paintings, but there's no reciprocity."

Q: This is always one of the difficult aspects. I think one of the interesting projects which grew out of this -- we're still really talking about the Indo-American Subcommission and the negotiations -- was the big project of Aditi.

EMBREE: Yes, it was a very interesting project.

Q: Because that was not just an art or cultural exchange. It had other implications.

EMBREE: There are many implications. I was one of those who would not have approved of Aditi, because I knew that there were many people in India who were very strongly opposed to this.

Q: What is Aditi, Ainslie?

EMBREE: It was a show, I think is the best word, that was set up by a very enterprising young entrepreneur in Delhi called Sethi. It was made up of street musicians, street village theater people, street magicians and performers, really the poorest level of Indian society.

Q: This is side two. We're talking about Aditi.

EMBREE: It was a very interesting item in our whole cultural exchange. There are many people in India who accuse the entrepreneur who had arranged Aditi that it was exploiting the most vulnerable people in India, the children who were entertainers, beggars in effect, people who had no place in normal Indian art or culture, but who were not only village performers but were extremely poor. Sethi had been very successful in arranging shows of these people, attended at first very largely by foreigners. And then, as often happens in India, when the upper classes realized that foreigners were interested in these things, they became interested in them, too.

And at that point he suggested that it be taken to America as part of the festival. There was very strong opposition, largely I think it's fair to say, from Marxist groups who said this was double exploitation. It was exploitation of extremely poor and vulnerable people by an Indian entrepreneur catering to the exploitive Americans. It was, however, a great success in Washington. People whom I respect said nothing had given them as much sense of India as did these performances. Sethi received a great deal of criticism when they went back because the people were literally thrown back to where they had been.

There was one pathetic story in the newspaper. One little girl was asked what she had liked about America. She said, "I was able to use soap everyday." She had never used soap before in her life and she would never get it again because it was so expensive.

But it was one of those cases in which perhaps some of us were too sensitive to Indian criticisms because it did make an impression here. I think one would still have to ask the validity of using these kinds of people for this purpose, bringing them here and then just throwing them back where they were found.

Q: Well, I remember when this was going on, the arrangements in Washington were very carefully developed with home hospitality and care of these children so that there could be no question about their well-being while they were in the United States. But, of course, any kind of cultural exchange especially when it involves people from two very different kinds of cultures can create all kinds of problems. I think some years there was the same kind of problem with some of the religious dancers out of Bali who when they went home were in effect never again considered truly religious dancers. They'd been contaminated. I don't know how you get over this kind of combination of seclusion and outreach of culture which should provide better understanding of what's going on in that particular society.

EMBREE: Yes, I think that's true. The criticism made of Aditi was that it didn't give a true picture of the Indian society. It gave the impression that these children, the dancers and musicians, occupied as important a place in Indian society as they had in Washington. They were treated very well, as you say, and they all loved it. But the argument is that this gave the impression that Indians valued them the way Americans had, whereas that's not the case. They have no place in Indian culture at all. Any place they have was due to the westerners having taken them up.

Q: Of course, it's always very sad. But it's always very hard to go home again.

EMBREE: Oh, yes. Some people said of the story, that at least the little girl had soap once in her life.

Q: That's very hard. Ainslie, I know that one of the things you did incessantly was entertain almost every night. How poor Sue ever managed I don't know, but you had a house full of people. This was not only because of your generous spirit but also because of your interest in people. It was certainly one of the great ways in which you contributed to the cultural programs of all kinds at the Embassy.

EMBREE: It's just something that comes very naturally to us. We both like entertaining. One of the interesting features, we did an enormous amount of entertaining, but we never had a real cook when we were in Delhi. But Sue would be able to manage with her people by being a good boss.

Yes, I think it was very interesting the whole question of entertaining. It plays a very important role in India. I was able to entertain people because of knowing as many people as I did and able to get to know new people. I think one of the things that Americans do well, on the whole, is entertaining, and it occupies a much larger place in India than many people realize.

One of the things that many people don't know in the outside world is all the other embassies get very large entertaining allowances. Somebody used to say to me, well, it's easy for you to

entertain since the government is paying for it. And I never told any of my American friends that the American government is very niggardly with everybody from the Ambassador down compared to other governments.

Q: It all comes out of your own pocket.

EMBREE: Yes, I discovered that a third secretary at the Canadian Embassy had a larger entertaining allowance than any of us did in the American Center. It's one of those things that you can't make a case for because what an outcry there would be in Washington if we suggested larger entertainment allowances.

Q: They always suspect somehow you're going to misuse it.

EMBREE: Yes, it's a very important aspect of American diplomacy that I think we do well at the personal level. And some of the young people were very good indeed. I may say in passing that I became very impressed indeed by the caliber of people in the American Embassy in Delhi when I was there, from the Ambassador down. One would expect it at the high level, but it was the younger people -- the political officer, economic officers were absolutely first rate.

One of the criticisms that I've heard from people who should know better is that there were no people in the American Embassy who spoke an Indian language. This was untrue.

Q: Who spoke Hindi?

EMBREE: Ambassador Goheen. Arch Blood, the DCM, spent an hour every day studying Hindi. There were half a dozen of the younger people who had taken training in South Asian studies in this country who were fluent. We had an extraordinarily well trained staff in the Embassy. And I think something that gets the least publicity and the least credit is how good our Embassy people are. I was interested in this being an outsider.

Q: Is there anything you'd like to say about Ambassador Goheen? He was after all a remarkable individual for that particular job. Did you find in observing him any particular elements which you thought either very good or maybe not so good? He is one of those political appointees who was ideally suited for the country to which he was appointed.

EMBREE: India, of course, had such an interesting series of political ambassadors, an extraordinary group going way back to people like Loy Henderson. The most famous, of course, were Chester Bowles and Pat Moynihan. I would have argued that Goheen from the Indian point of view was an excellent ambassador. But I always remember a comment made about Galbraith when he was there by the British High Commissioner. I asked him what he thought of Galbraith. He said, well, it's difficult to judge a man like Galbraith. I'm never sure -- "He's the most brilliant ambassador I ever met, but I'm not sure whether he's the American ambassador to India or the Indian ambassador to America, and I'm not sure that he knows which he is." And this is an interesting sidelight on the role the American ambassadors used to play. Chester Bowles, for example, played a role that no other American ambassador has ever played. He had instant access to Nehru. He lectured the people at all levels in the Indian government, hectored them on

what to do and so on. And reading his stuff, it's amazing. You can't imagine anybody now doing that.

Q: *Well, of course, he was there at an unusual time.*

EMBREE: Yes, he was there at an interesting time.

Q: *He was the right man for that kind of time.*

EMBREE: Yes, it wouldn't have worked later on. It didn't work the second time.

Q: *Yes.*

EMBREE: Moynihan was famous and it didn't work. Moynihan once said that he had never been asked to speak at an Indian university. But that again was part of the time. Goheen was very popular and this was partly because his parents had been missionaries there. I once mentioned to Goheen before I knew what the facts were, the only two Americans who had been knighted in India had been missionaries. He said, my grandfather was one. Who was the other one? I thought that was a great put down!

Q: *That'll teach you! Ainslie, what were your working relations with the Embassy? Did you have to get involved in staff meetings or do any of those other administrative chores? Jay Gildner and the Ambassador with his confidence in you freed you from this kind of daily --*

EMBREE: I suppose I did attend one or two staff meetings. I had a friendly relationship for two reasons. One was Goheen himself, of course. The other was his personal assistant, Marshall Booton, whom I had known very well.

Let me tell you a story. The day I arrived in Delhi a wire came in from the White House congratulating me which created some unhappiness. But people didn't notice the initials. It was Tom Thornton who was working in the White House and thought it would be amusing to send me a cable signed with the President's name.

Q: *And Tom, of course, was a National Security staff member.*

EMBREE: Yes, but people thought it was really from the President.

Q: *Yes, it's like all these messages from the Secretary of State that go out on the State Department telegrams saying personal message.*

EMBREE: I had very close relations, working relationships, with the Embassy people and the Voice of America people. They knew I had access to journalists and so on and I think that was useful.

Q: *You were a good door opener.*

EMBREE: Yes, I suppose I was a good door opener for them.

Q: Ainslie, what languages do you speak?

EMBREE: Just Hindi. But the kind of people we deal with in Delhi speak English. I think I would have said that was one argument for a Cultural Affairs Officer who's not a career person, but who has some kind of other associations and I think is recognized in this way. So I was useful to a number of people and I used to write, needless to say, things for Ambassador Goheen. I wrote him one important speech and I'd forgotten that I'd written it. And I heard him giving a speech and I went up to him and I said, Bob, that was a wonderful speech. He said, "Aren't you being a little immodest?" I'd genuinely forgotten.

Q: That raises a very important question which has got to do with a cultural officer, the top cultural officer in one of the top countries coming from outside the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service officers who aspire to promotion up the cultural line sometimes find this a very distressing situation. I don't know how you balance the two off unless what you do is really balance it off. But obviously, from everything you say you bring credentials and knowledge of people which a Foreign Service officer would rarely have in a particular country because none stay there that long.

EMBREE: There were people in India who had been around there a long time. People like Craig Baxter knew South Asia well, and there were others. But even in that case the outsider has advantages in terms of how he can meet people and the fact that he's recognized as an outsider. Even though I had the same rank as the rest, people knew I really wasn't one of them.

Q: They still admired you because you were Ainslie Embree.

EMBREE: Well, they knew I had these other connections. I had university connections and so on. I would argue for the independent person. I'm not sure about the ambassadorial level. I would certainly always have said we were extremely lucky we had the people we had, especially Goheen who was greatly respected by Indians. They liked his style. When they wanted to say nice things about Goheen, they would say it was because he was born here, he's like us. All they meant was he was mannerly and didn't bang the table and knew how to be polite.

Q: Ainslie, during your time in India, were there any delicate diplomatic policy matters that came up that impinged upon what you were doing?

EMBREE: Not really. After I had been there a week or so, the Patriot, the communist paper, published a fierce denunciation of me saying they were going to expose my connections with the RSS, the right wing Hindu organization. And if I wasn't out of India in 24 hours and so on. What had happened I discovered is that they had confused me with Walter Anderson who indeed is the best expert on right wing organizations, who is now in our Embassy in New Delhi. This raised an interesting question. I was surprised by it but some of my very close Indian friends, some in high places, called me and said if you want us to, we will write to the newspaper and say that these charges are absurd. The one man who was the vice chancellor at Delhi said, "You know our country. The best thing to do is to not say a word, for you not to reply and for none of us to

reply." He said, "I know that many of us are going to call you personally, but we're not going to say a word to the newspapers, will you mind?" Of course he was perfectly right. Within a week it was a joke. No, I was not involved in anything delicate.

On one occasion a man came from Kabul, a reporter from an English newspaper. He said he had information he wanted to give me. It soon became apparent the information was meant for the CIA chief. And I had protested that this was not my kind of information, that I wanted no connection with it. He insisted and he took his little book out to verify it and said, "Oh my God, I was to see you about a cultural matter." He had turned the wrong page. No, I think I can say I was not involved in anything that -- oh, there were some attacks, continuing attacks, on American scholars.

Q: *Was this from organs like the Patriot?*

EMBREE: The Patriot or in Parliament with people denouncing American scholars for being engaged in espionage.

Q: *Well, this is part of that larger disinformation operation which has always been particularly severe in India.*

EMBREE: We never made any public statements. We too used our own channels.

Q: *Sometimes it's the best way of making it go away.*

EMBREE: Yes.

Q: *What do you consider your most successful undertaking? Do you have a most successful?*

EMBREE: I don't have a most successful. One of the things that I started that I think has died out, Goheen or maybe it was Jay Gildner, had the idea that we should try to get young Indians who would be leaders in 20 years to meet their counter- parts from America. And we started one program of bringing some together. It was very difficult in either country to say who were the 20 leaders, or who are the young people who are going to be leaders, especially difficult in India.

But I did set up one seminar which I thought was a very good idea called the Chester Bowles Seminar in which we invited some bright young Americans and some bright young Indians. It was much easier for me to identify the bright young Indians from contacts I had. It was extremely difficult to identify bright young Americans. And, of course, it always raised the question of money. How are we going to get ten Americans? We did get ten in the end, taking people who were in India. And it was very interesting and to some extent it achieved what I think we wanted to achieve. And that was to get people who would know each other through the years. I think that could have been a very successful thing if it had been maintained.

Q: *Yes.*

EMBREE: Of course, like many of these ventures it was personal and too much depended upon one person.

Q: Well, funds shift and priorities shift, but maybe you weren't there long enough.

EMBREE: Another thing I was greatly involved in and interested in was the American Research Center in Hyderabad. I think that is one of the most worthwhile of all our endeavors. I think it as important as the US Educational Foundation, itself.

Q: Now, this has got to do with American Studies.

EMBREE: American Studies. People often laugh when they learn somebody who had never taken a course in American history was running a big program in American Studies. It's an excellent library and it's something that has come in for a great deal of criticism. Why do we have this expensive venture, people have asked. By American standards, it's not an expensive venture, but it's the best library of American literature and history I think in Asia, probably better than in Japan, at least I've been told it is. And it's of enormous importance for Indian scholars who want to work on the United States. It could be of even more value for scholars throughout the area. Some people did come from Southeast Asia, but it is hard for Pakistanis to get there. If I had one institution I'd want to make sure survived, it would be the American Studies Research Center. I think it's very important. The great problem is getting competent Americans to be the directors. We had the wrong approach, I'm convinced, of trying to get a Fulbrighter to go out and run it for two years. It didn't work. We couldn't get the right people. It would have been much better if we'd got a good Indian to be director and an American to go out as a resident scholar for two years. I think we could have done that, and I think we still could if we were going to put more money in. But we couldn't get first class Americans to go for two years for small pay. It just wasn't in the cards.

Q: Well, I visited the Hyderabad Center and I've also sent out people as part of that selection process. So I know what you are speaking about, that it is very difficult. But certainly the results are also excellent. In the one educational exchange project in which I was involved, I think this was after you had left India, we used the Center to bring together scholars from all over South Asia, including Pakistan, at a time when we weren't even sure that the Paks would be allowed in. But because of the nature of the Center and what the project was all about, it worked.

EMBREE: I think we could do much more with that. I think that could become a really great center. Again, I think that's one place where a non-professional CAO could play a big role. One of the things that I found interesting with American Foreign Service officers in the Embassy or in the USIS, it doesn't take long before they get out of touch with the United States, especially the American academic world. And then when you think of it, what they knew about American academic life from being a student. You get out of touch quickly. I think there's an enormous advantage in USIS of having an academic who really is into the American scene.

Q: Academic scene.

EMBREE: Yes.

Q: Well, you know, and I speak from the point of view of the Foreign Service officer, one finds that there's a certain amount of conflict, almost emotional resentment, between the academics who are in country and the Embassy. Part of this has got to do with the so-called perks which one has which they don't realize are not necessarily coming straight out of the government. I found that particularly true in Iran. But I think you're very right about the knowledge, the internal knowledge, of how universities work, who pushes which button and all of those things.

EMBREE: There is also, of course, ignorance on the part of the academics. I was attacked in Delhi by American academics for not pushing some particular policy that was clearly against American government policy. I remember having a very bitter argument with an American political scientist of some repute. I explained to him not only did I have no conceivable way of affecting the policy, that even the Ambassador --

Q: You're talking about political issues.

EMBREE: Political issues that were decided in Washington and we were carrying out. Academics have very little knowledge of how the government works, that the Ambassador is the agent of the State Department and the State Department is the agent of the Administration.

Q: That's right.

EMBREE: American academics, as you know, have a fashion of criticizing the government. I was talking just recently with a young woman, very well known, who referred to one of my former colleagues, Paul Kreisberg, as a CIA agent. And I said, well, Paul Kreisberg was a very high ranking officer, why would he be a CIA agent? She said, well, he was giving information about Indian politics to the American government. I said, that's what he was paid for.

Q: That's his job.

EMBREE: And she couldn't get this through her head. I said, you know, if he knew anything of value to the American government or the Indian government, of course, he would communicate it. He'd be a very poor Foreign Service officer if he didn't. And this shocked her. And she said, well, you wouldn't. And I said, well, if I knew anything that I thought would be of value, yes, of course.

I have great misgivings about second raters, especially in a country like India. They're terribly conscious, for example, of our American academics who go to India that they're often not our best people -- that we don't get the people out there whose books they read.

Q: Oh, dear. Let me ask you about one other element and then maybe we will -- two other elements. You traveled a great deal when you were CAO.

EMBREE: I traveled a lot to Calcutta and Madras. I was very involved with the Calcutta people. Now, you raise a very interesting question into the whole way, you know, what I knew my job was. I didn't do very much pushing, so to speak. I spoke when I was asked to speak. Now, this

was a very difficult position for me because all I am professionally qualified to speak on is India. And they would ask me to speak on India. And as you know, this was not looked upon with great favor. But I really wasn't qualified to talk about American subjects.

Q: So you did talk about India?

EMBREE: Actually, what I talked about a great deal was human rights and foreign policy, remember it's the Carter days. So I could give the President's line, which I wholly agreed with, and at the same time not have to pretend knowledge of American policy judgment.

Q: This is very true. And when you do travel around, which I always enjoyed doing, it gives you a wonderful opportunity to really see what's going on instead of being bound in the capital city. And you with your background would be particularly good at this. Well, how did you find living? Are there any comparisons about living -- I'm not even talking about your life as a missionary teacher and then your life in the Embassy, but I mean living -- what was it? A decade later in India? Did you find that there were many changes?

EMBREE: Oh, yes. There were great changes in India itself, enormous changes. We went to India in 1948. We didn't have a flush toilet. We didn't have a refrigerator. They hadn't even heard about air conditioners. None of the helps to living which became commonplace later on. In our early days we would have been very embarrassed to live in the kind of splendor we lived in in Delhi. We had got over that meanwhile. We realized the Indians didn't care. I don't think it was the least barrier to our friendships with Indians that we lived in the peculiarly large house.

Q: You had a very particular house. As I recall, it had lots of columns.

EMBREE: Lots of columns, yes. So there was tremendous change in our own lifestyle. But in that sense the change in India itself, the prosperity in India, the growth of the middle class, nobody would have foreseen when we went to India in '48. That's a change in Delhi, basically in Delhi, and in other big cities.

Q: The urban centers.

EMBREE: The urban centers. India now has a very affluent middle class.

Q: And you can see this. It's interesting when you travel around and make these observations. Has there been any special impact of this stint in the diplomatic service on your subsequent thinking or your subsequent academic career?

EMBREE: Oh, yes, I'm sure. It's linked me in a very interesting way with the academics, all of whom came through Delhi. I know virtually every American academic who came to India the two years I was there. It's also a very important link with the people in Washington, my involvement at the Foreign Service Institute.

Q: You lecture there from time to time?

EMBREE: I lecture regularly. Now, that comes about actually through connections I had made with Sid Sober and one or two others at an earlier period when I was lecturing for USIS in Pakistan.

Q: So you crossed country boundaries?

EMBREE: Yes, that was before I was CAO. I didn't when I was CAO.

One interesting thing that happened when you're speaking of diplomatic matters. Bhutan was very anxious to start a program in the United States of sending their young people in the service. And Senator Percy was a great friend of Bhutan and he was pushing this both in Washington and indeed in Delhi. And so I readily agreed that I would go to Bhutan and help them select some people to go study in the United States. They had no idea how to do it. The only catch was that the Indian government wouldn't let me go. Nobody wanted to say this publicly, especially the Bhutanese education minister. However, Senator Percy didn't know and he thought I had refused to help the Bhutanese.

Q: Too bad somebody couldn't whisper in the good Senator's ear of the niceties.

EMBREE: He probably didn't realize the close rein Indians kept on where certain Americans go. That was the other side of it, by the way, that I was watched more carefully by the Indian government than I think other people would have been, because they knew me and I had been there before. They sometimes used to check my guest lists of who went to my house.

Q: Before the guests arrived.

EMBREE: Oh, yes. Often before the guests arrived.

Q: One does not necessarily think of India with such a strong surveillance program. Did Sue have any special feeling about this second stint in India?

EMBREE: She was very unwilling to go because she remembered our former life and thought that was fine when we were young, but why go through that again? So she was somewhat dumbfounded when she arrived and discovered we had two freezers and two refrigerators in our kitchen.

Q: Happily surprised.

EMBREE: Happily surprised. She played a very interesting role. Mrs. Goheen once said to me, you know, there are only two real Embassy wives in Delhi. I said, what do you mean? She said, Sue and I are the only two women who act like old fashioned Embassy wives.

Q: That raises a whole issue, which we will not go into in this interview, about this change which is very true.

EMBREE: It was true. Of course, both Mrs. Goheen and Sue had been used to entertaining for their husbands always and continued to fit in with the pattern. She enjoyed the years.

Q: *She didn't teach again?*

EMBREE: No, she didn't teach. She didn't have any formal kind of activity, but she was very involved with some of the young Embassy wives who were very interested in learning about India and doing things.

ROBERT F. GOHEEN
Ambassador
India (1977-1980)

Ambassador Robert F. Goheen was born and raised in India as a child of missionaries and served two tours in the U.S. Army. After returning to the U.S. to work for the War Department, he was sent to the Philippines and later to India. Ambassador Goheen served as president of Princeton University from 1957-1972. He was ambassador to India from 1977-1980. He was interviewed by Fredrick Aandahl on December 15, 1988.

Q: *I wonder if I could jump ahead a few years and ask what were the immediate circumstances of your appointment by President Carter?*

GOHEEN: I was astounded by it because I'm not active in any political party and I don't have any money to contribute to politics, to speak of. Though I was a very, very minor and ardent Carter backer, I don't think I had ever really come to his attention. I did know Cyrus Vance, the incoming Secretary of State, and he knew that I knew a lot about India. It turned out further that on the panel that reviewed possible ambassadorial appointments that the President established, I chanced to have two good friends. One was Dean Rusk and the other was Ann Martindell.

So I had some prejudiced witnesses working for me, but I suspect I knew as much about India as most people who could have been available for that job.

Q: *In getting ready to see you here, I looked up and saw what a distinguished group of predecessors you had.*

GOHEEN: I certainly did.

Q: *Henry Grady, Loy Henderson, Chester Bowles, George Allen, John Sherman Cooper, Ellsworth Bunker, Kenneth Galbraith, Kenneth Keating, Daniel Moynihan, and William Saxbe.*

GOHEEN: It was a very distinguished group. It was a terrific group. I knew all of those people except Grady. I never met him. I had, one way or another, known all the rest of them.

Q: When you compare it with the list of politicians or big contributors at many other posts, India, apparently, has been reserved for people who were active in public affairs in the broader sense.

GOHEEN: I think that's been true, yes.

Q: I wondered, also, were you interviewed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

GOHEEN: I was, but they were very gentle with me. They didn't push me at all. But again, I knew a few people on that committee.

Q: Well, you've been strategically located for a long time, so you know almost everybody, I should think. Of course, you've been to India a great many times, but when you returned to India, did you find any great surprises from what you had seen earlier? You came, I guess, a few years after separation.

GOHEEN: Well, from about 1957, when I became President of Princeton, until going there 20 years later as ambassador, I must have been back to India seven or eight times, so that I had seen the progressive industrialization around the bigger cities and the second-tier cities, seen the growth of traffic, and development of pollution and all those other things that were happening. And so there's no surprises visually or in terms of just being there.

I went at an extraordinarily interesting time because India had, since independence, been governed by a single part, the Congress Party, which, to be sure, under Mrs. Gandhi, split off and became Congress (I). But it really was a continuity of one party controlling the country. And then there was this tremendous uprising of popular antagonism to her and her policies in early 1977 that led to the election of a new composite Janata Government, the People's Government. So, I went in as a whole new regime came into office, full of enthusiasm, full of promise. We were all very optimistic about the restoration of democracy in India.

And then over the next almost four years that I was there, I saw two further governments. Thus, in my short span as ambassador, there were more changes in government in independent India than it had had in its whole history before. That helped to make the job fascinating.

Q: Mrs. Gandhi was still the principal politician even when she was out of office.

GOHEEN: She was quite quiet for awhile and then she began to assert herself. By strange coincidence, I had come to know her a little bit when she came to this country with her father. Let's see, that would have been in the Kennedy period, 1962, I guess it was. By chance my wife and I were up in New Haven for the Yale-Princeton football game weekend with Whitney Griswold, then President of Yale, and his wife. Among the other house guests there, besides the two of us, were Indira Gandhi. Then she was a quite young, apparently non-political person. Young, being my age then, you know, 40-something. Also a guest was Dorothy Norman, an older woman, who had written a lot about India and was a friend of the Nehru family. So, I had, as I say, come to know Mrs. Gandhi a bit.

When I got to New Delhi, after presenting my credentials and getting to know the people in the new Janata Government, I felt it was incumbent on me also to get to know the leaders of the various opposition parties, of which she was far and away the most important. I called on her, and she appreciated that, though the government didn't appreciate it entirely.

Q: You mean the Indian Government?

GOHEEN: The Indian Government, yes. Our government thought it was the right thing for me to do.

Q: Yes, I would expect that.

GOHEEN: She appreciated my call, and we developed, I wouldn't say a terribly warm relationship, but a very good, fairly candid relationship for discussions together. She never gave me the kind of grief she gave some other ambassadors. She could be very, very short with them, they told me, and impervious to any real discussion. But I never had that problem with her. Later, I had to deal with her a lot during the last year I was there because she came back in office in January of 1980. I was there right through to December; I was there for 12 months when she was the Prime Minister.

Q: What was the principal focus of U.S. policy toward India in your tenure?

GOHEEN: Well, President Carter had a very genuine interest and concern about the Third World. And he had a particular interest and concern about India. I think it was because his mother had served there in the Peace Corps and had an, apparently, very moving and worthwhile experience. He had caught a lot of that feeling; so, a major effort was to try to show the goodwill of the United States toward this new, restored democracy of India and our desire to work and cooperate with them, stand together for human rights, and things like that. That concern was reflected in the fact that India was one of the few countries that the President visited. He came in the winter of 1978 to visit in New Delhi.

Q: Had he been in India before?

GOHEEN: No. He had never been there before. The President, Cyrus Vance, and Roy Atherton all came out together. They had first gone to Tehran which was not, I think in retrospect, a terribly successful visit. They had a pleasant time but they really didn't understand what was going on there. Then they came to India and had on the whole a good visit there, because of the President's great interest.

The big issue between us, through the whole time from before I got there until after I left, was the discrepancy in nuclear proliferation policy between the two countries. India, you know, had exploded a nuclear device in 1974 which they called a peaceful nuclear explosion. And that so shocked people in this country and members of the Congress that there was a great push on to tighten American nuclear export policy. That came afoul of a contractual agreement which we had made back in 1963 to supply uranium fuel to two power reactors built by General Electric a little bit north of Bombay at a place called Tarapur.

And so this issue of maintaining our commitment to supply fuel to these reactors, to that real contractual obligation, came up against legislation which was trying to cut off all of that and which, in effect, did cut off that kind of supply unless there was a Presidential waiver. Well, over a period of time, we got two Presidential waivers because the President wanted to keep good relations with India and he also respected the contractual obligation.

But the nuclear doves in Congress were so strong that there was no real chance of keeping the supply relationship alive after those two shipments. This was a very thorny area of amicable enough discussion that never approached agreement on resolving the issues, though we tried many different ways of coming to a solution. So, when I left office in January of 1981, I certainly left that big, unresolved, and festering problem behind me.

Q: What was going on with regard to Pakistan on this?

GOHEEN: Well, about March of 1979 we became aware that Pakistan not only seemed to be pursuing a course toward nuclear armament, but was definitely doing so, that it had managed clandestinely to get information and material from Europe and was developing an enrichment capability. The Carter Administration then invoked legislation, the Symington amendment, which terminated economic aid to Pakistan for awhile, trying to put the screws on Pakistan without, I think, any real success. Of course, we in India thought it was a good thing that our government was doing.

But when the Russians invaded Afghanistan in late December of 1979, that whole arrangement got turned tippy-turvy. It came to seem to the President, and Brzezinski in particular, critically important to back up Pakistan, show our commitment to helping it as an endangered forward line state. The President offered to provide Pakistan \$400 million economic and arms aid almost immediately. That's what General Zia described as peanuts, if you remember; in his view, it wasn't nearly enough.

But that issue of our willingness to arm Pakistan, in the last year that I was in India, was a very sore point in our relations with India because, from the Indian standpoint, every time we arm Pakistan, as we have in the past, Pakistan has used those arms to attack India and not to defend against communism or anything else. So they are very sensitive to American arms supply for Pakistan.

At the very same time our people were running around in China trying to talk with the Chinese about closer relations, including the supply of various kinds of arms. That also made the Indians very nervous because they still remember all too vividly getting whipped in that 1962 border war with China; they remain very suspicious of the Chinese. So, part of my task was to try to convince the Indian Government, Mrs. Gandhi, that the United States really did care for India. We were not going against India by trying to have better relations with China and by helping Pakistan. And that was my message. That was what I kept trying to sell week after week.

Q: Did you get good support from the Department?

GOHEEN: Yes. It was a wonderful Administration to work with, at least for me, because I knew that Cyrus Vance saw at least some of my cables and the President was very receptive. I saw him before I went out to India, I saw him every time I came back. I saw the Secretary every time I came back. And, you know, a lot of ambassadors don't manage to do that.

Q: No. It helps a great deal.

GOHEEN: Yes. It helps an enormous amount.

Q: Did you have good relations with the desk also?

GOHEEN: Yes. For this history, I would record that I was tremendously well impressed by the professional Foreign Service with whom I dealt both at the desk and in the field. I really had wonderful colleagues and, with very, very few exceptions, they were people of high caliber and intelligent, dedicated people. I really enjoyed it.

Q: One of the perennial cases where there is friction is between the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission.

GOHEEN: I had a wonderful DCM, whom I inherited. He had run the embassy for, I guess, the better part of a year. Saxbe left as soon as Ford lost the election.

Q: I sort of lost track of Saxbe.

GOHEEN: Saxbe was put in by the Ford people, or maybe by Nixon just before he went out. And Bill was out there with a mandate, really, not to do anything. The Nixon people really pretty much washed their hands of India following the Bangladesh debacle, and the infamous tilt toward Pakistan, and things like that. Bill Saxbe was a very able and nice guy, but he went out there with a mandate not to do anything, just to represent. And he had a wonderful time playing golf, and shooting, and buying rugs, and doing all those things. But as soon as Ford lost the election, he packed up and came home.

So his DCM, David Schneider, who is a real veteran of the South Asia service -- a wonderful fellow and Yale alumnus -- was the DCM when I arrived. And he and his nice wife, Ann, really broke me in. I had never been an Ambassador. I didn't know what an Ambassador did. They were wonderful and I was awfully sorry when they left. He went back to Washington for a brief stint, and then ended up being our ambassador in Bangladesh.

But his successor was an equally fine person who had been, in many people's view, given a very bum deal by the Kissinger people. His name was Archer Blood. Arch was our consul general in Calcutta at the time of the troubles leading to Bangladesh breaking free. He would send back to Washington cables about the genocide that was going on and on. Those messages were very inconvenient for Mr. Kissinger, who was trying to promote a very close relationship with Pakistan as a bridge to China. So, Blood got brought home, and I think he served in the Personnel office for a short time; I'm not quite sure of that. Then he was sent off to the Army War College. That's where he was when I took office.

As you know, I think they regularly let an ambassador consider a number of possibilities for his DCM and I talked with a number of very able and nice people. But I thought that Blood, of the ones I talked with, was the one that I could work most easily with and whose judgment I had high respect for. So Archer Blood and his nice wife came to New Delhi and served as the DCM the rest of my time there. He was an excellent DCM. Very, very professional but, you know, good breadth and good judgment.

So, as I say, I had luck. I had wonderful colleagues. And it's as true of my principal political officers, economic officers, junior political officers, and AID director. They were really high class people.

Q: How were the local employees? Were there problems, as we have had in some other countries?

GOHEEN: No. We had, I would say, minor employment problems. I guess it was during more or less the last year and a half of my time in New Delhi that the State Department undertook a world-wide reorganization of positions for foreign nationals. Getting this world-wide perspective to actual local and regional scenes involved a good deal of strain, and argument, and contention. But over time, the necessary adjustments were made. Harry Barnes was the Director General at that time, and he proved to be a very good person to work with on that set of problems. But the Indians who were helping do our political and economic reporting seemed to me to be very able and very easy to relate to.

Q: I was going to ask further about the efforts you made to better the relationship between India and Pakistan.

GOHEEN: Well, I'm fairly pessimistic about the ability of the United States or any external power to change that situation, other than either to rile it up by supplying arms or doing something nice for the other party, to which the second party always reacts negatively, or by staying out of the way. Arthur Hummel went to be ambassador in Islamabad the same time I went to New Delhi. And Art, you know, is a seasoned professional. We got to meet and know each other in Washington a bit before I went out. We were mutually determined that our embassies would not be sources of friction. Let the Indians and the Pakistanis have their frictions; we were not going to work against each other.

Q: There is a tendency for U.S. missions to represent the local government.

GOHEEN: I think that we managed that very well. We were aided by the fact that we knew and liked each other. And then annually there was a chiefs of mission meeting where we could get together and talk. My senior political officer had served there and his had served in India, so all those things helped, I think. The British found it out before us and we found it out afterwards -- namely, that our ability to bring about good relations between India and Pakistan is extremely limited. They are going to be governed by their direct perceptions of each other, which still tend to be very suspicious and, at quite a deep level, antagonistic. I think we're going to have to see another generation come. Now, this may be Ms. Bhutto's generation. I don't know.

Q: She's certainly a change from all the other people.

GOHEEN: I had hoped that with young Rajiv coming into office, we would see a greater relaxation toward Pakistan on his part. In both countries people take a lot of their cues from the leadership, I think, more than here. It looked for a short time as though that was going to happen. Then, for one reason or another, partly the Punjab problem, he found it expedient, or necessary, or desirable to become very tough-minded toward Pakistan. He feels, and I guess he thinks he has evidence, that Zia condoned the training of Sikh militants in Pakistan. That, of course, inflamed his thought and Indian thought. He may have been right. Zia, in turn, thought India was aiding people opposing his government and working for a democratic Pakistan, which probably was right, too, so that there were all these tensions.

Q: In that period, Afghanistan had not yet become such a problem as it is now.

GOHEEN: I do not believe that the Afghanistan issue initially was a big issue between India and Pakistan. It was, initially, a very big issue between our government and India's. When the Russians moved into Afghanistan in December of 1979, a care-taker government led by Charan Singh was in power, about to turn over authority to Mrs. Gandhi's government which was just then being formed. Her party had won the parliamentary election but she was not in office yet. The Ministry of External Affairs apparently fumbled around and tried to get Charan Singh to authorize a statement about India's response to the Afghan situation, but he wouldn't do it.

Some people, whom I know but won't name, got to Mrs. Gandhi and persuaded her to authorize a text which was just terrible. You may remember that it was read as part of the U.N. debate when India abstained from the general condemnation of Russia for that invasion. This statement made the point that the other superpower -- I forget the exact wording -- had built up its military forces in the Indian Ocean to the extent that one should not be surprised that the USSR felt some need to react to that threatening presence. Well, you know, that was ridiculous and self-serving. I have good, personal evidence that she never really knew what she was approving. I mean, she trusted these two fellows and, in effect, said, "If it's all right with you, it's okay."

So, this was a terrible blow. I mean, you can imagine the American reaction to that Indian statement coming at a time when the President was worked up about this enormous new menace that the Soviet Union had come to be. Remember, he said he had not realized how dangerous it could be until this move into Afghanistan.

I came back from Delhi for consultations very shortly after the invasion, while the Charan Singh government was still in office and before Mrs. Gandhi had taken office. So, I was in Washington and about to return to India on the day of the debate in the U.N. when this statement was read by India's permanent representative there. I got a copy of it at the State Department moments before I was to make a farewell call on the President at the White House.

So, I had a copy of it, and I went over there, and I said I had to see Brzezinski quickly. He came out and I said, "Do you know about this?" He said, no, he didn't know about it. I said, "Well, here's the statement." I've forgotten what he said, but it was something like, "Oh, my God." I said, "Who is going to tell the President about it?" He said, "You are."

So, we went in to meet the President and, after the ceremonial picture taking and politeness, we were alone, the three of us. I told the President and he exploded. I had not thought of him as an irascible person in any of my previous contacts with him, but he just exploded. He got livid and even cursed. I then had to work to calm him down. I said, "You know, we know very little about this situation. Mrs. Gandhi's government isn't officially in office yet. The Charan Singh government is going out. For goodness sakes, don't do anything and please don't say anything until I get back to New Delhi and can look into this and report more fully on it." After fuming some more, he accepted that, which was good.

I was able then to call on Mrs. Gandhi and also tell off the two guys who wrote that statement; the latter probably did no good. I made the point to her that, if she had approved this, she had very badly misinterpreted the sure American reaction to it. She said she hadn't meant to alienate us, and she felt that we, perhaps, were overreacting. She was convinced diplomacy was the way to get the Russians out, rather than threatening them, and India was committed to trying to do that. So I was able to report all that back to the Department; maybe it did some good.

She never got credit in this country for the fact that she did stand up against the Russians. Gromyko made a special trip to New Delhi in January or early February to try to get the Indian Government to endorse what the Russians had done in Afghanistan, and she flatly refused to do it. But the fact that she wouldn't come out and pick up the cudgels against the Russians was always held against her by many people in this country.

Q: Well, this is a good example of how advantageous it is to have an excellent ambassador who can see the President.

GOHEEN: Yes, sure.

Q: Most of them are cut off, except for completely ceremonial affairs.

GOHEEN: Yes, sure. If it hadn't been for his interest in India, I'm sure I wouldn't have seen him.

Q: Were you visited often by congressional delegations?

GOHEEN: I would have liked to have had more because my feeling was that Congress generally ignored India except to complain about problems. I wanted them to realize that this is a real, functioning democracy and that it has a lot of the same problems that we do. Often there, as here, it is hard to get a clear party line and sometimes policy isn't absolutely consistent because you have all these political forces at work.

Q: I suppose the embassy was concerned very much in keeping track of at least the major party.

GOHEEN: We had several congressional delegations but, as I say, I would have welcomed more. I think most of the visits were worthwhile in terms of congressmen getting a better sense of what the Indian government was like and what the country was like. There are a few individuals who were, obviously, boondoggling, but I don't think of any delegation being a waste of time.

Q: They are always getting stories in the paper about junkets of one sort or another.

GOHEEN: One congressman, whom I won't name, embarrassed us all by asking where he could get dirty pictures. You know, it was incredible. I didn't know where to get them. We had to ask our social secretary who she said she knew people who could get him some.

Q: I'm reminded of the story of one of the crazy politicians of the 1950s who gave De Gaulle an exploding cigar. Fortunately, the Eiffel Tower didn't collapse and we were all right. You didn't have too much concern about international terrorism like we've certainly had in the last few years.

GOHEEN: No, not at all. Every now and then we'd get a threat that some Japanese Red Army people were passing through India. They would tighten up security around the embassy for awhile, but I never worried about it. After the Iran fiasco we got a certain amount of demonstrating from Iranian students. There were lots of Iranian students in India. They would show up, often accompanied by people from the Communist Party of India -- all bussed out and probably paid three rupees; mill around; shout slogans and threats outside the residence and the chancery and then depart. I never felt any more threatened by them than I had felt threatened by some demonstrations here at Princeton. Some of our security people wanted me to take a lot of precautions that I thought were silly. I didn't do it, except for the residence because of my wife being there. I was never personally troubled.

Obviously, this wasn't terrorism, but mob action. Things got much more serious in Islamabad. Just before we were to spend the better part of the week there with the Hummels, the chancery in Islamabad was attacked by a mob and burned.

Q: I had forgotten that episode.

GOHEEN: It was attacked by some Pakistani fanatics who thought that the United States had been involved in some violence at the Black Mosque in Mecca. I don't remember the details. Some pilgrims were killed and somehow some Muslim in Islamabad thought the United States had had something to do with that. So, they took out their anger on our embassy at Islamabad. Obviously, somebody must have organized and planned the attack; they devastated that place and Zia's troops were very, very slow to react. We were very lucky that we didn't lose a bunch of people there. But anyhow, obviously, the Hummels didn't want any guests just then; they had their hands full. So, we never got to Islamabad. I've been there at other times, but not on that trip.

Q: I was going to ask about the seizure of the embassy in Tehran. Was there much impact on the Indian Government?

GOHEEN: The Indian Government, ever since its founding, has made a point of cultivating the Arabian and Muslim states. It stands to reason, when they've got an internal minority of 90-plus million Muslims and Muslim Pakistan not too friendly on their western border, that they should want to have good relations with the Gulf states, with Egypt, and Morocco, with Libya, the whole bunch of Islamic states.

When the Shah was overthrown, India quickly appointed a Shi'ite ambassador to Tehran in the hope that he could be a door opener, or a good link, between New Delhi and Tehran. I don't think it really worked. I don't think that at that time the Iranian people cared about their neighbors at all; they didn't care what anybody felt. They had their own agenda and, beyond their internal agenda, it was to spread their fundamentalism through the Arab world and wherever else they could.

Q: Any public sentiments you could see? I imagine the government kept at arms length.

GOHEEN: Well, it was a mixed reaction. The Shah had cultivated relations with India carefully and even aggressively. He looked upon his country and India as being the two principal secular nations and modernizing nations in that part of Asia. He thought that they had a common agenda in keeping down the mullahs and other reactionaries so as to speed economic progress. He put a lot of money, for example, into a big iron mine down on India's western coast at Kudremukh. He put other money into extending the Rajasthan Canal. He and Mrs. Gandhi met at various times and, apparently, got along pretty well.

So, he wasn't looked on by Indians as the kind of villain that many other people saw him to be. Indeed, I would think that, because he really did stand for a secular state and Indians sometimes feel as though they are the only secular power around in a vast sea of Islam from Indonesia through to Morocco, there must have even been disappointment for some Indians in the turn of fortunes in Iran, though they wouldn't say that. They surely didn't say that publicly.

Q: How did your background in classical studies, educational administration, and scholarly foundations affect your contacts with government and people of India?

GOHEEN: Well, I think classical studies give you an appreciation for history. They give you a sense of appreciation for people other than your own kind of people. As a classicist, you need to try to reach out and understand how the Greeks thought, or the Romans thought, which isn't always the way we think. There is a certain amount of training in that. I also think scholarly research tends to develop an attentive and analytical habit of mind which is useful in many walks of life.

Q: Did you get at all into philology?

GOHEEN: No. I'm not a philologist. I was more a historian of ideas and literary critic. But as a scholar, you have to learn to take some complicated data, break them down, analyze them, come to some conclusions. The general utility of that showed in the Second World War. Many academic people ended up in staff positions in the various services because they had been taught to think critically and analytically, and to write.

The university presidency was, obviously, important in two ways. You learn to manage -- or lead, if not manage -- a large, complex human organization. There are a lot of personnel problems you have to be sensitive to, and that was valuable. In a university president's life in a university like this there are also always many external relationships, plus entertaining, and making speeches of

general import rather than specifically internal import -- all, the same kinds of things an ambassador has to do.

Q: You have to be very flexible, too.

GOHEEN: Yes.

Q: In fact, I was wondering how you allocated your time among all the duties of an ambassador in a country of 800 million, with the Agency for International Development, and the USIS, and the Atomic Energy Programs, Agriculture, CIA, Treasury, and Defense. You were the universal man.

GOHEEN: You learn to try to size up your chief lieutenants in all those areas and how much you can rely on them; make clear to them that you expect them to raise their problems with you and not to run around corners; and meet with them often, sometimes with a full staff, but also in terms of their particular concerns. Every Monday we would have a staff meeting of the principal heads of these organizations.

I want to say two things. One of the things I liked was that Delhi was the kind of embassy in which I could roll up my sleeves and get right into the middle of things, especially in political affairs, but also into some of the economic issues, because I knew something about them and my officers knew that I knew. I think maybe at times they wished I would leave more of that to them, but they were nice and tolerant of my intruding on their reporting duties. I appreciated that, and I think I had good relations with all of them.

Because, as you said, it's such an enormous and diverse country, I felt it was a mistake to stay in Delhi all the time. I guess about every month and a half, usually with my wife, I would go off for four or five days, sometimes more, to some other part of India to meet with the government officials there, to talk with politicians and press there, meet with the Rotary Club, do all those things, just try to get a feel of this enormous country.

Q: Did you go by car, or train, or plane, or all of them?

GOHEEN: Well, we did all of those things. In North India we had a nice arrangement. We, often, would fly to our destination, but I would send an embassy driver ahead to be there to meet us and drive us around for the days we were in that area. Or, if it was near one of the consulates, the consul general would provide the transportation for us. He would usually come with me, although they couldn't always do that. I really felt that I had a much better sense of that extraordinary country that way than I ever would have had if I had just sat in Delhi. It's like sitting in Washington.

Q: Yes, very much so.

GOHEEN: You get to see things through such a narrow lens, such a special kind of lens, in any nation's capital.

Q: Something inside the beltway.

GOHEEN: And you can't ignore that, but it certainly isn't representative of the country.

Q: Did you make many speeches to Indian audiences?

GOHEEN: I never got my Hindi to the point where I could speak it that way, though I studied Hindi while I was there. I'm sorry to find that I'm losing it every month. I talked in English to Chambers of Commerce, and Rotary Clubs, and Foreign Affairs Clubs in all the major cities and many of the minor cities like Bhopal, and Indore, and Miraj, and places like that. That was part of it. I didn't go around the country just to sightsee; I went to represent the country and you do that, partly, by speaking.

Q: I suppose you had a security man with you occasionally, or at least in the appropriate places.

GOHEEN: I'm sure the Indian government almost always had somebody watching; I didn't always know about it. Certain cities, like Bombay, used to trouble me because the city government made a terrific fuss, providing us with motorcycle escorts and security people; we would have been happier to come and go quietly as we did in Madras. They never paid any attention to us while we were in Madras, that we knew of, although the security agencies probably had somebody watching over us.

Q: In retrospect, have you figured out what your most significant accomplishment was in your four years there?

GOHEEN: I don't think I really accomplished anything of terrible import. I think that I probably served....I think I helped the Carter Administration project its and my concern that India and Indians understand that the United States really cared about their country, and that we were not just bent on building up Pakistan at India's expense. I think I helped a little bit in this country, especially with respect to some of the members of Congress -- getting them to begin to realize that India is an enormously powerful country, as well as a great big one, and that it has a great capacity in that part of the world to affect what goes on, so that it is in our interest to be on good terms with this almost major power. It is far and away the strongest military and economic force between Aden and Singapore.

Q: Well, those were major accomplishments. What goes with it, usually, are frustrations.

GOHEEN: Yes. You can get frustrated. People don't listen sometimes, but I didn't experience any deep frustrations. I mean, I knew that, in terms of affecting Indian policy and what not, as an ambassador, the most I could do would be, at best, to soften it at the edges a little bit or to keep it from clashing with our policies where they differed in such ways as to produce heat. I knew too much about the subcontinent to think I could create peace between India and Pakistan or that I could help American and Indian interests come into absolute alignment. I mean, it would be nice if you could do those things, but that's beyond the pale. I never thought I could do those things.

Q: Why don't we take a specific example. Was there anything that American industry, or your embassy, or the Indian authorities could have done to prevent the Union Carbide disaster at Bhopal?

GOHEEN: I was shocked by that. I visited that plant. I'm not a scientist or technologist; so, I'm in no position to say whether it was well run or not. Interestingly enough, however, it was a piece of collaboration of which both Indian business and the Indian Government were very proud. It was a successful kind of collaboration until this dreadful accident occurred. Now I think it remains very much a matter of dispute whether it was negligence that caused the accident.

Q: That's up to a jury in India to decide.

GOHEEN: Yes. The Union Carbide people are convinced it was an act of sabotage and they know who did it, but the Indian Government doesn't want to recognize that; so, it remains a very disputed case. But the consequences were terrible, including the fact that it is all hung up in the courts. The poor people who have suffered have gotten no compensation at all to speak of.

Q: A lot of them will have died before they ever get compensation.

GOHEEN: Sure, yes. It is very, very tragic.

Q: My final question, is there anything else you wish to talk about or any question I forgot to ask you?

GOHEEN: No, I think I've said everything that I want to. I can just add that it was, for me, a tremendous experience, both personally and professionally -- if I can at all now claim to have become a foreign affairs professional. You know, when you get asked to be the ambassador of your country, which you love, to the land of your birth, which you also love, it's a tremendous thing. When I had to present my credentials and make a short speech, the way the ambassador always has to, I really choked up. It just grabbed me inside. And I continue to feel a tremendous sense of privilege in having had that opportunity.

At the same time, I tried to discipline myself very hard to keep my eye on the interests of the United States. My job was to represent the interests of the United States and not let my affection for India overly color my activity. I tried to do that. I also tried to help people in this country understand better what some of India's interests are and what some of its problems are. And I think developing that kind of understanding of divergent interests is, again, a service to American interests. So I enjoyed the opportunity. I don't know how well I did, but it was a great opportunity and I enjoyed it immensely.

BILHA BRYANT
Commercial Counselor
New Delhi (1977-1981)

Bilha Bryant was born in 1934 in Bulgaria. Bryant served in the Israeli Army and worked in the private sector before joining the Israeli Foreign Service in 1959. Bryant resigned from the Israeli Foreign Service and married Edward (Ted) Bryant in 1963. With her husband, Bryant was assigned overseas to Mozambique, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Korea and India. Bryant then began to work for the State Department and served in the Soviet Bureau, Eastern European Affairs and Congressional Relations. Bryant was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You were in New Delhi from when to when?

BRYANT: We got to New Delhi in-let's see- June of '77 to June '81.

Q: How did you find New Delhi at this point?

BRYANT: Most people could not believe that we actually loved Karachi and were even more amazed that we wanted to go back to this part of the world. The fact was that Karachi had a wonderful school for the girls, we had really good friends both in the ConGen, especially our Consul General and wife Gordon and Marian Tiger, and among the "natives," we had a wonderful house and we were just happy in Karachi.

So I thought of New Delhi in similar terms. When we arrived to New Delhi during monsoon, we had a house designated for us and ready for occupancy. And we liked the house and the vast garden. The house was actually an old English bungalow, quite large with intricate arrangement of rooms, but charming and comfortable. We actually settled down quite quickly and though the weather was horrendous, we were looking forward to our life there. We'd been there a week or so when one morning the cook called me to ask for something. As we finished discussing the menu for a dinner party in the foyer, since the kitchen was away from the house, and we both left, the whole ceiling of the foyer caved in. I am not exaggerating. Another minute and it could have killed us both. And for the next week I couldn't stop crying. And you know I'm a big, strong woman and I don't cry easily. I was so upset. Mind you, before we got into the house, we were given temporary quarters for three weeks so that they could fix our permanent house. This must have been the straw that broke the camel's back: having had to move three times in two years and then that happens. I must have had a mild nervous breakdown. Monsoon time in New Delhi is difficult as it is: you look out of your air conditioned house at the beautiful green gardens expecting to go out into the fresh air, but instead you go out into 120 heat with 99 humidity.

The embassy in New Delhi was quite large as was the city and the embassy community was dispersed. Perhaps this was the reason that nobody offered to help us, even to show us where the most essential places are.

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?

BRYANT: Ambassador Goheen, who was in a way an old Indian hand, because his parents had been missionaries in India.

Q: He was from Princeton?

BRYANT: Yes. He was actually the youngest president of Princeton University. Both the Ambassador and Mrs. Goheen were very nice.

Q: I was wondering whether that set the tone?

BRYANT: Very possibly. Normally somebody at the top says, "Well now, look, we want to make sure that newcomers are shown around and helped to settle down." If no volunteers were available, then make it part of embassy regulations. Archer Blood was DCM, and I think at this point he was not very happy with his career. This again colored the whole atmosphere in the embassy. Once a month Archer Blood gave a reception for all newcomers. If you were to miss his reception, you would have to wait for a month for the next group to arrive. New Delhi was a large city with a large embassy, and you were expected to make your own way, which thanks to having lived before in the sub-continent, we happily did. The ambassador was not very social as well; he was an intellectual and not the life of a party. Since Indian hosts usually served dinner not before 10 p.m., the ambassador accepted few dinner invitations. Indians are extremely hospitable, especially when it comes to important Americans and other foreigners and they cared deeply that we attend their lavish dinners. My Indian friends would often ask me to try and convince the ambassador to accept an invitation promising to serve dinner by 9 p.m. I also remember during dinners at the residence, when Ambassador Goheen would whisper to me, "Bilha, try to get them out of here by ten." But Indians never even arrive until about 10 or later. So socially it wasn't working very well in the embassy. And politically was not much easier: we were still tilting toward Pakistan and the Indians resented it openly. The first thing an Indian will ask me at cocktail parties "How are you, Mrs. Bryant? I understand you have lived in Karachi. How does that compare with New Delhi? You like India better, don't you?" Of course, in my case, I did not like India better; Karachi was friendly, comfortable and life much easier for us. I must admit though that we found India to be one of the most fascinating countries we have ever lived in, much more interesting than Pakistan. In India, wherever you turned, whatever you looked at was history, culture, civilization and even beauty. Since Ted was commercial counselor for all of India, we were able to travel a great deal all over the country. I can't tell you how much we enjoyed this.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Indians? I'm talking about the class that you were dealing with, I guess the political class.

BRYANT: Well, Indians are intelligent, quick and smart. They are hospitable and friendly, but they are definitely opinionated and quite defensive. As soon as we arrived to India, we met a great number of Indian businessmen and industrialists. They appeared open and easy to talk to provided the subject was agreeable to them. But anything that may be construed as criticism towards India, even complaining about the monsoon, is taken as an insult to the country. I mean, we were very careful when we talked about India's economy or the political system. What I did find, however, was that the women in India were well educated, independent, ambitious, career-oriented and free to pursue their interest. It was certainly not so with Pakistani Muslim women of the same class. Those women were doctors and professors and teachers. They were fascinating to meet socially. But here again the conversation had to be on their term. When we happened to talk

about the hard life of Indian women in the villages and I would ask, "Why do you have so many children? I mean, after all, there are now ways to-" the answer was "Oh, but India is such a rich country. There is a lot of food for everybody." Well, of course there was a lot of food for people who lived in certain sections of New Delhi. There was very little food in the poor suburbs of New Delhi and in the villages across India. There was very little room in their small huts for them and their many children. Movies that you see about India are actually very accurate. But Indians will never, never admit there are poor people in India. "We are taking good care of ourselves." Then they bring up the subject of American Blacks and the "terrible" treatment they receive here. In the late '70s and early '80s -maybe things have changed since then-most conversations were controversial, unless we talked about the beautiful saris, wonderful Indian food and of course the music. They have many things to be proud of, but their arrogance overshadows their achievements. It's interesting to compare them with Indians in the United States who contribute to American life in so many ways, from science to food without much fuss. But this is only my humble opinion made while living there for four years and getting to know the people very well. After all, we were out, and I don't exaggerate, every night of the week. We would first go to a cocktail party and then arrive at the dinner party by 9-9:30 still being some of the first guests. Dinner will not be served until midnight.

Q: How does one manage with this?

BRYANT: Not very well, really. I managed by trying to have a nap every day, but poor Ted! It was really very difficult on him because the next morning he had to get up early and go to the office by 8. That's why a lot of our American colleagues drew the line there. They said, "That's all, if they don't serve dinner by 9, we leave." I see pictures of us in India. I tell you we looked very tired, extremely tired. In addition, the weather in India is enervating. There is a very short period of the year when it's really comfortable; by February; New Delhi is already very hot. We had 12 air conditioners in our house, so if the electricity was going we were fine. Beautiful gardens surrounded the house. Because of the water we all had stomach problems quite often in India. You tried to be careful and always drink bottled water, but then the waiters would put a piece of ice in your glass, and that's it.

Q: After this assignment, in '81, what happened?

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (1977-1981)

Archer K. Blood was born in Illinois in 1923. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 after studying law at the University of Virginia. His career included positions in Thessaloniki, Munich, Athens, Algiers, Bonn, Dacca, and New Delhi. This interview was conducted on by Henry Precht on June 27, 1989.

Q: When you arrived in India and set yourself up as DCM, they obviously knew that you had been the dissenting consul general in Dacca.

BLOOD: With the Indians, of course, that was very much of a plus.

Q: *Yes. Did that help you?*

BLOOD: Yes, it did. Oh, publicly nothing was ever said about it, but the newsmen were aware of it, and the Indian foreign office people were aware of it. I think I was looked upon as somebody who was not hostile to India.

Q: *Were we generally off to a good start with India in the Carter Administration and Ambassador --*

BLOOD: Oh, absolutely.

Q: *Was he a popular figure there?*

BLOOD: Yes, we were off to a good start because his arrival coincided almost exactly with the end of the emergency in the election of the Desai government and Mrs. Gandhi's departure and the restoration of human rights and democracy in India. So that was very much a plus. Then Desai and Jimmy Carter had a rather interesting relationship through letter writing that went a little further than most of the letters written from head of state to head of state.

So it was a good time to arrive there. But then, of course, things began to disintegrate to some extent because of the nuclear issue, for one, and then because of the dissolution of the Janata government fell apart or were voted out.

Q: *Talk about the nuclear issue a little bit.*

BLOOD: That was the major issue that we as the embassy had with India during the time that I was there.

Q: *What prompted the Indians to go nuclear? Was it their experience with East Pakistan and the United States at that time? Our tilting policy towards Pakistan government?*

BLOOD: Well, I think there are a couple reasons. One was the Chinese went nuclear in 1964. And India now thinks of themselves in the same league with China rather than in the league with Pakistan. There is often speculation that when we sent the Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal in 1971, that the Indians thought that if perhaps they had nuclear weapons, maybe we would have hesitated to make any such show of force. I think it's primarily because the Chinese did it. Also, I think it was a matter of prestige.

Remember, the Indians exploded a nuclear device, but they haven't gone that extra step of making nuclear weapons. They could, but they haven't.

Q: *A nuclear device, nuclear weapons --*

BLOOD: Well, yes. They have shown they can do it, but they have stopped short so they can get the best of both worlds. They have proven that they are technically capable, and they can still inveigh against nuclear weapons.

Q: You don't think they've stockpiled nuclear weapons?

BLOOD: No, I don't.

Q: I mean, you don't think that in your heart of hearts, or you think there is evidence of that?

BLOOD: I don't think so. I think we have been following that as closely as we can. But, of course, they could on short notice make nuclear weapons.

Q: What efforts did we make, and how would you evaluate those efforts in trying to dissuade them from going nuclear?

BLOOD: Well, that was well before I was ever in India, so I don't know.

Q: When did the bomb --

BLOOD: It was 1974. I got there in 1977.

Q: They had already done the explosion.

BLOOD: And they had stopped.

Q: So what was the issue?

BLOOD: The issue was not that. The nuclear issue was Congress had passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 which said that after a eighteen-month grace period, the United States would be obliged to stop shipments of nuclear material to any country which did not have all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards or which did not --

Q: Permit its --

BLOOD: Join the Nonproliferation Treaty which would amount to the same thing.

Q: We are discussing the U.S.-India nuclear issue. Continue.

BLOOD: As I was saying, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 obliged the United States to, after eighteen-months grace period, to suspend shipments of nuclear material to any country that didn't put all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards or adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty which is the same thing because signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty have to put all their facilities under safeguards.

We had an agreement with India whereby we would provide slightly enriched uranium to be used as fuel in two nuclear power reactors near Bombay, a place called Terapore (PHONETIC). These facilities were under IAEA safeguards. And the Indians had agreed not to reprocess into plutonium any of the fuel or to look elsewhere for a supplier. The problem was that India had other nuclear facilities which were not under safeguard. Facilities which they developed on their own without foreign help. They refused to put these under safeguard.

So under the terms of the Act, when the Indians applied for new shipments of enriched uranium, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted against the shipment. Under the law, the president could decide in the national interest to go ahead with the shipment anyhow, but the Congress could veto the president's action by a vote of both houses of Congress.

President Carter authorized the shipment. The House voted against the shipment, and the Senate by a very close vote, two votes I think, sustained the president. So that shipment went forward, but it was very clear to everybody as a result of these events that that would be the last shipment. And it was.

Then we went into a sort of never-never land with the Indians in which time the Soviets offered to supply them. But the end result which took place well after I left India was that the Indians agreed to get their enriched uranium from France. The facilities are still under safeguard, but the other Indian facilities are not under safeguard so we have ceased to be a supplier to India in the nuclear field and without any influence in the nuclear field any more.

Q: Should we have conducted ourselves differently on that issue? Should we have --

BLOOD: No, I think the . . . There was never any disagreement in the embassy and in the State Department that we should keep trying to negotiate with the Indians. The trouble was that this legislation had this guillotine effect, you know. If by a certain time the Indians don't do something, boom, you've got to cut it off.

Q: Could we have prevailed if we hadn't had that humiliating deadline for the Indians?

BLOOD: Perhaps, perhaps. But the Indians feel very strongly about this. They feel the Nonproliferation Treaty is discriminatory because it distinguishes the nuclear haves from the have-nots. And also the U.S. action went further than the actions of any other nuclear supplier like the Soviets or the French or the Germans or the British by insisting that all facilities be under safeguard. I think it was a poorly conceived bit of legislation. It has caused the same problem in a number of other countries like Argentina and Brazil where we have cut off assistance, and those countries have merely just gone to another country for assistance.

Q: Do you know, did we make an effort with the French to prevent that?

BLOOD: Oh, no. We would much prefer the French to the Soviets as a supplier.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: No, no, no.

Q: *We didn't encourage the French to replace us though, did we?*

BLOOD: I don't know whether we encouraged it, but we certainly welcomed it.

Q: *Really?*

BLOOD: Yes. Oh, no, the idea was not to cut them off from the supplier. The idea, of course, was to use that as leverage, that was the Congressional intent. It was never the embassy viewpoint, the embassy just had to live with the law. It really exacerbated our U.S.-Indian relations.

Q: *Was the law --*

BLOOD: And see the Indians could claim it was ex post facto. Here we were with an agreement that was supposed to last until 1993, and we were changing the conditions upon which we provided the shipment. When we initially made this agreement, we weren't that stringent. We suddenly decided to apply very, very stringent conditions.

Q: *Was the law designed, written, with India in mind?*

BLOOD: No, not particularly. I think it was in part because the Indian explosion in 1974 had triggered a lot of concern that countries could use their peaceful nuclear power system to get the material for nuclear weapons. India was the first country that did that. That was the concern - that other countries would follow suit.

Q: *You don't think Israel did that as well?*

BLOOD: Beg your pardon?

Q: *Israel?*

BLOOD: No, Israel, I think, has just secretly set out to do it. They don't have a peaceful nuclear -

Q: *I see.*

BLOOD: Nuclear power system in Israel. I mean, power reactors and all.

Q: *Your discussions with Indians over this failure to reach any kind of an agreement, did this seriously distort our bilateral relationship during your period there?*

BLOOD: Oh, yes, it did.

Q: *I mean, it really made life difficult for you as a . . .*

BLOOD: Oh, not in personal terms, no.

Q: *Right.*

BLOOD: We found Indians very, very friendly and cooperative. No, not in personal terms but in official terms, yes.

Q: *Were there other issues with the Indians where we had harmonious and productive relationships? I mean, how would you characterize it after that happy beginning?*

BLOOD: Happy beginning. Well, it turned sour not only because of the nuclear issue but also because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which suddenly made Pakistan very important in our eyes because that was the only way you could get aid to the Afghan resistance was through Pakistan. When I went out to India, it was sort of a nice situation in that our relations with India were much better than our relations with Pakistan at the time.

Q: *Probably in consequence --*

BLOOD: Because again because the nuclear issue with Pakistan.

Q: *Right.*

BLOOD: And human rights, and the fact that they didn't have a functioning democracy there. So that was sort of the interesting -- I had never been in that situation before.

But with the Soviet invasion, suddenly Pakistan became very important to us, and India became relatively unimportant. And the Indians sensed that and didn't like and were pretty unhappy about it.

Q: *The Indians, of course, didn't react nearly the way we did to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.*

BLOOD: No, no, they didn't.

Q: *What did they think of our reaction? I mean, how did they --*

BLOOD: Oh, thought it was exaggerated. They thought by helping the resistance against the Soviets, we were just prolonging the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and that we should cease. If we wanted the Soviets out, we shouldn't help the resistance.

Q: *How should the Soviets be driven out then?*

BLOOD: They argued that they would just leave. When the resistance petered out, they would just leave the communist government in place and pull out.

Q: *And they had no concern with a communist government in Afghanistan?*

BLOOD: No.

Q: *Did they really care what government was in Afghanistan? How important was Afghanistan to New Delhi?*

BLOOD: Well, remember, Afghanistan traditionally had bad relations with Pakistan. So I think India would like to see a government there that is not on friendly terms with Pakistan which is unlikely to happen. The earlier governments had not been, the communist government was not.

Q: *Pretty sure thing in other words.*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *Our AID program, it ended when you arrived in -- I mean, the substantial AID program . . .*

BLOOD: It began again when I was in India. We started a new program again.

Q: *But on a much smaller scale.*

BLOOD: Much smaller scale. About a 100 million a year. Very small staff.

Q: *Not at all lauding it over the embassy.*

BLOOD: No, no. Nice relationship. AID was in its place.

Q: *How were your relationships with the Soviets in New Delhi? There they were presumably somewhat like the (inaudible) as they were in Afghanistan, that is --*

BLOOD: Oh, no, no where near as close as in Afghanistan.

Q: *But, I mean, they were superior position to you in the eyes of the Indians, no? I mean, the Indians preferred the Soviets because of their aid program much as the Afghans had in your earlier stay in that country.*

BLOOD: Well, in India there is sort of a dual track operating. Indians appreciate Soviet military sales and aid and consistent diplomatic support that the Soviet Union has given to India. At the same time, they really prefer Westerners to Soviets. They are democrats themselves. They like our ways of life, our institutions much more than the Soviets. The aim of most Indians is to visit the United States or live in the United States, many of them. They are quite capable of making the distinction on sort of the geopolitical level and on the personal level.

Q: *Well, did you have any kind of relationship with the Soviets in India?*

BLOOD: No, no more than the usual you would have in most posts where you bumped into them very occasionally. They were represented there by Yuli Vorontsov, who had been in Washington, who was the first deputy Soviet foreign minister and is now concurrently serving as Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan. Very able fellow.

Q: What about Indian politics at this stage? How well do you think our embassy understood the Indian scene? Was it a country where you could get behind what's in the press and really get an appreciation for the dynamics of politics?

BLOOD: I think we could pretty well. I think generally we tended to underestimate the extent of the swings in the pendulum. For instance, to underestimate the Janata victory in '77 and Mrs. Gandhi's return victory in the end of 1979. We could call it right as to the winner, but we tended to be more --

Q: Cautious.

BLOOD: Maybe cautious, you know, and say instead of a seventy-thirty victory, we would say maybe a fifty-five-forty-five or sixty-forty or something like that.

Q: When Mrs. Gandhi came back was Ambassador Goheen stay the full four years?

BLOOD: Yes. No. Ambassador Goheen resigned shortly after President Reagan was elected in November 1980. He actually left the first of January in 1981.

Q: Right. So you had a new ambassador?

BLOOD: No, we didn't. I served as chargé until I left.

Q: Uh huh. So you dealt with Madame Gandhi then?

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: Tell us something about what was your impression of her.

BLOOD: Well, she is very hard to figure because she could be --

Q: Did you talk to her chargé in the first place?

BLOOD: Well, I never -- the times that I visited her, I think, were always in accompanying --

Q: Someone else?

BLOOD: Visitors, yes, like congressmen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, somebody like that. I don't think Washington ever asked me to seek an appointment with her on my own, so I didn't. I wasn't rebuffed by her, but it just was not requested.

Q: What was your impression of her? How did you . . .

BLOOD: Remarkable woman. I mean, she -- a woman of moods. I think the moods though could be politically guided. I've seen her very charming when say somebody like Chuck Percy, Senator from Illinois, came. Very friendly, chatting family and all that. Very warm in her own home. I've seen her when she received Jean Kirkpatrick, and Jean Kirkpatrick was doing her best to be nice and gracious, and Mrs. Gandhi was cold as an iceberg from the very beginning. I mean, she just decided she didn't want to have anything to do with Jeanne Kirkpatrick and made it probably cruelly obviously apparent.

Q: But an able woman, intelligent?

BLOOD: Oh, extremely intelligent, yes. Tough, tough.

Q: Attitude toward the United States?

BLOOD: Very frank like most Indians. She tells what she thought. I like that. I mean, if she thought we were doing the wrong thing, the wrong idea, she would waste no time in telling that.

HUGH BURLESON
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Madras (1978-1979)

Policy Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1979-1982)

Mr. Burleson was born in South Dakota and raised in California. After graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, he served in the US Army before joining the United States Information Agency in 1957. A specialist in Southeast Asia Affairs, Mr. Burleson served variously as Policy Officer and Public Affairs Officer in Niigata, Tokyo, Saigon, Madras, New Delhi and Seoul. He also had several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Burleson was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1996.

Q: And what were you doing after that?

BURLESON: I had a direct transfer in summer '78 from Tokyo to Madras, India. Some of the documents I have here go into that in this file. Cliff Forster had wanted me to stay. I was, of course, still interested in staying in Japan but it was pretty clear that the Agency felt I was already too highly specialized in Japanese affairs and wanted me to become more of a generalist.

Q: So, in other words, if you understood Japanese better than most other people, the Agency says, "Just get out of there!"

BURLESON: Right, exactly. It's an argument, I guess, that was becoming endemic: generalist versus specialist; but back in Washington, they felt that you could become too enamored of the country, if you stayed too long. People used to ask me, "Well, aren't you too pro-Japanese?" and I would say, "Well, you know, when you have been in Japan and dealt with the Japanese as much as I have, it's easier to spot the difference between beauty spots and warts." But, anyway, Agency Personnel gave me the choice of PAO Chad or DPAO Madras, and used the strategy of calling me, like, at 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. in the morning when my defenses were down. I checked on the Chad situation, and found they were having a civil war there. So, I decided for Madras, which meant not just covering one state but all four states of southern India. I went to work there as DBPAO in the Summer of '78. It was to be a three-year tour. I got heavily involved in programs, program planning, and actually leading program teams. The DBPAO or BPAO would go out with Indian staff (we had 50 total) and all sorts of equipment, plus maybe an American speaker, or whatever.

Q: Did you go out into the villages?

BURLESON: Not into the villages; the major cities. As for the villages -- if there were any target audiences in the villages, we would send them invitations to come into the cities to attend the program. Quite few of programs were on the southwest coast of India, in Bangalore, or other major cities in the south. It was quite interesting; fascinating. One experience in Bangalore I remember, just about that time -- in late '78, I guess. In California, there was this Bakke case, about preferential treatment for minorities. Bakke was trying to get into a California medical school, but was blocked by affirmative action quotas.

Q: The Republicans were trying to do away with affirmative action...

BURLESON: Yes... wanted to knock it down. And this had quite a resonance in India because they had had their own minorities' affirmative action for a number of years, and it was just as controversial there as it became in the United States. It happened that we had planned a program in Bangalore on this issue and the timing was perfect. The Supreme Court decision came in on the Bakke case just then, so we had all of the judges from the area at this program, and it worked out beautifully. Good debate, with a video on the topic.

Q: Did you do any lecturing on that case?

BURLESON: I chaired the programs, but we had American speakers. If we were showing a film on this type of an issue or a video, I would help to explain the issues and guide the discussion, but I didn't do full-blown lectures because it wasn't an area of my expertise.

Q: How effective do you think that program was? You say you figured you had some success on it.

BURLESON: I think it was as effective as it could be expected. You know, there was a long history of antagonism between India and the United States over foreign policy, and the Indians some time earlier had opted for semi-alignment with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. So, it

was an uphill battle, and the Soviets, of course, were in India in a big way ... very actively running disinformation programs that we had to deal with. So, I think we did pretty well.

We usually had an American speaker and were able to team him with an Indian cospeaker. We did one such program with the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi. And so, we had ongoing impact but it's hard to point to any brilliant successes.

Q: How did you measure the impact? Did you find the difference in the treatment by the Press or...?

BURLESON: Where you see press articles that say, "Well, we should consider this aspect of the situation and not just what the Soviets are saying", or something like that. Yeah, we could see moderating tones on certain issues. But India is a very complex situation.

Q: It is! Did you find any really vehement feeling on the part of the Indian population on the things you were dealing with, either pro or con, so far as the Soviet Union was concerned, and as far as what the Americans were expounding?

BURLESON: There were quite pro-Soviet people that sometimes attended our programs and were approaching issues from way out in the left field, attacking what our guest speaker was saying.

Q: And they came to the session...

BURLESON: Yeah, sometimes...

Q: . . . and trying to disrupt what you were saying?

BURLESON: No, not in that sense. It was an intellectual debate.

Q: Did they participate in that debate or was it...?

BURLESON: Yes. They would participate, sometimes like shooting arrows -- as if they had come to puncture everybody else's balloons, but not in terms of stopping or trying to stop the debate totally. They were just getting in their own two bits worth.

I was in Madras only eleven months. As I said, it was a direct transfer and I got delayed home leave in the Spring of '79 and went back to Madras after home leave. In the summer of '79 they had an opening in New Delhi for the Policy Officer position, and PAO Jay Gildner said he wanted me for that job because of my experience in Japan. That sparked another debate in Washington.

There were some... saying that the point of my being in Madras was to give me more generalist and program management experience; and now I was proposing to go back into a policy slot. Well, my experience in Japan was that policy slots didn't mean just sitting there thinking there

was a lot of program involvement and management. So, I argued that I felt it wouldn't make me too much of a specialist!

Anyway, Jay Gildner and I prevailed, and I went up to New Delhi for two years more as a Policy Officer. It turned out that the Policy Officer was again in charge of the computerized records system. At that stage, we were just beginning to install our own computer and automate our own procedures. So, it was very much a management position, overseeing the planning and staffing of the DRS. It involved two trips back to Washington for training on the computerization process. I felt it was excellent experience for me.

**HERBERT LEVIN
Political Counselor
New Delhi (1979-1981)**

Herbert Levin entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and has served in Taichung, Hong Kong, Taipei, Tokyo, Dar es Salaam, Colombo, and New Delhi, as well as at the Bureau of Economic Affairs, NSC, NIC, and for Japanese Affairs. This interview was conducted in 1994.

LEVIN: Near the end of my assignment in Colombo, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, Robert Goheen, former President of Princeton University, etc., needed a DCM. I was not anxious to have another South Asian assignment and I was therefore not particularly interested to go to New Delhi. But apparently he had rejected various candidates and he had met me though we had no previous association of any kind. The DG's office worked out that I was to go to Delhi for a short time as Political Counselor (he was needed back in Washington), the DCM was going to become Ambassador someplace, then I would be already at post ready to move into the DCM slot.

This was all wired up by the DG's office and the South Asia Bureau. I had not known this but the decision was being made in Washington to recognize Beijing. This would mean the withdrawal of the Ambassador, and the downgrading of the Embassy in Taipei. The East Asian Bureau wanted me to go to Taipei to be the Chargé when the Ambassador was withdrawn, so I got frantic phone calls to change the assignment. I would have much preferred Taipei for obvious reasons. I said, "Well you guys in Washington go and fight it out. I'd been asked to do this in Delhi, I've said okay, now you're calling and asking me to go to Taipei. It's really not up to me to start walking out on this. You work it out in Washington."

Ambassador Goheen had not wanted other candidates, whoever they were, he did want me and I had accepted. So we went to Delhi. This worked out badly because my friends in the East Asian Bureau were annoyed with me for not going to Taipei, somebody else was pulled out in mid-tour elsewhere to go there and they were disappointed with me.

I got to New Delhi and the DCM, for reasons that had nothing to do with me, was denied his ambassadorship. He stayed as DCM as an extremely embittered person, and retired thereafter, a

very unhappy man. I stayed for two years as Political Counselor and never became DCM. India was professionally challenging and the Indians were serious people with whom to do business. But from the standpoint of positions and promotions, New Delhi was not a plus for me.

Q: Goheen wasn't there very long.

LEVIN: He was there for the full time that I was there. He had been born in India, as had, I think, his father and his grandfather, they were a long line of committed Indian missionaries. He had received his education through high school in India; he went to the Kodaikanal School in Tamil Nadu. The village where his family had their mission was not far from Bombay. He had served on various boards and commissions to assist India, to provide scholarships for Indians, this kind of thing, his whole life. He had always gone back for visits and maintained his connection with the village.

He had been a Professor of Greek and Latin. He had gone to Princeton. He was a scholar, and had remained at Princeton teaching Greek and Latin and became President. His interests in India were personal and sentimental, to assist India with the best academic training, etc. I think he was pleased to be back in India. He had his children come out, his grandchildren, he took them all down to the village. The villagers, when they visited Delhi, were always cheerfully received by him which was a great honor for humble rural people in India.

I don't think he thought of Indian-American relations as an area where he was now the instrument of trying to get the Indians to do things in the American interest that they might not want to do, and to stop doing things that we didn't want them to do. I think that was a difficult role for him. He saw himself as a friend of India and someone who wanted to help India. I don't think he saw himself as a friend of India who was there to try and advance American interests, even if it made the Indians a little bit grumpy. I think that was a role uncongenial for him.

His wife was a nice person but India was his inheritance, not hers. I think she found the climate difficult. She had children and grandchildren in the U.S. and wasn't around a great deal of the time. Goheen was a nice man, a courteous man, always accessible, always approachable, but I'm not sure it was the happiest time for him.

Q: His outlook was entirely different from his successor, Harry Barnes who, the way it was described to me, was to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative. And whatever the Indians wanted, we were going to give it to them.

LEVIN: I would say that Goheen didn't want to be the cutting edge. It wasn't how he had run his life. Even if we were doing something to assist the Indians, I don't think Goheen would want to push himself to the fore on that. As a President of Princeton, a high quality but small university, he had not had to take on prominent heavy fund-raising burdens as many university presidents have. He wasn't used to going around pressing people to do this and not to do that. He was a person a bit above the fray, highly respected, fair minded, who people would come to with a problem and he would advise them and they would follow his advice.

He was U.S. Ambassador in a country which had had a nuclear explosion and was working against the NonProliferation Treaty; it was backing terrorists in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; it was using transit and trade agreements with the Nepalese to try and squeeze them into concessions in violation of its UN commitments and international law, etc. Bob Goheen had a clear understanding of these things but I don't think that he considered himself the instrument to work against them. That was just not the way he had run his successful and respected life.

We saw a lot of India, visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.

Q: You'd mentioned that the Indian government was supporting terrorism in Bangladesh, the wisdom given in the American press is: oh well, this split up between east and west Pakistan occurred because of the evil terrorist religious fanatics in Pakistan, who hated the poor people in the eastern part of the country.

LEVIN: The split occurred long before I got to India. The basis for the split was the West Pakistanis contempt and cruelty towards the Bengalis, no doubt of that. At the same time, it was quite clear that the Indians looked upon this as an opportunity to split Pakistan. They did everything they could to worsen the situation, to make each side more distrustful of the other, and they achieved their goal.

The reason for the split was West Pakistani stupidity and bad treatment of the Bengalis, but the Indians certainly acted upon it as an opportunity, not a problem.

Q: To get back to the embassy a little bit, I'd had New Delhi described by a guy who spent 9 years in India, all told, that it's a place where people were never very happy. But you had mentioned that the DCM, the Deputy Chief of Mission, had been very, very embittered. Did he have any influence on this? Because at one time there was a scandal similar to what was going on in Tanzania. Where the husband of the Naval Attaché, or the Assistant Attaché, found the guys running the commissary at the embassy lining their pockets, had everything but cyclosound pictures of them doing it, and the DCM didn't want anything done, he let them walk with their pensions.

LEVIN: No, there was nothing like that when I was in India. I also think that DCM probably would have been very starchy, proper and correct faced with something like that. His disappointment was that he considered that he should receive an ambassadorship, and the people who were handing out ambassadorships didn't think so. But he had been led to believe he would be an ambassador, so his embitterment was personal.

He did take this out on people around. I understood his disappointment and was naturally sympathetic but since I was there to take his job, in a sense I was the symbol of his not getting an ambassadorship. I kind of accepted this as the sort of thing that just happens on occasion. I think that he considered that I was disappointed with him for not getting his ambassadorship, and I didn't become DCM, so our relationship was not good.

He went after people in the mission, for no reason that I could see. He bragged about how he was getting rid of people, he had fights with secretaries who then entered formal grievances against him. He was a melancholy figure.

Q: Who were some of these people that he was bragging he was getting rid of?

LEVIN: He just went after our Commercial Counselor. I think this was a "class clash" in an almost English sense. The Counselor was a bit of a New England aristocrat, though not a personal snob. He was fastidious in the way he dressed, the way he conducted his personal relations, and so forth. I don't know what part of the country the DCM was from, but any kind of personal formality and set dignity was not acceptable to him.

He just resented the Counselor and would say so, "I'm out to get him," giving no reason. The Commercial Counselor, I think, was professionally a rather effective person. But he also got into fights with secretaries over little things. There were actually formal grievance procedures. It was a sad conclusion to both of these careers.

Q: A couple questions on New Delhi, he's the Commercial Counselor, though people had described him as taking bribes for recommending corrupt Indian businessmen to American companies. One of these Indian businessmen was a known Russian agent, the kind who sold Soviet black money in India.

LEVIN: I never heard of anything like that. If that had been true then the Counselor would have been whisked out for security reasons. That must have been a different era. In a security case, the subject leaves instantly. That didn't happen for he finished his career there.

In Delhi, we had a black officer, who had been recruited into the Foreign Service without passing the examination, as an administrative specialist. He had not done well as administrative specialist, so they gave him the consular course and sent him out as the head of the Consular section, which was very active in New Delhi.

Q: He had not passed the exam?

LEVIN: No, he had come in through some special recruitment program because there weren't enough black officers. The fellow was manifestly incompetent. The organization of the consular section in a busy place like New Delhi consists of a number of people "manning the line," doing interviews. The chief of the Section does some interviews, but primarily he backs up the line interviewers when there are appeals or complicated transactions. This person often wasn't in his office and never manned the line. There was great bitterness and unhappiness on the part of his subordinates, both career consular officers and FSO spouses employed as consular assistants.

This had nothing to do with me. I was Political Counselor, and this was in the Consular section; these staff members would go to the DCM and complain. I may have been acting DCM part of the time.

It also turned out that the fellow had evaded getting a medical clearance for his wife to come to Delhi. She would not have been cleared because she was a very serious alcoholic, and home all the time. She would bribe her servants to get alcohol for her. Our Embassy doctors were not supposed to take care of her because she had come out without a medical clearance. At the same time she was an American and she was a sick person. But this fellow successfully stopped every attempt to get him out of there so his wife could be treated. They would appeal on the basis of prejudice. From the standpoint of the officers in the Consular Section, this man wasn't doing his job, so they couldn't do theirs properly.

Delhi was a large post with a number of highly competent black officers from State, USIS, AID and so forth. What it demonstrated to me was that if you depart from a single standard for admission, and you bring people in other ways, when you have had a single standard that's worked pretty well -- you're not doing the privileged individual any kindness. It isn't just the question of bringing in someone slightly less efficient, it affects a lot of people around them. This was a melancholy situation, this woman drinking herself to death, a guy not doing his job, and many people affected professionally, personally and even emotionally by this.

Q: There was a large AID presence there and a big CIA station. How did all these groups interact and how did things work, you had people buying books for the Library of Congress, all this stuff?

LEVIN: The Library of Congress office that bought books and also provided American materials was very good. They traveled around and they were responsible folks. That was a well-run operation, favorably regarded in the region.

The AID mission was relatively small. India doesn't have a shortage of trained people. Therefore, it wasn't necessary to have a large number of American technicians. You could hire good Indian technicians. The handling of funds and the decision making on the projects required Americans. There were also high quality Indian staff who were employees within the AID mission itself.

It was a well-run mission, it was responsive, we worked with them. They would drop by if they were thinking of doing something and ask if there were any political problems or other factors that they should take into account. We would go to them if we were going to have a traveler calling on provincial officials, looking into local politics and ask AID about projects in that area and what should we know about them. I would say that was a good relationship with the AID mission. I don't think they were at all uncomfortable with their role as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, albeit of a longer range and more public nature than other U.S. Government activities in India.

When I arrived there Mrs. Gandhi was out of office, having disgraced herself, by declaring "The Emergency," with her undemocratic activities. The government that was in office fell in a parliamentary way by losing a vote of confidence. India was going to vote. In a country as large as India, with paper ballots and an historically strong commitment to honest ballot counting and handling, it takes a while to get the ballots printed and to get them distributed. In the interim there was a caretaker government. In Britain or Japan, this might be for only a few weeks. In

India, it actually takes a few months to get this all cranked up. Indians know how to do it and they do it well but it takes time.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Christmas '79, took place while this caretaker government was in office. The politicians were out in the provinces electioneering to become the government. Therefore, a lot of important decisions were actually being made by the career Indian civil servants. During this period the embassy got along with these career ICS officials very well. We well knew that when there were governments in power in India that felt their interests were served by being highly critical of the United States and internationally noncooperative, the Indian civil servants would do their job and support that. What this '79 interlude demonstrated was that if there ever was a government that leaned the other way, the ICS would support that.

What was illuminating was that here the ICS was kind of left on its own and they were in many areas quite cooperative with the U.S. One could ask, why be surprised? If the ICS could send their kids abroad for education they didn't send them to Moscow, they sent them to the United States. Nevertheless, it was a positive moment, considering that the usual dialogue with the Indians is not without problems.

My point is that after the Russians went into Afghanistan, the responses of the Indian government were pretty much determined by the senior civil service; the career military, intelligence, and foreign ministry officials across the board were extremely cooperative. India had developed an intimate relationship with the Soviet Union, because they did not have good relations with China, had eternal quarrels with Pakistan, and therefore they cultivated the Soviet Union to give them a powerful friend in the region.

The specter of the Russian army in the Khyber Pass was as frightening to the Indians as it was to the Pakistanis. The Indian military told the Pakistani military, if you want to move your troops from the Indian border to the Afghan border, we will pull back from the Pakistan border so that you will know nothing could possibly happen there. The Indian military was very concerned about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Indian intelligence was also cooperative with us. But when Mrs. Gandhi won the election and came into office, this turned completely around within 24 hours. The Indian Permanent Representative in the United Nations gave a pro-Soviet speech about how this move into Afghanistan was understandable and necessary; India just flipped the other way very fast.

You could say, India is a democracy, they're supposed to obey their elected leadership. But this also suggested something about Mrs. Gandhi and her long term ruling group's view of the world, their view of where India's interests lie. She came into office having thought through what she was going to do. And so things became normally acrimonious with the U.S. again. I make no pretense of keeping up with Indian internal politics but noticed that India banned our supply flights to the Middle East during the Iraq-Kuwait war despite UN resolutions so I wonder if anything fundamental has changed.

ALBERT A. THIBAUT, JR.
Political Officer
New Delhi (1979-1983)

Albert A. Thibault, Jr. was born in Massachusetts on August 5, 1941. He received his BA from the University of Windsor in Canada in 1962, his MA from the University of Toronto in 1963, and another MA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1964. He entered the Foreign Service in 1969. His career has included positions in Guinea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Saudi Arabia.

Q: You went out, then, to India. I take it you went to India in '79?

THIBAUT: In summer of '79, yes. I was there for four years, from summer of '79 to summer of '83.

Q: What were relations like with India when you arrived in '79?

THIBAUT: I was political officer again in the section, again covering domestic, domestic politics, in a much larger section than I had had in Colombo. As I arrived, we were in the final months of the Desai government. He had been displaced and one of his colleagues in the cabinet, a man by the name of Charan Singh, became prime minister, with elections scheduled to be held in January. He was presiding over an interim government, a caretaker government. So this was a time of politicking. So Mrs. Gandhi was then campaigning and we got early exposure to her line of thinking because she was critical of the government for cozying up to the Americans. Then of course, in November, I believe, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan.

Q: Actually, I think it was Christmas, around Christmas.

THIBAUT: Christmas, yes, could be.

Q: Yeah, November was the hostage crisis in Iran.

THIBAUT: Shortly before that, Ambassador Spike Dubs was killed in Kabul. By the way, he had been deputy assistant secretary for South Asia in NEA. So he was very well known in our office and a great guy. The impact of his murder was just devastating in Kabul. That was before the Soviets moved in. Yeah, Christmas, I guess it was. Christmas of '79, when the Soviets occupied Kabul and Spike was killed just a few months before that, a short time before that. Then the Indian election itself was held within two or three weeks of the Soviet occupation and Mrs. Gandhi won overwhelmingly. A real seesaw: She had been so dominant during the Emergency, was just swept out of office, left with only a handful of seats in Parliament and then came back with an overwhelming majority. So it's a reflection of how dissatisfied the public was with the Desai government. And then she made comments about the Soviet occupation which just aroused tremendous anger in the United States. A very understanding and soft response to the occupation of a neighboring country, after all, just nearby, by a superpower. And that, as I say, fed into the very negative climate that had been longstanding so far as public opinion and Congressional opinion towards India were concerned. A lot of it was focused on Mrs. Gandhi,

the new prime minister. She tried then to backpedal in later statements. The one I'm mentioning was at the United Nations, by a UN representative. But it was very difficult. It set the tone. I mean her attitude was confrontational and during the campaign she wrapped herself in this mantle of nationalism, Indian nationalism, and was highly critical of India's neighbors for "making eyes", which is an expression in Hindi, towards the United States. She singled out a small country like Bhutan. I can't imagine a smaller country than Bhutan and yet it was depicted as a threat to Indian security. Yet, India, by treaty, controlled Bhutanese foreign policy, literally. That's the kind of rhetoric she was willing to engage in.

Q: How did the Iranian takeover of our embassy and the Iranian revolution play in India? You were in place by that time.

THIBAULT: That may have taken place a little earlier. That was in '78, wasn't it, '78 or '79?

Q: The revolution was '78ish. The takeover of the embassy was in November '79. Shortly thereafter was the burning of our embassy in Islamabad.

THIBAULT: That was in 1980. That was after the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca. There was no sympathy towards the Khomeini government in India. There was a concern as to what it meant for Islamic opinion in India. After all, India has the second largest population of Muslims after Indonesia. So there's always a concern about what Indian Muslim opinion might be. Now the Iranians are Shias; most Indian Muslims are Sunnis. So there was certainly no endorsement or hailing of the Embassy seizure. It was a clear violation of diplomatic status of the embassy, holding of hostages. That said, they were not inclined to be critical of the Iranians in any public comments. They deplored, they'd regret, they'd call for a resolution of the issue, but no strong condemnation. Again, I think, reflecting uncertainty over Indian Muslim opinion as well. But as I said this was quickly overshadowed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Q: Indira Gandhi made mollifying remarks about Soviet actions and all that. But what about in actuality? During the time you were there, how were the Indians, as we could sound it, feeling about the Soviets moving into that area?

THIBAULT: Well, the media generally took their lead from the government. One of the striking contrasts between my time in India in the early Eighties and my time in India in the early two thousands was how much the media had changed. But at that time the Indian media followed their government's line quite closely. The commentators, who are quite influential in India, all tended to echo the government, to some extent. There were some exceptions, but generally speaking.

Q: Is there any particular reason for this? Are they paid?

THIBAULT: I think there was a feeling that the Soviets were longstanding friends. The Treaty of Friendship had been very helpful to India after the war with Pakistan in the early Seventies. The Soviets had been willing to provide arms to India when we were providing arms to Pakistan. There was a feeling that the Soviets were a dependable friend of India and this attitude led to a soft-pedaling of their comments on the Soviet action. That said, there was absolutely no

enthusiasm for the occupation of Afghanistan and very considerable concern with what it could mean over the longer term for India itself and for its impact on Pakistan, and therefore also its impact on the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. So as they worked this out, there was very real discomfort with the Soviet occupation, particularly since it gave us a handle or leverage and a rationale for turning our relations with Pakistan around and for beginning to develop a military supply relationship. And that sort of, in their view, brought the Cold War closer to their borders than had been the case before. But as I say, their public line was relatively muted.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Indian government? You know, at your level. And with the media and movers and shakers.

THIBAULT: I didn't deal much, being focused on domestic politics, with the foreign ministry or the government ministries. I spent a lot of time with Indian politicians, journalists. Our consular district for Delhi was, and still is, northern India. So I often traveled with the ambassador and others and by myself to neighboring states. And at the personal level, there was very rarely any of this tension that existed between the two governments, from my earliest exposure to India to the present. There's no connection between them. People would relate to you on a personal basis. Having access to them was not a problem. They'd often be flattered that an American diplomat was seeking them out and seeking their views. So that was never an issue, that was never an issue.

Q: Who were the ambassadors?

THIBAULT: The first ambassador when I was there was Ambassador Robert Goheen, former president of Princeton, who was born in India of missionary parents. In fact he was very proud that when his children were there they were the fifth generation of the family to have an experience in India. His family had first come in the 1860's or '70's. But he was appointed by President Carter. The second ambassador was Ambassador Harry Barnes, a career ambassador, the first career ambassador, in fact one of the few career ambassadors we've had to India since relations were established there.

Q: How did you see him? How did he help us?

THIBAULT: Which one? Goheen or Barnes?

Q: Barnes.

THIBAULT: Barnes was very, was extremely active. And being well aware of the sort of the big issues that stymied relations between Washington and Delhi, he set out to identify areas of cooperation which previous ambassadors had not emphasized. So in scientific collaboration, in education, in culture and generally in non-political areas, he sought to begin a process of interaction across a whole range of significant members of the elite, to the extent that that was possible. He was very successful in getting funding for this approach and in launching these through bilateral agreements at the technical level and India was a very fertile field for that. So that was his emphasis. I should add he's an excellent, in fact an outstanding, linguist. So he made

it a point of learning Hindi. He was very visible, traveled extensively. He was an outstanding ambassador.

Q: Were you seeing, or was it indeed a fact, there were a good number of the young people in India, the educated group, were going to the United States, as opposed to going to say the UK or somewhere else like that? Or was that happening?

THIBAULT: That was happening, significantly. There was a tremendous demand for education in the United States. I remember well, to harken back to my previous stint as desk officer, when Prime Minister Morarji Desai came to Washington, of course we prepared all the briefing papers, these were for meetings at the White House. Then the first, or I don't know about the first, but one of the issues that he raised was student visas. I wasn't present but my office director told me that President Carter and the U.S. officials at the table were taken aback - there was nothing in the briefing papers about that. And it was sort of a mark of Desai's quirkiness; he hadn't told anyone in his own entourage he would raise it. They were all staring at him. What the hell is this about student visas? And then he launched into a long explanation of how a consular officer in Madras, today Chennai, was systematically denying visas to worthy Indians. The President, believe me, worked fast to inquire what was going on. What happened was, the consular officer, someone in his late fifties for whom it was his second tour and his last assignment was claiming that all the Indians were intending immigrants, had no intention of returning, and denying visas wholesale. I was later on the Board of Examiners and, as I recall, I don't think there's an age cutoff for new officers.

Q: No, there isn't but you have to be able to complete two tours.

THIBAULT: Well, but I mean he was in sort of the, he was retiring after his second tour. He just didn't like being in India. The result of this arbitrariness coming to the President's personal attention was actually extremely beneficial for the longer term because it was made very clear to him, and more generally, that it was not appropriate for him and others to assert, in effect, that "You're studying computer science, or you're studying dentistry or electrical engineering, and you know that these jobs, most of these degrees don't exist in India or don't pay well, so therefore your true intention must be to remain in the United States." Today our presumption is different, and it was clarified as a result of this incident, namely that it is not a legitimate question to ask or assumption to make in judging the visa applicant. But it reflected, as I say, this tremendous pressure to study in the United States. Most of these young people, young men but there were many women as well, came from well established families from all over India. So they were an important, if you will, part of a pro-American constituency.

Q: All right, let's do something off of this. Students get a look at us and we're a very attractive country.

THIBAULT: And the fact is, of course, many, many, many of them remained in the United States and the Indian-American community now is quite large, and we have reaped the benefit of this twenty years later, if I can fast-forward. Because they're now quite influential in our own society, in our own economy, and they are a real bulwark of the U.S.-India relationship but this was not so obvious then. More broadly, consular officers are typically the first point of contact

between the United States and local people. That, too, is not always recognized. So the guidelines reminding officers of what are the appropriate assumptions to make which they receive from the Consular section chief and from the mission leadership as a whole are really critical because that impact, that initial interaction, has ripple effects many, many times over than just the one-on-one discussion with an individual visa applicant.

Q: And, unfortunately, we're going through a very bad patch, now, the security thing and we're shooting ourselves in the foot in the Arab world with this. Well, did you find as went around the political parties, what were they, were there real issues or were this jockeying for positions of influence or jobs or not?

THIBAULT: Among the political parties? Well, the Indian parties for the most part are well established and have been there a long time and they tend to be identified with either particular areas of the country or particular interest groups. At that time the Congress Party, led by the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was the dominant influence, inherited from the time of the independence movement. Most of the parties there were sort of split-offs from Congress, had split off over time, their leaders had set up their own groups, or they were regional parties, which are important in India. So, yeah, they had genuine and well established differences, based on those interests. But what was more important was their commitment to the democratic process and system. For India, that is really crucial, given the diversity of the country, that this is how you reconcile policy questions and issues, through a process of democratic mediation in which the opposition has a legitimate and respected role, that they are very free to criticize, to offer their own ideas and that they have access to the media and to the public channels of communication. That was all there.

The one group that was particularly influential and just strenuously anti-American was the Communist Party of India. Again, there are several communist parties and one is called the CPI-ML, Marxist Leninist, who were prominent in Bengal, much easier to deal with. But this Communist Party of India was the pro-Soviet party and their relationship with the Soviets through the Soviet embassy and the Soviet cultural center and so-called Friendship Societies, was very powerful. And they had newspapers, one particularly, called the *Patriot*, which were subsidized by the Soviets and we could see that. The minute the Soviet Union collapsed and this support ended, the paper folded. Suddenly the CPI, which still exists became a relatively tiny, tinny voice compared to what it had been before.

I particularly single them out and remember them because they mounted a specific campaign to deny the assignment of our new political counselor, who would have been my boss as section head, a fellow by the name of George Griffin. George had served in Calcutta in 1970-71, at the time of the East Pakistan War. The claim, again, had been made by communists, not by anyone else, that he was in touch with Pakistanis trying to undermine the Indian policy in what was then East Pakistan, what is today Bangladesh. At the time, in 1980, he was in Kabul, Afghanistan. We had not yet broken relations with the Kabul government. But his family was living in Delhi and he was stationed in Kabul as a political officer and periodically he would visit his family in Delhi as there were direct flights between Delhi and Kabul. So based on his experience, his knowledge of the region, the fact that he's a very fine officer, the Bureau decided he should be assigned as political counselor in Delhi, which made a lot of sense. When that became known, a tremendous

press campaign against George Griffin was mounted, in which he was depicted as a CIA agent out to subvert the Indians. Here, it was claimed, he had been subverting them, subverting India in Calcutta, here he was conspiring with reactionary forces in Kabul and now he was going to play the same game in Delhi itself. It finally became such a drumbeat that the government specifically asked that he not be assigned, refused to accredit him as political counselor, before he arrived. We retaliated, we responded by denying then their assignment of a political counselor but it left a very bad taste in peoples' mouths. But the communists were a very loud, very vocal, and very anti-American element in the political spectrum.

Q: Did you have, see a problem from time to time that the Indians and the Americans tend to preach at each other. They're both, in some ways they preach past each other.

THIBAULT: Oh, that's been a consistent feature of our relationship. Again, excepting the last few years and when we get to that point in our dialogue, we'll have to discuss it.

Q: They've really changed.

THIBAULT: They've really changed but for a long time, for a long time, that was absolutely the case, absolutely the case, yeah.

Q: Well, did you notice this? Was there a way of getting around this or did you have to sort of listen to the sermon before you could get to the point?

THIBAULT: Well, I heard plenty of this in Delhi and traveling around northern India but you would never let these things go unanswered. Not that you would respond with a sermon of your own, but to whatever the kernel of their complaint was, you - at least my approach was - sought to address that, so that they would understand that there's a rebuttal, if you will. It varied a lot depending on the individual and maybe even categories of individuals. If you were with the politicians, you found much less of it. They were pragmatists who had survived a lot to be where they were. The journalists, on the other hand, tended to be the lecturing type and of course there were the academics, but also many plain citizens would sound off.

Q: How about the academic connection. In so many places, academia, including the United States, seems to be the last refuge of the theoretical Marxists, of the sort of anti-American line of thought. Was that evident?

THIBAULT: There was plenty of that. Particularly since there were a lot of newspapers in Delhi and in other major cities, all in English. They had to fill those pages and there's always an editorial page. So academics were often called on to contribute their thinking to that. And so when the issues were on international affairs there was very often an anti-American tinge to that or, as they would phrase it, a "non-aligned" perspective.

Q: What was the situation as regards the Sikhs? Was that the Punjab? Because this later cost the prime minister her life. But how did the situation, while you were there, how did we see this?

THIBAULT: Punjab was part of my beat, if you will, and I often went there, up to Amritsar and Jullundur, occasionally to Chandigarh, the state capital, but that's just an artificial town, or it was at that time. I heard a lot of grievance against Mrs. Gandhi, sort of against the system. A feeling that Sikhs were discriminated against. A lot of it were echoes of what I had heard in Sri Lanka from Tamils. But this was several years before so many Sikhs moved into an extremist and very violent phase. It's just a reminder that you have to be very careful in dealing with minorities, in any society. In many ways, it was hard to understand their grievance. Sikhs are among the most prosperous Indians and Punjab is among the most prosperous states in India. Also the Sikhs, unlike the Tamils in Sri Lanka, have long exercised a role and had a visibility on the national scene out of proportion to their numbers. The national government had always gone out of its way to accommodate the Sikhs, such as by creating a Sikh majority state, and this with very little public or Hindu opposition.

A lot of it was wrapped up in internal Sikh politics and again, just as in Sri Lanka, where the Buddhist monks were the seedbed of a lot of this very aggressive form of Sinhalese nationalism, and likewise the mullahs in Islamic countries, in the Sikh environment, the Sikh religious men and holy men - technically there's no priesthood for Sikhs - were very active. And then of course you had political factions. You had Sikhs aligned with the Congress Party and you had other Sikhs who were against it. And you know in poor countries where politics is a zero-sum game in many cases, any advantage to you is at the expense of someone else. And so unless you're careful in how you manage this and unless you're inclusive as well, you can generate a lot of resentment and a sense of grievance. And I think this is what happened in Punjab.

Q: At this time and again we're talking up to '83, did the expatriate Sikh communities in Canada or the United States play any role?

THIBAULT: No, that would be, that was after, particularly after the Indian siege on the Golden Temple, which I believe was in '83. So that event really generated enormous resentment overseas. And again, the Tamil parallel is striking, because your most militant Tamils, so far as Sri Lanka is concerned, typically are the ones who tend to be overseas and provide the funding and the support, like the Irish in America for the IRA.

Q: And other groups. And, of course, the Sikhs and the Tamils killed two Gandhis.

THIBAULT: Two Gandhis, that's right.

Q: You were there when Ronald Reagan came in.

THIBAULT: He was in '81, yes, right.

Q: Do you recall, how was he portrayed? This is kind of a shocker to people, a movie actor and all this, all of a sudden president of the United States, coming out of the right wing. Now it's not as extreme right wing as we see today, but in those days it was the extreme right wing of the Republican Party. Is this in a way a problem to explain it or is this a matter of concern, or what?

THIBAULT: I think there was a shock, after Carter, who, as I say, personally had made gestures reaching out to India that Reagan would succeed him. That said, Mrs. Gandhi was very much a pragmatist and she did not make any special effort to criticize, if you will, our new choice of a president. There was concern that the Republican administration would provide more arms to Pakistan. That's really the touchstone of the U.S.-India relationship.

Q: Well it seems the Democrats give money or are more friendly to India, Republicans more to Pakistan. It's not really true,

THIBAULT: No, it's not true.

Q: But it's one of those political urban legends.

THIBAULT: That's right. In fact historically, and I think many Indians will tell you this, now, that relations with the United States have been best under Republican administrations. And, surprisingly enough, that was the case with Reagan, as well because he acted to put Tarapur behind us. Remember I mentioned that this had been the sore point when Carter and Desai met. They had been unable to resolve it, in spite of all the flowery expressions of good will and personal admiration and so forth and so the issue just floundered there, poisoning the relationship. To Reagan's credit, he said, "We gotta do something about it" and in a very short period of time we came up with a policy whereby we stepped out of the picture, the French stepped in, and we didn't continue insisting on safeguards for their reactors even though we had stopped supplying fuel, which had been the line beforehand. I mean the nonproliferation theologians populated the Democratic administration and were much more muted during the Republican administration. That made a significant impact and there was also a very good meeting between Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi at Cancun.

Q: I talked to, I think it was Steve Eisenbraun and Steve was in Washington, describing the work that went into a Gandhi-Reagan meeting. The idea being that Ronald Reagan could charm, I won't say the pants off anyone, it's not true but anyway he's a real charmer and it was genuine. The thought, you know, let's sort of let these two get together and it worked at the time.

THIBAULT: It worked and Mrs. Gandhi herself, who made a very successful visit to Washington, could be equally charming. And again, coming back to Harry Barnes, who was Reagan's ambassador in New Delhi, as I said, Harry's concept was to identify specific areas for cooperation. He was doing this, to a major extent he was giving the lead to this but the administration was prepared to follow him, or at least it was a give and take with the administration, saying why don't we try this. Now this had never happened with Carter. And then the shock of the Afghanistan issue had died down, we had overcome it. And then, of course, Mrs. Gandhi died in '84, when Reagan was still president.

Q: Had we started getting very close to Pakistan and arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan while you were on this tour in India?

THIBAULT: We had. After the invasion of Afghanistan the administration had sent out two envoys. One was Clark Clifford to New Delhi and the other was Zbigniew Brzezinski to Pakistan.

The Pakistanis were as much under the nuclear gun as the Indians were and we had terminated our military and arms supply relationship with them under the Symington Amendment, as we had for India. Not that we had had any with India and therefore the impact was all the greater for Pakistan. But we reversed this on a dime when, after the Soviet invasion, both in Congress and in the administration, the view was we had to work with General Zia, the president, the dictator of Pakistan. So Brzezinski came out. He offered \$400 million worth of military assistance. Zia became famous for rejecting this, saying it was peanuts, given the risks that Pakistan was asked to assume in confronting a superpower in the neighboring territory. So we went back to the drawing board and we agreed to what the Pakistanis really wanted, which was F-16's, which was then a more powerful, potent aircraft than what India had. So this created enormous uproar in India. This was in '80, '81. The covert dimension of the relationship with Pakistan, which was led by the Agency, I think developed more in the mid-Eighties, '84, '85, '86, with Pakistan. By definition, that was very much less visible than had been the case before. By that time we had a new prime minister in India, anyway, Rajiv Gandhi, the son of Indira, who was much less abrasive than his mother had been and represented a new generation, very much a difference in tone than had been the case earlier.

Q: Well one more question on this period. Did Kashmir play any role while you were there?

THIBAULT: Other than being just a longstanding issue, no I don't recall that it was an element we followed closely or impacted the bilateral relationship. The militants who, to this day, infiltrate and attack in Indian Kashmir itself were not a factor at that time. So, no, I would not say it was.

From Delhi I went to Karachi, Pakistan.

J. MICHAEL SPRINGMANN
Foreign Commercial Service
New Delhi (1980-1982)

Mr. Springmann transferred to the Foreign Service from the Commerce Department and served in Stuttgart, New Delhi, Jeddah and in Washington, DC in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This interview was conducted in March of 1994.

Q: Well, coming from this rather unpromising thing, when you went out to India you were one of the first commercial...

SPRINGMANN: I was the first commercial officer.

Q: How were you received there? And what was the setup at the embassy?

SPRINGMANN: Well, it was kind of a mess actually. Ambassador Goheen left shortly after I arrived, and the new guy, Harry Barnes, came in with the idea there was nothing bad in India,

we're going accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative. The way he ran the embassy was to have an inner-circle staff meeting which was basically the political counselor and economic counselor, and the guy from USIS, and I guess Priscilla Bouton from AID too. And then following this meeting they would have a major meeting of all the section heads at the embassy (which was quite a lot). And I think this is more for show than anything else because I got the impression the real meeting was prior to this big staff meeting.

Q: Well, this is normal management. I mean, you want to get the information out, but you really have to have the operating council.

SPRINGMANN: There was a certain amount of resentment that the commercial counselor wasn't in the inner-circle. Commerce always felt, and I to some extent felt, that you were not really entirely accepted by State. In practice, I think one of the reasons why they excluded the commercial counselor was the guy had serious problems.

Q: Who was this?

SPRINGMANN: Edward W.M. Bryant. I had been warned about him by the commercial attaché in Bonn before I left Washington to go out there. He said he had worked with him before, and it was the only place where he had ever broken a tour because of personality conflicts with this guy. When I got there he was all smiles at first, and then I found out that he was leaving classified material on the secretary's desk after she went home at night so she would get a security violation because he didn't like her. People started asking me, have you gone down to the communications section to get the cable traffic so you could find out what was going on in your own section. I said, I hadn't gotten to that yet but I do feel excluded. He worked directly with the local staff, bypassed me entirely. Then I started hearing from the defense attaché's office, and the CIA Station, and from a couple of embassies around town, that this guy was altogether too tight with certain corrupt Indian business men. And I started keeping my eyes open and found out that he was giving these grossly inflated evaluations -- something called World Traders Data Report, which is a government Dun & Bradstreet report for businesses doing business in other parts of the world. It's a service of the U.S. government. And one of these corrupt local business men was a known Russian agent and a conduit for Soviet black money in India. I started to rewrite these things because this was my job at the time and he went through the ceiling, and screamed and yelled and carried on. And eventually had a summit, in which I was not a participant, between him, the econ counselor, and the head of the CIA station. Afterwards, we were toning these reports down considerably, and weaving enough in enough of the truth so that a savvy American business man could read between the lines, that Mr. X had major business dealings with state owned concerns in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and if they were smart enough they would stay away from these guys.

Q: In this unpromising atmosphere, what were you doing?

SPRINGMANN: Not a whole hell of a lot. I wanted to go out and travel, and they really didn't want me to do that. I did get a couple of trips out and talked to local business men. I tried to do some reporting on my own. And, again, much like I was in Commerce, I was sort of sitting in the corner marking time, and tried to break out of it as best I could.

Q: What was the Indian market for American goods?

SPRINGMANN: Not all that good. The Indians at the time had major restrictions on imports. For example, heart pacemakers required permission of some government agency before they could be imported. Their idea was to save foreign exchange, and to promote production of similar products among Indian businesses to try to lift them up by their boot straps. You could get stuff into the country if you, for example, wanted to set up a hotel downtown, and you wanted to import milkshake mixers, bake ovens, and whatever, because this was a service that foreign tourists expected and were used to in their own countries and wanted to see this in India. And this was a major foreign exchange earner for the country once the hotel was up and running, so they could get permission to bring the stuff in. But by and large it had to be something that the Indians didn't make themselves. At the time the Indians were promoting a lot of investment, hey, we have the largest pool of trained manpower in the world; we're the second largest democracy in the world, and on and on.

And Harry Barnes got into this, and started pushing with the second commercial counselor, Hal Lucius, to promote American investment in India, and to promote Indian investment in the United States, and do everything possible to say India is the greatest country in the world, bar none, which flew in the face of reality. It got to the point where they weren't reporting the truth about India to Washington, and as I heard a couple years later, the Defense Attaché opened up his own back channel to Washington to let the Defense Department know exactly what the hell was going on in the country.

Q: Were there trade fairs, and things like that?

SPRINGMANN: Not really. The Indian market wasn't big enough, or sophisticated enough for that. They occasionally would have a catalogue show where American companies would send literature about their products to the embassy, and we would find space in a hotel, or in USIS's America House downtown. And they would occasionally send over an American industry trade expert to answer questions. But by and large it was mostly personal contact with Indian firms who were interested in the few American products they could import. Or it was hand-holding for American companies who were coming over trying to find an honest, capable agent. Or it was doing these World Trader's Data Reports trying to find a company as a suitable contact for an American firm.

Q: Would you find that the Indian bureaucracy was difficult to deal with, or not?

SPRINGMANN: We didn't deal all that much with the Indian bureaucracy except once there was a major trade complaint where an American firm claimed it was being screwed out of a major contract with the Indian government. Somebody was bribing government employees, and that came to naught, but we did have a couple meetings with government officials. We also had a lot of complaints about tourists that the consular section couldn't resolve, essentially, that they had paid for something downtown and it hadn't been shipped a year later. And the local who dealt with this didn't really want to make waves with her countrymen. I finally pushed and pushed her and got her mad as hell, and I said, look, tell these guys that they're going to resolve this thing to

everybody's satisfaction, or we're going to do a WTDR -- World Trader's Data Report -- on the company, and as one section of it on whether to recommend it to American businesses, we're going to line out this complete problem that they're having with Mr. X in Iowa., and to tell the firm that it's business with American firms or tourists would likely dry up. And she hated it, and I sent the threats out and it proved marvelous, it resolved the issues in short order.

Q: Indian-American relations are always touchy. Did we find that decisions about allowing commerce into India, was this purely economic, or was the feeling sometimes there were political calculations?

SPRINGMANN: Oh, it was political. This is what Barnes was trying to do. He was trying to show the Indians we really want to be your buddies, and to do this we're going to eliminate negative reports about your country, and we're going to be circumspect about what we tell business men about your country. And they were organizing reverse trade missions of Indians to tour the United States to promote what a great place the Subcontinent was to do business. And, of course, Indians who had seen India and had gotten the hell out, were the most vicious, and the most vocal, of critics of this policy, aside from me, and the science counselor, or the econ counselor.

Q: It's always one of the big problems that there's always the commercial and the political side. The political side wants to show, it's always handy if you can show your country is a good market for goods. Whereas, the commercial side, we want to sell. In a way, I suppose, at least from a Congressional point of view, the genesis of the reinstitution of the Foreign Commercial Service to give some teeth to the idea that we really want to sell abroad as opposed to we want to show that we're a big warm friendly type from the ambassador on down. But this wasn't working then.

SPRINGMANN: On the surface it was working. I mean, the Indians thought it was great, and the Americans who were getting a trip to India thought it was great, I guess up to a point. But I don't know that anything concrete ever came out of it, and when it came down to specifics...there was one case where the ambassador would not weigh in, neither he nor Marion Creekmore, who became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia. There was an American company involved with a local Indian firm, and they made solar products, and they had worked up a number of things that would be good for the Indian market -- for example, a solar powered water pump for villages that were no where near an electric line, which was a lot of villages in India. And they wanted help from the American embassy in dealing with the Indian government. Apparently there was a provision where you could get a subsidy if you brought in foreign technology, and adapted to Indian conditions, and got an Indian firm to manufacture the stuff, all of which the American company had done. And they wanted help from the embassy in getting the stuff up and running, and out to the villages in India. And Creekmore and Barnes would not get involved with this. I'd even set up a demonstration in front of the embassy where their pump was connected to a hose in this lily pond in front of the building. And with the subsidy which the Indian government could give if it wanted to, it would have been a commercially viable proposition, and but for unexplained reasons, the Ambassador and DCM didn't want to get involved in a concrete example of commercial cooperation between India and the U.S.

Q: *Why not?*

SPRINGMANN: I've never gotten an explanation. Creekmore just wouldn't talk about it.

Q: *How about Bryant?*

SPRINGMANN: Bryant was gone by that time, and his successor, Hal Lucius, didn't want to get involved because he might have antagonized the Ambassador. (Hal wanted another promotion so he wouldn't be selected out.) And I just threw up my hands and said, look, we're here to do stuff for American businesses. This is a concrete example of what we can do, it's not splashy, it doesn't make the front page of the newspaper but it gets stuff done, and improves everybody's lot. Still, nothing was ever done.

Q: *Were the Japanese doing much better than we were, or not?*

SPRINGMANN: I didn't see all that many Japanese there at all. The competition apparently was French, and there was all this grumbling about, oh, these French are bribing the Indians, they're doing this, or they're doing that. And basically the French were getting in and finding who the hell they could contact, and greasing his palm, and getting the stuff done.

Q: *By this time Congress had passed laws making a criminal activity for American firms to bribe foreign officials. What was your impression of what this was doing to American business practices.*

SPRINGMANN: People who followed them literally got no where, people who were smart and who let their Indian agent deal with this, and kept themselves at arm's length, got things done. Monroe Aderhold apparently wrote an analysis of this that he said pissed off Senator William Proxmire. As an example of how things worked, there was this one German business man who was very clever. He told me there are three kinds of bribes: the bribe that just reminds the official you're dealing with that you exist; there's the bribe for moving your papers from the bottom of the pile to the top of the pile; and there's the absolutely corrupt bribe where you pay somebody off to get a contract that by rights should have gone to somebody else. The German guy from MAN, Maschinenfabrik-Augsburg-Nuernberg, a major truck maker, was very clever. He had Indians on the payroll for various things, paying them for information from the inside, and he learned about a contract to bid on, one that his competitor would like as well. The German said, I can't forbid him not to sell this information to somebody else, it would just make him run all the faster to my competition. So he paid him to delay disseminating the information that he had just sold for a couple of weeks until MAN had prepared the necessary paperwork for its bid. I think this was incredibly clever and sophisticated.

Q: *What would you tell American business men?*

SPRINGMANN: Just that. That officially you're not supposed to do this. If your Indian agent does it without your knowledge, you're squeaky clean. And by and large this is a corrupt part of the world, and there are ways of getting things done that are not quite as legal as they might seem, but then they're not absolutely unlawful and immoral as some people would allege.

Q: Then you left there in about 1982.

SPRINGMANN: Yes, they jerked me out a year early because I had pissed off Bryant about his alleged corrupt activities and he apparently talked to Lucius and FCS management which pulled me out a year early. Eventually, I grieved this and won but I was back in DC.

MARY JO FURGAL
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Madras (1980-1983)

Ms. Furgal was born and raised in Illinois. She attended a number of colleges and universities in the US and Austria, including the University of Chicago, where she pursued Library Science Studies. She entered the USIA Foreign Service in 1978 and served as Cultural Affairs Officer in Colombo, Madras, Katmandu, Dhaka, Bucharest and Harare as well as in Washington, DC. Her assignments were primarily tandem assignments with her Foreign Service Officer husband. Ms. Furgal was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: Madras. Okay. Let's talk about Madras, '80 to '82?

FURGAL: '83

Q: '83. What was Madras like at that time?

FURGAL: Climatically, it was very hot but not that much different, I guess, from Sri Lanka. However, it was very much bigger than Sri Lanka. It was a very conservative city. It was the capital of the state of Tamil Nadu and the consular section at that time had the four southern states. There were four or five consulates in India at that time and USIS had four officers in Madras alone. It's gone back up to two or three now but a couple of years after I left it went down to three then to two and, at one point, I think they only had one. Of course that was after USIS was absorbed into the State Department. It's starting to build back up a little bit now.

Q: What were you doing there?

FURGAL: Well, I guess you could say I was an assistant cultural affairs officer at that time.

Q: In the first place, what about that tip of, southern tip of India? Where did it fit sort of politically? Was it- what was the political situation?

FURGAL: Well, it didn't have a communist government as the neighboring state of Kerala. Kerala was the only communist state in India at that time; that's intriguing because it also had the lowest birth rate and the highest literacy rate, especially for women. Of course, this was the '80s and McCarthyism was over by that time but politicians found that odd, the fact that the

communist government seemed to be doing a slightly better job than India did in some of the other states.

Q: Well was that, you know, for us sitting there did we see that it's because they probably had a better government or?

FURGAL: It's a good question.

Q: Or was it cultural or?

FURGAL: I think the reasons are varied perhaps somewhat ethnically but also religiously. In addition to the Hindu majority, there was a sizable group of Syrian Christians down there. I don't know how the political section would answer your question but I was very junior at that time. I wasn't really that involved in political matters at post nor was I, before I joined the Foreign Service. I think probably that's one of the reasons that if we had been one big happy family at that time I probably wouldn't even have gone into the State Department; My interests and- my background were not in political or economic affairs; I had was always more interested in the cultural, educational and historical events

Q: Cultural side. Fair enough.

FURGAL: Student exchange type of programs.

Q: Well, who was consul general?

FURGAL: Doug Cochran.

Q: And how big was the post?

FURGAL: I think it was one of the smallest we were ever in. There were only 12 people and that was everybody from the one chap in the code room, whatever they called it at the time.

Q: Communicator.

FURGAL: Communicator, right. And this consul general had his own American secretary and we had four people in USIS. There was only one consular officer; maybe one and a half because the other half worked in other offices occasionally... So it was small.

Q: Well, what were you up to?

FURGAL: Well, mainly cultural and educational programs. I was lucky I survived because my late boss, who will remain nameless, was an alcoholic. He was only pulled out after the inspectors came to India and talked to the people in Embassy New Delhi. The inspectors happened to call the consular general one day when my boss was berating his secretary. She just burst into tears and he was finally removed but before that junior officers were just swinging in

the wind... And if I hadn't been tenured I probably wouldn't have survived. He never came back from lunch sober. It was pretty bad.

Q: How does this work? I mean, was this sort of a conspiracy of silence or what?

FURGAL: I think so. One of the big differences we noticed after coming back to the U.S. for a couple of years and then going back out, was that there was a lot less drinking in the '90s I don't know how you found that but when we first went in, I was almost 40; being the oldest in the class, I was from that generation of women who had benefited from the change, i.e. that an officer could be married. You know how it was in the old days; if a woman married, she could not be an officer. That was one reason, among others, that I turned down my first chance to join USIA. In 1968, I was still single but I was dating at that time; years later we decided to try it again and it worked.

You'd have cocktails and you'd have wine and you'd have drinks after dinner. When we went back in '90, many people didn't drink or would just have wine with dinner; there wasn't the constant pressure or supply of alcohol - I think partially it was a social change in the United States also.

But we liked Madras, despite my problem boss. I had been an East Asian Studies major at the East West Center, which is probably the major reason I came into the State Department. I'd never even heard of such a career- that is, USIA or the Foreign Service, although I grew up in Chicago. We were lower middle class, I suppose, and no one in our family had ever had professional careers. I was the first girl to go to college so when one of my professors out at the East West Center said why don't you take the Foreign Service exam, I did and that's how it all started.

Q: Early 1980s, were we sort of treading water, did you feel, sort of culturally in India or were we doing something? What were we up to?

FURGAL: Well, the kind of work I did at that time emphasized cultural and educational exchange programs. The U.S. Government was still funding more of these programs than now. Now this was Madras and we're quite a distance from the capital in New Delhi. In New Delhi, even USIA would have gotten more involved in the political scene. My boss was pretty useless at that point. I think it was his last overseas tour; there were problems with his children and his wife was an enabler, in the current jargon. But my colleague left post a day early so he wouldn't have to say goodbye to him. On top of that, I had a dependent husband and this man was verbally abusive to my husband because he couldn't imagine a man letting a woman support him. We couldn't join the Madras Club because I was the officer and my husband was my dependent so we got in as associate members. But we had some very good Indian friends and we became involved in the local culture, picked up a love of Carnatic music and Bharata Natyam dancing. And we made useful contacts, that way. We also had an active Fulbright program and East West Center program, plus other long and short term exchanges I joined the Zonta Club, which is to women what the Elks and the Moose are to men They didn't let women join Rotary in those days. I met local "movers and shakers" that way, important contacts for future programs. I think my most significant accomplishment in Madras, the most long lasting, was in cooperation with

the Fulbright office, in Delhi. We had a small one in Madras run by a very competent woman who eventually came over here and worked for the Academy for Educational Development here in DC; she ended up as their head... We put on a program that brought together important women leaders from a variety of groups doing social work, what educated and affluent Indian women did at the time. The Fulbright Commission in New Delhi sponsored a speaker, the local Fulbright Commission and USIS put on the program, and a rich local businessman sponsored a lunch and printed material. The end result was an organization called the Joint Action Council for Women, which eventually put up a shelter for battered women. It lasted for years after I left in '83, maybe good 15, 20 years. I'm not sure what it's called now and how it's working but it was the most successful project I was involved with in Madras.

Q: Were they having the situation in- where you were one reads about of women, you know, the husband's family essentially kills the wife after she's paid her dowry or something like that?

FURGAL: I don't think that happened as much in the south. You still hear about it occasionally in the north of the country but it's not as common now as it used to be... Indian women, for the past several decades are much more educated. There's an emerging middle class which is probably bigger than this country just because there's a billion people there. But I think in the rural areas there's still that kind of spousal abuse.

Q: Did you have a library?

FURGAL: Yes, yes, and we kept it open for quite awhile.

Q: How was it used?

FURGAL: Oh, very well. I can't tell you, how many times years later, Indians of all backgrounds would say to me that's where they first learned about the United States and realized what this country is all about. They were free to go into the American Center and use whatever they wanted and read whatever they wanted and the staff just left them alone. We used to joke about denying access to a British woman married to an Indian journalist who used to publish the diatribes against the United States. She'd come in and do her research in our library so we were a little amused and annoyed at the same time. Of course, nobody ever did; she was free to come and go. The library was very well used. That's why I felt bad when they started closing down the libraries in a lot of countries. We lost a good opportunity to inform and influence at the same time.

Q: I think we made a terrible mistake on cutting down on the whole cultural field because this is so important.

FURGAL: It depends on how you define "culture." I could go to a Chinese concert here but I'd still read the newspapers about their human rights record. So if you had to choose one thing, I would keep the student exchanges. Not that I disliked the other USIS programs; I did a lot of them over the years. We did the speaker programs through which professors from the U.S. would come overseas and lecture but those generally have a very short term appeal. It also depends on the professors; the exchanges can do them more good because they go back with an increased

insight into whatever country they lectured in. But if I had to choose one or two programs which I'd prefer not to, I'd go for the long term student/ university exchanges and the American libraries rather than the one or two week programs..

Q: Yes. Did you find, having been in Sri Lanka, was there much of a Tamil connection? I mean, were the Tamils of India a different breed of cat in a way?

FURGAL: I'm sure that in the '70s and '80s there was a lot more sympathy for the Tamils in Sri Lanka than there is now. I'm not a foreign relations expert, as you know, and as some of the people you interview tend to be, but it seemed, at least among the people I knew, sophisticated English speakers of various ethnicities, the mood changed in the 1990s after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated.

Q: Well he was assassinated by a Tamil down in that area.

FURGAL: - I was in the Maldives at that time, it happened when I was in Sri Lanka the second time and was accredited to the Maldives. But we visited India a lot because we had friends there and since we stayed in the subcontinent, we were able to visit on our own when we wanted to;. We spent holidays there in Madras with friends who would come down to Sri Lanka. Because of this frequent contact, we knew that opinions about the Tamils in general changed when Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were both killed.

Q: Despite the fact that you had a very difficult supervisor, how did you work? I mean, did you have to sort of avoid him? Was this sort of duck and run out of the office and find somewhere else to work?

FURGAL: Well, there were four of us as we also had a deputy branch PAO (Public Affairs Officer). - It worked out but we never really related professionally. - I remember only one time we actually sat down and chatted as two professionals would. I was probably not that much younger than him; he was probably in his 50s at that point and by the time I arrived, I was probably 41. But it was difficult, however, especially for my husband because he had been a professional; he had passed the Foreign Service exam, both the written and oral portions, and the Selection Board just hadn't gotten down to his name on the list.

Q: What was he doing there?

FURGAL: He taught social work for awhile at the school of social work in Madras. He's a very self sufficient sort but he became bored after a while; so he became a communicator just to get his foot in the door because he had done that kind of work in Vietnam. I was alone in Madras about a year and a half while he was in Kathmandu. The assignments panel placed him at least as close to India as they could. There's, maybe not now but then, there was a lot of lip service given to tandems and a lot of resentment of tandems also.

Q: Yes, I know. It was, at the beginning it was a difficult program for a lot of people to swallow.

FURGAL: I can imagine. I looked on the Oral History citation that you gave me to see what keywords would lead a future researcher to cultural relations or tandems, the areas I know more about. I imagine that your submissions are pretty heavily weighted toward political and economic officers. I suppose that's what most of the books are written about. I don't think anybody will find mine because I can't say too much about those issues.

Q: But we are, you know, who knows how people will look at this, but I have a certain bias and I've always felt that the cultural section, particularly if this is your program, the exchange program, but also the libraries and all have probably had more of an impact than- well, I won't say than any other but probably a longer lasting impact because I think we have a very good story to sell.

FURGAL: I quite agree. The libraries and the way people talk about them even now, what they had meant to them when they were young students, is very impressive and touching. Being a professional librarian before the Foreign Service, I guess I look at the libraries a little differently than other cultural affairs officers might. We tried to recruit a Fulbrighter to come as a librarian; the university libraries in South Asia needed and wanted professional assistance. Some of those libraries looked like the reject room at the Chicago Public Library; books were in such ragged shape. It's ironic because one of the most famous early librarians in the world was an Indian by the name of Ramanujan. In the early part of the last century, he had devised a unique method of cataloging books. It wasn't the Dewey or the Library of Congress systems, which are widely used now. An additional problem was that the Indian libraries were not well-funded.

Q: Well, you were there- during the time you were there did you get any feel for the students? Did you feel they were getting- university students particularly- did you feel they were getting a pretty good education or was it a mill or how did you- did you get any feel for this?

FURGAL: This was the early '80s but I think throughout the South Asian universities that we were familiar with, the best students would come out of the science and technology faculties. Now, this is before computers, by and large. There were excellent lecturers and professors in all faculties, i.e. the fine arts, languages, social sciences, history but they tended to attract students in the three-year B.A. Program. There was a four year honors program from which you had to graduate in order to get a Fulbright grant because the four-year program was comparable to our system. The three year programs tended to emphasize history and languages, subjects for use in their own system but the students from those faculties were not quite as competitive on an overall basis. The Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) were on par with our institutes of technology, such as the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago But I'm not sure about MIT, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, not being a scientist. Students from the IITs (Indian Institutes of Technology) mostly left India for further studies or employment. I had a yoga teacher who was the only one in his class who was still in Madras.

Q: How stood the computer at that time? As an instrument? Was there much of it or-?

FURGAL: I think what we had were Wangs and we had machines of some sort in the library but I'm not sure they were even computers.

Q: They were probably just essentially word processing.

FURGAL: Could be. I don't remember when I got my first computer overseas.

Q: Okay. Well then you left in '83?

FURGAL: Eighty-three.

MICHAEL PISTOR
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1980-1984)

Mr. Pistor was born in Oregon and raised in Arizona. After graduating from the University of Arizona and serving with the US Army, in 1959 he joined the United States Information Agency. He served as Public Affairs Officer in Tehran, Kampala, Douala, London and New Delhi. He also held senior positions at USIA headquarters in Washington before being appointed Ambassador to Malawi in 1991. Ambassador Pistor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Then in 1980 you left.

PISTOR: In 1980 I left to go to a wonderful job, which was PAO in India.

Q: You did that from 1980 to?

PISTOR: To 1984, four years.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

PISTOR: When Shirley and I arrived, the ambassador was Robert Goheen, who'd been president of Princeton and had been born in India. He was very ill, so he stayed with us only a couple of months before he came back to the United States. . After an interim— we got very lucky and Harry Barnes was named as our ambassador. Harry Barnes is a dedicated officer who doesn't take 'no' or 'maybe' for an answer if he has his mind set on something.

I think he in a sense almost single-handedly brought Indians and Americans, each of whom had a lot to say about the other, together. It was a remarkable feat because the Indians have feelings about the United States that make it difficult to communicate clearly, and Americans certainly have those same feelings about Indians. This was true in the foreign affairs establishments in both countries, and Harry just cut through a lot of that, convincing his people in Washington, I think, that this was a serious country that needed to be treated a little differently than it had been. We also had the very good luck of having at that time an equally direct, effective career Ambassador to Pakistan, Ron Spiers.

Of course, we had couple of months, less than a year, left of Carter before we had the Reagan Administration. Somehow Mrs. Gandhi, who had just come back to power, sensed that it was necessary to warm up relationships with the United States a little more than they had been. She met President Reagan in Cancun early in his administration and actively flirted with him. It made good copy in the papers, batting her eyes and so forth, and he was a great charmer himself. So both countries, through the personalities of their leaders, decided that we'd have a friendlier, at least a less barbed, relationship than we had, muting the problems of Pakistan, China, Kashmir and the others. It was a remarkable time to be there and a good time for us to have an ambassador as active as we did with Harry Barnes.

In Pakistan, Ron Spiers talked candidly to the Pakistanis. I think maybe nobody had done that before. So having these two men who were, both of them, a little bit on the maverick side but both of them clearly intent on pursuing US policies vigorously and clearly, made our job some days entertaining, always interesting, and sometimes with that wonderful kind of frustration you get in India - impossible. The USIS program was a very large one, and remained a large program because of the rupee situation— they were running out, but we still had lots of this PL-480 money; it was in rupees and the idea was to spend it. This meant that the USIS programs in India weren't pinched. I don't think we were extravagant, but we were able to do things that we couldn't have done in other countries, where our program budgets had been steadily declining.

Q: What was the role of the Soviet Union during this period?

PISTOR: They still considered India really their best independent friend. The Indians felt themselves to be more independent of the Soviets than we thought. But it was fraying some. The goods that the Indians got from the Soviets weren't terribly good in their eyes, and the goods that the Soviets got from the Indians weren't all that good in *their* eyes. Neither country made terribly good toothpaste, for example. I think what it was was a formal and professed friendship, and the profession was stronger than the actuality, and the coolness between the United States and India was really less than its actuality. We found ourselves agreed more than we thought we would in a number of ways.

Q: In this '80-to-'84 period did any issues sort of come to a head between the United States and India that caused problems?

PISTOR: There was always the nuclear problem, and we were telling them, "Don't experiment, don't do this," until we heard that rumble. Also, there were always tensions between India and Pakistan which always drew us in some way, so there were tensions. But Mrs. Gandhi did try during this time to be friendlier than she had been to the United States and to not use us as an international whipping boy.

I think we too during that period were less testy than we had been with India. And Mrs. Gandhi was having an awful lot of increasing domestic problems. Punjab was on the boil. I finished my tour only two or three months before her assassination. That trouble in the north had been brewing for some time, and you could watch it happening, and the same thing was true with Kashmir, which was giving her terrible headaches. So while we had tensions, she was much

more concerned about what was going on in her own country. She made a trip to the United States that was a pretty good one. I don't remember the time exactly. Again, she was trying to....

Q: There had been this Indira Gandhi and the Kissinger-Nixon team had never gotten along.

PISTOR: They'd never gotten along, and this was a time to put that behind us. Also, we had George Schultz as Secretary of State, who made the first Secretary of State visit in years, and George Bush as Vice President also made an Indian stop, and other dignitaries, Congressmen and Senators also made trips to India. They went to Pakistan as well, of course, but they made this Indian stop, so things were looking up in our relationship.

Q: What was your impression of dealing with the Indian media?

PISTOR: The Indian media during the time we were there was changing. The Indian magazines were getting better, and we thought that part of this was because our own magazine, *Span*, had shown the way for quality journalism.. *India Today*, a magazine modeled on *Time*, was objective and very well edited. Even the cheesier magazines, which remained cheesy in content, were less so in production. So things were getting better. The major newspapers, the ones we saw, were well written, but (unsurprisingly) contentious.

There was no overt censorship in India, press censorship, but there was this curious business that the international wires came into the Indian government which then decided what stories to put out on the wire in India. But the larger newspapers' editors and columnists and senior writers all got news from abroad. They were reading British and American papers, so you would find editorials about a big international subject that nobody else in India knew anything about. The government was able to limit the circulation of news it didn't or didn't like, by manipulating the flow through its official news service. Another device was the allotment of paper for newsprint. If a newspaper displeased the government, it could find its newsprint supply reduced, constricting its circulation and therefore its revenue. So while there wasn't formal censorship, there was a government hand in the preparation and dissemination of the news.

Q: Did you have any problems dealing with the media?

PISTOR: No. There were some editors and columnists I wouldn't trust as far as I could throw them, and there were others who were very trustworthy and very professional, sharp journalists, interesting, open minded and well informed.. They didn't all agree with one another, so it was an open and lively area. But there were some quite senior journalists whom you had to be very, very careful about, because they would stick the shiv in as readily as not.

Q: In some ways they were creatures of a different era.

PISTOR: You're exactly right. Some of these senior ones had been there throughout the Nehru and...

Q: Krishna Menon.

PISTOR: That's right. We used Krishna Menon and John Foster Dulles, who were very much alike, as examples. We used to say to Indian friends, "One reason our countries don't get along is that we are so closely related. We tend to have the same faults as well as the same virtues, so we're each preaching to the other and neither likes it." This is very true, and it's also one of the things that made it fun to be there. It was not only that the establishment was changing but the elder ones had been LSE....

Q: The London School of Economics, its influence was much worse than Marxism throughout the colonial world.

PISTOR: Well it's certainly stronger. Of course, Krishna Menon, for example, was one of the inventors of pocket editions, indeed Penguin Books, as a Londoner. Of course, I think I benefited from having been Student Affairs Officer in London in the '60s, getting a taste of Indian intellectual life at the LSE and elsewhere.

Q: Did you find yourself up against what the British would call the chattering class, the French call intellectuals, a group that not only talked a lot and played with ideas but also had some actual influence on the government? Did you find that in India?

PISTOR: Yes, but to a lessening degree because the new generation of the educated elite was more pragmatic, less Left-leaning than its elders, but also less sophisticated, less worldly in the European-American way. They had always been there in the Indian political mixture, but they were getting more and more vocal and stronger. And the chattering- class types weren't so much dying out as being less influential. I'd love to go back now and see how they're doing. Some members of the chattering class were more than entertaining; they were serious intellectuals. Some of the magazines reflected this. But they were often wrong and sometimes ignorant, a word they would never accept, ignorant about the United States. They tended to think of us as flawed Englishmen, as less sophisticated Englishmen, and they were dead wrong.

Q: How about the exchange program? This is particularly designed to get leaders who might have this erroneous idea to get to the United States and find out who are we.

PISTOR: I think it's been through the years a successful program, attracting people who may not have made it to the cabinet, but people who would be chancellors of the universities or heads of departments, or senior civil servants working their way into the political and administrative mix, who have had their eyes opened about the United States through the exchange program. We also had the advantage - this was just the beginning in the '80s - of the immigration into the United States of middle-class, educated Indians in our own institutions. So it was a time of change where the chattering classes were not paramount and not as cocksure as they had been and where the energetic Indians in the professions, including the foreign service and the civil service, and in business have adjusted their views of the United States and indeed adjusted their views of the market and their views of the polity generally.

Q: Was there much in the way of American studies in the universities? This has always struck me as being one of the problems of the residue of sort of European education and colonial things

where American studies has... They know a lot about "home," being either France or Great Britain, but they don't know much about the United States.

PISTOR: Again changing, but you're essentially right. This is the history of their association with us. But there have been active American studies programs in India for 40 years, and there is an American studies center in Hyderabad. But the problem has been that it has attracted people who are into literary studies and not those who are historians or political scientists or economists, and that's what we wanted in American studies, to be able to get people studying these subjects to get involved, and that was one of our efforts, to stimulate interest among the professions so the center wouldn't that it wouldn't be primarily a place of literary studies.

Even then, not so much now but then, there was a terrible snobbery about what university you had gone to. It had to be British to be really worthwhile in the eyes of a lot of people, and there was constant chivying about how to rate, how to rank and how to compare. I think we've done good work since in that regard.

Q: Was it beginning sort of to penetrate Indian - we're talking about upper classes, the ruling group - in particularly the fields of business, business administration, technology? Electronics and computer was just really coming to the fore, which the Indians have taken to like a duck to water.

PISTOR: They used to do it then too when they could.

Q: The United States is the place to plug into, not England or....

PISTOR: In my day, the early '80s, we could sense the change of direction. It was the time of a shift from that elder generation with its fixed ideas, the chattering classes of those days— anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-United States, all of apiece, and again under the influence of the London School of Economics and old fashioned British socialism. Those people were fading and indeed young people of the educated elites were more apt to want to go into business or technology than into the liberal arts. They wanted to make money and make an individual mark. The United States was indeed the place to go, and they certainly knew it then.

Q: Was there or had there really been much Soviet influence within Indian society, or was this something that was strictly a government-to-government thing?

PISTOR: I don't think it took very well. The effort was there. But go to Calcutta, as communist or radical Red governments had close relationships with Soviet officialdom and intellectuals and so forth, but Bengalis remained Bengalis, however Red. They didn't cotton so much to these northerners. They seemed much more at home with Americans than with Russians. The Russians really were quite foreign and didn't know how not to be foreign and were therefore awkward.

Q: Well, Americans have had a very long relation with India, from missionaries to business people. It goes back really to....

PISTOR: So American informality and directness connect in India certainly better than the Russians.

Q: Speaking of connecting, obviously you'd be sort of on the front line of dealing with people as Public Affairs Officers. Indians get exasperated with us and we get exasperated with them. You must have gotten preached to a great deal.

PISTOR: Oh, indeed, I did, and that's why I used Krishna Menon and John Foster Dulles as examples. But don't forget I had all that experience in England too, and if you've ever been preached to, it's by members of the chattering classes in England. The British have no compunction about telling you— always exempting you yourself— that you come from an appalling kind of society. These members of the chattering classes in India took on these same attitudes. In a sense it was familiar, but, yes, we got preached to, preached at. But we Americans are, you know, pretty preachy as well.

Q: Despite the fact that Ronald Reagan and Indira Gandhi were doing their best to be nice to each other, I would have thought that Reagan, in his first term - here he was a Hollywood cowboy - talking about a bigger Navy, etcetera, etcetera, this would have allowed the Indians to say we're such a warlike people.

PISTOR: Oh, yes, and I remember when we had the little problem with the island of Grenada. There was a real furor in the Indian press about our imperial adventure there, and I remember talking to a man named Indir Malhotra, who was one of the editors of the Times of India. Indir was somebody you absolutely know would be on the side of castigating the Americans for these dastardly deeds and this imperialist move, and he said, "When are you going to leave?" And I said, "Just as soon as we saw off the end of the runway." Grenada caused a furor, but the Indir Malhotras of the press were sanguine about the Russians in Afghanistan. Generally, however, because Mrs. Gandhi wanted to get along, we got along. And because of the undercurrent of private cooperation and understandings, we didn't have the split that we otherwise would have had.

Q: How did you find the American nongovernmental agencies there? There are a number, Ford and others, who have had very long experience in India. Was there any feel of cooperation, or did they do their thing and you did your thing and that was that?

PISTOR: There was a great deal of cooperation with American business interests in India. And of course we had very cordial relations with the foundations, Rockefeller, Ford and the others. We cooperated with them and with their representatives in India in all of our branch posts, too.

Q: What about your various posts? Did you find a library was a major plus?

PISTOR: Yes, and as USIS libraries were being wound down in other parts of the world when the Agency decided that they weren't as effectual as they had been, Indians who can read English have continued to patronize our libraries, which have always been enormously popular with serious readers. These libraries in India have continued to provide comfortable and familiar venues for the other things we do, the seminars and the lectures and the cultural events and discussion sessions. Calcutta also had a student center of many years standing in the university

area, a little walk-up place that was not pretentious but was awfully good. Convinced communists who wanted to meet a real American would hang out at the student center, which was (and is) very lively and percolating all the time.

Q: Did you get involved at all with Bollywood?

PISTOR: I didn't get much involved in that. One of the things we did in India: you could always pull in the intellectual crowd for film festivals of one kind or another. We did one on John Huston and John Huston's movies based on novels or short stories. One of them was The Man Who Would Be King. The Indian actor Said Jeffery had been one of its stars, and he and I hoped we could arrange for him to go to Mexico to interview John Huston on videotape about this and his other movies. We almost made it but we didn't— the project fell through. That's as close as I ever got to Bollywood. Our branch post in Bombay, however, had quite a number of Bollywood connections of one kind or another.

Q: What about Charlie Wick and his influence during the time you were in Bombay?

PISTOR: I was already in New Delhi when Charles Wick became director of USIA. Our first experience with his style was a big film extravaganza of his— other people must have talked about this, too— *Let Poland Be Poland*.

Q: Yes, we've had people talk about that.

PISTOR: We got these imperious telegrams from Washington saying, "Put this on." Well, India was not the place to put it on. It would have been entirely counterproductive. I don't think Wick understood this, but Jock Shirley, who was his senior career man there in Washington, had been posted in India himself, understood the delicacy of the thing, and we were able to finesse it so we didn't have to show it. Wick was scheduled to visit us, but it was scratched and he went to Morocco instead. I was furious because, you know, you can rent Morocco. You can get those policemen with the goggles and you can get the horsemen and you can do all this stuff, but in India things can go off the rails easily, so it's difficult to demonstrate its exoticism without risking disaster.

Then we had a visit from the Secretary of State. The gorgeous embassy residence is not big enough to take a Secretary of State and his entourage, and also I think George Schultz, a modest man, didn't want to bother people, so he was booked into the Sheraton Hotel, which had just been remodeled. The hotel was putting him in its grandest suite and they swore that the suite would be ready in plenty of time, no problem, for the Secretary of State. Of course, the day came and the suite was not ready, and they had to put him somewhere else in the hotel.

At USIS we noted that disaster, and in its wake we got a telegram saying Wick was coming after all. I was afraid that when he got to the airport the customs official would not recognize his passport or hold up his luggage, for starters. But things went swimmingly. And also, because we had seen the experience of the Secretary of State, we put Wick in the grand suite too, but we had our own paint crew and our own carpenters ready if the need arose. Because we wanted to leave nothing to chance, we went over the Wick needs two or three times with the manager of the hotel

and all of the relevant hotel staff. The Wick suite was in splendid order. Charles Wick had a very good time in India. He visited Mrs. Gandhi, who batted her eyes at him a little bit and sat kind of close to him on the sofa, or leaned toward him on the sofa, which is a good sign in the newspaper pictures. Everybody looks at the paper to see how far she is away from the visiting dignitary. So the cozy pose was very pleasing to Director Wick.

There was in India a wonderful big organization, which I haven't talked about, the Indo-US Subcommission on Education and Culture. It had a lot of PL-40 money, and members on the American side were PBS, the Metropolitan Museum and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others. On the Indian side were the National Museum, the Ministry of Education and as Chairman to represent Mrs. Gandhi, a senior member of this group you've been talking about: an LSE-trained Socialist Brahmin chattering- class leader, who in all his active years had been staunchly opposed to the United States but was quite a charming person.

I must say that the Indo-US Subcommission on Education and Culture did a number of noteworthy things to celebrate our two cultures. They brought Merce Cunningham and his dance company, who also brought with him John Cage. You might ask what did the Indians think of Merce Cunningham and John Cage; again, India's a big enough place so that you can find the an appreciative audience for even the most esoteric production.

Q: Would you explain the type of dance?

PISTOR: Merce Cunningham runs an internationally celebrated avant garde dance company. He has been a well known dancer and choreographer himself for many years. John Cage is a very well-known and always controversial American composer who uses things like radios and airplane propellers and whatever you want, very avant-garde. He and Cunningham were also in partnership with American painters. Jasper Johns was one of them. So was Robert Rauschenberg. We had other, not so avant garde, cultural exchanges as well. There are Indians crazy about theater, and there's active theater in India itself, and we brought to India plays by John Steinbeck and Sam Shepherd. Cultural ties were active and interesting in those days..

Wick's arrival coincided with one of the Subcommission's large projects, India Week at the Metropolitan Museum in New York, and concurrent events in Washington. Part of this was to be not only the marvelous exhibition at the Metropolitan, but a tour through India by the New York Philharmonic under Zubin Mehta. Not only these events, but a wonderful exhibit called "Aditi" which was - how would you put it?— peasant sculpture and design and street musicians and entertainers, scheduled to come to the United States and perform or demonstrate their crafts on the Mall.

But before they came to the States, I approached Aditi's director-coordinator with the idea of a Subcommission party for Wick at one of the Mogul sites in New Delhi, which could preview Aditi. He and I described the idea to the Subcommission's Indian Secretary, who was very tempted, but after some time reluctantly turned it down. So I thought, since they're not going to do it themselves, I will, so we had the party at my house, which had a large lawn.

As he stepped out of his car, Wick was greeted by a man who jumped through a flaming hoop, and then was escorted by costumed horsemen on pretend horses. We had actual snake charmers, we had puppet snake charmers, we had a levitator, we had dancers, we had musicians. The Aditi party was a spectacular success. And provided Wick with a great introduction to India.

Q: Did you have a Fulbright program there?

PISTOR: We had a very large and respected Fulbright program of many years' standing. Also, along with the established Fulbright program, there was a new initiative— the Hubert Humphrey Fellowships— one in which senior, mid-level and a little above, professionals would go to the United States for a year. I met some recently returned Fellows, among them a regional railway chief and a senior veterinarian. The Humphrey program attracted stimulating and very interesting professionals on their way up. .

Q: It sounds like you hit it at the right time.

PISTOR: I certainly did. It was just a wonderful time.

Q: Because we've had some real ups and downs.

PISTOR: We've had some real downs when nobody would talk to you, nobody would come to your house, but it was an open time when we were there and people were eager to see us.

Q: Did you run across problems of the closed economic system, it's hard to bring things in and all that?

PISTOR: We lived in pretty much privilege.

Q: I was just wondering whether, on the intellectual side, bringing books or movies or that sort of thing, and I'm talking about the cultural exchange between two countries. Was this a problem?

PISTOR: No. As I say, one of our great successes was film festivals. The American MPAA has had some difficulties with India, and people are worried about copyright infringements, so we have always had problems, but there was an Oxford University Press in India, Reader's Digest had an Indian version, and Doubleday and others had arrangements. We always had to be alert to piracy, but the legitimate organizations thrived there. American textbook people were regulars at the book fair in New Delhi, for example.

We'd find sudden problems, because the Government of India is often arbitrary and the place itself is often arbitrary, so you'd find you couldn't do something and then you'd have a problem to work out. But the question of films, exchanges with books and magazines and so forth was pretty easy.

Q: On the cultural side, was there any American TV show or things?

PISTOR: Television was just in its infancy there, but it would show old Hopalong Cassidy movies. Whatever was cheap and syndicated you'd be able to get. Also, New Delhi had a film festival which they hoped to rival Cannes. The festival organizers invited Robert Wise, the veteran American director. I guess he's best known for The Sound of Music, and he did other important films over a long and distinguished career. He and his wife went to India on the Festival's ticket. We didn't see him at first, didn't even know he was there. But suddenly we did know he was there because the Indians, when they realized he was not Robert Wiseman, who did the "Kitticut Follies," a documentary about a mental hospital, cut him off. They said, "What are you talking about, Sound of Music, for God's sake!. We're intellectuals."

And so poor Robert Wise, this wonderful director, got to New Delhi and found himself with no lecture to give or anything. They actually just dumped him. Fortunately they dumped him into our lap. He's a wonderful man and he had a lot of good stories to tell, including the fact that he was the editor of *Citizen Kane*. We organized lectures for him and he did very well.

Manny American artistic or intellectual notables went to India under somebody's sponsorship or another. I remember again when we had a problem because sometimes Indian sponsors didn't follow up terribly well, and so we had Dan Boorstin, the Librarian of Congress. He got to New Delhi and his program had fallen apart, and he was not a man to take that lightly. I think he called the ambassador or somebody. Anyway, we were able to get him connected again, and he lectured then under our auspices, which was wonderful for us, and he was very good at it. So we had a lot of exchanges and then you'd have sudden glitches, but they tended not to be serious ones.

Q: I guess you were all used to it.

PISTOR: Yes, by that time..

It was wonderful to be in India because we had the resources to do creative things, including the mock-up of the space shuttle, that toured India and went to a number of scientific institutions, which burned the Soviets terribly. They were very upset over that. And the large-scale model was a credit to the imagination and skill of our local Indian staff.

W. GARTH THORBURN
Agricultural Counselor
New Delhi (1980-1986)

Q: So, from there, you went on to New Delhi.

THORBURN: I went to Delhi.

Q: And how was that? What were you doing in New Delhi?

THORBURN: Delhi was very, very good, very interesting. When I got there, we were assigned, we covered Nepal and Sri Lanka as well. I went up to Nepal a couple of times, and I didn't think it was useful, because there was really nothing going on there, and they had a very good AID (Agency for International Development) mission. So if I needed information, I called.

I was trying to increase our exports to India in the '60s and '70s when we had PL (Public Law) 480, India imported a lot of wheat from us. But they came up with some good programs of their own and produced a lot of wheat and rice. They weren't self-sufficient, but with the low intake of calories, they were at their level, maybe 1,500 calories a day, and if you see some of the Indians with their concave chests, you know that they aren't well fed.

We tried very, very hard with certain things – soybean, wheat, nuts. We had a very, very interesting group of people whom we sent to California to buy almonds and pistachios from the United States, and it turned out to be very, very successful. We monitored very, very closely the monsoons, because the size of the crops, the major crops, pulses, wheat and rice, dependent upon rainfall. Monitoring it, we had a very good idea when they would have a shortfall.

One year, I can't remember exactly when, probably in '88, they had a short crop of wheat and we managed to export about 1.5 million tons of wheat at \$250 a ton if I remember, so we did pretty well that year. I think that year, we probably did about \$1 billion of exports to India. I had an excellent staff and I was very, very, very satisfied with my time there, as I spent seven and a half years there. When you spend seven and a half years anyplace, it's enjoyable.

Q: You talked a little bit about what it was like getting around the country and flying versus driving. Could you talk about that a little bit for the oral history?

THORBURN: Well, most people liked to visit the Taj Mahal, and that was not too bad a drive, but you took your life into your hands if you did that. As a matter of fact, the secretary of state came to visit and some of our people went down to accompany him, and on the way back, five or six were killed in an automobile accident – of our embassy staff. So you just take your life into your hands if you drive anywhere in India.

Making trips to Kerala, Tamil Nadu, to Calcutta, anywhere, we would fly from Delhi to that city, rent a car, go out into the boondocks and visit in order to gather information to make estimates of what's going on. But driving in India was worse than driving in Rome. It was unbelievable and terrible.

Q: So, after India, then you transferred on?

THORBURN: I was transferred to Turkey for three and a half years, and that was my last assignment in the Foreign Service.

STEPHEN EISENBRAUN
India Desk Officer

Washington, DC (1981-1983)

Mr. Eisenbraun was born in central Iowa in 1947 and graduated from the University of Northern Iowa and SAIS. He served in Dhaka, Lahore, Freetown and Mombasa. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Given your later career, had you been reading about India and the Raj and all that, the Kipling, the John Masters, the other things of that nature?

EISENBRAUN: I didn't read very much of that in high school, but I remember it was about my freshman year of college I read a long novel about China, it was The Sand Pebbles.

Q: Right. What sort of history were you taking?

EISENBRAUN: I took a number of America history courses, but my specialization, as much as it could be, developed into Asian studies. The school was just starting a foreign areas program and I was one of the first to sign up for it. That was the influence of taking the China course with Cheng hsi ling. Another course was a survey on India by another influential professor of mine named Emily Brown. After that, there were courses on the recent history of China and India, and another on modern Indian literature taught by a visiting professor from Cambridge University in the UK. So those were the kinds of courses I took, even during two summer sessions. They were general survey courses more than really specialized courses.

Q: So this takes us to '73 I guess?

EISENBRAUN: Yes. Teaching and living on the campus at Foxcroft was very satisfying and comfortable, but I was ambitious and wanted to go to graduate school, see the world, and work somewhere in Washington. I spent the fall of '72 applying to graduate schools and other programs and then in the spring of '73, I was accepted at Johns Hopkins, SAIS, and also got a fellowship to go to India to study Hindi. I was keenly aware that I didn't have any foreign experience, nor foreign language, and I had to make up for that in some way. Fortunately, the professor from the University of Northern Iowa, Emily Brown, who was the India specialist and the one who had offered me the graduate assistantship some years earlier, was on the board of the American Institute of Indian Studies, headquartered at the University of Chicago, and she suggested I apply for one of the Institute's nine-month fellowships in India to study Hindi. I know she was instrumental in making certain the board selected me for a fellowship.

So then I got the fellowship to India to study Hindi for a year at Delhi University and also got admitted to Johns Hopkins SAIS in Washington to pursue a master's degree in international relations. I visited SAIS, explained to admissions that I had this fellowship offer in hand, and asked if they would defer my entrance for a year. I also said, you know, I'm going to be studying Hindi out there and I'd like to use Hindi to fulfill the language requirement at SAIS. At that time, SAIS didn't teach Hindi. They do now and they have a developing South Asia department, but they didn't then. The assistant dean in charge of admissions, Roger Leeds, said, all right.

Luckily, I went home and wrote a letter to Leeds saying thank you for deferring me for a year to go to India and thank you for agreeing that I could use Hindi to fulfill my language requirement. That's important because a year later when I showed up to start SAIS, they said, we don't teach Hindi, so you'll need to start a different language. But I said, no, Roger Leeds (who's still at SAIS these 30 some years later) said I could. I produced a copy of the letter that I had written to him. To SAIS's credit, the school said, oops, I guess we'll have to honor what Leeds said. They not only allowed me to take Hindi, they provided tutoring as well. So I am quite grateful to SAIS for that and to Roger Leeds.

Q: Well then, you were there taking Hindi at Delhi University?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, concurrently with classes at the American Institute of Indian Studies. We had Institute classes in the morning and university classes in the afternoon. Fortunately, we lived during the first months within walking distance of the campus in a building named Riviera Apartments, can you believe, because elegant, as the name implied, they weren't.

Q: What was your impression of Delhi University and India at the time?

EISENBRAUN: We arrived in August of 1973 and I had done a lot of reading, certainly, about India and teaching about India, so I thought I knew something about the country. Well, I didn't know enough. We were both in for huge culture shock; it was very unsettling and we were told, well, go out and find an apartment. It better be close to Delhi University because you'll be taking classes there. And what? Just go out and find an apartment in Delhi? And around the university, which we discovered was not the most Westernized part of the city. I mean, it was so daunting. But we did it somehow. By the third day, I got horribly sick with dysentery, the first of many, many, times I got sick like that in the years to come in South Asia. I was laid up, absolutely flat out. I used to say that if I hadn't been too sick to get out of bed, I would have gone to the airport and caught a plane home, but I couldn't. Subsequently, I spent about 10 years in South Asia. But at any rate, it is fair to say that the year I spent in India changed my life. It broadened my horizons, it changed my perspective on international affairs, and it verified for me that I wanted to join the Foreign Service.

I had chosen SAIS with the idea of the Foreign Service, and India helped solidify that career direction. Although Delhi University was about 30 miles from the US Embassy, I met a few people at the Embassy and became convinced that the Foreign Service was the way to go. And also, one of the other people in the program had this in mind, too. So it turns out four of us took the Foreign Service written exam at the embassy in New Delhi in December of 1973. Four of us took the written exam, three of us passed it, and two of us eventually passed the orals and came into the Foreign Service. Amazing, huh, considering the odds.

A week or so before I departed the States in the summer of 1973 I went to a party in Reston, Virginia, and met one of the guests, a professor at Syracuse University. I told him that I was going off to study in India. He noted that Daniel Patrick Moynihan was the Ambassador in New Delhi at that time and that he also was a former faculty member at Syracuse. So, my new friend said, you've got to look up Pat and Liz, they're good friends of mine. He took out his card and wrote on the back, Pat, you've got to meet Steve and his wife Jane. You'll really enjoy them. He

said present this at the embassy. Well, even to me, as naïve as I was about the Foreign Service, I couldn't imagine such a thing but now looking back after 35 years, I find what happened even more amazing. In the middle of September, my wife and I made our way out to the American Embassy and presented that card, just a business card from this professor, and said, I'd like to meet the Ambassador. Eventually, a young Foreign Service Officer, John Yates, came down and talked to us and set up an appointment.

Q: Is John around? I tried to get ahold of him to finish an interview. Do you know where he is no?

EISENBRAUN: No, I don't. I know he became an Ambassador in West Africa, and I know a bit about his career, but I'm sorry I don't know where he is now. At that time, Yates was a special assistant to Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He said, I'll do what I can. We were sharing an apartment six blocks from the main campus of Delhi University, 30 miles from the embassy. And so I was given an appointment, I forget how that was communicated to me, I guess it was a letter. Now, given how the Foreign Service works, if that wasn't unusual enough, a few days before the appointment, there came a knock on the door of the apartment, and a Marine guard in uniform presented a letter to me from Yates, saying we're really sorry but someone else has come to town—it might have been Pearl Buck—and so the Ambassador was sorry he wouldn't be able to see me on the scheduled day but would the following day at 4:00 pm be all right?

The next day we arrived at the embassy and we were shown in to Moynihan. He was quite cordial and invited us to sit down on the sofa and have a drink. He had a Scotch and water. It was about 5:00 in the afternoon. Well, we all know from our Foreign Service experience that this just doesn't happen. I was just a kid at school. I mean, what is he doing? Well, he carried on a monologue for about 45 minutes about the issues he was dealing with and humorous anecdotes regarding India and the bureaucracy and this, that and the other, which we just listened. Finally, he got to the point and asked how we knew professor so-and-so? I said, I don't know him. I just met him at a party a couple of weeks ago before we got on the plane to come out here but he said to look you up. Moynihan, with a distracted tone in his voice, replied, well, isn't that very interesting. What are you doing in India? I said, well, I'm a student at Delhi University. He replied, well, it was nice of you to look me up, and that was the end of the meeting. That incident still qualifies as one of the more bizarre things that happened to me in my pre-Foreign Service days.

Q: Well, how did you find being an American in India in '73? This was after the creation of Bangladesh, Kissinger particularly had sent the Enterprise into the Indian Ocean and yes, it wasn't a great time, I mean, for Americans.

EISENBRAUN: No, it wasn't. Americans were not appreciated at any level in India. Just as you said, the residual antagonism from 1971 was alive in everyone's mind. So much so that in our orientation by the American Institute of Indian Studies, they said, you're going to be harassed on campus and maybe it's better to say you're Canadian. Well, we were harassed in some cases, yes. Students surrounded me on two or three occasions, eight, 10 students who jeered at me and so forth. But I never felt in danger. It was just pranksterism, you might say. But we felt antagonism from almost every sector of Indian society, especially the smaller bureaucrats and, let's say, bank officials, for example. We got a monthly fellowship stipend, and we were required to deposit the

money in our local bank, the Punjab National Bank, and then we had to make withdrawals from that account in order to have access to cash. We all felt that the bank officials were antagonistic to us, cold and harsh. On one occasion, I signed and presented my withdrawal slip, but the clerk just swept it away and sneered, that's not your signature, go away. I said, hotly, that that is my signature, and that's my money in the bank and I need it. He just repeated, go away. In the end, the bank manager came and gave it to me grudgingly. We all had these kinds of experiences.

So, I have to say, we felt a good deal of antagonism because we were Americans, but I have to qualify that. India's a very friendly country to Americans in general and there were many people who were extremely gracious and helpful to us. Any foreigner can be adopted by Mother India if they want, welcomed into peoples' homes and so forth. That eventually happened to us. I must say a large part of that had to do with my wife, Jane, who played the flute and started taking more flute lessons because flute is big in India. Because she was into modern dance in the States, she started taking some Indian classical dance lessons and pretty soon we were going to classical dance concerts all over the city.

Eventually we left the apartment we were sharing with another American couple on the program, and moved in with an Indian family. So then we began to learn a lot something about Indian life. It took a lot of time to become culturally more adjusted to India, especially from a student's point of view because they don't think too highly of foreign students or didn't at that period, let alone American foreign students. But we learned to adjust. Eventually, we lived with two different Indian families; first with a Christian family and then with a high caste Brahmin family that did everything very formally, including dressing in coat and tie for dinner. They always referred to us as Mr. Eisenbraun and Mrs. Eisenbraun.

We learned that Indians were just as frustrated with daily life in India as we were, in their having to cope with traffic and the buses and the bureaucrats that would treat them harshly too. The first family we lived with, the Dayals, asked us to try to buy them black market cooking oil and rice from local merchants, as the quality of these products available via the ration cards all people had to use was really poor and inadequate. For example, most products were adulterated, that is, the rice was cut with small rocks. I was unsuccessful in getting anything on the black market, however.

Q: Well then, how'd you find Hindi?

EISENBRAUN: In fact, it's almost impossible to learn good Hindi in Delhi. That's not where you should go to learn Hindi. The institute that brought us to India acknowledged that, but for political reasons, I suppose, that's where the classes were. One of the reasons it's so hard to learn Hindi in Delhi is that Delhi is such a cosmopolitan city that it draws from all over India, especially from North India. There is a very large Sikh community and they speak Punjabi primarily. All these other groups in Delhi were speaking variations of something the British in their colonial days called Hindustani, a little bit of Urdu, a little bit of Hindi, a little bit of Punjabi and you sort of mix them all together and it comes out Hindustani. That was not what they were teaching at the Institute, nor at Delhi University. They were trying to teach us classical, proper Hindi. You could learn Hindi in school and you could read it in the newspaper and you could hear it on All India Radio, but nobody spoke it. Well, the very well-educated did, but that's

it. So I was hearing things on the bus while riding back and forth to classes, or stuff in the bazaars, and I would try that stuff out in class. The professors would recoil in horror at what came out. So in fact I didn't learn a whole lot of Hindi. I learned a lot about India, but I didn't learn very much Hindi.

I should say too that with that last family, the high caste Brahmin family, the Shashadris, I invited a few of the friends I had met from Delhi University to their home and that was an education for me because I discovered how socially conscious the Indians are, very class conscious. I suppose every society is but the Indians are especially so. These students suddenly got very self-conscious because they realized they were in a proper Brahmin home and they were being judged. The lady of the house, Mrs. Shashadri, she was very gracious. She had in her youth been the private secretary to a maharaja's wife and had traveled to Paris and London. After meeting my friends, she would analyze the students and give her opinion, and to her, the most important factor was not the quality of their English, but the quality of their Hindi. These students at Delhi University had perfect English, very upper class English from the best of missionary schools. But she judged them on their Hindi and she insisted on speaking to them in proper Hindi.

I met a lot of Indian students, and here's how I did it. It wasn't so much in the classes for Hindi, because they were for foreign students from various countries around Asia. Those students were interesting as well. However, to meet Indians I tried to audit a few courses at the Delhi School of Economics. The concept of auditing a class doesn't exist at Indian Universities, but I tried it in an international economics course, and the professor let me do it. So I sat there and listened to his lectures day after day and I monitored a couple of other classes too. After class, it was a tradition that the students would leave the lecture and go down to the coffee shops around the classroom buildings and have coffee or tea and gossip. I was an object of curiosity, so students would sort of hang around me and start asking me questions.

The students were pretty friendly, actually. The students were a bit pointed in their questions. One of the students asked, early on, why are you studying here in India when every one of us has the goal of studying in America? It doesn't make sense. I replied that I'm going to be studying international relations at Johns Hopkins but I wanted to come to India and broaden my horizons and learn something about Hindi; it seems reasonable to me. But they said, it doesn't seem reasonable to us because Hindi isn't important. They went on, saying that there's only one conclusion; you have to be a spy. They weren't joking. They said you must have an ulterior motive, you can't be here as a student and clearly you don't know as much economics as we do. That was certainly true; they were sophisticated students of economics and I was not. My reply was, well, if you think I'm a spy, what secrets do you think the U.S. government is going to learn here in this coffee shop and around the campus? Well, they had to laugh and acknowledge that there probably wasn't much to learn. So we had a good time and I got to be quite friendly with a number of students, and those friendships continued for a good number of years.

Q: Well then, after this year, you came back where? You went to SAIS?

EISENBRAUN: I did, yes. I must say just for a moment, when the fellowship was finished in April, my wife and I went up into the foothills of the Himalayas to a missionary language school.

In the summer months, the school was in the hills at about 8,000 feet among the pine trees, looking out over the 20,000 foot snow caps in the distance. I attended for a couple of months. The other students were missionaries from around India. We enjoyed living in the mountains, and getting to know the missionaries, but I couldn't compete with them because they really did know a lot of Hindi. I learned the 23rd Psalm and the Lord's Prayer and other famous Biblical passages in Hindi, and they sound as good in Hindi as they do in English.

I came back to the States in the summer of '74, just in time to witness on television the resignation of Richard Nixon. Then I drove up to Washington from Florida and presented myself for the oral exam to the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you get any feeling, I realize you're the brand new boy on the block, but did you get any feel for the power relationship within NEA, one, for Bangladesh vis a vis India-Pakistan and two, India-Pakistan, well I mean, what we call the sub-continent and the Arab-Israeli problem?

EISENBRAUN: Bangladesh didn't count in the power relationships within the NEA bureau. It was just a humanitarian disaster to deal with. Kissinger actually went out to Bangladesh; he stopped through en route to another destination and probably didn't even spend overnight. But he did show up and he made some comment, probably an aside, of Bangladesh as a basket case, and unfortunately, that's what stuck as the essence of the American policy attitude. Bangladeshis even today, 30 years later, remember Kissinger's basket case comment.

Q: Well, you know, I mean, this is something that lingers on with me. I've never served there, or been there, but you know, I mean, it was kind of referred to as a basket case.

EISENBRAUN: Well, it was economically. Their needs were infinite and they were confused, and mind you, the best of their entire generation had just been massacred by the Pakistani army, so there were really valid reasons why the country was in chaos. It's just unfortunate that Sheikh Mujib, who had such potential because of his initial popularity, squander his great opportunity to start the country on a sound basis. Of course, within NEA, looking at South Asia, they were- it was always a balancing act between Pakistan and India, you know, trying to be friendly with both. In Pakistan there was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was in charge and things weren't going so well over there either.

Q: Yes. And you have the very chilly relationship with Mrs. Gandhi, I guess.

EISENBRAUN: That's right. Mrs. Gandhi had no relationship with President Ford, but Nixon and Gandhi detested each other. Partly that's because they were two very powerful personalities, practitioners of real politic who probably were very similar and probably could have been good friends under other circumstances, but they were rivals in world politics. Nixon was certain that Mrs. Gandhi had misled him over Indian intentions of attacking Pakistan when she came to Washington in December of '71. And apparently she—we can check this in the archives, I guess—but she basically assured him that Indian intentions were not belligerent but that they couldn't live forever with the 10 million Bengali refugees in West Bengal, to say nothing of the political uproar on their Eastern border. The United States in the early '70s was quite partial to Pakistan, and Mrs. Gandhi couldn't stomach it. Pakistan under Ayub Khan, and Yahya Khan

later, was willing to be friendly with the United States, and they were easy to deal with because they were relatively straightforward military men. We could provide them with military assistance, and India at the same time was friendly with the Soviet Union and the Soviets provided a good deal of military assistance and technology to India. So we had our own Cold War going on in South Asia. Bangladesh was essentially a humanitarian project, but we wanted to keep them at arm's length politically. We had no national interest in Bangladesh besides humanitarian.

Q: So often one's first contact is with your language teachers. Were you picking up something about Bangladesh in your-

EISENBRAUN: I'm glad you reminded me about my language instructor. Minoti Roy; she was Hindu and she was from Calcutta. She had never been to Bangladesh herself. She was brand new to FSI, and I was her first and only student for most of the year, except that a fellow named Ron Hagen came in for a few months about halfway through the year. Minoti and I got along really well. She took it upon herself to teach me about Bengali culture. Not Bangladesh culture only, but the culture of greater Bengal, which included the Indian state of West Bengal with its capital of Calcutta. Historically, the whole area of East India that was Bengali speaking was called Bangladesh, or the land of the Bengali or Bangla-speaking peoples. The West Bengal state in India as well as East Pakistan, it was all known as Bangladesh in the old days. She stressed to me that the Hindus of West Bengal in India felt a little bit put out that these upstarts, when they declared their independence in 1971, called their country Bangladesh, because the Indians in Calcutta said, we're Bangladesh, too.

Minoti decided it was her mission in life to make sure that I spoke the best Bengali I possibly could and to make sure my accent at least was right. I'm a pretty mediocre language student, but I'd had the Hindi study, and she said that that made me sound more like a Hindi speaker trying to learn Bengali, rather than an American. I thought she was being nice and just trying to build up my confidence, but in fact I heard this comment later when I got to Bangladesh. So, achingly, hour after hour, she worked on that accent. When I got done, those of us in the Foreign Service will understand, I ended up with a three-three in Bengali, but I had a better accent than that score would suggest.

Q: What about the hand of India while you were there?

EISENBRAUN: India presumably did exercise a tremendous influence clandestinely in Bangladesh. We heard rumors, I can't tell you exactly how truthful those rumors were, that the Indian intelligence service was controlling a lot of political events and funneling money to leaders. The Bangladeshis felt intimidated by this great country around them.

Q: Well, talking about Bangladesh being surrounded on three sides, what about these areas in India bordering on Bangladesh? Could you find out or?

EISENBRAUN: I had no way of knowing from my posting in Dhaka what was going on in those states.

Q: But was there any spillover?

EISENBRAUN: No, there wasn't much spillover, although there were rebel insurgencies in some of the remote areas. They continue today. India was afraid that some of the remote areas of their northeast would break away, so they wanted to make sure that Bangladesh was within their sphere of interest.

Q: At that particular point, what was the attitude of the Pakistanis towards the United States?

EISENBRAUN: The Pakistan government was rather disillusioned with the United States because there had been twenty years or more of hot and cold relationships from Washington. We had been quite supportive during the Cold War and we had supported them in '71 when they had their war with India, but then we had backed off a number of times and this period of '78-'79, my first year there, we were, because of the military overthrow of the elected government, we were pretty cool to the Pakistanis. I think that we had curtailed a good part, maybe all, military aid. It manifested itself on the provincial level in that it was sometimes difficult to get prior permission to go out on these travels. But in the end, I don't think I was ever denied. When I got out into the districts and met the local officials, the Deputy Commissioners and the Superintendents of police and others, they were always pleasant enough. Proper; I wouldn't say-- they were not effusive, but they were accessible. The Pakistani people were very friendly, and even farmers knew a lot about the American-Pakistani relationship. They knew that America had been a close friend at one time and wasn't so friendly anymore, so there was always this question, why can't America be steadfast in its friendship? But they were predisposed to be friendly.

Q: I mean, was there-

EISENBRAUN: What, repercussions? What was the explanation? I don't know specifically what the Pakistan senior authorities told the Americans in Islamabad or Washington. Basically, their story was that it took time to get from the cantonment in Rawalpindi to embassy in Islamabad, a distance of a dozen miles or so. I think they always denied that they had anything except the best of intentions. It's undoubtedly true that it caught them as much by surprise as it did us. But it did take them an awfully long time; I think they were afraid the fury of the mob would turn on them, so they lingered until the situation resolved itself.

However, to repeat, the police saved us in Lahore. As it turned out, down at the USIS center, the American and local employees got up to the roof, and that included all the patrons who were in the library too. No one died or was seriously injured. They all got up to the roof and eventually off the building. The center was reduced to a smoldering hulk, though.

The story was not quite over, however. We all dispersed to our homes for the night. A phone line was established with Islamabad from people's homes. We got the word that night that Washington had ordered the evacuation of all non-essential Americans from the country for the following evening. We were told that a Pan Am 747 had been leased to come to Islamabad to pick up all dependents. That plane had a maximum capacity of around 300, maybe 350 seats. But there were more than 350 Americans in Pakistan, so it had to be decided on the spot, who went and who stayed. Who were official Americans? We were told, figure it out. As far as Lahore was

concerned, they said that PIA had agreed to bring a special flight into the airport. The plane had 40 seats, so identify 40 people to be evacuated on that flight that would go up to Islamabad to meet the Pan Am flight. That was it. This was less than a two-minute order, and then the line was dead.

So, Fuller and I convened at the office early the next morning. The interior was okay, but the exterior was a shambles, a mess. The parking lot was filled with burned cars. The Pakistan Government sent around a cleaning force, even though we had not asked for it, and they cleaned up the exterior in a few hours, towing the cars out of public sight, and by noon, the consulate looked pretty good. Glass was reinstalled in the windows. I don't believe we ever asked for this, it was just provided, and we were back in operation. I guess the Pakistani authorities didn't want any evidence of this trouble to be tinder, you might say, for further demonstrations. Of course, they couldn't help the smoking building down at USIS. As for our work, the challenge was to figure out how to communicate with all the Americans and let them know that some of them, but not all, were going to be evacuated that night.

It didn't sit well with us, but we decided somehow that the American teachers didn't qualify as official Americans, that is, as U.S. government employees. We thought that's what it was defined as. We had to define it ourselves. The school was operating independently in that crisis; this is not a nice chapter in the relationships there among the Americans. They just made their own decisions. In fact, what they did is, the American teachers got in cars and headed for the Indian border 15 miles away. From there, they went to Amritsar and New Delhi. They were out of the country fast as far as I understand. I was pretty ashamed, you know, that the consulate didn't think of them first.

But still the question was, who are official U.S. government-funded people? Well, they were the U.S.-funded scientists at the malaria research lab and their families and there were some other U.S.-funded contractors around, plus the consulate staff and families; it wasn't hard to find 35 or 40 people. So we were calling and saying you're all being evacuated tonight. There's no choice, you have to leave with one suitcase. You've got to go. Everyone's in shock. That was Thanksgiving day, yes, and there had been plans for a huge American community picnic. I know that in our house, our cook was planning to cook about seven or eight turkeys that somehow they had found around the community and so the decision was okay, cook the turkeys. In the meantime, my wife was frantically packing, getting ready to fly off to the States. But who knew what would happen in Washington? There was no communication with the States. We were unable to call anybody in the States; that was impossible in those days.

We established a rallying point, the same apartment complex where we'd been evacuated to the night before. We had a departure of something like 7:30 in the evening and the army said, you gather your people and we will transport everybody in army trucks to the airport. And we're leaving right on time. They did. Everyone gathered in a chaotic and tearful scramble.

The army trucks arrived, and the soldiers said, get in right now. No one argued. There was a convoy of about five or six trucks, big ones. Totally anonymous. I mean, they're army, of course, but otherwise the canvas was down and they didn't want anyone to know that there were Americans inside. They drove through the dark and foggy night to the airport. We expected that

we would go through the usual check-in procedure. What's this? No. The trucks went around to a far entrance off on the field. They had no more pulled onto the end of a runway than a small propeller plane landed and pulled up to us, keeping its engines running. All this was in minutes. We got off the trucks and the army said, get on this plane as fast as possible. People exchanged a few hugs and kisses, and it was all over in minutes. The engines never stopped. The plane turned around and roared back down the runway, leaving just four of us standing in the dark on the field.

The four were the Fuller, the consul general, Lundstead, the consular officer, Jim Larkin, the admin officer, and me. We sent away our communicator and the secretary. It was crazy for us to make that decision, but in our haste we thought, well, all of our communications went through Islamabad and that's destroyed, so what do we need a communicator for? Well, we didn't realize how valuable a communicator was, because they do more than communicate electronically. We didn't have a clue how to make up a diplomatic bag, for example.

And so we just waved good-bye to the plane. It was about 8:00 at night. What do we do? We're in shock. I said, you know, I've got all these turkeys back at the house. So we came back to my place and had a big Thanksgiving dinner. Afterward, Lundstead said, I don't want to go back to the empty apartment at the compound where all the families had just left, can I stay with you?

So he stayed in the guest bedroom and he said he slept in his clothes. I did not, at first, but I had this vivid dream in the middle of the night; I dreamed that the phone rang and that somebody on the other end said, they're coming for you to finish you off. That was it, and I put the phone down. Then I awakened. The dream was so vivid that I believed it. I jumped up and got dressed and ran to tell Jeff, and there he was with his clothes on too. It's three in the morning. But then we began to realize this was a dream, so I got back in bed. I think I kept my clothes on, though, just in case I had to flee. I had that same dream the second night and the third night. Well, the third time around I recognized I'm having a dream, so I didn't jump up and get dressed.

Q: I'm still asking the question. Did you come up with any answer?

EISENBRAUN: Well, I want to tell you the thoughts of the Pakistanis on this subject. Art Hummel invited anyone on his staff and at the consulates to send in an analysis. He said you can send it directly to Washington, bypassing the embassy, which had reestablished communications. So I took this on as a big challenge. I thought, this is my chance to be George Kennon, you know, and explain it. Not that I had any original ideas, particularly, but I had the privilege of talking to a lot of very sophisticated Pakistanis in Lahore, a lot of people who were very thoughtful and very articulate. So I explored their thoughts—this was, after all, the topic everyone wanted to discuss anyway. Everybody in Lahore I talked with, whatever his or her position on the political spectrum, thought the same thing, which was this.

The Soviets really had a strategic plan in mind and they ultimately wanted access to a warm water port and Karachi was that warm water port, the main commercial port of Pakistan. Working with the connivance of the Indian Government, the Soviets had in mind the dismemberment of Pakistan in the effort to get their port in Karachi. Mind you, the Pakistanis were still just recovering from the 1971 war, so complete dismemberment didn't seem so radical a concept. They'd already been cut in half by India in 1971. The invasion of Afghanistan was

only the first step in the master plan, they thought, and Pakistan was in mortal danger. My contacts pointed out that the Americans must agree because they were sending in considerable military and economic assistance.

I spent a lot of time drafting what I thought was a good cable and send it in. It went under my name because I was the head of the office, and I slugged it, at the Ambassador's direction, for the NSC (National Security Council) at the White House and for the Secretary of State. The embassy put in its own analysis, as I'm sure Karachi and Peshawar did.

So, Fuller was gone for the month of January, and then I was slated to go to the States for the month of February because my wife was due to give birth.

In the first days of January, 1980, a cable came from the Secretary of State ordering every post in the Islamic world to destroy all of its classified material, or ship some of the vital material immediately back to Washington. The point was, within a couple of days, don't have any classified at post beyond a working file that it could be burned—and this is really important—in five minutes. Because Washington fully expected more attacks. Who knew what post would be overrun next? .

It's hard to imagine, but in the small consulate in Lahore, classified wasn't really destroyed. Virtually nothing, only maybe ten percent of what we held, as it turned out. Fuller felt that our holdings were of historical significance. They went back 20-some years, and there was a lot of fascinating archival information, and he said it just wasn't appropriate to destroy it. And second, it just wasn't feasible to box it up and ship it back because we were barely functioning with diplomatic pouches. Also our classified and our unclassified were mixed together to a large extent. Imagine file after file after file, things all mixed together.

On the roof of the consulate there were five burn barrels. You may remember the era when there were burn barrels in of our consulates and embassies around the world. I'll bet that few posts ever tried to use one of those barrels. We decided to try one out. The idea was that in an emergency you just dumped everything you had, even typewriters, in there, absolutely anything; and then light the fuse. Fuller said, let's use one of them and see what happens.

We gathered some of the classified material and half-filled one burn barrel and lit it. Well, that was quite a show. It worked. It was like a Saturn rocket going the opposite way, with its tail of fire going up into the air and the rocket theoretically going down into the ground. The flare went up 20 feet or something. It was just unbelievable and created quite a spectacle. People going by on the street no doubt wondered what on earth was happening. You couldn't get within 10 or 15 feet of the burn barrel, and there was no way of putting it out.

Well, we were mighty impressed. Fuller said, well, in five minutes time if we had to we could bring up all our files to the roof and use the other four burn barrels. We could dump everything in there indiscriminately and light the fuses and that's five minutes. The cable from Washington asked for a written compliance cable from the ranking officer saying we were down to five minutes. Fuller drafted it under his name and sent it, certifying that we had complied. But we hadn't complied. We may have been the only post that didn't comply

Fuller went back to Washington, leaving me in charge. The mood was tense. After all, on one side of us was Iran where the hostages were being held. The Soviets were invading to the northwest of us and the fighting was pretty fierce and refugees were coming into Pakistan. We had our own worries because we were convinced that the demonstrators would finish the job and burn us out. We knew that all the perpetrators of the attack were still out there in Lahore, probably passing by our consulate every day, rankled by the fact that the flag was still flying. So we felt deep in our bones it was a given that there was another attack coming. I know that Islamabad felt that way too, even more so. So, while life appeared to go back to normal, deep inside we felt that they were coming for us again, this time with a lot of gasoline.

I was in charge and I didn't know the extent of our classified holdings. The communications officer, Dick Gary, came to me a couple days after Fuller departed and said, you know, back there in the vault is an incredible amount of classified stuff. As you know, in our missions abroad, nobody goes back into those deep areas of the communications center except for the communications people themselves. He invited me back and showed me file after file, whole cabinets. And in the outer officer area by my desk and in Fuller's office there were other files thick with historical material with the classified and unclassified put together that went back 10, 15 years. I hadn't even realized what was back in the secure area. Dick asked, how could we have sent that cable saying we were down to five minutes destruction time? Clearly, this whole building is full of classified.

So, we had a meeting, the four of us. We agreed we couldn't live with this subterfuge. We had to tell Islamabad, this is national security information here, we can't keep it. So it was agreed that I would go up to the embassy and tell the DCM the situation. Mind you, I'm telling you stuff that was kept really quiet at the time, but I don't know that it has to be so quiet 25 years later. This was awfully sensitive at the time. I flew up to Islamabad and met with the DCM.

Q: But during this time you're talking about, you had Iran doing its thing, the Soviets doing their thing in Afghanistan, was India pretty quiet? I mean, because they're right, 17 miles away or something. Did you feel any threat from them?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, the people in Lahore felt a threat. They were sure that the Soviets were going to roll into the Punjab next. They were sending division after division of their best troops into Afghanistan. What, just to fight the Afghans and to subdue them? The Pakistanis couldn't understand why the Soviets would expend all this effort on the Afghans. There had to be another purpose. The Pakistanis were sure that the Soviets would be striking next into the Punjab and that the Indians were going to cooperate in some fashion. So there was a lot of tension in Lahore. On the other hand, it seems reasonable from the Indian point of view that they were about as shocked as anyone else with the Soviet invasion. It's one thing for the Indian government to have a close military supply relationship with the Soviets and to be allowed to produce some of the materials under license that the Soviets allowed them to do, some of the war materials, but it was quite another to have the Soviets really in their backyard. And after all, India has for decades seen itself as the major player on the South Asian subcontinent and Pakistan as a nuisance. From the Indian point of view, Pakistan was an important rival but still it was India's sphere of

influence. And the Soviets weren't any more welcome than the Americans were within their sphere.

Q: I would assume.

EISENBRAUN: So, in fact, I think that the great tension felt in Lahore regarding India was perhaps unfounded. It turned out to be unfounded, in fact, because nothing ever happened, but I don't think that India was doing anything belligerent to fan the flames. But nevertheless there was a palpable sense of tension.

Well then, at the end of January came and I went off to the States and attended the birth of my daughter, Annie, in Iowa.

I barely made it. She was born in the middle of a snowstorm a day or two after I arrived. I stayed several weeks in Iowa. In addition to new daughter Annie, I had to get reacquainted with my 18-month-old son John, who was OK, having recovered from his ear and intestinal infections. Then I had to return to Pakistan in three weeks, leaving my wife Jane to cope with a newborn and a toddler, all camping out with her mother.

So then it was the latter part of February when I returned to Pakistan. I stopped in Washington for some days and talked to people in the NEA (Near Eastern Affairs) bureau, and got caught up on what had happened in Pakistan in my absence. I asked the desk officer, the country director and then the principal DAS, Peter Constable, whether by chance they'd seen my cable from Lahore on the issue of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan. But they all said, no, they couldn't remember having seen it. I went over to the NSC (National Security Council) where a friend, Tom Thornton, was handling South Asia, and over a lunch of sandwiches in his office I asked if he had seen the cable. No, he said he couldn't recall any cable like that. So anyway, I left Washington with a little lesson in humility that not a soul could even recall my cable. In fact, I think probably what happened is that it went directly from my pen to the archives and was never read. Someday maybe I'll do a Freedom of Information request and try to find it.

Well, I flew back out to Pakistan at the end of February. Fuller told me it had been pretty quiet in Lahore while I had been gone, and we settled down to business as usual for a few days. Then, the Ambassador called Fuller up to Islamabad.

Q: Then, the rest of the time you were in Lahore, what was developing particularly as the Afghan conflict was concerned, its impact on where you were?

EISENBRAUN: Well, it never affected our lives very much in Lahore. After the great scare in the winter and spring of 1980 that the Soviets would come marching in, things went pretty much back to normal. We were aware that there were literally, what? Millions of refugees in the northwest frontier province a couple of hundred miles away from Lahore, but no refugees had made their way down to Lahore. I did go out and do a little bit more traveling. Travelled up to the northwest area near the frontier and I did see some refugees on the road but they never made their way into the heart of the Punjab. We were aware that a resistance force had been developed, the mujahidin, Afghan freedom fighters, who were back in the country fighting, and everyone

knew that the Americans were helping supply them, but the details I wasn't aware of. There's a book out now called Charlie Wilson's War, which describes Charlie Wilson, the congressman on the appropriations committee who took it as his personal mission to fund the mujahidin. Wilson had to overcome a great deal of skepticism and inertia even in Washington before sufficient resources went out to turn the tide against the Soviets and that took years. But we weren't aware of that in Lahore. All we knew was that American assistance was flowing.

I continued as acting principal officer until July, when a really fine gentleman named John Brims, who had been the deputy in Karachi, was named the consul general. So he came up and we got along really well.

Months and months dragged on in the spring of '80, February, March, April and the dependents were not being allowed to come back. After these shocks of the December-January period, Pakistan settled into pretty much into business as usual, and our fears began to recede that there would be another attack. There was a lot of pressure mounting to bring the families back. It became obvious eventually why the families weren't being brought back because there was this hostage rescue attempt being planned in Washington. That happened, I think, in April of '80. I got no advance warning, of course, because it was, after all, a super secret event. Seems to me it was a Friday afternoon when I heard, and I was at the swimming pool. A call got to me that the DCM was anxious to talk to me. What's going on? He said there's been this rescue attempt in Iran to try to get all the hostages out, but it went wrong and so you should inform the Punjab government and ask for extra security for the consulate. So we got another big contingent of police around the office. The Pakistanis were really very receptive to any security requests we asked for. There was a worry that there would be some kind of retaliation against the United States for this rescue attempt. There was none, however. Afterwards, it was obvious why the families hadn't been allowed to come back for so long.

During this same period, the Chinese premier made an official visit to Pakistan, and General Zia brought him down to Lahore, and the governor held a banquet. It was the only time I was at the governor's mansion in Lahore, which is really quite a splendid place. I was invited to this official dinner, and I think the Pakistani protocol people kind of had fun with the seating assignments, because although there were hundreds of guests, they seated me next to the Iranian consul. This while the hostage crisis was in full swing. Now, it just so happened I knew the Iranian pretty well from prior to the days when the Shah had fled and the Iranians were the only other consulate in Lahore. The diplomats at the Iranian Consulate had been very friendly with the Americans, and his wife used to bring their kids to play at our house. So, how could I give him the cold shoulder a few months later, even though officially I was not supposed to talk to him? He was pretty nervous and I was kind of nervous. Eventually, I asked how's your family? He seemed relieved and replied, well they're back in Teheran, and how's yours? I told him of the birth of my daughter in the States. He seemed grateful that I had acknowledged his presence, and we chatted a little further about the weather and so forth. I didn't report it to Washington.

In early part of June of 1980 the families were allowed to come back and they did. I should say it was kind of dramatic in my case. My wife flew first to Athens with my oldest son, who was 18 months old, and the newest baby, Annie, who was six months old. They intended to visit American friends there for a few days. But while there my son, John, got seriously ill and had to

have an operation. So at the last second, I was allowed to fly to Athens to join them. The operation turned out all right, and I was able to accompany them back to Pakistan.

After my wife returned to Lahore, she saw all her old friends and we were back on the social circuit. I had kind of dropped off because I didn't have the energy or the interest to run around to all the parties, and I don't think I was quite as interesting as my wife was, anyway.

The third year, 1981 to '82, was pretty uneventful. The dramatic events of the previous year tended to recede a bit. I was recruited to be the political officer on the India desk in the Department starting in the summer of '81. That was still in the days when the American government was using its excess rupies from India and Pakistan, and the government allowed those posted in India and Pakistan to travel on the Cunard Lines across the Atlantic. There was only a small contingent of us that knew about this travel prospect because the Foreign Service was not advertising it, but I know about a dozen officers and their families who were able to take advantage of that travel. Strangely, Cunard put a caveat on this travel which said one had to go first class, there wasn't any tourist class that they would accept. So the four of us in my family went back across on the Queen Elizabeth II in July of '81, first class. That was a nice way of going back to the States. And so we arrived back in the States in July of '81 and I took up my duties on the India desk.

Q: I was just thinking, you were on the India desk from when to when?

EISENBRAUN: Summer of '81 to the summer of '83.

Q: Did you find it, I mean, having been immersed in Pakistan, how it was it at the India desk?

EISENBRAUN: I was familiar with India because I had been out in the region for the previous five years and had been a student in India for a year, so India was not a foreign country to me. But it was a completely different type of work to come back and learn how to function in the Washington bureaucratic environment. India is such a big country with such diverse interests to Americans, from political to scientific to military to commercial affairs, and it was a huge challenge to learn about all these things.

Q: Well then, were you picking up what the Indian reaction to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan during this period?

EISENBRAUN: It was not something that dominated our relationship with India, but the Indian Government never lost an opportunity to protest all of the aid we were providing Pakistan. The Indian reaction to Afghanistan did not seem different from the Washington perspective than I had mentioned previously, that it, India did not like to see the Soviets in Afghanistan any more than we did.

Q: Who was the prime minister when you were on the India desk?

EISENBRAUN: Indira Gandhi., who did not have warm feelings for the United States. Most of her coolness probably came from her 1971 experience when she hadn't gotten along well with

Richard Nixon and she didn't feel that the United States was sympathetic to India's plight in the events that led to the creation of Bangladesh. I imagine she didn't understand why the Americans didn't give her-or India-its due as a world power. As a matter of fact, she was not alone in that regard. Probably every intellectual in India who dealt with foreign policy, and all those who didn't deal with foreign policy for that matter, couldn't figure out why it was that the Americans couldn't understand that India was on the verge of being a super power and accord them the status they deserved. They wanted even then to be on the UN Security Council, for example, and we would have nothing of it. They were developing a blue water navy, but we saw that as a potential threat. We were focusing a lot of attention on China because Nixon had opened up China some years earlier, and Soviet affairs occupied Washington's attention, not India. In strategic terms, Washington saw India as a friend of the Soviets, so that kept our relationship cool. The Indians couldn't understand how we wouldn't have a bigger strategic point of view and accommodate their interests more. But their interests and our interests hardly ever matched. They saw themselves as the preeminent power in their part of the world, and we were unwilling to recognize that to the extent that they wanted. So there was always tension in the relationship.

Q: We'll pick up some of the other issues later that came up during that period. Great.

Today is May 2, 2005. Steve, we're talking about when you were on the India desk from '81 to '83. Did anyone at the Department look at the relationship with Indira Gandhi figure out how best to make the relationship a little more friendly?

EISENBRAUN: Funny that you should ask that question because that's just what I had planned to talk about. In our relations with India in 1981, we were still recovering from the early 1970s when Mrs. Gandhi got such a frosty reception in Washington. The relationship had not improved very much, especially as we became more friendly with Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also, another major constraint to better relations had to do with India's nuclear program. They had exploded what they called a peaceful nuclear device in 1974; actually I was in India as a student at that time and I saw the outburst of national pride among the students at Delhi University. Even though India said it was a peaceful detonation without military implications, India continued its nuclear research, and some of it had to do with weapons research. We were quite concerned with a particular power plant in India, named Tarapur, that did not have safeguarded fuel, for example.

I came onto the desk in August of '81, just at the time that a new American was named the Ambassador to India. This was Harry Barnes, the first career Foreign Service officer to be named to New Delhi. Harry was a very vigorous and ambitious individual, and he had it in mind from the first day that he was going to do everything in his power to improve the relationship between India and the U.S. He had a variety of ideas for that. Central to his plan was to get Mrs. Gandhi invited to Washington, not on a working visit but on an official, full blown state visit. In one way or another, his whole focus in that first year of his in office was to get her to Washington and he was successful. She came in July of 1982.

A state visit wasn't all Harry had in mind for improving relations. He was not going out to India just to be a representative of the U.S. He was going out there as an active agent for change, positive change. Another of his initiatives for improving relations involved developing a number of bilateral commissions. I don't mean to do injustice to Harry here, but I don't remember how many he created, four or five of them; one for cultural matters, another for commercial affairs, and there must have been some kind of a political commission. His intent was to get very distinguished people from India and America, movers and shakers, who would be able to meet together on a periodic basis and develop programs that would tie the two countries together in such a way that their mutual interests would trump the larger bilateral strains.

He reiterated his goals for the commissions once to me personally as we sat together in Roosevelt House, the Ambassador's residence in New Delhi. I was on a visit to India in September 1982, and over a drink, he had asked me if I had any ideas how he could be more effective in Washington. I said he needed to find some way to be more critical of India, as he had developed a reputation in the Department as India's greatest cheerleader. He ignored my point, saying, Steve, you just don't quite understand that the whole point is to develop closer relations, using the commissions, and here he put his fingers together to form a web, to create an intermeshing of the important institutions and personalities in New Delhi and New York and Washington. His mission was to improve the relationship and I think by and large he did so within the greater constraints that he couldn't really control, that is, the greater strategic issues.

But anyway, I was jumping ahead. The first I spent on the desk was nothing but, in one way or another, developing Harry's relationship all through Washington and New York, wherever there were influential people that needed to know something about India. Harry would in some way or another contrive to meet everybody on Capitol Hill, in the business community, in the arts and cultural world, you name it. Of course the big business community didn't really care about India at that time because India had closed, essentially, its borders to major foreign trade and investment. Harry had only limited success with the business leaders in America, but he tried. His ultimate goal was to introduce Indians to these people.

His efforts happened to coincide with one of these strange events that happen in American popular culture occasionally when certain countries become the fad, and India was immensely popular just then, having caught the American imagination in the early '80s, evidenced by the fact that the movie Gandhi came out in 1982 and won the Academy Award as the Best Picture of the Year. Well, Harry was very happy to take advantage of that public interest.

Let me spend a fair amount of time describing the preparations for and then the execution of Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in the summer of 1982. That visit is a case study, I think, of how American foreign policy sometimes is made.

Q: Can you first, if you don't mind, what had happened to sour the relationship when she came in 1971 when Nixon was president, just to put the issue in contrast.

EISENBRAUN: Yes, we talked about that earlier, but it's probably worthwhile to just review that for a moment. Mrs. Gandhi came to Washington in December of 1971 and met Kissinger and Nixon at the White House, and the issue was, essentially, the civil war that was going on

between East and West Pakistan and those who would say that there was genocide in East Pakistan, in what became Bangladesh. At the time, there was a huge outflow of refugees, up to 10 million of them, into India, primarily into neighboring West Bengal. Mrs. Gandhi said this cannot be tolerated, first on a humanitarian basis and then economically. Her country could not absorb 10 million refugees, and there were terrible things, anyway, being perpetrated by the Pakistani army upon the civilians in what became Bangladesh.

For American strategic reasons, we did not want India to intervene in that situation, which would essentially mean some kind of a conflict, a war between India and Pakistan. We didn't want that instability in South Asia, largely because Nixon and Kissinger were working secretly with Pakistan as a conduit to China. Pakistan and China always had had a close relationship, and Nixon had his goal of being able to open up the doors to China. Kissinger actually flew from Peshawar to China, all facilitated by the Pakistanis. So that's the immediate concern, that we didn't want to have anything jeopardizing the basic stability and relationship of the South Asian countries. We didn't want a war between India and Pakistan that would likely result in the breakup of Pakistan, and who knew how far India would take this because India was going to prevail by force of numbers and who knew if they would keep moving and not just dismember East and West Pakistan but dismember West Pakistan, too. No one knew for sure.

So this was not in American strategic interest to have a war, and I think Mrs. Gandhi we didn't want a war. She thought, however, that she had all the right on her side. The Pakistani army was committing genocide in East Pakistan and why couldn't the American see that? Plus, she had the economic burden of the 10 million refugees. She felt that she had all the cards in her hand, and couldn't understand why the Americans would be so obstinate. And not only obstinate but belligerent. The Americans sent the carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal as a warning to the Indians not to go too far. The clear intent was to tell the Indians, don't go too far vis-à-vis the Pakistanis.

Q: This was the so-called tilt toward Pakistan.

EISENBRAUN: That was the tilt toward Pakistan, that's right. So Mrs. Gandhi felt that she was not treated with proper respect in Washington, that Washington simply did not understand the politics of South Asia, and that only confirmed her hostility anyway toward Americans over the years that went way back to when her father was prime minister when we always favored Pakistan as far as she could see. Then the Americans were equally antagonized because they thought they had assurances from her that there would be no war, and within weeks she attacked. So each side felt betrayed.

So now that ill-will lingered, that legacy. That was '71 and so now it was '81, 10 years later. You'd think in 10 years things would calm down and cool off, but they didn't sufficiently. There was still a great deal of antagonism in New Delhi and in Washington and you know, India didn't matter as much then as it does now. India is now emerging onto the world as a major player, and it is now a nuclear power and so forth, but in the early 80s, India didn't matter quite as much then to American strategic planners, who had their eyes fixed on China and the Soviet Union and the Middle East. And so India was second or third tier.

Well, Harry Barnes, looking at his relationship as Ambassador, was going to change the relationship as much as possible. He lobbied the Indian government to open up their country to American investment and trade. He had to work both sides. To say nothing of the political relationship, he wanted to impress upon the Indians that we had no choice strategically but to support Pakistan when the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, but he also argued to the Indians that look, you shouldn't really be so antagonistic about this because you don't want the Soviets on your doorstep either. Fine to be friendly with them, but the Soviets had gone too far and they're threatening your interests in South Asia and so we're merely doing essentially your bidding and you don't have to do anything except recognize it, be friendlier to us. He had a fairly strong argument there, he wasn't whistling in the wind. In addition to all the commissions he was developing and all the other arguments he was making to policymakers, I think it's fair to say that the idea of Mrs. Gandhi coming on a state visit originated with him. I can't remember any other element within the U.S. government that was leading this. I think it was Harry Barnes; he created it and he made it happen.

He was aided in this by the fact that there was a very friendly, gregarious president, Ronald Reagan, in the White House. Several of us had a chance to meet him a couple of times in this period. The White House started this practice; I don't know if other administrations had done it, of the President meeting the Ambassador and his family before their going out overseas, and including desk officers in the Oval Office meeting.

Q: I think he was the only one.

EISENBRAUN: He may have been. And getting a photograph taken and sitting down for 15, 20 minutes and chitchatting, and it was nice to include the desk officer in this. So in October of '81 Harry Barnes and his wife and I believe his daughter, we all went over to the White House to the Oval Office. I just watched, but at one point, someone motioned that I should join one of the photographs but I said no. Obviously, this was Harry Barnes and his family's time. I think that was the first time that Harry had met President Reagan, but not the last as I'll tell later, but anyone who met him, even for five minutes, could be charmed by him because he was just such a nice guy. I think Harry Barnes realized this was a great political asset, that if Prime Minister Gandhi and President Reagan could get together, she too could be charmed, regardless of her famous reserve. Turned out to be the case.

Did you want to ask a question?

Q: Oh, no, no, no. I think this is excellent.

EISENBRAUN: I think it's a case study in the making of foreign policy, where the personal relationships factor in. Because it runs contrary to a lot of what we learn in graduate school about the making of foreign policy. We learn so much about the institutional pressures or the historical pressures and the military alliances and the commercial relationships and so forth. Those are the determinants of foreign policy. And of course they are. And so it's true also in this case, we're talking about the history of 1971 as a factor in '81 and the strategic relationships in Pakistan, Soviet invasion, these were major background factors. But there sometimes is a personal factor too, as there was in this case.

As background, let me point out that it's a bureaucratic miracle when any foreign leader gets invited to the White House as part of a state visit. I think the Gandhi visit in '82 was the first of the Reagan Administration.

OK, so in the weeks in the summer of '82 leading up to the visit, we on the desk were engulfed in the creation of all the papers that go into the briefing books, both for the State Department officials and for the White House. Anyone who's worked at the State Department at the desk level knows that it's all encompassing for months in advance, and I didn't do all the papers; I was one of about four who worked on various aspects, but I did the political papers, or I did the first drafts because they were massaged a lot on the way up the line, too. Still, I was able to observe some of the ad hocism that developed.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned suddenly in the summer of '82 over issues related to Israel and Lebanon. George Shultz became the Secretary of State a week or ten days before Mrs. Gandhi was to arrive in the latter part of July. Harry Barnes had had a meeting scheduled with the Secretary to give him a short brief a few days before the visit. It turned out that now it wasn't Haig but George Shultz getting the briefing. It happened to be Shultz's first day in office. I went up there to join the briefing with Harry. Shultz said, well, I'm certainly pleased, Harry, that you're here to tell me a bit about this coming visit, because I don't really know a lot about the America-India relationship. That was Harry's opportunity to give Shultz the lecture on the importance of the improving the relationship, which Shultz didn't disagree with.

Mrs. Gandhi's office communicated to the embassy that she wanted to send a personal and secret envoy to Secretary of State Shultz to talk about this visit a few days before she arrived. This envoy's visit was not to be made known even to the Indian Embassy in Washington. Utterly secret. The Americans said OK. There was a lot of curiosity about the meaning of all this because there was no advance briefing about what the secret envoy's mission was going to be about.

Now, I am sorry to say for historic purposes I do not remember the name of the imminent individual. He was an elderly and distinguished gentleman. I'm smiling as I recall this gambit; we on the desk kind of believed the ploy at the time, or at least were willing to play along with the game. Now, looking back after 23 years, I think, I silly--how could this man's visit be secret to the Indian Ambassador in Washington? But that's what the Indians in New Delhi were asking us to believe. So, the afternoon that he was scheduled to come to the Department, I was sent down to the lobby to meet him. As I entered the C street lobby, I saw coming in the door Hemant (HK) Singh, the first secretary for political affairs from the Embassy, and my principal contact and good friend. I had been meeting him almost every day to go over details of the visit. Here he was, walking in the lobby all by himself just when the "secret" envoy was to arrive. I was astonished, I'm playing the game, so I stepped behind a pillar. Fortunately, HK went on into the Department apparently for some other meeting, and he missed me hiding behind the pillar.

I then walked out of the C Street entrance and stood on the sidewalk under the portico, not knowing exactly what was going to happen next. I expected a limo to pull up, but instead, here came this elderly Indian gentleman strolling around the corner and up the drive by himself. I

assumed that this must be the man, so I walked down and said I believe you are here to see Secretary Shultz. He replied, yes indeed. I said, well, I believe he's waiting for you. We walked into the building, and there wasn't much of a check-in process in those days, and I took him up in the secretary's private elevator, which had been pre-arranged. We got out on the seventh floor in the anteroom in front of the secretary's office, and there were four or five officials out there; you know, the logical people who would attend such a meeting. But somebody from the secretary's office said no, no, no, this has to be a small meeting. So, the only Americans who went in were assistant secretary Veliotis and myself, with Shultz. None of us knew what the agenda was.

I'd like to report that it was earth shaking. It was not. The envoy was relaxed and friendly and reported that Mrs. Gandhi was looking forward to her visit and constructive talks, and she hoped the Americans were doing the same. There was no bombshell, nothing else; it was merely that she was coming with an open mind and a friendly smile. However, we thought this was pretty important.

Q: Oh, absolutely.

EISENBRAUN: This news relaxed us, and although he and Shultz spent a few minutes reviewing some of the major issues to be discussed, there wasn't any real substance to it. The envoy had only one message, and he had given it, so he took his leave, and I escorted him back to the Department entrance, where he walked off down the street.

Q: Actually, it was a very clever move, I mean, to set the tone because otherwise it could have been a bit like two suspicious dogs sniffing each other.

EISENBRAUN: Well, that's right. I see it as the personal side of the making of foreign policy, and also another example of the ad hoc nature of foreign policy because it came up suddenly only a few days before the visit. But there was more that took everyone by surprise.

Mrs. Gandhi arrived in New York. Let me tell a little vignette about where she stayed. A skilled, young and beautiful lady named Gail who worked in protocol handled the logistical details of the visit. Gail later became President Reagan's personal secretary. Anyway, the issue was that Mrs. Gandhi let it be known that she would stay only at the Carlyle Hotel in a particular suite. We were told her family, the great Nehru family had been coming to New York for a 100 years and they had always stayed in that suite and so she was going to stay there again. As luck would have it, there was someone else booked in that suite. Since the Carlyle is a pretty fancy if discreet place, I imagine that that guest was important too. Somehow, Gail worked it out, and Mrs. Gandhi got her suite. That's neither here nor there, I just thought it was an interesting little side story of the visit.

Anyway, Mrs. Gandhi arrived in New York for a day before coming to Washington. I went up to join the American entourage escorting her to Washington. We had done all our papers for the White House, the Secretary was briefed to the extent he deemed necessary, everything was set. Then we were told by the White House that they had a different idea than we did of how the meetings were going to be conducted at the White House. We had provided extensive

background papers and talking points for those meetings, which we assumed the principals, including the President, would use as they conducted the meetings. The White House or NSC staff, however, decided to change the plan.

We were told that President Reagan and his people were not going to play a substantive role in the meetings. The President planned to turn everything over to his secretary of state. But that isn't how we had prepared any of our briefing books. Secretary Shultz didn't have adequate material to conduct the entire process himself. At the last minute, the office director, Howie Schaffer had to recast everything almost single-handedly. Howie told me later that that was the hardest day of his 30-some years in the Foreign Service. .

The ad hocism didn't stop there. The next morning we all went to the White House to enjoy the impressive welcoming ceremony of a major leader on a State visit, with its colonial marching band and speeches, and twenty-one gun salute, and so forth. Somehow we learned that at the very last moment the White House had decided that President Reagan was going to have a one-on-one meeting with Mrs. Gandhi in the Oval Office after the pageantry. There were to be no handlers, no notetakers, no one else. That hadn't been in the plan, as far as I knew. It occurs to me now that such a meeting might have been planned all along, and the White House hadn't considered it important to tell us at State, but I don't think so because of what developed after the receiving line and the two leaders went off to the Oval Office and shut the door.

What were they going to talk about? Anyway, as the receiving line ended, a few of us were invited to step into a smaller room off the grand foyer, maybe the Red Room. The few of us were the Vice President, George H.W. Bush, Secretary Shultz, the First Lady, the Indian Ambassador and the Indian Foreign Minister, and maybe a half dozen others, including my wife and me. We just stood around, waiting on the President and Mrs. Gandhi. There was nothing to do but stand around. Nobody even sat down, and there weren't enough chairs anyway. I remember introducing myself to the Vice President, and introducing my wife to him, and we chatted for a moment about the nice weather.

In the meantime, Nancy Reagan took Shultz aside to a corner, and talked earnestly and quietly to him, and he listened intently with hardly any question or comment that I could see. Remember, he had not been on the job more than a week or so. This may have gone on for 45 minutes, this standing around, with Nancy off in the corner with Shultz. Sometimes she gestured with her finger, emphasizing a point, and he listening like a schoolboy. I have no idea what she was talking about but whatever it was it was really serious.

I was enjoying just standing around observing all this, and then, unfortunately, I was called away and had to go out to the foyer by the grand staircase, where there was a phone. It was someone in protocol calling from State. The question was, what to do with Mrs. Gandhi's son Rajiv, who had come on the visit with his family, although he was not listed as an official member of the delegation. Protocol had assumed he would take part in the White House meetings, after the one-on-one. Now, protocol had learned that Rajiv was not to be in the meetings, so what to do with him? I suggested, or maybe I just agreed, that he would go around and see the monuments with a car and an escort.

By the time I was finished with that meeting and had walked around back to the Red Room, the Oval Office meeting had concluded, and it was time for my wife and me to leave. Historians will have to look into the archives to see if there is any record of that one-on-one meeting, but as we understood it at the time there was no observer. I can only imagine that President Reagan used his personal charm, and I don't think there was any guile to it, I'll bet; it was just that he was interested in getting to know this lady. I suspect they didn't talk very much about bilateral relations, either. I don't know what they talked about and in the week that followed, there was no readout, no report. Perhaps no one knows. That's hard to believe. Does our government work that way? Whatever, I'm sure the full brunt of his charm was brought to bear, and I think it worked, because it turned out to be a really pleasant week-long visit. There were no tensions that I can remember. She was true to her word; she was friendly. And of course the President looked like he was having the time of his life.

The White House really made an effort to impress and show respect to the leaders of India. The conductor of the New York Philharmonic at that time was Zubin Mehta, originally from India. It was a natural for the whole Philharmonic Orchestra to come to the White House to give a concert on the eveing of the State Dinner, to which my wife and I were invited. We were told this had never been done in the history of the White House. Fortunately, it was a beautiful night, and the concert was held out on the south lawn.

My desk colleague, Dan Waterman and his wife, also attended from the office. We didn't have any idea how one should arrive at the White House, and we never thought to get protocol's advice. I changed into my tux in the men's room at State and strolled over to the White House gate behind the Old Executive Office Building, and my wife drove downtown in our little VW Rabbit. Fortunately, at that hour, about 6:30 pm, it was easy for her to find a parking place around the White House. Mrs. Waterman had done the same, and the four of us met up at the gate without any advance planning.

In the meantime, there is this long parade of big black limosines lined up coming into the White House. All the other guests were savvy enough to have figured out that one rented a limosine for the evening. Quite stately and slowly, they went up the drive, stopped under the portico and as the guests stepped out and handed the invitation to a doorman, their names were announced on a loudspeaker. But we didn't have a car, so the four of us just strolled up the driveway. Fortunately, we did get in because we had our invitations. .

The evening was quite something. Our office had been asked to suggest people for the guest list, but our list had been small, and there were several hundred guests present. The trouble with White House dinners like this is that there is no guest list posted, so you don't know who else is there unless you recognize a face. You only learn when the guest list is published in the paper the next morning. You just have to mingle and find out who is who. The singer Wayne Newton and his wife were there, and my wife and I hit it off with them and later sitting with them during the concert.

Q: Well, how did the rest of the tour go?

EISENBRAUN: The rest of the tour went without a hitch. I was lucky enough to be part of the group that travelled with Mrs. Gandhi to Los Angeles and Honolulu. It is standard that the White House offered one of the Presidential planes for the in-country part of the visit, and the plane we used was also Air Force One when the President was onboard. She flew to Los Angeles, and the California governor, Jerry Brown, was waiting for her and so was the mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley. I think she had a very fine visit in Los Angeles, marred from her side just slightly by the fact that there's a large Sikh community in California and so there were noisy demonstrations outside of the hotel demanding that she recognize their interest in a separate homeland for the Sikh community in India. I don't know to what extent Mrs. Gandhi was affected by them. It certainly didn't appear that she even paid any attention. She essentially set her own agenda in California, and we had little to do but sightseeing for a day. Howie and I took a stroll down Rodeo Drive to the Beverly Hills Hotel. I know Mrs. Gandhi had a meeting with Armand Hammer, who was a real friend of India and the Nehru family, going back decades. He was the chairman of one of the major oil companies.

Q: Occidental.

EISENBRAUN: Occidental, that's it

Q: This is tape six, side one with Steve Eisenbraun. Yes.

EISENBRAUN: A lot of her meetings in California were personal, although there was a big reception in the evening. Amazingly we saw some of the same Indians and Americans at the events in Los Angeles as we had in Washington, including Zubin Mehta.

Ten we flew on to Hawaii and by the time we got there all the major meetings were over and it was just- time to relax and have a good time. Some wealthy Americans in Hawaii gave an elegant dinner for her and she presented a baby elephant to the zoo. That brought an end to her seven days or so in the States. Mrs. Gandhi was relaxed, friendly and joking at the zoo in her presentation of the elephant, and you could see that the Indian delegation thought this visit had been a great success. She had been received lavishly and that had made a difference, I think, in the relationship between New Delhi and Washington. So this helped Harry Barnes in his quest for improved relations.

I want to recount an incident in Hawaii after Mrs. Gandhi departed. Harry Barnes had engineered a luncheon with Admiral Robert Long, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, at his hilltop office overlooking Pearl Harbor. Howie and I joined the lunch, but all I remember of it now is that at the end, Admiral Long asked Howie and me if we had had a chance to visit the Battleship Arizona memorial during the trip. We said no, there hadn't been time, and the plane was leaving in an hour or two. He replied, you can't leave without seeing the Arizona, and he turned to his aide and ordered, Lieutenant, use a staff car and escort these people down to Pearl and to the memorial! So the lieutenant did, moving us through the various security checkpoints rapidly enough that we got to join a tourist boat out to the memorial and then get to neighboring Hickam Field in time for the flight. I am grateful to Admiral Long for making that visit possible, as I haven't been back to Hawaii since. I am doubly grateful also because, at that time, there was a veteran volunteering at the memorial that had been at Pearl Harbor during the attack on

December 7, 1941. He answered lots of questions about that day and about serving on a submarine from the war, also berthed there. I wanted to tell this story for the benefit of my oldest son, John, who is now a lieutenant in the navy and serves on a nuclear submarine in the Pacific.

OK, almost immediately after returning to Washington, I began preparations for a long trip out to India. I spent three weeks or so on that trip, going to all the major cities before heading off to Lahore again, then London. Everywhere, the topic of discussion was Mrs. Gandhi's trip. Many astute Indians asked what had been achieved by the visit. On most visits, it would be standard to sign some kind of agreement or come to some understanding of how relations would be improved, but there was none of that to point to. In this case, it was mostly atmospherics. Some of the observers in India probably didn't share the same enthusiasm that I was conveying, that oh, this had been a very fine visit and that this will make a difference, at least in the short run, in bilateral relations.

I found the situation there troubling for Mrs. Gandhi. Everywhere I went, after they talked about the visit, political leaders of all stripes talked about how difficult Mrs. Gandhi's political situation was in India and that she had serious trouble with this Sikh rebel movement in the Punjab that was seeking an independent homeland called Khalistan. That was the group which had demonstrated in front of her hotel in Los Angeles and that she had ignored. I heard also that the Congress Party that she headed was not being responsive to people's needs on the local level and that it was a shadow of what it had been in its heyday under her father, Jawaharlal Nehru. I was surprised. I think it's fair to say this kind of reporting was not coming out of the embassy in Delhi in great quantity.

I remember I came back to Washington and wrote a trip report entitled Political Potholes for Mrs. Gandhi in which I noted the Sikh problem and the lack of responsiveness of the party. That paper should be in the archives and probably still sits there. I'm curious what exactly I said in light of what happened a few years later, that is, the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi by members of her Sikh bodyguard.

Maybe I can turn to just a few other items during my tenure as desk officer and then we'll put that era to rest.

Q: By the time she made her state visit, I believe there had been a serious incident at the Golden Temple. Had that happened yet or not? I can't remember.

EISENBRAUN: No, that happened in June, 1984. Sikh militants had taken over the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest spot for Sikhs, and the Indian army was called to flush them out.

Q: How about Bhopal? When did that happen?

EISENBRAUN: December 1984. Poisonous gases leaked out of a pesticide plant, causing approximately 2,000 deaths, the worst industrial accident in history.

Q: What company was that?

EISENBRAUN: It was the American-owned Union Carbide company.

Q: Union Carbide, yes.

EISENBRAUN: Are there any other questions before?

Q: No, no.

EISENBRAUN: There are a few other personal things that were kind of interesting during that tenure. One, of course, was the movie, Gandhi, which had its American premiere in Washington in the winter following Mrs. Gandhi's visit. That would have been late '82 or early '83.

Q: It was a British production?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, it was a British film, with its world premiere in New Delhi. The Washington event was held at the Uptown Theater on Connecticut Avenue, if you know it. The event was a pretty glittering thing. Virtually nobody at the working level at State was being invited, but I was able to get tickets for my wife and me and Howie and his wife, Tezi.

This is how that happened. There was a gentleman who was Under Secretary for Cultural Affairs in the Reagan administration by the name of Daniel Terra. He was an influential man on the arts scene from Chicago. He took a major interest in India during the two years I was on the India desk, and certainly was a figure in the social side of the Gandhi visit. I had become friendly with his office staff, including his secretary. OK, so the movie premiere was coming and nobody that we knew of in the State Department was being invited. So I called up Daniel Terra's secretary and pointed this out and said, it sure would be nice if a couple of tickets could be made available. She said you're absolutely right. So she made six to eight tickets available to us. It was only through her good will that she did it, not because we were important.

I think it was supposed to be a 7:30 pm event, so about six we were at the Department and our wives were meeting us separately, just like the White House dinner. We all got in a taxi together to head up to Connecticut Avenue. The traffic was at a virtual standstill, with little movement from Dupont Circle on. We could see a spotlight reflecting off the clouds, and we said, gee, there must be something important going on, I wonder what it is? We were so naïve. As it turned out, the spotlight was for the film, and all the traffic was backed up because of the film and all these limousines and VIPs and so forth arriving and, once again, we were caught completely by surprise, but somehow we did manage to get in. Afterwards, there was a beautiful reception at the Corcoran Gallery of Art, where I met the director, Sir Richard Attenborough. Ben Kingsley, the actor who played Gandhi and who won the Oscar some weeks later as best actor for his performance as Mahatma Gandhi, was not at that reception. I listened to Attenborough as he described the filming in India. He reminded us that Hindus believe in reincarnation. He said that when they filmed at the actual locations where Gandhi had done many of his famous things, there were people around who could still remember seeing the real Gandhi doing the same things, and some people declared he had been reborn.

Q: By the way, on the movie, you know, you get these movies and then all of a sudden a country that's portrayed or something turns it into, you know, takes umbrage at something. I remember I was in Yugoslavia when Lawrence of Arabia came out and the Turks were making a big fuss about it. We had a- we were showing the movie in our embassy club and they were being- we couldn't open it up to the diplomats because the Turks were raising bloody hell. And I was just wondering whether- did the Indians seem to like, I mean, really care for the movie?

EISENBRAUN: I believe so. I never heard a word of criticism from anyone in India. Maybe my memory has dimmed on this, but I remember nothing but praise from the Indian side for this movie, this sympathetic portrayal of Mahatma Gandhi and the fight for independence. I don't know that it was so appreciated, though, in Pakistan because Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the political leader that led the creation of Pakistan, and who was a rival of Gandhi's, was not treated very sympathetically in the film. I certainly heard this from my Pakistani friends, that they didn't appreciate his portrayal.

Q: I might mention this offhand. A USIA (United States Information Agency) officer whose name I forget but I knew he played the British general who brought about the massacre.

EISENBRAUN: In Amritsar.

Q: Yes. He got very, very British and they drafted him for that.

EISENBRAUN: Wow.

Q: Yes.

EISENBRAUN: Yes, that is a very dramatic moment in the film and a terrible moment in history, too.

Now, just a few other things, just fun, but I have to tell them. At another point during my two years, this would have been after the Gandhi visit, I got another call from Daniel Terra's secretary one morning and she said the undersecretary is going to be meeting with the actor Danny Kaye in a few minutes and would you go down to the entrance and meet him and escort him up? I said sure. So I dropped my pencil and went down to the lobby, the same where I had hid behind the pillar when the Indian gentleman had come. Well, in this case I went again outside the doors and this time there was a red carpet put out; some real VIP was coming into the building, but it wasn't there for Danny Kaye. This limousine pulls up and he peeked out the door, saying to me, is it OK to get out, seeing the red carpet.

He's passed on now, so there's a generation that perhaps doesn't even know who I'm talking about, but Danny Kaye was a major Hollywood actor that I recognized immediately. He said to me, is it OK to get out, and I replied, sure, come on in. We went upstairs, and Terra invited me to come in for the meeting. Danny Kaye was there because he was the UNICEF Ambassador of goodwill, and he was a good friend of India and he'd either just been to India or was just about to go. We spent the rest of the morning, at least an hour and a half, being entertained, as Kaye told us story after story.

One story was about this big European palace where he had met some king, and Kaye said he didn't have a clue what to do, and he made this into a sidesplitting monologue. He got up and mimicked or pantomimed what he had done; this long walk up to the throne, stumbling and mumbling. All the while I was thinking, what a lucky guy I am, because I grew up watching Danny Kaye in movies like White Christmas with Bing Crosby

Q: No.

EISENBRAUN: Yes, I think so.

Q: I wouldn't swear to this.

EISENBRAUN: I think so.

Q: It was Bing Crosby and Fred Astaire.

EISENBRAUN: I'm sure it was Danny Kaye in White Christmas. Whatever the case, I grew up watching Danny Kaye in movies, and here I was sitting in the State Department, lucky enough to spend all morning with him. I got a photo shot with him, which is on my office wall at home, along with the photo of the Reagan reception for Mrs. Gandhi.

Sometime in that second year, Walt Rostow, the former national security advisor for Lyndon Johnson, was asked to go on a speaking tour to India. He called up the desk asked to get a briefing in person from the desk officer, that is, me, before going to India. To the younger people listening to this or reading this, they may not even be sure who Walt Rostow was, but he was quite a controversial figure during the Vietnam War because he was a super hawk and that made him very a lightning rod for criticism during Lyndon Johnson's presidency. And here I was, talking to Walt Rostow on the phone, and he said I want to come in and get a briefing about current events in India and our bilateral relationship. And I said to him, well, I'm happy to talk to you but on the other hand, there are more senior people above me you should speak with. He said no, I do not want to meet anyone more senior, I don't want to shake their hand or even know I'm in the building. They'll just give me a line, I don't want to have to hear a line, I want to have a candid, off the record, chitchat. I said okay.

Well, I told my boss, but we followed Rostow's instructions. I went down and met him in the lobby and he came up to my office and we shut the door and nobody came in to shake his hand, no one said a word. I'm sitting there one on one for an hour or more with the former national security advisor. He asked very perceptive questions about India. I wanted to ask him about Vietnam but was too timid until he brought it up. He said people didn't understand our position in Vietnam, and he spoke with passion about the memory. I thought, here I am, a kid from Iowa, seven or eight years into the Foreign Service, and first it's Danny Kaye and now it's Walt Rostow.

In the spring of '82, before the Gandhi visit, around mid-afternoon, my colleague who handled the science and technology matters walked into my office and said, can you imagine this? I just

got off the phone with NASA (National Air and Space Administration) and it turns out that America is launching a communications satellite for India from Cape Canaveral tomorrow at 2:00 in the morning. NASA's sending a private jet down to observe the launch and they're asking me if I want to go along. He said, are you crazy, at 2:00 in the morning? That was his attitude. I said, well, wait a minute. I'll go. He said, well, if you want to, here's the NASA telephone number. So I walked into Howie's office and said, hey, let's go down to Cape Canaveral tomorrow. He said great, let's go. So the next day we went over to National Airport, where NASA had this Lear jet for the Indian Ambassador to the UN and us, plus a NASA guide.

En route to Cape Canaveral, a great storm came up that forced the plane to land somewhere remote in Georgia. NASA was fast on its feet and got us to a local Marriott for dinner until the storm abated. Then we had to fly way out into the Atlantic to go around the storm before we could land in Florida. The storm caused the postponement of the launch until the next night at 2:00 am. We were put up at a little Holiday Inn on Cocoa Beach. As a kid, I had gotten up early each time for the first space launches, such as John Glenn's and others, which were all televised.

The question became what to do with us for a day while we waited. So NASA put together an inside tour of the space center that included quite a bit of going around to the original launch pads where the Redstone rockets sent Alan Shepherd into orbit and then where John Glenn was launched. In 1982, these sites had fallen into disrepair, with grass growing out of the launch pad and they had been abandoned, basically, for the bigger launch pads being prepared for the space shuttle, which had not been launched yet.

That night at 2:00 in the morning we all got on the bus and went to an observation spot about a half mile away from the launch site. For people who haven't observed a night launch, it is something else. The brightness of the rocket, and this wasn't even the largest rocket that's in the American inventory, but it was just, I mean, I had no idea how bright the glare would be from the exhaust and how it lit up the entire landscape from horizon to horizon, , like the second coming of Christ. And then, as bright as it had been, the rocket disappeared in the clouds and the glare faded away.

Q: Well, back just a touch to this time, this '81 to '83 period. In December of '79 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and a war was developing there. How were relations as we observed them between India and the Soviet Union during this period?

EISENBRAUN: Well, I touched on that earlier. The relationship continued to be close.

Q: Basically I really was asking, by '81 things had developed. Where did the relationship stand while you were on the desk?

EISENBRAUN: The Soviets had given the Indians license to produce locally many military items, such as a fighter jet, if my memory is accurate. This was a potentially destabilizing element in South Asia, and the commercial relationship was fairly strong as well. There were a lot of really bright Indian students who were being sent to Moscow for training at no cost to the students. I met some of these students later. They said that although they appreciated the free education, but they had had virtually no interchange with the Soviet people. The Indians said

they sensed a certain degree of condescension from the Soviets. I don't know that that people-to-people relationship paid off very much. The Indians got educated, but it didn't buy the Soviets any particular goodwill.

A phrase we often used in our briefings was that we sought "a constructive" relationship. By that we meant we know it's not going to be warm and friendly despite one-on-one meetings in the White House and so forth, there were great strategic barriers to having a seriously close relationship. But hopefully the relationship wouldn't deteriorate into verbal insults and trouble back and forth either. And so the middle ground was a constructive relationship. If anyone goes back to look at our talking points, if they're ever possible to find, you will see that word constructive appearing a lot. I know that was one of Howie Schaffer's favorite phrases.

I don't remember whether this was prior to or after Mrs. Gandhi's visit. Anyway, she gave a speech in which she blamed the foreign hand for whatever the trouble was at that moment in India. Well, that's code in India for either interference from Pakistan or interference from America. In this case it was pretty clear that she meant America. Her remarks broke in Washington in the morning, and Larry Eagleburger as Under Secretary for Political Affairs called in the Indian Ambassador, a man named Narayan who later became the president of India. I was there as the note taker, and I have to tell this about Eagleburger, he was a master at controlling situations either with brilliance, humor or toughness. In this case there was hardly any pleasantries, he simply shook the Ambassador's hand and sat him down and there was silence for a moment or two. It was Eagleburger's meeting, so the Indian was waiting.

Then, Eagleburger dropped the palm of his hand down on his leg very hard and sudden, and he got the angle just right, so the report was like a shotgun going off. We all jumped a foot in the air. Then he said I don't want anymore of this nonsense. What is this foreign hand baloney we're hearing from Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi? I won't stand for it. That's crazy and you know it and I won't have it and you go tell her so. And that was the end of the meeting. The Indian said, yes, sir, and left.

Q: Spell her first name.

EISENBRAUN: Well, it's an adopted name from Nigeria, Aduah. On my last day of work a year later, a few of us went for beers as a farewell, and she admitted then that her original first name had been Patricia, but there are few who knew that.

So, back on my first day in August, 1992, Aduah said she really needed help, because she said, frankly I'm not a very good writer, not so good at drafting things, but I'm good with people and policy ideas. And that she was—superb, actually, as I learned from working with her. She said help me out. Okay, I said, that's fine. As it turned out, almost unbelievably, I ended up at first with the same portfolio that I had at just left at IO/UNP, because Senator Simon had the same interests, UN peacekeeping, Somalia, apartheid., but his interests ranged over the whole African continent, of course.

I was able to draw on the knowledge I had gained in the two previous years. First off, she asked me to do a briefing paper for Senator Simon on the Somalia situation. She said he'll be meeting

with some senior people when he gets back from the August recess. Well, it was exactly the same type of assignment I'd had in the State Department. I discovered it was a lot easier writing a briefing memo on the committee staff, because I didn't have to clear it with anybody; I just showed it to Aduah. She made a couple of worthwhile suggestions and it went to Senator Simon.

When we did bigger briefing papers, there was one clearance to be obtained and that was from the committee staffer on the other side, the Republican side of the committee. At that time the ranking Republican member was Senator Jesse Helms. Helms had a good fellow doing African work. Tom Callahan. I just bumped into him the other day and he's working in the Department himself now, 13 years later, as an appointee. So anyway, that was the only clearance needed. On the smaller matters, I worked just with Aduah, putting her thoughts on paper, and adding my own. We worked well together. Anyone could have worked well with her. She had the kind of inclusive personality that brought people to her, and everyone wanted to help her and be associated with her.

Since I mentioned Senator Helms and his staff, it's worth a minute to note that, as I learned, it was unusual to have someone friendly, like Tom Callahan, on the republican staff in Helms' office. People on the democratic staff said that his previous staffers had been so uncooperative, so mean, frankly, that no one could work with them, and someone high ranking, I don't know who, had put his foot down and instructed Helms to restructure his committee staff.

Helms and his previous staff had caused a lot of grief at State over the years. I remember in 1983 going up with the new India desk office director, Victor Tomseth, to meet with a few of Helms' people when, if memory serves, Helms was planning a hearing on the issue of a separate homeland for the Sikhs in India, some of whom were fighting the Indian Government. Victor's point was that these radical Sikhs were terrorists, and that to give them the recognition of a hearing before the SFRC would cause trouble in our bilateral relations with India. The Helms staffers were indifferent to this; in fact, causing trouble for U.S. foreign policy may have been their primary purpose in the proposed hearing. Victor said he knew something about terrorists from his days as a hostage in Iran and that the proposed hearing would not be a good thing; they replied, sneering, well, you weren't a real hostage anyway because you were held at the Foreign Ministry. (Victor had been the second ranking hostage and had been at a meeting at the Foreign Ministry when the embassy was attacked.) That's the kind of people they were. By the way, Victor, a modest gentleman if there ever was one, would not have mentioned his experience as a hostage, but he had been asked to do it by someone higher at State.

BARBARA J. GOOD
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Calcutta (1981-1984)

Barbara J. Good joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served in La Paz, Rome, Buenos Aires, Kobe/Osaka, Paris, Calcutta, Amman, and Washington, DC. This interview took place on May 25, 1993.

Q: Before we go back to the Reagan-Bush thing, you worked in Calcutta, didn't you, for a couple of years, what were you doing?

GOOD: I was then very fortunate to be accepted on detail to USIS in Calcutta as Cultural Affairs Officer for 2 1/2 years from 1981 to 1984. The education and cultural program is one of the most effective ways of putting a human face on America and Americans in foreign lands and is a central and indispensable vehicle for promoting our international objectives in the political, social, commercial, economic and trade arenas.

My previous multilateral experience contributed significantly to my role as CAO with responsibilities as Director at the American University Center (AUC) and the libraries in both the AUC and the American Center (AC). Serving in a highly intellectual city was unique; one of the most rewarding experiences of my 37 years in the Foreign Service. Perhaps the most impressive element was related to collaboration with high-level Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) who worked in USIS American Centers. Calcutta Bengali FSNs are among the most intelligent, creative and work-oriented employees of any USIS operation in the world. As a result we were able to accomplish outstanding programs and relations with leaders throughout our Consular district.

At the AUC, in addition to presenting dissemination of key U.S. foreign and economic concepts (in order to challenge Marxist world views as subscribed to by important elite groups in Calcutta), I was required to strengthen and increase both educational and cultural programs and projects in the arts. I had to achieve this goal by expanding programs which stressed their inter-relationship, and carried out U.S. policy on advancing human rights for all minority groups with particular emphasis on rights of women by developing contacts with experts in this field in Eastern India. After 4 months in office my boss described my accomplishments as a remarkable job in both adapting to and being productive in a totally new job and cultural environment; an environment demanding enough to test the capabilities of even experienced officers. USIS Calcutta was much larger than many single-country posts in the Near East/South Asia, and a review of my work requirements indicated both the deep substance and considerable variety of work as Program Officer, that I charted for myself at the beginning of my assignment.

During USIS's planned Reduction in Force (RIF) I was able to play a special role. This was an extremely difficult period for FSNs and members of my staff at the AUC who felt particularly vulnerable inasmuch as one of the options was to close the Center. Allaying their fears and apprehensions in a city with practically no employment opportunities presented a challenge in winning their confidence and trust in helping to cushion the blow of the RIF.

With a reduction in the Indian personnel force the work situation became even more demanding of my patience and perseverance, especially since we lost such outstanding FSNs who were artists and cultural affairs experts.

My concern for human rights and women's rights in particular, resulted in my calling for an extension of post audiences to include Indian women prominent in business, social, political and educational fields. As a result of my contact with such people, and the women and men of Calcutta's media world, I was invited to discuss human rights issues with them in media sessions.

In addition to facing the frustrations arising from the continued deterioration of basic facilities of communications and transport in Calcutta, the AC and the AUC were subject to an unprecedented number of anti-American demonstrations, sometimes numbering one a day. Often students who participated in these demonstrations would tell me that they would join us in our international visitor dialogue programs right after their demonstrations ended. As an example of Indian resentment of U.S. foreign policy, AC's Library was attacked and ransacked on June 23, 1982 by 300 students protesting against an American who was alleged to have tried to destroy a mosque in Israel. But many Indian AC participants supported us and denounced the students' action. One Indian participant in an AUC program denounced our role in promoting foreign policy with press releases because he said they had enough toilet paper in their bathroom and didn't need our press releases for that purpose!

Also, for nearly eight months during this period the post was without a Branch PAO, obliging me to often assume important management responsibilities (including the Acting Branch PAO). On human rights and social processes I helped to lay the groundwork for a linkage with Jadavpur University's Department of International Relations and an American University and was able to convince USIS to send an international legal expert and activist Professor Richard Lillich. His visit marked the highpoint of the post's activities in the field of human rights since the 1981 Human Rights Day seminar resulted in a publication of the seminar papers on human rights implementation. His lecture at Calcutta University was tied in with that institution's 125th anniversary. Audiences were challenged to take a more active role locally in the enforcement of human rights. One of the AC's supporters -international lawyer Subrata Roy Chowdhury, who also served as legal adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, took off two weeks from his job to work with our task force and help to put this program together effectively. While it took two years to strengthen contacts and initiate long range programs in the field of human rights, I believe we finally developed a strong group of academics, social workers and legal experts working together to increase the enforcement of human rights. As a result of one of our programs there was interest in procedural aspects in utilizing international law in India with the ultimate goal of establishing a human rights law institute in Calcutta.

I was invited to address the Women's Christian College in Madras on the inauguration of their course in women's studies, having been instrumental in advising them on how to set up the women's studies course. This was related to my former position when I was assigned to the Secretariat for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and worked to convince UNESCO to broaden internationally women's studies.

In previous seminars I presented papers on women's rights and social justice in the U.S. I played a leadership role in organizing and participating in Hyderabad American Studies Research Center's Seminar on "Indian Perspectives of the Women's Movement in the U.S." I was then instrumental in organizing a follow-up seminar in Calcutta on "Women, Family and Social Change." I invited some of the leading Indian women experts whom I had met at the UN when I was Alternate Delegate to the UN Commission on the Status of Women and other leaders of successful organizations throughout India to participate in the seminar in order to provide a more positive view in Calcutta of efforts underway to improve the status of women. Given group rivalries, this took considerable time and patience in gaining the confidence of the leaders of

these organizations and convincing them to work together. As a result of this seminar I worked with FSNs and US Consul General George Sherman and his wife Nancy to establish a Women's Resource Center. This coalition of women's nongovernmental organizations comprised both traditional entities along with the more newly established radical feminist groups. This was obvious proof of what American CAOs can provide in "institution building" and with highly talented FSNs you can achieve far more.

Through a series of programs with this network of NGOs and social workers we sought to improve the status of women and minimize misperceptions of the women's movement in the U.S. by providing a forum for similar organizations to exchange ideas and resolve mutual problems.

Working with Indian colleagues at the AUC we were successful in carrying out an "alternative programming" concept to counter the influence of predominantly doctrinaire Soviet Marxist ideology in academic circles in Calcutta. The Center provided a forum for such ideologues, primarily academics, to interact with proponents of alternatives to Marxism.

Since many Bengalis thoroughly support American jazz, the American University Center developed a Jazz Club in Calcutta. When I was Director I was able to increase the knowledge and support of American jazz because this is a field I have focused on for decades, especially since this is one of the most unique contributions the U.S. has made to the world -- jazz, a truly classical style of music. It was my pleasure to introduce visiting American jazz musicians and describe the history and background at our jazz festivals where thousands of jazz lovers joined us. When I lectured in South Asia last January the members of the Jazz Club held a special party for me and we played many jazz tapes with primary focus on my brother Jerry Good, a jazz musician who formed a group titled the San Francisco Jazz Express. When I was assigned in Calcutta the Jazz Club requested his group visit them, but USIS couldn't afford to fund him. Unfortunately, Jerry died in 1990 at 55. In reflection of my fascinating assignment in Calcutta it was particularly gratifying to have been invited to deliver lectures in Calcutta as well as outside our Consular District and to moderate seminars at Calcutta University or participate in poetry reading programs for the public and media organized by local groups. In sum, I felt totally at home in public diplomacy and when I return to Calcutta these days it is like going home to family.

Now that I am working against female sexual slavery with the Coalition Against Trafficking Women and the International Abolitionist Federation, I am still in contact with women leaders and NGOs in India such as the All Bengal Women's Union which has spent decades rescuing women who are forced into prostitution, educating them and finding them careers and husbands.

HARRY G. BARNES JR.
Ambassador
India (1981-1985)

Ambassador Barnes was born in Minnesota and raised in Minnesota and New York. He was educated at Amherst College and Columbia University. After

service in the US Army in World War II, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted in 1950 to Bombay, India. His other foreign posts include Prague, Moscow, Kathmandu and Bucharest. He served as United States Ambassador to Romania (1974-1977; India (1981-1985) and Chile (1985-1996) in addition to having several senior level assignments at the State Department in Washington. Ambassador Barnes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: You've told us your very first assignment in the Foreign Service was to Bombay in 1951. Thirty years later you will serve as Ambassador from 1981 to 1985. [Editor's Note: Ambassador Barnes presented his credentials on November 17, 1981 and departed post in June 1985.] Before you went to post, what was the situation in India? Who was the prime minister? How were relations? What was going on there?

BARNES: The Prime Minister at the time was Indira Gandhi who had been ousted from office by elections some years earlier and had come back on an abolish poverty platform, and in part on the basis of not very great competence of the party that had taken her place. The attitude in Washington, because of the extreme, I would say non-alignment, approach of India, plus by that time you were beginning to get the spill over from the Afghan situation and the India government, if anything, was "understanding" about the Soviet motives for moving into Afghanistan. Whereas the United States was just beginning to figure out ways to dislodge the Soviets from there, which of course was a preoccupation for a number of years after that. All in all a negative cast, perception from the U.S. government's standpoint. Does the name Bud McFarlane mean anything to you? He was National Security Advisor. I mention him because about the time I was getting ready to go to India later in the year, he made a trip to Pakistan and to India, and brought back, not surprisingly in the context I was describing, pretty negative impressions of the Indian situation and its potential for complicating, if not harming, the U.S. policy as seen at that time.

Q: As you prepared for your congressional hearings and all, what issues did you perceive were going to be particularly important?

BARNES: Security, in the context I was talking about, the Afghan situation and Indian sympathy, if not actual support, for the Soviet position. Indo-Pakistan relations in the sense that Pakistan was seen, the phrase varied, as a key bulwark against Soviet intentions. Domestically, inhospitable Indian attitudes toward foreign investment in general, but American investment in particular. A series of problems or complaints from the American side, which were matched in their own way by the Indian side. The atmosphere was something between sour and...can't think of a good next sour word.

Let me recount one aspect that modifies what I just said. My appointment as Ambassador to India came through somewhere like June or so, and I spent the next couple of months with the usual preparations for an ambassador, but also spent some time at FSI with Hindi language lessons. In roughly October of that year there was an international gathering at Cancun, Mexico. I've forgotten under whose auspices it was held but it happened to include among the invited guests as heads of government, heads of state, both President Reagan and Indira Gandhi. Somebody in the White House was wise enough, at least in my judgment, to figure out that it

would not be a good idea not to have the President meet with Indira Gandhi. He was in any case schedule to meet with General Zia-ul-Haq, who at that point was the President of Pakistan. That idea went ahead with a certain amount of fear and trepidation on the part of various people in both the White House and at State. Not only would they not hit it off, but they would not hit it off so badly that a bad situation might be made worse. Dick Allen, who was the National Security Advisor, at that period and I talked after the meeting so I could get a fill in for how it went and in essence what he said was that it was remarkable how well they got on, much to everyone's surprise, and I think he said, or may be its my own imagination at this point, that it may have surprised the two of them themselves. So, I set off for Delhi at the end of that year with a somewhat better chance at good atmospherics than what I mentioned earlier.

Q: Well, Ronald Reagan was known for his charm. He got along extremely well with (British Prime Minister) Margaret Thatcher, (German Chancellor) Helmut Kohl. Particularly coming after the Nixon period, Kissinger got no where with Indira Gandhi. Did you find, this is jumping ahead a bit, that the Gandhi-Reagan relationship made your work a little easier?

BARNES: Definitely. Some months later, again with the Pakistan element in mind, the White House was drawing up its list of state visits for the ensuing year, 1982. Because of the continuing concern over Afghanistan it was deemed important to invite (President) Zia to pay a state visit to the United States and there was some discussion in Washington, which we in (New) Delhi took part, if you are inviting (President) Zia, should you invite Indira Gandhi? Or do you need to invite Gandhi just in case, to avoid other complications from the Indian standpoint? So, the decision was "yes" let's invite Indira Gandhi as well. So, we then began in Delhi quite and active period of preparing the ground, ideas, and proposals to send back to Washington as to what could be considered possible topics, possible approaches, and possible discussion themes. In brief I think again, going back to Cancun, they had a reasonably pleasant, satisfactory discussion with each other in Washington. The state dinner went well; in fact all the atmospherics were positive. A couple of things were decided upon in terms of programs which might be considered to be undertaken particularly in the area of science and agriculture.

Q: When you went to post could you describe the embassy, some of the people, your DCM. How well versed were they in Indian affairs?

BARNES: The DCM was actually someone 4. The previous DCM was scheduled to leave. Marion Creekmore, do you know him? We had a pretty good mix of people who had a background in South Asia, which I found useful. We had a good Science Attaché, because science was one of the areas we needed to work on. Without grading individuals, we had a good to very good staff of people.

Q: What was the political situation inside India when you got there?

BARNES: Indira Gandhi, as I said, was back in power, after having been out for a couple of years as I mentioned earlier. Pakistan, from the Indian standpoint, continued to be, from the Indian standpoint, a threat and there were increasing incidents in Kashmir, which the Indians were convinced were Pakistani sponsored or encouraged, which was probably correct.

One issue that came up fairly soon was that of supply of nuclear fuel to an Indian east coast reactor, it was one that had been constructed with American blessing, if not American assistance a number of years earlier. But then the Indians had detonated their own nuclear explosion which in effect was one of the causes which contributed to the non-proliferation legislation in this country. But that was pre-NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), but the question already arose from the U.S. standpoint whether the U.S. could continue to provide nuclear fuel to that reactor as we had undertaken to do earlier or whether the Indian action cancelled that obligation. The solution, if that is the right word, which was worked out in that period, and I was involved in some of that, was that the French government would supply the fuel with American acquiescence. This was agreeable to the Indians and I became involved in some negotiations with the French ambassador in (New) Delhi. But as is obvious now, for the last year or so, the efforts of this Administration to try to work out a different type of nuclear deal with India, the problem has not gone away yet.

Q: During your tour in India, what was your impression of the Congress Party? Was it sort of getting too old, been around too long?

BARNES: Indira Gandhi was such a dominant figure that she is almost a substitute, vocabulary-wise, for the Congress Party at that point. There were other people who were prominent at the state level and to some extent at the national level, but almost anything that was important in the area of foreign policy, not to mention domestic, involved her, or could involve her. So, you can talk about the Congress Party, but it did not have that much meaning as a political party in terms of the overall policies of the government.

Q: Talking about the time you were there, the Soviets and the Indians had a pretty close relationship in a number of areas, but it never seemed like a very good fit. Would you comment on that?

BARNES: Perhaps there was a contradiction. It wasn't a warm relationship, but it was warm enough to serve both countries purposes. It is useful from the Soviet standpoint to have a major non-aligned country "understand" Soviet interests, Soviet concerns, and so on. But Indira Gandhi, at the same time, made it quite clear that she was the Prime Minister of India and India was not a Soviet satellite state and India would not necessarily do "A," "B," or "C" just because the Soviets wanted it done. And although I don't...in fact I know I can't prove...my own guess at the time was that she and the Congress Party leadership were upset with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They didn't mind the distraction that might provide for the Pakistanis. From their standpoint, such a distraction might deflect Pakistani attention from Kashmir. She wasn't in anyway interested in India becoming or even appearing to become a Soviet satellite. I think part of the reasons she and Ronald Reagan got along well was that she knew it was in India's interest to have a better rather than a worse relationship with the United States. That didn't mean that she like much of what the United States did in that area, or elsewhere, or liked superpowers in general.

Q: Now, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 and you arrived in India a year later. Was this at all a subject of discussion or concern in India at the time, or was there an acceptance of the Soviet move?

BARNES: I would say on the whole it was...I would make a distinction between acceptance and acquiesce. It is not something the Indians would have sought. It is not something, as I think I implied earlier, that they therefore welcomed. But because of the Pakistan element it was useful to India, which seemed a pretty utilitarian approach.

Q: There is this Foreign Service image that relations between the embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi were contentious. How did that work during your ambassadorship?

BARNES: It didn't, in the sense that it wasn't contentious. I think there were two or three ambassadors in Islamabad during the time I was in India [Editor's Note: While Ambassador Barnes was in New Delhi, U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan were Ronald Spiers (1981-1983) and Deane Hinton (1983-1986)]. We exchanged visits; I went to Pakistan at least a couple of times. We tried to keep each other posted on things that were going on that we thought were relevant. I didn't feel any animosity...sure you get a certain amount, I suppose you would call it, of localities but it didn't, to the best of my recollection, distract us that much from what we were both attempting to do. Dean Hinton was there part of the time; Ron Spiers part of the time. Am I missing anyone else?

Q: India is a large country with an ancient and storied culture. How did your staff respond to such an absorbing place?

BARNES: My best recollection is that the staff on the whole was able to become comfortable in the Indian milieu. Not unexpectedly, there were common concerns about health and for people who had not been in South Asia before, just a certain amount of adjustment to the sheer numbers of people. I don't recall any particular problems.

Q: How many consulates did we have in India? What was their relationship to the embassy?

BARNES: Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. I was fortunate to have good consul generals in these posts during most of that period. I tried to travel to the consulates a couple of times a year. Part of my visit would be to travel to areas outside of the consulate city; to other parts of the consular district. Usually the consul general would come along. Periodically we would get together in Delhi and coordinate our activities.

Q: One of the Indian states, Kerala, had a communist government. Were we at all concerned?

BARNES: Two states. Kerala on the west coast south of Bombay, in which the communist party of India; there are two communist parties in India, had a leading role in the state government. The other was West Bengal, Calcutta, and that was what was called the CPM, Communist Party-Marxist, which is in the present government and is as a matter of fact playing an important role. It is major coalition party for the current Congress-led government. They could even bring the government down, if they thought an issue important enough. It is a little hard to tell what the "Marxist" label means these days.

Q: While you were there, did we feel these local communist governments had close ties to the Soviet system, agents of the Soviet Union, or were they pretty much Indian?

BARNES: Pretty much Indian and not Soviet agents.

Q: What was it like to deal with the Indian government? I had some dealings with the Indian Consul General in Saigon. A difficult interaction. It seems like the Americans and the Indians both like to preach. (laughter)

BARNES: We both are very aware of our own capabilities and our own, should I say, righteous approach to problems. It may be unkind to Americans, but sometimes we resent anyone else preaching, since we assume we have sole right to the preaching platform.

Q: Did you find that we often were talking past each other?

BARNES: I guess I would make two comments. One, you had to keep reminding yourself particularly with certain people, certain Indians, that this was a trap you could fall into, getting overly preachy yourself. Secondly, you want to be, if not sympathetic, at least smart enough to understand what it was that the Indians were getting at and what the real problems were and what were only the surface problems. But on the whole, I found in my own interaction with people in government that you could set up a good working relationship and that there was sometimes a latent and sometimes a more openly expressed admiration for the United States and a certain, not regret, but at least a certain wish, that the relationship between the two countries was better than it was; that it ought to be better than is often was. There were periods, as for example after the Gandhi visit to the U.S. when we began to work on more cooperative projects than the sort that had been worked on in earlier years, earlier administrations. The sense that really we did indeed, not only in words, but also in terms of activities, had a lot in common. That helped.

Q: Did you find in covering India with its multiple parties and vast size that you were on the road a lot?

BARNES: Yes, but it was deliberate on my part, because of the size and diversity of the country, I thought I needed to have some sense first hand, albeit limited, of what the regional variations were or the variations, in any, in intensity of the particular issues. That is why I relied a lot on the consulates general (CG), including the trips I would make periodically and calling in the CGs to Delhi.

Q: You have a reputation of being adept at languages. You had some FSI Hindi, how useful was it?

BARNES: It was not as useful as I hoped it would be when I first started studying it, because “too many” Indians with whom I dealt were even in some ways more fluent than I in English. On the other hand, I did give occasional talks in Hindi, particularly in the rural areas, the Hindi speaking parts of India. Outside of Delhi I could use Hindi as well. I think I got a certain amount, how should I say, credit because I had made an effort to try to understand and use the language.

Q: Did you find the London School of Economics socialism was pervasive among government people, as with other former British colonies, such as in Africa?

BARNES: As much as anything I would say it was a feeling perhaps in good part inherited from the British times, but also from socialism, the role of government was important, not just in terms of necessarily government institutions, including economic institutions, but also in the sense that India couldn't allow its economic structure or economic activities to be unduly influenced by foreigners. This applies to the Soviets as well as to ourselves. Let me add one more thing which I think is more a British inheritance perhaps, although some of it goes back to Nehru's time. That is the feeling that government control or often government regulation of almost every part of economic life was necessary to safeguard the Indian people from exploitation. That may be more Fabian, I'm not sure.

Q: What sort of role did the Soviet Ambassador have? How about your relations with him?

BARNES: Our relationship was not very frequent; polite, but not a great deal of contact.

Q: Were the British pretty active there?

BARNES: Yes, the British were definitely involved and I had very close relations with the various British ambassadors.

Q: How about China?

BARNES: China, let me put it this way, friendly enough, not the point of being able to get useful, for me anyway, insights into life in India. This was still was still a period, which would last for a number of years, of tension between India and China which grew out of the early 1960s war between India and China in the Himalayas. On the other hand at one point, I wanted to get visas for China. My father-in-law was born in China of missionary parents and my wife and I and my parents-in-law wanted to take advantage of their being in Delhi visiting us to go on to China to see if we couldn't see any of the places which he had been associated as a child. So, we had the Chinese Ambassador and his wife come up to our house for tea on afternoon to solicit their support for Chinese visas. That was very non committable in terms of talking about anything very serious, very pleasant in terms of a cup of tea on an afternoon.

Q: Were there any particular issues between China and India at this time?

BARNES: No, aside from that very general atmospherics. As the two countries began to develop their economies, the relationship between the two began to change ever so imperceptively. On October 31, 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated. I had gotten to know Rajiv (Gandhi) the first couple of years I was there and continued to see a certain amount of him after he became Prime Minister, more than I saw or was able to see Indira. He began fairly early on in his prime ministership to loosen some of the government controls on economic activity and to at least begin thinking about other ways to organize society; over what we discussed earlier as the Fabian approach. He was invited fairly early on in his prime ministership in June 1985 to the U.S.. He had a very useful and successful visit in terms of the overall relationship, opening

possibilities which had not been there with his mother. So when you are talking about Indian development, that marks, perhaps not a watershed, but at least a start.

Q: While you were there were you looking at various ethnic divisions in politics and society. After all, it was her Sikh bodyguard that killed her.

BARNES: I would say on politics you have a somewhat more open approach taken by Rajiv, than had ever been taken by Indira. He was clearly not only Prime Minister, but part of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. But he also was more of a listener and more of an innovator than his mother was. From our standpoint, we thought we should find opportunity in that change in attitude through visits that we could encourage in government and the private sector.

Q: Were we concerned that this huge and diverse country might split apart?

BARNES: No. Let me qualify that. In his mother's case, with Indira, she of course was assassinated by some angry, disaffected Sikhs who felt that her approach, her policies toward Sikh aspirations for a separate state, something even more Sikh than the state of Punjab. Yet, I don't know many of us foreign observers who can claim credit for having foreseen, before the assassination, that there were tensions there that were increasing as a matter of fact. Of course, one could go back to Gandhi to recognize the role assassination played in Indian politics. Rajiv would later be assassinated.

But a Moslem separatism, not a major force, aside from the fact that Kashmir was a case apart. Kashmir was not just a Moslem-Hindu issue, but it was Kashmiri versus various parts of India. The rest of the country, no. You had had going back to Nehru's time agitation in a number of parts of the country for what were called linguistic states, that is, in the Bombay area what ought to be predominate were the Marathi speakers; or in that in Madras that ought to be predominate were the Tamil speakers in the south. You sometimes got questions then of where the boundaries should be drawn, but that pretty much was settled on Nehru's watch by the 1960s.

Indira Gandhi at one level gave a stand-offish appearance, regal may not be the right word, but it has an element of that. At one point during our stay there, I decided to try an experiment, so to speak, I asked her to dinner and was surprised that she accepted. Not only did she accept, but she brought her son, Rajiv and her grandchildren, one of whom is now that head of the Congress Party, Rahul. And a good time was had by all, to all appearances.

Q: Let's talk about Pakistan and Kashmir. Did we have a plan or a stand on the issues, or did we hope the whole thing would go away?

BARNES: I, of course, was indirectly involved in Pakistan. The visits I mentioned were about four or five in number and it was hard to think about American interests in India without having to be aware of American interests in Pakistan. My overall impression of U.S. policy at the time was that if, with our assistance, continued pressure and in fact increased pressure could be brought on the Soviets, then they might go away. But I don't think that anyone at that time, I'm talking about the mid-1980s obviously, expected the Soviet Union to collapse in the way it did five years out.

You see, this ties into Pakistan because of the situation in Afghanistan. I guess my point was that U.S. policy toward Pakistan was that Pakistan is a front line state and Pakistan's help is needed in order to be able to carry on the proxy war in Afghanistan. That was the be all and end all. Not a great deal of concern or worry about what was happening inside Pakistan.

Q: Did you perceive within the United States either a Pakistan or Indian lobby or a congressional bloc that felt strongly about our relations one way or the other.

BARNES: I would say as a general generality that given the Cold War context, a feeling that we had to do all we could to support Pakistan because the brave Pakistanis were fighting the Soviets. With India I found, I'm thinking now of the American congress, I found a willingness to recognize, in some cases to remember from an earlier era, that the U.S. had, potentially anyway, a long-term interest in India. That if India were a success, then that success would be important in a global sense, that is, with a willingness to recognize that there was an Indian potential that was important to the U.S. and not relatively short-term which was the case in Pakistan. I couldn't give you an exact number of what later became in effect a sort of congressional India-favorable caucus, which was already taking shape at that point. I think to some extent Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States, and then Rajiv's accession later, helped people think about the fact that the situation regarding India was more complicated than there might be more benefits, interest that we had than we might initially suspect.

Q: On the nuclear issue, how did it stand at the time you were there?

BARNES: The nuclear issues, aside from the supply of fuel that I mentioned was not a major issue. This was before people started to talk about non-proliferation.

Q: How did the news of the assassination of Indira Gandhi come to you and what did we do?

BARNES: I was at a session of teachers and administrators at the American school, which was a couple of blocks from the Embassy. Do you know Delhi by the way? Couple of blocks from the Embassy talking over school problems when suddenly someone dashed in and said "Indira Gandhi's been shot!" That's how I found out.

Q: How did we see the political situation? Did Rajiv seem an obvious replacement?

BARNES: There was no question it would be Rajiv. It did not take any great foresight to come to that conclusion. To the extent that we knew him, and not many Americans did, I probably knew him as well, and that wasn't very well, as much as any other American in that brief period. We had an awareness that he had some diversity of thinking on major issues, modernization in a broad sense as important, more so than his mother did. So in a sense a hope that the relationship between the United States and India could become much more, should I say, positive. The potential was there, more than the case with his mother.

Q: Within the government, did you find any of the ministries more friendly toward the United States, think of Foreign Affairs, the military, the commercial?

BARNES: What they called External Affairs, obviously, beyond that some of the science-related ministries, because we placed some emphasis on scientific cooperation - that was one of the things that come up during Indira Gandhi's visit to the States in '84. That would include agriculture where there had been an earlier history of collaboration.

Slight diversion, the U.S. had in the early '50s provided on an emergency basis a large amount of food grains. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say, as some Indians said at the time, that India was one ship load or so away from, if not starvation, at least very serious food supply problems. There was an agreement reached some years after that called the P.L. 480 agreement where the U.S. and India agreed on how the funds that India had paid for the grain, which had not been free, but it was very reduced prices; some of those funds were set aside to be used in ways the two governments could decide. So, you had things like scientific exchanges, cultural exchanges, that sort of thing which were financed by those so called surplus rupees. That was an important to mention and became more important in terms of how to cooperate using other resources while they still were available.

GILBERT L. COREY
World Bank
New Delhi (1981-1985)

Dr. Gilbert L. Corey was raised in Colorado. He received a bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Colorado State University. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II. After working with the Agricultural Research Service and teaching at the University of Idaho, he received a call from Colorado State University to go to Pakistan and work for the Agency for International Development. Dr. Corey also served in Pakistan. He was interviewed by Samuel H. Butterfield on April 22, 1996.

COREY: One day someone in the World Bank called me and wanted someone's address because they needed a couple of engineers for India. As a result of that, I was able to transfer to the World Bank and went to India for four years "on loan" to the World Bank from USAID. Technically it was called a "transfer" where a person working for the US Government can temporarily transfer to an international agency for a period of time. That was one of my most satisfying experiences in the field of irrigation. India is such a large country with so many different types of irrigation systems and problems. I went there for two years and then was extended for another two years. I was not looking forward to coming back to Washington to my old job, because someone else had filled it. However, according to the terms of the transfer the Agency had to keep a job open upon a return from a transfer....Okay, the reason the World Bank needed people in India was that the World Bank provides loans to many countries, but in India at the time, this was in early 80's, the programs in India were very large and there were many in the field of irrigation. So contrary to the way the World Bank generally works, they wanted to put several technical people in India. In the World Bank system of operation, you must go out and supervise a project every six months. There must have been twenty projects in India in irrigation,

needing supervision every six months. Traveling from Washington, DC didn't make a lot of sense. There were four or five of us in New Delhi to do this. I was selected because of my experience beforehand in Pakistan and in AID, Washington -- and I had been to India on project design and evaluation for AID -- so I was known to the people in the World Bank in India.

Based on my experience, the first thing my supervisor wanted me to do, when I first went to India, was to review their research program. The World Bank in India had contracted with several consultants to do little pilot research programs around India.

There must have been three or four such programs in India. Some of the engineers in the Indian Government didn't seem to think some of the research programs were relevant. So, I was given a rather tough assignment to do this review because they were pet projects for whomever the contractors were and the contractors were not residents in India. They would come every three or four months to see how things were going and they had agencies in India operating these projects. I was allowed to spend, I don't know, probably three months reviewing these projects, going out in the field, seeing what they were doing and seeing if they made sense.

Well in India, after my experience in Pakistan, I was able to better understand what the farmers' problems with irrigation more readily than, I think, somebody that hadn't had that experience in Pakistan. Certainly I knew the Pakistani irrigation system, which is also a part, as I said, of the northern India system. What I found and what I wrote in my report was that a lot of the research that was going on did not make sense at all for the Indian system. One researcher was trying to make it possible for a farm, through modern devices, to determine exactly the moisture content of the soil and the evapo-transpiration rates of its crops. He was able to put the exact amount of water needed on those crops based on evaporation, evaporation that he had calculated using standard formulas which relate evaporation to measured weather parameters. Immediately I looked at how does the farmer get his water. Well, he got the water haphazardly, through a system where he had to bribe people to get his share. How could this expand to even five farmers, to say nothing of all the irrigation system? So I reported that the project didn't make any sense. In another case I found that individuals in the World Bank were trying to get the Indians to install the Pakistani irrigation system in India. As I said, the Pakistan system is a system deficient in water, maybe only half enough water for the land it commands. I am not complaining about that system; it is a good system for the condition where there is lot of land and not enough water, but in the many systems of India there is plenty of water to cover the land. And, they were trying to put that system in all of India. In fact, the central Government of India had passed a rule that it should be installed all over India, which was wrong, wrong. I finally got that stopped also .

Another project that was interesting was being conducted on a large irrigation canal system, the Rajasthan Canal (I guess they now call it the Indira Gandhi Canal). The pilot project that was being operated by the Bank and being championed as a great success. The canal that has an erratic supply of water, which means that sometimes the canals are full and sometimes not - maybe half the supply - because the canal system is fed from the Punjab in India and the Punjabis do not necessarily always pass the same amount of water down to the Rajasthanies. So the man who designed the project took one branch of the canal system and he was going to make this one reliable. He was going to take the fluctuations out of this one branch. He gave them less water but they are going to know exactly when they'd get it. They were to get, say, only nine irrigations when everybody else would probably get twelve on the average but we are going to

know the dates of irrigation. I was amazed that I could only get one person in the World Bank to agree with me that this wouldn't work either. It will work for the one branch but you cannot spread it because you cannot take the fluctuations out of the canal system for all the system. You just can't do it unless you store water some place. The Indians themselves knew that. I would talk to them, the chief engineer- - yes, he knew that, but this is working, the World Bank is happy -- and so the next thing I know they are going to do it to another branch. They were going to expand it and I went to ask to the engineer (I had nothing to do with this project, other than to go and look at it and tell them what I thought.) Well, they tried it in another branch and it was probably partly successful.

Well, the last thing I heard before I left India, was that the project had failed because the other farmers had gone to the head of that pilot canal with their clubs and other weapons and carried out what they call a "rasta roka" which means they closed the road. They would just sit there and would not let anybody pass. They said: until you change this system we are not going to move from here. So the farmers put a stop to it. Because they could see that it wasn't fair. It's amazing that you can see these kind of projects going on and is basically because... as the Governor of Oregon once said: "Man is not smart enough." Not enough experience and knowledge about how things work, I guess. So that was another project that.....

It was also interesting for me in India working for the World Bank, and of course, I had friends over in the USAID mission. At that time, the World Bank and USAID were trying to operate more cooperatively and we got some things going. One project that I was involved with in India involved research. Typically what the World Bank would do in an irrigation project was to have a big project that spent a lot of money on lining canals or other construction. For example, maybe a hundred million dollars project with ninety eight million dollars for construction and two million dollars would be to do a little research, pilot studies. AID got in that kind of mode a little bit too. Well, the problem with that is that two million dollars is a lot harder to manage than the ninety eight million dollars for government organizations that are in the business of construction. There is not the problem of making it all ethical and everything like that but these little research projects were just causing havoc with these people because they didn't know how to do it. You have an Irrigation Department doing a research project. Well, I would always tell them: hire the local university and get them to do the part of the research that you can't do. In one of the projects that I was managing for the World Bank I went to the project and said: We are going to have the USAID project people and the World Bank projects people here and we are going to go all over this research and see what you are doing. I was amazed to learn that USAID, in their project, had called for some of the same things that the World Bank had called for. We had two organizations independently doing the same thing with different sources of money. So I suggested cooperation they were very happy to see this because they were under the impression that they had to keep the programs separate. They knew that someone else was working on it but mine is USAID, and yours is World Bank....

Q: They and the Indians?

COREY: Yes, the Indians, they would not go and rock the boat for, I assume they felt they would lose something if it became known that there was duplication. But it was a lot of fun.

R. GRANT SMITH
Political Counselor
New Delhi (1982-1984)

R. Grant Smith was born on Long Island in 1938. He graduated from Princeton University in 1960. He later earned a master's degree from Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1963 and held positions in Pakistan, Nepal, and India. In 1995 he began his ambassadorship in Tajikistan. Ambassador Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: *Well, in '82, whither?*

SMITH: In early 1982, not in the normal rotation cycle, there was a sudden and unexpected vacancy in the job of political counselor in New Delhi, and they asked me to come to New Delhi.

Q: *That sounds like kind of fun, wasn't it?*

SMITH: Coming back to New Delhi, yes.

Q: *You did that from '82 to when?*

SMITH: '84.

Q: *Why don't we cover this period, then I think -*

SMITH: Okay, fine.

Q: *What was India like coming back? I mean, you had left in, what, '75.*

SMITH: Yes, came back in '82. Well, I used to tell people, "Well, I left in '75. Indira Gandhi was prime minister. I came back in 1982. Indira Gandhi's prime minister. *Plus ça change... [The more things change...]*" In fact, a lot had happened domestically in the meantime, in the sense that the Congress Party had lost an election in 1977, in fact had lost an election because of what began just weeks before I'd left in 1975, which was the Declaration of Emergency and the limitation of civil rights during that Emergency and the active, coercive, family planning program during that Emergency period. They'd lost the 1977 election. A coalition opposition government was in power that lasted fairly briefly. By the time I got back in '82, Mrs. Gandhi was back in power, and a lot of the same players. The relationship with Pakistan probably hadn't changed all that much.

Of course, the big even that had affected our relationship with Pakistan, and therefore our relationship with India, had been the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And that colored things a great deal during this period, in the sense that we - particularly under the Reagan Administration - had come out in full support of Pakistan. The Indians had opposed even the very limited

package of support that Carter had proposed, and of course very much opposed the support to Pakistan which Reagan was providing.

Q: I would have thought the Indians would have not been happy about the Soviets moving into Afghanistan.

SMITH: They weren't happy, but they were even less happy about our relationship with Pakistan and our rearming of Pakistan. It varied, of course, from Indian to Indian, including some of their diplomats. They had very different view on what the Soviets had done. India, as I recall, had a somewhat ambivalent position on the whole thing, but they were definitely against what we were doing in support of Pakistan, because their line was basically, this is like the situation before 1965; Pakistan wants those weapons to use against us, not against the Russians, but against us.

Q: Who was your ambassador during this period?

SMITH: The whole time I was there it was Harry Barnes.

Q: Now Harry Barnes was a professional. How was he as ambassador?

SMITH: I had worked for Harry Barnes once before, when he was DCM in Kathmandu in 1964-65. Harry Barnes was very good to work for. He spoke Hindi. He wanted people in his embassy to speak Hindi. In fact, he insisted that I - or encouraged me to - have a month of brush-up Hindi before I came out. He encouraged everybody to get out, to travel. I often thought that his approach to India was very much that this was a country with which there was a lot we could do. There were a lot of areas of common interest. He wasn't sure quite which one was going to work, so he pushed on this broad range of issues, drove us crazy sometimes because there was an element of not setting priorities. But in retrospect, it was probably pushing on a broad range of issues to see which would work, and some of the ones worked which people did not expect to work, such as the beginning of a relationship in the defense area. He would go around to see the science advisor in the Ministry of Defense, and I accompanied him on several of these calls. We sort of entered by the back stairway, because the idea of the American ambassador calling on the Ministry of Defense was very strange, so we'd sort of come in the back way, get taken upstairs separately. But we were discussing sort of the beginning of a relationship in the high-tech area.

Q: Were we beginning to see an India that was beginning to connect to... You mentioned that they said they had a lot of people technically trained. I was wondering whether you were beginning to see India looking towards what was to become the computer age. They had a very talented population evidently?

SMITH: I think it was the beginning of the end for the India which had been created under Nehru, with all of the statist economic controls, the London School of Economics approach to economics. The former Indian ambassador in Washington, L. K. Jah had been brought back to dismantle many of the controls that he had put in place. This was something we saw a great deal of later, but it was beginning in that period, as I recall. Again, there are others who would remember that aspect of it better than I would

Q: Was Mrs. Gandhi's confrontation with the Sikhs taking place at that point?

SMITH: Yes, that occurred during that period, and I had some Sikh friends. One of them had been the speaker of Parliament who had come to the United States on that Parliamentary delegation in 1970, a leader in the Congress Party in Punjab - just devastated by this. And her action in sending troops into the Golden Temple in Amritsar later led to terrible things, but certainly when I was there, the Sikh reaction to this was uniform, very, very negative.

Q: What brought about this confrontation?

SMITH: Well, there were a group of Sikhs who reportedly had received some support from Mrs. Gandhi or the Congress Party earlier on in a game of power politics or balancing factions within the state of Punjab, a group of Sikhs who wanted independence for a Sikh state - Kalistan - and they were not supported by the majority of the people of Punjab, but some of them did have weapons and they were killing people.

Q: And the Golden Temple, which is, well, the equivalent to a shrine in Jerusalem or the Kaaba in Mecca, wasn't it?

SMITH: For the Sikhs, yes.

Q: And why did she send troops in?

SMITH: Well, my recollection is that some of these militants were holed up in there, and she could have probably handled it differently, but she ended up sending troops in.

Q: I would have thought Amritsar would have had particular overtones, because wasn't this the place where the British -

SMITH: 1919.

Q: What was it, General... Anyway, it's a name -

SMITH: Jallianwala Bagh, yes.

Q: - mowed down a lot of people, and it's one of those climactic moments of Indian nationalism and all.

SMITH: That's right.

Q: And I would have thought that one would be a little careful about messing around down there.

SMITH: Yes, but on the other hand... Well, she certainly faced a problem, of these armed Sikhs - their arms, presumably, were coming through Pakistan - not supported by the majority of the Sikh population but very definitely undertaking terrorist acts in Punjab. And India has faced problems before, particularly in border areas and groups wanting independence, particularly in

the northeast, and historically has dealt with those with a combination of firmness and tact - very hard-nosed dealing with the counterinsurgency and then at some point negotiating - and has tended to adopt that approach elsewhere.

Q: Well, as political counselor, were you looking at India and looking not to glory in it but just to see that this was a state that could divide up? Were there fissures in India along religious lines or regional lines?

SMITH: I don't think that we were looking at it that way. It's a good question. Interestingly enough, it was a better question in the late 1950s, and by the 1980s very few people saw the likelihood of India breaking up. In the late 1950s, both Indians and foreign observers saw this as a real possibility. Jim Grant, who was later head of UNICEF, told me in Delhi once - he had served in our mission there in the AID mission in the late '50s. John Sherman Cooper, one of the ambassadors in that period, and he said that it was right after the creation of the linguistic states in India. That was done in 1957, so it must have been the '57-58 period. He said the ambassador drew his country team together and asked two questions: one, will India still be united in 10 years and, two, if it is united, will it still be a democracy? And the country team split fairly evenly on the first question and was fairly uniform on the second question that if it was still united it would *not* still be a democracy. And by 25 years later, if you had done the same thing, I don't think the country team would have felt that India was likely to split up, and would also have felt that democracy was extremely well-established there - parliamentary democracy in the sense of elections and the system that they had. So that was not something that we were looking at that much. In the case of the issue of Kalistan, I think we were convinced that the Indian government would prevail, partly because we didn't see great support for it within the Sikh community. It had arisen in part because of splits within the Sikh community. The Sikh community was very divided, but it wasn't largely supporting this.

Q: Was there a strong "old Indian hand" cadre that was working on India at this time in our own Foreign Service and all?

SMITH: Not that many old India hands left.

Q: I'm not talking about going way back, but I mean people who had been around a couple of tours and all that. In other words, was there a cadre or was it pretty much people coming in on excursion tours?

SMITH: Well, let's see. Marion Creekmore was the DCM. His background was not South Asia. Harry Barnes was the closest to an old India hand at that point. I was political counselor. I had served in both Pakistan and Nepal and previously in India. In the political section, my labor counselor was an old India hand. I don't remember who else we had there. Ernie Heck was there during that period, I think. She was an old India hand. So yes, we did have some.

Q: How were relations down south, the Tamil side and all?

SMITH: The problem began in that period, in the sense that it was 1983 when you had the... I don't remember the exact sequence, but there was a killing, bodies were brought back in

Colombo, riots in Colombo, a lot of killing of Tamils. It was a problem which had been going on for some years, and it suddenly became very clear the extent of alienation between the Tamil and the Singhalese community in those riots in the summer of 1983, which was what later led to the establishment of the guerilla groups and the current civil war that's going on there. But it was something that had its origins, many people think, in the policies of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in 1956, when he was first elected under a Sinhala-only policy, emphasizing the Singhalese language and culture and dividing the educational systems - because before that they had been educated together, and after that they were educated separately. So it goes back a long way, but it really bubbled to the surface in 1983.

Q: How did you find American relations with India by this time?

SMITH: Improved. Harry Barnes was working on them hard, and I don't remember the nature of our economic relationship in this particular period, but I do remember that he was working very hard on things like building a military relationship, a lot of very active personal diplomacy, quiet diplomacy - not only quiet, in the sense that with his Hindi language capability he had some public diplomacy as well. I accompanied him in October of 1982 on a trip to Kashmir, which may have been one of the first ones in some time by an American ambassador. It was a very good trip. Before we went, he said, "Grant, I'll only go to Kashmir if you tell me what to say about the Kashmir issue." And I said, "Mr. Ambassador, the answer is very easy. There's one word: Simla." And later, and I think Ron Spiers was in Pakistan at the time, and they later collaborated on a joint statement on the anniversary of Simla. I shouldn't say later; it must have been before. In the summer of 1982 they collaborated on a joint statement on the anniversary of Simla. That was a particular period of close coordination of the policies between the two ambassadors. It seems to me, in fact, that they each gave lectures at the other's defense colleges, so that Harry Barnes went over and lectured in Quetta and Ron Spiers came over and lectured at the National Defence College.

Q: Well, there are some times when political ambassadors make good sense, particularly if they're well connected, but in a case like this, to have two professionals, they're less likely to have their egos on the line and get, you know, caught up as being overly friendly to the country. They're more likely to see things in a little more objective sense. Would you say that, or is that a fair statement?

SMITH: I think so, and of course Harry had served in the area before and served in India before and knew Hindi, had ways of doing things that people hadn't thought of. At one point there was an American singer of south Indian classical music, and Harry had him give a concert at Roosevelt House and went through the government of India book and invited everybody with a south Indian name. And people came to that who had not been to the American ambassador's house ever before or for years, and wouldn't have come under any other circumstances. So it was brilliant.

Q: It was.

SMITH: It really was. And I think he had a kind of a relationship there that was extremely useful. I can't say that his relationship... You should talk to him about his relationship with Mrs. Gandhi,

but he did have a good relationship with Mrs. Gandhi's advisors, the foreign minister, the foreign secretary, other secretary and minister level people around the government.

Q: As political counselor, obviously you were following the parties there. How did you see the Congress Party? Did you feel it was sort of running out its time? The usual over-corruption or over-cronyism, the whole thing? How did you see it?

SMITH: Again, I have some trouble distinguishing what I saw when, because I was back in India '88 to '91, but yes, we did at that point see that the Congress Party was winding down, in the sense that it had lost its monopoly, and Mrs. Gandhi's way of running the party was killing it by over-centralization, over-control, that the life was going out of the party.

Q: It's the usual thing that happens when a leader of personal magnetism has been in too long.

SMITH: Well, it wasn't just her; it was her family, because she had been in, she had been out, she had come back - she had come back with the help of her son, Sanjay Gandhi, her younger son, who had died in a plane crash before I got there in '82, as I recall. And then she was promoting Rajiv, who... You know, the joke that went around Delhi was that Sanjay was a good politician but a bad pilot, and Rajiv was a good pilot but... He was very personable, however, and he certainly, in certain situations, could put things across very well. Sanjay was probably part of the problem in running the Congress Party, and Rajiv was not able to reorganize, revitalize the party to bring it back. It's not clear if anybody can. The problem was that the Congress Party had been built as an independence party, as an umbrella independence party, and that aura continued for many years. They had the benefit until 1964 of Nehru being there, and then for many years Mrs. Gandhi, so it had a continuity of leadership which benefited it tremendously in winning elections, but organizationally it had a very difficult transition to make, which it didn't make very successfully.

Q: Well, then, is there any other issue that you think we should cover on India in this particular '82-84 period? Why don't we stop at this point, and we'll put at the end, you're leaving India in '84, and where are you going?

SMITH: I actually came back to the State Department to head the Office of Multinational Force and Observer Affairs in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, which was the backstop for the Sinai force.

Q: Good, I'd like to talk about that next time.

SMITH: Yes, there had been a long-run issue of American ship visits. This was part of the overall question of having some kind of a contact between our militaries, or contact on military defense issues. And there was a problem with ship visits. The Indian Navy was always very prickly about the U.S. Navy, since 1971 in particular, and we had not been able to have ship visits because the Indians had developed a questionnaire that you had to submit on ship visits which asked, "Has the ship called, or will it call, at a port not under the control of a littoral state" or something to that effect. It was a complicated bit of wording which really meant, "Has this ship been to or is it going to Diego Garcia," which was a base to which the Indians objected

considerably. The U.S. Navy policy was never to say where the ship had been or where it was going, and therefore no U.S. naval ships were visiting, even though we had a fair number of ships that were going through the area that weren't going to Diego Garcia. And we were turning ourselves inside out trying to come up with a formulation that would allow us to have some contact, because this was obviously an important area, and the fact that we had ships that weren't going to Diego Garcia, it seemed we ought to be able to make something of that. And we were wrestling with all of this language. I remember a very long telegram that we did that was convoluted, and Harry took it, and at the very end we added, "Of course, we could always just say no." And it came back, and the Navy finally accepted that, when we had a ship that wasn't going to Diego Garcia and hadn't been there, we'd just say "No." And it worked. That was the beginning of some minor contact between our navies, which in fact was beginning to bear fruit when we had the second atomic explosion last year.

Q: All right, we'll pick this up then in 1984, when you're off to multi-peacekeeping affairs. Great.

CONSTANCE J. FREEMAN
Economic Officer
New Delhi (1983-1985)

Constance Freeman was born in Washington, DC in 1945 and graduated from American University and the University of Denver. She served with the Peace Corps in Brazzaville and Yaounde and with the Foreign Service in New Delhi and Nairobi. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: After a year, in '83, where did you go?

FREEMAN: I went to India as the economic officer, third in line under the counselor in the New Delhi Embassy.

Q: You were there from when to when?

FREEMAN: That would have been from July of '83 until about June '85, so I spent about two years in India. I was the officer in charge of trade and the investment portfolio.

Q: Which I would think would have been a very frustrating one, wasn't it?

FREEMAN: Yes. Again, I didn't feel like there was a huge amount of content.

Q: From what I've understood, although it's beginning maybe to loosen up a bit, India was not very amenable to foreign trade.

FREEMAN: Or even AID. AID was just going back in then. I was also sort of the AID liaison officer, which was a logical job that I fell into, with my development economics background. We were four people in the economic section.

My colleague, who was sworn in as ambassador to Bangladesh today, had what I felt was the poorer of the portfolio, because he was dealing with the Bank and with the Fund, essentially with the financial side. He had a special endowment they were trying to work on to [get] the last of the rupees that had been generated through PL480 food before they were completely used, as a part of either the Indian's budget or for the embassy. [He wanted] to get them into some kind of a foundation or endowment so that they could continue to generate an income to support some of the Library of Congress and other projects that had been done there.

What I did in India, the project that was most interesting and that ultimately got [me] promoted or off probation, was I worked on a tax treaty. I used to say the tax treaty had been in the works since almost the time I was born; it was that old. And we've continued to try to work on negotiating a tax treaty. And then I got the textiles portfolio. Textiles is a very nasty portfolio anywhere, and this was the middle '80s, and we had just established a new U.S. policy on textiles that was completely unilateral and violated both our multilateral agreements and our own bilateral agreements.

Q: Textiles are probably the most political of all commodity arrangements, particularly on the Republican side, where this was part of the Republican southern strategy. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but did you have the feeling that this was domestically politically driven?

FREEMAN: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. It had nothing to do with international relations at all. And that's why it was so egregious in terms of violating all of our agreements. Nobody cared about that.

But the hardest thing for me was, this thing started like in November, and we got people saying we should go and do calls. You know, call what? What is this, a diplomatic call? I didn't know anything more about textiles than that I wore them. Essentially, the calls were: "We are going to enforce a quota on you, pending negotiations, because you have sprung our computer, and your exports of men's and boys' shirts have exceeded one percent of the U.S. market. Therefore, we are enforcing a unilateral quota." But none of the language said that; it was a lot of technical language in the cable. And so I was supposed to go in and do these calls. The first time I went, I went with the commercial counselor, and he knew something about it, but it was still way over my head. By the third call, I was having to do it alone, because nobody else wanted to touch it. I still didn't understand, and Washington wouldn't tell me. I kept sending cables and calls and saying, "For God's sake, will somebody brief me on this?" And nobody knew, in the embassy, what it meant, either. Nobody could figure this out; what did it really mean.

I can remember, on this third time, going in to the same joint secretary, Saberwa was his name, and he started to holler at me again. I looked at him, and I said, "Mr. Saberwa, I am really sorry, but I am delivering this on instructions. I don't know what I'm doing. And I can't get Washington to tell me what all this is about. Could you explain to me why you're angry?" And he loved it. I like to say that the problem between the Americans and the Indians is we out-arrogant each other. And so the best way to get along well with Indians is to throw yourself on their mercy and say, "I am here to learn, please teach me." In this case, there was no game-playing; I was there to learn. So Saberwa taught me textiles. He had been doing textiles forever. He knew every back-room agreement that had ever been made, every conversation that had been in the halls, etc., clearly

from the Indian viewpoint, but he really knew his stuff very well. And so he taught me, because nobody in the U.S. would help.

Finally, when I went back on R&R, and I went around and did consultations and talked to people in USCRN, then they would talk to me. But nobody would send anything out on their cables or on the phone.

Q: Why was that?

FREEMAN: Because our new textile policy was so domestically driven that it did in fact violate both our multilateral and bilateral agreements. We were in the wrong, and we couldn't acknowledge that publicly. We'd only sort of do it in the back room. Nobody in the embassy in New Delhi and nobody in the consulates wanted to deal with this issue, so it went to the most junior officer in the economic section.

Q: What was known in government terms as the flack-catcher.

FREEMAN: That's right. I finally figured it out, with Saberwa's help and all kinds of documents and getting the agreements and poring through them. So I wrote the press releases, and I gave the constituent posts the language they could use to deal with inquiries. And we dealt with hand looms and all kinds of other things. Textiles was my biggest account there.

Then we had textiles negotiations. The team came through, and they were on their third country, and they didn't want to do any negotiations. They just wanted to close this down and go shopping, and what they wanted me to do was take them shopping. I sat at the table, on the American side, and wanted to crawl under it, because the behavior of the delegation was so egregious and so arrogant and so overbearing that it was truly embarrassing.

I remember I had a wonderful boss, George Kenny, and he was very good at figuring out how to train people. I came back and I was so angry, I was spitting-fire angry. And so he said, "Well, write it up. Write it down. If they're that bad, we'll send a memo to the DCM and have him make some representations in Washington." And I came back to him with what I'd written up. He looked at me and said, "You're repeating yourself. I need some substance here." By the third draft, I'd worked out the fury, and we had something we could send to the DCM. Nothing ever happened with it, because nobody was going to powder these textiles people. Everybody runs scared on the textiles people. So it taught me a lot.

On that delegation was a Customs guy, and he was trying to determine what customs to levy. There was an exception for hand looms. But hand looms were defined as something that could be made with a machine, but a machine that was hand- or foot- operated, not electricity-operated. And so they were woven, and then there would be stitching on places around the side. This guy looked at this, and he said, "I cannot tell whether that's made with a machine run by electricity or a machine run by a foot pedal. They'll all have duties on them." In doing so, he put masses of factories out of business, or potentially out of business. And they all showed up on my doorstep, with all these poor little textiles workers. We were able to get turned around by the [time the] next high-level delegation came, by appealing to them that this had been far too arbitrary.

That was essentially the substance of what I did in India. Going to India was going home for me, in a way, because I had traveled the whole country doing my Ph.D. work before. Perhaps the biggest thing for me was to make the switch between my weekends and vacations, where I became very Indian, and my weekdays at the embassy, where I had to put back on my American clothes, accent, demeanor, and culture. So it was good experience in many ways.

Q: How did you find the Indian bureaucracy at that point, and dealing with them?

FREEMAN: The Indian bureaucracy wasn't so bad when you were there on an official level. Certainly, if you were the most junior economic officer, with the ambassador and the DCM, and really trying to get things done, that was hard. And it was hard when I was a student trying to move around the country. But I don't remember being unduly upset by the bureaucracy per se. But remember that I'd lived in India and traveled all over. My dictum when I lived there before was: "I assume nothing will work. If it works, I'll be ecstatic, and if it doesn't work, then that's just the way things go. That's the way it is." So I just don't remember that as being a real issue.

Q: I realize you were in the economic section and relatively junior within this very large embassy, but during this, you might say, high-Reagan period, did you get a feeling about how relations were between the United States and India at that time?

FREEMAN: They weren't great. Harry Barnes was our ambassador, and I think he smoothed a lot of that over. When I was there, we had thousands of congressional delegations. Vice President Bush had come through just before I arrived. We had Maureen Reagan there. We had lots and lots and lots of visitors. That's what I remember the best, the idiocy of control-officering everybody in the world, and everybody wanting to go shopping. That was always a problem for me. I couldn't take anybody shopping, because I hated shopping, so I didn't know where to go. I mean, it just wasn't my bag.

My great frustration, again, was textiles, because nobody tried in any way, shape, or form to see the Indian viewpoint on this, and we were violating our agreements. So I experienced it, lived it, and knew it in that context. But I don't remember feeling as deeply embarrassed about what we were doing in our policy as I have in some other countries in some other situations. And I don't think it was that bad.

Q: There just weren't the issues. Vietnam had gone, and there was no particular India- Pakistan thing where we had to tip in one way or the other, although there might have been the army using Pakistan as a conduit for weapons into Afghanistan, which might have...

FREEMAN: But I wasn't really a part of that, remember. It wasn't one of the issues that was particularly pressing for me. I spent those two years really living, to the extent that I possibly could, as an Indian, and doing these economic issues that I had. I loved being back in India. I wasn't hugely challenged in my job. I spent my first three or four years in the State Department thinking this is really not hard enough, and being relatively bored. I wasn't in subsequent years.

Q: That's often the pattern. You're marking time, or you're overwhelmed. When you were dealing with textiles and you had a delegation coming out, did you just keep your mouth shut, or did you say, you know, our agreement states such and such? Did anybody else raise the issue, or did they just go ahead, pound the table, make their points, and walk off?

FREEMAN: The Indians could make those arguments for themselves. I didn't have to [do so] for them. The problem with our delegations was they didn't even listen. They pounded the table, and they essentially said, "We have the power. If you don't come to an agreement with us, we will continue to enforce these much lower quotas. If you negotiate with us, you might get a better deal. And that's it. We're not interested in talking about anything else." In all fairness, the Indians can go on and on and on and on. And these guys had been to four negotiations before. This was like their fifth country. They were exhausted. And they were trying to defend an indefensible policy. The only defense for the policy was U.S. domestic pressure. So I felt like crawling [under] the table. I don't remember how much I argued with them one on one. Probably not a great deal, because I was too junior, and I was the embassy control officer, after all. There was a State Department person on the delegation that came out, and I think I discussed it at length with [him]. State didn't have a lead role in this. This was USTR and company.

Q: USTR is the U.S. trade representative. Why don't we quit at this point.

FREEMAN: Okay.

Q: I'll pick it up next time in '83?

FREEMAN: We're into '85, and I'm about ready to leave India to go back and take over the Liberia desk in the State Department.

Q: So we'll pick it up then.

ROBERT GOLDBERG
Consular Officer/Ambassador's Staff Assistant
New Delhi (1983-1985)

Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, D.C. and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by David Reuther in 2011.

Q: So when did you arrive in New Delhi?

GOLDBERG: July of 1983. I went straight to the consular section. Frankly I wasn't suitable as a consular officer. Years later, as a mission manager, I tried to give new consular officers a sense of why the job is so important – and so difficult, especially when you have to say no. Somebody once compared it to being a second lieutenant in the Second World War where you were expendable. You led your troops into battle and if you got shot it didn't really matter. I treated the work much too casually. When people tell you that you are the interface with the community in the country in which you are serving, well, that is absolutely the case. How you handle that is absolutely critical in terms of soft diplomacy.

Q: Now the consular business covers two kinds of visas, immigrant (IV) and non-immigrant (NIV), and also provides assistance to Americans. What were your responsibilities in New Delhi?

GOLDBERG: I did it all at one point or another. Because at that time in New Delhi, we had two junior officers who did just about all the interviewing. We had a deputy who was uncomfortable on the line. The senior consular official, the consul general when I was there, only liked to issue visas and do third or fourth interviews and run visas through the visa machine. We did eventually get a third officer, who was only comfortable doing American citizen services. New Delhi was high volume and fraud post.

You just got very tired of hearing the same stories over and over again. I was on the line in 1984 when the first group of people came out of Iran post-revolution. One of the few places they were allowed to travel was to India. So they would get on a plane in Tehran and they would fly to New Delhi where they were picked up and bussed over to the American Embassy consular section where they would be refused en masse. I got interesting bribes from the Iranians, like nuts and raisins, the very best in the world. But all we could do on the spot was refuse them as Iranian cases had to be referred to Washington. The only Iranian visa issued in my time in Delhi – that I know about – came through the intervention of Betsy Barnes, the Ambassador's wife. She had taken up the case of a young woman who wanted to go to the States to become a doctor. Looking back, I regret just how cavalier I and my other FSO junior associate were. On some days, our refusal rate averaged 80%, which was unconscionable, really. We used to talk about it. Our mantra was: they have got other options, and as a matter of fact that was true, but I think we could have handled our work and ourselves better.

Q: Was your assignment one of those rotational ones through the various sections of the embassy?

GOLDBERG: Yes. Before I went to the front office in July 1984 I was actually acting consul general. Remember, I was like one year out of A-100. The consul general had left and the deputy had gone on leave and the guy I was working with didn't want to take on the responsibility. I was full of myself. So I took on that responsibility. Of course no good deed goes unrewarded – it turned out to be the busiest period for us in terms of consular work - Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated [October 31, 1984] after the assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar and parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh were burned. We had a lot of Sikhs coming into the mission asking for visas because they feared they would be killed if they remained in the city. The political section officers would come down to the consular section to talk to them about conditions in the Punjab.

Q: How did Mrs. Gandhi's assassination affect your work or the environment you were operating in?

GOLDBERG: Most of the Sikhs we used to see were Punjabis who were going out to California and Washington state farms through marriages that were not strictly legal. In fact in one of my IV interviews I found someone who actually married his sister. Not his cousin sister which was a fairly common term for a close relationship in India but actually married his sister in order to get to the States earlier than would have been possible legally. Now, what we had was a significant increase in Sikhs who were trying to get to the States on NIVs. There were no scheduled appointments in those days so we just tried to work through whoever came in during the course of the day.

Q: Why would the assassination affect Sikhs, the Sikh community in that way?

GOLDBERG: Well because it was her Sikh bodyguards who had been involved in Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. The outrage in New Delhi in particular was considerable. In fact there were blockades on some of the roads we used to travel to get back to our home – the specific purpose was to yank Sikhs out of their cars and beat them up. The AID [Agency for International Development] deputy director at the time Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated was on his way back from a visit somewhere in Uttar Pradesh and along the way he had seen some Sikhs being very violently assaulted and beaten to death.

Q: So you rotated out of the consular section.

GOLDBERG: I rotated out of the consular section in July 1984, I think, and went on to become a staff assistant to Harry Barnes [who served as Ambassador to India from November 1981 to June 1985] who had been Ambassador to Romania and was the Director General of the Foreign Service, when the Foreign Service Act of 1980 was passed. He brought the “up and out” ethos of the military, transformed the way we brought people in, increased the diversity of the Foreign Service, and the way we evaluated officers. He was a very thoughtful individual. Harry is still around. He must be 85 or 86. I haven't heard from him in about 25 years.

Q: What kind of atmospherics did he project in the embassy?

GOLDBERG: He was sort of distant and aloof. I mean he was one of these giant figures of the Foreign Service. Dean Hinton was the ambassador in Pakistan, and he and Barnes were reporting very different perspectives on South Asia to the Department without engaging one another in a dialogue – it reached the point where the Department sent out a notice to both posts to cease and desist from the bickering and urged – well frankly directed – them to coordinate some of the things they were sending in. Divergence of opinion, sure, but outright sniping, no and the arguing seemed to suggest each had a vested interest in demolishing the arguments of the other. Reg Murphy was the Assistant Secretary for what was then the Bureau of Near East and South Asian affairs at the time and he tried to mediate.

Barnes' DCM before I got to the front office was Marion Creekmore who was approachable, a very easygoing guy, well-liked by everyone in the mission. Barnes might not have interacted well with the embassy community but Creekmore more than made up for this in terms of that management, mentoring, and lifting spirits. Grant Smith was the political counselor at that time. Grant eventually became ambassador to three of the "-stans" after the breakup of the Soviet Union. George Kenney, an older and old style FSO, was the economic counselor. I got to know him a little bit when I was staff assistant. Grant left in July 1984, as did Marion. Marion was replaced by Gordon Streeb whom I liked immensely, but who was clearly in Harry Barnes' shadow in a way that Marion wasn't. Grant was replaced by Stan Escudero.

Stan was a wonderful briefer, had this wonderful voice. The briefing that he did in the aftermath of Mrs. Gandhi's death and a few other things, they were just first rate. I don't think he got along all that well with Barnes because they had some differences in analysis. Stan could never be as well versed on South Asian issues as Barnes; he came in cold, thought he knew the issues and in fact needed a bit more humility in dealing with someone like Barnes. When you think you know the issues but don't really, it's probably better to listen, which Stan didn't do very well at first. But I liked Stan a lot. He was a terrific person.

Q: From your perch there in the front office, what feeling did you get about U.S.-Indian relations?

GOLDBERG: A time of great possibility. Mrs. Gandhi had been essentially anti-American for a long time. Harry Barnes was the "Black Hand" who was trying to sabotage India in the Punjab area. Shortly before I got there the Embassy had put out a notice about Americans not traveling in the Punjab. Barnes had a very difficult relationship with Mrs. Gandhi and her ministers. When she was assassinated, there was a sense that Rajiv would be a very different prime minister, somebody who had a broad perspective on the world. I don't know how we got that idea because all we knew about him after his brother had died in a plane crash – the brother was the heir apparent – was that Rajiv liked to fly planes – he was a pilot – and had little interest in politics. But we had a vested interest in portraying him as a progressive and a reformer. Meanwhile Dean Hinton in Pakistan was arguing that this guy is a lightweight and not to be trusted. It turns out that he was an incredible lightweight.

But as I say there was this sense of possibility the year that I was staff aide, and Barnes tried his best, as did other members of the mission, to interest Rajiv, India's ministers and governors in a better friendlier relationship with the United States. The whole time I was up in the front office we were working in that direction. I subsequently came to view Rajiv as incompetent. He was easily manipulated by Congress party politicians right up to the time that he was assassinated [May 21, 1991]. Barnes had reasonably good access and talked about how American and India could work together to enrich the lives of the people of India.

Q: As a junior rotational officer in the embassy, what were your specific duties when you were in the front office?

GOLDBERG: Much of it was monitoring the paper flow before it got to Barnes, carrying messages to the sections that he wanted transmitted. The last four or five months I wrote four or five speeches for him, and that was great opportunity. And I traveled with him on three of his

trips, so it was a very productive period for me. When we left, Barnes had a farewell lunch for Sally and me at which he said he hoped I would become a South Asian hand. Sally blanched at that idea. We never did get back to South Asia.

Q: There are three consulates in India: Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras at that time. Did the ambassador make it a point to visit those places?

GOLDBERG: At least twice a year. He was very good about that.

Q: How would he get around? Did the DAO [Defense Attaché Office] have its own airplane?

GOLDBERG: No, we flew commercially. I accompanied him to Calcutta and to Bombay. Those were great trips. I also accompanied him on his ill-fated trip to somewhere in Uttar Pradesh where he fell and broke his shoulder. They had to do the X-ray in the veterinary office because that was the only machine that was working. To his credit he continued with his trip with his arm bound up before we got back to New Delhi. He was in great pain at the time. But he was well aware of the need to get out and about in the country. Was he similarly attentive to the needs of others in the American community, even the unofficial American community? I never got the sense that he was. I know in fact on our trips I can only recall one time when he addressed the Embassy staff.

Q: One of the big events for any embassy is the July 4th party. Being up in the front office you must have gone through one or more.

GOLDBERG: Yeah, one. Actually there were two events on that occasion. One was an Embassy function. Then the other was a broader community function. I worked on the Embassy function, which was funded through donations made by officers and their families. The embassy wasn't that large at that time. I mean it had a fair number of officers, but it wasn't that large – maybe fifty State, and however many more from other agencies. We had the equivalent of a community liaison office. I don't really recall that as a separate office at that time. We did have volunteer spouses working on that event

Q: As the junior rotational officer you did consular, front office, was there a third rotation?

GOLDBERG: No, those were the only rotations that I had. And I spent most of my assignment in the front office. I was there for 24 months, ten months in consular. That was long enough for me, and I think it was long enough for the poor Indians who had to endure my boorish ways. But the front office was really terrific work.

ERNESTINE S. HECK
Political Officer
New Delhi (1983-1986)

Ernestine S. Heck was born in Oregon in 1940. She received her bachelor's degree from Oregon State in 1962. Her career has included positions in Bombay, Saigon, Teheran, Niamey, Katmandu, New Delhi, Colombo, and Madras. Mrs. Heck was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.

HECK: I was assigned back to India via about five months of a course to remind me how to speak Hindi. So I went off to take Hindi for four months, I guess, and left Washington in early May of 1983.

Q: How effective did you find this emphasis on Hindi was. I've heard people say they spoke it more in Rosslyn where they got the training than they did when they got to India.

HECK: Well, we'll cover India tomorrow or next time, but I would say that in three years in New Delhi at that point as a political officer covering internal politics, which is what I went into, I only had one long-term - I mean by that an hour or more - interview with a government official in Hindi in three years. He was an untouchable, what we would call an untouchable, a harijan it was called then and now a dalit, but he was a government official, he was an Indian civil servant. It's called the Indian Administrative Service, the IAS, the people who run the country, the follow-on to what used to be the ICS, the British and Indian civil service that ran India before independence. I think he did it as a political statement, because I know that everybody coming into the IAS has to speak or be able to pass a certain amount of tests in English even if he wasn't particularly comfortable. Other than that, I used it on the streets. I used a little bit of it at first, as my predecessor did and I suspect my successor, because I was the official Hindi language officer for the embassy, I used it to establish that I knew something about India and that I wasn't just a dilettante, and then I would go into English, and that's basically the way it went for all of us. Certainly if the idea is communication, any educated Indian's English is going to be better than my Hindi. I did take lessons every day for an hour before I went to work every morning of the three years I was there, so I did keep it up, but I would make one point. In the embassy at the same time - now, as a Hindi language officer or as the official language officer, I got an extra ten percent in my salary for being the Hindi language officer. My first ambassador there was Harry Barnes, who had been in India off and on for at that point, I think, 36 years, who had been studying Hindi off and on for 36 years and who was a tremendous linguist, so that was always intimidating. But what was really intimidating was our science counselor, whose name was Ahmad Meer, who had been born in Lucknow. At independence in 1947 when his relatives, when his parents, went off to Pakistan, he had been left behind with an aunt in old New Delhi, so he was raised up until the age of university in old Delhi speaking Hindi all the time. Then he went to the United States, got his Ph.D., became an American citizen, was back as the science counselor. If there ever had been a real emergency needing Hindi, would they have come to me or to Ahmad Meer? Well, the answer is pretty obvious. So I always felt guilty about my ten percent pay on that.

Q: But you took it.

HECK: But I took it.

Q: Okay, Ernie, we'll pick this up next time in 1982. We've already talked about your use of Hindi, but then we'll pick up. You were in New Delhi from '82 to when?

HECK: From 1983, May of '83, until July of '86.

Q: Today is the 18th of August 1998. Ernie, after some hiatus we're back in business. We were talking about going to New Delhi in '83. You had had a Hindi course?

HECK: I had had a second Hindi course. I had done the original Hindi course in 1972, and as soon as I knew I had a 3-3 (useful level), I quit and got married. This was shortly after women were allowed to be married and be in the Foreign Service. So what I had in the spring of '93 was a refresher course to get me into shape for going off to New Delhi.

Q: So in '83 what was your job?

HECK: I was head of the internal political section, general political reporting section of the political section in New Delhi. At that point we had internal, external, pol-mil, labor and I guess that was it, four different sections.

Q: How were relations with India at this point and a little about the political situation when you arrived, and then we can talk about developments?

HECK: I got there toward the end of, although we did not know it at the time, the end of Mrs. Gandhi's period in office. When she had first become Prime Minister, her relationship with the then President of the United States was not very good at all. By 1983 things were slightly better but only slightly, and we were always seen in India as being pro-Pakistani. It has been a sort of roller coaster thing, American-Indian relationships, and it had been a no-win sort of situation, a zero sum game because of what we did with Pakistan. In the spring of '83 things were pretty good. She had been to the United States, and she had had a relatively good experience. Of course, President Reagan could charm the birds out of the trees if he so wished. I got there during the middle of the Secretary of State's visit. George Shultz was in town when I got there, and in fact I had to come out a bit early because they needed cannon fodder for the overnight operation center. So I would say that things were in a slightly better situation in the spring of '83 than they had been. However, it was still difficult. We were always seen as a possible ruiner of plans Indian. The foreign hand was shorthand to mean American and other imperialistic intervention or interference in things. Certainly working with the Foreign Ministry - and luckily I did not have to do anything much with that because I was covering internal politics, but I sure heard a lot of it from members of Parliament - sometimes I felt like we were under Chinese water torture with little drops of barbs coming down on us daily.

Q: Was the Foreign Ministry a bit or more so than I understand in Mexico? In Mexico they give the extreme left, the intellectuals, free play to play around because we have very close relations. The Mexicans can do their macho thing by sticking us there. I was wondering whether you had this feeling that there was something of that in the Foreign Ministry.

HECK: Oh, to a certain extent, yes definitely. The number of younger officers who had come out of JNU, which is Jawaharlal Nehru University, was probably larger than from many other universities, and they tended to have a leftist slant to things from their own background. There was also a certain amount of sort of castism, I suppose, a certain amount of supercilious Brahmanism. At least, that's what we would see it as at times. But it's like all things in India. You can find anything in India. In many ways the Indians and the Americans are an awful lot alike, and there is good and bad in all sorts of places. I do think that it was difficult to deal with bureaucracy at times, and certainly it was difficult to deal with politicians at times in the early '80s.

Q: Can you talk about the politics of the early '80s and how you got around and dealt with the internal politics and how we saw it with American interests.

HECK: Well, first of all, I should say that the idea of reporting on internal politics was something whose time had passed by the time I got there, although I hated to admit it. Being a political officer in India in the '60s, say, was more sexy in a sense and it was when this sort of system was set up. I did the same thing, of course, that political officers covering internal politics in India in the '60s had done. The difference was that it really didn't matter to have me or other embassy reporters going out into the countryside to report on what specific districts or district leaders thought about any policy in New Delhi, for two reasons: one, because power was so centralized in the hands of Mrs. Gandhi and the Cabal that ran the Congress Party at that time; and two, because our reporting function back to Washington had sort of been superceded. We were doing the same job the *New York Times* reporter was doing except the *New York Times* reporter got a lot larger spread and was probably read first in Washington because it got into the paper, it got into the operations center, and it got spread around. A few years later, of course, we were completely superceded by satellite television. So being an internal political reporter in India today just doesn't have the urgency or sense of urgency that it did before. In fact, the job has really atrophied since I left it. But what I did was a lot of traveling. First of all, we have three consulates general plus the embassy in India, so in terms of political reporting, the country was quartered, but, of course, Embassy New Delhi had control over everything that went out from the regional consulates general. My reporting area, therefore, was northern India or northwestern India. It comprised Kashmir, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi City. First of all, Punjab was off limits to us by the time I got there. There was an insurgency of some import going on at the time. The Akali Dal, the Sikh Party, which had a strong religious bent to it, was running rampant through the area, and although it was perfectly safe for us to go to large parts of the state of Punjab, the embassy front office had decreed that we could not. So Punjab, absolutely the most interesting political problem in the area at the time, was off limits except for what we could report from New Delhi. So that left me the rest of it. Kashmir, large parts of it, were off limits because the army wouldn't let us into it, but we could go to the Vale of Kashmir where Srinagar, the capital, is. And that left us the rest of the area. I did a lot of traveling. I was out in places like Gorakhpur, which is in the northern part of Uttar Pradesh in the sugar belt near the border with Nepal. I did a lot of coverage of Uttar Pradesh. Of course, the population of Uttar Pradesh is huge. At that point it was about 121,000,000 people as I remember, so it was larger than many countries and very important. It was at that point the linchpin upon which the Congress Party depended to run the country. Of course, some years later, 15 years later, it's totally non-Congress in terms of the parties that hold power there, and the whole Congress Party

strategy has shifted, but at that time it was very important. So I spent a lot of time in places like Allahabad and Benares and so on. Then I divided the rest of my district with the other political reporter from the internal political side, so we had a sort of division of half and half of the region. We probably traveled once every six weeks or so for perhaps a week at a time.

Q: Sometimes part of the reporting is to get out and meet people who may come up later on, and make your mark and all with them and all. Did you have feeling of that or picking out comers and cultivating them a bit?

HECK: We did a certain amount of that, but really if you're traveling in that area, we might get back to a place once every eight or ten months. It didn't really give us a chance to do that in depth. We did it certainly in New Delhi, and we relied on the entire mission for that sort of information, lots of it from, for instance, USIA, the USIS office there. We had at that point a counselor of embassy who was the labor counselor. That position has been downgraded, but we relied on other sections of the embassy to fill us in on different groups of people in the country. Remember, even then the population was almost 920,000,000 in the country, and it's very hard to pick out people, but, yes, we did the best we could on that.

Q: What were the issues between the United States and India that from your perspective the embassy was concerned about?

HECK: From my perspective the thing that mattered most was the Indo-Pak relationship, what India might or might not do in terms of nuclear proliferation, what it might do in terms of fighting with Pakistan over Kashmir, most definitely what it was doing in the state of Punjab to diffuse the situation in Punjab. There was a great deal of belief in the country at the time that Pakistan was arming and aiding the Sikh insurgency movement, and in fact there is truth to that just as India aids and abets various things that go on in Pakistan. There is a great deal of clandestine work back and forth across the border, I think. Certainly it always reminded me of that cartoon strip that used to run many years ago and maybe still does in *Mad Magazine* with the spy versus spy. There was a good deal of that back and forth. We were always seen, the United States was always seen, as trying to somehow get our own spies in the Indian hierarchy, particularly in the military and in the nuclear establishment and so on. But we were viewed with suspicion. Political officers as a group were viewed with suspicion as being the people who somehow corrupted Indians. This in fact, of course, has always been a game that is played, the great game that has gone on for many years, of course, but the political section per se was not really part of this. For instance, my house had belonged to my predecessor and his predecessor for a number of years. The theory was that we were very close - well, we were within a mile and a half or two miles of parliament building. Therefore, if anyone could get the members of Parliament over for lunch, it would be us, so we had this house which was very close to the embassy. This house was watched constantly. There was a member of the intelligence who ran a little bicycle repair shop across the street and who would occasionally come over and ask to get the names of the guests and certainly wrote down every license number and so on. In those days we did not have gate guards. Later in my tour we did, but he would come over occasionally and open the gate. The real reason, of course, was to find out who was coming in and out of it. So we were very closely watched, and I was watched everywhere I went in country, as were the other members of the political section. I remember one time being out in Allahabad and the local

person from the intelligence community actually escorted us around town on sort of a motorbike. He drove through town, but he insisted on sitting in on all of the appointments also, or he would find a way to get into them - let's put it that way - if not in the room, then in the outer room, and you could be sure that he heard every word.

Q: It really does sound much more like a police state. You're giving me not a positive face to that.

HECK: Oh, I don't mean to do that, but India changed a great deal beginning a few years later. India is a democracy. It's just a different kind of democracy than the United States and much different from European democracy, but it's a country that has been independent now for 50 years. Of course, in those days, '35 or whatever, '36, it has never had a coup. There had been rumors, at least a rumor, that Mrs. Gandhi attempted to do that after she was obviously losing power the first time in the '70s. It never happened. The military is scrupulous about this, and I have great faith in Indian democracy, but it was a much more authoritarian kind of democracy than we had, and Mrs. Gandhi was a very authoritarian sort of a woman. You know that, as she moved into power after Lal Bahadur Shastri died in 1966, January of '66, she was placed in power by the king makers of the party because they wanted somebody pliant. They learned to their horror shortly thereafter that Mrs. Gandhi may have been the housekeeper and chatelaine for her father but she was not pliant. By the time I got there in 1983, she was very, very much in charge of the country. They all kowtowed to her tremendously in her party. She, on the other hand, was distrustful of people. She was certainly distrustful of Americans and the United States. She ran a very closely held government. She made the decisions, and often they were made on very personal reasons. I could always see in her where so many men get their opinions about women in politics or women in any sort of official position or women in a professional position. She reacted to things on a very visceral level, and personal opinions of another person's worth or non-worth got in the way sometimes of logical thought. She was something to me of a caricature of what a woman is seen as by a lot of men. In any case, she died shortly thereafter, and things changed drastically in India. She was assassinated by the Sikhs. I should say that she had caused a terrible massacre in Amritsar, which is the holy city of the Sikhs, at the Golden Temple, which is the holiest of holies. It's like having a shoot-out at St. Peter's or at the Kaaba. It is not the sort of place where one would want to have soldiers, and the Indian army was directed and did mount an attack there against Jarnail Bhindranwale, who was this sort of charismatic, almost Rasputin figure who was the political and religious leader of a lot of Sikhs, not of the rational, middle-ground, middle-class Sikhs, but of the people who were his followers. The problem in Punjab had been one of economy as much as anything else, and I suppose that's true of many revolutions, is it not, or insurgencies rather. But Punjab is and was a very rich farming state with a finite amount of land, and the men who were the farmers or that had some farming families were able to send their young, particularly their young men, to local colleges giving them an education. When they got out of college, there were no particular jobs for them nor was there land anymore to divide, because the land had already been divided to a fare-thee-well. So here you have a pretty well educated - this is not Princeton, but I mean educated - class and no place to go, and that's where the trouble, I think, started as much as anything. But in any case, when she ordered her troops into the Golden Temple and they got Bhindranwale, killed Bhindranwale, and a number of other followers, the die was cast and it was only a matter of time before the Sikhs got to her. They did so the following October when she was assassinated as she crossed from her private house into her office area. She was assassinated by one of her own guards, who was a

Sikh. Her son and heir was at that time in the East, in the Calcutta consular area, I think actually in the Calcutta area at the time - I'll have to look that up. He was flown home immediately.

Q: This was ...

HECK: This was Rajiv Gandhi, and he was flown home immediately and was administered the oath of office by the President, who was a Sikh, Giana Zail Singh, but the trouble had already started. The fires were already seen around town, and several thousand Sikhs lost their lives in the following days in New Delhi as well as all over the country in various places. So once again there were lots of Sikh refugees in New Delhi living in the gurdwaras, the Sikh temples, and being cared for basically by the Sikh community although there were other organizations helping them. The difference this time - this is, I suppose, indicative of what was happening - in the past when there had been killings of Sikhs - and this had been going on for years - those who were killed or affected tended to be the poor. This time, as a very wealthy industrialist said to me, this time we were all targets. On the ring road, which is the peripheral road around New Delhi, cars were being stopped and Sikhs were just being pulled out and killed on the spot. This very important and wealthy Sikh businessman recounted stories of them trying to come over his wall. What had happened to some of his neighbors in an integrated, I mean the wealthy areas of New Delhi are certainly not of one religion; everybody lives together - but they were being targeted. They were being targeted by the Communist Party, it is believed by many. A certain number of members of Parliament were accused, and I think rightly so, of actually leading bands to do this sort of nefarious thing. The remains of what happened after the death of Mrs. Gandhi have been with the country for many, many years, and it's only recently, I would say, that the wounds have been somewhat healed. The distrust is always there at some level or another because of the same sorts of things that drive ethnic and religious violence in other parts of the country, as memories are long. But certainly today the situation has calmed down greatly. The Akali Dal is part of Parliament. The state is rich, Punjab is rich, the Sikhs are doing well. If there were members of the Congress Party leading demonstrations and leading mobs, it certainly wasn't the official policy of the government of the country nor of the Congress Party. So, unlike some other places I have served in, one could never say that the ruling party was part of this problem; it was not.

Q: Prior to the assassination of Indira Gandhi, was there any of what happens in some other countries where the Indians pay quite a bit of attention to political developments and other things in the United States and get a little bit miffed, because if anything happens in India outside of the assassination of the prime minister, it's going to be on page 23 or something?

HECK: Oh, of course, and isn't this true of most of the world?

Q: Oh, Canadians, of course, go bananas, but I was just wondering.

HECK: Yes, well, first of all, when I first went to India in 1963 and when I went back in 1983, something had changed but it was still there. Certainly in the '60s India was 15 years at that point out of being a colony, and it had tremendous hang-ups and feelings of inferiority left over from the colonial experience, from the way the Indians were treated by the British, with the racial thing. Skin color, of course, matters as much in India as it does anywhere in the world despite what Indians would like to tell you about this, and you can tell this by reading the ads in the

paper on Sunday that ask for white-complexioned brides because that's the highest form of praise. The darker you are, the harder it is to marry your daughters off and the more you have to pay for this privilege. In any case, when I first went to India, I can remember going into a pharmacy near where I lived and people trying to shove me to the front of the line. It wasn't because I was a woman; it was because I was a white woman. It was terrible. That had changed by the time I got to India in '83, and that was certainly a change for the better, but still there was this dichotomy about how people in general felt about the West. What they called Europeans (we were Europeans, Americans were Europeans), what they felt about color, how they treated some of my colleagues who were not white but were brown or black or yellow was a real problem. Certainly they were tremendously thin-skinned when it came to what was in the paper - I mean here in the United States. As you know, the big papers that have correspondents there full-time, like the *Post* and the *New York Times*, tend to do stories from time to time that are just sort of filler, color stories, you know, about elephants and monkeys and sadhus and so on. This really set people off, of course, because India has a huge middle class and it did even then, and there are more Ph.D.s from India in the United States doing all sorts of fantastic things in all sorts of industries than you can shake a stick at. The number of doctors and other professionals that India provides to the rest of the world is a huge one. So, of course, when you put that with all of their relatives back in India and then they hear that the *New York Times* is running another story on some sadhu who is sitting in a tree or whatever, of course, they tended to be mad. The stories about their politics, about Indian politics, about Indian economy very often have a feel about them which indicates that we think we're superior, and it's a problem. There are many things about Indian economy, of course, where we have a great deal to teach India, I think. But, yes, you're right. Of course, the Indians were very, very sensitive about what we said about them and how we wrote about it and how we showed it in the movies and newspapers and TV and so on.

Q: How about the embassy? I wonder if you could talk about, one, who was the ambassador and how he or she operated, and then, two, often there's the feeling of those who haven't served in the area that people who serve in India get sort of India-centric and those who serve in Pakistan get Pakistan-centric. I was wondering whether this has kind of worn off or not. We're talking about the '83 to '86 period.

HECK: Well, first of all, I had two ambassadors during that period. Harry Barnes was the first one, and the second one was John Gunther Dean. Both of them were very much professional ambassadors. Harry Barnes had served in India several times. He spoke very good Hindi. He knew a great deal about Indian politics, Indian economic things. He was concerned about human rights violations, for instance, in Punjab, and if he had to talk about that, he could do it in Hindi. He was very, very good, and because of the fact that he had served there several times, he had a long memory. He could drop things from his own past. John Gunther Dean had never served in India. However, this was his fifth embassy, I think four of them as ambassador and one as a permanent chargé, so he was most definitely one of our most senior officers. We certainly didn't lack for professional guidance from either one of them. Much depended on the larger state of Indian-American relationships. I personally feel that it's important in India to have somebody who has professionalism. However, because the country is so big and because the government feels that we have neglected them, India as a government over the course of 50 years has wanted more than anything to have an ambassador who has the ear of the White House, and this can swing. Career ambassadors don't have the ear of the White House quite as much as political

ambassadors, and we've had a whole series of political ambassadors in India. Some of them who have had the ear of the White House have been there in times when we were basically cut off and there was nothing left to do but play golf. That would be in the late '70s, for instance. But I was certainly pleased with my ambassadors and the way they handled things.

Q: I have spoken to John Gunther Dean about doing an oral history with him, but he's in Paris and so I haven't had a chance to do this, but I've heard from others that he was pretty authoritarian. How did you find that he ran the embassy?

HECK: Well, I think both of the ambassadors under whom I served left a lot of the running to their DCMs, who were obviously very senior men. John Gunther Dean took no nonsense from people. If he thought you were doing a good job, he gave you a lot to do, and he was very, very helpful to me and to some others I know. On the other hand, I have seen him eat consuls general for breakfast and spit them out when he didn't like the way the man in question was handling things. So, yes, he was - and is, I suppose - somewhat authoritarian. On the other hand, any man who has had that many embassies, I guess, also has something of a right to be so. He worked very hard in India, and he certainly cultivated ministers and all the proper people. He was very professional.

Q: Did you find any problem with some of our reporters - I won't say 'going native' is the wrong term - but getting sort of infatuated with the kaleidoscope that is India?

HECK: Well, this goes back to the very beginning, and all sorts of ambassadors on both sides of the fence, I think, have been accused of clientitis. The so-called Delhi-wallahs or India-wallahs in the Foreign Service who go from several posts or have had several posts in South Asia, I don't think they are like that, because they in many cases have served in several of the countries in the region and they can look at it in a pretty professional way. But it has been a problem, yes. But is it not a problem in other countries?

Q: Oh, yes, but I think...

HECK: The India/Pakistan thing, though, because of the great divide, has been particularly egregious. If you have served in Pakistan very often, you see things from the Pakistani way. Certainly governments, administrations here in Washington, are seen as being friends of one or the other. The Democrats are seen, or have been seen, as being pro-Indian much more than pro-Pakistani, and the Republicans pro-Pakistani. I have heard political appointees in Republican administrations saying, "Well, Pakistanis are real men. They wear pants; they don't wear those diapers." Of course, the Prime Minister of India, when it was Lal Bahadur Shastri, wore a dothi and it does look like a rather large sheet, or messy diaper. But those days, I think, are somewhat behind us. Certainly after Mrs. Gandhi died and her son, Rajiv, became Prime Minister, and Rajiv saw "The foreign hand" that got behind everything.

Q: You're raising your hand and...

HECK: I'm raising my hand openly, because at that point in the mid-'80s a raised hand, an open hand like this, was the sign of the Congress Party, and it was on every political poster for

elections that would come up if it were a Congress Party thing. The symbol of the Congress Party has changed so many times - well, there have been many of them - but at that point this was the sign, the open hand. So when Rajiv Gandhi talked about the foreign hand, he meant American usually, sometimes British, but definitely outside intervention or interference, we would laugh about it and show the open hand. But Rajiv Gandhi was a youngish, a very young, man at that point, of course. He was a very pleasant man. He was a well educated man. He didn't have the personality-type hang-ups that his mother did, and he was a welcome breath, I think, for a lot of people when he came in as Prime Minister. He had been an airline pilot. He has or had an Italian wife, and he had always said he didn't want anything to do with politics. It was his younger brother, Sanjay, who was supposed to be the politician in the family, and he made a point to let his family know that he wanted nothing to do with politics. He was only pulled into it unwillingly by his mother after his brother was killed in a - was it skydiving? It was an acrobatic thing in May of 1983, I guess, '82 maybe; it must have been May of '82. In any case, he was killed because his plane went up early in the morning and got knocked around by a monsoon. So when Sanjay was killed, she started putting pressure on Rajiv, and he, against his will I think, finally acquiesced, and he became her right hand. So when she was killed, he then became the leader of the party and by extension became the Prime Minister. He was, as I said, lower key, more modern. Well, he was a post-independence baby, and he didn't have the history in his mind the way his mother did of the incarcerations during the fight for independence, of the battle for independence and all the things that made Mrs. Gandhi what she was. So he was looked on hopefully by everyone, I think, not only in his party, of course, but in the various diplomatic missions around town, that this was going to be a new ballgame, and to a certain extent, I guess, it was. But he was still the leader of the Congress Party, and the Congress Party remains to this day a party of old men in many cases. So he wasn't able to just modernize everything, but he did a lot of modernization in ways that I suppose anyone living today would appreciate. He tried to bring them to use modern technology, for instance, and to become part of the 20th century, because the party itself was still sort of mired in the past. He tried to modernize the party and the government and he tried to modernize the country. The problem is, of course, that India is so huge and the party was so entrenched at that time that to do any of this is a very long-term problem. Like turning around a big tanker, it takes time and space. So when I left in 1986, he was almost two years into being Prime Minister. Things still looked very much part of the old way, but he was trying. He brought a lot of young men into the Parliament and into the office of the headquarters of the Congress Party. Some of them like Rajaish Pilot, for instance, had been one of his flying companions. There were a couple of pilots that he brought in who were like him, men in their early or mid 30s, and there was a whole series of men in their early or mid 30s whom he brought into Parliament. They were becoming increasingly important at that time when I left India in 1986. Some of them are still in Parliament.

Q: Well, in '83 to '86 we were pretty heavily involved in supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and using Pakistan as the conduit for getting equipment there and all. Did this set off nerves in New Delhi while you were there?

HECK: Yes, to an extent. Anything that we did in or with Pakistan was always suspect, as I have said. India was more supportive of the government of Afghanistan than certainly we or the Pakistanis were. They supported the then head of government. They had direct air transport: Indian airlines flew from New Delhi into Kabul. It was one of the few airlines that did. The

Foreign Ministry was often vociferous in its support for the President of Afghanistan and the government there and of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. One of the things that we did which was very annoying to them was that we briefed the foreign press once a week on what was happening in Afghanistan. That meant not only the American representatives of the American papers but also the Indian representatives of those American papers, so very often it would be an Indian correspondent coming in to receive this briefing, it would be the person from Australian radio, it would be journalists from any of the foreign press that happened to be there, and there is a large press corps based in New Delhi which covers all of South Asia for various nations. So we would have Japanese and we would have Australians in and the Americans and representatives of American papers and so on. When I was in New Delhi, even though I was doing internal politics, I usually gave the briefing because I had been the Afghan desk officer and I had a better background and feel for these events and people than perhaps some of the colleagues who would do it normally. So for my tour I did this. In the past if anyone came down from New Delhi, from the embassy in New Delhi...

HARRY A. CAHILL
Consul General
Bombay (1983-1987)

Harry A. Cahill was born in New York, New York and raised in New England. He received a bachelor's degree in English from Manhattan College and served in the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Colombia, and Bombay. Mr. Cahill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1993.

CAHILL: In December, 1983, I arrived in Bombay, India as Consul General.

Q: *When you got the job how did you see your job from talking with people and getting ready to go out? What were our interests in Bombay when you were there 1983-87?*

CAHILL: Principal areas of interest were economic and commercial. India's industrial might, huge population, resources of talented people and tremendous market size were very visible. Since mid-1991, liberalizing economic reforms have greatly spurred foreign business interest in India, but in my time activity was already strong. As time passed I got more and more into the political scene, observing internal and international trends. I will always admire Bombay for being independent and outspoken. The city powers the rest of India as the real business, artistic, press capital. Unlike Delhi where yes-men abound, Bombay can be vehemently critical. It also appreciates Western culture. The New York Philharmonic was greeted languidly in Delhi but with a roar in Bombay. Some of the most vicious politics in India played in Bombay along with some of the best thinking in literature, arts, medicine and nuclear physics.

Q: *Was this a Bombay area nationality trait or was this just a center where a lot of things were happening and a lot of people were mixing together?*

CAHILL: There are a number of nationalities in India. Maybe I could say there are several Indias, each with different traits. Bombay was the historic gateway to the West. All kinds of doers come together there. The driving cultural and economic forces are there. One observes the eclectic architecture, "Bollywood" where 900 feature films are completed each year, and the sizable news media complex. The great mix of elements gives off heat and generates forward motion.

Q: As consul general there what were your main duties at that time?

CAHILL: Doing all I could to improve economic/commercial ties with India, feeling the pulse of the political scene in the west of India, winning the people's friendship for America.

Q: Talking about commercial ties, how did you find India as a market? What were the problems and what were the opportunities and how did we meet these?

CAHILL: Market opportunities were good. Consumer goods imports were tightly regulated but other sectors were open and hungry. Especially sought by India were joint investment-technology ventures. In one week, for example, I inaugurated Indo-US ventures in pharmaceuticals, computers and Barbie doll manufacture. The middle class of India has a buying power that equals the average American. This market segment numbers over 300 million people. India is the twelfth largest industrial power in the world. Its pool of capable engineers, designers, accountants, doctors is enormous. American producers find excellent partners. Through their Indian branches, US firms sold very profitably to the Soviet bloc, companies like Xerox, Eli Lilly, Helena Rubenstein et al.

Problems included overwhelming government bureaucracy, a growing thirst for bribes, a protectionist mind-set that produced myriad regulations, poor infrastructure, volatile labor unions, and demagogic politicians who could interfere at any time. Our message: liberalize the economy and all India gains.

Our political concern focused on over-reliance on the Soviets and on internal ethnic friction. Abetted by political leaders including Mrs. Gandhi, the latter problem steadily worsened. We saw riots in Bombay which had never happened before. I worked with government officials, party people and police. When street fighting erupted they would call for prayers for rain to keep the mobs out of the streets. Terrible heat and humidity incite tempers. Needed are jobs and economic opportunities. Here American investment helps. Bombay was and is a fascinating laboratory. The most crowded city, it has very little crime.

Q: How did you find your dealings with the government people there on the economic/commercial side? Obviously some things were done in Delhi like tariffs and things of this nature.

CAHILL: Parliament consists of representatives from all over India. Reps from Bombay and western India have a lot to say. Powerful ministers and other leaders come from the western regions. Many of the largest firms are headquartered in Bombay and other western cities. All this means clout at the top. The consulate worked to build rapport with the power brokers and technocrats in western India. They were usually accessible, they listened.

Q: How did you find the embassy support of your efforts to increase American commerce in the Bombay area?

CAHILL: They did their thing and we did ours. When support was asked it was given in both directions as needed.

Q: Who were your ambassadors?

CAHILL: Harry Barnes was the first, a solid career officer who cared about his people. He was interested in non-government organizations. He transferred the rupee fund from the old AID days to a trust fund whose funds support continuing activities. Commerce was not a top priority. He was replaced by John Gunther Dean midway in my tour.

Q: I always think of him as being a very hard nosed operator, very active person. How did you find him?

CAHILL: I did not work closely with him. His style was different from most of the professional ambassadors I have known.

Q: Were there any major problems that you had to deal with while you were in Bombay?

CAHILL: Certain international incidents caused stress. One was the bombing of Libya in retaliation for terrorist acts. A large crowd of protesters came to the consulate. I met this group and explained why we had to act as we did. We had to protect innocent women and children from being blown out of airplanes. Such a scene was repeated after various events. I always met the demonstration leaders head on in the consulate courtyard. The Polish auction days helped me pitch my voice.

Q: How did the leaders of the demonstrators respond?

CAHILL: They backed away. News of events came early and gave time to prepare. The news of Libya came at sunset, always around 6:30 in Bombay because of latitude. I worried about the press reaction and realized I could blunt popular reaction if I could steer newspaper reporting. On entering a new country I always put priority on making friends with the news media and police. I definitely include the indigenous language press in this. That evening I walked fast through some streets and alleys to the home of India's top newspaper cartoonist. A smiling, small man with a twinkle in his eye answered my knock. Laxman's humorous, cutting cartoons normally straddled five columns on the front page of the Times of India which in turn straddled all of India. People absorbed his cartoon each day before they looked at the headlines. "Laxman, my friend, let's talk." We sat down and I explained what a menace this slimy, megalomaniac rat was to the world. That night Laxman went to work with pen and paper, and the next morning his big cartoon was devastating. Reagan looked like a mature, cautioning uncle on the left. Across and down the page was a swaggering, stunted, wild-eyed midget wearing an enormous general's hat. He waved weapons in both hands. India chuckled at this silly scene and much of the Libyan tension was defused.

Q: That shows you what can be done. You know the person and you know the impact and you save up for the big things.

CAHILL: You don't sit and hide in your residence shuffling paper. You work constantly to build up key contacts, build a wide and alert operational base. Problems appear at any moment. I remember one elderly American couple who sailed into the harbor in a small yacht. They were going around the world by themselves. They took photos of the harbor and were promptly nabbed as Pakistani spies. One phone call to Bombay's police chief freed them. I still get Xmas cards from the couple, now safely moored in San Diego, expressing thanks for the "miracle" that delivered them.

There are little and big things. In all, we received full, rapid support from the right people. And we always tried to move fast. For example, a large public relations disaster was averted when the New York Philharmonic visited India for the first time, led by Bombay's own son Zubin Mehta. The public and the press soured on the group when they complained of cockroaches in Delhi's leading state-owned hotel. Then when they arrived in Bombay there was a bomb plot scare. The theater was to be bombed. The total group of 171 persons met in their hotel ballroom and announced they were not going to sacrifice their lives. No concert. I could visualize the lasting image of spoiled Americans whining and running home, braggart America collapsing again. I brought in the police chief and his top officers to assure that all would be well. They spoke to no avail. Then from the ballroom stage I listened and dialogued for three hours. It was like the scenario from "Twelve Angry Men". One by one they crossed over, agreed to play. That night the performance started 104 minutes late but was the best, most inspired and rousing concert of the tour. The news media gave them a tremendous ovation for art and for courage.

Theater was important in Bombay. Another setback almost came with the Minnesota Opera Company who were to do "Once Upon a Mattress".

Q: A musical comedy based on the story of the princess and the pea.

CAHILL: Right. I found the cast in despair at the PAO's house shortly after arrival. "We changed planes in Frankfurt and all our equipment, costumes, musical instruments, props, everything, stayed on the plane and was lost. We have nothing." Our USIS people advised them to cancel and go home, an attitude that still saddens me. I told the group that giving up was a terrible mistake. I waxed on about the greatest theater thrill in my life being at Washington's old Arena stage where there were no props and the audience's imagination soared. "We'll improvise. You will be the greatest!" So we did. The next night the knights all wore white shirts and ties. The queen wore somebody's big bathrobe. The king wore a bandanna round his head. The cast waited behind the curtain as the audience also waited and grew restless. Then I balanced on the lip of the stage, looked up into the darkness and extolled: "We are so very fortunate because tonight we are going to have one of the great experiences of our lives. We are so lucky, you and I, to be here because tonight we are going to see something marvelous in the theater. There are no props but we are going to rise above that and be with these great performers." Etc, etc. All schmaltz. It worked. We had a warmed-up audience, totally sympathetic. And an inspired performance. Fantastic reviews praised the very talented and brave Americans.

Overall, our relations with the news media turned very positive. So much of this depends on personal relations, friendships, better communication between "us and them". One tabloid in Bombay had a long history of playing to the Soviets and bashing America. Behind this was a gifted, brilliantly witty publisher-editor who was a charming rogue. His biting humor demolished us. I soon made it my business to know him and found him quite likeable. I came to know his family. We became friends and the tone of his paper changed. He started praising our projects. But the worst blow to the Russians came when he put me in the seat of honor at his granddaughter's coming of age party and placed our Soviet counterparts in the back of the hall.

Q: Well, that is great. It shows what consul generals, or somebody in our business, can do. These things do have an impact and you act as a bridge to get them to understand the local milieu.

CAHILL: Take bad scenes and turn them around. Keep thinking, take new initiatives, seek ways to expand our influence. Listen to others, respect others. Reach out. Get the American view across. Become part of meaningful organizations. They can use you for their and your mutual benefit. In Sri Lanka the Buddhists invited me to speak in Singhalese at temples and hand out graduation certificates to the children who completed religious training courses. Later, Buddhist leaders helped us greatly when we initiated the 100th anniversary celebrations of Colonel Olcott's landing in Ceylon. He was the American Civil War officer who did much to save Buddhism in Asia. For three days in 1980, the country spent its energy in parades, poster contests, speeches, etc. commemorating the great help America had given Lanka. Lanka's President led the main march as massed bands played Union army tunes. I scoured the USIS library and forwarded the scores. Young and old got the message that America was an old and faithful friend. The Communist Party leader came to me and said: "This is gold, absolute gold, for America." In India there were so many organizations. I tried to be active in important ones whether purely Indian or a blend of foreign and Indian. Many speeches made at many Rotary and Lions Clubs, prize giving at sports clubs and race tracks, judging the Miss India and Miss Diamond Queen and Miss Secretary contests, serving as trustee-director on hospital and school boards, being the first non-Japanese chief guest at the Bonsai festival and the first non-Brit to lead the annual Scots Caledonian Ball. I wrote articles for leading Indian newspapers, my favorite being a feature story on India's aid program to the United States. True. India gave us many things from money for our Revolution to Vivien Leigh for our movies. There were long days. I remember one Friday night attending four receptions and three dinners, then heading to airport for a pre-dawn plane to Gujarat for a big wedding weekend involving industrial and political chiefs. After the wedding ceremony one tycoon said: "Do come with us in our airplane. We'll inspect our main complex in Madhya Pradesh." So I landed somewhere in middle India, explored an industrial city in a jungle, and hopped aboard the Frontier Mail train at midnight, arriving back in Bombay just in time to begin a business Monday.

For official travel I changed the traditional "entourage" approach. One used to take a big American vehicle with driver, interpreter and various post personnel and go off into the countryside. This used up many resources, lost much time bouncing over rural highways, and often seemed pretentious. I would go alone, flying to points and being met by local hosts. This was very much appreciated and respected, and we saved enough money and other resources to get many of our staff out into the field.

A crucial part of our work was visas. As my all-time favorite consular officer, Stu, you know this well. America's image was shaped very much in by the way we handled visas. Bombay posed challenges. Every day the visa waiting line outside the consulate stretched for blocks up the main street. We were vulnerable to criticism for having people stand in rain or sun for many hours. This was a sad spectacle for passing traffic. America was cruel.

I opened the gates at 6 a.m. and completely absorbed the long line by circling it around our large courtyard out of sight of the street. In heavy pressure seasons as in late summer when students poured in prior to going off to college in the US, I would enter the courtyard around 7 a.m. and issue visas myself, doing the interviews as I walked along the column. Young students were important clients. Their families worried about them being alone and at the mercy of the western barbarians in the big consulate. I also learned that students, both poor and rich, would camp outside the gates on Sunday nights to beat the crunch on Monday mornings. This made me start my Sunday night visa sessions. I would bring these kids from the street into the lobby, interview and sign approval. The word got around. The consulate's reputation as a caring bunch of humans soared.

OWEN CYLKE
Deputy Mission Director, USAID
New Delhi (1983-1987)

Mr. Cylke was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Yale University. After a tour with the Peace Corps in Ethiopia, he joined USAID in 1966 and served several years in Washington, where he dealt with African matters. In 1968 he was posted to Nairobi, the first of his overseas posts, which include Kabul, Cairo and New Delhi. In all, he dealt with environmental and development matters with USAID. Following retirement Mr. Cylke continued work in his field, including holding the Presidency of the Association of Big Eight Universities, which also dealt with developmental and environmental matters in the developing world. Mr. Cylke was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1996.

Q: What year now?

CYLKE: This was 1983. Just in clear terms, are you interested in cultural studies about AID?

Q: Sure.

CYLKE: I was the deputy director of the mission. They decided to bring another director in. The bureau actually put forward my name for director, even though there was never any reasonable prospect that that was going to come. I can't remember the dynamics of that, but my name was put forward. I think, in the career sense, while that wasn't ever going to happen- It's interesting: once having been proposed for that, you were considered eligible for assignments later on that perhaps you wouldn't have been considered for if your name hadn't been put forward. Just in

terms of anybody's career was a mix of some internal merit which you have, in terms of performance, but it's also luck and timing and how the whole situation. I couldn't have gone to Egypt in 1983 if the director hadn't come out in 1983. AID doesn't operate very much at interim kinds of things. I do recall, when I went to Egypt, seeing the front lines, that Priscilla Bouton had gone to India in 1979. While it wasn't a conscious part of my thinking, I can remember back saying, "Oh, isn't that nice, we're on the same schedule." I had always wanted to go to India one way or another, whether it was director in some other kind of capacity. In 1983, Tony Ford was the assistant administrator of the Egypt bureau. She thought I had done a good job there for four years. She thought I had a stressful fourth year under an outside director, where I was more or less representing bureau interests with what they considered to be an unknown. She thought that she would try to help me to do whatever I wanted to do in my next career step, which was not untypical of the way in which the system worked. I had said I wanted to go to India and she said she'd see what she could do. Joe Wheeler was dead set to get me to go to Sudan. He called me on the phone.

Sudan had a romantic part of my imagination from having been a Peace Corps volunteer and traveled there in the summer. The president of the African Development Bank had been Sudanese. I think there's a country in Africa which presents itself in I don't want to say romantic terms, but in- It's a country worthy of your attention. But in the ethos of Egypt, it's a country. It's a little town up the Nile. Being promoted to Khartoum from Cairo was the image among Egyptians was, "You're being sent out to the wilderness." I had always wanted to go to India and, frankly, the schooling and everything else was there.

As it turned out, I went to India. But I do remember the few moments there when I thought I was going to go to the Sudan. To me, and I'll say this, I think that going to India was the most exciting thing that happened to me in my professional career, bar none, and this was before I ever got there - just because of the development history. An awful lot of development theology, not just for AID, but for the world, had been written out of the Indian experience. So, when people talked about development, an awful lot of what they were talking about came out of India.

Q: Can you give some examples of that?

CYLKE: The best one came out of the Africa bureau and that was working with John Mellor and his wife, whose name was Unra Tele. We'd done a lot of work in Africa and stuff. I'd worked a lot with both of them and got to know them a lot. I'd read all of John's business about agricultural-led growth strategies and all of this kind of business. John was quite a powerful personality - one of the great people.

Anyway, when I was appointed to this job, I went to the library, which I really hadn't done, I don't think, in any other country, and gotten every book that I could get my hands on, on the culture, on the society. I was just captured by this thought of going to India and talked to lots of different people. Also, it was a dramatic change for me because I'd never really served in an AID mission. I had been the deputy director in Afghanistan and the deputy director in Egypt. In both cases, largely inside jobs. Your technical divisions were outside and your director was outside. You were in an operational position. So it was a very different role, going to India.

When I went to India, I consciously spent at least the first four months traveling and expanding my mind. India's quite an expansive place. The thing that strikes you was, one, how (inaudible) it is. I was just there and we had the same notice. I've been doing a lot of traveling in East Asia. When you go to the Philippines, they talk about Malaysia. When you go to Malaysia, they talk about Taiwan. When you go to Taiwan, they talk about Korea. They're all benchmarking off each other. When you go to India, they're benchmarking off the last five year plan. They don't benchmark off China. They're not benchmarking off Europe. It's internal, they're benchmarking off India.

Q: Introverted.

CYLKE: Very introverted kind of place. So, that is interesting because you're putting yourself into a society which has its own *raison d'être* and its own kind of- Every society does, but really a big universe unto itself. So, I spent some time looking around.

Now, the program at that time- Remember, the program had been closed and, following one of the Pakistani wars, reopened. We had a PL480 level of about \$100 million and we had a program level, I think, of \$125 million when I got there. I think it was down to about \$75 million and down to \$50 million. It became the bank for other kinds of interests in the Agency. They just kept peeling away at the Asian missions to finance other needs of the Asians. When I was there, it was \$125 million. There was enormous investment in rural areas. We had a huge forestry program. We had a huge irrigation program. We had a huge agricultural research program. We had a very large health program. But it was largely what the Agency had become, I think, over a set of years, for all kinds of policy directions. It's what India wasn't, development was.

Two things during my time got my attention focused on other kinds of opportunities. One was my own perception that I thought that the development community in India, the people that everyone respected so much, were all in their 80s. There were all these old gurus wandering around with kind of Fabian notions of the organization of the world. I thought, frankly, that they had had their time. A lot of their ideas had petered out. We didn't have any distinctive view as to what you did about a country with 400 million people below the poverty line. We worked away at it. We had lots of earnest people come out and say, "Well, I want to run a pilot project in village X to see what we should do." That was always what was going on, a very presumptive kind of thing. We didn't have a major resource level. With the poverty question, it seems to me you had two options. You either had to have a blind insight or you had to have a heck of a lot of money. We had neither an insight nor a lot of money. I thought that, frankly, we were spending an awful lot of money on what was straight out budget support dressed up as irrigation and dressed up as forestry. But it was money that was just moving right through the Indian government budget. We were converting that \$100 million into rupees. They were getting \$100 million of foreign exchange, which was probably buying computers from Japan. We were getting local currency construction and we weren't getting any policy out of it. I traveled all over the country with our engineers, who were reviewing these projects. I can remember standing on many dusty roads with a local employee, saying, "Now, let's see, you've written down that there's a crack in this irrigation canal. When on your schedule do you ever get back to this place?" We calculated that it was sometime after his retirement, given the schedule of site visits. So, it seemed to me a rather-

Q: These were sector grants?

CYLKE: These were loans for the irrigation construction program in the state of Maharashtra. They would have maybe- As I said, they were really public works programs. There were maybe 20 sites. Remember, the Indians wouldn't accept any technical assistance. So, we had no technical assistance contractors. We had a couple people in the mission. They had interesting discussions with counterparts about irrigation technology. But the program wasn't structured to see those replicated, as I said earlier, in any systematic way, against the "irrigation," if you want to call it that, policy or practices and procedures of the Ministry.

Q: But it was reviewed like a capital project?

CYLKE: Reviewed like capital projects. That's exactly what they were. That bothered me. I want to say, in India, it was probably the most exciting time in my career also. The mission was terrific. Very strong technical people, very strong. My perception of management I think is worth mentioning. This is the only time I was a director, so I'll mention my perception of management. At the time when we had a lot of money, a billion dollars and John Lewis was director, it seemed to me that the nature of the dialogue was really between the director's office and the Ministry of Finance. It was on policy issues. The technical divisions, in a certain sense, were technical advisors to the director for the carrying out of certain programs. But the program was really focused on that level and on what had to happen. What happened subsequently was that that resource level went away. The Indians were very, very proud about their- They didn't like policy interference. We ended up in a role of almost pretending that we were having more policy influence than we were for Washington's purposes. We weren't having much impact. But we had such a strong staff that my own management perception, which I didn't go to India with but which I came away with, was a sense that the role of the director and the program office in fact was to support the technical divisions. But the only thing we really had of currency was really smart guys in the technical divisions. In a certain sense, the dialogue changed and it was the head of our health division or the head of our forestry division who was carrying the dialogue because the currency that we had were ideas. I don't think we had a program structure to take advantage of those ideas, but it was one heck of a good staff.

I'll give a couple examples. Rogers Beasley, who you may or may not know, I think it was his only four years in AID, he was a Rockefeller fellow and a missionary in Liberia, walked 20 miles into his first assignment in Liberia. He was a graduate of the University of the South at Sewanee and had this kind of mixed true commitment to what was going on and also a superb leader. If you went to Rogers' house-

Q: What was his position?

CYLKE: He was the head of the health pop office. If you went to Rogers' office on any night, anybody who was anybody in the health field was at Rogers' home. I mean, he ran a salon at his house. The head of our forestry division was a guy named David Heesen. He's now in the Egypt mission. Rogers was an older guy and I will come back with a funny story. I remember, he was greatly resented by everyone in our program and PD shops. They said he didn't know the AID

rules and he didn't like project papers and he didn't do that. I argued back. I said, "Look, if you look at this mission, there were more health projects put out of that mission in my four years there than any other sector." Rogers knew how to get everyone else to do that stuff, including myself. I mean, he brought more assignments to me than I care to even remember. Worthy causes dropped at my desk. He was a true development entrepreneur in that sense. (Inaudible) in his career. The Agency had at that time people coming in from universities. We had two of these guys in the mission from universities, one from Idaho and one from Montana in our forestry division. That place was one of the happiest offices. They were excited. They had ideas and they, too, had made themselves, I think unquestionably, World Bank, anybody who came to town, wouldn't go anywhere without coming into our forestry division and talking to these guys. It was social and forestry. It was how to get agroforestry going in the country. But it was structured much like the irrigation portfolio. All the programs were based on states. They had four or five major \$60 million social and forestry projects going, with three technical advisors for the country, out talking to these people. In a technical assistance one to one basis, perhaps having some impact on their counterpart. But again, my sense was we weren't structured against changing the norms under which the entire program ran. The Indians were pretty resistant to wanting us to even get into that position. But that was another good division.

Similarly, in irrigation, we had a top flight group of guys. That unit was headed up by a guy named Ed Stains. The other area was agresearch. That was really stuck in the old Indian agresearch system.

If you don't mind, there are a couple of stories here that I think are well worth telling. It was the 25th anniversary of the founding of the first agriculture university in India when I was there in 1984. For all the prickliness of the Indian government about not wanting policy and not wanting to thank anybody for anything, there were two things that happened that I thought were interesting.

The Indian government invited the deans- We had founded the agricultural university system in India, modeled on the American land grant system. Six different American universities were involved with that. They all had counterpart institutions around India. The Indian government, at their expense, not our expense, invited the sitting deans of those six universities to come to India at their expense for three weeks to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the founding of these universities. Well, that was really something.

Q: This was at the time we were doing the CDIE review of USAID experience with of the land grant colleges in developing countries.

CYLKE: In 1984, they all showed up in Delhi. First of all, I was just so impressed to meet these people. I had a subsequent job after leaving AID. I was with the Midwest University Consortium. I learned a lot about the power of agricultural deans, which I didn't know at this time. But they were a pretty powerful group of folks. I was really impressed with them. Most of them had not had any touch with India. These were the current sitting deans. I had one experience which was just interesting. We split up and we traveled out to the different universities. So I went out with a fellow who was the dean of the University of Illinois, who subsequently became the president of Oklahoma State University and helped bring me into this Consortium. Very hard-charging guy,

who had no use for international- Didn't know what it was, didn't know about it, really thought it was a pain in the neck, but he was there. He was told he was supposed to be there. So we went out to one of the universities in Orissa, which had fallen somewhat into disrepair. His questioning was all, "Why did people come here 20 years ago? What was it about? What drove my faculty to want to be here?" He'd run his finger over the dust on a lab. I talked a lot about what I thought drove people, which was a mix, I think, of almost missionary spirit, development- There was a whole mix of patterns of things which I know more about from not direct observation but indirect observation. The next night, we went up to Pantnagar University, which was the class act of the universities which the University of Illinois had founded. I swear, 500 people were there to meet him. He did not sleep that night because- In India, they have the expression of "coming into your darshan," standing within the grace of a great man. He was representing something that was incredibly important. He was up the entire evening with people who wanted to come in and shake his hand and talk to him about what the University of Illinois had meant to their country, to their careers, to their life. This guy just was transformed. This rarely happens, but it's one of those moments where he understood what the whole development experience had really been. It was a very, very moving kind of experience. I was quite taken with the Indians reception.

Another story along that line. I got a cable from Washington, asking me if I couldn't go and get the Indians to thank us for 25 years of PL480. Well, thinking about the last thing you would ever want to ask for, that's it. I'll give you an example. When I was there the first year, there was an election in India. It wasn't nasty, but it's interesting to tell you the impact that PL480 had on that country. There was a full-page ad in the newspapers, in both the Hindi papers, and I suppose in other languages in other cities, and in the English press. It showed a cornucopia of food like we would see at Thanksgiving time, with vegetables and things falling out. It said, "Remember the sour taste of PL480." This was a campaigning poster. "Remember the sour taste of PL480. The Congress party brought you the sweet taste of self-sufficiency." So, the PL480 program still had that kind of currency in the political milieu. In that kind of milieu, I had no more intention of asking the Indians to thank us for PL480 than going to the moon. But it being India and India being the kind of country that it was, there was a local employee who felt a stronger obligation to adhere to the Washington masters than I did, which was always the case. They were watching us Americans to make sure that we followed our policy directions. He obviously sent it over to the- One day, I'm sitting in my office and I get a letter from the Prime Minister's office, saying that the PL480 experience was one of the profound experiences in the Indian independence, that it was a tribute to the relations between the countries, and India's strength today and the memories of a billion people are rooted in it. It was the most incredible letter I've ever read. So, you just take those couple of stories.

Q: Do you have that letter?

CYLKE: No, but AID must have it because ____ came out and we had a big celebration, so it must have gone back into the Washington records. But AID, more than in any other country I served in, had a profound effect on that country's consciousness and the United States standing with that country at its independence and through those famine years, not just providing the PL480, but building the agricultural research system, had a profound effect which lasts until today. I think it's true for a lot of AID directors because we're the United States, so there's an

element of that. But there was certainly no one, and it really hit me, the power of an AID director, there was no one I couldn't see in India. And there was no institution we hadn't touched, whether it was a development bank, the Fertilizer Corporation, the agriculture universities, the major hotels in Delhi were all built with Cooley loans. Remember, the Cooley loans were- Years ago, the PL480 loans were more used to the PL480 being local currency generations from the sale of the commodity. In the old days, the loans were actually repaid in local currencies, rather than dollars. That had been invested in private activities in India. Bob Blakely was a young project officer in India in those days. He ran the Cooley loan program and Bob's name was like some kind of saint in the private sector. The Taj Hotel was always known as "Bob's Hotel." So, I think as people think about this era, we had a profound effect, not only in what we did - building an agricultural research extension system, the green revolution, that whole phenomenon - but it also seared not only the conscience of individuals that participated, but I think we are part of the political cultural history of that era in India and closer identified in their minds. That's something for the United States to be proud of. I was going to say something else about that, but it just slipped out of my mind.

Q: Despite the fact that Lyndon Johnson cut off PL480 assistance?

CYLKE: There is a tape of interviews that I did with John Lewis. There is a tape of a two hour interview with John Lewis as director, which was a fabulous conversation, which Peter Thormann and I did as an interview- John Peter set up an interview series for us, with people who had been prominently involved with AID development. The other one was John Cole Cool, which is another fabulous tape about how the AID mission worked in those days. John told me that the actual shipments were authorized by the President of the United States. This was big time stuff in those days. When you asked for the comparison with Egypt, I think that, in fact, it was life and death. So, we had enormous leverage at that time. Much of the political reaction to outsiders hadn't gone up to the same height and pitch that it did in later years as well. But the resources were enormous. I mean, we're talking about significant resources. So, I thought that was important.

Anyway, to go back to the program men, if you didn't have the resources to put on the table- I didn't think we had any particular insight on poverty. We had some interesting insights on irrigation this and irrigation that. But my sense was that, and maybe this was just puffing myself up, India's not just another country. India's a billion people. India's a development phenomenon in a certain sense. They certainly have relevance beyond their own borders. I think part of the problem between the United States and India was that we were the leader of the capitalist world and they were the leader of the developing world. Therefore, we ended up taking postures with each other that weren't rooted in our bilateral relationship but really affected our multilateral relationship. I heard from many people in the State Department that some of the antipathy toward India that's famous within the State Department and famous within the Foreign Ministry of India, the Indian policy coterie in the Foreign Policy Ministry was largely communist or at least anti-U.S.

"Communist" is the wrong word, but pro-Russian. Most of the people I knew, I really didn't like India (inaudible) came out of the (inaudible), came out of the United Nations forums, where

there was tremendous tension on each side representing these different interests. Most people who hadn't served in India came away with a very different flavor for India.

Q: The leadership was non-aligned?

CYLKE: Yes, movement and all of the kind of business led to lack of understanding. At that time, Peter McPherson told me that he wanted me to be interested in science and technology. That was echoed to me by the Ambassador when I climbed off the airplane. He wanted me to be interested in science and technology. Now, I don't know that I ever fully understood either of their interests. I'm going to tell you how my interest evolved and why I think it's important when I come to it. The Ambassador's interest, I think, came from the sense that India has a significant science and technology community. In India, that science and technology community is equated with independence. In other words, coming to be an independent country, that India really prided itself on, was one, coming to independence, keeping a secular state, and three, being a scientific state. It's an important part of the finding consciousness of the nation, like we have in our society a sense of the role of the individual. And they were very important politically. And, of course, India has a bomb. So, you put all those things together and we had enormous interest in the Indian science and technology community. Most of the PL480 local currency resources which were left in India were devoted to science and technology projects between the United States and India. They weren't managed by AID, by the way. We had a science and technology office with three American officers in it when I was there. So, I said to the mission, "We're going to do this." The mission said, "Yes, but we're looking to you to defend these interests on science and technology. We want you to defend us and make a case for why we should stay in irrigation and forestry. That's your job as the AID director. You represent us. We expect you to go off and fly your sword with Peter McPherson and the Ambassador. Priscilla stood up to them after all and we're looking to you to do that." So, that's an interesting challenge for a mission director, I think. It tests your leadership skills.

Q: You were being asked to get out of those sectors?

CYLKE: I was being told to put more and more attention toward science and technology. McPherson made it absolutely clear that that's where he wanted us to move. Now, on the Ambassador's side, I think there was this political ambition. You may know better than I. I can't recall now what was driving Peter. But that was his image of what he wanted to have happen in India. When I first got there, in the first year, the pressure wasn't that strong and I had always gone wanting to do this poverty business. I must have spent two months of my first year there in Bihar, which is medieval. I was going to make Bihar my equivalent of the Helmand Valley kind of conversation we had (inaudible) Afghanistan. The poorest of the poor kind of thing. But then I began to wonder, "What are we doing? What are we achieving?"

So, the science thing came to me in a funny kind of way. We had a large agricultural research portfolio. As far as you could see, the research was pretty crummy. It was a remnant of the old ag university program. What stuck me was, I got interested in biotechnology. The reason I got interested was not so much the fact that biotechnology, I thought, was a whiz-bang thing, but for three reasons.

The people wondering about our technology were interdisciplinary in their approach. They were willing to talk to other disciplines, which the ag folks weren't willing to do. Two, they were global in their perspective. They all understood that biotechnology was a global science and it really got me tuned into the fact that there were global systems and how they really worked. It was important for India to become part of the global network, not just an autarkic thing. It wasn't enough to just build their capacity internally. Three, the biotech people (inaudible) clearly with on the user of the technology, on the private sector. We were going to use this stuff. But clearly, the Indian research community wasn't focused on it. It was a straight science exercise. So, I began to wonder, I think myself, for my own thinking, about the role that a technology orientation might play in trying to promote simply the idea of modernization in India. I think I really kind of decided that, if we had an agenda in India, it was really connecting them somehow to (inaudible) called "waves" or development waves or to technology systems or to something external to India that could begin- We weren't going to be able to finance change in India. This wasn't Egypt. We weren't going to make the policy change. My sense was, if you could somehow move India into- I began to become interested in global systems. At that time in the United States, there was a lot of work going on at the state level with science and technology, of cooperation between business, universities, NSF research institutions. It was a tremendous effort state by state to build this kind of technology capability where (inaudible) kind of phenomenon in Boston or the Silicon Valley kind of phenomenon. It was a very big movement in the United States, very richly financed. We ran seminars in a number of different states. India had a science citadel.

Q: The rationale for this may relate back to your earlier observation about the fact that the older generation, the university people who had had a link with the U.S. were now bowing out...

CYLKE: And losing that kind of connection. There was not a dynamic connection. It was becoming apathetic.

Q: The scientific research work was becoming significant I remember hearing about India-

CYLKE: They were leaders.

Q: They were getting 20 years behind and the government was to try to bring them into the modern development?

CYLKE: Absolutely. If you don't mind, I'm going to take a step ahead to post-AID, to something that really typifies what I'm trying to say. After I left AID and I was working for the Association of Big Eight Universities, I was invited out by the Thai mission, which was working as a partnership idea, to help create a petroleum college in Thailand. I took this vice chancellor of the university all over the U.S. because they wanted to do a project of some kind with him. I found that the Thais put up a 10 story building and put \$10 million worth of equipment into it. They wanted a U.S. partner for this university. They said they were not going to pay fees, they were not going to pay overheads. They would pay the faculty salary. They wanted half their faculty to be Americans and they wanted the seal of the American university on their diploma. That's what they wanted. So, this was tough. To even get an American university to talk to us was tough. As it turns out, we got the University of Oklahoma. I want to talk about this for a second. I was down at the University of Oklahoma one day. We were going around and around and the

president of the university said to me, "What these guys want me to do is invest in Thailand." I said, "I had never articulated it that way, but, yes, I guess that's what they want." Our whole conversation before that over three or four months had been about contracts and grants. The American university mentality was really organized around contracting. "There weren't any contracts and grants so why am I talking to you?" Two weeks later, he called me and said, "Come on back down. We're in." I said, "Well, why are you in?" He said, "Well, there ain't much of a petroleum industry here. There's going to be a big petroleum industry in Thailand. To the extent we have an obligation to train engineers. They are increasingly there. Our companies are there. Phillips is there. If we're going to stay alive, we'd better be there." Well, the interesting part of this conversation was, I had a meeting with Ronald Roskens, who was the big AID president from Nebraska, with the president of Kansas State, and (Thai word) University. We went in and Roskens said what you would have expected. And Ralph Smuckler was there, who had been very involved with this kind of work and was a good friend of mine. I got to know Ralph in India. Actually, I had him come out and do some evaluation. He had done a lot of work even subsequently with the ADP. They said almost what you would expect them to say. They said, "Mr. Chancellor, our job is to build your capacity, not to stay there. It's to build your institutional capacity and to go away," which was in fact a very legitimate AID objective over the years. It was something I think you and I fought for. The chancellor looked down and he said, "Well, that's a great strategy to keep us permanently second class." We all leaned back in our chair and said, "What?" He said, "If I'm going to be a first-rate university and I'm not connected to the important industrial centers of the world, if I'm not part of Houston, if that isn't part of my daily work and daily thing, you're really telling me that I should stay a second class university. I'm interested in being a first-class university." Well, very interesting. So here's a university in Thailand which is saying, "To be first rate, we have to be a global university. We want American universities as part of our faculty, 50/50 are the faculty. We'll pay their salaries, but we think it's to their advantage, so we don't want them on a contract. We don't want to pay them to be here. We want a joint venture university." On their diplomas at this college today, you have "Case Western, University of Michigan and Oklahoma." They're the three partners. There is a big academic issue as to how they're teaching. They're teaching a course at a time, six weeks a course. So, a faculty member doesn't give up a year or two to go out. He goes out for six weeks, teaches his course, and goes home and then directs research from (inaudible). But they thought what would happen was, the teacher would come once or twice, be interested in Thailand, and go away. The problem is that teachers who have taken the thing now won't give up their slots to other faculty members to participate. They say they are getting more publications out of their students there than are in the States, as a matter of fact. It's a recruiting source for home.

Right next to it, there's another business school, which is Northwestern Business School. So, when you stand on the front steps of the Regent Hotel in Thailand and look across the golf course, there's two towers that appear. One is Northwestern University and the other is the University of Oklahoma, Case Western and joint venture. Permanently established on an entirely different premise, created by the globalization of the world economy. We couldn't have done it 20 years ago. But it seems to me, those are development and political investments of an inestimable value.

That kind of issue is what got me interested also in development cooperation. I want to come back to India. Themes I got interested in were technology. I think a lot of us in the development

community failed to recognize or don't want to recognize or haven't hit our consciousness right, that in most of the developing countries today, the largest productive sector is the industrial sector, even in many African countries. It's amazing to me. And for a long time - the Asian countries for 20 years have been industrial-led economies. And yet for one reason or another, I don't think the development communities put a sufficient investment into understanding that process, partly because it's private sector, partly ideological. There were all kinds of reasons. But we haven't made the same investment in understanding that development phenomenon that we made in the rural sector and in the agricultural sector. We're just not as sophisticated about it. We don't get it. We feel awkward about it. So, I was interested in- And technology is key to that. So, I began to integrate this interest in technology in a larger development paradigm of industrial-led economies. What do we know about it and what makes it tick?

Second, globalization. There are world technology systems that operate outside. I started this in India, but I'm seeing it clearer now. An awful lot of what's happening in the world economy is not being run by nation-states, not even being run by international organizations, but being run by industry protocol, university relationships, etc., etc.

Third, my own sense in India that, increasingly, development assistance was not the appropriate tool. We didn't have the resources to do it. But we weren't taking sufficient account ourselves of the institutions that we ourselves had built in these countries. We'd made a tremendous investment, but we never woke up to say that, having educated all these people and having built all these institutions, India in fact was a different place than it was the day before yesterday. Those institutions could be put into play with other institutions, particularly in the globalizing kind of environment, which led me to this whole notion of development cooperation rather than development assistance.

The argument that graduation is a misguided kind of notion, that development is as important in the United States and Taiwan today as it was before. They don't need development assistance. Part of their development problem is that they are wasting too much money. There is overinvestment, which is creating environmental problems. But the perspective that we in the development discipline can bring to bear on the problem, which is not necessarily sectoral-specific, it's multi-sectoral, was a broader appreciation of how these different things play into democracy, into pricing policy, into income distribution, into these issues, which lots of technical ministries don't take into account. You have the ability to really begin to think about a context within which development goes forward. Development cooperation doesn't mean just stepping back, but it means you can still engage in a conscious and purposeful development promotion effort, but you don't have to have as much money. You can do it by trying to make connections, insights, exchanges, workshops or whatever it might be. I think India really set that stage for what is now my work, which was the concern for industrial-led growth and the role of technology, the power of globalization and global systems and the fact that the economic paradigm really extends outside the borders of any country. You have to think much more consciously about that.

Thirdly, a different way of doing business was required in India. They were still a development assistance candidate. We didn't have the resources to play that role. But they had the maturity of institutions that you really couldn't treat in an assistance relationship. Anyway, there is

something about an assistance relationship which isn't right for a mature country, in a certain sense.

Having said that, and I will shut up, that leaves out, to a certain extent, 600 million people in India. That seers at me constantly, but I think I rationalized it myself as an AID director in recognizing that we were not the most important thing in India. So, what we thought about it- What India really needed at a certain point was some leadership, some new ideas, some kind of way of getting new ideas into the system. The kinds of programs in which we engaged ourselves, like with biotechnology, offered the promise of a wave of fresh air, a different way of thinking about problems, into that system. I couldn't see that we had much to offer on the poverty side, except standing witness to it, which can often be important in and of itself. But the Indian system, in a certain sense, it's such an important part of the polity of the country, having an American stand witness to the poverty situation I didn't think was adding- That's a pretty shorthand philosophy,

Q: Let's go back to what we specifically tried to do in the science and technology area.

CYLKE: I don't think I did as much as I'm doing now. I was just coming to learn it. My basic interest we started out with was - and we got a lot of political play on this - to promote a program for private sector R&D. The thought there was, "How could you make technology relevant to development?" So, you wanted to move away from the science community and closer to what I'd call the technology community, the R&D community, and commercial R&D. My thought there again was, one, international. How do you connect this extraordinary capability to international current so that they could get the new technology ideas flowing into the country to the private sector? Not just for private sector because private sector is the marketplace so that your technology agenda gets shaped in response to what the society really needs. We called this first program, which financed collaborative R&D, "PACT," the Program for the Acceleration of Commercial Technologies. I remember being quite proud that, in the times of India that they authorized the project, the (inaudible) was "PACT is a fact." I don't think AID had had a lead editorial in the Times of India in 15 years. What it captured was that Indian leadership was just focused on this issue: how do we become a modern country? As the program shrunk down toward \$50 million, \$50 million worth of irrigation investment was a drop in the bucket. I think the Indians perceived that - and they had no problem in allocating resources to this question - that, if they could get themselves connected to the \$25 billion a year U.S. R&D machine, that that was value. So, spending \$3 or 4 million on a commercial R&D program that brought them closer into that network which gave them access to that, their goal was- They knew they weren't going to get another \$100 million in budgetary resources out of me. I think they saw the leverage inherent to getting themselves to become part of the global technology machine. So, as far as the Indian government went, this was a very popular program. I think they thought they were getting high leverage out of it.

Q: Can you explain the program a little more?

CYLKE: Then we went on from that. That program financed- I have to say, the individual activities that were financed were almost trivial. There was an alternator. There was an AIDS testing kit, which got commercialized and out into the marketplace. These were joint ventures.

The individual projects were kind of interesting, but the real thing was trying to get the Indian science community to become cognizant that it had to become much more closely related to the marketplace. So, my policy goal, if you will, was internationalizing it and getting them closer to demand sources. But, of course, in doing that, you had to fund something. So, there were a whole raft of R&D kinds of activities.

We were catching a wave in India. I'll tell you a story about that. The chairman of ICICI, which is the second largest development bank in India, who was Minister, who is now in charge of all the export strategy for India - quite a gentleman - became seized with this idea. I'll tell two stories on this because little stories are nice.

Seized with this idea. Jim Norris, who was one of the paragons of AID, and I have enormous regard for Jim, just thought this was bunk. So, I came out to India and I took him on a tour. At the end of it, he said, "You know, really, this couldn't- This is interesting, what you're doing, but it doesn't work anyplace else." That may even be true because there are very few places with that rich of an S&T community. We went in to see Rogue in his office. The president of this bank looked Jim in the eye and said, "There were three great moments in history. Christ, Buddha, and the opening of the technology era." I remember, Jim just said, "Get me out of here." I want to say just for the record, Haven, though this record may become obscure in a library somewhere, that Tom Nicastro, who was the head of our technology office in India, who is now the office director for a lot of different things in the Soviet Union, was the AID director in Chile, where he ran the technology program, was interested in globalization and development cooperation, was the office director for this area and was one of the brightest, best managers, best people motivators that I've ever worked with.

The other thing was that the Ministry of Finance- This was tricky business, too. Because in all of our other programs, we had a counterpart. We had the Ministry of Industry or we had something else. Here, we really didn't have a counterpart. The money was in the bank and Tom Nicastro traveled India-wide. We picked a city. We put a lot of money into Bangalore, which is now India's science city. I don't want to say we sparked it, but there are people in Bangalore who will say we sparked it. We got R&D funds put down there. We got state Ministry of Industry and Science and Technology to work together on collaborative programs. Tom Nicastro visited 10 cities in India before he picked Bangalore. This was before anyone was talking Bangalore. We created R&D funds, industrial extension programs to get technologies out to small enterprise, etc.

But let me tell one other story of Rogers Beasley, who brought problems to my desk. He was a missionary and he met a guy in India who was making vaccines for horses. He was a big horse racer. If you met him, he'd be the last person on earth you'd think an AID director would encounter. He (inaudible) horses in his backyard and everything. He made the vaccines because there was no quality vaccine for his horses. Rogers convinced this guy that his destiny was to make human vaccine. There were no private vaccine facilities in India. Rogers told me that anyone who got injected by an Indian-made vaccine at that time was taking their life in their hands, out of the public vaccine system. So Rogers delivered this guy to me and told me I should solve his problem and turn him into a private vaccine manufacturer and then vanished and went on to another project. So, this was a project that I had to develop for this guy, who developed

more projects in India but we all did his work for him. Fantastic experience because he came to me and one of the questions was, he couldn't get certified. So, how do you get certified? So I told him, "One thing you do is you start wearing a tweed jacket rather than a white suit. Get that stuff (inaudible) out of your office and get some books in there and look like you're a laboratory rather than a racehorse entrepreneur." Damned if he didn't put books in his office and damned if he didn't get certified! Incredible. There are now three or four private vaccine things, but he carved the way. He was making polio vaccine, smallpox, the regular range of vaccines. That's another thing that we did. I thought it was the break of that statist, government-sponsored, inward-looking kind of thing.

Q: Was the U.S. involved in that?

CYLKE: We funded- We gave him \$500,000.

Q: Was it connected with the U.S. vaccine?

CYLKE: Well, this was a tricky bit of business, now that you remind me. I forget the name of the drug company who had the polio formula, but they wanted \$3 million for it. I think he got it, in typical Indian fashion, through the back door, through a Romanian. I don't think he was prepared to pay. India's going to have to come into that market. Part of their problem in being commercial, of course, is people are afraid to do business with India because they're afraid of trademark piracy, etc., which is- If you are going to enter into a global economy, there are all kinds of global rules which are going to come to bear as well. But, in that case, no. We found that we couldn't fund it because there was no rationale for the pricing. My lawyers and people couldn't verify a price that was fair. The drug company was going to get what it could get. We couldn't establish what a reasonable price was.

Q: You weren't involved in any technical aspects?

CYLKE: We tried. Our guidance was largely internal financing, working with the Minister of Economy, getting money for him, getting him his approvals. I, with Rogers, did all the interaction with the Department of Biotechnology, which had to give him his certifications. It was what I'd call good, old-fashioned AID networking. It wasn't finance. It was AID auspices which were so important in that kind of activity.

We had some technological. As I say, we had some people out from CDC and other kinds of people. He was making animal vaccines. He got his technical advice here and there. What he really needed was guidance and encouragement on moving down the road. I'd say we gave him more financial advice and AID connections and plead his case in front of the powers to be in India more than anything else. We did a lot of vaccine programs. We did a lot of health research work, mostly vaccine. A vaccination program with the Embassy.

That then gets you into the whole issue of, if you're cooperating with the Embassy, you're probably doing something wrong. I think most people in AID feel that, if you collaborated with the Department of Commerce or you collaborated with somebody, there was something wrong. On my side, there was perhaps financing some things with the Embassy, with the science

department, that maybe I was doing because there was pressure. Not just (inaudible) which I rationalized. I think that AID, and I see it today, there's a reluctance in the Asia bureau today to deal with APEC. When you ask, "Why," they say, "Because they'll pick our pocket." It seems to me we're in business to spend development resources. APEC opens doors. The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. I'm working on environmental issues. They have a clean production initiative. I was at a meeting the other day. We've given them our agenda, but AID doesn't want to identify too closely with it because AID, I think, historically does not like ideas brought to it; it likes to fund its own ideas. I think we're very (inaudible). I think the institution still is, to its detriment.

Q: Was there a health program with which we were in any way connected?

CYLKE: Absolutely. We had a health program that was like our irrigation program. It was financing individual health clinics around the country. Again, it was straight budget support for health clinics. I've seen to many health clinics being built next to other health clinics. Frankly, there weren't irrigation or forestry or health projects; there were rural works projects. There were anti-poverty programs. We were providing budget support. A guy by the name of- A former AID officer who worked for the Berger Company, who worked on the Southern Africa report with me. He was the head of the Mekong Delta Commission at one point. His name will come back to me. I've worked with him on several sector loans over the years. I met him in that context. We turned our health program into a sector program. A health sector program where the objective was organized around, as I say, vaccine criteria: how much money they put into vaccine immunization, lowering the age limits of the children that they'd get the vaccines to. We turned our program into a sector program, which I thought was easier than pricing issues. But there were performance criteria that the states would move to- Only when they met the criteria, our money would then flow into the budget support for the program, but only at that point. I think it was one of the first health sector programs and, yes, it was absolutely related in that way.

Q: Was it effective?

CYLKE: I think so. I think it's been evaluated and considered quite effective. The problem with AID, of course, is you never know because we're all starting programs and evaluating somebody else's dream.

Q: But was it implemented enough during your time?

CYLKE: The impact was that we got the age at which the vaccination program in the country targeted at the right ages and the right vaccines. I think we did that. However, having said that, I'd have to be honest, we also had a population program. That's worth mentioning. We got nowhere in four years. I wore out my pants sitting outside secretary's offices, trying to talk about population issues, to zero avail in India. If you wanted to buy contraceptives, budget support again, you could. But if there was a policy issue that was not on the table, it was population, period. We did some programs, but Mike Jordan, who is now retired, was an eminent AID population officer and in that era was considered one of the top two or three population officers. I think Mike just broke his back. Mike left India without much taking place. But we provided

budget support to some family planning programs. But Mike was trying to get the private sector distribution of contraceptives. He had lots of innovative kinds but they were not on the table.

Q: This was a cultural resistance?

CYLKE: Political, government. Not cultural. This was political. They really didn't want the United States Government fooling around in this area.

Q: The government was active in this area of family planning?

CYLKE: Of India. That's probably the only- The family planning program was the government's (inaudible).

Q: But the government was supporting that?

CYLKE: Yes, they supported the program and they'd take budget support. They just didn't want you talking about or being seen near- They considered it politically volatile enough that they didn't want any foreigners near that program. It comes out of the attitude about the North preaching to them about population issues and their natural resistance to it came out of the forces sterilization thing that Mrs. Gandhi's son being engaged in that issue. It was considered to be much too sensitive an issue for donor countries to be telling them what to do. It was a very popular political issue, too, within the country, foreigners telling them about their- To be honest, I had no success- I gave up. I wouldn't go with Mike to any more meetings.

Q: But you did provide budget support?

CYLKE: We provided budget support, but I can't say it was important. It was budget support. After I left, in this last administration- The other problem in India, its strength and its distrength was, you had this elaborate political structure, administrative structure. The merit of it was, you had the Indian Administrator of Service, which was a small, elite service like our Foreign Service, where everyone turned over their jobs every three or four years. Everyone knew each other. Things could happen. You'd pick up the telephone. Everybody knew everyone. But you met some of the most stubborn officers that you've ever met in your entire life. So, Walter, I think, ran into this. The Agency's gone into this big program kind of notion for population, so they went to UP, which would be the seventh largest country in the world, Upper Pradesh, if it were. They had a break. They had an administrative officer to let them in. Got transferred. I know they're not expending any money. It just shut down again. So, part of it is the luck of the draw and who your officer is. There's a lot of autonomy in that Indian system. But, frankly, family planning is one very, very, very tough issue. Of course, you have 10 states that are larger than any country in Europe. So, they are different. Upper Pradesh is not a simple place and it's a much more backward place than lots of other states. India has this interesting situation where the southern states are probably more progressive than the northern states. But the politics are in the north.

Q: You made a passing reference about AIDS, which was-

CYLKE: We did an AIDS testing kit, but- Don't ask me why not, but it was not a conscious part of the program. We weren't pushed to do it. I don't know that AID was in AIDS work as such in '87.

Q: That's interesting that you would have that. Was that picked up by anybody?

CYLKE: It was also in Thailand.

Q: But I mean in India.

CYLKE: Well, you know how active this program is, as a matter of fact, my wife told me just yesterday that PAT, the organization out in Seattle to help (inaudible), they now have a permanent office in Delhi, basically organized around commercializing technologies. They're also very active in Thailand around the same thing, not just providing technical assistance, but actually commercializing commercial technologies like AIDS diagnostics and things of that nature.

Q: But you don't know what happened to your intervention at that point?

CYLKE: No. (Inaudible) my wife's firm, which was John Snow, was commissioned to do an evaluation of the AIDSCAP program a number of years ago. I was reading the findings and what struck me was the amount of control an AID director has on a global issue. I read that evaluation. You had a director in a country with a very high AIDS problem in Africa, in Uganda, that didn't want to deal with AIDS. You had an enormous AIDS program in another country in Africa, Cameroon, which had maybe the smallest incidence of AIDS on the continent, with a very large AIDS program, essentially directed by the predilection of the AID director. You've always had this tension within the Agency. I happen to know these people. I think they had a very good reason for what they were doing. But it casts into play this tension between what you were asking me earlier, the role of the Washington bureaucracy. Well, if the Agency thinks AIDS is important, there's a certain legitimacy to me to think that the Agency ought to say to their director, "Dammit, you're going to do it." On the other hand, you can say, why should you follow the foolish (inaudible) of some kind of Washington thing when you're on the ground and see it? So, I don't know if there's any right answer to that question. You just hope you're dealing with informed people who are not dealing with either their personalities or turf and seriously trying to address the issues. I was reading and it just jumped out at me as an example of the power of the AID director to (inaudible) the program.

Q: Let's return back to India and your own situation. How did you see your own relationships in your situation?

CYLKE: I thought, by and large, I was blessed. The deputy assistant administrator - deputies were always the good guys in the end - was Rocky Staples. Rocky was an unusual person, who had an unusual place in his heart for India and I think had a strange tolerance for me. I think he was intrigued, when I first went there, with my interest in Bihar and the poverty thing. He was interested in the move toward technology thing. He was just enormously supportive. I think his feeling was that, if the director had passion for his country, was doing his homework and was

connected, that was worth investing in. Whether it was the most important problem or not the most important problem, it was probably the highest return because you were going to get the most energy out of him on that.

My clear perception as director was - and it's a different perception than you had as deputies - that the only clear guidance from Washington was "no waves." If everything goes along and it's kind of quiet, you can pretty much do whatever you like to do, excepting the fact that you take guidance from somewhere. I want to mention that, too. I felt very independent.

Q: At the same time, you had an administrator who was pushing service and technology?

CYLKE: That's right. I convinced myself that that was an important place to be. So, I didn't feel pressed. Some of my staff would say it's just because I caved in. Who knows? But I did attend a mission director's conference when I was in India, which is apropos of this. One of these TRG- This consulting firm that does this management stuff for AID. It was a mission director's conference and they asked us who our boss was. It split four ways. Twenty-five percent of the officers raised their hand and said they thought their boss was the assistant administrator of their regional bureau. Twenty-five percent said they thought their boss was the Ambassador. Twenty-five percent said they thought their boss was the administrator of the Agency. And twenty-five percent said they were all factors to be taken into account. Part of that was regional. I wouldn't want to say that, but I think part of that reflected history of bureaus. The Asia directors felt very independent. I think the big mission tradition - Nigeria probably had that tradition, too - but the big mission tradition was very, very different. Your Latin America directors were much more sensitive to the Ambassadors, I think, than other kinds of people. So there was an element of that. But I think it was interesting, there was almost an even kind of split. I felt very strongly that the AID director's job was truly a unique job. You had this unique opportunity to represent not just your agency, but in a certain sense you were representing the American university system, you were representing the American technology system. We had a magnificent platform of stuff that you could represent.

And you were a representative. You were - and I'll go back to that Frank Pinder comment - I was surprised at my own ability to step out of the mission and be an outside actor because I had never really done that before. But I remember other directors. I think I mentioned earlier, Roger Ernst in Egypt, who used to pass out the card of who you had to see every week. He used to give every officer five names of who they were to talk to during the week to report back on. He was outside. I considered my job every bit as much administering the AID program, but it was so well run that there wasn't much to administer. I mean, you didn't need a deputy. We had very competent local staff, extremely competent, too competent. They were almost more in charge and therefore very rigid in changing. But the mission was pretty responsible.

Q: Were you an independent agent?

CYLKE: I was an independent agent. I don't know what I would have given it before. I thought it was comfortable, but I had to be responsive to Peter. I certainly had to be responsive to my Ambassador. My assistant administrator was not insignificant. I mean, one controlled my career, one controlled my daily health. If you're not in tune with the Ambassador, you're going to be ill.

So, I think it was a mix of all those things. But I think it's important because, with that kind of a mandate, you really are outside-moving. I have to say that I don't think the Agency ever asks a director what AID India was or the power or the authority or the representational value of that. I would say an awful lot of my influence was stuff that had nothing to do with projects, but I was judged, in terms of obligations, in terms of numbers, and in terms of projects, but in fact, that had very little to do with my daily life. I reviewed projects. If anybody knows me, I had my input into projects. But it's not how I was defining my influence in the country. They were part of it. But an awful important part of it was making connections, looking for the waves, looking for the opportunities, trying to move ideas out there. I think most successful AID directors were there. There was nothing in your EER really that had much to do with that and not much reward for that, I don't think, in the EER system, as a matter of fact.

Q: But you represented the development interest?

CYLKE: Absolutely. I definitely perceived myself every bit as much a member of the country team in that context, representing the development thing, as- I don't know how others felt about it. I felt that being part of the country team was important. I enjoyed it. It was a separate job from my job of administering the AID program. I think that was important.

The question of how do you move a mission to a different way of thinking about a problem? There are certainly directors who are more skilled at that than I because of my own kind of tendency to dominate a conversation or whatever. There are other directors that I've worked with - George Carner, I think, is the quintessential kind of leadership by consensus and engagement kind of person, which was a different kind of personality than myself. Tom Nicastro in my mission. That kind of a person. My sense was that you weren't going to push this mission around by saying, "This is the sector you're going to be in." It wasn't going to move that way.

It happened that it was my wife, but, in both Egypt and in India, we ran a development library center. It was really important to me for a number of reasons. I want to mention it. It was sponsored by CDIE, so it's a blurb for CDIE in that sense. I put a lot of stock in it. One, I asked the librarian to do three things for me. One was, I wanted to run a seminar series. I wanted somebody to bring ideas into this mission on a regular basis that weren't filtered to me through some client that we had for a project. So, every Wednesday afternoon, we had someone in the mission talking about something. I first heard of AIDS, if you want to know the truth, in the AID mission from a guy from the State of Massachusetts, who Tom Nicastro ran down somewhere, who was in India on some subject and came in and gave a two hour talk about what was really going on in the United States on this issue. We had Indians in. We had others in. Over time, when I knew where I wanted the mission to go, there were more of those conferences on topics that I was interested in than others. That's one way to let a mission know what a director is interested in.

Secondly, the collection. We built collection around the ideas. We had a first-class collection on what was going on in the United States in terms of state university business cooperation and technology. I think we had everything that was published in every state in the United States. It allowed our officers to move his agenda because he had something to work with and we used that aggressively.

Third, we had a publication series. I wanted the mission to be identified with important ideas. I was trying to put us across as a serious development institution, not just an aid institution. So we did that. I think it took the program office some time to figure out what was happening - that, in fact, the agenda of the mission was being set down in a library every Wednesday afternoon by who was coming through the door, not by their sending memos out and around the office. But I think it had a tremendous impact on the mission. It became a place where lots of people in the mission interacted with each other. That library is still going in the India mission. It's smaller. It still plays that role in that mission.

In Egypt, in fact, it played the role where it was like the development community club. You would always find people from the Ford Foundation or the World Bank when they came out because it was a place to go. There were had tables. We had the books, we had the materials. But it was also where they could run into people and talk. It was a place where you always knew you could meet somebody who was going to be talking about it. In Egypt, it was less Egyptianized at bringing Egyptians into the mission than in India, where we really made it into that. It was that notion, that if you're going to be a development partner and not just an assistance, and your influence is going to come through your ideas, then you had to not only have a place where ideas could get collected, but you had to present yourself as that kind of institution. We built quite a nice physical facility. It gives a signal that that's what you are, as opposed to something else. Actually, Mary Thormann, and Peter Thormann, who was in the Africa bureau did a nice job for us. We wanted to put out a brochure on the mission and our programs and she suggested that we put it out in the format of a college catalogue. I thought that was very effective. There were other mission directors, like in Egypt, who wanted to put it out in the form of a business annual report. That's the image they wanted to get across. We put ours out with our projects described as if they were courses in a college catalogue. It reeked of that kind of an atmosphere. I think that's the only legitimacy that the AID mission in India has, is the quality of its ideas. That's our currency today.

Q: How did you find working with the Indian people, the bureaucracy and so on?

CYLKE: My son told me - and he was only 10 or 11 in those days - but I can remember the first few days, when I would come home every night - and it went on for four years - Chris would say, "Oh, here he comes. It's the best day of his life again." Partly the job. I think the AID director's job is one of the best public service jobs that the United States Government has to offer. That's not saying that I wouldn't have enjoyed being an Ambassador either. But I think that, in foreign affairs work, I can't think of another job- Don Gardner told me once that what he liked about it (he was my first boss in AID) was that it was a nice mix of academic, because you were at the state of the art of all kinds of important ideas about economics, about politics, about science, management. You had interesting management tasks and assignments. You had larger operations to run, budgets to operate. But the interesting thing that distinguished it from university, which had both of those aspects to a certain extent, was that you could actually put your money behind some ideas and actually test things out and get them done. For a person of an academic mindset but not a research scholar, it was the best- It's an applied job. And then the AID director's position gives you a unique platform, partly because of our history in these countries and partly because you do represent the United States Government.

Q: The Agency gave you the latitude for innovation?

CYLKE: Yes, but I had never traveled in any country- In fact, I travel a tremendous amount now with this United States-Asian Environmental Partnership, in Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines. I think it's also our attitude. I still marvel at the willingness of people to allow a stranger to walk into their office and engage them in an hour and a half conversation about something that may not even be terribly practical, about "What do you think is really happening in this country in terms of environmental protect" and the time that they'll give you. I think that AID officers are largely very skilled at- You don't pull that off easily. You have to have something interesting to say to engage someone. I think, as development people and the ability to share ideas and move them around, I still enjoy this job with no money to hand out. My wife has been known to say, "Owen, you treated AID like it was your own New Yorker magazine. You're living the experience rather than reading it." That's certainly one of the joys I think we all got out of it. But you're also moving ideas around and putting people together. That's what I think the aid business it.

Our formal counterpart was the Ministry of Finance. They were Jesuits in a certain sense. Their job was to capture donor money for the budget. There was no doubt about what they considered their job to be. They'd put up with almost any conversation you wanted to have, but they had their eye on the ball. They wanted money captured for the AID budget and they were skilled at it. I had a problem with them which is instructive, in that, when I got there- A lot of our federal government agencies under fund their international programs and they come to AID to fund them. We were trying to fund a lot of United States Government participation in different science activities in India with the AID budget. The Indians said there was just no way they were going to play that. McPherson was behind this. He was supportive. AID was supportive of this. The Indians said, "No dice. These were supposed to be 50/50 mutual things. This isn't our AID program. This is our science collaboration. We're putting up our 50 percent. You guys go to Paris and pledge \$100 million to India. Then you come back and want to fund your share of a mutual program out of what you pledged. You're double counting and playing games." Lots of governments aren't sophisticated enough to make that argument. I have to tell you, Washington just told me never to repeat that argument again when I told them. They didn't want to hear it from the Indians. We do want to play both sides.

So the Indians played tough with me in the Ministry of Finance in terms of their accounting things. My work with the private sector they would let me do as long as I could find an accountable entity in the Indian government budget. That's where I would do an awful lot of work with this one development bank. They were in the Indian government budget. As long as it was in the budget, the Indians had no problem. You could do anything you wanted to. So then I could go out and work with the private sector and what I had was essentially a development- On the technology stuff, we had a small loan fund that was run down there. That was fine. If I had tried to actually take it out to the private sector, I would have been in a lot of trouble.

What we did in India was, also, they didn't make any distinction between grants and loans. It made no difference to them whether it was a grant or a loan. At the end of the year, very often there was some extra money around. We used to trade with PPC for loan money, for grant

money. We'd stick grant-loan money into the Indian budget. Then we had what we called the "mechanism," which was directly obligated grant funds outside that never showed in the ODA.

Q: Explain that.

CYLKE: If I had an ODA of \$25 million, the Indians knew it. If, at the end of the fiscal year, I could find some mission that couldn't obligate \$5 million in loan funds - and, generally, there were no grant funds around at the end of the fiscal year, but there were all these loan funds floating around. If I could get my hands on the \$5 million grant, I would always take it, add it up to my ODA and then the \$5 million that I would have already- I had my \$25 million, my grant money then I directly obligated to American institutions in the United States. Never showed it in the ODA and the Indians never knew I really had it. That's where we had all of our flexibility. The controller, whose name was Hickman or something like that, he told me that Rumpelstiltskin could turn straw to gold. I remember, he came and told me this one day. He called it the "mechanism." He said, "Look, there's missions trying to give away loan money. Just take it. The Indians don't make a distinction between the grant money. We already have our grant money. It's not obligated. Then we'll just directly obligate it outside of the ODA." That's where we got our flexibility. Otherwise, the Indians watched the ODA like a hawk.

Having said that, however, there was no level that I think the United States Government could have ever achieved to have gotten the political leverage that we wanted. There was no price that you could conceivably pay for that. The Ambassador told me once, when our level was cut one year, that he'd send in a message to Washington that would say anything, except that a reductional level would hurt the political relationship, because that's just not true. In fact, he argued that it might improve the relationship because it would take away opportunities to wrangle with the Indian government over issues. I think he was right. But he was very supportive on the importance of the program, etc. But he wouldn't go so far as to say the level was sensitive to the relationship. So, the Ministry of Finance, they were pretty permissive with me, but there had to be an understanding about my understanding about how the budget was used.

I happen to like Indian administrative officers because this was the most sophisticated group of government officials you're going to find probably in the world, as stubborn as they could be. A conversation with them was always just- You know, you had to be sheriff when you wanted with an Indian government official if he was the Indian administrative service. He was probably a hell of a lot smarter than you were. But incredibly frustrating experience sometimes because they like to fence. You spent a lot of time dancing around issues, where people, I thought, were just enjoying fencing with me rather than coming down on the issues. I think that, basically, our relationships with government were less satisfactory than our relationships with industry associations, banks, almost anything other than the government bureaucracy. Not because it was just sluggish. If you hit the right officer, you had a good day. But if you hit the wrong officer-

Q: This was true in the States as well.

CYLKE: That's a good point. That's an interesting point, too. The Indian system, of course, is different than a lot of other governments because, as we said, the states were political entities. In lots of the countries I had served in, you had decentralized government in the sense that the

administrative, executive powers were passed down. In India, it was different. So you had half the states of a different political party. Each state had its own parliament, had its own government, and half of them were of a different political party than the center. The Indian administrative service was interesting because there was no central service. Everyone was in a state service. The central service was staffed by people in deputation from the states. That was done consciously in India to break down the notion of a strong center running the country. That totally doesn't quite work that way because there's lots of people who finagle a way to make sure they stay in the center for their careers. But there was no such thing as a central service. They called it the "kodder" or some state kodder. State governments were small and, as a result, pretty easy to maneuver through. You had comparable quality at the leadership level because those guys were the same people that were at the center. But it was smaller. In fact, now that you ask me the question- I wasn't enamored of the irrigation and the forestry program, so I didn't spend as much time at that stop. But when I did go out and visit with those people, you worked your way through that much easier. But I was increasingly moving the program away from the set of government relationships into private industry association and private sector kind of relationship. So, my mind probably wasn't as much on- The Ministry of Health, I think anyone in Indian history will tell you, was impossible. The Ministry of Agriculture was behind the times. The Ministry of Irrigation was pretty good. The Ministry of Forestry was pretty good. They were straight technical ministries. They were relatively new, technically competent, I guess, with engineers and people who knew their business pretty well.

Q: The Ministry of Health was impossible?

CYLKE: Impossible.

Q: In what way?

CYLKE: The Health Ministry's everywhere. Their education system brings you to look at the cell, rather than its systems. So, I don't think that people are trained as managers. Public health is an understated issue, as we all know. It's very clinical and, as a result, I don't think people think in abstractions very easily. So, it's very hard to talk policy and programs, I think, with ministries of health. So, you could talk technically with somebody, but that didn't get anything done. So, I don't know that that was India's Ministry of Health. I think I feel that way about health generally.

Q: Was there another dimension in the Indian experience?

CYLKE: I think the India experience- I want to say that I worked for two Ambassadors who had a golden rule and that was that there would be no disagreement between offices on the country team, period. If there were professional differences, they wanted to hear those out, but here would be no tension. That was the only rule. If there was tension, you were going to be out of that country.

With both the Ambassadors, that was their starting rule. I've never worked in another country where the relationship within the country team was as positive as it was in India. It was explicit: there was no fooling around about it. Dean picked it up from his predecessor. I felt as comfortable with the Department of Commerce and with the science people as with anybody else.

In fact, our health program was developed with the science office and we offered to turn- We made a proposal once - a screwy one, but we made it anyway - to merge the ag attach 's office with the ag section. Washington couldn't cope with that. And there were other issues in other agencies - they don't want to give up their space, etc. You know it all. But intellectually and professionally, there was no- It was diametrically opposed, anything you try to get done in Washington interagency-wise. This is an impossible place to try to get anything done as far as I can see, interagency-wise. I have to give credit to both the Ambassadors. Both the Ambassadors shared what we were trying to do-

Q: Who were the Ambassadors?

CYLKE: Harry Barnes, who is now with the Carter Center and does peace stuff, and my DCM in India is the head of programs at the Carter Center, development programs. The other DCM in India was his predecessor in charge of development programs. It's an India mafia down there. Then John Gunther Dean came, who was kind of the cardinal of Ambassadors and had a reputation of being very prickly and whatever it was. Harry Barnes was a no necktie kind of character and John Gunther Dean was a tuxedo character, so they were different personalities. But both were absolutely supportive of the AID program, but in context. It wasn't the aid level that was important to them; it was the content of what we were doing. Neither one of them was very interested in the question of the level and perhaps, in bureaucratic terms, should have fought harder for the level over the years. So that was one character of the relationship. Secondly, I think, was the quality of the mission, both Americans and Indian staff.

I think there is an issue today- I think that the Agency thinks it's failing for some reason and thinks it isn't producing results and isn't having achievement, and it is. I think the Agency as a bureaucracy takes graduation and diminishing resources as a sign of failure when, in fact, the departure from Asia should be a sign for great jubilation. We ought to stand up and take credit for it. If I haven't mentioned to you, what I'm doing currently is, I'm working for the U.S.-Asian Environmental Partnership. I'm working for an Indian research organization, which I joined out of kind of a sense of psychic symmetry of working for a developing country, a development institution in the United States. But I was recently asked to look at a graduation project in Indonesia. I think I mentioned it, maybe, on another tape, where there was such pride on the thing- But I don't know that this whole results thing. Everything isn't driving AID down the medical road to looking at the smallest cell and there are some big ideas out there, which are still aborning and the one that we're working on in the AAP is, if you have an industrial-led development paradigm. Asia has done pretty well on the growth side, done pretty well on the poverty side, done pretty well on the income distribution side. But you're going to have continuing growth at 12 to 15 percent. There's going to be an environmental disaster. I think the statistic is, in 2010, 80 percent of the industrial stock of Indonesia is going to be stuff that isn't on the ground today. You probably have an opportunity to get in front of that industrial thing with a set of ideas which could really change the whole progress of industry. That's a big idea. The Agency seems to be saying, "No, we don't want to deal with that kind of a big idea. We're calling it the 'clean revolution' to relate it to the kind of transformation of the agricultural sector two generations ago. We want to know that you've actually improved the environment in some microclimate, in some geography," which it seems to me is not AID's job. That, it seems to me, is the government's job, to fix the environment in Village X. Our job is to set the development

context within which the government spends its money. I think the Agency's moved around from those major abstractions. Do you hear the word "policy dialogue" in the Agency even anymore? Not much. I don't even think it's a word of currency. I think it's an old-fashioned word. So, I think that the Agency is missing something by not focusing on some of the big development imperatives and ideas that are shaping the world, and focusing too much on - and it's almost an infrastructure result - how many health clinics did we get built?

We're talking about graduation here for a moment. I think the United States Government has a continuing development interest in whatever you want to call them, fast-growing or modernizing countries that are no longer really assistance candidates. One of the notions is, how do you keep it going so that we have an environment? To me, an endowment is a substitute for aid. In other words, how do we create a pot of funds, which we can give away like we did before, but it won't be appropriated funds anymore; there will be an endowment of funds. (Inaudible) have the same kind of people doing the same kind of work with the same kind of mentality. I think development cooperation work is a different kind of work. It really is a partnering kind of job. It's a linkage kind of job. It's an information flow job. The dramatic returns formed by the globalization of the world economy. The notion of a successor to AID simply being AID with the pot of funds coming from an endowment- When you focus on the endowment, that's what it ends up. It still will be a bureaucratic kind of system with AID rules, giving out our money. Somehow, I don't think that's-

Q: It would be a resource for funding programs?

CYLKE: I don't see that as a good organizing principle. It seems to me that that is more an argument for how does an agency stay alive, or how does an agency keep going? That isn't the issue. The issue really is how does the United States Government continue to project or promote development outcomes in our changing environment? That's why I, frankly, and this is heresy, I'm not as frightened by the notion of the State Department becoming engaged in AID work. It frightens me because I don't think they're ready for it. But the notion of getting mainstream development concern into our diplomatic service is not a bad idea.

It's the sense that, as the Agency - this current Agency, given its major substantive thrust - if it was looking for a region of the world where there had been success, where there was still a development situation (inaudible) the language they define it with, the promise is success. It seems to me that South Asia is such a place, where it's a coherent group of countries and people from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, where there is a great mass of poor people. All countries, democracies of one kind or another- They're the kind of development issues that the Agency articulates (inaudible due to static) success: women's groups, gender issues, population issues. You name the issue. There seems to be such discouragement about development. It seems to me that one of the mistakes that AID has made in a certain sense and that the development banks make is not looking at South Asia as (inaudible), just mashing it into the Near East and Asia bureaus - with South Asia with 1.5 billion people, sitting there - where what we mean by development was born, a lot of ideas were born, massive numbers of poor people. But almost all democracies are making significant progress. It just occurred to me that South Asia was a (inaudible).

I don't know that most of the world isn't progressing. There may be parts of Africa that are progressing which I'm not familiar with. But if you look at East Asia, while there are still development issues there, some modern issues and even some older kinds of issues, there are countries which have reached an economic state where development system doesn't look like it's going to be long for this world. Eastern Europe and Russia are different phenomenon than what we traditionally thought of in the developing world. They're no longer present in South America. They have Africa and Central America, the two places where AID (inaudible). We still have sizable programs, however, in South Asia. It's just that we never conceptualized them as a whole. Yet you look at microenterprise development work that's going on in India and Bangladesh or the population problem, which is really rooted in that part of the world. But they're all fledgling democracies. Each one of those countries has development as a central core of its national identity, development promotion. I really don't have much more to say about it. It seems to me that it's a part of the world that we never thought of as a part of the world development. It has the potential of a success story that's really important for the Agency.

Q: You're talking about development assistance. How do you characterize the difference?

CYLKE: Well, if you're talking about East Asia, for most of us, in AID context, we're talking about the two AID countries which were remaining, which were Indonesia and the Philippines. We're out of Thailand now. We have a program in Cambodia and we may do something in Vietnam. But, basically, AID's presence is in the Philippines and Indonesia. The Indonesia program, I think, is generally accepted by most people within the Agency. It's moving into a development phase-out strategy. Within five years, we'll no longer have a development assistance program in Indonesia. Philippines, perhaps a little bit longer for historical, political reason more than a current political reason. But we don't have a presence in East Asia as a region any longer. There may be the beginnings of some kind of a program in Indochina, but I can't believe it will ever be terribly significant because of resource restraints. They're all countries that have grown eight to twelve percent a year. There are classic graduate countries where I would argue separately that there's a continuing development interest. South Asia are all countries with the majority of their populations still living in poverty - and with a billion people sitting in India and were an important part of our global aspirations vis a vis population. It is our continuing interest in getting a majority of the people out of poverty. There's probably as much development experimentation going on with regard to small scale enterprise, population programs- I think each country in the region, except Nepal, has had a female president. Probably the only part of the world. Pakistan has one. India's had one. Bangladesh has had one. And Sri Lanka's had one. It was never conceptualized as a coherent region.

Q: What about the content of the program? You talked about wanting a continuing development relationship with the East Asia countries.

CYLKE: I think the more traditional AID portfolio range of interest: population issues-

Q: Technical assistance?

CYLKE: Yes. I would think those kind of programs still make sense. There's still time for it in that part of the world as well. India is slightly different, but Bangladesh and those kinds of

countries. It's not much, but it seems to me that they're cut off. If you talk about coherent regions in the world, and I don't know how many there are, South Asia has always gotten short shrift. Yet, if I were the administrator of the Agency, with all the things I want to do, you get that whole panoply of stuff that the Agency says it wants to do, some of which is out of sync with where we are. It doesn't have much to do with Russia or doesn't have much to do with Eastern Europe or doesn't have much to do with East Asia anymore. We're not even in South America. So they're really talking about Africa. Africa has a certain kind of downward spoke (inaudible) when people think about it. They're unhappy they're not optimistic. And yet here's a region of the world that's the same kinds of issues as Africa, where one could be quite optimistic and where one could take enormous pride for work that was done over the last 40 years and where work is still going on. They're all democracies, but with majorities of the population in poverty. It is a coherent region. It's not just six countries. They're, in fact, five countries that have to learn to live together for "their development purposes." If you look at the Ganges and its relationship to Nepal and to Bangladesh, and for security reasons as you look to the relationship between India and Pakistan and Sri Lanka. So, there are both security reasons and development reasons to think of that as a coherent region. It's a simple thought, but-

Particularly, as an agency, they're continually, I think, not thinking well enough of itself. I think there's a current depression in the Agency. An awful lot of that is rooted in the hard times that the Agency as an agency is having, as opposed to, I think, some of the more optimistic premises you can have about what's happening with development. I think that the Agency has not put together concern for its own downfall. I think (inaudible) with the Congress about success that they've had (East Asia) and successes which they could have in places like South Asia. One of the reasons is South Asia doesn't seem to arise on the Congressional (inaudible) is a place of incredible importance. It doesn't have the same trade resonance that East Asia has and it doesn't have the same security resonance which Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had. But there are still 1.5 billion people sitting in that part of the world. There are certainly security issues vis a vis the atomic weaponry between India and Pakistan. And it's a coherent region both ethnologically and natural resource-wise, particularly when you look at water flows between those parts of the world. (Inaudible) opposed to the Middle East, where I think one can be quite optimistic. It's a fertile ground for learning development. India, internally, I think, in the industrial sector (inaudible) 15 percent a year. It's incredible. There's still 600 million people in poverty that have to be moved, but there's a dynamic going on in all those countries now, since the collapse of the wall, have all pretty much gotten their policy house in order. They're outward-looking, export oriented. They're taking the IMF stuff kind of seriously. I think they're all on the right track. I think it's a place where development dollars would be well spent.

Q: We may come back to some of that in a minute. Then you finished up in India?

CYLKE: I finished in India in the summer of 1987. I was assigned to FVA to be the deputy to Julia Block, when Walter Bollinger moving to the Africa bureau as the deputy assistant administrator. That's what I did. I came back and there was not an assistant administrator. By the time I got back, I guess, Julia was appointed assistant administrator for the Asia bureau. So, I came in and was, for almost a year and a half, the acting assistant administrator for the bureau. There was also really no administrator. Allen Woods had just been appointed administrator and was sick for the better part of that time. I found that FVA was at that stage, not on anyone's

radarscope at any rate. So, in a year and a half, I don't think I had a one on one conversation with the administrator of the Agency. At any rate, we were in charge of a bureau and expected to be responsible. It's interesting to finally get a senior leadership position in Washington and find out there wasn't any Washington there.

Q: In India, did you have any dealings with BIFAD?

CYLKE: Not anything sharp. The gentleman who was the head of the BIFAD board, a former president of the University of Florida, whose name escapes me - a very gentlemanly guy who was (inaudible) out to India three different time. But my sense in India (we never got anywhere) was that the ag universities were the wrong place to put money in the Indian project. They were much too inward-looking, underfunded, autarkic, unconnected to real development outcomes. In India, they were so much more connected to a scientific agenda than what I call "technology agenda" that they were the wrong institutions to work for. I think BIFAD was disappointed I didn't see the world that way, but we never really put a BIFAD program together.

Q: But those were the institutions in which we had made a big investment in the earlier period.

CYLKE: We had, but my sense was, if you wanted to lead them out, you almost had to set a competing concept agenda. As you'll recall, I talked about biotechnology because they were willing to work interdisciplinary, they were willing to work against an outcome with the private sector, and they were willing to work internationally. I don't think you can run any kind of a technology program which isn't internationally connected. I just don't see how you can. The scientific endeavor now is without borders. I think the Choo Long Kuan University situation, where they said, "How can we run a first-class university without having a root in Houston" really defines the future much more than a autarkic system, which says, "We're going to run our own research thing in Pantnagar and the heck with the rest of the world and the heck with what the output of our scientific research is for."

Q: From my understanding, they became more and more out of date, irrelevant and more introverted, is that correct?

CYLKE: I think so. In India, the ag university system was just- We were funding individual research projects when I got to India that you couldn't see were dynamically connected to anything. That's not to put a blanket on all those universities and the work they were doing, but I didn't see that there was any wave there to ride in terms of trying to get them up a notch. The notch that I could see was trying to move another research agenda which might create a leadership cadre for how scientific research ought to be conducted in the country. As I said, the keys to that, I thought, were interdisciplinary kinds of connections. The ag universities out there wouldn't talk to the biology departments of other universities. It had to be connected to the international community and I say "private sector," but what I really mean is being connected to the users of technology and what the demands for scientific research (inaudible).

Q: Let's go back then to your work with this association.

CYLKE: Then I left the Association. I want to mention Henrietta Olson Fore because I thought she was a unique person. And how idea emerged from different places. Henrietta went to a mission director's conference and said, "Hey, look, the Africa bureau has an initiative. They have the-" whatever it was.

Q: African Development Fund.

CYLKE: Russia's getting the money because there's Russia. If we're out of this, then we better develop an initiative or we're not going to be in business any longer. That's the bureaucratic side of it. So the mission directors of the Asia bureau decided that the one common theme throughout their region was the environment and that they ought to shape some kind of initiative around the environment. So the impetus for it really came from a bureaucratic drive of Henrietta. What she then brought to that initiative was a sense that it shouldn't just be a rubric. AID for too long, I think, has- Any of us who have worked in the Agency for a long time know that, if someone says, "Our initiative's now going to be X," we could line up any program that we had ongoing under X with facility, which I think was always frustrating to people who ran the Agency. You'd read this for a long time and then all of a sudden say, "Guess what? We've been doing what you wanted us to do all along anyway." So she wanted it to be more than rubric. She really wanted to start an initiative which would be driven by her vision of the environment.

Secondly, she really wanted to engage the private sector, not just from a sales point of view. I think her sense was that development wasn't happening just because development agencies promoted development. Development happened because people - universities, private sector institutions, states, etc. - had a reason in today's global economy to be engaged. Her sense was that one role for AID was to create a development context, within which lots of these disaggregated ideas, that being driven by internal institutional purposes could be aggregated around a development goal to a development outcome. I think that was an interesting approach to this development cooperation idea. It is a counterpoint to the idea of creating a foundation. To my notion, I kept creating a foundation to create a pot of funds, which would still be administered largely as AID administers a pot of funds. Her idea was that, instead of that, or as an alternative to that, you created a context and some momentum or initiative around which lots of independent actors, spending their own funds, would continue to spend their own funds to their own interests, but within some kind of a context.

He asked me to join that program. I've been with it now for five years. I did it though the Tata Energy Research Institute, which is an Indian policy research organization incorporated in the United States. I often said I joined them rather than another institution for psychic symmetry, to be associated with a Third World development institution incorporated in the United States. I also like the idea that the head of it was 10,000 miles away, probably. But his feeling of incorporating in the United States is an incomplete vision, but an interesting vision. He believed he would never be taken seriously as long as he was perceived strictly as an Indian organization and that he had to incorporate in the United States in order to be taken as an equal and not treated as a small boy, if you will, by the other institutions. I think that was an uninteresting kind of vision. He's never really been able to fulfill the idea of what role he really plays in the United States as an Indian institution, other than a representation office for his office in India. But the notion of how you get that done, how you get rid of the donor industrialized world sense of "we

are the leaders; we know better; we know more-" If you're going to have a development cooperation relationship, where you're not in the assistance relationship giving away money, you've got to find some way to break that cultural hierarchical relationship as well with much more mutual respect. I think that's what he was after. So, I gladly identified with him, even though it's an employment perch for strategic planning work that I'm doing for the US(inaudible).

There, I will just say two or three things. One of our key ideas was- Environment to me is almost like food aid. Most development people don't like environment either because I think they fear a special pleading foreign interests which, while important, gets disproportionate attention in the development context. I think it's a legitimate concern. Our argument is that it's not so much an environmental program as a development program concerned about economic growth. That, if you have economic growth at 12 percent a year in East Asia, where 80 percent of the industrial stock of the country can be stuff that is now on the ground today in just 20 years, that you won't have the opportunity to get in front of that development agenda with sustainability kinds of concerns. Our sense was, they had the growth pattern down, they had the poverty issue pretty well dealt with, income distribution was dealt with, they hadn't dealt with democracy and the environment. Our interests was, "How do you build a sustainable development paradigm," not, "How do you promote the environment as such?" Number one. So it was an economic issue.

Secondly, a big issue. For some reason, I don't think the Agency has put its mind around this shift in developing countries. I think we all know it happened, but there's no consciousness of it. I started looking at when did these countries become industrial-led as opposed to agricultural-led. It's over some significant period of time. Indonesia's been led by industry now for almost 15 years. And yet I don't think the Agency or the development community's ever come to put the same attention on understanding that phenomenon, how it works, what its relationship to employment, to wages, to the environment, etc. really are. It's the same way we made the investment in the natural resource side. Mike Rock at Winrock kind of coined the notion of "clean revolution" to rhyme with "green revolution." His argument was that there's the potential in Asia to think about a restructuring of the industrial sector, which would be profound in its impact on the way in which development occurs in those countries as the restructuring of the agricultural sector was two generations ago around the green revolution. (Inaudible) come to believe that there are forces at work in the world which offer that which are dependent on things like, since 1984, private sector firms adopting a concern for the environment, for whatever reason that is different than 1984. The localization now has a way of spreading some of those ideas on a global stage which didn't exist before, partly through the desegregations of manufacturing, where so much of American manufacturing is taking place in Indonesia or in India or in China. Increasingly, you see it in child labor kinds of issues. You're seeing it in the environment. Projecting the values of Europe onto those people through the marketplace, not through international organizations, not through national governments. A big movement's called the "International Standards Organization." They have an international quality marker. There's now an international environmental quality marker. You see private banks now imposing environmental criteria because they're afraid of liability issues. I think there's a whole new phenomenon taking place under the rubric of private ordering, which gets added onto what national governments can do, what international organizations can do, which I know we in the development community and the political science community aren't yet up to getting onto. I guess my sense is that there's a real opportunity here for the Agency - because I think AID's way

ahead on this issue of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, APEC, and ASIAN - to get itself organized around a big idea, sustainable development, in a practical kind of way. In a situation where development cooperation will work, the issue isn't more development assistance funds, the problem is, there's so much money being invested that what's the consequence going to be for the environment? Whether we like it or not, the East Asian development model is the model of choice which AID, the World Bank and everyone is pushing on the world. That's the development model of choice and yet it's being done without any real concern for the environmental consequence of what it is we're promoting. So I think there's a real case to be made that's not just an Asian phenomenon, but a worldwide phenomenon. It mixes an interesting development problem with a tremendous opportunity with a different way of doing business. I don't want to go into great length on this because it's post-AID, but I think it had the beginnings of articulating a different way of doing business and thinking about development that AID could do at a dramatically lower cost. In integrating, I worked with the private sector so that it's trade in aid in its best sense. It's not AID trying to play the role of commercial-

Q: But, you know, an interesting point on the Egypt program was that the Embassy and the Ambassador were pushing you to get more assistance out to the masses and the individuals and not to the infrastructure?

CYLKE: That was not coming from within the Agency. There would have been a context where they would have quarreled with the policy. But the Egyptians, one, didn't pay any attention to our policy interventions and did allow us to yak on about it, so there wasn't any tension at the Embassy.

But I will say that the Embassy did have impact. The Embassy in India had a tremendous impact on the structure of our program. They wanted it to go toward the higher-end technology kinds of issues. That was clearly rooted not only in the Ambassador's personal perceptions about AID. The United State's Government's posture in India was organized around that. Whether it was the ag office or the science office or the economic office, it was clearly around that. There happened to be a coincidence of interests between he and the administrator on that issue. But I never had a sharp disagreement with State.

Q: Were there any particular projects or programs that you were personally associated with or helped bring about that you particularly feel a lot of satisfaction with?

CYLKE: I'd have to go get my resume and look at it! There were all kinds of programs that we worked on over the years that I think I was- Frankly, I think the program we're working on now, if you want to know the truth, is the most satisfying program that I've worked on in a long time because I think (and I think I've had some responsibility for it) it is now associated with an important development idea. The idea of development activities which aren't associated with an important broader, upscale development goal aren't as satisfying to me. I think that it's not the role of the United States Government to be financing specific projects which are government responsibilities - more setting the table or setting the context. That's where I'm coming from.

Therefore, in India, I thought, although it wasn't my major area of interest was in technology relationships, where I think we had some modest success in trying to get a tremendous

investment which the Indians had in science, moved more consciously toward being concerned about the end product use of that. I would say the stuff we did with the health sector, of trying to get up above building health clinics and building specific activities, to trying to affect the context within which that happened. I guess I call that "sectoral programming." The Agency had other words for it. They were program loans in the old days. I think program loans, which dealt with macroeconomic things, were probably successful in some countries, may require even larger amounts of resources to be effective. The IMF has almost co-opted that as an area. The notion of sectoral programming around ideas like health, where you would try to get what I'd say the effective "spigot of the faucet," in different countries was probably the most successful stuff that I was associated with as I look back on it. I attribute that to AI and Princeton Lyman, who gave me the chance to work on sectoral programming. The whole notion of non-project lending (inaudible), but I think agricultural sector lending, health sector lending, population sector lending, (inaudible) the criteria is probably more useful than-

You've asked the question a couple of times about specific projects or programs or things that you're associated with and I haven't answered that question well in any kind of (inaudible), Haven, so I'm going to- I don't think the projects in the end are what I was interested in, or what really makes the difference. So, I think, while all the projects are individually sensible and made some sense, I think the notion that a project is going to change the world- To me, while we carry out our craft in project context - and, as I said earlier, I wonder sometimes about the whole context of the project and whether there isn't a different abstraction we could bring to bear, whether it's portfolios or themes or something- My memory of my career with AID, I don't think, is tied up with individual projects, even though I'm sure I could go through my resume and look at a set of projects which I thought were really important. That's what we accomplished perhaps. That's what I happened to be fortunate enough to be associated with. But, as I look back over my career, I was associated with what happened in the Sahel, which in development was one of the big dramas of our time: what do you do with people in marginal lands who are going to be consistently - that was Ethiopia, the Sahel - at the mercy of non-productive agricultural land, where the educational systems and commercial systems aren't there. What do you do with those in those situations to give people a tolerable life expectancy or life expectation that is totally inconsistent with the geography in which they live? I think that the Sahel, Ethiopia, those kinds of circumstances were really important and interesting for me to be associated with.

Secondly, associated with a set of political circumstances where the same question arises, where the political circumstances was not going to give rise, whether that was the Southern Africa circumstance, which now looks promising, Afghanistan, which looks discouraging, Mozambique. That whole set of other issues that I had the opportunity to be associated with related to the Sahel and the political ones, it seems to me, equally related. How do you create life expectations or help to participate in defining life expectations in very difficult kinds of environments?

India just gives you a chance to be associated with a huge hunk of humanity organized around democratic premises, with 600 million poor people operating with one foot in the 20th century, with 200 million people operating at the same level of economy as the people in East Asia. 600 million people outside of it, where the 600 people are not forgotten. They're a fundamental part of the political process, almost to the detriment of the political process. But just having the

opportunity to sit in that environment, which was the cradle of what we even mean by the word "development," where people first started thinking about it at the end of the 50s.

Egypt, the largest assistance program the United States Government had launched since the Marshall Plan, with modest success on changing the fundamentals of Egypt. But again a very well run program where I could find all kinds of projects which had success and were professionally managed and run by AID, some of which are going to be terribly important in an infrastructure kind of sense, but going to be (inaudible) to the kind of country it's going to be.

Currently, my engagement with an environmental issue, which has broadened out to a whole concern for is there a growth pattern which can be made more consistent with the environmental aspirations of the world and a whole set of new issues.

Finally, I think the food aid association was an interesting one. So, that's all from my own perspective. They were four or five really broad- Which I had the privilege to be associated with and to learn from. Now, the question really is whether I had enough to learn from, but whether the Agency had something to learn from that. The way we're organized right now, we're all bureaucrats. I think the decline of PPC is a tragedy. There's no central repository. And it's not the Global bureau because they're tied up with managing projects. Except maybe in population, I don't see any truly global kinds of ideas coming forth. But the Agency doesn't have a central think tank. I can't discern any kind of organizing- It seems adrift from or even uninterested in the main currents of what's happening in the development world. What are the main themes? What are the main places? What are the main ideas? Because it's caught in a survival battle of trying to catch a project or a country or a smaller idea which might be appealing to someone on the Hill.

PRUDENCE BUSHNELL
Administrative Officer
Bombay (1984-1986)

Ambassador Bushnell was born in Washington, DC into a Foreign Service family. She was raised in Washington and at Foreign Service posts abroad and received degrees from Russell Sage College and the University of Maryland. After working as a clerk at Embassies Teheran and Rabat, she became a Foreign Service Officer in 1981 and subsequently served in several posts before serving as Ambassador to Kenya 1996 – 1999. There she experienced the bombing of the Embassy by al Qaeda. In 1999 she was named Ambassador to Guatemala, where she served until 2002. During her career, the Ambassador served in several senior positions in the Department in Washington. Ambassador Bushnell was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Today is the 27th of July, 2005. Alright, you were in Dakar for two years, then off to Bombay which is now called what?

BUSHNELL: Mumbai

Q: I suspect it will stay Bombay for most people for a long time. Anyway, you were in Bombay from when to when?

BUSHNELL: 1984 to 1986 as the Administrative Officer.

Q: First, let's go to India as a whole and then we'll go to Bombay. What was the state of India, particularly the vis a vis, U.S. and Indian relations at that time?

BUSHNELL: Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister and angry at the U.S. Relations were not good. She threw out American businesses, for example. There were significant strains between the Indian government and the United States government, which made us all the more grateful that we were in Bombay and not New Delhi. Bombay was a very cosmopolitan city, home of "Bollywood," and movie stars, as well as Parsees – Zoroastrians who had fled Persia many years before and who had a significant impact on the culture in Bombay. I found New Delhi to be far less friendly.

Q: From other interviews I learned there wasn't a lot of love lost I think there. How did you find it in Bombay?

BUSHNELL: The city was overwhelming. Twenty million people (at that time) on a narrow peninsula. There was scarcely any room so there were very few houses left. Instead, you had high-rise buildings and lots and lots and lots of people in the streets, sleeping, raising families and doing everything. It was also a practice in Bombay to honk your horn when the traffic light turned from red to green. So, you had a cacophony of noise, odors, heat and overwhelming population. Dick and I had a conversation about six weeks after arrival about how we were going to survive this experience, and we decided that the way was to get out of Bombay as frequently as possible. We traveled a lot around western India, which was terrific.

Professionally, I found it challenging, because I was the first woman to hold the position of Admin Officer. A lot of Indians felt very uncomfortable dealing with a woman and made no bones about it. The first time I met the Chief of Police he stared and said, "I can't believe the United States of America would send a woman to do this job"! The status of women was abominable. In addition, there were tensions among the FSNs that I had not seen in Senegal. I found it difficult to form teams among the people with whom I worked at the Consulate. It's not that I didn't enjoy most of the people as individuals, I just couldn't get the supervisors to see themselves as part of a larger team. So I stopped even having staff meetings. I've always regretted that. I think I should have put more effort into it.

Q: Well, sometimes you're up against something bigger and a two year assignment is too short to change the culture.

BUSHNELL: Well, there was an awful lot going on at the time, as well. Bombay was the point in my career when I began facing disasters. Twice when I was "acting" in the absence of the Consul General, we had crises. First, when Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated and then when the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, which was in our consular district, experienced a chemical leak

that killed I don't know how many people, and injured thousands and thousands more. The British Consul General was assassinated during our tour, and we had the fall-out from President Reagan's decision to bomb Libya. Lots of demonstrations in front of the consulate. I was the post security officer, so Harry Cahill, our CG would always send me out to face them. "You're such a nice lady, they won't know what to do, and they certainly won't harm you," he would say.

Q: The assassination of Indira Gandhi, what happens when the head of state, well the prime minister of the state is assassinated? Do we automatically bring the flag down -

BUSHNELL: Ah, interesting that you ask that, because that was "the" issue of the day, whether to bring the flag down. I was so happy when dusk finally came, and I could pull that flag off the flagpole. Rumors were rampant about whether or not the Prime Minister had actually been killed, and the Indian government was stonewalling, so we didn't know what to do with the flag during most of the day. Fortunately, the Public Affairs Officer, Alan Gilbert, had prior experience when President Sadat was assassinated in Egypt. Alan called me and recounted that when our embassy in Cairo lowered the flag before the Foreign Ministry, it got into a heap of trouble. His advice to me was, "Don't lower the flag no matter what until the Indian government lowers its flag." And, that was absolutely the correct instruction.

Q: Yeah. It's the sort of thing you wouldn't think about really.

BUSHNELL: Or you think, who cares and who's watching? But, lots of people were watching. We had crowds in front of the consulate demonstrating, because we had not lowered the flag. Later, the Chief of Protocol telephoned to complain that we had. I was just grateful that we'd abided by the rules of protocol.

Q: What was the reaction in Bombay? This was Sikhs who killed Mrs. Gandhi. This is obviously not a Sikh area, but what was the reaction there?

BUSHNELL: There was the natural horror that people experience when your head of state is assassinated. There wasn't any kind of hate; people were sad and left it at that.

Q: You mentioned that the area was what? Was it Parsee? What was the prominent religion?

BUSHNELL: Hinduism, then Islam. Parsees originally came from Iran and were Zoroastrians, which I think, was the first monotheistic religion in the world.

Q: Were there religious-based riots?

BUSHNELL: Not as many as you hear about now. The fundamentalist Hindu Party had almost no political power. That said, I always had the feeling in Bombay that a spark could ignite at any time because of the density of the population.

Q: I would think that you as the Administrative Officer and responsible for people and security officer, that Americans driving there must have given you great concern.

BUSHNELL: Few of us had cars and a shuttle took people to and from work. The consulate motor pool was large enough to accommodate those who wanted to rent a vehicle and hire a driver. Taxis were also plentiful – and dangerous.

Q: Just steam right through the crowd?

BUSHNELL: Yep. Or that you wouldn't run into a wall. We actually did not lose anybody from a traffic accident.

Q: With your local staff, you're saying you almost had to deal with them individually. This must have been very difficult, wasn't it? Could you communicate to, because there's times when you just want to tell everybody, we're going to be doing this, or we've got this problem coming up or something?

BUSHNELL: Well, I would have meetings, but people would sit in silence. After, people would phone me but they wouldn't say much of anything in front of anyone. It was rather frustrating. But, we got a lot accomplished, including finding properties, which was an excruciating task. Housing was going at something like \$3,000 a square foot – this was 1982, mind you. A lot of landlords wanted offshore payment so they wouldn't have to pay taxes, which we, of course, were prohibited from doing. This diminished my negotiating leverage considerably. But it was OK to offer cash, so I did. One landlord picked up \$96,000 in hundred rupee notes that we had put in two or three liquor boxes.

Q: How about on the local staff. What about women? At most posts women are the backbone of our foreign national staff, because we usually offer a better deal for women than most other businesses. How about in Bombay?

BUSHNELL: Let's see. My secretary was a woman, as well as the personnel, protocol and travel people. Also, the head consular FSN.

Q: Bhopal. This sent shock waves around the world. In a way, I got the feeling that the Indians really enjoyed this. I mean, it's the wrong term, but I mean this is a chance to really stick it to the United States and to capitalism and all that. When it happened, did the embassy realize that they had a horrible situation on their hands? Were they sending any help down or instructions or how did it work?

BUSHNELL: The embassy took over, although when the Union Carbide CEO, Warren Anderson, came rushing in, he stopped at the Consulate. I remember strongly advising him not to go to Bhopal but he did. He was arrested within minutes and, once he was plunked in jail, it became a bilateral issue that was dealt with in Delhi.

Q: You said a British Consul General was killed. Why?

BUSHNELL: You know, I don't know that we ever found out. I think it was thought originally that it was an act of terrorism, but then, ultimately, there were rumors that this was private.

Q: Although you were the Administrative Officer, you getting reflections from, I would imagine the consular section would. Isn't, this is the area of India where all the motel people came?

BUSHNELL: Yes, from Gujarat. We had huge, long visa lines. I remember I wanted to put in new bathrooms, because we had inadequate facilities. I thought I was being really clever when I sent a cable to Delhi talking about the number of toilets we had, the average number of visa applicants we had per day, the average time they were in the waiting room and, therefore, the average number of flushes the toilets had. And therefore, after oh six zillion flushes, we needed new toilets, and they sent back another cable saying, "Nice cable, nice try, no money." We had money for security after our embassy in Beirut was blown up in 1983, but not for toilets in Bombay!

As a result of the Inman Commission which looked into the vulnerabilities of overseas embassies, Congress gave funding for security upgrades. I spent my last year taking apart and rebuilding the consulate, especially the consular section. The consulate was a former Maharaja palace and looked like one, so we had to work carefully. And I had a really good time. We needed to put in watch towers, so I went out to a local architect to see if he could design something in keeping with the architecture. It looked like it was part of the original design. Yeah, it was a great deal of fun. I enjoyed being Admin Officer, actually.

Q: Well, you're doing things.

BUSHNELL: Right and fairly autonomously. You know, if you're taking care of people's needs, and providing good services, by and large people leave you alone to do your job, and I really enjoyed that.

Q: You mentioned you were a security officer and dealing with the police and all. Are you saying you had problems?

BUSHNELL: Some. But, ultimately, I had good relations. The police official I dealt with most was the head of the traffic police. And I thought, oh what a job you have! I got along with him very well. The Bombay International School was right across the street, and the children would use the consulate grounds as their play ground. They literally had to dodge cars careening around the corner. I wanted to get a traffic policeman to stop the traffic as the children walked across the street, which I ultimately did.

We also had lots of bomb threats, so I got to know the people with the sniffer dogs pretty well. I found that after a couple of encounters I would get along well with whomever I needed to. But it took a huge amount of energy. When we got on a plane to leave Bombay, I felt a huge weight lift off of me. Part came from relief from the responsibilities but also from expending so much effort to get the kind of attention I needed from Indian officials – getting them to deal with me, whatever they thought, and with respect.

Q: What were the bomb threats about?

BUSHNELL: Our policies. U.S.-Indian relations were not very good. Plus, the sub-continent has

never been the safest area of the world. Airplane hijackings were fairly frequent, and I think it was then that the Air India flight was hijacked. It was a high-threat environment, and the bomb threats just became a part of it.

Q: Did you get involved with Bollywood; this is the movie industry in Bombay.

BUSHNELL: No, not really. We did enjoy lots of other aspects of Indian art. So much of it is public art. The huge posters advertising movies were all done by hand and some were just incredible. The architecture in Bombay was also amazing. When I first went there, all I saw were buildings with green mold oozing down because of the effects of humidity on the limestone. But, once you began to look beyond, there was amazing architecture.

Q: That's a big arch there isn't there?

BUSHNELL: Yes, called the Gateway to India.

Q: What was your husband doing there?

BUSHNELL: He did some consulting work with the embassy, and he served as a consular associate at the consulate. In those days, associates could work the visa lines, so that's what he did. For one year he was the principal of the Bombay International School. He was good. He did the job that needed to be done, and I think people were very grateful.

Q: What was his impression of the visa lines?

BUSHNELL: Overwhelming. After we returned to the United States and we were in some store, I heard my husband's name being called, and it was an Indian woman who came up and said, "I want to thank you for the visa you gave me. I got another one." [laughter]

Q: What about the Soviets? Were they still doing their thing? I mean, they had very close relationships with the Indians, certainly up in New Delhi. How was that played out in Bombay?

BUSHNELL: I didn't get involved in political issues. The CG didn't talk about them in staff meetings. The Soviets were not players in my world. My only encounter was a Russian who came at the signing the condolence book for the assassinated Prime Minister. The CG had broken his arm and wanted me with him to sign the book. My instructions were to sign the book ahead of the Soviets. It was critically important. It seemed pretty silly, but okay. The only Indian woman present – the only other woman in that mass of people -- either deliberately or inadvertently helped me cut short the rigid protocol, which gave me a great spot in the long line waiting to sign the condolence book. The Soviet CG then arrived with a huge wreath and jumped the queue. I was not going to cede my place, so we literally stepped up to the table together, facing the television cameras. He had two choices: elbow me out of the way or behave like a gentleman, which is what he did. So, I got there first. Another triumph for our side!

Q: But it does show these little games that are played, that sometimes can be in some people's eyes important.

BUSHNELL: I suppose. I found it a little amusing. Had I been a man, it would never have played out that way.

Q: No. What was social life like there?

BUSHNELL: We had a nice community and would get together often. The consulate rented a beach hut –you can’t do this anymore --a few miles out of town. Representational events also came frequently because Bombay was India’s commercial capital.

Q: I was wondering whether you found that since Bombay was a big commercial center and there’s some people with lots of money in India.

BUSHNELL: Oh, incredible.

Q: Did you get addicted to Indian movies or not?

BUSHNELL: No, I got addicted to Indian food. Bombay had wonderful restaurants. I learned what a difference freshly ground spices make. Also, Dick and I traveled at every opportunity.

Q: How was the head of the embassy there?

BUSHNELL: Pretty light. Harry Barnes was ambassador the first year, and I can’t remember the name of the ambassador the second year. He was a political person, a non-career person. Harry Barnes had a very light touch. His replacement did not. He would no longer allow Bombay to send cables out -- everything had to go through Delhi for clearance before going out, so you had a different atmosphere.

Q: How about the administrative side?

BUSHNELL: Very light. I was almost autonomous. The most interaction I had was with the budget people and the regional security officer was when we were doing the physical upgrades. The embassy and consulate admin sections orbited their own universes -- didn't even have annual conferences.

Q: Today is the 28th of July, 2005. Pru, I’d like to ask one question going back to India. Can you talk a little about being an Administrative Officer and the bureaucracy? I saw some of this when I served in the Gulf. Can you talk a little about your experiences with Indian bureaucracies as an Administrative Officer?

BUSHNELL: A lot of Indians maintained vestiges of the Brits as they ruled in the 30’s and 40’s. Everything stopped for tea, for example. Airline reservations had to be confirmed in person and noted by hand in a huge logbook. This part has changed, of course, but when computers first came in, you had to show up to confirm the reservation in the log book and in the computer.

Q: I’m trying to capture periods. How about custom clearances?

BUSHNELL: I had to personally sign every single coupon that went on our pouch bags. You were not allowed to use a signature stamp; you had to personally sign each of the four tickets that went on each pouch. I kept a stack at the side of my desk to sign a bunch at a time. Couldn't use initials, had to be your full name and mine is long. Thank goodness I didn't have a middle name..

Literally millions of commuters would come to Bombay every day. Their lunches would be sent to them from their homes through an extraordinary system of pickup and delivery. Imagine millions of lunch boxes that have to be personally delivered to the office and then returned to the home before the end of the day. The "tiffin" boxes, as they were called, would be picked up at the homes by bicyclists, organized at the local train station to go to specific spots where they would be redistributed and delivered by bicycle. After lunch, the reverse. It was extraordinary.

Another example of incredible efficiency is the fact that traffic actually flowed in a city that size crammed into that small an area. There were huge numbers of people in rickshaws, bullock carts, donkey carts, trucks, bicycles, buses and feet, yet traffic moved.

ANTHONY KERN
Labor Attaché
New Delhi (1984-1986)

Tony Kern was born to immigrant parents (from Yugoslavia). He completed high school in Pennsylvania. He went to Duquesne University and Southeastern University. His postings have taken him to Barbados and India. He was interviewed in 1993 by Morris Weisz.

Q: Well, let's discuss that, because it's an interesting thing. One of the problems is -- and I'm closer to the old AFL position because of my history -- that if you decide to open up your relations with the communists, to what degree are you interfering with your contacts with the anti-Communists? For instance in Vienna it would have made no difference, because they were already way ahead of the American movement in their contacts with the Hungarians especially. But I don't know that that's so in a country like India, where I was permitted, or rather nobody disagreed with my decision, to attend meetings at which Communist speakers appeared, so that I could answer them. I used to lecture at conferences of that sort. But I would not have wanted to open up a contact with a Communist trade union because it might have affected adversely my relations with the other unions to the extent that the other unions were so anti-communist. So you do have to balance these things. In any event, I gather that in the Department [of State] and among the regular Labor Attaché Corps there was a feeling that we shouldn't arbitrarily say, "No," just like we shouldn't arbitrarily say, "Yes." I mean, that is the problem.

KERN: That's the problem.

Q: And that is something that some of our Labor Attaché friends were not willing to go that far and the AFL-CIO was not willing to go that far? They didn't trust us to use intelligently a policy which permitted that tactic.

KERN: Absolutely true. You certainly can talk to the more traditional democratic unions and get their sentiment on this, but we didn't even go to that degree at all.

Q: You then served for a couple of years as Tony's deputy?

KERN: Yes, two years.

Q: And then?

KERN: From there I went to India.

Q: How well I know!

KERN: Which was a fantastic assignment. Unfortunately abbreviated. I was there for about two years, and I was medevaced twice and on the second time back, the Embassy doctor met me at the airport and he said, "Tony, that's it. They're sending you back home." So that came to a short tour.

Q: Was it a full two years as a matter of fact?

KERN: Yes.

Q: It seemed like less to me. It's too bad, because I feel and I feel you do, that it's not until the second tour that you really get to know India. It's such a big country.

KERN: It's a huge country and you're sort of waiting around trying to get a sense of direction. We were all benefiting from Krishnan's guidance, but still you had to absorb it and analyze everything and that was part of the problem. I did travel a fair amount though. In that two year period I got up to Gorakhpur, which was up on the northern border attending a railway conference. It was a long train ride, about twelve hours, and I was in this little compartment with four other people.

Q: Which railroad union was that, the Northern?

KERN: The Northern. And I recall riding, and I was kind of shivering.

Q: Who was the head of the union at that time? This fat fellow, what's his name.

KERN: Yes, his name I . . .

Q: Did you go with Krishnan?

KERN: No, Cheenu [V. Srinivasan] was with me at that time.

Q: We're using these names. You'd better identify them.

KERN: Cheenu was the deputy Indian local in the Embassy who was working in the labor section at that time.

Q: And later succeeded our friend. . .

KERN: That's right. He later succeeded Krishnan. As I was sitting up, they threw in a big canvas thing, which looked like a pillow, so I figured, well all right. I tried to prop that up at the end of the bunk and used that as a pillow. When I woke up the next morning, it was very cold. I put my head out of the curtain and I saw people stuffing the blankets into this canvas thing which I thought was a pillow. (laughter)

Q: Well, after two years, you would have learned!

KERN: Yes, the third year I would have learned!

Q: Say something about the trade union situation and what you had to do during that period in India.

KERN: I don't think the alignment changed. The INTUC, Indian National Trade Union Congress, was allied with the Congress Party.

Q: Tony, don't forget that this is your interview so when you say that it hadn't changed much, you mean it hadn't changed much from the time I know, but please describe it.

KERN: I'm talking to Morrie [Weisz, who served as Labor Counselor in New Delhi 1966-72] and I'm saying that I don't think the situation changed in the, what, twenty intervening years?

Q: Almost, yes.

KERN: At that point, if there was any excitement there, it was speculation that Rajiv Gandhi would tell the INTUC that they were no longer an integral part of the Congress Party and that they could go off on their own. There was a large INTUC Congress at that point and Rajiv Gandhi was addressing it and there was a lot of excitement or tension, really, or concern that he might use that speech as the occasion to separate the Congress Party and the INTUC. He hinted around at it in his speech and he obviously was just teasing the trade unionists. He never made that kind of a break.

The other dominant trade union organization was the HMS [Hind Mazdoor Sabha trade union organization], somewhat aligned to the BJP [Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party], although they continued to maintain that they were separate and distinct.

Q: From the BJP, really?

KERN: Yes.

Q: At that time. That was different from my experience. The HMS was closer to the Socialist Party. That's interesting. And what about the relations of those unions to the AFL-CIO and the effort to get American trade union help?

KERN: It never materialized. Before I went over, naturally I talked to Chuck Gray, who was in charge of the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), and he gave me a little briefing about the relationship which was cool at best. I never could understand why until subsequently when I came back on home leave, I stopped by to see Chuck again, and I said, "Gee, I don't understand." In that intervening time I'd tried to get more trade unionists to come over and tried to get AAFLI to set up an office there. AAFLI had been banned or thrown out some time earlier. I talked to Kanti Mehta who was the head of the INTUC and he said, "Sure Tony, we can try." They were open and receptive and I mentioned this to Chuck. INTUC was willing to work with the Indian bureaucracy to get AAFLI to come back legally. And Chuck wouldn't respond to it. He said, "You know that son of a bitch, we paid big dollars for him to have eye surgery and he never even thanked us." And I think that was the reason that AAFLI kept out of India. They resented the fact that Kanti Mehta didn't express appreciation for this.

Q: Well, I may be wrong, but Kanti got in touch with me when he came here and my impression was that he was paying for that himself. Did they say that the AFL-CIO paid for that?

KERN: Paid for that eye surgery, yes. Chuck was very direct about that, and he resented the fact that he never even got a note saying "Thank you." It sounds crazy, but I swear that was it.

Q: That might have been the reason for what? For the AFL-CIO or the AAFLI not working with the INTUC or what?

KERN: Yes, for the strained relationship. There really wasn't any kind of relationship at all that I could detect. I tried to get trade unionists to come over. It's tough, you know, traveling almost twenty-four hours to get there. But there was no receptivity on the part of Chuck Gray to set up an AAFLI office there. The Embassy was all for it.

Q: The Embassy was for setting it up. I thought the government of India wasn't too happy about the prospect.

KERN: That's right, absolutely true. But Kante said he was willing to work with the government to support the return of AAFLI.

Q: But Chuck would not apply or what?

KERN : He wouldn't apply. He absolutely wouldn't make the effort. And I think it all had to do with the eye surgery. Isn't that amazing?

Q: Yes, that is amazing. Let's get to the Krishnan [issue], that I want to mention. Krishnan was, of course as we have discussed, the assistant to a series of labor officers beginning with Burgess in 1956 until Krishnan retired in about 1986. We all admire him greatly and he certainly was wonderful and there's not a disagreement among all of us who worked with him that he was a great contribution to whatever success we had.

KERN: Right.

Q: How do you feel about whether he displayed any biases between the unions that he was working with or whether he was able to cover up those feelings that he had for or against the union in connection with his work? Now I want to get comment on the general area of the Foreign Service national working for a labor officer.

KERN: In the situation with Krishnan, I think his service was invaluable. I think it would have taken each Labor Attaché an inordinately long period of time to find their way around that immensely complex country. I don't think we could have functioned very effectively. I think he was straightforward in terms of unions. I think he had a bias toward INTUC and that reflected his predilection toward the Congress Party as the Party of Independence and the Party of Freedom. But I think he kept it in check so that it really didn't result in any kind of distorted activities on the part of the labor section at the Embassy.

Q: Well I asked you that question without any prompting because I didn't want you to know how I felt about it and I agree with you entirely. And so does everybody else. We had a series of Labor Attachés, some of whom were pro-AFL, so pro-CIO, some independent and all that, and every one of us seems to agree, 1) that personally Krishnan was pro-Congress Party and 2) that it did not interfere with the wonderful relations he had with the HMS and the other unions and with management. And I think that is a remarkable feat.

KERN: You're absolutely right. You mention management and that's true. We met with the Tatas and the other big industrial families there.

Q: That is so different from the case with respect to other countries where the Foreign Service nationals sometimes had limited usefulness because of relations they had with one side or the other. I hope some of the research in this field will reflect the value and limitations of having Foreign Service nationals work for them.

KERN: The only area of concern, I think, at one point I was trying to get some information for our Defense Attachés, and I asked Krishnan if he could try to line up some unions involved in defense activities that were related, and we never did get near those unions. That was the only place where I would have a little negative comment.

Q: Well, was that due to an unwillingness to try to do it or the Indian Government's really being very worried about that?

KERN: I don't know. I'm sure the Indian Government would have had restrictions and concerns about that, but I don't know if he really made the effort. That's the only question mark I've had. I

would say, "Listen, you know we have AFGE, which represents military bases all over the U.S. Maybe we can get them to interact with their Indian counterparts." Nothing happened on that.

Q: Well, let me go over some of these points that are raised in our questionnaire. Before I cover the subject matters, I now have a series of questions that go into your reactions on the basis of your total Foreign Service career, so let's bring you home from India. Do you have any other comments to make? Anything on AID or USIA in India?

KERN: Yes, the AID Mission was interesting. I made courtesy rounds shortly after I got there, calling on all of the counselors and all of the heads of the agencies there. I arranged to see the AID Mission Director. I was ushered into his office and he said, "Kern, before you say one word, I don't have a goddamned dime for you." (laughter)

Q: Oh Tony, I'm afraid that you suffered from the amount of money that I got from them. They and USIA used to pay for a whole lot of my travel.

KERN: There was nothing there.

Q: Sorry, buddy! (laughter) But they had so much more money when I was there than they had when you were there and we had a limited travel budget for the Embassy and they got good value for the money they gave because I used to give lectures and I also commented on the AID projects. I don't feel guilty about it. Sorry, Tony.

KERN: He never did give me a dime.

Q: Were there any projects you were interested in that they could have helped you on? Because the AID program by that time had gone down.

KERN: Yes, it was really down and the amount of discretionary funds they had was virtually nil. They really didn't have anything to work with.

Q: Yes, AID went down pretty much. What about the USIA where we did have a whole lot of cooperation from them and even just before you came there, they had me coming out for lecture tours and things like that.

KERN: They were very good about that. They were very, very receptive and frankly I always found USIA overseas to be much more receptive to the labor program than the AID folks.

Q: Well, in countries like India, it just makes so much sense for them to feel as though they're getting into the nitty-gritty of the society if they have people coming over as AMPARTS.

KERN: You recall the Bhopal chemical disaster there, where several thousand people died. I had been contacted by the University of Arizona, which had received seven million dollars from Union Carbide to set up a program in Bhopal, but they needed Embassy assistance. So I worked with the various ministries to try to get them established. We got them residency permits and they were setting up a training school for the blind and another training school for vocational

education: electricians, carpenters, and other needed kinds of skills and training. But we never got beyond the residency permit. They couldn't get the approval from the government to move forward because of their concern that this might somehow compromise the lawsuit they had with Union Carbide. And I guess the Arizona reps. were there about six months and then folded up and went back home. I always thought this was a sad development.

Q: Did you have regular meetings with management people or did it have to wait for some strike to happen? Did they call upon you other than when they were in trouble, management people?

KERN: No, again you're talking about Krishnan's invaluable assistance. I'd just ask Krishnan, "Can you meet with management people in every town?" and we did. We met with the Tatas. I've forgotten the other major industrial family there. And with the Tata family, not some underling. Chemical plants, anyplace, electronic plants, so I had fairly good access to management. . .

Q: Are you talking about the Birlas as the other one?

KERN: That's the other one, right.

Q: I think, as a matter of fact, they're supposed to be bigger in terms of size than the Tatas, but those two companies really. . .

KERN: Monster companies.

Q: And they both have a social conscience that doesn't interfere with their profit making, but they do that. And that's something that's lacking in many other countries. And the Tatas especially, and the Birlas also. It's fascinating for a person like me, who comes out of a conflict situation between labor and management on everything, although that's changing now, to see how they operated, to see, which I'll mention now because I may forget about it later, to see that the Tatas operating as a steel corporation against the government-owned steel operation would assign one of their prime labor relations specialists to work for the Indian Government's rival steel corporation, as they did with this very interesting guy for a number of years. It is just unusual.

KERN: Yes, they were very progressive companies, very much so.

Q: But they did exploit their people. Well, that's part of the business, isn't it?

KERN: That's true of India though.

Q: On the other hand, the degree of exploitation is not as much. Well, you then came back from India. If you think of anything else you'd like to say about it, by all means do before we're finished. And before your retirement, what did you do?

KERN: I was the Labor Advisor. . .

Q: Do you want to say anything about your illness? Was it caused by India?

KERN: No. It was not caused [by India]. It was a pre-existing condition.

Q: You're okay now?

KERN: Yes. So I came back from India and served as the labor advisor for the ARA Bureau and then for the Africa Bureau. Both of these assignments, I think, gave me more access to the AFL-CIO and their activities as well as the various regional institutes. And I also at that point had more interaction with the USIA and AID bureaucracies in Washington, and that was an eye-opener..

Q: Headquarters. Sally Dupree [of USIA] and company?

KERN: Sally's fine. Sally's wonderful. We always worked well [together], but the other divisions over there [at USIA] were absolutely anti-union. At one point I had a short assignment at USIA. This kind of hostility didn't make sense. So I talked to Tom Kahn who headed up the International Department at the AFL-CIO, and I said, "Tom, we ought to get together and we'll bring all these people together, tell them what you're doing, how you're doing it, let them question you, go back and forth." And he said, "Fine. I'll arrange for it."

So I contacted the USIA folks who said, "Sure. We're willing to do it. We'll get the bus." Well it was a rainy day and the bus was about forty-five minutes late, so it started off bad. We finally get out to the Meany Center and had a very nice luncheon hosted by the AFL-CIO. We had what I thought was a good exchange of questions and answers. As we were heading back to the USIA Headquarters, I said, "Now wasn't that helpful?" I just got sneers and they said, "He was just trying to buy us off." And I said, "Ah, hell." I gave up at that point. They were so anti-AFL-CIO, it was pathetic.

Q: It's interesting, because out in the field, just like your experience, mine was that they saw this as a necessary part of their job, whereas in the headquarters. . .

KERN: . . .they resisted.

Q: Right.

KERN: And again, I think it was a question of power. This was money being siphoned off from more "worthy" projects [like] bringing in dancers or whatever.

Q: Yes. How much of this was due to just the battle for money for their programs and how much of it was a sort of an intellectual bias that they felt that the arts and the fancy stuff was more important? They were looking down on. . . .

KERN: Oh it was intellectual bias. They made no pretenses of knowing anything about labor overseas or domestically.

Q: Do you have any comments on how that could be corrected other than your valiant efforts to get them together? (laughter) What has to be put into the USIA? I think under the present administration, it's more likely to be helped, but. . .

KERN: It's hard. If you don't come from a working-class background, it's hard to relate. And I think that's the problem they've had over there. I'm not condemning all of them, but enough of the folks in the [USIA] headquarters office just do have this intellectual bias.

Q: Well this has changed so much from the days when I was active. I wonder whether we can put part of the blame on the fact that they do not have a full-time active headquarters man like Joe Glazer. When Joe was there, he was very effective with the operations people. And we don't have. . . Is [Thomas] Stillitano [still there]?

KERN: Yes, Tom. I don't know if he is still. . . .

Q: He doesn't work full-time.

KERN: He never did. But Tom was the kind of personality you need. He's very outgoing, gregarious. Just great.

Q: Oh, sure, but what is the reason that he hasn't had as much of an effect on the bureaucracy of USIA as a person like Joe Glazer did?

KERN: Well, one thing, I think, was that Tom realized there was no future for labor at USIA, and consequently he was looking to his career future. So he would do what he could, but he had other activities, which I think were more important to him than labor. I frankly think that he made the correct personal assessment in that setting. I think it is a kind of an intellectual, maybe a class bias. I think if you look through the background there, you won't find people that really know what's going on in America. They do tend to be pseudo-sophisticates. They do like the arts and entertainment world and the communications world and I think that anything other than that is kind of an intrusion on their real world. So that's where we run into a problem.

Q: That's interesting. How would you compare the AIFLD and the AALC in terms of personality, program, effectiveness? You had dealings with both.

KERN: Yes, I had that unique experience. By far the AIFLD operation was more dynamic, better funded, and had a very dynamic leader in Bill Doherty. As I said earlier, I really am amazed at Bill's ability to know what's going on politically throughout all of Latin America. Just immensely impressive. And the people he knew, not just trade union leaders, but people in management and government. He played a very vital role and I have tremendous admiration for him and the folks that worked for him.

Q: Staff, yes. What about Irving Brown? It wasn't in your period though, of course, but didn't Irving Brown have the same sort of relationships with leadership in Africa?

KERN: North Africa. That's my understanding, yes. I don't know that he had any kind of influence in sub-Saharan Africa, but Pat O'Farrell, who was his deputy, also had that kind of knowledge of people in sub-Saharan Africa, but he didn't have the program and he didn't have the money, and I think, more importantly, Africa was not that important to us. Latin America was; therefore, it had all the attention. All the assistant secretaries knew Bill Doherty and Bill knew them as well as folks on the National Security Council and the White House. And that was because Latin America was important to us. Africa wasn't. And consequently Pat didn't have that kind of inter-relationship with the hierarchy of the U.S. Government. He was a very able man and he did well and he plugged away in supporting "democratic" unions. Some were really marginal, borderline, but I think it's paid off. For example, in Zambia, Fred Chaluba who was the president of the Zambian Trade Union Congress, became president, I think, about a year ago. He unseated Kenneth Kaunda, who was almost president for life there, in a fair election.

In South Africa, Pat [O'Farrell] really had problems trying to work with COSATU, the big black trade union movement. Pat was working more with -- I've forgotten the name of it -- the National Association of African Workers. There was a smaller trade union movement which was black. He ran into problems with AID. They had hired an outside contractor, Arnold Zack, -- You may know him. -- to evaluate the program. He came back with a very, very negative report and with suggestions which would have, in effect, I think, destroyed AALC as an entity. Zack, I think, was buying off on recommendations made by the COSATU Trade Union Movement and in particular Cyril Ramaphosa, who was a very strong, very articulate trade union leader there, that they would deal only with the AFL-CIO. Pat tried to make the argument that the AALC was part and parcel [of the AFL-CIO], as it was, and Zack kept pushing that program, trying to push that idea through the AID bureaucracy, not realizing fully that [AFL-CIO President Lane] Kirkland wasn't going to accept that argument.

Q: Isn't that parallel to the Indian situation where one time the INTUC said, "We want to deal with the AFL-CIO. We don't want to deal with the alleged CIA connection"?

KERN: That's right. There's a similarity.

Q: Is that a qualm we should give some weight to in our work with our people? Or should we just say, "Look, you work with the German Stiftungen [German Assistance Institutes]," which receive funds from the German Government. What is there about American Government support?" In India they say, "The [U.S.] Government is supporting the AAFLI and therefore we don't want to have anything to do with them. We want to deal with the trade unions," whereas they don't raise that question about the Stiftungen or the British Council.

KERN: Right. I think the difference was that our trade union movement was "tainted" by the CIA. And I think -- Who was it? -- the Church Committee came out and indicated that the CIA had funded various trade union activities overseas.

Q: The question is, "What did they fund them for? For undermining the government or for carrying on anti-Communist activities?" That's the point.

KERN: Right. We know that they were being funded to carry out anti-Communist activities and to support democratic unions. But in many parts of the world, it wasn't seen that way. It was seen as being a CIA agent. I think one of the few good things that Reagan did was to create the National Endowment for Democracy. He was up front. Money went from the Congress, money went to the USIA, and then automatically it went to the four institutes. And it was up-front and there was nothing devious about it. And I think that was a very positive step forward.

Q: Isn't that the case now with the AID thing? The AID funds go directly to the institutes. What's wrong about that? The CIA connection, so far as I know, hasn't existed for years.

KERN: That's true. Absolutely true.

Q: And when it did exist, it was exposed and that's finished now.

KERN: Going back to my time in Barbados, for example, on some occasions my visits would be preceded by announcements in some local left wing rag about "the great destabilizer" coming to the country now with CIA connections. I recall talking to a really left-wing union in Saint Lucia. I had at that time one of these thick watches. You know, the self-winding ones with the [large] mechanism. I was sitting there talking, and I noticed that the union president kept staring at my watch. I said, "Do you think this is a microphone in here?" And he says, "Yes, brother." (laughter) I said, "Here, take it and put it away somewhere." But that was the kind of mentality that was present. It was this CIA taint which I think really distorted [things] and in many cases made the AFL-CIO's work much more difficult, and ours as well, in trying to convince them that this was not true.

Q: Tony, it's almost six o'clock and I would like to stop now and go over the other questions possibly at dinner and tell you what I think it would be a good idea for you to cover and ask you what you'd like to cover. So should we stop this at this point? Thank you.

KERN: All right

BRUCE F. DUNCOMBE
Economic Officer
New Delhi (1985-1987)

Bruce F. Duncombe was born in Massachusetts in 1937 and graduated from Amherst College and the University of Minnesota. He entered the Foreign Service in 1979. His career included posts in Abidjan, Cairo, New Delhi, Jakarta, Lagos and Abuja. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Today is the 6th of May, 2002. You're off to India, 1985. What were you going to be doing? You are going right to New Delhi, is that right?

DUNCOMBE: That is correct.

Q: What did you do?

DUNCOMBE: I was, again, what they call, a finance and development officer, basically number two in the economic section. I was responsible for Macao economics, again writing the budget report, balance of payments assessments, and that sort of thing. It turned out that one of the major things I worked on and a lot of the embassy worked on, was technology transfer. Several years earlier, a memorandum of understanding had been worked out with the Indians, that ostensibly would provide a framework for transferring to them, very sensitive advanced technologies. These were technologies that were controlled for national security reasons. Because of the very friendly relationship that existed between India and the Soviet Union, this was a very, very sensitive area. The number two in the commercial section, the commercial attaché, and I spent an enormous amount of time dealing with that particular question.

Q: Before we move into that, how would you describe the relations between India and the United States, at this particular juncture?

DUNCOMBE: I would answer that by jumping ahead to when I was in Indonesia. After having served in India for a couple of years, I went to Indonesia. After having experienced the two of them, who are both leaders in the non-aligned movement, the way I would describe it from my Indonesian viewpoint is that India was non-aligned with the Soviet Union, and Indonesia was non-aligned with the west.

Q: Who was the ambassador? How did you find the embassy at that time?

DUNCOMBE: The ambassador was John Gunther Dean, a career ambassador. The embassy itself was designed by Edward Durrell Stone, if I remember correctly. It was supposed to be an architectural marvel, but it was a very unpleasant building to work in, physically, in my opinion. I don't know if you have ever been in the embassy?

Q: No, I've seen pictures.

DUNCOMBE: It has an open courtyard in the middle, with a duck pond. All the offices are located around this open courtyard. So, in winter, it does get cold in New Delhi. Whenever you wanted to go from your office to the restroom or somebody else's office, you went from a heated room, out into a place that was quite cold. In summer, where it gets hot and humid, you went from an air conditioned room into a place that was very hot and humid, to get anywhere else in the building.

Q: There was not an internal corridor?

DUNCOMBE: There were internal corridors, but it was all in the open courtyard. Architecturally, it was supposed to be a very interesting building, and maybe it was. In terms of a physical building to operate in, it left a lot to be desired, in my opinion.

Q: Who was the economic counselor?

DUNCOMBE: For the first year I was there, it was George Kenney. He retired. The embassy and the bureau wanted me to become the new economic counselor. Senior assignments would not release the position, therefore, a new senior officer counselor was brought in two months before I got promoted to the senior service, which is one of the great ironies of life.

Q: Again, and again. How did you find John Gunther Dean, while you were there?

DUNCOMBE: John Gunther Dean is a very capable man, a very opinionated man, and can be, when he wants to be, very charming. At other times, he can be very difficult.

Q: I've been interviewing him. When he comes back from Paris, we go over to the Kenwood Country Club. We haven't covered India yet. He is reluctant to do that, because he was removed from there, for medical reasons, which rankle him very much.

DUNCOMBE: That was after I left. I have heard scenarios about his departure, but I would not want to say anymore about that because I was not in the embassy when he was invited by Secretary Shultz to...

Q: While you were there, he was a strong ambassador?

DUNCOMBE: Absolutely.

Q: He had been through an awful lot. He lived in Lebanon, Laos, Vietnam, the whole thing. How did you find the Indian authorities, the government level, that you dealt with?

DUNCOMBE: They could be very accommodating at times, and very difficult at other times. As I say, India was non-aligned, as I came to describe it. Others may not want to describe it that way. India was non-aligned with the Soviet Union. The relationships with the United States, which were proper, I would not characterize as necessarily cordial.

Q: Moving to this technical transfer, why would we want to put anything into the hands of the Indians, who were militarily supplied by the Soviet Union? I would think this would be counterproductive.

DUNCOMBE: I think for foreign policy reasons, many people were interested in improving our relationship with the Indians, and cooperation with high technology matters. They have many, many capable people, who are capable of very sophisticated technological work. This was seen as an avenue that could advance a more cooperative arrangement. For instance, one of the issues we spent an enormous amount of time working on was whether or not they would be able to get a CRAY super computer. The Indians wanted this for purposes of doing meteorological studies to map and predict monsoons. Our people were concerned, since they had a nuclear program, that the Indians would, on an unauthorized basis, use it for purposes of nuclear modeling. How one does nuclear modeling is beyond my technical competence to assess, but this stress was right there.

Toward the end of my tour, we had agreed that we would license a CRAY XMP24, a very sophisticated super computer, that they would be able to use for meteorological research. But, there was going to have to be a cleared American on site 24 hours a day, to monitor the use of this particular piece of equipment. Jumping ahead to my Indonesia experience, in view of the problems we had had with Indians on this, I was quite surprised when I arrived in Indonesia, to discover that the Indonesians had one of these computers. It was being used at IPTN, their aircraft plant, for aerodynamic modeling for development of an indigenous Indonesian aircraft. There was no American presence to monitor the security of the use of this XMP24. The science attaché and myself were asked by Washington to, in fact, do security assessments, to be sure that it was not being used for unauthorized purposes, which we in fact did not have the technical competence to do. We did, for a few months, make periodic trips to Bandung, where it was located. We were able to report back to Washington, that there were security cameras in place, and there was controlled access, at least in principal, to the facility where the computer was operated. People in Washington wanted to monitor whether or not it was being used for unauthorized purposes; we said they were going to have to send out people who had technical skills that far exceeded any technical skills any of us in the embassy would have.

But, it reflects, in my view, the fact that India, while non-aligned, was non-aligned with the Soviet Union. There were lots of security concerns. Whereas, Indonesia, again non-aligned, was non-aligned with the west. In terms of my dealings with the government in these two countries, it was like night and day in terms of the access one had, and the kind of cooperative arrangements, and the quality of the discussions, you should have with your counterparts in the host government.

Q: Well, looking at the India economy, the budget and all that, how did you find their figures?

DUNCOMBE: Good.

Q: I mean, what you got was pretty good?

DUNCOMBE: I don't recall having any real problems with the numbers, the way I had problems with the numbers in Egypt.

Q: Looking at the budget and all, did this seem to be a well run government?

DUNCOMBE: The Indian concept was self reliance. To that extent, they had a national plan and state enterprises. They had all sorts of incentives for people to locate in various parts of the country, where it didn't necessarily make a lot of sense for them to locate their economic activity. There were virtually no imported goods in India, during the time I was there. Rajiv Gandhi was seen as a great performer on the economic front, but that was only in comparison with his predecessors, not in comparison with what one would think of as liberal economic thinking and openness to market forces and competition, and that sort of thing.

Q: Were we trying to break down the barriers, or were we just sort of relaxed, saying, "This is the way you're doing it, good luck.?"

DUNCOMBE: Our message, to the extent that message could be heard, was that this kind of centralized planning that you have and the notion of self reliance, as opposed to economic competition, is in large part responsible for what even the Indians would refer to as the Hindu rate of growth, a slow rate of economic growth. But, it was based on being more or less self sufficient.

Q: Did we have a commercial officer there?

DUNCOMBE: Yes, a very large commercial section. There was a commercial counselor, and there was a commercial attaché.

Q: If they are self-reliant and don't buy anything, what were we doing? What were our commercial people doing in India?

DUNCOMBE: Trying to develop traditional markets. There were no imported consumer goods. There were some industrial raw materials and other products that did need to be imported. It was a very difficult market. In many respects, it was quite difficult to get a beat on the Indian economy in New Delhi, because New Delhi, like Washington, is a political capital, and is not an economic capital. The economic capital is basically Bombay. The Bank of India is in Bombay. To the extent there was an American business community, it was in Bombay, not in New Delhi.

Q: Did you get out and see Indian factories, and that sort of thing?

DUNCOMBE: Some.

Q: I was wondering, what was your impression of what you were seeing?

DUNCOMBE: Not the cutting edge of being modern. Having said that, I never visited Hindustan Aeronautical, where they were, for instance, assembling Mig jets. This was off-limits. But, one of the high-tech issues we had with them was they wanted to import composite materials, from the United States, in order to develop an Indian fighter aircraft. They insisted they would be able to keep what they were developing as the indigenous Indian aircraft, separate from the Hindustan Aeronautical plant that was operated in conjunction with the Soviets. You can just see the kind of tension that was just below the surface.

Q: During this time, looking at the newspapers, were the Indians beating us over the head about things, with the United States as sort of the natural target?

DUNCOMBE: I don't remember that. At this juncture, I would not really say that the press was in control of the government. It was a pretty free press. There was criticism of the government in the press. There were lots of newspapers. I would not regard looking at it from, not having been there for 15 years now... My recollection is not that we thought there was an Indian press, there was a government spokesperson, putting out whatever the government was telling them ought to be the official line.

Q: Was Indian society relatively open to Americans? Were you seeing each other, that sort of thing, or was it pretty formal?

DUNCOMBE: No. Aside from government contacts that were sometimes very cordial, sometimes very stiff... Let me put it that way. We lived in an Indian neighborhood, albeit just two or three blocks from the embassy compound. We had a number of friends in the neighborhood. I saw them socially, frequently. We visited many Indian homes in New Delhi. I traveled around the country, and visited many Indian homes.

Q: Were there any things that the United States was closely involved with, such as agricultural changes or working on population? Was any of this going on?

DUNCOMBE: I can't remember at this juncture. There was a small U.S. AID program in India. I say small, in comparison to Egypt, where I had just come from. It was small in comparison to Indonesia, where I was about to go. It wasn't minuscule. It must have had maybe a dozen or two direct hire Americans involved in it. Quite frankly, I don't remember at this juncture just what the focus of their activities was.

Q: In looking at the economy, did the class system intrude?

DUNCOMBE: Oh, absolutely. Just as an example, thinking about the situation in our own home. I very distinctly recall one day, while we were waiting for lunch, one of my daughters looking around, assuming she can see through the walls, counted there were seven people working for us in our house. There was the chocidar, who was the guard that tended the front gate. Then, there was the gardener who raked the leaves on the lawn, but the gardener would not sweep the front walk. So, there was an outdoor sweeper who came every day to sweep the walkways, in the front and the back of the house. But, the outdoor sweeper does not do the indoor sweeping, so you had the indoor sweeper, who essentially dusted and vacuumed and that sort of thing. Then, you had the cook, and then you had the dohbi, who did the washing. I don't remember what the person was called who did the ironing. But, the person who does the washing doesn't do the ironing. Basically, if I have remembered them all, there were seven such people. We did not have a driver. We drove ourselves. In fact, we almost never drove, because we lived in walking distance of the school and my office. In the two years we were in India, I think we only put about 4,000 miles on our automobile.

Q: How did you find the Foreign Service national staff there in your section?

DUNCOMBE: Oh, very capable.

Q: I would imagine they would be.

DUNCOMBE: Very capable. India basically had at that time maybe 850 million people. I thought of it in terms of three different countries. There was a country of 150 million people, that were well educated, modern people, just like you and I. There were another 300 million people who aspired to that status. Some of them had a good deal of opportunity to have upward mobility

into this modern, well-educated population. Then, there were approximately 400 million people living in the stone age.

Q: Were we trying to do anything, that you recall, from the embassy point of view, rather than the AID point of view, toward helping the wholeness, or anything like that? Were there any embassy-run programs, maybe by the wives?

DUNCOMBE: We had a very active bilateral program of educated, cultural and scientific exchange outside the AID program. I helped negotiate the formal agreement for funding these exchanges.

Q: Well, in 1987, you left for Indonesia?

DUNCOMBE: That is correct.

Q: Was this relief that you left India, or did you like India? How did you feel about it?

DUNCOMBE: I enjoyed India very much. In fact, I had extended for a third year, and then I got promoted. I said, "Well, that's nice, but I'm here for a third year." Then, I started getting contacted from various offices in Washington about other job possibilities. I said, "Well, if Washington is going to regard me as mobile, I will regard myself as mobile." I had no particular interest in returning to Washington, but the economic counselor position in Indonesia suddenly became vacant. With the support of the ambassador and the DCM, once I had made the necessary contacts, I was allowed to curtail my tour of duty, back to two years in India, and move onto the economic counselor position in Indonesia. As I said earlier, when George Kenney retired, the bureau in Washington and the embassy had wanted to make me the counselor in India, but senior assignments would not release it. I preferred to be the head of the section, rather than number two. I was able to line up the Indonesia assignment. The embassy concurred in letting me move on.

Q: Who was the DCM when you were there?

DUNCOMBE: Gordon Streeb.

Q: Where is he now, do you know?

DUNCOMBE: He is retired, and I believe with the Carter Center in Atlanta.

Q: So, in 1987, you were off to Indonesia?

DUNCOMBE: That is correct.

EDDIE DEERFIELD
Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Calcutta, India (1985-1988)

Mr. Deerfield was born in Nebraska and raised in Nebraska and Illinois. He was educated at the University of Illinois and Northwestern University. After service in the US Army Air Corps in WWII and work with a Chicago TV station, Mr. Deerfield joined the USIA Foreign Service in 1966 serving abroad in Madras, Islamabad, Blantyre, Vancouver, Kampala, Lagos and Calcutta. Mr. Deerfield submitted his personal memoir in 2012.

DEERFIELD: I was facing mandatory retirement in 1988 at the age of 65. I had been asked to return to Washington for my final tour of duty, but wanted to finish in the field, preferably in India where I had started my diplomatic career two decades earlier. The position of Branch Public Affairs Officer in Calcutta was open, professionally a step down from my previous assignment as Country PAO in Lagos, but at this stage a career move upward was not of paramount importance. Our posts in India have always had outstanding staffs of national personnel and Calcutta was among the better of the best. Our Indian staff's relationships with the media, university and cultural communities was strong and enabled me to accept speaking engagements and meet local leaders throughout northeast India for exchanges of views on a wide variety of America-oriented subjects. I moderated a seminar for journalists on "Media Power in a Democracy;" conducted briefings for journalists on American foreign policy; inaugurated art exhibitions; addressed Rotary Club meetings, spoke to students and faculty at numerous colleges, met with members of the Indo-American Society and chaired a seminar on the American political system. We introduced Calcutta audiences to visiting American entertainers sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency. This included performances of the musical, "Once Upon A Mattress" and a country music band called the "New Grass Revival".

Mary Lee met with Mother Teresa and offered to help by teaching English as a second language to novices coming from villages and she also raised money for the Holy Order. My biggest surprise in the Calcutta assignment was an invitation to play a role in film director Bijoy Chatterjee's production of Dristidaan based on a story by Tagore. After getting clearance from our embassy in New Delhi, I accepted and was cast as an eminent British surgeon in India during the Victorian Era. I tried to save the eyesight of a young woman going blind because of lack of proper care. Mary Lee had a walk-on role as a patron at a chemist shop.

As scheduled, I retired in Calcutta in 1988 on August 24 when I reached the age of 65.

JOHN D. STEMPEL Consul General Madras (1985-1988)

Dr. John D. Stempel served in Guinea, Burundi, Zambia, Tehran, and Madras as well as at AF (Ghana), Operations Center, DOD, and NEA. This interview was conducted in 1993.

Q: Well, during your time in Madras, what aspects of south Indian politics did the US have the most interest in?

STEMPEL: Well, there were two. One was politics and one was economic. First, we were very interested in the Tamil insurrections in Sri Lanka. Now Madras, of course, is the center of Tamil Nadu, "Tamil state," so there was a lot back and forth that had allegedly been helping their colleagues across the water and we kept a very close watch on that.

Aside from that, my mission, my main goal, was to ease consular problems on the one hand, because of all the Indians who wanted to come to the States, and to build up the business and science collaboration with south India. In the three years I was there we tripled the collaboration in money terms. We were strong supporters of the scientific effort down there, to the point of working with the embassy in Delhi to try and get the Indian telephone industries to sign a \$12 billion contract. That was two years after the telephone divestiture took place and we couldn't get the Americans to organize it, so we got only half the business.

Q: How was it working with the ambassador there, John Gunther Dean? Did you have a good working relationship with him?

STEMPEL: I had a superb working relationship with Ambassador Dean, I think. I saw very clearly what he was trying to do and I supported it. I think he had a lot of confidence in me. In fact, it got so good in effect that the last year or so of my consul generalship, it was almost impossible to get him to pay the ritual visits to the south that he was supposed to do. I would say, "Mr. Ambassador, you really need to go over to Bangalore and talk to these people." "But John we have so much trouble up here and you are doing a good job. Go in and tell them you have my blessings, etc." So it was a very good relationship. Others have said that he was difficult to work with. And he could be firm. But I never minded that because I always felt I knew where I stood and if he didn't like something I was doing he would tell me and I would change it. Or I would try to convince him it was wrong. I had some success in that. You know, we really didn't want to do it the way he wanted because of various negative consequences. He was good to work for.

Q: During that time what kind of relationship did the US and India have? I know there was some problems when we bombed Libya, etc.

STEMPEL: Yes, but actually our relationships were on the upswing. I was in Washington for Rajiv Gandhi's visit in June, 1985. By the time I got to India, everything was on the up and up. We went through it and loved it. It was a terrific time for us. The other thing is that most of the southerners, those in south India, have a really different view of the federal government. They look at it with a certain amount of suspicion and in fact were much more sympathetic to the American views on things like the bombing of Libya. They understood why we were doing it. Well, put it this way, they were at least willing to understand my explanations of that kind of thing. I had some severe doubts about it when it first started too, and it turns out it was quite the right thing to do, I think. But they were not always with their own government.

I remember, it is a very small issue, but in 1987 when the Indian Davis Cup team, and then it was quite good with the Amritraj brothers and Ramesh Krishnan, had won their first round match and

was scheduled to play Israel. The Indian government had had a long history of pulling them out before really difficult matches and they didn't recognize Israel. Anyway we helped show P.R. Reddy, the vice president of the International Tennis Association, the steps to take and I got with the ambassador and we helped them out with the Indian government so they could play Israel. They played Israel and beat them, beat the Australians and went on playing in the Davis Cup finals against the Swedes. I think the United States got a fair amount of credit among the tennis circles for helping them out in doing that. A year later they sort of disemboweled themselves tennis-wise. But these were the kinds of things that were going on.

Two or three of the key businessmen on the Indo-American Business Council were based in Madras or Bangalore, which were cities in my territory. I worked very closely with the commercial side of it. That was sort of a new thing for me, but it flowed directly from my own interest of economic development.

ANNE O. CARY
Economic/Commercial Officer
New Delhi (1987-1989)

Anne O. Cary was born in Washington, DC in 1952 and raised in New Jersey. She received a degree in international economics from the University of Wisconsin in 1973. Ms. Cary's Foreign Service career included positions in Brussels, Belgium; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; Paris, France; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; New Delhi, India; Casablanca, Morocco; and Washington, DC. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 30, 1995.

Q: ...Maybe we should stop at this point and pick it up...with your departure for India. You were there from when to when?

CARY: From 1987-89.

Q: Today is March 21, 1996. Okay Anne, we are off to India. It is always interesting how tandem assignments work. How did it work out at this point?

CARY: This is exactly why we ended up in India. John Craig, who I had worked with in Haiti and who knew both of us, felt we should be in NEA, because he was in NEA and thought the Near East Asian Bureau was a great place. He contacted us very early on in the bidding process and said, "We have two jobs in India." Mine was going to be basically econ/commercial/trade policy officer and for John it was the staff assistant position to Ambassador John Gunther Dean. It sounded interesting. People said fascinating things about India, so we bid on it and were assigned. We had bid on a couple of other countries. There were two jobs in Barbados which also sounded interesting. I had specifically called to see if there would have been a conflict because John would have been political officer and I would have been econ and head of section. First they said no but then called back and said, yes, we couldn't do this. There were a number of possible jobs...you just go down the list...the bidding tool is useful because they do it by post so

you just go down and look for two jobs in the same post. We were always able to identify four or five reasonable positions. India was a reasonable chance for me to go to a large econ section with a lot of issues. John was less thrilled about being staff assistant, but it was supposed to be for only one year after which he was to go into the political section.

Q: You went out to India in 1987. As you saw it and what you got from the embassy, what was happening in India internally and vis-a-vis the United States?

CARY: Relationships between the US and India are strained. A lot has to do with the non-proliferation situation. India has exploded a nuclear device and would not sign the non-proliferation treaty. Because of this we were very careful about what we would sell them in terms of technology transfer. They had a well established relationship with the Soviets and were receiving a lot of, particularly military and aviation equipment from them. The tension between India and Pakistan was such that the United States wanted to balance things off and made sure there wasn't the possibility for another war. Also, India was a leader of the non-aligned countries and almost as a given would say no to anything the US proposed in international forums. Rajiv Gandhi was prime minister. They were just in the first steps of economic liberalization which was of major concern to the US. Companies would just look at this 900 million people market and salivate saying, "If I only sold one whatever to each Indian, I would make it." And the Indian market was very, very closed. We were working to open up the Indian market, to liberalize it. There was an ongoing joint economic commission that didn't do much but would push a bit on liberalization each time it met. There were a number of issues that had political overtones, Union Carbide's involvement in the Bhopal disaster, for one.

Q: This was where a couple of thousand people died from the emissions of a chemical plant.

CARY: The litigation continued during my time there.

Also, Delhi was a huge mission and had agencies represented that I didn't even know had people overseas like the Library of Congress. There were a lot of DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency, people. The Afghan war was also going on. There was a lot going on. Then you also have the immigration issues, the brain drain and a lot of high tech exchanges going on.

Q: Would you explain the brain drain.

CARY: Indian schools produced large numbers of very well educated graduates with no jobs whatsoever in India. There is a large number who seek to immigrate to the United States. There is resentment that the US is taking the best from India; there is resentment that the United States gains from India's spending scarce money to educate her people and then India obtains no benefit from it. Of course, on the other side, there are no jobs for these people and it is a very frustrating situation for them.

Q: What was your impression of John Gunther Dean as an ambassador. He is one of the imperial ambassadors and had been around a good bit. People talked about him as difficult but effective as an ambassador. I was wondering with the Indians, he doesn't sound like the type that would work very well.

CARY: He left under duress from India while we were there. It was a very difficult situation. This was his fifth ambassadorial post. He had sort of done everything and been everywhere and his lack of contact with the Department and regular communication became a problem. He would basically make his own policy in many instances. Reagan nominated a replacement as a recess appointment, a person named John Hubbard, president emeritus of USC, who had been a "Scholars for Reagan" fund raiser. John Dean just did not believe that this was going to happen. They could not possibly replace him and he really did not accept it when it did happen. It was a very sad end of a career.

Q: He was of German birth, rather you might say Germanic and a very serious hard charging individual. It would strike me that this would not be a very good mix with the Indians, but one never knows about these things. What was your impression?

CARY: He had some very good relations with key people in the Indian government. He had a formal manner which I think appealed to some of the elite. He wore white shirts with French cuffs and a jacket through the hot season. In India from mid-March until October, nobody wears a tie. Everybody is in bush jackets. Most of the Indian government offices were not air conditioned. Dean was meticulous about his personal appearance and damn the weather.

I saw him on a number of instances with the Indian government bringing up mostly trade issues that were really of key interest to us. A big irritant was India's quota on the number of American films which could come in.

Q: The Indian film industry is the largest in the world isn't it?

CARY: Yes.

Q: It always seems to be the same movie, but...

CARY: Yes, after four hours of singing and dancing in wet saris.

So, Ambassador Dean could be very effective on certain issues when he chose to be. But, as I said, at that point he was just not being involved necessarily on all the issues and if he didn't like the instructions, he didn't necessarily follow them. This made it very difficult for the people on his staff. If the ambassador doesn't make the point it is very hard at a lower level for the point to carry any conviction whatsoever.

The ceremonial part, which is a big part of an Ambassador's job, went well because the Indians were very much into ceremony, as was John Gunther Dean. When we were going to post, somebody partly in jest told me to take my white gloves, because the Ambassador insisted on them in the receiving line. I took them but never used them. However, it was just a level below that in terms of being absolutely appropriate. He had very strong feelings about the importance of family. People whom he believed didn't respect family had a harder time. We were okay because we were married and had these two kids who were the same age as his grandkids. So, we

did get to see him because John was his staff assistant. In fact, we saw him a lot. We were frequently invited to the residence where everything was served with white gloves.

But, during that time, it was very difficult because there was a real gulf between him and the Department. When you lead a mission saying we are going to do it my way, the rest be damned, it is hard on the staff, hard on the DCM as well.

Q: Did you see any conflict from your perspective or maybe from chats with people in other ones, with our embassy at Islamabad?

CARY: No. This again was an odd time because Arnie Raphael was killed at that time.

Q: He was our ambassador and blown up in an airplane with Zia, the President of Pakistan, an assassination.

CARY: And a number of other people. They never did quite figure out what really happened. And also because of all the US arms being channeled to the Afghan rebels, there was a special ambassador for Afghanistan which was covered out of Washington. So, you more or less had two ambassadors dealing with the same issue because for Pakistan at the time, the Afghan war was the biggest issue. There was a great divide...people would go over to Islamabad and say this is wonderful, it is so different from India. Muslim society is so much easier.

Q: There are Muslim societies and Muslim societies. But, as so often happens between these two embassies the main issue was not Kashmir or something of that nature?

CARY: No. Kashmir closed just as we were leaving. In fact, various parts of India were closed. Darjeeling was closed because of guerrilla fighting much of the time. You couldn't go into the Punjab because of internal problems. There were an awful lot of Indian internal problems at that point. A lot of terrorists, a lot of killing of each other, intercommunal violence. It was probably the most violent place I have ever lived. Every spark could strike something. There were just so many people. You stop to change a tire and all of a sudden you have 200 people and somebody shoves somebody else and you have a fight. It was much in contrast to the image of Gandhi's India, India had nothing to do with non-violence.

Q: Your responsibility was trade. I would think that this would be a very difficult job. One, the Indian is bureaucratic. Two, the Indian is just plain difficult to deal with in the business sense, for us. We are trying to break into something where the international politics aren't in our favor. They would prefer to have somebody else as their main customer. Could you tell me how you went about your work?

CARY: We had a lot of really difficult trade issues. The people I dealt with on a regular basis, particularly, Anwal Hoda, who headed their GATT section and is actually in the GATT secretariat now, was just superb. He had been doing GATT issues for 20 years. He had written a book on it. He knew the issues cold and if you just walked in, he was going to get you. He would quote sections of the agreement verbatim or of previous panel reports. His expertise meant he could say, 'don't you remember five years ago when we had this same dispute?'

We had a lot of ongoing trade disputes. Almonds was a big one issue, concerning the tariff for almonds. We finally did negotiate it successfully with the Indians. I found the Indian International Service, which is staffed on the basis of a highly competitive exam, had excellent people. So the working relationship was very good. I found they were just as sharp as they could be, did their homework, knew their issues and they knew what your position was going to be. Now, they didn't change their position, so negotiating was very frustrating. You would move one inch and then go back and debate it again when we thought we were ready to move on.

We negotiated a Science and Technology agreement. Intellectual property rights were a main concern for us both because there is an awful lot of piracy of US films and US music in India and we were trying to get the Indians to change the law. On the patent side we had major battles. India didn't provide product patent protection. For US pharmaceutical companies this was the main issue. In the GATT rounds, improving intellectual property was a key US goal and we were very far apart. That was really a lot of the nuts and bolts that I was working on.

You could see where the Indian position had come from, straight from the economic socialism of the planned economy. The state should be able to get some benefit, the individual shouldn't get all the money from an invention. Something that was good for mankind should be spread out. So, they allowed that if something was good, then anybody could make it. Overlaid on this system was an incredibly extensive and corrupt license system where they figured out if they needed ten thousand teaspoons they would give licenses to people to manufacture ten thousand teaspoons. So there was no competition and quality was absolutely miserable. But, they felt the Western system was not equitable and left people out, so they refused to provide the same kind of intellectual property protection that we thought was important, except in computers. The Indians excel in computer software. Indians hold many copyrights. They provide copyright protection for 50 years as opposed to the 17 of a patent. So, you could see things changed when their interests were at stake.

The other interesting thing about working with the Indians Services, both civil service and the international side, was they were very thinly staffed on many issues. The ambassador, the DCM, head of the econ section and I all had Hoda as a contact, because he was the person who made the decisions. The minister merely would confirm them. So in essence, the Indians did with one person what we did with 4.

Q: The politicians were pretty much politicians and that was what they did.

CARY: Right, and they really didn't get involved with these decisions at all. The Permanent Secretary made the decisions. So that was the person we had to deal with. In one way you might say that probably we were overstaffed if we had so many people dealing with one contact. It also worked on the foreign affairs side. There were two people basically on the America desk.

Q: You mentioned intellectual and patent rights. What weapons did we have to deal with them and what was the outcome of some of these issues?

CARY: Super 301, which is a US trade law saying that if countries don't provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights or use unfair trade practices, they can be cited and the US can take retaliatory action against them. And India was cited. We spent so much time going back and forth working with the Special Trade Representative's Office at USTR in terms of what unfair trading practice India should be cited for because there were lots of things to choose from. We were all absolutely shocked at the end. USTR cited India for unfair trade practices for the insurance industry, which had been nationalized some years earlier. We were surprised because none of the insurance companies had ever said they wanted back in the market. Under the terms of the Trade Act specific dates were set for when they must make progress hold talks. The Indians said they were not going to talk about this although they eventually did sit down and talk. There was a lot of posturing. It was watchlisted for intellectual property rights. As is often the case when the US acts under mandated fiat you get these laws passed which would restrict your action so somebody comes up with a way to maneuver around it. The watchlist was a maneuver to avoid citing a country, because once you have actually cited a nation then the incentive to negotiate is gone. You retaliate, they retaliate back and it is a trade war. So, what you want to do is keep the pressure on to keep things improving. India was one of 20 countries that were watchlisted the first year the trade law went into effect in 1988. There was an awful lot of back and forth with the desk, with USTR, who really was the office calling the shots on who was going to be listed. They were out on a regular basis negotiating various things.

Then, on the other side we had technology transfers because Reagan had signed an agreement with Rajiv that we were going to transfer technology. A sensitive issue was the super computer. The Indians really wanted to buy a Cray.

Q: The Cray being at that time the top of the line computer with tremendous capacity.

CARY: The Defense Department said over our dead bodies. But, we had the Presidential agreement to work it out. So, we negotiated with the Indian government, with Cray, and among the various concerned US agencies. We had members from the Defense Department and State and other interested agencies on how to put in safeguards so the Indians couldn't use it for any nuclear stuff. The Indians were also testing a long range missile. They weren't successful while I was there. They kept trying but it didn't quite work out. Their argument for being able to buy the Cray stemmed from the fact that they had already been successful in developing their own technology and US efforts to prevent missile and nuclear research were futile. "Listen, we know how to do this. We want it for weather patterns because the monsoon is the single most important element in the economy and weather patterns are so complex that you need a supercomputer to be able to work them out."

At the same time they were working on parallel processing to create a supercomputer. The concept was to put together enough computers, hooking them up together rather than the more complex way the Cray supercomputer worked and being able to do the same type of calculations with the same speed, which is what they needed.

There was an Indian project working on that and they were having some success. In the end, we finally did sign an agreement to sell them a Cray with safeguards on the Cray which nobody was really happy with but it allowed them to get the Cray. Cray was not at all happy about it because

they had an ongoing involvement in something that they didn't feel they should be involved -- basically limiting the runs of the program so they could be monitored in a way which made it tedious and traceable to do the type of calculations needed for nuclear development. The agreement was a compromise about how you deal with technology transfer when politics has said we will do this now, how do we do it to keep our security risks well covered. In India at this time there were lots and lots of Russians everywhere doing everything. The Soviet Union was becoming less and less of a threat and a lot of our personnel were involved in watching Soviets than they were dealing with the Indians. A lot of people thought that the Indian trading relationship with the Soviet Union benefited India. The Indians got all of this good military stuff for selling the Soviets lousy consumer products.

Q: Looking at the Soviet Union and looking at what you are saying about India, I would have thought that the Indian would be basically a more sophisticated country in trading practices than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wouldn't have much to offer outside of military hardware.

CARY: Well, military hardware was what the Indians wanted. And they gave them a production line for the MiG fighter jet. That was important to the Indians just to have this type of thing. So they would sell them their pretty miserable consumer goods.

They sent people to the Soviet Union to study for a while and then brought them back and would work on projects. What was happening was the technology in India was advancing so rapidly. They were doing so much and the government was helping it. They were doing everything they could to bring these people in. The econ section got involved when Microsoft wanted to bring over about 50 Indian software engineers for a 3-5 year period. Of course, most of them were in their early '20s and there was the problem of whether or not they would return to India. We said, "Why don't you just do what a lot of other software companies were doing -- establishing companies in India and working through direct satellite hookups? You would have these engineers who were being paid very well by Indian standards who would be working on all problems for the US and would just go back and forth in instantaneous communication." But Microsoft didn't believe that would work. They had to come and learn the Microsoft philosophy and could only do that by living and working in the US at headquarters. Microsoft really wasn't used to "no". I think they got 35 visas out of 50, which is really very good. The Microsoft lawyers kept saying, "We know they will come back." We replied that they couldn't know that and couldn't guarantee it. It was raised at higher levels because obviously Microsoft was a very important US company and they didn't understand why the US government wasn't trying to help them. It became a fairly sensitive issue. We had to work with the consular section and, of course, you can not tell a consular officer what to do and to whom to issue a visa, nor was anybody inclined to do that. We all had a lot of respect for how they were making their decisions.

Q: Here the Indians were building up an army on Soviet equipment, and, of course, the Gulf War hadn't yet happened which was to happen a couple of years later, but certainly with Syria vs. Israel and all, Soviet military equipment just didn't seem to be as good as American equipment. Did you get a feeling that the Indians realized the difference in equipment?

CARY: Oh, absolutely, they wanted very much to buy US, but we just wouldn't sell them the level that they wanted.

Another issue which I was involved in, we called it “shake and bake,” and it was a combined accelerator vibration testing system used for testing satellites. India was building its own satellites. The whole television system was done through satellite. They wanted to launch on US vehicles. They wanted to adequately test the satellites before spending a lot of money to send them up. We got into games about what percentage of the satellite were US parts or Soviet parts. We spent more than three years in negotiation on that. And whether we would sell them radiation hardened chips to put in their satellites. That was another proliferation concern. Congress was very much tuned to the concerns and every time you talk about a sale of high technology equipment to India they would turn around and say, “No, you can’t.” During the negotiations the US team went through some of the Indian facilities where they were building their satellites to see how they would control the chips to make sure they could account monthly for each and every chip and prove where everyone of these things were. It was ridiculous, our policy on so many things, because they could be used for nuclear testing. Anything that could possibly be used for nuclear testing was really sensitive, overly so, in my view. Specially as we had gone through three or four rounds on these radiation hardened microchips and the industry guy who was on the negotiating team said, “You know, we don’t manufacture them separately anymore...all they have to do is buy them.” I am sure the Indian knew this too, but to the Indians it was the principle that was important...You will sell these to us because we are a worthy ally.

Q: Was there ever a time after the negotiations that your Indian colleagues would join you in a drink and let their hair down and tell you what they really felt about the situation?

CARY: The business community certainly did that. But officials, no. Nobody would ever criticize their government. They had no problems. The civil service just did not get involved in talking politics or anything. There was just no advantage in that. When you got into the internal troubles and human rights, it became much more emotional. Criticism was just not possible for officials. The reply to US criticism was, "You don’t understand what is going on.

Q: Did you get involved with the problem of child labor?

CARY: Yes.

Q: Will you talk about that?

CARY: The requirement to limit imports of goods was not yet part of US trade law, but we were very concerned about child labor and slavery because it is a major component in certain Indian industries...rug making is one of the major industries, but also mining. Child labor is just everywhere because the wage in India is a real problem. No one person earns enough money to support a family so everybody has to work including the kids and they do. It becomes a very emotionally charged issue. Parents say, “Well, we will starve if we send them to school. We can’t afford to send them to school. Although school is free you have to have books, shoes, clothes.” Most of India is hideously poor and people simply couldn’t do that. I would visit mills...they had a few top of the line textile mills that are all automated, but most of the textiles industry in India is hand loomed.. Little kids, 7, 8, 9 years old sit at the loom and work it or knot the rugs. Some worked outside, but a lot of it was just very unhealthful. There was no education

and no future for these children. People would say that we have enough educated people, we don't need any more, we can't give jobs to the ones we have. And what else do you do to keep people alive? I certainly don't believe child labor is the answer, but they really did believe there was no alternative. If you were smart that was good and they would try if they had a smart kid and sacrifice everything to get that kid to school and to keep him in school.

The other sensitive social issue was dowry. It was illegal to charge dowry, which is what the bride's family gives the groom. It is a huge amount, two or three year's salary worth of presents. The bride, herself, will have her jewelry, which is hers and that doesn't go into the family. But 95 percent of the marriages are still arranged marriages and part of the negotiation is how much we are going to get...the set of dishes, clothes, stove, refrigerator, motorbike, television, etc. When the average Indian earns maybe \$50 a month, a pretty decent middle class wage...some kids may earn \$10 a month, which is possible. But the families would agree to this marriage with the payment of say \$1000. The couple would be married and if the bride's family didn't come up with what they had promised, or if indeed they did come up with what they promised but the groom's family decided they wanted more, it was not at all infrequent, the bride's life could be in danger. At least one woman a day was burned to death in what were called dowry deaths. Either the dowry hadn't been paid or more usually, they wanted more and the bride's family couldn't do anything about it. They couldn't afford it and it was just unacceptable for her to go back home. She was stuck. It was just a horrible situation.

Q: Did that come up in our relationship at all?

CARY: Yes, in the human rights report. Another issue that came up as was female infanticide.

Q: I would have thought under this system that some people would cut off the problem at the beginning, no girls or something.

CARY: Yes. They used amniocentesis, for example.

Q: This is a way of testing for the sex of a child.

CARY: A study was made and out of 8,000 abortions cases following amniocentesis, 7,999 were female fetuses. It was unquestionably used for sex selection. If you didn't have a son, you were nothing. Some families, because they couldn't afford the dowries, would kill their baby girls. There was an awareness that this wasn't acceptable. The Indian press, which was very odd, very undisciplined, would report these things. They found it pretty awful. There was one case of suttee, which is a widow throwing herself on a funeral pyre of her husband, when we were there. It was very unusual though. A 19 year old girl. It had been illegal for years. The British had outlawed it and the Indian constitution doesn't allow it and it really hadn't been practiced for a long time. Now, granted, as a childless widow, her life was not worth a whole lot in a village. But, she indeed did commit suttee, suicide, and it raised a lot of attention. People would talk about whether this was a good thing or a bad thing. Whether she should be allowed to do it, more because it was such a miserable life for a childless widow. If you have sons you are okay and are going to be protected. But if you are childless there is nothing to protect you.

Q: As a female moving up to the higher ranks of a Foreign Service officer, what was your impression of the role of professional women in India at that time?

CARY: There were not very many, particularly at the higher ranks. This is ironic because India had been led by a female prime minister. There was a deputy secretary (relatively high rank) at the Foreign Office. I can't think of any women in trade ministry. There were a couple in commerce. Indian unmarried female foreign service officers couldn't live. I remember one woman in particular, who was the deputy secretary in the Foreign Office, and I asked her if she would go overseas and she said, "No, I can't really because I am not married and it is just unacceptable for a woman to live on her own. If I marry somebody in the foreign service, then that would work out and we could go and I could keep working." There was not a taboo about married women working, but she couldn't live alone. I thought that was an interesting thing. There were, certainly, some women who were out, but most not. Most of the women who worked were very poor women. They were hauling dirt in 115 degree weather in a sari. The poverty in India to me was much worse than Ethiopia. Although, you get to a certain level and how miserable is miserable, it is not a contest. But, there seemed to be an acceptance of it because, of course, with the Hindu philosophy, if you are an untouchable it is because that is what you deserved. So, there is no need for society to feel sorry for you because you have earned that position and you have to work to be better, to move up in the next reincarnation. It was very much a family orientated system where anything outside the family didn't matter. The rest of the world's troubles just really couldn't be your concern.

Now, to me, as a way of living, I found that very, very difficult. You understand that in a country with so many people where there isn't enough for everybody that the way people protect themselves is different. The common spaces were just filthy. People would spit, people would urinate in the corners and staircases. This in a government building. Then you would go into a lovely office, nicely appointed with carpets on the floor. It was a real land of contrasts.

Q: On the more frivolous side, but important to us, how did the clash between the movie moguls work out?

CARY: Well, Jack Valenti...

Q: Jack Valenti was the president, and has been for many, many years, of the American Movie Producers Association.

CARY: India imposed a quota of about 100 US films a year going into India. We felt that was just ridiculous. There shouldn't be any quota at all. The censors would eliminate an awful lot of what could go in because you could not show a kiss on the screen and no nudity. You could blow everybody to smithereens, that was okay, but no sex whatsoever was allowed. Certain films the director wouldn't allow any cuts so they weren't imported, but most producers or directors didn't care about what happened to a film in international, particularly "third-world" distribution. But, India had a strict quantitative limitation and we were able to get that increased and MPAA was happy. But, Jack Valenti was there every step of the way with letters and phone calls.

Q: Of course, you couldn't work reciprocity because nobody would cross the street to see an Indian movie.

CARY: That was our point. India can send as many films as it wants to the US. There are a few, obviously that have won best foreign film, but most of the 400 odd films are of limited or no interest to the US audience. I did go down to Bombay and call on the film studios, because the other movie issue was piracy. There was an awful lot of pirated copies of movies on video coming in and the Indian film makers didn't like this because it cut down on the people who went to see their films.

Q: We are talking about video tapes.

CARY: Yes. The other thing was pornography was coming in. I was surprised at the subterfuge that went on. The smugglers would put a regular movie for 15-20 minutes at the beginning of the tape and then put a pornographic film on after that with the idea that the censors were not going to sit there and really look through more than 20 minutes before they pass it.

Q: I would have thought there would be a thriving pornographic industry in India. They invented pornography in a way.

CARY: I can remember going with my mother to Khajuraho, which has erotic carvings all over the temples walls. The guide went on at great length about them. But, again, their idea of pornography is just very different. Sex isn't necessarily pornographic, although kissing is. But, the other is all in a married sense.

Q: Where there any other issues you had to deal with? What was life like in the embassy? Big embassies often have their problems.

CARY: It worked very well as a matter of fact. There was a science section...the people I worked with most frequency were the military side, the intelligence, and the commercial section. This was a Foreign Service Commercial post as well and they had three people there. We worked very, very well together. It is not unusual to have a good relationship between the econ section and the commercial section, but we worked very, very well together. They were very good about inviting me to functions or making sure that I met with the business community. Sometimes the economic and commercial our interests conflicted. With the technology side we were trying to restrict sales and the business community is trying to sell. The military side was also very cooperative.

Q: How did you find the Indian business community?

CARY: Extravagant. Here you had one of the contrasts of India with people lying on the streets begging and people literally dripping diamonds, emeralds and gold threaded saris stepping over them to go to parties. The business community had an awful lot of money and for certain things would spend it so lavishly. At the hotels we would be invited to just huge events, 5,000 people to a wedding. There was very conspicuous consumption. particularly of items which could not be legally imported. I remember being in on wealthy business man's home where he was pushing

Johnny Walker Black I can remember somebody saying, "Oh, yes, somebody from one of the other embassies sold it to me." And, I thought, that is one of the reasons why we are closing down our commissary. We closed it to all non-Americans at that point.

New Delhi was really like Washington 20 years ago when no business people lived there. Most of the business community would come to lobby and commute by Air India or the internal airlines. Because of the security problems throughout the country you were physically searched every time you got on an airplane. It was very thorough. The business community would make "air dashes" up and down the country.

Q: You left there when John Hubbard was ambassador.

CARY: Yes. He was the political appointee that gives the bad name to political appointees. He was in his mid-'70s and had been involved with educational exchanges in India, so his appointment did make some sense. But he had the title of ambassador and had no interest at all in being an ambassador. He really didn't believe there were some things that he had to do as ambassador. It was in contrast to John Gunther Dean who took the business seriously. He might not say what you wanted him to say, but he did go see the people and say it. Hubbard approach was just..."are you kidding, I'm not going to do this." He liked the social aspects of it. He had more girl friends come and stay at the residence, as well as his ex-wife with whom he had a good relationship. You had to ask, "Who is at the residence today?" And he was not confirmed. He was a recess appointment who was not confirmed. So, he left after less than a year when the Bush administration came in.

Q: And you left about that time too, didn't you?

CARY: Yes. We left in the summer of 1989.

SUSAN KEOGH
Political Officer
New Delhi (1988-1990)

Mrs. Keogh was born and raised in the United Kingdom and educated at the University of Dublin, the University of Cape Town and the National Defense University. After several years of teaching English abroad, she married State Department Foreign Service Officer Dennis Keogh and accompanied him on his assignments in Mbabane, Bogotá, Niamey and Cape Town, meanwhile continuing her profession at these posts. After the death of her husband, Mrs. Keogh joined the State Department as a Foreign Service Officer and served several tours in Washington as well as in New Delhi, Asmara (Deputy Chief of Mission), Quebec City (Consul General), Lima, and LaPaz. Her assignments included Country Desk Officer, Public Affairs, Human Rights and Anti-Narcotics Officer. Mrs. Keogh was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2013.

Q: Well, then you moved on to India.

KEOGH: Yes.

Q: Where did you go in India and when?

KEOGH: We went to New Delhi from 1988 to 1990. I was in the Political Section, covering the human rights portfolio and multilateral affairs. I was also the Tibet person, the Bhutan person, and I covered India's regional foreign relations. It was a period when India was very closely allied with the Soviet Union. And so there was considerable tension in our relations.

Q: What was the political state of India when you got there?

KEOGH: It was a few years after Indira Gandhi was killed, after the terrible reprisals on Sikhs. There were frequent communal massacres and violence all across the Punjab. Then the war in Kashmir broke out. As the human rights officer I was not only reporting on bride burnings and child labor and those kinds of things. I was also trying to follow what was happening in Srinagar, where up to a million people were demonstrating in the streets because of the unresolved territorial dispute that had gone on since 1947.

Q: Because it broke out into war, was there any solution possible?

KEOGH: Well, a temporary UN mandate put most of Kashmir under India pending a referendum. Of course this never happened and is still unresolved. I didn't get the sense that the Kashmiris wanted to be either part of Pakistan or India, they wanted their autonomy. But it became bloody as they took to the streets and the Indian Army and police tried to suppress the demonstrations.

Q: How did you know about the situation there?

KEOGH: One source was close to home. Unwittingly, just prior to the conflict breaking out, I had arranged a vacation for my three older children in Srinagar! Having recently had another child, I could not travel with them, so they went on a package tour with a guide that included Ladakh – the 'roof of the world' – and a house boat on the Dal Lake. They flew up to Ladakh and climbed mountains, got altitude sickness and generally had a memorable trip. They were coming down in a taxi from Ladakh to Srinagar when a lot of army officers started riding in their taxi -- they knew something was up. Small towns en route had pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini everywhere. When they got to Srinagar the demonstrations were starting. They were able to get on a plane and leave. They went to the RSO (regional security officer) to tell him their story. And after that, the Embassy put a travel ban on Srinagar. It was really the beginning of the conflict.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?

KEOGH: John Gunther Dean, then William Clark.

Q: I would think being a human rights officer in India at almost any time would be difficult because the Indians like to preach to the United States and the United States likes to preach to the Indians.

KEOGH: The Indian Government was very sensitive to outsiders criticizing their handling of 'internal affairs.'

Q: Would you go down and talk to the police commissioner or something?

KEOGH: Well, initially I had to find out what was going on. So I read the newspapers and spent a lot of time developing contacts and talking to human rights lawyers and to press people and to women's groups. Later on, to dissident Kashmiri policeman and others who were worried about the situation there and would unburden themselves because they were trying to stop the violence. As the human rights officer you meet some of the finest people in the society, some real fighters for truth and justice. One person I met early on was Ravi Nair - he was a young human rights lawyer who documented human rights abuses. He'd been in prison 26 times, mostly under Indira Gandhi - an outspoken and fearless advocate. He wanted India to be a better place that protected its people.

Q: Did you find that you had problems within the embassy? It doesn't help relations when the government knows that something's going to be published in the world about their internal affairs. And I would think that the elders from the Political Section would say lay off, you're not helping.

KEOGH: The political section worked closely together and helped each other. At that time our relations with India were quite complicated anyway. I never felt anybody was trying to suppress or divert anything.

Q: It's almost like you're saying we didn't really care. I mean the Indians were snuggling up to the Soviet Union so we didn't really have to play nice with them.

KEOGH: Not at all. Everyone understood the strategic importance of India in the region and in the world. There was huge concern about instability in that region, as there still is. The conflict in Kashmir and confrontation with Pakistan were only two areas of concern – the Russians were leaving Afghanistan, harassed by the Mujahadeen, the conflict with the Tamil Tigers was going on to the south, relations with Nepal and Bangladesh were shaky. It was a dangerous period.

Q: What about China? The border was not resolved, was it? Still isn't.

KEOGH: No. There's still a stand-off near the McMahon Line. Both sides patrol and have built infrastructure. My only involvement was when I had the Tibet brief. I used to go up by train from Delhi to Dharamsala where there were about 35,000 Tibetans. Refugees were still coming all the time from Lhasa. I was restricted to talking about human rights and refugee issues. Not politics, because the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community were allowed to stay in India on a refugee basis. They had to be careful not to be overtly political because the Indians didn't want China to react.

Q: The Dalai Lama has been played up as a very benevolent personage. What was your impression of him?

KEOGH: He's a great man. While he has fought for Tibetans' freedom and welfare, he's a realist - he recognizes that autonomy within China is the only option. He was never, as the Chinese said, a "splitist." Some younger Tibetans want to push for independence, but that's not the Dalai Lama's position. Underlying his globe-trotting public image, he's plain. He sees himself as a simple monk. His preference for a separation between the political and religious leadership has now happened, so he is freer to teach and promote human happiness.

Q: Well, what was your impression of Indian treatment of the Tibetans?

KEOGH: They treated the Tibetans carefully. They had freedom to live and work and practice Buddhism. They set up their own schools. They had their own structures, like a parliament. The Indians walked a fine line. But they basically did the right things by the Tibetans.

Q: What did you do when you left India?

KEOGH: We came back to the U.S. in 1990. I was to be the Deputy Public Affairs Advisor for the Middle East Bureau. Ten days before I started, Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait. I was one of the people who spoke to the press and prepared guidance for the Seventh Floor and did public speaking during the First Gulf War.

LOUISE TAYLOR
India Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1988-1990)

Ms. Taylor was born and raised in Illinois and educated at Wellesley College, George Washington University and Boston University. After joining the Foreign Service of USIA, Ms. Taylor served in Washington and abroad in the field of Cultural and Information. Her foreign posts include Moscow, Kabul, Tel Aviv and Rabat. She also served in Washington as USIA Desk Officer for Afghanistan/Pakistan and for South Asia and as Policy Officer for Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States. Ms. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: In '88, you left.

TAYLOR: We did.

Q: Whither?

TAYLOR: We came back here. We were exhausted. Four years in Israel is just exhausting. It wipes you out. I had been on the go for four straight years without ever sitting down and catching my breath. So we came- (end of tape)

Q: You were saying you had moved into the...

TAYLOR: I took up India. I went back to South Asia after the Middle East. I think many people feel after four years in a place like Israel you have to get away from those issues. My agency wanted me to take a position that was more directly involved with Israel. I just felt I had to step away from this from a while. It was too intense. It was too all encompassing. It just dominates your life. My heart was left back in South Asia from my Afghan days. The India desk came open. In those days, it involved India and Sri Lanka. India was our largest country program in the entire world, perhaps exceeded by Germany by one or two officers. Otherwise, India was our most enormous program with the most resources. I wanted that challenge. I wanted to work on those issues again. The other little country that came with it was Sri Lanka. I had never been to Sri Lanka. I got to make a visit out there. There was conflict there even at that time. The Tamil Tigers was already geared up for a big fight – still is. I just had the most extraordinary trip to Sri Lanka. I had never realized, small though it is, what a remarkable vibrant society of well educated people with lots of different things to say and opinions on everything, very artistic, very dynamic, on the move. Your heart just goes out to them. Here are these people with all this talent and they don't have the desperate situation that the Arabs and the Israelis do yet they're fighting it out in the same way. I've never been to Ireland, but I assume that I would have a similar reaction there.

So, I spent two years working in Washington, '88-'90, when South Asia was still within the NEA family fold. Years later, when I came back to South Asia, South Asia had been spun off from NEA in the Department of State, which I think is a terrible mistake. I think that at the time in the late '80s and all through the '80s, NEA had been such a strong bureau and it benefited from people serving everywhere from Bangladesh to Morocco and the flow through of people and officers with this kind of experience just strengthened all of us. I was in a position as India country officer – I don't know how it fell to me, but I was the USIA NEA representative to the NEA weekly meetings over at State. This was when USIA was still an independent agency. We were by this time, thanks to Charlie Wick, down on Fourth Street, which is truly the end of the earth. Charlie had moved us out of this wonderful address that we had a block from the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue. Due to his machinations with his real estate buddies, he had gotten us into this slum.

Q: Why did he do that?

TAYLOR: My feeling is that he had this personal business relationship with the guys, the Antonelli brothers, the famous Antonelli brothers, who owned all the parking lots in Washington at one time and had rather shady construction deals. They owned this building that we moved into. Charlie sold us and everybody else on the idea because of two things. He said, "Well, it will bring us closer to the Voice of America," which we still owned at that time. And it will consolidate all of the little USIA annexes which were around town. Our television studios were here. There were various other people around, just as the State annexes are all over town. Well,

we were all supposed to be in this one building. Of course, that never happened. Up until consolidation with the State Department, we were still all over the place. Of course, the building turned out to be an immediate slum. It started falling apart. The towel racks in the ladies room fell off the wall within the first week that we moved in. It was just a horrible place. Plus, it was in the middle of nowhere. It turned out also that USIA had been on the GAO's list to move into some new building someplace within a five year period sometime in the '80s. At one point, that was to have been what is now called the Reagan Building. At another point, it was to have been some other nice new building in a better location. In any case, he sold us out on that. There are still people on Fourth Street. It's between C and D on Fourth Street.

Q: There is no restaurant nearby.

TAYLOR: There is a McDonald's [laughter]. It's the pits. You greet a foreign visitor in the USIA building – and we have many high level foreign visitors who come to visit us – and you tromp them through this lobby and then down these dismal hallways to offices. Of course, the place right now is half deserted because most people have moved to the State Department. It's sort of like a tomb. Then you walk in the lobby and there is literally a McDonald's right in the lobby of a foreign affairs building with the smell of cheeseburgers wafting out. It's no more than 30 feet away. If you have the occasional Arab visitor that thinks that the hegemonic power has its McDonald's everywhere, this certainly proves it to them.

Q: In the '88-'90 period, how were relations from your perspective with India?

TAYLOR: I have always felt that we have never paid enough attention to India. The Indians know this. They are a very talented, huge country with potentially great influence. All of my briefing papers used to say, "India has the largest emerging middle class of any country in the world. Some 250 million people qualify as the middle class," probably bigger now with the whole Internet explosion, which has benefited India greatly. They have one of the most talented, educated peoples in the world. We have the oldest democracy. They have the biggest democracy. We have kept this country on the margins forever. While I was India country officer, USIA had lots of money. We were always looking for more; but we had a lot of money. We had a lot of people in four different places in India. We had a lot of programs going on. There were quasigovernmental entities like the Indo-U.S. Subcommission on Education and Culture... The Smithsonian had a number of subgroups working on special projects in India. Everybody in town was doing something special related to India. It was really more than I could keep up with as the country officer for India. Because we did have money, you were only limited by your time and by the staff that you had. I don't want to say we had everything, but we could do a lot. I had the feeling that I was almost as overwhelmed as I was in Israel. All of a sudden I inherited Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, and Nepal. The officer who had those countries went off to language training for a full year. This was a sudden thing. There was no one to replace him for another year's cycle. So, I had all of these countries. Of course, Pakistan and India were the two big ones. But little Bangladesh was very active. Our people out in Bangladesh had a tremendously active program going on. Keeping up with all of this was a strain for me. Nevertheless, it was a very exciting job. It was terrific. I learned so much.

R. GRANT SMITH
Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (1988-1991)

R. Grant Smith was born on Long Island in 1938. He graduated from Princeton University in 1960. He later earned a master's degree from Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1963 and held positions in Pakistan, Nepal, and India. In 1995 he began his ambassadorship in Tajikistan. Ambassador Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: *Well, you went out to India as DCM in 1988?*

SMITH: Right.

Q: *Who was your ambassador there?*

SMITH: I served under three ambassadors there, but for the first few months I was there it was John Gunther Dean, and then we had Jack Hubbard. They had somebody there in an interim appointment for 11 months. And then Bill Clark for the end.

Q: *Bill Clark. Okay. Well, we'll pick this up in 1988, when you go out to be DCM to John Gunther Dean. Great.*

SMITH: Okay, good. Thank you.

Q: *Today is August 5, 1999. Grant, you were in India as DCM?*

SMITH: As DCM.

Q: *From when to when?*

SMITH: August, 1988, till the summer of 1991.

Q: *Who was the ambassador?*

SMITH: Well, we had three different ambassadors - John Gunther Dean when I arrived; Jack Hubbard for eleven months; and then Bill Clark.

Q: *How did you get the job?*

SMITH: I'd been country director, and I think probably if you look through, run a statistical analysis, you'll find that a fair number of times the country director becomes a DCM in a

significant-sized country. And in fact, since I'd been working with John Gunther Dean as country director, it was sort of logical that I'd move on to be DCM.

Q: How did things work out between you and John Gunther Dean? He was a gentleman who's had about every assignment. He's had many major and very, very difficult assignments, including Cambodia at the time -

SMITH: I was only there for a couple of months when he was there. I arrived in August, as I recall, and he left in September or October, came back to the States, was here for a month or so, came back and sort of packed out, and left in November - would be my recollection. But there wasn't much overlap in the field, and if you want to talk to someone who was his DCM in the field, you ought to talk to Gordon Streehan, who was my predecessor in Delhi.

Q: Where is he now?

SMITH: He's retired. I believe he's at the Carter Center, along with another former DCM there, Craig Creekmore - and Harry Barnes.

Q: Yes, I've tried to get hold of them all to do something. There was some controversy about Dean. You don't want to talk about that. I have talked to John Gunther Dean, and he's obviously very, very bitter about this.

SMITH: Yes, he is.

Q: And I'm trying to do an oral history with him because it's -

SMITH: I would say that one thing was very clear that I can say very honestly - that he wasn't prepared for and hadn't accepted the idea of retirement. He's somebody who expected to and wanted to continue to be in the traces - something we all have to reflect on - but he obviously took it very hard when Jack Hubbard's appointment was announced. I remember one day in Washington, before I came out, I was talking to Jack Hubbard, and John Gunther Dean came into the office and looked at Jack Hubbard and said, when I introduced him, "I know who you are. You're the one who wants my job."

Q: Who was Jack Hubbard, or who is Jack Hubbard - at that time?

SMITH: Jack Hubbard had been in the AID mission in India in the 1960s, as I recall. He's an educator. He had, as I recall, helped set up the agricultural universities. He had come back. His most recent incarnation before coming to India as ambassador had been as president of USC [University of Southern California].

Q: So a major figure.

SMITH: A major figure - major figure in southern California, and obviously knew the republican leadership, the Reagan leadership from southern California. But he had been to India, back and forth to India, maintained ties there. He was involved with the Indo-U.S. Subcommittee on

Education and Culture. He was a member of that, so he continued an association with India and was certainly very happy to come back, but didn't have much background in diplomacy.

Q: 1988, when you arrived in India - how would you state our relations were with India at that point?

SMITH: Well, as I said when we were doing the last segment, I have some trouble differentiating exactly what happened when, because I went from country director to DCM, and remembering exactly what the situation was. But this was a period when we were strengthening our relations with India. I think some people saw the whole period as trying to "wean India away from the Soviets," some people would say. I think a better way to describe it would be that India was beginning - and much more was done later - economic liberalization, which was sort of unleashing the Indian economic and entrepreneurial abilities so we were building a relationship in this period looking to the future, trying to have a relationship with India and have a relationship with Pakistan that was not determined by our relationship with the other. And in the case of India it had a lot to do with high-tech, the beginnings of some work with India on high-tech in the military area - not assistance, but sales - and a broadening and deepening of our relationship in general during this period. This was a time, when I arrived there in '88, of a Congress government, and it was Rajiv Gandhi.

Q: Who was the prime minister?

SMITH: Rajiv Gandhi at that time. Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in '84. Rajiv was elected. He was prime minister when I arrived in '88. I think we still saw Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir in Pakistan as providing opportunity for these two countries to get on to a new generation, a new era. It turned out it didn't work that way. Both of them were probably better politicians than they were leaders, but that was our view at the time. We'd had the Aditi exhibit here in 1985, as I recall. He'd come for that. He came to the United States again in 1987, arrived on the day, "Black Monday," when the stock market fell so much? That was the day he arrived on one of his visits. So there was certainly a better relationship, but as always in India, there are people who are very suspicious of the United States, who remember the past, who are looking for any reason to get at us.

Q: When you got there, you were country director, so you were intimately involved -

SMITH: Not only that, I had been political counselor until '84. I had been political counselor, country director, and back as DCM.

Q: Were you beginning to think of yourself as an Indian hand, somehow?

SMITH: Yes, actually, for my own career it probably would have been better to go somewhere else, not to be so closely associated with India, and I think that some people in Delhi, in the embassy, felt that there was micro-management of the Political Section coming from the front office, which was sort of hard to get away from because I knew the issues pretty well.

Q: But when you arrived there, being on the ground, did you sense any difference in sort of the attitude of the embassy and how things were going that what you had when you were political counselor or working from the Desk?

SMITH: Well, of course, I'd been out there a couple of time when I was on the Desk. I think that I did sense a better relationship. I'm not sure I can say a better relationship than was there in '82-84, but certainly a different relationship from what was there in the '70s when I'd been there. And there had been a gradual improvement, and there was the beginning of this economic liberalization. I can remember fairly soon after I arrived I spoke at a conference sponsored probably by the Chamber of Commerce on economic issues, and one of the other speakers was Abid Hussein, who had been a member or chairman of the planning commission and was later Indian ambassador here in the United States, and quite a proponent of liberalization. And he told me afterwards... Well, first of all, he spoke, and I still remember what he said, talking about liberalization. He said, "We have to open the windows. A few flies will come in, but we need the fresh air." And afterwards he came up to me, and he said, "Well, what you said was very good, but you really aren't enthusiastic enough." So you had the beginnings of this liberalization, which of course really took off in the '90s, and as a result there had been quite a change in India's international economic situation. If you look at India's reserves right now, it's in the billions of dollars. They're very very comfortable, whereas in the '80s and certainly before that it was very close. It was a much dicier thing.

Q: Well, when you're talking about liberalization, we're really talking about opening up markets and people coming in -

SMITH: Well, you're talking both about that and about opening up the domestic economy, because India had had an economy that was built by Nehru and the other leaders who had been educated at the London School of Economics, Fabian socialist influenced, very statist, many state corporation, many controls. The basic philosophy was that the government would license factories to produce x -number of refrigerators, and that would be all. Therefore, the economic competition in the country was to get the license. And you can imagine a lot of pressure and money exchanged hands in trying to get the license, but once you got the license you were home free. You didn't have to provide service or quality or anything, because this was all controlled, with the government deciding how many refrigerators should be produced. And they were beginning to liberalize this. In the late '80s or early '90s you saw the beginning of this. Bajaj, which is the maker of motor scooters, maybe the largest in the world, but you find their motor scooters in Southeast Asia, many places. They suddenly had to set up a marketing department, for the first time. And this was going on in other industries. The industrialists had to begin to worry about quality and service for the first time. You had young entrepreneurs coming up. You began to have young entrepreneurs coming back from the United States, who'd been here as engineers, scientists, setting up companies in India. You began to have... I saw it in the times when I was there, this having been the third or fourth time that I was there. When I was in India, back in the '50s and the Indian era in the '60s, every college student's main ambition was to become a member of the Indian administrative service or the Indian Foreign Service. That was the best thing to do. By the time I was there, in the early '80s, the objective was probably to join a large Indian company. But by the last time I was there, this last time, it was to *start up* a company, and I actually saw this going on and talking to students.

Q: I've never served in India, but I have pictures of it because at one point I served in Dhahran and I used to go over to Bahrain and see sort of the Indian Civil Service type thing working there, and I'd think of huge offices full of overhead fans or something and piled high with papers stitched together -

SMITH: The term "red tape" was invented there.

Q: -I mean, paper, paper, paper, and this was mostly civil servants who were doing these things. You're talking about one very big rice bowl that's getting broken, as far as government control over these things. Were you seeing this as a sort of a major battle within the Indian-

SMITH: It was a major battle, and actually, the person who started undoing it was one of the people who put the controls in place. I think I may have mentioned that before - L. K. Jah. But yes, there was a major conflict, and you would see it in Indian bureaucrats trying to retain control. You'd also see it in the state corporations, and you would hear them arguing, "Well, we can do it as well as anybody else." And the area where I think liberalization has been most difficult in India has been getting rid of those state corporations, particularly the ones that are money-losing operations. And this is not just India; it's been true in Latin America and other places around the world, one of the most difficult things to do. But in India, you always did have a private sector; there was never *just* a state sector. For instance, in steel, there was government steel, but there was also private steel, and I think what's happened recently is that you've had increasing willingness of the government to allow the private part of that to expand, and in many areas - computers being an example - the private sector is dominant, not the government. There may be some government corporations in there - I'm not sure whether there still are - but the private sector is dominant. During the same period you had the first linkup between Texas Instruments - getting permission to put a satellite dish into Bangalore and to begin using Indian programmers in India, rather than having them- (end of tape)

So you had the beginnings of the Indian software in this period. And of course now they're a dominant factor or a very important factor in international software.

Q: Did the embassy crank up to be quite aggressive in promotion of American investment there but American sales there with this opportunity, or did we... How did we work this, or was this really something that we said, "Here it is, fellows, come on in," and to the private sector?

SMITH: In most case, the American companies which were coming in, were coming in with an Indian partner. We were aggressive in some areas, where there was a case of government contracts - not always successfully. We were very aggressive... One of the biggest issues there, which was only been resolved and not completely resolved up to now, was intellectual property rights, and this was an area where we were, I think, tough and aggressive. It basically involves pharmaceuticals and some chemicals.

Q: And how about computer type things? That hadn't come yet?

SMITH: The Indians, on copyright, are okay, because the Indians are the world's largest producer of films, and they make something over 700 a year - two a day - and they realized very early that copyright protection was very much in their interests. And as I recall they quickly extended it to computer things as well. So copyright was not particularly an issue. What was an issue was this pharmaceuticals.

Q: Was that a philosophical difference? I know in some places the feeling is if this medicine protects people, and you charge big money for it, you are cheating humanity, really.

SMITH: It is a philosophical difference, and the Indians would make several arguments. We may have discussed some of this on the last tape, but one of the arguments was the one you made - that the Indians saw it important to have basic medicines widely available at a reasonable price. Now this is something that I'm sort of sympathetic about because serving in Francophone Africa, a shot of penicillin there when I was there was one month's salary for a lot of people, whereas in India, basic pharmaceuticals actually are quite reasonable. Another India argument was basically the "infant industry" argument: that they need this to get going, and other countries, including the United States, had only introduced product-patent protection very late in the game. The issue is product-patent protection versus process-patent protection. The Indians provided process-patent protection but not product-patent protection on pharmaceuticals. However, we argued that it was in the Indians' interest to go into product-patent protection because India itself was getting into the realm - it was developing things - and if it really wanted to have a strong pharmaceutical industry, in addition to having those high-tech more recent pharmaceuticals available in India (which had not been available in India because foreign companies had been unwilling to sell them there because of the patent protection issue, so if you need something that is fairly new, you can't get it in India), but we argued that the Indians should start providing product patent, because then they could develop their own R&D and really develop their pharmaceutical industry, not as a derivative but as a real industry. Of course, this has been resolved through the WTO.

Q: World Trade Organization.

SMITH: Right. This resolution was not bilateral between the U.S. and India, but multilateral in the WTO sense. I don't think the Indians have quite worked out all the details yet, but this was a major issue during the period I was there. It wasn't just pharmaceuticals; there were a few agricultural chemicals that were also an issue. And some American companies, as a result, just refused to have any dealings with India. FMC was an example, felt very strongly about it. And I couldn't argue with them. So we'd push very hard on this area. We also pushed very hard in trying to get American companies into the high-tech area with the government, particularly with the Indian military. The Indians were trying to develop a new light combat aircraft. Northrop with memoranda of understanding, and Northrop was working with them, with their issues of releasability of particular kinds of technology, composite technology in particular, and how far were we willing to go. And this was an issue with Washington, but it was also an issue in India because, obviously, they were foreign competitors here. But the big American companies, like Enron was beginning its work then, and others, often didn't need any particular American help. They were well established. A number of American companies had very good joint ventures there - Cummings Diesel, for example, has a longstanding agreement with a very fine Indian

company, as I recall. Some American companies have very good arrangements with Tata. So there are some longstanding joint ventures there that are quite successful.

Q: Well, did you find at least at the ministerial level and all there was a tendency to try to get the companies to deal more with the European Union or something, I mean just a natural reaction against the United States?

SMITH: To some extent. Again, I think we touched on a little bit of this last time. But the Indians don't want to put all their eggs in one basket, so when it comes to buying aircraft or having licensing agreements in sensitive areas, they're going to want to deal with the Europeans and with the U.S., not separately. In some areas, the Europeans had a definite advantage because of their more lax laws and regulations on bribery. Our law on this is quite unique.

Q: It's getting more universal, I think.

SMITH: In fact, there were some major scandals in India over alleged bribe payments, and one of my arguments with the Indian government used to be, "Gee, if you bought from the United States, you can be pretty sure that there haven't been any bribes because you know that an American company that bribes is going to get taken to court in the United States; whereas in France, French companies can *deduct* those - they're tax-deductible - not only they're legal, they're tax-deductible." But just as we had some longstanding arrangements, obviously some European companies had longstanding arrangements in certain areas, plus, some of the Indian leaders, coming from... By then it was many years after Independence, 40 years after Independence, but you still had some leaders who had been educated in the UK and had a more European background. It varied from individual minister to individual minister, and of course the government changed several times when I was there, so we were dealing with different ministers on different occasions.

Q: By this time, the whole political spectrum - we've mentioned it before - it really was a democracy, wasn't it? I mean, with all its warts and all that. There were genuine elections.

SMITH: In India there are genuine elections, and if you judge the success of a former colony in the field of democracy by its ability to change government twice - not just once, but twice - India actually passed that, has more than passed that test, and while we were there that time, it changed several times. In fact, in this period, you saw the first Congress Party defeat - the big defeat was in 1977 - and there had been a gradual erosion of Congress Party power, and beginning by 1989, you saw the beginning of coalition governments, which is what you've had continuously since then.

Q: Did you find that the Political Section was able, had good contacts?

SMITH: Well, you'd always like them to have better contacts, but yes, I think that they had good contacts.

Q: It's a hard country to cover, isn't it, because of both the geography, and some of the parties are so ethnically or religiously oriented, or whatever you want to call it? Does that make a difference? That makes it more difficult to sort of understand.

SMITH: Perhaps. People are generally fairly accessible. There isn't a problem... The problem is more of manpower to do all of this than accessibility. We had, of course, if you went back to the '60s, we had had a larger political section. We had had political officers in all of our consulates. By this time I don't think we had political officers in any of our consulates left. Our consulate in Bombay was a consul general, and there was one political-economic officer, as I recall, and then basically consular. And Madras was similar. So we had very little political work being done in the consulates, except by the consuls general themselves.

Q: How did you find relations with the Foreign Ministry? Was it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

SMITH: Ministry of External Affairs.

Q: Ministry of External Affairs. Did you find that this was sort of the last bastion of the old India that you'd known and loved?

SMITH: Well, certainly, there were people of that kind there, and I had personal relationships with a lot of people in the Foreign Ministry going back for by then more than 15 years, which gave me an ability to call people up and do business on the phone, which I always consider the indicator of efficiency in dealing with the Foreign Ministry, the ability to be able to call up and do your business on the phone. And yes, I was to that point with a lot of people - again, personal relationships going back a long time with some of them. But yes, there were people like that who were in the Foreign Ministry and are still active there.

Q: I'm talking really about a visceral dislike of the United States and its policy, not of Americans. This '88-91 period is very interesting because the death-knell of the Soviet Union came about in this time. It didn't cease until '92, but the Wall came down in '89 and all this happened. How did this affect the Indians? How were they watching, because the Soviet Union had been their partner?

SMITH: I think that you really ought to ask the person who was there next, because I think the impact became much more evident after '91 or late in '91. Clearly the relationship with the Soviet Union had been important for India. It had been important, I would say, in three different areas. One was the Soviets' political support in the Security Council; secondly was the military supply relationship to the Soviet Union; and third was economic. Well, the economic relationship was not important by then. The military supply relationship continued, but the Indians had always wanted to manufacture themselves whenever they could, and of course, that was an opportunity for us to have a relationship that would be different from the traditional relationship we've had with developing countries where we've sold them end-items. In the case of India, this was an opportunity to have... And when I talked about "weaning them away" from the Soviets, you could do that by developing a relationship with them, helping them make their own military equipment so they wouldn't buy from the Soviets. And actually, that was much preferred on their part, so this was something they were already doing, and I think that as a result, the military part

of the relationship with the Soviets had already become less important. But I think psychologically the breakup of the Soviet Union was important for them, and I think they can still count on Russia in the Security Council, probably, for the veto on Kashmir issues if necessary.

Q: What about the Indian Communist Party? Was that important? Where did that stand during this time?

SMITH: Well, the Indian Communist Party, of course, had split, and there were two Communist Party, or more, depending on how you counted, but two main Communist Party - the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India Marxist. That split had occurred in the early 1960s and was a well-established split. The Communists participated in governments or, in one case, ran the government in various parts of India. It was very interesting to watch the Marxists, the CPIM, which was not allied with the Soviet Union, became the government in West Bengal. I don't remember exactly what year it was the government, but it was the government during this period. And they were obviously being corrupted by being in government, because suddenly they were getting interested in foreign investment and efficiency of government and various other things that we would say would be good. And of course, the CPIM and politicians in West Bengal in general, you often find if you look at the politicians that they are London-trained barristers; and that was true in the case of some of the CPIM also, I believe. The CPI, the pro-Moscow Communists, could always be relied on to be very critical of the United States.

Q: Did we have much contact with them?

SMITH: Oh, we used to go see them, talk to them. I can remember one time - and again, I don't remember whether this was in '84 or '88-89, I went around and called on the head of the CPIM. In fact, he was a historic figure. He'd been blowing up trains in India in the 1940s - you know, a real historic figure - and we sort of heard indirectly from their intelligence people that a few weeks later he said, "What was Grant Smith going over to CPIM headquarters for?" I'd done it very openly, intentionally, because he was a *fascinating* person to talk to. And when they had the government in West Bengal, our consul general in West Bengal talked to them. In fact, we had quite an interest in maintaining a dialogue with them. The CPI was a little bit more difficult, but yes, we talked to them.

Q: We've talked before about it, but during this time, the Tamil business, in dealing with sort of the ethnic groups in India in this period?

SMITH: Well, you had had by now the Congress Party was weak in all of the south, and you had state parties in leadership positions or coalition leadership positions in all of the states of the south. And in some of the states you'd have two state parties vying, Tamil Nadu being an example. But this was true in all of the states of the south, that the state-based, linguistically-based parties had become very significant. And that's part of the change in India that's taken place - the decline of the Congress Party, the increasing strength of these state-based parties in the south, the increase of the strength of really caste-based parties in the north. So it's quite different from the post-Independence period, when Congress was totally dominant. And there has been a steady erosion of Congress power.

Q: Sort of an overall question - we were helping militarily, and of course there's always the Pakistan-Indian issue, but was there any concern on our part about a movement for a greater India? I mean, India was always talking about exerting its influence in the Indian Ocean and all. Were we concerned, looking down the pike, India might become a real problem to us in Southeast Asia or South Asia?

SMITH: I don't think the U.S. government as a whole was, but when you asked questions like that, you often had to ask, well, who is we and who is they? I think the U.S. Navy may have been somewhat concerned, and certainly perhaps groups in India were more active in these areas than others. However, in the last interview, we talked about India and Sri Lanka, and I don't remember all the details or the dates, but India had brokered this agreement in 1987, which we thought could lead to an end of the Sri Lanka problem. In fact, it led to an Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, and Indian military force in Sri Lanka.

Q: When did they go in?

SMITH: I don't remember the exact dates.

Q: But I mean, which watch were you on? Were you on the Desk or were you-

SMITH: I don't remember whether it was late '87 or in '88. I don't remember the exact time, but what happened was that they got very badly burned. Sri Lanka was India's Vietnam, many people say. And you could talk to Indian officers coming back from Sri Lanka who were really in a state of shock - as we might have found some coming back from Vietnam - over going up to little old ladies who would blow up and blow them up, suicide bombers. So they went into Sri Lanka, they brokered the agreement thinking that... Rajiv was very full of himself, thinking that he could persuade the militants to abide by this agreement. That didn't work, and they went in with their military force to deal with the militants, and that didn't work either. And then they ultimately withdrew. That was, in a sense, they were probably less likely to try this kind of adventure in the future, even if they were building up their naval forces and their ability. And they do talk about force projection ability. But after Sri Lanka, the incentive for this kind of thing was somewhat less in India, I think.

Q: Was there any particular concern at this time about events in Burma, Indonesia, or any of those places?

SMITH: Not particularly.

Q: I mean the Indian concern. Were they talking about meddling?

SMITH: No, no, no. Their focus is Pakistan, China, the immediate area - Afghanistan - because this was the period where you had the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the fighting between the factions, the fall of Najib, and the fighting between the factions. Actually, there were differences of opinion within the Indian government about what was going to happen in Afghanistan, one group saying Najib would survive, another group saying he wouldn't survive.

Of course they saw Afghanistan through the Pakistan prism, not through the Russian prism, as we did. The events that involved us with India that you may have heard - if you've interviewed Bill Clark, you've probably heard about this-

Q: Tom Stern interviewed him.

SMITH: - the Iran-Iraq War and the Indian position on the Iran-Iraq War, because for one thing, governments changed in India during this period so it made it very complicated, but India had a relationship with Iraq, as part of the nonaligned relationship. It had an economic and possibly some military relationship with Iraq - I forget the details. It had a large Indian community in the Gulf, so it had a concern there, an involvement. I remember that shortly after the invasion of Kuwait and before Desert Storm, the Indian foreign minister went off to Iraq and made some statements that were pretty bad as far as we were concerned. But in fact, when we went to them to try and move some supplies thorough India, some flights thorough India, we did get permission, and we were able to move a fair amount through India. So their position was - and it varied depending on which government was in power, as I said, governments change - but we were able to get their cooperation to a fair extent on transiting supplies, landing in India and going on.

Q: When did you leave in '91?

SMITH: The summer of '91, July probably.

LAWRENCE COHEN
Political/Economic Consul
Madras (1989-1991)

Mr. Cohen was born and raised in Pennsylvania and was educated at Dickinson College, and the Universities of Pennsylvania, Tel Aviv, Chicago and Northwestern. Entering the Foreign Service in 1980, he served variously as Economic, Political and Political/Military Officer at posts in Mexico, Honduras, India, Hungary, Nigeria and Brazil. In his assignments at the State Department in Washington Mr. Cohen dealt with Foreign Assistance and Environmental and Scientific matters. His last post was in Afghanistan, where he had two assignments with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Mr. Cohen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Where did you go?

COHEN: I received an assignment as the political/economic consul in Madras, India.

India was far afield from Latin America. We departed in mid-January 1989. Our daughter Rebecca was fourteen months old. Lulu was four months pregnant. We arrived in India on January 19, a couple days before the inauguration of George H.W. Bush.

Q: Madras. Where does Madras fit into the Indian complex?

COHEN: Today, Madras is called Chennai. To those of us who served there, it will always remain Madras.

Madras was one of four U.S. posts in India; Calcutta, Bombay and the capital New Delhi were the other three. Consulate General Madras had a staff of about sixteen Americans and plenty of local staff. More than four million people resided in Madras, a typical teeming South Asian city. Four South Indian states made up our consular district: Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. Over 200 million people, perhaps 250 million, lived in southern India. Each of the four states had its own language, its own script. Madras was located in Tamil Nadu. It was notorious as India's "anti-Hindi language" state. The place possessed a colorful political history and outlandish politicians. Characters from Madras' cinema industry including script writers, actors, and actresses, rose to the highest level of state politics.

In Madras, we immediately moved into permanent quarters. The property was called "Marine House." Years earlier, the USG actually had Marines assigned to the consulate. Our house was just two blocks from the consulate. I walked every morning, half a block on Kodambakkam High Road, then turned right on Nungambakkam High Road. I passed underneath Gemini Flyover, one of Madras' most noteworthy highway features. The consulate was next to the flyover. My daily walk was two blocks, but I described it as seven centuries!

Our house was remarkable. It was huge. I estimated it was at least 5,000 square feet. After we had been living in the house for two weeks, I discovered another bathroom!

As I said, we had one small child and another on the way. We had to decide early on whether to have the delivery in India or in the States. Until perhaps 1987, the medical unit at the embassy in New Delhi was quite capable of delivering babies. It had a delivery room. But the practice ended due, we were told, to neo-natal care issues. I assume liability concerns were paramount. We investigated the possibility of having the child delivered in a local Madras clinic. Visits to the local health care facilities dissuaded us. About six weeks before the due date, Lulu and Rebecca returned to the U.S. They took up residence in the State Plaza Hotel, across the street from the State Department. Andrew was born in Fairfax Hospital, the same location as Rebecca. I got back from India about five hours too late on June 16. Andrew was born when I was somewhere over Labrador. We stayed in the hotel for three weeks then returned to Madras via Pan Am. Andrew was pretty young to have flown halfway across the world!

Our Madras lifestyle was very laidback. We enjoyed numerous friendships, both among ex-pats and Indians. We associated with the other consulate Americans less frequently. With a few exceptions, most of our close friends were outside the American community.

Madras is on the southeast coast of India on the Bay of Bengal. An hour drive south of the city, a nice resort called Fisherman's Cove was a popular weekend destination. A resort hotel located on the beach was the perfect atmosphere for an afternoon gathering. The Madras Club was straight out of the British Raj. Although Lulu and I were not formal members, we spent many

evenings there. Other consulate Americans lived in U.S.-owned property next to the club.

When we lived in Washington, I had been introduced to soccer. On Monday afternoons at 5:15, about eight or ten ex-pats got together for games on a dirt field. Each Monday, I tried to rush out of the consulate to get to the game. I literally changed my clothes as I am drove to the pitch. The players included a couple of Brits from the Deputy High Commission, Germans, and a Dane or two. We usually played against local Tamil kids about half our size but twice as quick. They ran circles around us at midfield. But our size dominated the corners and we usually won the headers. We probably lost more games than we won, but it was tremendous fun.

We played occasional soccer games against the Russians. The Soviet Union had a large, insular consulate in Madras. It fielded a team with uniforms. On those occasions when we played them, the Russians came out to the pitch *en mass* by consulate bus. Families usually accompanied. It was all quite regimented and very organized. I do not remember that our wives ever attended, but theirs certainly did. Nor can I recollect when we competed against the Russians any game ending in a score other than a tie. Either we were fairly balanced, or some mysterious political equilibrium had been imposed on us by the Hindu gods!

Q: When I think of Madras, I think of eating an awful lot of vegetarian food, very hot and rich.

COHEN: Quite. Southern India is overwhelmingly vegetarian. Our Lilliputian consulate commissary obtained frozen ground beef from a butcher in Bangalore. We could not buy meat locally. I'm certain the butcher in Bangalore was Muslim. I never developed a taste for Madras cuisine.

On the other hand, I loved Indian food from elsewhere. India's hottest food is served in Andhra Pradesh. Even Indians agree, and they agree on little else, that if you want hot food, go to Hyderabad. I love hot, spicy food. I went to Hyderabad. I ate the Andhra food and concede it was hot, incredibly hot! Absolutely the hottest food I have eaten anywhere on the planet.

Q: I think during the Cold War, particularly early in the Cold War, Kerala was on the front pages all the time of being the red core of India.

COHEN: Kerala was on the southwest coast of India, the Malabar Coast. In 1957 Kerala became the first state in the world to freely elect a communist government. The Communist Party of India (CPI) victory was the first time an opposition party won an Indian state. Later the CPI split and a Marxist party, the CPI(M), was formed.

Kerala is a unique Indian state. The population is almost 100 percent literate. Its rate of population growth is significantly lower, by far, than for any other Indian state. This demonstrates the connection between education and a lower birthrate. Kerala implemented a population policy that was beyond what other Indian states ever attempted. It reduced population growth towards sustainable levels. Compare Kerala to Uttar Pradesh or Bihar where the population growth rates continue to be unsustainable. Kerala is densely populated and tropical. Many, perhaps most, Indians who work in the Persian Gulf come from Kerala. When the first Gulf War hit in the summer of 1990, thousands of Keralans were stranded in the Gulf.

The ancient and exotic town of Cochin, in Kerala was my favorite Indian location. It held special meaning for me. Cochin's tiny Jewish community claimed its roots went back to King Solomon, approximately 3000 years ago. The community described itself as either white – descendants perhaps of the original Jews from the biblical period and later immigrants from the Middle East – or black – those natives who had become Jews over the centuries. Most lived in an ancient neighborhood in Old Cochin called Jew Town. In 1947 there were over two thousand Jews in Cochin. When we visited in 1989, there were under one hundred. Most had already immigrated to Israel. The Paradesi (literally, “foreigners”) synagogue built in 1568 was a true jewel. On the roof was a clock tower with Hebrew letters. The floor consisted of beautiful eighteenth century Chinese tiles. Everyone had to walk barefoot in the synagogue. A tablet on the outside wall dated from an earlier synagogue from the fourteenth century. In 1990 Lulu and I were invited by Mr. Koder, the community patriarch, for Simhat Torah, the most joyous holiday for the Cochin Jews. A year earlier, I was there for Yom Kippur. Sadly, the Jewish community of Cochin now essentially belongs to history.

Across the lagoon from Cochin is the more modern town of Ernakulam. Small islands dotted the lagoon. Fishermen dried their nets on the beach. We took a small boat around the inland waters.

I also will describe Bangalore, another fascinating place.

Q: Bangalore had not yet turned into the information technology capital of the world.

COHEN: To call Bangalore the IT capital of the world is a slight exaggeration, but it is not far-fetched. In the late 1980s, the information technology revolution was in its nascent stages. Bangalore's IT industry grew from internal and external factors. The Indian Institute of Technology, situated in Bangalore, is India's MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Cal Tech (California Institute of Technology) rolled into one. Other local Indian schools produced high quality engineers and technicians. The workforce was fluent in English and labored at Indian wage scales. For the subcontinent, Bangalore enjoyed a moderate climate. Its elevation was perhaps 3,000, 3,500 feet. Bangalore displayed traits from its British Raj tradition: libraries, restaurants, cultural centers, etc. These factors inspired foreign companies to extend operations to India. At the time, India did not possess a welcoming environment for foreign investment. Commercial investment in India took some guts.

Texas Instruments (TI) was one of the first companies to open a facility in Bangalore. The operation was designed to take advantage of the time difference between India and the U.S. At the end of the workday in Austin, Texas, TI transmitted data telephonically by satellite to Bangalore for processing. The Indian operation downloaded the information, processed it, and retransmitted it back to Texas in time for opening of business there the next day. TI technicians left the office with unprocessed computer program code, came to work with the finished data waiting on their desks. This was the Texas Instruments concept. I cannot say for certain if TI was first. As telecommunications improved, the work became a twenty-four/seven operation. Today, India has multitudes of twenty-four hour call centers. Try getting computer assistance today without speaking with India! Even in 1990, it was clear that these companies were on to something.

Q: Did you feel, particularly with your economic background, that India really had to do something about its protectionist policies?

COHEN: Indian economic and trade policies repressed capitalism and discouraged investment. Government policies inhibited the flow of FDI (foreign direct investment.) For example, the transportation sector had not modernized. Indian streets continued to be clogged with “Ambassador” automobiles. The Ambassador was a British-designed Morris Minor, circa 1957, made by Hindustan Motors. The Ambassador car was shaped like a box, with a large chrome grill and deep fender wells, round headlights, and the old fashion door handles straight out of the early 1950s. The interior dome light switch was a house switch. In 1990, it had not been updated.

Q: An upside down bathtub.

COHEN: Exactly, but not as handsome. In the 1950s the manufacturing factory had been relocated from England when the car was no longer in production to India. No updates had been made to the chassis, the body, or the engine. For four decades Hindustan Motors mass produced these vehicles unchanged. A ride in an Ambassador was time travel. A close analogy in my travel experience was flying in a Honduran DC-3 from La Ceiba to the Caribbean island of Roatan.

At the time, another automobile was just coming on stream in India. The Maruti was a Japanese vehicle made by the Suzuki Corporation, similar to a small Toyota Celica. When you observed Marutis and Ambassadors together, the dichotomy was dramatic. Today, I believe over half of India’s passenger vehicle fleet is made up of Maruti-Suzuki autos.

Then there was India’s banking system. The banking system had changed minimally from, say, the time of David Copperfield. This was before the era of electronic banking. Modernity had little place in an Indian bureaucrat’s or a banker’s office. On every desk it seemed ubiquitous piles of documents tied with red ribbons or pinned to keep the pages together gathered dust.

Q: You always think of folders tied up in knots piled high on desks, with coolies running back and forth carrying tea.

COHEN: That’s right. That was the bureaucracy – managed by the Indian Civil Service (ICS). I met with members of the Indian Civil Service, a talented and savvy lot. The Indian civil servants with whom I dealt were highly educated and competent. Competition to enter India’s civil service was severe. Only the best, and I assume well connected, made it into the ICS. I sensed, however, that most of my interlocutors failed to appreciate the preposterousness of the bureaucracy for which they labored, these gross systemic inefficiencies. These were the days before desktop computers. But when it came to information management, the United States was light years ahead of India. India’s bureaucratic system kept the nation looking backwards.

India’s power sector exemplified gross inefficiency. State electricity boards delivered electricity almost free to farmers. The nominal charge was, if I remember, under a penny per kilowatt hour. Of course, there were no meters. For pumping water to the fields, electricity was critical for

Indian agriculture. While there was a political rationale and logic to assist poor villagers, there was no incentive to conserve power usage. Farmers pumped away to their hearts' content. Throughout the country, millions of pumps in half a million villages consumed enormous power, an enormous drain on India's fragile electricity grid. And the grid constantly went down.

If farmers were not paying for electricity, then who was? India's power generation was heavily subsidized. India desperately needed investment in the power sector. But who would invest in a sector where so much production was given away? Without a stable power supply, how could India attract investment into other economic sectors? Without industrialization, where were the new jobs for the children of the farmers? It was a snowball effect. Many Indians recognized a problem existed. India had a tough time getting over that hurdle.

A few months after we departed post, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on May 21, 1991. After his death, India's fundamental economic policies changed radically.

Q: Speaking of the assassination, it was tied to the Tamil situation there. During your time what was the Tamil situation?

COHEN: India served as haven for thousands of Tamil refugees. The Tamils in Tamil Nadu state shared a common ethnicity and bond with their kin across the Palk Straits. There was local sympathy and support for Tamil refugees who were living in camps throughout the state. I occasionally met local Tamil leaders who spoke on behalf of Tamils in Sri Lanka. I do not recollect specifically meeting representatives of Prabhakaran's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers). Not a few people in Madras were affiliated with the Tamil Tigers. However, there was no overwhelming local support for Prabhakaran's brutal methods.

During the late 1980s the Indian military had a presence in Sri Lanka. The IPKF, the Indian Peace Keeping Force, introduced in 1987 under the terms of a peace accord between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government, had a challenging assignment. Some equated the IPKF's supposed debacle in Sri Lanka to Vietnam. That was a tremendous exaggeration. The Indian Government was smart enough not to let the situation slip completely out of its hands. The Indian military remained careful about its role in Sri Lanka. With the election of the V.P. Singh government in 1989, the troops were gradually pulled out. The last soldiers left in March 1990.

The Indian navy was quite active in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian Government held high aspirations for its navy which it hoped would truly become a blue water extension of India's regional power. I was reminded on occasion that the body of water was referred to as the "Indian Ocean."

Tamil Nadu faced enough problems on its own and most civilians were not compulsive about events in Sri Lanka. The refugees living in the camps were not in great shape. However, refugee camps elsewhere on the planet were in worse condition.

Q: What were you doing at the consulate general? What was our main concern other than reporting?

COHEN: I was consul for political and economic affairs. Indians take democracy seriously. I met constantly with provincial politicians. Elections, it seemed, were occurring every month somewhere in our consular district! The election process never ended. The country's electoral politics were uniquely colorful -- somewhat raw but absolutely vibrant.

With the invaluable efforts of the consulate's foreign service nationals (FSNs): K. Prabhakaram Nair, C.S. Madhava Rao, R. Natarajan, and Lalitha Natraj, I covered south Indian political economic and social issues. Earlier I mentioned Kerala's population policy. The nuclear sector drew my attention. India's counterpart to Cape Canaveral, Sriharikota, is located in Andhra Pradesh just north of Madras. I reported on the nuclear power generating plant at Kalpakkam, south of Madras, and not far from the temples at Mahaballapuram. I reported on India's industrialization and its manufacturing sector, for example, the Vizag Steel mill in Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. In coordination with the Foreign Commercial Service staff, I addressed commercial issues in Bangalore and other cities. For about six months, I headed the commercial section.

The Tamil situation, the refugees, the Indian navy's quest to establish a blue water presence in the Indian Ocean, the occasional visitors who came to Madras -- I had plenty to do.

I sensed our performance in Madras was somewhat underappreciated. On one trip to the embassy in New Delhi, I noticed a new group meritorious honor award for the political section. The citation cited the outstanding embassy reporting during a recent national election. I was taken aback. Embassy policy required the consulates to feed all their election reporting to the embassy. The political section essentially regurgitated the consulate insight to the Department. We could not send our election reporting directly to Washington. Reading the award on the wall of the political section, I resented that the section recognized itself with such an award but neglected the three consulates which fed it much of the information. Madras' four FSNs had worked diligently on election reporting. "How can you award yourselves a meritorious honor award and not recognize the work of the consulates?" I asked. Soon, we got the same award for the consulate staff.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

COHEN: John R. Hubbard, a political appointee. Ambassador Hubbard was a Texan who had been President of the University of Southern California. The political counselor was George Sherman.

Q: Who was the consul general?

COHEN: Early in my tour it was Tom Timmerman. He was succeeded by Ernestine (Ernie) Heck, wife of former Ambassador Doug Heck. At the time Ambassador Heck was an invalid with Parkinson's. He lived at the consul general's residence with constant medical care. We never saw him, he never emerged from the residence, and I am certain it was very tough on Ernie. At least she was a competent consul general. Timmerman was not as effective.

India was a combination of all the best things you would want in a Foreign Service career.

Q: Did you feel any reflection of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989? The Soviets had been the big ally of India and all of a sudden, it was gone. Were you there at the beginning of the Gulf War?

COHEN: Yes and yes. We were distant from events going on in Europe and the fall of communism. On the other hand, we enjoyed a front row seat for how those events affected India. I will mention our relations with the Russians in Madras. As I mentioned, the Russians had a large consulate, much larger than ours. We had some, albeit limited, social intercourse with them. After the fall of the Wall, one Russian diplomat in particular who was part of their intelligence service, played up the “friendship” part. He said he had served in the United States; that was believable since he spoke impeccably unaccented American English. He became our so-called “friend,” “There were no real winners or losers in the Cold War,” he argued. Both sides were winners, etcetera. Perhaps that was the perception that the Russians wanted to foster.

Among the Indians, the collapse of communism did not play dramatically. True, India had been a long time Soviet ally. But there was never an ideological bond, except for the communist parties. However, communism in India, the active Marxist parties in our consular district, did not seem dramatically affected by the fall of the Wall.

Q: Okay. The Gulf War started in August of 1990.

COHEN: Yes. The Persian Gulf was much closer to our playing field than Berlin. The weekend before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the last Saturday night in July, we attended a big social event at the Madras Club. At least a hundred fifty people were there. The ubiquitous raffle took place in the large hall. Lulu and I were sitting outside with friends on the lawn, not paying attention to what was going on inside. We heard this commotion. Someone came out and told me I won the grand prize. “What are you talking about?” “Your name was pulled from the raffle, you won the raffle prize.” I went inside to collect it. At this point I still did not know what the raffle prize was.

Q: Probably a trip to Kuwait or something.

COHEN: Good guess. I went inside. Everyone is staring at me. I collected a club class roundtrip ticket on British Airways from Madras to London via Kuwait. Less than 48 hours later Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. One of the first acts of his invasion, of course, was to detain a British Airways jetliner which was transiting Kuwait. It was the London-Madras-Kuala Lumpur flight, the flight on which I had just won a seat!

The Iraqis held the hostages for months. I do not remember the duration. We were monitoring events in the Middle East from the consulate. We watched CNN in the consulate auditorium. CNN was still a new medium for news. The network showed video clips of the passengers who were on that flight. They had been moved to Baghdad to serve, allegedly, as human shields. Many faces of Madras residents were familiar to people watching in the audience. Someone would call out, “Oh, there is so-and-so, oh, there is so-and-so.”

After some time, it was obvious the situation was not going to be resolved quickly. I visited the British Airways office with my raffle prize letter. I asked if I could exchange the ticket. No problem. I turned in my one club class ticket to London for two club class tickets Madras-Kuala Lumpur. Lulu and I traveled to Malaysia for vacation.

From a substantive point of view, Southern Indians focused on the thousands of Indian workers who were stranded in Kuwait and throughout the Gulf.

Q: Everything that happens in India is sort of regional. Were the workers essentially from your part of India?

COHEN: The majority came from the state of Kerala, on India's southwest, Malabar Coast. I explained earlier that Keralans tend to be more highly educated and sophisticated than other Indians. Many thousands migrated to the Persian Gulf and became laborers. I am sure many stranded workers were from Bombay, Maharashtra, etc. But Kerala was overwhelmingly the home for most. The Indian Government mounted a massive relief effort to bring back the stranded workers.

I was responsible for reporting the situation in Kerala. Initially, the Gulf War perspective focused on the repatriation of these people. Most were successfully repatriated back to India. In Kerala, a potential human catastrophe was averted. However, the economic consequences from the lost Gulf worker remittances were severe.

Q: Did you have much of an Islamic presence in your area?

COHEN: We did. Obviously, Saddam Hussein and Iraq is a part of the Arab world. One Muslim country attacked another Muslim country. There was no love lost, among Indians, for Saddam Hussein. Initially, there was a slight Islamic tilt to the news. Andhra Pradesh contains a large Muslim minority population. Its capital, Hyderabad, is largely Muslim. The other states, including Karnataka and Kerala, had significant Muslim minorities. To my recollection, there were no major domestic problems with regards to those populations. South India was relatively tolerant towards Muslims

Q: How about the media? Did they take any particular fix on this war?

COHEN: The Indian media is very buoyant, often outrageous and consistently outspoken. The media pushed the GOI for repatriation of the stranded workers in the Persian Gulf. During the crisis their criticism of the United States was relatively muted. This occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Cold War had almost ceased to exist by this point. U.S. support for Pakistan dissipated with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. Anti-Americanism in India was pretty much at low ebb.

Q: Did you find that the Indian people got involved as so many did in the United States and elsewhere with CNN, watching the war.

COHEN: Southern India in 1990 did not have an extensive information network beyond state run

television and the written press. CNN was not easily accessible, except perhaps in the fancier hotels. Satellite dishes were non-existent. There was no cable system at the time. The consulate had a fax machine but the faxes generally were poor quality. Sending or receiving a fax was an ordeal and the copy often unreadable. The consulate did have access to the USIS international television service, called WorldNet. CNN was a new medium. At our residences, forget it. Each residence had a phone, a heavy black box with an earpiece the size of a tennis ball. To call the states or anywhere beyond Madras, the caller reserved a call hours in advance. To book a call, I contacted the operator and provided the number in the United States. Even the operator sounded like she was on the moon. The operator informed us when the call back could be expected, usually a few hours. For this wonderful service, long distance phone charges were incredibly steep, something like \$6 a minute to the U.S. This was in 1990! India did not have telecom deregulation.

India's print media was a different story. India's vibrant press, both in the vernacular and English, covered the war widely. Thus, much of our international news came from Indian newspapers. The International Herald Tribune arrived almost a week late; Newsweek magazine came irregularly. We were near the end of the information chain, or so it seemed.

Q: Was there anything particularly threatening to the consulate during the Gulf War?

COHEN: There were two parts to the Gulf War: Desert Shield and then Desert Storm.

Q: Desert Shield being the buildup to Desert Storm.

COHEN: Correct. On January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Storm was launched, the actual attack then invasion of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait. We departed India in February. During Desert Shield, security was beefed up slightly at the consulate. From a physical security standpoint, the consulate is not very defensible. Although the consulate sits within a large compound with a wall around it, there is no setback from Gemini flyover, one of Madras's busiest traffic areas. There was little protection from serious demonstrations. Only very small, minor demonstrations took place.

Q: Were you all given instructions to go out and explain what we were doing and why we were doing it?

COHEN: That was part of my job. I spoke with Indian audiences, generally on topics not necessarily related to the Gulf War. But the situation in the Persian Gulf always came up. I delivered talks to Rotary clubs, often on trade issues. I answered questions about U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. With Indian audiences, I kept the dialogue low key. Just below the surface, many Indians possessed resentment against us. Perhaps it was the residual of so many years of India's anti-U.S. foreign policy following perceived U.S. favoritism for Pakistan. A preaching American diplomat was not how I wanted to be portrayed.

Q: As I recall the Indians played a more positive role than would appear on the surface.

COHEN: Absolutely. The GOI allowed military over-flights, provided clearance to U.S. support

missions. India also has a significant navy -

Q: Quite a significant navy.

COHEN: For the region yes. As I said, India aspired to create a real blue water navy, one that would extend India's reach from Africa to Australia, and perhaps beyond. They have had mixed success. But Indians liked to remind people that the body of water nearby was called the "Indian Ocean." Our operating base out of Diego Garcia, south of the Indian sub-continent, and our nearby fleets including additional aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf rubbed Indian sensitivities the wrong way. I was not involved in this, but I recollect that the Indian and U.S. navies collaborated fairly well during the Gulf War.

Q: Regarding trade, I am not sure if we covered this before but one of the problems that existed with India for a very long was India's protected trade environment.

COHEN: I was stationed in India just before the liberalization of the economy. At that time, a keen observer may have sensed that the impetus for liberalizing the economy had reached a crossroads. The country was moving slowly, but undeniable momentum was starting to build. Think of a roller coaster as it reaches the crest moments before the rapid ride down. Three months after we left, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. Under Gandhi, India had almost reached the crest of the roller coaster. Under his successors, that roller coaster accelerated down swiftly.

Q: We are talking the roller coaster being -

COHEN: Economic reform, trade liberalization, the opening of the country to foreign direct investment. India exhibited many contradictions that could not really be easily rectified. As I mentioned banking was stuck in the 19th century. Auto manufacturing could not get past the 1950s. The antipathy to foreign investment hurt no one more than the Indian people. These self-inflicted wounds could not last forever. Primitive technologies were being utilized next to cutting edge technologies. A huge uneducated mass of humanity co-existed with a few of the world's best institutes of technology and science. Parts of the economy were ready to take off; other parts were hardly removed from antiquity. It could not last; something had to give.

Q: One thinks of Indian villages and the sacred cows wandering around. What was your feeling how was this going to come out?

COHEN: As a diplomat, one usually does not have opportunities to speak to a very broad population. A diplomat generally communicates with the elites, contacts, journalists, politicians, businessmen. The folks with whom I spoke were already on that roller coaster. Many were cognizant that India needed to get on the roller coaster glide path or suffer. China at this time was already perking forward in impressive fashion. Foreign investment was starting to flow to China but not to India. I talked about trade and about the GATT -

Q: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

COHEN: I spoke about trade liberalization and opening India's economy. The country had great

potential to utilize foreign direct investment. India did not have to depend solely on self-generated capital and resources. Massive foreign investment would come to India if the building blocks were in place. The first sector to address was telecommunications. This was before the cell phone era, but potential existed in satellite telecommunications. Eventually, other sectors such as banking and finance attracted investment. Suzuki began to manufacture Maruti automobiles which were increasingly common. A few years later, everything had changed in India. The country had reached takeoff.

Q: You left about four months before Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. This was by a Tamil who blew himself up. It happened in your consulate district.

COHEN: It happened thirty kilometers from Madras. It was a suicide bomber from the LTTE. Given India's role in Sri Lankan peacekeeping, the threat of Tamil extremism directed against the government had been obvious. Perhaps, it was not taken seriously enough, because the problems in Sri Lanka had already been going on a long time.

Q: Sri Lanka.

COHEN: The Indian Government was extensively engaged there, but not in a heavy-handed manner. Moreover, Tamils from Sri Lanka, outside refugee camps, tended to enjoy free reign in Tamil Nadu. Despite the attacks on Indian soldiers in the IPKF, the Tamil Tigers and their sympathizers were not hunted down or persecuted in India. They operated quite freely in southern India for a long time. A Tamil Tiger attack on the Indian Government of such magnitude is an example of biting the hand that feeds you. But there was nothing logical about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which later denied involvement in the killing.

When I first heard about the assassination, I was already at my next post. Initially, I did not believe it was a Tamil Tiger attack. It was so obvious as to be counterintuitive. Although the LTTE had enjoyed the largesse of the Indian government, it was perfectly capable of such an attack.

Q: Did you from accounts and personal contact get any feel that this was a renegade outfit?

COHEN: I do not know. These guys were thugs. I sensed the LTTE was a very cohesive group. Prabhakaran, the Tamil Tiger chief, seemed to have a fairly tight hold on operations. On the other hand, there were disparate groups. Communications were not easy amongst these groups; there were no cell phones. I doubt they used radios that the Indians could monitor. It was possible that groups out there had their own agendas. I was surprised by the assassination. In hindsight, I should not have been.

Tamil Nadu, on the southeast corner of India, has always been a very self-centered region. Tamil, I understand, is the oldest language on the Indian subcontinent. It is one of the world's oldest continually spoken languages. South Indian civilization, Dravidian India, is quite different from that in the Mogul north. Southern India was never conquered by the Moguls, had never come under Muslim domination. It was old Hindu, a traditionally religious part of the country with many ornate temples. The Tamils were viscerally anti-Hindi. Tamil Nadu was arguably the most

“anti-center” of all Indian states. The anti-Hindi movement contributed to great usage of English among Tamils who insisted on learning English rather than Hindi. There was broader literacy in English than in Hindi. New Delhi promoted Hindi as the national unifying language. Yet, I do not remember much Hindi programming in Madras. It was never written on signs. If not Tamil, signs were exclusively in English. Politicians in Tamil Nadu used Tamil ethnic identity to promote their own ends.

Q: Did you find in your consular district an important role for religion?

COHEN: The Muslim population was *relatively* small, although in Indian standards, relatively small means only tens of millions versus hundreds of millions. There were significant Muslim pockets throughout the consular district, especially Hyderabad. Hinduism and Hindu culture was more than just a religion; it was the fabric of society woven together and impossible to differentiate. I cannot identify where religion began and other parts of society ended.

Parts of the district possessed especially heightened Hindu identity. We witnessed the growth of very nationalistic Hindu political parties, such as the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) or the most radical of the groupings, the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh). The RSS was somewhat like the John Birch Society, the LaRouches of the Hindi identify movement.

Q: Sort of an extreme right wing party.

COHEN: Very extreme. The BJP was more main stream than the RSS party but still quite intolerant towards Muslims. For years, they fed off the crumbs from the Congress Party’s table. Eventually, in 1989, the BJP won a national election. The RSS was the extreme right.

Another Hindu-Muslim event was playing out, the controversy over a mosque in northern India at Ayodhya. Although not in our consular district, Ayodhya nonetheless had become a huge issue throughout India. Ayodhya was considered the birthplace of the Hindu God Shri Ram. Four centuries earlier, the Hindu temple at the site had been converted into the Babri mosque by the Emperor Babar. It was not a significant mosque. However, the Hindu zealots played it up. The Hindu population was riled up. The government faced a dilemma. In 1992, the dam broke. A Hindu mob stormed the mosque and destroyed it. That could have catalyzed the beginning of a very bitter, almost 1947-like catastrophe. Fortunately, India dodged the bullet. The Muslim population was not looking for trouble. But that was a close call.

Q: Were you in India at the time?

COHEN: We had left India the year before.

Q: Were you looking at mosque attacks or mobs? Could mobs be generated rather easily?

COHEN: In southern India, Muslim-Hindu tension was less severe. On the contrary, the people with whom I dealt emphasized that south India was relatively tolerant. Much more tolerant, it was obvious, than the Hindi belt where Ayodhya is located. The Hindi belt consists of the northern states, particularly highly populous UP (Uttar Pradesh). Northern India contains the

most impoverished regions of the country. True, ethnic and other tensions existed throughout southern India. In many cases, the divisions had to do with land and water. India enjoys few rivers and is a very crowded country. Land and water disputes, between states, tribes and ethnic groups, produced a constant cauldron of strife.

Q: Just to get a feel for consular operations there; were you keeping book on the religious map, the water map, the land map, the disputes and all?

COHEN: I was responsible for observing, analyzing and reporting on events such as I described. The breadth of the issues consisted of traditional political, economic, and social issues. What, for example, were the implications for instituting actual cost pricing for electricity in rural areas? What would this mean for Indian farmers? As with water, electricity was a very sensitive issue in India. I looked at the region's pollution problems. We observed the early emergence of a perception of India's environmental challenges. I looked at population issues, especially, as I said, in Kerala. These social issues were an important component of my portfolio.

Q: Were there any characters or elections, colorful Indian types, who particularly stand out?

COHEN: There were many. Madras is very much a movie city, the counterpart to Bombay's "Bollywood." It was quite amazing how leading movie actors took over local politics. Of course, this was just after the Reagan Administration. What could we say when it came to movie actors becoming politicians? Yet, the incestuous relationship between movie magnates and actors and control of Tamil political mechanisms was quite amazing. The movie actors who moved into politics made my job truly entertaining.

One major movie figure in Tamil Nadu was an idolized film star named M.G. Ramachandran (MGR). Everyone referred to him as MGR. He headed the AIADMK party, an offshoot of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party founded by Tamil Nadu patriarch C.K. Annadurai. As Chief Minister, MGR became almost a god in Tamil Nadu. That was fitting since in his Madras movie career he played god parts. At MGR's death in December 1987, a year before we arrived, dozens of people reportedly flung themselves on his funeral pyre. His principal rival was Muthuvel Karunanidhi, head of the DMK party since Annadurai's 1969 death and multiple times chief minister of the state. MGR and Karunanidhi had parted company in 1974. Although I never met MGR, I perceived similarities with his rival. In addition to being capable Tamil politicians, the two wore dark sunglasses all the time, no matter how dark the room. Both always wore distinctive hats. The sunglasses and hats lent each a mysterious air and contributed, I am sure, to their popularity among the masses.

After MGR's death in 1989 there was a four-way battle for the governorship of Tamil Nadu. Four candidates sought to fill MGR's throne, so to speak. One candidate was MGR's widow but she was a non-entity. MGR's mercurial mistress, Jayaram Jayalalitha, was more politically savvy, colorful in her own right. She had been an actress and played parts opposite the god character of MGR. She was popular, but at that time she did not yet possess the necessary political machinery behind her. The Congress Party ran a candidate but it was a hopelessly uphill effort for Congress in Tamil Nadu at the time. Congress could not take Tamil Nadu in those years. Karunanidhi who had been chief minister twice before in the 1970s, was formidable. In the four candidate horse

race, Karunanidhi was easily elected chief minister.

Throughout southern India, huge billboards, perhaps 30 feet tall, portrayed profiles of the leading political figures, figuratively larger than life. Wooden billboards were used to advertise movies. Since actors and the politicians were often one and the same, Indians likely saw no incongruity in viewing their movie heroes as politicians. It was no wonder actors became leading political figures. I will add a footnote. Months after the inauguration of President George H.W. Bush in 1989, Consul General Tom Timmerman decided the Consulate would honor the president with his own movie board! It was commissioned and placed on the consulate grounds overlooking Gemini Flyover which, as I mentioned, was one of Madras' busiest thoroughfares. Imagine a pallid, five times larger than life, George Bush (senior) looking over the city's minions. I thought the entire episode overly pretentious. The board was moved to the CG's residence, in time for July 4th.

I believe that before politics, Karunanidhi had been a movie scriptwriter. Karunanidhi was, and still is a fascinating character. He again won the chief ministership in May 2006, at age eighty-two! His own personal history remains inexorably linked with Tamil identity. While all powerful in Tamil Nadu for two generations, Karunanidhi, in my view, was never a major influence on the national scene. During my period in Madras, he was grooming his youngest son, M.K. Stalin, to be his political heir. Who names a child Stalin? I guess M.K.'s birth, coinciding almost to the day that the Soviet dictator died in 1953, was seen as portentous. Although Stalin was elected to the legislative assembly and served a term as Madras mayor, I doubt he possesses a fraction of the old man's political capability. So it goes. However, he was, and I assume still is very cunning, Mafioso-type figure. I disliked him.

Later, Jayalalitha, MGR's heir to the AIADMK mantle, succeeded in building her political base. She was manipulative and exploitative. I met her privately in her home where she turned on her political charms. After we departed post in 1991 she defeated Karunanidhi and became Tamil Nadu chief minister. For the next decade and a half, she and Karunanidhi vied back and forth, one defeating the other, as chief minister. The pattern was identical. Each charged the other with corruption. The charges never stuck longer than an election cycle. When Karunanidhi won back the chief minister job in 2006, Jayalalitha was the loser.

In neighboring Andhra Pradesh, there was another colorful figure from the silver screen. N.T. Rama Rao also had played god figures. I suspect he still thought he was a Hindu deity. He wore saffron robes all the time, make-up, and exploited his god-like movie demeanor incessantly. The people of Andhra Pradesh ate it up. But N.T. Rama Rao was not very competent and never gained much traction politically outside his state.

WILLIAM CLARK, JR.
Ambassador
India (1989-1992)

Ambassador William Clark, Jr. was born in California in 1930. He received a bachelor's degree from San Jose State College in 1955. He served in the U.S. Navy intermittently from 1949 to 1953. In 1957, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Sierra Leone, Japan, Korea, and Egypt, and an ambassadorship to India. This interview was conducted by Thomas Stern in 1994.

Q: In 1989, you were appointed as US Ambassador to India. How did that come about?

CLARK: It was one of those interesting events in one's career. When the Bush administration came to power, it had some difficulty finding a suitable candidate for the Assistant Secretary for EA position. For a variety of reasons, Gaston Sigur had decided that he wanted to leave before Bush's February trip to Japan. So he resigned, leaving me as acting Assistant Secretary -- a situation that lasted until June 1989. In that first half of that year, we faced the Tiananmen Square episode and we went through a successful fight with Congress on the FSX program with Japan.

We handled Tiananmen about as well as it could be given all the circumstances. It occurred on June 3, 1989 which was a Friday night here and spilled over into Saturday. When we got the news, we put a task force together and wrote some talking points for the President. In a rare occasion, Bush used the talking points almost *verbatim*. He struck the right tone. Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was the titular head of the task force, but the day-to-day management was left to me.

On the FSX issue, I already mentioned my frequent Congressional appearances. I believe I appeared before 18 committees and subcommittees and held innumerable meetings with members of Congress and their staffs. In the final analysis, our proposal was approved by one vote in the Senate. The FSX program called for a transfer of American technology to Japan to help the Japanese to build their own fighter aircraft. This program was started when the Japanese came to us and told us that they were planning to develop their own next generation of fighter aircraft. Washington didn't take much time before it told us in the Embassy -- this happened while I was the DCM -- to inform the Japanese that their idea was not a very good one, but if they were interested in developing their own plane, they should base it on an FS-16 frame. That would permit us to stay involved. A big debate ensued because there were many American firms that were ready to sell their equipment to the Japanese which could have been hung on the frame. I am referring to such items as avionics. The whole discussion didn't get very far while I was in Tokyo. I picked up the issue when I became the senior DAS in EA. Then I had to tell firms that most their offers would be rejected. Finally, we and the Japanese signed all the necessary agreements which called for the transfer of some US technology particularly on materials, in exchange for primarily production technology from Japan. For example, in exchange for composite carbon material from the US, Japan would show us how to manufacture a solid form airplane wing and fuel tanks without rivets from that carbon. Also we were building state-of-art radar, but the Japanese were confident that they could bring down significantly the cost of production. Each unit in a phased array display was costing us something like \$2,000. The Japanese thought they could help us manufacture it at a cost of approximately \$200. So the concept called for an exchange of technology which would improve our manufacturing capability while at the same time protecting the high end of our technology -- e.g. we would not

provide the codes for the flight boxes. When the Bush administration came in, it decided to review the whole program. It was not satisfied with what it saw. That required some reworking of the draft arrangements to provide even greater protection for our very sophisticated technology. I think even our earlier draft arrangements protected us well; I don't think we ever contemplated or would ever have transferred our most sophisticated technology. The Japanese have been working since 1945 to maintain a "warm base" for aircraft production, whether it was the US-1 -- the "flying boat" -- or the F-1 -- their fighter aircraft. It has cost them a lot of money to maintain an aviation industry, allowing them to manufacture, for example, about 40% of Boeing 737. Some of the F-16s are built in Japan -- in fact, after having bought the first air wing from us, they replaced the planes' wings because they did not feel that they were up to their standards. That was expensive, but the Japanese were willing to spend the money. They were going to build an aviation industry, regardless of costs or what contribution an American manufacturer might or might not make. This FSX program is still underway, although at a pace slower than anticipated; I am told that it is coming along well and close to completion, even though there seem to be some disagreements between the American and Japanese manufacturers about some of the technology exchange. A prototype may take to the air very soon. The rivetless wing technology has been acquired by US manufacturers; under the agreement, American manufacturers were to build a certain number of these wings for the Japanese plane so that we could learn the process. The phase-array radar's costs have not decreased as much as anticipated; we didn't give the Japanese any codes to be used in the black boxes. I believe that it probably turned out to be fair deal for both sides. Neither side will have gained any great advantage over the other, although the Japanese will, if they wish, be able to build a front line fighter plane. The F-16 is now twenty years old and the next generation of US fighters will be build based on Stealth technology; that will leave a gap in other countries' arsenals. I believe that the FSX program is a good model for future cooperative programs. It enables the Japanese to build their own fighter aircraft, but at the same time still makes them dependent on certain US technology, which is vital to insure that the US-Japan security agreement will be maintained. In 25,000 years of Japanese history -- which is their claim to the trace of their ancestry -- have only have had two treaty agreements similar to the security treaty. One was with the British back in the early 1900s and the other was with us, which is only 42 years old. So treaties are not a normal pattern in Japanese history.

The process for obtaining Congressional approval of this FSX program was interesting. We finally assigned the task to a three man team: one was from State (me), one from Commerce (Joan McEntee, an Under Secretary) and one from DoD, which was at time represented by Glenn Rudd from DSAA and at other by a three-star Air Force General. The latter was superb; he awed the Committees. As I mentioned earlier, the three of us did all of the testifying except for the final session before the Foreign Affairs Committee when Secretaries Mosbacher, Cheney and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger testified.

In any case, through the FSX program and the China problems, I became better acquainted with Secretary Baker and his close entourage. I had met Baker first when he was the Secretary of the Treasury and part of the US delegation to Roh Toe Woo's inauguration. I also had known Eagleburger for a long time; I had also known Ross and Zoellick earlier. I got to know Margaret Tutwiler through my work on the FSX program. So by mid-89, I had many contacts with the "closed" Baker circle; in fact, I think I more contacts with Baker and his staff than I had later on

with the "open" administration of Warren Christopher. I guess it must have been in June of 1989, during one of my late evenings with Baker, when he turned to me and asked me what I would like to do on my next assignment. I told him that I would certainly enjoy being an Ambassador. He told me to look at the vacancies -- by this time, the new administration had already made many appointments -- and to pick one. I knew which I would chose, but I told Baker that I would look at the list and then give him an answer. I went home to discuss the decision with my wife and the next day I let the Secretary know that I would like to go to India.

I picked India because it had fascinated me for a long time. I has passed through on a number of occasions, often just at the Delhi airport. But early in my career, I had come to the conclusion that people who were assigned to India soon became part of a South Asia corps, who would serve much of their career on the subcontinent. That did not interest me, but by 1989, the relationships between the US and India had developed sufficiently that I thought that I might be able to push them closer. So I was interested in India both because of the country and the contribution that I might be able to make to relationships between the two countries.

I had some competition for the job, although I don't know who it was -- I was told later that Abe Sofaer, the Department's Legal Advisor, may have an interest. He had been born in Bombay in an Indian-Jewish family. Chuck Percy has told on a number of occasions that he could have had it, which suggested to me that he tried, but failed to win approval. John Hubbard, who had been the Ambassador for less than a year, wanted to remain. He was a recess appointment made after Senate told Reagan that it didn't want anymore nominations. The sole exception that the Senate made to that rule was when Arnie Raphel was killed in an airplane crash in Pakistan and Bob Oakley was nominated to replace him. I was told that Hubbard's nomination was sent at the same time. When the Committee met, it heard Oakley's and Hubbard's statements, questioned Oakley rather vigorously for a couple of hours. Then they thanked both Oakley and Hubbard and told the latter that if he had time, the Senators would get back to him. They never did, so that Jack went to Delhi with a recess appointment. I understand that when the Bush administration began to review its ambassadorial nominations, there was a lack of interest in sending Hubbard's name to the Senate again. But it did take the White House a long time to reach a decision. Fortunately, I had a good number of people who supported my nomination.

I had never seen the Chancery or the Residence, but I did remember a comment that I read in the State magazine when these two buildings were opened. One of my colleagues noted at the time that these buildings, with all their glass and open spaces, would be a security nightmare. Since the opening many fences have been built around the property. By the time I arrived in Delhi in December, I had been thoroughly briefed on those buildings. My first impression was that they looked a little like the Kennedy Center. There were too many ducks in the pond that was in the middle of the Chancery and the fountains didn't work. The Residence was like many of the ambassadorial homes that we have built: for show -- great entertainment areas, but with very inadequate living areas.

Since I had to remain in Washington for much of 1989, I did have an opportunity to become familiar with Indian issues. As I mentioned earlier, the administration had difficulties finding a suitable Assistant Secretary. Jim Lilley at one point thought that he might get the nomination and then there were others. Dick Solomon was finally chosen, but it took time to get him through the

appointment process. But despite FSX and Tiananmen, I did have an opportunity to learn about India. At that time, the Department was very nervous about letting any nominated candidate act as if he or she had already been confirmed. But the Indian Ambassador was leaving and I decided I should see him even though I had not been blessed by the Senate. I called Senator Moynihan's office and asked for an appointment. I was told that I could be squeezed in on a "courtesy" call. I told the staffer that I didn't want to take up the Senator's time unnecessarily; I wanted to talk to Moynihan about India, since he had been our Ambassador there in the mid-1970s. The staffer said he thought that the Senator would be very pleased to do that. When I got to his office, Moynihan had left for a vote; another staffer was very apologetic, but suggested that I wait for a short "courtesy" call. So I went through the same drill again, with that second staffer admitting again that the Senator would be very pleased to have an extended conversation about India. So a meeting was finally arranged; I spent about 45 minutes with Moynihan, listening to his experiences and his views of the current situation. As chairman of the South Asia subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had managed to stay up to date on Indian matters. He had always held very strong negative views of the Indians' "non-alignment" policy. It was one of his pet peeves. When my formal hearing was held, which Moynihan chaired, it lasted 45 minutes and was essentially a replay of our conversation in his office. He asked me the same questions he had asked me before; he knew what the answers would be. Frank Murkowski, the ranking Republican, walked in the middle of the hearings and asked me a couple of easy ones -- he was an old friend. He wished me good luck and left. That was the essence of my confirmation hearing.

I knew something about many of the Embassy's staff. I knew the DCM, Grant Smith, from reputation; he was at the time one of the two leading Southeast Asia specialists. I knew the Economic Counselor. The Political Counselor, George Sherman, had worked for me in Cairo. I knew I had a good INR man there -- Walter Anderson; he was there on a temporary assignment and was one of the Department's leading experts on India. I was very lucky: the PAO was first class and he was replaced an equally good man. There were about 280 Americans and 1500 Indians on the Embassy's staff.

As usual, I ran into the "we have always done it that way" syndrome. For example, I mentioned earlier that the fountains in the pool were not operating. I asked why only to be told that the medical staff thought they were causing damage to the ducks. The ducks had a large fan club in the Embassy; they had been residents in the courtyard since the opening of the building. Fortunately, one day the pool sprung a leak. It had to be drained; that meant that another home had to be found for the ducks. It took about six months to fix the pool. I asked that while the leak was fixed, the fountains also be put back in operating condition. When told that the pump had been taken out, I suggested that it be replaced. When that was done, I was then told that the new pump was very fragile and that it could only be put into operation on special days. I told the staff that that was not satisfactory; I wanted the fountains on all the time and if the pump broke, then we would fix it. The pump never broke; the fountains are still running and were doing so when I visited the Embassy a few months ago. The ducks never returned, as I hoped they never would. My answer to those who kept asking about the ducks, I always said that I would be glad to make one available if the inquirer would keep it at his or her house. One employee came to my office and demanded to see me to talk about the ducks. My secretary suggested that he go away because she knew that I did not want to discuss the ducks. After about fifteen minutes, he did

leave. I heard all of the dialogue from the next room. After he left, my secretary told me who it was. I called the guy's boss -- the Station Chief -- and suggested that he had a staff member who obviously didn't have enough work to do. I told the Station Chief that perhaps a review of his staffing might be appropriate; I never heard another word about ducks from that organization.

The final part of the duck saga concerns a plaque that had been placed on the side of the pool which read: "On this spot, Ambassador Keating fed his water fowl thereby demonstrating his humanity to us all." I was assured that it had been given to him with tongue-in-cheek; he was known to have kicked a couple of ducks that had gotten in his way. I asked that that plaque be removed. Along the same lines, and this has been confirmed to me by Moynihan himself, I heard a story that one day soon after his arrival, Ambassador Moynihan found one of our Marine Guards standing by the pool with a brown bag in hand. Upon seeking clarification, the Ambassador was told by the Marine that it contained his (the Ambassador's) duck food. Moynihan told the Marine that he didn't have time to feed the ducks. Upon his departure from New Delhi, Moynihan was presented a plaque which said: "On this spot, Ambassador Moynihan said he didn't have time to feed the Goddamn ducks." That plaque apparently was never mounted on the pool. Such is the life of an ambassador!

The size of the Embassy did not concern me greatly. There were many agencies represented in India; each seemed to be about appropriately staffed. The total was large, but I did not think that the components were overstaffed. The usual large groups -- AID, the Station -- were relatively modestly staffed. We had an FAA component, a DSAA group, an Agriculture Attaché, a Commercial Section and the Defense Attachés. Soon after my arrival, the Defense Attaché came to see me with a request that I approve a new position of Deputy Defense Attaché. He needed a deputy, he told me, because the Army and the Air Attachés had deputies. I told the officer that the solution did not lie in adding a new deputy position, but in abolishing the deputy position already in existence. That ended that conversation and any further request for staff increases from the military. In the end, I did manage to abolish one deputy position, based on some decrease in work-load. We had a large communications unit. But Delhi was essentially the size of the Tokyo embassy and I didn't find the staffing in India egregious or out of line with other embassies in which I has served.

On the other hand, I did think that some of the constituent posts could be reduced. Bombay was about right; it is the financial center of India and we had to have representation there. It was not a large post; we had a Consul General, a commercial officer, one junior reporting officer, a large consular staff -- the third largest visa issuance post in the world -- and an administrative support group. The Delhi consular operations were almost as large. Most of the work was non-immigrant, but there was also a considerable immigrant visa workload. During my time, we discovered a visa fraud operation, as happens perhaps too often when the demand is so great.

Madras was about right in terms of staffing. On the other hand Calcutta had 18 Americans, six of whom were Marine Guards. Since we didn't do much business in Calcutta -- consular or economic -- I had serious reservations about having a Marine Guard contingent there. We didn't have that in Bombay or Madras, both of which had a much heavier substantive work-load. After lengthy discussions with our regional security officer, our Marine Sergeant, the Guard's Company Commander from Singapore and the Washington Marine Headquarters, I finally got

agreement to withdraw the Calcutta contingent. That made some difference to that Consulate General's operations -- e.g., they had to store their classified material in a different way -- but that was not a major problem. In any case, this joint recommendation went to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic security, Sheldon Krys, who turned it down. He and I argued about this with Krys maintaining that Calcutta was different because the state in which it was located had a communist government. I didn't understand that at all because it made absolutely no difference to our security interests. It is true that during the Gulf War, our USIA Library in Calcutta was shut down for three days -- the only post in the world where that happened. The Communist Youth League just blocked the entrance to the library and the state authorities did not intervene. I threatened to close all of our establishments in Calcutta; that finally got the authorities' attention and they removed the demonstrators. A long time before, the street that our building was on was renamed to "Ho Chi Minh Serani". That was about the extent of the threat that a Indian state communist government presented; it was perfectly harmless. I would have reduced the staff even more, but USIA had built a large marble mausoleum on the city's main street which was so designed that it could not be used to house the Consulate General's staff as well. The office space in this large edifice was marginal; useless space was everywhere. In any case, our recommendation with Krys' dissent was sent to the Under Secretary for Management, Ivan Selin who sided with Sheldon. Two weeks later, we got a circular telegram which said that the Marine Corps Security Company was having staffing problems and it would welcome any suggestions for reductions. That is all I needed; I sent the shortest telegram in history to Selin and Krys which said: "You just got Calcutta". And that is all said. Two weeks thereafter, the Department approved the termination of the Calcutta Marine Guard contingent. Eventually, I managed to reduce the size of Calcutta from 18 Americans to six. If I could have, I probably would have moved it to Bangalore. Calcutta was a big city, but it was of little interest to us. It was there because our first Consul to India, Benjamin Joy, was sent to Calcutta in 1896. Unfortunately, his credentials were not accepted; the Governor General, who had left a few weeks earlier, had left instructions to his successor that under no circumstances was an American representative to be recognized. The name of the departed Governor General was Lord Cornwallis, a direct descendent of the British General who left the US shores in late 1700s with somewhat less than honor. After that, it took us sixty years to have a Consul recognized in Calcutta.

Some of the Calcutta reductions went to opening a commercial section in Bangalore, which is India's "Silicon Valley". There were a number of American firms working there and our representation in that city was absolutely necessary.

I probably spent more time than most ambassadors on management issues because it is a subject that interests me. I would guess that I probably spent about 20% of my time on those matters. When I say "management" that includes everything from establishing "Housing Boards" -- to make sure that the allocation of government owned or leased housing was equitable -- to adjudicating personnel matters, such as the case of sexual harassment. That took considerable time because by the time it was closed, many other issues became involved such as substance abuse, family problems, etc. I finally had to ask the Department to evacuate the individual for medical assistance. Of course, staffing levels were always a concern. I also got involved in a construction problem, stemming from US ownership of two duplex residences that it had constructed in Delhi before my arrival. We had taken possession of one of the buildings and then

found that the ground floor on the other had sunk because the Indian construction company had used cement too heavy for the ground. Also cabinets had fallen off the wall in the other building. Those events raised a question of whether the contractor was building to the agreed upon specifications. That generated a law suit which by the time I had arrived had been in court for eight years. We were paying a Bombay lawyer US-level fees to pursue the matter, but he never seemed to be able to bring the case to settlement. The two buildings just sat there deteriorating from lack of use, guarded by one person. I was anxious to bring this matter to a close, but all I got from FBO in Washington were warnings to be careful. I finally went to the Under Secretary for Management, pointing the stupidity of the situation. We were spending approximately \$100,000 per annum for renting quarters for the officers that might have occupied the two buildings under dispute and probably about \$50,000 for the lawyer and the value of the buildings was decreasing sharply. I threatened to occupy the buildings and challenge the builder to toss us out. John Rogers, the Under Secretary, finally took an interest and closed our dispute with the contractor and now they are occupied by two families. I was sent pictures of the buildings after they were rehabilitated and as people were moving in. So I spent a lot of time on management/administrative matters.

In some respects, I did become involved in matters which normally might be left to the DCM. My first one, unfortunately, was not comfortable making difficult personnel decisions. He was very South Asian in his approach to personnel matters! Of course, there were matters on which the DCM and some other agency disagreed; that left the final decision to me, as it should be. My first DCM was one of the best South-Asia experts in the Foreign Service and I regarded his substantive views highly. But as I have suggested before, the whole Embassy had taken on a very Asian attitude: "This is the way things have always been done". The outside wall needed repainting, but I was told that it had always looked that way. I thought the Bombay Consulate General looked terrible; I wanted it spruced up, even if it had been like that for many, many years. People just did not notice deterioration or if they did, they accepted it as a natural phenomenon. Habits develop and they become very hard to break unless some eyes are brought to bear. Women for example cut and raked the lawns; when I suggested using lawnmowers, I was told that that was too expensive; using women was the "traditional" way. I suggested once that some protection against the sun be provided for people standing in the visa line only to be told that they had always stood that way. It is true that there were rotations among the American staff, but I noticed that both in Cairo and in India, that since these posts were not among the highly desired, the vacancies tended to be filled by specialists in the area who tended to accept local culture and customs without challenge. The culture did not regard change highly; it had its own tempo and its own pace. In addition, Delhi was a very comfortable post for our staff; the school was very good, the housing was more than adequate, food was plentiful and many families had servants. It didn't require much effort to live well and I don't think when American supervisors felt comfortable with the *status quo*, the local staff wouldn't upset time honored practices. I don't think the American staff had as much drive as might have been the case in other posts. I think I need to note that the Administrative Counselor whom I inherited was selected out, and he did not perform at all satisfactorily the year that he was with me. He was followed by a good man; he and I developed a list of actions that needed to be taken and we got a lot of things done. So I believe that the management of an Embassy depends on having good persons -- preferably people that the ambassador has known favorably -- and an ambassador who cares

about management/administrative matters and who expects improvements to be made all the time. If the ambassador doesn't care, very few on his or her staff will.

The second one, Ken Brill, was superb and he, by the time I left, functioned as a normal DCM should.

I should mention that not only the Embassy was finding it difficult to change. I had a similar criticism of the Department, particularly in the computer field. I was not satisfied that it was taking advantage of the new information technologies; I hadn't been when I was in Tokyo or Cairo or Washington. I thought the Department's use of computers was antediluvian. I finally managed to get two terminals in my office in Delhi because the Department had two systems: a classified one and unclassified one. That takes two terminals. I used the unclassified terminal to retrieve and use the management base and the classified one for most messages to Washington. It was a very unsatisfactory process. The Department's system is basically designed by and for the technicians. When the Housing Board was setup, I wanted a data base that would permit to see what assignments were being made. I told the technician that I did not want to manipulate the data base, but just be able to retrieve the information. That was done, but when I asked how I could look for a particular piece of information, I was given a thick stack of papers which was a print out of the data base. I asked why I couldn't retrieve the information on the terminal. I was told the system would not permit to seek just one piece of information; I would have to go through the data base until I found what I wanted. That is what I mean by a system established for the technician's use and not for the users. It was very difficult to get an overview of the housing situation which is what a supervisor needs. This was a State wide program which we installed while I was in Delhi; we also installed an inventory program also developed by the Department. Fortunately, we had Burt English as our General Services Officer and he had been involved in a pilot project and therefore was familiar with the programs and knew how to use them. The new inventory program was a major step forward because until its installation, every inventory was taken by human beings, with some unexplained losses.

Before leaving for Delhi, I got the standard briefing. I was told that we were not doing much in military cooperation, that Gandhi had managed to take a small step towards economic liberalization in 1984 which had not progressed very far and that Indians were not easy to deal with. By 1989, Gandhi had reversed himself and had run a campaign against further liberalization; he lost that election. Nothing was said to me about Kashmir; I heard a lot about the Punjab and the rebellion that was taking place there. Commerce didn't show much interest in India, but I did talk to a lot of corporations -- all of whom told me that they were watching, which, translated into plain English, meant that they had no intention of looking for business in India. The American private sector was interested, but only over the long run. One of the best briefings I received was from representatives of the academic community, funded by INR. That took place at the Meridian House and I found it extremely useful. In general, I think that India did not rank very high on anyone's agenda in Washington.

At that point in time, even the responsible regional bureau looked on India as a step-child. The Middle East always consumed so much time of the NEA leadership that no other issue ranked very important on a day-to-day basis. Basically, the NEA Assistant Secretary was then, and had been for decades, essentially the Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs. During Murphy's

tour as Assistant Secretary (1983-89) he appeared once at a Congressional hearing on Southeast Asia. He will tell you that he wasn't prepared and took a real beating from Solarz. There were a few Members of Congress that were concerned about Southeast Asia -- Solarz and Moynihan. Much concern about the subcontinent stemmed from the danger of a nuclear armament. Furthermore, since both India and Pakistan came under the jurisdiction of one deputy assistant secretary, any policy initiative towards one of the countries immediately triggered concern about the other's reaction. I used to argue about this constant "coupling". Under those circumstances, it was impossible to develop the best US position towards India -- or Pakistan -- and then worry about the impact on the neighbor. The concern of not upsetting either country was uppermost in the policymaker's mind right at the beginning; that warped our policy towards both countries and in fact blocked making much progress even on bilateral issues.

It was Washington's view in 1989 that India was on the side of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, although people did admit that it did not support the Soviets on all issues. Nevertheless, India was linked to the Soviets since it was using Soviet weapons and equipment, traded heavily with Moscow and could be counted to support the Soviets in the UN. I should note however that this view, that had prevailed for so long, was beginning to be amended in 1989, primarily due to changes taking place in Moscow under Gorbachev's guidance. The Indian Chief of Staff had paid a visit to his American counterpart and vice-versa.

I found that when I reached Delhi and had a chance to acclimate myself that the Washington views as expressed to me during the briefings were somewhat outdated, particularly concerning stated Indian government attitudes as perceived in Washington. I was extremely fortunate because when I arrived, a new government under V.P. Singh had just been formed. The Prime Minister had employed in his immediate office one of the best Indian foreign service officers, Ronen Sen, who is now the Ambassador to Moscow. He was very bright and an agile and adept operator. The Director General for American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry was P.K. Singh who is now the Indian Ambassador to Israel. He was also an unusually competent operator. Both Sen and Singh were a real pleasure to work with; I used to chat very privately with them about issues that had not yet even risen and about improving US-India relationships. I found those contacts very rewarding. Both had worked for the Gandhi government, one in the Foreign Ministry and the other in the Prime Minister's office. The fact that Singh kept someone in his own office who had worked for his predecessor was not highly unusual, but it tells you something about Sen's reputation. I found that in the Foreign and Defense Ministries, with some rare exceptions, the officials were favorably disposed towards the US. The Finance Ministry was mixed -- many of the anti-privatization ideologues still resided there; the domestic ministries could be downright rude. Of course, the Finance Ministry had a bunker mentality because they were sure that when the sorry state of the Indian economy would become public, they were sure that they would be blamed. In fact, when the current Finance Minister took the job in 1991, he admitted that as a former member of the Finance Ministry bureaucracy, he was sorry what they had wrought and that, as he was coming to the end of his career, he would like to redress the damage done by his former colleagues. And he proceeded rapidly to do just that!

The tensions between the US and India were caused in part by the Indian bureaucracy with the support and sometimes with the leadership of the politicians. While I was Ambassador, Indian bureaucrats, during the GATT talks in Geneva, were not well received by other representatives.

The head of the Indian delegation was a) bound to talk too long and b) would lecture the West in general and the US in particular. The Indian bureaucracy shared with some politicians some anti-US sentiments. I must say that the Indian "administrative service" -- as the top 3500 bureaucrats are called -- and the Indian Foreign service were staffed with some very bright people. You might not have agreed with their analyses, but it was usually very intelligent. I came to have a lot of respect for them, even if I didn't always like them and even, as I often did, disagree with them. They are in general extremely competent and well educated.

I arrived in Delhi during a period of change. There was a new government headed by P.C. Sen. He promised economic liberalization, but never seemed to get around to it. I had been in Delhi for a couple of months when I found out that the Air Attaché had a plane in Islamabad -- a C-12 twin engine, propeller driven. I asked my DCM to raise the question of my using this plane with the Foreign Ministry so that I could take some trips within India. He told me that the Indians would certainly not approve the use of the plane. I accepted that advice at that time, but I kept going back to the issue with the DCM. Finally, I told him that I expected him to take the matter up with the Indians; at worst, they could only say "No." He finally, and very reluctantly, raised the question with P.K. Singh. Much to the DCM's surprise, Singh said, "Fine. No problem." No one had ever asked before; it was the first time that such a request had been made since 1971 when the Indians asked that the plane be withdrawn from their country after it had by mistake flown over some Indian troop concentration just before the Bangladesh war. But the Embassy had always prejudged the answer. My predecessors had used the plane, now stationed in Pakistan, for trips to Nepal or Sri Lanka. But the issue of using the plane internally in India had never been raised in twenty years and assumptions -- wrong ones, as it turned out -- had been made by our staff. In fact, by the time I left India, I am sure the Indians would have permitted our own Air Attaché to have his own plane stationed at the Delhi airport. This is another illustration of the ingrained practices that I encountered when I became Ambassador.

I believe that in this period of transition in the world away from the Cold War the Indians were reviewing their relationships with us. They were also giving serious consideration to the restructuring of their economic policies, but unfortunately they were also reviewing their domestic political policies. That latter review doomed economic liberalization under Singh. He got caught up trying to gain the support of the "other backward" castes. These were not the "untouchables," but were people still at the bottom of the economic and social ladder. Singh resuscitated a report that had been submitted over a decade earlier which had recommended that a larger share of government jobs be set aside for these "other backward" castes. The government had already set aside 27% of its jobs for "scheduled" castes -- i.e. what had been known as "untouchables" -- and tribes. Singh wanted to add another set aside of 27% for other lower caste members. This meant that almost half of all government jobs were reserved for people of little education and social skills. That left little for everyone else; as could be expected, there was a major backlash. University students, who were likely to be the biggest losers in this new policy, burned themselves in the streets. There were a lot of tensions generated by Singh's "set aside" policy.

In addition, Singh had to face the beginning of the dispute over the mosque at Iodia, which gave the Hindu National Party an opportunity to demagogue. So Singh had a lot of domestic problems on his hands. Then the Kashmir issue raised its head again in late 1989. So Singh had his hands

full with domestic issues. There was turbulence inside India, although it was not as virulent as it has been at other times. In early 1990, Washington became quite concerned that India and Pakistan might once again be involved in hostilities. That concern stimulated a trip by Bob Gates in May to both Pakistan and India. Seymour Hersch wrote an article about that trip, which makes for fascinating reading, although erroneous. The international tensions between Pakistan and India affected the Indian internal politics. By this time, our relationships with India were good enough to permit to talk to the head of the Parliamentary BJP group, L.K. Advani. I told him that he was inflaming the population -- he had just made a strong anti-Pakistan speech in Calcutta -- which I thought was unfortunate. Advani, who had participated for many years in the militant organized wing of the party, denied that he had done any such thing. He was a very precise man and pinpointed all that he had said and what had been said in a communiqué that he had issued after his speech. I admitted that he had not inflamed the passions, but that the speaker who had followed him had called for war on Pakistan. Since Advani had been on the same platform, it was reasonable to assume that he agreed with that sentiment. He accepted that perception and the rhetoric did cool after that. The key element of this story is that an American Ambassador could counsel Indian politicians and be heard; that had not happened very often before. So the relationship was changing. I had good access to all sides of the political spectrum.

The Indians do use the Pakistan issue to rally political support, but I do not believe it is used as widely or as often as it is in Pakistan. There the calls for "freeing Kashmir" are frequent. Benazir Bhutto does it all the time. In India, it is an issue that the opposition will raise in the hopes, never publicly pronounced, to curry favor with the Indian Muslims. I don't believe that it has been a very successful tactic; the Kashmir situation is not one that seems to be uppermost in the minds of Indian Muslims. The tensions with Pakistan were always present; they reached fever level in 1990. When I first arrived in India in 1989, I was assured by all to whom I spoke that Kashmir was a "manageable" issue and that the real problem was the Punjab. By the time I left in 1992, everyone said that Punjab was no problem, but that Kashmir certainly was. The Indians were surprised by the Kashmir developments. Bob Gates' visit was helpful in containing the tensions, although I should note that neither Bob Oakley, our Ambassador in Pakistan, or I thought that war between the two countries was imminent. It was true that slowly, but surely, the tensions were being heightened; if a mistake had been made by either side, major combat could have resulted. During this tense period, I went to see General Sharma, the commander of all Indian forces, with my Defense Attaché. He was a nice man from the Punjab. He asked his operations officer and his intelligence officer to join us; they showed me on maps where the Indian forces were deployed along the border. The General emphasized that his troops were not in a war-like position. They were training in the Mouthy, which was not the an appropriate attack-launch area. He added that that his troops didn't have any heavy equipment with them and therefore certainly could not be expected to go to war. I asked whether our military attachés could make a reconnaissance of the border areas to verify the situation; he readily agreed and allowed the inspection to proceed. It is interesting to note that Bob Oakley was receiving similar reassurances in Islamabad from the Pakistani. It is true, I believe, that his Air Attaché in Pakistan was more pessimistic about likely events, but most of the military in my Embassy agreed with the assessment that neither side was really preparing for a military engagement. The Indians had a very good commander of their troops on the border, General Rodriguez, who later succeeded Sharma. His troops were on alert to respond to any Pakistani attack, but certainly did not seem to have deployed his forces in an aggressive mode. I think that was also true of the Pakistani forces.

The politicians, however, kept shouting at each other, which always has some risks. Much of the debate was over the Kashmir. The Gates' mission went to Islamabad and suggested that the Pakistani stop training Kashmiri rebels. He was told that 31 training camps were being closed. He reported that to the Indians, who welcomed that news. Pakistanis subsequently denied that they had passed that information to Gates; whatever happened, the fact that the Indians heard the report eased the tensions. I believed that the importance of the Gates mission was in the symbolism that an American official was welcomed in both Delhi and Islamabad on the same trip who was perceived by both sides as an honest broker and not a partisan for one country or the other. Neither Pakistan nor India saw Gates as a proponent of its point of view. The Gates mission gave both sides an excuse to disengage gracefully from an escalating situation and both were thankful for that.

There have of course been other US efforts to mediate or at least reduce the tensions on the subcontinent. We can play a constructive role if the process is well and carefully managed. Also it is important to have the right American. Bob Gates was good and should get full credit for his efforts. Sey Hersch only saw the dangers of a nuclear exchange; that was not really in the cards. Bob Gates did come at a key juncture and performed a valuable service; he set the stage for further US efforts on improving India-Pakistan relations which came subsequently. Sending a high level US emissary is a good process if the timing is propitious and if the person is skilled. I did not resent the intervention of a Washington representative; if done correctly, it can be helpful to an Embassy.

I like now to return to my observations about the Indian economic scene. In my three years, I think that the changes were more psychological than real. The GDP growth rate was 3%, as it is today. That is better than the 2.4% that it used to be which matched the birth rate, but it is not adequate. In order to have an impact on the lives of an ordinary Indian, that growth rate has to be in the 10-12% range. As it is, the 3% rate can be attributed in large measure to the good fortune that the Indians enjoyed from their weather; they have had good monsoons for four years in a row, which is unprecedented. That allowed a major increase in agricultural production. There was a shift in attitude among the economic experts. The pre-1989 concern about the risks of multinationals investing in India and thereby "taking over" was replaced by a confidence that the country could manage foreign investment without losing its sovereignty. For example, when Pepsi Cola showed interest in developing a bottling capacity in India, there ensued a long drawn out negotiation. Finally, that company went into partnership with the government of the Punjab. As part of the deal, Pepsi had to establish an agricultural research station which explored ways to improve tomato production. Those tomatoes then were turned into paste which was canned and made available, for example, to pizza producers who used it for a topping. In exchange, Pepsi was allowed to make soft drinks and snacks. The major problem was that a Pepsi manufacturing facility in the Punjab was quite acceptable, but that was not really an appropriate area for tomato growing. But that is what the government wanted and Pepsi had to go along. I visited the area and was given a briefing by a Punjab government official. He told us about the research facility and about the additional crop that the farmers could grow. Not a word about the bottling plant. When I asked why that had not been mentioned, he said that he had nothing to do with that. He, like many of his colleagues, found it very difficult to link American investments in consumer goods with programs that they considered worthwhile. To add to Pepsi's burden, the Indian

government refused to let Pepsi use its own bottles; the labels had to have an Indian name on them. So all the bottles had to be repainted, which cost several million; they now read "Lar Pepsi" -- "Lar" being the Hindi word for "wave."

I saw this same attitude one day during a party given on Holi -- an Indian holiday, which I sometimes thought was sponsored by Indian tailors, because the custom is that on that day you pour some colored water on people who are theoretically wearing new suits, thereby ruining them. I don't think that anybody wore new suits, but the custom continues. We were in the garden of a rather modest house under a tent. The table had on it all sorts of imported whiskeys and scotches and food. One Indian gentleman came and sat down next to me and started the conversation by saying that he was not sure that he even wanted to talk to me. I told him the decision was up to him. I found out that he was an economic advisor to Rajiv Gandhi. He told me that Pepsi Cola wanted to sell potato chips for 60 paise; he was incensed because one could buy the same nutritional value for 10 paise worth of ground-nuts, which were plentiful and available to all. Of course, at the gates of the house there were lots of people begging which was also one of the Holi customs. I noted that he was sitting under a tent, enjoying lots of food and imported spirits, saying that every Indian had all the nourishment he or she needed. I suggested we go to the gate and ask the beggars whether they had all they wanted or whether they wanted to come in to share in the spread under the tent. That of course ended the conversation, but enabled me to make the point that people should have a choice on how they might spend their money. He stormed away, but I saw him again on several occasions and we got along well. There is an attitude of "big brother" knowing best which inhibits a true performance of an open market. The view was that the upper class could tell others how to behave even if it itself did not conform with its own dictates. It was a very paternalistic view, but I think that is changing, albeit slowly.

At another party, I ran into another gentleman who was raving about how the Indian constitution should be enforced. One of his Indian friends asked whether that was really what he wanted, noting that the first man had an alcoholic drink in his hands, which was contrary to the constitution. So we often noted contradictions in the Indian attitudes. But as I said, changes are occurring. Coca Cola when it first considered investing in India was to be part of a joint venture with a cookie-maker; that didn't work. So it finally bought up the largest Indian soft drink producer which had been campaigning against allowing Coca Cola to open production facilities in India. That avoided the necessity of investing in social "good" deeds, as Pepsi had done and Coca Cola is now prospering in India. Coca Cola did not have to repaint its bottles; those sold in India look the same as the ones in the US. India now has Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken and other American food chains which is a recent development indicating considerable shifts in Indian attitudes on economic development.

The Bhopal accident had occurred five years earlier. It was not a major issue any longer by 1989. The Indians had requested that the plant be built where it was built and no Americans were involved in the actual operations of the plant. But no American had been there since 1984 and I decided that I would visit the site. When I got there, I was told that I was only the second American Ambassador who had ever visited Bhopal -- the first having been Galbraith and that was in the late 1950s. Periodically, the Bhopal explosion is raised partly because the settlement of \$740 million dollars still just sits in a bank account. Some stipends have been paid from it, but

the bulk of the payment remains untouched. The Indian government has refused to run any tests to see what the extent of the injuries and personal permanent damages really are. Anyone who says that he or she was in Bhopal at the time of the accident -- even if unverified -- has a claim on the settlement. The government seems to be unable to reach a decision on how to distribute the proceeds. The settlement was made on the basis that the monetary compensation of \$740 million would cover all civil and criminal penalties. That was an excessive amount in Indian terms, in light of what the fines are if an Indian is killed in a motor accident. By US standards, it was a pittance. The Indian Supreme Court found, as a result of a suit started by one of the many lawyers in India, that while the government could settle civil damages, it could not agree on a settlement on criminal damages. So a warrant has been issued for Mr. Henderson, the former head of Union Carbide, by the Bhopal court which can only be served should he ever return to India. Recently Union Carbide sold the rest of its property in India, but the settlement remains frozen. Unfortunately, the whole Bhopal process dampened enthusiasm for American investors to a degree. It affected even some Indian investments because it became clear to all that Indian law did not limit corporate liability; it permitted suits to be petitioned to parties in a foreign country that had no longer any involvement in the management of a facility. Of course, the Bhopal accident and subsequent settlement was caught in the political upheaval that caused Rajiv Gandhi's fall; he, after agreeing to the settlement and having the courts approve it retroactively, had a plan to sell it to the country, but was never able to do so because he was defeated. So potential investors became wary in light of the Union Carbide experience; they saw the possibility of similar fates for them. Indian corporations have talked about finding some ways to limit liabilities, but haven't been successful as yet. There are still legal impediments to foreign investments, but at least India has a body of law and a functioning legal system and more lawyers than we have. The barriers are primarily caused by the fact that the laws don't spell out every detail of every investment process, leaving open questions that can only be resolved in court. But then India is not the only country that suffers from that defect.

I should mention briefly how I spent a normal day as Ambassador. For the first six months, I spent part of almost every day calling on people. I called on all the Cabinet Ministers, of which there were many -- 32, if I remember correctly. I also decided that I would call on all of my ambassadorial colleagues, a practice that many American ambassadors do not follow. I was advised to call only on those that represented major powers, but I wanted to cover all of them. I called on them in precedent order, starting with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and finished with the Yugoslav Ambassador who had presented his credentials just three days before me. He is now the Slovene Ambassador in Washington. I called on 77 ambassadors; there were more countries accredited, but some were represented by charges or by ambassadors who had arrived after I had. When I got to the Yugoslav, I took a bottle of champagne with me so that I could celebrate my last call. I think it was time well invested; my contacts stood me in good stead for the rest of my tour. I had become acquainted with many and I could take to all of them. Those ambassadors had appreciated that I had called on them and it made a difference -- far more than I had thought. I made it clear that no return visit was required and only a few did so. One who came to see me was the new Papal Nuncio; when he drove to the gate of the Embassy, he was asked to open the trunk of his car, as we did with all visitors. He felt insulted and turned around and left, but he never mentioned the incident to me. I used to see many ambassadors frequently. The Dean of the Corps, who is now the Mauritius Ambassador in Washington, lived nearby and I used to attend his "welcome and farewell" functions. In general, the ambassadors were very good.

One of the first social events I attended was at the Soviet Embassy, which was also just down the street. The Ambassador was Victor Isakoff, who had spent eleven years in Washington as the Congressional Liaison officer for the Soviet Embassy. After Washington, he went to Brazil, which he thought he would hate, but actually became fascinated by the culture. After 18 months or so, the Soviets sent him to India which he hated. The end of that story was that Isakoff was pulled out of Delhi a year before retirement and assigned to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow which, as I understood it, made considerable difference to his pensions and other benefits. I think Victor was not well treated by his government. He was not a bad ambassador; we got along well, but I don't think that he was among the best of the Soviet foreign affairs officials. His successor was abler -- he had been the director of the Soviet Union's foreign service personnel and was the one who maneuvered Victor's early reassignment out of India so that he could succeed him in Delhi. The assignment of an ambassador such as Isakoff did not indicate a lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union in India. As a matter of fact, while I was serving in Delhi, the Soviets constructed a four story apartment building for their personnel which was right behind the Swedish ambassador's residence. So the Soviets could look right into the Swede's gardens, which was a violation of the rules of the diplomatic enclave which barred the construction of structures that would interfere with the privacy of other neighbors.

When I arrived in Delhi, the Indians had a retired foreign service officer, Eric Gonzalves, who was running their international house. His brother was the Indian ambassador to Moscow. I remember that one day in 1990, Eric was hosting a seminar to which he invited me. He told me that the Soviet Ambassador and the Japanese Ambassador were expected. He asked me to be provocative -- the subject was "Europe over the next twelve months." I accepted and I thought that the Japanese would be speaking after Victor and before me. I arrived just as Isakoff was finishing, which was unfortunate because I didn't get a chance to hear his full remarks. Eric, when he saw me, asked me to make my presentation next so that the audience could contrast the Soviet and American points of view. I could have killed him! In any case, I proceeded and suggested, that based on current events, I thought that Germany would be reunified within the year. It was a lucky guess, but I was just trying to be provocative. Victor in response said that he basically agreed with my analysis, but he thought that Germany would not be reunified within a year. When the discussion was opened to the audience, Victor was severely criticized, particularly from some Indian professors, for not defending socialism. He argued that the world was changing and so was the Soviet Union. All of the defects of the old system would be thrown out and the good aspects would be kept. He admitted that the way socialism had been run in Eastern Europe had some major problems which would have to be corrected. I was accused of "imperialism" which I said was really no longer -- if it ever was -- the direction of US foreign policy. I found the whole exchange very educational because it was clear evidence how far the Soviets had come in their thinking and how little progress some Indian professors had made in their understanding of the new realities of the world. Not too long after that, the Downtown Rotary Club invited Victor and myself to make a joint presentation. We were introduced by the Indian Foreign Minister who was the past President of the Rotary Club. Victor and I got to the Club a little early and had an opportunity to chat. All of a sudden, we heard a stirring behind us. Victor thought that the guests were commenting on the fact that the Soviet and American Ambassadors were talking to each other. We gave our presentations; they were so similar that it would been hard to tell which one of us had made them. The Indians were nonplused by the whole event; they had a difficult time adjusting to the new world. I commented that the joint

Soviet-American appearance was evidence that the Cold War was over and that the Indians had better adjust their sights if they were to be world players. When the coup against Gorbachev took place, Albert Gonzalves, the Indian Ambassador to Moscow, is said to have commented back to his Foreign Office that finally the Soviet people had taken control of their own affairs. That brought a comment from the Prime Minister to the effect that people should be careful about commenting on situations because things might not be all they seem. He may have been right because of course, the coup didn't succeed and Gorbachev returned to power -- some saying that he had fostered the coup in the first place. After that the joke in Delhi was that the only way that the Indian Ambassador in Moscow could get close to the Soviet government was if he were assigned to Mongolia! The point I wanted to make was that the Indians had a difficult time accommodating to the changes in the world and particularly the end of the Cold War.

I traveled a lot through the country. I had decided from the outset that India, being as large as it was, needed to be seen as completely as possible. Furthermore, if I wanted to understand the country, I needed to see it. Delhi was not India, just as Washington is not the U.S. I decided that one week of every month would be devoted to traveling. I got to almost all of the Indian states; I did not visit the Kashmir out of concern for stirring up potential violence; I did not get to Eastern India -- Assam and that area. Otherwise, I think I saw a considerable amount of the country. Almost always, these visits gave me an opportunity to make some public remarks; in fact, I found that I could give the same speech in three different locations and have it published in Delhi as a new news item every time. The Delhi papers picked up the story from the local papers, so I would get considerable mileage from the same speech. The coverage by the local papers was usually objective and I was satisfied with their coverage. When I first arrived in India, I would receive every morning a stack of news clips coming from the English language press all over India. One day soon after my arrival, I asked the Public Affairs Officer why I was not seeing any items out of the vernacular press; I was only getting summaries of those stories. He said that it would obviously have to be translated; I suggested that that might be a worthwhile effort and the PAO hired a couple of translators. Then I had a much broader picture of the press coverage of all the items of interest to us. I also insisted thereafter that whenever the Indian press was invited to my residence or the PAO's house or to other functions, it would include representatives of the vernacular press. That paid big dividends. That part of the press that had been virulently against the U.S. started to include our point of view; it didn't necessarily change their point of view but at least the readers had an opportunity to be exposed to a wider spectrum of opinion.

My availability to the press and for public appearances soon became known and I had more invitations that I could possibly accept. I was asked to dedications and openings and many other events. I tried to do as many as I could, but I just didn't have time for all. Because of my personal view that the business community was the key to many other doors, I paid special attention to it. I saw all the leading politicians in Delhi and the states because I always paid a call on the Chief Ministers of the states that I visited. One day, I went to Delhi University to make a presentation. I had visited the campus before and never had any problem. But when it was announced that I would appear, some students -- about forty out of 25,000 -- staged a demonstration. The administration called me in a panic and asked that I postpone my appearance. The students were members of the "Muslim Student League." It was the only time that I was barred from making a public appearance. I talked to University groups during periods on internal tensions -- the quotas for the other "Backward Caste", which I described earlier. I went to St. Stephen's -- a small

Catholic College -- and ate with the students who were quite upset by the new policy. The school had actually closed because of the student sit-ins and other demonstrations. I talked to them about foreign policy and then I asked whether I could ask them some questions. There ensued a fascinating hour during which they explained to me why they opposed the new policy. I found that the students' explanation was different from what others were saying; they were very articulate and were trying to be fair and objective. They didn't object to the policy, but to the process which gave preference to members of a certain group, whether qualified or not. The government was not trying to educate the high school members of that group to rise to University levels; rather the University levels were being brought down to fit the qualifications of the members of that particular caste. Later, those caste members were given preference for government jobs, but even after having been given employment, the caste member's children were still given preference when it came time for them to enter university and later government employment. The St. Stephen students were willing -- even if reluctantly -- to have preference given to one generation of caste members, but saw no rationale for giving that same preference to succeeding generations. They saw it as reverse discrimination against them. One preference per family was all that they saw as justified -- a point of view which I thought had some validity. In fact, a lot of preferential treatment was given to caste members who had graduated from their low social and economic status and were in fact part of the Indian middle class. That session with those students was one of the events that made the ambassadorial job so interesting, even if the event was not of any interest to Washington. It was however an illustration of the difficulties the government was encountering in the pursuit of its domestic agenda. In fact, it was this caste preference issue that barred V.P. Singh from doing much about privatization and eventually caused his government's downfall.

I should say that Washington's interest in India waned and heightened during my three years in Delhi. There was of course the 1990 Pakistan/India tension which caused the Gates trip that I have already mentioned. Then came the Iraq invasion and "Desert Storm." That period started rather badly. The Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral, was the only senior official of any government that visited Baghdad; not only that, but while there, he gave Saddam a big hug and flew to occupied Kuwait. When he returned to Delhi, I asked him what he thought he was doing; after all, a coalition of countries friendly to India had been assembled to oppose Iraq and they certainly could not be happy about his actions. He said that he had to go to Kuwait because there were some Indian citizens there; in fact he mentioned that he had brought some back on the plane with him. I suggested that was a lame excuse that the Philippines and Kuwait would hardly appreciate, not to mention the U.S. I knew that he had not brought back many Indians who worked at menial tasks in Kuwait, but rather some well paid professionals. So Gujral did not endear himself to us. But we did manage to get V.P. Singh's approval to move some aircraft -- C 130s -- through Agra at the start of our military build-up in the Gulf. After Singh's fall, we continued this practice under the brief regime of Chandra Shekhar, who was an old line socialist and a thug -- I liked him and he was good to deal with, whom I had known for sometime. The Indian Air Force cooperation in fueling our planes could not have been better. We had our people at the airport assisting with the landing, fueling and take-offs. As we approached the war, I was called by the Prime Minister. He told me that the refueling operation was becoming a domestic political issue. Rajiv Gandhi had just spoken out against it; he had been briefed at my request from the beginning. So I went to see Rajiv to find out why he was all of a sudden taking this new line. He told me that Washington shouldn't be concerned; he was speaking out for

domestic purposes. I told him that that wouldn't wash; I would be glad to report that he had "lost his marbles." Washington would not accept such a flimsy excuse from a world leader. People usually did not talk to Gandhi that way, but I had found out that one could be frank with him. In any case, Shaker told me that we would have to end the operation, which by this time was down to one flight each way a day. I asked him not to make that request then. I said that I would be back to him in two days. I cabled Washington and pointed out that the Indians had been very cooperative and that I had hoped that the operation would not need to be brought to a close at the Indians' request. Since there were so few flights using Agra by then, I suggested that it be rerouted so that the refueling would not become an issue. Within 24 hours, Washington told me that the flights would no longer land in India. So I was able to tell the Indian government that we had stopped an operation on our own; it was the first time that our two governments had done something cooperatively. Shaker appreciated our action. As soon as the ground war was over, the refueling operation began again without any difficulties.

Let me spend a few minutes talking about the non-State Department contingents that were stationed in Delhi. Let me start with AID. By the time I arrived in India, all plans had been set for the AID staff to move out of the Chancery to a new building of their own. That mission was responsible for an annual program of \$22 million in direct grant programs and about \$80-85 million in PL 480 food grants, two-thirds of which was administered by CARE and one-third by Catholic Relief. The PL 480 program did nevertheless require some AID supervision. In any case, the AID mission moved out to a huge complex which now belongs to the Ministry of Science; that was about half an hour away by car. I was not too happy about the arrangement but since all the contracts and necessities had been done, I couldn't stop it, but I did require that the Mission Director maintain an office in the Chancery and that he spend eight hours each week there so that I could talk to him if I needed to. Both of the AID Directors who worked for me were very good and I did work closely with them. I worked with them in getting a new population control program reestablished. I urged that the \$22 million be spent more on such activities as feasibility studies and other planning operations which might in the end result in greater American/Indian private sector cooperation. I became involved in both program planning and project approvals. I enjoyed my collaboration with AID.

I was also blessed by having two very good USIA directors during my tour. I kept them quite busy and I saw them every day, even though they were also in a separate building ten-fifteen minutes away by car. The USIA operation was very good; we did have some problems with their branch offices, but managed to correct them over time. I used USIA in conducting our public diplomacy; I asked the PAO to make speeches -- the second one was so good on economics that I would let him address that issue in public fora. As I mentioned before, I made an effort to be available to the press myself and always on the record. My experience was that if I said anything "off the record" it would sooner or later find its way into public print and often garbled. I didn't have any secrets and I wasn't afraid of being quoted by name. I have never understood how "senior officials" of the U.S. government could make pronouncements on U.S. policy and then demand that they remain anonymous. That doesn't make any sense to me at all! If you're willing to talk to the press, then you should be willing to let the world know to whom it was talking. I learned that Mansfield, who was always "on the record." When I first arrived in Delhi, the press was not accustomed to meeting with the American ambassador; it took some coaxing and I asked the PAO to host some social occasions so that I could meet the local press. When I returned to

Washington, as I did on many occasions, I always made sure that I got an opportunity to meet at the Foreign Press Club. I met the Indian press there. I would brief the press upon my return from Washington consultations, usually in a press conference. In 1990, I had just returned from the States after some minor surgery, just at the time that the Gulf War was at its height. I wanted to have a reception to show people that I was alright; the DCM thought that was not necessary, but I insisted. In any case, the reception was held on the evening when we stopped hostilities in Iraq; everyone thought I had been very prescient. The press was there. When I traveled in India, I always talked to the local reporters no matter how small their newspaper might be. I let it be widely known that I was always available to the press. I felt that it was important that even the smallest local newspaper heard and carried our message and as I said earlier, I knew that my comments would also be replayed in the Delhi papers. Repetition is always useful. My staff was very supportive of my public relations efforts; I used to discuss my appearances with them. My first Political Counselor, George Sherman, was an old journalist and he of course thought that my approach was great. His successor, Robin Raphel, now the Assistant Secretary for South Asia, was also very much in favor of my openness. I should say that I would not recommend that every ambassador follow my pattern under all circumstances, but in India, during the period I was there, I think an open approach to the press was the right strategy. There were times during my predecessors' periods when, even if they wanted to, they would not have attracted any interest from the Indian press.

The Station was fairly small and relatively inactive. I am sure that I knew all that it was doing. Commerce was represented in Delhi and that worked well. When I first got to Delhi, the Commercial Counselor was someone I had known previously, Mel Searal, who is now in China. He had a small three-man staff. He was replaced by one of my choices, Jim Morehouse, who had been at the War College in my class. I think the commercial work being done in the late 1980s was different than that I had done twenty years earlier. There was considerably more high-level attention paid to it and that meant that there were more people involved beyond the reporting officer and his or her backstopping office in Washington. In fact, I used the whole Delhi Embassy to push American commercial interests; whoever I thought could be effective in pursuing our interests. It was a field that always had been of interest; furthermore, by this time, the Department of State had come to the conclusion that commercial work was a worthwhile effort and urged every ambassador to be, in fact, the chief commercial officer in a country. It was not clear in the late 1980s and early 1990s that India was yet ready to be a fruitful market for American investment and sales, but we felt that it was worth pursuing. We knew that others were selling goods that we produced and felt that we should be in competition. Most of the private American efforts were in the sales business, although some companies like Caterpillar and Timken had made investments. Dupont was trying to do something and finally did manage to get an investment off the ground after I had left. We, including me personally, worked with the American companies and the Indian government. Before I arrived, Air India had signed a contract for six 747's with some additional follow-ons later. It had signed a letter of intent to GE for the engines. For no reasons that we were able to divine, that letter was withdrawn and the contract awarded to Rolls Royce. I found that unacceptable and spent eighteen months first slowing down the procurement and then having the whole bid reopened. By that time, unfortunately, the GE representative in Delhi had made some nasty comments about the head of Air India which effectively knocked GE out of the running. But fortunately Pratt Whitney won the new competition; I was pleased by that development. That is just an illustration of my

personal and the Embassy staff's involvement in commercial matters. I think it is was then and is now an appropriate role for an American ambassador. At the time I was in India, it was especially appropriate because India was in an economic liberalization process and the visibility of the American ambassador in this issue I think was helpful particularly for American enterprises that wanted to take advantage of the new Indian economic policy. On one occasion, I flew for one day to Janshedpur in Bihar to cut the tape when Timken Bearing opened a plant there. I also went to the Punjab to see the Pepsi-Cola plant despite some political opposition. I believed that at that juncture in Indian economic development, the visible support of the American Ambassador might be helpful. I also became involved in the sales of American products and would periodically personally take up the cudgels with the relevant Indian Minister on one product or another. This was not a day-to-day activity because I tended to get involved only in major sales, such as aircraft or engines for their military tanks. On the latter, the Indians wanted to get a few samples for free "for testing purposes;" that didn't get them very far.

My Military Attaché staff was very useful. We had representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Indians had a large military establishment and our Defense Attaché Office maintained good contacts with it. That staff was invaluable in 1990 as I have described earlier. Although their function was essentially intelligence, our military attachés had such good relations with the Indian military high command that when I decided early in my tour that US contacts with the Indian military should be increased, it was easy to do because the attachés just opened the doors for me. Some of the friendly relationships I had in India were with the three Indian Service Chiefs. Surprisingly, the military gave no indication of any anti-American feeling. It was probably that part of the Indian society which was most separated from the rest of the world. Every once in a while, they might be permitted to go to the Soviet Union, but no other military in the world made any efforts to establish contacts with them. The US government has some programs that never get much attention, but can be very useful to foreign policy. One such program was the International Military Exchange Training program, which allowed us to invite senior Indian military officers to attend the senior American training institutions like the War Colleges. It had been going on for twenty years. This went on even during US/India tensions; then we didn't stop the IMET program or cut off economic assistance entirely. Reciprocally, we had American officers at the Indian Defense University and their Command Staff College at Wellington. I found that exchange program extremely useful. Two of the Indian Navy's Chiefs of Staff had been at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. which raised some eyebrows in Delhi which often imagined the darkest motives. The Indians liked the IMET program; they were anxious to participate and enjoyed their experiences and always sent their best personnel for such training.

I always passed on each agency's annual budget request. There were some debates about the size of some budgets or personnel levels. As I think I have indicated, I tend to believe in as small a mission as possible; I'd rather have fewer people who are actively engaged all the time. That view, of course, was not always accepted by other agencies. I did manage to reduce the size of some staffs, like the Station, AID and the Defense Attachés. I reallocated within the State complement. I don't think my management improvement opportunities would have been enhanced if I had been given full control of all U.S. resources and been able to allocate them as I wished to the different programs. I was satisfied with the arrangements then in place although I must say I might have been able to reduce the State complement somewhat if I could for example

reduce the communications or consular staffs. But they were really untouchable. For example, I never felt that every applicant for a non-immigrant visa had necessarily to obtain it immediately. I would not have resisted having some applicants wait for a day or two or even three. That might have resulted in some personnel reductions, but that approach is just not acceptable to the Department. So when you look at the State staffing at a post, there are parts that are untouchable leaving any reductions to come out of administrative, political or economic sections and that is a very small component of any large embassy.

We had central administrative staff to service all US components in India, although each agency also had some administrative personnel on their rosters. For example, the central staff was responsible for building maintenance, but we never had a unified motor pool. That was just unacceptable to the other agencies primarily because a number of them were in separate buildings at some distance from the Chancery. We were never able to find a way to avail ourselves of the efficiencies of a centralized motor pool without reducing the effectiveness of the operations of the US government units that were located away from the Chancery. The disparity of perquisites was no longer an issue in India as it had been some years earlier. The internecine warfare that disparity of treatment created among US personnel was essentially over by 1989. There may have been some occasional skirmishes, but in general the fundamental problems had been resolved. I insisted on the establishment of a Housing Board consisting of representatives of all agencies, just to minimize frictions and to allocate resources -- housing -- in an even handed fashion. That eliminated the periodic fights between the Administrative Counselor and some US personnel in Delhi. There were still some problems when I got to India with the furnishings that each agency wanted for its staff. All of it came out of central pool, but naturally some staff members felt they deserved to be treated like some other staff member, even if the latter was of higher rank. It was never a major issue and we always tried to settle it using fair treatment as the fundamental tenet. One of the assets that the Embassy in Delhi had was its very good school; that helped unify the community and provided a first class education.

On country team management, I would make one final comment. Not only is it important for an Ambassador to visit the constituent posts periodically, but also other senior officers, some of whom may be reluctant to travel and need to be forced. For example, Administrative Counselors should not believe all is well because the post has some administrative staff. The Consul General must visit, the political staff must visit, not as supervisors, but so that we all knew that we were one team in India, all talking from the same script and approaching similar problems in similar fashion. It is interesting how over a period of time some particularities slip into the operations of a constituent post and then you run into "This is the way we have always done it" syndrome. So a close relationship between Embassy staff and the constituent posts is very important and I always made sure that our budget request included sufficient travel funds. I held the PAO responsible for the USIS operations throughout India, the AID director for his programs, etc. The DCM was the overall supervisor, although I expected him to leave the day-to-day supervision of the operations of the Embassy's sections or other agencies whether in Delhi or at the constituent posts in the hands of the agency's senior official in India. This system can run into some "turf" battles. For example, the officer in charge of the consular operations in Delhi was a Consul General, the same rank as the person in charge of a constituent post. It was hard sometimes for the constituent post to take direction from an equivalent in Delhi. Whenever such a problem arose, my position was that I really didn't care about who was senior to whom; I was interested in standardization of

treatment to any Indian whether he sought a visa in Madras or Calcutta or Delhi. To do otherwise might have encouraged "visa shopping" and that was not acceptable. I encouraged constituent posts, if they had a question on a consular matter, to call the Embassy first before seeking guidance from the Department. There had been situations where the same question had been asked of Washington by different constituent posts; that seemed to me to be entirely unnecessary. One answer should serve the needs of all US government establishments in India. My whole goal was to have a more structured operation throughout India, whether it was the administrative or consular. I wanted the economic and political officers to travel to: a) see for themselves what was going on in the various Indian states and b) to provide guidance to the Consul General and the younger officers who were still learning their craft. The Consul Generals had the right to communicate directly with Washington on all matters; I only insisted that the Embassy be provided a copy of the message. There is no point, in my view, of assigning a seasoned officer to a constituent post if you are not going to have confidence in him or her. They have to be given responsibilities; if they can't carry them, then you take action, but you should not assume anything but confidence and that includes direct communications with the Department in Washington. I know of embassies who have taken the opposite view, but that was my philosophy. I, of course, expected the CGs to use common sense and judgement; if the Embassy was engaged in an analysis and if the CGs knew about it, I expected them to contribute their views to us rather than sending them to Washington. We made sure that if a CG had an input into a major study or analysis, he or she received due credit. It is important that the CGs be told from time to time that they were doing a good job; they must feel appreciated, as any human being does. I leaned to doing that more than less. My system worked well for me; I never had any problem with my CGs even if they saw an issue differently from me or members of my Embassy staff. I might have challenged the CG's view, but I certainly would not have resented him or her having a different point of view from mine. I would make a general criticism of the Department's system: it tries to accommodate so many different points of view that a final position is so watered down that it is sometimes meaningless. If there are sharp differences, let them be known publicly.

Now let me get to policy issues. When I was sent to India, I understood that my first priority was to see whether relations with India could not be improved. That was a general direction; I was not given orders on specific issues nor was I instructed on how to implement the general guidance. Occasionally, I would be requested to discuss UN issues with the government, although most of the time our delegation at the UN preferred to conduct the US/India dialogue in New York. We did raise specific UN issues with the Indian government and on a couple of occasions even convinced the Indians to abstain on some votes that they had made against us for many, many years -- e.g. Afghanistan. But the late 1980s and early 1990s was a curious time in India/US relations. There were some Indians who even apologized to me because they only abstained; they wished they could have voted with us. That was a new approach. The UN issues were among the most difficult ones in US/India relations. Under this category I include the NPT and the IAEA, which is a UN agency; there the Indians were still adhering religiously to Gandhi's view that India would only sign the NPT after the two superpowers had surrendered their nuclear weapons; it would cease its nuclear development efforts once other nuclear powers had surrendered or destroyed all their weapons. That was a different view of the world from us, but I think at least in the late 1980s, a more rational dialogue on nuclear issues was initiated.

I think it is fair to say that India/US relations were improving even before the break up of the Soviet Union. Certainly the fall of the Berlin Wall spurred the growth of those relationships. I think the Indians were a little surprised by the international developments. For example, I think they did not expect the US to be so sympathetic about the internal collapse of the Soviet Union and the difficulties that Gorbachev was encountering. I think they were surprised that the American and Soviet Ambassadors in Delhi seemed to be along well. Of course, not many knew that Victor was an old "Washington hand" and therefore was not inhibited by talking to Americans, as some of his predecessors undoubtedly were. So I think US/India relations were beginning to improve even before I arrived, but international developments during the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly accelerated the process. I can't say that the end of the Cold War brought any greater interest in Washington in India. I think that interest really didn't become a priority until around 1991 when India changed its economic policies. I thought the establishment of a new South Asia Bureau was a mistake, even though I knew that getting the attention to India by the Assistant Secretary for the Near East was very difficult. Tezi Schaffer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia, gave us enough support, but our issues didn't usually go up beyond that level. Her husband had been our Ambassador in Bangladesh and she is now our Ambassador in Sri Lanka. She had been the Egyptian desk officer and when Howie retired, she succeeded him as the DAS. I have no doubt that the economic opportunities that a large nation like India presented when it changed its economic policies greatly accelerated the US government's interest in India. I refer here to a continuing interest; there had always been a sporadic interest as arose in the May, 1990 during the Pakistan/India tensions. I remember well that when Washington would annually ask us for our priorities for the next year, my staff would invariably list stability on the subcontinent as the first priority objective. I would return the paper with a notation that I strongly disagreed with that assessment because by saying so they were also stating that US interests in India *per se* were of secondary importance. I believed that we had other major interests besides preventing a Pakistani/Indian war. I asked my staff to rethink the issue and consider that the US might be interested in India as a fruitful area to develop our economic interests. I thought that other foreign policy goals would lead to stability, but I was not prepared to accept that was our first and over-riding concern. The Embassy's list of priorities therefore might have changed during my tour, but I am sorry to say that even today, the South Asia experts will still maintain that stability is the over-riding US concern in the region. That is wrong; it is not. That is a negative interest. We have many positive interests in India which, as I said, hopefully will lead to stability. We need to pursue a balanced policy which has many interests, all linked perhaps, but separate and distinct from "stability."

I can understand why in 1989, our experts were thinking primarily in negative terms. They had "suffered" through 45 years of Indian independence with both sides shouting at each other during most of that period, after an initial "honeymoon" period. From 1965 on, there were frequent tensions between the US and India. Most people saw India as a surrogate for the Soviet Union -- not a vassal state, but certainly one that through its non-aligned prism would see issues more from the Soviet point of view than ours. Many of my predecessors, I think, would have described the US/India relations in those terms. I think Dennis Kux, in his book *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* -- a damn fine book -- describes the situation that way. I agree with him that both India and the United States until fairly recently were caught in a time warp: we saw India as the embodiment of Krishna Menon and the Indians saw the US as the embodiment of John Foster Dulles. That has changed by now. In fact, Dulles and Menon were psychological and

culturally incompatible, but they had passed from the scene many decades earlier. This time warp existed to a much lesser extent when I arrived in India and certainly the mutual perceptions changed considerably while I was there, partly because India's changed economic policies had a great impact in Washington and the United States as a whole. India had always paid considerable attention to the U.S., sometimes positive, often negative. The Indians could never understand why, as long as they were paying so much attention to us, we were showing so little interest in them. They are of course not unique in that complaint; a lot of countries feel neglected by the U.S. The tensions were not personal; a lot of Indians sent their children to the U.S. for education -- Oxford was nice, but MIT was better. There are now 40,000 students in the U.S. There have always been many, many of them. Even our severest Indian critics have some personal attachment to the U.S., either through relatives or educational facilities.

There is a story in India which goes something like the following: there were a million Indians in the US; each had 880 relatives with no overlap which covered the whole Indian population of 880 million. I think that story had some truth in it because every Indian I ever met in my three years had a relative in the United States. It was obviously an exaggeration, but among the Indians that were the leaders of the society, it was absolutely true. They all had relations or connections living in the U.S. So Indian interest in the U.S. was always acute, even when reactions were negative. I could always attract a crowd for any public appearance I might have made, unlike my counterpart in Washington who was mostly ignored by the American public. The question, "Why is the U.S. not more interested in India?" was asked all the time. It was usually phrased, "Why are you more interested in China than you are in us?" The answer was that China had been a concern and interest of the U.S. for many, many years whereas India had become only a recent actor on the world stage. The size of the two countries was not that much different, but our first Consul was sent to Calcutta in 1896. As I mentioned earlier, he was refused entry at the time. India was perceived until after WW II as part of the English sphere of influence and therefore did not loom very large on our interest list. China, on the other hand, had always excited the American imagination and our connections with that country went back to the first half of the 19th Century. When I was growing up, I was aware of missionaries who had just returned from China because they would address our congregation and raise money for their next foray. That never happened with India; some Americans were of course aware of Indian religion and its ancient origins, but it was not a topic for popular consumption. What the Americans knew of India came from Kipling. It was only in the last half of the 20th Century that India came into popular American focus through contacts with Indian students and emigrants and through the opening of the economic markets. The challenge of raising American awareness of India was still with us in 1989-92, although slow progress was being made. Today, I find greater interest in India and more media coverage about more things than the Maharajahs and the poverty. I think the U.S. perception of Indian acceptance of U.S. business has played a large role in this wider and more favorable media coverage.

Also, I believe that the tilt toward Pakistan has waned in the last few years bringing India into a more favorable light, particularly in the Department, where, as I mentioned before, India and Pakistan were viewed as one package rather than as separate identities in which the US had different and distinct interests. Even the organizational change in the Department hasn't resolved that problem entirely although I think progress is being made.

The economic relationships between the U.S. and India was not always smooth sailing. About the time I arrived in India, the administration announced that it would start an investigation under the "super 301" law. We never really pursued it, but I was repeatedly accused by Indians for having ruined their economy through the application of the "301" rules. I had a hard time convincing them that the U.S. had done nothing; the common perception was that we had landed on them like a ton of bricks. The accusation of having applied the law to India was always followed by a plaintive question, "Why poor us?" The investigation was completed and then the decision was made not to take any action. You have to remember that the "301" target was really Japan and that Brazil and India was thrown into the mix just to make it look more "balanced." But it was hard to convince the Indians that we had not interfered with their exports to the U.S. or their domestic economic development, although we were unhappy with Indian production of pharmaceuticals. The American companies would have liked to sell their pills in India, but it was not a big market. What concerned them was that as their patents were expiring, the Indians would manufacture generics which then became competitors with American products. I suggested, and Washington did, that we remove the GSP protection from ibuprofen in India, which in effect took it out of the US market, since it didn't enjoy duty free status any longer. The word about what we had done got around in India and I think reduced the Indian spurt into the pharmaceutical exports arena. But the US action was taken very quietly and only those immediately concerned ever really knew about it. It was a lesson for the Indians who then understood that we took intellectual property rights seriously.

As long as we are talking about India and Pakistan, I should mention that the relationships between the two American embassies in Islamabad and Delhi were first rate in the 1989-92 period. It had not always been such, I have been told, especially when Deane Hinton and John Gunther Dean were our ambassadors. I was fortunate because Bob Oakley was our Ambassador to Pakistan since 1988. He was an old friend whom I had known for twenty years. Very soon after my arrival in Delhi, I flew to Islamabad and met with the President of Pakistan. Bob later came to Delhi. We agreed from the outset that our two embassies would work in a collegial manner and that we would be in constant communications. If an issue arose on which we might disagree, we decided we would consult and try to be accommodating to both of our views. This agreement between the two ambassadors brought a new atmosphere to our respective embassies, to which they had some problem adjusting. There was competition between officers of both embassies for attention from Washington, which is a natural phenomenon given the circumstances. That competition was probably the result of "localities," i.e. the tendency of defending your host country when it was in dispute with another. This is an unstated undercurrent which is not publicly discussed but which does exist. The single event which showed me the folly of this partisanship was May 1990, which I will talk about in greater detail later. I encouraged my substantive staff to visit Pakistan; people from our Embassy in Islamabad came to India, not to the extent that I would have liked, but more than before. My personal contacts, mostly by phone with Bob and then Nick Platt, another old friend who succeeded Bob, were frequent and good. Nick came to Delhi within two months after his arrival in Pakistan; that was a good move. Usually, the two American embassies were working together to move the Washington policymakers in a direction that made sense to us in the field. Most often, Washington did not give us much guidance and therefore we had to fill that gap by pushing Washington in one direction or another.

Of course, the perceptions of the United States differed in each capital. Pakistan saw us as a counter-balance to India, but I don't think either capital saw us as actual or potential mediators in their disputes until May 1990. Then both Pakistan and India looked to us to resolve the tensions. Before 1990, I believe that the Indians had for decades seen us as always favoring Pakistan, but Pakistan wasn't sure that was the case or at least that we didn't show enough bias towards it, particularly on Kashmir. It is certainly true that in a Cold War context, given Afghanistan and the good offices that Pakistan provided for the US/China dialogue during the Nixon administration, Pakistan probably was of greater importance to the U.S. than India. India had had a close relationship with the Soviet Union; by 1989, it was a major exporter to the Soviets of civilian goods which were in part paid for with Soviet military equipment. The Soviets bought 60% of the Indian tea crop and the Indians were the world's largest tea producers.

The subcontinent consisted of Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka (the SARC Association). India has always had a mixed attitude of the SARC. It wants to have a regional grouping of which it wants to be the leader. The other countries agree to a regional grouping because they see it a dispute-resolution mechanism. India doesn't want to submit any major issues to the multilateral context preferring to resolve disputes bilaterally. India faces somewhat the same problem that the U.S. has with Mexico and Canada; it just overwhelms the neighborhood. I don't think Indians would agree with this characterization because when it comes to Pakistan, they feel that country is so large that it can't be treated as an equal. So the Indians are torn, but there is no denying that India is the largest country in the region and its neighbors are wary. China was only important to the subcontinent in the areas that she borders. Today, the Sino/India relationships are better than they were in 1989 when they were not talking about border issues. There was some movement in their relationship, but it was the Rao government that put emphasis on improving ties to China. During my tour, the Indians viewed China as a security threat, stemming from the 1962 Chinese invasion which acutely embarrassed the Indian Army and bureaucracy which literally came unglued as the Chinese moved south from the foothill of the Himalayas. The Chinese voluntarily withdrew back to their own lines having proven that if necessary they could take territory at will. The Indians have never really overcome that blow. The Indians also recognize that China had nuclear weapons and missiles, which gives the Indians one additional reason to refuse to sign the NPT. Some of the Indian position is tactical, but some is deeply felt. I had good contacts with our Ambassador in Beijing, but we didn't have too many issues on which we could work together.

I mentioned India's mixed views on the SARC. I should perhaps talk a little about India's view in 1989 of its role in the Third World. Although the Non-Aligned Movement had long ceased to be a major factor, India still saw itself as the spokescountry for the Third World. This is one of the rationales that then Indians use when addressing the need to reorganize the UN Security Council. It wants the permanent membership enlarged to include Germany and Japan -- for their economic power -- and India, Brazil and Nigeria for the size of their populations. The only problem is that Pakistan would probably not agree to India becoming the spokescountry for South Asia, Argentina might take the same position vis-a-vis Brazil and many countries might well raise a question about Nigeria's stability. India's self perception as the leader of the Third World is ingrained; even today, as India edges toward a market economy, it still holds on to its memories as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement; unfortunately, times have changed and the Third World

does not need a leader as much as it might have. Since the Second World -- the Soviet empire -- has dissolved, is there really a Third World still?

I used to discuss these issues with the Indians regularly. I found that I had good access to all levels of the Indian government. Also the Indians liked to talk about substantive issues of concern to them and they liked the intellectual challenge of debating an issue. Sometimes they lapsed into the teaching/preaching mode which is not always well received; it is a fault of both American and Indian cultures. A lot of these conversations took place as I tried to understand the Indian point of view; most often, I did so without instructions from Washington. We did not get too many instructions from home, which surprised me a little. The nuclear issue was frequently a subject of my discussions. There had been a stalemate in our talks on this matter. The Indian maintained that their nuclear program was only for civilian purposes; no one believed them, but they stuck to their line. We came down hard on Pakistan when we suspected them of engaging in military applications of nuclear energy; we cut off our assistance to them. Under the aegis of the National Defense University and an Indian think-tank -- funded by the Indian government -- we held a seminar series in Pune, a town near Bombay. The first conference was attended by our Pacific CINC, the Assistant Secretary for ISA in Defense, the Deputy Assistant Secretary from State, Steve Cohen -- a Harvard professor -- and myself. The Indian side was well represented and included their most prominent spokesman on non-proliferation, K. Subramaniam. When we had discussions like this, the Indians always fell back on their line that a nuclear freeze on the subcontinent was just not feasible, because they had to worry not only about Pakistan, but China as well. I have always been convinced that the Indians had and have a military program, but are also embarrassed to open their nuclear reactors to IAEA inspection because they just do not have modern or perhaps even adequate and safe technology nor the resources to upgrade these facilities to modern standards. Some of the technology is home developed and some came from the Soviet Union. They have some of their own plants which have had problems and two Russian plants under construction. In any case at this seminar and at other occasions such as lunches, Subramaniam and I used to shout at each other across the table. We each thought that was the only way to catch the other's attention. People would raise their eyebrows at this behavior, but I always said that we were friends and got along well. Over the three-year period I was in India, I think that Subramaniam shifted his position which brought us to the conclusion that there might be ways to reduce the risks of nuclear exchanges. A freeze was not in the cards, but Oakley and I developed the idea of a five nation conference -- India, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union and the US -- to talk about nuclear non-proliferation. The Indians wouldn't buy it. The three powers -- China, USSR and US -- could bring a non-first use pledge to the table, which would have avoided any necessity for India to admit to ownership of any weapon, but merely to pledge that they wouldn't use it first. We never got very far with that idea, but I think it helped making progress on a process that would insure that there would not be a nuclear accident as result of a conventional war -- an issue in which both Pakistan and India were greatly interested. This prevented either side from dropping conventional bombs on the nuclear facilities of the other. That meant identifying nuclear facilities -- power plants and research labs -- in both countries, which was finally done, even though then Indians suspect that the Pakistanis did not divulge their full capacities. That much was done and the dialogue between Pakistan and India on nuclear issues continues. I think the lists exchanged were pretty complete. We still are urging a non-proliferation treaty for the subcontinent. We needed more "carrots". Near the end of my tour, Ivan Selin, then the Under Secretary for Management and now the Chairman of Nuclear Energy

Commission, visited India. I wanted him to discuss the possibility of US assistance on nuclear safety issues. After my tour was over, I talked to Selin again about that "carrot". The US has never dangled it, but I believe it could be an important inducement towards some progress on nuclear issues on the subcontinent.

I believe we now have reached the stage when I should discuss the May 1990 events in greater detail. As I mentioned, I arrived in Delhi in December, 1989. I found that the Kashmir dispute was heating up on an exponential curve. The Indians were surprised by this development; they had not expected Kashmir to loom so high on the "problems" list. I was told upon arrival that Kashmir was not the principal potential flash point, but the Punjab was. It is fact turned out to be 180% degrees different, as it is still today. I also found that Mrs. Bhutto was making inflammatory speeches; the Pakistani were training insurgents; the Indians were mishandling their side of the border. It was a real mess. This all must be viewed against a background of 1987 events when the Indians decided to run a humongous military exercise named "Brass Tacks," which the Pakistanis read as a prelude to an invasion.

When it came in the winter of 1989-90 for the Indians to run their annual military exercises in the Majahan training range, the Pakistanis responded by publicly denouncing these exercises as a disguised effort to prepare the Indian Army for an invasion. The Pakistanis brought some of their forces near the border. It should be noted that both India and Pakistan have strike forces whose location is well known to the other side. No rational war plan would leave those forces unused; they were highly mechanized and well equipped. Neither the Pakistani or the Indian strike forces were moved from their normal locations. But the Indians did move some lightly armed contingents into Kashmir, which has been the breeding ground for all of the wars that those two countries have fought. That Indian move seemed to cause a reaction from the Kashmiris who started to move some of their men into more aggressive positions. Bhutto went to Musafarahabad to hold a large rally; thousands showed up and reminded one of the larger Nazi demonstrations. She called for a violent liberalization of Kashmir, which was taped and broadcast throughout India. Not only was it broadcast, but it was done over and over again continuously. That wasn't well received in Delhi and the Indians of course responded in kind. It was obvious that tensions were building up.

Oakley and I set up a hot line between the two embassies. This enabled us to check out rumors that were springing up in both Islamabad and Delhi, which we would check out and report back to the other what the actual facts were. This enabled us to keep the governments to which were accredited informed with real facts, rather than street gossip. I think both India and Pakistan began to rely on our reports and I believe our efforts laid the ground work for the Gates visit. By the spring of 1990, I had already made many contacts in the military. General Sharma, the commanding officer of the Indian Army, whom I mentioned earlier, had gone to school with his Pakistani counterpart before partition. I told you before that he opened up his maps to us and let us see where his forces were and later allowed my Defense Attaché to verify the information. Bob was doing the same thing with the Pakistanis so that the two of us had a pretty good idea of the state of readiness of both sides and through that, I believe, also understood motivations. We concluded that neither military was preparing for war, but we were much more concerned with the emotional fervor that the politicians had raised on both sides of the border which might eventually force the military to take actions it wasn't prepared for or, as far we could see, was

really anxious for. Washington, from its long distance, was much more alarmed and decided to send Bob Gates to try to calm the ardor. It was a funny situation; if Washington had had the same picture that Bob and I had, it probably would not have sent Gates. That would have been unfortunate because Gates did calm tensions that might otherwise have escalated, resulting in perhaps armed conflict. Before Gates left, both Bob and I sent cables explaining the positions of our respective host countries and suggesting some approaches that he might take. Neither Bob nor I saw him face-to-face before he landed in Islamabad. When he arrived in Delhi, I had a chance for a brief private conversation; he did not stay in Delhi overnight. Gates was well informed and had absorbed all the information that we had sent in. I knew what Bob was going to tell him and before Gates even landed in Delhi, Bob and I had a conversation over the secure phone so that I knew what had happened in Islamabad. So Gates was well prepared for his Indian visit and was able in the few hours that he was in Delhi to see the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, who had a lunch for him, and the Defense Minister with General Sharma. Gates went first to Islamabad then came to Delhi. In Pakistan he told the government that it had to stop fomenting unrest in Kashmir. In Delhi, he said that he had obtained agreement in Pakistan to close 31 training camps -- the Pakistanis later denied ever having made such a commitment. The Indians appreciated that and soon the tensions were diffused. The hot air went out of the balloon! In Delhi, Gates dealt with a curious man, V.P. Singh, the Prime Minister, who was a minor Rajah. I made a mistake once telling Karan Singh, who would have been the Maharajah of Jammu in Kashmir, that I thought the Prime Minister was one of "his group." I was quickly reminded that Maharajahs and Rajahs were different and separate and that V.P. was only a "small landlord." In any case, V.P. was a very introspective man and interested in bringing some reform to the age-old Indian caste system. Gates had a good meeting with him as he did with the Foreign Minister. The Defense Minister was a little more difficult, but fortunately Sharma was there and he did most of the talking. The meetings were very small, which also made them more effective; our side was represented by Gates, Schaffer and myself. Schaffer knew all the players on both sides having served in both countries and therefore undoubtedly did a lot of briefing of Gates herself. She is very good; I think she and her husband, Howard, are the Department's leading South Asia experts. Both the Indians and the Pakistanis took the Gates visit as the rationale to calm tensions; it enabled them to back down without "losing face."

The Indians had imposed Presidential rule on Kashmir before I arrived. I don't remember raising the issue with them until some of their actions -- atrocities, I would say -- became public. Then we discussed this with them often. The Indian of course maintained that they didn't understand why we were raising a human rights issue with them when they were just reacting to Pakistani misbehavior. Gates made it quite clear that we were not supporting Indian actions in Kashmir nor were we supporting Pakistani support for the insurgents in Kashmir. Human rights violations wherever they took place in India were a subject in our dialogue with the Indians, both in Kashmir and in the Punjab. There are some American groups that are very active on both of these issues. A Dr. Alec is the President of "Khalistan Committee" -- Khalistan being the name of an independent Punjab. There is a similar committee for an independent Kashmir, which is balanced somewhat by a group of Hindus who were forced to leave the Kashmir and who therefore take a different view of the future of that territory. Both the American Kashmiris and the Sikhs were pressuring certain Congressmen, who in turn made their views known to the Department. We in Delhi were also concerned because some of the Indian suppression was egregious. We always were told that it was all Pakistan's fault -- there was some truth of course

in that allegation both for Kashmir and the Punjab. The Pakistan under-cover operatives were quite active in supplying arms to the insurgents in both territories. The Indian counterpart operatives were doing the same thing in the Sindh, Karachi and other Pakistani places. It was a tit-for-tat situation. But I don't think all of the unrest in the Punjab and in the Kashmir can be laid at the feet of the Pakistanis; there were certainly local leaders who were acting independently, but the Indians maintained that they could come to some agreements with these local leaders if the Pakistanis would stop their interference. The total human rights area was the subject of some of my more contentious discussions in Delhi. It was a serious matter for us and we pursued it.

I should say before we leave the India part of my career a few words about the Gandhi family. I had many contacts with Rajiv, who was a charming man. He had lost his Prime Ministership in November, 1989, just before I arrived. I called on him at his official residence not too much after my arrival as I did with all opposition leaders throughout my tour. I would see Rajiv fairly regularly. If he couldn't see me and if he had something on his mind that was important, he would send P.V. Narasimha Rao who is now the Prime Minister. If the matter was not important, Rajiv would send one of his entourage; that process always gave me a clue on whether the matter was important or not. Rajiv had two kinds of advisors: those that always hung around his house, which was also his office and those, like Rao, that he would call on when needed. The "home entourage" was the source of the pressure on Sonia Gandhi to run after Rajiv was assassinated. That would have really shook India: an Italian lady as Prime Minister. The real politician in the Gandhi family is now Priyanka, the daughter. I don't think we have seen the end of the Gandhi dynasty.

Rajiv usually drove his own car; he wore a traditional Indian dress -- Nehru jacket -- when in public. At home, I used to see him in loafers, slacks and an Italian sweater; he was very comfortable with Western ways, probably more than he was in Hindi tradition -- his Hindi was not very good, for example. He had attended the Doon School, one of India's elite schools and his English was very good. He was not very much like his mother, whom I didn't know, but from all I have heard must have been a formidable woman. Rajiv had a mild temper and I always felt that he was genuinely nice. He was in politics although I don't know that he initially really enjoyed it. He had tried to liberalize the Indian economy in 1984; it had responded well even though the effort was rather marginal. But then his advisors urged him to stop which he did. That created the curious situation in 1989, when in fact he ran against himself urging greater liberalization even though he had not pursued it while in office. Had he been reelected, I am sure he would have taken up the liberalization cudgels once again. In fact, Rao used for his program a study that Gandhi had started when he was in power. By 1989, Rajiv was a politician. I have already illustrated that in my comments of our activities in India during "Desert Storm." Rajiv used that for his own domestic political purposes and as I said, I had to call him on it. He was not happy about that and may have had pangs of conscience about his actions because there was no question that he knew that Washington would resent his remarks, but felt that his domestic political purposes had first priority.

My relationships with Singh were a little more distant; he was not the affable guy that Rajiv was. He was a mystic and could never be quite sure of what he might say. He was more open at the beginning of his administration. One of my first conversations with him dealt with liberalization; he was very positive that he would take all the necessary steps. By the time he left office, he was

not doing anything on liberalization; he had become completely bogged down on his efforts for the neglected castes -- "set asides" -- at Universities and in the Civil Service for those who had not had previous equal opportunities. He became more and more withdrawn towards the end of his term and increasingly difficult to engage in a dialogue. His successor, who was in office very briefly, was a socialist and somewhat of a thug, as I mentioned. On my last call on him, he said that whoever was to be Prime Minister would have to pursue economic liberalization, although I don't think he had a clue about what the phrase meant. It was interesting to me that a hard-line Socialist had come to the conclusion that India had to strive for a free and open market system. During his term, he had to authorize the shipment of some gold reserves to Tokyo and London as collateral; that I think brought to him the realization that the Nehru economic model was just not viable. Rao, who was the last Prime Minister with whom I worked, was a known quantity since I had had conversations with him starting soon after my arrival. He then had just returned from Houston where he had some back surgery. That was a successful operation; he looks better today than he did in early 1990. I think that operation rejuvenated him and allowed him to do things that just weren't possible before the operation. I might say that he looks better since he has become Prime Minister; he has learned to pace himself. I don't think he was ever a convert to liberalization; he understood that something had to be done, but I think he probably had some doubts and fears about liberalization. So for a while, he kept jumping from one view to another, but I noticed that when he came to Washington earlier this year (1990) he was very comfortable talking to the business community about his "program" and about the changes he intends to make. He has become a real salesman for India; he now can communicate well with Western industrialists. I have mentioned liberalization on several occasions. I should make it clear that when I arrived in India in 1989, the economy was an issue, but liberalization as such was never the focus of any election. It was discussed, but the only election that I witnessed actually took place before the liberalization program was formally announced. Now it is part of the Indian political debate. While I was in India, the major issues were Hindu nationalism, as illustrated by the incident at the mosque in Ayodhya and L.K. Advani's writings on a truck decorated like a chariot. A lot of people were killed because that mosque was supposed to have been built over some sacred Hindu land; that issue is still alive today. The other issues were Pakistan and the "reservation" system for the lower castes.

Foreign policy was discussed, but it was never a major issue in Indian politics. there was interest in the U.S. and, as I mentioned before, in the public comments that the U.S. Ambassador made. Everyone knew about the "Super 301" law and the Gulf War. I can thank CNN for helping me out on the Gulf War. Without it, I would have had a much harder time explaining the Gulf War, but the TV pictures were so self-evident that the opinion leaders did not need to rely on Indian news and obtained our views on the situation directly from their TV sets. It made us look good and that is always helpful. I should note that TV in general had a major impact on Indian views. Rajiv commented to me once that he had underestimated the impact that TV would have on Indian culture. One day, he was campaigning in the Bihar, which is the poorest of the Indian states. He came to a town on a dusty road which didn't even have a tea shop -- that is about as poor as you can get. But as he entered the town, he noticed a video library. This new technology had broken the monopoly of Doordarshan; news tapes were made -- they were like a news magazine, called "Eye Witness" and that is what the Indians used for their information. Soon, other producers got in the game and then all Indians including those in the poorest villages had access to tapes, both for news and entertainment. Those tapes spread very quickly. Then, in

many homes in Delhi, one could see dishes going up and soon world wide TV was available to many. It took the Embassy a little longer to get into the modern world; I finally had to get USIS to reposition its antenna so that we could access to the same air waves as Indians had. The new technology opened Indian eyes to new sights and insights. The Iraq war was a problem for some Indians because they had a close and warm relationship with Iraq for many years. They were disappointed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; if they had not witnessed it through their own eyes, they might not have believed me if I had told them. So CNN was a great help. Furthermore, CNN and other Western news services were bringing the news in real time. The Indians no longer had to rely on Third World television which consisted essentially of talk shows or news reports without visual evidence. CNN showed events as they were taking place; it was an entirely different experience which the Indians eagerly accepted. CNN was followed by Star TV, originally a Hong Kong based program, started by Richard Lee, a young scion of a very rich family. Murdoch bought it later and made it into a British news service. Because it originated in Hong Kong, the reception in India was much better. The Indians used to say that none of their companies would ever advertise on Star TV because a local TV network was already in operation. They didn't initially, but as soon as Indian businesses noted that their up-scale customers were watching, they jumped on the band wagon and advertised on Star TV, which also carried the Asian version of MTV that attracted the attention of the younger generation. Star TV, in turn, has started broadcasts in Hindi. The whole TV technology has opened India as nothing else has ever done since independence -- down to the village level. Radio was influential, but it was government run; only short wave was uncensored and that was too expensive for most Indians.

I should finish this discussion on India by mentioning the high tech aspects of Indian economic development. The Indians are whizzes at developing software. Some one told me once that if a computer language had not been developed, the next best thing would have been Sanskrit. I found it fascinating just to watch the growth of the software industry. Indians are very good at tailoring programs to the specific needs of an individual client. This ability created a problem for our consular operation because the Indians, once having developed a program for an American client, wanted to come to the US to install it and would then, too frequently, just stay in the US. For the American companies, the outsourcing to India was cost effective because the programmers there received far lower compensation than an American one.

The largest software company in the world is Tata in Bombay. When I was in India, City Corp had a software operation which used in part their internal capacity and in part they contracted some of their development work. This was intended to insure that it was keeping up to date with what was going on in India in the software business. By now, that one company has split into four: two in Bombay and two in Bangalore. The pace of the software development work in India is just mind boggling. The Indians could also manufacture the hardware but their talents really lie in software development. It is a growing market internally and for export and the Indians are now using the new applications more and more. They were and are acquiring computers more and more all the time.

They had some difficulties in installing a computerized reservation system for their railroad; it is now installed and is probably the only modern part of the railroad system. The argument was one often heard: computers will take away jobs. As it turned out, of course, no jobs were lost; there

had to be as many ticket vendors as there used to be. It is just that now you can be assured of a ticket and a seat. That was and will always be a continuing argument in India as more and more operations are computerized. One of the consequences of this drive to use computers is that foreign software developers have difficulties in protecting their intellectual property rights. Indians won't always use programs that are just copied from one made elsewhere, but they will tailor that program and then sell it. For example, computer games might well be pirated, but if AT&T had a program, it would be fine-tuned in India because it is a program that no one could use and could not be sold "as was." This protection of intellectual property was a source of dialogue between us and the Indians. They did not do as good a job as we wanted on enforcing their copyright laws for films and computer software. I could get a film locally in Delhi before it was shown in American theaters. It was very easy to buy pirated programs and films. You can see some of the same problem here in Washington now from the carts on K Street. The Indian answer to our complaints was always that they didn't have the resources to police and enforce their own laws. I knew that they would have troubles with enforcement, but I was also convinced that it was in the Indians' own self-interest to crack down on pirating because they were so good at software development that eventually their own industry would be severely damaged if they couldn't enforce intellectual property protection and certainly would have had difficulties in complaining to other countries about their practices if the situation in India was not brought under control. That argument I think finally won them over and they improved their enforcement activities, although they still have a long way to go. I admit that enforcement in a country in India is difficult because they are so adept at development that there always is a question of whether the program was just plainly copied or whether it was improved locally or whether in fact it was developed entirely by local sources.

Once, I wanted to install a couple of programs that a colleague had on my computer, but we didn't have the operating manual. So I went down to one of the local stores and bought the manuals; they weren't always as complete as the originals, but they sufficed. There was never any problem buying standard American programs and games on the local market; they had all been pirated and readily available.

The other problem of copyright protection was in the pharmaceutical industry to which I have already referred. That was a problem of patent registration which the Indians tended to neglect because they felt that the drugs were manufactured for the good of the people and therefore somehow exempt from the normal patent protection laws.

ERNESTINE S. HECK
Consul General
Madras (1990-1993)

Ernestine S. Heck was born in Oregon in 1940. She received her bachelor's degree from Oregon State in 1962. Her career has included positions in Bombay, Saigon, Teheran, Niamey, Katmandu, New Delhi, Colombo, and Madras. Mrs. Heck was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.

Q: All right, well, then we'll pick this up the next time. 1990 you went where?

HECK: To Madras.

Q: And you were in Madras when to when?

HECK: From July of 1990 to July of 1993.

Q: All right, we'll pick that up the next time then.

Today is August 26th, 1998. Ernie, '90 to '93, Madras seemed like a logical assignment. Was there any problem with it, or it just went?

HECK: You mean a problem in getting the assignment?

Q: Getting the assignment.

HECK: No, it sort of just happened, it just was there. I had, at that point, had a lot of years in the subcontinent, seven of which had been in India. The issues which were big in Sri Lanka, in some instances at least - and I mean by that the Tamil Tigers and the general question of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka - this was also a big issue in Madras, so it made sense. I went off in the summer of 1990. I was the consul general. We had 15 Americans and about 100 Indians and another 135 contractors. We had several different agencies including two intelligence agencies and USIA and the Commerce Department as well as the State Department. The consular district was about 205,000,000 people. It covered four states, the four southern states. These are generally referred to as the Dravidian area as opposed to the Aryan area in the north. The languages are all different. The alphabets on all four are different one from the other as well as from the northern alphabet. But the people are generally related. It was a fascinating area and one about which I didn't really have a lot of background. It's funny but the so-called India experts in many cases, this phrase, means north Indian experts, and a lot about the history and the forces that form these states in the south really is not very well known by a lot of Americans. It's also true that it's not very well known by a lot of Indians who are in positions to do something about it. I was always interested how different political events looked in the north from in the south and how we were just in sort of a different world down there. The capital of the state of Tamil Nadu is where we have the consulate. This is a historical thing, because, of course, it's on the ocean and it was the place that the British set up their regional headquarters early on and where the Americans, of course, landed when they came into south India in the late 18th century. One of the buildings in the area, still there, now a college dorm, is a roundish sort of a building called the Ice House, and it's where American ice used to land in the late 1700s in large blocks and be carried in. That was what kept the British gin and tonics cold, I guess, if they had ice in their drinks, I'm not sure that they did. But we were the main suppliers of ice going back to the 19th century. This is only the second oldest consulate in India, I believe. I think Calcutta was a few years older than us but not by very much, and we've had a consulate there in some form or another going back to the early 19th century, and I think that there was representation from the United States in the late 18th century as well. So it's an old post. It probably would not be the consulate general if we were able to set up a consulate for the south today; we would probably

put it in Bangalore, which is the Silicon Valley of the nation, the big high-tech place for India, and it is home to perhaps the most number of American businesses in the south. But history and the fact that we own property in Madras keeps us down there and probably will keep us down there for the foreseeable future. During my time, however, we did open a Commerce Department office in Bangalore. Bangalore is about a 7-hour drive from Madras or a little bit over an hour's flight if you go by plane.

Q: Who was the ambassador up in India in '90 when you arrived?

I think you're telling me something. We're have a very long pause.

HECK: The ambassador when I arrived was Bill Clark. I am trying to remember whether he was actually in country when I arrived. Yes, I think he was. He was there for about a year after I arrived, a little bit more, then there was a break, and he was followed by Tom Pickering, who was there from August of '92 to March of '93, so his tenure was very, very short. There was a considerable period in between where there was a chargé, and, of course, following Tom Pickering's departure, a chargé was in place for I think over a year or about a year anyway, certainly for the rest of my tenure. But I should say that the embassy is 1,000 kilometers from Madras. In the early '90s telephones were not all that great. We did not have e-mail. Madras at least had only unclassified Wangs and we were not connected to the outer world until after I left the post in mid-'93.

Q: A Wang being a computer?

HECK: Well, no, a word processor, not even a computer. Now, of course, I think almost all of our posts are on a worldwide e-mail net, so there can be communications. But I can remember one period of almost a month while I was in Madras when what is called the PTT, the post and telegraph people in India, telephones, telegraph on post, went on strike in the four southern states. Nobody in New Delhi seemed to notice this. Now I'm not talking about the embassy, but the government of India didn't seem to notice it either. And it meant that for almost a month the only way the embassy could really communicate with us was by sending a cable. We couldn't telephone them even. That's assuming that the telephones work, but they didn't work at all. They were always getting cut anyway. I would get cut off from calls to Delhi all the time. So we really were without connection with the embassy. During this period it got so bad in the area that businesspeople were flying in from Japan and flying in from the United States to do business, to make contracts, or to talk to their businesses out there, their suppliers perhaps or whatever, because there was just no way that we could get in touch with the outer world. Even the parliament in New Delhi didn't really seem to care very much. It finally worked itself out, and we got back on line, but it was very interesting to be in a place where everything just stopped. Money transactions stopped, and there were no cables, and there were no telephone calls, and there was no mail. We did have fax, but it didn't work, of course, because the telephone lines were down. Even when the faxes did work, they didn't, because there was one period, as I think I told you, Stu- (end of tape)

He would pack them up at the end of the day and deliver them over with his driver, and that was how we were getting our mail. No one in Washington would believe us, because faxes don't work that way, do they? But yes, they do in certain places in the world. So that's the way it was.

Q: Just to get a feel for India at that time, here was a lot of very sophisticated Silicon- Valley-type investment. India was really opening up, wasn't it, in your area?

HECK: Well, during my tenure it opened up considerably. There had been tentative moves by Mrs. Gandhi, and after her death by Rajiv Gandhi, her successor, to do just that, but it hadn't really taken. Then there were problems in the Indian body politic, and there was a period of some uncertainty, and a series of people held the prime ministership for short periods of time and none of them were very strong, I mean personally strong, but they didn't have the power base to really do too much about it. The real beginning of the opening up, although most of those American firms were there in some measure when I arrived, or at least many of them were, the real opening up came when P.V. Narasimha Rao, who was a member of the Congress Party, the party of Jawaharlal Nehru, when he became prime minister and leader of the pack. The economic situation of the country was very bad in that there was almost no foreign reserve left. There were just weeks left of foreign reserves, and it kind of finally shook the party into doing things that, of course, it should have done many, many years previously. It then made some real efforts to open the economy. What they did was courageous in light of the way things worked in India. The talk of self reliance and keeping other businesses out had been so much a part of the Indian body politic going back to before the British left and when the Congress Party in its effort to get independence for the nation made a big part of its campaign one of what they called swadeshi, of only buying things that were locally made, that were from India. This, of course manifested itself in all the burning of British cloth and that sort of thing in the '30s. But the very idea of letting other people get into the Indian economy in terms of doing business was one that was very unpopular with a very vocal part of the Indian politicians. So to change that made a big difference. There were several things that were done to open up, and one of them was to get rid of a lot of the paperwork or at least to try to get rid of a lot of the paperwork that was involved in doing business in India. They used to say that India had a license raj, the raj, of course, being the government. You had to have a license to breathe down there if you were a businessman. Businessmen used to spend most of their time on airplanes going to and from New Delhi to bend the knee in front of somebody or another and try to get another piece of paper to do whatever it was. What came out of all that was that there might be two firms in the whole country that made a certain product, whether it was zippers or thread or anything, and the idea of opening that to market forces and the sort of modern global economy was very scary to a lot of people including to a lot of bureaucrats. A lot of the businesses liked this at first, and then only as they began to have competition from products which were better made and came from somewhere else, whether it was Japan or Sweden or Canada or the U.S., then they began to think maybe it wasn't such a grand idea either. So the whole process has moved in fits and starts, and right now it's in a period, I would say, of some steps backward instead of forward, because it's a very conservative government that's in power at the moment. But it was opened up in the early '90s to some extent, and that did make a difference. A lot of American businesses came in to look around, if not in my consular district, in one of the other three, particularly in fields like power generation, big things like that, as well as the high-tech industries. The power generation has moved more slowly, I would say. Part of the problem has been that each state controls its own. It's very much

a system of federalism like ours in that sense. But it has, I think, been better in terms of the high tech, one of the reasons being that India is full of very good, young computer engineers trained at some very good schools, and there is a ten-and-a-half-hour time difference, so they can be working for us during their daytime and it's our nighttime, and it makes our businesses move very much more rapidly.

Q: But you need telephone connections to make that make any difference.

HECK: Oh, yes, and we need things like electricity, of which there's a shortage. For many of the other businesses one of the big problems is the infrastructure of the country. The road system is just abominable. Cars have multiplied like rabbits, and the roads are these 1930s two-lane highways which one shares with a variety of other wheeled vehicles including ox carts and so on, so it's very hard to move products. But India is working on all those things. In any case, my job in Madras, aside from just the administration of this presence, became really mainly commercial and business related on one side and consular related on another. There are over a million Indians in the United States, citizens, permanent residents, students, growing rapidly. The Indian community in the United States in the mid-'80s, and probably still, had the best education of any immigrant group in the United States and the highest per-capita income of any first-generation group in the United States, at least of the major ones that we have coming in from overseas. This is probably changing as more family members of citizens come in and are perhaps less educated, but the United States is full of Indian doctors and nurses and scientists and university professors and computer specialists of all types, I mean technically very well qualified people. And they all have relatives, a quarter of whom are in my consular district, and they all want to come or they want to go for a visit or they want to send servants so that the young doctor in Potomac, Maryland, can be taken care of the way he's supposed to. So the consular lines were just tremendous. I, of course, had never had any consular work at all. I had had a three-week consular course in 1968, and the law has changed hundreds of times since then. What I had heard in 1968 didn't make much difference on the way things were in 1990. Our consular office was terribly overworked. I found myself doing an awful lot of letters for them to VIPs around India. I got phone calls from chief ministers, I got phone calls from cabinet ministers in New Delhi, you name it. I could be awakened at any hour of the day or night. In fact, the first thing I had to do, the first major task I had to do when I arrived in the summer, I got a phone call from my deputy chief of mission, or chargé - I'm not sure which he was at that point - but my ambassador in New Delhi, Bill Clark, had been called by a prominent member of parliament from the state of Andhra Pradesh, which is where Hyderabad is. He called the ambassador at some ungodly hour, like two in the morning, to give him the rundown on why he needed a tourist visa for the daughter of a chief minister of the state of Andhra Pradesh, who had just finished college and was going to go visit one of her brothers who lived in California. So the ambassadors apparently, before I got there, sent the word down that Miss Such-and-Such was to have this visa. She was given the visa. This chief minister had been a very famous movie star in Andhra, had millions of dollars. There was no question about support, and there were legal residents in the United States who were her brothers and perhaps they were even citizens. But, in any case, she got the tourist visa and then, of course, three days later there was in the newspaper the story about this huge wedding that she had just had to some man who lived in the United States. At that point our brides, because of the visa restrictions for wives of green card holders, or at least as they were then, our brides from my states were having to wait over a year to join their husbands. That's an untenable position to be in

in India, because you then move in with these perfect strangers who are your in-laws and you sit there without the support of your own family and wait for this man you hardly know to get to the point where you can go and join him. So this was obviously a scam, and I was told to go up there and to tell the then Chief Minister to get his daughter back, she had gone to the United States, and so I did. I went to Hyderabad on my first calls, and I went among other things to see the Chief Minister, and I had breakfast with him, and it was all very warm and fuzzy, and then I pulled this thing on him about what a great embarrassment it would be to him personally to see this in the newspaper and wouldn't it be nice if he would bring his daughter back and let us process her as she should be processed. And he did, but I did not like that. I knew right then I was not cut out to be a consular officer. I was used to worming material out of people. I was not used to telling them what to do. It turned out that the man she married was a citizen of the United States, so all she had to wait was, like, three weeks. We got her processed very rapidly. The father had all the money in the world, so bringing her home was no problem. But that always stuck with me that I had had to pull this on a very famous personage in India, and I didn't find it easy to do. But, as I said, I would get phone calls every day. I would get them from my Rotary Club. I became a Rotarian. I was the first woman Rotarian in Madras at that point. I would be called up all hours of the day or night by these people, and I would also, because the consular section was so far behind in letter writing, I found myself more and more, not at the beginning but as the consul in charge changed and the new one was perhaps not as rapid in getting his work done as the first one, writing letters constantly to keep them up, because they would be weeks late in the letter writing. The poor vice consuls - we had three first-term officers - were working themselves just silly, absolutely silly. The consular section had four people, and it should have had six or eight. It was a great pity. But those were our two biggest problems, or biggest responsibilities, in the south.

Q: What about promoting business there? In a way, it would be counterproductive for the United States to encourage businessmen to invest in India.

HECK: Well, no, we were trying very hard to get more American investment in or at least to facilitate. India is such a big potential market, and the middle class in India, by American standards, is like 150,000,000 people. It's something worth going after. Business was interested although in many cases, when they saw all the hoops they had to jump through, it became just easier for them to take their money and put it in southeast Asia or put it in China or send it somewhere else. But we had a lot of people asking, and there was also a big Indian-American business community here in the United States which, all things being equal, wanted to help their original country and were very interested in setting up businesses in India. So, no, we had a constant stream of people coming for all sorts of things, cell phones, just all sorts of interesting things. Tobacco, the big American tobacco companies were trying to break into the big tobacco market in India. There is a lot of smoking in India and an indigenous tobacco crop. Anyway, we had more than our share, and we had a Commerce office in Delhi, an FCS office with several officers. Each of the other three consulates general had an FCS officer from the Department of Commerce whose main job was to push American business in India. We had various fairs and shows, lots of catalog shows, lots of actual more hands-on type shows. It seemed to me I was cutting ribbons or giving opening speeches to things all of the time. American hospitals were interested. There was a whole series of Indian physicians and doctors who were trying to set up

American-style hospital facilities in various towns and cities in the south and, I suspect, all over India. No, there were all sorts of things which were happening.

Q: Did you find a different attitude towards the United States down there than you did up there?

HECK: Yes, I think so. Well, I think anytime you're out of a capital in a big country like that, you see a different facet of it. The south Indians in general were, of course, every bit as patriotic as Indians in any other part of the country, but they were a long way from what is the major interest certainly in New Delhi and probably in Bombay, and that's Pakistan. That means all of the permutations of the relationship with Pakistan, whether it's the nuclear issue or whether it's shooting at each other on the Koon glacier up in Kashmir or whether they're lobbying things across the border somewhere or whether they're training insurgents in each other's country to send into the other. Those were issues up in Delhi, and the United States got involved in that in that we were very often seen as pro-Pakistani, and, therefore, there would be demonstrations against us on that and the other and so on. Down in the south it didn't come up much. Now I'm sure if there had been a real war with Pakistan while we were there, we would have seen the patriotism coming out, but it just didn't matter. Business was what was mattering in the towns and the cities that I dealt with, the major cities of Hyderabad, Bangalore and Madras, and in smaller cities throughout the region it was much more business related than anything else, and the great desire to send whichever relatives needed to the States. So we didn't get involved a lot in the sort of political issues that took place in New Delhi. Politics in the south is a different ball game. I'm just trying to remember. I think when I arrived none of the four states in my district - I had the four states of Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu plus the remains of the French presence in Pondicherry, which means also three little enclaves on the eastern and western coasts of the south - in none of those places was there a government of the ruling Congress Party at that point. Later on one of the four states - in fact two of the four states - became Congress at various points, and then lost it again. But basically regional parties are what run the politics in the south, and they are very chauvinistic about their own state, about their own ethnic heritage, about their own language, and their issues are different. So as far as they're concerned, dealing with the center, with whoever rules in New Delhi, is one of which party do we back and we will back them in parliament and they will leave us alone and let us do what we want in our own state. That's how things were down there, interesting, very different from New Delhi.

Q: I assume you were reporting on the politics. Were there any developments that really were of particular concern to the United States?

HECK: The issues changed over time, of course, but we had lots and lots of Sri Lankan refugees in camps in Tamil Nadu. We had Dravidian parties ruling in Tamil Nadu for the whole time. There are two major Dravidian parties, and they have gone back and forth, so both of the two major parties were ruling. In Kerala we had for part of the time I was there a Communist government.

Q: That used to be a great concern to us.

HECK: It isn't a great concern to us anymore, partially because the Soviet Union fell apart, had fallen apart by then. The Soviet Union was not bankrolling anything. While we were there, the Russians had to close their library in Kerala, and they were flogging on the streets busts of Lenin and so on. Nobody wanted to buy them. They had the complete works of Stalin, and nobody cared. But the Communist Party in Kerala has become a very Kerala party. It's just another Kerala national party. The Communist Party in India has shrunk. There have been two major ones, one pro-Beijing, one pro-Moscow, but the whole number of members of these parties has shrunk and in many cases the parties have become almost irrelevant. There are a couple of places left where the parties have become regional. One of them is Kerala in the south, and one of them is Tripura up on the northeast along the Burma border areas. But they're not what they used to be. They really are regional parties just as the Tamil Nadu Dravidian parties were regional and the Andhra Pradesh regional party was regional. It's just regional politics now. And, no, they're not antagonistic particularly nor dangerous to the United States or to the welfare of the country of India, in fact quite the opposite.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of working on the Indian bureaucracy to make it easier for American business to exist?

HECK: Well, we certainly tried. It was of mixed blessing. Everybody in the south, the four governments in the south, all spoke a good story, claimed to be eager for investment, would flog projects, whatever they might be. I'm thinking now of the big hydroelectric things that they wanted to do, the big power projects, generation of power being a major need to modernize the country. But talking a good story and doing something about it are two different things. Corruption is still a major part of the political ballgame in that part of the world. There are lots of palms to be greased. Many of the palms to be greased belonged to relatives or caste members or otherwise connected to leaders of various state governments. These were all major problems for us. As I may have said before, one of the impediments along the way to modernization, capitalization of the economy, privatization, all of the things that the United States would have wanted to see in India in order to open the markets and make it a level playing field - one of the major impediments was the bureaucracy, the civil servant of India. As you know, a determined, high-ranking civil servant in charge of a specifically big office can put a great deal of brakes on for this sort of thing. So there was that to be faced also. It was not, perhaps, the easiest thing in the world, but it was definitely worth doing and we were certainly trying.

Q: Were there any particular development while you were there, for example, Rajiv Gandhi's?

HECK: Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated just beyond the outskirts of Madras one night. It was May of '91. He was running. He wanted to be back in as prime minister, and I think he would have made it. He was the legitimate leader of the party. At that point Congress did not rule in New Delhi. One of the short-lived coalitions from the left side of the spectrum was in charge, but Rajiv was the party leader of the Congress Party, and he was campaigning in a place called Sri Perambur, which was a few miles outside of Madras on the road to Bangalore. He was in a big field. It was 10:30 at night. In India the campaigning starts at dawn and goes until midnight or two a.m., and it gets later and later, falls further and further behind, so this was probably scheduled for before that. Anyway, he was to address this gathering of people in this field, and a Tamil woman, young woman, came up to him with flowers. It's the custom in India to drape

flowers around people's necks as a sign of honor, very much like what we have in Hawaii with the leis. In any case, this lady had a garland in her hands, and she knelt or bent over to touch his feet, which is another very common gesture in India of respect, and she triggered something in her waist and blew herself and him up. He was in pieces. It was a very, very awful thing, great carnage. Other people were killed. It turned out later that she was a Sri Lankan Tamil, she was a member of the Lady Tigers, and she was doing this on direction from Prabakaran in Sri Lanka. This is how far he had come from being the hero of the Sri Lankan Tigers to being their sworn enemy. The thing that interested me the most about this indicated the way things work in India, both in how governments in India react to tragedies like this - this was not the first one, of course; his mother had been assassinated before him - and also about the communications. The evening news was on at ten o'clock. I had watched it, and I had gone to bed about 10:15 or 10:30. It had happened at more or less 10:30, as I understand it. I had a kind of a private area upstairs. It was a bedroom and a sort of an office outside that you could close both rooms off, and I had closed them off. There were telephones on the desks in my office room as well as by my bed. About 12:00 or 12:15 the phone rang, and I got up to answer it and I got as far as understanding it was the embassy, and then the lines were cut. This happened a couple of times. The second time I don't think I even knew it was the embassy, but I figured it must have been, and I couldn't get through to them. Well, I just went back to bed. I figured they'd reach me. About an hour and a half later I got a phone call that came in clear as a bell, and it was from the op center in Washington DC, and that's how I learned that Rajiv Gandhi had been killed. It was not publicized. At that point nobody officially knew this in Madras. The Indian government had not announced it. The body had not been brought in. They had clamped on an absolute hold. So I got up, and I got out of bed the member of my political section who was our Tamil person. Because of the difference in languages, both written and spoken, as well as because of the vastness of the area, we had a separate Indian person for each of the four states. I got my Tamil person out of bed, and he and I went to the consulate general. When I drove down, the streets were absolutely calm and quiet and empty, and it just looked like any other night at about two in the morning, a few drunks rolling home and that was about it. But he and I got on the phones, and we started calling people. Of course, the newspapers knew about it by then. We talked to politicians and we talked to newsmen, and we wrote a cable. We got the communicator in, and we sent this message out. In fact, I think we sent several that night. But anyway, by the time we started home again, it was close to five in the morning and the town was beginning to wake up. People obviously knew then, because there were crowds gathering on the streets, and there was obvious tension in the air. They brought the remains of Rajiv into town that morning. There wasn't much to send to New Delhi, but they brought what they could and sent him out. His family was not with him. His wife and his two children had not accompanied him on this trip, so it was just what remained of him and some of the people who had come with him. There was then a tremendous outpouring of sorrow all over the country, a very big state funeral for the man. It was in May. It was very, very hot. I'm sure the people who had to sit in the sun in New Delhi waiting for that funeral pyre to be lit must have really roasted. Our monsoon in the south was at a different time of the year than the rest of the country, or at least in Tamil Nadu it was at a different time, so we were not suffering quite the way they were. But at the same time in my state - and when I say that, I mean Tamil Nadu since that was where I was physically present - the backlash against Sri Lankan Tamils was immediate. Here again, it was a case of things having changed 180 degrees, because the first reaction of people in Tamil Nadu and, in fact, all over India when the troubles began in Sri Lanka in 1983 had been one of great support, tremendous support for the Sri Lankan Tamils. The

various groups had been given asylum in Tamil Nadu. The Indian government had trained these groups in many cases. There was a great back and forth. There was all sorts of support going from India for them, and this began, of course, to change when the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka started attacking the Indian army. But it really changed in Tamil Nadu when this happened, and all of a sudden people were being chased out. People in refugee camps tended to be poorer, the farmers, the small people - they were not hurt at all. But all over the big cities there were Tamils living in towns and cities, and in many cases protected by the Indian government. I'm thinking now of representatives of the Tamil Tigers. They were hunted, and a number of them, particularly in the Bangalore area, were surrounded and there would be shootouts, and a number of them would be killed. They were basically chased away from the major cities. They were not welcome in India at that point, nor have they been since. In fact, the ones who were captured have recently been tried and, I believe, have been given life terms. In fact, some of them, I think, were given a death sentence, but I don't think anything has happened from that. The one exception to this was on the southeastern coast of Tamil Nadu at the area closest to the Jaffna Peninsula, where there were a lot of cross-straight marriages, family ties, and so on. That particular area way down there, which was pretty primitive and cut off from most of the country by lack of decent roads, people down there still had the ties and they would give protection. Basically Tamils in Tamil Nadu who just wanted these people out didn't want trouble, didn't like people shooting on their main streets, didn't like blowing up prime ministers or ex-prime ministers, once and future prime ministers. The mood really changed, and that was a major political event in the period that I was there. In terms of American relations with south India, I think one that went on until after she left the chief ministership of Tamil Nadu was the unlawful taking over of a large part of the campus of what had been an American missionary school in the hills bordering Tamil Nadu and Kerala. This is at a place called Kody Canal, and the school there had been there since the 19th century. It had been a Lutheran school, and title to it had been given to an Indian branch of the Lutheran Church after independence. It was still a Lutheran school. It still had plenty of foreign professors and teachers, and it was a boarding school going through high school and down into the lower grades. Jayalalitha, who was then the chief minister, a woman, the chief minister of the state of Tamil Nadu, another movie star who had made it into politics, had some personal reasons for wanting to turn it over to some personal supporters of hers. Some of what they call in India gundas or thugs went into this building in the middle of the night during the summer vacation when the teachers were gone and just stole it. Then for the next two years the U.S., certainly the Lutheran synod in Missouri and the school - it's an incorporated school in India and it has a board of directors who are international in scope but lots of Indians - tried desperately to get it back. Basically the chief minister would just look at us and smile, and nothing ever happened. When she lost power, I gather that the fortunes of the missionaries changed, and I am not really sure what the status of that is now, but we spent an inordinate amount of time on that and got absolutely nowhere except holding hands with a lot of very nice missionary folk trying to encourage them but being unable to handle it. She is no longer the chief minister of the state. She is under all sorts of threats of lawsuits. She may, in fact, go to jail, but right now she has attached her party's star to the ruling party in New Delhi, and she is the king maker, or I guess you would say the queen maker in this case, of the BJP government ruling in Delhi now, because she holds a certain number of parliament seats there. She's really wielding the whip at the moment, and I don't know how this will all come out, whether she will go to jail, whether any of her friends will ever get back the building that they had wanted. It was

choice lakeside property in a hill station, which means it would be worth a lot for apartment buildings and tourist hotels and that sort of thing.

Q: They weren't trying to use it as a university?

HECK: Oh, no, no, no, no, no. This was strictly for money. This had nothing to do with improving the lot of the local people or anything else. I remember her telling me once before she became a chief minister that one of the reasons that she would not ever be tempted by corruption or by bribes was the fact that she was so very wealthy. She had been a very successful ingenue teamed both in real life and on the screen with M. G. Ramachundrin, who had been a previous chief minister, was chief minister until the day he died, who was a tremendously popular movie star. It was like having Ronald Reagan a hundred times over. People saw this man as a god. He left her money, and she had earned her own money, and her mother had been a film star. There was lots of money. She didn't need money. Well, it turned out she was an extraordinarily corrupt chief minister even by Indian standards. So I guess just having a lot of money does not necessarily keep you on the straight and narrow in conditions like this. There were some caste reasons for this. She had a girlfriend at that point, and there were some reasons that her friend, Shasha Kala, had connections with the people who got the property. It was all terribly intertwined, and who knows what the real reason was that this was allowed, but it was certainly protected, let's say.

Q: When you arrived, the Gulf War just over.

HECK: No, the Gulf War had just begun, had not begun actually. It's interesting because the Gulf War impacted - I do not like that word - made a big impact in Tamil Nadu and in Madras particularly. This was because the night that the Iraqis went into Kuwait in August of 1990, the British Airways flight that went from London to Kuwait to Madras was on the ground in Kuwait and the people who were on that plane were basically from Madras. A lot of Madrasis, a lot of people from Madras, then were captured, were prisoners, because that plane, the British Airways plane, was not allowed to take off. They included one of the biggest industrialists in the city who had a lot of business ties with the United States, collaborations with the United States. They included a man who was a Mennan, Mennans being a group from Kerala, a Mennan who lived in the United States and was either an American citizen or a green card holder and was very important in the film industry. I think at that point he was one of the heads of MGM. He was on that plane. I mean, all sorts of people were on the plane. So people in Madras paid a great deal of attention to this, but, we were a long way away from the Gulf War. In the period following that, the Indians were basically treated well and ultimately released by the Iraqis, but it was all these people who looked like Indians but maybe had American passports that one really worried about, because they were fair game, and all sorts of things happened to various people. Some escaped. Some never did escape and only got out afterwards. Some went underground in Kuwait and were alright but couldn't come home. So it was something that people followed. Then in about October Madras and Bombay both began to be used as bases for planes to come through on their way to the Gulf, Bombay more. But I remember going out to the airport once when the commandant of the Marine Corps and his entire planeload of generals and colonels came through on their way to Kuwait, where they were going to help plan strategy for the war, and we moved a certain amount of cargo through Madras which was destined for Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, not

until later to Kuwait. So in that sense there was some impact. This was handled in a very low key manner. We did not get a lot of publicity in Madras as they did in Bombay, where pictures of these planes would be taken from the sides of the airport and would get into newspapers. This sort of thing did not happen in Madras. We, like the rest of South Asia, were under "voluntary departure." I'm not quite sure why they thought anybody in Madras consular district would be hurt. None of my staff went home. They didn't send any children home or anything like that, but it was offered. We were not allowed to bring families in. My new political economic officer arrived in February of '91, and her husband, who had knocked about all over the world and was in his 50s, couldn't come, because he was a dependent. He could only come months later even though the war was basically over by then. This sort of thing disrupted our life for the newcomers who came to post in that off season, the winter of '90-'91. But basically the war did not have a tremendous effect on us.

Q: There were no political buttons that were being pushed, demonstrations against America on generic terms?

HECK: Only very small ones and nothing that made a whit of difference, nothing that was at all of concern. There were a few who for political reasons wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with the Iraqis, but it wasn't big. It made almost no difference. There was much more of that in New Delhi and in Bombay, where there was a much larger Iraqi community. We just didn't have any. There were very few Iraqis in the district, and I'm sure you could count them on your hands and toes. It was not important to us other than it disrupted our lives in other ways.

Q: Did you travel to all the states and make calls all the time?

HECK: Oh, yes, of course. There was a great deal of that, usually by airplane. As I said, the closest capital of the other states was in Bangalore, and that was a seven-hour drive. I've done it often enough, but it was not a nice, easy drive, so usually by plane. I was on the road it seemed like all the time. The second part of my tour, when Tom Pickering came, then I was on the road all the time with Tom Pickering, because, as you may have heard, the Pickerings are inveterate travelers by land. They believe in driving, and they have driven across Africa and Russia and India and every country that they have ever served in. It was great fun having him because of all the traveling that we did. But I remember it drove the security people in New Delhi just bananas. I'm not quite sure whether they thought the robbers were going to attack us on the road or whatever, but we drove once from Hyderabad down to Madras, which was a very long two-day drive, and we drove from Madras to Bangalore over to Kerala and up and down the coast of Kerala. That was another two-day drive, coming back to get the car home. This sort of thing, we did a lot of that, and it was great fun.

Q: Are there any other sort of elements that we should cover?

HECK: Well, one thing that I would want to mention, I suppose, because in the north and the west and even a bit in the east in my last year there was a tremendous political brouhaha which caused religious riots and great destruction. In Bombay, for instance, there was a lot of burning of Muslim properties. This all started because there is a mosque in UP, in Uttar Pradesh, in north India which was called the Baberamoched after Baber, the first of the Mogul emperors. Some

Indians believed that it was built on the site of the birthplace of Lord Shiva, who is a mythological god, at a place called Iodja in UP. The party now in power, the BJP, the Bharatiya Janata Party, is a very conservative party and very, very Hindu. It's trying hard now to become more multireligious but it has a strong basis in what you might call fundamental Hinduism, if there is such a thing. So a number of the strict fundamentalists in the BJP were demanding that India tear down this 16th century mosque and build a temple to Lord Shiva on the property. This argument had started when Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister, and he died in 1963, so this has gone on a long, long time. But for years and years it had been locked. The government just solved the whole problem by closing it to everybody. That was being changed, and pressure was building up, and there were demonstrations in the north. Well, ultimately some of the hot-blooded types in the BJP overwhelmed the policemen and they started tearing the building down, and the next thing you knew the whole building was torn down, and then the riots started. A lot of Islamic sites got attacked, and there were huge demonstrations. People were killed. Buildings were burned. It was very messy in north India and in Bombay and in other places in the north and center part of the country. People in New Delhi, including the government of India, just couldn't understand why none of this made any difference in the south. It really didn't. This never affected us, and there are some really fundamental reasons for it. One of them is that Lord Ram - I had said Shiva before, it's Lord Ram, but it doesn't matter - the point was that Lord Ram is an incarnation of Vishnu, and Vishnu is the major one of the triumvirate of three Hindu deities in north India. Lord Vishnu has 10 incarnations, one of whom is the Buddha and one of whom is Krishna and one of whom is Ram, and Ram, of course, is a very big hero in Indian mythology who saved the country from the Dravidians, because he got his- (end of tape)

In any case, Ram is Vishnu, and Vishnu is the most important deity in the north, but in the south it's Lord Shiva, who is one of the others of the three of the triumvirate of three, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. It would be sort of like having a big Catholic-Protestant argument in the north and in the south having a completely different religion, Taoism. It just didn't connect, and so people didn't demonstrate. Nobody was hurting Muslims, nobody was rioting in the streets, nobody was doing anything. Neither our embassy could understand this nor could the government of India seem to understand the differences that existed between north and south on this thing.

Q: Did you get any high-level visits at all or Congressional visits or anything?

HECK: We got a certain number of them. I had Larry Pressler once for five or six days.

Q: A Congressman?

HECK: He was a Senator from South Dakota. We had Steve Solarz, of course, who was still the chair of the committee, the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for South Asia, or for all of Asia for that matter, in the House. We had a high-level delegation led by Senator Boren of Oklahoma, who was at that point the chair of the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, and he brought a group of his Senators from the Intelligence Committee, Carl Levin and Claiborne Pell - I'm trying to remember, there were about six of them. But basically, we had visits from government officials, American government officials. We had businesspeople. The members of Congress tended to go to Bombay if they left Delhi. In the consular district, the place they wanted to go most was Bangalore and that area, and sometimes they would fly into Bangalore and I would

meet them up there, but basically we did not have a tremendous number of Legislative Branch visitors. We had more military, we had quite a bit of military at various times. We had the Coast Guard. We had ships visits in the region. But, no, we did not have a tremendous amount. Larry Pressler's was particularly interesting to me, because we were able to get into a base which is used on the southeastern coast of India just where Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh come together, very near that, and it's a place where they tested Indian rockets. Just to be able to get into that was a tremendous coup. Nobody had been in that place, I mean from the U.S. government, for years. Now I don't think that Larry Pressler and I knew what we were looking at particularly. It was not like having the head of one of our atomic energy organizations looking at it, but it was an interesting opportunity to see a part of India that I did not see very often.

Q: How did you feel about the diplomatic process there?

HECK: I enjoyed my tour there, but I must say that I much prefer embassies. I missed the political input on things. Over the course of the years that I have been in India, we have changed, the United States government has changed, tremendously. Its interest has dropped in things political. We, as the State Department, as the Foreign Service, are no longer covering Indian politics the way we did 30-some years before. It really doesn't matter very much about Indian politics. The government is a democracy. It is run out of New Delhi, and the permutations and the convoluted processes of various state governments are not important as the way it seemed to be to us in the 1960s when the Cold War was on.

Q: Everything was important. Kerala - I've never been to India, but I certainly know of that place.

HECK: Because of the Communist Party, that's right. But it doesn't matter anymore. To us now Kerala is the place that a lot of American nurses come from. We get a tremendous amount of nurses out of Kerala.

Q: Where did the patels of the motels come from?

HECK: The patels of the motels come from Gujarat. That's western India. There are lots of patels in Bombay, and, of course, Bombay until a few years - well, relatively speaking in Indian terms - until 30 years ago or so was basically a Gujarati city and not a Maharastran city. So the politics didn't matter, and, of course, I had somebody to cover the politics. I found that the ceremonial side of it kind of bored me. All of the ribbons that I cut and all of the speeches that I read and all of the interminable openings that I went to were particularly awful under my first chief minister in Madras and Tamil Nadu, because he was a strong believer in auspicious times and non-auspicious times. He would be invited to an opening of something that would be at eleven o'clock, and this man would whip in at 12:30 or 1:00 and we would have been sitting under a shamiana, which is a tent, in the hot sun for an hour and a half waiting for it to be auspicious again so that he could join us. This sort of thing used to just drive me nuts, because this always seemed to be on weekends that I was seated in the sun waiting for this man. I must say that Jayalalitha was a little bit better on that. When she said she would be there at a certain hour, she was there at a certain hour, but even so. I did an awful lot of escorting of various embassy visitors and Washington visitors and so on to meet various governors and chief ministers and

chief secretaries. I got very adept at getting around for state and one territorial governmental sets of offices, but it always seemed as if we were having the same conversation for the eighteenth time and nobody really cared in New Delhi what was said on this and certainly not in Washington. The reporting that was done from the field was also... The longer I was there, the more Delhi wanted it all routed through them first rather than our being able to send things directly to Washington. I felt constricted by that to some extent. So I enjoyed my time there, but three years was certainly adequate. I was glad that I left when I did. But it was a beautiful place. The area is fascinating. People were terribly friendly. I have nothing but good memories of my time there really.

Q: Was the food good?

HECK: If you like Indian food, it's completely different than north Indian food. It's strongly vegetarian in at least parts of it. I can eat chilis till the cows come home, but there's one part of Andhra Pradesh where I can't quite get through some of the food because it is so hot, truly hot, to the point that a course called curd rice is always the last thing served. They give you sort of a half and half of boiled white rice and yogurt, the idea being that it takes the last of the heat out of your mouth. But, yes, I like south Indian food.

Q: Well, in '93 you went where?

HECK: In '93 I returned to Washington until my retirement in 1997. So I was here for four years, two years in Personnel and two years as the office director in East Asia Pacific for regional security affairs.

CHARLES A. MAST
Consul General
Bombay (1990-1994)

Charles A. Mast was born in South Dakota in 1939. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Calvin College in 1963, he received his master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1967. His career has included positions in Kastamanu, Curacao, Teheran, Tabriz, Ankara, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Dhaka, and Bombay. Mr. Mast was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2001.

MAST: Then I became consul general in Bombay, in India.

Q: And you were there from -

MAST: 1990 to 1994. We extended a year we liked Bombay so well.

Q: What was the situation vis-à-vis the United States in India when you got there in 1990?

MAST: Well, I'm trying to think. Gandhi was no longer prime minister. There had been a recent election, and V. P. Singh was the prime minister. It wasn't a Congress Party government, nor was

it a BHP or Hindu Nationalist Party coalition. It was a coalition of a lot of smaller parties, including Marxist parties. Our relationship was pretty good. Singh was seen as a very competent bureaucrat and a very honest politician, probably a little bit arrogant who found it difficult to compromise. That was one of the problems that he had, and his coalition fell apart within a matter of months. Of course, the invasion of Kuwait happened within a few weeks of my arrival and this had a fairly major impact on our relationship with India.

Q: How did that play there?

MAST: Well, it played two or three ways. India has maybe 125 million Muslims, and the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis and the Saudis would fight - intellectually at least - for the support of the Muslim community, and so you had factions within the Muslim community, whether it was in the bazaar or whether it was the more educated or the more religious or obscurantist groups. The Iraqis had a lot of support, but the Saudis had a lot of money to spend, so they had their strong supporters as well. Any demonstrations we had during that time, and there were some demonstrations against US policy in Iraq, would obviously be put together by this Iraqi faction. Later, during the war itself, particularly January and February, we had voluntary departure status, so some of the wives and children left India, mostly from Bombay, not so much from Delhi. Bombay, because it was a major port and a huge airport, had a lot of activity there by Iraqi agents. Iraq had a large consulate in Bombay. Our intelligence sources said that probably our people in Bombay were at more risk - not huge risk, but at more risk - than American diplomats and their families in Delhi.

Q: There was concern that Iraqis would announce they were going to wage war against -

MAST: Well, there were a couple of incidences - remember in the airport in Manila and the airport in Bangkok - where I think they arrested some Iraqis or some associated terrorists who were working for the Iraqis, who were trying to put bombs on planes. We had an apartment building where, I think, 12 or maybe 14 members of our staff lived, primarily single people, and the Iraqis, with diplomatic cars, granted, but they would park in front, and they would drive slowly by at night. We know that we were under constant surveillance. Now, of course, I always said, since we would discuss this at our staff meetings, that I would prefer to be under surveillance by an Iraqi car that has a diplomatic license plate than by a Indian car, when you don't know who they are. At least we know that the police, obviously, are keeping a very close eye on this diplomatic car that's teasing our staff. I wasn't trying to minimize it, because it was scary, and we had some people, a couple of female staff, that went back. It was very hard on them, and they took advantage of the voluntary departure status to relocate elsewhere.

Q: Let's talk about the consulate general in Bombay. What was the size and what were its activities?

MAST: We had pretty much everything there that you'd have in any embassy. We had 26 American officers and staff. There was a large USIS facility downtown, where there was a very large library. Indians were fantastic readers, and we had great programs. And in the same building there was a Foreign Commercial Service officer, with an office and library and a staff of local employees as well. In the consulate building itself, which was a few miles away, we had a

large consular section with eight officers. At that time, we issued many more visas than they did either in New Delhi or in Calcutta or in Madras because Gujarat, which is a province in western India, sent the largest amount of Indian migrants to the United States. These were obviously coming through the consulate in Bombay. Plus the fact that Bombay as a large business and banking and commercial center generated a lot of non-immigrant visas, especially business visas. We had two DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) officers.

Q: *Why in Bombay?*

MAST: It primarily had to do with smuggling into and out of the port of Bombay. They would work in liaison with the Indian authorities, and with their people in Karachi, and working together with the Pakistanis and the Indians they would be able to come up with some fairly major intelligence finds that would cause large quantities of drugs to be seized, either in India or in Karachi, before they got to the United States. So they were relatively active. And then we had the typical communications sections as well as a political officer and a couple of economic-commercial officers.

Q: *I know up in Delhi - I've talked to people who have served there - and they say that at the upper level of bureaucracy the Americans and Indians don't meet very well because they tend to preach to each other and all that. At a different - I won't say level - at a different plane of some kind down in Bombay, it was more commercial, wasn't it?*

MAST: Yes, I would tend to agree with that. I don't know that I would have enjoyed an assignment in Delhi, when I loved India, and we loved Bombay, and we liked to travel to Delhi when we would have conferences or Embassy business. We'd go shopping or go to restaurants and that sort of thing. And I thought the living conditions were quite nice in Delhi - in many cases nicer. Bombay was extremely urban. It was like living on Manhattan. But in Delhi, especially in New Delhi, where the embassy was, it was more like living in a large American suburb - you know, big houses and yards. Pollution was terrible in the winter time, however, much worse than in Bombay, so I wouldn't have liked that.

But I think you're right that the Foreign Ministry kept a fairly tight hold over our relationships with the government - or at least tried to. So the Political Section had quite a bit of difficulty dealing with other agencies and other ministries other than through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Now in turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had quite a lot of clout in the Indian Government, so I don't say it wasn't worth working with them. In the Economic Section, of course, they would deal more with the Ministry of Trade and Finance and other more specialized economic agencies. But I had a feeling it was difficult. We didn't have that much difficulty in Bombay. The Central Bank was in Bombay and we had a lot of dealings with them. Some of our dealings there were representations on policy issues and commercial problems but most had to do with economic analysis and statistics.

Q: *It was all more -*

MAST: Day-to-day, yes. We didn't have to make many representations on US policy.

Q: One has the feeling that the Indians had absorbed an awful lot of the British, sort of, London School of Economics type of thing, but particularly the Foreign Ministry is always more susceptible because this is where the people who get their Oxford firsts or something go. And it doesn't work very well, I mean, as far as easy relations.

MAST: The Indians claimed that the Indian Civil Service created a certain breed of Indians and to a certain extent this was true. But while one doesn't want to make too big a thing of this, who is an Indian, what is an Indian? There are Punjabis, there are Gujaratis, there are Maharashtrians, you have Tamils, and Sindhis, not to mention Bengalis, to start and there enormous differences among these people. Then there are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, Jews, etc. Delhi tends to be perhaps one-half Punjabi, and they have the reputation of being hard, aggressive pushers, generally, and very loud, boisterous, jewelry everywhere on the women - that sort of thing. In Bombay, we had the Gujaratis, who tend to be a little less sophisticated, perhaps, than the Punjabis, but I really quite liked them. They are very, very good in business - better than the Punjabis usually - and they really are people who take a longer term view on business and investment, for example. There is a great deal of difference among the peoples of India.

Q: Jokes have been made in the last couple of decades about the "Patel Motels" because it seems like every time you go into a motel it's run by somebody named Patel. Where do they come from?

MAST: The Patels are Gujaratis, and approximately one-third of Gujarat, which has about 40 million people, has the surname Patel. They aren't all related, obviously (although they probably are going way back when). But that's where the "Patel Motel" joke came from, because if one-third of all the Gujaratis that come to the United States are Patels and a number of them go into the motel industry, one-third of those are going to be Patels.

I would give a lot of speeches. I really enjoyed US immigration policy, US ethnic history, how different groups came in at different times, how the foreign-born coped and so forth. That's always been sort of an interest of mine. And there was a long article in *Commentary* magazine, somewhere around 1990, 1991, that had a lot of data on this Patel phenomenon in the hotel industry. Using some of that - and building from other information we had in the consulate or my graduate background in US history and from periodicals I would give speeches about US immigration history that was at the same time a defense of US immigration policy in the present. I would weave in little hints about why we had to turn away people for visas and so forth. But it was mostly a "big picture" thing about what had happened and what was happening, and a fair amount of what I would say would focus on the kind of opportunities that Patels were exploiting in the entrepreneurial area and also, obviously, the benefits that the US was obtaining from this kind of entrepreneurship.

Q: Were you beginning to feel an Indian lobby in the United States reflecting back? In other words, were the Indians getting themselves organized?

MAST: I think that was happening then. It's happened more since then, although the Indians sometimes have a tendency to shoot themselves in the foot. Sometimes the more sophisticated Indians in the United States would be working on something in India, and the Indians would

torpedo whatever they were working on. So there tended to be difficulty in coordinating all of this properly. During the last few years, however, the Indian Embassy has become much more sophisticated in working with Indian-American groups. President Clinton, who was the first President in 22 years to visit India, had an incredible trip there. The Indian-American community would probably vote for him hands down. There are a couple of major fundraisers that Bush has, too, so there is Republican support as well. Clinton's in India again, or was in India again a couple months ago, in Gujarat working on earthquake rehabilitation. I've seen considerable publicity on that in the Indian press; though not much in the US press. And of course, many Indians are very, very successful here, particularly in software and Silicon Valley. We could easily come up with a half a dozen Indian billionaires, at least we could have prior to the dot.com meltdown.

Q: Were you seeing this transformation of India into a technological country, a high-tech country?

MAST: Oh, yes. That had started certainly by 1990, and by 1994 it was booming pretty well. It started out with some pretty non-sophisticated software writing. At the time, this was called a body shop. Indians would come to the United States and work on simple code, or people in India would work on relatively simple time consuming projects. But they're gradually getting more and more sophisticated. By the time we left in 1994, we were starting to see, for example, Honeywell having a regional center in Bangalore, which is in south India. They would have skilled Indian troubleshooters there, and customers would call in, for expert advice on how to repair software or how to go about repairing a particular problem with technical machinery.

Q: I read an article, I think in The Economist, recently, how they have centers - I think in Bangalore or something-

MAST: Bangalore mostly, yes.

Q: -where you have young Indian experts who would take on American-sounding names and fix up a sort of little fictitious history, so people are calling with no idea they're talking to somebody in Bangalore. They think they're calling somebody in Spokane or somewhere.

MAST: I can believe that. And of course that's starting to happen now. We talk regularly to Jamaica or the Bahamas. But you're right, it's happening in India, too.

Q: What about the industry around there? Were we trying to open up India? Was this mainly done through the embassy, or were you contributing to open up India to American goods and all that?

MAST: It was mainly done in the embassy, of course, but they would work very closely with us, and we would be sending problems that the American business community had up to them. There was what we called an American Business Council in Delhi, and we had a similar group in Bombay, and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce was much larger in Bombay than it was in Delhi because Bombay was a much larger commercial and industrial center. So we were quite

a large part of that, but obviously we didn't have a Ministry of Trade or Foreign Affairs to whom we could make representations.

Q: How did American business people that you were dealing with feel about their work in India?

MAST: Terribly frustrated, but the potential was so huge - still is so huge, although they've opened up a lot - that it was the kind of place they *had* to be. I remember Guardian Glass, for example, was building a large glass factory in Gujarat, in our part of India, and I had lunch with a Guardian executive just before I came, and I, of course, had been in Indonesia recently, and I had been in Malaysia and thought I knew something about China, and I said, "Well, what are you doing here? What are you doing there?" And he said, "Well, we've got two or three areas where we've just got to be." Indonesia was one, and they had a factory there. China was one, and India was one. That if Guardians didn't get in, get the factory set up, learn how to make glass competitively in India, there was a danger of being shut out of the market.

So ironically - or not so ironically, perhaps - some of the Indian protectionism sort of forced people to try to set up factories in India, where they might have lost money for a number of years, but though that they had to be there because of the potential. But also even in terms of trade, exports and so forth, people would say: "We've just got to be there."

Q: How about American in trouble and all that? You're the chief consular officer in a major area.

MAST: I had a deputy, of course, who was an FS-1 consular officer, and he and his staff would deal with most of that, although I occasionally had to get involved personally as well. One of the more interesting problems we had involved ashrams and this is true all over India - but we had them in Gujarat and we had them in Maharashtra.

Q: These are Buddhist retreats.

MAST: Hindu retreats.

Q: I mean Hindu retreats.

MAST: They could be Buddhist, too, but they're primarily Hindu, obviously, in India. And there was one that we called the "Yuppie Ashram," and the devotees there tended to be wealthy Americans - I think Richard Gere was even there, you know, people like that - and their *guru* was wealthier or more sophisticated than others. There were other ashrams which included basically a common *guru* and a number of Indian disciples and somehow some American would get involved with that, and then there would be odd accidents, sometimes very tragic ones that would take place, and the consular officer had to go up and investigate. We had several of those in our area.

We had some people in prison, but not that many. I've probably had more people in prison in other places where I've been than we had in India. A lot of times they would just deport people, unless they got into serious problems.

Q: *Did you get involved with "Bollywood" or whatever it is?*

MAST: Actually, it's very interesting. I've talked to other consuls general who have been there, and my immediate predecessor said, "Stay away from Bollywood." His predecessor had been deeply involved with Bollywood, and one of my successors has also been involved with Bollywood. We generally stayed away. Initially we had some peripheral contact with some of these folks who are big entertainers. Time means absolutely nothing to these people, so you'd be invited for a nine o'clock dinner, and you'd think, Oh, I don't want to be too early, I'll go at nine-thirty." We would get used to doing that. We would eat at one. At nine-thirty we would probably be the first people. In fact, often the host and hostess would still be getting ready. Indians ate late anyway. We never ate at dinner parties until 10:30 or 11 or 11:30. If one had to go to work - we went to work earlier than Indians did, although as consul general I could adjust a little bit, but if one worked all night and half the morning one should be able to sleep in till eight o'clock, but I usually couldn't. So I decided I did not need this aggravation. We were so sought after in the commercial community and in the university and in the intellectual-cultural community that we did not pursue Bollywood folks. We got to know some of them, and we got to know writers, and they would sometimes have some of the Bollywood people at their parties. But Bollywood, *per se*, we'd kind of try to stay away from. Although at the end, I must admit, one of the last nights there, we had a wonderful evening with three or four friends that were having a little farewell for us, and which included some movie stars. One was Amitabh Bachchan, who is sort of Mr. Everybody in Indian movies, and he's a wonderful person. I had a great conversation with him for the evening. And then I thought how wonderful it would have been to have gotten to know each other a little better. But we just didn't have time for everything there. There were times during the social season, which would be the cool weather - December - March - when it wasn't unusual at all to have three functions a night for night after night after night. I used to joke somewhat arrogantly that there was little in an important social sense happening in Bombay to which the American CG was not invited.

Q: *What about the universities?*

MAST: I was not as involved, again in retrospect, as I should have been. Our USIS BPAD was a senior officer, and he was very active, of course, and he would periodically get me involved or come with me. I would do that some, to defend US policy or attend university functions. But generally he did that himself. I got very involved in US policy during the Iraq war. I had to be a little bit careful there, because the Kuwaitis obviously made a big thing out of the occasion. They spent a fortune on major banquets and public fora, and of course I was always included on the dais, and I always had to say something. I had some set talking points, but usually I would have to do more than that. They usually managed to get the Russian consul general on the dais also, so he had to also make some comments about Russian policy. So for the first six months or a year that I was there, there was a great deal of that, and that was something new to me. I hadn't gotten that deeply involved in public diplomacy before.

Q: *What about the consular corps there? Were they pretty active?*

MAST: Yes, it was a large consular corps. I think we had something like 40 or so career, consul generals. Virtually all the Arabs were there, most of the Europeans, the Canadians, one or two

Latin Americans, and a few Asians, including the Indonesians, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Malaysians, Thais, and the Filipinos. So there was as pretty good-sized consular corps. The governor of the state and the chief minister would each do me a major representational event annually for the corp and, of course, we were invited en bloc to all Indian national functions.

Q: What about trade disputes? Were the Indians exporting much to the United States?

MAST: I got deeply involved in one part of US policy, which was, I guess, fairly secret at the time, although it's not particularly now, and that had to do with our concern with dual-use chemicals.

Q: Yes.

MAST: I had some pretty good friends, good contacts, who were manufacturers of chemicals. When I first got there, there wasn't so much emphasis on dual use, or maybe I just didn't know that much about it, but certainly after the Gulf War got more deeply into that sort of thing. Of course, there's always a certain bureaucracy in Washington that believes that no Indian, and certainly no Iraqi or no Syrian, should ever buy any kind of precursor raw material for insecticides because they don't need insecticides. We need insecticides, but they don't need insecticides. There's usually a great debate going on as to what is proper use for these precursors, and what is improper use. Well, I knew this Indian quite well, and now and then I'd see some intelligence on so-and-so. I'd think, I know this guy. I got pretty deeply involved with analysis and lots of memoranda of conversation. Washington would be quite interested: check this out and check that out, and so forth. This guy was just a manufacturer and exporter, and he was selling certain kinds of chemicals. He argued that if the Iraqis wanted to buy it, well, they were legitimate consumers, why not sell it to them, or the Syrians. His government had no export embargo on these products. There were a lot of honest misunderstandings about many of these things.

Q: Talking about chemicals and all, this was way before your time, but Bhopal, where there had been a major poisoning.

MAST: It was in 1984, I think, where they had turned a valve on improperly and several thousand were killed. Well, we used to go to Bhopal periodically because it was in our consular district, but it was rather quiet at the time, although there were still lawsuits going on. The Indian Government won a major lawsuit against Union Carbide, I think \$450 million or so. And then, of course, what happened was it basically went into the Central Bank, and the government was supposed to use that for the people in Bhopal. Of course, the Indian Government said that for eight years we've been taking care of all of these people and we've spent x hundred millions on this. There were many debates in the press and among NGOs and other groups who argued that the government was exploiting these poor Indian people who had been injured and died in the accident. They were exploiting them almost as badly as Union Carbide had, so it was quite a story. For a little while, there was a danger that - I've forgotten his name - the chairman of Union Carbide might be extradited or arrested, but we were not directly involved in that, as of course the consulate general had been earlier in the 1980s.

Q: You set up a factory in India and very quickly, as happened in Bhopal, you have squatters and all getting all around the fence, which creates a problem. Did this happen?

MAST: I remember it happened with a number of Indian factories. I knew people in the chemical industry who would have this problem. Indian chemical effluent wasn't nearly as clean as it should have been. But the problem intensified when squatters moved so close that the kids were actually playing right in the effluent or people were washing their clothes in it or whatever. So you're right. The press of population and the poverty really does make it very difficult. Again, this guy I knew in the chemical industry was very successful and had a very large plant in Gujarat. He told me, "You know, I used to go to this plant, and I'd see this effluent coming out, and it would be blue and it would be red and it would be yellow. We have started to really clean it up. Now it's just sort of a dirty gray." He added, "I'm not doing that for humanitarian reasons. That was money flowing down there, so we've just got to recover the chemicals that we were flushing away and reuse them or resell them or re-exploit them." There is economic sense in cleaning up, maybe not when you get to where you've got to take 99 percent out, as we find out with our own smokestacks. But if it's going to be the difference between 50 and 90, there is a great economic incentive in cleaning up.

Q: The Soviet Union while you were there ceased to exist, and for a long time, India had looked to the Soviet Union as being its strategic ally. Did that make any difference for you all?

MAST: On a personal level, I had a good relationship with the Soviet consul general. There were two or three of them during that period, and obviously the Indians, some of the more idealistic ones, would always be trying to get us together on the dais in a public venue. The theme would be how there was going to be world peace now that the Cold War was over. You can imagine this kind of thing going on. There was a large naval base in Bombay, and the end of the Cold War and subsequent US naval visits made it much easier for us to get to know Indian naval officers.

Q: Was there anything else we should cover on Bombay, do you think?

MAST: Well, of course, there were failures.

Q: Yes.

MAST: We had the BARC, which was the nuclear power facility and research facility, the center in Bombay and Tarapur, which was a major facility we had sold to them originally in the 1960s. There was intense interest in the USG in getting to know as many of these people and what was happening as possible. I mean it was a major interest for open-sourcing, but our covert people were also very interested in what was going on there. You know I think I understood why we didn't know that the Indians were going to blow off the atomic bomb, whenever it was, two or three years ago, because it was just virtually impossible to get to know any of those people. If I was at a party and I would just accidentally meet a BARC scientist and he might tell me his name, or I might be able to find out and he might even talk to me a little bit, but then it would totally close. I mean there was no way *ever*. I'd come home from a party and think that so-and-so is the technical director of such-and-such. Maybe we can have him over to our next party. Or I'd

tell someone in the consulate that he might want to get to know that fellow, and so on. Never. They were just very secretive. I understood why we didn't know very much about what was going on in the nuclear area.

Q: *What was your sounding of -*

MAST: Excuse me. For an open society and economy like India, where *everybody* was willing to tell you *anything* at any time, for certain sectors of that society to be able to keep that kind of secret was extremely unusual. Americans tend to be very open, too, but we manage to keep some secrets also.

Q: *What about the attitude towards Pakistan? What were you getting. Bombay was somewhat removed from it and all. I was wondering what you were getting.*

MAST: There were different attitudes among different groups of Indians. There were many Sindhis in Bombay who had originally come from Pakistan. Many of them were among our best friends. They had incredible interest yet in Pakistan, and surprisingly, for people who had been driven out of Pakistan, some sympathy for Pakistan. Other people - there was a nationalist almost nativist group who were born and raised in Maharashtra, the state that Bombay was in, who tended to be fanatics when it came to Pakistan. They were fanatic anti-Muslims, and that of course also made them anti-Pakistan. So there were these different groups with different points of view having to do with Pakistan. There was a Pakistani consul general in Bombay for a couple of years. I got to know him very well, and it was very interesting to see India through his eyes. He felt that he had made a lot of good relationships there, but it was always very difficult because any time anything adverse would happen there would be all kinds of demonstrations. They never opened a consulate. He lived in a hotel for a long time before the Paks closed the office. Different groups made it too difficult for them to open a consulate.

Q: *So you left there in 1994. Incidentally, what was your impression? We had probably a couple of ambassadors while you were there, didn't we?*

MAST: I served for only 8 months with *the* best US ambassador I ever served with, Tom Pickering, who was ambassador there just for that short period of time. The ambassador when I came had been Bill Clark, who was an East Asia hand, and I thought did a good job, although I wasn't as impressed with him as I was with Pickering. And then Ken Brill, who was a young DCM at the time (he's since been ambassador to Cyprus and was executive secretary in the Department), and was chargé a couple of different times for several months. I was very impressed with him. It was interesting to work for someone who was younger than I was. I think that's probably the first time I'd ever done that. Frank Wisner came about three months before I left, so I just barely got to know him.

Q: *Well, then, you left in 1994. Whither?*

MAST: Well, back to Washington.

STEPHEN F. DACHI
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1991-1994)

Stephen F. Dachi was born in 1933 in Hungary. He attended the University of Oregon Dental School and then joined the Peace Corps. While in the Peace Corps he served in Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. During his career in USIA he served positions in Hungary, Panama City, Brazil, and India. Mr. Dachi was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in May 1997.

What about India? You were in India from when to when?

DACHI: I was in India from 1991 to 1994. That was very nice. When I went to India, I said, "I will not get into trouble with anybody ever again." I went out there and was a different person. I tried to be a team player. I didn't get into fights with anybody. It turned out to be a very interesting assignment.

I think implicit in what we've been talking about... I was consul general in Sao Paulo. The scope of that job was light years ahead of anything else I had done in every respect. It was a large mission doing important issues. When I finished in Sao Paulo, George Landau who had been a great ambassador, tried to recruit me to be his deputy at the Americas Society in New York, where he had gone to be Director after his retirement from the Foreign Service. He said, "You have just hit the peak of your career. The smartest thing you can do now is retire and come to work for us." Well, there were a number of reasons why my wife and I thought about it and decided not to do it. When I said "No" to him, he said, "I can see why you're doing this. You don't want to do it because you think that you are going to become an ambassador and you don't want to cut your chances off from doing that. I can tell you you're not going to become an ambassador, it is not in the cards for somebody from USIA. But, I understand you doing this. I wouldn't want you to come here if you're going to sit here in this office next to mine and the first time you get mad at me, you're going to say, "Dammit, I could have been ambassador to Peru and instead I came to work for this bastard, George Landau and you'll never forgive me. Go right ahead and see if you'll ever become an ambassador. I wouldn't want to deprive you of the opportunity to get frustrated in your own way."

Be that as it may, leaving any emotional and personal factors aside, no one can argue that the scope of the job I had in Sao Paulo was beyond anything else that I could aspire to get in the future. Certainly the job in New Delhi was nice and most interesting, I'm glad I did it, I got a lot out of it and I think I did some useful things there. But it was no Sao Paulo. At the same time, after what happened in Washington and my travails there, it was a positive experience for which I was grateful.

As it turned out, we went for 18 months in New Delhi without an ambassador during my time there. For half my tour, I was de facto acting DCM with a chargé d'affaires, Kenneth Brill, now Ambassador to Cyprus, who was an absolutely outstanding individual of whom I was very fond and whom I admired greatly. My professional relationship with him I enjoyed personally more

than I've ever enjoyed working with anyone else. So, it was just wonderful. That 18 months, when he and I were there working together in the front office was just great. That made a big difference. The other thing about being in India was that it's such an interesting place. The history, the culture, the religion, the civilization is so different from anything I had ever encountered anywhere else. It was a great learning experience. From a working standpoint on the other hand, India is very frustrating and exasperating. It is very difficult to get anything done in India. India and the U.S. have had a very rocky, frustrating, up and down relationship ever since their independence.

Q: They are two basically arrogant countries which each believe has the unique wisdom of how the world should be run.

DACHI: That's right. And each genuinely believes that of the other. It was difficult. On the other hand, India was just entering this period of change and economic reform that now has acquired a certain life of its own. So, it was a good time to be there. It was a good tour, all things considered.

Q: I have a couple of questions about India at this time. We're talking about 1991-1994. You were the PAO. What was your impression of the Indian press?

DACHI: You have to divide it into three. The English language press, which is the national press and is widely read by the elites, was quite free. It was fairly good. But the majority of the people read the vernacular press, which is much more nationalistic and has been slower to shed its virulent anti-U.S. tone, a legacy from all those years when a very close relationship with the Soviet Union dominated the atmosphere. Radio and television during my time were still under absolute, total state control. There was only one radio station in India, All India Radio. News there consisted of texts prepared and released by the Ministry of Information. Television was the same. When a fanatical right wing Hindu mob tore down the mosque in Ayodhya, an event that made headlines and set off alarm bells all over the world, coverage on Indian radio and television was drastically censored. People could learn about it only by listening to foreign broadcasts, which not many were in the habit of doing. Now, satellite and cable have come in and things have changed very significantly. But the free press at that time was mainly the English-language written press. The latter was even able to write about the Ayodhya incident, but since no more than three or four percent of Indians read English, the government did not regard that as a threat.

The overwhelming factors at that time (and they're still important) are the following. Number one, there is a greater suspicion of foreigners in India than in any other place that I know of. The British period, the East India Company, etched the deepest, most lasting impressions imaginable into Indian hearts and minds. The suspicion of foreigners is pervasive and often poisonous. It makes it very difficult to work there. In Latin America where it is also widespread, it was at its highest in Mexico. But I always thought it was limited to a relatively small circle of people. Throughout Latin America, no matter how anti-American government policies may have been, and even though the population at large always had a sort of love-hate relationship with the U.S., there was always respect, admiration and often envy for a lot of things we have achieved. In India, although there is a segment of people who have relatives here and so on, suspicion of foreigners and the condemnation of American "cultural imperialism" and its consumer society

was far wider and deeply held. Many Indians liked to refer to the U.S. as a “society in decline,” and sincerely believed it.

Aside from the communist countries, India was the only one that never allowed the Embassy to invite anyone from the public sector, and that meant virtually everyone of any importance in policy making, to participate in the International Visitor Program or accept Leader Grants as they were called, to visit the U.S. in a professional capacity. They insisted that any such grantees had to be chosen and designated exclusively by the Indian government, a provision which has always been unacceptable to us. They were so afraid of being brainwashed or “subverted by the CIA,” they couldn’t contemplate such a program even in the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union when I served there. As a result, we wasted countless grants on people of little importance, by that I mean without prospects of becoming leaders or occupying prominent positions (the purpose of the IV program) simply because they held no public position and were available to travel.

Number two, admittedly I was there at the very beginning of economic reforms, privatization, liberalization of trade and so on, but the opposition to these changes was wider, broader, and deeper than anywhere else. Even now that I’m teaching a course on the global economy at Georgetown and I do comparative studies with other countries including China, I still believe that to be true. Today I saw a story in “The Washington Post” in connection with President Clinton’s visit to Brazil. It wasn’t about Clinton. It just said that Brazil is very hesitant and afraid of this free trade that Bill Clinton is advocating, because it would mean going much faster toward opening up markets. Domestic companies were reportedly afraid that they would go under if this opening is too fast. Therefore, there was resistance. Nowhere is that more true than in India. There is resistance to that kind of economic liberalization and opening of trade almost everywhere where the formally protected industries are trying to slow things down because they’re justifiably afraid they’ll go under. But in India, the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and his advocacy of self-reliance and *swadeshi*, the word they use to describe it, is still deeply ingrained. It has now been revived by the BJP, the Hindu nationalist party and the opposition to economic reforms and globalization is as widespread as ever.

Specifically, there is an enormous ideological opposition to bringing in foreign consumer goods and also to attracting foreign investment to certain key sectors. They feel that this will bring in Western values and undermine their culture. At the same time, the bureaucracy fears the loss of control this implies over a socialist economy it has ruled and regulated almost to death over the past fifty years. Obviously I am referring to official circles. I don’t know of any place in the world where the consumers are opposed to having access to western goods. Ideological and cultural resistance to economic reforms at this level of intensity is not what drives resistance to change in most countries globalizing today. In the latter, it comes from the vested interests of old-line businesses fighting for survival and the bureaucrats who regulate and control the system of protectionism and a closed economy. Not in India. In India, the business considerations may be present but ideology continues to play the dominant role.

Another thing that is unique to India is the Hindu philosophy of life, which to the western mind is very hard to understand, almost unfathomable. It is extremely conservative and resistant to change, particularly to new and modernizing ideas from the outside. The faster the outside world

moves, the faster change, innovation, and technology, all these things that are anathema to Asian religions and cultural values insinuate themselves from the outside, the more apprehension and fear it generates. If you add up these factors, you're talking about a place where extraordinary challenges face us in trying to reconcile our contrasting views on foreign policy and economic questions, before you even get to the intractable issues like Kashmir and nuclear policy.

Q: This time you were there saw the absolute disintegration of the Soviet Union into an empire that is gone. India has always used the Soviet Union as being its friend, as a counterweight to the United States. Did you sense in the people you dealt with there any disquiet on the fact that their friend to the north had disappeared?

DACHI: Oh, enormous disquiet. It was a big factor. I have a theory on that. When I first got there, it was just as the Soviet Union was disappearing. In my previous assignments overseas, when you had contact with Soviet diplomats, you had to report every meeting, every conversation to the Embassy security officer. The Soviets were always suspected (with good reason) of trying to recruit or subvert you. They were usually people who were very ill at ease if they unexpectedly met an American diplomat, were hard to reach, often uncommunicative, and so on. I showed up in India just as the Soviet Union was disappearing and, all of a sudden, these very same diplomats, now known as Russians rather than Soviets, morphed into the most friendly, "democratically oriented," capitalism espousing people, talking to us like we had been friends forever. It took them about 24 hours to change their spots. Yet they were the very same guys who a year before, and even two weeks before, were the heavy gumshoes.

I had served in Hungary for four years in the '70s and had extensive exposure to this kind of world. I always thought that most of the people over there claiming to be communists were in reality just opportunists and careerists. I always maintained that the number of convinced Marxist- Leninists in the communist world was very, very small. Not so in India. The people claiming to be Marxists or communists really believe in it. Most of the "true believers" weren't in Moscow or Beijing all along. They were in New Delhi, in government, in Indian universities and in the labor movement, and still are. The academics still believe in this stuff. There are still two sizable, fully functioning communist parties in India.

Why? My theory is not implausible. How did communism come to China? Mao Tse Tung imposed it ruthlessly by killing off everybody, mainly land owners, who was against it. How did communism come to Russia? Lenin and Stalin killed everybody that stood in their way. How did communism come to Eastern Europe? With the Red Army imposing it at the end of World War II, with puppets who spent the inter-war period being trained in Moscow and foisted on each country. So, communism in those countries was imposed by brute force on all these people.

The kind of socialism that came to India, on the other hand, was not imposed by anybody. It was brought in by unquestioned intellectual leaders who were revered as the fathers of independent India, first and foremost, Jawaharlal Nehru and, to a great degree, Mahatma Gandhi. A similar phenomenon took place elsewhere in South Asia, like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Gandhi and Nehru were the fathers of an independent and democratic India, people who learned their Marxism in London, who were much more pure of heart than the likes of Mao, Lenin and Stalin. They actually convinced people by their moral stature and their character. As a result, they made

millions of genuine converts because they were credible people who never resorted to the kind of totalitarian steps that these others did. You can see the consequences today. India is virtually the only place in the world where there are still thousands and thousands of Marxist and communist true believers.

I remember visiting a university campus in Calcutta once. I couldn't believe my eyes. The walls were plastered with huge posters of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Marx and Lenin, okay. But Engels and Stalin? It took me back to my days as a school boy in Romania in 1947 and 1948 when we had to go out marching in parades as "little red pioneers" carrying placards of those four. I haven't seen displays of Stalin posters anywhere in the world since the late 1950s.

To a certain extent all that is beginning to slowly erode now. In the last few years, the revisionist historians on Jawaharlal Nehru have multiplied rapidly. Jawaharlal Nehru is being viewed in much less favorable terms than he was at one time, and many of his philosophies on which independent India was founded in 1947 are now seen as having been misguided. Many of the old ideological premises which went unchallenged for nearly fifty years are no longer taboo. But the transformation in people's minds is not as fast as it had been in China and Russia.

Q: I have my own personal theory that the Fabian socialists, the brother and sister in England, had a much more pernicious impact on the Third World (Africa, India, and other places) than did Marx and Engels.

DACHI: There you have it. I agree with you completely. I left Romania in 1948 to emigrate to the West. I went to Canada and the United States and forgot all about Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It was not until I went to Calcutta in 1992 that I saw them again. I asked somebody, "How do you explain the Soviet Union's disappearance?" The answer I got was that there is nothing wrong with communism, it is still the best system. The reason the Soviet Union collapsed was that Gorbachev screwed it up and mismanaged it.

Q: Particularly as a public affairs officer, you're sort of the point man in dealing with the intellectuals. In some countries, intellectuals are important; in other places, they aren't. What about the intellectual class and your contact with them in India?

DACHI: I did have some contact with the intellectual class. I lay the emphasis on "some" because the maximum contact I've had with the intellectual class was in Hungary. In those days in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, intellectuals were really important. The intellectual class in Hungary, which was basically western-oriented, just reached out to me. They craved any contact with and access to western culture that they could get near. Again, there was an article either today or yesterday in "The Washington Post" about how former Soviet dissidents are at sea because they've lost their status. Indian intellectuals on the other hand, almost without exception looked down their noses at western culture and felt no need for contacts with a lowly U.S. Embassy officer to discuss it. After Hungary I went to Panama. There was no intellectual class there at all. There is damn little of it in Brazil. In India, there is an intellectual class, but most of their thinking is on a different planet and, as I was saying, most of them were not particularly interested in mingling with an American public affairs officer.

In Hungary, I used to have lunch with editors of journals who used to hang on my every word. I was one of the few sources who in their own language could talk to them about U.S. culture, life, politics and so on. They were dying to hear another version, even if they couldn't write about it. I don't know how many lunches I had with Indian editors. They didn't care what I said. They were there to tell me where I was wrong, where the U.S. was wrong, explaining to me things that they were sure I didn't understand about India. It was ships passing in the night. Most of them were nice, very civilized people. Several of them liked me because I had become a "likable chap" in my old age and I didn't seek confrontation in dialogue with them. On non-controversial issues, we could have a nice conversation. But in our position on these intractable issues like nuclear non-proliferation, Kashmir and above all "Western cultural imperialism," forget it. That's another pernicious thing about U.S.-India relations. They are so heavily dominated by these hopelessly intractable issues. That is why everybody on our side is so desperately looking for rapid growth in U.S. trade and investment, praying that it will go faster and better all the time, so as to finally give us something by way of a constructive, positive element in talking to the Indians.

In Hungary, I used to have wonderful conversations with journalists about all kinds of things. It didn't matter whether we agreed or not. They were very eager to hear what I had to say and I was eager to hear what they had to say. But in India, everything was so predictable. You could have just said, "Alright, these two people will have lunch. I'll tell you before they ever start exactly what each side is going to say, so you might as well not speak with your mouth full because there is no need to rush. No minds are ever going to be changed."

Q: By this time, had the first love worn off? We had had ambassador after ambassador going out there who sort of fell in love with India. We would always tout up India, particularly by some of our political ambassadors, yet when you get right down to it, nothing ever really came of this. The Indians seemed to be, oddly enough, as comfortable or more comfortable with the Soviets than with us.

DACHI: They were much more comfortable with the Soviets because they were ideologically much closer. And yes, the people who had love affairs with India had faded into the background by the time I got there. There were three ambassadors: Bill Clark, Tom Pickering, and Frank Wisner. They were all vigorous promoters of better relations and labored mightily on the intractable issues, but they had no illusions about India.

Q: All three professionals.

DACHI: Right. For my money, Bill Clark was the best of the three. That may not be what you would expect most people to say given the legendary reputations of Wisner and Pickering. But Bill Clark was very well liked by the Indians and he liked the Indians. Yet he never lost sight of U.S. interests or what he was there for. Although on a personal level he was very, very into the Indian thing in every respect, on the policy side, he was a good, hard-nosed, effective ambassador. I don't mean to say that the others weren't, but Bill Clark had it all in balance. Tom Pickering, I would say, as far as intellectual prowess is concerned, is light years ahead of everybody else. That, in a sense was a disadvantage in India.

We as Americans collectively have this problem that we believe that if you really understand a problem thoroughly, we must be able to find a solution to it. If I can bring you around to understanding my point of view, which is based on an objective, dispassionate analysis of the facts, you cannot possibly escape reaching the same conclusions I do. That is an American characteristic (I would say it is virtually embedded in our genetic code) that is particularly disliked in India, I suppose because they believe the same thing themselves. Because Tom Pickering is so brilliant, he was even more a victim of this. He believed that even though all the cogent analyses of the American point of view over the last 50 years didn't carry the day, he could argue them just a little bit more clearly and persuasively and, as a consequence, carry the day. He was there for a very short period of time, but he was relentless in the fundamental belief that if you were just rational and articulate enough in arguing your point of view, people could not escape coming to the same logical conclusion that you did. I don't know how long it would have taken him to get frustrated and disappointed, but he got a chance to leave before that moment arrived.

Frank Wisner, on the other hand, is a guy who believes that no one can resist his charms and that he would inevitably carry the day, not necessarily on the power of irresistible logic, but on his impeccable diplomatic finesse. I think he began to get frustrated after a while. I don't think he left India with the same idealistic vision that he arrived with. So, no one has an old-style love affair with India any more. The last two officers at the Embassy who had love affairs with India had left just before I got there.

Q: In a way, with the great democracy in the world, it was a pretty sterile time there.

DACHI: Absolutely. We have always said that we are the world's two "greatest democracies." We were grasping for straws to find a way to give that some practical meaning, to say that we have something in common, some common interests, but the fact is that, if you look at the history of Indo-U.S. relations, it rarely worked out. The fundamental cornerstone of Jawaharlal Nehru's belief that India had to retain its option of an independent foreign policy and not automatically follow the U.S. lead resulted in his policy of non-alignment. That was dealt a crushing blow with the incredibly painful Indian experience of being invaded by China in 1962 and having to ask for help from the United States. That was very painful. After that, things were a little bit better for a brief period, but that too ended in 1971 when the U.S. sided with Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war that led to the independence of Bangladesh.

Then there was the period in which they had to get wheat from us under PL 480 because they were not self-sufficient in wheat. That was just as painful. Most other countries would have been delighted that we gave them such vital aid. To Indians, it was a humiliating experience too painful to ever recall. After Nehru died, Indira Gandhi came in and we had the war in Bangladesh. Even though the Green Revolution took place in about the same period and it was through our research that we were able to provide them this miracle wheat and miracle rice, the key factor in having made India self-sufficient in food, forget it. That didn't count. We tilted toward Pakistan in the case of Bangladesh and she could never forgive us. She signed the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union that same year and started to introduce additional, rather radical socialist measures into the economy. So, things went down again on multiple fronts. Then we increased our cooperation again with Pakistan because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

and the resulting war. That bothered the Indians tremendously. So, there just haven't been many positives there. Rajiv Gandhi had a brief romance with Ronald Reagan, but that didn't last long either. Our relations were not so hot for a long time, really until the Soviet Union collapsed. Then Kashmir and non-proliferation have been this ongoing crisis, forever poisoning the well.

Now, we're laying our eggs in the trade and investment basket. Certainly much has happened in that field, although it has been much slower and more tortuous than what had been predicted. Without a doubt, it has been an important, positive factor. In the last few years they have also opened up their media. That became inevitable with the advent of satellites and email, making it impossible to control the electronic media. As a result, there is much more media freedom. The consumer society is giving rise to a growing middle class. So, things are moving now more so than I would have predicted when I left there. Things are on a much more positive note today.

Q: But as a practical matter, for a very long time, India was really not very important to us when the chips were down. It wasn't actively fighting us. It was preaching on the side and we would preach back at it. But it really wasn't very important.

DACHI: Absolutely true. We were on opposite sides on most foreign affairs issues, they were against us most of the time at the U.N., and we were always perceived as favoring Pakistan over India. (In Pakistan it was the other way around, hence the origin of the term "zero-sum game" perpetually applied to our relations in South Asia.) They condemned us for any aid we gave to Pakistan, especially on the military side and they never acknowledged any aid we gave them, not even the billions of dollars worth of PL-480 food aid we delivered before India became self-sufficient. And, they kept us at arms length on economic relations, trade and investment until their key ally, the Soviet Union collapsed, thus we never derived a strong mutual benefit from any sort of common undertaking. So, rather than being important to us more often than not they were a thorn in our side.

Again, if a one liner can symbolize that, my son, who at that time was the national security legislative assistant to Senator John Chaffee of Rhode Island, came to visit me while I was in India. He was invited as a speaker at several think tanks and other places because as a Senate aide, he was in great demand. He is very articulate and very bright. He gave some great talks and gave very much the congressional point of view, which goes to the point you made. They would ask him about Kashmir. He would get up in front of these high-powered think tanks and say, "Let's face it. To the population of the United States, Kashmir is a sweater." That got the point across more effectively than anything else. Congressional people can say anything they want. We can't.

By the way, the Indians love that kind of talk, or, at least it is the only kind that gets them to sit up and listen. I gave dozens of talks about economic reforms, U.S. policy, and so on. At first, I went in there in the usual way and tried to be helpful and explain. But there would always be people in the audience who had just been waiting for months or years to get a crack at a live U.S. diplomat. As soon as I was through, they would get up, take out their notes, and give speeches instead of questions. They never listened to a word I said. They would come back with all of these anti-American chestnuts they had been roasting over the fire for years. Most of these

sessions quickly turned into a dialogue of the deaf. If you try and be too accommodating they just come in and eat you alive.

The way to get these Indian tormentors to sit down and listen is to be as aggressive as they are and come right back at them. Then all of a sudden, they say, "Oh, okay" and you may actually be able to have a conversation with them. I have had this happen after I learned the hard way. I went once and spoke at a Rotary club, which is generally made up of "friendlies." So, I decided to give my friendly speech, not the hard one about economic reforms. I got through the first question and a guy got up. I thought this was going to be a love fest, but the guy said, "Look, we all know that the U.S. interest is to maintain the military industrial complex. That is in the U.S. interest to do. So, how do you explain the contradiction between the outward devotion of the U.S. to reduction in arms, disarmament and peace when, in fact, you know that the U.S. interest is to keep the military industrial complex going?"

It occurred to me that most people would have tried to answer that question in a sort of apologetic way: "Look, that's not the way it is. Our defense budget has been significantly reduced. President Bush has called for reduction in arms. Even President Reagan has. We have had SALT treaties and so on. It's not so." I knew that none of that would work, so I didn't say it. I heard him out. When he got through, I said, "I'm glad to have your question because I came here for a dialogue, but don't you come and tell me what U.S. interests are. I am here to tell you what U.S. interests are. I am going to tell you that first. You can ask me questions about anything, but don't tell me what the U.S. interests are. You don't know what U.S. interests are. I am the one who is here to tell you that." He sat right down. Everybody said, "Wow!" After that, we had a wonderful conversation. But you have to come back at them the same way they come at you.

You said something earlier about both Indians and Americans thinking they have all the answers. I used that point on one occasion also. When somebody started preaching to me, I said, "You know, Indian and American people have one thing in common that is very, very important to keep in mind. We both think that we have all the answers to the world's problems and we're two of the most generous people on Earth in sharing our advice about it with everybody else around the world." I think the audience got the message.

Q: You left there in 1994. Did you retire at that point?

FRANK G. WISNER
Ambassador
India (1994-1997)

Ambassador Frank G. Wisner was born in New York in 1938. He graduated from Princeton University in 1961. He was stationed in Saigon, Dinh Tuong Province, Tuyen Duc Province, Tunis, Algiers, and Dacca. He later served as Ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India. Ambassador Wisner was interviewed by Richard L. Jackson on March 22, 1998.

Q: So the India years were '94 to '97.

WISNER: '94 to the summer of '97.

Q: And in some ways that was the culmination of your focus on American business, opening up markets on a very big stage -- India.

WISNER: Big stage, a lot of latitude. India has not been at the center of American foreign policy, although we've wanted to treat it well and not find ourselves in an antagonistic position. But India was at a real turning point in her society. Her economics had not worked out. Her balance of payments situation had deteriorated terribly at the beginning of the 1990s. She had begun liberalization. It looked like she was going to surge ahead with that liberalization. Unfortunately, the then-government in Delhi lost control of a lot of state governments in 1994, and the political situation India became much more chaotic. They just had an election in the last couple of weeks in India, right now, and still there are coalitions in India's future and for some time to come. All of this, however, is to say that India has begun to achieve much higher levels of growth throughout this decade. American investment has been expanding, but not at the rate it could have expanded. The reform in India has continued, but not at the depth it should have proceeded. I found myself in a very high-profile embassy, arguing a new, post-war relationship with India, arguing that the future of the globe depended on the interactions of the great powers: Russia, China, India, the United States, Europe, and Japan to maintain a core of stability through our interactions and then our ability to influence the broader international scene. I argued, as well, for concentration on the new agendas: refugees, drugs but also the environment. India's environment was cruelly degraded. We were trying to see ways to engage the United States economically with India in a wholly new way, one that would provide us with a major platform for economic expansion in a globalized economy through a deep relationship with this huge, nine-hundred-million-strong Indian market and, from India, via her human resource potential, out beyond India's shores. A big, big canvas to write on.

During my years in India, I was served with a very able embassy. I never had a better DCM than Matt Daley or a more able executive assistant than Penny O'Brien. We worked hard. We took the message of the United States and a new vision of the future all over the country. Our three consulates general were active points of diplomacy, as well as the normal conduct of consular relations. We issued thousands of visas. I think, in this time, we began to set a certain style of the United States, demarcated our previous approaches, and began to come to terms with some of the harder edges of the nuclear issue, moving away from pretending that we could roll back India's nuclear capability to learning to live with it, if the Indians could keep that capability recessed, if Indians would recess their missile capabilities. We were trying to create a sense of a greater partnership between India and the United States, which was hard to do. Things don't turn around quickly, anywhere. Big democracies are distracted, and that was India's case, heavily domestic in their orientation and inward looking -- a great nation between three seas and the mountains. But I think we began to write on some of the slates of the Indian political leadership and to make India a reality, certainly in the American business community, and beyond the normal debates over just non-proliferation as the only aspect of the policy. We stimulated both Pakistanis and Indians to intensify their discussions with each other, recognizing the chances of them going to war were not the highest in the world. I suspect we must continue to nudge them, discreetly, toward

negotiated solutions. They had, for 25 years, kept tabs themselves on each other's habits. We helped to make some important statements for the United States. It was the 50th Anniversary of Indian Independence. I was able, with my embassy, to raise about a million dollars and put one of the best dance troops in America in ten Indian cities and a lot of other activities showing respect and recognition for Indian society and culture and to encourage and see a couple of Indian prime ministers come to the United States. We encouraged a dialogue taking place at many different levels, intensifying strategic exchanges between the Pentagon, the State Department, policy planners and Under Secretaries.

I took my leave of India in the summer of 1997 with great sadness. It was a fascinating country which is really a continent at a time of great transition, great change in its national life and style.

Q: There was clearly growth, in the years you were there, of Hindu nationalism, reflected in the recent elections.

WISNER: No, I think I wouldn't quite see it that way. I would say that it was more the decline of the great Congress Party and growth of regional political expression. The Nationalist Party -- the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) -- has not, of itself, grown very much. It's got about ten more seats in this Parliament than it had in the last Parliament, but it's proved itself more skillful in building its coalition base.

Q: The future India is governable?

WISNER: India will stick together. India will retain sovereignty, keep her borders secure. But the degree to which India will enter the world stage as a major actor -- mix it up, commit herself to taking risks internationally, be a player, a negotiator and leader -- that is still to be seen.

Q: India as a major market and trade partner of the future for the U.S.?

WISNER: Very, very possible. I think that, without stretching the point too much but to give a conceptual focus, India could be the fourth or fifth largest economy in the world in 20 years.

Q: You had a number of high profile economic visits. I think that Treasury Secretary Rubin, others were there?

WISNER: Sure, Mrs. Clinton was there. Secretary Perry visited. The Secretary of Commerce, two Secretaries of Commerce came. The Secretary of Energy came twice. The Secretary of Agriculture visited. Quite a piece of the American Cabinet came out to India.

Q: What were your greatest frustrations in a country that vast?

WISNER: I think in our policy. It was hardest to get us to turn our attention to shifting our policy on the nuclear issue. I just don't think we have been very flexible or very smart. We've hoped that we could talk the Indians out of being a nuclear power. We can't do it. They won't accept it. They consider it essential to their national security and even more essential to their national pride.

Q: Well, Frank, as you were getting towards the end of your tour, there was the daily lottery in the Washington papers about whether you were going to Paris or whether Felix Rohatyn was going there. What was that all about, can you say?

WISNER: Well, I was encouraged to put my hat in the ring for Paris, to be ready to serve in Paris, by Secretary Christopher just after the election. And I agreed to do it. Pamela Harriman made it very clear she hoped I would be her successor. A number of other people wished I would do the same thing. The Administration did not move immediately to name new ambassadors, but I was eventually offered Paris, just about the same time I was offered a new life outside government, a second career with American International Group. But before I went to India, I had made a decision that, after 36 years at the end of my time in India, I would go on and follow a new path. It would be my last chance to really have a crack at a second career. I was interested in trying my hand at a second career, and I enjoyed the prospect of doing one in business. All of this weighed heavily in my decision to go to New York and to give up Paris. My wife had had a bout of ill health too, and I think some of the financial concerns about Paris weighed in my decision. None of these were decisive. My main course was I had decided that the time was right, and I had a terrific offer, and I decided to pick that offer up and go with it.

E. ASHLEY WILLS
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
New Delhi (1995-1997)

Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (1997-2000)

Ambassador Wills was born in Tennessee and raised in Tennessee and Georgia. He was educated at the University of Virginia and John Hopkins University. Entering the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1972, Ambassador Wills served abroad in the field of public affairs in Romania, South Africa, Barbados, Yugoslavia and Belgium and in India as Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in Washington as Deputy Director for Southern Africa Affairs for USIA and as Political Advisor to the US Military Commander in the invasion of Grenada. From 2000 to 2003 he was US Ambassador to Sri Lanka. His final posting was as Assistant US Trade Representative. Ambassador Wills was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: Okay, let's go to India.

WILLS: Yeah, let's go to India.

Q: You were in India from when to when?

WILLS: I got there in June or July 1995.

Q: Yeah.

WILLS: And we stayed five years. For the first two years I was PAO, the first year and a half or so. The next three to three and a half I was DCM. As I said, I think it was the biggest USIS program in the world at the time. Also at the time USIA was declining as an agency; its budget was being whacked and the first thing I had to do there was cut something like \$2 million out of the budget. We had, believe it or not, in USIS India at the time we had about 38 Americans and I want to say 750 Indians; it was a huge empire. I had to cut, actually it was more than \$2 million it was something like three or four million. Anyway, I ended up cutting maybe half the Americans down to 20 and about half the Indians down to 400, all in the space of about six months; that was traumatic. We had all kinds of negotiations with the employees associations, with the American officers concerned; I obviously didn't want to have their assignments curtailed. Then we had to eliminate all kinds of activities. We had libraries all over the country that were deeply part of the local communities, American centers they were called. We had magazines being published, television shows we produced; it was a very big operation. Frank Wisner, as I said, was the ambassador and Frank is nothing if not opinionated and he informed me at the first meeting we had when I got there that he wanted me to close down those American center libraries and the magazines, quit publishing the magazines. I said, "Frank, I just got here, you've got to let me look at the situation and determine which are the activities that we can cease and which ones we should continue." I decided almost immediately that those magazines and those libraries were way too valuable. Everyday you would walk in and there were 300 Indians in the library reading everything that we had. The magazine in a country that is as... India has a big problem with illiteracy even now but it also has some of the most literate people in the world and they loved our libraries. So I had a much tougher time negotiating this with Frank Wisner than I think our negotiators had doing the SALT talks with the Russians back in the Cold War. But eventually he let me do what I wanted to do and I cut other things and kept the libraries open and the magazine going. I'm happy to say here we are thirteen years later and they are still going; they are still valuable.

Q: What sort of things were you cutting?

WILLS: We closed a couple of small posts, we eliminated some of the television and radio programs that we were doing. We published fewer newsletters than we had been doing, although we maintained one or two of them. That was it; mainly it was a question of reducing staff. We got people to work harder, longer hours to produce as much as they could. It was very stressful cutting all those people but very pleasing that it ended up being a fairly happy post even with all those cuts. We were, I think, especially effective in the Indian media. Have you lived in India?

Q: Nope.

WILLS: My God I've never seen anything like it. To go from Belgium where everything in moderation is venerated to India where there is nothing moderate in the country, it was the biggest culture shock I had ever experienced as an American diplomat moving around the world. I mean there are the shocking aspects as far as poverty is concerned, seeing beggars everywhere; you have to remember 1995 India had just begun its economic reform program after forty years

of socialism. Over half the world's poor at that point as defined by the United Nations lived in India. But in the middle of all that poverty one would find absolutely astonishing wealth. There were so many rich Indians and no one had told me about that. It was a country of extremes, a country where you would go out in the deserts of Rajasthan and come across the ruins of a castle that had belonged to a maharaja and that dated from the 4th century, it was just amazing, amazing things that you could find and that weren't restored; they were just out there. It was such a remarkable place and such a deep culture. They would take a kind of condescending view toward us and say, "Oh you Americans you are only 200 or so years old, our culture is 3,000 years old." There was some truth to it but I got tired of being patronized.

Q: People always equate it that our culture started in 1776 but it goes back as far as any...basically it comes out of Europe so it's not as though it just sprang up all of a sudden.

WILLS: But I have never lived in a place that was as culturally dense as India. We like to think that our society is diverse, we are minor leaguers compared to the Indians. They have 20 something official languages; English is spoken only by a small percentage of the people but still a large number in absolute terms. They have the caste system, which complicates things; it's the second most populated Muslim country in the world, there are 140 million Muslims in India. It's the birthplace of Hinduism and Buddhism, there is Jainism and there are Zoroastrians, there is a Jewish community. I sometimes felt that you needed a degree in higher math to figure it all out it was so complex and so awesome. There was not one day that I lived in India in five years when I wasn't reminded in some way this is a very different place than I am used to; this is a very strange country.

So I found it professionally and personally too to be enriching, deeply aggravating, the Indians would piss me off, piss us all off, especially Brahmin's, higher caste Indians with their preening and their belief that they were superior to everybody. Living there was so difficult, the climatic conditions were tough. Getting things done in our house, we had nine people who worked in our house full time. In the back of our house we had a row of dwellings, it was like a little village. Those nine people had spouses and children; there were 45 people who lived on our property apart from our four-person family. So you needed all those people to get things done, to have your water boiled because people were getting sick including me all the time from eating food that hadn't been properly cleaned or stored. People were getting sick from other things, air borne illnesses of various sorts. We had, I think, the largest medical unit the State Department has in any mission overseas. It was such a difficult...getting around, the traffic. In those days there were only two airlines in the country. I learned a new word in India. After we had been there about six weeks and I had gone through this stressful period of cutting the hell out of the USIS operation I said to my family, "Let's go down to Rajasthan to Jaipur for a weekend vacation, just to get out and see a little bit of India." So we flew down there and we had two lovely days exploring the castle, palaces, and Jaipur is a gorgeous high desert city. Our flight was due to go back to Delhi at like one in the afternoon on Sunday afternoon. We showed up at eleven in the morning two hours ahead of time and I noticed that there was nobody in the airport so I walked up to the ticket counter and said, "We are here for our flight." The guy said, "Oh your flight sir has been preponed." I said, "What?" Well, postponed means it's going later, preponed meant the pilot decided to take the God damn plane off at about 9:30 in the morning and just left and flew back to Delhi. We were sitting there and after I got over my shock I said, "Well when can we get

to Delhi?" He said, "Oh, the next flight's tomorrow." So we went back to our hotel and I learned a new word, to be preponed. Your flight is preponed sir, your flight is preponed.

Q: Tell me when you got there in '95 how stood relations with India? Of course, by this time the Soviet Union had ceased to exist which had been their great supporter and all. How stood things at the time and how did things develop while you were there?

WILLS: Well I mention that India's economic reform was, when I got there, four years old. It began in 1994 when the country almost went bankrupt, it couldn't pay its bills. That was because of years and years and years of socialist policies; that's why we have so many Americans of Indian decent in our country, because they had no opportunity in their country. They were well educated and they came to our country as doctors and scientists; it was a very poor place and they had all those years of non-alignment. India was one of the leaders of the non-align movement and successive Indian leaders but particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister and his daughter Indira Gandhi, were hostile to us, they didn't like us. There was a kind of a leftist ethos in India even when I got there in '95 even though they had moved toward the free market in '91; it was a very slow movement, India was still a very heavily regulated economy. I think it must be the broadest engagement with any country on the planet earth; there wasn't a single issue in American diplomacy that wasn't in play in India. We would talk to them about nuclear weapons, terrorism, democracy, human rights, international economic issues, trade issues, population issues, health issues, regional security issues, and aids. India has, I think, even with all the aids in southern Africa I think there are more HIV positive people in India than in any other country. So we were engaged on every possible issue with India, whereas in Belgium we really only had an issue or two and they weren't all that serious.

We had forty issues to deal with the Indians about and they were all very serious. The mission was working at a very high level of activity and with a very high level of professionalism. It was one of the largest embassies in the world; I think second largest after Egypt because we had all those AID and military advisers in Egypt. We had, I think, about 400 Americans and 3,000 Indians working in the mission. So it was a huge operation. We had a vehicle fleet in the embassy that must have been a couple hundred vehicles that we ran. So the administrative section of the embassy was a big operation.

Q: Things were obviously changing but how did we find say dealing with the foreign ministry?

WILLS: It was tough. The first forty years of India's independence, as I said, it was a socialist economy and a socialist leftist sort of politics so although there was a public sector and some people got quite rich in the private sector the most prestigious occupation was being an Indian administrative service officer, the IAS. The elite from the best universities in the country wanted to be civil servants. In our country the word civil servant is not a cuss word but it's not a revered occupation in many parts of the United States. In India being an IAS officer or an IFS, Indian Foreign Service Officer, these were the coolest things people could do. With the leftist political ethos in the country even in '95 you would go to the foreign ministry and you would be lectured to about the evils of American diplomacy in this part of the world or that part of the world; so it was difficult. But I kept reminding my staff that I didn't join the Foreign Service to go to a place where everybody agreed with me, I liked having to figure out ways to get the Indians to work

with us or at least to tolerate and listen to us. So meanwhile India was reforming economically and more and more people were choosing not to go into the IAS or the IFS. Instead, and it was visible when I was there, the best graduates wanted to join the private sector rather than the government and that trend has accelerated and now it's by far in favor of the private sector but that was not the case when I got there just thirteen years ago. So dealing with the Indian government was difficult. I could talk about my five years in India, Stu, for a week. It was an amazing experience.

I was one of the three embassy officers who were authorized to go to Kashmir where there was then and still is an insurrection. The Pakistani's are supporting the insurrection; it's mainly an Islamic insurrection. The Indians have forces up there trying to maintain public order; Kashmir is gorgeous. It's a Himalayan paradise but in the middle of it all there is this tension and armed check points everywhere, bombings periodically, assassinations so you have this high mountain jewel that is a very unhappy place. The northeast of India is these little states that look like they are really part of Southeast Asia and culturally they are. But, they are part of India and very different from everywhere else. I mean I was so stimulated there and by that point in my career I'd learned five foreign languages. I just didn't have the wherewithal to study Hindi or any of the other languages so I did my best to learn what I could as an English speaker and I managed to read and learn a lot about the country and came away deeply impressed and deeply depressed. You see problems there that would stagger us in the United States. They have to deal with so many issues on a massive scale because there are so many people. When I was there there were one billion, now it's a billion one hundred million. Anything is off the charts. Two percent of the population is HIV positive, that's 25 million people, 25 million people. So even a little bitty percentage of a very big number is a lot of people. So everything there is outsized and, as I said, extreme.

After about a year and a half Frank was getting ready to leave and there were a whole series of negotiations and coincidences and it worked out that I was named DCM and I served with him just a short time in that capacity. Then he left and I was chargé for almost a year while we waited for a new ambassador to come, seven months I guess a little over a half a year. We had all kinds of exciting events there. Mother Teresa died and the head of the U.S. delegation to pay her respect at her funeral was Hillary Clinton; I spent three days with her.

Q: How was she how did you find her?

WILLS: She's a very smart woman and a very serious person. She wasn't very warm, she and her aides, I thought, were a little too devoted to their own agendas rather than...but I mean she was there as a head of a delegation to a funeral, it wasn't like she was negotiating an agreement with the Indians.

We had all kinds of Congressional delegations. I took Richard Shelby the senator from Alabama...he wanted to go to Kashmir, he was then on the intelligence committee, so we took him up to Kashmir. It was a dicey trip with a U.S. senator in tow. Secretary Albright came out maybe four or five times while I was there as DCM and chargé so it was a deeply enriching experience as I said earlier professionally.

Q: How did you find the media?

WILLS: The media? Well when I lived in India the illiteracy rate was something like 42 percent, 42 percent that's 500 million people who can't read or write but that leaves 500 million people who can. The number of newspapers was astonishing, in all these languages. The Indian journalists were very well informed; many of them, there were so many newspapers that you had newspapers that were aligned with the 47 different political parties including the Communist. Some of them were just hacks but the free independent media were very, very good and I would say at a world standard; now things are even better. When I got to India in 1995 there was one television station, Doordarshan, the public station, now there are probably fifty television stations. There were like two radio stations in the country and no FM at all; this is thirteen years ago. Now there are hundreds and hundreds of privately owned radio stations and FM stations.

I remember very well shortly after I got there I went to see an old Brahmin leader of the Congress Party and he was giving me yet again a lecture about how we were just wiper-snappers culturally and the Indians were old and wise. He said, "We will not change quickly, Mr. Wills." Well what's happened? India has changed as dramatically as any country on the planet earth in the last thirteen years. It's gone from being unnoticed to being a major force, to say nothing of the horror of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai just last week. But I mean who had ever heard of outsourcing thirteen years ago and now India has been outsourcing capital of the world for lo these many years. It's just growing in unpredictable and astonishing ways.

Q: What was your impression of how the major media reported on the United States in relations with us?

WILLS: Mainly as I said then, not so much now, then there was still a sort of leftist slant. Whereas if you take as a base the United States as kind of a centrist country the center of political discourse in India is what we would call the left wing of the democratic party, that's the center over there. So you would be dealt with critically, suspiciously, they would need to be persuaded that you had any merit in your point of view; that's changed. Now India is moving rightward in a way and the old third world non-aligned nonsense is receding from public discourse. India is not becoming an ally of the United States but it's actually becoming a friend and that began when I was there and we take great pride in that. In 1998 we had an ambassador come out early that year, Dick Celeste, he had been governor of Ohio twice as a Democrat and he had lived in India for two or three years after he completed his Rhodes Scholarship in the UK; he came out to work as a political appointment in the embassy as an aide to the then Ambassador Chester Bowles. Then he went back to the United States and became a prominent politician himself. But he had been governor of Ohio and he was looking for other things to do and he asked Bill Clinton, his old friend, to send him to India as ambassador and Bill Clinton obliged him. He was a terrific ambassador, very, very enthusiastic, smart, very, very able man in a lot of ways. He looked at the world as a professional politician and taught me a lot. I was very glad to have had that association with him.

Anyway, he had come out I think in December of '97 and in May of '98 he was called back to Washington I think it was a chiefs of mission conference. He was there about a week and we woke up one morning and the Indians had exploded three nuclear devices. Our intelligence

agencies had completely missed it and, in fact, I learned about it from a call from Washington. So that caused a tremendous amount of excitement, as I'm sure you can imagine, and we ended up imposing sanctions on our relations with the Indians, which were just beginning to improve, suddenly plummeted. A lot of tensions and they thought we were punishing them for the wrong reasons but almost immediately we began to repair the relationship and we did so well that less than two years later Bill Clinton came out on a historic and very positive eight day long visit. Can you imagine having an American president in your country for eight days? It was the most complicated logistical undertaking I'd ever been part of and I was in charge of the visit.

Q: How did it work for you?

WILLS: President Clinton was fascinated by India even then. I don't think he had ever been before as a governor of Arkansas or as a private citizen. He really wanted to come to India and he wanted to see India so we took him...that's why it was so complicated. I think we ended up going to six or seven different cities. You know what it's like when a U.S. president comes; getting him to the capital city is a huge ordeal. This guy wanted to go to several places. Thank goodness we had a large embassy and then we brought in a lot of people from around the world to help us. We probably had 600 journalists who were there for this visit. We had secret service agents probably 200 of them, FBI special agents, God it was an amazing undertaking. Every single moment of his visit had to be negotiated with the Indians; this is where they could be aggravating as hell. I'd been part of four or five presidential visits to other countries where I lived and they were always difficult but when you say to a foreign government the president is coming and here is what he would like to do, most foreign governments will say okay, they won't give you any backchat. The Indians gave us backchat about everything, every little detail, but in the end it was a spectacular success. I even took him to a tiger park down in central India called Ranthambhore and we had a motorcade of twelve vehicles. We were driving through this park and we actually saw three tigers, two adults and a baby. Of course, the international media accused me of creating a Potemkin tiger park saying I'd drugged the tigers so that they would be out there where we could see them. That was not true but I couldn't persuade them. But that was exciting and that came right at the end of my assignment. He came in March of 2000 and I left in June of 2000. So we recovered from that horrible period when we were imposing sanctions and castigating them for exploding those nuclear weapons. I haven't even talked about the numerous times we almost had war with Pakistan and the numerous times we had a hostage situation and we had an American killed in Kashmir. Everyday there was some crisis.

Q: Well how did you deal with the minor manner of Monica Lewinsky?

WILLS: You mean how did we portray that to the Indian media?

Q: That caused quite a...

WILLS: We didn't even make an attempt, that was just out there.

Q: That was just out there and just say well that...

WILLS: We knew he had a wondering eye and we were ready because India is full of everything but it's also full of beautiful women. We thought surely he would notice that and he surely did. But Monica Lewinsky, I mean what can you do about that.

Q: Yeah, well I mean was it all over the papers?

WILLS: Yeah because people liked Clinton even before he came to India, it was known that he had imposed these sanctions with regret. We were obligated under the acts of Congress regarding the nuclear proliferation to do what we did and we didn't have any choice. But Clinton had made some speeches and made it very clear that he thought India was a coming power. People like to think now, so short are our historic memories, that the rapprochement with India began with George Bush, that's complete nonsense; it began under Bill Clinton. Bush continued it and has done a lot of great things but he didn't start it, it started with Bill Clinton who for all his shortcomings was far sighted.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Indian perspective and relationship with China during this time because China was obviously an economic power who was on its way up?

WILLS: You know what was remarkable then, Stu, was they knew hardly anything about each other and had hardly any contact. You may remember, or perhaps you don't, that when the Indians exploded those nuclear bombs we asked them why, why did they do that? They said because of the threat from China, not Pakistan, which everybody thought, was really the reason. So I sent out a bunch of political officers all over the country to find out exactly what India knew about China, think tanks, universities, and the foreign ministry. We could hardly find a soul who knew anything about China. I mean in the foreign ministry there were a few people who had served there at the Indian embassy. There were a couple people who spoke Chinese because they were professors of the language at Jawaharlal Nehru University of Delhi. But what was remarkable was that these two countries that fought a war in 1962, a border war, and were the two biggest countries in Asia and the two biggest put together they make up a fourth of humanity or more than a fourth of humanity together over two billion, how many of us are there? Seven billion or something like that. So 25 percent of humanity didn't really have much to do with one another. I remember we checked and in 1997 they had had like maybe \$40 million in trade, \$40 million? Today the figure is \$40 billion. Now they are beginning to deal with one another but in 1998 they had hardly any contact since the war in '62.

Q: How did you find American business dealing with India during this time?

WILLS: American business?

Q: Yeah.

WILLS: Well, there was a lot of excitement in the business community because the market was so huge, which had been closed to us for those many years since independence or essentially closed. We had very little U.S. investment and very little business interest until they began to open up in '91; then companies came in. India needed power so there were all kinds of power contracts that were signed. You might remember the ENRON deal. One of their first big

international investments was at a power plant in Maharashtra State in western India. There were others too all over the country; power projects, GE (General Electric) came in. When I got to India in 1995 GE had I think it was under 100 employees and today I think it has 50,000. But the remarkable thing about American business activity in the five years I lived there was they all had this hope that it would work out brilliantly and the market would be a rich one; but they all suffered. The India bureaucracy, as I said, was still strong and it got in the way. All these power projects very few of them actually were ever built although agreements were signed and everything because if the Indian national level bureaucracy didn't get in the way a state level bureaucracy would. So it was really hard to do business in India. I felt a tremendous sympathy for the business executives who came out there to give it a go again because it was tough living. We had an embassy administrative section that we could rely on for services. If you were there as a business executive and had to rely on Indian power, Indian telephones, Indian this and Indian that it would drive you crazy. So it was really tough. Now again, things have improved tremendously in the last several years.

WAYNE LEININGER
Consul General
New Delhi (1996-1999)

Born in New York State, Mr. Leiniger was raised in New York and Florida. After graduating from Florida State University he joined the Foreign Service. His foreign assignments, primarily in the Consular field, include Moscow, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong and New Delhi, where he was Regional Supervisory Consul General. After attending the State Department's Senior Seminar, Mr. Leiniger had several assignments in Washington concerning Personnel Management.

Q: Right, exactly, having finished with Hong Kong.

LEININGER: I have to leave Hong Kong. I have been in Moscow already. Philippines, again, was not coming open. They weren't going to teach me Italian to go to Rome. What a terrible thing! So it was Delhi. Again, I had DCM prospects on and off through most of the assignment cycle, but Mary Ryan just kept me on the back burner. She said, "Wayne when you are ready just let me know. We will make it happen." Yes, Mary, right. Now of all places I have been I think that Delhi was simply the hardest to live, on a daily basis. Even harder than Moscow. You couldn't drink the water without boiling it and filtering it. You couldn't breathe the air. You couldn't eat the food without soaking it in Clorox water first. It was the filthiest place you have ever seen. Virulent diseases – dengue fever, tuberculosis, the plague...we had the plague!

Q: All these things you could do in Hong Kong, drink the water and eat and so forth?

LEININGER: Absolutely. Right. Even in the streets, from the vendors, not a problem.

Q: You have extensive pollution in Delhi.

LEININGER: Heavy particulates; soft coal and cow dung ash. And the weather is abominable.

Q: Meaning?

LEININGER: Meaning that four months a year was livable. Eight months a year is either hot and dry or hot and wet. Now by hot I mean like 115 degrees, 117 degrees, 120. From about halfway through March until halfway through October it is always above 90 degrees. I remember one news report on CNN covering a heat wave in the U.S., mentioning that Dallas had had seven days of over 100 degree temperatures. We all chuckled, because at that point we were well into our third *month* of 100 degree temperatures! The heat was unrelenting, day and night. It is hot and dry from March almost until the end of June, and then the monsoon season starts in. Now that doesn't mean it rains every day but it rains very frequently, and then is very humid. The temperature goes down from 120 all the way to 97!

Q: ...In Delhi in the summer of 1996. You were explaining that the conditions of living were very demanding. What was the nature of the consular business there?

LEININGER: Well India is one of those happening places of the third world. It is emerging from a period of relative economic stagnation. The Government was attempting to do things to make the investment climate more favorable to international businesses. Its own indigenous intellectual wealth has never been doubted. There is a very high premium placed on education. The export of Indian physicians, Indian-trained computer technology people, is famous worldwide. It is only lately, however, that conditions of doing business in India are getting to the point where they can support an internal software industry, and hardware industry, for that matter. Now, the population is just over a billion; there were 920 million when I was there. It is forecast that the population will exceed that of China by the middle of the 21st century. There are very few breakthroughs going on in terms of birth control anyplace in that country. Even if you posit it, then, that the middle class of India is only 10% of its population, or 15% of its population, you are still looking then at a middle class, visa-seeking, qualified population of 100 million to 150 million people. Nonimmigrant visa workload was growing at a rate between 25 and 40% per year when I was there, so that in the course of my three-year tour of duty, workload doubled. Completely doubled. It was already the third largest immigrant visa producer to the United States when I got there. You can't increase those numbers very much because they are largely in categories strictly limited by law, and they are right up against the ceiling. But the visa sections in India were in danger of going under.

Q: You had a supervisory role.

LEININGER: I had a supervisory, coordinating role for all the consular sections in India, including the ones in Calcutta, and Chennai, formerly Madras, and Mumbai, formerly Bombay. Mumbai is actually the largest of the consular sections in India. It had nine or ten officers as I recall. Calcutta is just a one-officer post. Chennai fell in the middle, but as time has gone on, and since it is located in the heart of India's version of Silicon Valley, it has become the focus of this booming growth in the H-1B visas, the special professional category visas issued to the highly trained computer folks who come to the U.S. And the H-1B issuance in turn drove an upsurge in the regular B-1, B-2 issuances. My Chennai colleagues did a little in house study in which they

demonstrated that every time they issued an H-1B visa, it generated an additional 2.2 regular visitor visa applications. Well who were they? Well, Junior would get his H-1B and go over to the United States, having gotten out of the India Institute of Technology with a BA in computer science. He would get himself set up in a \$45,000 a year job in some suburb of Palo Alto, and get himself into a little condo. Within the next year Mom and Dad would want to go over and see how Junior was doing. It was lovely. By his third year Junior would be back in India, advertising for a wife, arranged marriages still being the order of the day. Very educated and very civilized populations. There would be pages after pages of personal ads in the Times of India. "Computer professional H-1B (or green card holder, that is really to be desired) in the United States seeks homely Indian wife." "Homely" in this case does not mean Cinderella's ugly sisters. Homely means a homemaker, a stay at home person who will keep the hearth fires burning. That is a traditional family structure, still is, in many respects.

Q: So the workload is jumping.

LEININGER: Workload is going over the top.

Q: How big was the actual section in Delhi?

LEININGER: In Delhi we only had five officers and a consular assistant. The section was adjudicating, at the time I left, about 120,000 NIV's a year, and 12,000 immigrant visas.

Q: How do they do that?

LEININGER: We were damn good, he said modestly. The consular sections of India – I went out of my way to get the workload statistics of some of the other major visa factories of the world – the consular sections of India were the most efficient we had anywhere, in terms of staff hours per case. Now efficient, I don't know if that means we were perfectly correct in everything we did or not, but in terms of churning them out, we were the most efficient in the world.

Q: What kind of refusal rate would you have in a place like Delhi?

LEININGER: Well that was one of the easy parts of consular work in India: it very largely still is a country of haves and have-nots. The haves easily qualified for visas. The have-nots are the easy refusals. There is very little gray area where you have to agonize over, "is this guy barely across the line or under the line?" So, of our Punjabi agricultural workers, we'd refuse 60 percent, but of our Delhi metropolitan area business professionals, we'd issue 90 percent.

Q: You don't find a lot of Indians tending to disappear in the United States, because they go on legitimate H visas and then they are able to adjust. It is perfectly legal, rather than people getting visitors visas and disappearing.

LEININGER: Right. And as I said, the haves are really so qualified that there are legitimate channels to get here.

Q: Can you verify that the computer applicants were genuine...were you worried about fraud?

LEININGER: Addressing that was one of our signature achievements during my tour, the means by which we were able to verify some of these credentials from the software services industry. Interestingly, the impetus for getting this resolved was derived from the H-1B issuance cap, 65,000 a year. We were all facing this. We, meaning the industry, we as administrators of the program, the Indian Government, and the Indian software services industry as a whole, were facing this cap. We all had a reason to make sure that we issued those precious visas only to people who deserved them, and who in fact were going to be able to go to the United States and do the services for which they had been contracted. Intended to, and had the qualifications to, and followed through and did it. Well, as sure as God made little green apples, whenever an avenue to get into the United States opens up, there will be people who will duly manufacture credentials to get on it. So a certain percentage of these H-1B visa credentials, when I arrived, were fraudulent. And, as would be expected, those applicants never reported for duty in the United States. Well, this concerned the India software services industry as much as it concerned us. They didn't want the reputation of their computer workforce to be sullied in this way. It was they who prevailed upon Indian state university systems, the India Institutes of Technology, and the major universities with a computer science majors, to open up to us, on an online, passworded basis, access to their graduation and education records. If somebody came to us with a diploma from the Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai, we could type in the name, give our passworded access code, get to the central academic records, and verify that this diploma was genuine. They made similar arrangements with every member company in the software services industry association, with respect to job histories. We could have online access to visa applicants' job histories. We'd never find this stuff otherwise. Can you imagine the state university system of Virginia opening up its graduation records, academic records to the Indian Embassy in Washington?

Q: The advantage of being number one!

LEININGER: It just would not have happened.

Q: The people who came in for visitors visas and so forth, could you label or generally verify their documentation?

LEININGER: For most applicants we couldn't and we didn't depend on documentation. I mean, unlike Hong Kong where almost any piece of paper brought to you was reliable, in India we couldn't depend on paper. For instance, in Delhi 60% of our workload was from Punjab. They were all Sikhs, and most of them would be farmers. They'd all come in with tractor registrations, land ownership documents, proof of having sold last years crop for X amount of rupees, and so forth. We didn't care. I mean they either looked and sounded and behaved as prosperous farmers who knew what the hell they were doing, or they were obviously dirt poor, and could not possibly have afforded these parcels of land and a tractor. As a matter of fact, we very often would have seen that same tractor registration in the previous week, because there were document vendors out on the street in front of the Embassy, who sold those documents to the applicants as they lined up every morning. And they re-sold them the next day to the next batch of applicants, and the next, and the next. So documents in India didn't mean a damn thing. We did sort of gestalt types of interviews, in which everything they said on the application had to

match their physical appearance, and had to match how they presented themselves orally and conducted themselves in the interview. All that had to fit in with the purpose for which they said they wanted to go to the U.S., and, in the end, it all had to fit – to make sense.

Q: So did you find then that in general practice that you didn't have much problem with visitor visa issuance?

LEININGER: There were not that many problems, aside from volume. Our refusal rate was about 32%, and as I said, they were very easy refusals.

Q: So you were able to churn out a lot of applications.

LEININGER: Not just able to, we had to. Now, there was an organized fraud ring that sort of sprung up under our noses as we watched. That had to do with P-3 visas. These were performing artists of a non-professional nature, almost always Sikh bhangra dancers. Bhangra dancing is the traditional folk dance in Punjab, sort of like square dancing in the United States, where you get together and have a hoe down. In Punjab they get together at Sikh festivals and they have bhangra dancing. People play instruments, and people dance, and people sing at these festivals. There is a large Sikh population in the United States, and for years there had been a tradition of two or three dozen groups a year going from Punjab to New York City, Chicago, certain other areas of Sikh concentrations in the United States, to perform during these holidays. Well, all of a sudden instead of issuing one or two hundred of these visas a year in groups 25 to 30, the demand, the number of petitions filed, and the number of people attempting to get the visas, shot up to 1200 to 1300 a year. In other words, a hundred a month. No way, we said. There aren't that many venues in the United States. There aren't that many groups of Sikhs in the United States to receive these people. It was clear that there were ringers being smuggled in, intermingled with the bona fide folks, many of whom had already had two or three visas previously. We did some surveys of groups of 30, and found only 12 of 30 came back. Eighteen of them were ringers. So we resorted to the traditional first line of defense: "Perform for me. Dance. Sing. Play your instruments." Of course, two thirds of them couldn't, and two thirds of them were refused, and most times that meant that the entire tour was canceled. Well, the organizers of these scams, being no dummies, shifted tactics. Instead of charging these people \$3,000 for just being included in their group, they charged them \$5,000. The \$2,000 extra was devoted to a period of 30 days or so training, singing, dancing, or playing instruments. They were giving a package deal! The applicants learned a skill, *and* they got a visa to the United States! So, after awhile, *everybody* could in fact play and sing, at least rudimentarily. We couldn't just rule them out that way. Well the other weakness in this whole scheme is they didn't really have any venues booked in the United States. They didn't have any sources of income from impresarios, really. So we demanded, up front, that the organizers show us prepayment of hotel rooms, prepayment of auditoriums, prepayment for air fares, round trip, for everybody. And for a group of 30, who purported to stay in the United States for a period of four to six weeks to perform, this was usually up to \$100,000 or more. They didn't have that money. They didn't have it. The groups themselves, the smugglers wouldn't pay the organizers the balance owed until they got to the United States. So as soon – this was about the time the movie Jerry McGuire came out – as soon as we went, "Show me the money," the demand went right away. We went right back down within a matter of three months down to our traditional levels of the numbers of petitions. But we

had major feedback with the INS offices in New York and Philadelphia, especially, on how they should be screening petitions in the first place. They took our screening criteria and started to apply it to petition adjudications. So that choked things off at the source. Then along with that, we did get one lawyer in New York disbarred for her involvement in smuggling people. And there were criminal charges filed against her as well.

Q: I want to ask you this question about visas and politics. I seem to remember one story from the '70s when Jimmy Carter went to India and Brzezinski was with him. The first question the Indians brought up was about visas. Somehow I have in my mind the anecdote when President Clinton went to India for some prime minister or premier, again it was something about visas that was on the very top of the list that the Indians brought up. They wanted more?

LEININGER: The old days, right, exactly, stood on its head. In the old days it was "brain drain. You are taking away our best and our brightest." By the time the H-1B ceilings were getting bumped up against every year, the Indians had gone over the other way. They *wanted* to export that brainpower for the remittances it brought.

Q: They weren't complaining about the refusals. That wasn't the hassle.

LEININGER: There certainly weren't enough visas being made available. And that led of course the American computer industry lobbying very hard, and that led to the revision of the law, which, at least temporarily, raised that H-1B cap to a 100,000 and then 120,000. Now we have brought it back down to 65,000.

Q: So in other words these things do have political implications. Now do you have an opinion on this argument as to whether the American companies are using this just to get cheap workers or do they really need these people, because there was simply a deficit in the United States?

LEININGER: I think it's yes, and yes, both. They are needed, and are available. They are willing workers, and because they are entry-level employees with no previous experience, even if they are paid on a U.S. pay scale, they are paid on the bottom end of that U.S. pay scale. Whereas most of the U.S. workers who would be out there job shopping from one company to the next would have been in the business five, seven, ten years, and would expect and demand a higher wage than the entry-level employees. So I don't think the American employers are being exploitative in the sense that they are underpaying the Indian workers with respect to their overall levels of expertise and experience. They are not. They are paying them appropriately. But compared to either retraining an American worker, which is expensive, or hiring an American experienced worker at a mid-level pay scale level, they are saving money. Whether they should or should not do that, that is an argument for the economist and the politicians to watch.

Q: So was there a lot of pressure in effect from American companies to move these things along in a hurry?

LEININGER: Oh, yes. But we weren't the backlog. It was getting petitions approved through INS. I mean, it would take three to six months to get a petition approved. Once the cleared

people walked into us with a notice of approval, we took an afternoon. They had their visa by that same afternoon.

Q: Did you get much pressure from the Indian government about various types of visas, especially if you turned people down. Did you find...

LEININGER: India being one of those places where networking among who you know, and who knows whom down the line, is a way of life, we often heard about it when a visa was refused to anybody of even marginal consequence. Three removes from somebody of stature, a Member of Parliament or what not, you would still get a call. But we just stuck to the mantra that, "Everyone must qualify for a visa in his or own right. We definitely appreciate your interest, but this gentleman simply did not meet the requirements."

Q: Did they go to the Embassy front office much, or the political section?

LEININGER: They usually went to the front office. They'd claim that they'd met the Ambassador or the DCM at some reception somewhere. Of course Ambassadors and DCMs being what they are would sometimes feel obliged at least to inquire of us, "What's going on with so-and-so?" But generally they were not pushy at all. Especially to Richard Celeste's credit – he was a political appointee Ambassador my last two years there; former Governor of Ohio, Director of the Peace Corps, and Democratic Party strategizer, who was involved in some of the early efforts to address the health care situation, before the Clinton effort there fell apart – he was extremely understanding of what our obligations were under the law, and how far we could go, and how far we could not go. He just took the simple position, "I'm sorry, I don't know anything about visas. You'll have to ask my Consul General." Moreover, we came up with two or three dozen instances in which Members of the Indian Parliament had sponsored personal servants to travel with them to the United States, given hand written letters. "This is my body servant, please do the needful and issue him a visa." Of course you would ask the body servant, "Well, how many bathrooms are in sahib's home?" "I don't know." "What kind of car does he have?" "I don't know." These guys would know nothing about their reputed employers. We made all those members of Parliament ineligible for visas as alien smugglers. 212-6E, permanently ineligible.

Q: So that caused a little ruckus?

LEININGER: It did early on, but it was, again, at the stage of India's coming out that they wanted to try and put on a better face to the world, trying not to appear to be a totally corrupt society. First of all we would go to the Foreign Ministry, to the Consular and to the Americas divisions. We said, "Look, your people in the Parliament are not doing your parties any credit, they are not doing the Parliament any credit, by coming forward with these palpably false statements on behalf of these unqualified visa applicants. You really better do something." So the Ministry would contact the Speaker of the Parliament, and he would send out these little blurbs. "Everybody clean up your act." So, when we eventually just cut off people, they were perfectly understanding about it. We didn't have a problem. But Celeste, was actually pleased with us, because he paid attention to these things, and he honestly felt that India had to address its corruption issue if it ever was to emerge, just like Hong Kong did twenty years before. Ashley Wills was the DCM at the time; he'd been our USIS chief when Ambassador Frank Wisner and

his DCM, Matt Dailey, left. Wills and Celeste are neck and neck with Zimmerman and Hartman as the best front office tandem I ever worked for. We were inspected while they were in charge, and they got the highest rating on the OIG questionnaire that employees filled out rating the front office that the OIG team had ever seen. Human understanding, able to make decisions when necessary, moving things along under hard times. The last year there was hard for everybody, because it took place under the cloud, literally, of nuclear testing. India and Pakistan got into this whole business of who has got the biggest, and who can throw it the farthest, nuclear weapon. We had been on the verge of signing major technology change agreements with India, scientific exchanges, military contracts. All of that went straight in the toilet. So our colleagues in the Defense Attaché's Office, in the political/econ section, in the commercial sections, were all in the dumps our last year there. And the situation had fallout – to make another bad pun – into the consular section too, because the technology alert list program was being revamped. This is a special program, in which, you recall, visas used to be refused to people suspected of illegal technology transfer to the Eastern bloc. Upon the end of the Cold War, it shifted focus to those who might be misusing certain areas of knowledge gained in the United States, bringing it home to their home countries to assist in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Okay, so you had Indian physicists, Indian mechanical engineers, and Indian chemists, who had been for years going to the United States to attend international symposia of various kinds, who now fell under this new regime. Suspicion. And until we had cleared their names by running them personally, and the purpose of their going to the United States, past the appropriate officials in the Washington intelligence/scientific community, they couldn't go. A lot of the problem back here was there was no real system set up, at that early stage, of organized wise people who could really say, "Yes, well this has a military application, and no, that really doesn't." Some things were so theoretical that no one knew what it was all about. Where that dividing line could and should be drawn between what was permissible and what was not was still up in the air. So we would send applications back for review. We often just wouldn't get an answer until after the deadline for their attendance had passed. Now that raised hackles. Because these were respectable people. They had gotten many visas to the United States before, but we were refusing them outright in some cases, and in other cases we just couldn't get them an answer in time for them to attend these meetings and symposia. And of course that had repercussions, reverberations within the American academic community, because this whole issue of openness, academic freedom, free exchange of ideas, came into question. "We are America; we are supposed to be welcoming this kind of thing. We were not supposed to be secretive and closed..." Well, welcome to the latter part of the 20th and now the early part of the 21st century, folks. We are not going to be that open anymore. So the technology alert program goes on as we speak, even more so in the post-9/11 era, but it took awhile before people understood what the ground rules were. We had people refused to come to attend one of these scientific presentations, and then two weeks later, they would want to go and come in and apply to go to their niece's wedding. Okay, they could go for that. The refusal was not to the individual, it was to the purpose of travel. "Now how," people said, "how do you know when he went in for his niece's wedding that he didn't go and talk to some scientist?" Obviously you can't control that. But, at least, whatever major event or exchange that had been scheduled previously was by the boards by that time.

Q: Did you find Americans who would run afoul of this notoriously complex Indian bureaucracy one hears about, and find themselves in terrible complications.

LEININGER: Not so much with the regular bureaucracy. I think most Americans in that part of the world just sort of shrugged their shoulders and didn't expect anything particular of the Indian bureaucracy. If they were trying to get a driver's license or a residence permit or anything else, they knew it would take weeks. They knew they would have to pay off somebody. This horribly disturbing cable out of Bombay – it was still Bombay at the time – about three months after I arrived there that sort of set the scene for me. The reporting officer took a slice of life of middle Indian man, not middle American, middle Indian man, going about his or her daily life. In attempting to get a telephone line installed, in attempting to get electricity turned on, in attempting to get medical attention for an injured child, in attempting to get that child into school of choice, in attempting to apply for retirement benefits. At every stage of the way, Mr. Middle Indian had to pay somebody off. For every single one of those routine services. Nothing could be done without somebody expecting and taking a bribe on the side, and what's almost worse, the service-seeker expected to have to pay it. Top to bottom. India was rated in the top – or bottom, depending on how you look at these ratings on international corrupt societies – they are in the top three or bottom three every year. In is endemic. I mean it is just the way of life. Again, Americans, most Americans in India in my day were rather worldly-wise travelers; the real Amciti services problems, having to do with naïfs traveling, were back in the flower- power, hippie days, when people would go to India to seek enlightenment, and study with the Maharishi in the upper reaches of the Ganges. Those are the folks who had no clue about how to survive outside of the United States at all. And there they'd be in a place like India, where nothing is as it was. "We are not in Kansas anymore Toto!" Those folks got themselves in trouble. But most of the Americans there when I was there knew the lay of the land. There were organized tour groups, who paid attention to our tips to travelers on where to go, or where not to go. We didn't have a lot of people going around Kashmir, getting themselves taken hostage. That had taken place about six years before I got there. We still had missing people, whom we presumed to be dead bodies by that time. Once in awhile the American relatives would come over and implore the Indian and Kashmiri officials to please keep looking, but nothing ever came of it.

Q: But you didn't have, there weren't many cases of Americans who either disappeared or who got into terrible trouble.

LEININGER: Well, there were the annual numbers of mountain climbers who fell off on of the Himalayas. We just hoped against hope that they would have signed up for their medevac insurance, so that the helicopters could fly into the base of the mountain and get them out. There was usually one or two of those a year. There was one horrible, terribly sad death case I handled myself. A 22 year-old American came to India prior to his scheduled marriage to the 21 year-old daughter of an American Congressman, for a ritual spiritual cleansing. The historic Ganges is sort of like the River Jordan. If you bathe in it, your sins are forgiven, which was a lot of fun when you went white water rafting, because every time you fell off the boat you could say, "Well I can go and sin again. I am clean, I can start all over." But this kid went up into the Ganges at the wrong time of year. He went up there in late February, early March, which is the beginning of the snow-melt season. At that time of year the Ganges runs at a sort of pace as the worst of the Colorado River does. You have seen those scenes where you see nothing but whirls and whirls of muddy roiling churning water, beset with eddies and whirlpools. Well that is the way the Ganges gets at that time of year. He went down to river's edge one evening to have an

evening ablution, and slipped on the rocks and got sucked under in there, and his body was never found. Never ever found. That, according to the police and the army. We had a company of Indian soldiers mustered out to do the search for us. The Defense Attaché was able to prevail upon a contact to have them do a search, but the general rule was, if somebody goes in there, you don't find them.

I was on the phone personally with the Dad on this one. He wouldn't believe his son was dead. He wanted to come and see for himself. I mean you can't argue with somebody in those circumstances. We tried explaining, "Mr. Smith, there really isn't much to see." By this time his son's body was likely to be 12, 15, 20 miles downstream. I didn't want to tell him that actually what otherwise happened was the body got lodged under some rocks on the bottom of the river, and was being eaten by catfish. But he flew over. The plane got in at 11:30 at night. We had the duty driver meet him at the airport, take him to the railway station. He took a 1:30 in the morning train to the upper reaches of the Ganges, was met there by the Indian colonel of the army in charge of the search, taken to the banks of the Ganges. He spent two minutes looking at it, said "Thank you very much, Colonel," turned on his heels, caught the train back, caught the plane back. I never even saw the man, but he had to see for himself. That is just the way folks are.

Apart from that, most Amcitra services matters were minor. We had only three to five Americans in jail at a given time, usually for dope. But three to five, that is nothing. You would expect far more. We had a couple of suicides.

Q: Was there a lot of American tourism to India?

LEININGER: Not individuals. They would come in tour groups, which is the preferred way of doing it. Each one of these groups would generally have somebody who knew the lay of the land, kept the people out of the most nefarious of the tourist traps, put them in reputable hotels, took them to reputable shops. They didn't get ripped off. You didn't want everybody running around loose, God forbid.

Q: Because?

LEININGER: Well the individuals say an 18 or 19 year old American again going back to the old days, was considered to be fair game by the various cults. "Come with me. I will take you to the best place to get you some..." and they would get mugged and rolled and all sorts of things would happen. But we didn't have very many of those.

Q: Was there any hangover from the famous Bhopal case in those days, that Union Carbide thing?

LEININGER: No. I mean the Union Carbide executives didn't dare set foot in India. There were outstanding warrants of arrest for them. There was no way any extradition could proceed. As matter of fact a concluded extradition treaty in Hong Kong was my duties that was brought up until 1997. And then they had been negotiating one in India for nine years. I finally helped get that one brought to conclusion too.

Q: So it didn't apply.

LEININGER: It didn't apply to this particular instance because of the number of years since the incident.

Q: So you did find the living there very demanding as you said because of the...

LEININGER: Just the day to day burdens. Now there were compensations. I mean you didn't have to boil your own water. You had your servants do it. You didn't have to soak your own veggies and fruits; you have your servants do it. Going to the markets and dealing with the dirt. You didn't want to see the stuff at the butchers. You didn't want to see it in the food stalls at the market. You only saw it after your servants brought it home and cleaned it up. Then, too, we had a very small commissary for American goods at the Embassy.

Driving in India, my God. I didn't get behind the wheel once in three years. I had a driver all the time. It wasn't so much they drove on the "wrong" side; we drove on the "wrong" side in Hong Kong and it was just fine. But the prevailing philosophy seemed to be that the double yellow line down the middle of the road was meant to be the place where you aimed your hood ornament. You aimed the car down the middle of the road, and leaned full-time on your horn. People passed on the left; people passed on the right; people passed in the opposite lane going the opposite direction. The numbers of head on collisions you saw every day was appalling. There was every form of transportation since the Stone Age on the road at the same time in India. From ox carts with hand-hewn wheels, to Mercedes Benzes, and everything in between, camels, elephants and horses. Bicycles, motorcycles, three-wheeled motorized cabs, everything. Diesel trucks that spewed out more pollution per minute than the entire Virginia Electric Power Company does producing electricity for the whole state of Virginia. Just breathing the air there was the equivalent of smoking a pack and a half of cigarettes a day. After every run I'd take I'd purposely hawk and spit up phlegm until it wasn't gray anymore, just to try to be sure I got all the gunk out of me...I guess that falls into the category of "too much information..."

Q: Now say something about your general impression of Indian-American relations. India was for a long time my impression a kind of a neutralist maybe leader of the third world movement and so forth. Was that changing by the time you were there, or how would you characterize it in your observations and discussions with political people?

LEININGER: Well, the Indians are pretty proud folks, custodians of 4,000 years of civilization, of which they constantly remind you. You almost want to stop them and say, "Hey, look around you. What happened? Where's that civilization?" Ashley Wills, our DCM, used to refer to Indians at some of the private CODELs and staff meetings, as "the French of South Asia." Overly, particularly proud, and self important, with no apparent justification, at least in recent times. But I had a continuing sense, and I know that Celeste did, and I think the people who have been there since have had it, that they are coming out of that. There is, in fact, an underlying shared value of democracy. I mean, it is a cliché, but it's true. The world's largest democracy in terms of population da, da, da. And we are the world's largest democracy in terms of area and da, da, da. They are really trying. But they operate under all kinds of traditionalist and hereditary and religious encumbrances that so circumscribe their ability to live in the 21st century. There are still

areas of India where wives are burned on funeral pyres when the husband dies. The dowry system for buying wives in some of the backward states is just out of all control. Sectarian tensions between Hindus and Muslims are out of control in some areas, but not just between Hindus and Muslims. There are about 17 different ethnicities within India, most with their own, official language. There are certain areas in the south which are largely Christian, which are relatively enlightened in terms of women's rights, infant mortality, education of women, job opportunities for women and so forth, that almost sound like Iowa, as opposed to these other places where women are getting burned on funeral pyres.

Q: But is their attitude towards the United States, has it...

LEININGER: Well this is my point. There is no single attitude. There are many attitudes towards the United States, as many attitudes as towards what it is to be Indian. I sort of had the idea about India as I did when I was in Israel. Had it been not for the fact that it felt itself under attack and practically at war with its neighbors, it would spin apart from centrifugal force, because there are so many internal rifts in that society. The rift between the haves and have-nots is incredible. The have states are getting really tired of supporting the have-not states, the ones that are willfully backwards, the ones that are irredeemably corrupt in their government structures. The more progressive states – you can tell it by the way their politicians are declaiming themselves – were getting tired of shouldering that burden. So if peace ever comes between Pakistan and India, and Kashmir is settled, I want to sit back and watch what happens to India.

Q: That is interesting. So that's their problem. They may be doing well economically but they still have in effect you would say terrible poverty and things they are going to have to work out in a way just like the Chinese have.

LEININGER: Well Italy was not really a country until 1900 or so. So many internal principalities and so on, but at least they spoke the same language.

Q: Well, yes, we can come back to that another time.

LEININGER: Yes, but India isn't even in that mode.

Q: So you did three years there. Anything else you want to hit from your time in particular?

LEININGER: Oh, yes. One thing that we tried to do in India is take to heart this whole gospel of what used to be called "best practices," as preached by CA. As a matter of fact one of the things that CA PDAS Donna Hamilton, before I went, said to me, was, "Look, you have got to do something to try and modernize consular operations out there in preparation for what appears to be this huge surge in workload." Well, of course, by the time I got there, it was already up to our necks and rising. We did get, while I was there, four more American positions, and about 14 more FSN positions, countrywide. But workload doubled. So how did we cope? Well, we started finally to introduce things like drop boxes for the previously-visaed people. They never had drop boxes in India before. Like a travel agent's referral system for previously-traveled people, who otherwise could have personal appearance waived, with the standards in effect of the day. We looked into offsite information services, to a local company, but we were hampered by the fact

that India does not have a nationwide 800 number or a 900 number telephone system in place. You couldn't just call up toll free, or even charge a fee to the calling party, yet. It was coming. They kept telling us it was coming, so we started negotiations. First it was going to happen in Bombay. We looked into offsite fee collections, but our financial management officer could not dream of having any U.S. money pass through the Indian banking system if he could possibly help it. He would die first. Yet the banks he would trust, the few branches of international multinational banks, Barclay's Bank and so on, were established only in so few cities in India it would almost be impossible to do offsite fee collection. So that one was dropped for awhile. But we started all those movements in all those directions, and we did in effect streamline a lot of the processing of our operations, so we did survive without any need to move into new buildings. Now, with cutbacks in the waiver of personal appearance program we have seen since 9/11, coupled with the imposition of the fingerprint requirement, I understand they are having to do something in the waiting sections both in Mumbai and Delhi, because there is just no more room for human bodies.

Q: They don't want people dropping visas off any more without some kind of personal appearance I think. We have to talk about that separately. So after three years there, you are thinking about time in class and wanted to come back to the United States...

LEININGER: For my remaining two years, and I knew there wasn't going to be any Assistant Secretary position fall out of the sky. What had happened in the meantime while I was overseas on the HR front was interesting. It started while I was arriving in Hong Kong...

Q: HR being...

LEININGER: Well now it is called Human Resources. The Bureau of Personnel renamed itself Human Resources. It reorganized itself. The Office of Career Development and Assignments, you might recall, was vastly downsized. They combined the functions of career development officer and assignment officer. Now, when this proposal was broached, it was about '93 or '94. My first year in Hong Kong. I went on record in sending cables both to AFSA saying, "fight this," and to management saying, "it is stupid to do this. I know it might seem inefficient, but it isn't." I was arguing that not only is there an inherent conflict of interest for someone acting both as assignment officer and CDO, but there aren't enough hours in the day to do it all, if you do it right.

Q: I thought those were full time jobs when I was in.

LEININGER: They were completely full time jobs. People used to come in on weekends to catch up.

Q: I did that often, yes.

LEININGER: Yes. You had to keep everything current. All the modernization and computer applications they installed did nothing to speed things up, just as on the consular front. It didn't speed anything up; it might have made record keeping after the fact easier, but it didn't make anything any quicker. To do both of these jobs properly, people would have had to have the

wisdom of Solomon, and the strength of Hercules, and be purer than Caesar's wife. They would have had to resist bureau blandishments, on the one hand and clients' blandishments on the other. I just couldn't see how that was going to work out. So after about three or four years of fooling around with that, they declared it a failure – surprise, surprise.

Q: They had put the positions together, right?

LEININGER: Together.

Q: With the hope of eliminating some positions, downsizing...

LEININGER: Right. They tried to make it work, but its failure was obvious in the complaints from both employees, who weren't getting any response from people who were supposedly to act as their career development officers, and from bureaus, who weren't even having e-mails or phone messages returned from assignment officers about getting people on agenda and getting assignments done. It was just an impossible task. So HR management spun around on their heels, eventually, and decided, just about the time now I am leaving India, that they were going to go back to the old way of doing things – re-establish an assignments division, and re-establish a counseling division. I became the candidate to be the head of the mid-level counseling and assignments division, which. I would, in effect be the CDO to the CDOs who would be in charge of counseling political, economic, administrative, consular, information management officers, office managers, and security people; everybody, all specialists and generalists at the mid-levels. I had 21 CDOs working for me. I would be working for, irony of ironies, Vincent Battle, who had been my deputy back in the old CDA/CON 10 years prior. He was to be the new director of CDA.

Q: So instead of the old system where you had a career advisor in your office but in effect they all reported to the director in essence. They put a level. So you went in below the director, but above all the CDOs.

LEININGER: There was a similar division chief at senior level and another division chief at entry level. Mid-level was the largest division, since most FS employees are in those grades.

Q: Ok, I got you.

LEININGER: And we also had a CDO who was in charge of care and feeding of Civil Service employees who were with us on excursion tours. We had 120 doing that at that time. No kidding. The whole downturn in junior officer intake during the lean years of the nineties left us at the end of the decade with a huge mid-level staffing gap. We just didn't have enough people to fill our existing positions. This is why CA had to push the consular associates program, and get family members commissioned to do adjudication of visas and passports. It was why we were taking on excursion tours from specialists, and why we were taking on excursion tours from Civil Service personnel. So we had 120 Civil Service people in the field, in the middle of tours of duty. Every year we assigned an additional 35 to 45. Now, these were jobs that had been left over, still vacant, as the end of the assignment cycle approached. We wouldn't start doing those assignments until February, so usually they were the hardest jobs in the worst places that we have. And they

weren't just consular positions. They were in every area, political, office management jobs, economic reporting. We would hold annual Civil Service recruitment drives each year in the Department, and the central system worked out special re-employment rights agreements, to be sure these folks would have jobs waiting for them when they returned from their overseas tours.

Q: We are still talking with Wayne Leininger. We are going to fill in a couple of things here that we skipped over. One of them is something that Wayne wants to bring up about his time in New Delhi, so go ahead.

LEININGER: I just wanted to mention in passing the way we reacted, and the way many of the other immigrant visa issuing posts around the world reacted, to the imposition of a new, legally binding affidavit of support requirement for immigrants who were sponsored by relatives in the United States. Now to put it in perspective, for years and years, family members who sponsor other family members for immigration to the United States have always been required in some way, shape, or form or another, to put up evidence that the alien to whom we are going to be giving this visa will not become a public charge. They have an old affidavit of support, called the I-134, which the courts sort of looked at and chuckled a little bit and said, "Yes, that is a nice expression of intent, but it is by no means a basis for confiscating someone's assets or attaching their salaries or anything else." Well in 1996, Congress stiffened the requirement.

They were clamping down, as you might recall, on the entitlement of immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, to any kind of social welfare benefits. Along these lines, they said anybody who is going to legally come to this country and is going to be sponsored by a relative, is going to have that relative held legally responsible for this person not becoming a public charge a) until that alien accumulates 40 quarters of social security work; b) until that alien becomes a citizen him or herself; c) until that alien dies, or d) until the sponsor dies. At least the sponsor's obligation did not go down to the next generation! To that end, anyway, the Department of State, and the then-INS, got together and they drew up about an eight page document called, an I-864. It is – the way they did it, and it passed all the lawyers tests – sufficient basis to take somebody to court if their sponsored immigrant ends up on public assistance. Sponsors had that to show income and/or assets in the United States sufficient to support the incoming applicant and his entire family, and their *own* family, at a level of 125% of the poverty level in the area in which they are living. Now for our purposes, "the area in which they are living," means just one of three. There is Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental United States. Now you know and I know that the cost of living in New York City is a hell of a lot more than in Omaha, but nevertheless, we have one standard for the whole of the continental United States.

This all sounds wonderful when you are sitting back in Washington drawing up these rules, and we say people are going to meet these tests, or they are not going to get their visas. This is the way we are going to stop people from ever going on public assistance, and if they go on public assistance, we are going to get the money back out of the individuals who sponsored them in the first place dammit! Yes! Well, in practice, there were several problems in administration that cropped up within the first two weeks of implementation. First of all, the I-864 it is the most complicated government document I have ever seen. It beats the hell out of any IRS form I have ever encountered. I have had immigration lawyers, whose business it was to handle these things, curl up in despair, not being able to make heads or tails out of that form or its instructions. Now,

those are the professionals, the *lawyers*. Can you imagine some person who is not literate in any known language, having to send this to a relative in the United States saying, "Please to fill this out for me." Hello! The form has to have copies of the sponsor's income tax returns for the previous three years. It has got to be notarized. It has got to be signed in about three different places. If you have got a spouse's income that has got to be included, the spouse has to fill out a portion. If your combined income is still insufficient and you have another joint sponsor, there is another form added to it. Long story short, when this thing was actually put into play in 1997, the refusal rate of first time applicants coming in and presenting it to us at the time of their interview for the supposed issuance of their visa, the refusal rates around the world were between 75% and 85%. People just couldn't get it right. It wasn't usually that the income levels necessarily were lacking. In some cases they were, which was a valid grounds for refusal under the public charge provisions of the law. But, mostly, they simply hadn't dotted the i's and crossed the t's appropriately. They didn't have the number of copies, didn't have it notarized, didn't have the number of signatures, didn't have, didn't have. So there we were in India and other colleagues were in the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic, and in Haiti, trying to explain to these poor semi-educated people what it was wrong with this most complicated form the U.S. government has ever issued.

**JANEY DEA COLE
Branch Public Affairs Officer
Calcutta (1996-1999)**

**Temporary Duty, Nuclear Disarmament Conference
New Delhi (1999)**

Ms Cole was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and was educated at Hartwick College, the University of Hawaii and Virginia Polytechnic Institute. After working in New York City several years, she joined the United States Information Agency in 1980. During her career, Ms. Cole served in Dacca, Caracas, Katmandu, Calcutta, and in Islamabad, where she was District Public Affairs Officer. In Washington, she served in the East bureau of USIA and was a Congressional Fellow on Capitol Hill. Ms Cole was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

COLE: Calcutta opened up and it had always been my dream to go to Calcutta.

Q: Why was that?

COLE: When I had served in my first post in Dacca, Calcutta had been this promise land where you could go and buy food, go to the movies, and walk on the street and it was just wonderful. Also, I had studied Bengali and I had liked it very much; it was a language of my heart, and the idea of going back to where it was spoken was just enormously attractive to me.

Q: So you went to Calcutta from when to when?

COLE: From '96 to '99.

Q: What was Calcutta like when you got there in 1996?

COLE: It was a city that had greatly improved since I had seen it in the early 1980s. The supply of electricity was much, much better. The telephones worked a whole lot better. It seemed to me that almost everything had improved. I think it reflected the fact that India was emerging from the Fourth World into the Third and their economy was growing, the country was becoming more confident and competent.

Q: You know, when I hear people talk about Calcutta I always think about the beggars in the street. How was that?

COLE: Not bad. I mean, even in 1981 the popular image of beggars in the streets was not quite accurate. At the birth of Bangladesh in '71 enormous numbers of refugees, thousands, maybe millions had come across the border to Calcutta. These were Hindus who had been driven out by the Pakistani army and were afraid to go back. They were refugees in dire need who overwhelmed the infrastructure in Calcutta, then essentially a 19th century city. It had Dickensonian industries and being there was like being in the middle of a novel by Dickens in many respects. But by the time I got back a lot of those refugees had been absorbed into the fabric of Calcutta.

Q: What was your job?

COLE: I was what we used to call the branch public affairs officer. But our PAOs in New Delhi were more or less freeing us from the constraints of working through the center. So we were able to negotiate our own programs, do our own reporting and be the PAO for a district that included all of Eastern India, millions and millions of people.

Q: Who was the PAO in New Delhi?

COLE: Well, first it was Ashley Wills and then he moved on to be DCM and eventually became our ambassador in Sri Lanka. And then it was Frank Ward, who had been his deputy and then moved up.

Q: Who was the consul general in Calcutta?

COLE: At that time we didn't as of yet report to the consul general. When I arrived it was Bob Boggs. He went on to become, I think, political counselor in Delhi and then DCM in Kathmandu. After him it was Cheryl Simm who is still in the midst of her career.

Q: What were your objectives there?

COLE: A long-term objective for USIA and public diplomacy today, is to make the world safe for capitalism, particularly American capitalism. We did an enormous amount of economic

programming attempting to explain, particularly to the Marxist-oriented Bengalis, what capitalism was, what a joint venture was, why it wasn't a big scary thing to have American or foreign partners in a joint venture. For a lot of the other people living in Eastern India you didn't have to do this because they themselves were entrepreneurial. But the Bengalis dominate politically and intellectually so you have to talk with them.

Q: Who were the entrepreneurial-minded people?

COLE: A lot of people who at partition were driven out of Pakistan into Calcutta. There were a lot of Sindhis, Hindus from the Sind in what is today Pakistan who fled for their lives. They tended to be small and medium range traders. Then of course there were the Marwaris; these are people from Rajasthan who back in the British period immigrated into Calcutta and established themselves as the great trading class or clan and they are traders by caste, traders by inclination, by training. Some extremely respected and some extremely disliked.

Q: How did you work with these various groups? Did you find opportunities in the university? Was Marxism influential there?

COLE: I loved working with the university. One of the things that I had learned in Venezuela is that the young always want to exercise their prerogative to make their parents crazy. And if you want to drive your dear old Marxist Leninist professor father bananas, what do you become? A Reaganite economist. So it was wonderful fun to go out and talk directly to students. You'd ask them, why should you have second class things? Why should your only choice for a car be one that was based on a 1940s British model? Because that's what the masters in Delhi have decided should be manufactured. And why should they improve it when there's no competition? And I asked, why are your mothers, continuing to wash stuff by hand when you could have a clothes washer and make it really hygienic. And this appealed to people.

We were also very lucky in that a Bengali intellectual, long settled in the West, named Amartya Sen who won the Nobel Prize. And a lot of his work was in social capital.

Q: This was the Nobel Prize for economics?

COLE: For economics, yes. Like most good Bengali boys, he came back every winter to see his parents. They lived in Santiniketan, the community established by Rabindranath Tagore, right in the bosom of Bengali culture. And he was a great proponent of the argument that while the state should be interested in generating the infrastructure of economic success, it shouldn't be busy managing the economy.

Q: How did USIS translate this into action?

COLE: We took policy and turned it into programs or actions to explain it and to change people's behavior. One of the things I remember doing was sponsoring an address by Amartya Sen, and then having it transcribed and printed up in the magazine that was published in New Delhi and circulated to some of our contacts. We also staged conferences where we would bring in a variety of experts both from India and from the United States to talk about joint partnerships,

what they were, how they worked, the intellectual framework for capitalism. We had professors come through and they sat with the academics at the university and talked about the issues related to being entrepreneurial.

Q: Well, I would think that you would have run into strong opposition from the entrenched faculty of the universities.

COLE: That was not necessarily the case. Bengalis all have ironclad beautiful manners; they're a real credit to their families. And they are interested in ideas, truly, deeply, profoundly, bred in the bone; they want to know. Moreover, even ideologues, could look around and see that things were changing, that it was no longer the Congress Party in Delhi giving out licenses to their pets to manufacture whatever product they wanted; it was changing. Their view had been that whatever Bengalis think today the rest of India thinks tomorrow. But they found it was the opposite, and they were interested in catching up intellectually, no matter what they had thought or felt, they wanted to address the issues.

Q: By the time you'd reached there had India made adjustments? Gotten away from protectionism and the idea that everything had to be done by the Indians themselves?

COLE: What they called Nehruvian socialism very much reflected Gandhi's principles, and was very much a post-colonial fixation. But, I got to India 50 years after that and members of the generation coming up just weren't interested, they didn't have to fight that battle anymore.

Q: But had the political powers in New Delhi changed the rules?

COLE: Yes, they had. Back when I was serving in Nepal they had had a terrible gold crisis and they had had to change the rules right then and there. And slowly but surely they were opening up. The symbolic way of talking about this is Coca-Cola. At one point Coca-Cola was well-established in India. It's a ready market when you think about people buying affordable luxuries like a cold Coke. But then they were kicked out because they refused to give the government of India their formula; at least that was the ostensible reason. When I was in Calcutta they were back in and it was very nice to be able to cite the example because everyone said, our local Colas are going to be run off the market. But that didn't happen. Coca-Cola was smart and they bought up some of these and kept on producing them. So the camel's nose was under the tent and the Indian economy was beginning to open up.

Q: Could you use American entrepreneurs, the Coca-Cola executives and others, as part of your program?

COLE: Yes. There were some people introducing a good American mattress, making it someplace down in the south of India and I got one of their executives to come on down and talk about how if you get an American company in your neighborhood, it will make a contribution to the local dancing school and the music academy and hire people. But there wasn't much of that. American businesspeople are interested in business, not in going about giving talks. So occasionally we could get somebody, but it wasn't so easy.

Q: How about the Department of Commerce? Were they a partner of yours or not?

COLE: We had a little Department of Commerce office run by FSNs in Calcutta and that was about it. But we did work closely with them and we did consult back and forth with them and they would often send people to us. The Department of Commerce's business is to sell U.S. products; it's not to help host country nationals market their products in the U.S. So whenever somebody wandered into their little library and said, I make industrial gloves and I want to know how I can find a distributor in the U.S., they would say, go to USIS, see Ms. Cole. And we'd get on the Internet and find a distributor in the U.S. for industrial gloves. This distributor mainly didn't sell them in the U.S. but to other countries where they were a very viable product.

Q: You mentioned the Internet. Had the Internet become a real tool by the time you arrived there or while you were there?

COLE: Yes, there were some wonderful entrepreneurial people in Calcutta working on the Internet, including one Bengali. We had access in our library and it was one of the reasons why we got large contributions from Indian firms doing business in Calcutta. They found our access to the Internet and our researchers useful. They also liked to present themselves as patrons of culture, and we put up plaques behind the library check-out desk with the names of these great business firms on them. The fact that they made significant donations helped us save the library when others were being closed.

Q: With Bengalis taking their culture very seriously, were you able to provide them with examples of American culture?

COLE: This was the last gasp of cultural programs for a long, long time. We had pretty much stopped doing them. The last big exhibit we had was of the works of an African America artist, Lawrence Jacob. The West Bengal government's minister of culture came, the first time he had ever been in a USIS or U.S. government facility. He happened to take an interest in African American art and he had an uncle who had been a translated Langston Hughes. Our most successful program was Ambassador Wisner's idea to bring the Paul Taylor Dance Company to India during the celebration of its 50th anniversary. He raised almost all the money from, or had us raise almost all the money, from private sector U.S. companies. Since there weren't any in Calcutta, I raised our share from Indian companies.

Q: Did you find Indians had much rapport with African Americans?

COLE: Yes, there was a great deal of romanticization of the African American experience. We sent a lot of Fulbright students to Howard University to study African American literature and we did this in Bangladesh also. But, one of my deputies, Terry White, had pointed out that this interest was declining among the younger generation. They were less interested in the literature of victimization and struggle and they wanted something different. So we started to work with Asian American literature.

One of the most interesting cultural events I did there was a seminar on American literature and we also did a WorldNet conversation about African American literature. And as I said, my

district, in addition to heavily Bengali also included Bihar, Orissa and what was called the Seven Sisters of the Northeast, which were largely tribal areas. We had somebody talking about, Toni Morrison and Maya Angelou and all my good Hindu participants were shocked at the fact that women were having babies without having fathers. But this lovely tribal woman with a Fulbright PhD got up and said, that exactly describes how my tribe works. And there was this stunned silence. She was standing there, very pretty in her little sari, explaining her tribe's matriarchal, matrilineal institutions. It was great.

Our other important policy emphasis was on disarmament issues. This, of course, was the period of Indian nuclear testing. The Bengalis had always been pacifists and were always against any country being nuclear including us and themselves. So there were a lot of demonstrations against Indian policy. I was always writing cables and calling up New Delhi and saying, you have to include a little paragraph pointing out that not all Indians were out in the streets clapping their hands and celebrating the nuclear program. That in Bengal there was a huge demonstration against the nuclear policy. At one point I was invited to speak at a conference and the person on the other side was a retired Indian brigadier general and I thought, what can I say? So I said, I can't discuss strategic issues the way my friend the general can and I'm also constrained by the fact that, as a foreign diplomat, I can't be critical of Indian policy; that's not my business, that's your business. But I can tell you about growing up under the shadow of the mushroom-shaped cloud. In New York City in the 1950s, we had dog tags with our blood types on them and at school we had take cover drills, where you would get under your desk or we'd go down to the basement and stand with our hands on the wall. And, of course, we were smart children; we knew that if somebody dropped an atomic bomb on us it would generate a gigantic tsunami that would totally cover Brooklyn. Later on we had speakers come to our student assembly to explain that we didn't have to be afraid, that we had Minuteman rockets that would shoot these evil things down because it was felt that our fears were causing us great psychological damage. And so everyone was really quite taken by this tale. And I said, now that India is nuclear, my question to you is, are you having your children take cover drills? Do your children know their blood types? And then I went into some statistics provided by an academic, Steven Cohen who had done research on this, to point out that if there is a nuclear exchange it will probably be in the north of India where the bases are. And everyone went, whew. That would mean total nuclear contamination of the Punjab. Where would the food come from? Millions and millions of people, many of them very sick with radiation poisoning, will flood into the city. Where are your hospitals where people are trained to treat radiation poisoning? This was treated by the press as a very effective counter to the brigadier's presentation, and indeed provided talking points that activists used against this policy.

Q: You mentioned the decline of cultural diplomacy. When did this start happening, why, and what were the effects?

COLE: The principal proponent of the decline was Jesse Helms during the Clinton administration. The main factors were economic. Our budgets were being cut and cut and cultural programs are very expensive. There was also the argument, I think a legitimate one, that in many countries as in Europe and Japan, cultural activities were adequately available on a commercial basis. However, in large parts of the world this was not the case. So we had to become very entrepreneurial spending our own money to hire artists. We discovered there was a

whole culture of elite and upper middle class children studying piano in Calcutta. In the tribal areas also were a lot of children in missionary supported schools who were studying piano. So, if we could get a good pianist who was also a good teacher we could do master classes in some remarkable places and talk to people, some of whom were very hard for us to reach otherwise, about something they cared about, which was their children's education. And it was great at opening doors and keeping channels of communication open.

Q: Did you find that the growing spread of international television, CNN but other programs, make things easier or harder for you all?

COLE: There was less of that penetration in Calcutta in my day. There were lots and lots of little TV stations that serviced neighborhoods or districts. We were working with them and you could really make friends forever if you did such things as inviting them to come in with their cameras for a press conference with the ambassador. Ambassador Celeste was great at this and had the politician's genius for remembering people's names. So you could get the U.S. ambassador on a channel that reached a couple of million people who would turn it on because they were flattered by the attention. So, in that respect the spread of TV was good for us.

Q: Did you feel there was particular tough competition from outside? I mean, it always used to be the Soviets but that was way passed by this point.

COLE: Most of the western powers who had had a diplomatic presence in Calcutta had withdrawn. So we were left with the British Council, the Alliance Française, a small Italian presence, and the Goethe Institute, which was very impressive. The Japanese and the Thais had only a diplomatic presence there. We were more inclined to work with these folks than against them. The Russians still had a large presence there and had apartments in their compound they rented to Indians. We had quite a nice relationship with them and we tried to complement one another in our activities.

Q: How was the Monica Lewinsky scandal received there?

COLE: Indians know very well that their political leaders have their scandals too but it would be unthinkable to dredge those up or dwell on them; it would simply be bad manners. They were both amused and horrified by the fact that we were giving all this attention to this relatively trifling affair. And mainly I was lucky. It was unlike my case in Venezuela where, you know, we had to deal with the fact that the president of the republic had a mistress. I was kind of protected in this but I can remember any number of private conversations in gatherings with Indian women, and they'd want to know what exactly had Clinton done? I found ways to tip toe around this and I remember saying, most of you went to convent schools and were educated by nuns. Weren't you required to read the bible? And they said, oh yes. And I said, well, you know, our president says that it wasn't sex; think about the bible; it was an abomination, not sex. That indeed was our president's defense.

Q: Well, to my mind, you know, I mean, this whole thing, the way I was brought up sex meant one thing. It was heavy petting or- didn't have the abomination but I could have very easily

sworn I didn't have sex. It was a very peculiar time in American politics. It was blown way out of proportion.

COLE: Well, so I had to learn to tip toe, as I say, around this. And the ladies, often at the end of the gathering, somebody would suddenly say, an abomination. I know what he did. I said yes, and some of it involved a cigar. And they'd say, "Wait until I tell my husband." Later on at the club I would run into their suited, booted, and felt-hatted, very correct husbands and they'd look at me and chuckle and say, yes, my wife has explained it all to me.

Then India Today, I believe it was, came out with a very frank article which explained exactly what it is that these two people had been doing and that was helpful. And if men ever asked me about it I said, oh, have your wife ask me. I'm just too embarrassed to talk to you about it.

Q: You've talked mostly about Calcutta and the Bengalis, were you able to do much in the tribal areas?

COLE: I managed to get to two tribal areas, Nagaland and Assam, both in northeastern India which, next to Kashmir is the bloodiest place in India. Many of the people there were in unadministered territories in the British era and felt they should not have been incorporated into independent India in 1947. The Nagas particularly with their warrior history had gone into immediate rebellion. However, when I was in Calcutta, a truce was in effect. So I became the first USIS officer since 1968 to go to Nagaland to do programs although my predecessor had visited there with a group of British veterans of the Imphal campaign and our Consul General had gone in under army escort – not exactly the most appropriate way to visit the university.

Getting into Nagaland required my FSN to get permission from the state capital. We also had to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get the stamped permission which we had to show at innumerable military road blocks. In the five days we were permitted to stay, I was able to visit the university (which we had not known existed) and revive some much earlier USIS contacts that had been long forgotten.

In Assam, the fighting was not against the Indian government but against the state government or tribe against tribe. Because of the violence we had stopped programming there in 1980. But I was able to get the cooperation of the local tea planters and we were able to put on our first cultural program in many years. It included a cowboy singer who was a great hit.

Q: Well then, in '99, what did you do?

COLE: I had been assigned to go to Islamabad, Pakistan, as the Cultural Affairs Officer. I had already had all my farewell parties in Calcutta. My apartment was scheduled for major renovation. They were redoing each apartment as it emptied out because it had sort of 1950s, '60s wiring and we all knew very well the walls were going to start to smoke from the stuff we were plugging in. I also had one entire wall in my bedroom that was weeping. I was ready to move to Islamabad with my mother, who had Alzheimers, and my cat. The packers had arrived.

And low and behold the Clinton administration lobbed a bunch of Tomahawk missiles at Osama Bin Laden's camp in Afghanistan. Our embassy in Pakistan was drawn down; and the rest of us were frozen in place. After about two months I ended up in New Delhi for another three months where I worked on nuclear disarmament issues. We put on a big conference between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Eventually they started letting people back into Islamabad and permission came for me to go. We couldn't bring our families with us and I said, no, I can't go, my mother has Alzheimer's, what am I going to do with her? They also started cutting CAO positions. Fortunately, the PAO did protect that position and I was able to go to Pakistan.

Q: Well, one last thing on this sort of Calcutta-New Delhi thing. I noticed you kind of rolled your eyes at one point about Ambassador Wisner. Why?

COLE: When he came down to Calcutta he was wonderful. He was like a highly charged naked wire. He had wonderful energy, wonderful creativity. I was very glad that I was somewhat removed from daily contact with him because I think he would have burned. He was a real professional; he had a million ideas. One of these was a big conference in Calcutta on developing the economy in the eastern side of the subcontinent. It was attended by representatives from industry, from Bangladesh, eastern India, Nepal, as well as by U.S. speakers. This was his idea. He's a real extrovert and he was great fun. He was wonderful with the press and he loved a press feeding frenzy. And my FSN press chief was great at setting these up. So as he was walking out of Ryder's Building, the state capital where he'd been meeting with the top politicians in West Bengal we would get all the press snapping photos and standing on desks and screaming and carrying on and he just thought that was enormously amusing.

ALICE A. DRESS
Economic Counselor
New Delhi (1997-2000)

An Economic and Financial specialist, Ms. Dress was born in Indiana and educated at a number of colleges and universities, including George Washington, Tufts and Boston Universities. Initially working with the Department of the Treasury in Washington, DC and in Rome Italy as Treasury attaché, Ms. Dress joined the State Department Foreign Service in 1985, and served, primarily as Economic Counselor, in Kinshasa, Zaire, Dakar, Senegal, New Delhi, India and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. At the State Department in Washington, DC she held senior positions in the European and African Bureaus. Ms. Dress was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: How was the state of relations between the United States and India at the time?

DRESS: Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and during the Cold War, bilateral relations with India were very bad, very strained. Prime Minister Gandhi was also a leading force in the non-aligned movement and India opposed us in the UN system. The Indians were much closer to the Soviets than to the United States. The Indian economy was an autarky and stagnated under Gandhi socialism and from being deliberately cut off from relations with the global economy. In 1991 then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed through financial liberalization measures. So by the time I got there the economy had started to open. It was a very long, fitful process of opening up to foreign investment, reducing restrictions on imports and privatizing vast unproductive government-owned enterprises. U.S. policy aimed at encouraging the liberalization and the privatization and making sure that American business had access to the Indian market.

Q: India had such a huge civil service of people who basically, my impression is they sat at a desk with a mound of papers in front of them and did very little except not approve...

DRESS: Not approve things. In the embassy, we all had horror stories about how difficult it was to deal with the Indian babu or bureaucrat. It was difficult to get in to see government officials and painfully difficult to get them to do anything helpful. I was always awestruck when I walked into an official's office and saw the enormous piles of files on every surface.

Q: They were literally 18 inches high.

DRESS: When you raised an issue with an Indian official, he invariably wanted to "consult the file." That was always said in a portentous manner. A minion would bring in an enormous file, visual proof that the bureaucracy moved glacially, that issues were not resolved but just accreted paper. It wasn't just mythology about how the babus ran the country, it was the truth.

My three years in New Delhi were very active, very challenging. Dick Celeste, a Clinton political appointee, was the ambassador. When he was governor of Illinois, he visited India a number of times on trade missions, so he knew people and had a strong interest in the country. He was very energetic and a surprisingly good manager. I've been lucky that the political ambassadors I have worked for, apart from Governor Volpe in Rome, have all been competent, knowledgeable and energetic.

Ambassador Celeste believed in teamwork and team building. One of the first things he did when he arrived at post was to assemble the country team at his residence to draft a mission statement. (The country team by the way is composed of heads of sections and agencies who regularly attend the ambassador's staff meetings.) Until he introduced the concept to us, I didn't even know what a mission statement was. He had it printed up and laminated and we carried it around in our wallets. I bet if I looked carefully enough at home now I would find a copy. He also took the country team out of town for mission performance planning exercises each year. As a team, we would define what U.S. interests were in India and how we planned to achieve them during the coming year.

He made a campaign-like promise that he would visit every state in India during his ambassadorship. Once a politician, always a politician, I suppose. He fulfilled that pledge even though the Indian government restricted travel to some of the states in the northeast because of

the separatist terrorist activity. I was fortunate enough to accompany him on his visit to Meghalaya, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland in the northeast. That is a region distinct from the rest of India, ethnically, religiously and linguistically. They are closer in all respects to South East Asia than to South Asia and the predominant religion is Christian. It was in Nagaland the British stopped the Japanese advance into India in 1944. Another distinction for Nagaland was its Presbyterian terrorist groups.

Ambassador Celeste was especially interested in improving bilateral scientific cooperation with India. I negotiated, under his direction, a cooperative agreement with the Indians to set up a bilateral science council to promote cooperation, an agreement Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed during President Clinton's visit in 2000.

Q: On the scientific side one is always impressed you go to any of our schools or universities that particularly deal in scientific things and the Indian names are always at the top of the list. Obviously they're a people who really have a propensity towards science but was this being translated in India at the time?

DRESS: The government had an active space program, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). I visited the ISRO headquarters in Bangalore and saw some of the communications satellites they were working on. Bangalore was also the center of the information technology boom created by Indian IT entrepreneurs. Indian companies did a lot of back office business for American companies -- processing insurance claims and manning call centers. India has excellent technical schools and turns out a lot of engineers and computer specialists, all of whom speak English. That makes India an attractive place for U.S. firms to invest and do business.

Q: Had the Indians worked out their problems with the bureaucracy and attitude in dealing with this?

DRESS: No. Actually, the private sector was growing in spite of the dead hand of bureaucracy, which is a legacy of the British Raj and dates back to colonial times.

Q: Of course too in a country the size of India and all the bureaucracy represents a tremendous number of jobs and the more you dig in and make it...

DRESS: In spite of the 1991 reforms, the government continued to be a drag on the economy. For example, the quotas or preferences extended to the disadvantaged groups - the scheduled tribes and scheduled classes -- for government jobs and university admission have a perverse brain-drain effect. A lot of middle class kids can't get into Indian universities so they study overseas and stay overseas to work.

Q: Sort of looking down the pike did you see India as becoming a major scientific and production power?

DRESS: In 1997 it was clear that India was an emerging technological powerhouse, which was why Ambassador Celeste was so keen to get that cooperative science agreement in place. There was no looking into the future about that; the future had arrived.

Q: What about the agreement what did this mean? What were we after then?

DRESS: It was a bilateral framework agreement to facilitate scientific exchange and cooperation and studies.

Returning to the Indian economy, one of the major problems on the macroeconomic front was that India was liberalizing too slowly. The annual rate of population increase outpaced the annual increase in GDP and there was no improvement in per capita income. India had a large and growing middle class that made it a very attractive market for U.S. business but India also had 300 million desperately poor people. Economists calculated that GDP growth needed to exceed 6% per year for people's daily lives to improve and for more of the poor to climb into the middle class. Another important economic factor was the monsoon rains. A good monsoon meant good economic growth. It wasn't until almost ten years after I left that India was able to achieve a growth rate in excess of population growth. For the last couple years they've gotten up to nine percent, which is impressive, given that there are still significant barriers to trade and investment. Unfortunately, now the monsoon rains are less favorable and reforms are stalled. Thirty years ago the world feared that India couldn't feed itself. With the 1960s green revolution and years of good monsoon rains famine is not a concern.

Q: Were you as economic counselor sort of monitoring what was going on in China and comparing and contrasting China with India because they seem to be the two stars?

DRESS: The Indians were preoccupied with China from a security standpoint, having engaged in armed skirmishes with the Chinese over the years. From an economic standpoint they felt that they were always unfairly compared to the China. Potential American investors would say to them, "Well the Chinese are doing this and that and the Chinese economy is growing at a fantastic rate. Here you are a democracy and it's much harder to do business in India and you are growing much more slowly." The Indians were aware that they were competing with China. This was underscored when the Indian population hit the one billion mark, catching up with China.

The biggest political event during my three years in India was their nuclear test in 1998.

Q: Were we prepared for this?

DRESS: As far as I know, we were caught by surprise. After the test, the Indians told us that they had given us a head up and pointed to language in a speech by the prime minister. But frankly, only with hindsight could we have interpreted the remarks as advance notice that they planned to test a nuclear device.

Q: How did you find did the various major political parties, there is the Congress Party and then there is the...

DRESS: When I arrived in India, the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, was in power. It was a BJP-led government that conducted the 1998 nuclear test.

Q: Did you find that the BJP and the Congress Party were both as interested in particularly economic relations with the United States or was the BJP, for example, more nationalistic?

DRESS: The BJP was definitely more nationalistic and many of the BJP ministers that we called on were polite but distant. Just a minor example of the BJP's anti-Western, anti-American attitude -- one of the BJP ministers refused to allow Coca Cola to be served in his ministry. But then again the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi hadn't been all that friendly to the United States either so I'm not sure there was that much to choose from between the two parties in that regard.

Embassy New Delhi was huge with many USG agencies represented, even the Library of Congress. The defense attaché did not have an easy job because the Indians were reluctant to engage in military-to-military relations. We didn't have an APO (military post office) because the Indian government wouldn't allow it and we had to rely on the much slower diplomatic pouch for our mail. The Indian government also required their officials to report contacts with American official. We were still viewed with distrust, an attitude carried over from the Cold War days.

Q: I would think that dealing with the Indians and the little I've had to do with it, not much, but I would think to do this on a daily basis would be just plain exhausting or was it so challenging that it was fun?

DRESS: The work was challenging, but I enjoyed it. Living in India was a colorful adventure, but sometimes overwhelming. The sheer press of humanity was wearing. New Delhi wasn't as densely populated as Mumbai (Bombay) or Kolkata (Calcutta) but it was still wall-to-wall people.

Q: Did you find yourself in a role of American businesses who were established having their phone centers and all that coming to you continually trying to work out tangles and problems or not?

DRESS: Most of the big U.S. companies operating in India were sophisticated enough and well connected enough that they didn't need our help, but they would stop in and chat with the ambassador or DCM to get the our take on the political situation. India had an energy shortage; it lacked sufficient power production capacity. In 1993 Enron, the Houston-based energy company, signed a multimillion-dollar contract to build a power plant in the state of Maharashtra. At that time, Enron was very big, very powerful and - -

Q: Cutting edge.

DRESS: Yes, cutting edge. They may have been the "smartest guys in the room," but they ran into trouble with their Dabhol power project in India. The local power board decided the power the plant produced cost too much. In 1996 a newly elected Indian government decided the whole project was too expensive and stopped payments to Enron. High-level Enron officials visited India frequently trying to get their money; they came to the embassy to ask for the ambassador's help with the central government.

Q: One is dealing with these really big economic developments in India but did you find yourself every once in a while being able to go out into the countryside and get a real dose of reality of...

DRESS: Well, there was an awful lot of "reality," of the real India to be seen in New Delhi every day. The drive to and from work was always colorful thanks to smoke-spewing three wheelers, beggars on every corner, cows in the median strips, and the occasional horse from a wedding procession or elephant walking down the street. And a trip to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not without it's excitement because of the monkeys that invaded the offices and hallways. Of course given the size of India and its regional differences, it was necessary to travel outside of the capital. I visited the U.S. consulates in Mumbai, Calcutta (renamed Kolkata) and Chennai. I also took business trips to Bangalore in Karnataka, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Jaipur in Rajasthan. As a tourist my first trip was to Agra in Uttar Pradesh to see the Taj Mahal. That was an eye opener. The poverty and squalor of Agra contrasted with the serene beauty of Mumtaz Mahal's marble tomb. With other members of the embassy community, I visited the Ranthambore National Park in Rajasthan to see tigers. The Indian conservationists were pessimistic about the survival of the Indian tiger due to poaching and human encroachment on tiger habitat. Tigers are incredibly beautiful and majestic. Their loss would be tragic. I had the great pleasure of touring the state of Gujarat around Ahmedabad and the Gulf of Kutch to view Indian textile handicrafts -- batiks, wood block prints, silk saris, and embroidery-embellished hand-loomed cottons. All beautiful, artistic work. Oh and let's not forget the Pushkar camel fair in Rajasthan.

In contrast to the African posts I served at, India was very important to U.S. interests. The size of the embassy and the number of high-level visits we hosted were proof of that. Just to name a few VIP visitors during the 1997-2000 whose visits the economic section helped support - Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, Congressman Dick Gephardt and delegation, Senator John Kerry, Enron VP Rebecca Mark, GE CEO Jack Welch, and Citibank President Sandy Weill.

I was fortunate to work with wonderful folks in the combined economic and science operation - Necia Quast, Mary Townsend, Brian Aggeler, Aruna Amirthanayagam, Tanya Bodde and Marti Doggett.

In March 2000, President Clinton came for a state visit. As anyone who has worked on a presidential visit knows it was a huge production. All of the personnel at embassy and three consulates were involved in the visit.

Q: How did it go?

DRESS: It went well. There were the usual stresses and strains and toes stepped on, embassy people being driven insane by the presidential support staff. The President had a good visit and all the events went off as planned, so it was successful.

Q: When you left there how did you feel about India?

DRESS: After living and working there for three years, I came to appreciate how talented and hard working the Indian people are and what an incredible variety of cultures, religions and art India has. And the shopping was outstanding.

Q: Well then where did you go? You left there when?

DRESS: I left New Delhi in the summer of 2000 for Saudi Arabia. You know the advice that you get from day one when you join the Foreign Service -- don't bid on a job unless you are willing to take it?

G. EUGENE MARTIN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Beijing, China (1999-2000)

A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University.

Q: While you were there, did India come up? It's going to surpass China in population soon, and it's had a completely different experience. With all its problems, it is a democracy, and things are moving there. Was China looking over its shoulder at India?

MARTIN: I think the Chinese are paying more attention to India now. They've always had their alliance relationship with Pakistan because Pakistan was the only one that supported China's policies around the world. They saw India as a potential and a growing rival, both in geopolitical terms as well as a potential threat to their control over Tibet and the Himalayan regions. They also see democratic India as an alternative model for the third world, which China always sees itself as. They keep saying that they don't want to be a leader of the third world. They're just one of the gang. But they do see their system and their ways of doing things as an example for other underdeveloped countries. And China's successful economic development is quite a selling point.

Q: India's restrictive trade practices, which are finally being removed, are in a way has almost an advantage over the Chinese, because they have many aspects of the Western world.

MARTIN: Right. They have an underlying foundation of the British common law system, which the British left them. They have more of a rule of law than China has. But I think the countries are very different in many ways. The chaotic nature of Indian politics and society makes Chinese blanch. And Indians looking at China see it potentially as a hostile

power. In reality, if you look at geopolitical relationships, the Himalayans are a wonderful barrier! Not much gets through there! There are a few passes, but it's not a broad boulevard in which you're going to send lots of goods, people, or troops back and forth. There are certain areas in which they rub up against each other, and there's friction, but it's not the north German plain.

The WTO angle is interesting. India, of course, was quite concerned about China joining WTO, mainly from a competitive point of view. The end of textile quotas in 2005 made other textile producers, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, concerned that there's going to be a great sucking sound as China took all the textile markets around the world by being the low cost producer. While it has not reached that extent, China and India are essentially economic competitors.

DEAN RUST
Director, Nuclear Proliferation Bureau
Washington, DC (1999-2005)

Mr. Rust was born and raised in Ohio, and was educated at Bowling Green University and Ohio State University. In 1970 he joined the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, D.C. and worked with that Agency until his retirement in 2005. An expert in nuclear and conventional disarmament issues, Mr. Rust was a major participant in the US government's international treaty negotiations during five Presidential Administrations.

Q: Anything else before we move to Bush II?

RUST: Yes, checking my notes I almost forgot to mention the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan because that was a huge event in the second Clinton term. I still remember being called by a friend, "Did you hear that Delhi has announced that they conducted a nuclear test this morning?" I didn't believe it at first. But in retrospect, we should not have been that surprised. A hard line nationalist political party took over the Indian government in 1997.....

Q: Hindu Nationalists they were called.

RUST: Yes, the BJP. They kept talking about the importance of India becoming a major player on the international scene. Clearly, they decided that one way to do that was to conduct a series of nuclear tests and become a declared nuclear weapons state. So for the next two years, 75% of my work was focused on trying to deal with this. One person dealt with the political aspects of the issue, and I dealt with the nuts and bolts of the sanctions that U.S. law mandated in the aftermath of such nuclear tests. Remember that in 1996, a comprehensive test ban treaty had been signed, so these Indian and Pakistani tests were a severe blow to that treaty, to nonproliferation in general, and of course to the prospects of stability in South Asia not to mention increasing the risk of regional nuclear war. Of course, the Indians used the "threat" from China as the primary reason for going nuclear, but most analysts with ample knowledge of India

realized this was all about prestige -- getting a seat at the table with the big boys.

ACDA was constantly pushing State to take a more condemnatory stand against these tests and to set a precedent that would help to discourage others from following suit. Strobe Talbot was the lead man for Madeleine Albright, and our senior people were meeting with Strobe about twice a week. The State regional officials were always trying to minimize the sanctions. And of course the Commerce Department didn't want this event to have a substantial impact on U.S.-Indian trade. They argued: "Yes, we would have preferred they not acquire nuclear weapons, but both countries are friends. The horse is out of the barn; they're not going back. So what good is it to impose comprehensive sanctions, particularly since we will just lose trade opportunities to other countries." So it was a constant fight, particularly with Commerce and inside the State Department. After the dust settled, we got very strong support globally for political condemnation of these tests. The P-5 Foreign Ministers met in Geneva in June 1998 to issue a strongly worded statement; the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution of condemnation and that established benchmarks for India and Pakistan to remedy the serious damage done to international security by these tests. And the EU, Japan and Australia also adopted a wide range of political and economic sanctions; and the support of these countries also led to a delay and/or denial of non-humanitarian loans to India and Pakistan from international financial institutions.

Even the president was pretty strong there for awhile because he said, "India has done the wrong thing. They are on the wrong side of history." I remember that quote very well. The U.S. and Russia were substantially reducing their nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Cold War, and yet the Indians moved to become a nuclear weapons state. Of course the Pakistanis, despite considerable international pressure, followed a few weeks later.

This solid wall of disapproval and punitive actions did not last very long, unfortunately. The Clinton Administration itself had already begun, before May 1998, an effort to overcome the decades long estrangement in our bilateral relations with India. And after six months or so the furor over the tests died down, and there was considerable pressure from the Congressional Indian caucus, State regional officials, and South Asian NGO's to relax the sanctions. Some of this occurred before Clinton left office, but they all disappeared after 9-11-2001 for obvious reasons.

RUST: One other thing -- sorry for belaboring this period of time, but in 2000 there was another NPT review conference, and I was at the right hand of the senior Ambassador in charge of U.S. preparations. It was an enormously satisfying diplomatic experience for me; he told me later that he relied very heavily on my advice. I did a lot of drafting. I did a lot of negotiating with other governments at my level at the review conference. Much to the surprise of pundits and diplomats from many NPT parties, the conference arrived at a substantive consensus outcome. .

Q: What were we trying to come out with?

RUST: Well, as I mentioned earlier, the NPT had been indefinitely extended in '95. And many non-nuclear NPT parties felt that with this decision out of the way, it would be more difficult to obtain progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, events between 1995 and 2000 tended to

reinforce that perception. While the comprehensive test ban had been signed in 1996, the U.S. Senate had disapproved ratification in the fall of 1999 and the U.S.-Russian START process had atrophied during Clinton's presidency. This created an unfavorable political climate going into the 2000 review conference, not to mention the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 and continued concerns over compliance with the NPT by North Korea, Iran and Iraq. So by the opening of the 2000 conference, there was a lot of public speculation about whether NPT parties could rally behind the Treaty, or whether it was on the verge of collapsing. I should note that these conferences are held every five years and are viewed as a way to "take the temperature" of the Treaty. Do the parties spend all their time in pointed or even bitter public recrimination, or are they willing to sit down in private to search for compromise formulations that both review the operation of the Treaty as well chart the way forward? We actually did the latter. We despaired in advance about the prospects for consensus among the 150+ parties that attend such conferences, and would have been happy with an outcome where the U.S. was seen as a constructive actor and where no nations threatened to leave the Treaty. In five previous review conferences, consensus had been achieved only twice on a comprehensive substantive final document.

It came down to some high level Washington decisions, and Arab states placed a great deal of pressure on Iraq to accept an outcome that singled out their continued defiance of Security Council resolutions dealing with WMD. The Conference did not adjourn until after an all-night session that went until 5:00 AM, and then reconvened to seal the compromise at 11:00 AM. We were able to achieve it contrary to everybody's expectations. So that was a pretty high point in my career. Everybody came out of the 2000 conference feeling pretty good about the treaty. Nobody was about to run away from it. Nobody was thinking we had achieved Nirvana but they were encouraged. We accomplished this because the Clinton Administration's arms control and nonproliferation policies were more favorable toward treaties in general, and thus it was willing to show flexibility to gain an outcome that strengthened the NPT. Yes, the CTBT had been voted down by the Republican Senate, but the Democratic administration had not wavered in its support of the treaty. So that was an immensely satisfying experience. We spent four weeks in New York at that conference. They were all 20 hour days. I was at the computer drafting constantly. So that ended the Clinton years on a very up note for me. Even though ACDA had gone away, one of my best friends was ambassador at large in charge of the delegation . he and I worked out a lot of stuff together.

Q: Who was that?

RUST: His name is Norman Wulf. He was a career civil servant, who retired in 2002. He is a lawyer, worked law of sea issues in the early 80s and then started working nuclear non proliferation. A retired navy officer, he knows international legal stuff. Very astute multilateralist. Knows when to take a hard line, when to show flexibility. Knows where our red lines are. It is possible to achieve outcomes that are positive for your country's interest. But you also have to know when to say no. He was personable. He listened to people. He showed respect for their opinions. All that contributed to a positive outcome.

Q. OK, so now we go on to 2001.

RUST: We all knew based on some of the speeches that candidate George W. Bush made during the campaign, that things were going to change. He had come out against ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. And he thought that negotiating agreements with Russia to limit nuclear forces was a waste of time, which meant that the strategic nuclear negotiating process dating from 1968 was gone. Bush thought that we should just set our nuclear force levels wherever it made sense; why bother with a treaty? It took too long to negotiate one in any event, and besides we needed the flexibility to build back up if necessary. And of course, he was a strong supporter of missile defenses and it was clear the ABM Treaty could be history as well. Of course, none of this necessarily directly impacts nuclear nonproliferation. Nothing he said led any of us to believe that he would forsake the NPT or the IAEA or any other of the traditional multilateral nonproliferation tools. Yet, his position on strategic nuclear issues tracked with prominent neo-conservative thinking in the Republican party and so we braced ourselves for topsy turvy policy changes that would probably down grade multilateral approaches, even in nonproliferation. John Bolton was confirmed as the Under Secretary of State in charge of arms control and nonproliferation, and soon he had a team of Assistant Secretaries to carry out his preferences.

The first couple years things went along without much change in my area of the world, i.e. NPT and IAEA. U/S Bolton focused his early energies on the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea, Iraq and making sure the U.S. reversed position on the International Criminal Courts. There was an interagency nonproliferation policy review, but little changed for my office initially as the President reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and IAEA, and the need to strengthen their activities. The new Administration placed a much stronger emphasis on the need for compliance and enforcement of the nonproliferation obligations under the NPT and IAEA, but that didn't create much difficulty for my office as we were more than ready to develop and implement stronger steps in these areas. So we set in motion some policies that were aimed at strengthening those aspects of our policy.

My other focus was on preparations for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which began in 2002.

I also got involved in Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty issues both in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The Southeast Asia Treaty had opened for signature in 1995, and the Central Asian treaty was still in draft in 2001. Most of this diplomacy was simply managing the status quo, as the Administration was not prepared to become actively engaged unless and until it had conducted a policy review in this area.

By way of background, I mentioned NWFZ in one of the earlier interviews. I can't remember what I said before, but these are regional treaties that ban the acquisition of nuclear weapons by regional states and prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in territories in the region by any state. Each of these treaties has at least one protocol for the nuclear weapon states. The Southeast Asian nations had messed up the protocol they had drafted. None of the nuclear weapons states supported it initially. So consultations had begun around '97-'98, twice a year up until about the year 2001 on ways to try to resolve these differences. The Southeast Asian states insisted that their undertakings in the treaty extended out into the South China sea 200 miles rather than the standard 12 mile territorial limit. Whenever a security treaty is concluded, in which states claim authority for security issues out to 200 miles, it is not going to go anywhere with a major naval

power. They are just not going to recognize sovereign security claims out that far. So we, along with the UK, France, Russia and China, had been busy during the latter part of the Clinton Administration figuring out a way to find compromise approaches that would deal with this. There was very little activity on this Treaty between 2001-2005. The pace is set by the regional states, and ASEAN clearly had other priorities. The Central Asian states, however, were being pushed strongly by the UN, a sponsor of the negotiations, to conclude a NWFZ treaty. We coordinated with the other nuclear weapon states on these negotiations, although the Central Asian states pretty much ignored what we, the UK and France had to say. It appeared to us that those who still retained security ties to Russia were slanting the Treaty in a fashion that favored Moscow. To make a long story short, the final text was not acceptable to the U.S., UK and France - we urged it be changed before it was opened for signature. They took another look at it, and that's where I left it when I retired. The last overseas mission I undertook was a P-5 meeting in Geneva to discuss our respective positions on the draft Treaty. Since I left, the Treaty has been signed with the same objectionable language. Personally, I don't see how the U.S. could support the Treaty and sign the Protocol as it now stands.

Q: Well how did you find working with the new people. I mean some of them like Bolton had been around for a long time. But with others, I mean did they come in looking upon you as being a bunch of wild eyed liberals or were they willing to draw on your knowledge and experience to learn the job? How did you find these people?

RUST: Bolton claimed to have an open mind, initially, but I think he quickly discovered the advice he would get from career people was simply not compatible with his "take no prisoners" approach. I swear that the notion of "compromise" is simply not in the man's vocabulary; or if he does concede something to the views of another country, it's only at the 11th hour and probably because someone at a higher political level told him to do so. His philosophy seemed to be that you don't deal with bad actors; you can't trust them, so even if you're trying to devise multilateral approaches to deal with these bad actors, it's the U.S. way or the highway. With Bolton, our approach was to draw a line in the sand and if compromise could not be reached on our side of the line, then the U.S. would opt out. We sat on the sidelines from 2003-05 in regard to Iran, because Bolton could not stomach the approach the EU was taking with Iran. It's almost a given that Bolton took this approach with the blessing of the Vice President's office. And of course, the ultimate solution to John Bolton in some cases is probably regime change. Well, it's a little off the charts from my experience to have regime change as a policy option when it comes to nonproliferation. My approach is that if it's a bad regime, you use nonproliferation tools to contain any WMD threat as much as possible, hoping ultimately for a combination of sticks and carrots that will change the regime's policies. Maybe that won't happen until there are dramatic political changes, including possibly a regime change, but until then there needs to be consistent international pressure on the state not to acquire nuclear weapons. And the U.S. must play a leadership role in that effort.

Sure Bolton used some career staff; aspects of the Administration's policy were consonant with past approaches and in those circumstances he drew on government experts. But, even then, there was no room for thinking that went beyond the strict policy guidelines prescribed by Bolton. John was pretty much a one man policy apparatus. He surrounded himself with loyal political aides, who would follow his instructions to the letter. There was no room for

questioning; if you asked a staffer "why" Under Secretary Bolton wanted to take a particular approach, you seldom got an answer. It didn't matter; all you needed to know was that My Bolton wanted it this way. I doubt if any important policy of any kind John ever pushed was vetted with anybody but himself, and maybe the Vice President's Office and DOD and probably Bob Joseph at the NSC. He knew this business very well from his previous work at IO and from work outside the government during the Clinton years. He was an extraordinarily bright guy in international law. I mean he knew this stuff. He also picked people that he felt he could trust as assistant secretaries in the non proliferation, arms control, and verification bureaus. Although, he made a mistake in the non proliferation bureau when he brought in a career foreign service officer, who had once worked for Bolton in IO during Bush I, but who over the past decade had developed into a senior officer who could not be bullied.

Q: Who was that?

RUST: John Wolf. During the Clinton years Wolf had become an ambassador to Malaysia and taken on other senior positions. By 2002, he was in his early 50s I think, had been in the foreign service for 25 years; and couldn't be pushed around or be told how to think. Certainly, Wolf was loyal to the Administration, to Secretary of State Powell, and followed John Bolton's wishes much of the time. It didn't take long, however, for John Wolf to get crossways with Bolton. If Wolf disagreed, he said so. Well, you don't do that very many times to John Bolton before you get into his "dog house" big time. I wasn't privy to their relationship, but it was my impression that Wolf occasionally had different ideas about how best to pursue our nonproliferation diplomacy whether in regard to Iran, North Korea, NPT, or IAEA.

So to return briefly to your question about whether the career staff could work the new people; certainly, in the case of John Wolf, the answer is yes. He was pragmatic and trusted career staff to pursue approaches consistent with the President's policies. Wolf chose a highly respected career civil servant as his PDAS, and a former Dick Lugar staffer as the political DAS. It was a pretty collegial place; tense and frantic, but the career staff felt they were being utilized. Wolf left in July 2004, after many serious run-ins with Bolton, and the PDAS led the bureau for 10 months. A new political leader for NP was never confirmed, as by early 2005 the reorganization issue began to surface with Bolton making clear that he wanted to merge NP with the Arms Control Bureau. And the AC Assistant Secretary, loyal to Bolton to a fault, was actually placed in charged of NP in the final months before its merger with AC.

Q: Well it's not unusual to go through a period of posturing before you settle down to get something done.

RUST: Well no, Bolton wasn't posturing. My impression was that Bolton wanted the outcome to be "tough" according to his criteria; and if he can't get that kind of outcome, then it's not worth doing. Solidarity among countries on a weak solution is worse than nothing at all, according to this type of thinking. He isn't alone in his frustration with the slow pace of the international community in responding to dire proliferation threats. It was clear from the git-go in 2003 that Iran had violated the NPT and that the Security Council should take up the case. But it took many years of further IAEA investigation and of continuing Iran's non-cooperation before the IAEA Board referred the matter to the Security Council. Unfortunately, that's the way the system

works. But John Bolton has no patience with institutions that can't respond to what he views as such obvious dangers.

Q: This is tape four, side one with Dean Rust.

RUST: Of course, it was largely the Russians and the Chinese who were reluctant to push the Iran and North Korean cases at a faster pace, particularly an approach that included sanctions. The UK and France were also not happy with the Russians and the Chinese, but in the last analysis they felt it was better to keep the P-5 together than to try to force an outcome that would require the Chinese and the Russians either to vote against or veto a resolution. It is true that the longer the IAEA worked in Iran, the more we all knew about what had really gone on there. But the delays have still not solved the problem and meanwhile Iran is several years farther along with its enrichment program. Multilateral institutions may be the only effective peaceful way to deal with these issues, but if they don't become more responsive to proliferation the U.S. and others will take steps on their own.

The irony of the current situation is that Bolton's 2005-06 tenure at the UN involved U.S. acceptance of nonproliferation outcomes that we would never have gone along with while Bolton was Under Secretary of State. He and his allies in the Vice President's office, OSD and NSC would have seen to that. That group of folks is now dispersed and Rice is pretty much able to call the tune. She takes a tough line, but she is putting P-5 solidarity ahead of substance. I remember reading recently, upon Bolton's resignation from the UN job, quoting anonymous sources in the French and British government that whenever they ran into a problem with Bolton in New York, they would just go over his head. They would contact Rice or Nick Burns, who were willing to sit down and work something out." Bolton was just never that way.

My principal difficulty with Bolton in my last two years came in connection with preparations for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. This process, which has occurred every five years since 1970, has little direct impact on operational issues, but it does define the general political setting in which NPT implementation takes place. In 2005, debate ranged from the key questions of Iran and DPRK violations, IAEA safeguards, nuclear export controls, to the pace of nuclear disarmament by existing nuclear weapon states including the U.S. Given the NAM preoccupation with nuclear disarmament, these NPT fora generally include a lot of U.S. bashing and pressure for getting rid of our nuclear weapons. Israel also comes in for more than its share of criticism from Muslim states. Bolton loathes this type of fora and debate. He has little patience for those who are more concerned about U.S. nukes than about Iran's violations. The result is he doesn't really care what happens; he is not prepared to support an activist U.S. approach designed to forge common ground. He just wants to get out of the NPT review process with our skin, and hopefully without much blame for any negative outcome, which unfortunately was virtually preordained in 2005.

He is disdainful of any real diplomacy re the NPT review conference because he knows the U.S. will be asked to "pay a price" if the U.S. is to obtain consensus support for U.S. policies, for example, in regard to NPT violations by Iran and DPRK. He felt the Clinton Adm. paid too high a price in 2000 for the consensus outcome that was achieved. And so his approach is to essentially dismiss the concerns of states that talk about what they perceive as the failure of the

United States and Russia and others to reduce nuclear forces. He clearly resents the efforts of some states to use the NPT to imply some constraints on U.S. freedom of action with regard to its nuclear forces. But, on the other hand, Bolton did want the U.S. out there with a concerted campaign on issues of importance to us, e.g. Iranian violations. Of course, that's fine; but when you fail to address the concerns of others you don't get much receptivity to your own priorities. The main point as I perceived is that Bolton et. al see no value in trying to do smart diplomacy, i.e. find ways to listen and take even symbolic steps on nuclear disarmament issues with the view that treating others' concerns with respect will gain you a more sympathetic ear for U.S. policies toward Iranian violations.

This is counterintuitive diplomacy from my traditional perspective. All my efforts in regard to 2005 to pursue smart diplomacy, as I called it earlier, were met with a blank stare. When this situation was combined with deep distrust by Bolton of the NP bureau and of my office, the working situation for about 18 months was barely tolerable. Bolton loaded up the U.S. preparatory process with his own bureaucratic allies with instructions to keep a close watch over NP. They made our life a living hell.

Q: When did you retire?

RUST: September 30, 2005.

ALBERT A. THIBAUT, JR.
Deputy Chief of Mission
New Delhi (2000-2003)

Albert A. Thibault, Jr. was born in Massachusetts on August 5, 1941. He received his BA from the University of Windsor in Canada in 1962, his MA from the University of Toronto in 1963, and another MA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1964. He entered the Foreign Service in 1969. His career has included positions in Guinea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Saudi Arabia.

THIBAUT: I left in July, 2000.

Q: And what happened?

THIBAUT: Well, after a short leave I proceeded directly to New Delhi, India as DCM there as well. I had been DCM in Riyadh. I mentioned that my tour had just been extended to a third year as DCM, for a total of six. I had to seek special approval of a sixth year in country, because of the Department's policy of a maximum of five years. That had come through and then was in place and I was to spend that additional year and in fact I was told informally then that I'd probably become chief of mission in a neighboring Gulf country. I talked with the Department on that. Then when the assignment of the person who was to go as DCM to Delhi fell through, a complicated process, my name popped up because I had earlier bid on the job, a year or two before and of course I had extensive experience in the region. The ambassador there, Governor

Dick Celeste, was keen to have someone who was knowledgeable about the country and had previous management experience. So he was keen to have me. Ambassador Fowler in Delhi knew how much an assignment to India meant to me. So the Department in Washington and others made it happen. I had said I was prepared to go but I've made a commitment to spend an additional year in Riyadh. If this is what the Department wants me to do, I will do it but I will not lobby to do it, to go there, because it did place the bureau, the NEA bureau, in a difficult position in May and June to find a DCM for Riyadh, which is an important post. I said, "If you want to make it happen, fine but I will not become actively engaged. I'm quite happy to remain where I am."

But in fact I did go to Delhi. I was there for three years. The first year as DCM for Ambassador Dick Celeste and then the last two years for Ambassador Bob Blackwill, so for a total of three years.

Q: Well, you got there in 2000. How would you describe the state of relations between India and the United States?

THIBAUT: Well, they were on an upturn and Ambassador Celeste deserves a great deal of credit for this because as recently as 1998 the Indians had exploded a nuclear device which caught the U.S. government with its proverbial pants down. The intelligence community was completely buffaloeed by this development. They had not expected it. The Indians had played the positioning of our satellites that observed their test site and did a lot of preparation at night. In other words, operated in a way that concealed those preparations from our surveillance. I say this is nothing classified. This is well known. So it came as a great shock and of course was seen by the administration, the Clinton Administration, as a real slap in the face, particularly as they thought they had been assured by the new government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee that the government of India had no intention of exploding a device but yet it happened. So this was in 1998. Within two years President Clinton had made a state visit to India, a five day state visit, which was extremely successful. And a presidential visit, especially to a developing country, does not happen often or overnight.

As I said, the credit for the visit and for really doggedly influencing attitudes both in Delhi and in Washington, goes to Ambassador Celeste, who's a remarkable man, a three time governor of Ohio and former director of the Peace Corps. After college, he had spent three years as special assistant to Ambassador Chester Bowles, who's one of the icons of the U.S.-Indian historical relationship, in the late Sixties. He developed a love of India which has lasted to this day. I might note, just to round out his biographical picture, that he's presently the president of Colorado College in Colorado Springs. He obviously worked hard to persuade the Administration, or maybe he didn't work so hard, I don't know, to be appointed as ambassador to India but he was a wonderful choice, a man who has a great sense of policy and is an enormously likeable, outgoing person, a great manager for the embassy and an Ambassador who made it his mission to overcome the tremendous trough in the bilateral relationship. As I say, it was capped by a presidential visit, which occurred in March and I arrived in August.

So relations were on an upswing and as a result of that visit there was, of course, follow-up action and I was caught in that immediately because, within a day of my arrival in August, the

ambassador went on leave and so I was caught up in preparations for the prime minister's visit to Washington, which occurred in the fall of 2000. We had a number of senior level visitors, coming and going in both directions, an enormous amount of preparation that the U.S. government, including the mission in India, was engaged in. So it was a good thing that I had some familiarity and awareness of India and had a background in it because it would have been much more difficult. So I got off on a very active and positive note and the prime minister's visit went extremely well. Very important to this process was the continuity that developed.

I say this because while we in New Delhi were in the throes of getting ready for the PM's visit and basking in the after-effects of the Clinton visit, at home we were in the final throes of the presidential campaign and of course President Bush was elected to his first term in the fall of 2000 and took office in January of 2001. The statements that candidate Bush had made on foreign policy, for the first time ever in a presidential campaign, included very positive references to India. Historically, most presidential candidates had simply ignored India or would make a passing mention of it with a number of other countries but in several statements Governor Bush particularly emphasized the commitment he was making and the importance he would place on building a new relationship with India. This caught a lot of people's attention in India and, as I say, it was very unusual. It meant that there was confidence as we proceeded with the transition into the first few months of the administration that the relationship would continue on a high note and that is, in fact, exactly what happened.

The credit for this, once again, comes down to personalities as much of the reason for this very positive approach by the new administration belonged to my second ambassador in Delhi, who was Ambassador Bob Blackwill. He had been a foreign policy advisor to Governor Bush as a candidate and would come down from Harvard, where he was a professor at the Kennedy School, to spend several days a week with Governor Bush traveling around the country. He drafted several of Bush's campaign speeches on foreign affairs or had an important hand in them and persuaded him that the time was ripe to make India a centerpiece of his approach to foreign policy. And, after the election, he was nominated to be ambassador to India. As I say, it made for very smooth continuity of policy and immediate engagement on the part of Indians, a predisposition on their part, the Vajpayee government, to further develop the good relationship with the United States. In other words, they worked hard to avoid poking their finger in our eye and to consider seriously new policy initiatives from the Bush Administration. And that is what happened.

Ambassador Celeste remained in Delhi through April of 2001 and I was chargé thereafter for several months 'til Ambassador Blackwill was confirmed and able to come out to New Delhi. But in that period of time, the administration, and again we're talking about the pre-9/11 period, May 2001, the administration unveiled new ideas about missile defense to which the Indians were among the very few countries to respond positively. This came as a great surprise to Washington, a very pleasant surprise for an important country like India to make positive statements like this at a time when there was so much criticism at home and abroad, especially from a country whose stereotype was that it would distance itself consciously from the U.S. While awaiting confirmation, the ambassador-designate, Bob Blackwill, spoke about the desire of the administration for a "transformation" of the bilateral relationship. This became a phrase, a

mantra, that was his hallmark for the entire period during which I worked with him and in which he was ambassador. So it was a good experience to have that policy continuity.

Q: When was the last time you had been in India, now?

THIBAULT: I had been, I had left India in 1983. I passed through several times when in Nepal but had not spent any period of time.

Q: Did you sense, was there a new generation of Indian bureaucrats or maybe Indian thinking in universities? Was this really a new India in thought or

THIBAULT: It was a new India and I was astounded. It had been 17 years since I'd been there. Recall that I first went to India in 1968, so I've had 30 years of exposure to the country. It was an astounding, unbelievably different country. New Delhi alone, as a city, was far more vibrant and prosperous and interesting than I had recalled it. Attitudes, as you rightly suggest, were the key change. Attitude towards the U.S., I won't say Americans because Americans never had any problem in interacting with Indians, but with the U.S. as a sort of a concept. It was like night and day. You recall that when I was there in the early Eighties, our political counselor designate was blackballed by the Indian government because of the communist influence. The fall of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the communist media which they were subsidizing were two factors. Much more important was the turnaround in their economy when they abandoned their socialist model of economic growth. And the emergence of a new generation across the board.

Q: It was mostly socialist and internalized.

THIBAULT: Yeah, it was a self-sufficient model, yeah. I mean, not entirely. We say socialist. The state was to be the guiding hand, so to speak but there was a very substantial private sector, don't get me wrong, but that was the Nehru philosophy. It had been sanctified by being associated with Nehru and his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, continued with it. It began to change under Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi's son who himself was of the new generation. He was only forty when he became prime minister and then was tragically assassinated. Then a near economic collapse in 1991 and 1992 forced them to revise their policy and their overall thinking. The innate entrepreneurial talents and spirit of the Indian business community and of Indians generally immediately manifested themselves. They began to achieve a growth rate of six, seven, eight, nine per cent per year for many years, which continues to this day.

A younger generation - we could see this particularly in the bureaucracy. I had previously functioned as a domestic political officer. I dealt mostly with politicians and not so much with the bureaucracy in the early Eighties when I'd been there. But I certainly heard plenty about their attitude, the difficulty of working with them. They were proverbial, not just for those who had to deal with them but even globally. This time I was working with them on a day to day basis, across many ministries at pretty senior levels but working levels. They got the message, so to speak, that the government leadership wanted a positive relationship with the United States and they understood that they had to make it happen. And I developed some very good and close friendships with Indian officials in the foreign ministry and in other ministries as well.

Throughout the three years I was there, I would be in their offices daily and we would also see them on a social basis as well.

So it was a totally different environment. Finally India had found its place in the global economy, particularly with its high tech capability. This was very important because, first of all, it meant a close relationship with the United States, which was the fountainhead of their technology, which was built on very close ties with many American companies, on the many Indians educated and working in the United States, some of whom came back and interacted in India. But secondly as a source of pride to the nation, overcoming this image of Calcutta and Mother Teresa and poverty-stricken India which was so prevalent in the Sixties and Seventies. The Indians had had a chip on their shoulder which represented a defensive attitude, almost an inferiority complex. The younger generation had none of that. Not that they were overbearing or moved to the other side of the spectrum. You could just deal with them on their own terms and on a positive and productive basis in which they were not counting their fingers after shaking your hand or second guessing what your real motives were. And then thirdly, that sector had grown up free of government control because it fell between the cracks. It was so new, the technology was so new it didn't fit within the usual footprints of government ministries. People drew a powerful lesson from this. It had grown because the government ignored it, and then it grew so rapidly and to such a size that if government tried to intervene there would be a tremendous pushback.

The attitude of the private sector, which had been very obsequious and very deferential to government, had completely reversed. They functioned as a modern interest group does here in the United States, attempting to inform the legislative process to their benefit, both at the individual corporate level and in associations as well. That was very important.

The fact that tens of thousands and maybe millions, today, of young, well educated English-speaking Indians can find good job opportunities in their own country, without having to emigrate, itself was a source of strength and pride as well and of self-satisfaction. So, yes, everything had changed, everything had changed.

Q: How about relations, in a way our military to military relations were good even during the bad times, weren't they?

THIBAULT: Well, you know that had always been a source of misgiving and complaint on the part of the Indians, that we always tilted towards Pakistan and that the U.S military instinctively felt more comfortable working with the Pakistanis. Indeed, the Pakistanis had been members of CENTO, which was the Central Treaty Organization, which existed in the Fifties and Sixties. They had allowed U.S. bases in Peshawar. The U-2 was based there. Then of course during the Afghan war we provided ... there was a turnaround in our attitude towards providing military equipment, F-16's, to Pakistan. The Indians, on the other hand, had a privileged relationship, including arms supply relationship, with the Soviet Union. All of that was part of the background, and the result was that the Pentagon, in particular, had no particular fondness for India. The mil-mil relationship was a very thin one. That began to change. This really began taking off under the Bush Administration and was particularly propelled by the intellectual and bureaucratic energy that was provided by Ambassador Blackwill.

Q: Talk a bit about Blackwill. I never interviewed anyone who served with him but the papers seem to allude to his managerial style and not in particularly glowing terms but I know nothing about it. Could you comment on working with him?

THIBAUT: He is without doubt the smartest and most brilliant, that's the word I would use, person I've ever worked with or for. Bob has a penetrating intellect which is applied to public policy issues. He is a student of diplomacy in the old fashioned sense of the word. On the coffee table in his office in Delhi he had various books by Kissinger which he almost knew by heart and would often quote verbatim, books full of pithy insight on the diplomatic-cum-bureaucratic and policy-making process. He is an acolyte of Henry Kissinger, was a key aide to him in the 70's, and has remained on very, very close terms with him. He sees himself as a Kissingerian, as do others as well. He was intimately involved with the evolution of U.S. policy towards the collapse of the Soviet Union, towards the reunification of Germany, was decorated by the German government for his role as a key aide to Secretary Baker. He often described himself as a Harvard don in his speeches in India, recognizing that there academic eminence trumped diplomatic background (a la Galbraith whom he also knew), but, in fact, for almost 25 years he was an FSO, rose to the rank of ambassador to the MBFR in Vienna. And during that time he was also political counselor in Tel Aviv at the time of the Camp David negotiations.

He has a phenomenal range of personal friendships and contacts both in Washington and throughout the Western Alliance. I say phenomenal and I mean that. He is policy oriented to his fingertips and I say that in the most positive way possible because for him it is not enough to have an analytical or intellectual understanding of an issue and of a possible course of action. The question he will instantly pose is very specifically, operationally, how do you affect and influence and change policy to achieve your desired objective. His understanding of how bureaucracy, our bureaucracy, works in Washington, the relationship of the National Security Council to the Defense Department, to the State Department, to the intelligence agencies and to other players is second to none, second to none. He enlisted his forceful personality and boundless energy to challenge, overcome, and shape ingrained positions about India generally, the accumulation of 40 years of dealing with a difficult country, and in particular, the orthodoxies of the non-proliferation theologians, but in other areas as well. He relished that. Quite simply, he is a remarkable man.

His association with President Bush as a campaign advisor, the fact that he had been Condi Rice's boss in the NSC in the late Eighties when Scowcroft was national security advisor, where he worked with Colin Powell, with all kinds of people whose names today are front and center in our own policy environment means that he knows everyone in the current administration. He knows how their minds work. He knows how they can be moved. He knows where they can't be moved. He knows how to get others to move them. He is a brilliant, brilliant person.

Beyond that, he has an energy level that I have never encountered before in anyone. He is a person who sleeps maybe three or four hours a day and has for many years. He gets up at about four o'clock in the morning and then immediately logs on and then just goes through a bunch of papers, both U.S. and foreign, overseas. By six he's ready to go. He's a Force of Nature, no question about it, no question about it.

Now you asked about his managerial style. He's extremely demanding; he just is. His standards are extremely high. He's always thinking ahead. He's a great communicator. Nothing is secretive with Bob Blackwill. You know what he's looking for, what his approach is, what his analysis is, what his objectives are, and it's constant, that way. He expects people to understand what the goal is and to support him in achieving that. Now, this goes down well with some and not so well with others. He can be very, he works 24/7. His expectation is that those who work with him will not necessarily share the same intensity of purpose, he understands that he's unique in his ability to get by with as little sleep, and that people have other things in their lives as well. That said, he demands a very high level of commitment and engagement. So conventional hours are not the norm, if you want to work with Bob; don't expect to do that. There's no question that there were some who didn't cotton to this approach.

Q: Did you find yourself, as some DCM's are, standing between this Force of Nature, as you put it and ordinary human beings who work within the embassy, to keep them productive and not getting bruised?

THIBAULT: Inevitably that's the case. That described my role, in effect. Absolutely, yes. I was managing the mission. Bob's focus was on the policy and the policy goals and the transformations that I mentioned before. This is not a lightly used word in his lexicon. Transformation means moving ahead and moving real change, not at the margins but substantive change, on difficult issues, on a wide range of fronts. That was all-consuming for him, so the day to day mission, if you will, was something that he expected me to take care of, while at the same time providing him needed support. He was looking for his DCM to achieve those goals. So it meant for me a very tough schedule, a grueling schedule, throughout those two years that I worked with him.

Q: During this time, because of 9/11, I'm thinking about Bangalore and others, these tech centers, was there concern on the embassy's and the ambassador's part about that we were giving up too much to the Indians?

THIBAULT: No, quite the contrary. We saw this as a win-win situation for both countries, as I continue to regard it as that. It added value to both sides, keeping in mind that the U.S. government had very little to do with any of it. These were corporate relationships that were established. The companies that operated in India and who came to operate in India did not consult us except on problems they might face and that was rare, didn't inform us. They were always cordial if we went down there but these were relationships that they had built and developed on their own. So whether we liked it or not was neither here nor there. I am sure that is very much the case now. Now you might have your own views as to where it might lead but at that time it was viewed as a very positive step. I should add here that I think that, I've noticed in the last two years, since I've come back and particularly in the last year that China and India are often mentioned in the same breath as formidable players in the evolving 21st century global economy and as you implied, over time, could pose some kind of, if not threat, at least challenge to us. I can't comment about China but I certainly think that's overblown with regard to India, at least for a long time to come. I think I'm second to none in my admiration for and affection for India but I also have, I believe, a clear understanding of their limitations and there are very, very, very considerable limitations. Their political process is complex and not conducive to clear-cut

decisions. There are very severe limitations on infrastructure and in areas other than this high tech one that so much attention has focused on, which embraces really a very minute percentage of the population. They have a long way to go to overcome them and this is not easy to achieve, given their free wheeling and democratic political process because a lot of difficult choices have to be made.

Q: Because of the sheer size of the population. Well, how about, during the time you were there, how stood things between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and did we get involved in this?

THIBAULT: Let me just talk about, I'll come back to Pakistan but let me just make a comment, for the record here, on this transformation that we were talking about. We spent an enormous amount of time trying to develop a relationship on civil nuclear cooperation, on civil space cooperation, and on improving our mil-mil ties. We achieved a lot of success in the latter, that is the mil-mil relationship, and were less immediately successful in the first two, civil nuclear and civil space, because of entrenched opposition here in Washington, in the PM bureau in particular. Whether that's John Bolton or not, as some would allege, I have no idea but we had great difficulty in that regard. And it was not an issue that's easy to explain or where there are large constituencies involved, where you could find allies to do that. So when I emphasized Ambassador Blackwill's bureaucratic savvy, that doesn't mean he was successful in all regards. Yet a great deal of effort was expended in those areas. However, seen over the longer term, what Bob did achieve was to persuade most of official Washington of the benefit to the U.S. of a relationship with India in the emerging Asia of the 21st century, highlighting that trust could be established on the basis of shared values and with a rock-solid democratic partner. I believe we will yet see those agreements reached, especially on civil nuclear cooperation. .

The Pakistan relationship of course starts with Kashmir and that's been the case now for fifty or more years. There was a lot of ferment in Kashmir itself. There had been an insurgency that had continued for many years, beginning in the late Eighties and starting in the early Nineties, that led to tens of thousands of people being killed. The evidence was very clear that the source of this was in Pakistan itself, in which militants would have refuge on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control as it's called, on the Pakistani side in Kashmir and elsewhere in Pakistan, and with direct encouragement by the government of Pakistan, who would arm and equip them and then send them across the border to conduct mayhem. The Indians found that very difficult to counter. Part of it was because of some sympathy with the militants on the part of the Kashmiri population but also because of the nature of the terrain, which is very rugged, and then also because of the nature of the tactics that would be used to deal with them.

9/11 cast all of this in an entirely different light. Instead of talking about militants and insurgents, we talked about terrorists. 9/11 did several things. With the collapse of the Taliban and the attack on them and on al-Qaeda, of course the Pakistani bases of support for al-Qaeda became a major concern for the U.S. government. That in turn led to serious questions in Washington, which continue to this day, about what is going on in Pakistani society, in which fundamentalism has taken strong root and in which you have groups responsible for the murder of Daniel Pearl of the *Wall Street Journal*, for several attacks on President Musharraf attempting to assassinate him, an attack on an international church in which a number of Americans were killed in Islamabad, attacks on the U.S. consulate in Karachi, car bomb attacks, attacks on a group of French

engineers, ten of whom were killed in Karachi also, frequent and deadly sectarian bombings. In other words, terrorism as a continuing phenomenon around the country. Then you have these groups operating in Kashmir and it became clear to us, at least viewed from the information we had in India, that they were part of the sub-culture of terrorism entrenched in Pakistan which made the use of terrorism an acceptable political tool. What was hard to accept was that the intelligence agencies in Pakistan that were targeting domestic terror groups and al-Qaeda, in response to U.S. pressure and in self-defense it has to be admitted, were at the same time supporting the terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, whom they typically equipped and trained. And the latter often had close ties to the groups that the GOP claimed to be trying to suppress in Pakistan itself that were such a danger to their internal order. The Islamic justification against infidels which motivated a lot of these young men was directed against India as much as against the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and other countries. So, as I say, 9/11 really gave us a different kind of insights into what was going on there.

And it became a subject of increasing importance in the U.S.-India relationship. If we're going to be talking about terrorists worldwide, the ambassador argued, we should be pointing to the terrorists, Islamic terrorists, operating against India. In December 2001 there was a suicide attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi. They came this close *an inch apart* an inch apart, my fingers, of penetrating the door of the inner sanctum of the Indian parliament, the lower house of parliament, and they intended to murder, to assassinate as many parliamentarians as possible. There was a gun battle in which they were all killed and a number of security, Indian security folks, were killed as well. Instantly, in India and on the part of the government, the conviction sprang up that these were Pakistani recruited, trained and supported terrorists. The investigation, including examination of their mobile phone calls and whatever documentation they found on them added to that conviction. The belief was that the Pakistanis were determined to attack the very foundations of the Indian state. The way the Indians would put it to us, was just imagine you had a similar group trying to break into the U.S. Congress. Of course this did happen in 1947, with a group of Puerto Rican nationalists. And therefore the reaction was extremely strong.

This came in the wake, too, of an earlier meeting between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf in Agra, prior to this attack, which had buoyed hopes of a breakthrough in relations but which if anything led to a downturn. The meeting was a total failure. So now you had the belief that the Pakistanis were really out to get the Indian state, if you will. Events began moving very quickly after that, after December 2001, through 2002, when there was a major buildup in Kashmir of Indian military personnel, all kinds of movements along the Indian-Pakistani border and growing signs the Indians might be prepared to attack Pakistan. This generated enormous concern in Washington and in our mission as well because, of course, you have both countries armed, having nuclear weapons and a delivery capability. The Pakistanis have been testing their missile delivery systems and the Indians have those capabilities too. It was believed and feared that a nuclear exchange was a very, very real possibility in that kind of climate.

The Indians began making increasingly insistent demands that the Pakistanis cease their support of the terrorist groups in Kashmir. This support and the climate of violence in Kashmir is very cyclical, very seasonal. During the winter, given the mountain terrain, there are heavy snows which cut off the passes that are used by infiltrators and so there's a sharp falloff in terrorist

incidents. But then as the snows melt, beginning in May-June, the number begins to increase. So you have what are relatively objective measures of terrorist activity and a basis on which you can conclude that they are receiving support. The Indians, of course, claimed and would share with us information that included radio intercepts, the questioning of prisoners when they were traced and so forth to indicate that the evidence against Pakistani backing was clear and incontrovertible. So we watched, the whole U.S. government watched, this situation developing with growing alarm. The ambassador was exceptionally active. He's always active but if anything he was even more so.

Let me emphasize that his relationships with the leadership of the Vajpayee government were probably the closest that any ambassador has ever had, including those of Galbraith with Nehru in the early 60's. Part of his strategic focus is to identify and get to know well the people who count in government, meaning who can have some influence on the policy you're trying to work on or work with. And that others who fall outside that scope are not of much interest to you. Now, some might say well, an ambassador should devote a lot of attention to promoting commercial relationships, to cultural relationships, you name it. But that ambassador was focused on transformation and in this particular instance of crisis management the emphasis he had placed on cultivating key officials paid big dividends. We would meet with the national security advisor of the prime minister and senior officials involved in that policy almost on request, often daily or near daily, it was that close. So they had a very clear eyed understanding of Washington's views, of Washington's alarm, of our assessments, and of our insistence that they restrain themselves and that they make sure that there be no miscommunication or missignaling of their intentions. So this was a major focus.

I should add as well that we worked extremely closely with the British on this. In fact, Ambassador Blackwill's tenure was marked by the closest possible relationship between the U.S. and the British missions. Washington and London were like this and I link my fingers together here, in lockstep. So Powell and Straw, Colin Powell and Jack Straw, were in direct communication on a frequent basis. Of course the ambassador, who knew the national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, she had worked for him before, so they were in very frequent contact as well.

President Musharraf issued a statement that Pakistan was not supporting terrorists and would not support terrorists. Of course we tried to make the most of that statement with the Indians but they remained very suspicious and the way in which they measured this was by what they saw on the ground in Kashmir. They did not see these public statements translated into action on the ground. As the military preparations gathered steam and particularly as weather conditions in the late spring and early summer permitted military deployments more easily, people were very much focused on the fact that three previous Indo-Pak wars had been fought at that time of year. So things were coming to a head.

The ambassador, and again for all the criticism that some people make about his managerial style, was totally and absolutely and fundamentally focused on the security of our people, not just members of the official community and the mission but of American citizens in India. I want to emphasize that because we, meaning he, devoted an enormous amount of thought and time and dialogue with Washington on this issue and in ensuring that should war break out as few of our

people would be in harm's way as possible, and therefore there was a need to make public statements alerting Americans to the grave danger that was building. These events culminated in a recommendation to the Department that the embassy be evacuated of all but essential personnel. This was the first time ever in the U.S.-India relationship and it was accepted by Washington. It was implemented within a few days, at the very end of May, coinciding, fortunately, with the end of the school year so it was minimally disruptive in real terms and with the normal transfer cycle as well. Within a few days all but a small number of people had left. I had been allowed to go on leave for a few days and was in South Carolina at the time and was called back by the ambassador, and I immediately returned. So we oversaw that evacuation and the British and many other embassies followed suit as well.

Q: Must have scared the hell out of everybody.

THIBAULT: I think it was viewed cynically by some the Indian media but I think it brought home to the government of India and to the Indian public just how seriously we viewed this crisis. So we observed this through June and well into July and we did begin seeing a tailing off of infiltration and finally the Indians began calling units back. You can only maintain this level of forward deployment and high alert for a limited period of time. So by August the situation had become a little bit more relaxed. The Indians announced elections in Kashmir which was something that Musharraf could use with his own people and the crisis eased. We were able to lift the evacuation and our people were able to come back within a relatively short period of time.

Q: Well, was the view from Delhi and our people that the Pakistani intelligence service was a loose cannon? In other words, was that under control of the president? To some extent, Pakistan was showing signs of being a failed state.

THIBAULT: Well, I don't accept the notion of Pakistan as a failed state, as someone who has spent some time there. I think our view was in fact the intelligence agencies were not rogue agencies but were reflecting the policy and the choices of the government of Pakistan, not necessarily in all of the operational details but in terms of the basic posture and in terms of the basic policy. The Pakistani Army is a very well-disciplined organization and always has been, which is one of the reasons why it's intervened as frequently as it has in domestic politics. So I don't think we accepted that notion.

Q: Was there, this attack, was it December of...

THIBAULT: December of 2001.

Q: Looking back to another thing, we were focused on al-Qaeda and the terrorists. Our president keeps reiterating, everything is terrorism and it stems from one source. According to somebody I was just interviewing, there was an attack in the Nineties on our airmen who were lodged in the Khobar Towers and the operation was an Iranian operation.

THIBAULT: Right, I was there at the time.

Q: We talked about this but there seemed to be a, I think you mentioned, there was an attempt to almost not overplay. This was taking our focus away, this was another source of terrorism and we had another policy. Was this coming up at all, because having Pakistani terrorists could dilute that focus?

THIBAULT: There was a conundrum for the administration, no question about it. On the one hand, we depended on the Pakistanis for their cooperation in going after al-Qaeda and there were a number of spectacular arrests that were made of al-Qaeda operatives, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, among others. Not to mention that in building up the Karzai government and creating a more friendly state in Afghanistan we needed Pakistani understanding and support for that as well, given their ability to really make that goal much more difficult to achieve if they weren't inclined to work with us. So our reporting and our very strongly expressed views, as expressed by Ambassador Blackwill, were not always welcome in Washington. He was extremely tough in his public remarks and he understood very, very clearly that an essential dimension of what we were trying to achieve in this transformation of the relationship was that it had to be publicly explained. So he was constantly working with the media and always accessible for interviews, for statements on television, seeking them out, giving public speeches, writing op-ed pieces. This was a major element of his diplomatic approach and style and he was pursued by the media wherever he traveled in the country for his comments and he never shrank from that. So he would make very, very forceful statements. As I said, one that comes to mind is, referring to these people operating across the border from Pakistan, that these were not "militants," they were not "insurgents," they were not "misguided youths," he would say, "Let us call them what they are. They are terrorists and they should be treated like terrorists and the United States government is committed to fighting terrorism and we apply that policy towards terrorism in Kashmir and wherever it happens."

Well this was a line that was not always welcomed in Islamabad. The Pakistanis viewed the people coming across the line of control as indigenous and the insurgency in Kashmir as having an indigenous character. They would dress it up in terms of people fighting for their freedom and "we support them, we sympathize with them, we provide moral support but nothing more than that." Of course, that was baloney. So it would create problems for our embassy, for our ambassador in Pakistan, because sometimes Blackwill's statements would be made at a time of delicacy in our U.S.-Pak relationship and his remarks would be highly publicized in Pakistan. As I say, it would create problems for us there. But this was not something on which Bob would back down, nor was he ever told by the Department or the White House to take a different line.

Q: What about our, after 9/11, our response, one, Afghanistan, two, Iraq? How did that play?

THIBAULT: Let me just mention, in terms of 9/11, the day of 9/11, I very well remember watching on CNN the attack going on, the plane crashing into the building, the towers and so forth. This was in the late afternoon, our time. As that was occurring, the ambassador received a phone call from the foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, in which he expressed the firmest and most positive support for the United States, to any degree and at whatever level and whatever way they could be helpful, they would be with us. And again, this was a very uncompromising, very swift, very instinctive response on their part and highly welcomed in Washington. There were no nuances to it, unlike some of the weasel words we might have gotten a few years beforehand. It

testified to this strong relationship and this transformational process that was underway. This was all put to the test on the issue of Iraq. When it became clear that the administration was prepared to consider military action if Saddam Hussein did not implement UN Security Council resolutions, the question then arose as to where would the Indians be.

This was not only a theoretical or hypothetical question but a real one after the fighting war concluded followed by the occupation beginning in the spring of 2003. The administration was very keen on lining up as many other countries as possible to join us, particularly with, as they say, boots on the ground. In that regard we came very close to getting a large Indian contingent in Iraq. We were in very intense dialogue with them. Secretary Rumsfeld himself came out to Delhi, as did Gen. Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. The Indian defense minister also traveled to Washington for talks on this issue. The Indian army was institutionally disposed to dispatching up to a division, as I was well aware, dealing personally with several of the senior generals. During the war, at Blackwill's initiative, a mark of the new relationship as he put it, but with full endorsement from Washington, I undertook a formal briefing of the Indians, on a day by day basis, on military developments in Iraq, an unprecedented step on our part, drawing from all sources, including classified ones, to give them a sense of what was going on and to promote a serious dialogue between us. The Defense Department was extremely keen to get that presence in Iraq because the Indians, unlike some other nations, represent a serious fighting force. They've had plenty of experience, they're well regarded, and they have large numbers.

The Indian army was quite ready to go, quite prepared. They had identified the units that would be deployed and it seemed that it would happen. But as word of the dialogue between the two governments began leaking to the media, there was a counter reaction, particularly among the opposition parties and therefore in Parliament, expressing reservations about this. Not about the bilateral relationship but about this particular action and ultimately Prime Minister Vajpayee decided that he could not manage it. This would have been a departure from their previous fifty years of policy. He felt he could not break this kind of new ground unless he had a consensus, a national consensus, behind him and he finally opted out of it. It was a disappointment to us but we understood - this was a political decision that he alone could make.

Q: Did some aspects of the Bush Administration, while you were there, have repercussion with our relations with India? I'm thinking, we've tended to repudiate treaties and go it alone. These are oversimplifications but it was much more of a confrontational, almost nationalistic type of policy than what we had under previous presidents, and how did that translate because the Indians have always been great ones for multilateral things and all that.

THIBAULT: I've been talking about transformation of bilateral relations but you and I had earlier discussed the transformation of the India I had last encountered almost twenty years earlier. Very little of the Bush Administration's policies aroused a strong negative reaction on the part of the Indians, very little. I think that an important reason was the fact that, to some degree or another, they shared some of the views of the administration. But I believe the most important factor was that they were not going to allow themselves to be distracted from sharing in and pursuing the bilateral transformation that I was talking about. India sees itself as a different kind of country in the world. Unspoken in either our approach to India or in the Indian approach to the United States is the China factor. We all are looking at and wondering how

China is going to evolve. What role will it play in the 21st Century? As a strategist, and one who knew China well from his years of teaching Chinese military officers under a special program at the Kennedy School and from regular trips to China, Bob Blackwill was keenly aware of China. Although he never spoke on this publicly, nor does the Administration, it was in this important context, as he saw it, that a strong U.S.-India relationship is vital for both countries, and I know this is how the Indians saw it as well.

India shares a very long border with China, fought a war with China back in 1963 which it lost. It sees itself now as having new technological prowess and strength as potentially a major player in the world economy. It wants to be taken seriously, especially by the United States. The Soviet Union is long gone. As you said earlier, a new generation has come to the fore. So they're committed to building the relationship with us. They may have had views about particular aspects of U.S. policy but they rarely allowed themselves to get wrapped up in that. Nor did the media, again part of this very surprising change in attitude. The leftist parties, which were very prominent when I was in Delhi in the early 80's, are fairly marginal in Indian politics today. There's a whole new generation in charge now which has gone beyond the thinking of earlier times. So, no, that's a long way of saying there was very little in U.S. policy that really prompted a negative reaction and certainly nothing similar to what we saw in Europe, for example, among our traditional allies. For example, arising over Iraq.

Q: It's interesting, for one might say that the Indians already had gotten over their anti-Americanism where the Europeans had been sitting around and for years under the thumb of the United States and getting tired of it. Here's a great chance to get out and venture annoyance without any particular repercussions.

THIBAULT: Right, and I think so much of dealing with the Indians, as is the case in Asia more broadly and the Middle East, is reflecting a respect for them. We have worked very, very hard to do that and deal with them as a major, serious country, which is how they view themselves. And to work hard to get our bureaucracy to buy into developing ways in which we can work together with India for mutual benefit. That is not easy. These all sound like pious platitudes but they really are not, they really are not.

Q: One of the things that I've had people talk about who have dealt with India in the past, India and Pakistan, was that whereas the Pakistani embassy seemed to know how to get out and glad hand its way around Congress and do the right thing, the Indian embassy, from the ambassador on down, seemed to be very concerned about their dignity and would only deal with people of a certain rank and all this, which essentially hindered them very badly in playing the Washington game. Has this changed?

THIBAULT: Well, of course, I was not in that great a position to observe their Washington operations but I certainly suspect it has changed. If anything, there's a complete reversal of views in official Washington, certainly on the Hill, towards Pakistan and India, particularly since 9/11. If there's one thing that we now devote a great deal of attention to is having shared values. Remember I said that for Saudi Arabia we had plenty of shared interests but no shared values, whereas with India we had relatively few shared interests but lots of shared values. Today we have lots of shared interests and shared values with India. We had a constant flow of members of

Congress to India and it was very positive. You have the Indian-American community. I haven't talked about that but the Indian-American community is very large now, very influential, these are very successful people. You have a stake now at the political level, at the district level, for many members of Congress. You also have a business relationship which is very important, is growing very rapidly. So the threads that link us together are far more significant today and have far greater weight today than they did 15 or 20 years ago when the period you were mentioning existed, far more than with Pakistan, far more than with Pakistan. We're talking now of the president visiting India, he's made a commitment to do that. The Indian prime minister is expected here shortly, this summer. I'm not sure the embassies, here at least, play that key a role but they don't get in the way, either.

Q: You left there in ...

THIBAUT: I left there in July 2003 and I decided that I would retire at that point. I could have stayed on in the Foreign Service for another two or three years.

End of reader